Chapter 1
General Provisions [Repealed]

Part 1
Definitions and Construction [Repealed]

39-1-101 — 39-1-105. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 39-1-10139-1-105 (Code 1858, § 4596; Acts 1873, ch. 57, § 1; Shan., §§ 6437, 7185; Code 1932, §§ 10749, 10751, 10752, 10755; Acts 1968, ch. 513, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-101 — 39-103, 39-106, 39-114), concerning definitions and construction, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 11, part 1 of this title.

Part 2
Penalties [Repealed]

39-1-201, 39-1-202. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 39-1-201, 39-1-202 (Code 1858, §§ 5232, 10756 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, § 67); Shan., § 7205; mod. Code 1932, § 10753; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-104, 39-105), concerning penalties, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 11, part 1 of this title.

Part 3
Accessories [Repealed]

39-1-301 — 39-1-307. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, §§ 39-1-30139-1-307 (Code 1858, §§ 4588-4592, 4594 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, §§ 62-64; deriv. Acts 1845-1846, ch. 73, § 1); Shan., §§ 6429-6431, 6433, 6435; Code 1932, §§ 10758-10762, 10765; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 10760; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-107 — 39-111, 39-113), concerning accessories, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 11, part 4 of this title.

Part 4
Solicitation [Repealed]

39-1-401 — 39-1-404. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 4, §§ 39-1-40139-1-404 (Acts 1973, ch. 62, §§ 1-4; T.C.A., §§ 39-115 — 39-118), concerning solicitation, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 12, part 1 of this title.

Part 5
Attempts [Repealed]

39-1-501 — 39-1-507. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-1-50139-1-507 (Code 1858, §§ 4630, 4796; Shan. Supp., §§ 6471, 6700; Acts 1923, ch. 14, § 2; Code 1932, §§ 10801, 11076, 11248; Acts 1933, ch. 151, § 3; 1939, ch. 38, § 3; 1941, ch. 158, § 4; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 6798a24b1, 10895, 10895.3, 11043.5 (Williams, §§ 10919.3, 11043.4); Acts 1957, ch. 168, § 3; 1968, ch. 535, § 4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-503, 39-603, 39-1403, 39-2523, 39-3305, 39-4410, 39-5109), concerning attempts, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 12, part 1 of this title.

Part 6
Conspiracy [Repealed]

39-1-601 — 39-1-615. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 6, §§ 39-1-60139-1-615 (Code 1858, §§ 4789-4792, 5535 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, § 66; deriv. Acts 1923, ch. 38, § 31); Acts 1897, ch. 52, §§ 1, 2; Shan. Supp., §§ 6693-6696a2, 7554; Code 1932, §§ 11063-11069, 12153; Acts 1941, ch. 158, § 5; 1949, ch. 216, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11043.6, 11063 (Williams, § 11043.5); Acts 1955, ch. 174, § 1; 1957, ch. 85, §§ 3, 4; 1968, ch. 484, § 3; 1968, ch. 535, § 7; 1979, ch. 210, § 1; 1979, ch. 318, § 10; 1980, ch. 864, § 1; 1981, ch. 126, § 1; 1983, ch. 255, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1101 — 39-1109, 39-1407, 39-1408, 39-4411, 39-5103, 39-5112, 41-709, 41-852), concerning conspiracy, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 12, part 1 of this title.

Part 7
Class X Felonies [Repealed]

39-1-701 — 39-1-704. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 7, §§ 39-1-70139-1-704 (Acts 1979, ch. 318, §§ 1-3, 26; 1980, ch. 463, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 39-5401 — 39-5404), concerning Class X felonies, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989.

Part 8
Habitual Criminals [Repealed]

39-1-801 — 39-1-807. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 8, §§ 39-1-80139-1-807 (Acts 1939, ch. 22, §§ 1-7; mod. C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11863.1-11863.7; Acts 1973, ch. 212, §§ 1-3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 40-2801 — 40-2807), concerning habitual criminals, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989.

Part 9
Forfeiture of Criminal Proceeds [Repealed]

39-1-901 — 39-1-903. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 9, §§ 39-1-90139-1-903 (Acts 1983, ch. 159, §§ 1-3), concerning forfeiture of criminal proceeds, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 11, part 1 of this title.

Part 10
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations [Repealed]

39-1-1001 — 39-1-1010. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 10, §§ 39-1-100139-1-1010 (Acts 1986, ch. 633, §§ 2-11), concerning racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 12, part 2 of this title.

Chapter 2
Offenses Against the Person [Repealed]

Part 1
Assaults and Injuries [Repealed]

39-2-101 — 39-2-119. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 39-2-10139-2-119 (Code 1858, §§ 4606, 4608, 4609, 4626-4630, 4637, 4642, 5223, 5224 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, §§ 52, 54, 55; 1849-1850, ch. 109, § 1; 1851-1852, ch. 36; 1851-1852, ch. 123, §§ 9, 10); Acts 1869-1870, ch. 54, § 3; 1917, ch. 54, §§ 1, 3; Shan., §§ 6447, 6449, 6450, 6467-6471, 6478, 6483a1, 6483a3, 6670, 7196, 7197; Code 1932, §§ 10777-10779, 10797-10801, 10810, 10814, 10816, 10825, 11033, 11759, 11760; Acts 1963, ch. 162, § 1; 1968, ch. 604, §§ 1-5; 1968, ch. 607, § 1; 1973, ch. 352, § 1; 1974, ch. 575, § 4; 1976, ch. 565, § 1; 1977, ch. 68, § 1; 1977, ch. 142, §§ 1, 2; 1977, ch. 338, § 1; 1979, ch. 210, § 1; 1979, ch. 318, §§ 11, 14; 1980, ch. 505, § 1; 1982, ch. 804, § 1; 1984, ch. 940, § 1; 1985, ch. 300, §§ 1, 2; 1986, ch. 762, § 1; 1988, ch. 753, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-601 — 39-604, 39-607 — 39-615, 39-2803, 39-3601, 39-3612, 39-3619, 39-5114, 39-5117, 41-851), concerning assaults and injuries, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 13, part 1 of this title.

Part 2
Homicide [Repealed]

39-2-201 — 39-2-235. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 39-2-20139-2-235 (Code 1858, §§ 4593, 4597-4605, 4641, 4642, (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, §§ 2-8; 1845-1846, ch. 73; 1851-1852, ch. 123, §§ 11, 12); Acts 1913 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 36, § 1; 1915 (Vol. II), ch. 181, § 1; 1917, ch. 14, § 1; 1917, ch. 54, §§ 2, 4; Shan., §§ 6434, 6438-6446, 6483a2, 6483a4; Acts 1919, ch. 4, § 1; 1919, ch. 5, §§ 2, 3; Code 1932, §§ 10763, 10767-10776, 10815, 10817; Acts 1973, ch. 192, § 2; 1974, ch. 462, §§ 1-4; 1977, ch. 51, §§ 1-6; 1978, ch. 927, § 1; 1979, ch. 318, §§ 4, 5; 1981, ch. 33, § 1; 1986, ch. 606, § 1; 1987, ch. 204, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-2401 — 39-2414, 39-3602), concerning homicide, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 13, part 2 of this title.

Part 3
Kidnapping and Hostages [Repealed]

39-2-301 — 39-2-305. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, §§ 39-2-30139-2-305 (Code 1858, § 4619; Acts 1901, ch. 31, § 1; Shan., §§ 6465, 6465a1; Code 1932, §§ 10793-10795; Acts 1935, ch. 49, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 10795; Acts 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1973, ch. 24, § 1; 1979, ch. 318, § 1; 1981, ch. 487, § 1; 1983, ch. 348, § 1; 1984, ch. 916, §§ 1, 2), concerning kidnapping and hostages, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 13, part 3 of this title.

Part 4
Libel [Repealed]

39-2-401 — 39-2-404. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 4, §§ 39-2-40139-2-404 (Code 1858, §§ 4760-4764 (deriv. Const. 1834, art. 1, § 19); Shan., §§ 6658-6662; Code 1932, §§ 11021-11025; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-2701 — 39-2704), concerning libel, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989.

Part 5
Robbery [Repealed]

39-2-501, 39-2-502. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-2-501, 39-2-502 (Code 1858, §§ 4631, 4632 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, § 20); Shan., §§ 6472-6473a2; Acts 1925, ch. 128, § 1; Code 1932, §§ 10802-10805; Acts 1953, ch. 66, § 1; 1955, ch. 72, § 1; 1973, ch. 192, § 4; 1979, ch. 318, § 8; 1981, ch. 343, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 39-3901, 39-3902), concerning robbery, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 13, part 4 of this title.

Part 6
Sexual Offenses [Repealed]

39-2-601 — 39-2-642. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 6, §§ 39-2-60139-2-630, 39-2-63639-2-638, and 39-2-64039-2-642 (Code 1858, §§ 4616, 4618, 4843, 4846 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, § 7; Acts 1871, ch. 56, § 3; Shan., §§ 6460, 6462, 6764, 6769; Code 1932, §§ 10789, 10790, 11184, 11189; Acts 1943, ch. 157, §§ 7-9; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11190.6-11190.8 (Williams, §§ 11190.7-11190.9); Acts 1979, ch. 429, §§ 1-10; 1980, ch. 463, §§ 2, 3; 1980, ch. 788, §§ 1-8; 1982, ch. 568, § 3; 1982, ch. 798, § 1; 1983, ch. 142, § 1; 1986, ch. 774, §§ 2-9, 12-15; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-707, 39-3506 — 39-3508, 39-3510, 39-3511, 39-3701 — 39-3711, 39-3714, 39-3721, 39-3722), concerning sexual offenses, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 13, part 5 of this title.

Former §§ 39-2-63139-2-635 (Acts 1943, ch. 157, §§ 2-6; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11190.1-11190.5 (Williams, §§ 11190.2-11190.6); Acts 1969, ch. 243, § 1; 1972, ch. 581, §§ 1, 2; 1977, ch. 397, § 1; 1979, ch. 216, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-3501 — 39-3505), concerning prostitution or assignation, were repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 774, § 11.

Former § 39-2-639 (Code 1858, § 4845; Shan., § 6768; Code 1932, § 11188; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 39-3509), concerning enticing a female to a house of ill fame, was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 774, § 11.

Part 7
Threats, Intimidation and Extortion [Repealed]

39-2-701 — 39-2-710. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 7, §§ 39-2-70139-2-710 (Code 1858, § 4633; Acts 1869-1870, ch. 54, §§ 1, 2, 6; 1907, ch. 427, § 1; 1915, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 6474, 6668, 6669, 6673, 6673a1, 6673a4, 6673a6; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10806, 11031, 11032, 11034-11036, 11038; Acts 1981, ch. 63, § 1; 1981, ch. 105, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-2801, 39-2802, 39-2804 — 39-2806, 39-4301, 39-4302, concerning threats, intimidation and extortion, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 1 and ch. 17, part 3 of this title.

Chapter 3
Offenses Against Property [Repealed]

Part 1
Animals [Repealed]

39-3-101 — 39-3-131. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 39-3-10139-3-131 (Code 1858, §§ 4657, 4658, 4686-4688 (deriv. Acts 1803, ch. 9, § 2; 1847-1848, ch. 67, §§ 1, 2); Acts 1865-1866, ch. 1, § 1; 1865-1866, ch. 3, § 2; 1873, ch. 87, § 1; 1889, ch. 16, §§ 1, 2; 1895, ch. 75, §§ 2, 3; 1903, ch. 162, § 1; 1917, ch. 55, § 1; 1919, ch. 164, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 2857-2868, 2870, 6499-6501, 6501a3, 6501a4, 6508, 6509, 6527, 6528, 6552-6554; Code 1932, §§ 5091-5102, 5104, 10845, 10849, 10850, 10864, 10865, 10891, 10892, 10931-10933; Acts 1947, ch. 104, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 10891, 10892; Acts 1957, ch. 66, §§ 1-3; 1963, ch. 125, § 1; 1965, ch. 280, § 1; 1971, ch. 314, §§ 1-3; 1977, ch. 230, § 1; 1978, ch. 650, § 1; 1978, ch. 651, § 1; 1981, ch. 451, § 1; 1983, ch. 155, § 1; 1988, ch. 480, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-401 — 39-415, 39-417 — 39-426, 39-4211, 39-4213, 39-4214, 39-4221), concerning animals, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, parts 1 and 2 of this title.

Part 2
Arson and Burning [Repealed]

39-3-201 — 39-3-227. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 39-3-20139-3-226 (Code 1858, §§ 4669, 4770; Acts 1907, ch. 397, §§ 1-3, 15; Shan., §§ 2883a75b4-2883a75b6, 2883a75b17, 6532, 6533; Code 1932, §§ 10900, 10901, 10903-10905, 10909; Acts 1931, ch. 21, §§ 1-3; 1933, ch. 151, §§ 1, 2; 1937, ch. 280, § 11; 1939, ch. 213, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 10893, 10894, 10902.1, 10905.1-10905.3; Acts 1963, ch. 25, § 1; 1963, ch. 26, § 1; 1963, ch. 80, § 1; 1967, ch. 89, § 1; 1967, ch. 219, § 1; 1968, ch. 478, § 1; 1968, ch. 535, §§ 1-3, 5, 6, 8; 1979, ch. 68, § 3; 1979, ch. 318, § 9; 1981, ch. 440, §§ 1, 2; 1982, ch. 664, § 1; 1984, ch. 944, § 1; 1986, ch. 651, §§ 3-5; 1988, c. 991, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed), §§ 39-501, 39-502, 39-504 — 39-514, 39-518, 39-5106 — 39-5108, 39-5110, 39-5111, 39-5113, 39-5114), concerning arson and burning, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 3 of this title.

Former § 39-3-227 (Acts 1963, ch. 80, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-2215), concerning false alarms, was repealed by Acts 1983, ch. 329, § 2.

Part 3
Bad Checks [Repealed]

39-3-301 — 39-3-310. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, §§ 39-3-30139-3-310 (Acts 1967, ch. 322, §§ 1-7, 9; 1969, ch. 186, §§ 1, 2; 1972, ch. 704, §§ 1, 2; 1976, ch. 387, § 1; 1977, ch. 160, § 1; 1978, ch. 642, § 1; 1983, ch. 61, § 1; 1988, ch. 868, §§ 1-4; T.C.A., §§ 39-1959 — 39-1964, 39-1966, 39-1967), concerning bad checks, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 1 of this title.

Part 4
Burglary [Repealed]

39-3-401 — 39-3-408. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 4, §§ 39-3-40139-3-408 (Code 1858, §§ 4672-4676 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, §§ 19, 30; 1857-1858, ch. 84, § 1); Acts 1871, ch. 39, § 1; 1885, ch. 19, § 1; Shan., §§ 6535-6541; Code 1932, §§ 10910-10914, 10917, 10918; Acts 1941, ch. 65, § 1; 1953, ch. 63, § 1; 1953, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 321, § 1; 1967, ch. 83, § 1; 1971, ch. 2, §§ 1, 2; 1973, ch. 227, §§ 1-4; 1981, ch. 495, § 1; 1982, ch. 908, §§ 1-7; 1986, ch. 628, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-901 — 39-905, 39-907, 39-908, 39-910), concerning burglary, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 4 of this title.

Part 5
Credit Card Crimes [Repealed]

39-3-501 — 39-3-513. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-3-50139-3-513 (Acts 1961, ch. 68, §§ 1, 3-5; 1968, ch. 583, § 1; 1969, ch. 121, §§ 1-11; 1975, ch. 55, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 39-1943 — 39-1955, 39-1968 —39-1978), concerning credit card crimes, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 1 of this title.

Part 6
Debit Card Crimes [Repealed]

39-3-601 — 39-3-615. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 6, §§ 39-3-60139-6-615 (Acts 1977, ch. 144, §§ 1-15; T.C.A., §§ 39-1972 — 39-1986), concerning debit card crimes, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 1 of this title.

Part 7
Explosives [Repealed]

39-3-701 — 39-3-711. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 7, §§ 39-3-70139-3-711 (Code 1858, §§ 1694, 1695; Acts 1919, ch. 87, §§ 1, 2; 1921, ch. 45, § 1; Shan. Supp., §§ 3009, 3010, 6538a1, 6538a2; Code 1932, §§ 5228, 5229, 10915, 10916, 10919; Acts 1939, ch. 38, §§ 1, 2; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 10895.1, 10895.2 (Williams, §§ 10919.1, 10919.2); Acts 1957, ch. 85, §§ 1, 2, 4-6; 1957, ch. 168, §§ 1, 2; 1959, ch. 235, §§ 1, 2; 1963, ch. 47, § 1; 1965, ch. 142, § 1; 1976, ch. 793, § 2; 1979, ch. 318, § 13; 1981, ch. 17, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-906, 39-909, 39-1401, 39-1402, 39-1404 — 39-1406, 39-1408 — 39-1412, 39-4922), concerning explosives, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 13, part 1, ch. 14, part 3 and ch. 17, part 13 of this title.

Part 8
Forgery and Counterfeiting [Repealed]

39-3-801 — 39-3-821. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 8, §§ 39-3-80139-3-821 (Code 1858, §§ 4718-4730, 4734-4741 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, §§ 23, 31-41); Shan., §§ 6596-6608, 6612-6619; Code 1932, §§ 10979-10991, 10994-11002; Acts 1935, ch. 52, § 2; C. Supp. 1950, § 11157.2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1702 — 39-1722), concerning forgery and counterfeiting, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 1 of this title.

Part 9
Fraud and False Dealing [Repealed]

39-3-901 — 39-3-954. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 9, §§ 39-3-90139-3-954 (Code 1858, §§ 4523, 4524, 4695, 4701-4705, 4709, 4711-4717, 4825-4827 (deriv. Acts 1741, ch. 47, § 8; 1841-1842, ch. 48, §§ 1, 3, 23; 1843-1844, ch. 190; 1855-1856, ch. 113, §§ 17, 19, 22); Acts 1859-1860, ch. 67, §§ 1, 2; 1879, ch. 131, § 1; 1883, ch. 164, §§ 1, 2, 4; 1883, ch. 223, § 1; 1887, ch. 31, § 1; 1901, ch. 4, §§ 1-3; 1901, ch. 130, §§ 1, 2; 1905, ch. 329, §§ 1, 2; 1909, ch. 509, §§ 1, 2; 1909, ch. 548, §§ 1, 2; 1913, ch. 42, § 1; 1913 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 35, § 1; Acts 1915, ch. 106, §§ 1, 2; 1915, ch. 138, § 1; 1915, ch. 173, § 1; Shan., §§ 6559, 6568-6573, 6573a1, 6573a2, 6580-6586, 6588-6591, 6734, 6735a2, 6735a4, 6735a5, 6740, 6741, 6742a1-6742a7, 6888a31-6888a33, 6888a68, 6888a69; Shan. Supp., §§ 3473a39b1, 3473a39b2; Acts 1921, ch. 14, §§ 1, 2; 1923, ch. 7, §§ 29, 59, 64; 1925, ch. 62, §§ 1, 2; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10938, 10949-10956, 10961, 10963-10970, 10972-10975, 11133-11145, 11147, 11148, 11150-11153, 11155, 11156, 11390-11392, 11411, 11412; Acts 1935, ch. 52, § 1; 1943, ch. 17, § 1; mod. C. Supp. 1950, §§ 1157.1, 10949, 11150; Acts 1955, ch. 282, § 1; 1957, ch. 332, § 1; 1959, ch. 86, § 1; 1961, ch. 68, §§ 2, 5; 1961, ch. 77, § 1; 1963, ch. 84, §§ 1-8; 1965, ch. 84, § 1; 1965, ch. 124, § 1; 1967, ch. 329, §§ 1-3; 1968, ch. 497, § 1; 1968, ch. 583, § 1; 1971, ch. 171, § 2; 1972, ch. 514, § 1; 1972, ch. 856, § 1; 1974, ch. 558, § 1; 1974, ch. 765, § 1; 1975, ch. 192, § 1; 1975, ch. 194, §§ 1-4; 1978, ch. 746, §§ 1-6; 1979, ch. 220, §§ 1-4, 6; 1979, ch. 242, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 608, § 1; 1985, ch. 122, § 1; 1987, ch. 29, § 1; 1988, ch. 917, §§ 1, 2; 1989, ch. 283, § 1; 1989, ch. 426, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1901 — 39-1903, 39-1906 — 39-1947, 39-1949, 39-1951, 39-1952, 39-1954 — 39-1958, 39-1968, 39-1970, 39-1971, 39-1979, 39-1980, 39-1989, 39-4226 — 39-4228, 39-4237, 39-5201; T.C.A., §§ 39-1904, 39-1905, 39-1910, 39-1949, 39-1951, 39-1956, 39-1987 — 39-1989, 39-4241 — 39-4243, 39-4252, 39-4812), concerning fraud and false dealing, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 1 of this title.

Part 10
Litter Control [Repealed]

39-3-1001 — 39-3-1010. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 10, §§ 39-3-100139-3-1010 (Acts 1971, ch. 123, §§ 1-7; 1973, ch. 254, § 1; 1974, ch. 455, § 1; 1976, ch. 391, § 1; 1976, ch. 724, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 768, § 1; 1981, ch. 442, § 1; 1981, ch. 513, §§ 1-3; 1986, ch. 852, § 1; 1988, ch. 794, § 1; 1988, ch. 1007, §§ 3, 4; T.C.A., §§ 39-4536 — 39-4544), concerning litter control, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 5 of this title.

Part 11
Theft, Larceny and Embezzlement [Repealed]

39-3-1101 — 39-3-1136. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 11, §§ 39-3-110139-3-1136 (Code 1858, §§ 4677-4681, 4683, 4685, 4691-4694, 4696, 4697, 4700, 4708, 4710 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, §§ 23, 25-29, 49; 1841-1842, ch. 48, § 7; 1843-1844, ch. 190); Acts 1875, ch. 31, §§ 1-3; 1875, ch. 36, § 1; 1877, ch. 50, § 1; 1883, ch. 188, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 6542-6547, 6549-6551, 6555-6558, 6560-6564, 6567, 6576, 6578, 6592; Shan. Supp., §§ 652024, 652025; Acts 1923, ch. 56, §§ 1, 2; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10879, 10880, 10920-10926, 10928-10930, 10934-10937, 10939-10941, 10944, 10958, 10959, 10962, 10976; Acts 1957, ch. 124, §§ 1-5; 1957, ch. 301, § 1; 1959, ch. 11, § 1; 1963, ch. 190, § 1; 1965, ch. 56, § 1; 1967, ch. 214, §§ 1-3; 1967, ch. 261, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 469, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 609, § 1; 1969, ch. 251, § 1; 1971, ch. 166, §§ 1-6; 1972, ch. 676, § 1; 1975, ch. 191, § 1; 1979, ch. 219, § 1; 1980, ch. 636, § 7; 1981, ch. 265, § 1; 1983, ch. 326, § 1; 1983, ch. 358, § 1; 1984, ch. 725, § 1; 1984, ch. 882, §§ 1-3; 1984, ch. 1008, §§ 1, 2; 1986, ch. 828, §§ 1-11; 1989, ch. 275, §§ 1-6; 1989, ch. 453, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-4201 — 39-4209, 39-4215 — 39-4220, 39-4222 — 39-4225, 39-4229, 39-4232 — 39-4236; T.C.A., §§ 39-4238 — 39-4240, 39-4244 — 39-4251), concerning theft, larceny and embezzlement, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 1 of this title.

Part 12
Trespass and Loitering [Repealed]

39-3-1201 — 39-3-1212. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 12, §§ 39-3-120139-3-1212 (Code 1858, § 4652 (deriv. Acts 1847-1848, ch. 45, § 1); Shan., §§ 1598, 1599, 6496, 6497a1; Acts 1889, ch. 249, §§ 1, 2; 1911, ch. 27, § 1; Code 1932, §§ 10831, 10840, 2665, 2666; Acts 1941, ch. 137, §§ 1, 2; 1949, ch. 63, §§ 1, 2; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11203.1, 11203.2 (Williams, §§ 11412.4, 11412.5), 11203.3 (Williams, § 10831.1); Acts 1959, ch. 37, § 1; 1968, ch. 554, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 257, § 1; 1970, ch. 442, § 1; 1973, ch. 256, §§ 1, 2; 1977, ch. 462, §§ 2, 5, 6, 8; 1978, ch. 265, § 1; 1982, ch. 815, § 1; 1986, ch. 632, §§ 1-3; 1986, ch. 637, § 1; 1986, ch. 886, § 1; 1987, ch. 261, § 1; 1988, ch. 755, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1211, 39-1212, 39-3611, 39-4508 — 39-4510, 39-5302, 39-5307; T.C.A., §§ 39-1215, 39-4545, 39-5305 — 39-5307), concerning trespass and loitering, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 4 of this title.

Part 13
Vandalism and Injuries to Property [Repealed]

39-3-1301 — 39-3-1327. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 13, §§ 39-3-130139-3-1327 (Code 1858, §§ 4652, 4655, 4663, 4828 (deriv. Acts 1833, ch. 90, § 2; 1847-1848, ch. 45, § 1; 1857-1858, ch. 63); Acts 1867-1868, ch. 57, § 1; 1870-1871, ch. 36, §§ 2, 4; 1875, ch. 75, §§ 1, 2; 1897, ch. 102, § 1; 1897, ch. 106, §§ 1, 2; 1899, ch. 21, §§ 1, 2; 1899, ch. 354, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 2883a75b9 — 2883a75b12, 6496, 6503, 6503a1, 6503a2, 6503a4 — 6503a6, 6504, 6505, 6505a1, 6505a2, 6506, 6507a1, 6507a4, 6513a1, 6513a2; Shan. Supp., §§ 6498a3 — 6498a5; Acts 1903, ch. 444, § 2; 1907, ch. 397, §§ 6, 7, 9, 10; 1907, ch. 529, §§ 1, 2; 1911, ch. 17, § 1; 1925, ch. 147, §§ 1-3; 1927, ch. 16, §§ 1-3; 1937, ch. 216, §§ 2, 4; 1959, ch. 234, §§ 1-3; 1961, ch. 173, § 1; 1967, ch. 199, §§ 1, 2; 1970, ch. 582, § 1; 1972, ch. 560, §§ 1, 2; 1977, ch. 462, §§ 2-4, 7, 8; 1978, ch. 526, § 1; 1979, ch. 68, § 3; 1984, ch. 541, §§ 1, 2; 1985, ch. 208, § 1; 1986, ch. 720, §§ 1, 2; 1986, ch. 740, §§ 1-5; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-4501, 39-4502, 39-4506 — 39-4535, 39-5301 — 39-5305, 39-5307, 39-3-130139-3-1305), concerning vandalism and injuries to property, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 4 of this title.

Part 14
Computer Crimes [Repealed]

39-3-1401 — 39-3-1406. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 14, §§ 39-3-140139-3-1406 (Acts 1983, ch. 130, §§ 1-6), concerning computer crimes, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 6 of this title.

Chapter 4
Offenses Against the Family [Repealed]

Part 1
Abandonment of Spouse or Child [Repealed]

39-4-101 — 39-4-113. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 39-4-10139-4-113 (Shan., §§ 6888a14, 6888a16, 6888a25, 6888a27; Acts 1915, ch. 126, §§ 1, 3; 1915, ch. 127, §§ 1, 3; Code 1932, §§ 11377, 11378, 11386, 11387; Acts 1951, ch. 211, §§ 1-3 (Williams, §§ 11387.1 — 11387.3); 1955, ch. 31, § 1; 1967, ch. 230, §§ 1-10; 1978, ch. 882, § 1; 1981, ch. 23, § 1; 1985, ch. 378, §§ 1, 2; 1985, ch. 477, § 15; 1989, ch. 206, § 7; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-215 — 39-220; T.C.A., §§ 39-201 — 39-210), concerning abandonment of spouse or child, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 15, part 1 of this title.

Part 2
Abortion [Repealed]

39-4-201 — 39-4-208. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 39-4-20139-4-208 (Acts 1883, ch. 140, § 1; Shan., § 6463; Code 1932, § 10791; Acts 1973, ch. 235, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5; 1974, ch. 471, § 1; 1978, ch. 811, §§ 1, 2; 1978, ch. 847, § 1; 1979, ch. 183, § 1; 1979, ch. 287, §§ 1-5; 1979, ch. 334, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 39-301; T.C.A., §§ 39-302 — 39-308), concerning abortion, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 15, part 2 of this title.

Part 3
Bigamy and Incest [Repealed]

39-4-301 — 39-4-307. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, §§ 39-4-30139-4-307 (Code 1858, §§ 4836-4842, 4844 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, §§ 16, 18; 1851-1852, ch. 134); Acts 1885, ch. 151, § 1-3; Shan., §§ 6757-6763, 6765-6767; Code 1932, §§ 11177-11183, 11185-11187; Acts 1982, ch. 568, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-701 — 39-706, 39-708; T.C.A., §§ 39-3712, 39-3713), concerning bigamy and incest, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 15, part 3 of this title.

Part 4
Children [Repealed]

39-4-401 — 39-4-422. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 4, §§ 39-4-40139-4-422 (Code 1858, § 4620; Acts 1883, ch. 136, §§ 1, 2, 4; Shan., §§ 6466, 6827-6829; Code 1932, §§ 10796, 11297, 11298; Acts 1949, ch. 184, §§ 1, 2; C. Supp. 1950, § 10796.1; Acts 1965, ch. 340, § 1; 1973, ch. 81, § 6; 1974, ch. 538, § 1; 1977, ch. 142, § 3; 1979, ch. 68, § 3; 1981, ch. 403, §§ 1-7, 9; 1984, ch. 885, § 1; 1986, ch. 654, §§ 1-7; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1001, 39-1002, 39-1006; T.C.A., §§ 39-1012, 39-1019, 39-1041 — 39-1048), concerning children, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 15, part 4 of this title.

Chapter 5
Offenses Against the Administration of Government [Repealed]

Part 1
Bribery [Repealed]

39-5-101 — 39-5-116. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 39-5-10139-5-116 (Code 1858, §§ 4797-4801, 4803-4806 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, §§ 44, 45); Acts 1875, ch. 34, §§ 1-6; Shan., §§ 6701-6705, 6707-6710, 6724-6729, 6886a5, 6885a6; Shan. Supp., §§ 6711a7-6711a10; Acts 1909, ch. 179, §§ 1, 2; 1921, ch. 138, §§ 3-6; mod. Code 1932, §§ 11081-11087, 11089-11092, 11098-11101, 11123-11128, 11367, 11368; Acts 1947, ch. 117, §§ 1, 2; 1949, ch. 143, § 1; mod. C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11098.1, 11099, 11101 (Williams, §§ 11098, 11102.1, 11102.2); Acts 1961, ch. 88, § 1; 1961, ch. 92, § 1; 1967, ch. 93, §§ 1-3; 1967, ch. 94, §§ 1-3; 1967, ch. 95, § 1; 1970, ch. 438, § 1; 1976, ch. 523, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-801 — 39-807, 39-809 — 39-812, 39-814 — 39-819, 39-821 — 39-826; T.C.A., §§ 39-835, 39-836), concerning bribery, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 16, part 1 of this title.

Part 2
Contraband in Prisons [Repealed]

39-5-201, 39-5-202. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 39-5-201, 39-5-202 (Acts 1961, ch. 143, §§ 1, 3; 1974, ch. 772, §§ 1-3; 1979, ch. 362, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 41-132, 41-134, 41-727), concerning contraband in prisons, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 16, part 2 of this title.

Part 3
False Personation [Repealed]

39-5-301 — 39-5-303. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, §§ 39-5-30139-5-303 (Code 1858, §§ 4819, 4820; Shan., §§ 6730, 6731; Code 1932, §§ 11129, 11130; Acts 1973, ch. 398, § 1; 1977, ch. 407, § 1; 1979, ch. 68, § 3; 1980, ch. 636, § 12; 1985, ch. 135, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1502, 39-1503), concerning false personation, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 16, part 3 of this title.

Part 4
Misconduct Involving Public Officials and Employees [Repealed]

39-5-401 — 39-5-440. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 4, §§ 39-5-40139-5-440 (Code 1858, §§ 4706, 4731, 4732, 4774, 4775, 4802, 4808-4811, 4813-4817, 4878, 5264, 5276, 5440, 5531, 5541 (deriv. Acts 1805, ch. 31, § 1; 1805, ch. 66, § 3; 1817, ch. 61, §§ 1, 7; 1829, ch. 21, § 1; 1829, ch. 23, § 61; 1829, ch. 38, § 2; 1829, ch. 101, § 3; 1839-1840, ch. 82, §§ 1, 2); Acts 1870, ch. 13, §§ 2, 4; 1870, ch. 42, § 1; 1871, ch. 90, § 2; 1883, ch. 171, § 28; 1885 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, § 10; 1885 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 16, § 1; Acts 1889, ch. 204, § 28; 1895 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, § 21; 1897, ch. 22, § 1; 1897, ch. 35, §§ 1-3; 1897, ch. 125, § 1; Shan., §§ 6574, 6593, 6609, 6610, 6645, 6646, 6649, 6679, 6680, 6706, 6711a1, 6711a2, 6712-6719, 6720a1, 6720a2, 6721-6723, 6814, 7242, 7252, 7253a2, 7497a1, 7550, 7562, 7563; Acts 1903, ch. 31, §§ 1, 2; 1909, ch. 500, § 2; 1909, ch. 535, § 5; 1909, ch. 536, § 6; 1913, ch. 38, §§ 1, 2; 1915, ch. 20, §§ 2, 9; 1919, ch. 39, §§ 1, 2; 1923, ch. 7, § 42; 1927, ch. 65, § 1; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10957, 10977, 10992, 10993, 11047, 11048, 11088, 11094, 11095, 11103-11107, 11110-11115, 11117-11121, 11283, 11848, 11858, 11860, 11905, 12080, 12096, 12149, 12160; Acts 1951, ch. 240, § 11 (Williams, § 11935.11); 1955, ch. 102, § 1; 1955, ch. 117, §§ 1, 2; 1972, ch. 832, §§ 1-3; 1973, ch. 50, § 1; 1976, ch. 825, § 1; 1979, ch. 68, § 3; 1982, ch. 943, §§ 1, 2; 1985, ch. 150, § 1; 1989, ch. 278, §§ 49, 50; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-808, 39-820, 39-1937 — 39-1940, 39-2011, 39-3201 — 39-3204, 39-3206 — 39-3211, 39-3213 — 39-3223, 39-4230, 39-4231, 39-4906 — 39-4908, 40-510, 40-1021, 40-3104, 40-3110, 40-3120, 41-107, 41-703 — 41-705, 41-707, 41-722; T.C.A., §§ 41-112(b), 41-135, 41-729), concerning misconduct involving public officials and employees, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 16, part 4 of this title.

Part 5
Obstruction of Justice and Law Enforcement [Repealed]

39-5-501 — 39-5-530. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-5-50139-5-522 and 39-5-52439-5-530 (Code 1858, §§ 4660-4662, 4699, 4771, 4783-4788, 4807 (deriv. Acts 1825, ch. 63, § 3; 1829, ch. 23, § 48); Shan., §§ 6521-6523, 6676, 6687-6692, 6711, 7559, 7560; Acts 1891 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, §§ 1, 2; Code 1932, §§ 10883-10885, 10943, 11044, 11057-11062, 12158, 12159; Acts 1937, ch. 119, §§ 1, 2; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11059.1, 11059.2; Acts 1957, ch. 215, §§ 1-4; 1967, ch. 92, §§ 1, 2; 1967, ch. 96, § 1; 1968, ch. 425, §§ 1-5; 1974, ch. 637, § 1; 1976, ch. 716, §§ 1, 2; 1979, ch. 68, § 3; 1983, ch. 329, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-813, 39-2809, 39-3101 — 39-3110, 39-3116, 41-701, 41-702; T.C.A., §§ 39-2809, 39-3111 — 39-3116, 39-5115), concerning obstruction of justice and law enforcement, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 16, parts 5 and 6 of this title.

Former § 39-5-523 (Acts 1974, ch. 637, § 1; T.C.A. 39-3115), concerning the dismissal of employees because of jury service, was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 583, § 2. For related provisions see § 22-4-106.

Part 6
Perjury [Repealed]

39-5-601 — 39-5-606. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 6, §§ 39-5-60139-5-606 (Code 1858, §§ 11073-11075, 11077; Shan. Supp., §§ 6700a1, 6700a3; Acts 1919, ch. 73, § 3; Code 1932, §§ 11072, 11078, 11080; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-3301 — 39-3304, 39-3306 — 39-3308), concerning perjury, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 16, part 7 of this title.

Part 7
Rescues and Escapes [Repealed]

39-5-701 — 39-5-720. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 7, §§ 39-5-70139-5-720 (Code 1858, §§ 4772, 4773, 4776-4778, 4781, 5533, 5534, 5536, 5537, 5539, 5542-5547 (deriv. Acts 1807, ch. 73, § 12; 1829, ch. 23, § 60; 1829, ch. 38, §§ 29, 30); Shan., §§ 6677, 6678, 6681-6683, 6685, 6686, 7552, 7553, 7555, 7556, 7558, 7564-7569; Acts 1923, ch. 7, § 42; 1927, ch. 38, §§ 1, 2; mod. Code 1932, §§ 11045, 11046, 11049-11056, 12151, 12152, 12154, 12157, 12162-12167; Acts 1941, ch. 6, § 61; C. Supp. 1950, § 12151; Acts 1953, ch. 68, § 1; 1955, ch. 102, § 1; 1963, ch. 360, §§ 1-5; 1972, ch. 474, § 1; 1973, ch. 24, § 2; 1973, ch. 255, § 1; 1977, ch. 246, §§ 1-3; 1977, ch. 318, § 1; 1977, ch. 493, § 1; 1982, ch. 802, § 1; 1982, ch. 803, § 1; 1984, ch. 611, § 1; 1988, ch. 558, § 1; 1989, ch. 234, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-3801, 39-3802, 39-3804 — 39-3812, 41-708, 41-710 — 41-716, 41-726; T.C.A., §§ 39-3813 — 39-3815), concerning rescues and escapes, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 16, part 6 of this title.

Part 8
Treason, Disloyal Conduct and Sabotage [Repealed]

39-5-801 — 39-5-848. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 8, §§ 39-5-80139-5-848 (Code 1858, §§ 4742-4795, (deriv. Acts 1715, ch. 31, § 2); Acts 1859-1860, ch. 82; 1865, ch. 15, § 1; Shan., §§ 6626-6629, 6663; Shan. Supp., §§ 6888a60-6888a64, 6888a66; Acts 1923, ch. 25, §§ 1-5, 7; mod. Code 1932, §§ 102-107, 11003-11006, 11026; Acts 1941, ch. 158, §§ 1-3, 6-10, 12-14; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11043.1 (Williams, § 11043.13), 11043.2 (Williams, § 11043.1), 11043.3 (Williams, § 11043.2), 11043.4 (Williams, § 11043.3), 11043.7-11043.12 (Williams, §§ 11043.6-11043.11), 11043.13 (Williams, § 11043.14), 11043.14 (Williams, § 11043.15); Acts 1959, ch. 236, § 1; 1961, ch. 287, §§ 1-4; 1967, ch. 377, § 1; 1967, ch. 382, § 1; 1967, ch. 401, § 1; 1976, ch. 534, §§ 1-3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1601 — 39-1607, 39-4401 — 39-4409, 39-4412 — 39-4424), concerning treason, disloyal conduct and sabotage, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, part 3 of this title.

Chapter 6
Offenses Against Public Health, Safety or Welfare [Repealed]

Part 1
Miscellaneous [Repealed]

39-6-101 — 39-6-110. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 1, §§ 39-6-10139-6-110 (Acts 1939, ch. 211, §§ 1-3; 1947, ch. 89, §§ 1, 2; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11173.1 (Williams, §§ 11412.14, 11412.15), 11176.1-11176.3; Acts 1955, ch. 73, §§ 1, 2; 1957, ch. 262, §§ 1, 2; 1961, ch. 7, § 1; 1976, ch. 555, § 1; 1976, ch. 594, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 28, § 1; 1983, ch. 405, § 1; 1989, ch. 39, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-2207—39-2214, 39-2222), concerning miscellaneous offenses against public health, safety, or welfare, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, part 1 of this title.

Part 2
Common Carriers [Repealed]

39-6-201 — 39-6-216. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 39-6-20139-6-216 (Code 1858, §§ 4634, 4636, 4638-4640, 4646, 4647, 4671 (deriv. Acts 1851-1852, ch. 123, §§ 1-4, 5-8, 13; 1855-1856, ch. 94, § 12); Acts 1870, ch. 60, § 1; 1870-1871, ch. 49, § 1; Shan., §§ 1583, 2883a75b14 (p. 7225), 2883a75b15 (p. 7226), 2883a75b16 (p. 7226), 6475, 6477, 6479-6481, 6487, 6488, 6526a3, 6526a4, 6534; Shan. Supp., §§ 6487a1, 6487a2; Acts 1907, ch. 397, §§ 12-14; 1913 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 36, § 1; 1915 (Vol. II), ch. 181, § 1; 1917, ch. 14, § 1; 1917, ch. 128, §§ 1, 2; 1919, ch. 4, § 1; 1919, ch. 5, § 3; 1921, ch. 41, §§ 1, 3; mod. Code 1932, §§ 2647, 10807, 10809, 10811-10813, 10821-10824, 10834, 10835, 10889, 10890, 10906-10908; Acts 1968, ch. 629, § 1; 1974, ch. 575, §§ 1-3; 1987, ch. 64, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-515 — 39-517, 39-3603 — 39-3610, 39-3613, 39-3615 — 39-3618), concerning common carriers, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, parts 3 and 4 of this title.

Part 3
Disorderly Conduct and Riots [Repealed]

39-6-301 — 39-6-346. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, §§ 39-6-30139-6-346 (Code 1858, §§ 4853-4855 (deriv. Acts 1801, ch. 35, § 1; 1824, ch. 3, §§ 1, 2; 1833, ch. 90, §§ 1, 2); Acts 1866-1867, ch. 1, § 1; 1870, ch. 85, § 1; 1873, ch. 94, §§ 1, 2, 6; 1875, ch. 105, §§ 1-3; 1879, ch. 209, § 1; 1881, ch. 166, § 2; 1897, ch. 101, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 3023, 3024, 6512, 6513, 6753, 6776, 6778, 6779, 6779a1, 6779a2; mod. Code 1932, §§ 5248, 5249, 10826, 10866, 10867, 11171, 11197-11201; Acts 1961, ch. 236, §§ 1, 2; 1967, ch. 270, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 480, §§ 1-3; 1968, ch. 484, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 568, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 223, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 257, §§ 2, 3; 1969, ch. 443, § 1; 1970, ch. 581, § 1; 1978, ch. 535, § 1; 1979, ch. 210, § 1; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 11, § 1; 1989, ch. 278, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1203 — 39-1207, 39-1209, 39-1210, 39-2908, 39-4701, 39-4702; T.C.A., §§ 39-1011, 39-1213, 39-1216, 39-1217, 39-5101, 39-5102, 39-5104, 39-5105, 39-5116, 41-724, 41-850), concerning disorderly conduct and riots, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, part 3 of this title.

Part 4
Drugs [Repealed]

39-6-401 — 39-6-458. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 4, §§ 39-6-40139-6-458 (Shan., §§ 6749a1 — 6749a3; Acts 1901, ch. 27, §§ 1-3; Code 1932, §§ 11165-11167; Acts 1967, ch. 26, §§ 1-6; 1971, ch. 163, §§ 1-16, 25-27; 1972, ch. 597, §§ 1-4, 10-12; 1972, ch. 836, § 1; 1973, ch. 295, § 21; 1974, ch. 741, §§ 1-6; 1975, ch. 145, § 1; 1975, ch. 248, § 1; 1976, ch. 580, § 1; 1977, ch. 66, § 7; 1977, ch. 124, § 1; 1978, ch. 566, § 1; 1979, ch. 318, § 12; 1979, ch. 404, § 1; 1980, ch. 636, § 9; 1980, ch.796, § 5; 1980, ch. 862, § 8; 1981, ch. 114, §§ 8, 9; 1981, ch. 512, § 3; 1982, ch. 671, §§ 1, 2; 1982, ch. 854, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 410, §§ 1-5; 1983, ch. 412, §§ 1-3; 1983, ch. 446, §§ 1, 2; 1984, ch. 1005, §§ 1-3; 1986, ch. 910, § 1; 1987, ch. 5, § 1; 1987, ch. 222, §§ 1-6; 1988, ch. 731, §§ 1-4; 1988, ch. 921, § 1; 1989, ch. 24, § 1; 1989, ch. 531, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-2202, 39-2203; T.C.A., §§ 15-1408 — 15-1423, 39-6-416, 39-2216 — 39-2221, 52-1432 — 52-1434, 52-1449), concerning drugs, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, part 4 of this title.

Part 5
Fraternal Organizations and Secret Societies [Repealed]

39-6-501 — 39-6-507. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-6-50139-6-507 (Shan., §§ 6888a48-6888a55; Acts 1897, ch. 67, § 1; 1907, ch. 591, §§ 1-5; 1911, ch. 48, §§ 1, 2; 1921, ch. 7, § 1; Code 1932, §§ 11404-11410; Acts 1967, ch. 298, § 1; 1979, ch. 68, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-3801 — 39-3807), concerning fraternal organizations and secret societies, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989.

Part 6
Gambling [Repealed]

39-6-601 — 39-6-635. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 6, §§ 39-6-60139-6-635 (Code 1858, §§ 1720-1722, 1775, 4870-4874, 4876, 4877, 4886, 4887, 4889-4891 (deriv. Acts 1799, ch. 8, § 2; 1803, ch. 12, § 2; 1809 (Sept.), ch. 39, § 1; 1811, ch. 112, §§ 1, 2; 1833, ch. 68, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5; 1835-1836, ch. 47, §§ 2, 3; 1843-1844, ch. 90); Acts 1859-1860, ch. 85, § 1; 1883, ch. 230, §§ 1, 2; 1883, ch. 251, §§ 1-3; 1899, ch. 5, § 1; Shan., §§ 3026-3028, 3165-3168, 6804-6810, 6812, 6813, 6817a2-6817a6, 6822-6824, 6834-6836a6; Acts 1907, ch. 88, §§ 1, 2; 1907, ch. 89, §§ 1-3; 1909, ch. 277, §§ 1-4; 1919, ch. 94; mod. Code 1932, §§ 5250-5252, 7818-7821, 11275-11282, 11284, 11287-11291, 11294-11296, 11302-11311; Acts 1955, ch. 234, §§ 1-7; 1957, ch. 406, § 1; 1969, ch. 160, § 3; 1969, ch. 319, §§ 3, 4; 1970, ch. 456, § 1; 1970, ch. 496, § 1; 1970, ch. 510, § 1; 1970, ch. 588, §§ 1, 2; 1971, ch. 37, § 1; 1971, ch. 53, §§ 1, 2; 1971, ch. 167, §§ 1, 2; 1971, ch. 216, § 1; 1971, ch. 231, § 1; 1972, ch. 449, § 1; 1972, ch. 584, § 1; 1973, ch. 389, § 1; 1974, ch. 631, §§ 1, 2; 1974, ch. 782, § 1; 1975, ch. 181, §§ 1, 2; Private Acts 1976, ch. 242, § 1; Private Acts, 1976, ch. 293; Acts 1977, ch. 68, § 3; 1977, ch. 239, § 2; 1979, ch. 68, § 3; 1979, ch. 358, §§ 1, 3-5, 6-9; 1980, ch. 622, §§ 1-3; 1980, ch. 636, § 13; 1980, ch. 753, § 1; 1982, ch. 872, §§ 1-8; 1982, ch. 881, § 1; 1983, ch. 106, §§ 1-4; 1984, ch. 728, § 13; 1984, ch. 808, §§ 1-8; 1984, ch. 893, §§ 1-3; 1985, ch. 80, §§ 2, 3; 1985, ch. 205, §§ 2, 5, 6; 1986, ch. 778, §§ 1-3, 5, 6, 11-14; 1987, ch. 175, § 1; 1987, ch. 450, §§ 2, 3; 1988, ch. 1029, §§ 1-20, 26; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1007, 39-2001 — 39-2010, 39-2013 — 39-2039; T.C.A., §§ 39-2031 — 39-2033, 39-2038 — 39-2044), concerning gambling, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, part 5 of this title.

Part 7
Graves and Dead Bodies [Repealed]

39-6-701 — 39-6-707. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 7, §§ 39-6-70139-6-707 (Code 1858, §§ 4663, 4848-4852 (deriv. Acts 1857-1858, ch. 63); Acts 1899, ch. 34; Shan., §§ 6524, 6771-6775a1; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10886, 11191-11196; Acts 1965, ch. 53, § 1; 1975, ch. 250, § 1; 1976, ch. 708, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-2101 —39-2107), concerning graves and dead bodies, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 4 and ch. 17, part 3 of this title.

Part 8
Highways [Repealed]

39-6-801 — 39-6-806. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 8, §§ 39-6-80139-6-806 (Code 1858, § 4652; Acts 1879, ch. 183, §§ 1-5; Shan., §§ 6496, 6514-6518; Shan. Supp., §§ 6513a3, 6513a4; Acts 1911, ch. 45, §§ 1, 2; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10831, 10870-10875; Acts 1961, ch. 16, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 576, § 1; 1972, ch. 829, § 7; 1973, ch. 132, §§ 1-3; 1978, ch. 858, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-2301 — 39-2306; T.C.A., §§ 39-2307 — 39-2311), concerning highways, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 4 and ch. 17, parts 1 and 3 of this title.

Part 9
Intoxicating Liquors [Repealed]

39-6-901 — 39-6-930. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 9, §§ 39-6-90139-6-930 (Acts 1859-1860, ch. 12; 1885, ch. 123, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 6723a2, 6748a1, 6748a2, 6748a6, 6795, 6795a4, 6795a7, 6798a8-6798a13, 6798a13b1, 6798a19b11, 6798a20, 6798a21, 6798a24, 6798a25b1, 6798a25b2, 6798a26-6798a32; Shan. Supp., §§ 6743a1-6743a3; Acts 1903, ch. 63, § 1; 1905, ch. 422, § 1; 1909, ch. 1, § 1; 1909, ch. 10, § 1; 1909, ch. 178, §§ 1, 2; 1917, ch. 2, §§ 1, 2; 1917, ch. 3, §§ 1-3; 1917, ch. 5, § 1; 1917, ch. 12, §§ 1-6; 1917, ch. 53, § 1; 1917, ch. 101, § 1; 1919, ch. 50, § 11; 1921, ch. 130, § 1; 1923, ch. 2, § 1; 1923, ch. 4, §§ 1-3; 1923, ch. 12, § 1, 2; 1923, ch. 14, § 1; 1925, ch. 22, § 1; mod. Code 1932, §§ 11158-11160, 11204, 11208-11210, 11212, 11215-11222, 11234, 11242, 11243, 11246, 11247, 11249-11257; Acts 1937, ch. 56, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 11259.1; Acts 1967, ch. 149, § 1; 1971, ch. 70, §§ 1-7; 1971, ch. 106, § 1; 1971, ch. 162, § 2; 1972, ch. 599, §§ 2-4; 1972, ch. 831, § 1; 1973, ch. 121, § 1; 1979, ch. 68, § 3; 1979, ch. 413, § 1; 1980, ch. 786, §§ 1, 2; 1984, ch. 693, § 1; 1984, ch. 915, §§ 1, 3; 1987, ch. 164, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1003, 39-2501 — 39-2517, 39-2520 — 39-2522, 39-2524, 39-2525, 39-2527 — 39-2535; T.C.A. § 39-1218), concerning intoxicating liquors, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, part 7 of this title.

Part 10
Nuisances [Repealed]

39-6-1001 — 39-6-1003. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 10, §§ 39-6-100139-6-1003 (Code 1858, §§ 4833, 4835, 4913, 4915 (deriv. Acts 1819, ch. 63, § 4; 1835-1836, ch. 88, § 1; 1843-1844, ch. 153, § 2); Shan., §§ 6750, 6752, 6869, 6871; mod. Code 1932, §§ 11168, 11170, 11353, 11354; Acts 1972, ch. 717, § 1; 1986, ch. 774, § 10; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-2901 — 39-2903, 39-2905), concerning nuisances, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, parts 3, 4 and 9 of this title.

Part 11
Obscenity [Repealed]

39-6-1101 — 39-6-1142. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 11, §§ 39-6-110139-6-1142 (Acts 1969, ch. 278, §§ 1-4; 1971, ch. 334, §§ 1, 2; 1971, ch. 368, § 1; 1972, ch. 538, § 1; 1972, ch. 837, § 1; 1973, ch. 220, § 1; 1974, ch. 510, §§ 1-13, 16; 1975, ch. 205, § 1; 1975, ch. 306, § 1; 1976, ch. 574, § 1; 1976, ch. 635, § 1; 1977, ch. 226, § 1; 1977, ch. 405, §§ 1-3; 1980, ch. 874, §§ 1-5; 1983, ch. 381, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 383, §§ 1-4; 1984, ch. 722, § 1; 1984, ch. 860, § 1; 1985, ch. 91, § 1; 1985, ch. 308, §§ 1, 2; 1986, ch. 646, §§ 1-4; 1986, ch. 903, § 1; 1988, ch. 565, §§ 1, 2; 1988, ch. 995, §§ 1-3; 1989, ch. 147, § 3; 1989, ch. 380, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 39-1010, 39-1012 — 39-1018, 39-1020, 39-3001 — 39-3024), concerning obscenity, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, parts 3 and 9 of this title.

Part 12
Professional or Business Misconduct [Repealed]

39-6-1201 — 39-6-1210. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 12, §§ 39-6-120139-6-1210 (Acts 1891, ch. 114, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 3030, 6881a1-6881a3, 6888a41, 6888a42; Acts 1903, ch. 48, §§ 1, 2; 1917, ch. 110, §§ 1-3; Code 1932, §§ 5254, 11358-11360, 11398, 11399; Acts 1968, ch. 537, §§ 1-5; 1977, ch. 49, § 1; 1984, ch. 824, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed), §§ 39-3401 — 39-3404, 39-4003; T.C.A., §§ 39-3411 — 39-3415), concerning professional or business misconduct, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 1 of this title, title 63, ch. 6, part 2.

Part 13
Public Events [Repealed]

39-6-1301 — 39-6-1304. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 13, §§ 39-6-130139-6-1304 (Shan., §§ 6674, 6675; Acts 1901, ch. 77, §§ 1, 2; 1909, ch. 155, § 1; mod. Code 1932, §§ 11039, 11043; Acts 1947, ch. 103, §§ 1-4; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11403.1-11403.4; Acts 1953, ch. 134, § 1 (Williams, § 11403.5); 1974, ch. 636, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 727, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1201, 39-1202, 39-4101 — 39-4105; T.C.A., § 39-1219), concerning public events, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, part 11 of this title.

Part 14
Race Relations [Repealed]

39-6-1401 — 39-6-1407. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 14, §§ 39-6-140139-6-1407 (Acts 1957, ch. 151, §§ 2-7, 9; T.C.A., §§ 39-5001 — 39-5007), concerning race relations, was repealed by Acts 1983, ch. 350, § 1.

Part 15
Solicitation of Funds [Repealed]

39-6-1501 — 39-6-1522. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 15, §§ 39-6-150139-6-1522 (Acts 1957, ch. 152, §§ 1-8; 1961, ch. 294, §§ 1-3; 1971, ch. 143, §§ 1-3; 1973, ch. 155, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-827, 39-1953; T.C.A., §§ 39-828 — 39-834, 39-837, 39-1969), concerning solicitation of funds, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 1 and ch. 16, part 3 of this title.

Part 16
Waters and Watercourses [Repealed]

39-6-1601 — 39-6-1614. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 16, §§ 39-6-160139-6-1614 (Code 1858, §§ 1825, 4652, 4655, 4834, 4835 (deriv. Acts 1809 (Apr.), ch. 5, § 5; 1835-1836, ch. 29, § 4); Acts 1871, ch. 105; 1873, ch. 60, §§ 1, 2; 1877, ch. 24, § 3; Shan., §§ 1815, 1825, 6506, 6520a1, 6520a2, 6526a1, 6526a2, 6751, 6752, 6754, 6755; Acts 1903, ch. 303, §§ 1, 2; 1903, ch. 310, §§ 1, 2; mod. Code 1932, §§ 3081, 3089, 10863, 10877, 10878, 10887, 10888, 11169, 11170, 11172, 11173; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-2205, 39-2206, 39-2904 — 39-2907, 39-4801 — 39-4811), concerning water and watercourses, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 14, part 4 of this title.

Part 17
Weapons [Repealed]

39-6-1701 — 39-6-1725. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 17, §§ 39-6-170139-6-1725 (Code 1858, §§ 4746, 4747, 4864, 4869 (deriv. Acts 1837-1838, ch. 137, § 2; 1855-1856, ch. 66; 1855-1856, ch. 81, § 2); Acts 1869-1870, ch. 22, § 2; 1869-1870, ch. 41, § 2; 1870, ch. 13, §§ 1, 3, 4; 1871, ch. 90, §§ 1, 3; 1879, ch. 96, § 1; 1879, ch. 186, §§ 1, 3; Shan., §§ 6630, 6631, 6641-6643, 6649, 6650, 6792, 6803; Shan. Supp., §§ 6657a1-6657a3; Acts 1921, ch. 55, §§ 1-3; 1923, ch. 38, § 1; mod. Code 1932, §§ 11007-11010, 11012, 11015, 11018-11020, 11274; Acts 1941, ch. 31, § 1; 1943, ch. 115, §§ 1, 2; 1949, ch. 140, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 11007, 11009.1; Acts 1959, ch. 151, § 1; 1959, ch. 165, § 1; 1968, ch. 439, § 1; 1969, ch. 70, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 88, § 1; 1969, ch. 241, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 291, § 1; 1971, ch. 13, § 1; 1971, ch. 286, § 1; 1972, ch. 759, § 1; 1972, ch. 783, §§ 1, 2; 1973, ch. 30, §§ 1-4; 1973, ch. 94, § 1; 1973, ch. 349, §§ 1, 2; 1973, ch. 371, § 1; 1974, ch. 583, § 1, 1976, ch. 768, §§ 1, 2; 1976, ch. 793, §§ 1, 3, 4; 1980, ch. 771, § 4; 1982, ch. 552, § 1; 1982, ch. 711, § 1; 1983, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 421, § 1; 1984, ch. 567, § 1; 1984, ch. 615, § 1; 1984, ch. 641, § 1; 1986, ch. 685, § 1; 1986, ch. 710, § 1; 1987, ch. 79, §§ 1, 2; 1988, ch. 811, §§ 1-3; 1989, ch. 76, § 8; 1989, ch. 111, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 39-1208, 39-4901 — 39-4905, 39-4908, 39-4911 — 39-4921, 39-4923 — 39-4925, 39-4951 — 39-4954), concerning weapons, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, part 13 of this title.

Part 18
Malicious Intimidation or Harassment [Repealed]

39-6-1801 — 39-6-1804. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 18, §§ 39-6-180139-6-1804 (Acts 1988, ch. 537, §§ 1, 3-5), concerning malicious intimidation or harassment, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1, effective November 1, 1989. For new law, see ch. 17, part 3 of this title.

Part 1
Construction

39-11-101. Objectives of criminal code.

The general objectives of the criminal code are to:

  1. Proscribe and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens harm to individual, property, or public interest for which protection through the criminal law is appropriate;
  2. Give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited, and guide the exercise of official discretion in law enforcement, by defining the act and the culpable mental state that together constitute an offense;
  3. Give fair warning of the consequences of violation, and guide the exercise of official discretion in punishment, by grading of offenses; and
  4. Prescribe penalties that are proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section states the general objectives of the criminal code. It describes the broad principles that guided the commission in its work and should be used as an aid in interpreting the remaining sections of the code.

The general objectives in this section reach three areas: crime prevention, fair warning, and proportionate sanctions. Although the objectives are not ranked in any particular order, crime prevention is of special significance and is an indirect theme for the other three objectives.

Subdivision (1) clearly states that a basic goal of the criminal code is to prevent harm to public and private interests. However, in recognition of the fact that not all harm can be addressed by the criminal code, this subdivision limits the code's application to those harms where criminal law is an appropriate prevention agent.

Subdivisions (2) and (3) provide that another goal is to let both the general populace and law enforcement personnel know the conduct that is prohibited and the sanctions for violation of the criminal law. Fair warning, long accepted as a basic principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence, provides the people with guidance in their choices and places limits on law enforcement discretion. It also serves a crime prevention function by clearly articulating what is illegal and what are the consequences of illegal conduct.

Subdivision (4) states the traditional, and constitutionally required, principle that the severity of penalties should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense. This suggests that penalties should not be too severe or too lenient when measured against the gravity of the offense.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Classification of felony offenses occurring prior to November 1, 1989, § 40-35-118.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Law Reviews.

In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1099 (2014).

Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2001).

The Language of Mens Rea, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1327 (2014).

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals: A Study and Analysis (Daniel J. Foley), 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 427 (1999).

39-11-102. Effect of criminal code.

  1. Conduct does not constitute an offense unless it is defined as an offense by statute, municipal ordinance, or rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.
  2. Parts 1-6 of this chapter apply to offenses defined by other laws, unless otherwise provided by law.
  3. This title does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture, or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil suit for conduct the criminal code defines as an offense, and the civil injury is not merged into the offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Subsection (a) is designed to accommodate the commission's specific legislative mandate to modernize the former penal code. It is the intent of the commission that common law offenses be replaced with statutory offenses to effectuate the goals set forth in § 39-11-101(1) and (2). While this revised criminal code supersedes common law offenses, the commission does not intend to abrogate the interpretive rules developed under common law and specifically includes such interpretations under § 39-11-104.

Subsection (b) states that the general principles apply to offenses defined in all volumes of the Tennessee Code Annotated unless the law provides otherwise.

Subsection (c) is a restatement of prior code § 39-1-102. Tennessee case law has established a consistent rule that a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case constitutes no bar to subsequent civil actions. Galyon v. State, 189 Tenn. 505, 226 S.W.2d 270 (1950).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Criminal Contempt.

As defendant's violation of court orders to discontinue contact with her ex-husband did not constitute a criminal offense as defined by T.C.A. § 39-11-102(a), the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, T.C.A. §§ 40-30-101 to 40-30-122, did not apply to her criminal contempt convictions; therefore, her petition was properly dismissed. Baker v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 535 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2012), aff'd, 417 S.W.3d 428, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

39-11-103. Territorial jurisdiction.

  1. Every person, whether an inhabitant of this or any other state or country, is liable to punishment by the laws of this state, for an offense committed in this state, except where it is by law cognizable exclusively in the courts of the United States.
    1. When an offense is commenced outside of this state and consummated in this state, the person committing the offense is liable for punishment in this state in the county in which the offense was consummated, unless otherwise provided by statute.
    2. It is no defense that the person charged with the offense was outside of this state when the offense was consummated, if the person used:
      1. An innocent or guilty agent; or
      2. Other means proceeding directly from the person.
  2. When the commission of an offense commenced within this state is consummated outside of its boundaries, the offender is liable to punishment in this state in the county where the offense was commenced.
  3. If one (1) or more elements of an offense are committed in one (1) county and one (1) or more elements in another, the offense may be prosecuted in either county. Offenses committed on the boundary of two (2) or more counties may be prosecuted in either county.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1000, § 5.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is a recodification of prior law regarding territorial jurisdiction and venue. It combines prior code §§ 40-1-10140-1-103 and is moved to its present location because it is logically part of the general principles of Tennessee criminal law.

Subsection (d) is a restatement of former code §§ 40-105 and 40-106.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Attorney General Opinions. Advertisements promoting lawful, out-of-state casino gambling, OAG 99-030 (2/18/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

When an offense is continuing in nature and has continued into Tennessee from another state, the offense is deemed to have both commenced and consummated anew in Tennessee so long as any essential element of the offense continues to be present in Tennessee. State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1999).

Tennessee had territorial jurisdiction and the county was the proper venue for defendant's trial for conspiracy to sell over 300 grams of methamphetamine because the evidence showed that one of co-conspirator's transported methamphetamine from Atlanta to the county in Tennessee. State v. Castillo, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2020).

39-11-104. Construction of criminal code.

This title shall be construed according to the fair import of its terms, including reference to judicial decisions and common law interpretations, to promote justice, and effect the objectives of the criminal code.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The commission intends the language of the sections themselves to be an authoritative statement of the law. Since some of the terms utilized have been clearly defined by judicial decisions, those decisions and common law interpretations should be consulted where necessary. Prior Tennessee law required penal statutes to be strictly construed. This section requires that the statutes be construed by the fair import of their terms. The comments in this code are intended to explain its provisions and to aid in their interpretation. The comments are not authoritative statements, but are evidence of the considerations which prompted the statutory text.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Law Reviews.

State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to Retain the Natural and Probable Consequence Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 273 (1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. §§ 39-15-401 and 39-15-402 are not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a mother who gave her child an extra dose of Clonidine, because the statutes require that the mother know her conduct was abusive. State v. Prater, 137 S.W.3d 25, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2004).

Criminal responsibility statute was sufficiently precise to put a person of common intelligence on notice of the prohibited conduct where the statute intended to assess criminal liability to persons who acted together in committing criminal offenses. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2015), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2015), cert. denied, Thomas v. Tennessee, 194 L. Ed. 2d 559, 136 S. Ct. 1458, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 1999 (U.S. 2016).

T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3) does not violate the fair warning doctrine merely because it has not been for a significant period of time employed to the prosecution of burglaries where a person entered a building open to the public, without the consent of the owner, and committed or attempted to commit a felony, theft, or assault. State v. Bowens, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

2. Trial of Accessory After the Fact.

The common law rule that a person charged as an accessory after the fact could not be tried prior to the principal offender being convicted, unless the person charged as an accessory after the fact expressly consented to waive the common law rule, had not been abrogated by the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 591, and it declined to judicially abrogate it. State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 2005).

By defining accessory after the fact in a manner similar to the statutory definition of the offense at issue in Wilson v. State, 190 Tenn. 592, 230 S.W.2d 1014 (Tenn. 1950) and by also declaring that the Reform Act, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 591, is to be construed by reference to judicial decisions and common law interpretations, the legislature has evinced an intent to retain the common law rule, that a person charged as an accessory after the fact may not be tried prior to the principal offender being convicted, as to accessories after the fact. State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 2005).

3. Kidnapping

Kidnapping statutes, construed according to the fair import of their terms, T.C.A. § 39-11-104, and coupled with their derivation from the Model Penal Code, evince a legislative intent to punish as kidnapping only those instances in which the removal or confinement has criminal significance above and beyond that necessary to consummate some underlying offense, such as robbery or rape. State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

39-11-105. Computation of age.

A person attains a specified age on the day of the anniversary of the person's birthdate.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The age of victims and offenders is sometimes determinative of punishment and criminal responsibility. This section sets forth an objective method of making a determination of age. Under this rule, a person becomes 18 years old at 12:01 a.m. on the person's eighteenth birthday, irrespective of the actual time of day the person was born. This abolishes the common law rule.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Defendant's conviction for the aggravated rape of a child was proper because the evidence demonstrated that defendant penetrated the victim with his hand and that the victim was three years and one month of age at the time of the offense; a medical examination confirmed the victim's injuries and defendant admitted during a recorded telephone call to the sexual touching of the victim. Further, the offense took place on December 15, 2006, while the victim was still three years of age; she remained three years of age until her fourth birthday on November 3, 2007. State v. Ramos, 331 S.W.3d 408, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010).

39-11-106. Title definitions.

  1. As used in this title, unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Antique firearm” means:
      1. Any firearm, including any firearm with a matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system, manufactured in or before the year 1898;
      2. Any replica of any firearm described in subdivision (a)(1)(A) if such replica:
        1. Is not designed or redesigned for using rimfire or conventional centerfire fixed ammunition; or
        2. Uses rimfire or conventional centerfire fixed ammunition which is no longer manufactured in the United States and which is not readily available in the ordinary channels of commercial trade; or
      3. Any muzzle loading rifle, muzzle loading shotgun, or muzzle loading pistol, which is designed to use black powder, or a black powder substitute, and which cannot use fixed ammunition;
    2. “Benefit” means anything reasonably regarded as economic gain, enhancement or advantage, including benefit to any other person in whose welfare the beneficiary is interested;
    3. “Bodily injury” includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, and physical pain or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty;
    4. “Coercion” means a threat, however communicated, to:
      1. Commit any offense;
      2. Wrongfully accuse any person of any offense;
      3. Expose any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule;
      4. Harm the credit or business repute of any person; or
      5. Take or withhold action as a public servant or cause a public servant to take or withhold action;
    5. “Criminal negligence” refers to a person who acts with criminal negligence with respect to the circumstances surrounding that person's conduct or the result of that conduct when the person ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person's standpoint;
    6. “Deadly weapon” means:
      1. A firearm or anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or
      2. Anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury;
      1. “Deception” means that a person knowingly:
        1. Creates or reinforces a false impression by words or conduct, including false impressions of fact, law, value or intention or other state of mind that the person does not believe to be true;
        2. Prevents another from acquiring information which would likely affect the other's judgment in the transaction;
        3. Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact the person knows to be false and:
          1. The person created; or
          2. Knows is likely to influence another;
        4. Fails to disclose a lien, security interest, adverse claim or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a matter of public record;
        5. Employs any other scheme to defraud; or
        6. (a)  Promises performance that at the time the person knew the person did not have the ability to perform or that the person does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed, except mere failure to perform is insufficient to establish that the person did not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed;
          1. (vi)  (a)  Promises performance that at the time the person knew the person did not have the ability to perform or that the person does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed, except mere failure to perform is insufficient to establish that the person did not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed;
          2. Promising performance includes issuing a check or similar sight order for the payment of money or use of a credit or debit card when the person knows the check, sight order, or credit or debit slip will not be honored for any reason;
      2. “Deception” does not include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed;
    7. “Defendant” means a person accused of an offense under this title and includes any person who aids or abets the commission of such offense;
    8. “Deprive” means to:
      1. Withhold property from the owner permanently or for such a period of time as to substantially diminish the value or enjoyment of the property to the owner;
      2. Withhold property or cause it to be withheld for the purpose of restoring it only upon payment of a reward or other compensation; or
      3. Dispose of property or use it or transfer any interest in it under circumstances that make its restoration unlikely;
    9. “Destructive device”:
      1. Means:
        1. Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas:
          1. Bomb;
          2. Grenade;
          3. Rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces (4 oz.);
          4. Missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce (0.25 oz.);
          5. Mine; or
          6. Device similar to any of the devices described in subdivisions (a)(10)(A)(i)(a)-(e); and
        2. Any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any destructive device described in subdivision (a)(10)(A)(i) and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled; and
      2. Does not include:
        1. Any device that is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon;
        2. Any device, although originally designed for use as a weapon, that is redesigned for use as a signaling, pyrotechnic, line throwing, safety, or similar device;
        3. Surplus ordnance sold, loaned, or given by the secretary of the Army pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 7684(2), 10 U.S.C. § 7685, or 10 U.S.C. § 7686;
        4. Any antique or rifle which the owner intends to use solely for sporting purposes; or
        5. Any other device that is not likely to be used as a weapon;
    10. “Effective consent” means assent in fact, whether express or apparent, including assent by one legally authorized to act for another. Consent is not effective when:
      1. Induced by deception or coercion;
      2. Given by a person the defendant knows is not authorized to act as an agent;
      3. Given by a person who, by reason of youth, mental disease or defect, or intoxication, is known by the defendant to be unable to make reasonable decisions regarding the subject matter; or
      4. Given solely to detect the commission of an offense;
    11. “Emancipated minor” means any minor who is or has been married, or has by court order or otherwise been freed from the care, custody and control of the minor's parents;
    12. “Firearm”:
      1. Means:
        1. Any weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive;
        2. The frame or receiver of any such weapon;
        3. Any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or
        4. Any destructive device; and
      2. Does not include an antique firearm;
    13. “Force” means compulsion by the use of physical power or violence and shall be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of this title;
    14. “Fraud” means as used in normal parlance and includes, but is not limited to, deceit, trickery, misrepresentation and subterfuge, and shall be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of this title;
    15. “Government” means the state or any political subdivision of the state, and includes any branch or agency of the state, a county, municipality or other political subdivision;
    16. “Governmental record” means anything:
      1. Belonging to, received or kept by the government for information; or
      2. Required by law to be kept by others for information of the government;
    17. “Handgun” means any firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve inches (12") that is designed, made or adapted to be fired with one (1) hand;
    18. “Harm” means anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage or injury, including harm to another person in whose welfare the person affected is interested;
    19. “Intentional” means that a person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is the person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result;
    20. “Jail” includes workhouse and “workhouse” includes jail, whenever the context so requires or will permit;
    21. “Knowing” means that a person acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person's conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result;
    22. “Law enforcement officer” means an officer, employee or agent of government who has a duty imposed by law to:
      1. Maintain public order; or
      2. Make arrests for offenses, whether that duty extends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses; and
      3. Investigate the commission or suspected commission of offenses;
    23. “Legal privilege” means a particular or peculiar benefit or advantage created by law;
    24. “Minor” means any person under eighteen (18) years of age;
      1. “Obtain” means to:
        1. Bring about a transfer or purported transfer of property or of a legally recognized interest in the property, whether to the defendant or another; or
        2. Secure the performance of service;
      2. “Obtain” includes, but is not limited to, the taking, carrying away or the sale, conveyance or transfer of title to or interest in or possession of property, and includes, but is not limited to, conduct known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by conversion, embezzlement, extortion or obtaining property by false pretenses;
    25. “Official proceeding” means any type of administrative, executive, legislative or judicial proceeding that may be conducted before a public servant authorized by law to take statements under oath;
    26. “Owner” means a person, other than the defendant, who has possession of or any interest other than a mortgage, deed of trust or security interest in property, even though that possession or interest is unlawful and without whose consent the defendant has no authority to exert control over the property;
    27. “Person” includes the singular and the plural and means and includes any individual, firm, partnership, copartnership, association, corporation, governmental subdivision or agency, or other organization or other legal entity, or any agent or servant thereof;
    28. “Property” means anything of value, including, but not limited to, money, real estate, tangible or intangible personal property, including anything severed from land, library material, contract rights, choses-in-action, interests in or claims to wealth, credit, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric or other power. Commodities of a public nature, such as gas, electricity, steam, water, cable television and telephone service constitute property, but the supplying of such a commodity to premises from an outside source by means of wires, pipes, conduits or other equipment is deemed a rendition of service rather than a sale or delivery of property;
    29. “Public place” means a place to which the public or a group of persons has access and includes, but is not limited to, highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, places of business, playgrounds and hallways, lobbies and other portions of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence. An act is deemed to occur in a public place if it produces its offensive or proscribed consequences in a public place;
    30. “Public servant” means:
      1. Any public officer or employee of the state or of any political subdivision of the state or of any governmental instrumentality within the state including, but not limited to, law enforcement officers;
      2. Any person exercising the functions of any such public officer or employee;
      3. Any person participating as an adviser, consultant or otherwise performing a governmental function, but not including witnesses or jurors; or
      4. Any person elected, appointed or designated to become a public servant, although not yet occupying that position;
    31. “Reckless” means that a person acts recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct when the person is aware of, but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person's standpoint;
      1. “Recorded device” means the tangible medium upon which sounds or images are recorded or otherwise stored;
      2. “Recorded device” includes any original phonograph record, disc, tape, audio, or videocassette, wire, film or other medium now known or later developed on which sounds or images are or can be recorded or otherwise stored, or any copy or reproduction which duplicates, in whole or in part, the original;
    32. “Security guard/officer” means an individual employed to perform any function of a security guard/officer and security guard/officer patrol service as set forth in the Private Protective Services Licensing and Regulatory Act, compiled in title 62, chapter 35;
    33. “Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that involves:
      1. A substantial risk of death;
      2. Protracted unconsciousness;
      3. Extreme physical pain;
      4. Protracted or obvious disfigurement;
      5. Protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty; or
      6. A broken bone of a child who is twelve (12) years of age or less;
    34. “Services” includes labor, skill, professional service, transportation, telephone, mail, gas, electricity, steam, water, cable television, entertainment subscription service or other public services, accommodations in hotels, restaurants or elsewhere, admissions to exhibitions, use of vehicles or other movable property, and any other activity or product considered in the ordinary course of business to be a service, regardless of whether it is listed in this subdivision (a)(37) or a specific statute exists covering the same or similar conduct; and
    35. “Value”:
      1. Subject to the additional criteria of subdivisions (a)(38)(B)-(D), “value” under this title means:
        1. The fair market value of the property or service at the time and place of the offense; or
        2. If the fair market value of the property cannot be ascertained, the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after the offense;
      2. The value of documents, other than those having a readily ascertainable fair market value, means:
        1. The amount due and collectible at maturity, less any part that has been satisfied, if the document constitutes evidence of a debt; or
        2. The greatest amount of economic loss that the owner might reasonably suffer by virtue of loss of the document, if the document is other than evidence of a debt;
      3. If property or service has value that cannot be ascertained by the criteria set forth in subdivisions (a)(38)(A) and (B), the property or service is deemed to have a value of less than fifty dollars ($50.00);
      4. If the defendant gave consideration for or had a legal interest in the property or service that is the object of the offense, the amount of consideration or value of the interest shall be deducted from the value of the property or service ascertained under subdivision (a)(38)(A), (B) or (C) to determine value; and
      5. For a violation of § 39-14-408(b)(1), the value of the property includes the fair market value of repairing, cleaning, and restoring the property.
  2. The definition of a term in subsection (a) applies to each grammatical variation of the term.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, §§ 1, 2; 1995, ch. 322, § 1; 1996, ch. 1009, § 22; 1997, ch. 437, § 2; 2009, ch. 307, § 1; 2009, ch. 325, § 1; 2011, ch. 348, § 1; 2014, ch. 984, § 1; 2019, ch. 279, §§ 1, 2; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote the definition of “Firearm”, which read: “‘Firearm’ means any weapon designed, made or adapted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or any device readily convertible to that use;”; and added the definitions for “Antique firearm” and “Destructive device”.

The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 added (a)(38)(E).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 279, § 5. May 2, 2019.

Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Applicability of Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, § 40-35-117.

Classification of offenses committed prior to November 1, 1989, § 40-35-118.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Mental states defined, § 39-11-302.

Vandalism of caves or caverns, § 11-5-108.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 5 Tenn. Juris., Burglary and Housebreaking, § 3; 17 Tenn. Juris., Larceny and Theft, §§ 2, 5; 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, §§ 3, 4; 25 Tenn. Juris., Weapons, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Constitutional Law — Searches, Seizures, and Confessions — Constitutional Protections for Students in Public Schools (Bryan C. Hathorn), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 211 (2008).

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

Attorney General Opinions. Effect of new traffic citation legislation, OAG 93-51 (7/29/93).

Procedures for use of minors in tobacco sales sting operations, OAG 99-016 (2/2/99).

Department of agriculture enforcement agent as law enforcement officer, OAG 99-016 (2/2/99).

Public Chapter 279, which became effective May 2, 2019, exempted “antique firearm[s]” from the definition of “firearm” in T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(11). As a result of the passage of Public Chapter 279, the prohibitions in T.C.A. § 39-11-1307 on the possession of firearms and handguns by individuals convicted of felonies and certain misdemeanors no longer apply to antique firearms. OAG 19-19, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 56 (10/9/2019).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bodily Injury.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated rape under T.C.A. § 39-13-502(a) where the victim received eight stitches in her genital area and was hospitalized for five days, the victim immediately recognized defendant several days after the rape when he showed up at her apartment building, and the DNA evidence showed that the sample contained a mixture of genetic material from the victim and another individual whose DNA profile was consistent with defendant's profile. State v. Sellers, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1047 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2015).

Trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact during his trial for domestic assault where defendant's actions of using a tree branch to strike the victim's backside and leaving visible bruising was not the type of action that could be characterized as offensive or provocative. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for assault because she pushed an off-duty police officer into a ditch and sprayed him with mace as he attempted to climb out of the ditch, the officer testified that his finger was injured and that his eyes burned, which fell under the statutory definition of bodily injury, and the trial court, by its verdict, clearly rejected defendant's claim of self-defense and accredited the testimonies of the witnesses who denied that the officer assaulted defendant prior to being pushed into the ditch and sprayed with mace. State v. Teets, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated rape as the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to establish that she felt physical pain while defendant penetrated her mouth and her anus because the victim testified that defendant smacked her two or three times while he forced his sexual organ inside her mouth, that her head hurt a little bit from being hit, and that it continued to hurt until she was able to go home and sleep; and the victim testified at trial that it hurt when defendant penetrated her anus, and that it hurt for about a week afterward, and a detective testified that the victim appeared to be in pain and was having trouble sitting when he spoke to her on the night of the rape. State v. Mervan Eyup Ibrahim, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016), appeal denied, State v. Ibrahim, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of assault where a rational trier of fact could have found that the victim reasonably feared imminent bodily injury both at the time he was behind bulletproof glass and at the moment when he left the bulletproof area to help the young girl who had been shot. State v. Perrier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016), aff'd, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault by use of a skillet as a deadly weapon because the victim, defendant's then spouse, after arguing and consuming alcohol with defendant for some time before falling asleep on a sofa was jarred awake when defendant struck the victim in the head with an iron skillet, causing the victim pain and leaving the victim with a large knot and a cut on the top of the victim's head. State v. Lamb, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Evidence, including the victim's testimony, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated rape because the first count of aggravated rape was accomplished through force or coercion when defendant threatened the victim at knife-point and the second count of aggravated rape was accomplished when the victim suffered bodily injury through cuts to the hand. Furthermore, other witnesses testified as to how distraught the victim appeared, while a police officer testified to finding a knife in the bedroom where the incident occurred. State v. Bowles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2017).

Proof was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated rape based on his own act of sexually penetrating the victim because the jury accredited the victim's testimony that defendant sexually penetrated her without her consent and that defendant caused the bodily injury to the victim; photographs admitted at trial corroborated a nurse's testimony regarding the victim's injury to her vagina. State v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

2. Coercion.

Where defendant performed oral sex and anal intercourse on one of his 13-year-old victims without force or threat, there was no “coercion,” and a rape conviction was modified to statutory rape. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

In prosecutions for rape and sexual battery, evidence that defendant threatened to tell people that victim was a homosexual if he did not cooperate was sufficient for the jury to find the element of coercion. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

Actions of defendant in threatening a juror with loss of her job if she did not vote as he wished during grand jury deliberations constituted coercion of a juror. State v. Brewer, 945 S.W.2d 803, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Evidence, including the victim's testimony, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated rape because the first count of aggravated rape was accomplished through force or coercion when defendant threatened the victim at knife-point and the second count of aggravated rape was accomplished when the victim suffered bodily injury through cuts to the hand. Furthermore, other witnesses testified as to how distraught the victim appeared, while a police officer testified to finding a knife in the bedroom where the incident occurred. State v. Bowles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for coercion of a witness because during a phone call, defendant threatened to kill defendant's spouse by putting a bomb in the spouse's car if the spouse did not drop the spouse's charges against defendant. From this, the jury reasonably could have inferred that defendant threatened to kill defendant's spouse in an attempt to influence the spouse, as a prospective witness in the domestic assault case, to avoid testifying against defendant. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020).

3. Criminal Negligence.

The statutory definition of criminal negligence is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Butler, 880 S.W.2d 395, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

For conduct to constitute criminal negligence the accused must know, or should know, that his or her conduct, or the result of that conduct, will imperil the life of another given the circumstances that exist when the conduct takes place. State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d 471, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Tennessee law did not preclude drag racer's conviction for criminally negligent homicide because the victims, other drag racer and passenger, were co-perpetrators in the underlying crime of drag racing. State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. 2001), rehearing denied, 66 S.W.3d 188, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. 2002).

While defendant was caring for the five-year-old victim, and where he consumed beer and marijuana and took the victim swimming at a lake without notifying his parents or supervising his activities, defendant's conduct met the definition of criminal negligence under T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a); upon the victim's death by drowning, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for criminally negligent homicide under T.C.A. § 39-13-212(a). State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).

Trial court did not err by defining criminally negligent homicide for the jury because it defined criminal negligence as stated in the first sentence of this section and the risk as stated in the second sentence of the statute. State v. Maupin, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 879 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant judicial diversion for his criminally negligent homicide conviction because his amenability to correction as evidenced by his failure to see that he did anything wrong, the egregious circumstances of the offense of his driving a fully-loaded tractor trailer with very little sleep and under the influence, and the deterrence value to other similarly-situated individuals, as well as the interests of justice, substantially outweighed the factors in favor of judicial diversion. State v. Maupin, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 879 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child neglect convictions because, based on defendant's testimony, the jury could have found that defendant acted knowingly when defendant took medication, placed the infant victim in a bed in an unsafe sleeping environment, and fell asleep which resulted in the victim's death. Moreover, the jury could have determined that defendant was criminally negligent in that the victim should have known that the victim's actions were a gross deviation from the standard of care. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Even though the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide relative to the felony murder charge, as the key issue in the case was defendant's mental state, the error was harmless because the jury was properly instructed on all lesser-included offenses in the first degree premeditated murder count, including reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide, and the jury's guilty verdict in that count entailed finding that defendant acted with premeditation, rejecting that he acted recklessly or in self-defense. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's criminally negligent homicide conviction because defendant arrived and approached the victim at a dice game with a handgun and the intent to take money from the victim, an altercation ensued, and codefendant took the handgun and shot the victim multiple times. Defendant was aware of, but disregarded, the risk created by displaying a firearm at the victim and defendant's failure to perceive the risk was a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would have exercised. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

4. Deadly Weapon.

A motor vehicle can constitute a deadly weapon. State v. Tate, 912 S.W.2d 785, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

A hard plastic BIC(R) or Papermate(R) type pen is capable of causing either “extreme pain” or “obvious disfigurement,” and therefore defendant's use of the pen during his assault as a deadly weapon supported his conviction for aggravated assault. State v. Eaves, 959 S.W.2d 601, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Fists and feet are not deadly weapons under T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a). State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. 2000).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions on two counts of aggravated child abuse by use of a deadly weapon for incidents occurring on two separate dates, because the victim testified that defendant abused him with a heavy-duty extension cord wrapped with coat hangers and duct tape, because several witnesses corroborated the victim's testimony regarding injuries to his face and neck, and because the prosecution introduced photographs of these injuries at trial; however, the case was remanded for new trials because the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating the indictments. State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d 216, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery because the metal flashlight as used was properly classified as a deadly weapon, and testifying co-defendant admitted that there was discussion that defendant would knock the victim out if the victim awoke. State v. Downey, 259 S.W.3d 723, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2008).

Court overruled defendant's assertion that the state failed to prove use of a deadly weapon because a flashlight, as used by defendant to strike the victim in the head several times, was capable of causing serious bodily injury; defendant hit the victim over the head with the flashlight multiple times, causing potentially life-threatening head injuries which left the victim in the hospital for over a month. State v. Downey, 259 S.W.3d 723, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery, as he used an object consistent with a hammer to cause trauma to the victim's head, and he used pantyhose to strangle her, and both items, in the manner in which they were used, were capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; the jury accepted the State's contention that defendant assaulted and killed the victim for the purpose of stealing her personal possessions, and the evidence would not be reweighed on appeal. State v. Smithson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault by use of a skillet as a deadly weapon because the victim, defendant's then spouse, after arguing and consuming alcohol with defendant for some time before falling asleep on a sofa was jarred awake when defendant struck the victim in the head with an iron skillet, causing the victim pain and leaving the victim with a large knot and a cut on the top of the victim's head. State v. Lamb, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated robbery because he came onto the victim's porch and began hitting the victim with a metal stick with a ball on the end of it that extended; he then entered the victim's home without his permission while forcing the victim onto the living room floor; he tied the victim's wrists and legs with an electrical cord and blind cord while he kneeled on the victim's back; as a result of defendant's offenses, the victim suffered blunt force injuries, bruises, abrasions, broken ribs, internal bleeding, and eventually died from a stress heart attack; and it was within in the jury's prerogative to find that the metal stick that defendant carried was a deadly weapon. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated assault conviction because a rational jury could have found that he knowingly caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the manner in which he displayed a deadly weapon, the baseball bat, because he approached the victim in an aggressive manner, the victim feared he would be struck and jumped into a nearby car to avoid harm, and based on defendant's threats earlier in the day it was reasonable for the victim to believe that defendant presented a real, immediate threat to his safety. State v. Fisher, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2018).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was proper, as he said he intentionally rammed the victims'  small car with his tractor-trailer because the driver pulled out in front of him and then tapped her brakes, plus defendant caused bodily injury to both victims with the use of a deadly weapon, his tractor-trailer; defendant's statement that he intentionally hit the vehicle was sufficient to establish the reckless mens rea. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's multiple reckless aggravated assault convictions because defendant acted recklessly as a witness testified that defendant was driving in the wrong direction on an interstate highway when defendant's SUV hit the victims'  car head-on and crash reconstructionists testified that defendant's SUV was driving in the wrong direction and that the SUV's crash data recording system reflected that the SUV accelerated just before impact. State v. Pena, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 761 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on two law enforcement officers because defendant intentionally and knowingly used his vehicle as a deadly weapon, causing both officers to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury as defendant placed his vehicle into reverse and rammed into the officers'  vehicle with enough force to cause it to spin over 90 degrees; and an automobile could be considered a deadly weapon. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

5. Deprive.

Accountant's admission that he had misappropriated funds from clients and failed to report the amount on his federal income tax established that he committed theft of property under § 39-14-103 since he had “deprived” the owners of their property even if he had intended to return it. United States v. Parrott, 148 F.3d 629, 1998 FED App. 200P, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15001 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1998).

Trial court's failure to give lesser-included instructions on robbery and theft was not plain error because robbery and theft were not lesser-included offenses of carjacking; the definition of theft contained a statutory element that was not included within the statutory elements of carjacking, namely an intent to deprive another of his or her motor vehicle, and because robbery included all of the elements of theft within its statutory elements, robbery was also not a lesser-included offense of carjacking. State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. 2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a theft conviction where defendant left the scene of the murder in a truck with a plate that was stolen, and the identification number of a truck that was found in Arkansas was traced to the truck defendant used to flee a murder scene. State v. Blocker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft of real property because the evidence showed defendant (1) sought to obtain record title to the property, and (2) physically occupied the property, showing an intent to permanently deprive a bank of the property. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

6. Effective Consent.

Defendant relied upon the false impression he had created and reinforced to get inside the victim's home, and, once inside, accomplished the felonious deed which prompted his entry. Thus, having peaceably gained entry by deception, defendant's entry into the victim's home cannot be deemed with “effective consent.” State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Defendant's three burglary convictions, arising from his entry into a laundromat during regular business hours and his subsequent stealing of money from video game machines and a soap dispenser, were reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, as defendant had the owners'  effective consent to enter the laundromat; the laundry facility, which was often unattended, was open and unlocked for persons to enter the premises, and it was apparent to a person who approached the laundromat during the hours it was open for business that the person had the owners' consent to enter. State v. Ferguson, 229 S.W.3d 312, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2007).

Defendant was properly convicted for theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 because defendant intended to deprive the victim of the victim's money by deceiving the victim into purchasing a counterfeit ring for $8,000 which was worth no more than $2,000, and defendant acted knowingly. State v. Dixon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

For purposes of the burglary statute, a retail store does not effectively consent to a banned person's entry into the store simply because that individual enters the store to carry on a commercial activity; and the failure to detect or to even prosecute a criminal act, criminal trespass, does not prohibit enforcement or prosecution of subsequent criminal act. A retail store's failure to recognize a banned individual who enters its buildings does not amount to assent in fact, whether express or apparent, for the banned individual to enter the retail store based on the statutory definition of effective consent. State v. Ivey, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 245 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Because the jury charge on effective consent was at worst incomplete, not erroneous, and the issue was waived by defendant's failure to make a contemporaneous objection. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to specify whether “effective consent” related to entry into the building or to the theft because the jury instructions were clear enough for the jury to determine that defendant did not have consent to enter a store or to steal property; an asset protection associate of the store testified that defendant did not have permission to enter the store and did not have permission to conceal merchandise down his pants. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

7. Force.

Where there was proof that defendant “held down” one of his 13-year-old victims and performed oral sex on him, the jury could have found “force” sufficient for conviction of rape. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

While “force” and “violence” are obviously related, the terms are not synonymous. In effect, violence is a more severe degree of force. State v. Fitz, 19 S.W.3d 213, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. 2000).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of resisting arrest because defendant ignored officers'  orders to come out from underneath a vehicle and had to be dragged out; defendant then refused to place his arms behind his back so that he could be handcuffed; and defendant struggled with the arresting officers before an investigator was able to place handcuffs on him. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's rape conviction because there was no evidence of force or coercion, as the victim recanted her allegation at trial, defendant's confession included no details that could be construed as force or coercion, and the State was not permitted to use the victim's statements contained on a video recording as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt as it did not satisfy the requirements of Tenn. R. Evid. 803(26) and it did not seek the admission of the video. State v. Wyse, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2020).

8. Fraud.

In a prosecution for sexual battery by means of fraud, where the victim reasonably relied upon a belief that defendant's touching was for medical purposes, his allowing the touching would not constitute such a consent that would make the contact lawful so as to preclude a conviction. State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

9. Handgun.

Where a detainee openly carried a Draco AK-47 pistol at a state park and was detained and disarmed, the detainee's Fourth Amendment claim failed because: (1) The AK-47, carried openly and fully loaded through a state park, gave the park ranger ample reason for suspicion that the detainee possessed an illegal firearm since the barrel was a half-inch shy of the legal limit, and, when coupled with a thirty-round ammunition clip, it reasonably could look more like a rifle than a handgun; and (2) The officers stopped the detainee only as long as it took to investigate the legitimacy of the weapon and bring a supervisor to the park. Embody v. Ward, 695 F.3d 577, 2012 FED App. 293P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18399 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2012).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm because witnesses testified that defendant approached and attempted to speak to the victim moments before the victim was shot, the driver of the car in which defendant was riding testified that defendant shot the victim, a forensic scientist testified that the bullet that was retrieved from the victim's heart was fired from defendant's .25 caliber pistol, and an inmate testified that defendant spoke about the shooting when they were incarcerated. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2018).

10. Intentional and Knowing.

Where the defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded, the risk of serious bodily injury to the victim, in such a fashion as to constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would have exercised, the defendant's conduct could easily sustain a determination that his conduct was intentional and knowing, as well. The defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the victim's serious bodily injury so as to justify a conviction for aggravated assault. State v. Baggett, 836 S.W.2d 593, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Second degree murder was a result-of-conduct offense, and allowing the jury to convict based upon awareness of the nature of the conduct or circumstances surrounding the conduct erroneously lessened the state's burden of proof for the offense; the error in a jury charge regarding the “knowing” element was not harmless, because the only real issue at trial was the degree of homicide committed, which in turn rested upon the mens rea and appropriate conduct element. State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d 781, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to have determined that defendant acted with premeditation; defendant threatened to kill the victim prior to the shooting and was angry with the victim on the morning of the incident, defendant admitted shooting at the victim, who was hit at least twice in the head, the jury could have inferred that defendant exercised reflection and judgment in forming the intent to kill the victim, and the jury rejected defendant's claim of self-defense. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2016).

Evidence established that defendant intentionally killed the victim with premeditation; defendant was not armed during his original altercation with the victim, then later appeared without warning and shot the victim, who was unarmed, and the jury could have determined that sufficient time had passed for defendant to have acted after reflection and with premeditation, not with excitement and passion. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2016).

Doctor testified that the minor victim's tongue injury could have been caused by either non-accidental or accidental means, which provided sufficient evidence for a jury to have found that the injury was the result of non-accidental conduct, and therefore was knowing relative to the conduct involved or to the circumstances surrounding the conduct, for purposes of defendant's aggravated child abuse conviction. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of cruelty to animals because several witnesses testified as to the condition of the horses and the lack of any grass or hay, defendant had been previously warned that her horses were being underfed, several months later she had failed to remedy the situation, and one horse's spine, ribs, and hip bones were all visible and her foal was undersized due to mare malnutrition. State v. Wood, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1028 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated child abuse conviction because an expert in forensic pathology, who performed the one-year-old victim's autopsy, testified that the victim, defendant's stepchild, died from multiple blunt force injuries and because the jury heard recordings of defendant's statements that were made during a police interview as to what happened. It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant knowingly inflicted the victim's extensive injuries, other than by accidental means, while in defendant's sole care. State v. Batiz, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's second degree murder conviction because codefendant brought a handgun to take money from the victim, an altercation occurred, defendant obtained the gun during the altercation, defendant pointed the gun at the victim and fired it multiple times, and the gunshot wounds resulted in the victim's death. Defendant acted with an awareness that defendant's conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim's death. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Defendant acted with the intent to kill and with premeditation in that defendant traded handguns for a high-powered assault rifle; defendant stopped defendant's car at a red light on a street, lowered the window, pointed the rifle toward an unarmed group of people on a sidewalk who did not provoke defendant, and fired a shot, paused, and fired a second shot; and defendant fled the scene and disposed of the rifle during a high-speed police pursuit. State v. Corbin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2020).

11. Owner.

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated robbery because, even though no money was taken from a store employee personally, a clerk operating a cash register was considered the “owner” of property for purposes of aggravated robbery. Moreover, defendant was apprehended a few blocks from the store wearing a torn t-shirt, the victim's wallet and store receipts were found near defendant, the victim identified defendant as the perpetrator, and a clothing fragment found in the store's parking lot matched the hole in defendant's t-shirt. State v. Minter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 439 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Although defendant contended that the corporate owner of a building was improperly identified in the indictment for vandalism and burglary of a building, the indictment listed the statute of the offenses for which defendant was indicted, giving defendant sufficient notice of the charges against defendant. The evidence introduced at trial did not substantially vary from the information on the indictment, and there was no evidence that defendant's efforts at defending against the charges were hampered by the notice given by the indictment. Walton v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's vandalism conviction under T.C.A. § 39-14-408(b)(1), as he admitted he caused the damage to the trailer and offered to repair the damage, plus he showed the officer copper wires in his possession and acknowledged that he obtained items from the trailer; by finding defendant guilty, the jury accredited the victim's testimony, which stated that he was the owner of the trailer, for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(26). State v. Watson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2017).

12. Serious Bodily Injury.

A head injury which was so severe that it first led the victim and others to believe she had suffered a fractured skull, and caused severe pain and dizziness in the victim constituted “serious bodily injury” within the meaning of T.C.A. §§ 39-11-106 and 39-14-404. State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

In a prosecution for aggravated rape, proof that defendant caused the victim to suffer excruciating pain, caused a bruise on her leg, broke a scab on her knee causing it to bleed, scratched her neck when he choked her, and injured her lip established “bodily injury” within the meaning of the statute. State v. McPherson, 882 S.W.2d 365, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Evidence that the victim of a robbery suffered a broken nose, a bruised cheekbone, and a laceration across the bridge of her nose was not sufficient proof of serious bodily injury to support a conviction of especially aggravated robbery. State v. Sims, 909 S.W.2d 46, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled, State v. Osborne, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 1999), overruled in part, State v. Osborne, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 1999), overruled, State v. Price, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1154 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 24, 1999), overruled in part, State v. Lowery, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 12, 2000).

Bite wound to victim's arm did not constitute “serious bodily injury” sufficient to support conviction for aggravated assault. State v. Barnes, 954 S.W.2d 760, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Convictions of especially aggravated robbery, T.C.A. § 39-13-403(a)(1), (2), were vacated because there was insufficient proof that the victim's gunshot wound was a serious bodily injury; serious bodily injury was not established under T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(34)(B)-(E) because there was no evidence that the injury involved a loss of consciousness, no proof that the victim suffered extreme physical pain, and nothing supported an inference that the injury involved protracted or obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. Finally, serious bodily injury was not established under § 39-11-106(a)(34)(A) because courts had to look to the injury that occurred rather than the injury that could have occurred or the manner in which it occurred. State v. Farmer, 380 S.W.3d 96, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. Aug. 22, 2012).

Evidence supported the serious bodily injury element of defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery, as the medical examiner confirmed that the victim had been shot at least twice with a .45 caliber weapon, and also described the victim's serious bodily injuries, stating that one of the wounds caused almost immediate death, while the other bullet caused injuries to the victim's neck, shoulder, and arm. State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 746 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2012).

Child abuse victims did not suffer pain to the degree necessary to qualify as serious bodily injury; although they testified that defendant had choked them until they stopped breathing or passed out, neither testified that their loss of consciousness lasted for more than a brief period. State v. Mathis, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2013), cert. denied, Mathis v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 51, 134 S. Ct. 60, — U.S. —, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 5552 (U.S. 2013).

Evidence was insufficient to support a finding of bodily injury because, although the alleged child sexual assault victim testified that it felt bad when defendant touched the victim, the medical examination of the victim did not reveal any bruises, cuts, or abrasions. The appellate court was hard pressed to find that “it felt bad” equated to the injury required for child abuse. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 504 S.W.3d 260, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2016).

In connection with his convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping, defendant did not challenge the application of three enhancement factors, and his only complaint was that the trial court discounted the mitigating factor that his conduct neither caused nor threatened serious injury; while it was arguable whether a migraine headache fit the definition of serious injury, the trial court did not err in giving no weight to this proposed mitigating factor, the sentences imposed were within the appropriate ranges, and the trial court adequately considered the purposes of sentencing. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault because defendant used his vehicle to ram into a victim several times, injuring her severely; defendant drove his vehicle at another victim, who fell while trying to get away but was able to get up and run away, and that victim specifically testified that he was scared when defendant was driving toward him. State v. Rush, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2016).

Minor victim's tongue had a one-and-one-half centimeters cut, but the injury only required observation during a six-week healing period, the victim suffered no complications, and the tongue barely had dimple after it healed; thus, for purposes of defendant's aggravated child abuse conviction resulting in serious bodily injury, although the evidence sufficiently established that the victim suffered bodily injury, a rational jury could not have found that the injury constituted serious bodily injury. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that the victim sustained serious bodily injury as an element of especially aggravated robbery. The serious bodily injury element was based on a gaping gash on the side of the victim's neck, and this injury was inarguably the result of the crime. State v. Heath, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury where the victim testified that he suffered five gunshot wounds, classified his pain as the worst he had felt in his life, and testified that he was still in pain a year later, had permanent scarring from the gunshot wounds, and lost complete function of his right arm. State v. Vaughn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016).

Victim's testimony that his pain was such that he was unable to lie down or sleep for the first two days following the assault and that he experiences such extreme vertigo that he repeatedly vomited was sufficient for the jury to find that the victim suffered a serious bodily injury as required for aggravated assault. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 618 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault as the victim suffered serious bodily injury because the victim was intentionally assaulted by defendant when he exited the market and refused to share his beer and/or cigarettes; two men got the victim on the ground and proceeded to kick and punch him; the beating resulted in a broken nose, a dislocated jaw, a torn eyelid, a detached optical nerve, and multiple bruises; the victim had blood squirting out of his eye nearly a day after the incident; the victim rated his pain as above 10; and the victim required jaw surgery and was now permanently blind in one eye. State v. Palmer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated kidnapping because he came onto the victim's porch, struck the victim, and forced the victim back into the residence; he then pushed the victim to the living room floor and pinned the victim down by placing his knee on the victim's back; he tied the victim's wrists and legs together in the “hogtied” position; he and another person left the victim's residence while the victim was still tied up and lying on the floor; the victim sustained contusions, abrasions, broken ribs, blunt force injuries, and eventually died from a heart attack from the stress of the offenses; and the jury could have found that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Although defendant argued that defendant acted in self-defense, the evidence supported defendant's conviction for domestic assault because the victim and eyewitnesses testified that defendant struck the victim, whom defendant had dated at times over the years, but never married, during an exchange of custody of their infant son in a store parking lot. Although defendant argued that defendant acted in self-defense, the evidence supported defendant's conviction for domestic assault because the victim and eyewitnesses testified that defendant struck the victim, whom defendant had dated at times over the years, but never married, during an exchange of custody of their infant son in a store parking lot. The victim suffered cuts to the victim's nose in the altercation. State v. Glenn, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant mother of aggravated child neglect because she acknowledged that she noticed blisters on the 10-month-old victim on a Wednesday and Thursday; defendant was told that the victim should be taken to a doctor or a children's hospital; defendant did not take the victim for medical treatment until she was forced to do so five or six days after he was injured; 15% of his total body surface was covered with second degree burns; the first two or three days of the victim's burns were the most painful; he could have been treated immediately with narcotics and steroids to lessen the swelling and decrease the pain from his eye injuries; and the lack of medical treatment caused him to suffer excruciating pain. State v. Lopez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2018).

Although petitioner waived the issue, his claims of ineffective assistance related to the failure to argue that the victim did not suffer serious bodily injury still failed, as counsel testified that he could not make a good faith argument to that effect, the post-conviction court determined this was a matter of trial strategy, and the court agreed on review. Dyer v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Testimony that the victim's nose was broken, eye and ear were cut, his hearing aid was driven into his ear, he required stitches, and he was in physical pain was sufficient to support a finding of serious bodily injury. State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2018).

Because the rape of a child necessarily involved mental suffering—or at least a threat of such—within the meaning of serious bodily injury, the mitigating factor under T.C.A. § 40-35-113(1) was inapplicable to defendant's offenses. State v. Kimble, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the first, second, and third defendants of especially aggravated kidnapping because defendants knowingly confined the victim by hanging her by her arms from the ceiling in order to inflict serious bodily injury upon her; and, although each defendant argued that the victim voluntarily submitted to the BDSM (bondage and discipline, dominance and submission, and sadism and masochism) lifestyle and her role as a house slave, the evidence did not support the argument that the victim consented to having her liberty restricted so that she could be beaten to death. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Because defendant was convicted of both especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault based on the same serious bodily injury to the victim, defendant's especially aggravated burglary conviction had to be reduced to aggravated burglary. State v. Fykes, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault because defendant did not reside at the victim's house and he entered without the victim's effective consent as he did not have a key to the victim's house, and he entered by throwing a cinder block through a window; and the victim suffered serious bodily injury as she had significant swelling and pain, a broken nose, a fractured jaw, multiple contusions, and permanent vision impairment. State v. Fykes, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the element of serious bodily injury as required to establish the offense of especially aggravated robbery because as a result of the robbery, the victim suffered permanent scarring on his head and inside of his lip, and photographs of the same were admitted into evidence at trial. State v. Darvin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2019).

Definition of serious bodily injury under T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(34) was inapplicable for purposes of terminating a parent's rights on the ground of severe child abuse, and instead, T.C.A. § 37-1-102(b)(27) governed. In re Imerald W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish serious bodily injury, and therefore defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping was affirmed, because the record showed that defendant repeatedly struck the victim resulting in her losing consciousness multiple times, defendant had to support her while walking, she could not shower or walk from the shower to the hotel bed unassisted, her eyes were so swollen from the beating that she could not see the hotel telephone and had to feel around for the cord, and she suffered a laceration on her head that bled, a hematoma to the back of the head, extremely swollen facial features that prevented paramedics from examining the victim's eyes and mouth, a broken nose and eye socket that required surgery, and a neck sprain. State v. Evans, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault and domestic assault because the victim suffered serious bodily injury after being hit and then kicked in the face multiple times by defendant; her left eye was swollen shut, and the left side of her face was heavily bruised; the victim testified that she still experienced facial pain from the assault, and her eye still did not completely open; defendant and the victim had been dating for approximately two years and had been living together; and defendant did not act in self-defense as he was not in danger of death or serious bodily injury at the time he dragged the victim out of the truck and then kicked her in the face multiple times. State v. Porter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

13. Value.

Cost to repair the victims'  properties in a vandalism case was an appropriate measure of value. State v. Bolton, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's vandalism conviction where it showed that the victim and two other testified to large amounts of wire being cut and removed from the house and a witness testified that the estimated cost of repair was $12,600. State v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016).

When defendant was convicted of theft of real property, the property was correctly valued at over $250,000, for sentencing purposes, because (1) the property's rental value was not the correct measure, as such a valuation was not statutorily authorized and defendant did not only intend to permanently deprive a bank of the property's rental value, and (2) the property was appraised at $3 million. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

There was sufficient evidence that the fair market value of the stolen property exceeded $ 10,000, given that the victim testified that the value of all of the items that were stolen was between $ 12,000 and $ 13,000, and while she agreed that she submitted a list to the police department stating that 40 pairs of shoes had been stolen, she explained that there had always been at least 100 pairs of shoes in storage, and the trier of fact was free to accredit the victim's testimony. State v. Firestone, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2017).

State does not have to make an election of offenses in prosecutions for theft and vandalism as the State is permitted to aggregate the value of the stolen and vandalized property and prosecute the multiple thefts and acts of vandalism as a single offense. Because the indictment charged defendant with one count of theft and one count of vandalism that occurred between the fall of 2011 and January 2012, even though multiple acts of theft and vandalism might have occurred during that time, the acts were against the same owner, from the same location, and were committed pursuant to a continuing criminal impulse or a single sustained larcenous scheme, and the State could aggregate all of the theft and vandalism allegations into one indictment. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the value of the stolen goods was over than $1,000 because the victim testified that the value of the laptop was between $900 and $1,000 and the value of the camera was approximately $300. State v. Rembert, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2018).

Trial court appropriately sentenced defendant for a Class E felony after applying the criminal saving's statute to the vandalism conviction because the punishment applicable to defendant's vandalism conviction moved from a Class D felony to a Class E felony under the amended theft statute, which provided defendant with a “lesser penalty” for his vandalism conviction; the victim stated defendant inflicted $ 2,000 in damages on her van. State v. Swinford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of theft of property over the value of $60,000 because he stipulated at trial that he admitted to police to forging the deeds that conveyed the three properties to him, two appraisals of the properties—one using a cost approach and the other a market value approach—determined the value of property at $60,000 or more, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing lay witnesses to testify that they believed that the appraised values of the properties were low. State v. Sears, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony vandalism because it showed that defendant used a forklift to pick up the victim's pickup truck and flip the truck on its side, the victim stated that his truck was in excellent condition and the insurance adjuster said that the truck was an average to above-average vehicle, the adjuster estimated that the cost to repair the truck was $9,488.24, and because the adjuster determined that the truck was totaled, the victim was written a check for $12,562.83, which was determined to be the value of the truck minus a $250 deductible. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2020).

14. Evidence.

15. —Sufficient.

There was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in a head-on collision with another car where the defendant was driving on the wrong side of the street, the day was clear, the roadway was dry, just a block or two prior to the collision, the defendant was seen, if not driving recklessly, at least driving in a careless, hurried, and anxious manner, the defendant had a blood alcohol level of .02 percent at 1:40 p.m. which would support a finding that his blood alcohol level would have been between .04 percent and .07 percent at the time of the collision (10:00 a.m.); the defendant falsely told a police officer at the scene that a friend was driving; and the defendant's explanation for driving on the wrong side of the road might well have been disbelieved by the jury. State v. Norris, 874 S.W.2d 590, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), overruled in part, State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. 2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, as it showed that: (1) Defendant and his co-defendant decided to rob the victims instead of paying for the weapons; (2) Defendant was overheard saying that if they robbed the victims they would have to kill them because they knew defendants; (3) They carried handcuffs, rope, and duct tape to the meeting; (4) When defendants returned to the co-defendant's apartment they had numerous assault weapons and one of the victim's cars; (5) Defendant told a friend that he had killed one victim because his co-defendant had been unable to do so; (6) Defendants burned and abandoned the victim's car in a remote location, then spent the night in a motel away from their usual abode; (7) When confronted by police the next day, both defendants fled; and (8) Following defendant's arrest, he admitted to being at the scene. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of premeditated first degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) and T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(18) where the evidence showed that defendant had been physically and mentally abusive toward the victim during their relationship; defendant beat the victim with a pistol; defendant threatened to kill the victim, and these actions were filmed by a surveillance camera; a passenger in the car with the victim when she was shot five times identified defendant as the shooter; another witness said the shooter resembled defendant; and several witnesses saw a car resembling defendant's car speeding from the scene. State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's attempted extortion convictions because defendant admitted that he was attempting to obtain a more satisfactory divorce settlement, defendant sent a list of demands connected to the divorce to the attorney who was handling the divorce for defendant's ex-wife, and the list of demands was addressed to the attorney's husband, who was a judge seeking re-election; the list included a draft of a complaint against the attorney, and defendant stated that he would campaign against the husband/judge in the upcoming election if the divorce was not settled to his satisfaction. Parris v. State, 236 S.W.3d 173, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a first degree murder conviction because, prior to the murder, the victim's wife saw defendant “peeping” over at her house, on the day of the murder a witness encountered defendant at 7:40 a.m. walking near the victim's home, and the murder occurred between 8:30 a.m. and 9:20 a.m.; after 10:00 a.m., a witness picked up defendant at a location near a trail leading from the victim's home, and the ammunition found in defendant's home was consistent with the unusual combination of power piston wads and “double aught buckshot” found at the crime scene. State v. Stephens, 264 S.W.3d 719, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2008), overruled in part, State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant knowingly killed a victim, as expert testimony detailing three separate skull fractures and eleven fractures to eight different ribs established that defendant violently beat the victim, and defendant admitted that defendant threw the victim to the ground in what defendant described as a “body-slam.” State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), cert. denied, Pruitt v. Tennessee, 189 L. Ed. 2d 839, 134 S. Ct. 2874, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4624 (U.S. 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to establish the element of premeditation in defendant's convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder because: (1) defendant shot the adult victims multiple times and then repeatedly stabbed and beat the young children, moving from room to room to do so; and (2) defendant altered the scene to make it appear as if the murders were drug or gang-related, moved bodies, disposed of or hid kitchen knives and handles, and collected the cartridge casings. State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2013), aff'd, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because he admitted to hitting the victim in the face, breaking her nose; he hit the victim on the head with the butt of a gun; he pushed the victim into the bathroom with tremendous force, causing her to collide with the vanity; the victim testified concerning her loss of consciousness, pain, scars, and permanent physical conditions; and medical personnel discussed the severity of the victim's injuries. State v. Feaster, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2014), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of vandalism because the proof established that defendant had, over at least 16 months, dumped massive amounts of construction and demolition debris on the victims'  properties without the consent of any of the victims. The State presented sufficient proof of the value of the damaged properties because a geologist testified about the cost to remove and dispose of the debris defendant dumped on the victims'  property and the cost to fill the pits on the properties, and an operations manager for an industrial and environmental contractor testified that one victim's property no longer held any value due to the amount of damage caused by the dumping. State v. Bolton, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder because the jury could infer that defendant traveled about one-fourth of one mile on foot from a church to the victim's house, where he placed a barrel under a window, removed the screen, entered the house through the open window, shot the victim in the head with a .22 caliber weapon, left through the front door, went to his mother's house, and waited until the body had been discovered the next day before initiating any contact with the authorities; and because defendant's actions were inconsistent with a conclusion he was incapable, due to intoxication, of premeditating the victim's killing. State v. Rayfield, 507 S.W.3d 682, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000 because the evidence was sufficient to establish the value of the property defendant stole from a department store because loss prevention officers at the store testified as to observing defendant shoplift items from the store, a computer-generated report of stolen items was created by scanning the price tags of the items in defendant's possession, and defendant signed a statement of admission which listed the same items and the total price. State v. Shotwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of first degree murder where it showed that defendant and his family had a lengthy disagreement with the victims and their friends, defendant told a witness he would put a bullet through one of the victim's head, both victims were shot in the head, bullets found in defendant's truck were consistent with the caliber of bullets found at the scene, documents of email and social media messages relative to the desire to kill the victims and defendant's willingness to help found shredded in defendant's truck, defendant's accomplice admitted both he and defendant were involved in the murders, and defendant implicated himself in the crimes during a phone call with his wife. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because the victim testified that she remained in the hospital for two days following the attack, that she sustained numerous cuts and stab wounds, that she was heavily medicated for weeks following the assault, and that she was still unable to bend her thumbs due to the severity of the injury to her hands. State v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated rape because a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant attempted to penetrate the victim's vagina with his penis without her consent and caused bodily injury to the victim; defendant demanded sexual intercourse from the victim, and when she refused defendant grabbed her throat, punched her in the head, climbed on top of her, and penetrated the victim's vagina with his penis. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because defendant struck the victim with a wooden beam multiple times, and the victim sustained bodily injury; the victim testified in detail about his injuries, and his testimony was supported by the photographs received as an exhibit. State v. Tiger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000 as defendant intended to deprive the victims of their property because the first victim observed defendant walking alone in the street wearing his son's baseball cap, which was distinctive due to its custom lettering; when an officer approached defendant, the first victim looked inside defendant's bags and identified his items; defendant had a store receipt for perishable goods; and the last four digits of the debit card used in the store transaction matched the last four digits of the second victim's missing debit card. State v. Leonard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because defendant involved himself in an altercation between the victim and defendant's friend; during the altercation, defendant left the friend's porch, approached the victim, and struck him in the head with a brick; once the victim was on the ground, defendant struck him an additional three or four times; as a result of the incident, the victim suffered multiple facial fractures, requiring three surgical procedures; and the trial court charged the jury on the issue of self-defense, and the jury chose to reject that defense, as was its prerogative. State v. Benfield, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment against his two-month-old daughter where it showed that he shot into the driver's car while his daughter was strapped in her infant carrier in the backseat, defendant knew that the victim was in the vehicle because he had placed her there, he recklessly shot through the window of the car on the passenger side, and he walked around to the driver's side and fired multiple shots into the car. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon because whether defendant intended to harm the investigator was immaterial as defendant used his vehicle in a manner capable of inflicting serious bodily injury to the investigator because defendant swerved into the investigator's lane at the moment of their passing; the investigator's testimony evinced that defendant looked directly ahead as he shifted half of his vehicle into the investigator's lane; had it not been for the investigator's evasive action, it could be reasonably concluded that the vehicles would have collided head-on; and defendant's act undoubtedly placed the investigator in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. State v. Boaz, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, sexual battery, and assault where it showed that he broke into his estranged wife's house, choked her, repeatedly threatened to kill her, coerced her into having oral sex and sexual intercourse with him multiple times, the wife had bruises and marks on her throat, a DNA swab from the victim was consistent with defendant's DNA profile, and defendant had a bite mark on his forearm, marks on his cheeks, and scrapes on his head and elbow. State v. Blanton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery where his girlfriend testified that on the night of the crimes, defendant went into the victims'  motel room with a gun and she heard two pops, the victims died from gunshot wounds to the head, even though one victim had a considerable amount of money earlier that evening when his body was found he had none, the girlfriend saw defendant with a cell phone after the crimes which he later disposed of, and the victim's cell phone was never found. State v. Wade, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of assault and domestic assault where it showed that the victim had a slight abrasion on her nose and slight discoloration on her neck, the jury heard the victim's testimony and saw photographs of her injuries, the jury could have found that the victim reasonably feared bodily injury when defendant charged her and forced her to the ground, and the victim and defendant had a child together. State v. Freitas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2016).

Evidence strongly supported defendant's convictions for the lesser included offenses of reckless endangerment and attempted especially aggravated robbery because the proof adduced at trial established that defendant accosted the victim, pointed a handgun at him, shot him once in the lower left leg, and stole his cellular telephone and cash; both the victim and a witness positively identified defendant in a photographic lineup one month after the incident. State v. Thaxton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of resisting official detention because the new charge of felony murder was considered a new arrest, he was taken into custody at the jail and was subjected to new booking procedures, and by refusing to provide a fingerprint he resisted the arrest for the new charges. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

Evidence at defendant's trial was sufficient because, viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the State, the evidence showed defendant murdered a victim during an attempted especially aggravated robbery. State v. Greer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2017).

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of aggravated assault because the State's evidence established that he assaulted a correctional officer by striking the officer over thirty time; the proof powerfully established that defendant's attack on the officer resulted in serious bodily injury and that defendant assaulted the officer with intent and knowledge that his actions would result in serious bodily injury; State v. Armstrong, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 5, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because defendant was aware of but consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim would be seriously injured; defendant, while being repositioned in his hospital bed, looked the victim directly in the eye, lifted both legs, and kicked her beneath her chin, and a nurse and officer testified that defendant stated he intended to kick the male nurse rather than the victim. State v. Day, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 873 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault and child abuse because defendant and the child's mother were the sole caretakers of the one-month-old victim; defendant solely cared for the victim while the mother worked; both defendant and the mother admitted to becoming frustrated with the victim when he became fussy; at two-months-old, x-rays revealed numerous fractures throughout the victim's body; a doctor testified about the 23 fractures in various stages of healing to the victim's rib cage, legs, and arms and opined that the injuries were sustained through abuse; and defendant admitted to the police that he handled the victim roughly when frustrated and even heard a “pop” sound during one such incident. State v. Crawford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 870 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated child abuse of the three-month-old victim because, other than some slight congestion, the victim was healthy when her mother dropped her off with defendant; a video recorded on defendant's phone at 12:45 that afternoon showed the victim appearing unharmed and not displaying any symptoms of a severe brain injury; the victim's injuries were discovered around 2:03 p.m. when defendant's neighbor called 911; a child abuse pediatrician classified the injuries as non-accidental; and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant knowingly inflicted the injuries as she was the only person capable of inflicting such injuries on the victim at the time they were sustained. State v. Humphrey, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for three counts of aggravated child abuse because defendant knowingly engaged in the conduct that resulted in the victim's bone fractures; the two-month-old victim had nine bone fractures, a doctor concluded that the fractures were the result of blunt force trauma to the chest or any type of squeezing mechanism, and defendant admitted to becoming frustrated with the victim and squeezing him. State v. McDuffie, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed because defendant placed a loaded handgun into a cooler and then placed the cooler on the front seat of his vehicle, and defendant acknowledged that he carried the weapon for the purpose of defending himself. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property valued over $10,000 but less than $60,000 because defendant was driving the truck that had been reported stolen by the owner; when stopped near a repair shop, defendant told officers that he thought the truck belonged to another individual and that he was taking it for repairs; and the reasons given by defendant for driving the truck were contradicted by the other individual's testimony at trial that he did not operate a trucking company at the time and did not employ defendant as a driver or repairman. State v. Richards, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft of property valued at $1,000 or more than but less than $10,000 because defendant was defendant's paramour and asset protection managers for a retail store identified defendant in the store's video surveillance recording removing items from the store without playing for them in two incidents. The asset protection managers'  testimony sufficiently established the aggregate value of the items that were taken during the two incidents. State v. Keese, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence that the 90-year-old victim was very bruised, with lots of facial trauma, was very uncomfortable and in pain due to the repeated blows to her face, and faced the possibility for intracranial bleeding due to her being on a blood thinner was sufficient to support a finding that she suffered serious injury involving a substantial risk of death and to support first defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property valued at $ 1,000 or more because witnesses'  testimony established the total value of all the fitness trackers taken during the five thefts; both witnesses testified that they were charged with keeping track of the fitness trackers and that they maintained logs of the items, and both testified to the manufacturer's suggested retail price of the fitness trackers at the time they were taken. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse because it showed that defendant was alone in the room with the five-year-old victim who suffered injuries that medical experts equated with having been injured in a car accident or while skydiving. State v. Cooke, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated robbery as the victim suffered serious bodily injury based on both an obvious disfigurement and the substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member because the victim testified that he was unable to fully perform his work duties for a year after the shooting and even needed help turning a screwdriver; he had a scar on his neck from the shooting that would continue to expand as time progressed; and he suffered a spinal fracture to his C4 vertebra. State v. Nelson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of attempted second degree murder because defendant knowingly fired at least four rounds into the tow truck containing the two victims; the evidence presented at trial established that defendant was not standing in front of the tow truck when he fired his weapon; the jury rightfully rejected defendant's argument that his actions were justified because he was in state of passion caused by the towing of his brother's truck; one victim was permanently paralyzed from the armpits down; and it was apparent from the record that the jury heard and rejected defendant's self-defense argument at trial. State v. Proffitt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because a trooper recovered a firearm and a baggy containing marijuana and pills from defendant's person during a search of his vehicle. State v. Barnett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder because it showed that both before and after a drug transaction defendant and the victim argued, defendant shot the victim in the face, and he disposed of the gun by throwing it from a bridge. Defendant also failed to render aid to the victim and fled the scene. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. July 18, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping because it showed that he choked the victim from behind, he did not attempt to retrieve any of her scattered belongings, he threatened to snap her neck unless she stopped screaming and got into the vehicle, the victim briefly lost consciousness and when she came to she was partially inside the vehicle, an eyewitness saw two men trying push a woman into a vehicle, the victim did not escape until defendant fled, and she sustained injuries to her head, and scratches, and bruises. State v. Green, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first degree premeditated murder conviction because defendant requested a witness to drive defendant to the scene of a fight where the victim and a group of men were fighting, defendant spoke angrily to the victim and provoked the fighting, defendant admitted to chasing the victim into the woods, defendant admitted to shooting once at the victim who died from a gunshot wound, and defendant appeared to lack emotion after the shooting, disposed of the weapon, and fled the jurisdiction. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to have determined that defendant entered a store and committed a theft because an asset protection associate of the store observed defendant select five pairs of scrubs, conceal them in his pants, and proceed to the exit. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of first-degree murder because it showed that they fired multiple shots into a house after calling the home to see if a particular person was at the house, and the fact that they did not kill their intended victim was irrelevant. State v. Avant, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of attempted first-degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury because they opened fire on a home with people inside and were seen by an eyewitness firing shots from the car, and while the proof did not indicate which defendant actually fired the shot that injured the victim both defendants were criminally responsible for the conduct of the other. The proof also supported the finding that the victim suffered the loss of a bodily organ. State v. Avant, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of second-degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide because her friend's testimony established that defendant pulled the trigger on the gun that killed the three victims, the testimony was corroborated by the fact that defendant's fingerprint was on a receipt recovered from one victim's vehicle, a witness testified that defendant entered his home with blood on her clothes and a pistol that was not fully loaded, and the pistol was one of the types of pistol that could have fire the bullets recovered from the crime scene. State v. Isaac, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated rape because the two victims each testified that defendant held them down on the bed and took turns vaginally penetrating them, physical evidence matching defendant's DNA profile and one of the victim's DNA profile was found at the scene, and each victim testified that they felt pain during the rape. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated child abuse because the physician testified that all of the victim's injuries were recent and non-accidental and the overwhelming evidence showed that the victim was in the sole care of defendant when he received his injuries. State v. Groves, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of child neglect because defendant, knowing that victim was injured, failed to immediately contact the mother or seek medical assistance for the victim. State v. Groves, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless homicide because she consciously disregarded a substantial and justifiable risk that the baby would suffocate by placing her hand over the baby's mouth and nose after birth, and the risk was of such a nature and degree that its disregard constituted a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2020).

16. —Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to sustain a criminally negligent homicide conviction because defendant's act of holding her child on her lap in the front passenger seat was not a gross deviation from the standard of care at the time of the accident; articles entered into evidence illustrated how new the risk of air bags was at the time of the accident, in 1998, and the fact that there was a need for a large-scale public information campaign aimed at educating parents about child car safety indicated how many people were not using child safety restraints at the time of the accident. State v. Jones, 151 S.W.3d 494, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 992 (Tenn. 2004).

No reasonable fact finder could conclude that defendant's entry of the residence was without the victim's “effective consent,” and, therefore, the evidence is insufficient to establish defendant's guilt of aggravated burglary or burglary; no rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant deceived the victim either by reinforcing a false impression of intent to enter the residence in order to purchase a drink, or by failing to correct a false impression that he was a legitimate customer. State v. Pope, 427 S.W.3d 363, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1086 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2013).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct because the proof did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's refusal to exit the vehicle created a “hazardous” condition. State v. Webber, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 894 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 2016).

Defendant's trial counsel provided deficient performance by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of defendant's especially aggravated robbery conviction on the basis that the act of violence or force, which resulted in serious bodily injury to the victim and elevated the charged offense to especially aggravated robbery, occurred after the taking was complete. Boatwright v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2020).

17. Reckless.

Evidence supported defendant's vehicular homicide by reckless conduct and reckless aggravated assault convictions because defendant acted recklessly as a witness testified that defendant was driving in the wrong direction on an interstate highway when defendant's SUV hit the victims'  car head-on and crash reconstructionists testified that defendant's SUV was driving in the wrong direction and that the SUV's crash data recording system reflected that the SUV accelerated just before impact. State v. Pena, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 761 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment because it showed that he fired two shots from a handgun at the boyfriend, who was standing behind and near the ex-wife, which placed her in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. In so doing, defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the ex-wife would be injured or killed by a stray bullet. State v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's reckless homicide conviction because the evidence showed defendant mishandled a firearm defendant knew was loaded, resulting in a victim's death. State v. Lane, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 600 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of misdemeanor reckless endangerment as he showed a complete disregard for the victim's well-being because she testified that she lost consciousness after being assaulted by defendant; he left her lying injured in the middle of the highway in the dark with impaired vision and no shoes or cell phone; there were no street lights for 2.4 miles; and she walked 3.8 miles barefooted to a restaurant to get help. State v. Porter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

18. Benefit.

Trial court erred in granting defendant, a corrections officer, judgments of acquittal on three counts of official misconduct because, while he had no relationship with the three inmates at issue, did not try to confer a benefit or do harm to them, and did not receive anything from them in exchange for entering unearned work credits, the benefit was not required to accrue to defendant, but could benefit “any other person in whose welfare” he had an interest, and whether he “was interested” in the welfare of a third party for whom a benefit was obtained was a question for a properly instructed jury. State v. Stoner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 3, 2019).

39-11-107, 39-11-108. [Reserved.]

  1. When the same conduct may be defined under both a specific statute and a general statute, the person may be prosecuted under either statute, unless the specific statute precludes prosecution under the general statute.
  2. When the same conduct may be defined under two (2) or more specific statutes, the person may be prosecuted under either statute unless one (1) specific statute precludes prosecution under another.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-11-110. Felonies and misdemeanors distinguished.

All violations of law that may be punished by one (1) year or more of confinement or by the infliction of the death penalty are denominated felonies, and all violations of law punishable by fine or confinement for less than one (1) year, or both, are denominated misdemeanors.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Classification of felony offenses occurring prior to November 1, 1989, § 40-35-118.

Classification of misdemeanors and felonies, § 40-35-110.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Penalties for misdemeanors and felonies, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 25.62, 27.194.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, §§ 4, 25; 16 Tenn. Juris., Intoxicating Liquors, § 3; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 22.

Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), § 803(22).1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Because the penalties for a violation of the D.U.I. statute provided for a maximum punishment of 11 months and 29 days under T.C.A. § 55-10-403(a)(1)(A) (see now § 55-10-402), defendant's charge for D.U.I. in his arrest warrant was classified as a “misdemeanor” under T.C.A. § 39-11-110 for purposes of determining the proper statute of limitations. State v. Tait, 114 S.W.3d 518, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. 2003).

Definition of “felony” provided in T.C.A. § 39-11-110 controls the determination of whether an out-of-state conviction constitutes a “felony drug offense.” State v. Smith, 495 S.W.3d 271, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

Applying the definition of “felony” in T.C.A. § 39-11-110 allows courts to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” regardless of the classification system used by the other jurisdiction. State v. Smith, 495 S.W.3d 271, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

2. Misdemeanors.

Where attorney was charged with criminal contempt in an underlying divorce suit, because an unfavorable ruling could have resulted in punishment by the assessment of a fine or imprisonment for less than a year, the charge was actually a misdemeanor charge. Robinson v. Fulliton, 140 S.W.3d 304, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Denial of the attorney's request that the trial court expunge the public records relating to the charge of criminal contempt was improper, where T.C.A. § 40-32-101(a)(1) applied insofar as the contempt charges were criminal in nature; further, criminal contempt was a misdemeanor under T.C.A. § 39-11-110, and a charge of a “misdemeanor” in T.C.A. § 40-32-101(a)(1) included the contempt proceedings in the case. Robinson v. Fulliton, 140 S.W.3d 304, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

39-11-111. Prohibited act when no penalty prescribed is misdemeanor.

When the performance or nonperformance of any act is made criminal by statute, and no penalty, punishment or forfeiture for the violation of that statute is imposed, the doing of the act is a misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Felonies and misdemeanors distinguished, § 39-11-110.

Penalty for misdemeanor where punishment not prescribed, § 39-11-114.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systemic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253 (1974).

39-11-112. Repealed or amended laws — Application in prosecution for offense.

When a penal statute or penal legislative act of the state is repealed or amended by a subsequent legislative act, the offense, as defined by the statute or act being repealed or amended, committed while the statute or act was in full force and effect shall be prosecuted under the act or statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. Except as provided under § 40-35-117, in the event the subsequent act provides for a lesser penalty, any punishment imposed shall be in accordance with the subsequent act.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 16.65, 32.12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

The criminal savings statute has never been interpreted to apply to convictions and sentences which were already received when a subsequent act or amendment provided for a lesser penalty. State ex rel. Stewart v. McWherter, 857 S.W.2d 875, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

T.C.A. § 39-11-112, not T.C.A. § 40-35-117, governs the issue whether changes in capital sentencing by the 1989 amendments, as contained in T.C.A. § 39-13-204, apply to persons who committed offenses prior to November 1, 1989; thus, since the amendments did not provide for a lesser penalty, but merely changed the procedures to be followed at the sentencing hearing, where the offense occurred prior to the amendments, a jury instruction under the pre-1989 was appropriate. State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. 1995), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S. Ct. 99, 133 L. Ed. 2d 53, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5601 (1995).

Defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective, pursuant to former T.C.A. § 40-30-210(f), in setting out the range of punishment for the offense charged, when the conspiracy to which defendant pled guilty, delivery of over 300 pounds of marijuana, continued beyond the effective date of the statute designating the offense as a Class A felony, T.C.A § 39-17-417(j)(13), and defendant could properly be convicted of a Class A felony without violating the ex post facto provisions of U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, Tenn. Const. art. I, § 11, and T.C.A. § 39-11-112. Agee v. State, 111 S.W.3d 571, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Apr. 28, 2003).

Court's erroneous application of the 1998 amendment to T.C.A. § 39-13-204 in defendant's 1992 felony murder case was not harmless where it led directly to the prosecution's introduction of detailed and graphic evidence of prior violent felonies committed by defendant. The law as it existed at the time of the offense prohibited such evidence, and moreover, the prosecution heavily relied upon the inadmissible evidence underlying defendant's prior felonies in arguing that the jury should impose the death penalty for defendant's offense. State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 2004).

The amendment of T.C.A. § 39-11-501(c) in 1995, which operated to prohibit expert testimony on the ultimate issue of sanity, did not apply to defendant's offenses because they were committed before the amendment's effective date of July 1, 1995. State v. Thompson, 151 S.W.3d 434, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 995 (Tenn. 2004).

Trial court incorrectly sentenced defendant for possession of marijuana as a Class E felony instead of a Class A misdemeanor; although defendant was charged and tried under prior law, T.C.A. § 39-17-418(e) had been amended by the time of his sentencing hearing and resulted in a lesser penalty, for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-11-112, and therefore, the imposition of a Class E sentence had to be reversed. State v. Hester, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 978 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2017).

Trial court exceeded its authority by the application of the amended version of a sentencing statute, which provided for the grading of theft offenses, before the effective date in calculating defendant's sentence. Because the conviction offense was committed before the effective date of the amendment, and the sentencing occurred before the effective date of the statute, not even the date of the sentencing supplanted the date of the offenses as the controlling date in the case. State v. Keese, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Trial court erred by applying the amended version of a sentencing statute, which provided the grading of theft offenses, to modify the class of defendant's conviction offense following the revocation of defendant's probation. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the trial court was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. State v. Tolle, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2018).

Trial court appropriately sentenced defendant for a Class E felony after applying the criminal saving's statute to the vandalism conviction because the punishment applicable to defendant's vandalism conviction moved from a Class D felony to a Class E felony under the amended theft statute, which provided defendant with a “lesser penalty” for his vandalism conviction; the victim stated defendant inflicted $ 2,000 in damages on her van. State v. Swinford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2018).

Grading defendant's theft conviction as a Class E felony and imposing a Class E felony, Range II offender sentence of two years constituted plain error because prior to his sentencing hearing, the statute was amended to provide that the theft of property valued at $ 1,000 or less was a Class A misdemeanor. The sentence was vacated and modified. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Defendant's conviction for theft was to be modified from a Class D felony to a Class E felony because the Tennessee Public Safety Act of 2016, 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 906, modified the grading of theft offenses to provide for a lesser penalty. While at the time of defendant's crime and indictment defendant's actions amounted to a charge and conviction of a Class D felony for theft, by the time of defendant's sentencing hearing, the Act had taken effect, and therefore, defendant's actions constituted a Class E felony for theft. State v. Cole-Pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Savings statute was applicable to the revisions in T.C.A. § 39-41-105 providing for penalties for violation of the theft statute and thus, defendant's offense was reduced to a Class E felony rather than a Class D felony. State v. Goldberg, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2019).

T.C.A. § 39-11-112, the criminal savings statute, applies to the amendments of the theft grading statute. State v. Ruben, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2020).

State's claim that the trial court erred in applying the Criminal Savings Statute to defendant's conviction for theft over $500 lacked merit because the amended version of the theft grading statute provided for a lesser penalty for defendant's theft conviction than the prior version of the statute and thus, the condition provided in the Criminal Savings Statute was satisfied. State v. Crosland, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2020).

Inasmuch as defendant's sentencing hearing was held after the enactment of the amended theft grading statute, the trial court should have classified defendant's theft convictions in counts 3 and 4 as Class A misdemeanors. The trial court's failure to apply the amended theft grading statute at sentencing was plain error, requiring that defendant's six-year, Class E felony sentences be vacated. State v. Moats, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2020).

2. Construction with Other Statutes.

The enabling provision of the 1993 act amending T.C.A. § 39-13-202(b), which expressly states that the amendment applies to offenses committed after July 1, 1993, controls over the more general provisions of this statute and the option of sentencing a defendant to life in prison without parole was thus not available to the jury where the crime was committed before July 1, 1993. State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Cauthern v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 967, 119 S. Ct. 414, 142 L. Ed. 2d 336, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6941 (1998).

Trial court properly denied the State's Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1 motion to correct defendant's sentence for two merged convictions of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 where the grading of theft statute had been amended after defendant's conviction, the amended statute, T.C.A. § 39-14-105(a) (2018), was effective at the time of the sentencing hearing, under judicial precedent, the amended version of the grading of theft statute applied even where the offense occurred before the amendment's effective date, as long as the amended version was effective at the time of sentencing, and the record reflected that the trial court imposed Range III sentences for a Class E felony. As a result, the corrected judgments did not reflect illegal sentences, and the trial court did not err by denying the State's Rule 36.1 motion. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 27, 2019).

3. Purpose.

T.C.A. § 39-11-112 is the general saving statute by which prosecutions are preserved after the statute proscribing the offense has been amended or repealed. State v. Davis, 825 S.W.2d 109, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Jan. 27, 1992).

4. Proper Sentence.

By agreeing to entry of a judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to a six-year sentence for a Class E felony, defendant rendered his argument that the trial court, defense counsel, and prosecutor were confused about the sentence moot; defendant faced a twelve-year sentence and should not have received the lesser six-year sentence under the criminal savings statute. State v. Birdwell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 711 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2019).

39-11-113. Penalty for felony where punishment not prescribed.

Every person who is convicted of a felony, the punishment for which is not otherwise prescribed by a statute of this state, shall be sentenced as for a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Classification of felony offenses occurring prior to November 1, 1989, § 40-35-118.

Felonies and misdemeanors distinguished, § 39-11-110.

Jury may provide for punishment in county jail or workhouse for less than twelve months, § 40-20-103.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 27.194, 32.3.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 44.

Law Reviews.

Evidence — Admissibility of Prior Convictions to Impeach a Witness (Doris C. Allen), 44 Tenn. L. Rev. (2) 401 (1977).

39-11-114. Penalty for misdemeanor where punishment not prescribed.

Every person who is convicted of a misdemeanor, the punishment for which is not otherwise prescribed by a statute of this state, shall be sentenced as for a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Felonies and misdemeanors distinguished, § 39-11-110.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Prohibited act when no penalty prescribed is misdemeanor, § 39-11-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 27.194, 32.3.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 44.

Law Reviews.

Jail Fees and Court Costs for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: An Examination of the Tennessee Procedure, 35 Tenn. L. Rev. 74 (1968).

39-11-115. Determination of value.

Whenever a determination of value is necessary to assess the class of an offense in this code or the level of punishment, the determination of value shall be made by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Value, definition, § 39-11-106.

39-11-116. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-11-116 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1), concerning disposition of forfeited property, was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 1, effective June 27, 1998. For new law concerning forfeited property, see part 7 of this chapter.

39-11-117. Classification of first degree murder.

    1. For the purposes of classification of other offenses, first degree murder is one (1) class above Class A.
    2. Attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder are Class A felonies.
    3. Solicitation to commit first degree murder is a Class B felony.
  1. For the sole and exclusive purpose of determining the classification of prior offenses under sentencing guidelines, first degree murder is considered a Class A offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Because first degree murder is punished by either life imprisonment or death, first degree murder is not punished according to the sentencing structure provided in § 40-35-105 et seq. However, first degree murder is classified for two purposes only: (1) first degree murder is considered one class above a Class A felony for the purpose of classifying the preparatory offenses that are punished pursuant to § 39-12-107 and (2) first degree murder is classified as a Class A felony for the sole and exclusive purpose of calculating prior convictions under the sentencing structure where the defendant is convicted of a new offense.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Penalties for Class A and B felonies, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sentence Upheld.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing defendant to the maximum sentences of incarceration available for each of defendant's attempted first degree murder convictions because the trial court relied heavily on defendant's criminal history and noted defendant could have been sentenced as a Range II offender. In addition, the trial court found the facts established at trial indicated defendant was the leader in the commission of the offenses and that defendant acted without hesitation when the risk to human life was high. State v. Sims, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017).

39-11-118. Restitution to victims of crime.

  1. In addition to the punishment authorized by the specific statute prohibiting the conduct, it is a part of the punishment for any offense committed in this state that the person committing the offense may be sentenced by the court to pay restitution to the victim or victims of the offense in accordance with §§ 40-35-104(c)(2) and 40-35-304.
  2. In addition to the punishment authorized by the specific statute prohibiting the conduct, it is a part of the punishment for the offenses named in this subsection (b) that the defendant be sentenced by the court to pay restitution to the victim or victims of §§ 39-13-309, 39-13-514, 39-17-1005(a), 39-13-528(a), and 39-13-529(a) in accordance with §§ 40-35-104(c)(2) and 40-35-304.

Acts 1996, ch. 699, § 1; 2013, ch. 242, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1996, ch. 699, § 4 provided that nothing in that act, which added this section and amended §§ 40-35-104 and 40-35-304, shall be construed to prohibit or delay a victim from applying for and receiving any compensation to which such victim is entitled under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, compiled in title 29, chapter 13. If the court orders the defendant to pay restitution pursuant to Acts 1996, ch. 699, the state shall have a subrogation interest in such restitution payments for the full amount paid the victim under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act.

Acts 1996, ch. 699, § 5 provided that that act shall apply to any defendant sentenced on or after July 1, 1996.

Acts 2013, ch. 242, § 2 provided that the act, which added subsection (b), shall apply to all applicable offenses committed on or after July 1, 2013.

Part 2
Burden of Proof

39-11-201. Burden of proof.

  1. No person may be convicted of an offense unless each of the following is proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
    1. The conduct, circumstances surrounding the conduct, or a result of the conduct described in the definition of the offense;
    2. The culpable mental state required;
    3. The negation of any defense to an offense defined in this title if admissible evidence is introduced supporting the defense; and
    4. The offense was committed prior to the return of the formal charge.
  2. In the absence of the proof required by subsection (a), the innocence of the person is presumed.
  3. A person charged with an offense has no burden to prove innocence.
  4. Evidence produced at trial, whether presented on direct or cross-examination of state or defense witnesses, may be utilized by either party.
  5. No person may be convicted of an offense unless venue is proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
  6. If the issue is raised in defense, no person shall be convicted of an offense unless jurisdiction and the commission of the offense within the time period specified in title 40, chapter 2 are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section codifies the prior Tennessee principles regarding burdens of proof. The presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt doctrines remain unaltered and a defendant is entitled to a jury charge on those issues. Hardin v. State, 210 Tenn. 116, 355 S.W.2d 105 (1962); Gentry v. State, 184 Tenn. 299, 198 S.W.2d 643 (1947); Owen v. State, 89 Tenn. 698, 16 S.W. 114 (1891).

Note that subsection (d) is a new provision of the law. The burden regarding issues of jurisdiction and time limitations have not been altered from prior law. Under subsection (e), proof of venue by a preponderance of the evidence is required in every case. The burden of proof for venue was previously “beyond a reasonable doubt”. Subsection (f) states that jurisdiction and time limitations need be proven only in cases where those issues are raised by the defendant. Once these issues are raised, the state must prove proper jurisdiction and timely prosecution by a preponderance of the evidence.

Cross-References. Civil procedure, process, title 20, ch. 2.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Definitions for title, § 39-11-106.

Evidence and witnesses, title 24.

General defenses, title 39, ch. 11, part 5.

Jurisdiction, long-arm statutes, title 20, ch. 2, part 2.

Notice of charge, § 40-10-101.

Venue, title 20, ch. 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Defenses.

The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense. State v. Belser, 945 S.W.2d 776, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Trial court erred in admitting into evidence the prior acquittals of two men defendant claimed were the individuals responsible for a murder because defendant had a right to suggest that the men were responsible for the murder; because the jurors in defendant's case could come to a different conclusion concerning the responsibility of the men, the evidence of the acquittals did not demonstrate that it was more or less probable that the men committed the crime and under T.C.A. § 39-11-201(a) was inadmissible to demonstrate their innocence. State v. Turner, 352 S.W.3d 425, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2011).

Although the trial court should not have included in the jury instructions the prefatory phrase that, “If evidence is introduced supporting self-defense,” because that was not a proper determination for the jury but for the court itself; however, the error was harmless because the prosecution in effect conceded to the jury that evidence was introduced supporting self-defense and that the jurors had to determine whether the State had negated the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, there was simply no possibility of jury confusion regarding the fact that evidence of self-defense had been introduced and that the jury was required to consider the issue. State v. Slimick, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because defendant involved himself in an altercation between the victim and defendant's friend; during the altercation, defendant left the friend's porch, approached the victim, and struck him in the head with a brick; once the victim was on the ground, defendant struck him an additional three or four times; as a result of the incident, the victim suffered multiple facial fractures, requiring three surgical procedures; and the trial court charged the jury on the issue of self-defense, and the jury chose to reject that defense, as was its prerogative. State v. Benfield, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction because it showed defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused a victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by pointing a gun at the victim, and (2) did not act in self-defense. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Defendant's contention that the State's proof failed to rebut his self-defense theory was rejected because the State offered evidence that defendant got out of the car, pulled the victim from the car while she was injecting drugs, initiated the assault that culminated in the shooting, and had the only weapon involved. A rational jury could conclude that if the victim had been shot with a gun she possessed, defendant would have had no reason to dispose of either his gun, which he claimed had not been fired, or the victim's gun, which would have supported his claims that she had pointed a gun at him and that they had struggled for control of it. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. July 18, 2019).

Defendant's claim that defendant fatally shot the victim in self-defense and in defense of defendant's adult child failed because the strongest legitimate view of the evidence was that defendant's child was not struck and injured by the victim, defendant had the wherewithal to record officers'  radio communications in response to the shooting, defendant could not explain the parties'  orientation at the time of the shooting, and defendant later calmly discussed the shooting and mocked the victim's surviving spouse after talking to the police. State v. Waggoner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the jury clearly chose to credit the victim's version of events, rejecting defendant's testimony supporting self-defense; the victim testified specifically about the manner in which defendant and co-defendant began to follow him, about his attempts to get help through 911, about the shooting, about his fleeing the scene, and about his abandoning his own weapon to seek. State v. Manning, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

2. Mitigating Circumstances.

There is no provision in the capital sentencing scheme requiring a jury instruction that the state has the burden to disprove mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, State v. Hodges, 522 U.S. 999, 118 S. Ct. 567, 139 L. Ed. 2d 407, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7140 (1997).

3. Time of Offense.

Under T.C.A. § 39-11-201, the legislature has mandated that before a person can be convicted of a criminal offense, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person committed the offense prior to the time he was formally charged with the offense; while it seems obvious that no person would be indicted or otherwise formally charged with the commission of the offense of murder before the victim was actually killed, the legislature has chosen to require the state to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. May 14, 2001), review denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2002).

The rule requiring the state to prove that the offense occurred prior to the return of the indictment was a result of the rule that the exact time of the offense is not material and an indictment need only allege that the offense occurred prior to the indictment. State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. May 14, 2001), review denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2002).

The indictment is not to be considered evidence of a defendant's guilt, but the indictment itself can establish the date upon which it was returned; thus, the reading of the indictment to the jury, coupled with evidence of when the offense was committed, would establish that the offense was committed prior to the return of the indictment. State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. May 14, 2001), review denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2002).

Where the trial court instructed the jury regarding the indictment but there was no evidence that it gave the jury the indictment, and the state did not otherwise offer proof of the date of the indictment or proof that offense was committed before the return of the indictment, the defendant's convictions were reversed for lack of proof; although it was obvious that the murder was committed prior to the return of the indictment, the state did not prove this fact. State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. May 14, 2001), review denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2002).

4. Culpable Mental State.

Defendant's fear of his brother was not the type of mental disease or defect contemplated by a diminished capacity defense. State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. May 4, 2010).

Failure to consult a mental health expert and to obtain an evaluation of petitioner was deficient performance, as the State was required to prove a premeditated, intentional killing, but defendant was not prejudiced because the doctor's testimony was not admissible and prompt consultation would not have affected the defense; he only said it was a possibility that due to a mental disease, petitioner lacked capacity, and evidence of certain diagnoses was not relevant and admissible without an opinion regarding the ultimate issue of petitioner's capacity to form the required mens rea, such that he was not entitled to post-conviction relief. Williamson v. State, 476 S.W.3d 405, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. July 21, 2015).

Trial court's instruction on diminished capacity required defendant to negate his mental state, an essential element of the offense, by clear and convincing evidence, erroneously shifting the burden of proof regarding an essential element of the offense to defendant. State v. Bonsky, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Although defendant asserted that because of a mental disease or defect he was unable to form the requisite culpable mental states for the offense of attempted first degree premeditated murder, the State presented substantial proof showing defendant was capable of forming the culpable mental states required because defendant and victim had been arguing about their divorce the day of the attack; just before the attack, defendant, in a very calm, rational voice told the unarmed victim that when he started hitting her she was not going to get up and that he was going to kill her; and defendant's protracted 9-1-1 call showed his calmness immediately after the attack. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

5. Admissibility of Evidence.

State may utilize evidence of state of passion offered by the defense when proving the offense of voluntary manslaughter; although a defendant may choose to present evidence of state of passion produced by adequate provocation, which indicates a lesser degree of culpability, in order to obtain a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, the State bears the burden of proving the mental state for the charged offense and any lesser included offenses, and the instruction, which properly placed the burden of proof on the State to prove the elements of voluntary manslaughter, was not in error. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

6. Jury Instruction.

Trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's requests for special jury instructions on the issue of self-defense because the court used the applicable Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions, the jury instruction regarding the State of Tennessee's burden to negate defendant's claim of self-defense was given to the jury before it began deliberating, and the prefatory phrase “if evidence has been introduced supporting self-defense” did not improperly shift the burden to defendant to present the defense. State v. Floyd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

39-11-202. Exception.

  1. An exception to an offense in this title is so labeled by the phrase: “It is an exception to the application of …,” or words of similar import.
    1. Unless the statute defining an offense states to the contrary, the state need not negate the existence of an exception in the charge alleging commission of the offense.
    2. An exception to be relied upon by a person must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 4.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The following sections in this part describe procedural effects of the many exceptions (this section), defenses (§ 39-11-203), and affirmative defenses (§ 39-11-204), provided in Tennessee criminal law.

This section deals with exceptions to criminal liability. These exceptions are noted in the law defining the offenses.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-11-203. Defense.

  1. A defense to prosecution for an offense in this title is so labeled by the phrase: “It is a defense to prosecution under … that …”
  2. The state is not required to negate the existence of a defense in the charge alleging commission of the offense.
  3. The issue of the existence of a defense is not submitted to the jury unless it is fairly raised by the proof.
  4. If the issue of the existence of a defense is submitted to the jury, the court shall instruct the jury that any reasonable doubt on the issue requires the defendant to be acquitted.
    1. A ground of defense, other than one (1) negating an element of the offense or an affirmative defense, that is not plainly labeled in accordance with this part has the procedural and evidentiary consequences of a defense.
    2. Defenses available under common law are hereby abolished.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section describes the procedural consequences of criminal defenses. The defendant has the burden of introducing admissible evidence that a defense is applicable. If the defense is at issue, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply.

Subsection (d) outlines the content of a jury charge on a defense and codifies prior case law. King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S.W. 169 (1892).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Defenses excluded, § 39-11-407.

General defenses, title 39, ch. 11, part 5.

Law Reviews.

“No Provincial or Transient Notion”: The Need for a Mistake of Age Defense in Child Rape Prosecutions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 693 (2004).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Diminished Capacity.

Evidence of diminished capacity is relevant not to excuse or defeat a criminal charge but to lessen the offense when it serves to negate mens rea. State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

“Diminished capacity” is not an enumerated defense under the 1989 revision of the criminal code, but negation of an element of a criminal offense is recognized as a defense in Tennessee. State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 524 U.S. 941, 118 S. Ct. 2348, 141 L. Ed. 2d 718, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4097 (1998).

Failure to consult a mental health expert and to obtain an evaluation of petitioner was deficient performance, as the State was required to prove a premeditated, intentional killing, but defendant was not prejudiced because the doctor's testimony was not admissible and prompt consultation would not have affected the defense; he only said it was a possibility that due to a mental disease, petitioner lacked capacity, and evidence of certain diagnoses was not relevant and admissible without an opinion regarding the ultimate issue of petitioner's capacity to form the required mens rea, such that he was not entitled to post-conviction relief. Williamson v. State, 476 S.W.3d 405, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. July 21, 2015).

2. Duress or Necessity.

Neither duress nor necessity are affirmative defenses; both are “defenses” and, if admissible evidence fairly raises either defense, the trial court must submit the defense to the jury and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of duress under T.C.A. § 39-11-504 did not constitute plain error under former Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (see now T.R.A.P. 36(b)), and therefore his conviction of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon in violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) was reinstated, even though the evidence, including defendant's testimony, may have been sufficient to warrant such an instruction, because duress was never discussed as a theory of the defense and defendant expressly declined a jury instruction on self-defense, a defense closely related to duress. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Apr. 26, 2007).

Defense of duress failed because there was no proof that defendant's brother threatened defendant in order to achieve his assistance in the attack upon the victims. State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. May 4, 2010).

Trial counsel's performance was not deficient by failing to request jury instructions on the defenses of duress and necessity because the defenses were not raised by the proof at trial. Counsel researched the possibility of arguing the defenses of necessity or duress at trial, but was unable to corroborate defendant's story, while abandoned this theory of the case when defendant informed counsel that defendant had never entered the building that was vandalized and burglarized and by testifying to living in a hotel at the time of the offense. Walton v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Petitioner failed to prove that trial counsel's failure to request jury instructions on duress and necessity was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; the defense of duress was inapplicable to petitioner's charge of first degree murder because the urgency of harm to petitioner would not have outweighed the harm to the deceased victim, and the statutory defense of necessity arguably had no application in the case of homicide. Hendricks v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 810 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

3. Self-defense.

Vacation of petitioner's, an inmate's, convictions was improper because the courts below erred in concluding that counsel performed deficiently by exclusively pursuing a theory of self-defense because, if successful, the self-defense strategy trial counsel pursued would have resulted in a complete acquittal of the attempted first-degree murder charge, T.C.A. § 39-11-203(d), and likely would have resulted in an acquittal of the aggravated burglary charge by negating an essential element of the offense, T.C.A. §§ 39-14-402 and 39-14-403. Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1060 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2011).

Petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied because appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of trial counsel's alleged failure to request a self-defense instruction on appeal as the proof at trial did not fairly raise the issue of self-defense because the victim, an unarmed security guard, responded to an emergency call related to a gang fight in the mall; the victim was able to pin defendant against a booth; defendant's friend then told the victim to let defendant go; the victim released defendant; defendant then pulled out a handgun and fired a fatal shot into the victim's chest; and a witness testified that the victim was standing still with his hands at his side when defendant fired his weapon. Loverson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction because it showed defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused a victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by pointing a gun at the victim, and (2) did not act in self-defense. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because the evidence showed defendant did not attempt to retreat before using deadly force. State v. Toles, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's request for a jury instruction on self-defense because it was not fairly raised by the evidence, as the evidence showed that defendant already had a gun in his hand before the victim exited the market, defendant got out of his vehicle with a gun after blocking the victim's car, and the victim walked out of the market unaware of defendant's presence until defendant ran up and shot him. State v. Thompson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

4. Burden of Proof.

There is no provision in the capital sentencing scheme requiring a jury instruction that the state has the burden to disprove mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, State v. Hodges, 522 U.S. 999, 118 S. Ct. 567, 139 L. Ed. 2d 407, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7140 (1997).

5. Year and a Day Rule.

The common law year and a day rule requiring that a murder victim's death must occur within a year and a day of the fatal wound was not abolished by the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, but has been abolished by the Tennessee Supreme Court. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. June 21, 1999), aff'd, Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 149 L. Ed. 2d 697, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3519 (2001).

Retroactive application of the abolition of the year and a day rule as it existed at common law in Tennessee, did not deny defendant due process of law; the court's abolition of the year and a day rule was not unexpected and indefensible as the year and a day rule is widely viewed as an outdated relic of the common law. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 149 L. Ed. 2d 697, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3519 (2001).

6. Mistake of Fact.

Reasonable minds could accept ignorance or mistake of fact as a defense to premeditated first degree murder and counsel were deficient by failing to request a jury instruction on ignorance or mistake of fact where: (1) Petitioner testified that he believed he removed all of the bullets from the gun and that the gun fired as he was “fumbling” with it; and (2) Petitioner's theory at the trial was that he was mistaken in his belief that the gun was unloaded and that he did not intend to shoot the victim. Nesbit v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2013), aff'd, 452 S.W.3d 779, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 917 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2014).

7. Jury Instructions.

Without evidence either that the victim acted in a manner causing defendant to believe that the victim presented an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, there was no evidence that defendant's force was immediately necessary to protect against the victim; there was no basis to find that the evidence fairly raised an issue as to whether defendant acted in defense of either self or another, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of person was not error. State v. Estrada, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense because the only evidence defendant presented was a witness's testimony that she heard what she believed to be the victim rummaging through a knife drawer and leaving after defendant, but she did not see the act take place. State v. Rahman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017).

Trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity during defendant's trial for being a felon in possession of a handgun because it was fairly raised by the evidence, as it showed that defendant became involved in a physical altercation with two men inside a convenience store, a gun from the jacket of one of the men, the two men grappled with defendant for the gun but defendant reached it first, a jury could have inferred that defendant reasonably believed that obtaining the gun was immediately necessary for him to avoid imminent harm, and defendant's girlfriend was shot with another gun very shortly thereafter. State v. Cole-pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Oct. 25, 2019).

Where the general defense of necessity is fairly raised by the evidence, the trial court is obligated to instruct the jury accordingly, regardless of whether the instruction is requested. A defendant need not testify that he reasonably feared imminent bodily harm; the trial court may draw this inference from the evidence as it is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom. In addition, a request for a jury instruction on a general defense is not subject to waiver for failure to submit the request in writing. State v. Cole-pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Oct. 25, 2019).

Trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on duress and defense of a third person with regard to the charge of the attempted first degree premeditated murder because defendant was not charged with that offense for shooting the victim in a club when the victim allegedly pulled a gun on defendants'  sibling as defendant allegedly shot the victim in the parking lot after pursuing the victim. By that time, defendant's brother was no longer in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury by the victim. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support a flight instruction because, after the shooting of the victim, defendant fled the scene in a jeep driven by another person, defendant was no longer inside the jeep when police officers conducted a traffic stop, and defendant travelled to another city after the shooting and was arrested in that city. Although defendant argued that defendant fled to the other city because defendant feared for defendant's life, defendant's specific intent for fleeing was a jury question. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2019).

An instruction on self-defense was warranted because there was some evidence from which the jury could have determined that defendant's use of force was only for protection against police officers who were using more force than was necessary to place defendant under arrest. Defendant testified that defendant was sitting in a car at night when someone with a blinding light from a flashlight approached, began hitting the window, pulled defendant out, and began hitting defendant as defendant attempted to comply with the officer's demands. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2019).

Trial court did not breach a clear and unequivocal rule of law by declining to give a jury instruction on the defense of duress because the danger of death could not reasonably outweigh the harm of causing a death; therefore, duress in a homicide case could not be fairly raised by the proof, regardless of whether defendant was being threatened at the time he shot the victim. State v. Kelso, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2020).

8. Construction.

Statute does not identify state of passion as a defense to first or second degree murder and does no more than generally describe defenses within the context of the State's burden of proof; the legislature plainly intended for state of passion produced by adequate provocation to be an element of the separate offense of voluntary manslaughter, not a defense to second degree murder. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

39-11-204. Affirmative defense.

  1. An affirmative defense in this title is so labeled by the phrase: “It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under …, which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that …” or words of similar import.
  2. The state is not required to negate the existence of an affirmative defense in the charge alleging commission of the offense.
    1. If a person intends to rely upon an affirmative defense, the person shall, no later than ten (10) days before trial, notify the district attorney general in writing of the intention, or at such time as the court may direct naming the affirmative defense or defenses to be asserted, and file a copy of the notice with the clerk.
    2. Except as provided in this title, if there is a failure to comply with this subsection (c), the affirmative defense may not be raised; provided, that this shall not limit the right of the person to testify on the person's own behalf.
    3. The court may, for cause shown, allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make other orders as may be appropriate.
    4. Evidence of an intention to raise an affirmative defense, which is later withdrawn, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who gave the notice of the intention.
    5. This subsection (c) shall only apply in courts of record.
  3. The issue of the existence of an affirmative defense may not be submitted to the jury unless it is fairly raised by the proof and notice has been provided according to subsection (c).
  4. If the issue of the existence of an affirmative defense is submitted to the jury, the court shall instruct the jury that the affirmative defense must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 5.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section prescribes the form, and the procedural and evidentiary consequences of an affirmative defense. A defense is an “affirmative defense” only if so designated in the criminal code.

Since the matters at issue in affirmative defenses are peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge, the defendant has the burden of raising the issue and proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of the affirmative defense. To ensure that the prosecution is not surprised by the defendant's use of an affirmative defense, subsection (d) requires the defendant to provide the prosecutors with written notice of the intent to use an affirmative defense. Under subsection (c), good cause for late filing is intended to include failure of or delays in discovery.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Affirmative defense of claim of right to property, § 39-14-107.

Affirmative defense of insanity, § 39-11-501.

Affirmative defense of renunciation, § 39-12-104.

Affirmative defense to carrying a weapon on school property, § 39-17-1310.

Affirmative defense to criminal responsibility of a corporation, § 39-11-406.

Affirmative defenses to be asserted in answer, § 40-30-108.

Criminal exposure to HIV, HBV, HCV, affirmative defenses to, § 39-13-109.

Extortion, affirmative defenses to, § 39-14-112.

Gambling, affirmative offenses to, § 39-17-502.

Reports to law enforcement of certain injuries, affirmative defense to criminal liability, § 38-1-101.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Defense Fairly Raised By Proof.

Court failed to properly instruct the jury on the affirmative defense for extortion found in T.C.A. § 39-14-112(b) because defendant inquired into the possibility of a more favorable divorce settlement, his wife's lawyer told defendant that his only option was to appeal, he then made a “list of demands,” and that evidence “fairly raised” the proposition that defendant reasonably believed that there was “harm done” to him and that his demands were “appropriate restitution”; the issue should have been submitted to the jury for them to determine if defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his actions were a result of a reasonable claim for appropriate restitution for harm done. Parris v. State, 236 S.W.3d 173, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2007).

2. Burden of Proof.

In the case of the affirmative defense of renunciation, the burden of raising the defense rested with defendant, and, where the evidence supported the conclusion that there was no voluntary, complete renunciation on the part of defendant, he failed to carry his burden. State v. Jackson, 946 S.W.2d 329, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Part 3
Culpability

39-11-301. Requirement of culpable mental state.

    1. A person commits an offense who acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the definition of the offense requires, with respect to each element of the offense.
    2. When the law provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally.
  1. A culpable mental state is required within this title unless the definition of an offense plainly dispenses with a mental element.
  2. If the definition of an offense within this title does not plainly dispense with a mental element, intent, knowledge or recklessness suffices to establish the culpable mental state.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, §§ 6, 7.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Subsection (a) reduces the number of mental elements to four. Section 39-11-302 defines each of the four. The former confusing distinction between general and specific intent has been abandoned.

The four mental elements are in a hierarchy. While each of the four elements is unique, subdivision (a)(2) provides that lesser levels of culpability are included in greater levels. For example, a person who acts “intentionally” also acts knowingly, recklessly and with criminal negligence.

Subsection (b) creates a presumption that at least one of the four mental states is required for offenses within the criminal code. See Duncan v. State, 26 Tenn. 148 (1846).

An intent to punish without the requirement of a culpable mental state must be clear from the language of the statute creating the offense. Pappas v. State, 135 Tenn. 499, 188, S.W. 52 (1916). Under subsection (c), offenses within this title which are silent regarding whether a culpable mental state is required will be presumed to require at least recklessness. The better reasoned cases from other jurisdictions have reached this result in interpreting common law authorities. See, e.g., People v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1927).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Definitions of mental states, §§ 39-11-106, 39-11-302.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

Rethinking Presumed Knowledge of the Law in the Regulatory Age, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 137 (2014).

The Language of Mens Rea, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1327 (2014).

Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment to Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

In a prosecution for aggravated rape, statutory language required that “intentional,” “knowing,” or “reckless” all should have been charged to the jury as such elements related to “reckless” behavior favored the defense and did not affect the results of the trial. State v. Jones, 889 S.W.2d 225, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Oct. 10, 1994), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

T.C.A. § 39-11-301 applied to a prosecution for escape because the escape statute makes no reference to a requisite mental state. State v. Anderson, 894 S.W.2d 320, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, where the indictment charged a “knowing” assault, a jury instruction containing the mental element of “reckless” was not erroneous since “recklessly” is a lesser level of the mental element of “knowingly,” and if the state proved that defendant acted knowingly, it also would have proved that he acted recklessly. State v. Crowe, 914 S.W.2d 933, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Jan. 8, 1996).

Instructions that the offense of aggravated sexual battery included the mens rea element “that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly” were incorrect; this mental state applies to the element as to whether the victim was less than 13 years of age. Under T.C.A. § 39-13-504, the act itself — i.e., the touching — must be intentional. State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), overruled, State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1998).

No culpable mental state is required for guilt of driving under the influence. State v. Turner, 953 S.W.2d 213, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 618 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Proof of intent, knowledge or recklessness is required to sustain a conviction for aggravated rape. State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. 1997).

An indictment charging aggravated rape in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-502 met constitutional requirements of notice and form and was valid, even though it failed to allege a culpable mental state. State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. 1997).

An indictment need not specify a culpable mental state as long as the language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of notice to the accused of the charge against which the accused must defend. Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. 2000).

An indictment is not rendered void for failing to allege a specific mental state as long as it reasonably identifies the nature of the criminal conduct alleged by the state in compliance with T.C.A. § 40-13-202 and the requisite mental state can be inferred from the alleged conduct. Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. 2000).

Habeas court properly dismissed petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus because the indictment charging petitioner with felony murder was valid since it referenced the statute defining felony murder, T.C.A. § 39-13-202, and described the offense, which provided notice to petitioner of the charged offense; because the indictment set forth the specific underlying felony supporting the felony murder charge, the requisite mental state was obtainable by reviewing the robbery statute, T.C.A. § 39-13-401, providing adequate notice to petitioner of the charge against him. Cooper v. Carlton, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2012), cert. denied, Cooper v. Sexton, 185 L. Ed. 2d 203, 133 S. Ct. 1260, 568 U.S. 1171, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1298 (U.S. 2013).

2. Instructions.

Trial court properly instructed the jury on rape of a child where it instructed the jury that defendant could be found guilty of the crime only if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 1028 (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2014), cert. denied, Clark v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2846, 192 L. Ed. 2d 882, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3937 (U.S. June 15, 2015).

Because the offense of rape did not specify a requisite mental state, it was not error for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could find defendant guilty if he acted recklessly in relation to the element of unlawful sexual penetration. State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 389 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

During defendant's trial for aggravated robbery charged under a theory of criminal responsibility, the trial court plainly erred by failing to read to the jury the written instructions defining the terms intentionally and knowingly because the mens rea was an essential element of the offense and was a contested issue at trial. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

While defendant was caring for the five-year-old victim, he consumed beer and marijuana and took the victim swimming at a lake without notifying his parents or supervising his activities, and where defendant had no knowledge of the victim's swimming abilities, defendant's conduct met the definition of criminal negligence under T.C.A. § 39-11-301(a)(2); upon the victim's death by drowning, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for criminally negligent homicide under T.C.A. § 39-13-212(a). State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).

Proof that defendant intentionally caused the killing sufficed to prove that he knowingly caused the killing. State v. Short, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2012).

4. Mutually Exclusive Offenses Not Found.

Defendant's convictions for felony murder and for aggravated criminal trespass were not mutually exclusive because the relevant offenses did not involve different mental states. For both aggravated burglary, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder conviction, and for aggravated criminal trespass, the State was required to prove that defendant acted with intent, knowledge, or recklessness. State v. Snipes, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Snipes v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 796, 134 S. Ct. 920, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 94 (U.S. 2014).

5. Recklessly.

Because the verdict did not reflect the mens rea with which defendant acted, it was unclear whether the jury unanimously found that the he either intentionally or knowingly assaulted the victim causing serious bodily injury, and his conviction for Class C felony aggravated assault could not stand; the jury was correctly instructed as to the meaning of intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly, and because the mens rea of reckless is a lesser mens rea of intentional or knowing, the jury was unanimous in finding that defendant was guilty of reckless aggravated assault, and in order to do substantial justice, the conviction was so modified. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

Because the jury's verdict did not reflect the mens with which it found defendant acted, it was unclear whether the jury unanimously found that defendant either intentionally or knowingly assaulted the victim causing serious bodily injury; because of this deficiency, defendant's conviction for Class C felony aggravated assault could not stand, but because the mens rea of reckless is a lesser mens rea of intentional or knowing, and the jury was properly instructed and was unanimous in finding, at a minimum, that defendant was guilty of reckless aggravated assault, the court imposed that conviction to do substantial justice. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was proper, as he said he intentionally rammed the victims'  small car with his tractor-trailer because the driver pulled out in front of him and then tapped her brakes, plus defendant caused bodily injury to both victims with the use of a deadly weapon, his tractor-trailer; defendant's statement that he intentionally hit the vehicle was sufficient to establish the reckless mens rea. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

Trial court did not err by including recklessness as a mental state in the jury charge concerning aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery because the indictment charged that the crimes had been committed intentionally, and therefore defendant was on notice that knowing and recklessness were contained within the statutory definition. State v. Watkins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 26, 2019).

39-11-302. Definitions of culpable mental state.

  1. “Intentional” refers to a person who acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is the person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
  2. “Knowing” refers to a person who acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person's conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
  3. “Reckless” refers to a person who acts recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct when the person is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person's standpoint.
  4. “Criminal negligence” refers to a person who acts with criminal negligence with respect to the circumstances surrounding that person's conduct or the result of that conduct when the person ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person's standpoint.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Intentional conduct or an intentional result occurs when the defendant wants to do the act or achieve the criminal objective. A defendant acts knowingly, on the other hand, when he or she is aware of the conduct or is practically certain that the conduct will cause the result, irrespective of his or her desire that the conduct or result will occur.

Subsection (c), defining “reckless” conduct, provides liability for conscious risk creation where there is no desire that the risk occur or no awareness that it is practically certain to occur.

Subsection (d) is in line with case law of Tennessee on the degree of negligence required for criminal culpability. The proposition that criminal liability be based on a higher degree of negligence than that required for civil liability is well settled. Claybrook v. State, 164 Tenn. 440, 51 S.W.2d 499 (1932); Miller v. State, 164 Tenn. 388, 50 S.W.2d 388, 50 S.W.2d 225 (1932); Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn. 7, 285 S.W. 565 (1926).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Culpable mental states, §§ 39-11-106, 39-11-301.

Definitions of mental states, § 39-11-106.

Requirement of culpable mental states, § 39-11-101.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

Instructing the Jury in Murder Cases, 38 No. 7 Tenn. B.J. 30 (2002).

State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to Retain the Natural and Probable Consequence Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 273 (1998).

Tennessee Attempts to Tighten the Purse Strings on Punitive Damages: Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co. (P. Steven Hacker), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 983 (1993).

The Language of Mens Rea, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1327 (2014).

Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment to Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Intentionally and Knowingly.

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault required the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were intentional or knowing, as defined by the criminal code; proof that occupants of a house were fearful when shots were fired into the house, while essential to establishing the actus reus, did not in any way establish this mens rea element, and defendant's conviction could not stand on the basis of such evidence. State v. Wilson, 924 S.W.2d 648, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. 1996).

Person can act knowingly irrespective of desire that conduct or result will occur when that person is aware of nature of conduct or where conduct is reasonably certain to cause result. State v. Gray, 960 S.W.2d 598, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Shooting at a car from a distance of one to one and one-half car lengths is reasonably certain to result in the death of an occupant. State v. Kelley, 34 S.W.3d 471, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2000).

Second degree murder was a result-of-conduct offense, and allowing the jury to convict based upon awareness of the nature of the conduct or circumstances surrounding the conduct erroneously lessened the state's burden of proof for the offense; the error in a jury charge regarding the “knowing” element was not harmless, because the only real issue at trial was the degree of homicide committed, which in turn rested upon the mens rea and appropriate conduct element. State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d 781, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain a second degree murder conviction because the only proof that defendant caused a head injury to the victim were the victim's reports that defendant “put her to the ground” and that she subsequently suffered a headache; there was no proof that defendant was aware that his treatment of the victim was “reasonably certain” to cause her death. State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2011).

Defendant's conviction for attempt to commit first-degree murder in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a) and 39-12-101 was appropriate because, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the crimes committed against the victim in the course of the robbery, carjacking, and assault, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant and his co-perpetrator, with premeditation, planned and intended to kill the victim, T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(d), 39-11-302(a). State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2011).

Evidence that defendant repeatedly punched and kicked the victim all over her body, including her head, after she lost consciousness, causing the victim's brain to swell and eventually her death, was sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude defendant's knowingly killed the victim. State v. Lopez, 440 S.W.3d 601, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. June 20, 2014).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction because, although defendant claimed that a shotgun accidentally discharged, a law enforcement agent performed function tests on the shotgun and found that it would not accidentally discharge as defendant claimed. The doctor who performed an autopsy of the victim testified that the doctor believed that the victim was lying flat on floor when shot, and defendant held a baseball bat to demonstrate how the shotgun was pointed downward when the shot was fired. State v. Ramsey, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2015), cert. denied, Ramsey v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2809, 192 L. Ed. 2d 853, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3727 (U.S. June 8, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first degree premeditated murder because it was within the jury's prerogative to reject testimony from experts that defendant lacked the mens rea required for this offense based on his intellect, brain injuries, and intoxication by alcohol or drugs. The evidence showed that defendant and the victim had an extremely tumultuous relationship; moreover, he fled the crime scene after the stabbing and was ultimately detained by law enforcement in another state. State v. Blocker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Jury could have inferred that defendant intentionally used his motor vehicle in a way that caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent harm, and thus the evidence supported defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and vandalism; defendant first encountered the victim at the mailboxes in the subdivision and parked bumper to bumper with her car, as she had parked in the wrong direction, and when she tried to back out, he rammed his car into her car, and as she drove away, he followed her and rammed her car again, and the damage to her car was more than $ 1,000. State v. Windrow, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's two convictions for aggravated assault because the State proved he intended to cause the officers to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the display of a deadly weapon; the officers testified that they were scared when defendant pointed a shotgun in their director, and a jury could have found that defendant was aware that his conduct caused the officers to fear injury. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2016).

Evidence sufficiently established that defendant engaged in a shoot-out and, acting in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation because of being shot at after attempting to stop a robbery, he shot back at the car in which four rival gang members rode, and he attempted to kill the occupants therein; his convictions of three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter against two co-defendants and one victim was proper. State v. North, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for facilitation of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school because defendant was in close proximity to the duffel bags containing cocaine, defendant admitted ownership of one of the bags, defendant's student identification was found in one of the bags, and defendant knowingly provided substantial assistance to another individual and that individual's drug operation by possessing and safeguarding the drugs. State v. Gibson, 506 S.W.3d 450, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for the first degree premeditated murder of defendant's spouse because defendant acted intentionally and with premeditation in that defendant, following an argument with the victim, shot the door to the victim's apartment multiple times and then kicked open the door. Once inside, defendant repeatedly fired a gun at the unarmed victim while the victim was retreating and begging for mercy, broke into the bathroom when the victim hid in the bathroom, and shot the victim multiple times. State v. Durant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

Defendant's sole act of firing one bullet toward the occupants of an apartment was not sufficient to support three convictions for attempted second degree murder, as the evidence did not show that he acted with the objective to cause the killing of three victims or that he believed firing one bullet would cause the killing of three victims, who were spread out across two rooms, without further conduct on his part. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder, rather than voluntary manslaughter, because it showed that in the months prior to the shooting arguments between defendant and his wife had escalated, defendant admitted to policy that after escaping his wife with the knife he retrieved his loaded handgun from the shed and aimed it at his wife, an agent concluded that the handgun was not malfunctioning, and a physician testified that the gun had been fired from between six inches and three feet. State v. Langston, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Defendant acted intentionally because witnesses testified that defendant chased seven unarmed victims, with no evidence of provocation presented, fired at least eleven gunshots at the victims, and one of the victims died as the result of a gunshot wound to the victim's neck, which was fired at the victim in relatively close proximity. State v. Sims, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder because he was home with the victim, his mother, on the morning she died; defendant's wife saw him in the victim's room in the hours before her death; the wife heard a scream and, when she questioned defendant about what had happened, he responded, from the victim's room, that the victim had fallen and that he would take care of her; the victim was found hours later in her bedroom having been beaten to death; the day before her death, defendant sold the victim's jewelry for cash; the victim's blood was found on defendant's clothes; and it was defendant who was last seen with the victim in the hours shortly before she died. State v. Knight, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of violating the sexual offender registry's requirements because he was convicted of aggravated sexual battery in Kansas, which was classified in Tennessee as a violent sexual offense; as he was homeless, he was required to report to a probation and parole officer monthly; after five months, he quit reporting to the officer; he provided written acknowledgment that he was aware of and understood the requirements of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004; and, based on his signature on the registration and forms, the law presumed he had knowledge of the Act's registration, verification, and tracking requirements. State v. Hoss, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1033 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 205 (Tenn. Apr. 18, 2018).

Evidence presented at trial supported the jury's finding of premeditation in the shooting death of the victim because the victim was unarmed when the victim was killed, defendant did not render aid and immediately fled the scene after firing shots at the victim, eyewitness testified that three to four shots were fired without any provocation from the victim, and the victim was shot in the back. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder because it showed that he shot the victim several times after he greeted the victim at his door, the victim identified his shooter using a known nickname for defendant, the casings recovered from the crime scene matched the weapon owned by defendant, and the medical examiner testified that the victim's cause of death was the result of multiple gunshot wounds. State v. Starks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of contraband in a penal institution; the jury could have inferred defendant's knowledge of the contraband based on his failure to take advantage of multiple opportunities to turn over the controlled substance, the manner in which it was concealed, and defendant's control over the location where the drugs were located. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Oct. 11, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated sexual battery based on the allegations that he touched the victim's intimate parts with his hand and that he penetrated the victim's anus with his penis because the jury could have inferred that he intended to sexually touch the victim as the victim stated that he showed her explicit photographs of minors; the jury could have inferred that defendant intended to sexually touch the victim as the victim stated that he touched her intimate areas multiple times; the testimony of a minor victim alone was sufficient to uphold a conviction; and the jury impliedly credited the victim's statements that defendant intentionally made sexual contact with her intimate areas. State v. Freels, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 520 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone because a rational juror could find defendant knew a package delivered to defendant's address in a drug-free zone contained methamphetamine which defendant and defendant's associates intended to sell. State v. Cole, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 824 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder (resulting in serious bodily injury), because the evidence showed specific intent in that defendant and the victim were involved in a physical altercation, defendant waited for the victim to return home from work, defendant walked up to the victim and told the victim, “You know you should have killed me,” and defendant pulled a bag concealing a revolver from behind defendant's back and fired multiple times and wounded the victim. State v. Rogers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. July 25, 2019).

Reasonable juror could have rejected defendant's claim of self-defense and concluded that defendant acted knowingly by being aware that stabbing the victim with a pocketknife multiple different times in the head and neck area was reasonably certain to cause death. State v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on two law enforcement officers because defendant intentionally and knowingly used his vehicle as a deadly weapon, causing both officers to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury as defendant placed his vehicle into reverse and rammed into the officers'  vehicle with enough force to cause it to spin over 90 degrees; and an automobile could be considered a deadly weapon. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for second degree murder because of defendant's varying statements about the victim's death, expert medical testimony that the victim's gunshot wounds were not self-inflicted as defendant claimed, and a police sergeant's testimony that the pistol used to kill the victim—with whom defendant was living—had likely been wiped off. The jury could have concluded that defendant knew that defendant's conduct in shooting defendant's pistol at the victim's face was reasonably certain to cause the victim's death. State v. Dodd, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for second-degree murder because defendant knowingly killed the victim beyond a reasonable doubt as defendant approached the victim when the victim was walking, defendant confronted the victim about a rumor of the victim hitting defendant's sibling, the victim put the victim's arm around defendant in a friendly way, and defendant fatally shot the victim. Although defendant claimed that he shot the victim in self-defense, the victim was neither acting aggressively towards defendant, nor carrying a gun. State v. Branch, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for resale because the evidence was sufficient that defendant had actual possession of a cylinder of methamphetamine before a police officer initiated a traffic stop, that defendant directed defendant's paramour to conceal it in the paramour's vagina, and that defendant intended to re-obtain actual possession if the police failed to discover the drugs. Defendant had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the methamphetamine. State v. Ledet, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 224 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish a knowing killing because defendant stabbed the victim twice; the chest wound was five to six inches deep, and it resulted in a fractured rib, a lacerated lung, a lacerated pericardium, and penetrated the heart; the back wound was three to four inches deep; the medical examiners agreed that the chest wound required significant force to inflict; and, although defendant was trained in first aid, he failed to seek immediate medical assistance for the victim, who bled profusely, and lived for possibly 20-30 minutes after she was stabbed. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2020).

2. Reckless.

Punitive damage award of $20,000,000 against automobile manufacturer in a wrongful death action did not violate manufacturer's due process rights even though the ratio between the compensatory damage award and the punitive damage award was one to 5.35 because manufacturer's conduct was reprehensible where even though it had knowledge of the danger it continued to sell its vehicles in an unreasonably dangerous condition for years; court held that punitive damage award of $125,000, the maximum fine for reckless homicide, would not adequately punish manufacturer or deter future instances of similar conduct. Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. July 24, 2008), rehearing denied, Flax v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 970 (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2008), cert. denied, ,, 556 U.S. 1257, 129 S. Ct. 2433, 174 L. Ed. 2d 227, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 3910 (U.S. 2009), superseded by statute as stated in, Grant v. Kia Motors Corp., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157325 (E.D. Tenn. May 10, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Cone v. Hankook Tire Co., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8607 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2017).

In a case where one passenger was killed and the others were injured, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of vehicular homicide by intoxication, vehicular assault with intoxication, and reckless endangerment because, although defendant initially asked other passengers to drive his vehicle, he later assumed control of the vehicle with the knowledge that not all of the passengers had access to seat belts; at that time, according to a passenger, defendant's speech was slurred and his eyes appeared glassy; defendant drove at a high rate of speed, clipped a culvert by a driveway, and lost control of and flipped the vehicle; and an analysis of defendant's blood showed the presence of drugs that affected his central nervous system. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for reckless endangerment and reckless aggravated assault because the State of Tennessee presented evidence that defendant placed the numerous occupants of a home into imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury by recklessly firing a rifle through the walls of the home, causing bodily injury to the victim of the gunshot. State v. Butts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon; the accomplice witness testimony was sufficiently corroborated, plus the evidence established that while driving past a bar, defendant handed a loaded firearm to the accomplice, who was so intoxicated he had been kicked out of the same bar minutes earlier, and signaled for him to shoot, and at the time, the bar was full of patrons, such that defendant acted recklessly. State v. Katz, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's reckless endangerment convictions because a police officer found cartridge cases fired from the same unknown gun at the scene of a shooting in a club, defendant admitted to shooting defendant's gun—which defendant threw away—multiple times in the club, and the victims were shot in the club. A reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that placed the victims in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury while using or displaying a deadly weapon. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because a police officer found cartridge cases fired from the same unknown gun at the scene of a shooting in a club, the victim testified that defendant shot the victim in the club, and defendant admitted to shooting defendant's gun—which defendant threw away—multiple times in the club. A reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant recklessly caused bodily injury to the victim while using or displaying a deadly weapon. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Crime of attempted reckless endangerment did not exist, and therefore defendant's conviction was vacated, because in order to find defendant guilty, defendant would have had to have the intent to act recklessly. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2020).

3. —Awareness Factor.

Defendant does not have to be aware of his conduct and aware that his conduct would cause the result of death to be convicted of second-degree murder. State v. Rutherford, 876 S.W.2d 118, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

What differentiates recklessness from “criminal negligence” is the degree of awareness — that is, recklessness includes awareness, but disregard, of a risk while criminal negligence involves a lack of awareness when one should be aware. State v. Gillon, 15 S.W.3d 492, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1024 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

4. Criminal Negligence.

The statutory definition of criminal negligence is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Butler, 880 S.W.2d 395, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

For conduct to constitute criminal negligence, the accused must know, or should know, that his or her conduct, or the result of that conduct, will imperil the life of another given the circumstances that exist when the conduct takes place. State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d 471, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Determination that defendant was reckless in the operation of his truck led to the inevitable conclusion that the defendant was also criminally negligent. State v. Gillon, 15 S.W.3d 492, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1024 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

5. —Substantial and Unjustifiable Risk.

T.C.A. § 39-11-302(d) views the situation through the eyes of the suspect and whether he could have perceived and then chosen to ignore a “substantial and unjustifiable risk.” State v. Slater, 841 S.W.2d 841, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 726 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

When a driver disregards a stop sign and enters a four-lane, divided highway, and without slowing down, crosses through a median connector, the risk of injury is surely a “substantial and unjustifiable risk.” State v. Gillon, 15 S.W.3d 492, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1024 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

6. Evidence Sufficient.

Defendant failed to show that a rational trier of fact could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of second-degree murder; the defendant actively sought out a knife and chased his brother from corner to corner in the trailer, he stabbed victim twice while chasing him, and a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the defendant was aware of the nature of his conduct or was practically certain that the conduct would cause the result. State v. Rutherford, 876 S.W.2d 118, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury reasonably to infer that the defendant committed the knowing killing of the victim. State v. Copenny, 888 S.W.2d 450, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), appeal denied, State v. Copeny, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. 1993).

In a prosecution for aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery, mere recklessness as to the age of the victim was sufficient evidence to establish defendant's guilt for either crime. State v. Parker, 887 S.W.2d 825, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, testimony that defendant looked directly at the victim when he kicked her was sufficient proof that he acted intentionally, and the state did not have to demonstrate that he intended to cause serious bodily injury to the victim. State v. Crowe, 914 S.W.2d 933, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Jan. 8, 1996).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of second-degree murder, a knowing killing of another, beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Summerall, 926 S.W.2d 272, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1009 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

One who participates in beating another person over the head with a brick ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will occur and therefore would be “criminally negligent” under T.C.A. § 39-11-302(d); alternatively, an ordinary person engaging in such conduct would be aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will occur and therefore would be “reckless” under T.C.A. § 39-11-302(c); similarly, participation in beating a victim over the head with a brick is conduct reasonably certain to cause death and therefore a participant in such behavior would be “knowing” under T.C.A. § 39-11-302(b). State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 600 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Bowers v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 979, 122 S. Ct. 408, 151 L. Ed. 2d 310, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9880 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to show that four gang members who engaged in the kidnapping of two gang members, were criminally responsible for the ensuing death of one of the gang members. Proof of premeditation was abundant; deadly weapons were used and witnesses testified that defendants were part of the crowd beating the unarmed victim with bats, jack irons, crowbars, and hammers. State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Sept. 2, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's reckless endangerment conviction where defendant left his shotgun, which he knew to be loaded and cocked, in woods that were 50 feet behind a house. The time he left the gun, defendant was fleeing from the police, and while there were no children or other persons in the woods at that time, defendant had seen children playing at a nearby residence. State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a woman and her lover of premeditated first degree murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 and 39-11-302(a) where the woman's version of events was inconsistent with the physical evidence because the autopsy of the victim, her husband, revealed that he had been shot six times in the head with a .22 caliber gun prior to the woman's departure for the grocery store, and there were email messages between the defendants that could be fairly characterized as an ongoing discussion of various methods of murder. State v. Watson, 227 S.W.3d 622, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. July 3, 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment because he temporarily pinned the officer between the victim's car and another car. State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and facilitation of attempted first degree premeditated murder, because defendant and his accomplices formed a firing line while at least two of them aimed their weapons toward a group of unarmed persons, and without provocation opened fire; two bullets struck and killed one victim, a third bullet struck and injured another victim, and defendant rendered no aid to the victims. Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. June 4, 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to sell because: (1) Defendant took off on foot and got into a scuffle with a police officer; (2) After defendant was arrested, the officer located a blue container filled with .5 grams of cocaine near the area where the scuffle took place; (3) Defendant claimed that the cocaine was for his personal use; (4) The officer testified that the amount discovered was not consistent with personal use; (5) No drug paraphernalia was found; and (6) Defendant was spotted in a location known for illegal drug sales. State v. Nelson, 275 S.W.3d 851, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2008).

Because the state needed to prove only that petitioner intentionally attempted to kill someone (and not necessarily anyone specifically) the evidence was plainly sufficient to support petitioner's attempted first degree murder conviction, and he was not entitled to habeas relief; the evidence produced at trial revealed that petitioner, after threatening to get a gun and return to kill either two specific individuals, or everyone, went to his house, retrieved his shotgun, and upon returning to the tavern, fired the shotgun into the tavern. Krantz v. Lindamood,  594 F.3d 896, 2010 FED App. 43P, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3008 (6th Cir. Feb. 17, 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 869, 131 S. Ct. 166, 178 L. Ed. 2d 98, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 6657 (U.S. 2010).

Evidence that defendant shot the victim in the abdomen at close range, which was likely to cause the victim's death, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for second degree murder and reckless homicide. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2013), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 49, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. June 3, 2015).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's drug and conspiracy convictions because (1) a jury could infer from evidence that a portion of the substance defendant sold was cocaine that the entire substance was cocaine, and (2) the evidence showed defendant's implied understanding with a co-defendant. State v. Murchison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for conspiracy to sell more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and conspiracy to deliver more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school where it showed that he personally sold cocaine to the confidential informant on several occasions, he communicated with his co-defendant about selling cocaine to the informant, he was present for a buy between the co-defendant and the informant at a carwash, he discussed the co-defendant's drug prices with the informant, and acted as a drug courier between the co-defendant and the informant. State v. Graham, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because defendant either intended to use a deadly weapon to cause bodily injury to the second victim or was aware that his conduct of shooting into the front seat of the vehicle where the second victim was sitting beside the first victim was reasonably certain to result in bodily injury to the second victim. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because defendant acted at least knowingly in causing the two backseat passengers to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury as defendant was aware that his conduct of using a deadly weapon to shoot into the victim's vehicle was reasonably certain to cause the other passengers in the vehicle to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment against his two-month-old daughter where it showed that he shot into the driver's car while his daughter was strapped in her infant carrier in the backseat, defendant knew that the victim was in the vehicle because he had placed her there, he recklessly shot through the window of the car on the passenger side, and he walked around to the driver's side and fired multiple shots into the car. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of 150 grams or more of heroin with the intent to sell or distribute where it showed that a package containing heroin was addressed to a fictitious person, when a detective posing as a delivery person approached the residence on the package defendant ran toward him from the other side of the duplex, defendant told the detective that it was his house, he followed the detective to the truck to retrieve the package, and he was arrested after receiving it. State v. Gonzalez-Fonesca, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's second-degree murder conviction because a jury could reasonably infer that defendant knowingly killed the victim. State v. Hollingsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second-degree murder because a witness and the victim gave accounts of witnessing defendant stab the victim multiple times after an argument, and a paramedic testified that the victim had to be transported to the hospital for immediate surgery. State v. Rahman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  second-degree murder convictions where it established that defendants approached the victim and his friends at an apartment complex, produced guns, fired multiple shots at the victim, and fled the scene. State v. Flynn, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 600 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

For purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-14-146, 39-14-105, 39-11-302(b), the evidence was sufficient to show defendant intended to deprive the store of the laptop and knowingly caused it to be removed from the store, and a jury could have found that the laptop had a fair market value of $ 750, given the testimony; defendant exited the store with a man carrying the laptop, refused the store employee's request to inspect the contents of the bag, and drove away. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminally negligent homicide and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery because defendant went to the apartment of the victim's first son in search of drugs; he was wearing a black hoodie and a cap; the victim, his wife, and his second son left the apartment to go home, but, as they were leaving in their vehicle, three men wearing black hoodies approached the vehicle to rob them; the victim's sons recognized defendant as one of the three men as he was wearing the same clothing that he wore earlier to the apartment; the second son testified that defendant shot the victim; and the first son testified that he was 100% percent sure that defendant was the person he saw committing the robbery. State v. Gergish, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated child abuse of the three-month-old victim because, other than some slight congestion, the victim was healthy when her mother dropped her off with defendant; a video recorded on defendant's phone at 12:45 that afternoon showed the victim appearing unharmed and not displaying any symptoms of a severe brain injury; the victim's injuries were discovered around 2:03 p.m. when defendant's neighbor called 911; a child abuse pediatrician classified the injuries as non-accidental; and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant knowingly inflicted the injuries as she was the only person capable of inflicting such injuries on the victim at the time they were sustained. State v. Humphrey, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for three counts of aggravated child abuse because defendant knowingly engaged in the conduct that resulted in the victim's bone fractures; the two-month-old victim had nine bone fractures, a doctor concluded that the fractures were the result of blunt force trauma to the chest or any type of squeezing mechanism, and defendant admitted to becoming frustrated with the victim and squeezing him. State v. McDuffie, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property valued over $10,000 but less than $60,000 because defendant was driving the truck that had been reported stolen by the owner; when stopped near a repair shop, defendant told officers that he thought the truck belonged to another individual and that he was taking it for repairs; and the reasons given by defendant for driving the truck were contradicted by the other individual's testimony at trial that he did not operate a trucking company at the time and did not employ defendant as a driver or repairman. State v. Richards, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the first-degree, felony murder of the first victim, his estranged wife, committed during the first-degree, attempted murder of the second victim because defendant's course of action in obtaining a gun in advance of the shooting, lying in wait, undetected outside of the home, attacking the first victim by grabbing her and pointing a gun to her head, threatening to shoot both victims, shooting the first victim, and then fleeing the scene established his conscious objective was to kill both victims; defendant admitted that he intended to kill the second victim; and the State established defendant committed the first-degree, attempted murder of the second victim with sufficient evidence. State v. Beverly, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1029 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless endangerment because defendant engaged in reckless conduct that placed the victim in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury when he used a pocketknife to slash the victim four times; the jury acted within its province if it rejected defendant's testimony that he merely acted to defend himself by reaching for and using his knife to injure the unarmed victim, who punched defendant; and the jury was within its province if it determined that defendant's use of a knife was an unreasonable response to the use or threatened use of unlawful force by the victim or that defendant's use of deadly force was not based upon reasonable beliefs. State v. Dixon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant premeditatedly and intentionally killed the victim because defendant acquired a gun prior to the victim's killing, he drove around for approximately thirty minutes observing the victim before he exited his car and shot the victim in the back of the head, and he fled the scene and threw the murder weapon in a lake; defendant testified that upon seeing the victim, he knew he was going to shoot the victim. State v. Crowley, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second degree murder because it showed that defendant approached the victims after they left a store, he pulled out his gun, the victims began walking backwards, defendant attempted to hit one victim with a glass bottle, both victims fell, and when the second victim reached for the gun defendant shot him. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant mother of aggravated child neglect because she acknowledged that she noticed blisters on the 10-month-old victim on a Wednesday and Thursday; defendant was told that the victim should be taken to a doctor or a children's hospital; defendant did not take the victim for medical treatment until she was forced to do so five or six days after he was injured; 15% of his total body surface was covered with second degree burns; the first two or three days of the victim's burns were the most painful; he could have been treated immediately with narcotics and steroids to lessen the swelling and decrease the pain from his eye injuries; and the lack of medical treatment caused him to suffer excruciating pain. State v. Lopez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless endangerment because the 12-year-old victim testified that after he ran out of the house, he observed bullets flying past him and heard bullets ricocheting off the truck he was hiding behind. State v. Grant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Defendant was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal because sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for attempted second-degree murder, as the evidence showed defendant approached the victim from behind and slashed the victim's throat from ear to ear. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder because she admitted that she grabbed the rifle out of the closet and shot the victim, the medical testimony was that the victim died of a single gunshot wound to the front of his torso, defendant sent text messages to multiple people claiming that she “shot him,” a rifle was found near the victim's body, and a single shell casing was found at the end of the main hallway of the house. State v. Sherlin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 24, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because it showed that the victim suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the back of his head, it was a contact wound, a special agent testified that the shotgun only fired as designed, defendant was familiar with firearm safety, defendant used a deadly weapon on an unarmed, sleeping victim, and the jury could reasonably conclude that prior to killing the victim, defendant came up with a plan to cover up the crime she planned to commit by quickly asserting that it was an accident. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of second-degree murder because when he exited the club, someone handed him a handgun, and he immediately turned and shot the unarmed victims, killing them. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine because he knowingly sold less than 0.5 grams of cocaine to a confidential informant; the informant indicated to defendant that he desired to purchase cocaine and gave defendant sixty dollars, and defendant eventually gave the informant a substance later determined to be cocaine. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for the first degree premeditated murder of one victim and the attempted first degree murder of a second victim because there was overwhelming evidence that he acted with premeditation; defendant was involved in a verbal altercation with the victims, he made phone calls to family members, who arrived armed at an apartment complex, and he lured the unarmed victims from an apartment with a challenge to fight. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder because it showed that after an argument, defendant fired multiple shots at the unarmed victim who was attempting to run, both of the shots into the victim's back would have been fatal, and defendant left the scene and threw away his weapon. The jury rejected defendant's argument that he had adequate provocation for the shooting. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of attempted second degree murder because defendant knowingly fired at least four rounds into the tow truck containing the two victims; the evidence presented at trial established that defendant was not standing in front of the tow truck when he fired his weapon; the jury rightfully rejected defendant's argument that his actions were justified because he was in state of passion caused by the towing of his brother's truck; one victim was permanently paralyzed from the armpits down; and it was apparent from the record that the jury heard and rejected defendant's self-defense argument at trial. State v. Proffitt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's second-degree murder conviction because it showed that the night before the murder defendant had spent the night with another woman, when he returned to the victim's home she had thrown his clothes outside and told him to get out which angered defendant, he retrieved his gun and returned to the victim's apartment, they argued, and defendant shot the victim in the head. Tenn. v. Satterfield, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated arson and other crimes because it showed that defendant, who had been drinking and using drugs, intended to set the loveseat on fire, as her boyfriend testified that she wanted him to leave, she poured lighter fluid on the chair he was sitting in before lighting the lighter fluid, and she knew her grandchildren were asleep in the house. Defendant's alleged belief that the fire on the loveseat had been extinguished before rekindling did not negate her culpability for setting the fire in the first place. State v. Dunavant, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had constructive possession of methamphetamine and marijuana because moments after the agent knocked at the door and was greeted by the occupant of the residence agents at the back of the house heard the flushing of the toilet and hurried movements, the occupant and defendant were the only people in the house leaving defendant as the person in possession of the drugs that were being flushed, numerous agents testified to locating scales in plain sight, agents located defendant's clothes and debit card in the house, and $2,100 was found on defendant's person. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver and possession of illegal drug paraphernalia because it showed that he was found inside a residence where .32 grams of crack cocaine and a crack pipe were present, he was found in a bathroom with a digital scale commonly used for weighing drugs, and he later admitted to selling crack cocaine as a means of making money and to keeping a third of an ounce of cocaine with him at all times. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of of attempted felony child neglect because defendant admitted to locking the victim in her bedroom at night and forcing her to urinate in a cooking pot, defendant admitted to removing the carpet in the victim's bedroom and leaving the tack strips exposed, a witness testified the condition of the victim's bedroom was noticeably worse than the other rooms in the house, the bedroom contained exposed wiring and mouse droppings, and the victim was dirty and “did not smell good.” State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's second degree murder conviction because codefendant brought a handgun to take money from the victim, an altercation occurred, defendant obtained the gun during the altercation, defendant pointed the gun at the victim and fired it multiple times, and the gunshot wounds resulted in the victim's death. Defendant acted with an awareness that defendant's conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim's death. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had physical control over the methamphetamine and an intent to exercise control over it because a false-bottom can containing a substantial amount of methamphetamine was found wedged beneath the passenger seat in his vehicle and he was carrying a large amount of cash on his person. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 27, 2020).

7. Jury Instructions.

In a prosecution for aggravated rape, statutory language required that “intentional,” “knowing,” or “reckless” all should have been charged to the jury as such elements related to “reckless” behavior favored the defense and did not affect the results of the trial. State v. Jones, 889 S.W.2d 225, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Oct. 10, 1994), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, where the indictment charged a “knowing” assault, a jury instruction containing the mental element of “reckless” was not erroneous since “recklessly” is a lesser level of the mental element of “knowingly,” and if the state proved that defendant acted knowingly, it also would have proved that he acted recklessly. State v. Crowe, 914 S.W.2d 933, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Jan. 8, 1996).

Reasonable minds could accept ignorance or mistake of fact as a defense to premeditated first degree murder and counsel were deficient by failing to request a jury instruction on ignorance or mistake of fact where: (1) Petitioner testified that he believed he removed all of the bullets from the gun and that the gun fired as he was “fumbling” with it; and (2) Petitioner's theory at the trial was that he was mistaken in his belief that the gun was unloaded and that he did not intend to shoot the victim. Nesbit v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2013), aff'd, 452 S.W.3d 779, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 917 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2014).

During defendant's trial for aggravated robbery charged under a theory of criminal responsibility, the trial court plainly erred by failing to read to the jury the written instructions defining the terms intentionally and knowingly because the mens rea was an essential element of the offense and was a contested issue at trial. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

8. Willful.

Trial court did not err by holding the father in criminal contempt for returning the children two days late and failing to provide the mother with his new cell phone number for 11 days because his violations were willful. Renken v. Renken, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019).

Judgment holding the mother in criminal contempt was affirmed, as her failure to have the child in Ohio for the father's parenting time as per court order was voluntary and intentional; her failure in the time since learning of her travel restrictions in early October to make arrangements to satisfy her obligations under the order relative to the father's Thanksgiving visitation demonstrated a conscious and deliberate decision to disregard the order. In re Khrystchan D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2020).

Part 4
Criminal Responsibility

39-11-401. Parties to offenses.

  1. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense, if the offense is committed by the person's own conduct, by the conduct of another for which the person is criminally responsible, or by both.
  2. Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Sections 39-11-401 — 39-11-407, and 39-11-411 describe general principles used to assess the criminal liability of persons who act together to violate a criminal law. Sections 39-12-102 (solicitation) and 39-12-103 (criminal conspiracy) also are pertinent.

This section is a restatement of the principles of Tennessee common law which provide equal criminal liability for principals, accessories before the fact, and aiders and abettors. The revised code does not utilize these terms; instead, it provides that any person may be charged as a party if he or she is criminally responsible for the perpetration of the offense.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 26.53.

Law Reviews.

State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to Retain the Natural and Probable Consequence Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 273 (1998).

The Death Penalty in Tennessee — Recent Developments (Roy B. Morgan, Jr.), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 107 (1978).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Natural and Probable Consequence Rule.

The natural and probable consequence rule which derives from the common law is applicable under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-401 and 39-11-402, and, thus, defendant, who assisted codefendants in committing aggravated robbery, was criminally responsible for additional offenses committed by them. State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. 1997).

The natural and probable consequence rule can be used to sustain a defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder based upon criminal responsibility for the conduct of a codefendant during an especially aggravated robbery; the jury, however, must be instructed on all elements of a charge of criminal responsibility, including the natural and probable consequence rule. State v. Howard, 30 S.W.3d 271, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. 2000).

Because the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequence rule, the defendant's conviction of premeditated first degree murder was reversed. State v. Howard, 30 S.W.3d 271, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. 2000).

Four gang members who engaged in the kidnapping of two gang members were criminally responsible for the ensuing death of one of the gang members. State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Sept. 2, 2003).

2. Notice.

Indictment of defendant for aggravated assault was insufficient where it failed to provide adequate notice that she would be required to defend under a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. State v. Barnes, 954 S.W.2d 760, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict a woman and her lover of premeditated first degree murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 and 39-11-302(a) where the woman's version of events was inconsistent with the physical evidence because the autopsy of the victim, her husband, revealed that he had been shot six times in the head with a .22 caliber gun prior to the woman's departure for the grocery store, and there were email messages between the defendants that could be fairly characterized as an ongoing discussion of various methods of murder. State v. Watson, 227 S.W.3d 622, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. July 3, 2006).

Defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was criminally responsible for the crimes committed by a friend was without merit because the evidence adduced at trial sufficed to support the jury's conclusion that defendant was criminally responsible for the friend's conduct when the friend committed the especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and attempted murder of the victim. In part, although defendant argued that he failed to take any steps to prevent the crimes because he was too frightened, the law was clear that the state be afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that might be drawn therefrom; the jury simply drew different conclusions from the evidence than those advanced by defendant. State v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2012), cert. denied, Adams v. Tennessee, 184 L. Ed. 2d 146, 133 S. Ct. 269, 568 U.S. 880, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 6401 (U.S. 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions based upon the theory of criminal responsibility where (1) defendant knew that co-defendants intended to carjack a vehicle, did so, and then kidnapped, raped, and killed the victims, and (2) defendant's presence and support of the endeavor showed that he furnished substantial assistance in the commission of these felony offenses. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2015), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2015), cert. denied, Thomas v. Tennessee, 194 L. Ed. 2d 559, 136 S. Ct. 1458, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 1999 (U.S. 2016).

Evidence that defendant, at the behest of another man, repeatedly drove him to locations in which the man proceeded to rob at gunpoint and that defendant was aware the man planning on robbing the locations and had a gun was sufficient to support a finding that defendant was criminally responsible and to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft. State v. Porrazzo, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1022 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. May 5, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for especially aggravated robbery because based on the proof, the jury reasonably could have concluded that defendant knowingly and intentionally participated in the robbery; after an accomplice shot the victim, defendant took items from the victim's residence without permission. State v. Askew, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1048 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

Jury could have found that defendant was guilty of felony murder in perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate theft, under a theory of criminal responsibility; the proof established that defendant was an active participant in the events resulting in the victim's death and not merely present before and after the offense, as defendant assisted in the commission of the offense by purposefully blocking the victim's car so that the victim could not escape the gunman. State v. Crockett, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault as a party to the offenses where it showed that defendant was driving with his co-defendant and a passenger, the co-defendant and the passenger exited the car, and the co-defendant displayed a gun at the victims. The evidence that defendant stopped the vehicle in a traffic lane for his co-defendant to exit was sufficient to show that defendant knowingly and voluntarily shared in the criminal intent of the crime and promoted its commission. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2016).

Defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder was supported by sufficient proof of her criminal responsibility for the victim's death, and her conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder was supported by sufficient proof of an agreement to commit the murder; defendant knew the killing of her husband was going to occur, she agreed to pay half of the compensation to the killer, plus defendant and her daughter were victims of abuse by the husband and wanted him dead, and they conspired to commit the murder. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), rev'd, 537 S.W.3d 892, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery based on criminal responsibility because the gas station cashier alerted the victim that someone was getting inside his car; when the victim approached his car, co-defendant, who had already closed the driver's side door, brandished a weapon, causing the victim to retreat; co-defendant then drove away in the victim's car; the theft of the victim's car by violence occurred contemporaneously with the taking of that automobile; co-defendant intended to use violence against the victim, if necessary, in order to take the victim's car; defendant instructed co-defendant to get the car; and defendant was arrested driving the stolen vehicle, and he was accompanied by co-defendant. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2016).

Defendant and his other passengers exchanged fire with others and attempted to kill them; defendant was criminally responsible for his own conduct and for the conduct of the others inside his vehicle, and thus the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's separate convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated robbery conviction where the victim testified that defendant and his accomplice passed the gun to each other twice, a witness testified that both defendant and his accomplice had guns during the robbery, and the evidence established that the accomplice used a gun during the robbery, and therefore the jury could have found him guilty as the principle offender or under a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Doak, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 625 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 880 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2016).

Evidence defendant provided an accomplice with the gun used to shoot a victim and rob a store and knew the accomplice intended to rob the store supported convictions for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated assault under a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Wallace, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 633 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence that defendant contacted the perpetrator and asked him to “get rid of” the victim, the victim arrived at defendant's residence following communication with defendant, the perpetrator hit the victim in the head multiple times, and defendant helped load and conceal the victim in a wooded area was sufficient for the jury to find defendant criminally responsible for the victim's death. State v. Bond, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder based on a theory of criminal responsibility because a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant's order that the victim endure a six-minute beating killed the victim as multiple witnesses testified that there was a hierarchy of power within the gang and a disciplinary system in place; witnesses identified defendant as a gang member and indicated he had a high rank within the gang; regardless of where the order originated, defendant delivered the order ensuring that the beating occurred; and the possibility that defendant was only relaying the order for a beating, rather than directly issuing the order himself, did not absolve him of responsibility. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Circumstantial evidence supported a finding that defendant forged the check with the intent to defraud the victim or was criminally responsible for the forgery; although no direct evidence tied defendant to the forgery of the victim's check in the amount of $ 900, the check was dated and cashed on the day after defendant stole the victim's wallet that contained her checkbook. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

Defendant stole the victim's wallet, which contained her credit cards, which were used in six unauthorized transactions, and although no direct evidence tied defendant to the credit card transactions, the circumstantial evidence supported a finding that he knowingly obtained the victim's personal identifying information with the intent to commit an unlawful act, and in any event, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he was criminally responsible for the actions of another in the unauthorized use of the victim's credit cards and was therefore guilty of identity theft. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery where defendant told a witness that he intended to rob the victim by creating a false drug deal, he and his two co-defendants discussed robbing the victim, defendant who was armed drove his co-defendants to the victim's home, he was inside the home while the victim was shot six times, a co-defendant's blood was found in the victim's home, defendant had blood on his hands when he returned to a witness's home, they discussed the division of the proceeds, and defendant told the witness not to say anything about the offense. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 908 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder in the attempt to perpetrate a robbery and attempted especially aggravated robbery because there was proof defendant was present during the crime and assisted the other suspect in committing the crime. Defendant admitted to the witness that he assisted the suspect in the murder, an eyewitness identified defendant as being present in the apartment at the time of the shooting, and his fingerprint was found on a candle holder from the victim's living room that he used to light a cigarette. State v. Taliaferro, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. May 19, 2017).

Evidence that second defendant possessed a gun and displayed it, and fled with the other defendants and assisted them in disposing of their firearms supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder on the theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Burgess, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary as either a principal offender or under a theory of criminal responsibility; defendant and her friend entered the victim's apartment without her consent, defendant hit the victim on the head with a gun and demanded drugs, guns, and money, while the friend searched the apartment and took property, defendant was found with the victim's wallet in her sleeve and a handgun on her person, and the victim positively identified defendant and her friend as the robbers. State v. Sullivan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 85 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree felony murder because defendant gave a statement to the police admitting that defendant, along with accomplices, murdered the victim during the course of robbing the victim of the victim's car and multiple witnesses corroborated defendant's statement. Defendant was to meet with the victim under the pretext of buying the car and to distract the victim while the accomplices stole the car, but one of the accomplices shot and killed the victim during the theft of the car. State v. Vance, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1007 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to have found defendant guilty of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine because defendant gave cocaine to a confidential informant in exchange for money; by finding defendant guilty, the jury implicitly resolved any conflicts between the testimonies of the detectives and between the undercover operations report and the indictment information and discovery. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's constructive possession of the stolen goods corroborated the accomplice's testimony; the accomplice was the sole lessee of the apartment where the stolen items were found, and none of defendant's belongings were found in her apartment even though he told a detective that he was staying at the accomplice's apartment. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's confession to a detective corroborated the accomplice's testimony; defendant confessed that at some point after the burglary he had possession of the stolen handgun, and the accomplice's testimony established that he knowingly obtained or exercised control over the stolen items when he assisted her in the burglary. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Evidence that defendant and codefendant approached the scene with guns out and that codefendant fired three times without provocation through the victim's front window and defendant shot at the back of the vehicle, and defendant threatened to kill the woman who drove them from the scene was sufficient to establish premeditation and that defendant knowingly and voluntarily shared in the criminal intent of first degree murder. State v. Lowe, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted aggravated robbery of the second victim under the theory of criminal responsibility because the jury could conclude that co-defendant intended to take property from the second victim when he brandished a gun and demanded that the second victim drop everything; co-defendant's actions constituted a substantial step towards the completion of aggravated robbery; and the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant and co-defendant were working together to rob the victims as defendant pointed his gun at the first victim and ordered him to give him everything while co-defendant pointed his gun at the second victim and told him to drop everything. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault of the second victim under the theory of criminal responsibility because the second victim testified that he was shot in the hand and that scars remained on his hand from the gunshot wound; he identified co-defendant as the shooter; the jury could conclude that co-defendant either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fired his gun, a deadly weapon, thereby causing bodily injury to the second victim; and the jury could conclude that defendant and co-defendant were working together to rob the victims as defendant pointed his gun at the first victim and ordered him to give him everything while co-defendant pointed his gun at the second victim and told him to drop everything. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because two witnesses testified that both defendant and the accomplice were armed with guns; the victim testified that defendant hit him in the face, held him down, and instructed his accomplice to take the victim's wallet; and the use of a BB gun by the accomplice supported the guilty verdict as it was an article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery because convenience store cashiers testified that defendant and co-defendant, after communicating together, assaulted the victim together inside a convenience store and that defendant had a knife, surveillance video showed that a box cutter fell to the floor in the struggle, defendant recovered items from the victim's wallet that fell to the floor and ran, and the victim's social security card and a check stub were found inside defendant's vehicle hours later. State v. Bingham, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 760 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine because defendant aided codefendant by allowing defendant's house to be used as the location for a drug venture and defendant intended to benefit from providing this aid by receiving drugs, rather than cash, for defendant's personal use. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder under the theory of criminal responsibility because it showed that defendant aided or attempted to aid her husband and her daughter's boyfriend in the victims'  murders. The jury could have inferred that defendant and her daughter convinced her husband that their daughter was the target of harassment and death threats from the victims and their friends, defendant wrote in emails that she wanted the victims dead, and she attempted to destroy evidence relating to the offenses and provided her husband with a false alibi after he carried out the murders. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery under a theory of criminal responsibility because he arranged a meeting with the victim to purportedly sell clothing, during the sale two men approached and attacked the victim, taking cash and a cell phone, defendant admitted he knew one of the robbers, defendant fled the scene in a red car, which picked up the two robbers minutes later, and defendant admitted he received a cell phone and posted it for sale. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property; defendant's transfer of property stolen during the burglary was a rational connection between his possession of the stolen property and his participation in the aggravated burglary, and regardless of who went inside, defendant benefitted from the proceeds of the aggravated burglary and theft and aided his co-defendant in the commission of the offenses. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the murder under a theory of criminal responsibility because, based on cell phone records, the evidence showed that defendant pointed the gun that was used to kill the first victim at a second victim in another area of town sometime between 6:30 p.m. when he last called the second victim and 6:49 p.m. when calls began to be exchanged between the second victim's cell phone and his brother's cell phone regarding defendant's demand for ransom. Defendant also boasted to the second victim that he had committed other murders earlier in the day. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2019).

Convictions of defendant for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault, based upon a theory of criminal responsibility, was supported by the evidence because the evidence established that defendant intended to benefit from the proceeds of the robbery of the victim and aided codefendants in planning the robbery. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as a perpetrator of the armed robbery and provided sufficient corroboration of the codefendant's testimony because it showed that defendant entered the market brandishing a shotgun and wearing a ski mask and gloves, he pointed the shotgun at the victim and demanded that she give him the money bag, defendant was picked up by his codefendant which was captured on video, the codefendant admitted that he was the driver and provided the police with the location of the ski mask and a glove, and defendant was the primary contributor of DNA obtained from the mask and glove. State v. Judkins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated robbery because defendant and the accomplice entered the victim's apartment in order to rob him; the accomplice pointed the gun at the victim before shooting him and taking his cell phone; and defendant was criminally responsible for the accomplice's actions as he was engaged in a criminal endeavor to rob the victim. State v. Dodson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder because defendant and his accomplice were asked by a third party to steal marijuana from the victim; the accomplice fatally shot the victim using defendant's gun; and defendant intended to promote or assist in the commission of the robbery and was criminally responsible for the victim's death. State v. Dodson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of theft; she participated in a scheme to obtain money from the human services department through a ministry becoming a sponsor in a summer food services program. Defendant claimed to be the program administrator but auditors found no evidence that she purchased large volumes of food, and while a church employee claimed defendant was not involved, the jury could have found defendant was directing or assisting that employee in taking the money. State v. Jives-Nealy, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

There was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated battery and murder, including evidence that defendant and his co-defendants forced their way into the victim's apartment armed with a gun, the victim was unarmed and surrounded by the men demanding to know where her son was, and when she failed to provide an answer, a co-defendant shot the victim in the head at the defendant's direction. State v. Fletcher, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, which were merged, based on criminal responsibility as defendant acted with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the crimes and aided or attempted to aid in the crimes because defendant initiated the robbery by placing a telephone pizza order which lured the victim to the scene; while the victim attempted to deliver the pizza order to the residence, two men waited until the victim returned to his car to approach the victim; defendant heard a gunshot coming from the direction of the men; and defendant repeatedly ran over the victim to ensure he was dead prior to taking his vehicle. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 11, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to corroborate a codefendant's testimony as an accomplice, as the victim's testimony established a crime had been committed independent of the codefendant's testimony, the evidence corroborated codefendant's testimony implicating third defendant, and third defendant's testimony admitting she was in the van while traveling and fleeing from the victim's home corroborated codefendant's testimony regarding her presence. State v. Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

4. Jury Instructions.

In a murder and robbery case, the court properly instructed on criminal responsibility because defendant was not only present in the motel room, but he was acting with the intent to promote or assist in the aggravated robberies. Needing money for bail for a family member, the two men arrived armed at the motel room together, and they proceeded to force their way inside the victims'  motel room and attempted to steal items from the occupants therein. State v. Price, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Mar. 11, 2014).

Trial court did not err by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility where the proof showed that the victim was shot nine times by three weapons, the victim sustained all of the injuries within a very short time period, four witnesses identified defendant was one of the shooters and his codefendant was identified as another shooter, and a witness so the codefendant with another accomplice immediately prior to the codefendant opening fire. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 991 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 257 (Tenn. Mar. 23, 2016).

Despite defendant's referring to the trial court's instruction as a material modification of the criminal responsibility and first degree murder instructions already given, it was in fact an accurate supplemental instruction in response to the jury's question, plus the trial court did admonish the jury not to place undue emphasis on the instruction. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), rev'd, 537 S.W.3d 892, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 9, 2017).

Record failed to include a transcript of the instructions as read to the jury, although it contained what purported to be a written copy of the trial court's charge; in any event, the criminal responsibility instruction provided in the written copy of the charge was fairly raised by the evidence, tracked the language of the pattern jury instruction, and was a correct statement of the law, and thus the inclusion of the instruction was not error. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

Trial court's jury instructions were proper because defendant did not object to the court's decision not to charge attempt as a lesser-included offense, the evidence established only a completed crime, the jury was properly charged on flight and criminal responsibility, and any error in not charging facilitation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Daniels, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

5. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support one of defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because the doctrine of transferred intent was inapplicable to the conviction when the victim on a sidewalk was shot while defendant and a codefendant in the car which defendant was driving exchanged gunfire with codefendants in another car, as there was no evidence that defendant provoked anyone. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Given the lack of provocation on the part of the victim towards any of the defendants, the State could base a conviction for the attempted manslaughter conviction of the victim on the other's actions under a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

None of the shooters involved could be guilty of the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter of the victim, which requires the act of the slayer be the result of provocation instigated by the person slain; there was no credible evidence to suggest that anyone was adequately provoked by the victim that day, and thus there was no offense committed by the conduct of another for which defendant could be found guilty. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

None of the shooters involved could be guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter of one victim, as the offense requires the act of the slayer be the result of provocation instigated by the person slain; there was no credible evidence that anyone was adequately provoked by the victim that day. State v. North, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016).

6. Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's multiple convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violated double jeopardy; the single offending act was the employment of a handgun during the shooting event, regardless of the number of firearms used by the various individuals, the number bullets fired by defendant, or the number of predicate felonies arising out of that single transaction, and the appropriate unit of prosecution was a single conviction for the felonious conduct during one transaction, regardless of whether the conviction was garnered under a theory of criminal responsibility or as a principal actor. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

39-11-402. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another.

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another, if:

  1. Acting with the culpability required for the offense, the person causes or aids an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense;
  2. Acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense; or
  3. Having a duty imposed by law or voluntarily undertaken to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, or to promote or assist its commission, the person fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section establishes three conditions under which a person may be criminally liable for the conduct of another. Subdivision (1) codifies Tennessee common law regarding criminal responsibility for the use of an innocent or irresponsible person to commit an offense.

Subdivision (2) sets forth the conduct of defendants formerly known as accessories before the fact and aiders and abettors.

Subdivision (3) sets forth what criminal liability is imposed upon offenders who neglect their duty with intent to benefit from, promote, or assist in the commission of an offense.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Culpable mental states, §§ 39-11-106, 39-11-301, 39-11-302.

Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to solicitation, attempt or conspiracy, defenses, § 39-12-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 26.51, 26.53, 26.54.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Accomplice and Accessories, § 7; 6 Tenn. Juris., Conspiracy, § 2; 6 Tenn. Juris., Compounding Offenses, § 3; 16 Tenn. Juris., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 15, 16.

Law Reviews.

Accessory Liability: Acquittal of the Principal Bars Conviction of the Accessory Before the Fact — The Common Law Lives in Tennessee, 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 87 (1984).

State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to Retain the Natural and Probable Consequence Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 273 (1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The fact that T.C.A. § 39-11-403 referred to T.C.A. § 39-11-402(b), even though T.C.A. § 39-11-402 had been changed to show (1)-(3) rather than (a)-(c) at the time of their indictment and trial, did not warrant granting defendants a new trial. State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Aug. 2, 1993).

Under § 39-11-402(2) and (3), proof of negligence or recklessness does not suffice to make a person criminally liable; it is necessary that defendant in some way associate himself with the venture, act with knowledge that an offense is to be committed, and share in the criminal intent of the principal. State v. Maxey, 898 S.W.2d 756, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

The natural and probable consequence rule which derives from the common law is applicable under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-402 and 39-11-401, and, thus, defendant, who assisted codefendants in committing aggravated robbery, was criminally responsible for additional offenses committed by them. State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. 1997).

To impose criminal liability based on the natural and probable consequences rule, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt and — the jury must find — the following: (1) The elements of the crime or crimes that accompanied the target crime; (2) That the defendant was criminally responsible pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-11-402; and (3) That the other crimes committed were natural and probable consequences of the target crime. State v. Howard, 30 S.W.3d 271, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. 2000).

Tennessee state offense of solicitation to commit aggravated assault involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and involves the same kind of purposeful, violent and oppressive conduct as the enumerated offenses; it therefore qualifies as a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(2). United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9940, 2011 FED App. 128P (6th Cir. May 17, 2011).

Because the crime of solicitation to commit aggravated assault was at least one step removed from the requisite level of force contemplated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(1), it did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the first prong of the definition. United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9940, 2011 FED App. 128P (6th Cir. May 17, 2011).

Statute was sufficiently precise to put a person of common intelligence on notice of the prohibited conduct where the statute intended to assess criminal liability to persons who acted together in committing criminal offenses. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2015), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2015), cert. denied, Thomas v. Tennessee, 194 L. Ed. 2d 559, 136 S. Ct. 1458, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 1999 (U.S. 2016).

Under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403(a), 39-11-402(2), a defendant must know that an individual intended to commit a specified felony and the defendant must furnish substantial assistance to that individual without intending to promote or assist in the commission of the specified felony or benefit in the proceeds. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

2. Relationship to Federal Law.

Defendant's prior conviction under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-402 and 39-11-403 for facilitation of the burglary of a building was not a “violent felony” under the “otherwise” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Although the offense of facilitation of a burglary created a serious risk of violence, it did not qualify as purposeful, violent, and aggressive; to be guilty of facilitation of a burglary under § 39-11-403, an individual had to have acted without the intent required for criminal responsibility for the ultimate criminal act. United States v. Vanhook, 640 F.3d 706, 2011 FED App. 95P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7884 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2011).

3. Aider and Abettor as Principal Offender.

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on facilitation, T.C.A. § 39-11-403(a), as a lesser-included offense during defendant's criminal trial, because the evidence did not support the notion that defendant merely furnished substantial assistance in the commission of premeditated first-degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, without intending to promote or assist the commission of those offenses. The evidence reasonably supported only one of the following conclusions: (1) Defendant was not present at the apartment at which the victim was beaten, was not involved in the victim's murder or the gang that killed the victim, and therefore was completely innocent; (2) Defendant was innocent because, while he gave orders, he did not order anyone to kill or kidnap the victim; or (3) Defendant was guilty by criminal responsibility, T.C.A. § 39-11-402, because he ordered other gang members to kidnap and kill the victim. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Robinson v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 1429, 164 L. Ed. 2d 132, 546 U.S. 1214, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1839 (2006).

Where there were email messages between a woman and her lover, both convicted of murdering the woman's husband, that could be fairly characterized as an ongoing discussion of various methods of murder, it was not necessary that the lover be present to be criminally responsible; evidence was sufficient to support the lover's conviction even though he was in Shreveport, Louisiana. State v. Watson, 227 S.W.3d 622, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. July 3, 2006).

4. Presence and Companionship.

Presence and companionship with the perpetrator of a felony before and after the commission of the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the crime may be inferred; no particular act need be shown and it is not necessary for one to take a physical part of the crime. State v. Jones, 15 S.W.3d 880, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

5. Accessory After the Fact.

Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the common law rule that a person charged as an accessory after the fact could not be tried prior to the principal offender being convicted, unless the person charged as an accessory after the fact expressly consented to waive the common law rule, had not been abrogated by the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, and it declined to judicially abrogate it. State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 2005).

6. Elements of Offense.

Although the state did not allege that defendant was guilty under a theory of criminal responsibility by assisting the co-defendant's neglect of her child either in the indictment or the bill of particulars, the state was not precluded from pursuing theories of criminal liability that were not mentioned in the bill of particulars, so long as such theories of liability did not exceed the scope of the indictment. State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2008).

Because criminal responsibility was not eliminated as a possible theory of guilt by the bill of particulars, granting defendant's motion to dismiss child neglect charge was improper. State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2008).

Presence and companionship with the perpetrator of a felony before and after the commission of the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the crime may be inferred; no particular act need be shown and it is not necessary for one to take a physical part of the crime. State v. Jones, 15 S.W.3d 880, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Mere presence during the commission of the crime is not enough to convict. State v. Jones, 15 S.W.3d 880, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Encouragement of the principal is sufficient to infer one's participation in a crime. State v. Jones, 15 S.W.3d 880, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

7. —Intent of Aider and Abettor.

The culpable mental state of an aider and abettor is “intentional,” as defined in § 39-11-302; thus, where defendant intentionally permitted another person to operate her motor vehicle when that person was intoxicated, defendant was criminally responsible for the crimes committed by the driver. State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 989 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

8. — —Murder.

The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution does not bar the death penalty for an aider and abettor where the proof shows that person intended that a killing take place or was a major participant in the underlying felony and had a mental state of reckless indifference to human life. State v. Taylor, 774 S.W.2d 163, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, Taylor v. Tennessee, 493 U.S. 945, 110 S. Ct. 355, 107 L. Ed. 2d 342, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 5136 (1989).

The trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on facilitation of felony murder where the evidence showed that defendant and accomplices met and planned a robbery and the murder was committed by an accomplice of defendant in the course of the robbery. State v. Utley, 928 S.W.2d 448, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Four gang members who engaged in the kidnapping of two gang members, were criminally responsible for the ensuing death of one of the gang members. State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Sept. 2, 2003).

9. — —Possession of Drugs.

A jury could rationally conclude that the defendant, by making arrangements with the defendant's first cousin to secure a residence for the purpose of selling drugs, acted with the intent to and in fact did aid the defendant's live-in lover in the sale of drugs. State v. Bigsby, 40 S.W.3d 87, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

Trial court did not err in charging a jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver where the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support conviction for facilitation of possession of marijuana where when the vehicle defendant was in was initially stopped by the police, one or more of the occupants had been recently smoking marijuana due to the strong odor observed, defendant was aware of his friend's attempt to hide the marijuana from the police by removing it from the front center console and placing it under the front passenger seat, and it was the defendant (not his friend) who was in physical control of the marijuana due to his proximity to the brown paper bag. State v. Nash, 104 S.W.3d 495, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. 2003).

10. — —Facilitation of Felony Murder.

Knowledge of the specific felony required under T.C.A. § 39-11-403 is met in a felony murder prosecution not by knowledge of the felony murder, but by knowledge that the other person was going to commit the underlying felony; thus, defendant could be guilty of facilitation of felony murder because he knew his codefendant was planning on committing a robbery. State v. Lewis, 919 S.W.2d 62, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled, State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree felony murder because defendant gave a statement to the police admitting that defendant, along with accomplices, murdered the victim during the course of robbing the victim of the victim's car and multiple witnesses corroborated defendant's statement. Defendant was to meet with the victim under the pretext of buying the car and to distract the victim while the accomplices stole the car, but one of the accomplices shot and killed the victim during the theft of the car. State v. Vance, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1007 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2017).

11. — —Rape.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated rape even though the victim could not say with complete certainty that he was the one who penetrated her; the victim identified defendant as the one who initiated the attack and, if he was not the one who penetrated her, he clearly assisted the one who did. State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

12. — —Robbery.

Where a jury could reasonably have concluded that, while defendant participated substantially by kicking and beating the victim, the defendant did not intend to promote, assist or benefit from the offense of robbery since defendant took no property from the victim, the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation. State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. 2000).

The natural and probable consequence rule can be used to sustain a defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder based upon criminal responsibility for the conduct of a codefendant during an especially aggravated robbery; the jury, however, must be instructed on all elements of a charge of criminal responsibility, including the natural and probable consequence rule. State v. Howard, 30 S.W.3d 271, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. 2000).

Facts supported the conclusion that defendant acted with the intent to assist an accomplice in an attempt to rob the victim where defendant quoted the accomplice as saying, “I ought to rob the old bastard and take a whole carton of cigarettes,” defendant claimed to have waited in the car while the accomplice went back to the store, and after the accomplice returned, defendant took accomplice's ski mask to have it burned; based on this testimony, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of felony murder based on criminal responsibility. State v. Cureton, 38 S.W.3d 64, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Nov. 6, 2000).

13. Notice.

Indictment of defendant for aggravated assault was insufficient where it failed to provide adequate notice that she would be required to defend under a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. State v. Barnes, 954 S.W.2d 760, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

14. Jury Instructions.

In the absence of a special request for further instructions, there was no reversible error in a conviction for a crime against nature where the trial court's charge dealt with aiding and abetting and did not directly charge that defendant would be criminally chargeable with acts which he forced others to perform, but where charge did say that if the jury found defendant to have committed the crime, defendant was guilty of a crime against nature. Lundy v. State, 521 S.W.2d 591, 1974 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).

In determining whether an instruction on a lesser-included offense must be given, a court must: (1) Determine whether any evidence exists that reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser-included offense and (2) Determine whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the existence of the lesser-included offense is legally sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense. State v. Fowler, 23 S.W.3d 285, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. 2000).

Facilitation of a felony, is a lesser-included offense when one is charged with criminal responsibility for the actions of another; however, defendant, a passenger in a fleeing vehicle, was not entitled to an instruction on facilitation since defendant did not contend to be guilty of facilitation, did not show evidence of “substantial assistance” so as to raise the issue of facilitation, and did not ask for that instruction. State v. Fowler, 23 S.W.3d 285, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. 2000).

The lower court did not err in omitting the natural and probable consequences instruction with respect to the especially aggravated robbery count, inasmuch as that count represented the target crime. State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

Defendant was statutorily responsible for all homicides committed during the course of the robbery, whether or not the homicide was foreseeable; as such, despite the state's concession that the instruction should have been given, the trial court was not required to give the natural and probable consequences instruction for the felony murder count. State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

In a premeditated murder case, a court's error in failing to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule was not harmless, where there was contested evidence of defendant's intent. State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

Despite defendant's referring to the trial court's instruction as a material modification of the criminal responsibility and first degree murder instructions already given, it was in fact an accurate supplemental instruction in response to the jury's question, plus the trial court did admonish the jury not to place undue emphasis on the instruction. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), rev'd, 537 S.W.3d 892, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 9, 2017).

Record failed to include a transcript of the instructions as read to the jury, although it contained what purported to be a written copy of the trial court's charge; in any event, the criminal responsibility instruction provided in the written copy of the charge was fairly raised by the evidence, tracked the language of the pattern jury instruction, and was a correct statement of the law, and thus the inclusion of the instruction was not error. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

Trial court did not err by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility, as the evidence showed that defendant and another man acted in concert to steal a car, they fled when police attempted to stop the car, they continued fleeing on foot, and defendant was found hiding in the vicinity of the stolen vehicle, allowing the jury to infer that defendant was one of the occupants of the car and intended to promote or benefit from the failure to yield to police. State v. Perkins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 831 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

Trial court's jury instructions were proper because defendant did not object to the court's decision not to charge attempt as a lesser-included offense, the evidence established only a completed crime, the jury was properly charged on flight and criminal responsibility, and any error in not charging facilitation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Daniels, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

Jury was properly instruction on criminal responsibility, as the evidence showed that two people approached the victim in his driveway in the middle of the night with an intent to rob him and both perpetrators sole and drove away in the victim's car. State v. Perkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 892 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

The evidence showed that one of the defendants was an active participant in the beating, robbery, and kidnapping of the victim so that the facilitation instructions which the defendant requested were not necessary. State v. Buford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 181 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2018).

During defendant's trial for aggravated robbery charged under a theory of criminal responsibility, the trial court plainly erred by failing to read to the jury the written instructions defining the terms intentionally and knowingly because the mens rea was an essential element of the offense and was a contested issue at trial. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

Trial court properly instructed the jury on the law of criminal responsibility because the evidence adduced at trial established that defendant assumed the role of the victim's father; defendant's name was listed in the father's portion of the victim's school enrollment form, defendant was present for school drop off and pick up, and he undertook the discipline of the victim by spanking him. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

15. —Accomplice Instruction.

In a case where police arrived at the scene of a three-car accident, defendant was found outside the truck while his companion was found in the passenger seat, and defendant and several witnesses testified that his companion was driving the vehicle; in defendant's criminal prosecution for vehicular assault and aggravated vehicular homicide, although trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to accomplice liability under T.C.A. § 39-11-402(2), the error was harmless because ample evidence introduced at trial corroborated the companion's testimony that defendant was driving at the time of the accident. State v. Bowman, 327 S.W.3d 69, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. June 15, 2009), cert. denied, Bowman v. Tennessee, 175 L. Ed. 2d 388, 130 S. Ct. 559, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8080 (U.S. 2009).

Although defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court provided a jury instruction on criminal responsibility for conduct of another, T.C.A. § 39-11-402, the trial court did not err by providing an instruction on criminal responsibility for conduct of another because a witness testified that he saw defendant in the room where the victim was tied to a chair, heard defendant raising his voice toward the victim, and understood defendant to be primarily responsible for his kidnapping. In consequence, even if the jury determined that defendant did not physically participate in the kidnapping, the testimony was sufficient to establish that defendant was not only present at the house during the kidnapping, but that he had encouraged other participants in the commission of the offense. State v. Little, 402 S.W.3d 202, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2013).

16. Evidence.

Where defendant father and defendant mother were charged with aggravated child abuse, and she was also charged with violating T.C.A. § 39-11-402, evidence of defendant father's prior assaults against her was irrelevant and improperly admitted because it did not establish that it was more probable that she intended to promote, assist, or benefit from results of the offense. State v. Gomez, 367 S.W.3d 237, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 291 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2012).

17. —Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Todd, 631 S.W.2d 464, 1981 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 426 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Lequire, 634 S.W.2d 608, 1981 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Moore, 631 S.W.2d 456, 1982 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); State v. McBee, 644 S.W.2d 425, 1982 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Hall, 656 S.W.2d 60, 1983 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Aug. 2, 1993).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder as defendant assisted in the commission of murder, assisted in the concealment of the crime, and aided another in the disposal of the body. State v. Hill, 118 S.W.3d 380, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1074 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping because: (1) It showed that defendant and his co-defendant left the co-defendant's apartment carrying handcuffs, rope, and duct tape; (2) There was evidence, including defendant's own statement, that the victims were bound and transported to a construction site where their bodies were eventually found; and (3) Rope found at the murder scene was further evidence that the victims had been bound. It was clear that defendant played an active role in planning, preparing, and executing the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of the victims, and the evidence was certainly sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of especially aggravated kidnapping under at least a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a felony murder conviction where defendant admitted he was present during a robbery by an accomplice, and one victim was shot and killed during the robbery. State v. Summers, 159 S.W.3d 586, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2005).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery against the older victim because, although the older victim did not remember the incident, the younger victim testified that defendant made her touch the older child's private area with her hand and made the older child touch her the same way. State v. Osborne, 251 S.W.3d 1, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008).

Proof was overwhelming that defendant was a willing and active participant in the attack instigated by his brother. State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. May 4, 2010).

Defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was criminally responsible for the crimes committed by a friend was without merit because the evidence adduced at trial sufficed to support the jury's conclusion that defendant was criminally responsible for the friend's conduct when the friend committed the especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and attempted murder of the victim. In part, although defendant argued that he failed to take any steps to prevent the crimes because he was too frightened, the law was clear that the state be afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that might be drawn therefrom; the jury simply drew different conclusions from the evidence than those advanced by defendant. State v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2012), cert. denied, Adams v. Tennessee, 184 L. Ed. 2d 146, 133 S. Ct. 269, 568 U.S. 880, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 6401 (U.S. 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted first degree murder because the victim said defendant demanded money and drugs and yelled, “we're going to kill you guys if you don't tell us where it's at.” Defendant hit the victim with a baton, threatened to kill everyone in the cabin if he did not receive money, and although defendant did not fire the gun, he was criminally responsible for the shootings because he sought out assistance and armed the accomplice with a gun before going to the cabin. State v. Dickson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 413 S.W.3d 735, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 777 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), dismissed, Dickson v. Leibach, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174459 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, as an aider and abettor, of two counts of attempted first degree murder, because a natural and probable consequence of his and his companion's attempt to obtain money and drugs by force was the companion's shooting of two unarmed men. State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 777 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013).

Evidence that defendant admitting being present and touching the female victim's vagina, and that he received $ 100 in proceeds from the crime permitted a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that defendant benefitted from the crime and acted in such a manner to assist such that he guilty based on a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Peebles, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013).

Even if the evidence did not establish that defendant was the gunman, the jury could have properly found him responsible for his accomplice's employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (aggravated burglary) under T.C.A. § 39-17-1324 because the evidence established that defendant aided the accomplice in committing the burglary. State v. Fayne, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2013), aff'd, 451 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping under an accomplice theory because defendant and the codefendant knowingly and unlawfully confined the employees so as to interfere substantially with their liberty, defendant and the codefendant accomplished those actions with handguns, and the two men were acting as a team. State v. Teats, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2014), aff'd, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions based upon the theory of criminal responsibility where (1) defendant knew that co-defendants intended to carjack a vehicle, did so, and then kidnapped, raped, and killed the victims, and (2) defendant's presence and support of the endeavor showed that he furnished substantial assistance in the commission of these felony offenses. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2015), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2015), cert. denied, Thomas v. Tennessee, 194 L. Ed. 2d 559, 136 S. Ct. 1458, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 1999 (U.S. 2016).

Jury could have found that defendant was guilty of felony murder in perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate theft, under a theory of criminal responsibility; the proof established that defendant was an active participant in the events resulting in the victim's death and not merely present before and after the offense, as defendant assisted in the commission of the offense by purposefully blocking the victim's car so that the victim could not escape the gunman. State v. Crockett, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault as a party to the offenses where it showed that defendant was driving with his co-defendant and a passenger, the co-defendant and the passenger exited the car, and the co-defendant displayed a gun at the victims. The evidence that defendant stopped the vehicle in a traffic lane for his co-defendant to exit was sufficient to show that defendant knowingly and voluntarily shared in the criminal intent of the crime and promoted its commission. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2016).

Defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder was supported by sufficient proof of her criminal responsibility for the victim's death, and her conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder was supported by sufficient proof of an agreement to commit the murder; defendant knew the killing of her husband was going to occur, she agreed to pay half of the compensation to the killer, plus defendant and her daughter were victims of abuse by the husband and wanted him dead, and they conspired to commit the murder. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), rev'd, 537 S.W.3d 892, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery because a witness testified that defendants left his house after agreeing to commit a robbery; both defendants were identified by an eyewitness as leaving the victim's apartment with him the last time he was seen alive by anyone other than defendants; the victim was shot multiple times, and his body was left in his vehicle; the bullets removed from the victim's body and shell casings found in his vehicle were fired by the type of pistol recovered from the second defendant's residence; and the jury was instructed regarding criminal responsibility and rejected the first defendant's argument that he was only present during the murder. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery based on criminal responsibility because the gas station cashier alerted the victim that someone was getting inside his car; when the victim approached his car, co-defendant, who had already closed the driver's side door, brandished a weapon, causing the victim to retreat; co-defendant then drove away in the victim's car; the theft of the victim's car by violence occurred contemporaneously with the taking of that automobile; co-defendant intended to use violence against the victim, if necessary, in order to take the victim's car; defendant instructed co-defendant to get the car; and defendant was arrested driving the stolen vehicle, and he was accompanied by co-defendant. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated robbery conviction where the victim testified that defendant and his accomplice passed the gun to each other twice, a witness testified that both defendant and his accomplice had guns during the robbery, and the evidence established that the accomplice used a gun during the robbery, and therefore the jury could have found him guilty as the principle offender or under a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Doak, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 625 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 880 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2016).

Evidence defendant provided an accomplice with the gun used to shoot a victim and rob a store and knew the accomplice intended to rob the store supported convictions for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated assault under a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Wallace, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 633 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder based on a theory of criminal responsibility because a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant's order that the victim endure a six-minute beating killed the victim as multiple witnesses testified that there was a hierarchy of power within the gang and a disciplinary system in place; witnesses identified defendant as a gang member and indicated he had a high rank within the gang; regardless of where the order originated, defendant delivered the order ensuring that the beating occurred; and the possibility that defendant was only relaying the order for a beating, rather than directly issuing the order himself, did not absolve him of responsibility. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

There was evidence showing that a robbery occurred, and therefore the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery, where the jury could have found defendant guilty based on his own conduct or that of his codefendants, as defendant admitted he shot the victim in the head, one codefendant's statements showed that defendant participated in the robbery, and the other codefendant's testimony established that defendant admitted he had shot the victim and shared in the proceeds from the robbery. State v. Tull-Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2016).

Circumstantial evidence supported a finding that defendant forged the check with the intent to defraud the victim or was criminally responsible for the forgery; although no direct evidence tied defendant to the forgery of the victim's check in the amount of $ 900, the check was dated and cashed on the day after defendant stole the victim's wallet that contained her checkbook. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

Defendant stole the victim's wallet, which contained her credit cards, which were used in six unauthorized transactions, and although no direct evidence tied defendant to the credit card transactions, the circumstantial evidence supported a finding that he knowingly obtained the victim's personal identifying information with the intent to commit an unlawful act, and in any event, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he was criminally responsible for the actions of another in the unauthorized use of the victim's credit cards and was therefore guilty of identity theft. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

None of the shooters involved could be guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter of one victim, as the offense requires the act of the slayer be the result of provocation instigated by the person slain; there was no credible evidence that anyone was adequately provoked by the victim that day. State v. North, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery where defendant told a witness that he intended to rob the victim by creating a false drug deal, he and his two co-defendants discussed robbing the victim, defendant who was armed drove his co-defendants to the victim's home, he was inside the home while the victim was shot six times, a co-defendant's blood was found in the victim's home, defendant had blood on his hands when he returned to a witness's home, they discussed the division of the proceeds, and defendant told the witness not to say anything about the offense. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 908 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Evidence that the male victim was anally raped with such force that his anus was injured, after defendant robbed and kidnapped him, supported defendant's conviction for facilitation of the rape. State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 66, 138 S. Ct. 105, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5551 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder in the attempt to perpetrate a robbery and attempted especially aggravated robbery because there was proof defendant was present during the crime and assisted the other suspect in committing the crime. Defendant admitted to the witness that he assisted the suspect in the murder, an eyewitness identified defendant as being present in the apartment at the time of the shooting, and his fingerprint was found on a candle holder from the victim's living room that he used to light a cigarette. State v. Taliaferro, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. May 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary as either a principal offender or under a theory of criminal responsibility; defendant and her friend entered the victim's apartment without her consent, defendant hit the victim on the head with a gun and demanded drugs, guns, and money, while the friend searched the apartment and took property, defendant was found with the victim's wallet in her sleeve and a handgun on her person, and the victim positively identified defendant and her friend as the robbers. State v. Sullivan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 85 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendants'  robbery convictions because (1) the evidence showed the victim was threatened contemporaneously with a taking, (2) the victim's statement that the taking would have occurred despite the threat did not defeat a conviction, and (3) defendants acted in concert with one another when one tried to distract the victim while the other two stole property, which all three put in their pockets. State v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 765 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery as a principal actor because defendant sent the victim a text message asking him to pick her up; when the victim arrived, defendant told the victim where to park, entered the truck, and turned off the truck; she then sent a text message; codefendant and a second man then approached the victim's truck; the second man pointed a gun at the victim and placed it on his stomach, and removed the victim's cell phone from his jacket pocket; the victim's GPS device, cell phone, and debit card were taken without the victim's consent; and the victim's stolen debit card was found at a nearby townhome, where defendant and the second man were found after the robbery. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 3, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault under a theory of criminal responsibility because it showed that shortly after his co-defendant approached one victim with the gun, defendant approached the second victim, asked for her cellphone, and told her not to move. Defendant admitted that the purpose for his actions was to prevent the second victim from calling the police. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 594 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for felony murder because a jury could have inferred that defendant had the intent to commit a robbery prior to, or concurrent with, the killing of the victim based on his own conduct or the conduct of his accomplices, for which he was criminally responsible; defendant admitted he planned to rob the victim, he provided the gun used in the offense, he participated in the robbery, and he fled in the victim's car after the victim was shot. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018), cert. denied, Collins v. Tennessee, — L. Ed. 2d —, — S. Ct. —, — U.S. —, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 7182 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to have found defendant guilty of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine because defendant gave cocaine to a confidential informant in exchange for money; by finding defendant guilty, the jury implicitly resolved any conflicts between the testimonies of the detectives and between the undercover operations report and the indictment information and discovery. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's first and second degree murder convictions under a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of defendant's paramour because defendant confessed that defendant and the paramour discussed killing the victim, defendant and the paramour purchased ammunition for the victim's gun, a witness testified that the victim was with defendant and the paramour, defendant confessed that both defendant and the paramour shot the victim at the paramour's direction, and defendant assisted in disposing of evidence. State v. Briggs, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 2, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted aggravated robbery of the second victim under the theory of criminal responsibility because the jury could conclude that co-defendant intended to take property from the second victim when he brandished a gun and demanded that the second victim drop everything; co-defendant's actions constituted a substantial step towards the completion of aggravated robbery; and the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant and co-defendant were working together to rob the victims as defendant pointed his gun at the first victim and ordered him to give him everything while co-defendant pointed his gun at the second victim and told him to drop everything. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault of the second victim under the theory of criminal responsibility because the second victim testified that he was shot in the hand and that scars remained on his hand from the gunshot wound; he identified co-defendant as the shooter; the jury could conclude that co-defendant either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fired his gun, a deadly weapon, thereby causing bodily injury to the second victim; and the jury could conclude that defendant and co-defendant were working together to rob the victims as defendant pointed his gun at the first victim and ordered him to give him everything while co-defendant pointed his gun at the second victim and told him to drop everything. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

There was overwhelming evidence that defendant solicited, directed, or aided other people in the commission of first degree premeditated murder because witnesses identified defendant's voice on the recorded phone calls instructing family members to “get their straps and come out here,” and just prior to the shooting, the men were seen using hand gestures and getting in a formation; twelve of the thirty-one cartridge casings recovered at the crime scene had been fired from defendant's handgun. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery because convenience store cashiers testified that defendant and co-defendant, after communicating together, assaulted the victim together inside a convenience store and that defendant had a knife, surveillance video showed that a box cutter fell to the floor in the struggle, defendant recovered items from the victim's wallet that fell to the floor and ran, and the victim's social security card and a check stub were found inside defendant's vehicle hours later. State v. Bingham, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 760 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape and incest convictions, under a criminal responsibility theory, because defendant's wife, who was the mother of their teenage son, and defendant's son, who was mentally incapacitated by an intellectual disability to an extent that the son was incapable of consenting, testified that they twice engaged in sexual intercourse in defendant's presence at the insistence of defendant, who threatened defendant's wife and on one occasion assaulted defendant's wife. State v. Sherrill, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2018).

Defendant drove to the gas station and drove around the store to ensure that there were no customers, then parked while his co-defendant went inside the store with a toy gun; when he returned with money, defendant drove to purchase drugs, and thus the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant aided in his co-defendant's commission of the aggravated robbery. State v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine because defendant aided codefendant by allowing defendant's house to be used as the location for a drug venture and defendant intended to benefit from providing this aid by receiving drugs, rather than cash, for defendant's personal use. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery based on the theory of criminal responsibility because defendant was present inside the market two minutes before two men entered; defendant's pizza order required the victim to leave the front counter; the victim stood in the pizza preparation area when the first man shot him and when the second man jumped on the front counter and removed money from one of the cash registers; and the jury could have inferred from defendant's presence and actions at the market and from his companionship with the men before and after the offenses that defendant acted with the intent to assist in the armed robbery, resulting in the victim's death. State v. Vales, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder under the theory of criminal responsibility because it showed that defendant aided or attempted to aid her husband and her daughter's boyfriend in the victims'  murders. The jury could have inferred that defendant and her daughter convinced her husband that their daughter was the target of harassment and death threats from the victims and their friends, defendant wrote in emails that she wanted the victims dead, and she attempted to destroy evidence relating to the offenses and provided her husband with a false alibi after he carried out the murders. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Evidence that the victim saw defendant, who she knew, and others driving around in her neighborhood despite not knowing anyone who lived there, saw defendant hiding behind a tree in her yard acting as a lookout, and then saw the vehicle they had been driving in pull into her driveway and two others run from the side of her home was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for facilitation of aggravated burglary. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery under a theory of criminal responsibility because he arranged a meeting with the victim to purportedly sell clothing, during the sale two men approached and attacked the victim, taking cash and a cell phone, defendant admitted he knew one of the robbers, defendant fled the scene in a red car, which picked up the two robbers minutes later, and defendant admitted he received a cell phone and posted it for sale. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property; defendant's transfer of property stolen during the burglary was a rational connection between his possession of the stolen property and his participation in the aggravated burglary, and regardless of who went inside, defendant benefitted from the proceeds of the aggravated burglary and theft and aided his co-defendant in the commission of the offenses. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions based on a theory of criminal responsibility because the proof was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the gunman who accosted one victim outside the home, attempted to force her into the home, and, along with an armed accomplice, engaged in an exchange of gunfire with the second victim. The proof was also sufficient to show that the second victim died as a result of a bullet fired by either defendant or his accomplice. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 205 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the murder under a theory of criminal responsibility because, based on cell phone records, the evidence showed that defendant pointed the gun that was used to kill the first victim at a second victim in another area of town sometime between 6:30 p.m. when he last called the second victim and 6:49 p.m. when calls began to be exchanged between the second victim's cell phone and his brother's cell phone regarding defendant's demand for ransom. Defendant also boasted to the second victim that he had committed other murders earlier in the day. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of facilitation of aggravated burglary, as the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that defendant provided substantial assistance in the burglary by opening the window but he did not originally intend to benefit from the proceeds of the burglary. State v. Kiser, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2019).

Convictions of defendant for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault, based upon a theory of criminal responsibility, was supported by the evidence because the evidence established that defendant intended to benefit from the proceeds of the robbery of the victim and aided codefendants in planning the robbery. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to find the second defendant criminally responsible for aggravated assault as he hit and kicked the victim while the first defendant held a gun on the victim; and the victim sustained a collapsed lung and contusions from the beating. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as a perpetrator of the armed robbery and provided sufficient corroboration of the codefendant's testimony because it showed that defendant entered the market brandishing a shotgun and wearing a ski mask and gloves, he pointed the shotgun at the victim and demanded that she give him the money bag, defendant was picked up by his codefendant which was captured on video, the codefendant admitted that he was the driver and provided the police with the location of the ski mask and a glove, and defendant was the primary contributor of DNA obtained from the mask and glove. State v. Judkins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because it showed that defendant and the codefendant planned and executed the crimes jointly and with a common intent, and that defendant told a cellmate that he “tricked” the codefendant into killing the victim. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated robbery because defendant and the accomplice entered the victim's apartment in order to rob him; the accomplice pointed the gun at the victim before shooting him and taking his cell phone; and defendant was criminally responsible for the accomplice's actions as he was engaged in a criminal endeavor to rob the victim. State v. Dodson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder because defendant and his accomplice were asked by a third party to steal marijuana from the victim; the accomplice fatally shot the victim using defendant's gun; and defendant intended to promote or assist in the commission of the robbery and was criminally responsible for the victim's death. State v. Dodson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2020).

State established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was criminally responsible for his codefendant's conduct because he shared in the codefendant's intent to rob the victim by approaching the passenger side of the victim's car and pointing his gun at the witness while the codefendant approached the victim's side and pointed a gun at him, and both defendant and the codefendant fired shots when the victim attempted to drive away. State v. Lawrence, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of theft; she participated in a scheme to obtain money from the human services department through a ministry becoming a sponsor in a summer food services program. Defendant claimed to be the program administrator but auditors found no evidence that she purchased large volumes of food, and while a church employee claimed defendant was not involved, the jury could have found defendant was directing or assisting that employee in taking the money. State v. Jives-Nealy, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

There was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated battery and murder, including evidence that defendant and his co-defendants forced their way into the victim's apartment armed with a gun, the victim was unarmed and surrounded by the men demanding to know where her son was, and when she failed to provide an answer, a co-defendant shot the victim in the head at the defendant's direction. State v. Fletcher, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, which were merged, based on criminal responsibility as defendant acted with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the crimes and aided or attempted to aid in the crimes because defendant initiated the robbery by placing a telephone pizza order which lured the victim to the scene; while the victim attempted to deliver the pizza order to the residence, two men waited until the victim returned to his car to approach the victim; defendant heard a gunshot coming from the direction of the men; and defendant repeatedly ran over the victim to ensure he was dead prior to taking his vehicle. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 11, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's five convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping because defendant and one of the perpetrators entered the home in the middle of the night, the perpetrator entered the victims'  bedroom and held them at gunpoint with a shotgun, defendant stood in the doorway in the living room and held two other victims at gunpoint using a pistol, and two witnesses testified that they did not feel as if they could move around in or leave the residence while defendant pointed the pistol at them. State v. Kiser, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2020).

18. —Insufficient.

There was insufficient evidence to show that defendant furnished substantial assistance in initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine because the evidence related to methamphetamine production was discovered in a shed located, and there was no evidence defendant ever entered the shed or that he was present at the owner's house when the lab was active; the only evidence presented purportedly linking defendant to the methamphetamine lab was that he was involved with the owner. State v. Hammack, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2016).

19. Sentencing.

Because both of defendant's prior convictions for attempted robbery and facilitation of first degree murder, under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-117, 39-11-403(a), 39-11-402(2), 39-12-101, 39-13-401, included an element of actual or threatened bodily injury or serious bodily injury, the trial court properly considered them to be separate convictions and found that defendant was a Range II multiple offender under T.C.A. § 40-35-106. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

20. Severance.

Trial court did not err by refusing to sever the charge of setting fire to personal property from the charges of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery because all of the offenses were charged in a single indictment and evidence that defendant and the co-defendant burned the victim's car was relevant and admissible as evidence of their attempt to cover up the earlier murder and robbery. That there was evidence to suggest the co-defendant bore the bulk of responsibility for the burning offense availed the defendant no relief because she was clearly criminally responsible for the co-defendant's conduct. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

39-11-403. Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony.

  1. A person is criminally responsible for the facilitation of a felony, if, knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony, but without the intent required for criminal responsibility under § 39-11-402(2), the person knowingly furnishes substantial assistance in the commission of the felony.
  2. The facilitation of the commission of a felony is an offense of the class next below the felony facilitated by the person so charged.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section recognizes a lesser degree of criminal responsibility than that of a party under § 39-11-401. The section states a theory of vicarious responsibility because it applies to a person who facilitates criminal conduct of another by knowingly furnishing substantial assistance to the perpetrator of a felony, but who lacks the intent to promote or assist in, or benefit from, the felony's commission.

A defendant charged as a party may be found guilty of facilitation as a lesser included offense if the defendant's degree of complicity is insufficient to warrant conviction as a party. The lesser punishment is appropriate because the offender, though facilitating the offense, lacked the intent to promote, assist or benefit from the offense.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Mental states, §§ 39-11-106, 39-11-301, 39-11-302.

Penalties for felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for felony where punishment was not prescribed, § 39-11-113.

Law Reviews.

State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to Retain the Natural and Probable Consequence Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 273 (1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The fact that T.C.A. § 39-11-403 referred to T.C.A. § 39-11-402(b), even though T.C.A. § 39-11-402 had been changed to show (1)-(3) rather than (a)-(c) at the time of their indictment and trial, did not warrant granting defendants a new trial. State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Aug. 2, 1993).

Application of T.C.A. § 39-11-403 is appropriate where an offender participates substantially in a felony but lacks the intent to promote, assist or benefit from the offense. State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. 2000).

Facilitation is a lesser-included offense when a defendant is charged with criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. State v. Fowler, 23 S.W.3d 285, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. 2000).

Where defendant is convicted of facilitation of first degree murder, the jury found only that the defendant knowingly furnished substantial assistance in the murder while knowing that others intended to murder the victim. State v. Jackson, 52 S.W.3d 661, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

Under T.C.A. § 39-11-403, a defendant is never convicted of a generic “facilitation of a felony” charge, but is always found to have facilitated a specific underlying felony; therefore, where defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, his sentence was properly enhanced for a prior conviction of a crime of violence because his prior conviction involved a guilty plea to facilitation of aggravated assault, and the underlying felony of aggravated assault was a crime of violence as it presented a serious risk of physical injury to another person. United States v. Chandler, 419 F.3d 484, 2005 FED App. 347P, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17205 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005).

Lawyer who pleaded guilty to facilitation of a felony violation of T.C.A. § 48-2-121 (now T.C.A. § 48-1-121) was guilty of a serious crime within the meaning of ABA Stand. Imposing Law. Sanctions § 5.11. Given aggravating factors of his prior discipline, his experience practicing law, and his lack of remorse, disbarment was appropriate. Talley v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 358 S.W.3d 185, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 971 (Tenn. Oct. 26, 2011).

Facilitation under T.C.A. § 39-11-403 is not controlled-substance offense because elements required to prove facilitation are not substantially equivalent to elements of aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and attempt United States v. Woodruff, 726 F.3d 845, 2013 FED App. 220P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16678 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 2013).

Under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403(a), 39-11-402(2), a defendant must know that an individual intended to commit a specified felony and the defendant must furnish substantial assistance to that individual without intending to promote or assist in the commission of the specified felony or benefit in the proceeds. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403(a), because first degree murder includes an element of serious bodily injury, facilitation of first degree murder includes such an element. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Facilitation of criminal attempt is not statutorily defined, but reading the two statutes together, the State would have had to prove that defendant (1) knew that another intended to commit criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and (2) knowingly furnished substantial assistance in the commission of the criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2020).

2. Relationship to Federal Law.

Defendant's prior conviction under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-402 and 39-11-403 for facilitation of the burglary of a building was not a “violent felony” under the “otherwise” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Although the offense of facilitation of a burglary created a serious risk of violence, it did not qualify as purposeful, violent, and aggressive; to be guilty of facilitation of a burglary under § 39-11-403, an individual had to have acted without the intent required for criminal responsibility for the ultimate criminal act. United States v. Vanhook, 640 F.3d 706, 2011 FED App. 95P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7884 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2011).

Where defendant appealed his 120-month sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), while facilitation under Tennessee law was not a controlled-substance offense, district court's conclusion was not plain error that his conviction for facilitation of the sale of cocaine, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-11-403, was controlled-substance offense as there was no controlling law before district court. United States v. Woodruff, 726 F.3d 845, 2013 FED App. 220P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16678 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 2013).

Where defendant appealed his sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), a district court erred in its conclusion that his conviction for facilitation under Tennessee law, T.C.A. § 39-11-403, was a controlled-substance offense; but the error was not plain because the state of the law was both uncertain and not obvious at time of its decision and at time of appellate review. The district court had no controlling law before it. United States v. Woodruff, 735 F.3d 445, 2013 FED App. 311A, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22002 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013).

3. Proof Required.

Before the accused can be convicted of the facilitation of a felony, the state must prove the commission of a specified felony and the assistance the accused gave to the person committing that felony. State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), overruled in part, State v. King, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2013), overruled in part, State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2014).

4. Section as Lesser Included Offense.

T.C.A. § 39-11-403 can be a lesser included offense of a greater charge, and such offense may be given in a charge to the jury where its application is fairly raised by the evidence in the case or, where by the nature of the offense charged, the section would logically be seen as a lesser included offense. State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Aug. 2, 1993).

In a prosecution for first-degree murder, the trial court did not err by not charging on the lesser included offense of facilitation of murder where neither the state's proof nor defendant's proof raised sufficient evidence to support the charge. State v. Spadafina, 952 S.W.2d 444, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

The offenses of facilitation and solicitation were found to be lesser-included offenses of criminal responsibility for first-degree murder as charged in the defendant's indictment. State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 572 (Tenn. 1999), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2015), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Whitehair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Because the offense of theft is wholly incorporated into the offense of aggravated robbery, and because facilitation of theft is thereby incorporated into the offense of facilitation of robbery, the offenses are the “same” for double jeopardy purposes. State v. Hayes, 7 S.W.3d 52, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Facilitation of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery are lesser-included offenses of especially aggravated robbery. State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. 2000).

Failure to charge the defendant as criminally responsible instead of jointly liable as a principal was insignificant; therefore, facilitation of felony murder was a lesser-included offense. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. 2001).

Virtually every time one is charged with a felony by way of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, facilitation of the felony would be a lesser-included offense. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 600 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Bowers v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 979, 122 S. Ct. 408, 151 L. Ed. 2d 310, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9880 (2001).

The charge of facilitation of a felony in relation to defendant's involvement in a murder was not an immediately lesser included offense to felony murder because conviction required a separate and distinct theory from that of a principal offender or someone who was criminally responsible for the conduct of another. State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d 663, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. 2002).

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on facilitation, T.C.A. § 39-11-403(a), as a lesser-included offense during defendant's criminal trial, because the evidence did not support the notion that defendant merely furnished substantial assistance in the commission of premeditated first-degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, without intending to promote or assist the commission of those offenses. The evidence reasonably supported only one of the following conclusions: (1) Defendant was not present at the apartment at which the victim was beaten, was not involved in the victim's murder or the gang that killed the victim, and therefore was completely innocent; (2) Defendant was innocent because, while he gave orders, he did not order anyone to kill or kidnap the victim; or (3) Defendant was guilty by criminal responsibility, T.C.A. § 39-11-402, because he ordered other gang members to kidnap and kill the victim. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Robinson v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 1429, 164 L. Ed. 2d 132, 546 U.S. 1214, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1839 (2006).

5. Failure to Convict Criminally Responsible Defendant.

The jury's failure to convict codefendant of sexual battery did not bar the defendant's conviction for facilitation of sexual battery. State v. Gennoe, 851 S.W.2d 833, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Nov. 30, 1992).

6. Jury Instructions.

In determining whether an instruction on a lesser-included offense must be given, a court must: (1) determine whether any evidence exists that reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser-included offense and (2) determine whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the existence of the lesser-included offense is legally sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense. State v. Fowler, 23 S.W.3d 285, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. 2000).

Trial court did not err in charging a jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver where the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support conviction for facilitation of possession of marijuana when the vehicle defendant was in was initially stopped by the police, one or more of the occupants had been recently smoking marijuana due to the strong odor and it was defendant, not his friend, who was in physical control of the marijuana due to his proximity to the brown paper bag. State v. Nash, 104 S.W.3d 495, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. 2003).

Petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial by counsel's failure to request a facilitation instruction as the evidence did not support a facilitation instruction. The evidence at trial established that petitioner had the intent, at a minimum, to promote or assist in the commission of the sale of a Schedule I controlled substance within a school zone. Bryant v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 702 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2013), modified, 460 S.W.3d 513, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2015).

Petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial by counsel's failure to request a facilitation instruction as counsel's decision not to pursue such an instruction was a strategic one designed to have petitioner acquitted of the charged offenses based on the defense of entrapment. Bryant v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 702 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2013), modified, 460 S.W.3d 513, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2015).

Petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial by counsel's failure to request a facilitation instruction as counsel's failure to request such an instruction was not prejudicial. A reasonable jury would not have convicted petitioner of facilitation instead of the charged offenses because petitioner knowingly committed the offense of sale of a Schedule I controlled substance, which took place within a school zone. Bryant v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 702 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2013), modified, 460 S.W.3d 513, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2015).

Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a jury instruction on facilitation as a lesser-included offense of sale and delivery of a Schedule I controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school; there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant merely facilitated the drug sales because he set the price for the drugs, acquired the drugs, accepted payment for the drugs, and delivered the drugs. Bryant v. State, 460 S.W.3d 513, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2015), overruled in part, Moore v. State, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

Trial court's jury instructions were proper because defendant did not object to the court's decision not to charge attempt as a lesser-included offense, the evidence established only a completed crime, the jury was properly charged on flight and criminal responsibility, and any error in not charging facilitation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Daniels, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

Despite defendant's desire to have an all or nothing charge in his dogfighting case, the trial court did not err in charging the jury on facilitation because the evidence supported the instruction. State v. Trent, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2017).

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of facilitation of aggravated robbery because there was no evidence that someone else committed the robbery and that petitioner knew and gave them substantial assistance, as the State offered evidence that petitioner committed the robbery, which included DNA evidence and petitioner's admissions to two witnesses. Brown v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Petitioner failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object the jury instructions on criminal responsibility because the instruction incorporated the language of this section. Gray v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 2019).

Petitioner failed to establish that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of facilitation because the proof did not support an instruction on facilitation, as there was no evidence at trial regarding the existence or role of a third party. Instead, the evidence at trial established that petitioner, and not the confidential informant or a third party, sold the drugs. Carero v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

7. Sentencing.

District court correctly determined that a defendant's prior conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of facilitation of aggravated burglary constituted a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because the crime presented a risk of physical injury sufficient to be classified as a “violent felony.” United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 2005 FED App. 255P, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11032 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 457, 163 L. Ed. 2d 347, 546 U.S. 950, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7535 (U.S. 2005).

Defendant's prior conviction in Tennessee of facilitation of armed robbery constituted a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882, 2007 FED App. 126P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8000 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2007), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, — FED App. —, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20455 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007), cert. denied, 169 L. Ed. 2d 532, 128 S. Ct. 680, 552 U.S. 1052, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 12533 (2007).

Habeas corpus court did not err in summarily dismissing petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus because the petition failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, regardless of which offense petitioner pleaded guilty; had petitioner pleaded guilty to criminal responsibility for facilitation of attempted first degree murder, his sentence would still be below the maximum 30-year punishment authorized for a Class B felony, and the sentence would be legal on the face of the judgment, T.C.A. § 40-35-111(b)(2). Dykes v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2012).

In connection with defendant's convictions of facilitation of dogfighting, the trial court did not err in ordering defendant to serve 60 days of his concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days in confinement and the remainder on probation; he had a prior criminal history of felony conviction and several misdemeanor convictions and he violated parole on at least one occasion. State v. Trent, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2017).

Trial court erred when classifying defendant's facilitation of delivery conviction as a Class B felony and requiring 100 percent service of the minimum sentence. State v. Pinegar, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 386 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Five year sentence, one year beyond the minimum under T.C.A. § 40-35-112(b)(4) for facilitation of robbery under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401(a), 39-11-403(a) was proper; the trial court properly considered the factors under T.C.A. § 40-35-210(b) and applied enhancement factors under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1), (8), (13)(C) related to defendant's criminal history, his failure to comply with conditions of a sentence involving release into the community, and the fact that he was released on federal probation at the time he committed the offense. State v. Shane, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 19, 2017).

Because both of defendant's prior convictions for attempted robbery and facilitation of first degree murder, under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-117, 39-11-403(a), 39-11-402(2), 39-12-101, 39-13-401, included an element of actual or threatened bodily injury or serious bodily injury, the trial court properly considered them to be separate convictions and found that defendant was a Range II multiple offender under T.C.A. § 40-35-106. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

8. Evidence.

Where defendant mother was charged with facilitation (T.C.A. § 39-11-403) in connection with defendant father's aggravated child abuse, evidence of his prior assaults against her was irrelevant and improperly admitted against her because such evidence did not demonstrate that it was more probable that she knew he intended to abuse their child. State v. Gomez, 367 S.W.3d 237, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 291 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2012).

There was insufficient evidence to show that defendant furnished substantial assistance in initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine because the evidence related to methamphetamine production was discovered in a shed located, and there was no evidence defendant ever entered the shed or that he was present at the owner's house when the lab was active; the only evidence presented purportedly linking defendant to the methamphetamine lab was that he was involved with the owner. State v. Hammack, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2016).

9. —Sufficient.

The evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict the defendant where he provided the weapon, transported his codefendant to the location of the robbery, and shared in the money taken. State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), overruled in part, State v. King, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2013), overruled in part, State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2014).

The evidence was sufficient to find that defendant was guilty of aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated assault where defendant aided juvenile in the commission of the aggravated robbery by driving the juvenile to the pharmacy, where the juvenile committed these offenses, and then provided a means for the juvenile to escape by picking him up and driving him home. State v. Harris, 30 S.W.3d 345, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1072 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Four gang members who engaged in the kidnapping of two gang members were criminally responsible for the ensuing death of one of the gang members. Witnesses testified that defendants beat the unarmed victim with bats, jack irons, crowbars, and hammers. State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Sept. 2, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict because a reasonable jury could have determined that defendant facilitated the possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in a drug-free school zone; two bags of cocaine were found by officers in a bag close to where defendant had been sitting, and he acknowledged that one of the bags was his. State v. Gibson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 506 S.W.3d 450, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of first degree murder where it showed that defendant and his family had a lengthy disagreement with the victims and their friends, defendant told a witness he would put a bullet through one of the victim's head, both victims were shot in the head, bullets found in defendant's truck were consistent with the caliber of bullets found at the scene, documents of email and social media messages relative to the desire to kill the victims and defendant's willingness to help found shredded in defendant's truck, defendant's accomplice admitted both he and defendant were involved in the murders, and defendant implicated himself in the crimes during a phone call with his wife. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for facilitation of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine because defendant lived in the camper under which an active methamphetamine laboratory was found, purchased an excessive number of cold tablets containing the essential ingredient for the manufacture of methamphetamine, and claimed in his own testimony that he bought the tablets for the owner of the property where defendant's camper was located to use to cook the methamphetamine that defendant craved. State v. Fletcher, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for facilitation of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school because defendant was in close proximity to the duffel bags containing cocaine, defendant admitted ownership of one of the bags, defendant's student identification was found in one of the bags, and defendant knowingly provided substantial assistance to another individual and that individual's drug operation by possessing and safeguarding the drugs. State v. Gibson, 506 S.W.3d 450, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Defendant's conviction for facilitating a violation of the sex offender registry was supported by evidence that defendant knew that her daughter's boyfriend was a convicted sex offender who was not supposed to live with her daughter's three children, but defendant allowed the boyfriend to live in her house with her daughter and the children. State v. Patrick, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction of facilitation of dogfighting, given that the residence in question was owned by defendant's son, but defendant used the address on his checks, driver's license, and vehicle registrations, dogs were found with injuries and scars consistent with dogfighting, an expert testified that many items found during the search related to dogfighting, including training items, nutritional supplements, and a “crash kit” for treating a dog's wounds after a fight, and defendant was seen coming and going from the residence four times during one month and twice he spent the night. State v. Trent, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2017).

Three witnesses plus the victim identified defendant as the individual who approached the victim in a home and asked him to go outside, and once outside, a group of men surrounded the victim and forced him to the ground while others took his boots and cash; a rational jury could have found that defendant facilitated the robbery of the victim, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401(a), 39-11-403(a). State v. Shane, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 19, 2017).

In defendant's case, the underlying felony was first degree murder, which was clearly a violent felony for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A), and thus facilitation of first degree murder for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-11-403(a) was likewise a violent felony and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of aggravated rape, facilitation of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated robbery because it showed that not only did defendants both rape the victim, they did so absent any force or coercion from the co-defendant, they joined their co-defendants in taking cell phones, TVs, and a laptop from the victims, although the co-defendant wielded a gun during the crimes it was never turned on defendants, and the co-defendant's threats of violence were directed solely at the victims. State v. Denton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient that defendant constructively possessed cocaine found behind the backseat of a police car after a police sergeant transported defendant and the driver of the car in which defendant was a passenger to a police station. During the traffic stop defendant was arrested after a police officer discovered dihydrocodeinone tablets that defendant had secreted in the crotch of defendant's pants and defendant's hands were handcuffed in front of defendant's body, while the driver's hands were handcuffed behind defendant's back. State v. Bynum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Defendant's conviction of facilitation of felony murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-11-403, with kidnapping and theft as the underlying felonies under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-302, 39-14-103 was affirmed, as jurors could have found that defendant and his accomplice intended to deprive the victim of his vehicle when they forced him into the backseat, and the kidnapping and theft were still in progress at the time the victim was shot because he was still resisting confinement and refusing to consent to the taking of his property. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for facilitation of attempted second degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1), 39-12-101(a), 39-11-403; a reasonable juror could have found that defendant knew his accomplice intended to knowingly kill the victim and defendant substantially assisted his accomplice by handing him the gun, and the victim's eventual death did not mean that defendant's conviction for attempt could not stand. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Evidence that the victim saw defendant, who she knew, and others driving around in her neighborhood despite not knowing anyone who lived there, saw defendant hiding behind a tree in her yard acting as a lookout, and then saw the vehicle they had been driving in pull into her driveway and two others run from the side of her home was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for facilitation of aggravated burglary. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of facilitation of aggravated robbery because the second defendant provided substantial assistance to the first defendant by beating the victim while the first defendant held him at gunpoint and then robbed him of his necklace, rings, money, wallet, cell phones, and tattoo equipment. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver; defendant was a regular overnight guest at the home and was present when the cocaine, which he constructively possessed, was seized, and a rational juror could have found that he provided substantial assistance to co-defendant by using a measuring cup that tested positive for trace amounts of cocaine in attempting to manufacture cocaine for sale or delivery. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2020).

39-11-404. Corporate liability.

  1. A corporation commits an offense when:
    1. The conduct constituting the offense consists of an intentional failure to discharge a specific duty imposed upon corporations by criminal law;
    2. The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, commanded or knowingly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of the agent's employment on behalf of the corporation; or
    3. The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation acting within the scope of the agent's employment and on behalf of the corporation, and:
      1. The offense is a misdemeanor; or
      2. The offense is one defined by statute which indicates a legislative intent to impose criminal liability on a corporation.
  2. The following definitions apply in this part, unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Agent” means any officer, director, servant or employee of the corporation or any other person authorized to act on behalf of the corporation; and
    2. “High managerial agent” means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation who has duties or such responsibility that the agent's conduct reasonably may be inferred to represent the policy of the corporation.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section specifically acknowledges corporate criminal responsibility. The commission recognizes the need to control and punish corporate involvement in economic offenses, including tax and security fraud, pollution, corporate support of pornography, gambling and other offenses.

A corporation is made liable in three situations. Subdivision (a)(1) creates criminal liability for the corporation's intentional failure to discharge a legal duty imposed by criminal law.

Subdivision (a)(2) provides liability when either the board of directors or a high managerial agent (acting for the corporation within the scope of the agent's employment) authorizes or knowingly tolerates criminal conduct.

Subdivision (a)(3) holds the corporation liable for its agent's conduct if the agent was acting for the corporation and within the scope of employment, and either the offense was minor or the statute clearly makes the corporation liable for the agent's actions.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-11-405. Individual liability for corporate conduct.

A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense that the person performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in the person's own name or behalf.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section makes it clear that a person who commits an offense while acting for a corporation can be personally liable for the offense if he or she would have been liable if acting in his or her own behalf. Thus, the high managerial agent whose actions constitute an offense against the corporation under § 39-11-404 can also be personally responsible for the misdeeds.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Law Reviews.

“Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance”, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343 (1999).

39-11-406. Affirmative defense to criminal responsibility of a corporation.

  1. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution of a corporation under § 39-11-404(a)(1) or (3) or § 39-11-405, which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.
  2. Subsection (a) does not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose expressed in the law defining the particular offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is provided to encourage due diligence on the part of corporate personnel to prevent criminal conduct by employees. Subsection (b) states that the due diligence defense is not applicable if the defense is inconsistent with the clear legislative purposes in the applicable offense.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Law Reviews.

The Prevalence and Use of Criminal Defenses: A Preliminary Study (Neil P. Cohen, Michael G. Johnson, Tracy B. Henley), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 957 (1993).

39-11-407. Defenses excluded.

In a prosecution in which a person's criminal responsibility is based upon the conduct of another, the person may be convicted on proof of commission of the offense and that the person was a party to or facilitated its commission, and it is no defense that:

  1. The other belongs to a class of persons who by definition of the offense is legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity; or
  2. The person for whose conduct the defendant is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or different type or class of offense, or is immune from prosecution.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section reflects a policy determination that, in a case involving multiple offenders, a conviction should be sustained where there is sufficient evidence to support it, regardless of whether there is a failure of proof in another case involving other people. Thus, the defendant may be convicted whether the other parties to the offense are convicted, acquitted, or incapable of criminal responsibility.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Affirmative defense, § 39-11-204.

General defenses, title 39, ch. 11, part 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Convict Criminally Responsible Codefendant.

The jury's failure to convict codefendant of sexual battery did not bar the defendant's conviction for facilitation of sexual battery. State v. Gennoe, 851 S.W.2d 833, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Nov. 30, 1992).

Trial court did not err in charging a jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver where the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support conviction for facilitation of possession of marijuana when the vehicle defendant was in was initially stopped by the police, one or more of the occupants had been recently smoking marijuana due to the strong odor and it was defendant, not his friend, who was in physical control of the marijuana due to his proximity to the brown paper bag. State v. Nash, 104 S.W.3d 495, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. 2003).

It is not a defense for a person convicted under a theory of criminal responsibility that the person for whose conduct the defendant is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or different type or class of offense, or is immune from prosecution. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

2. Trial of Accessory After the Fact.

Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the common law rule that a person charged as an accessory after the fact could not be tried prior to the principal offender being convicted, unless the person charged as an accessory after the fact expressly consented to waive the common law rule, had not been abrogated by the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, and it declined to judicially abrogate it. State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 2005).

3. Ineffective Assistance Claims.

Proof at trial revealed the existence of another actor in the criminal episode for whose conduct the petitioner was criminally responsible; trial counsel was not deficient for failing to challenge the petitioner's convictions on that basis and he was not entitled to post-conviction relief in this regard. Cole v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

4. Principal Offender.

State v. Farner opinion does not stand for the proposition that the principal offender must be known, only that there must be one. Cole v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

39-11-408 — 39-11-410. [Reserved.]

  1. A person is an accessory after the fact who, after the commission of a felony, with knowledge or reasonable ground to believe that the offender has committed the felony, and with the intent to hinder the arrest, trial, conviction or punishment of the offender:
    1. Harbors or conceals the offender;
    2. Provides or aids in providing the offender with any means of avoiding arrest, trial, conviction or punishment; or
    3. Warns the offender of impending apprehension or discovery.
  2. This section shall have no application to an attorney providing legal services as required or authorized by law.
  3. Accessory after the fact is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 978, § 4; 1995, ch. 281, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is similar to prior code §§ 39-1-306 and 39-1-307. While recognizing that all citizens, including families of criminal offenders, must work together to reduce crime, this section retains a portion of the traditional defense for close family members who merely harbor or conceal an offender. Under former subsection (b) [deleted in 1995], the defense was limited; any family member actively assisting an offender to escape or avoid prosecution or its consequences is beyond this defense. In 1994, this defense was abolished for family members who harbor or conceal offenders who commit the offense of aggravated child abuse of a child age 6 or less.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Mental states, §§ 39-11-106, 39-11-301, 39-11-302.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 26.54.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law — Accessory After the Fact — When Felony is Complete, 1 Vand. L. Rev. 127 (1947-1948).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Principal's Conviction.

The common law rule that a person charged as an accessory after the fact could not be tried prior to the principal offender being convicted, unless the person charged as an accessory after the fact expressly consented to waive the common law rule, had not been abrogated by the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 591, and it declined to judicially abrogate it. State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 2005).

4. Comparison to Other Crimes.

Defendant qualified as a Range II offender and the trial court did not err in considering defendant's convictions in South Carolina for harboring a fugitive and assault of an aggravated nature as felonies; the trial court properly considered the elements of harboring a fugitive under South Carolina law and accessory after the fact under Tennessee law in determining that defendant's harboring conviction would constitute a felony in Tennessee, plus he conceded that his South Carolina assault conviction would also be considered a felony in Tennessee. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Part 5
General Defenses

39-11-501. Insanity.

  1. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of the defendant's acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
  2. As used in this section, “mental disease or defect” does not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
  3. No expert witness may testify as to whether the defendant was or was not insane as set forth in subsection (a). Such ultimate issue is a matter for the trier of fact alone.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1995, ch. 494, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section codifies the criteria of criminal insanity or mental responsibility which has been followed in Tennessee since the ruling in Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977). The commission explicitly recognizes a distinction between those defendants who are capable of controlling their conduct and those who are not. The finder of fact must determine not only whether the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect but also whether the defendant's condition rendered him or her incapable of conforming his or her conduct to lawful standards or of appreciating the wrongfulness of that conduct. Thus, offenders who have the capacity and reason to control their behavior or appreciate the distinctions between lawful and unlawful conduct are responsible for their criminal acts.

Subsection (b) follows the Graham  rule by denying the defense to psychopaths, i.e., those repeat offenders without other medically discernible symptoms.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1995, ch. 494, § 2 provided that the amendments by that act apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1995.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Justification excluding criminal responsibility, title 39, ch. 11, part 6.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in the Advisory Commission Comments under Rule 704 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

Textbooks. Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), Nos. 3-11-1, 3-12.2-6.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Appellate Procedure — Insanity Defense — The Proper Standard of Review When Reviewing a Jury Decision on Sanity (Kevin Thompson), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 1213 (2003).

Madness Alone Punishes the Madman: The Search For Moral Dignity in the Court's Competency Doctrine as Applied in Capital Cases, 79 Tenn. L. Rev. 461 (2012).

Paine on Procedure: Expert Opinion and the Insanity Defense (Donald F. Paine), 49 Tenn. B.J. 27 (2013).

Symposium: Competency for Execution: The Implications of a Communicative Model of Retribution, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 713 (2009).

The Criminalization of Mental Illness: How Theoretical Failures Create Real Problems in the Criminal Justice System, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1053 (2009).

The Red Velvet Swing Murder (Donald F. Paine), 35 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 26 (1999).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of proposed “guilty but excused from responsibility” verdict, OAG 99-116 (5/14/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The clear and convincing standard in T.C.A. § 39-11-501(a) is constitutional. State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

This post-1995 version of T.C.A. § 39-11-501, which is patterned closely after the federal insanity defense statute, is constitutional. State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2000).

2. Construction.

T.C.A. § 39-11-501(c) must be construed narrowly because of the interests at stake. State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Although T.C.A. § 39-11-501(c) precludes an expert from testifying that a defendant was, in fact, legally “insane” at the time of the commission of the offense, the expert may testify that the defendant suffered from a severe mental disease or defect. State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Under T.C.A. § 39-11-501(c), an expert may state whether the defendant could have appreciated the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense; however, T.C.A. § 39-11-501(c) prevents the expert from stating that the severe mental disease or defect operated to prevent the defendant from appreciating the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct. State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

3. Application.

Where defendant denied having mental illness problems on a gun purchase application a few weeks before the shooting, and knew why the police were arresting the defendant when they came to the defendant's home, the jury's rejection of the defendant's insanity defense was reasonable. State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. 2002), rehearing denied, 88 S.W.3d 540, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. 2002).

In a two-count premeditated first degree murder case, the appellate court's modification of the jury's guilty verdict to not guilty by reason of insanity was reversed as a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that, as a result of a severe mental illness or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions where the evidence showed defendant was not suffering from a severe mental illness at the time of the offense, defendant's proof that he suffered from a severe mental illness was countered by testimony elicited on cross-examination suggesting that it was also plausible that defendant was malingering, and the record contained proof suggesting that defendant realized his conduct was wrongful. State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2003).

The amendment of T.C.A. § 39-11-501(c) in 1995, which operated to prohibit expert testimony on the ultimate issue of sanity, did not apply to defendant's offenses because they were committed before the amendment's effective date of July 1, 1995. State v. Thompson, 151 S.W.3d 434, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 995 (Tenn. 2004).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain an insanity defense where neither of defendant's experts testified unequivocally that he was insane at the time of the crimes, his physician stated that on the day before the shooting defendant appeared stable, there was evidence that some of the psychological test results were invalid because defendant had fabricated his symptoms, and the state offered lay testimony which established that defendant did not have mental health problems requiring treatment for the four years preceding the shooting. State v. Thompson, 151 S.W.3d 434, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 995 (Tenn. 2004).

Defendant failed to show insanity in his abuse of a corpse conviction because a doctor concluded that defendant never suffered from a severe mental disease or defect. Moreover, the evidence established that defendant went to methodical lengths to conceal the victim's death and dismemberment, telling her family that she left with a friend and forging a Christmas card to her sister. State v. Climer, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2011), modified, 400 S.W.3d 537, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Jury reasonably could have found that defendant failed to establish that he was insane at the time of the offenses,as the evidence showed that defendant's delusions were not well formed and he was not out of control delusionally, in committing the offense defendant did not believe he was engaging in entirely different conduct, cleaning up the crime scene showed that defendant understood what he had done was wrong, and defendant was calm and able to communicate when he arrived at the jail. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2018).

4. Burden of Proof.

Although the law presumes sanity, if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity, the burden of proof falls upon the state to establish the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jackson, 890 S.W.2d 436, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. 1994).

In order to prove sanity the state must prove either: (1) The defendant was not “suffering from a mental illness at the time of the commission of the crime,”; or (2) The illness proved did not “prevent his knowing the wrongfulness of his act” and did not “render him substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he is charged with violating.” State v. Jackson, 890 S.W.2d 436, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. 1994).

In attempting to meet its burden of proving sanity, where the state's evidence was consistent with sanity, it still did not establish sanity because it was not inconsistent with insanity; thus, the state failed as a matter of law to prove that the defendant while suffering from a mental illness was capable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct and conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. State v. Jackson, 890 S.W.2d 436, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. 1994).

The evidence relied upon by the state to prove that the defendant was sane was not sufficient; the state's burden may be met by expert testimony, lay testimony based on a proper foundation, and evidence of conduct consistent with sanity and inconsistent with insanity. In this case there was no expert testimony in support of the defendant's sanity. State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. 1995).

The burden of proof is on the defendant to establish insanity by clear and convincing evidence, particularly after the 1995 amendment of T.C.A. § 39-11-501. State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2000).

Proper standard of review, which requires proof that the defendant was insane at the time the defendant committed the crime by clear and convincing evidence, is whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant's insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. 2002), rehearing denied, 88 S.W.3d 540, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. 2002).

5. Mental Disease or Defect.

It may not be assumed that a defendant suffering from paranoid schizophrenia accompanied by delusions is necessarily incapable of premeditated murder. State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2000).

6. Diminished Capacity.

“Diminished capacity” is a defendant's presentation of expert, psychiatric evidence aimed at negating the requisite culpable mental state. State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

7. Inability to Appreciate Wrongfulness.

In a vehicular homicide case, defendant proved by clear and convincing evidence that she was insane at the time of the wreck where experts testified that defendant was delusional and suffered from a severe mental disease, bi-polar mixed, and as a result, did not appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of her acts; an expert believed that defendant's delusions around the time of the wreck, that J.F.K. was alive and behind 9/11, and that she was pregnant with a “world leader”, were triggered by the September 11th attacks, defendant was “out of touch with reality,” and she believed that her car would fly if she pulled back on the steering wheel. State v. Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d 16, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 939 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004).

8. Rejection of Defense.

Record supported the jury's rejection of defendant's insanity defense because an expert's testimony, along with the evidence regarding defendant's behavior before and after the murder, was sufficient to rebut another expert's opinion that defendant did not understand the nature and wrongfulness of his conduct. State v. Colvett, 481 S.W.3d 172, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1142 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of domestic assault because the record supported the jury's rejection of the affirmative defense of insanity because, although the State's expert witness and defendant's expert witness disagreed, the State's expert witness opined that the defendant could appreciate both the nature and wrongfulness of his actions when he attacked the victim, and his opinion was corroborated by substantial other proof offered by the State; and the victim testified that defendant calmly told her he was going to kill her before beating her and that he knew exactly what he was doing during the attack. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

It was reasonable for the jury to reject defendant's insanity defense because a physician testified that even though he had a severe mental illness, he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, as he selected the people he was going to shoot and chose not to shoot others, he fled the scene and hid so well from the police that they were unable to find him, he fled to another state, called family members to come get him, and had a gun concealed on his person on the day of the shootings when he did not normally carry a gun. State v. Woodley, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

9. Jury Instructions.

Even though the trial court erred by relying on a doctor's testimony to reject defendant's request for an instruction on insanity as an affirmative defense, the error was harmless because defendant's efforts to conceal his guilt indicated that he was aware of the wrongfulness of his conduct, and the trial court did provide a jury instruction on the issue of diminished capacity which the jury rejected. State v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2019).

39-11-502. Ignorance or mistake of fact.

  1. Except in prosecutions for violations of §§ 39-13-504(a)(4) and 39-13-522, ignorance or mistake of fact is a defense to prosecution if the ignorance or mistake negates the culpable mental state of the charged offense.
  2. Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact may constitute a defense to the offense charged, the person may be convicted of the offense for which the person would be guilty if the fact were as the person believed.
  3. It shall not be a defense to prosecution for a violation of § 39-13-514 or § 39-13-529(a), (b)(1) or (b)(2) that the person charged was ignorant or mistaken as to the age of a minor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1995, ch. 495, § 1; 2013, ch. 337, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section recognizes a defense where the mental element of the offense is negated by the defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact. It is a narrow defense and does not include a mistake regarding the existence or meaning of a criminal law. See McGuire v. State, 26 Tenn. 54 (1846).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Law Reviews.

“Let’s Talk About Sexting, Baby”: A Mens Rea-Centered Approach to the Sexting Issue in Tennessee, 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1139 (2012).

“No Provincial or Transient Notion”: The Need for a Mistake of Age Defense in Child Rape Prosecutions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 693 (2004).

The Language of Mens Rea, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1327 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Raise Defense.

Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of mistake of fact, where it was not “fairly raised” by the evidence or asserted by the accused when he was tried for the offense of which he was convicted. State v. McPherson, 882 S.W.2d 365, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Reasonable minds could accept ignorance or mistake of fact as a defense to premeditated first degree murder and counsel were deficient by failing to request a jury instruction on ignorance or mistake of fact where: (1) Petitioner testified that he believed he removed all of the bullets from the gun and that the gun fired as he was “fumbling” with it; and (2) Petitioner's theory at the trial was that he was mistaken in his belief that the gun was unloaded and that he did not intend to shoot the victim. Nesbit v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2013), aff'd, 452 S.W.3d 779, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 917 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2014).

2. Instructions.

Where a defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact constitutes a defense to the offense charged, he may still be convicted of the offense for which he would be guilty if the facts were as the defendant believed, and therefore if the defendant had believed the child to be 16 at the time they first had intercourse, a jury instruction — and, ipso facto, a conviction — on statutory rape was appropriate. State v. Ealey, 959 S.W.2d 605, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on mistake of fact; defendant admitted he just fired his gun not knowing it was police lawfully executing a warrant, and if the jury believed him, there would be no culpable mental state to negate. Even if the jury believed defendant fired at police because he mistakenly thought they were intruders, he would still not have been entitled to a mistake of fact defense instruction because his beliefs, even if reasonable, would not have justified his actions. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

39-11-503. Intoxication.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (c), intoxication itself is not a defense to prosecution for an offense. However, intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, is admissible in evidence, if it is relevant to negate a culpable mental state.
  2. If recklessness establishes an element of an offense and the person is unaware of a risk because of voluntary intoxication, the person's unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
  3. Intoxication itself does not constitute a mental disease or defect within the meaning of § 39-11-501. However, involuntary intoxication is a defense to prosecution, if, as a result of the involuntary intoxication, the person lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the person's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law allegedly violated.
  4. The following definitions apply in this part, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
    1. “Intoxication” means disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body;
    2. “Involuntary intoxication” means intoxication that is not voluntary; and
    3. “Voluntary intoxication” means intoxication caused by a substance that the person knowingly introduced into the person's body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication was known or ought to have been known.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Under prior Tennessee law, intoxication was not a defense unless it was so extreme as to negate a finding of the specific intent which was an essential element of the offense charged. See State v. Adkins, 653 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1983). Subsection (a) retains this rule, permitting intoxication to be considered whenever the intoxication prevents the defendant from forming the required mental state.

Subsection (b) makes it clear that voluntary intoxication can never negate awareness of a risk where recklessness is sufficient to establish a culpable mental state of an offense.

Involuntary intoxication may suffice to negate any essential element of a defense including recklessness. The commission recognizes that a defendant who is not responsible for his or her intoxicated condition and either cannot control his or her own conduct or is unable to appreciate its wrongfulness because of the intoxicated condition should be excused from criminal responsibility. Subsection (c) also preserves the rule that intoxication does not in and of itself constitute a mental disease or defect, sufficient to constitute insanity, unless the intoxication is found to be involuntary.

The definition of intoxication is sufficiently broad to include all substances which alter mental or physical capacity, including alcohol, marijuana, glue sniffing, and heroin.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Law Reviews.

Law On the Rocks: The Intoxication Defenses are Being Eighty-Sixed, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 607 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Mental State.

Expert testimony bearing on issue of whether defendant was intoxicated was relevant evidence and properly admissible because questions of whether defendant was under the influence of PCP at the time of the offense, and whether his intoxication had any bearing on his ability to premeditate and form the intent to kill were questions appropriate for the jury's consideration; thus, trial court erred by revoking funds for defendant to hire an expert effectively prevented him from presenting the defense of voluntary intoxication at his trial because this was critical to defendant's defense. State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2008).

None of the evidence demonstrated that defendant's alleged intoxication was such that, hours later, it deprived him of the mental capacity to form the culpable mental state required for premeditated murder or attempted premeditated murder. State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. May 4, 2010).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder because the jury could infer that defendant traveled about one-fourth of one mile on foot from a church to the victim's house, where he placed a barrel under a window, removed the screen, entered the house through the open window, shot the victim in the head with a .22 caliber weapon, left through the front door, went to his mother's house, and waited until the body had been discovered the next day before initiating any contact with the authorities; and because defendant's actions were inconsistent with a conclusion he was incapable, due to intoxication, of premeditating the victim's killing. State v. Rayfield, 507 S.W.3d 682, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).

Destruction of defendant's blood sample did not violate defendant's due process rights because the State did not have a duty to preserve the blood past the date it was destroyed, as blood could not be preserved indefinitely, it had been preserved for over one year, and defendant failed in her obligation to secure the sample. The presence of the prescription drug in defendant's blood was not apparently exculpatory because it would not have been relevant to negating any mental state as DUI was a strict liability offense and defendant, who voluntarily ingested alcohol and the prescription drug, could not claim that her subsequent actions were involuntary. State v. Blair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 16, 2016).

2. Rejection of Defense.

Defendant claimed he was so intoxicated that he was incapable of premeditation and that he should have been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, but there was evidence to the contrary regarding his intoxication, and by the jury's verdict of guilty to the charge of first degree murder, the jury necessarily rejected the claim that defendant acted in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner. State v. Hudgins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 753 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

3. Driving While Intoxicated.

Because driving under the influence of a drug or intoxicant is a strict liability offense, a defendant whose intoxication results from knowingly ingesting a prescription drug and alcohol cannot use the involuntary intoxication defense under T.C.A. § 39-11-503. State v. Kain, 24 S.W.3d 816, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 17, 2000).

4. Jury Instructions.

Since the culpable mental state of a person who aids and abets another in a criminal offense is intentional, the trial court should have included an instruction of intoxication as it pertained to the facts of the case. State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 989 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The court allowed evidence of defendant's use of cocaine and properly instructed the jury that a defendant's voluntary intoxication could negate a culpable mental state, in accordance with T.C.A. § 39-11-503(a). State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Morris v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 1082, 121 S. Ct. 786, 148 L. Ed. 2d 682, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 301 (2001), cert. denied, Brown v. Utah, 148 L. Ed. 2d 676, 121 S. Ct. 778, 531 U.S. 1079, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 250 (2001).

Defendant did not present any proof that the marijuana he smoked impacted his ability to form the mental state required for first degree murder, and he testified in detail about what happened and that he shot the victim for raping his girlfriend; thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to give the instruction regarding voluntary intoxication. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Trial court erred in its determination that the instruction on intoxication was proper because defendant did not testify that he was intoxicated to the extent that he was unaware of his conduct; no evidence showed that intoxication affected his capacity to form the culpable mental state required to commit second degree murder; an agent and an investigator testified that defendant did not appear intoxicated; and defendant told the agent that he was not intoxicated. Therefore, the trial court's inadvertence in failing to give the instruction was not erroneous. State v. Simpson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

39-11-504. Duress.

  1. Duress is a defense to prosecution where the person or a third person is threatened with harm that is present, imminent, impending and of such a nature to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done. The threatened harm must be continuous throughout the time the act is being committed, and must be one from which the person cannot withdraw in safety. Further, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm must clearly outweigh the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness.
  2. This defense is unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly becomes involved in a situation in which it was probable that the person would be subjected to compulsion.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Consistent with existing Tennessee law and a long history of Anglo-American tradition, this section recognizes the defense of duress. This rare defense is present when a defendant commits an offense because another person threatens death or serious injury if the offense is not committed.

The standard sufficient to excuse criminal conduct is that the compulsion must be immediate and imminently present and of such nature to produce a well-grounded fear of death or serious bodily harm. In addition, there must be no reasonable opportunity to escape the compulsion without committing an offense. See State v. Robinson, 622 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).

Subsection (b) retains the view that this defense is unavailable to people who recklessly place themselves in a situation where compulsion was probable. See United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850 (1984).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Mental states, §§ 39-11-106, 39-11-301, 39-11-302.

Law Reviews.

The Prevalence and Use of Criminal Defenses: A Preliminary Study (Neil P. Cohen, Michael G. Johnson, Tracy B. Henley), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 957 (1993).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Neither duress nor necessity are affirmative defenses; both are “defenses” and, if admissible evidence fairly raises either defense, the trial court must submit the defense to the jury and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

2. Instructions.

Trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of duress under T.C.A. § 39-11-504 did not constitute plain error under former Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (see now T.R.A.P. 36(b)) even though the evidence, including defendant's testimony, may have been sufficient to warrant such an instruction, because duress was never discussed as a theory of the defense and defendant expressly declined a jury instruction on self-defense, a defense closely related to duress. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Apr. 26, 2007).

Defense of duress failed because there was no proof that defendant's brother threatened defendant in order to achieve his assistance in the attack upon the victims. State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. May 4, 2010).

Post-conviction court properly dismissed petitioner's application for post-conviction relief because petitioner failed to prove that trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on duress was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; defense of duress would clearly have been inapplicable to petitioner's charge of first degree murder because the urgency of harm to petitioner would not have outweighed the harm to the deceased victim. Hendricks v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 810 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on duress and defense of a third person with regard to the charge of the attempted first degree premeditated murder because defendant was not charged with that offense for shooting the victim in a club when the victim allegedly pulled a gun on defendants'  sibling as defendant allegedly shot the victim in the parking lot after pursuing the victim. By that time, defendant's brother was no longer in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury by the victim. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Trial court did not breach a clear and unequivocal rule of law by declining to give a jury instruction on the defense of duress because the danger of death could not reasonably outweigh the harm of causing a death; therefore, duress in a homicide case could not be fairly raised by the proof, regardless of whether defendant was being threatened at the time he shot the victim. State v. Kelso, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2020).

3. Evidence.

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel was properly denied as trial counsel's performance was not deficient for failing to obtain an expert witness to testify on the defense of duress because defendant failed to produce an expert witness on duress to testify at the post-conviction hearing or to introduce evidence on what an expert witness might have presented and how it would have aided his defense. Mims v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. June 9, 2017).

Trial counsel's performance was not deficient by failing to request jury instructions on the defenses of duress and necessity because the defenses were not raised by the proof at trial. Counsel researched the possibility of arguing the defenses of necessity or duress at trial, but was unable to corroborate defendant's story, while abandoned this theory of the case when defendant informed counsel that defendant had never entered the building that was vandalized and burglarized and by testifying to living in a hotel at the time of the offense. Walton v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

State met its burden of proof regarding defendant's defense of duress because the record made clear that defendant walked into the bedroom on his own and received oral sex from the victim while they were the only two in the room and no evidence existed to suggest that defendant was forced or threatened into entering the bedroom by a co-defendant. State v. Denton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

State met its burden of proof regarding defendant's defense of duress because no testimony existed indicating that a co-defendant pointed a gun at defendant during the rape or robbery of the victims, the three victims testified that the men took their cell phones along with a laptop and two TV's, and two co-defendants testified that defendant took a TV as they exited the apartment, absent any threats from the co-defendant. State v. Denton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

There was no error in the rulings related to the defense of duress because the proffered evidence describing the culture of the football team was not relevant to the defense of duress and the defense was discounted by several witnesses at trial. State v. Banks, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 181 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Jury could have rejected his defense of duress because it could have determined that by agreeing to come to Nashville for a job with the co-defendant, who defendant knew had a violent past, and staying with him for several days that he did not have a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury, and based on defendant's own testimony the jury could have determined that he had many opportunities to escape and he armed was during the offense. State v. Wyche, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2019).

39-11-505. Entrapment.

It is a defense to prosecution that law enforcement officials, acting either directly or through an agent, induced or persuaded an otherwise unwilling person to commit an unlawful act when the person was not predisposed to do so. If a defendant intends to rely on the defense of entrapment, the defendant shall give to the district attorney general a notice comparable to that required for an insanity defense under Rule 12.2 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

In 1980, the Tennessee supreme court recognized the defense of entrapment in the case of State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1980). In addition, the defendant must give notice of his or her intent to rely on the defense of entrapment to the district attorney general.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Insanity defense, § 39-11-501.

Law Reviews.

The Prevalence and Use of Criminal Defenses: A Preliminary Study (Neil P. Cohen, Michael G. Johnson, Tracy B. Henley), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 957 (1993).

Witch Doctors and Battleship Stalkers: The Edges of Exculpation in Entrapment Cases, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1869 (1999).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

By abolishing common law defenses, the 1989 Criminal Code superseded the definition of entrapment as announced in State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 437 (Tenn. 1980), including the solicitation exception, and replaced it with T.C.A. § 39-11-505; thus, the defense of entrapment applied to the crime of solicitation to commit murder. State v. Latham, 910 S.W.2d 892, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Entrapment defense is not a matter of law or right based solely upon the fact that a state agent furnishes contraband to a defendant by means of sale or delivery; the fact that the state furnished the contraband is a point of evidentiary value only. State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. June 30, 2003).

Where defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to sell after negotiating a cocaine transaction with an undercover detective and paying for the cocaine, the trial court properly refused defendant's request for a jury instruction on entrapment, as it was clear that defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. June 30, 2003).

Defense of “sentencing entrapment” is not recognized in Tennessee. State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. June 30, 2003).

Because the record did not show that petitioner informed counsel of the factual basis for asserting entrapment, he had not demonstrated deficiency in counsel's failure to file a pretrial notice; furthermore, petitioner could not establish a reasonable probability that a properly preserved entrapment defense would have changed the outcome of trial, as he did not accidentally and unexpectedly find rocks of crack cocaine in his pocket and then give them to law enforcement only because he was persuaded to do so. Jamison v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 16, 2018).

2. Evidence.

In a prosecution for sexual battery by means of fraud, where the victim reasonably relied upon a belief that defendant's touching was for medical purposes, his allowing the touching would not constitute such a consent that would make the contact lawful so as to preclude a conviction. State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Expert testimony about defendant's susceptibility to inducement, proffered to establish an entrapment defense, was admissible even though it embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 487, 70 A.L.R.5th 743 (Tenn. 1997).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject defendant's defense of entrapment, as defendant agreed to bring cocaine to a trailer on three separate occasions, and during one of the three transactions, defendant urged two individuals to purchase a larger amount of cocaine from him the next time. State v. Keys, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. June 20, 2014), cert. denied, Keys v. Tennessee, 190 L. Ed. 2d 345, 135 S. Ct. 459, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 7281 (U.S. 2014).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's petition for post-conviction relief because trial counsel's background search of a confidential informant's criminal history was more than reasonable and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the defense of entrapment where the informant testified at trial that it was defendant's idea, not his, to conduct an exchange of drugs for guns at the informant's mobile trailer, which happened to be within a protected school zone. Clanton v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2018).

Part 6
Justification Excluding Criminal Responsibility

39-11-601. Justification a defense.

It is a defense to prosecution that the conduct of the person is justified under this part.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This part enunciates the various principles of Tennessee law which excuse or justify otherwise unlawful conduct. Justification as a defense is consistent with Tennessee case law. See May v. State, 220 Tenn. 541, 420 S.W.2d 647 (1967).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. General defenses, title 39, ch. 11, part 5.

Law Reviews.

The Prevalence and Use of Criminal Defenses: A Preliminary Study (Neil P. Cohen, Michael G. Johnson, Tracy B. Henley), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 957 (1993).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Duress or Necessity.

Neither duress nor necessity are affirmative defenses; both are “defenses” and, if admissible evidence fairly raises either defense, the trial court must submit the defense to the jury and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

2. Self-Defense.

Instruction that the victim was acting in defense of his residence in order to justify his conduct was error since the plain language of T.C.A. § 39-11-611 is that self-defense may be utilized in defense of the prosecution, not as justification for a victim's conduct. State v. Belser, 945 S.W.2d 776, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense. State v. Belser, 945 S.W.2d 776, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Defendant's recitation about engaging in a struggle with victim over victim's gun rather than retreating negated the defendant's theory of any attempt to abandon the burglary; thus, the trial court was correct in finding that the evidence did not support the requested instruction on self defense. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Sims v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S. Ct. 357, 151 L. Ed. 2d 270, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9558 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the jury clearly chose to credit the victim's version of events, rejecting defendant's testimony supporting self-defense; the victim testified specifically about the manner in which defendant and co-defendant began to follow him, about his attempts to get help through 911, about the shooting, about his fleeing the scene, and about his abandoning his own weapon to seek. State v. Manning, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

39-11-602. Justification definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Custody” means under arrest by a law enforcement officer, or under restraint by an officer, employee or agent of government pursuant to an order of a court;
  2. “Deadly force” means force that is intended or known by the defendant to cause or, in the manner of its use or intended use, is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; and
  3. “Escape” means unauthorized departure from custody or failure to return to custody following temporary leave for a specific purpose of limited period, but does not include a violation of conditions of probation or parole.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-11-603. Confinement as justifiable force.

Confinement is justified when force is justified by this part, if the person takes reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as the person knows it can be done safely, unless the individual confined has been arrested for an offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section recognizes confinement as a form of force which may be used whenever justifiable. This concept is based on present Tennessee law which relieves merchants, employees, and officers from both civil and criminal liability for false arrest, false imprisonment or unlawful detention if the arrest or detention was based on probable cause. § 40-7-116(a), (b), (c). This section is intended to authorize reasonable alternatives to the use of force. Confinement is recognized as a form of justifiable force; restrictions on the use of force contained elsewhere in this part also apply to confinement.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-11-604. Reckless injury of innocent third person.

Even though a person is justified under this part in threatening or using force or deadly force against another, the justification afforded by this part is unavailable in a prosecution for harm to an innocent third person who is recklessly injured or recklessly killed by the use of such force.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section provides that a defendant may be justified in using force against another person but criminally responsible if that use of force recklessly injures a third person. The underlying principle is that a defendant's culpability is to be measured independently for each victim. The section is designed to deter reckless conduct that could harm innocent third persons.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-11-605. Civil remedies unaffected.

The fact that conduct is justified under this part does not abolish or impair any remedy for the conduct that is or may be available in a civil suit.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section creates a distinction between justifications for criminal and civil law. The defenses in this chapter apply only to criminal law and are not intended to affect civil liability. See also § 39-11-102(c).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-11-606 — 39-11-608. [Reserved.]

Except as provided in §§ 39-11-61139-11-616, 39-11-620 and 39-11-621, conduct is justified, if:

  1. The person reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm; and
  2. The desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section codifies the common law defense of necessity. It excuses criminal liability in those exceedingly rare situations where criminal activity is an objectively reasonable response to an extreme situation. For example, the necessity defense would bar a trespass conviction for a hiker, stranded in a snowstorm, who spends the night in a vacant cabin rather than risking death sleeping in the open.

The defense is limited to situations: (1) where the defendant acts upon a reasonable belief that the action is necessary to avoid harm; and (2) where the harm sought to be avoided is clearly greater than the harm caused by the criminal act. The defense is further limited in application to those offenses where it is not expressly excluded by statute.

Subdivisions (1) and (2) contemplate a balancing between the harm caused by the conduct constituting an offense, and the harm the defendant sought to avoid by the conduct. If the harm sought to be avoided was, by ordinary standards of reasonableness, clearly greater than the harm actually caused (the offense), the defendant's conduct causing the offense is justified.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Law Reviews.

The Prevalence and Use of Criminal Defenses: A Preliminary Study (Neil P. Cohen, Michael G. Johnson, Tracy B. Henley), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 957 (1993).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Neither duress nor necessity are affirmative defenses; both are “defenses” and, if admissible evidence fairly raises either defense, the trial court must submit the defense to the jury and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Trial court properly refused to instruct jury on the defense of necessity where defendant first claimed the money he stole was to buy drugs for himself and only later claimed to need the money to protect his grandchildren from drug dealers, defense witnesses only marginally corroborated his story of threats to the children and defendant provided no proof that robbery was the only alternative available to protect the children. State v. Davenport, 973 S.W.2d 283, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 212 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Jury instruction on duress adequately conveyed the general policies supporting the existence of both the duress and necessity defenses; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request for an instruction on necessity. State v. Green, 995 S.W.2d 591, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1079 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

To be entitled to the defense of necessity, defendant must show an immediately necessary action, justifiable because of an imminent threat, where the action is the only means to avoid the harm. State v. Watson, 1 S.W.3d 676, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

2. Jury Instructions.

Trial court did not err in rejecting request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity where the record did not demonstrate that defendant's actions in driving with a revoked license were the only means of avoiding an imminent threat to her passenger's health and safety. State v. Watson, 1 S.W.3d 676, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on the defense of necessity where defendant failed to show that a non-human act caused him to fire the shots or that the harm sought to be avoided was greater than the harm caused by his criminal act. State v. Perrier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016), aff'd, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Trial counsel's performance was not deficient by failing to request jury instructions on the defenses of duress and necessity because the defenses were not raised by the proof at trial. Counsel researched the possibility of arguing the defenses of necessity or duress at trial, but was unable to corroborate defendant's story, while abandoned this theory of the case when defendant informed counsel that defendant had never entered the building that was vandalized and burglarized and by testifying to living in a hotel at the time of the offense. Walton v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Post-conviction court properly dismissed petitioner's application for post-conviction relief because petitioner failed to prove that trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on necessity; the statutory defense of necessity arguably had no application in the case of homicide, and trial counsel's strategy claiming petitioner acted in self-defense was reasonable and sound. Hendricks v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 810 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

In a prosecution of defendant for being a felon in possession of a handgun, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for an instruction on the defense of necessity. Nothing in the record indicated defendant's action of possessing the gun in any way delayed or hindered the subsequent violence, and the trial court was correct in finding the evidence produced at trial did not fairly raise the defense of necessity as to defendant's actions. State v. Cole-Pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2018).

Where the general defense of necessity is fairly raised by the evidence, the trial court is obligated to instruct the jury accordingly, regardless of whether the instruction is requested. A defendant need not testify that he reasonably feared imminent bodily harm; the trial court may draw this inference from the evidence as it is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom. In addition, a request for a jury instruction on a general defense is not subject to waiver for failure to submit the request in writing. State v. Cole-pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Oct. 25, 2019).

Trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity during defendant's trial for being a felon in possession of a handgun because it was fairly raised by the evidence, as it showed that defendant became involved in a physical altercation with two men inside a convenience store, a gun from the jacket of one of the men, the two men grappled with defendant for the gun but defendant reached it first, a jury could have inferred that defendant reasonably believed that obtaining the gun was immediately necessary for him to avoid imminent harm, and defendant's girlfriend was shot with another gun very shortly thereafter. State v. Cole-pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Oct. 25, 2019).

3. Defense to Escape.

In order to establish defense of necessity in an escape case: (1) The person must reasonably believe the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm; (2) The desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweighs, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; (3) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such compliance illusory; and (4) The prisoner must immediately report to the proper authorities when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat. State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

In a prosecution for escape, where defendant's offer of proof tended to establish several of the necessary elements of necessity, the evidence was relevant and should have been admitted. State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

4. Defense Rejected.

Even if someone had been threatening to shoot defendant, his firing toward the convenience store where three people were outside and at least three people were inside was a far greater harm; therefore, the proof did not fairly raise the defense of necessity. State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender and driving on a revoked license because the jury heard the evidence and, irrespective of whether it believed defendant's claim that she thought she was having a stroke, chose to reject her defense of necessity, as was its prerogative. State v. Hottiman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. July 19, 2018).

39-11-610. Public duty.

  1. Except as qualified by subsections (b) and (c), conduct is justified if the person reasonably believes the conduct is required or authorized by law, by the judgment or order of a competent court or other tribunal, or in the execution of legal process.
  2. The following sections of this part control:
    1. When force is threatened or used against a person to protect persons, pursuant to §§ 39-11-611 — 39-11-613;
    2. To protect property, pursuant to §§ 39-11-614 — 39-11-616; or
    3. For law enforcement, pursuant to § 39-11-620.
  3. The justification afforded by this section is available if:
    1. The person reasonably believes the court or tribunal has jurisdiction or the process is lawful, even though the court or tribunal lacks jurisdiction or the process is unlawful; or
    2. The person reasonably believes the conduct is required or authorized to assist a public servant in the performance of the public servant's official duty, even though the public servant exceeds the public servant's lawful authority.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section codifies the defense of public duty, allowing justification under certain limited circumstances while preventing a blanket “following orders” defense. The justification allowed under this section requires a reasonable belief in the legality of the actions taken, so that defendants who knowingly disregard the law or exceed their authority are denied the defense.

Subsection (a) limits the defense to situations where the defendant reasonably believes his or her conduct is lawful. For example, under some circumstances, Tennessee law authorizes law enforcement officers to enter buildings to execute search warrants or to seize goods. This section protects law enforcement officers who perform these duties under a reasonable belief that their actions are lawful.

Subsection (b) clarifies that where force is used, the code sections governing justification of force control. Thus, this section does not apply to the use of force.

Subsection (c) protects persons who act under a reasonable (though incorrect) belief of the lawfulness of an authority granted by a court or tribunal (any official adjudicatory body) and private citizens who assist public servants under a reasonable belief the conduct is necessary or authorized to assist the public servant in carrying out the public servant's official duties.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-11-611. Self-defense.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Business” means a commercial enterprise or establishment owned by a person as all or part of the person's livelihood or is under the owner's control or who is an employee or agent of the owner with responsibility for protecting persons and property and shall include the interior and exterior premises of the business;
    2. “Category I nuclear facility” means a facility that possesses a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material, as defined and licensed by the United States nuclear regulatory commission, and that must comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73;
    3. “Curtilage” means the area surrounding a dwelling that is necessary, convenient and habitually used for family purposes and for those activities associated with the sanctity of a person's home;
    4. “Deadly force” means the use of force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;
    5. “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, that has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed for or capable of use by people;
    6. “Nuclear power reactor facility” means a reactor designed to produce heat for electric generation, for producing radiation or fissionable materials, or for reactor component testing, and does not include a reactor used for research purposes;
    7. “Nuclear security officer” means a person who meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, who is an employee or an employee of a contractor of the owner of a category I nuclear facility or nuclear power reactor facility, and who has been appointed or designated by the owner of a category I nuclear facility or nuclear power reactor facility to provide security for the facility;
    8. “Residence” means a dwelling in which a person resides, either temporarily or permanently, or is visiting as an invited guest, or any dwelling, building or other appurtenance within the curtilage of the residence; and
    9. “Vehicle” means any motorized vehicle that is self-propelled and designed for use on public highways to transport people or property.
    1. Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening or using force against another person when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force.
    2. Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening or using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, if:
      1. The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury;
      2. The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and
      3. The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.
  2. Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury within a residence, business, dwelling or vehicle is presumed to have held a reasonable belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury to self, family, a member of the household or a person visiting as an invited guest, when that force is used against another person, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence, business, dwelling or vehicle, and the person using defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred.
  3. The presumption established in subsection (c) shall not apply, if:
    1. The person against whom the force is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, business, residence, or vehicle, such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder; provided, that the person is not prohibited from entering the dwelling, business, residence, or occupied vehicle by an order of protection, injunction for protection from domestic abuse, or a court order of no contact against that person;
    2. The person against whom the force is used is attempting to remove a person or persons who is a child or grandchild of, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is used;
    3. Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, the person using force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is using the dwelling, business, residence, or occupied vehicle to further an unlawful activity; or
    4. The person against whom force is used is a law enforcement officer, as defined in § 39-11-106, who enters or attempts to enter a dwelling, business, residence, or vehicle in the performance of the officer's official duties, and the officer identified the officer in accordance with any applicable law, or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer.
  4. The threat or use of force against another is not justified:
    1. If the person using force consented to the exact force used or attempted by the other individual;
    2. If the person using force provoked the other individual's use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless:
      1. The person using force abandons the encounter or clearly communicates to the other the intent to do so; and
      2. The other person nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force against the person; or
    3. To resist a halt at a roadblock, arrest, search, or stop and frisk that the person using force knows is being made by a law enforcement officer, unless:
      1. The law enforcement officer uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest, search, stop and frisk, or halt; and
      2. The person using force reasonably believes that the force is immediately necessary to protect against the law enforcement officer's use or attempted use of greater force than necessary.
  5. A nuclear security officer is authorized to use deadly force under the following circumstances:
    1. Deadly force appears reasonably necessary to prevent or impede an act, or attempted act, of radiological sabotage at a category I nuclear facility or nuclear power reactor facility, including, but not limited to, situations where a person is attempting to, or has, unlawfully or forcefully entered a category I nuclear facility or nuclear power reactor facility, and where adversary tactics are employed to attempt an act of radiological sabotage, such as, but not limited to:
      1. Use of firearms or small arms;
      2. Use of explosive devices;
      3. Use of incendiary devices;
      4. Use of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices;
      5. Use of water borne improvised explosive devices;
      6. Breaching of barriers; and
      7. Use of other adversary or terrorist tactics which could be employed to attempt an act of radiological sabotage;
    2. Deadly force appears reasonably necessary to protect the nuclear security officer or another person if the nuclear security officer reasonably believes there is an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury;
    3. Deadly force appears reasonably necessary to prevent the imminent infliction or threatened infliction of death or serious bodily harm or the sabotage of an occupied facility by explosives;
    4. Deadly force appears reasonably necessary to prevent the theft, sabotage, or unauthorized control of special nuclear material from a nuclear power reactor facility or of a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device or special nuclear material from a category I nuclear facility; or
    5. Deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to apprehend or prevent the escape of a person reasonably believed to:
      1. Have committed an offense of the nature specified under this subsection (f); or
      2. Be escaping by use of a weapon or explosive or who otherwise poses an imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to nuclear security officers or others unless apprehended without delay.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 8; 2007, ch. 210, § 1; 2008, ch. 1012, § 1; 2009, ch. 194, § 2; 2012, ch. 627, §§ 1, 2; 2016, ch. 701, §§ 1-5; 2017, ch. 80, §§ 1-4.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section codifies much of the common law doctrine of self defense. The defense is applicable to the use or threatened use of force and to both ordinary force and deadly force. Threats are included because under some circumstances they constitute offenses.

Subsection (a) allows the justification of self defense to persons who reasonably believe they are imminently threatened with force or are actually attacked and who react with the force reasonably necessary to protect themselves. The test of “reasonable belief” places the emphasis on the defendant's reliance upon reasonable appearances rather than exposing the defendant to the peril of criminal liability where appearances were deceiving and no actual danger existed. The test is threefold: the defendant must reasonably believe he is threatened with imminent loss of life or serious bodily injury; the danger creating the belief must be real or honestly believed to be real at the time of the action; and the belief must be founded on reasonable grounds. Under this section, there is no duty to retreat, which changes Tennessee law.

Subsection (b) is a restatement of a prior Tennessee statute which created a presumption that a person using force against an intruder in the residence held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious injury.

Subsections (c), (d) and (e) are restrictions to the defense. Subsections (c) and (d) continue the traditional rule that the defendant claiming justification should be free from fault in bringing on the necessity of using force. Subsection (c) recognizes that persons who consent to the force used against them are prohibited from utilizing self defense in responding to that use of force. Examples would be mutual combatants or participants in contact sports. The defense, however, is available if the force used against the defendant exceeded the scope of the defendant's consent.

Subsection (d) also restricts the defense by codifying the traditional concept of the initial aggressor. In order to use the defense, the initial aggressor must withdraw or communicate an intent to withdraw and the force must continue despite this communication. See Irvine v. State, 104 Tenn. 132, 56 S.W. 845 (1900); Gann v. State, 214 Tenn. 711, 383 S.W.2d 32 (1964).

Subsection (e) represents a policy decision by the commission that the street is not the proper forum for determining the legality of an arrest. To a large extent, the rule is designed to protect citizens from being harmed by law enforcement officers. Research has shown that citizens who resist arrest frequently are injured by trained officers who use their skills and weapons to protect themselves and effectuate the arrest. If the defendant knows it is a law enforcement officer who has stopped or arrested him or her, respect for the rule of law requires the defendant to submit to apparent authority. The justification is restored if the law enforcement officer uses greater force than necessary under the circumstances and the defendant acts under reasonable belief that his or her acts are necessary for self-protection.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Attorney General Opinions. Retaliation by gang members subjected to armed attack, OAG 99-009 (1/25/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Deadly Force.

A person is not justified in using deadly force to prevent or terminate another's trespass on real estate which is not the person's residence or to prevent or terminate unlawful interference with personal property. State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Because the jury found that defendant did not employ the handgun in justifiable self-defense pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-17-1322, it was able to consider his commission of the employment of a firearm offense in determining whether he was engaged in unlawful activity pursuant to the self-defense statute. The defeat of a weapons charge pursuant to § 39-17-1322 meant that the jury could not consider the conduct that was the subject of the weapons charge in determining whether defendant was engaged in unlawful activity for purposes of this section. State v. Perrier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016), aff'd, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

2. —Duty to Retreat.

Under the “true man” doctrine, one need not retreat from the threatened attack of another even though one may safely do so; neither must one pause and consider whether a reasonable person might think it possible to safely flee rather than to attack and disable or kill the assailant. The doctrine applies only when the defendant is without fault in provoking the confrontation, and when the defendant is in a place where he has a lawful right to be and is there placed in reasonably apparent danger of imminent bodily harm or death. State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. 1995).

Mutual combat and situations where the initial use of force is provoked by the defendant may negate the availability of the defense of self defense. State v. Inlow, 52 S.W.3d 101, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

Defendant's recitation about engaging in a struggle with victim over victim's gun rather than retreating negated the defendant's theory of any attempt to abandon the burglary; thus, the trial court was correct in finding that the evidence did not support the requested instruction on self defense. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Sims v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S. Ct. 357, 151 L. Ed. 2d 270, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9558 (2001).

Phrase “engaged in unlawful activity” in the self-defense statute applies only to a person's duty to retreat. State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

For purposes of self-defense, the duty to retreat does not mean that a person cannot defend herself or himself as a defendant may still defend himself even to the point of using deadly force, and may be acquitted of a weapons offense if a jury finds that his self-defense was justifiable; those provisions are not mutually exclusive. State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

3. —True Man Doctrine.

As in all cases of self defense, the force used must be reasonable and, moreover, the “true man” rule implies no license for the initiation of a confrontation or an unreasonable escalation of a confrontation in progress. State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. 1995).

4. Defense of Residence.

Instruction that the victim was acting in defense of his residence in order to justify his conduct was error since the plain language of T.C.A. § 39-11-611 is that self-defense may be utilized in defense of the prosecution, not as justification for a victim's conduct. State v. Belser, 945 S.W.2d 776, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

5. Burden of Proof.

The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense. State v. Belser, 945 S.W.2d 776, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

6. Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because defendant involved himself in an altercation between the victim and defendant's friend; during the altercation, defendant left the friend's porch, approached the victim, and struck him in the head with a brick; once the victim was on the ground, defendant struck him an additional three or four times; as a result of the incident, the victim suffered multiple facial fractures, requiring three surgical procedures; and the trial court charged the jury on the issue of self-defense, and the jury chose to reject that defense, as was its prerogative. State v. Benfield, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the rejection of defendant's self-defense claim because none of the shooting victims were armed, the evidence showed that all of the victims were shot from more than five feet away, and two of the victims could not have been involved in any confrontation, even if one believed defendant's story about the third victim's threat to defendant. In addition, even if true, defendant's confession showed that defendant escalated any confrontation. State v. Pruitt, 510 S.W.3d 398, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 980 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless endangerment because defendant engaged in reckless conduct that placed the victim in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury when he used a pocketknife to slash the victim four times; the jury acted within its province if it rejected defendant's testimony that he merely acted to defend himself by reaching for and using his knife to injure the unarmed victim, who punched defendant; and the jury was within its province if it determined that defendant's use of a knife was an unreasonable response to the use or threatened use of unlawful force by the victim or that defendant's use of deadly force was not based upon reasonable beliefs. State v. Dixon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2017).

Once defendant shot the victim, he had committed a knowing killing and his actions and those of the officers after that point were not relevant to defendant's claim of self-defense; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the officer's statements. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the jury clearly chose to credit the victim's version of events, rejecting defendant's testimony supporting self-defense; the victim testified specifically about the manner in which defendant and co-defendant began to follow him, about his attempts to get help through 911, about the shooting, about his fleeing the scene, and about his abandoning his own weapon to seek. State v. Manning, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

7. Necessary Force.

There was sufficient evidence from which a jury might conclude that, despite the victim's having thrown the initial punch and having pulled the defendant's coat over the defendant's head, the defense of self-defense did not excuse the defendant's actions. State v. Inlow, 52 S.W.3d 101, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

Uncommunicated threat made by a victim is admissible as an exception to the rule excluding hearsay statements as an indication of the victim's state of mind, and evidence establishing the victim's status as an aggressor is not excluded under Tenn. R. Evid. 403, even if there is substantial evidence (including a stipulation) that the victim was in fact the aggressor; however, a trial court's failure to admit such a statement did not constitute reversible error because the outcome of the trial was not affected where the evidence showed that defendant used more force than necessary to show self-defense. State v. Saylor, 117 S.W.3d 239, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 861 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Saylor v. Tennessee, 540 U.S. 1208, 124 S. Ct. 1483, 158 L. Ed. 2d 133, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1500 (2004).

8. Defense Rejected.

In a felony murder case, a witness's testimony that he saw defendant pointing a rifle at the victim, who held his hands in the air, and heard three shots fired from a .22 caliber weapon, followed by a single shot from a higher caliber gun, along with evidence that defendant used a .22 rifle and that a single shot was fired from the victim's .38 caliber revolver, was sufficient to allow the jury to reject defendant's claim of self-defense. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Oct. 10, 2012).

Defendant's conviction for second-degree murder was supported by sufficient evidence where: (1) four witnesses testified that they saw defendant's altercation with the victim and that the victim did not have a gun; (2) law enforcement officers testified that they did not find a weapon on the victim's person or near his body; and (3) defendant's claims that the victim had a gun and that he acted in self defense under T.C.A. § 39-11-611(b) were rejected by the jury. State v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Apr. 9, 2013), dismissed, Webster v. Phillips, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166130 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017).

Evidence that defendant had no injuries despite her claim that the victim choked her and tried to snap her neck, and testimony from the 9-1-1 operator that she did not hear anything to indicate that an attack was occurred was sufficient to defeat defendant's claim of self-defense. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 920 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2015), cert. denied, Taylor v. Tennessee, 192 L. Ed. 2d 158, 135 S. Ct. 2368, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3523 (U.S. 2015).

Defendant violated T.C.A. § 39-13-102 as: (1) he did not object to the victim's statement that he displayed the gun, pointed it at the victim and threatened to kill him; (2) defendant's statement supported a finding that he displayed the gun to the victim; (3) he was not justified in using force as he armed himself, went to the victim's home and instigated a confrontation with the victim during which he reached for and partially displayed his gun; (4) he did not act in self-defense as he provoked the victim's father into pointing a gun at him and he did not abandon the encounter before he pulled his gun; and (5) as he was not justified in using force under this section, he was not justified in using force in defense of others. United States v. Neal, 627 Fed. Appx. 543, — F.3d —, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17722, 2015 FED App. 681N (6th Cir.).

Since defendant was in possession of at least one, if not two, weapons, the victim's were unarmed, and the lack of gunpowder on the victims'  clothes indicated that they were shot from a distance, the jury did not err in rejecting defendant's claim of self-defense. State v. Pruitt, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2015), aff'd, 510 S.W.3d 398, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 980 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

Jury was free to discredit defendant's testimony that he used force to protect himself, as other witnesses testified that the victim was unarmed and did not threaten defendant, and the evidence showed that defendant returned to the victim after initially turning away, uttered a threat, and used a knife on an unarmed man. State v. Moffitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the jury was instructed on self-defense and rejected the notion that defendant's striking the victim repeatedly with a wooden beam after the victim fell on the ground was justified as self-defense; any threat the victim posed to defendant ended once the victim fell on the ground. State v. Tiger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2016).

Evidence did not support a finding that defendant killed the victim in self-defense; the evidence did not reflect that a reasonable person could have believed the victim's attempting to gather shopping bags and exit a car posed an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, the victim was unarmed at the time of the shooting, defendant had no legal right to be on the property, and the jury could have found that he was waiting in the dark for the victim to return. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant and a codefendant in the car which defendant was driving exchanged gunfire with codefendants in another car. Several eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from defendant's car, while the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of a youth on a sidewalk that was stopped by codefendants in the other car. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from the defendant's car, the forensic evidence established that the victim was likely hit by a bullet that came from defendant's car, and the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of others, which was not second-guessed on appeal; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and the corresponding counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

It was within the jury's province to reject defendant's claim of self-defense, given that the unarmed victim was shot in the back of the head as he attempted to leave a bar, his repeated verbal threats to kill defendant alone did not justify defendant's actions, and the victim's throwing down a glass and breaking it was not evidence of his attempt to put his threats into execution, nor was the simple act of turning towards defendant. State v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 871 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree murder conviction and to reject his claim of self-defense because it showed that he was angry with the victim for taking his gun, defendant forced his way into the apartment and shot the victim several times, defendant testified that the victim fell after the first gunshot, and defendant's gun was still in the victim's waistband after the shooting. State v. Hill-Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2017), appeal denied, State v. Hill-Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was charged with aggravated assault by the use of a deadly weapon, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the lesser-included offense of assault because, although defendant testified that the victim became violent, shoved and choked him, and beat him with a fan, and he used a knife to fend off the victim's attacks, the jury was free to reject defendant's testimony that he acted in self-defense; and the victim testified that defendant threatened and stabbed him with a knife, and he defended himself with a fan. State v. Parvin, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction because it showed defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused a victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by pointing a gun at the victim, and (2) did not act in self-defense. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Proof at trial established that defendant did not act in self-defense when he shot the victim because a witness testified that when she entered the victim's apartment she saw the victim on the floor clutching keys in her hands, another witness testified that the knives on the floor had blood splatter on the handles, and a doctor testified that because of the similarity between the droplets of blood on the knives and on the floor, he believed that the knives were already lying on the floor when the victim was shot. Tenn. v. Satterfield, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because defendant became upset with the victim at a party, when the victim approached defendant and asked for the return of the victim's keys, defendant threatened the victim and lunged toward the victim, during the altercation defendant pulled out a knife and stabbed the victim, defendant chased the victim while still holding the knife, and defendant yelled that defendant was going to kill the victim. Furthermore, the jury rejected defendant's claim of self-defense. State v. Wood, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

Defendant's contention that the State's proof failed to rebut his self-defense theory was rejected because the State offered evidence that defendant got out of the car, pulled the victim from the car while she was injecting drugs, initiated the assault that culminated in the shooting, and had the only weapon involved. A rational jury could conclude that if the victim had been shot with a gun she possessed, defendant would have had no reason to dispose of either his gun, which he claimed had not been fired, or the victim's gun, which would have supported his claims that she had pointed a gun at him and that they had struggled for control of it. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. July 18, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's rejection of defendant's claim of self-defense for the first-degree murder charge because it showed that he caught one victim by surprise and shot him mid-sentence, another victim testified that defendant put a gun to her head, pulled the trigger, and calmly walked away after the gun jammed, and the victim suffered two gunshot wounds to the back. State v. Burrow, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

There was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not shoot the victim in self-defense, including eye-witness testimony that the victim was sitting on the couch unarmed when defendant came into the residence and shot the victim multiple times State v. Davenport, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2019).

Defendant's claim that defendant fatally shot the victim in self-defense when the victim attacked defendant and defendant's child failed because the strongest legitimate view of the evidence was that defendant's child was not struck and injured by the victim, defendant could not explain defendant's orientation to victim, defendant had the wherewithal to record officers'  radio communications in response to the shooting, and defendant calmly discussed the shooting and mocked the victim's surviving spouse after talking with the police. State v. Waggoner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for second-degree murder because defendant knowingly killed the victim beyond a reasonable doubt as defendant approached the victim when the victim was walking, defendant confronted the victim about a rumor of the victim hitting defendant's sibling, the victim put the victim's arm around defendant in a friendly way, and defendant fatally shot the victim. Although defendant claimed that he shot the victim in self-defense, the victim was neither acting aggressively towards defendant, nor carrying a gun. State v. Branch, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2020).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's second-degree murder conviction and the jury properly rejected his self-defense claim; despite defendant's claim that he never heard the numerous police announcements of a search warrant, he also admitted that he could not see what was going on and just grabbed his gun and shot, and the jury could have found that defendant did not have a reasonable belief of imminent danger of death or serious bodily. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of second degree murder and unlawful possession of a handgun because the surveillance video showed defendant near the sidewalk outside the club when he started shooting the victim, there were no witnesses that testified the victim made any threats, verbal or otherwise, toward defendant, and the surveillance video did not show the victim in the possession of a weapon, and the only weapon found near the scene was the handgun which contained defendant's DNA. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2020).

9. Instructions.

In petitioner's felony murder case, counsel was deficient in failing to investigate and assert self-defense because counsel admitted that he knew that the petitioner told police that he and the victim had argued, that the victim had “rushed” him, and that he and the victim had fallen into a dresser; although the petitioner did not mention his bloody nose, reasonably diligent counsel would have inferred grounds for self-defense from the argument between the petitioner and the victim and from the petitioner's consistent allegation that he had been “rushed” by the victim. Wiley v. State, 183 S.W.3d 317, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of duress under T.C.A. § 39-11-504 did not constitute plain error under former Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (see now T.R.A.P. 36(b)), and therefore his conviction of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon in violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) was reinstated, even though the evidence, including defendant's testimony, may have been sufficient to warrant such an instruction, because duress was never discussed as a theory of the defense and defendant expressly declined a jury instruction on self-defense, a defense closely related to duress. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Apr. 26, 2007).

Court did not err in declining to give a third person defense instruction and giving a self defense instruction because defendant saw his best friend fighting, he exited the truck with his shotgun and walked toward the friend, the victim approached defendant and defendant shot the victim, allegedly to “protect” himself. Moreover, defendant testified that he shot the victim to protect himself. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 406 S.W.3d 121, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. June 20, 2013).

Trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense because it was fairly raised by the testimony, where defendant picked up the intoxicated victim, they argued, the victim reached down to her ankle holster where defendant saw a gun, defendant fired his gun to prevent the victim from using her gun, in doing so he caused property damage but no physical damage to anyone, he remained at the scene and cooperated fully when approached by authorities, and the jury's verdict of attempted voluntary manslaughter indicated the jury's belief that defendant acted under adequate provocation. State v. Lunsford, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Sept. 27, 2016).

Trial court did not improperly advised defendant that if he testified that he had acted in self-defense, the jury would be instructed that he was engaged in unlawful activity by being a felon in possession of a firearm because, at the time of the trial, being a felon in possession of a firearm could constitute unlawful activity for purposes of the self-defense statute. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Trial court did not err by refusing to provide a jury instruction on self-defense because reasonable minds could not have accepted a theory of self-defense based on the State's proof as all of the evidence indicated that defendant was the initial aggressor in the confrontation and that his display of a weapon was what provoked the victim to also display a weapon; there was no evidence that defendant attempted to abandon the encounter once he saw the victim's weapon; and defendant could not claim that he acted in self-defense when his conduct provoked the opposing threat, and he made no effort to retreat. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Trial court did not err in declining to give a self-defense instruction, as the uncontested proof showed that the unarmed victim was asleep when defendant shot him. State v. Self, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017), cert. denied, Self v. Tennessee, 198 L. Ed. 2d 666, 137 S. Ct. 2224, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3666 (U.S. June 5, 2017).

Even though the trial court erred by charging the jury on self-defense by including in the instruction offenses that were not charged in the indictment and requiring the jury to determine whether defendant was committing any of the uncharged offenses at the time he used deadly force, the error was harmless because the jury convicted defendant of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. State v. Perrier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016), aff'd, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Trial court stated the applicable Tennessee pattern jury instructions provided a correct and complete charge of the law on self-defense, plus the jury instruction regarding the State's burden to negate defendant's claim of self-defense was given to the jury before it began deliberating, and no error was found; the prefatory phrase did not shift the burden of proof, plus any error in including the prefatory phase would have been harmless because it was clear that evidence of self-defense had been raised and that the issue was squarely before the jury. State v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 871 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2016).

Without evidence either that the victim acted in a manner causing defendant to believe that the victim presented an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, there was no evidence that defendant's force was immediately necessary to protect against the victim; there was no basis to find that the evidence fairly raised an issue as to whether defendant acted in defense of either self or another, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of person was not error. State v. Estrada, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense because the only evidence defendant presented was a witness's testimony that she heard what she believed to be the victim rummaging through a knife drawer and leaving after defendant, but she did not see the act take place. State v. Rahman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017).

For purposes of self-defense, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that he or she did not have to retreat from an alleged attack only when the person was not engaged in unlawful activity and was in a place the person had a right to be. State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Trial court makes the threshold determination whether to charge the jury with self-defense, and the trial court, as part of that threshold determination, should decide whether to charge the jury that a defendant did not have a duty to retreat; as part of that decision, the trial court should consider whether the State has produced clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity such that the no duty to retreat instruction would not apply. Because the allegedly unlawful activity will oftentimes be uncharged conduct similar to evidence of prior bad acts, the procedure outlined in Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) should be utilized by the parties. State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Because defendant's engagement in unlawful activity for the purpose of the self-defense statute was a threshold determination to be made by the trial court, the trial court's jury instructions in defendant's case were erroneous; however, the error was harmless because defendant's possession of a firearm when he was a convicted felon amounted to engaging in unlawful activity; and no reasonable jury would have accepted his self-defense theory as the evidence showed that any belief on defendant's part that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury was not reasonable considering the testimony by multiple witnesses that only words had been exchanged and that no one had used or attempted to use unlawful force on defendant. State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Trial court did not err by failing to give a jury instruction on self-defense because defendant conceded that he was engaged in unlawful activity by breaking into the owner's vehicle, the victim's use of force against defendant was clearly provoked by defendant's unlawful activity as the victim testified that he tackled defendant in an attempt to prevent him from stealing anything, and there was no evidence that defendant abandoned the encounter, communicated his intent to do so, or otherwise attempted to retreat prior to stabbing the unarmed victim. State v. Schipp, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2018).

Trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's requests for special jury instructions on the issue of self-defense because the court used the applicable Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions, the jury instruction regarding the State of Tennessee's burden to negate defendant's claim of self-defense was given to the jury before it began deliberating, and the prefatory phrase – “if evidence has been introduced supporting self-defense” – did not improperly shift the burden to defendant to present the defense. State v. Floyd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense, because he consented to the victim's use of force when he re-entered the victim's residence after being locked out. State v. Sanders, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 6, 2018).

Because the trial court's failure to give the jury a self-defense instruction lowered the State's burden of proof because it removed the requirement that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense, his conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. State v. Benson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2018), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Apr. 30, 2019).

When the issue of self-defense has been fairly raised by the evidence, it is up to the jury, not the trial court, to determine whether the defendant's belief in imminent danger or the amount of force used by the defendant were reasonable; as self-defense was fairly raised by the proof in this case, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense. State v. Benson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2018), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Apr. 30, 2019).

Evidence did not fairly raise an issue as to the existence of self-defense; the elements of aggravated rape were established and the offense was completed before the victim grabbed defendant's testicles, and defendant was not acting in self-defense when he engaged in what he claimed was a consensual sexual encounter with the victim. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2019).

An instruction on self-defense was warranted because there was some evidence from which the jury could have determined that defendant's use of force was only for protection against police officers who were using more force than was necessary to place defendant under arrest. Defendant testified that defendant was sitting in a car at night when someone with a blinding light from a flashlight approached, began hitting the window, pulled defendant out, and began hitting defendant as defendant attempted to comply with the officer's demands. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2019).

Causal nexus between a defendant's unlawful activity and his or her need to engage in self-defense is necessary before the trial court can instruct the jury that the defendant had a duty to retreat. State v. Booker, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2020).

Trial court did not err in instructing the jury that defendant had a duty to retreat because he was engaged in robbery at the time of the offense. The proof overwhelmingly established a causal connection between defendant's robbery of the victim and defendant's perceived need to engage in self-defense. State v. Booker, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2020).

Trial court instructed the jury concerning self-defense pursuant to the pattern jury instruction but did not, as required by case law, make the initial determination of whether or not defendant was engaged in unlawful activity, which was error; however, the evidence overwhelmingly established that defendant was engaged in unlawful activity such that the no duty to retreat instruction would not apply, and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's requests for special jury instructions on self-defense and adequate provocation because the instruction given closely tracked the language of the pattern jury instructions and was consistent with this section and therefore the trial court was not obligated to give the special instruction. State v. Donaldson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020).

Defendant was not entitled to relief on the basis that the trial court erred by not amending the pattern jury instruction on self-defense because the court did not breach a clear and unequivocal rule of law by denying the request when defendant was accused of shooting the unarmed victim before the victim set foot on defendant's property. The jury had the benefit of both an accurate description of the law in the pattern instruction and counsel's highlighting the sections of those instructions benefitting the defense theory. State v. Manis, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2020).

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that defendant had no duty to retreat because it found that defendant was acting unlawfully by carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed and the Perrier decision was not limited to convicted felons in possession of a firearm. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's request for a jury instruction on self-defense because it was not fairly raised by the evidence, as the evidence showed that defendant already had a gun in his hand before the victim exited the market, defendant got out of his vehicle with a gun after blocking the victim's car, and the victim walked out of the market unaware of defendant's presence until defendant ran up and shot him. State v. Thompson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

10. Ineffective Assistance.

Vacation of petitioner's, an inmate's, convictions was improper because the courts below erred in concluding that counsel performed deficiently by exclusively pursuing a theory of self-defense, T.C.A. § 39-11-611(a), (d). Trial counsel spent over 100 hours on the case, worked with two other attorneys, discussed the case with the inmate many times, and generated an extensive trial memorandum, which included a comprehensive statement from the inmate; concluding that the inmate had no criminal intent when he entered the home and simply responded to the victim's attack, trial counsel pursued self-defense exclusively. Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1060 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2011).

Petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied because appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of trial counsel's alleged failure to request a self-defense instruction on appeal as the proof at trial did not fairly raise the issue of self-defense because the victim, an unarmed security guard, responded to an emergency call related to a gang fight in the mall; the victim was able to pin defendant against a booth; defendant's friend then told the victim to let defendant go; the victim released defendant; defendant then pulled out a handgun and fired a fatal shot into the victim's chest; and a witness testified that the victim was standing still with his hands at his side when defendant fired his weapon. Loverson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

11. Applicability.

Chancery court erred in ruling that a civil service commission violated a statutory provision by failing to give an employee the benefit of the self-defense statute because that statute was not relevant to the commission's resolution of a factual dispute; the commission was fully apprised of the employee's claim that he acted in self-defense during an altercation and afforded more weight to the evidence supporting the victim's account of the altercation. Holmes v. City of Memphis Civ. Serv. Comm'n, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

13. No Self-defense.

Defendant failed to prove that he acted in self-defense; given his struggle with the officer when the officer tried to arrest defendant, including fighting over the officer's gun, the evidence did not show that, at the time defendant committed the aggravated assault, the officer was using greater force than necessary to make the arrest. State v. Sweeney, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that defendant-who had been drinking heavily and sent multiple inflammatory text messages to the victim before the victim came to defendant's home; did not act in self-defense-either because defendant did not have a reasonable, actual fear of imminent bodily harm, or because defendant's use of lethal force was not reasonable when defendant shot the unarmed victim before the victim set foot on defendant's property. Moreover, defendant also was calm during a 9-1-1 call. State v. Manis, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault and domestic assault because the victim suffered serious bodily injury after being hit and then kicked in the face multiple times by defendant; her left eye was swollen shut, and the left side of her face was heavily bruised; the victim testified that she still experienced facial pain from the assault, and her eye still did not completely open; defendant and the victim had been dating for approximately two years and had been living together; and defendant did not act in self-defense as he was not in danger of death or serious bodily injury at the time he dragged the victim out of the truck and then kicked her in the face multiple times. State v. Porter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

39-11-612. Defense of third person.

A person is justified in threatening or using force against another to protect a third person, if:

  1. Under the circumstances as the person reasonably believes them to be, the person would be justified under § 39-11-611 in threatening or using force to protect against the use or attempted use of unlawful force reasonably believed to be threatening the third person sought to be protected; and
  2. The person reasonably believes that the intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section makes it clear the right to defend a third person is to be determined in the same fashion as the right of self defense. Section 39-11-611 governs the determination of whether a defendant would have been justified in using force in self-defense under the same facts and circumstances. If the defendant reasonably believes that intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person, the defendant is justified in the same manner as he or she would have been under § 39-11-611.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Defense of Third Person Rejected as Defense.

Evidence was sufficient to determine that defendant committed simple assault, a violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(2), because defendant's threats of force against the victim were not justified under T.C.A. § 39-11-612 to protect defendant's brother, and the victim reasonably feared bodily injury. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2012).

Defendant violated T.C.A. § 39-13-102 as: (1) he did not object to the victim's statement that he displayed the gun, pointed it at the victim and threatened to kill him; (2) defendant's statement supported a finding that he displayed the gun to the victim; (3) he was not justified in using force as he armed himself, went to the victim's home and instigated a confrontation with the victim during which he reached for and partially displayed his gun; (4) he did not act in self-defense as he provoked the victim's father into pointing a gun at him and his friends and he did not abandon the encounter before he pulled his gun; and (5) he was not justified in using force in defense of others. United States v. Neal, 627 Fed. Appx. 543, — F.3d —, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17722, 2015 FED App. 681N (6th Cir.).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant and a codefendant in the car which defendant was driving exchanged gunfire with codefendants in another car. Several eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from defendant's car, while the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of a youth on a sidewalk that was stopped by codefendants in the other car. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from the defendant's car, the forensic evidence established that the victim was likely hit by a bullet that came from defendant's car, and the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of others, which was not second-guessed on appeal; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and the corresponding counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction because it showed defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused a victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by pointing a gun at the victim, and (2) did not act in self-defense or defense of his family. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a kidnapping as he came onto the victim's porch, struck the victim, and forced the victim back into the residence; he then pushed the victim to the floor and pinned the victim down by placing his knee on the victim's back; he tied the victim's wrists and legs together in the “hogtied” position; he and another person left the victim's residence while the victim was still tied up and lying on the floor; the victim sustained contusions, abrasions, broken ribs, blunt force injuries, and eventually died from a heart attack from the stress of the offenses; and defendant did not need to strike victim or tie him up to protect the other person from the victim. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a robbery as defendant took the victim's property by violence and put the victim in fear because he came onto the victim's porch and struck him with a metal stick with a ball on the end of it; defendant forced the victim back into the residence and onto the floor, where he continued to hit the victim; the victim later died from a heart attack induced from his injuries and the stress of the attack; and, even if the jury credited defendant's testimony that he initially struck the victim to defend another person, the jury clearly concluded that defendant's continued assault on the victim, which resulted in the victim's death, was not in defense of another person. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on duress and defense of a third person with regard to the charge of the attempted first degree premeditated murder because defendant was not charged with that offense for shooting the victim in a club when the victim allegedly pulled a gun on defendants'  sibling as defendant allegedly shot the victim in the parking lot after pursuing the victim. By that time, defendant's brother was no longer in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury by the victim. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Defendant's claim that defendant fatally shot the victim in defense of defendant's adult child failed because the strongest legitimate view of the evidence was that defendant's child was not struck and injured by the victim as a medical responder did not believe the child was injured, the child sought medical attention the next day, but did not follow up, defendant had the wherewithal to record officers'  radio communications in response to the shooting, and defendant later calmly discussed the shooting and mocked the victim's surviving spouse. State v. Waggoner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2019).

While the proof included evidence from which the jury could have drawn the inference that defendant believed that co-defendant was being coerced into a sexual relationship, the failure to give an instruction on defense of other was not error, as there was simply nothing in the record from which the jury could have concluded that defendant reasonably believed that his use of force was immediately necessary to protect co-defendant from any use of force by the victim, as the record was devoid of evidence to support an inference that the victim used physical power or violence. State v. Vincent, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2019).

2. Instructions.

Court did not err in declining to give a third person defense instruction because defendant saw his best friend fighting, he exited the truck with his shotgun and walked toward the friend, the victim approached defendant and defendant shot the victim, allegedly to “protect” himself. Moreover, defendant testified that he shot the victim to protect himself. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 406 S.W.3d 121, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. June 20, 2013).

In defendant's trial on a charge of first degree premeditated murder, T.C.A. § 39-13-202, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on defense of a third person, T.C.A. § 39-11-612, because the evidence fairly raised the possibility that defendant acted in self-defense when he fired his shotgun at the victim, but the evidence did not fairly raise the possibility that, at the moment he fired the weapon, defendant believed that pulling the trigger was “immediately necessary” to protect a third person, § T.C.A. § 39-11-612(2); at trial, defendant consistently described his mental state, at the moment of pulling the trigger, as one of self-defense. State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. June 20, 2013).

Without evidence either that the victim acted in a manner causing defendant to believe that the victim presented an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, there was no evidence that defendant's force was immediately necessary to protect against the victim; there was no basis to find that the evidence fairly raised an issue as to whether defendant acted in defense of either self or another, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of person was not error. State v. Estrada, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

39-11-613. Protection of life or health.

A person is justified in threatening or using force, but not deadly force, against another, when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to prevent the other from committing suicide or from the self-infliction of serious bodily injury.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is new to Tennessee law. It is designed to remove a possible impediment to the reasonable use of force to aid another person. It justifies the use of force, but not deadly force, against another to prevent self-inflicted serious bodily injury or suicide. The justification is dependent upon the defendant's reasonable belief of the necessity of immediate action.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-11-614. Protection of property.

  1. A person in lawful possession of real or personal property is justified in threatening or using force against another, when and to the degree it is reasonably believed the force is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property.
  2. A person who has been unlawfully dispossessed of real or personal property is justified in threatening or using force against the other, when and to the degree it is reasonably believed the force is immediately necessary to reenter the land or recover the property, if the person threatens or uses the force immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession:
    1. The person reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when the other dispossessed the person; and
    2. The other accomplished the dispossession by threatening or using force against the person.
  3. Unless a person is justified in using deadly force as otherwise provided by law, a person is not justified in using deadly force to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on real estate or unlawful interference with personal property.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2009, ch. 194, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section affords justification for the defenses of protection of both real and personal property. This defense is available to all persons “in lawful possession” and thus applies to owners, lessees, and bailees. The amount of force allowed is limited to that degree of force reasonably believed to be necessary to terminate the trespass or unlawful interference.

Subsection (b) provides justification for the use of force to reenter land or recapture property under very limited circumstances. The defendant must use or threaten to use force immediately after the dispossession and the defendant must reasonably believe the other person had no right to dispossess the defendant. Further, the dispossession must have been accomplished by the use of threats or force by the other person. This section is intended to encourage the resort to legal process to recover property in all circumstances except those where immediate self help is likely anyway.

Subsection (c) makes it clear deadly force is never justified under this section. Deadly force may be justified, however, under § 39-11-611(b).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Residence.

A person's intermittently spending the night at a business establishment as part of that person's part-time employment as a night watchman or security guard does not turn the establishment into a “residence” as that term is used in T.C.A. § 39-11-611. State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

2. Automobile.

Automobile owner was not justified in pulling police officer out of owner's automobile, even though he may not have known the man was a police officer, where officer was lawfully inspecting the interior of the car to determine if it had been stolen. Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1998 FED App. 56P, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2006 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1998).

3. Driver's License/Identification Card.

Revocation of defendant's probation under T.C.A. § 40-35-311(e)(1) was proper as defendant assaulted an officer and resisted arrest where he struck the officer for refusing to return a driver's license while the officer was writing a citation as defendant did not have a property interest in his driver's license/state-issued identification card under T.C.A. § 55-50-336 since the state had the authority to revoke a driver's license; even if defendant had a property interest in his identification card, he was not entitled to use force against a police officer to retrieve it under T.C.A. § 39-11-614(b). State v. Morton, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 209 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2012).

39-11-615. Protection of third person's property.

A person is justified in threatening or using force against another to protect real or personal property of a third person, if, under the circumstances as the person reasonably believes them to be, the person would be justified under § 39-11-614 in threatening or using force to protect the person's own real or personal property.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section justifies the use of limited force to protect another person's real or personal property. Similar to § 39-11-612, defense of third persons, this justification is based upon the defendant's right to protect his or her own property under § 39-11-614. This section permits a defendant to use the same force to protect the property of another that he or she could use to protect his or her own property.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-11-616. Use of device to protect property.

  1. The justification afforded by §§ 39-11-614 and 39-11-615 extends to the use of a device for the purpose of protecting property, only if:
    1. The device is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm;
    2. The use of the particular device to protect the property from entry or trespass is reasonable under the circumstances as the person believes them to be; and
    3. The device is one customarily used for such a purpose, or reasonable care is taken to make known to probable intruders the fact that it is used.
  2. Nothing in this section shall affect the law regarding the use of animals to protect property or persons.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section provides a limited justification for the use of a device, such as a hidden trap, to protect property. This rule is substantially consistent with the common law tort rule. The commission has considered both the importance of protecting innocent persons (e.g., firefighters, law enforcement officers, and children) and the importance of protecting one's property. Under this section, the use of a device must be reasonable, the device must be one customarily used for protection of property or the user must use reasonable care in giving warning to probable intruders, and the device must not be designed or known to cause death or serious bodily injury.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-11-617 — 39-11-619. [Reserved.]

  1. A law enforcement officer, after giving notice of the officer's identity as such, may use or threaten to use force that is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of an individual suspected of a criminal act who resists or flees from the arrest.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (a), the officer may use deadly force to effect an arrest only if all other reasonable means of apprehension have been exhausted or are unavailable, and where feasible, the officer has given notice of the officer's identity as such and given a warning that deadly force may be used unless resistance or flight ceases, and:
    1. The officer has probable cause to believe the individual to be arrested has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury; or
    2. The officer has probable cause to believe that the individual to be arrested poses a threat of serious bodily injury, either to the officer or to others unless immediately apprehended.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 9.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is a codification of the principles set forth by the United States supreme court in Tennessee v. Garner, 465 U.S. 1098 (1985). It is identical to § 40-7-108. Subsection (a) requires a law enforcement officer to give notice of his or her identity as an officer in order to be justified in using any force to make an arrest. The amount of force justified is only that reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest.

Subsection (b) allows justification for the use of deadly force in effecting an arrest under very limited circumstances: (1) all other means of apprehension are exhausted or are unavailable; and (2) where feasible, the officer has given notice both of his or her identity as an officer and that deadly force may be used; and (3) the officer has probable cause to believe the individual has committed a felony involving threatened or inflicted serious bodily injury or poses a threat of serious bodily injury unless he or she is immediately apprehended.

The Garner  decision made drastic changes in the law in Tennessee that previously allowed an officer to use deadly force if necessary to effect the arrest of any felon.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Attorney General Opinions. Extent of municipal police authority beyond municipal limits.  OAG 10-48, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 48 (4/12/10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

T.C.A. § 39-11-620 did not apply in a civil action arising from a deputy sheriff's fatal wounding of a mentally disturbed person. Thompson v. Williamson County, 965 F. Supp. 1026, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7491 (M.D. Tenn. 1997), aff'd, 219 F.3d 555, 2000 FED App. 233P, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16679 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2000).

39-11-621. Use of deadly force by private citizen.

A private citizen, in making an arrest authorized by law, may use force reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of an individual who flees or resists the arrest; provided, that a private citizen cannot use or threaten to use deadly force except to the extent authorized under self-defense or defense of third person statutes, §§ 39-11-611 and 39-11-612.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Tennessee law allows a private citizen acting upon his or her own initiative to arrest for any public offense committed in the citizen's presence, when the person arrested has committed a felony, or where a felony has been committed and the citizen has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested committed it. § 40-7-109. A citizen who makes an arrest for an offense not committed in the citizen's presence acts at his or her peril. This section implements the arrest laws by permitting the citizen to use reasonable force to effectuate the arrest.

It was the consensus of the commission that use of deadly force by private citizens in effecting arrests should be prohibited except to the extent it would be justifiable as self defense or defense of others under this part. See §§ 39-11-611 and 39-11-612.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Attorney General Opinions. Retaliation by gang members subjected to armed attack, as stated in proposed SB1316 to SB2167 on 3/16/98, OAG 99-009 (1/25/99).

The use of handcuffs or restraining devices is permissible by private persons and security guards provided it is reasonably necessary to accomplish an arrest, OAG 03-018 (2/19/03).

39-11-622. Justification for use of force — Exceptions — Immunity from civil liability.

    1. A person who uses force as permitted in §§ 39-11-611 — 39-11-614 or § 29-34-201, is justified in using such force and is immune from civil liability for the use of such force, unless:
      1. The person against whom force was used is a law enforcement officer, as defined in § 39-11-106 who:
        1. Was acting in the performance of the officer's official duties; and
        2. Identified the officer in accordance with any applicable law; or
        3. The person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer; or
      2. The force used by the person resulted in property damage to or the death or injury of an innocent bystander or other person against whom the force used was not justified.
  1. The court shall award reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, compensation for loss of income, and all expenses incurred by a person in defense of any civil action brought against the person based upon the person's use of force, if the court finds that the defendant was justified in using such force pursuant to §§ 39-11-611 — 39-11-614 or § 29-34-201.

Acts 2007, ch. 210, § 3.

Part 7
Disposition of Forfeited Property

39-11-701. Legislative intent.

  1. The general assembly finds and declares that an effective means of deterring criminal acts committed for financial gain is through the forfeiture of profits and proceeds acquired and accumulated as a result of such criminal activities.
  2. It is the intent of the general assembly to provide the necessary tools to law enforcement agencies and district attorneys general to punish and deter the criminal activities of professional criminals and organized crime through the unitary enforcement of effective forfeiture and penal laws. It is the intent of the general assembly, consistent with due process of law, that all property acquired and accumulated as a result of criminal offenses be forfeited to the state, and that the proceeds be used to fund further law enforcement efforts in this state.
  3. It is further the intent of the general assembly to protect bona fide interest holders and innocent owners of property under this part. It is the intent of the general assembly to provide for the forfeiture of illegal profits without unduly interfering with commercially protected interests.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 1.

Cross-References. Good faith purchase for value, § 47-2-403.

Racketeer-influenced and corrupt organizations, title 39, ch. 12, part 2.

Recovery barred for injuries suffered in attempting to commit a felony on property of another, § 29-34-201.

Secured transactions, title 47, ch. 9.

Value, definition, § 39-11-106.

Law Reviews.

Forfeitures Under the Tennessee Drug Control Act (Lewis L. Laska), 16 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 431 (1986).

39-11-702. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Attorney general” means the district attorney general, and the district attorney general's assistants;
  2. “Interest holder” means a secured party within the meaning of § 47-9-102(a), a mortgagee, lien creditor, one granted a possessory lien under law, or the beneficiary of a security interest or encumbrance pertaining to an interest in property, whose interest would be perfected against a good faith purchaser for value. A person who holds property for the benefit of or as an agent or nominee for another person, or who is not in substantial compliance with any statute requiring an interest in property to be recorded or reflected in public records in order to perfect the interest against a good faith purchaser for value, is not an interest holder;
  3. “Owner” means a person, other than an interest holder, who has an interest in property. A person who holds property for the benefit of or as an agent or nominee for another person, or who is not in substantial compliance with any statute requiring an interest in property to be recorded or reflected in public records in order to perfect the interest against a good faith purchaser for value, is not an owner; and
  4. “Property” means anything of value, and includes any interest in property, including any benefit, privilege, claim or right with respect to anything of value, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 2; 2000, ch. 846, § 25.

39-11-703. Criminal proceeds subject to forfeiture.

  1. Any property, real or personal, directly or indirectly acquired by or received in violation of any statute or as an inducement to violate any statute, or any property traceable to the proceeds from the violation, is subject to judicial forfeiture, and all right, title, and interest in any such property shall vest in the state upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture.
  2. Any real property, including any right, title and interest in the whole of or any part of any lot or tract of land and any property used as an instrumentality in or used in furtherance of a violation of the following laws shall be subject to judicial forfeiture:
    1. A conviction for a violation of § 39-17-417(i) or (j) or the commission of three (3) or more acts occurring on three (3) or more separate days within a sixty-day period, and each act results in a felony conviction under chapter 17, part 4 of this title; or
    2. The commission of three (3) or more acts occurring on three (3) or more separate days within a sixty-day period, and each act results in a conviction for promoting prostitution under chapter 13, part 5 of this title.
  3. The following items are subject to judicial forfeiture as provided in this part:
    1. Conveyances, including aircraft, motor vehicles, and other vessels when used or intended to be used in connection with a violation of §§ 39-13-307, 39-13-308 and 39-13-309 committed on or after July 1, 2011;
    2. Books, records, telecommunication equipment, or computers when used or intended to be used in connection with a violation of §§ 39-13-307, 39-13-308 and 39-13-309 committed on or after July 1, 2011;
    3. Money or weapons when used or intended to be used in connection with a violation of §§ 39-13-307, 39-13-308 and 39-13-309 committed on or after July 1, 2011;
    4. Real property when used or intended to be used in connection with a violation of §§ 39-13-307, 39-13-308 and 39-13-309 committed on or after July 1, 2011;
    5. Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange for an act in violation of §§ 39-13-307, 39-13-308 and 39-13-309 committed on or after July 1, 2011, all proceeds traceable to the exchange, and all negotiable instruments and securities used, or intended to be used, to facilitate the violation;
    6. Any property, real or personal, directly or indirectly acquired by or received in violation of such violation or as an inducement to violate such statutes, or any property traceable to the proceeds from the violation; and
    7. Any real property, including any right, title and interest in the whole of or any part of any lot or tract of land and any property used as an instrumentality in or used in furtherance of a violation of §§ 39-13-307, 39-13-308 and 39-13-309 committed on or after July 1, 2011.
  4. In any in rem forfeiture action in which the subject property is cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a financial institution, or other like fungible property:
    1. It shall not be necessary for the state to identify the specific property involved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture action; and
    2. It shall not be a defense that the property involved in such an action has been removed and replaced by identical property.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 3; 2009, ch. 432, § 1; 2011, ch. 354, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 354, § 3 provided that the act, which added subsection (c), shall apply to all applicable offenses committed on or after July 1, 2011.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Burden of Proof.

Trial court properly ordered forfeiture of the $1,098,050 cash seized when a search warrant was executed. The State satisfied its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the cash was subject to forfeiture based on defendant's conspiracy convictions arising from 2012 drug trafficking activities. State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

39-11-704. Property exempt from forfeiture.

  1. No interest in any property described in § 39-11-703(a) shall be subject to forfeiture when one (1) of the following conditions is established:
    1. If the owner or interest holder acquired the property before the conduct alleged to give rise to its forfeiture;
    2. If the owner or interest holder acquired the property during or after the conduct alleged to give rise to its forfeiture, and the owner or interest holder acquired this interest as a good faith purchaser for value, or acquired this interest in a commercially reasonable manner, and the owner or interest holder:
      1. Acted reasonably to prevent the conduct giving rise to forfeiture; or
      2. Did not know of the acts giving rise to forfeiture.
  2. No interest in real or personal property shall be forfeited under § 39-11-703(b), unless the owner or interest holder is convicted of a crime or crimes described in § 39-11-703(b). If the owner or interest holder is an entity other than a natural person, the property shall not be forfeited unless the entity's officer, employee or agent is convicted of the crime or crimes under § 39-11-703(b) and the state shall also have the burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the following additional elements:
    1. The conviction is based on acts by the defendant in the course of and within the scope of the defendant's employment; and
    2. The entity knew or had reason to know from information in the entity's possession, other than through its convicted officer, employee or agent, of the criminal nature of the acts.
  3. The state may stipulate that the interest of an owner or interest holder is exempt from forfeiture upon presentation of proof of the claim. The state shall file the stipulation with the court exercising jurisdiction over the forfeiture action and the filing of stipulation shall constitute an admission by the state that the interest is exempt from forfeiture. If a stipulation is submitted, then no further claim, answer or pleading shall be required of the stipulated owner or interest holder, and a judgment shall be entered exempting that interest from forfeiture.
  4. If equipment and fixtures are seized while in possession of someone other than the owner, or are on premises that are padlocked and the owner of the equipment and fixtures has no interest in the padlocked premises, then the owner may obtain return of the equipment and fixtures, if the owner:
    1. Did not know of the act giving rise to forfeiture; or
    2. Acted reasonably to prevent the conduct giving rise to forfeiture.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 4; 2009, ch. 432, §§ 2, 3.

Cross-References. Good faith purchase for value, § 47-2-403.

Value, definition, § 39-11-106.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Plain reading of the exemptions contained in T.C.A. § 39-11-704 indicate that they apply not to the question of standing, but the question of whether property may ultimately be forfeited to the State. Indeed, from the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Jackson's, reading of § 39-11-704, these exemptions apply even if the State complied with all other procedural requirements applicable to justify the forfeiture. The exemptions do not, however, place additional requirements on claimants to assert that the forfeiture of their property was inappropriate because the State failed to strictly comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of the forfeiture statutes at issue. In re Tenn. Walking Horse Forfeiture Litig., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017).

39-11-705. Jurisdiction and venue.

  1. Jurisdiction in a civil forfeiture action under this part extends to the chancery and circuit courts of this state, and general sessions courts for personal property where the value of personal property subject to forfeiture does not exceed the jurisdictional limits of the court, over the following:
    1. All interests in property if the property for which forfeiture is sought is within this state at the time the action is filed; and
    2. The interest of an owner or interest holder in the property for which forfeiture is sought if the owner or interest holder is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.
  2. Jurisdiction in a criminal forfeiture action under this part extends to the circuit and criminal courts of this state, and general sessions courts for personal property where the value of personal property subject to forfeiture does not exceed the jurisdictional limits of the court and the state and defendant consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the general sessions court. Jurisdiction over the interests of a third party who is not a defendant in the criminal prosecution must be exercised in a separate civil forfeiture action.
  3. In addition to any other provision of law, a proceeding for forfeiture under this part may be maintained in the judicial district in which any part of the property is found or in the judicial district in which a criminal prosecution could be maintained against an owner or interest holder for the conduct alleged to give rise to the forfeiture. Any court with jurisdiction pursuant to this section may issue and cause to be served in any other judicial district such process as may be required to bring before the court the property that is the subject of the forfeiture action.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 5; 2001, ch. 381, § 1.

Cross-References. Chancery courts, title 16, ch. 11.

Circuit and criminal courts, title 16, ch. 10.

General sessions courts, title 16, ch. 15.

Value, definition, § 39-11-106.

Venue, title 20, ch. 4.

39-11-706. Evidence.

In a forfeiture action under this part, pertaining to the issue of whether the property or proceeds were known to be from some form of criminal offense, either party may introduce evidence that:

  1. The property was involved in a financial transaction that was conducted or structured to evade the reporting requirements of any state or federal law;
  2. Money or any negotiable instrument was found in proximity to contraband or instrumentalities of an offense;
  3. The property was involved in a financial transaction that was conducted with the use of a false or fictitious name; and
  4. A financial transaction involving the property was structured so as to falsely report the actual consideration or value of the transaction.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 6.

39-11-707. Procedure for seizure of property.

  1. Any property subject to forfeiture under this part may be seized by the attorney general, the attorney general's agents, or any law enforcement officer, when acting pursuant to a lawful arrest or search, the execution of a search warrant, a petition to abate a nuisance, or a court order. When property is seized under this part, it may be removed by the seizing agency or official to a place to secure the property, it may be preserved as evidence, it may be padlocked as ordered by a court of record, it may be secured by depositing in an interest bearing account as approved by a court of record or it may be secured as otherwise authorized by law regarding the maintenance, storage, or disposition of seized property.
  2. Upon seizure of property for forfeiture under this part, the seizing agency or official shall cause to be delivered a written receipt and notice of seizure to the possessor, owner and interest holder as determined from public records. The notice shall list and describe generally the property seized, the agency or official responsible for the seizure and shall state the procedure for obtaining return of the property. The seizing agency shall deliver a copy of the notice to the district attorney general of the judicial district where the seizing agency is located or of the judicial district where the seizure occurred.
  3. Upon the seizure of personal property for forfeiture, the seizing agency shall within five (5) working days, apply ex parte for a forfeiture warrant from a judge authorized to issue a search warrant. Upon a finding that probable cause for forfeiture exists, a forfeiture warrant shall issue. The warrant shall be based upon proof by affidavit that there is probable cause that the owner's interest in the seized property is subject to forfeiture. In the event a forfeiture warrant is not issued, then the property shall immediately be returned unless the property is to be retained for evidence in a criminal proceeding. No forfeiture action for personal property may be filed without the issuance of a forfeiture warrant.
  4. No claim need be filed by an interest holder and no interest holder may have interest forfeited without service of a complaint for forfeiture under this part.
  5. The attorney general may file a notice of lien lis pendens against any real property subject to forfeiture under this part. The lien shall generally describe the real property and the reason for forfeiture. The notice shall specify the court and jurisdiction in which the action is pending and, if known at the time of the filing of the notice, the case number of the action. After the filing of the notice of lien lis pendens the state shall, as soon as is practicable, serve a copy of the notice upon any person who has a duly recorded interest in the property as reflected in public records.
  6. The filing of a notice of lien lis pendens under this part creates, from the time of its filing, a lien in favor of the state on the property described in the notice and subject to forfeiture under this part against the persons named in the notice.
  7. There shall be no seizure or attachment of real property unless and until a hearing is conducted, with due notice to the owner.
  8. A possessory lien of a person from whose possession property subject to forfeiture is seized is not affected or prejudiced by a seizure for forfeiture under this part. Such a lien shall take precedence over all other liens.
  9. A person who acts in good faith and in a reasonable manner to comply with an order of the court or a request of a peace officer while enforcing this part is not liable to any person for acts done in furtherance with the order or request.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 7.

Cross-References. Lis pendens, title 20, ch. 3.

Warrants, title 40, ch. 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Notice Sufficient.

State provided sufficient proof that the detective complied with this section when he delivered the notice of seizure by certified mail to defendant where the detective explained the need to get an accurate count of the money at a bank prior to providing notice of the seizure to defendant, defendant did not claim that he did not receive the notice of the seizure, and the record showed that he had sufficient time to file a pretrial motion to dismiss the forfeiture and to challenge the forfeiture of the funds in a post-trial hearing. State v. Tuttle, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2015), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

In a case in which defendant challenged the trial court's order of forfeiture of $1,098,050 cash, the notice of seizure provided defendant by certified mail satisfied statutory requirements. State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

In a forfeiture case, a claimant's argument that there was a due process violation was rejected because the record showed that she received the required notice; when police took possession of the property, the claimant was served with a copy of the notice of seizure, which included the information required. When the officers obtained forfeiture warrants for personal property, the State filed a notice of lien lis pendens with the clerk's office with regard to the real property seized. The claimant received notice and elected not to file a claim. In re Property of Miles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Miles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. May 19, 2017).

39-11-708. Procedure for judicial forfeiture of property.

  1. If real or personal property is subject to forfeiture under this part, the attorney general may initiate an in rem forfeiture proceeding in the circuit, chancery, or general sessions court of the county where the property is located or where the conduct giving rise to forfeiture occurred. If the property is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the attorney general may initiate an in personam action against the owner or interest holder if the owner or interest holder is subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The complaint shall state a description of the property to be forfeited and the reasons for forfeiture under this part.
  2. If personal property is sought to be forfeited, the complaint shall state the date the forfeiture warrant was issued. However, no complaint shall be dismissed for defects or insufficiencies in the forfeiture warrant. The complaint shall be served by registered mail at the last known address of the owner, if known, or the person in possession at the time of seizure. In the event the owner or possessor of the property does not answer the complaint, the state may move for a default judgment. An interest holder shall, however, be served with the complaint for forfeiture prior to any disposition of the property.
  3. The court shall proceed as soon as practicable to a hearing and determination of the issue of forfeiture. The state shall notify the appropriate state official or commissioner as to the pendency of the judicial forfeiture action when such property is pending administrative forfeiture action. The filing of a complaint under this section shall operate as a stay of any pending administrative forfeiture proceedings. The state shall have the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture under this part and that one (1) or more acts described in § 39-11-703 giving rise to forfeiture occurred after June 27, 1998, regardless of when the property was originally acquired, as long as the owner's interest in the property appreciated following the commission of an act giving rise to forfeiture. The forfeiture action shall be commenced within five (5) years after the conduct giving rise to forfeiture terminates or the cause of action accrues, whichever is later. Any party who claims an interest in the property subject to forfeiture must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the party is an owner or interest holder in the property seized before other evidence is taken. The claimant has the burden of establishing standing to assert the claim. Notwithstanding any other law, no other claims, pendent claims or counterclaims may be filed in an action for forfeiture under this part.
  4. If real or personal property of a criminal defendant is to be forfeited as part of a criminal prosecution, the indictment or information must contain notice in a separate count that the state will seek forfeiture of property under this part and all property subject to forfeiture must be generally described within the separate count. By agreement of the state and the defendant, a general sessions court may enter upon the judgment of the case that the property is to be forfeited or returned. The state shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture under this part. If the forfeiture count includes property described in § 39-11-703(a) the state shall establish that one (1) or more acts described in § 39-11-703(a) giving rise to forfeiture occurred after June 27, 1998, regardless of when the property was originally acquired, as long as the defendant's interest in the property was acquired or appreciated following the commission of an act giving rise to forfeiture. If the forfeiture count includes property described in § 39-11-703(b), the state shall establish that the property was used as an instrumentality in or used in furtherance of a violation of the law described in § 39-11-703(b). As soon as practicable after entering a guilty verdict or accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on any count in an indictment, presentment, or information with regard to which criminal forfeiture is sought, the court shall determine whether the state has established that the property is subject to forfeiture. The court's determination may be based on evidence already in the record, including any written plea agreement, or if forfeiture is contested on evidence or information presented by the parties at a sentencing hearing. Upon the request by the state or the defendant in a case in which a jury returns a verdict of guilty, the jury shall determine in a bifurcated hearing whether the state has established that the property is subject to forfeiture. The state and defendant may introduce evidence at the forfeiture hearing. If the jury or court finds that the state has met its burden of proof from all the evidence in the case, then each property determined to be subject to forfeiture shall be designated in a special verdict and forfeited in accordance with this part. The criminal forfeiture action shall be charged within five (5) years after the conduct giving rise to forfeiture terminates. If a third party who is not a defendant in the criminal action has an interest in any of the property described in the criminal forfeiture count of the indictment or information, then the state shall determine the rights of the third party in a separate civil forfeiture action under this part.
  5. If the forfeiture count includes property described in § 39-11-703(a), a rebuttable presumption exists that the property of any person is subject to forfeiture, if the state establishes all of the following:
    1. The conduct giving rise to forfeiture occurred;
    2. The person acquired the property during the period of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture or within a reasonable time after that period; and
    3. There is no likely source for the property other than the conduct giving rise to forfeiture.
  6. Property subject to forfeiture may be located in any county or state. Upon a finding by the court that the evidence establishes that the property is subject to forfeiture, the judge shall enter a judgment of forfeiture of all property subject to forfeiture and shall order that title to the property be vested in the state of Tennessee from the date that the conduct that gave rise to the forfeiture occurred, subject to any exemptions provided for in this part.
  7. Upon entry of the judgment of forfeiture and the recording of the judgment in the county and state where the property is located, title to the property shall vest in the state and shall thereafter be disposed of as provided for in §§ 39-11-713 and 39-11-714. If the property cannot be located or is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall enter a judgment against the owner equal to the value of the property ordered to be forfeited. The court may use its contempt powers to enforce any orders of forfeiture of property located beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and other orders in furtherance of the purpose of this part.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 8; 2001, ch. 381, § 2; 2015, ch. 180, §§ 1, 2.

Cross-References. Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Certified mail in lieu of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

Contempt, § 16-1-103.

Contempt of court, title 29, ch. 9.

Indictment or presentment, § 40-3-102.

Indictments, generally, title 40, ch. 13.

Limitation of actions, title 28.

Remedies to recover personal property, title 29, ch. 30.

Value, definition, § 39-11-106.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Premature Sale.

Premature sale of petitioner's property violated T.C.A. § 39-11-708(c), but did not deprive the Tennessee Department of Safety of jurisdiction, although had petitioner prevailed in the forfeiture proceedings, petitioner would have had a claim against the Department under T.C.A. § 40-33-215 for the wrongful deprivation of the property. Watson v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety, 361 S.W.3d 549, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011), appeal denied, Watson v. State Dep't of Safety, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012).

2. Statute of Limitations Tolled.

Money seized from defendant was not barred from forfeiture by the five-year statute of limitations where, based on his overt acts, and because the cash was minted prior to 2002 and found in a dirt-covered ammo can on defendant's property, it was conceivable that he accumulated and concealed the money from his 2002 offense and therefore the State was unable to pursue the claim in a timely manner through no fault of their own. State v. Tuttle, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2015), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

In a case in which defendant challenged the court of criminal appeals'  adoption and application of the doctrine of equitable tolling to uphold a forfeiture of $1,098,050 cash, the Supreme Court concluded that the State satisfied its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the cash was subject to forfeiture based on defendant's conspiracy convictions arising from his 2012 drug trafficking activities. State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

39-11-709. Procedure for return of property seized.

  1. Only an owner or interest holder may make a claim for return of property seized for forfeiture or otherwise contest the forfeiture under this part. In the event of a seizure for forfeiture under this part, the property shall not be subject to replevin, conveyance, or attachment, but is deemed to be in the custody of the seizing agency or official.
  2. If after thirty (30) days from the date of the seizure of the property or the filing of a notice of lien lis pendens no administrative or civil forfeiture action has been initiated, the owner or interest holder may petition the court of record having criminal jurisdiction in the judicial district where the seizure occurred for return of the property seized or to have the notice of lien lis pendens released. The district attorney general having jurisdiction over the judicial district where the petition is filed shall be served with a copy of the petition. If no administrative or civil forfeiture action is commenced within thirty (30) days after the appropriate official has been served with the petition for return of property or release of lis pendens, then the court shall order the property be returned or the lien released.
  3. The order to return property or to release a lien shall not bar any action to forfeit the property in a future proceeding, but such property may not be seized nor lien filed against the property until such time as a forfeiture proceeding seeking forfeiture of the property has been filed. At any time subsequent to the seizure of the property by the seizing agency, the attorney general may direct the return of the seized property or release any lien filed upon a determination that forfeiture proceedings would be without merit.
  4. After the filing of a forfeiture action under this part, a claimant may file a motion with the court in which the action is pending for the state to show cause why the property, or any portion of the property, should not be returned or the lien released. The court shall conduct a hearing on the motion within twenty-one (21) days from the date such motion is filed. The claimant must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant is an owner in the property seized before other evidence is taken. The claimant has the burden of establishing standing to assert the claim. If the claimant fails to establish standing to assert a claim, then the request shall be denied. If the state then proves that a probability of success on the merits of the forfeiture action exists, the court shall deny the request to return the property or release the lien. If the court finds that the state has failed to prove a probability of success on the merits of the forfeiture action, the court shall order that the property be returned or that the lien be released. If the state proves that a probability of success on the merits exists as to some portion of the property seized or upon which a lien is attached but not on other portions of the property, the court shall order that the portions upon which the state did not meet the burden of proof be returned or the lien released.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 9; 2015, ch. 180, §§ 3, 4.

Cross-References. Attachment and replevy, title 29, ch. 6.

Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Forfeiture of conveyances, title 40, ch. 33.

Lis pendens, title 20, ch. 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Standing.

In an in rem forfeiture case, a claimant lacked standing, and she did not even file a claim or a motion asking the trial court to set a show cause hearing. Simply receiving notice of a forfeiture hearing did not establish standing. In re Property of Miles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Miles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. May 19, 2017).

T.C.A. § 39-11-709 contains the specific procedures for establishing standing. Nowhere in this statute is it stated that a finding that the claimant is innocent is required to establish standing to contest a forfeiture. Instead, the claimant must merely establish that he or she is an owner of the property. T.C.A. 39-11-709(d). Likewise, the definition of owner contained in the statute makes no mention of a requirement that the claimant establish his or her innocence. T.C.A. § 39-11-702(3). Because these statutes specifically govern the question of standing to contest a forfeiture, they control over the more general statute elucidating the General Assembly's intent in enacting the statutory scheme. In re Tenn. Walking Horse Forfeiture Litig., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017).

Trial court correctly concluded that the purported horse owners had standing to intervene in a forfeiture proceeding and contest a forfeiture where they were title-holders of the subject horses, nothing in T.C.A. § 39-11-709 required a finding that a claimant was innocent to establish standing to contest a forfeiture, and they had complied with the requirements of § 39-11-709. In re Tenn. Walking Horse Forfeiture Litig., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017).

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Jackson, cannot agree that a threshold showing of innocence is required to establish standing to contest a forfeiture under T.C.A. § 39-11-709. In re Tenn. Walking Horse Forfeiture Litig., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017).

T.C.A. § 39-11-709(a) and (d) make clear that to have standing to contest the forfeiture of property under the general forfeiture statutory scheme, the claimant must establish that he or she is an owner or interest holder in the subject property. In re Tenn. Walking Horse Forfeiture Litig., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017).

39-11-710. Rights of interest holders and owners.

  1. Nothing in this part shall limit or restrict the right of an interest holder in real property that was of record, prior to the filing of the notice of lien lis pendens, to enforce its deed of trust, or to take any other action permitted under its deed of trust as long as prior notice is given to the court and the attorney general who filed the notice in accordance with this section.
    1. Pending any proceeding to forfeit real property, an interest holder who desires to take action under the mortgage or deed of trust shall give notice to the attorney general who filed the lis pendens of any action to be taken under the mortgage or deed of trust.
    2. If the state has stipulated to the interest holder's exemption from forfeiture of its interest and a judgment has been entered, then the interest holder may proceed to foreclose, in accordance with its mortgage or deed of trust, subject to the approval or conditions of the court.
    3. When no judgment has been entered exempting the interest holder's interest from forfeiture, the interest holder may not exercise its right to foreclose its deed of trust on the property, unless it gives the official who filed the lis pendens written notice at least twenty (20) days prior to the date of a foreclosure sale and indicates the time, date and place of sale and the balance owing on the debt. Upon receipt of the notice of foreclosure the official who filed the lis pendens may petition the court where the forfeiture action is pending to require that the foreclosure sale be subject to the approval or conditions of the court. Upon notice to the interest holder, the court may grant the request and upon those conditions as it deems just.
  2. The court may enjoin any foreclosure sale when probable cause exists that the interest holder is a co-conspirator or accessory to the conduct giving rise to forfeiture.
  3. Upon completion of a foreclosure sale of real property pending forfeiture, the interest holder or the interest holder's trustee shall give written notice of the intended distribution of the proceeds of the sale to the official who filed the lis pendens. The interest holder shall deposit with the clerk of the court where the forfeiture action is pending all proceeds from the foreclosure sale in excess of the debt and fees and expenses secured by its deed of trust. If, however, the court has ordered that the sale be conducted under conditions or subject to the approval of the court, the interest holder shall file with the court proof under oath that those conditions were met and any proceeds of the sale ordered to be deposited with the clerk. If no objection is filed by the official who filed the lien lis pendens, then the court shall approve the sale and distribution of proceeds.
  4. Pending any proceeding to forfeit any personal property, an owner or interest holder may petition the court exercising jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding for possession of the property, unless the property is needed as evidence. The court shall permit the owner or interest holder to obtain possession of the property upon the execution of a bond in favor of the state of Tennessee and for payment of the appraised value of the property at the time of the hearing, the sureties for the bond to be approved by the court. The court shall, upon approval of the bond, permit the owner or interest holder to obtain possession of the property unless it is needed for evidence.
  5. If the state has filed a stipulation that an interest holder has an interest that is exempt from forfeiture, the court may release personal property for sale, to be leased, rented or operated, when the property used for collateral is depreciating in value or when justice dictates, and upon the posting of a bond to ensure compliance with this subsection (f), unless the property is needed for evidence. Upon the court's release for public sale or lease, the interest holder shall dispose of the property but only by a commercially reasonable public sale or lease and, within ten (10) days of disposition, shall deposit with the clerk of the court where the forfeiture action is pending the amount received at disposition, less the amount of the interest holder's encumbrance and reasonable expenses incurred by the interest holder in connection with the sale or disposal, including the costs of the bond. For purposes of this subsection (f), “commercially reasonable” is a sale or disposal that would be commercially reasonable under § 47-9-610.
  6. If an indictment, information, or arrest warrant is filed against an owner claiming return of property that is subject to a forfeiture action filed under this part and the criminal action alleges the same conduct as the conduct giving rise to forfeiture in a civil forfeiture proceeding, the court in the civil proceeding shall stay civil discovery against the criminal defendant and against the state until the defendant's criminal action is completed.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 10; 2000, ch. 846, § 26.

Cross-References. Foreclosure sale, § 21-1-803.

Injunction generally, title 29, ch. 23.

Injunction pending litigation, § 29-1-102.

Lis pendens, title 20, ch. 3.

Secured transactions, title 47, ch. 9.

Sureties on bonds, title 29, ch. 33.

39-11-711. Protection of seized property.

In the event there is probable cause to believe that any individual having a right to enter real property that is the subject of a forfeiture proceeding under this part is also engaged, or about to engage, in conduct that will result in the diminution of the value of the real property to the state, then the court in which the forfeiture is pending may grant injunctive relief enjoining any such action diminishing the value of the property, including the padlocking of the premises or the appointment of a receiver or any other appropriate extraordinary relief.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 11.

Cross-References. Extraordinary process, title 29, ch. 1.

Injunction, generally, title 29, ch. 23.

39-11-712. Sale of forfeited property.

  1. Whenever a judgment of forfeiture is rendered under this part, the court may authorize the attorney general to sell the property at public auction, subject to the orders and approval of the court. The court, in lieu of such sale, may order that the property be sold by any person having an interest in the real property whose interest has not been forfeited. The proceeds of the sale shall be subject to the orders of the court.
    1. If the court orders a property interest in property owned as tenants in common forfeited under this section to be sold, whether by a public official or by a person having an interest in the property as in subsection (a), the innocent spouse of a person whose property interest has been forfeited shall have the same right to the property interest as granted an innocent spouse in subdivision (b)(2) or (b)(3). If there is no spouse or if the spouse does not elect to pursue the rights provided in subdivision (b)(2) or (b)(3), then any other person or persons whose interest in the property has not been forfeited shall have the first right to purchase the forfeited interest for its fair market value prior to the court ordered sale. In order to exercise the first right to purchase, the person or persons must petition the appropriate circuit or criminal court at least thirty (30) days prior to the date the court ordered sale is to be conducted. If the person or persons do not purchase the forfeited property, the sale shall be conducted as provided by law. For the purposes of this subdivision (b)(1), “fair market value” is determined by taking an average of three (3) appraisals conducted by separate and qualified real estate appraisers selected by the court. Before any such purchase, the court shall approve the average of the appraisals for fair market value as reasonable.
      1. Notwithstanding subdivision (b)(1) to the contrary, if a court orders property forfeited under this section pursuant to subsection (a) and the property is held through tenancy by the entirety and one spouse's interest is not forfeited, then that spouse shall have the first right to purchase the forfeited expectancy interest in the property.
      2. A spouse purchasing the forfeited property interest in the manner specified in subdivision (b)(2)(A) shall take the property subject to all bona fide liens on the property. In order to exercise the right of purchase, the spouse shall petition the court that ordered the forfeiture for the purchase at fair market value at least fifteen (15) days prior to the court ordered sale.
      3. If the spouse does not purchase the forfeited expectancy interest, the spouse shall retain that spouse's interest as a tenant in common subject to all bona fide liens, and the forfeited expectancy interest shall be sold at public auction and the proceeds disbursed as provided for in § 39-11-713.
      4. If a party possessing a security interest in property being held by an innocent spouse institutes proceedings pursuant to its deed of trust or otherwise that results in the foreclosure and sale of the property, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to receive from the first proceeds of the sale an amount equal to an elective share as provided in § 31-4-101, subject to bona fide outstanding liens not satisfied by the remainder of the proceeds.
      5. If the innocent spouse predeceases the defendant spouse, if there are children of the innocent and guilty spouses, at least one (1) of whom is eighteen (18) years of age or younger on the date of the sale, and if the entity holding the right of expectancy is the state, then upon the sale of the property, one third (1/3) of the proceeds from the sale shall be allocated and divided equally among all the children, subject to all outstanding bona fide liens not satisfied by the remainder of the proceeds.
      1. Notwithstanding subdivision (b)(1) to the contrary, if the property subject to forfeiture under this section is property titled solely in the name of a guilty spouse or titled in the name of the guilty spouse as tenants in common with any other person or persons, the innocent spouse may petition the court, at least thirty (30) days prior to the court ordered forfeiture sale, to have the court vest the ownership of the property in the couple as tenants by the entirety; and the innocent spouse shall have the same rights as provided in subdivision (b)(2). If the petition is timely filed, it shall be granted.
      2. The filing of the petition shall act as a stay of any court ordered sale of the property and the stay shall remain in effect until disposition is made of the petition.
      3. If the innocent spouse does not petition the court to vest the property ownership in the couple as tenants by the entirety, then the property shall be forfeited and disposed of as provided by this section.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 12; 2009, ch. 432, § 4.

39-11-713. Disposition of forfeited property.

  1. All property ordered forfeited shall be sold at public auction. The proceeds from all property forfeited and sold at public auction shall be disposed of by the court as directed by this part. The attorney general shall first be compensated for all expenses incident to the litigation, as approved by the court. Any such costs for appeals shall be provided for by the trial court upon conclusion of the litigation. The attorney general shall then direct that any public agency be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses resulting from the investigation, seizure and storage of the forfeited property. If any property seized and ordered forfeited was taken from the lawful owner through theft or fraud, then the property shall be returned to the lawful owner, or restitution provided, as the court determines.
  2. The court shall then award the remainder of the funds as follows:
    1. In the event that the investigating and seizing agency is a state agency, the funds shall be distributed to the state general fund;
    2. In the event that the investigating and seizing agency is the Tennessee bureau of investigation, or in the event that the office of inspector general participates in the investigation, seizure, or prosecution, then, the funds shall be distributed to the state treasurer, who shall deposit the funds in a designated account for the agency to be used in its operations; provided, that, if more than one (1) state agency participated in the investigation or seizure as certified by the prosecuting attorney, then the court shall order a distribution according to the participation of each;
    3. In the event that the investigating and seizing agency is a local public agency, then the funds shall be distributed to its local government, when, upon ratification of this part by the local governing body of a municipality, metropolitan government or county governing body by ordinance or resolution, the municipality, metropolitan government or county has authorized the receipt of the distributed funds and has designated how the funds are to be distributed, which shall be designated for law enforcement, and the court shall make the award and distribution consistent with such ordinance or resolution by the local governing body. When more than one (1) local public agency participated in the investigation and seizure of forfeited property as certified by the attorney general, then the court shall order a distribution according to the participation of each local public agency. Accounting procedures for the financial administration of such funds shall be in keeping with those prescribed by the comptroller of the treasury; or
      1. In any matter concerning or arising out of TennCare fraud or abuse that is or may be the subject of a proceeding pursuant to this part, the district attorney general may specially appoint the following persons to prepare, initiate, and conduct such proceedings as the district attorney general is authorized by law to conduct pursuant to this part:
        1. Upon consent of the commissioner of finance and administration or the commissioner's designee, a licensed attorney employed by the department of finance and administration;
        2. Upon consent of the director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation or the director's designee, a licensed attorney employed by the Tennessee bureau of investigation; or
        3. Upon the consent of the chief executive officer of any governmental agency, a licensed attorney employed by that agency.
      2. The acts of an attorney acting for the district attorney general pursuant to this subdivision (b)(4) shall be valid as if done by the district attorney general, and there shall be no requirement that the district attorney general be disqualified from acting or that there be a vacancy in the office. Nor shall the district attorney general or any of the district attorney general's assistants be compelled to attend court proceedings in the matters in which an attorney is acting for the district attorney general pursuant to this subdivision (b)(4); provided, that the district attorney general or any of the district attorney general's assistants may be in attendance, and participate, if the district attorney general so desires. The authority to make such appointments extends to all proceedings brought under this part, whether civil or criminal.
  3. For purposes of this section, a local public agency includes any county or municipal law enforcement agency or commission, any judicial district drug task force established under state law, the district attorney general, or any local department or agency of local government authorized by the attorney general to participate in the investigation.
  4. Funds awarded under this section may not be used to supplement salaries of any public employee or law enforcement officer. Funds awarded under this section may not supplant other local or state funds.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 13; 2005, ch. 474, §§ 23-25.

Compiler's Notes. Subdivision (b)(3) is set out above as enacted by Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 13. There are no provisions in the act for ratification of the act by local or county governing bodies.

Acts 2005, ch. 474, § 28 provided that:

“To effectuate the provisions of this act, the commissioners of finance administration, commerce and insurance, and health, for the respective sections of this act that their departments are responsible for implementing, shall have the authority to promulgate any necessary rules and regulations. All rules and regulations provided for by this section shall be promulgated as public necessity rules [now emergency rules] pursuant to § 4-5-209 [now §  4-5-208]. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.”

39-11-714. Assistance by other agencies.

The attorney general may authorize any governmental department or agency of this state, any political subdivision of the state, or any other state or federal government to participate in the investigation into the conduct giving rise to forfeiture under this part. The grand jury may provide any records, documents, or evidence received by subpoena to the district attorney general for the enforcement of this part.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 14.

39-11-715. Equity powers of court.

Any criminal court or general sessions court may conduct such hearings and enter such orders, injunctions, restraining orders, prohibitions, or issue any extraordinary process for the purpose of ensuring that any defendant does not use any proceeds directly or indirectly derived from a criminal offense for the purpose of securing an appearance bond or to pay the premium for the bond. Any court may require the defendant or bonding agent to prove in open court the source of such bond or premium before accepting the bond, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party seeking the approval or acceptance of the bond.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 15.

Cross-References. Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Extraordinary process, title 29, ch. 1.

Sureties on bonds, title 29, ch. 33.

39-11-716. Immunities.

The attorney general, the attorney general's assistants and investigators shall not be civilly liable for any acts performed in furtherance of the purposes of this part.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 16.

39-11-717. Supplement to other laws — Retroactive application.

This part does not supersede any other statute or law relating to forfeiture of property and may be used in conjunction with administrative forfeiture laws. This law pertaining to the forfeiture of property is remedial and shall be liberally construed to effect its purpose. This part shall apply retroactively to all proceeds acquired or received prior to June 27, 1998, if the conduct giving rise to forfeiture constituted a criminal offense at the time of the acquisition of the property.

Acts 1998, ch. 979, § 17.

39-11-109. Prosecution under more than one statute.

39-11-411. Accessory after the fact.

39-11-609. Necessity.

39-11-620. Use of deadly force by a law enforcement officer.

Chapter 12
General Offenses

Part 1
Inchoate Offenses

39-12-101. Criminal attempt.

  1. A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the offense:
    1. Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute an offense, if the circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person believes them to be;
    2. Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the person's part; or
    3. Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense.
  2. Conduct does not constitute a substantial step under subdivision (a)(3), unless the person's entire course of action is corroborative of the intent to commit the offense.
  3. It is no defense to prosecution for criminal attempt that the offense attempted was actually committed.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Prior Tennessee law contained several attempt laws. One was quite general, covering an attempt to commit any felony. Others dealt with attempts to do specific offenses. This section creates a generic attempt law that punishes an attempt to commit any offense except a Class C misdemeanor. See § 39-12-107.

Criminal attempt is an offense directed at the individual whose intent is to commit an offense, but whose actions, while strongly corroborative of criminal intent, fail to achieve the criminal objective intended. Accordingly, the offense is basically one of criminal intent coupled with acts that clearly demonstrate the offender's proclivity toward criminality.

Subsection (a) defines three varieties of the offense of criminal attempt; all three varieties retain the traditional requirement of specific intent to commit an offense. Thus, a person must either intentionally engage in criminal acts or intend to accomplish a criminal result. This requirement is consistent with common law. See Clark v. State, 86 Tenn. 511, 8 S.W. 145 (1888); State v. Johnson, 2 Shannon 539, 1 Leg. Rep. 324 (1877).

Subdivisions (a)(1)-(3) are not intended to define mutually exclusive kinds of criminal attempt. Rather, these three subdivisions set out alternative statutory tests for determining if a course of conduct that does not produce a proscribed harm can be classified as an attempt to commit an offense. Subdivision (a)(1) is directed at a completed course of conduct, while subdivisions (a)(2) and (3) focus on conduct that is incomplete in the sense that it is cut short at some point in time before accomplishment of the intended criminal objective. Thus, a completed course of conduct constituting a criminal attempt under subdivision (a)(1) could also include conduct sufficient to establish attempt responsibility under subdivisions (a)(2) and (3).

In addition to the elements required by subdivision (a)(1), (2) or (3), to be convicted of criminal attempt the offender must act “with the kind of culpability otherwise required” for the object offense.

Subdivision (a)(1) makes criminally liable a defendant who intentionally engages in a course of conduct that, under the surrounding circumstances as perceived by the defendant, would constitute a completed offense but does not because the actual circumstances make commission of the offense impossible. Bandy v. State, 575 S.W.2d 278 (Tenn. 1979).

Subdivision (a)(2) is a codification of the generally accepted “last proximate act” doctrine as a basis for imposing attempt responsibility. If an offense is defined in terms of causing a certain result, an individual commits an attempt at the point when the individual had done everything believed necessary to accomplish the intended criminal result. For example, a wife commits attempted murder when she replaces her husband's nightly sleeping pill with a cyanide tablet, intending to cause his death and believing he will take the tablet and die as a result. The fact that the husband does not take the tablet, or that he does not die following its ingestion, does not alter the wife's responsibility for attempted murder, since she believed her conduct would cause her husband's death without further conduct on her part.

Subdivision (a)(3) formulates a general standard to determine at what point acts performed in the course of a criminal enterprise become punishable as a criminal attempt. This is the most difficult task in defining attempt responsibility. Although courts use various tests to resolve the question, the basic element traditionally required is that the individual's conduct must proceed beyond “mere preparation.” See Dupuy v. State, 204 Tenn. 624, 325 S.W.2d 238 (1959). Subdivision (a)(3) provides that the point of attempt responsibility, beyond mere preparation but short of the completed offense, is reached when an individual's intentional acts constitute a “substantial step toward the commission of the offense.” Because of the infinite variety of factual situations that can arise, subdivision (a)(3) leaves the issue of what constitutes a substantial step for determination in each particular case. As in subdivision (a)(1), subsection (b) prescribes an additional element to distinguish attempt from preparation: the individual's “entire course of action” must be corroborative of the intent to complete the offense.

Subsection (c) expressly eliminates the defense that the offense has in fact been committed.

Other defenses are provided in §§ 39-12-104 (renunciation), 39-12-105 (lack of responsibility), 39-12-106 (multiple convictions barred). Sanctions for attempt are in § 39-12-107.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Attempt to procure criminal miscarriage, § 39-15-201.

Conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to attempt, solicitation or conspiracy, defenses, § 39-12-105.

Jury providing punishment for less than one year, § 40-20-103.

Perjury and aggravated perjury, §§ 39-16-702, 39-16-703.

Sexual offender registration and monitoring, title 40, chapter 39.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attempts and Solicitations, §§ 2, 5; 10 Tenn. Juris., Drugs and Druggists, § 5; 14 Tenn. Juris., Homicide, § 32; 16 Tenn. Juris., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 14, 20, 21; 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, § 8; 21 Tenn. Juris., Receiving Stolen Goods, § 5; 22 Tenn. Juris., Robbery, § 4.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systemic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253 (1974).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Attempt to commit felony murder does not exist as an offense in Tennessee. State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. 1996).

Crime of attempted extortion exists in Tennessee because the crime of extortion does not include every attempt to complete the crime. Parris v. State, 236 S.W.3d 173, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2007).

Defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated rape was not barred by the statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 40-2-101(b)(1)-(2), because the John Doe arrest warrant and DNA profile commenced the prosecution against defendant in a timely fashion and tolled the statute of limitations until he was identified and apprehended; a John Doe warrant coupled with a DNA profile of an unknown suspected offender obtained before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations may validly commence a criminal prosecution and toll the statute of limitations. State v. Burdick, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 2011), aff'd, 395 S.W.3d 120, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2012).

2. —Attempted Child Abuse.

Record did not justify the district court's conclusion that defendant's prior conviction was for a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 after defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); the district court erred in failing to consider only the charges in an indictment for aggravated child abuse under T.C.A. § 39-15-402 that were essential to the offense to which defendant pled guilty, which was attempted child abuse under T.C.A. § 39-12-101 and T.C.A. § 39-15-401, in finding that the prior conviction was a crime of violence. United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 2006 FED App. 412P, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27379 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2006).

Evidence that defendant placed a pillow over the victim's face while admonishing him, “I'm not going to hear this,” dropped the pillow when she saw the sitter watching her, and fled to the bathroom was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that defendant was acting with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to the victim and took a substantial step as required for attempted aggravated child abuse. State v. Hammers, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 947 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

3. —Attempted Murder.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for attempted second-degree murder. State v. Freeman, 943 S.W.2d 25, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

An attempt to commit second degree murder is a criminal offense in Tennessee. State v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 638, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Because the jury could have found that the defendant's conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim's death, that the defendant was not acting in self-defense, and that the defendant intended to kill the victim based upon the use of a deadly weapon and the seriousness of the wounds inflicted, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of attempted second degree murder. State v. Inlow, 52 S.W.3d 101, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

Evidence that the victims arrived at defendant's house, defendant came outside with a gun, defendant shot at the unarmed victims, and police arrived to find defendant holding the weapon was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder. State v. Pruitt, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2015), aff'd, 510 S.W.3d 398, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 980 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

Evidence that defendant held a gun to the male victim's head and told him to get out of the car and began shooting when the victim pushed the gun away, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder. State v. Holmes, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder because defendant's motive for the shooting in believing that one of the people in a house was responsible for someone breaking into defendant's car and taking defendant's property, defendant's procurement of a weapon from defendant's car and loading it, defendant's repeated use of the weapon by firing it into the house despite not being in immediate danger, and defendant's concealment of the weapon after the shooting supported a finding of premeditation. State v. Moates, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Court rejects as inapplicable any theory of transferred intent; the question remains, however, whether a wayward single-shot scenario that results in no injuries may ever result in multiple convictions for attempt to commit a murder, and such a question is resolved by analyzing the circumstances of each given case. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

Conviction for the attempted second degree murder of one victim was affirmed, as she was standing visibly in the window and made eye contact with defendant before he fired the shot. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

Defendant's sole act of firing one bullet toward the occupants of an apartment was not sufficient to support three convictions for attempted second degree murder, as the evidence did not show that he acted with the objective to cause the killing of three victims or that he believed firing one bullet would cause the killing of three victims, who were spread out across two rooms, without further conduct on his part. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for facilitation of attempted second degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1), 39-12-101(a), 39-11-403; a reasonable juror could have found that defendant knew his accomplice intended to knowingly kill the victim and defendant substantially assisted his accomplice by handing him the gun, and the victim's eventual death did not mean that defendant's conviction for attempt could not stand. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for attempted second degree murder because the victim and eyewitnesses testified that the victim was standing on the sidewalk by the street with the victim's back to defendant and was unarmed when defendant crossed the street, called to the victim, and shot the victim as the victim was turning around. The victim and the eyewitnesses all testified that neither the victim, nor the victim's family had approached or yelled at defendant immediately prior to the shooting and that they were all unarmed. State v. Floyd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for attempted first-degree murder because defendant, who was upset over the fact that the victim, defendant's estranged spouse, had introduced their children to the v's paramour, located the victim's residence using a computer search, drove to the house, parked and started walking to the house, returned to the vehicle and retrieved a large knife, confronted the victim at the door of the house, stabbed the victim twice with the knife, returned to defendant's car, and left the scene. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for the first degree premeditated murder of one victim and the attempted first degree murder of a second victim because there was overwhelming evidence that he acted with premeditation; defendant was involved in a verbal altercation with the victims, he made phone calls to family members, who arrived armed at an apartment complex, and he lured the unarmed victims from an apartment with a challenge to fight. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

Evidence that defendant intended to take a vehicle and shot at the victim after he did not comply with defendant's demand for the vehicle's keys, the pistol misfired, the victim ran and defendant kept shooting, and the victim was wounded twice and a second victim was wounded once was sufficient for the jury to find defendant committed attempted first-degree premeditated murder. State v. Grimes, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder (resulting in serious bodily injury), because the evidence showed that defendant and the victim were involved in a physical altercation, defendant waited for the victim to return home from work, defendant walked up to the victim and told the victim, “You know you should have killed me,” and defendant pulled a bag concealing a revolver from behind defendant's back and fired multiple times and wounded the victim. State v. Rogers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. July 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second degree murder, as he repeatedly stabbed the unarmed victim in the neck, back, shoulders, and abdomen, and while stabbing her, defendant said he was going to teach her a lesson. The victim underwent surgery and was unable to care for herself for months, and thus the jury could have found that defendant acted with the intent to cause the knowing killing of the victim, believing his conduct would cause her death without further conduct on his part. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2019).

Evidence that defendant, by his own admission, was in the middle of a heated argument with the victim when he went to the closet, retrieved his gun, turned, and fired multiple shots directly at her was sufficient to support his conviction for attempted second degree murder. State v. Dean, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Testimony that defendant drove the vehicle from which two weapons fired multiple gunshots and evidence that three victims were shot and one died from her wounds permitted the jury to infer defendant knew that firing a gun at the home which he knew to be filled with people could have resulted in any of their deaths and thus supported defendant's convictions for second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and possession of a firearm during the attempt. State v. Parham, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder because defendant traded handguns for a high-powered assault rifle; defendant stopped defendant's car at a red light on a street, lowered the window, pointed the rifle toward an unarmed group of people on a sidewalk who did not provoke defendant, and fired a shot, paused, and fired a second shot; and defendant fled the scene and disposed of the rifle during a high-speed police pursuit. State v. Corbin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2020).

5. —Attempted Robbery.

Attempted robbery count of indictment was sufficient where it alleged defendant employed violence, or placed the victim in fear, and that he used a deadly weapon. State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

For purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-401, attempt to commit a robbery through violence or by putting a person in fear also includes a threat of bodily injury. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Whether defendant succeeded in taking property from one victim was of no consequence in determining if he committed attempted aggravated robbery with respect to the other victims; the act of demanding money while pointing a gun at the victims was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted aggravated robbery. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

6. —Attempted Statutory Rape.

Where defendant stated that he wanted a young boy for “straight sex” and subsequently paid an undercover cop 200 dollars for an underage male, the defendant's conduct constituted a substantial step toward the commission of statutory rape. State v. Fowler, 3 S.W.3d 910, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. 1999).

7. —Attempted Rape of a Child.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted rape of a child because the victim testified that, after the victim refused defendant's requests to engage in sexual intercourse with defendant, defendant flipped the victim over onto the victim's stomach on a bed, removed the victim's pajama pants and underwear, placed Vaseline on defendant's erect penis, and repeatedly attempted to penetrate the victim with defendant's penis from behind. State v. Black, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted rape of a child because defendant sent text messages to the nine-year-old victim asking when she wanted to have sex with him; a detective began posing as the victim; defendant messaged the victim to meet him at a specific location; when defendant arrived at the meeting location and was arrested, he had a tube of petroleum jelly, a condom, and an inflatable mattress in his car; and the State was only required to prove that defendant believed he was going to have sex with a child under the age of 13. State v. Holbrooks, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2020).

7.5 —Attempted reckless endangerment.

Crime of attempted reckless endangerment did not exist, and therefore defendant's conviction was vacated, because in order to find defendant guilty, defendant would have had to have the intent to act recklessly. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2020).

8. Double Jeopardy.

Because aggravated assault and attempted voluntary manslaughter each required proof of a fact not required in proving the other, the offenses were not multiplicitous and defendant's dual convictions did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Feaster, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2014), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015).

Although defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault arose out of the same incident, each of those offenses contained numerous elements that the other did not, and there was no evidence that the General Assembly intended to prohibit multiple punishments in circumstances such as these, and thus double jeopardy did not preclude the dual convictions. State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015).

After the appellate court reversed defendant's convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, double jeopardy did not preclude retrial on charges of attempted especially production of child pornography, as the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser offense. State v. Whited, 506 S.W.3d 416, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Nov. 7, 2016).

Defendant claimed that a conviction for both employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the predicate felony violated the principles of double jeopardy, but it was clear that the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments, and defendant was not entitled to relief. State v. Pirtle, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Although the offenses arose from the same act or transaction of defendant's act of putting a knife to the victim's throat and then dragging her 20-30 feet down a dark driveway toward a scrap yard, aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense of attempted aggravated kidnapping and the offenses were not the same for the purposes of double jeopardy as each crime contained an element that the other did not because attempted aggravated kidnapping required a specific intent to commit the crime of aggravated kidnapping, including a removal or confinement of the victim; and aggravated assault contained an element of fear and required the State to show that defendant caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. State v. Tittle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

Although defendant's convictions of attempted rape and sexual battery arose out of the same transaction, defendant's dual convictions did not violate double jeopardy because the state supreme court had already determined that sexual battery was not a lesser-included offense of attempted rape; and the elements of the offenses are not the same; thus, the trial court committed plain error by merging the convictions for attempted rape and sexual battery. State v. Durham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery were all based on discrete acts or involved multiple victims; therefore, they did not satisfy the threshold inquiry of the Blockburger test, and double jeopardy did not bar defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary along with his convictions for aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

In denying defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, because especially aggravated robbery had to involve a theft, be accomplished with a deadly weapon, and result in serious bodily injury to the victim, but second-degree murder involved the intent to kill someone, separate convictions for especially aggravated robbery and attempted second-degree murder did not violate principles of double jeopardy, and trial counsel's failure to seek merger or appellate counsel's failure to argue such as error on appeal did not constitute deficient performance. Dickerson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2020).

Indictment charging defendants with attempted first degree murder was sufficient to protect defendants against double jeopardy even though it did not identify the victims because the indictments specified the day on which the shooting happened, specifically referenced the surveillance videos that captured the shooting on film, and specifically differentiated the victims by the clothing that they were wearing. If the victims were to come forward after the current prosecution had ended, the State and defendants would have enough information to determine that the victims were speaking of the same shooting, thereby precluding a second prosecution for the same offenses. State v. Bowen, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

9. Indictment.

Indictment failing to allege that either of the defendants committed “an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy” rendered all subsequent proceedings void, as a conviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process. State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W.2d 1, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 1993).

An indictment charging an attempted crime must allege some overt act committed toward the commission of the offense. State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

For purposes of T.C.A. § 40-13-202, the indictment for attempted first degree murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-202 was legally sufficient, as the indictment referenced the murder statute, named the victim, and provided a time period during which the State alleged the offense occurred; although the indictment did not state the means by which the State alleged defendant committed the offense, such was not required in order to provide him with notice. State v. Fisher, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Indictment charging defendants with attempted first-degree murder was not insufficient for failing to name the victims because the identity of the victim was not an essential element of the offense. State v. Bowen, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

Defendants'  argument that the Clark decision did not apply to the indictment charging them with attempted first-degree murder because a bill of particulars could not provide them with the names of the victims, as the State did not know who they were and could not provide them in a bill of particulars, was unavailing because a bill of particulars would be superfluous as the indictment provided the date and location of the offense, the clothing each victim was wearing, and identified the surveillance video that showed the exact conduct charged. State v. Bowen, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

10. Election of Offenses.

Proof did not show multiple acts that could separately constitute the offense of attempted first degree murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-202, and thus the trial court did not err in not ordering the State to provide an election; the State theorized that defendant embarked upon a course of conduct that collectively constituted the attempted first degree murder of his wife, and the State's response to the motion for a bill of particulars informed defendant of the course-of-conduct theory. State v. Fisher, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

11. Lesser Included Offenses.

Tenn. Const., art. I, § 10, prohibiting double jeopardy, barred defendant's conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter because the offense was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. 1996), overruled, State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012), overruled, State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012), overruled, State v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Brawner, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2012), overruled, State v. Buford, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2012), overruled, State v. Readus, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2012), overruled, State v. Alston, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2013), overruled, State v. Hollins, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), overruled, State v. Ralph, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1125 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2013), overruled, Garrett v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2014), overruled, State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2014), overruled in part, State v. Isabell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2014), overruled, State v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2014), overruled, State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2015), overruled, State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015), overruled in part, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), overruled, State v. Freitas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2016), overruled, State v. Jernigan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), overruled in part, State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), overruled, Johnson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), overruled, State v. Steelman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

Defendant's convictions for attempted aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery did not merge where the proof in the case clearly and separately supported the convictions; nor were principles of double jeopardy and duplicity violated since the offenses required separate types of contact and proof of facts not used to prove the other. State v. Binion, 947 S.W.2d 867, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 476 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Where evidence used to prove the offenses of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault was the same, defendant's convictions for both offenses were the “same” for purposes of Tenn. Const., art I, § 10, prohibiting double jeopardy. State v. Hall, 947 S.W.2d 181, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

While attempted aggravated sexual battery is a lesser included offense of rape of a child under T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101(a), (b), and 39-13-504(a)(4) and there was sufficient information to raise the issue of attempt, the lack of that instruction did not result in plain error because there was testimony by the victim that she was touched by defendant and testimony by the mother of the compromising circumstances in which she found defendant and the victim. State v. Biggs, 218 S.W.3d 643, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1167 (Tenn. 2006).

Because the inmate affirmatively requested a jury instruction on the offense of aggravated assault, even though he was in error in believing that it was a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree murder, he effectively agreed to amend the indictment to include aggravated assault; therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to convict the inmate of aggravated assault, his conviction was not void, and he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Demonbreun v. Bell, 226 S.W.3d 321, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. May 8, 2007), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. May 25, 2007).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on attempted especially aggravated kidnapping as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping, because the evidence showed defendant placed the victim in a chokehold while pointing a gun to her head, forced her into the kitchen, and shot her during a struggle; thus, the kidnapping was completed and there was no attempt. State v. Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2013).

Because criminal attempt is available as a lesser-included offense of any charged offense in every case in which the charged offense has a requisite intent element, and in which the proof has fairly raised the completed offense, the trial court did not err by including the attempt charge in its jury instruction in defendant's case charging him with sexual battery by an authority figure as the offense had a requisite intent element, and the proof fairly raised the issue of the charged offense. State v. Thorpe, 463 S.W.3d 851, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2015).

Because Class B misdemeanor assault was not a lesser-included offense of attempted rape, as assault as charged in defendant's case always involved an unlawful sexual contact whereas attempted rape did not, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on Class B misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted rape. State v. Durham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

12. Proof Required.

T.C.A. § 39-12-101 requires that the state prove two material elements: (1) The culpability required for the attempted crime and (2) An act or acts in furtherance of the attempted crime. Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. 2000).

Defendant may be guilty of attempted child neglect under T.C.A. § 39-12-101(a)(3), provided that the State proves that the defendant's conscious object or desire was to engage in conduct constituting neglect and that defendant took a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.3d 666, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 625 (Tenn. 2001).

Although defendant asserted that because of a mental disease or defect he was unable to form the requisite culpable mental states for the offense of attempted first degree premeditated murder, the State presented substantial proof showing defendant was capable of forming the culpable mental states required because defendant and victim had been arguing about their divorce the day of the attack; just before the attack, defendant, in a very calm, rational voice told the unarmed victim that when he started hitting her she was not going to get up and that he was going to kill her; and defendant's protracted 9-1-1 call showed his calmness immediately after the attack. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Facilitation of criminal attempt is not statutorily defined, but reading the two statutes together, the State would have had to prove that defendant (1) knew that another intended to commit criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and (2) knowingly furnished substantial assistance in the commission of the criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2020).

13. —“Substantial Step.”

When an actor possesses materials to be used in the commission of a crime, at or near the scene of the crime, and where the possession of those materials can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances, the jury is entitled, but not required, to find that the actor has taken a “substantial step” toward the commission of the crime if such action is strongly corroborative of the actor's overall criminal purpose. State v. Reeves, 916 S.W.2d 909, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. 1996).

Evidence was sufficient to convicted defendant, as an aider and abettor, of attempted first degree murder because the actions of his companion in firing a handgun at two unarmed men entitled the judge to find that the companion took a “substantial step” toward committing first degree murder. State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 777 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013).

14. —Specific Intent.

A jury charge on attempted second degree murder that required the jury to find defendant “acted with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would constitute second degree murder” sufficiently encompassed the specific intent required for criminal attempt. State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

15. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Court affirmed defendant's conviction of attempted child rape, in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522(a), 39-12-101, where the evidence showed that defendant climbed on top of the victim, who was 11 years old at the time, but defendant was thwarted by another person who pulled defendant off; given that the next attack was similar in nature and within two weeks of the first attack, and that the victim testified that defendant raped the victim during the second attack, it was permissible for the jury to have inferred that defendant intended to rape the victim the first time. State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. 2003), dismissed, Elkins v. Sexton, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131508 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2011).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and facilitation of attempted first degree premeditated murder, because defendant and his accomplices formed a firing line while at least two of them aimed their weapons toward a group of unarmed persons, and without provocation opened fire; two bullets struck and killed one victim, a third bullet struck and injured another victim, and defendant rendered no aid to the victims. Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. June 4, 2007).

Defendant's DUI conviction was upheld where the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the parking lot of a public park was a premises generally frequented by the public at large; in addition, when defendant saw the approach of the police cruiser and began to drive toward the parking lot's exit in an impaired state, he attempted to commit DUI pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-12-101(a)(3). State v. Dobbins, 265 S.W.3d 419, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's attempted extortion convictions because defendant admitted that he was attempting to obtain a more satisfactory divorce settlement, defendant sent a list of demands connected to the divorce to the attorney who was handling the divorce for defendant's ex-wife, and the list of demands was addressed to the attorney's husband, who was a judge seeking re-election; the list included a draft of a complaint against the attorney, and defendant stated that he would campaign against the husband/judge in the upcoming election if the divorce was not settled to his satisfaction. Parris v. State, 236 S.W.3d 173, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's attempted rape conviction because a witness testified that he took defendant to the victim's residence and defendant spent fifteen to twenty minutes inside. The victim's assailant had placed his hand between her legs, and DNA evidence established a strong correlation between defendant and a hat left on the victim's bed during the attack. State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2011).

Defendant's conviction for attempt to commit first-degree murder in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a) and 39-12-101 was appropriate because, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the crimes committed against the victim in the course of the robbery, carjacking, and assault, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant and his co-perpetrator, with premeditation, planned and intended to kill the victim. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2011).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery because defendant was prosecuted for the completed offense of aggravated sexual battery and not attempt, which was an improperly charged lesser-included offense. The only defense presented at trial was that no crime ever occurred. The evidence presented at trial led to only two possible factual scenarios - that defendant either completed the offense or he did not. State v. Edwards, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2012), overruled in part, State v. Thorpe, 463 S.W.3d 851, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2015).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted first degree murder because there was no evidence that the accomplice assisted defendant in planning defendant's return to the cabin, other than suggesting defendant obtain a gun; there was likewise no evidence that the accomplice asked to hold defendant's gun or that he indicated he intended to shoot anyone. State v. Dickson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 413 S.W.3d 735, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 777 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), dismissed, Dickson v. Leibach, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174459 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted first degree murder because the victim said defendant demanded money and drugs and yelled, “we're going to kill you guys if you don't tell us where it's at.” Defendant hit the victim with a baton, threatened to kill everyone in the cabin if he did not receive money, and although defendant did not fire the gun, he was criminally responsible for the shootings because he sought out assistance and armed the accomplice with a gun before going to the cabin. State v. Dickson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 413 S.W.3d 735, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 777 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), dismissed, Dickson v. Leibach, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174459 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to establish the element of premeditation in defendant's convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder because: (1) defendant shot the adult victims multiple times and then repeatedly stabbed and beat the young children, moving from room to room to do so; and (2) defendant altered the scene to make it appear as if the murders were drug or gang-related, moved bodies, disposed of or hid kitchen knives and handles, and collected the cartridge casings. State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2013), aff'd, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant, acting in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation, acted with the intent to cause the death of the victim as he inflicted several serious injuries on the victim; he bound the victim's feet to an entertainment center by use of an electrical cord and taunted her about seeking medical help for her; and, after staging a false 9-1-1 call from a female acquaintance, he fled the State and was apprehended weeks later in South Carolina. State v. Feaster, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2014), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of criminal attempt to commit sexual battery by an authority figure because defendant intended to commit a sexual battery upon the victim and he took substantial steps toward that end as he sent text messages to the victim telling her to change her clothes to make it easier for him to access her intimate parts; he sent text messages to the victim about what he intended to do; and he kissed her on the inside of her legs; and because defendant was an authority figure as he was responsible for disciplining the victim and her brother while the mother was at work. State v. Thorpe, 463 S.W.3d 851, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated burglary, attempted theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, and vandalism of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, where it showed that defendant entered the victim's residence without his consent with the intent to commit theft, he used a wood file to disengage a lock on a door, he admitted that he intended to take three guns from the victim's house, he had removed the guns from the gun cabinet and placed them on the sofa, and the victim testified that they were valued at $800. State v. Watson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted second degree murder because defendant possessed the intent to knowingly kill the victim and, by repeatedly stabbing her and slamming her head into the toilet, he took a substantial step toward doing so. State v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted aggravated rape because defendant stated his intent to have sex with the victim, he threatened and stabbed her with a knife, he repeatedly slammed her head into the toilet, and he attempted to penetrate her with his penis. State v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated rape because a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant attempted to penetrate the victim's vagina with his penis without her consent and caused bodily injury to the victim; defendant demanded sexual intercourse from the victim, and when she refused defendant grabbed her throat, punched her in the head, climbed on top of her, and penetrated the victim's vagina with his penis. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and attempt to commit aggravated robbery where one victim identified defendant as the perpetrator at the scene of the robbery, both victims chased the reddish-color car from the scene of the robbery, and an officer identified defendant as the passenger in the reddish-color car who fled the scene of the traffic stop. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of attempted rape of a child because, with respect to the rape of a child counts, the victim described defendant penetrating her vagina with his penis and his fingers, and she testified that it went on for a long time and that she was raped almost every day; and, with respect to the attempted rape of a child counts, the victim described one occasion of attempted anal penetration where defendant tried to put his penis in her butt, but was unsuccessful; and both the victim and the step-brother testified that defendant tried to get the step-brother to have sex with the victim, but the step-brother freaked out when he could not get an erection and left. State v. Irwin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery because defendant was identified by the victims in a photographic lineup and in court, even though defendant had a very different appearance during the trial. The victims testified to the same general sequence of events relating to crimes that were committed against them during an attempt to purchase marijuana, with minor discrepancies. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because defendant and one of the victims had a dispute over money; on the day of the incident, defendant sped through traffic to cut off the vehicle carrying the two victims; defendant waved a handgun and exited his vehicle, demanding money; defendant took money given to him by one of the victims; he then shot the decedent four times, several times while the victim was already down, shot the other victim once, and fired at least nine rounds; and defendant then discarded his handgun, fled the scene, and hid inside of a truck. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon because, without a prior disagreement or provocation, defendant drew a gun while the victim's back was turned, pointed it at the victim, and shot him when he attempted to escape, the shooting was a substantial step toward killing the victim, firing the gun was an intentional act, the victim believed that defendant intended to rob him, defendant did not attempt to render aid to the victim, left the scene, and hid in his mother's attic, and the parties stipulated that defendant had two prior felony convictions involving violence and/or drugs. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016).

Based on the character of and the circumstances surrounding the offense, specifically the number of times the victim was shot, the jury could conclude that the gun was not fired accidentally but that defendant knowingly shot the victim. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted second degree murder. State v. Henderson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2016).

Evidence that defendant got out of the car to commit the aggravated assaults, chose to get up off the ground and return fire, and he and his accomplice fired numerous shots allowed the jury to reject the self-defense claim and convict him of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during attempt to commit a dangerous felony. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because defendant shot the unarmed victim three times and fled the scene when the victim raised his hands after approaching defendant regarding a recent break-in and theft at the victim's home where defendant was in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner and he intended to go armed when he shot the victim. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of attempted second degree murder because defendant intentionally chased after one victim with his truck and unsuccessfully attempted to hit that victim; defendant also intentionally chased after a second victim with his truck and successfully struck her several times and caused her injury, and he did not after making explicit and implicit threats. State v. Rush, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2016).

Despite the acquittal on the attempted first degree murder charge, the State presented evidence from which a trier of fact could have found that defendants, by shooting eight times each into a nearby vehicle containing six people, committed attempted murder, and that they employed a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; thus, the evidence supported the attempted second degree murder conviction. State v. Pirtle, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant had words with the victim's friend over a debt the friend allegedly owed defendant; defendant returned to the scene later that evening and confronted the victim about the friend's debt; the victim testified that the discussion became heated, but he considered it over when he walked away, however, defendant returned moments later and shot the unarmed victim in the leg; when the victim attempted to escape into the store, defendant pursued him firing two more shots at the victim; and the victim testified that defendant stated that he was going to make the victim pay for his friend's debt and threatened to kill the victim. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 2, 2016).

Record supported the jury's finding that defendant acted with premeditation in killing three victims and attempting to kill a fourth victim, as it showed that, after becoming angry with his girlfriend for cheating, defendant rammed a door and fired his gun at the door in an effort to get to her inside the bedroom and once inside, defendant continued shooting his gun. In addition, defendant did not render aid or summon help, fled the scene and traveled to multiple locations. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant and a codefendant in the car which defendant was driving exchanged gunfire with codefendants in another car. Several eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from defendant's car, while the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of others. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support one of defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because the doctrine of transferred intent was inapplicable to the conviction when the victim on a sidewalk was shot while defendant and a codefendant in the car which defendant was driving exchanged gunfire with codefendants in another car. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from the defendant's car, the forensic evidence established that the victim was likely hit by a bullet that came from defendant's car, and the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of others, which was not second-guessed on appeal; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and the corresponding counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Given the lack of provocation on the part of the victim towards any of the defendants, the State could base a conviction for the attempted manslaughter conviction of the victim on the other's actions under a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Defendant and his other passengers exchanged fire with others and attempted to kill them; defendant was criminally responsible for his own conduct and for the conduct of the others inside his vehicle, and thus the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's separate convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

None of the shooters involved could be guilty of the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter of the victim, which requires the act of the slayer be the result of provocation instigated by the person slain; there was no credible evidence to suggest that anyone was adequately provoked by the victim that day, and thus there was no offense committed by the conduct of another for which defendant could be found guilty. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Child victim's testimony that she thought defendant was going to shoot her mother and her, and testimony defendant pointed the gun at his girlfriend's car while she and the child were inside it and threatened to kill them supported convictions for aggravated assault and attempted aggravated assault, and the girlfriend's admission that a year later she could not remember whether defendant actually threatened to kill her did not create reasonable doubt, nor did her ongoing relationship with him. State v. Abujaber, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Evidence defendant waited for the victim in a parking lot, walked to his car while she loaded groceries and returned with a gun, was angry and repeatedly struck her in the head with his gun, and shot the victim's hands and abdomen supported a conviction for attempted second degree murder. State v. Vinson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery because the victim was not questioned and did not testify relative to defendant's or the codefendant's searching her purse or attempting to take her property and the jury heard neither direct nor circumstantial evidence from which it could reasonably infer that they attempted to take property from the victim. State v. Hawthorne, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempt to commit second degree murder. A reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant intentionally shot the victim with the knowledge that shooting the victim was reasonably certain to kill him. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's rejection of defendant's claim that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent for attempted first-degree murder where he was able to recall details about the amount of drugs and alcohol he consumed, when and with whom he consumed them, and his exact travel route home, including the specific roads he took and which landmarks he passed. State v. Peden, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 976 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence supported convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, and the employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous offense, as defendant admitted helping plan the robbery, driving the assailants to the victim's home, and that he expected to be compensated, and the jury determined the offenses against the victim's friend were a natural and probable consequence of attempting to rob the murder victim at gunpoint. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 714 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder where it showed that he shot the unarmed victim from behind and when the victim turned around shot him again, he attempted to shoot the victim a third time but his gun jammed, and he had previously threatened anyone who stepped on his turf. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Defendant's attempted murder and firearms convictions were supported by evidence that at least 15 shots were filed at the victims'  home, immediately prior to the shooting someone claiming to be defendant called an individual an asked her to get in touch with the male victim and then defendant asked the victim if he had any “beef” with defendant moments before shots were fired, and the casings recovered from the scene matched cartridge casings found in a vehicle where defendant was a passenger. State v. Lagrone, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 751 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

Although the victim was unable to identify defendant as one of the perpetrators at the preliminary hearing, there was sufficient evidence of his identity, as the jury chose to credit the victim's trial testimony that defendant was one of the men who fled in a vehicle from her rental home, knocking her down in the process, and there was evidence that the vehicle that fled the scene was registered to defendant's mother and defendant had access to the vehicle and had driven it on another occasion. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Feb. 28, 2017).

Evidence sufficiently established that defendant engaged in a shoot-out and, acting in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation because of being shot at after attempting to stop a robbery, he shot back at the car in which four rival gang members rode, and he attempted to kill the occupants therein; his convictions of three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter against two co-defendants and one victim was proper. State v. North, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016).

None of the shooters involved could be guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter of one victim, as the offense requires the act of the slayer be the result of provocation instigated by the person slain; there was no credible evidence that anyone was adequately provoked by the victim that day. State v. North, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury where the victim testified that he suffered five gunshot wounds, classified his pain as the worst he had felt in his life, and testified that he was still in pain a year later, had permanent scarring from the gunshot wounds, and lost complete function of his right arm. State v. Vaughn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of domestic assault because the record supported the jury's rejection of the affirmative defense of insanity because, although the State's expert witness and defendant's expert witness disagreed, the State's expert witness opined that the defendant could appreciate both the nature and wrongfulness of his actions when he attacked the victim, and his opinion was corroborated by substantial other proof offered by the State; and the victim testified that defendant calmly told her he was going to kill her before beating her and that he knew exactly what he was doing during the attack. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Evidence that defendant went to a residence and asked the victim to come outside to settle some business, the victim came out, defendant pulled out a handgun and pointed it at the victim, the victim charged, and defendant fired the gun, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted second degree murder. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2016), modified, 538 S.W.3d 431, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Nov. 30, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder in the attempt to perpetrate a robbery and attempted especially aggravated robbery because there was proof defendant was present during the crime and assisted the other suspect in committing the crime. Defendant admitted to the witness that he assisted the suspect in the murder, an eyewitness identified defendant as being present in the apartment at the time of the shooting, and his fingerprint was found on a candle holder from the victim's living room that he used to light a cigarette. State v. Taliaferro, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. May 19, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for attempting to introduce contraband into a penal facility because defendant and codefendant were discovered lying in a ditch on the side of a rural road adjacent to a prison from which defendant had been released two weeks earlier, just after midnight, at or near a known hot-spot for smuggling illegal contraband into the prison. Moreover, two large duffel bags containing cell phones, cell phone charges, tobacco, and marijuana were found one to two feet from defendant. State v. Matthews, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Evidence that second defendant possessed a gun and displayed it, and fled with the other defendants and assisted them in disposing of their firearms supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder on the theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Burgess, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence that 16 grams of powder cocaine were found in defendant's residence, and plastic baggies, digital scales, and pyrex measuring cups that tested positive for cocaine residue were found in the residence, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempt to commit the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver. State v. Byars, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2017), overruled in part, State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted robbery as the underlying felony of attempted robbery and the killing were part of a continuous transaction with no break in the chain of events, and the killing was committed in pursuance of the attempted robbery because defendant and co-defendant decided to commit a robbery on the night of the offense; although defendant claimed that he became scared and attempted to retreat from the robbery, and that the gun unintentionally discharged, a firearms expert testified that at least five pounds of pressure had to be applied to the trigger for the gun to discharge; and the victim was shot once and later died from his wound. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second-degree murder because a witness and the victim gave accounts of witnessing defendant stab the victim multiple times after an argument, and a paramedic testified that the victim had to be transported to the hospital for immediate surgery. State v. Rahman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree premeditated murder because it showed that defendant pulled out a gun and pointed it at the victim, as the victim was driving away defendant fired two shots at him, defendant had tried to fire a third bullet while walking toward the victim but his gun jammed, the victim never used his rifle during the altercation, after the shooting defendant washed his hands, secreted the gun in a backpack, and hid from the police in a bathroom, and when the police found defendant's gun it was fully loaded. State v. Puckett, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted first degree murder because the victim testified that defendant confronted him while entering a barber shop and told him that he was about to die before shooting the victim; the victim was shot 14 times by defendant and co-defendant, who the victim repeatedly identified as the shooters without hesitation; the victim positively identified defendant in a photo lineup and at trial as one of the individuals who shot him; and he testified that he could clearly see defendant before defendant shot him, and that he had no doubt about defendant's identity. State v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. July 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because it showed that, had the victim not found the camera defendant placed in her bedroom, it would have recorded her bare breasts, pubic area, and buttocks while she dressed after showering. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2017).

Evidence at defendant's trial was sufficient because, viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the State, the evidence showed defendant murdered a victim during an attempted especially aggravated robbery. State v. Greer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction because the State provided adequate corroboration of the accomplice's testimony, including a witness's identification of defendant as the man in the car driven by the accomplice, defendant's shorts collected by the police were consistent with the witness's description of the suspect's clothing and they contained blood and gunshot residue, defendant admitted that he bought marijuana from the victim, and damage to the victim's home was consistent with a struggle having occurred. State v. Cosper, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of second-degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery because it showed that defendant and his friend accosted the victim outside the victim's residence, defendant forced the victim to the ground at gunpoint and rifled through his pockets before fleeing with his friend, a short time later while the victim and another man were driving around searching for the robbers defendant fired 14 gunshots from a semiautomatic handgun at the victim's vehicle and struck the victim in the head, killing him. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 652 (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted second degree murder as the State proved that he acted knowingly when he shot one of the victims in the back during the robbery because the two victims were lured to an apartment complex under the pretext of buying a gaming system and a television; defendant pointed a gun at them and robbed them; as they ran away, defendant fired gunshots in their direction; one of the bullets hit one of the victims in the back; and the jury was at liberty to infer that defendant knew that firing a gun in the direction of the victims as they attempted to escape the robbery could have resulted in their deaths. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 840 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Evidence that defendant shot eleven bullets at the vehicle the victims were riding in was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. State v. Donaldson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's identity as the shooter because the victim knew defendant, the victim testified regarding his unique haircut and gait, the jury was presented with video of the shooter as well as video of defendant filmed with the same equipment at the same location under similar circumstances, the shooter's appearance was consistent with defendant's in physique, movement, and general hairstyle, both had a similarly shaped tattoo in the same location, the shooter and defendant appeared to be wearing the same shoes, and the victim testified that he was certain the shooter depicted on film was defendant. State v. Myles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 787 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminally negligent homicide and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery because defendant went to the apartment of the victim's first son in search of drugs; he was wearing a black hoodie and a cap; the victim, his wife, and his second son left the apartment to go home, but, as they were leaving in their vehicle, three men wearing black hoodies approached the vehicle to rob them; the victim's sons recognized defendant as one of the three men as he was wearing the same clothing that he wore earlier to the apartment; the second son testified that defendant shot the victim; and the first son testified that he was 100% percent sure that defendant was the person he saw committing the robbery. State v. Gergish, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence that defendant drove by, stopped and looked at the victim and another, and started shooting at them from the car was sufficient evidence that defendant acted with premeditation, as required for convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. State v. Linzy, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 786 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence that defendant and codefendant fired 19 shots at the victim while the victim ran and continued to shoot at the victim after he fell to the ground, hitting him a total of 13 times and leaving him paralyzed and in a wheelchair, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted second-degree murder. State v. Cunningham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for multiple counts of attempted first degree murder as witnesses testified that defendant, a known gang member, chased seven unarmed victims, with no evidence of provocation presented, fired at least eleven gunshots at the victims, and one of the victims died as the result of a gunshot wound to the victim's neck, which was fired at the victim in relatively close proximity. Defendant then rejoined defendant's friends and discussed the events of the night, including the fact that defendant fired shots. State v. Sims, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted first-degree murder of the second victim because defendant admitted that he intended to shoot the second victim when he went to the home of the first victim, his estranged wife; and defendant took a substantial step toward killing the second victim as defendant waited with a loaded gun outside of the home where he knew the second victim to be and then threatened to shoot the second victim while holding a gun to the first victim's head; and defendant did, in fact, shoot the first victim in the head. State v. Beverly, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1029 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted rape because, although the victim said that defendant did not try to insert his penis into her vagina, she said that she thought he was going to rape her and that she kicked him off of her; and a reasonable jury could infer from the facts that defendant intended to sexually penetrate the victim and that his forcing her onto the bed, telling her to shut up, and pulling her tights and underwear down to her ankles constituted a substantial step toward accomplishing the act. State v. Durham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Defendant's argument that he could not form the requisite specific intent to commit the offenses due to his alleged intoxication was rejected by the jury, and thus, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated burglary, burglary of a vehicle, two counts of theft, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Goss, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second degree murder because it showed that defendant approached the victims after they left a store, he pulled out his gun, the victims began walking backwards, defendant attempted to hit one victim with a glass bottle, both victims fell, and when the second victim reached for the gun defendant shot him. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated arson and attempted first degree murder because the evidence showed (1) defendant knowingly set fire to a victim which damaged the victim's store, and (2) defendant took a substantial step toward attempted first degree murder by lighting the victim on fire. State v. Boutrous, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. June 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted first-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder because it showed that he fired at unarmed victims and an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry testified that defendant was capable of premeditating his actions and was deceptive in his interview. State v. Starks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because two witnesses testified that defendant and the intended victim were arguing immediately before the shooting, a witness saw defendant walk out of his home with a gun and shoot at the intended victim, the witness then saw the victim fall to the ground after the shot was fired, and two witnesses testified that before the shooting defendant told them to get out of the way because he was about to shoot the intended victim. State v. Williamson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2018).

Defendant was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal because sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for attempted second-degree murder, as the evidence showed defendant approached the victim from behind and slashed the victim's throat from ear to ear. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault, because despite the alibi testimony of defendant's mother, the jury chose not to accredit her testimony and resolve all conflicts in favor of the State and the victim's testimony identifying defendant as one of the shooters without hesitation. State v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018).

Evidence that defendant and his accomplice fired at least 12 shots at the victims was sufficient to show that defendant intentionally shot the victims with the knowledge that shooting them was reasonably certain to kill them and thus, supported defendant's convictions for attempted second-degree murder and unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. State v. Orozco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted aggravated burglary because he entered a townhouse through a window that he had left unlocked for the express purpose of entering the townhouse, claimed he was coming inside to retrieve some clothes he had left in a kitchen cabinet above the refrigerator when the resident confronted him, and the trial court discredited defendant's excuse that he was entering the townhouse to retrieve his clothes as was its prerogative. State v. Lockridge, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted second-degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because, in an apparent fit of road rage, defendant pulled an AK-47 style weapon from his van and shot into the passenger side of the victim's semi-tractor trailer truck, striking him in both legs, and while defendant argued that he was trying to send the victim a message by shooting the engine of the truck, any rational juror could have concluded that he intentionally engaged in conduct that would have, if completed, resulted in the knowing killing of the victim. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018).

Evidence that defendant and codefendant ambushed the victims as they entered their home, defendant demanded money from a victim while codefendant subdue the other victims, defendant shot one victim when he attempted to fight back and later shot the other victims, and the bullets recovered from the victims were fired from a weapon that defendant sold to someone and had fired a month before the murders was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for murder, attempted murder, robbery and aggravated assault. State v. Wade, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 523 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Nov. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 where a bank branch manager's testimony estimated the amount in the ATM at $60,000, but admitted on cross-examination that it could have been $58,000, and a rational trier of fact could had found from that testimony that the value of the property taken was more than $10,000. State v. Dunn, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted first degree premeditated murder because his conduct constituted a substantial step towards the killing of the victim, as evidenced by his using a gun to shoot the victim while the victim lay unarmed on the ground and attempted to crawl away; the evidence of premeditation was that defendant made multiple attempts to unjam the gun after having already shot the victim and walked away from the victim before returning to shoot him. State v. Gary, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted aggravated robbery of the second victim under the theory of criminal responsibility because the jury could conclude that co-defendant intended to take property from the second victim when he brandished a gun and demanded that the second victim drop everything; co-defendant's actions constituted a substantial step towards the completion of aggravated robbery; and the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant and co-defendant were working together to rob the victims as defendant pointed his gun at the first victim and ordered him to give him everything while co-defendant pointed his gun at the second victim and told him to drop everything. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Evidence that defendant grabbed merchandise from a store and left without paying for it, that a loss prevention employee approached defendant and brought him back to his office, that defendant was knocking over tables and yelling profanity and threatened to kill the employee, and that while in the employee's office, defendant used a telephone cord to strangle the employee until he lost consciousness was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and theft. State v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 679 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault because it showed that he used a gun to shoot multiple shots towards the vehicle as the victim drove away and several of the shots hit the vehicle. State v. Battle, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted first degree premeditated murder as defendant's conduct constituted a substantial step towards the premeditated and intentional killing of the victim because the evidence of premeditation was that defendant and the victim were in a fight prior to the shooting, and that defendant brought a weapon to the home where he knew the victim would be, concealed the weapon in a paper bag, walked up to where the victim was standing, made a slang reference to shooting someone, and lifted his hand and fired the weapon at the victim several times; and because the victim was shot in the head and the back. State v. Burnette, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 682 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of attempted second degree murder because defendant knowingly fired at least four rounds into the tow truck containing the two victims; the evidence presented at trial established that defendant was not standing in front of the tow truck when he fired his weapon; the jury rightfully rejected defendant's argument that his actions were justified because he was in state of passion caused by the towing of his brother's truck; one victim was permanently paralyzed from the armpits down; and it was apparent from the record that the jury heard and rejected defendant's self-defense argument at trial. State v. Proffitt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2018).

Evidence supported conviction for attempted theft as a reasonable juror could have concluded that defendant, a city mayor, intended to deprive the city of property when he paid city employees to pick up a truck being purchased for defendant's personal use, used city funds to pay for the tow of a city-owner truck and trailer, and the trucker's repair, and the tow of the newly purchased truck after the city truck broke down, and repaid funds only after being caught. State v. Loveless, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because the evidence showed at most that when he hid a video camera in the minor victim's bedroom aimed to record the area where she normally changed clothes, defendant intended to produce material that would include images of the victim engaged in everyday activities ordinarily performed in the nude, which were deemed insufficient in the Whited case to constitute a “lascivious exhibition.” State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Jan. 7, 2019).

Evidence that defendant stated that he was “fixin to get” the victim and was identified by the victim and a witness as the shooter after firing five or six rounds toward the victim was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder. State v. Russell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Evidence that defendant, who was angry with the victim, took the shotgun out of its case when the victim knocked on his door, opened the door to his apartment, reiterated that he told to the victim to get away from the door, and fired the shotgun was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. McKinnie, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted first-degree murder because the State established premeditation by showing that defendant was angry with his girlfriend over her plans to move out of state, he procured a weapon, he blocked the apartment door and pretended to reach for his cell phone, he fired multiple times at the victims, he reloaded the weapon, he failed to render aid to his girlfriend and her children, and the shootings were particularly cruel, as she shot his girlfriend and her children in front of each other and other family members. State v. Woodley, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant's prior altercation with the shooting victim, a bouncer at a club who asked defendant to leave the club at closing time, served as adequate provocation when defendant became angry with the victim and subsequently returned and fired gunshots at the victim. State v. Juarez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder because it showed that both before and after a drug transaction defendant and the victim argued, defendant shot the victim in the face, and he disposed of the gun by throwing it from a bridge. Defendant also failed to render aid to the victim and fled the scene. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. July 18, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony because the evidence showed defendant fired numerous shots at victims in the parking lot of a crowded shopping mall. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder because it showed that, during a verbal altercation with his ex-wife and her boyfriend, defendant produced a gun, announced his intent to shot the boyfriend, and fired twice at the boyfriend, even though he was unarmed and was attempting to remove himself from the disagreement. State v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter because, when a crowd began fighting in a club, defendant saw defendant's sibling in the fight (which provided adequate provocation), pulled out defendant's gun, and shot toward the victim and another person. Defendant then chased the victim, who was unarmed, into the parking lot, shot the victim in the back, stood over the victim, and shot the victim several more times as the victim was lying on the ground. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second degree murder, as he repeatedly stabbed the unarmed victim in the neck, back, shoulders, and abdomen, and while stabbing her, defendant said he was going to teach her a lesson. The victim underwent surgery and was unable to care for herself for months, and thus the jury could have found that defendant acted with the intent to cause the knowing killing of the victim, believing his conduct would cause her death without further conduct on his part. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate theft, robbery, and especially aggravated robbery because the jury could have inferred from the evidence that defendant followed the witness to the victim's apartment intending to deprive the victim of his property, as he knew the witness was going to the victim's home to purchase drugs, he asked the witness how big the victim was, when the victim opened the door he encountered defendant pointed a gun at him, and another witness testified that defendant told her that he had committed a robbery. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of attempted first-degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury because they opened fire on a home with people inside and were seen by an eyewitness firing shots from the car, and while the proof did not indicate which defendant actually fired the shot that injured the victim both defendants were criminally responsible for the conduct of the other. The proof also supported the finding that the victim suffered the loss of a bodily organ. State v. Avant, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant knowingly killed one victim and attempted to kill a second victim, including evidence that defendant, armed with a semiautomatic pistol, lay in wait until an accomplice moved away and then opened fire on the victims, followed the victims as they tried to escape, and stated he would have kept shooting if his gun had not jammed. State v. Wren, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2019).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault including that defendant texted an accomplice about a robbery, defendant dropped off the accomplices at the pawn shop where they robbed the store and customers, the accomplices ran to an abandoned house and changed clothes before defendant picked them up, and the offenders were all tracked using a GPS placed in one of the jewelry cases taken during the robbery. State v. Wise, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver; defendant was a regular overnight guest at the home and was present when the cocaine, which he constructively possessed, was seized, and a rational juror could have found that he provided substantial assistance to co-defendant by using a measuring cup that tested positive for trace amounts of cocaine in attempting to manufacture cocaine for sale or delivery. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2020).

Evidence that defendant entered the home and pointed a handgun at the victims, chased the victims when they fled, and returned fire when shot at was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempt to commit second degree murder. State v. Wilkins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted sexual exploitation of a minor because the mere fact that defendant previously took a photograph that was awfully close to the victim's private parts was not enough to say that such a photograph would have been lascivious exhibition of the victim's genitals and defendant's using food items to lure the victim into engaging in sexual activity did not constitute a substantial step toward sexual exploitation because defendant's entire course of action did not corroborate the intent to commit such an offense. State v. Glatz, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery because it showed that defendant returned to the victim's body after the shooting, stood over him, and turned out the victim's pants pocket in an attempt to take something out of that pocket. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

Evidence that defendant went to a home under the guise of purchasing drugs, intending to rob the victims of the drugs, held a gun to one victim and shot another, retrieved the drugs, and fled in a vehicle taken from a third victim was sufficient to establish premeditation and intent so as to sustain a conviction for attempted first degree murder State v. Fleming, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of attempted unlawful photography because the victim was fully clothed in a public place; and the victim had no reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted sexual battery because the victim tried to get away from defendant, but he followed her; defendant then grabbed her bottom; the victim's mother testified that when she went to her daughter after her daughter hollered out, her daughter informed her that defendant had just grabbed her, which provided some level of corroboration; and completion of the attempted offense was not a defense to prosecution for criminal attempt. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim's identification of defendant in a photographic lineup and at trial was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator, and the jury could consider defendant's accomplice's testimony because it was sufficiently corroborated by the victim's testimony. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions because it showed that a co-defendant and defendant made a plan to “hit a lick” on Hispanic people, obtained a working magazine for the malfunctioning handgun, armed themselves, and asked another co-defendant to drive them around town to identify vulnerable targets. After choosing a house, the co-defendant and defendant walked back to the house, fired two shots into the air, and ordered the victims onto the ground, one of the men took a victim's wallet, and when they were surprised by the victims inside the house opening the door, the co-defendant and defendant opened fire, striking the house and four people present. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of one count attempted possession of a weapon by a convicted felon because defendant mistakenly called a detective and asked him if was interested in purchasing a shotgun; the detective recognized defendant's voice and knew that he was a convicted felon; the detective went to a specified location at a specified time where he saw a vehicle that defendant was known to drive; when approached and questioned by the detective, defendant admitted that the shotgun was in the trunk of the vehicle; and, despite the testimony of defendant's girlfriend that the shotgun belonged to her, the jury chose to determine the facts sufficient to support a conviction for attempt. State v. Moose, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2020).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of attempted tampering with evidence because a reasonable juror could conclude that between the time a police officer observed and commented on the baggies of drugs in defendant's lap and the time defendant crashed his vehicle, he destroyed most of the white powdery substance contained in one baggie in an effort to impair its availability as evidence in the investigation. State v. Colbert, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2019).

Evidence that the surviving victim saw defendant with a gun, saw the deceased victim grab his chest, and defendant shot the surviving victim in the face and knee was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second degree murder because the video from the store's security cameras showed that defendant looked in the store employee's direction prior to approaching the service counter and demanding money from the victim, and after shooting the victim, defendant turned and fired his gun once in the direction of the fleeing employee. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly attempted to kill a deputy where it showed that the deputy spotted the defendant speeding and attempted to effectuate a traffic stop, defendant failed to stop and led the deputy on a chase for approximately 20 minutes, and when defendant stopped his car, he exited his vehicle while holding a gun in his left hand and fired at least one shot in the direction of the deputy, who was outside of his vehicle at that point. State v. Ochoa-Puentes, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 643 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2020).

16. Enhancement Factors.

Exceptional cruelty is not an element of attempted second-degree murder and may be considered as an enhancement factor in the commission of the offense. State v. Hall, 947 S.W.2d 181, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

17. Jury Instructions.

Because there was nothing in the record to indicate that defendant filed a written request for an instruction on attempt, defendant waived the issue for appeal, and the court of criminal appeals reviewed his claim for plain error. State v. Morrison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2016).

Defendant failed to show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached or that one of his substantial rights was adversely affected when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on attempt, and he was not entitled to plain error relief, because the evidence at trial showed that all three episodes of theft were completed and did not support an inference of guilt on the lesser included offense of attempted theft. State v. Morrison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2016).

Trial court's jury instructions were proper because defendant did not object to the court's decision not to charge attempt as a lesser-included offense, the evidence established only a completed crime, the jury was properly charged on flight and criminal responsibility, and any error in not charging facilitation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Daniels, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

Trial court did not err in instructing the jury because defendant agreed to the proposed instructions, which contained proper statements of the law; the trial court's instructions tracked the language of the relevant statutes for first degree premeditated murder, criminal attempt, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and they followed the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions. State v. Gary, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018).

Defendant did not show it was plain error not to instruct a jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment because the jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of attempted second degree murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter but chose to convict defendant of attempted first degree murder, so defendant did not show a reasonable probability that a reasonable jury would have convicted defendant of misdemeanor reckless endangerment instead of attempted first degree murder. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

18. Sentencing.

Although defendant was eligible for consecutive sentencing, the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing that resulted in a total sentence of 44 years for defendant's crimes of aggravated robbery, theft by shoplifting, and attempted aggravated robbery; the robberies were committed with a toy gun, no one was injured, two victims knew the gun was plastic, defendant was 49 years old and already serving a 12-year sentence, and the sentence was in effect a sentence of life imprisonment, was not justly deserved, and was not the least severe measure necessary. State v. Biggs, 482 S.W.3d 923, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2015).

Total effective sentence of 35 years for defendant's convictions for two counts of rape of a child, two counts of attempted rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of incest was proper because defendant abused a position of private trust as the biological father of the victim; with regard to consecutive sentencing, the trial court determined that defendant was convicted of two or more statutory crimes of sexual abuse that were sustained over a period of time; the child suffered extensive damage to her mental and emotional health; and society needed to be protected from defendant who had abused a child beginning when the child was approximately four years of age. State v. Irwin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2016).

Defendant's consecutive sentences were not an abuse of discretion, as both defendants were on probation at the time of the shooting, both defendants fell into the dangerous offender category, and the proper findings were made. State v. Pirtle, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentencing for defendant's attempted second degree murder and aggravated robbery convictions because defendant was eligible for consecutive sentencing based upon his extensive criminal history and the determination that he was a dangerous offender; defendant was previously convicted of criminal attempt, car-jacking, where he violated his diversion, by picking up a weapons offense; defendant robbed the victims at gunpoint and fired multiple shots at them as they attempted to escape; and the trial court found that the circumstances of the offenses were aggravated and stated that the length of the sentence was reasonably related to the offenses for which defendant was convicted. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 840 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Because both of defendant's prior convictions for attempted robbery and facilitation of first degree murder, under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-117, 39-11-403(a), 39-11-402(2), 39-12-101, 39-13-401, included an element of actual or threatened bodily injury or serious bodily injury, the trial court properly considered them to be separate convictions and found that defendant was a Range II multiple offender under T.C.A. § 40-35-106. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a five-year sentence because defendant was eligible for a sentence of three to six years; and, although the trial court misapplied the enhancement factor that defendant committed the crime to gratify his desire for pleasure or excitement as that factor was an element of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the trial court properly found as a separate enhancement factor that defendant abused a position of trust when he terminated the parental rights of the victim's biological parents and then subsequently sexually abused her. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2018).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant probation because, while he pled guilty to the reduced charge of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the evidence supported the conclusion that he committed more than one completed aggravated sexual battery on his adopted daughter while she was under 13 years old; he obtained custody of the victim, removing her from the guardianship of others who could have protected her from him; and the trial court's finding that the presentence report was very disturbing supported the conclusion that it found the crime to be especially shocking, reprehensible, offensive, and of an exaggerated degree. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentencing and a total effective sentence of life plus 24 years for first degree felony and premeditated murder, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm; defendant committed six distinct violations of the law and the trial court properly applied the dangerous offender category after making the necessary findings, which included in part his long history of being a drug dealer and being affiliated with a gang. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

19. Federal Sentencing.

Habeas petitioner's prior conviction for attempted rape, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-503, § 39-12-101, qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because attempted rape fell squarely within the class of crimes that presented a serious risk of physical injury to another, as contemplated by the Act. Dawson v. United States, 702 F.3d 347, 2012 FED App. 417P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26099 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012).

Defendant's Tennessee conviction for attempted aggravated arson qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act because it was akin to and possessed same the kind of risk as arson, which was an enumerated offense under the statute. United States v. Fallins, 777 F.3d 296, 2015  U.S. App. LEXIS 959, 2015 FED App. 12P (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2015).

20. Evidentiary Rulings.

Trial court did not err in admitting the bloody clothes of the victim's daughter because the clothes helped the State establish that defendant attempted to kill the victim by completing a substantial step in the commission of the offense of attempted first degree premeditated murder and that defendant acted with premeditation; the clothes corroborated the daughter's testimony about the incident and suggested that had she not intervened, the defendant would have killed the victim; and the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

In an attempted first degree premeditated murder case, the trial court did not err in admitting the victim's testimony that she called her divorce attorney after informing defendant about the divorce to tell her attorney that she was more than a little afraid of going home because that testimony qualified as a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, was relevant, and made it less likely that the victim provoked defendant; and it explained why the victim avoided defendant upon arriving home and declined to respond to him when he tried to talk to her. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Trial court did not err in admitting crime scene photographs and photographs depicting the injuries to the victim's body because, to prove attempted first degree premeditated murder, the State was required to establish that defendant attempted to kill the victim and that defendant acted with premeditation, and the challenged photographs, which depicted the brutality of the attack and the nature and extent of the victim's injuries, were particularly probative of those issues; and because the probative value of the photographs was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

In defendant's trial for attempted first degree murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-202, the chief's testimony was rationally based on his perception, but his opinion that he thought defendant was going to kill his wife if he had not been apprehended was closely intertwined with the ultimate issue of whether defendant had taken a substantial step toward killing his wife; the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, but it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against defendant. State v. Fisher, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

39-12-102. Solicitation — Defenses disallowed.

  1. Whoever, by means of oral, written or electronic communication, directly or through another, intentionally commands, requests or hires another to commit a criminal offense, or attempts to command, request or hire another to commit a criminal offense, with the intent that the criminal offense be committed, is guilty of the offense of solicitation.
  2. It is no defense that the solicitation was unsuccessful and the offense solicited was not committed. It is no defense that the person solicited could not be guilty of the offense solicited, due to insanity, minority, or other lack of criminal responsibility or incapacity. It is no defense that the person solicited was unaware of the criminal nature of the conduct solicited. It is no defense that the person solicited is unable to commit the offense solicited because of the lack of capacity, status, or characteristic needed to commit the offense solicited, so long as the person soliciting or the person solicited believes that either or both have such capacity, status, or characteristic.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section punishes those who instigate group criminal activity by trying to enlist others in criminal deeds.

Subsection (a) states that the defendant must intentionally try to enlist another in criminal activity and must intend that the offense be committed. It must be noted, however, that the solicitation need not succeed.

Subsection (b) provides limits on defenses available to defendants charged with solicitation. In general terms, the defendant cannot escape liability because the offenses solicited did not occur or because the person solicited could not be convicted of the offense solicited. These limits are consistent with the view that solicitation is harmful because it starts group involvement in the commission of an offense.

If the offense solicited did occur, however, the defendant may not be convicted of both the solicitation and the completed offense. The solicitation is merged with the completed offense, and the offender may be guilty of the completed offense under § 39-11-402.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

General defenses, title 39, ch. 11, part 5.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to attempt, solicitation or conspiracy, defenses, § 39-12-105.

Title definitions, § 39-11-106.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.115.

Law Reviews.

Book Review, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Tennessee, 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (1988).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Legislative Intent.

The clear language of T.C.A. § 39-12-102 evinces a legislative intent to require both an intent to solicit and an intent that the crime solicited be committed. State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 652 (Tenn. 2000).

2. Nature of Offense.

As a matter of law, solicitation to commit aggravated robbery under Tennessee law is a crime of violence for purposes of establishing career offender status under the federal sentencing guidelines. United States v. Walker, 181 F.3d 774, 1999 FED App. 228P, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13692 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 980, 120 S. Ct. 435, 145 L. Ed. 2d 340, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 7328 (1999).

Tennessee state offense of solicitation to commit aggravated assault involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and involves the same kind of purposeful, violent and oppressive conduct as the enumerated offenses; it therefore qualifies as a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(2). United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9940, 2011 FED App. 128P (6th Cir. May 17, 2011).

Because the crime of solicitation to commit aggravated assault was at least one step removed from the requisite level of force contemplated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(1), it did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the first prong of the definition. United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9940, 2011 FED App. 128P (6th Cir. May 17, 2011).

3. Jury Instructions.

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on solicitation, T.C.A. § 39-12-102(a), during defendant's criminal trial, because the evidence unmistakably established either the completed offenses of murder and especially aggravated kidnapping or defendant's claim of innocence. Thus, the proof in the record did not support the lesser charge. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Robinson v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 1429, 164 L. Ed. 2d 132, 546 U.S. 1214, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1839 (2006).

Trial court did not err in declining to give instruction on solicitation of murder, T.C.A. § 39-12-102(a), as a lesser included offense where the evidence established either the completed offense of murder or defendants'  claim of innocence. State v. Watson, 227 S.W.3d 622, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. July 3, 2006).

5. Entrapment Defense Allowed.

By abolishing common law defenses, the 1989 Criminal Code superseded the definition of entrapment as announced in State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 437 (Tenn. 1980), including the solicitation exception, and replaced it with § 39-11-505; thus, the defense of entrapment applied to the crime of solicitation to commit murder. State v. Latham, 910 S.W.2d 892, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

39-12-103. Criminal conspiracy.

  1. The offense of conspiracy is committed if two (2) or more people, each having the culpable mental state required for the offense that is the object of the conspiracy, and each acting for the purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of an offense, agree that one (1) or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes the offense.
  2. If a person guilty of conspiracy, as defined in subsection (a), knows that another with whom the person conspires to commit an offense has conspired with one (1) or more other people to commit the same offense, the person is guilty of conspiring with the other person or persons, whether or not their identity is known, to commit the offense.
  3. If a person conspires to commit a number of offenses, the person is guilty of only one (1) conspiracy, so long as the multiple offenses are the object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship.
  4. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense, unless an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by the person or by another with whom the person conspired.
    1. Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct that terminates when the objectives of the conspiracy are completed or the agreement that they be completed is abandoned by the person and by those with whom the person conspired. The objectives of the conspiracy include, but are not limited to, escape from the crime, distribution of the proceeds of the crime, and measures, other than silence, for concealing the crime or obstructing justice in relation to it.
    2. Abandonment of a conspiracy is presumed if neither the person nor anyone with whom the person conspired does any overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy during the applicable period of limitation.
    3. If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated as to that person only if and when the person, advises those with whom the person conspired of the abandonment, or the person informs law enforcement authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of the person's participation in the conspiracy.
  5. It is no defense that the offense that was the object of the conspiracy was not committed.
  6. Nothing in this section is intended to modify the evidentiary rules allowing statements of co-conspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Prior Tennessee law contained a general conspiracy offense and a number of specific conspiracy offenses.

This section creates a generic conspiracy law. It reaches a conspiracy to commit any offense except a Class C misdemeanor. See § 39-12-107(b). The offense of conspiracy, aimed at group criminality, is based on the principle that offense committed by a group poses a greater public threat than offense committed by a single individual.

Subsection (a) defines conspiracy in terms of an agreement of two or more people to commit an offense. Each conspirator must satisfy two mental elements. First, each conspirator must have the culpable mental state required for the offense that is the object of the conspiracy. For example, a defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery must have the mental state required for the offense of robbery. Second, each conspirator must act for the purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of an offense. Subsection (b) describes the reach of a chain conspiracy.

Subsection (c) deals with the number of conspiracies for multiple offenses. This rule provides that only one conspiracy occurs if multiple offenses are the object of one agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship. For example, if A and B agree to commit three robberies, they are guilty of only one conspiracy since there is only one agreement.

Subsection (d) alters Tennessee law by requiring an overt act by at least one conspirator before a conspiracy is committed. This requirement assures that the conspiracy is more dangerous than a mere agreement. It also protects against erroneous convictions based solely on the exchange of words. Prior Tennessee law required an overt act for most, though not all, offenses. See prior § 39-1-602.

Subsection (e) describes the duration of a conspiracy and the effect of abandoning the conspiracy.

Subsection (f) states that a conspiracy may occur even if the offense that was the object of the conspiracy did not occur. This is consistent with the theory of conspiracy as directed at the harm of group criminal activity. If the offense that was the object of the conspiracy did occur the defendant may be convicted of both the conspiracy and the completed offense. The conspiracy is not merged with the completed offense, and the offender may be guilty of the completed offense under § 39-11-402.

Subsection (g) makes it clear this section does not modify existing evidentiary rules.

Defenses are provided in §§ 39-12-104 (renunciation), 39-12-105 (lack of responsibility of co-conspirator), and 39-12-106 (multiple convictions barred).

Sanctions for conspiracy are provided in § 39-12-107(b).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Alleging conspiracy, § 40-13-216.

Arson and explosives, title 39, ch. 14, part 3.

Coercion laws, §§ 39-14-112, 39-16-507,39-16-508, 39-17-309.

Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Disorderly conduct and riots, title 39, ch. 17, part 3.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to attempt, solicitation or conspiracy, defenses, § 39-12-105.

Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, title 39, ch. 12, part 2.

Solicitation to commit a crime, §§ 39-12-102, 39-12-104, 39-12-107.

Written request for charge on lesser included offense, § 40-18-110.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 26.52.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Conspiracy, §§ 2, 3, 6, 8.

Law Reviews.

A Noble Ideal Whose Time Has Come (Penny J. White), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 223 (1989).

The Language of Mens Rea, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1327 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Conviction of Offense and Conspiracy.

It is constitutionally permissible for a defendant to be convicted of both first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. June 20, 1994), overruled, State v. Mitchell, 137 S.W.3d 630, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

2. First Degree Murder.

Defendant's sentences of incarceration and death did not constitute multiple punishments for the same conduct in violation of the U.S. Const. amend. 5 because the Blockburger  test was satisfied, as first-degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) required proof of a killing but did not require proof of an agreement to commit a killing, as required under T. C.A. § 39-12-103(a). State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. 2006).

Defendant's sentences of incarceration and death did not constitute multiple punishments for the same conduct in violation of Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10 because: (1) The offenses, first-degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (1989) and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-12-103(a) (1989) were not the same under the Blockburger  test; (2) The same evidence was not required to prove both offenses, as defendant's conviction for first-degree murder required proof of his criminal responsibility for his wife's death and proof of his wife's death, but his conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder required proof of an agreement to commit murder, but not necessarily proof of a killing; (3) Although there was only one victim, defendant committed separate acts and distinct acts. Defendant's act of murder, which he committed by employing another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, was separate and distinct from defendant's entering into an agreement with his accomplice to have his wife killed; in addition, defendant's agreement with his accomplice to have his wife killed was separate and distinct from the act satisfying the aggravating circumstance of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(4), defendant's act of offering his accomplice a boat, motor, and pickup truck in exchange for the completed killing; and (4) the legislative purpose of the statutes was different. State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder because it showed a mutual implied understanding among defendant, her daughter, and her daughter's boyfriend that the victims would be killed, as numerous emails among the daughter, defendant, and the boyfriend included references of their intent to kill the victims, defendant would bring the boyfriend up to speed on the bad things the victims had said about the daughter, the boyfriend was included in family meetings during which defendant and her husband would discuss the situation with the victims and what to do about it, on the evening before the murders defendant called the boyfriend and invited him to their residence, where the husband asked the boyfriend to do him a favor, and the boyfriend agreed. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder because when the suspect's girlfriend told defendant that the suspect needed to get rid of the two victims, who had witnessed a home invasion defendant replied “okay,” according to defendant's cell phone records he made calls on two dates when his phone utilized the cell phone tower that covered the area where the victims lived, when defendant spoke to the suspect a few days later he stated that the victims could not be located, and a man testified that defendant offered to pay him $5,000 to murder the victims. State v. Bond, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2019).

3. Indictment.

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for election of theories and/or bill of particulars concerning the conspiracy charge where the indictment specified the date of each individual offense, the evidence at trial was precise as to the date of each controlled drug buy, the State alleged several overt acts in support of the two alternative conspiracy counts, and the jury unanimously found defendant guilty of each of the separately charged offenses or one of the lesser-included ones. State v. Graham, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

4. Jury Instructions.

Defendant failed to show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached or that one of his substantial rights was adversely affected when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on attempt, and he was not entitled to plain error relief, because the evidence at trial showed that all three episodes of theft were completed and did not support an inference of guilt on the lesser included offense of attempted theft. State v. Morrison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2016).

5. Evidence.

In a trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or deliver heroin, in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-12-103 and 39-17-417, the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing testimony establishing the street value of the drugs seized from the vehicle driven by defendant because the value of the drugs was relevant to establish defendant's intent to sell or deliver. State v. Martinez, 372 S.W.3d 598, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 27, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Post-conviction court properly denied defendant's petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel made an informed, strategic decision not to seek severance where a jury might find defendant was the leader in the offense, a co-defendant's attorney had unsuccessfully filed a motion to sever, and the charges involved conspiracy, which required the State prove the involvement of two or more persons. Murchison v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

6. —Sufficient.

The record supported a finding that the defendant was guilty of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery where the defendant and codefendant admitted calling the victim from a pay phone prior to the commission of the crime in order to determine whether the victim was home, and the defendant possessed a tire iron when entering the victim's residence, implying that the defendant anticipated a confrontation. State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2001).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendants' convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II substance. State v. Reed, 845 S.W.2d 234, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

The evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conspiracy conviction where a witness testified that she saw the defendant, victim and two other people leave the job center together, the defendant and the two other people later returned without the victim, defendant confessed to the witness that she had killed the victim, the witness's testimony corroborated defendant's confession in which she said she and a second person had killed the victim, and blood stains matching the victim were found on the defendant's and the second person's clothing. State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied,  State v. Pike, — S.W.3d— , 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Pike v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1147, 119 S. Ct. 2025, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1036, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 3718 (1999).

Defendant's argument that because he is blind, he necessarily required the assistance and cooperation of another person to sell or deliver cocaine, and that therefore, a conviction for conspiracy would constitute double jeopardy, failed because the offenses of delivering or selling cocaine and the offense of conspiracy to deliver or sell cocaine contain different elements. State v. Thornton, 10 S.W.3d 229, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1045 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2000).

Where there were email messages between a woman and her lover, both convicted of murdering the woman's husband, that could be fairly characterized as an ongoing discussion of various methods of murder, it was not necessary that the lover be present to be criminally responsible; evidence was sufficient to support the lover's conviction for conspiracy under T.C.A. § 39-12-103(a) even though he was in Shreveport, Louisiana because evidence of the correspondence between the two defendants established that they mutually desired the elimination of the victim, and they discussed various methods of murder. State v. Watson, 227 S.W.3d 622, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. July 3, 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendants'  convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone because all defendants met at a parking lot beforehand and each either participated in the delivery of marijuana to a carwash or placed himself in position to assist in the drug transaction. State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. 2007), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery because the metal flashlight as used was properly classified as a deadly weapon, and testifying co-defendant admitted that there was discussion that defendant would knock the victim out if the victim awoke. State v. Downey, 259 S.W.3d 723, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2008).

Evidence clearly established that defendant conspired with one person for the delivery of more than 300 grams of cocaine and that defendant conspired with another person to possess more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. Defendant's presence alone in an apartment at the time officers entered and defendant's knowledge of the key to a lock box established defendant's ability to reduce the marijuana, cocaine, and handguns found to defendant's actual possession at any moment. State v. Elliot, 366 S.W.3d 139, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010).

While most of the evidence was circumstantial, it was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or deliver heroin, in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-12-103 and 39-17-417, where defendant was paid to help drive the codefendant's vehicle, which contained hidden black tar heroin, across the country, he was shaking during the vehicle stop, he backed away when asked about the presence of illegal drugs, and he was unable to provide the last name of the codefendant. State v. Martinez, 372 S.W.3d 598, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 27, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Defendant's claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit kidnapping were without merit under T.C.A. § 39-12-103(a) because circumstantial evidence abounded in the record in support of the jury's conclusion that defendant participated in a group conspiracy to kidnap the victim and that the conspiracy was separate and apart from any conspiracy to purchase illegal drugs. State v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2012), cert. denied, Adams v. Tennessee, 184 L. Ed. 2d 146, 133 S. Ct. 269, 568 U.S. 880, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 6401 (U.S. 2012).

Evidence supported defendants'  convictions for conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone as the evidence showed that they entered and exited the home from which they obtained the cocaine together, that they went to a pickup truck after exiting the home and concealed the cocaine together in the engine compartment of the truck, and that they transported it from the home together after they concealed it in the truck. A reasonable jury could have inferred that defendants possessed 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendants agreed to commit the offense and committed an overt act in furtherance of the crime. State v. Vasquez, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 971 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Mar. 20, 2013), dismissed, Araguz v. Leibach, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102538 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's drug and conspiracy convictions because (1) a jury could infer from evidence that a portion of the substance defendant sold was cocaine that the entire substance was cocaine, and (2) the evidence showed defendant's implied understanding with a co-defendant. State v. Murchison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for conspiracy to sell more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and conspiracy to deliver more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school where it showed that he personally sold cocaine to the confidential informant on several occasions, he communicated with his co-defendant about selling cocaine to the informant, he was present for a buy between the co-defendant and the informant at a carwash, he discussed the co-defendant's drug prices with the informant, and acted as a drug courier between the co-defendant and the informant. State v. Graham, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder was supported by sufficient proof of her criminal responsibility for the victim's death, and her conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder was supported by sufficient proof of an agreement to commit the murder; defendant knew the killing of her husband was going to occur, she agreed to pay half of the compensation to the killer, plus defendant and her daughter were victims of abuse by the husband and wanted him dead, and they conspired to commit the murder. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), rev'd, 537 S.W.3d 892, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 9, 2017).

Evidence defendant conspired with another to rob the victim, acted with the intent to rob the victim through the use of a deadly weapon, and was in possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed on a college campus supported his convictions for aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm on a college campus. State v. Spicer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2016).

There was evidence from which a jury could find defendant guilty of conspiracy to sell and deliver a Schedule II controlled substance because defendant and his co-conspirator acted in concert to sell cocaine to a confidential informant (CI); defendant knowingly solicited, negotiated, and arranged for the drug sale, and he provided directions, access to the co-conspirator and was the person designated to literally hand the drugs over to the CI. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2017).

Evidence that second defendant wanted his wife killed, second defendant conducted several internet searches regarding the penalties for accidentally shooting and killing a person, first defendant approached a potential shooter and arranged a meeting with the shooter and second defendant, and first defendant provided the shooter with an initial payment was sufficient to sustain defendants'  convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. State v. Patel, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Jan. 17, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone because a rational juror could find defendant knew a package delivered to defendant's address in a drug-free zone contained methamphetamine which defendant and defendant's associates intended to sell. State v. Cole, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 824 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for facilitating a conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone because a rational juror could find defendant knowingly substantially facilitated the conspiracy. State v. Cole, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 824 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2018).

Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder was supported by evidence that defendant and others worked to coordinate her father and her friend going to the victims'  house to kill them. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

All three defendants were involved in the events that led up to and included the victim's murder, and there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that an accomplice's testimony was corroborated and to sustain the convictions for each defendant for first degree murder, conspiracy, attempt, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment; they all met to discuss killing someone in retaliation for the murder of one defendant's sister earlier that day, and witnesses identified them. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's drug convictions because each of the co-conspirators testified that defendant was in charge of a network that trafficked controlled substances from Detroit to Knoxville, recorded phone calls and text messages corroborated that defendant was in charge of the drug network, the controlled buys took place within drug-free zones, defendant answered the same phone number used by a coconspirator to set up the controlled buys, multiple people testified that defendant delivered heroin and opiate pills to members of the conspiracy, and officers seized drugs at locations where defendant was known to frequent. State v. Winbush, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2020).

Trial court properly sentenced defendants to 21 and/or 25 years of incarceration after a jury convicted them of conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell heroin within 1000 feet of a drug-free school zone because the trial court made an explicit finding that a conspiracy existed—the first defendant packaged heroin for resale into small heat-sealed Ziploc baggies while the second defendant was present, and the second and third defendants resold the heroin to others—it would be extremely impractical and inefficient to hold a pretrial hearing due to the number of defendants and witnesses, the trial court could admit the co-conspirators'  statements before determining that a conspiracy existed. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of the sale of a Schedule II drug and conspiracy because an officer testified that he saw defendant pass the bottle of the purported drug to the accomplice, which the accomplice then gave to the officer, and when defendant and the accomplice were subsequently pulled over following the transaction, defendant had $150 on him, the exact amount the officer paid for the drug, but the accomplice had no money on him. State v. Savely, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to sell over 300 grams of methamphetamine because it showed that he supplied methamphetamine to the co-conspirator at the direction of another co-conspirator, the weight of the methamphetamine involved was over 300 grams, defendant knew that the methamphetamine was delivered to Tennessee by the first co-conspirator, the first co-conspirator delivered the methamphetamine to a third co-conspirator in the county, and defendant supplied the methamphetamine on more than one occasion. State v. Castillo, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support second and third defendants'  convictions for aggravated robbery, theft, conspiracy, aggravated burglary, and firearms offenses, as it showed that first defendant devised a plan to conduct a home invasion and steal stuff, he enlisted others, including second and third defendants, to carry o ut the plan, and the group carried out the plan, which included the use of masks, gloves, and a gun to take the items from the victim's home. State v. Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to sell or deliver a controlled substance because it showed that a confidential informant (CI) purchased oxycodone and heroin from defendant on two occasions, defendant was seen on two separate occasions getting into the CI's car and going to another man's house to purchase heroin for the CI, the drugs provided by the CI were tested and determined to be oxycodone and heroin, and the testimony at trial revealed that on two separate occasions defendant purchased heroin from another man to sell to the CI. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2020).

7. —Insufficient.

Where the jury determined that only one actor conspired to sell the cocaine, and only one actor conspired to deliver it, no conspiracy was established. State v. Copeland, 983 S.W.2d 703, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1337 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to possess marijuana where the record was devoid of any conspiratorial conduct between defendant and his son, a single drug transaction that took place on defendant's six-acre property was insufficient to establish a conspiracy, and the fact that marijuana, a large amount of money, and guns were found in defendant's home did not show that he agreed to participate in the conspiracy. State v. Tuttle, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2015), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to launder money where the record failed to show that he was aware of and agreed to participate in his son's drug trafficking organization and all of the money seized from defendant's home was minted prior to 2000 which meant that it was more than likely obtained prior to the drug conspiracy. State v. Tuttle, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2015), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

8. Sentencing.

Trial judge committed no error by finding that T.C.A. 40-35-114(10) applied because it was defendant's decision to permit the victim to be shot, and for that shooting to continue until all ammunition was exhausted that substantially increased the victim's risk of death. Those facts were entirely separate and apart from those necessary to establish that defendant agreed with one or more other persons to kidnap the victim; consequently, it was not error for the trial judge to apply that enhancement factor to defendant's conspiracy sentence. State v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2012), cert. denied, Adams v. Tennessee, 184 L. Ed. 2d 146, 133 S. Ct. 269, 568 U.S. 880, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 6401 (U.S. 2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to five years in prison for conspiracy to sell and deliver more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine where it appropriately weighed the enhancing and mitigating factors under T.C.A. §§ 40-35-113, 40-35-114 and the evidence showed that defendant had participated in prior criminal conduct and the trial court acknowledged that defendant gave a considerable amount of information to law enforcement. State v. Mohssin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Jan. 26, 2017).

9. Lesser Included Offenses.

While the facts of the case, defendant's sole act of firing one bullet toward the occupants of the apartment, would support a conviction for reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation or reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, these crimes are not lesser-included offenses of attempted second degree murder, with which defendant was charged. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

10. Jurisdiction and Venue.

Tennessee had territorial jurisdiction and the county was the proper venue for defendant's trial for conspiracy to sell over 300 grams of methamphetamine because the evidence showed that one of co-conspirator's transported methamphetamine from Atlanta to the county in Tennessee. State v. Castillo, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2020).

39-12-104. Renunciation defense.

It is an affirmative defense to a charge of criminal attempt, solicitation or conspiracy that the person, after committing the criminal attempt, solicitation or conspiracy, prevented the successful commission of the offense attempted, solicited or conspired, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of the person's criminal purpose.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This defense applies to charges of criminal attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy. Since this is an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden to raise the defense and establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 39-11-204.

This defense applies only to the preparatory offenses of attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy.

The renunciation defense is designed to provide an incentive for offenders to abandon their criminal purpose before they accomplish their criminal goal. This section provides a defense only when the offender: (1) prevents successful completion of the ultimate offense; and (2) voluntarily renunciates the criminal purpose.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

General defenses, title 39, ch. 11, part 5.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to attempt, solicitation or conspiracy, defenses, § 39-12-105.

Solicitation, § 39-12-102.

Title definitions, § 39-11-106.

Law Reviews.

Book Review, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Tennessee, 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (1988).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Burden of Proof.

In the case of the affirmative defense of renunciation, the burden of raising the defense rested with defendant, and, where the evidence supported the conclusion that there was no voluntary, complete renunciation on the part of defendant, he failed to carry his burden. State v. Jackson, 946 S.W.2d 329, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

39-12-105. Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to attempt, solicitation or conspiracy — Defenses.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (c), it is immaterial to the liability of a person who solicits another to commit an offense that:
    1. The person or the one whom the person solicits does not occupy a particular position or have a particular characteristic that is an element of the offense, if the person believes that one of them does; or
    2. The one whom the person solicits is not legally responsible or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction for the commission of the offense.
  2. Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), it is immaterial to the liability of a person who conspires with another to commit an offense that the one with whom the person conspires is not legally responsible or, after the formation of the conspiracy, has been given immunity to prosecution or conviction for the commission of the offense.
  3. It is a defense to a charge of attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit an offense that if the criminal object were achieved, the person would not be guilty of an offense under the law defining the offense or as an accomplice under § 39-11-402.
  4. It is a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the person or the one with whom the person conspires does not occupy a particular position or have a particular characteristic which is an element of such offense, if the person believes one of them does.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Under subsection (a), an offender can be convicted of solicitation even if the person solicited is a minor, a police agent, incompetent or immune from prosecution. The underlying theory is that the public is harmed by a solicitation even if the co-conspirator cannot be prosecuted for the offense that is the object of the solicitation. Under subsection (b), an offender can be convicted of conspiracy even if the sole co-conspirator is a minor, incompetent or is immune from prosecution. Under subsection (d), however, a person could not be convicted of conspiracy if the sole co-conspirator is a police agent acting within the agent's duties. This retains the multilateral approach to conspiracy.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Solicitation, § 39-12-102.

Title definitions, § 39-11-106.

Law Reviews.

The Prevalence and Use of Criminal Defenses: A Preliminary Study (Neil P. Cohen, Michael G. Johnson, Tracy B. Henley), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 957 (1993).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Waiver of Defenses.

Because the statutory defense of T.C.A. § 39-12-105(c) could be waived in a voluntary guilty plea as it was non-jurisdictional, the inmate stood convicted at most by a voidable, but not void, judgment; therefore, he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief from his conviction of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping under T.C.A. § 39-13-305. State v. Cook, 250 S.W.3d 922, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008).

39-12-106. Multiple convictions.

  1. A person may not be convicted of more than one (1) of the offenses of criminal attempt, solicitation or conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same offense.
  2. A person may not be convicted of criminal attempt or solicitation and the offense that was the object of the attempt or solicitation.
  3. A person may be convicted of conspiracy and the offense which was the object of the conspiracy.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 10.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Subsection (a) bars multiple convictions for more than one preparatory offense where each is designed to achieve the same criminal objective. For example, if A hires B to assist in committing one robbery, A cannot be convicted of more than one of the preparatory offenses of attempt, solicitation or conspiracy.

Under subsection (b), a person cannot be convicted of criminal attempt or solicitation and the object offense of the attempt or solicitation. Under subsection (c), the conspiracy is not merged with the completed offense and, therefore, the offender may be convicted of both the conspiracy and the object offense.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to attempt, solicitation or conspiracy, defenses, § 39-12-105.

Instructions regarding insanity, § 40-18-117.

Solicitation, § 39-12-102.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

After a mistrial, double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial on the charge of conspiracy to commit first degree murder after a conviction on the charge of criminal responsibility for criminally negligent homicide because the elements were not the same under the test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306, 1932 U.S. LEXIS 875 (1932). State v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2007).

Defendant's sentences of incarceration and death did not constitute multiple punishments for the same conduct in violation of the U.S. Const. amend. 5 because the Blockburger  test was satisfied, as first-degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) required proof of a killing but did not require proof of an argument to commit a killing, as required under T. C.A. § 39-12-103(a). State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court improperly merged defendant's conspiracy conviction into her convictions for first degree premeditated murder and failed to impose a sentence for that conviction because this section provides that provides that a person may be convicted of conspiracy and the offense which was the object of the conspiracy. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

2. Merger.

Trial court erred in merging the conspiracy conviction because defendant could be convicted of both conspiracy and murder. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

39-12-107. Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy.

  1. Criminal attempt is an offense one (1) classification lower than the most serious crime attempted, unless the offense attempted was a Class C misdemeanor, in which case the attempt would not be an offense.
  2. Solicitation is an offense two (2) classifications lower than the most serious offense solicited, unless the offense solicited was a Class B or C misdemeanor, in which case the solicitation would not be an offense.
  3. Except as provided in § 39-17-417(i) and (j), conspiracy is an offense one (1) classification lower than the most serious offense that is the object of the conspiracy, unless the offense conspired was a Class C misdemeanor, in which case the conspiracy would not be an offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section departs from prior Tennessee law and provides a gradation of penalties for the preparatory offenses of attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy. This section provides that the punishment for attempt or conspiracy is one category lower than the most serious offense that was the object of the attempt or conspiracy, and the punishment for solicitation is two classifications lower than the most serious offense solicited. For example, kidnapping is a Class C felony. Therefore, an attempt or conspiracy to commit kidnapping is punished as a Class D felony, and solicitation to kidnap is punished as a Class E felony.

The only exception to this rule is in § 39-17-417(i) and (j), which makes the punishment for serious drug conspiracies the same as for the completed offense. The commission believes this additional sanction is appropriate for drug conspiracies involving substantial quantities of drugs.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Felonies and misdemeanors distinguished, § 39-11-110.

Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to attempt, solicitation or conspiracy, defenses, § 39-12-105.

Penalties for Class B and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for felony where punishment not prescribed, § 39-11-113.

Penalty for misdemeanor where punishment not prescribed, § 39-11-114.

Solicitation, § 39-12-102.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Because the crime of solicitation to commit aggravated assault was at least one step removed from the requisite level of force contemplated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(1), it did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the first prong of the definition. United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9940, 2011 FED App. 128P (6th Cir. May 17, 2011).

Tennessee state offense of solicitation to commit aggravated assault involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and involves the same kind of purposeful, violent and oppressive conduct as the enumerated offenses; it therefore qualifies as a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(2). United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9940, 2011 FED App. 128P (6th Cir. May 17, 2011).

Defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated rape was not barred by the statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 40-2-101(b)(1)-(2), because the John Doe arrest warrant and DNA profile commenced the prosecution against defendant in a timely fashion and tolled the statute of limitations until he was identified and apprehended; a John Doe warrant coupled with a DNA profile of an unknown suspected offender obtained before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations may validly commence a criminal prosecution and toll the statute of limitations. State v. Burdick, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 2011), aff'd, 395 S.W.3d 120, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 where a bank branch manager's testimony estimated the amount in the ATM at $60,000, but admitted on cross-examination that it could have been $58,000, and a rational trier of fact could had found from that testimony that the value of the property taken was more than $10,000. State v. Dunn, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2018).

2. Sentence.

Defendant's consecutive sentences for second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction were appropriate because the sentence for employment of a firearm was statutorily required to be consecutive to the sentence for the accompanying dangerous felony conviction; as for the other two convictions, defendant was a dangerous offender as his behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high; and the extended confinement was necessary to protect society from defendant's behavior and was reasonably related to the underlying offenses. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Length of defendant's sentences for second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction were appropriate because the sentences were within the applicable ranges; and the trial court identified several enhancing factors on the record as defendant had one prior felony and one prior misdemeanor drug conviction in addition to a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault, and he was on probation at the time of the current offense and previously had a sentence of probation revoked. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Record supported the trial court's findings that defendant was a dangerous offender, as the offense took place during the day in a public location, and the trial court found that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to serve his sentences for especially aggravated robbery and attempted voluntary manslaughter consecutively. State v. Steed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017).

Others were in the area when defendant began shooting, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement factor regarding no hesitation to commit a crime when the risk to human life was high, plus nothing established that the trial court wholly departed from the statutes in applying the various enhancement factors and within-range sentences; thus, there was no abuse of discretion in defendant's sentences of 23 years for aggravated robbery, five years for aggravated assault, and four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Steed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017).

Trial court erred when classifying defendant's attempt to deliver conviction as a Class B felony and requiring 100 percent service of the minimum sentence. State v. Pinegar, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 386 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Defendant's seven-year sentence for robbery was not excessive because it was within the sentence range for a Range II multiple offender and the presentence report supported the trial court's application of an enhancement factor for defendant's history of criminal convictions. State v. Ketchum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant probation because, while he pled guilty to the reduced charge of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the evidence supported the conclusion that he committed more than one completed aggravated sexual battery on his adopted daughter while she was under 13 years old; he obtained custody of the victim, removing her from the guardianship of others who could have protected her from him; and the trial court's finding that the presentence report was very disturbing supported the conclusion that it found the crime to be especially shocking, reprehensible, offensive, and of an exaggerated degree. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2018).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a five-year sentence because defendant was eligible for a sentence of three to six years; and, although the trial court misapplied the enhancement factor that defendant committed the crime to gratify his desire for pleasure or excitement as that factor was an element of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the trial court properly found as a separate enhancement factor that defendant abused a position of trust when he terminated the parental rights of the victim's biological parents and then subsequently sexually abused her. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2018).

Defendant's within-range sentence for attempted second-degree murder was proper because (1) statutory factors were considered, and (2) probation was properly denied based on avoiding depreciating the seriousness of the crime, rather than the crime's elements. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018).

Part 2
Organized Crime

39-12-201. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act of 1989.”

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Drug interdiction programs, financial incentives for counties, title 38, ch. 11, part 2.

Forfeiture of real property due to illegal drug-related activities, § 53-11-452.

Law Reviews.

The Use of Collateral Estoppel in Private Civil RICO Actions (Laura Ginger), 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 31 (1986).

39-12-202. Legislative intent.

  1. The general assembly hereby finds and declares that an effective means of punishing and deterring criminal activities of organized crime is through the forfeiture of profits acquired and accumulated as a result of such criminal activities. It is the intent of the general assembly that this part be used by prosecutors to punish and deter only such criminal activities.
    1. It is not the intent of the general assembly that isolated incidents of felony conduct be prosecuted under this part, but only an interrelated pattern of criminal activity, the motive or effect of which is to derive pecuniary gain.
    2. Nor is it the intent of the general assembly that employers or owners of businesses or corporations that are licensed to dispense controlled substances in this state be subject to this part because of violations of this part committed by employees of the businesses or corporations, if the employers or owners did not know or have reason to know of the violations.
    3. This section shall be construed to further the intent stated within this part.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-12-203. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

    1. “Beneficial interest” means either of the following:
      1. The interest of a person as a beneficiary under any trust arrangement pursuant to which a trustee or any other person holds legal or record title to personal or real property for the benefit of the person; or
      2. The interest of a person under any other form of express fiduciary arrangement pursuant to which any other person holds legal or record title to real or personal property for the benefit of the person;
    2. “Beneficial interest” does not include the interest of a stockholder in a corporation or the interest of a partner in either a general partnership or a limited partnership;
  1. “Documentary material” means any book, paper, document, writing, drawing, graph, chart, photograph, phono record, magnetic tape, computer print-out, or other data compilation from which information can be obtained or from which information can be translated into usable form or other tangible item;
  2. “Enterprise” means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, union chartered under the laws of this state, or other legal entity, or any unchartered union, association, or group of individuals associated in fact, although not a legal entity, and it includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental, as well as other entities, including criminal gangs, as defined in § 40-35-121(a);
  3. “Innocent person” includes bona fide purchasers and victims;
  4. “Investigative agency” means the office of the attorney general and reporter;
  5. “Pattern of racketeering activity” means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents; provided, that at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after July 1, 1986, and that the last of the incidents occurred within two (2) years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct;
  6. “Person” means any individual or entity holding or capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property;
  7. “Personal property” includes any personal property, or any interest in personal property, or any right, including bank accounts, debts, corporate stocks, patents or copyrights. Personal property and beneficial interest in personal property are deemed located where the trustee is, the personal property is, or the instrument evidencing the right is;
  8. “Racketeering activity” means to commit, to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to solicit, coerce, or intimidate another person to commit an act for financial gain that is a criminal offense involving controlled substances, and the amount of controlled substances involved in the offense is included under § 39-17-417(i) and (j) and its subdivisions or involving aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under §§ 39-17-1004(b)(1)(A) and 39-17-1005(a)(1) or to commit, attempt to commit, conspire to commit, or to solicit, coerce, or intimidate another person to commit a criminal gang offense, as defined in § 40-35-121(a);
  9. “Real property” means any real property situated in this state or any interest in the real property, including, but not limited to, any lease of or mortgage upon such real property. Real property and beneficial interest in real property are deemed to be located where the real property is located;
  10. “RICO lien notice” means the notice described in § 39-12-207;
    1. “Trustee” means any of the following:
      1. Any person who holds legal or record title to real or personal property in which any other person has a beneficial interest; or
      2. Any successor trustee to one (1) of the persons in subdivision (12)(A)(i);
    2. “Trustee” does not include any person serving as a fiduciary appointed by a court to administer an estate or acting as a trustee of any testamentary trust or as a trustee of any indenture of trust under which any bonds have been or are to be issued; and
  11. “Unlawful debt” means any money or other thing of value constituting principal or interest of a debt that is legally unenforceable in this state in whole or in part, because the debt was incurred or contracted in violation of:
    1. Chapter 17, part 4 of this title, and the amount of controlled substances involved in the violation is included under § 39-17-417(i) or (j);
    2. Sections 39-17-1004(b)(1)(A) and 39-17-1005(a)(1), involving especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor;
    3. Section 39-13-309, involving trafficking for commercial sex acts;
    4. Section 39-13-515, involving promoting prostitution;
    5. Section 39-13-514(b)(3)(A), involving patronizing prostitution;
    6. Section 39-13-528(a), involving solicitation of a minor; or
    7. Section 39-13-529, involving soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, exploitation of a minor by electronic means.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1992, ch. 937, §§ 1, 2; 2012, ch. 1090, §§ 1, 2; 2013, ch. 278, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence.

Summary-judgment procedures simply do not apply to a federal habeas court's final adjudication of an Atkins v. Virginia claim. Rather, it is the petitioner who has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734, 2017 FED App. 174P, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14771 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2017).

39-12-204. Unlawful activities.

  1. It is unlawful for any person who has, with criminal intent, received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the proceeds derived from the use or investment thereof, in the acquisition of any title to or any right, interest, or equity in, real or personal property or in the establishment or operation of any enterprise.
  2. It is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of any enterprise of real or personal property.
  3. It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to knowingly conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of any unlawful debt.
  4. It is unlawful for any person to conspire or endeavor to violate subsection (a), (b) or (c).
  5. Multiple and alternative violations of this section shall be alleged in multiple separate counts, with the factual basis for the alleged predicate acts set forth in each count. A person may only be convicted either of one (1) criminal violation of this section, including a conviction for conspiring to violate this section, or for one (1) or more of the predicate acts, but not both. The state shall not be required to elect submission to the jury of the several counts.
  6. In order to convict a person or persons under this part, based upon a conspiracy to violate any subsection of this section, the state must prove that there was a meeting of the minds between all co-conspirators to violate this part and that an overt act in furtherance of the intention was committed.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Application for consent to petition to convene investigative grand jury, § 40-12-201.

Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Part definitions, § 39-12-203.

39-12-205. Penalties.

  1. Any person convicted of engaging in activity in violation of this part commits a Class B felony and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) or sentenced to imprisonment from within Range II, unless the person qualifies for a higher range, or both.
    1. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law, any person convicted of engaging in conduct in violation of this part, through which pecuniary value is derived, or by which personal injury or property damage or other loss is caused, may be sentenced to pay a fine that does not exceed three (3) times the gross value gained or three (3) times the gross loss caused, whichever is the greater, plus court costs and the costs of investigation and prosecution, reasonably incurred.
    2. For the purposes of subdivision (b)(1) “pecuniary value” means:
      1. Anything of value in the form of money, a negotiable instrument, or a commercial interest or anything else, the primary significance of which is economic advantage; or
      2. Any other property or service that has a value in excess of five hundred dollars ($500).
  2. The court shall hold a hearing to determine the amount of the fine authorized by subsection (b).
  3. Any fine imposed pursuant to this section shall be fixed in accordance with § 40-35-301.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Part definitions, § 39-12-203.

Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

39-12-206. Civil proceedings — Injunctions — Forfeiture of property — Future criminal actions — Statute of limitations.

  1. Any circuit or chancery court may, after making due provision for the rights of innocent persons, in compliance with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, enjoin violations of this part by issuing appropriate orders and judgments, including, but not limited to:
    1. Ordering any defendant to divest the defendant of any interest in any enterprise, including real property;
    2. Imposing reasonable restrictions upon the future activities or investments of any defendant, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any defendant from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise in which the defendant was engaged in violation of this part;
    3. Ordering the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise;
    4. Ordering the suspension or revocation of a license, permit or prior approval guaranteed to any enterprise by any agency of the state; and
    5. Ordering the forfeiture of the charter of a corporation organized under the laws of the state, or the revocation of a certificate authorizing a foreign corporation to conduct business within the state, upon finding that the board of directors or a managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation, in conducting the affairs of the corporation, has authorized or engaged in conduct in violation of this part and that, for the prevention of future criminal activity, the public interest requires the charter of the corporation forfeited and the corporation dissolved or the certificate revoked.
  2. All property, real or personal, including money, used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through, conduct in violation of this part is subject to civil forfeiture to the state. No fee paid for legal, medical or accounting service shall be subject to forfeiture under this section, unless the person or persons to whom such fee was paid had knowledge that the funds used to pay the fee were derived from activity in violation of this part. The state shall dispose of all forfeited property as soon as commercially feasible, subject to the lawful claim of any creditor. If the property is not exercisable or transferable for value by the state, the forfeiture shall expire. All forfeitures or dispositions under this section shall be made with due provision for the rights of innocent persons. The proceeds realized from forfeiture and disposition shall be promptly deposited in the criminal injuries compensation fund established by § 40-24-107.
  3. Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by a law enforcement officer upon court process. Seizure without process may be made, if:
    1. The seizure is incident to a lawful arrest or search or any inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; or
    2. The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a forfeiture proceeding based upon this section.
  4. If a seizure occurs under subsection (c), a forfeiture proceeding shall be instituted promptly. Property taken or detained under this section shall not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the law enforcement officer making the seizure, subject only to the order of the court. When property is seized under this section, pending forfeiture and final disposition, the law enforcement officer may:
    1. Place the property under seal;
    2. Remove the property to a place designated by the court; or
    3. Require another agency authorized by law to take custody of the property and remove it to any appropriate location.
  5. The office of the attorney general and reporter shall institute all civil proceedings and RICO lien notices under this part. In any action brought under this section, the circuit or chancery court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination.
  6. In a civil proceeding, relief shall be granted in conformity with the principles that govern the granting of injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other civil cases, except that no showing of special or irreparable damage to the person shall have to be made. Pending final determination of a proceeding initiated under this section, the court may enter a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, may require execution of satisfactory performance bond, or may take any other action, including the appointment of receiver, upon a showing of immediate danger or significant injury, including the possibility that any judgment for money damages might be difficult to execute or that such action is necessary to preserve the reachability of property subject to civil forfeiture. Following the entry of any order of civil forfeiture under this section, the trial court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action, including the appointment of a receiver, that the court deems proper to protect the interests of the plaintiff.
  7. A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding under this part shall estop the defendant in any subsequent civil action or proceeding as to all matters as to which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties.
  8. Notwithstanding any other law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under this part may be commenced at any time within five (5) years after the conduct in violation of this part terminates or the cause of action accrues. If a criminal prosecution or civil action or other proceeding is brought, or intervened in, to punish, prevent or restrain any violation of this part, the running of the period of limitations prescribed by this section with respect to any cause of action arising under subsection (f) that is based in whole or in part upon any matter complained of in any such prosecution action or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency of the prosecution action or proceeding and for two (2) years following its termination.
  9. The application of one (1) civil remedy under any provision of this part shall not preclude the application of any other remedy, civil or criminal, under this part or any other law. Civil remedies under this part are supplemental and not mutually exclusive.
  10. It is an element of the burden of proof in the final resolution of any civil proceeding instituted pursuant to this section that the defendant committed either the requisite predicate acts or a criminal violation of this part.
  11. In any action in which the plaintiff substantially prevails, including preliminary proceedings under subsection (f), the plaintiff shall also recover reasonable attorney's fees in the trial and appellate courts and costs of investigation and litigation reasonably incurred.
  12. Personal service of any process in an action under this section may be made upon any person outside the state, if the person was a principal in any conduct constituting a violation of this part in this state. The person is deemed to have thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for the purposes of this section.
  13. Forfeited property shall be titled in the name of the state of Tennessee and shall be disposed of in accordance with the terms of this subsection (m). The office of the attorney general and reporter may contract for property management services, including, but not limited to, the collection, securing, safekeeping, repair and disposition of property forfeited or seized. The state shall self-insure forfeited and seized property, both realty and personalty, pursuant to title 12, chapter 3, part 9. Liability claims against the state relative to forfeited and seized property shall be presented to the claims commission in accordance with its governing sections and rules.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 977, § 1.

Cross-References. Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Disposition of forfeited property, title 39, ch. 11, part 7.

Injunctions, title 29, ch. 23, part 1.

Process, title 20, ch. 2.

Remedies, title 29, ch. 23.

39-12-207. RICO lien notice — Liens — Title or interest holders — Unauthorized conveyances.

  1. Upon the institution of any civil or criminal proceeding, the investigative agency, then or at any time during the pendency of the proceeding, may file a RICO lien notice in the official records of any one (1) or more counties. No filing fee or other charge is required as a condition for filing the RICO lien notice, and the clerk of the court shall, upon the presentation of a RICO lien notice, immediately record it in the official records.
  2. The RICO lien notice shall be signed by the attorney general and reporter or the attorney general and reporter's designee. The notice shall be in such form as the attorney general and reporter prescribes and shall set forth the following information:
    1. The name of the person against whom the civil or criminal proceeding has been brought. In its discretion, the investigative agency may also name in the RICO lien notice any other aliases, names, or fictitious names under which the person may be known and any corporation, partnership, or other entity that is either controlled or entirely owned by the person;
    2. If known to the investigative agency, the present residence and business addresses of the person named in the RICO lien notice and of other names set forth in the RICO lien notice;
    3. A reference to the civil or criminal proceeding, stating:
      1. That a proceeding under this part has been brought against the person named in the RICO lien notice;
      2. The name of the county or counties in which the proceeding has been brought; and
      3. If known to the investigative agency at the time of filing the RICO lien notice, the case number of the proceeding;
    4. A statement that the notice is being filed pursuant to this part; and
      1. The name and address of the investigative agency filing the RICO lien notice and the name of the individual signing the RICO lien notice.
      2. A RICO lien notice shall apply only to one (1) person and, to the extent applicable, any other aliases, names or fictitious names, including names of corporations, partnerships, or other entities, to the extent permitted in subdivision (b)(1).
      3. A separate RICO lien notice shall be filed for each person against whom the investigative agency desires to file a RICO lien notice under this section.
  3. The investigative agency shall, as soon as practicable after the filing of each RICO lien notice, furnish to the person named in the notice either a copy of the recorded notice or a copy of the notice with a notation on the notice of the county or counties in which the notice has been recorded. The failure of the investigative agency to furnish a copy of the notice under this subsection (c) shall not invalidate or otherwise affect the notice.
    1. The filing of a RICO lien notice creates, from the time of its filing, a lien in favor of the state on the following property of the person named in the notice and against any other names set forth in the notice:
      1. Any real or personal property situated in the county where the notice is filed then or thereafter owned by the person or under any of the names; and
      2. Any beneficial interest in real or personal property situated in the county where the notice is filed then or thereafter owned by the person or under any of the names.
    2. The lien shall commence and attach as of the time of filing of the RICO lien notice and shall continue until expiration, termination, or release of the notice pursuant to § 39-12-208. The lien created in favor of the state shall be superior and prior to the interest of any other person in the real or personal property or beneficial interest, if the interest is acquired subsequent to the filing of the notice.
  4. In conjunction with any civil proceeding:
    1. The investigative agency may file a lis pendens in any county without prior court order; in such case, any person acquiring an interest in the subject real property or beneficial interest, if the real property or beneficial interest is acquired subsequent to the filing of lis pendens, shall take the interest subject to the civil proceeding and any subsequent judgment of forfeiture; and
    2. If a RICO lien notice has been filed, the investigative agency may name as defendant, in addition to the person named in the notice, any person acquiring an interest in the real or personal property or beneficial interest subsequent to the filing of the notice. If a judgment of forfeiture is entered in the proceeding in favor of the state, the interest of any person in the property that was acquired subsequent to the filing of the notice shall be subject to the notice and judgment of forfeiture.
    1. A trustee who acquires actual knowledge that a RICO lien notice or a civil proceeding or criminal proceeding has been filed against any person for whom the trustee holds legal or record title to real or personal property shall immediately furnish to the investigative agency the following:
      1. The name and address of the person, as known to the trustee;
      2. The name and address, as known to the trustee, of each other person for whose benefit the trustee holds title to the real or personal property; and
      3. If requested by the investigative agency, a copy of the trust agreement or other instrument pursuant to which the trustee holds legal or record title to the real or personal property.
    2. Any trustee who fails to comply with this subsection (f) commits a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. Any trustee who conveys title to real or personal property for which, at the time of the conveyance, a RICO lien notice naming a person who, to the actual knowledge of the trustee, holds a beneficial interest in the trust has been filed in the county where the real or personal property is situated is liable to the state for the greatest of:
      1. The amount of proceeds received directly by the person named in the RICO lien notice;
      2. The amount of proceeds received by the trustee as a result of the conveyance and distributed to the person named in the RICO lien notice; or
      3. The fair market value of the interest of the person named in the RICO lien notice in the real or personal property so conveyed.
    2. However, if the trustee conveys the real or personal property and holds the proceeds that would otherwise be paid or distributed to the beneficiary or at the direction of the beneficiary or the beneficiary's designee, the trustee's liability shall not exceed the amount of the proceeds so held for so long as the proceeds are held by the trustee.
  5. The filing of a RICO lien notice shall not constitute a lien on the record title to real or personal property as owned by the trustee, except to the extent that the trustee is named in the RICO lien notice. The investigative agency may bring a civil proceeding in any circuit or chancery court against the trustee to recover from the trustee the amount set forth in subsection (g), and the state shall also be entitled to recover investigative costs and attorney's fees incurred by the investigative agency.
  6. The filing of a RICO lien notice shall not affect the use to which real or personal property or a beneficial interest owned by the person named in the RICO lien notice may be put, or the right of the person to receive any rents, or other proceeds resulting from the use and ownership, but not the sale, of the property, until a judgment of forfeiture is entered.
    1. This section shall not apply to any conveyance by a trustee pursuant to a court order, unless such court order is entered in an action between the trustee and beneficiary.
    2. Unless the trustee has actual knowledge that a person owning a beneficial interest in the trust is named in a RICO lien notice or is otherwise a defendant in a civil proceeding, this section shall not apply to:
      1. Any conveyance by the trustee required under the terms of the trust agreement, which trust agreement is a matter of public record prior to the filing of the RICO lien notice; or
      2. Any conveyance by the trustee to all of the persons who own beneficial interests in the trust.
  7. Upon the entry of a final judgment of forfeiture in favor of the state of Tennessee, the title of the state to the forfeited property shall:
    1. In the case of real property, or a beneficial interest in the real property, relate back to the date of filing of the RICO lien notice in the official records of the county where the real property or a beneficial interest in the real property is located; and if no RICO lien notice is filed, then to the date of the filing of any notice of lis pendens under subsection (e) in the official records of the county where the real property or a beneficial interest in it is located; and if no RICO lien notice or notice of lis pendens is filed, then to the date of the recording of the final judgment of forfeiture in the official records of the county where the real property or a beneficial interest in the real property is located; and
    2. In the case of personal property, or a beneficial interest in it, relate back to the date the personal property or the beneficial interest in it was seized by the state, or the date of filing of the RICO lien notice in the official records of the county where the personal property or a beneficial interest in the personal property is located; but if the property was not seized and no RICO lien notice was filed, then to the date of the recording of the final judgment of forfeiture in the official records of the county where the personal property, or a beneficial interest in the personal property, is located.
  8. If real or personal property, or a beneficial interest in the real or personal property, subject to forfeiture is conveyed, alienated, disposed of, or otherwise rendered unavailable for forfeiture after the filing of the RICO lien notice, or after the filing of a civil proceeding or criminal proceeding, whichever is earlier, the attorney general and reporter may institute an action in any circuit or chancery court against the person named in the RICO lien notice or the defendant in the civil proceeding or criminal proceeding; and the court shall enter final judgment against the person named in the RICO lien notice or the defendant in the civil proceeding or criminal proceeding in an amount equal to the fair market value of the property or any beneficial interest in the real or personal property, together with investigative costs and attorney's fees incurred by the investigative agency in the action. If a civil proceeding is pending, such action shall be filed only in the court where such civil proceeding is pending.
  9. If real or personal property, or a beneficial interest in the real or personal property, subject to forfeiture is conveyed, alienated, or otherwise disposed of after the filing of the RICO lien notice, or after the filing of a civil proceeding or criminal proceeding, whichever is earlier, the state may treat the disposal as a fraudulent and preferential conveyance.
  10. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any person who has perfected a security interest in real or personal property, or a beneficial interest in it, for the payment of an enforceable debt or other similar obligation prior to the filing of a RICO lien notice or a lis pendens in reference to the property or interest may foreclose the interest as otherwise provided by law. The foreclosure of the interest shall, insofar as it is practicable, be made in such a fashion that it will not otherwise interfere with a forfeiture under this part.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-12-208. RICO lien notice — Term — Renewal — Release — Termination.

  1. The term of a RICO lien notice shall be for a period of six (6) years from the date of filing, unless a renewal RICO lien notice has been filed by the investigative agency; in such case, the term of the renewal RICO lien notice shall be for a period of six (6) years from the date of its filing. The investigative agency shall be entitled to only one (1) renewal of the RICO lien notice.
  2. The investigative agency filing a RICO lien notice may release, in whole or in part, the RICO lien notice or may release any specific real or personal property or beneficial interest from the RICO lien notice, upon such terms and conditions as it may determine. A release of a RICO lien notice executed by the investigative agency may be filed in the official records of any county. No charge or fee shall be imposed for the filing of a release of a RICO lien notice.
  3. If no civil proceeding has been instituted by the investigative agency seeking a forfeiture of any property owned by the person named in the RICO lien notice, the acquittal in the criminal proceeding of the person named in the RICO lien notice, or the dismissal of the criminal proceeding shall terminate the RICO lien notice. In such case, the filing of the RICO lien notice shall be of no effect. If a civil proceeding has been instituted, and if the criminal proceeding has been dismissed or the person named in the RICO lien notice has been acquitted in the criminal proceeding, the RICO lien notice shall continue for the duration of the civil proceeding.
  4. If no civil proceeding is then pending against the person named in a RICO lien notice, the person named in the RICO lien notice may institute an action in the county where the notice has been filed against the investigative agency that filed the notice seeking a release or extinguishment of the notice. In such case:
    1. The court shall, upon the motion of the person named in the RICO lien notice, immediately enter an order setting a date for hearing, which date shall be not less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) days after the suit has been filed; and the order, along with a copy of the complaint, shall be served on the investigative agency within three (3) days after the institution of the suit. At the hearing, the court shall take evidence on the issue of whether any real or personal property or beneficial interest owned by the person is covered by the RICO lien notice or is otherwise subject to forfeiture under this part; unless the investigative agency shows probable cause that the RICO lien notice is applicable to the person or that any real or personal property or beneficial interest owned by the person is subject to forfeiture under this part, the court shall enter a judgment extinguishing the RICO lien notice or releasing the real or personal property or beneficial interest from the RICO lien notice;
    2. The court shall immediately enter its order releasing from the RICO lien notice any specific real or personal property or beneficial interest, if a sale of the real or personal property or beneficial interest is pending and the filing of the notice prevents the sale of the property or interest; provided, that the proceeds resulting from the sale of the real or personal property or beneficial interest shall be deposited to the credit of the clerk of the court, subject to the further order of the court; and
    3. At the hearing set forth in subdivision (d)(1), the court may release any real or personal property or beneficial interest from the RICO lien notice, upon the posting by the person of such security as is equal to the value of the real or personal property or beneficial interest owned by the person.
  5. If a civil proceeding is pending against a person named in a RICO lien notice, the court, upon motion by the person, may grant the relief set forth in this section.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Part definitions, § 39-12-203.

39-12-209. Investigative agencies — Oaths — Subpoenas — Evidence.

  1. If, pursuant to the civil enforcement provisions of this part, the investigative agency has reason to believe that a person or other enterprise has engaged in, or is engaging in, activity in violation of this part, the investigative agency may administer oaths or affirmations, subpoena witnesses or material, and collect evidence pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. If matter that the investigative agency seeks to obtain by the subpoena is located outside the state, the person or enterprise subpoenaed may make the matter available to the investigative agency or its representative for examination at the place where the matter is located. The investigative agency may designate representatives, including officials of the jurisdiction in which the matter is located, to inspect the matter on its behalf and may respond to similar requests from officials of other jurisdictions.
  3. Upon failure of a person or enterprise without lawful excuse to obey a subpoena, and after reasonable notice to the person or enterprise, the investigative agency may apply to the circuit or chancery court for the judicial district in which the person or enterprise resides, is found, or transacts business for an order compelling compliance.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Part definitions, § 39-12-203.

39-12-210. Remedies of creditors and innocent persons.

  1. Any creditor or innocent person who has an interest in any real or personal property that is the subject of any civil suit filed by the investigative agency shall have the right to intervene in the civil suit.
    1. If there is no civil suit pending, any creditor or innocent person who has an interest in any real or personal property that is the subject of any RICO lien notice may apply to the investigative agency for a release of the property. The investigative agency shall, within thirty (30) days of such application, either release the property or deny the application. If the investigative agency denies the application for relief, the creditor or innocent person may petition the appropriate chancery or circuit court for release of the lien. The hearing shall be held within thirty (30) days of receipt of process by the investigative agency.
    2. Upon application for release or hearing pursuant to this section, the real or personal property, or portion of the real or personal property in which a creditor or innocent person has an interest, shall be released, upon a finding that the creditor or innocent person is not a participant with the defendant in the enterprise or racketeering activity, and did not know, or have reason to know, of such activity prior to the filing of a RICO lien notice.
  2. The remedies provided to creditors and innocent persons in this section are in addition to any other rights or remedies provided by this part or by law.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Part definitions, § 39-12-203.

Part 3
Crimes of Force or Violence

39-12-301. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Acting in concert”, as used in this part, means such conduct that would make one criminally responsible pursuant to § 39-11-401, § 39-11-402, or § 39-11-403; and
  2. “Crime of force or violence” means any of the following felony offenses:
    1. Aggravated assault as defined in § 39-13-102(a)(1);
    2. Robbery as defined in § 39-13-401; and
    3. Aggravated burglary as defined in § 39-14-403.

Acts 2012, ch. 725, § 2.

39-12-302. Higher classification for crime of force or violence when acting in concert.

  1. A crime of force or violence committed while acting in concert with two (2) or more other persons shall be classified one (1) classification higher than if it was committed alone.
  2. The indictment shall charge that the offense was committed while acting in concert with two (2) or more other persons.

Acts 2012, ch. 725, § 3.

Chapter 13
Offenses Against Person

Part 1
Assaultive Offenses

39-13-101. Assault.

  1. A person commits assault who:
    1. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
    2. Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury; or
    3. Intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another and a reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or provocative.
    1. Assault under:
      1. Subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by incarceration and a fine not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);
      2. Subdivision (a)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor; and
      3. Subdivision (a)(3) is a Class B misdemeanor.
    2. Any conduct by an inmate against a correctional officer, guard, jailer, or other full-time employee of a penal institution, local jail, or workhouse, that would constitute an assault under subdivision (a)(1) shall be reported by the managing authority of the institution to the appropriate district attorney general for prosecution.
    3. In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of this section, if the relationship between the defendant and the victim of the assault is such that the victim is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601, and if, as determined by the court, the defendant possesses the ability to pay a fine in an amount not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200), then the court shall impose a fine at the level of the defendant's ability to pay, but no less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200). The additional fine shall be paid to the clerk of the court imposing sentence, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fine to the general fund. All fines so credited to the general fund shall be subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the exclusive purpose of funding family violence shelters and shelter services. Such appropriation shall be in addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to § 67-4-411.
  2. For purposes of this section and § 39-13-102, “health care provider” means a person who is licensed, certified or otherwise authorized or permitted by the laws of this state to administer health care in the ordinary course of business in the practicing of a profession.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 11; 2002, ch. 649, § 1; 2009, ch. 412, § 1; 2010, ch. 981, § 2; 2013, ch. 325, §§ 1, 3; 2016, ch. 1052, § 1; 2018, ch. 925, § 1; 2020, ch. 756, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is the generic misdemeanor assault offense. “Bodily injury,” broadly defined in § 39-11-106, includes abrasions and cuts, physical pain, illness or impairment.

Subdivision (a)(3) extends beyond “bodily injury” and proscribes physical contact that a “reasonable person” would consider extremely offensive or provocative. Since bodily injury is more harmful than physical contact, it is punished if done intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. Both fear of bodily injury and physical contact must be done intentionally or knowingly to constitute assault; recklessness is not sufficient.

When bodily injury results or is reasonably feared, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor. If only physical contact which is extremely offensive or provocative occurs, the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2020, ch. 756, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses occurring on or after July 1, 2020.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, in (b), rewrote former (1)(A) which read: “Assault is a Class A misdemeanor unless the offense is committed under subdivision (a)(3), in which event assault is a Class B misdemeanor; provided, that, if the offense is committed against a law enforcement officer or a health care provider acting in the discharge of the provider's duty, then the maximum fine shall be five thousand dollars ($5,000).”, added present (1)(B) and (1)(C), redesignated former (1)(B) and (2) as present (2) and (3), respectively, and substituted “the managing authority of the institution” for “the department of correction” in present (2).

The 2020 amendment substituted “but no less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200).” for “but not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200).” at the end of the first sentence in (b)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 925, § 5. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2020, ch. 756, § 2. July 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Attempt, § 39-12-101.

Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Criminal injuries compensation claim procedure for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-108.

Criminal injuries compensation for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-106.

Criminal injuries compensation fund privilege tax upon persons committing sexual offenses upon children, § 40-24-107.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Jury providing punishment for less than one year, § 40-20-103.

Limitation of actions in prosecutions for offenses committed against children, § 40-2-101.

Notification to victim that family member or household member who was arrested for assault may be released on bond, § 36-3-615.

Penalties for Class A and B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Robbery, §§ 39-13-401, 39-13-402.

Spousal abuse, title 36, ch. 3, part 6.

Title definitions, § 39-11-106.

Weapons, title 39, ch. 17, part 13.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 27.103, 32.64, 32.131.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Assault and Battery, § 1; 10 Tenn. Juris., Double Jeopardy, § 11; 14 Tenn. Juris., Homicide, §§ 32, 33, 62; 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, §§ 7, 8; 22 Tenn. Juris., Robbery, § 4.

Law Reviews.

Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey of Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 177 (1999).

Denying the Dyad: How Criminalizing Pregnant Drug Use Harms the Baby, Taxpayers and Vulnerable Women, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 745 (2015).

No Safe Harbors: Examining the Shift From Voluntary Treatment Options to Criminalization of Maternal Drug Use in Tennessee, 46 U. Mem. L. Rev. 203 (2015).

The Proposed Tennessee Criminal Code — General Interpretive Provisions and Culpability, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 131 (1975).

Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment to Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Relationship with Other Laws.

Tennessee state offense of solicitation to commit aggravated assault involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and involves the same kind of purposeful, violent and oppressive conduct as the enumerated offenses; it therefore qualifies as a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(2). United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9940, 2011 FED App. 128P (6th Cir. May 17, 2011).

Because the crime of solicitation to commit aggravated assault was at least one step removed from the requisite level of force contemplated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(1), it did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the first prong of the definition. United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9940, 2011 FED App. 128P (6th Cir. May 17, 2011).

T.C.A. § 39-13-111(b) does not categorically qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Violation of a statute that builds on T.C.A. § 39-13-101 but makes it a crime only to cause “bodily injury,” serious or not, does not require the use of violent force.  United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d 582, 2012 FED App. 344P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 19635 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 2012).

Juvenile petitions conclusively showed that defendant was convicted under the (a)(1) variant of Tennessee aggravated assault; neither the (a)(2) nor the (a)(3) variant of aggravated assault would have been a lesser-included offense because the original attempted murder charge did not include the elements needed for a conviction under those subsections, and it was a crime of violence under the ACCA's use-of-force clause.  Davis v. United States,  2018 FED App. 0189P (6th Cir.), — F.3d —,  2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24163 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2018).

2. Elements.

For Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) purposes, predicate felonies did not have to be in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt; however, defendant's conviction under former T.C.A. § 39-13-102, which included recklessness through its incorporation of T.C.A. § 39-13-101, was not a categorically violent felony under either the “use of physical force” or “otherwise” clause of the ACCA. United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 2011 FED App. 202P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16025 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2011).

3. —“Intentionally and Knowingly.”

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault required the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were intentional or knowing, as defined by the criminal code; proof that occupants of a house were fearful when shots were fired into the house, while essential to establishing the actus reus, did not in any way establish this mens rea element, and defendant's conviction could not stand on the basis of such evidence. State v. Wilson, 924 S.W.2d 648, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. 1996).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated burglary, given that after forcefully entering the room, defendant continued to press further and further into the room, and he retreated only after seeing that there was another person in the room and the victim started screaming, and thus it was shown that defendant entered the room without consent and that he intended to cause fear of bodily injury, if not actual injury. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault by use of a skillet as a deadly weapon because the victim, defendant's then spouse, after arguing and consuming alcohol with defendant for some time before falling asleep on a sofa was jarred awake when defendant struck the victim in the head with an iron skillet, causing the victim pain and leaving the victim with a large knot and a cut on the top of the victim's head. State v. Lamb, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

4. —“Extremely Offensive or Provocative” Physical Contact.

No reasonable jury could conclude that defendant committed an assault by “extremely offensive or provocative” physical conduct, where defendant, using a knife, stuck the victim's finger and stabbed the victim's palm; examples of extremely offensive and provocative contact include kissing without one's consent, cutting one's hair without consent, or spitting in one's face. State v. Smiley, 38 S.W.3d 521, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. 2001).

5. —Causation.

The defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the victim's serious bodily injury so as to justify a conviction for aggravated assault. State v. Baggett, 836 S.W.2d 593, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

6. Election of Offenses.

Because the State adduced proof of more than one incident that each matched the allegations of the charging instrument, the election of offenses doctrine was implicated; the State's proof at trial allowed the jury to consider two incidents as each matching the single charge in the indictment for an aggravated assault, committed by violating an order of protection. State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction had to be reversed because the State's failure to elect an offense as to the aggravated assault charge, and the trial court's failure to require the State to do so, resulted in plain error; because the State failed to elect the specific instance for which it wanted the jury to consider for the charge, a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached, and defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was adversely affected. State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Neither defendant nor co-defendant one was entitled to relief based on their claims that the state failed to elect offenses as: (1) they were charged in the indictment with aggravated assault for intentionally and/or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to the victim; (2) the proof did not establish multiple offenses of aggravated assault such that the state was required to make an election; and (3) the trial court merged the assault convictions into their respective convictions for attempted first-degree murder and facilitation of attempted first-degree murder. State v. Brawner, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2012).

7. Multiple Convictions.

Defendant's convictions for assault and domestic assault violated double jeopardy under U.S. Const. amend. VI and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10 because all of the elements of assault were included in domestic assault and even though domestic assault included an element that assault did not the reverse was not true. State v. Freitas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2016).

8. Combination With Additional Criminal Charges.

In a home invasion case were the defendants were also convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, defendants'  separate convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping of victim did not violate due process where the confinement of the victim was beyond that necessary to commit robbery, where it lessened the risk of defendant's detection, and where it increased the victim's risk of harm. (overruled to extent this case required a legal, as opposed to factual, due process evaluation) State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Fuller v. Tennessee, 547 U.S. 1164, 126 S. Ct. 2321, 164 L. Ed. 2d 842, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4190 (2006), overruled in part, State v. Osby, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Hulse, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2013), overruled, State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013), overruled, State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2013), overruled, State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2013), overruled in part, Fuller v. Barbee, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137295 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014).

9. Lesser Included Offense.

In a prosecution for attempted aggravated sexual battery, where the facts presented were susceptible to a determination that defendant's conduct toward one victim was merely the type that a reasonable person would regard as extremely offensive or provocative, rather than an attempt to make unlawful sexual contact, the trial court should have charged the jury on simple assault as a lesser included offense. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

In a prosecution for rape by force or coercion, defendants could be convicted of the lesser included offense of assault where the touching of the victim, i.e., acts of sexual intercourse, was offensive but did not rise to the level of rape. State v. Buckmeir, 902 S.W.2d 418, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Class B misdemeanor assault is a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery. State v. Swindle, 30 S.W.3d 289, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. 2000), overruled in part, State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d 663, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. 2002).

The offense of intentionally causing “extremely offensive or provocative” physical contact should not have been submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault (bodily injury) under T.C.A. § 39-13-102. State v. Smiley, 38 S.W.3d 521, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. 2001).

Where evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction of child abuse, as it showed that defendant held the victim down to sexually assault the victim, the victim attempted to fight off defendant, and the victim sustained bruises as a result of defendant's conduct, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense of child abuse; because the appellate court was unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the omission of a jury instruction on child abuse did not affect the outcome of the trial, the error was not harmless, and defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery had to be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. State v. Elkins, 83 S.W.3d 706, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. 2002).

Because the inmate affirmatively requested a jury instruction on the offense of aggravated assault, even though he was in error in believing that it was a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree murder, he effectively agreed to amend the indictment to include aggravated assault; therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to convict the inmate of aggravated assault, his conviction was not void, and he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Demonbreun v. Bell, 226 S.W.3d 321, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. May 8, 2007), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. May 25, 2007).

Defendant was improperly found guilty of aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of the indicted offense of rape of a child because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for child abuse and neither assault, nor attempted assault was a lesser included offense of rape of a child. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 504 S.W.3d 260, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2016).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was modified to reckless endangerment because (1) the jury found serious injury but did not find an adverse effect on the victim's welfare, and (2) reckless endangerment was the next properly-charged lesser-included offense the evidence supported. State v. Hodges, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Because Class B misdemeanor assault was not a lesser-included offense of attempted rape, as assault as charged in defendant's case always involved an unlawful sexual contact whereas attempted rape did not, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on Class B misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted rape. State v. Durham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Petitioner failed to show that, but for trial counsel's deficiency, the jury would have convicted him of misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery because the State presented proof that petitioner's unlawful sexual contact with the victim was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification; the victim's mother testified that she saw petitioner rubbing the victim's vagina over her clothes and that he had an erection. Townsend v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

10. Consent of Victim.

Where one victim admitted that he consented to defendant's sexual advances and did not claim to have suffered any bodily injury as a result of defendant's acts, assault convictions were not warranted. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

11. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient for conviction. State v. Buckmeir, 902 S.W.2d 418, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

There was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact would conclude that driver was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in a head-on collision with another car, where the defendant was driving on the wrong side of the street, in what witnesses described as a careless manner; had a blood alcohol level which supported a finding that his blood alcohol level would have been between .04 percent and .07 percent at the time of the collision; and falsely told a police officer at the scene that a friend had been driving. State v. Norris, 874 S.W.2d 590, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), overruled in part, State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. 2002).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's reckless aggravated assault convictions where there was absolutely no proof of bodily injury to either of the victims; in addition, reckless aggravated assault could not be a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault based on knowingly or recklessly causing another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault because the proof at trial established that defendant held the two victims at gunpoint and threatened to shoot them. One victim testified that he was terrified, while the second testified that he was afraid and thought that one or both of them were going to be killed. State v. Parsons, 437 S.W.3d 457, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. May 23, 2012).

Evidence that defendant scratched the victim's vagina, damaged the device affixed to the victim's back, causing her pain, caused the victim to have a sore forearm from the struggle, and caused discomfort to the victim's pubic area from the attack was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for assault. State v. Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for assault because she pushed an off-duty police officer into a ditch and sprayed him with mace as he attempted to climb out of the ditch, the officer testified that his finger was injured and that his eyes burned, which fell under the statutory definition of bodily injury, and the trial court, by its verdict, clearly rejected defendant's claim of self-defense and accredited the testimonies of the witnesses who denied that the officer assaulted defendant prior to being pushed into the ditch and sprayed with mace. State v. Teets, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016).

Although the victim denied any recollection of defendant hitting or harming her during their altercation, the officer's testimony that, when she arrived at the victim's home, the victim displayed scratches on her neck and the side of her cheek was sufficient for a rational jury to find that defendant intentionally caused bodily injury to the victim. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping because the jury credited the victim's testimony, and the testimony of other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated her account; the victim reported defendant's abuse to an officer, who noted injuries to her face and redness to her neck, and the injuries were observable in the photographs admitted at trial. State v. Baxter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second-degree murder where, by defendant's own admission, the victim was in the car with the door shut when he walked up and shot the passenger-side window out of the vehicle where the victim was sitting, there was no testimony that the victim was attempting to threaten defendant at that time, and defendant walked around to the front of the car, told the driver to move, and then shot the unarmed victim several more times. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault where the driver testified that defendant pulled a black and silver gun from his pants and pointed it at her, and she was terrified. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of assault where a rational trier of fact could have found that the victim reasonably feared imminent bodily injury both at the time he was behind bulletproof glass and at the moment when he left the bulletproof area to help the young girl who had been shot. State v. Perrier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016), aff'd, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault where it showed that the victim had to have part of his intestines, his gallbladder, and half of his liver removed, he was still unable to run or ride a bicycle as a result of his injuries, and defendant was armed with a gun. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Proof presented at trial was sufficient for rational trier of fact to find defendant committed an aggravated assault of his estranged wife beyond a reasonable doubt. The State proved the essential elements of aggravated assault by showing that defendant violated an active order of protection when he threatened his wife with a taser at an auction house. State v. Vinson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of assault and domestic assault where it showed that the victim had a slight abrasion on her nose and slight discoloration on her neck, the jury heard the victim's testimony and saw photographs of her injuries, the jury could have found that the victim reasonably feared bodily injury when defendant charged her and forced her to the ground, and the victim and defendant had a child together. State v. Freitas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2016).

In rejecting defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his convictions for aggravated kidnapping by bodily injury and domestic assault by bodily injury, the court of criminal appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the victim's removal and confinement had criminal significance beyond that necessary to consummate the domestic assault. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. July 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because the victim offered extensive testimony at trial regarding being cut by defendant, and the jury accredited that testimony; a doctor testified that the victim's injuries were extensive and required surgery, and without treatment, the victim would have likely died. State v. Pittman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Evidence that a man kicked open the victim's door, struggled with the victim causing injuries, fled out the front door, that a glove with defendant's DNA was left in the home, and that a car matching the description of the one the assailant left in was found at his fiance's home was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary, vandalism, and assault. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because defendant was aware of but consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim would be seriously injured; defendant, while being repositioned in his hospital bed, looked the victim directly in the eye, lifted both legs, and kicked her beneath her chin, and a nurse and officer testified that defendant stated he intended to kick the male nurse rather than the victim. State v. Day, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 873 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was charged with aggravated assault by the use of a deadly weapon, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the lesser-included offense of assault because, although defendant testified that the victim became violent, shoved and choked him, and beat him with a fan, and he used a knife to fend off the victim's attacks, the jury was free to reject defendant's testimony that he acted in self-defense; and the victim testified that defendant threatened and stabbed him with a knife, and he defended himself with a fan. State v. Parvin, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction because it showed defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused a victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by pointing a gun at the victim, and (2) did not act in self-defense. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because based on the testimony of the victim alone–that defendant had a gun in defendant's hand, held the gun out the window of defendant's vehicle, and fired a shot at the victim and that, as a result, the victim feared for the victim's life–a reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the use or display of a deadly weapon. State v. Tiller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2017).

Although defendant argued that defendant acted in self-defense, the evidence supported defendant's conviction for domestic assault because the victim and eyewitnesses testified that defendant struck the victim, whom defendant had dated at times over the years, but never married, during an exchange of custody of their infant son in a store parking lot. Although defendant argued that defendant acted in self-defense, the evidence supported defendant's conviction for domestic assault because the victim and eyewitnesses testified that defendant struck the victim, whom defendant had dated at times over the years, but never married, during an exchange of custody of their infant son in a store parking lot. The victim suffered cuts to the victim's nose in the altercation. State v. Glenn, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because the State of Tennessee presented evidence that defendant acted recklessly in discharging a deadly weapon into a house, causing bodily injury to the victim of the gunshot. Furthermore, defendant's admissible statements to the police established defendant's identity as the shooter. State v. Butts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for assault and contributing to the delinquency of a minor because the testimony by the witnesses for the State of Tennessee established that defendant not only encouraged defendant's minor child to attack the minor victim and prevented other people from going to the victim's aid, but that defendant also struck the victim. The evidence further established that the victim was injured as a result of the attack State v. Edwards, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Sept. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated assault conviction because a rational jury could have found that he knowingly caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the manner in which he displayed a deadly weapon, the baseball bat, because he approached the victim in an aggressive manner, the victim feared he would be struck and jumped into a nearby car to avoid harm, and based on defendant's threats earlier in the day it was reasonable for the victim to believe that defendant presented a real, immediate threat to his safety. State v. Fisher, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's multipe reckless aggravated assault convictions because defendant acted recklessly as a witness testified that defendant was driving in the wrong direction on an interstate highway when defendant's SUV hit the victims'  car head-on and crash reconstructionists testified that defendant's SUV was driving in the wrong direction and that the SUV's crash data recording system reflected that the SUV accelerated just before impact. State v. Pena, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 761 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault because the victim testified that defendant squirted lighter fluid on him and attempted to ignite it, and defendant admitted to a detective and a deputy chief that she had been the aggressor. State v. Dunavant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated assault because, although neither shooting victim directly testified the victim was in fear during the shooting, the jury was entitled to infer the victims'  fear of imminent bodily injury as the victims were forced to hide behind vehicles as defendant began shooting at them, one victim testified to ducking and dodging bullets while attempting to shoot back at defendant, and, after the shooting ended, the victims called 911 and followed defendant until police arrived. State v. Juarez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony because the evidence showed defendant fired numerous shots at victims in the parking lot of a crowded shopping mall. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Evidence did not establish that the victim constructively possessed any of the property taken from an apartment because the evidence did not support a conclusion that the victim had any interest in or right to the items taken from the apartment, and the victim's presence as a guest did not establish that the victim had a greater right to possess the items than defendant. Likewise, the lack of evidence regarding from where the items were taken precluded a conclusion that the items were taken from the victim's immediate presence and control. Boatwright v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary, theft, and assault because defendant had been informed he was no longer allowed inside the store or on the store's property; defendant, without the store's consent, entered the store and attempted to leave with a cup of ice and a bag of peanuts without paying for the items; and, when confronted by a store employee, defendant hit him in the face. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the jury clearly chose to credit the victim's version of events, rejecting defendant's testimony supporting self-defense; the victim testified specifically about the manner in which defendant and co-defendant began to follow him, about his attempts to get help through 911, about the shooting, about his fleeing the scene, and about his abandoning his own weapon to seek. State v. Manning, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault resulting in death, where an expert, after being apprised of the victim's pre-existing medical conditions as well as what occurred with the paramedics during transport, testified that the blunt force trauma was the cause of the victim's death. State v. Armstrong, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 672 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2020).

12. Jury Instructions.

Trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact during his trial for domestic assault where defendant's actions of using a tree branch to strike the victim's backside and leaving visible bruising was not the type of action that could be characterized as offensive or provocative. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 2016).

In a case in which defendant was indicted for five counts of rape by force or coercion, but was convicted of only two counts of the lesser offense of sexual battery, defendant's convictions were reversed as the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to the lesser-included offense of assault by extremely provocative or offensive physical contact because, by acquitting defendant of three of the indicted offenses and convicting him of the lesser-included offense of sexual battery on two of the counts, the jury obviously found much of the victim's testimony incredible; and there was a reasonable probability that the jury, if instructed on the lesser-included offense, would have convicted him on that offense rather than sexual battery. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 3, 2017).

Petitioner's conviction for aggravated sexual battery was reversed because trial counsel's failure to request an instruction on misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child was prejudicial to petitioner since given the proof, a properly instructed jury could have found petitioner guilty of misdemeanor assault; the victim's mother testified that she did not see petitioner doing anything to the victim, and the jury discredited the victim's claim of penetration. Townsend v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

13. Sentencing.

Where the trial court failed to instruct the jury that they had to determine the grade of misdemeanor assault, and no distinction was made by the jury in their verdict, defendants should have received convictions for Class B misdemeanor assault and been sentenced accordingly. State v. Buckmeir, 902 S.W.2d 418, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Where the affidavit of complaint states that defendant struck a police officer on the head with his fist during a traffic stop, he necessarily committed aggravated assault under Tennessee law. When defendant pleaded guilty to a federal offense for possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, the federal district court did not err by designating him as a career offender because his prior Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault was properly counted as a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2). In re Smith, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23525 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2016).

Because, under T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3), the crime of burglary was not complete until the person committed or attempted to commit a felony, theft, or assault, under a double jeopardy analysis, the statutory violations of theft and burglary in defendant's case arose from the same act or transaction, and the trial court was required to merge the theft and assault convictions into the burglary conviction. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2020).

14. Double Jeopardy Violation.

When the trial court amended defendant's conviction to simple assault, it did so in violation of defendant's protection against double jeopardy because, under T.C.A. § 39-13-101, simple assault was an offense that required an intentional or knowing mental state and specifically excluded the mens rea of recklessness, and the jury had already determined that defendant did not act intentionally or knowingly, collaterally estopping the trial court from entering the simple assault conviction; State v. Howell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2018).

15. Fresh Complaint Evidence.

In connection with defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, aggravated criminal trespass of a habitation, and two counts of assault, the victim's co-worker's testimony qualified as fresh complaint evidence, as he testified about the details of the incident, and defendant had vigorously attacked the victim's credibility prior to the co-worker's testimony; the victim's statements were timely and any error in admitting the testimony was harmless. State v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2018).

16. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, based upon a theory of criminal responsibility, because the evidence established that defendant was involved in planning the robbery of the victim in the victim's home, provided a BB gun and supplied a Sharpie for the purpose of painting the BB gun so that it would look like a real gun knowing that the BB gun was going to be used to rob the victim, provided the wrench which was used to repeatedly hit the victim during the robbery, and took a share of the stolen marijuana. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence that defendant pushed the victim and broke his beer bottle and that codefendants then beat the victim while defendant stood nearby but did not attempt to stop codefendants or aid the victim was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault. State v. Flowers, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because defendant became upset with the victim at a party, when the victim approached defendant and asked for the return of the victim's keys, defendant threatened the victim and lunged toward the victim, during the altercation defendant pulled out a knife and stabbed the victim, defendant chased the victim while still holding the knife, and defendant yelled that defendant was going to kill the victim. Furthermore, the jury rejected defendant's claim of self-defense. State v. Wood, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

Defendant's conviction for assault was supported by evidence that defendant told her daughter to go get a gun while standing on her balcony overlooking the victim's courtyard, the victim suffered from a disability was her mobility was restricted, and the threat caused the victim to fear for her life. State v. Goldberg, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because a police officer found cartridge cases fired from the same unknown gun at the scene of a shooting in a club, the victim testified that defendant shot the victim in the club, and defendant admitted to shooting defendant's gun—which defendant threw away—multiple times in the club. A reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant recklessly caused bodily injury to the victim while using or displaying a deadly weapon. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

17. “Law Enforcement Officer.”

Defendant was properly convicted of retaliation for past action because there was no dispute that defendant threatened to kill a deputy and his family—body camera footage was played for the jury during trial from both a deputy and a correction officer showing the struggle with defendant and his threats—the deputy was a “law enforcement officer” as statutorily defined, and defendant's threat was in retaliation for the deputy's attempt to restrain him, which was done in the deputy's official capacity as a corrections officer. State v. Calvera, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2019).

39-13-102. Aggravated assault.

    1. A person commits aggravated assault who:
      1. Intentionally or knowingly commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101, and the assault:
        1. Results in serious bodily injury to another;
        2. Results in the death of another;
        3. Involved the use or display of a deadly weapon; or
        4. Involved strangulation or attempted strangulation; or
      2. Recklessly commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101(a)(1), and the assault:
        1. Results in serious bodily injury to another;
        2. Results in the death of another; or
        3. Involved the use or display of a deadly weapon.
    2. For purposes of subdivision (a)(1)(A)(iv), “strangulation” means intentionally or knowingly impeding normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying pressure to the throat or neck or by blocking the nose and mouth of another person, regardless of whether that conduct results in any visible injury or whether the person has any intent to kill or protractedly injure the victim.
  1. A person commits aggravated assault who, being the parent or custodian of a child or the custodian of an adult, intentionally or knowingly fails or refuses to protect the child or adult from an aggravated assault as defined in subdivision (a)(1) or aggravated child abuse as defined in § 39-15-402.
  2. A person commits aggravated assault who, after having been enjoined or restrained by an order, diversion or probation agreement of a court of competent jurisdiction from in any way causing or attempting to cause bodily injury or in any way committing or attempting to commit an assault against an individual or individuals, intentionally or knowingly attempts to cause or causes bodily injury or commits or attempts to commit an assault against the individual or individuals.
  3. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
      1. Aggravated assault under:
        1. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
        2. Subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i), (iii), or (iv) is a Class C felony;
        3. Subdivision (a)(1)(A)(ii) is a Class C felony;
        4. Subdivision (b) or (c) is a Class C felony;
        5. Subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) or (iii) is a Class D felony;
        6. Subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii) is a Class D felony.
      2. Notwithstanding the authorized fines established in § 40-35-111, a violation of this section is punishable by a fine not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), in addition to any other punishment authorized by § 40-35-111.
    1. In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of this section, if the relationship between the defendant and the victim of the assault is such that the victim is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601, and if, as determined by the court, the defendant possesses the ability to pay a fine in an amount not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200), then the court shall impose a fine at the level of the defendant's ability to pay, but not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200). The additional fine shall be paid to the clerk of the court imposing sentence, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fine to the general fund. All fines so credited to the general fund shall be subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the exclusive purpose of funding family violence shelters and shelter services. Such appropriation shall be in addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to § 67-4-411.
      1. In addition to any other punishment authorized by this section, the court shall order a person convicted of aggravated assault under the circumstances set out in this subdivision (e)(3) to pay restitution to the victim of the offense. Additionally, the judge shall order the warden, chief operating officer, or workhouse administrator to deduct fifty percent (50%) of the restitution ordered from the inmate's commissary account or any other account or fund established by or for the benefit of the inmate while incarcerated. The judge may authorize the deduction of up to one hundred percent (100%) of the restitution ordered.
      2. Subdivision (e)(3)(A) applies if:
        1. The victim of the aggravated assault is a correctional officer, guard, jailer, or other full-time employee of a penal institution, local jail, or workhouse;
        2. The offense occurred while the victim was in the discharge of official duties and within the victim's scope of employment; and
        3. The person committing the assault was at the time of the offense, and at the time of the conviction, serving a sentence of incarceration in a public or private penal institution as defined in § 39-16-601.
    2. In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of this section, if the relationship between the defendant and the victim of the assault is such that the victim is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601, the court shall assess each person convicted an electronic monitoring indigency fee of ten dollars ($10.00). All proceeds collected pursuant to this subdivision (e)(4) shall be transmitted to the treasurer for deposit in the electronic monitoring indigency fund, established in § 55-10-419.
    3. Notwithstanding this subsection (e), a person convicted of a violation of subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(i), or (a)(1)(B)(ii) shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is otherwise provided if:
      1. The violation was committed by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle, as defined by § 55-1-103; and
      2. The victim was a minor at the time of the violation.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 2; 1990, ch. 1030, §§ 12, 13; 1993, ch. 306, § 1; 1995, ch. 452, § 1; 1996, ch. 830, § 1; 1996, ch. 1009, § 19; 1998, ch. 1049, § 9; 2002, ch. 649, § 2; 2005, ch. 353, § 10; 2009, ch. 394, § 1; 2009, ch. 412, § 2; 2010, ch. 981, § 3; 2011, ch. 401, § 1; 2013, ch. 325, § 2; 2013, ch. 407, § 1; 2013, ch. 461, §§ 2, 3; 2015, ch. 283, § 1; 2015, ch. 306, §§ 1, 2; 2018, ch. 925, §§ 2-4; 2018, ch. 1046, § 1; 2019, ch. 149, § 1; 2019, ch. 485, § 2; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section punishes as a felony serious assaults. Subdivision (a)(1) requires the offender to commit an assault in violation of § 39-13-101, and to satisfy one of two other aggravating conditions.

Subsection (b) provides for enhanced punishment when the victim of the aggravated assault is a law enforcement, probation or parole officer or a firefighter.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 18 provided that the act shall apply to sentencing for criminal offenses committed on or after June 7, 2005. Offenses committed prior to June 7, 2005, shall be governed by prior law, which shall apply in all respects. However, for defendants who are sentenced after June 7, 2005, for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1982, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the provisions of the act by executing a waiver of such defendant's ex post facto protections. Upon executing such a waiver, all provisions of the act shall apply to the defendant.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 19 provided that the act shall have no application to sentencing for persons convicted of murder in the first degree, which shall be governed by the provisions of §§ 39-13-20239-13-208.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 20(b) provided that the Tennessee code commission is requested to insert a cross reference in §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-505, 39-13-506, 39-13-522, 39-14-302 and 39-14-408 to § 40-35-114 stating that the enhancement factor formerly found in each such section was moved to § 40-35-114 so that all enhancement factors are located in one (1) section.

Acts 2011, ch. 401, § 2 provided that the act, which amended subsection (a), shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 2011.

Acts 2013, ch. 461, § 1 provided that subdivisions (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(ii) shall be known and may be cited as “Boomer's Law.”

Acts 2013, ch. 461, § 5 provided that the act, which amended subsections (a) and (e), shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 2013.

Acts 2015, ch. 283, § 2 provided that the act, which added (e)(3), shall apply to any applicable aggravated assault committed on or after July 1, 2015.

Acts 2018, ch. 1046, § 12 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to  offenses committed on or after July 1, 2018.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2019, ch. 149, § 2 provided that the act shall apply to violations occurring on or after July 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 485, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “JaJuan Latham Act”.

For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment by ch. 925 deleted former (d) which read: “A person commits aggravated assault who, with intent to cause physical injury to any public employee or an employee of a transportation system, public or private, whose operation is authorized by title 7, chapter 56, causes physical injury to the employee while the public employee is performing a duty within the scope of the public employee’s employment or while the transportation system employee is performing an assigned duty on, or directly related to, the operation of a transit vehicle.”; and, in (e), deleted former  (e)(1)(A)(i) which read: “Subsection (d) is a Class A misdemeanor;” and substituted “"or subsection (c)” for “subsection (c), or subsection (d)” in (e)(1)(B).

The 2018 amendment by ch. 1046 added (e)(4).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 149, in (e)(1)(B), substituted “Healthcare provider” for “Health care provider” in (vi) and added (viii).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 485 added (e)(5).

The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 rewrote (e)(1)(B), which read: “(B) However, the maximum fine shall be fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for an offense under subdivision (a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(B), or subsection (c), committed against any of the following persons who are discharging or attempting to discharge their official duties:“(i) Law enforcement officer;“(ii) Firefighter;“(iii) Medical fire responder;“(iv) Paramedic;“(v) Emergency medical technician;“(vi) Healthcare provider;“(vii) Any other first responder; or“(viii) An identifiable employee or contractor of a utility.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 925, § 5. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2018, ch. 1046, § 12. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 149, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 485, § 4. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Admission to bail pending appeal, § 40-11-113.

Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal sentencing enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Injunctions, title 29, ch. 23.

Jury may provide punishment for less than one year, § 40-20-103.

Notification to victim that family member or household member who was arrested for assault may be released on bond, § 36-3-615.

Penalties for Class C and D felonies, § 40-35-111.

Recovery barred for injuries suffered in attempting to commit a felony on property of another, § 29-34-201.

Spousal abuse, title 36, ch. 3, part 6.

Title definitions, § 39-11-106.

Use of force defending residence against intruder, § 39-11-611.

Vandalism, § 39-14-408.

Verdict and sentence on felony conviction, § 40-20-107.

Weapons, title 39, ch. 17, part 13.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 27.103, 28.119, 32.3, 32.64.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Assault and Battery, §§ 1, 2; 4 Tenn. Juris., Automobiles and Other Vehicles, § 32; 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 3; 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, § 8.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Nature of the Offense.

For Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) purposes, predicate felonies did not have to be in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt; however, defendant's conviction under former T.C.A. § 39-13-102, which included reckless aggravated assault was not a categorically violent felony under either the “use of physical force” or “otherwise” clause of the ACCA. United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 2011 FED App. 202P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16025 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2011).

2. Relation to Federal Law.

Although defendant argued the district court erred in overruling his objection to the presentence report's conclusion that he was an armed career criminal, based on its classification of his juvenile adjudication under T.C.A. § 39-13-102 as a violent felon under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the district court correctly followed the categorical approach, and the documents that it properly examined were narrowly drawn, covering only conduct that involved the use of a firearm; therefore, the juvenile adjudication was properly designated to be a violent felon. United States v. White, 455 Fed. Appx. 647, — F.3d —, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 791, 2012 FED App. 44N, (6th Cir. Tenn. 2012).

Although aggravated assault conviction under Tennessee law did not categorically qualify as crime of violence under career offender guidelines, Shepard documents demonstrated that defendant necessarily pleaded guilty to Class C felony, which criminalized conduct within generic definition of aggravated assault and did not cover wider range of behavior, and thus, defendant's conviction qualified as crime of violence, and district court correctly applied career-offender enhancement to defendant. United States v. Cooper, 739 F.3d 873, 2014 FED App. 5P, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 231 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2014).

Because crime of aggravated assault under Tennessee law categorically presented serious potential risk of physical injury to another that was roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree posed to enumerated offenses, defendant's violation was categorically violent felony for purposes of Armed Career Criminal Act. United States v. Bell, 575 Fed. Appx. 598 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2014), ___ F.3d ___, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15263, 2014 FED App. 599N (6th Cir.).

District court properly classified defendant as Armed Career Criminal because his prior two Tennessee convictions for aggravated assault constituted violent felonies under Armed Career Criminal Act's “force” clause.  Braden v. United States, 817 F.3d 926, 2016 FED App. 80P,  2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6269 (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2016).

3. Elements.

Reckless aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder, because reckless aggravated assault requires proof of either: (1) Serious bodily injury; or (2) Bodily injury and display of a deadly weapon, neither of which is required to prove attempted second degree murder. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 2001).

Available Shepards documents did not demonstrate that defendant pleaded guilty to a narrowed charge of aggravated assault under T.C.A. § 39-13-102, or that defendant admitted to facts that established that he necessarily pleaded guilty to a section of Tennessee's aggravated-assault statute that constituted a “violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 2011 FED App. 202P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16025 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2011).

Post-conviction court did not err in denying defendant's petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel because, with respect to counsel's alleged deficiency for failing to investigate the medical report, the appellate court noted that no medical report of the minor victim was submitted at the evidentiary hearing; and defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and attempted aggravated assault against the minor victim did not depend upon the victim's injuries, but instead were based on the victim's reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury caused by defendant's strangulation of the victim's neck and his use of the weight as a deadly weapon against the victim. Blaylock v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2016).

Rational trier of fact could have found that the aggravated assault was accomplished when defendant put a knife to the victim's throat at the roadside and that the attempted aggravated kidnapping involved a separate attempted removal or confinement when defendant dragged the victim down the driveway; thus, there was no due process violation as there was no basis to disturb the determination of the jury that any removal or confinement was beyond that necessary to commit the aggravated assault. State v. Tittle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

Defendant was properly convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault because, inter alia, defendant's mental defect did not prevent him from comprehending what was being said during his interview and his inquiry as to when a lawyer could come was not an unequivocal request for counsel, defendant admitted that he shot one person, had a motive for the shooting, procured a gun, fled the scene, disposed of the gun, tried to remove gunshot residue, and attempted to hide from police, and the jury could reasonably infer that, when he sprayed 32 bullets in the two assault victims'  direction, they reasonably feared for their lives. State v. Simmon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2018).

4. —“Intentionally and Knowingly.”

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault required the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were intentional or knowing, as defined by the criminal code; proof that occupants of a house were fearful when shots were fired into the house, while essential to establishing the actus reus, did not in any way establish this mens rea element, and defendant's conviction could not stand on the basis of such evidence. State v. Wilson, 924 S.W.2d 648, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. 1996).

Phrase “intentionally or knowingly” in the aggravated assault statute, T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A), did not modify the phrase “causes serious bodily injury.” Therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to allow defendant to argue that he did not intentionally or knowingly cause the victim serious bodily injury. State v. Jones, 341 S.W.3d 318, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011).

Because the verdict did not reflect the mens rea with which defendant acted, it was unclear whether the jury unanimously found that the he either intentionally or knowingly assaulted the victim causing serious bodily injury, and his conviction for Class C felony aggravated assault could not stand; the jury was correctly instructed as to the meaning of intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly, and because the mens rea of reckless is a lesser mens rea of intentional or knowing, the jury was unanimous in finding that defendant was guilty of reckless aggravated assault, and in order to do substantial justice, the conviction was so modified. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

5. —Causation.

The defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the victim's serious bodily injury so as to justify a conviction for aggravated assault. State v. Baggett, 836 S.W.2d 593, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

6. —Use of Deadly Weapon.

A motor vehicle can constitute a deadly weapon within the meaning of T.C.A. § 39-13-102. State v. Tate, 912 S.W.2d 785, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Categorical approach that was used to determine the nature of prior felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), applied to defendant's juvenile convictions; however, while his aggravated assault conviction and his involvement in several drive-by shootings constituted two offenses qualifying as violent felonies given the underlying facts and his admissions, neither his adjudication of delinquency based upon a plea to the charge of attempted robbery nor his adjudication of delinquency based upon a charge of aggravated assault could be used as a third qualifying conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes. United States v. Wells, 473 F.3d 640, 2007 FED App. 8P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 360 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2007).

Victim's testimony alone was sufficient to establish that defendant hit her in the head with a revolver, and thus the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault involving the use or display of a deadly weapon. State v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2017).

7. —Instructions.

Where the indictment charged a “knowing” assault, a jury instruction containing the mental element of “reckless” was not erroneous since “recklessly” is a lesser level of the mental element of “knowingly,” and if the state proved that defendant acted knowingly, it also would have proved that he acted recklessly. State v. Crowe, 914 S.W.2d 933, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Jan. 8, 1996).

It was error for the trial court to include “attempt” in its instruction on reckless aggravated assault and the error was so misleading and confusing that it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cromwell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 3, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 729 (Tenn. Nov. 15, 2018).

8. —Serious Bodily Injury.

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the State failed to establish that the victim suffered serious bodily injury; the victim's swollen and bruised eye did not satisfy the requirement of “protracted or obvious disfigurement” to establish serious bodily injury. State v. Rowlett, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2013).

Because defendant was convicted of both especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault based on the same serious bodily injury to the victim, defendant's especially aggravated burglary conviction had to be reduced to aggravated burglary. State v. Fykes, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2019).

9. Indictment.

An indictment sufficiently charged the offense of aggravated assault where it stated the time and place of the occurrence, that defendant intentionally and knowingly assaulted the victim, and that defendant used a dangerous weapon, namely, a motor vehicle. State v. Tate, 912 S.W.2d 785, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

An indictment for aggravated assault which does not specifically allege the theory by which the state intended to establish the second element of the offense — commission of an assault — is sufficient so long as the indictment both protects the accused's constitutional rights to notice and satisfies the requirements imposed by statute. State v. Hammonds, 30 S.W.3d 294, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. 2000).

Because the inmate affirmatively requested a jury instruction on the offense of aggravated assault, even though he was in error in believing that it was a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree murder, he effectively agreed to amend the indictment to include aggravated assault; therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to convict the inmate of aggravated assault, his conviction was not void, and he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Demonbreun v. Bell, 226 S.W.3d 321, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. May 8, 2007), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. May 25, 2007).

Defendant's indictment for aggravated assault was sufficient to permit defendant to be retried on that charge because the indictment provided to defendant sufficient notice of his charge for aggravated assault and provided to the trial court an adequate basis to enter a proper judgment; the indictment's language stated that defendant did threaten to commit domestic assault or assault against the victim, and the indictment referenced the applicable statute. State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

It was error to dismiss an indictment because counts of sexual exploitation of a minor were not based on the same conduct and did arise from the same episode as the offenses for which defendant was tried, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault; there was no proof images shown to the victim were the images that led to the indictment for sexual exploitation, and there was no overlap in the evidence necessary to prove the other offenses and sexual exploitation. State v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

10. Separate Injuries.

Separate stab wounds inflicted by the defendant upon the same victim were part of the same offense, even though they did not occur immediately and simultaneously but were close in time and proximity, and it was error for the trial court to allow separated convictions for two counts of aggravated assault. State v. Pelayo, 881 S.W.2d 7, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

11. Lesser Included Offense.

One indicted for attempted first-degree murder may not be convicted of aggravated assault since aggravated assault is neither a lesser grade or class of attempted first-degree murder nor a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. (overruled to the extent it established a distinction between lesser grades or classes of offenses and lesser-included offenses) State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. 1996), overruled in part, State v. Dominy, 6 S.W.3d 472, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. 1999), overruled in part, State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2000), overruled in part, State v. Beeler, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1004 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 2000).

Tenn. Const., art. I, § 10, prohibiting double jeopardy, barred defendant's conviction for possessing a weapon intended for use in the commission of an offense and for voluntary manslaughter, because the offenses were lesser included offenses of aggravated assault. State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. 1996), overruled, State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012), overruled, State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012), overruled, State v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Brawner, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2012), overruled, State v. Buford, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2012), overruled, State v. Readus, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2012), overruled, State v. Alston, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2013), overruled, State v. Hollins, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), overruled, State v. Ralph, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1125 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2013), overruled, Garrett v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2014), overruled, State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2014), overruled in part, State v. Isabell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2014), overruled, State v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2014), overruled, State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2015), overruled, State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015), overruled in part, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), overruled, State v. Freitas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2016), overruled, State v. Jernigan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), overruled in part, State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), overruled, Johnson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), overruled, State v. Steelman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

Where evidence used to prove the offenses of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault was the same, defendant's convictions for both offenses were the “same” for purposes of Tenn. Const., art. I, § 10, prohibiting double jeopardy. State v. Hall, 947 S.W.2d 181, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Aggravated assault by a parent or custodian is not a lesser included offense of first-degree murder by aggravated child abuse. State v. Roberson, 988 S.W.2d 690, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

The offense of intentionally causing “extremely offensive or provocative” physical contact should not have been submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault (bodily injury). State v. Smiley, 38 S.W.3d 521, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. 2001).

Defendant could not be convicted of reckless aggravated assault on the theory it was a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder; application of the three-part Burns analysis dictated reckless aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder; reckless aggravated assault requires proof of elements not required to prove attempted second degree murder and reckless aggravated assault does not necessarily involve a less serious harm or risk of harm to a person—indeed, it always involves bodily injury—whereas an attempted second degree murder offense sometimes involves no injury at all to the victim. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 2001).

Although defendants' convictions on two counts of aggravated robbery violated double jeopardy principles, they were each guilty of two crimes because the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction against each defendant for aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, as each of the two victims was threatened with a gun during the course of the robbery. State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, State v. Sandridge, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1302 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2003).

Because reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault committed by intentionally or knowingly causing another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by use or display of a deadly weapon, the trial court committed plain error by charging reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense of reckless endangerment. Defendant was entitled to a new trial on aggravated assault. State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Trial court's failure to charge the next lesser-included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court properly charged the jury to first consider the greater offense of intentional or knowing aggravated assault, T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102(d), (a)(1)(A), and 39-13-101(a)(1), and also instructed the jury that, if it determined defendant was not guilty of that offense, then it must consider the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault; the jury convicted defendant of intentional or knowing aggravated assault. State v. Shelbourne, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1076 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2012).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was modified to reckless endangerment because (1) the jury found serious injury but did not find an adverse effect on the victim's welfare, and (2) reckless endangerment was the next properly-charged lesser-included offense the evidence supported. State v. Hodges, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

12. Double Jeopardy.

Convictions for the offenses of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment did not violate double jeopardy since each offense required proof of an additional fact that the other did not. State v. Brooks, 909 S.W.2d 854, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Because aggravated assault and attempted voluntary manslaughter each required proof of a fact not required in proving the other, the offenses were not multiplicitous and defendant's dual convictions did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Feaster, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2014), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015).

Although defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault arose out of the same incident, each of those offenses contained numerous elements that the other did not, and there was no evidence that the General Assembly intended to prohibit multiple punishments in circumstances such as these, and thus double jeopardy did not preclude the dual convictions. State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015).

Unlawful killing of a person is a crime distinctly different from that of an assault upon a person, and although serious bodily injury is an element of assault it is not an element of murder and assault resulting in serious bodily injury and second degree murder are completely separate offenses; thus, reckless aggravated assault contains an element (serious bodily injury) not contained in the reckless homicide statute and that reckless homicide contains an element (killing) not required for a conviction for reckless aggravated assault, and defendant's convictions for both could stand under the double jeopardy analysis. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

It had previously been held that the 2009 amendment of the statute abrogated part (b) of the State v. Burns double jeopardy test; thus, reckless aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of reckless homicide under the statute and dual convictions are proper, and defendant was not entitled to relief. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

Crimes occurred on the same day and in the same location, and thus the reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault clearly arose from the same conduct; however, reckless aggravated assault contains an element (serious bodily injury) not contained in the reckless homicide statute and that reckless homicide contains an element (killing) not required for a conviction for reckless aggravated assault, and thus defendant's convictions for both could stand under the Blockburger  double jeopardy analysis. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Although the offenses arose from the same act or transaction of defendant's act of putting a knife to the victim's throat and then dragging her 20-30 feet down a dark driveway toward a scrap yard, aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense of attempted aggravated kidnapping and the offenses were not the same for the purposes of double jeopardy as each crime contained an element that the other did not because attempted aggravated kidnapping required a specific intent to commit the crime of aggravated kidnapping, including a removal or confinement of the victim; and aggravated assault contained an element of fear and required the State to show that defendant caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. State v. Tittle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not merging the sentences for his voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault convictions, but the issue was waived as defense counsel did not raise any double jeopardy issue at trial and the issue was not raised in a motion for new trial. Furthermore, relief via plain error was unwarranted as these offenses were not multiplicitous because they each required proof of a fact not required in proving the other, and thus defendant could not establish that a clear rule of law has been breached. State v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2020).

13. No Self-defense.

Defendant violated this section as: (1) he did not object to the victim's statement that he displayed the gun, pointed it at the victim and threatened to kill him; (2) defendant's statement supported a finding that he displayed the gun to the victim; (3) he was not justified in using force as he armed himself, went to the victim's home and instigated a confrontation with the victim during which he reached for and partially displayed his gun; (4) he did not act in self-defense as he provoked the victim's father into pointing a gun at him and he did not abandon the encounter before he pulled his gun; and (5) as he was not justified in using force under T.C.A. § 39-11-611, he was not justified in using force in defense of others. United States v. Neal, 627 Fed. Appx. 543, — F.3d —, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17722, 2015 FED App. 681N (6th Cir.).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the jury was instructed on self-defense and rejected the notion that defendant's striking the victim repeatedly with a wooden beam after the victim fell on the ground was justified as self-defense; any threat the victim posed to defendant ended once the victim fell on the ground. State v. Tiger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2016).

Defendant failed to prove that he acted in self-defense; given his struggle with the officer when the officer tried to arrest defendant, including fighting over the officer's gun, the evidence did not show that, at the time defendant committed the aggravated assault, the officer was using greater force than necessary to make the arrest. State v. Sweeney, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2019).

14. Evidence.

Successor judge, who heard only defendant's motion for a new trial after his appointment under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1), could not properly act as a thirteenth juror in this case because credibility was an overriding issue. The validity of defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated burglary depended upon the credibility determinations by the jury and ultimately the judge, acting as a thirteenth juror; other than the victims'  own statements, no one provided any independent knowledge of what was taken from the victims, that it was taken at gunpoint, or that defendant entered the residence forcibly. State v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 262 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2013), rev'd, 453 S.W.3d 889, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2015).

Even though the trial court erred by admitting into evidence numerous graphic photographs of the victim's face during surgery, as the extent of the victim's injuries was clearly stated and not contested, the error was harmless because it was not more probable than not that the photos affected the jury's decision, given the conflicts in the testimony and the fact that the jury found defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense on one charge and acquitted him of the other. State v. Thompson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2017).

Evidence of defendant's prior bad acts towards the victim were relevant to show motive and intent; the trial court found the order of protection necessary to establish an element of aggravated assault by violation of a court order under T.C.A. § 39-13-102 and the allegations of threats and abuse in the petition were relevant to establish defendant's criminal intent and to rebut his theory of self-defense, plus witnesses testified regarding the victim's fear of defendant, and he was not entitled to relief. State v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017).

In connection with defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, aggravated criminal trespass of a habitation, and two counts of assault, the victim's co-worker's testimony qualified as fresh complaint evidence, as he testified about the details of the incident, and defendant had vigorously attacked the victim's credibility prior to the co-worker's testimony; the victim's statements were timely and any error in admitting the testimony was harmless. State v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2018).

15. —Sufficient.

The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. State v. Boling, 840 S.W.2d 944, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 530 (Tenn. Aug. 31, 1992).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Mar. 18, 2002).

There was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact would conclude that driver was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in a head-on collision with another car, where the defendant was driving on the wrong side of the street, in what witnesses described as a careless manner; had a blood alcohol level which supported a finding that his blood alcohol level would have been between .04 percent and .07 percent at the time of the collision; and falsely told a police officer at the scene that a friend had been driving. State v. Norris, 874 S.W.2d 590, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), overruled in part, State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. 2002).

Testimony that defendant looked directly at the victim when he kicked her was sufficient proof that he acted intentionally, and the state did not have to demonstrate that he intended to cause serious bodily injury to the victim. State v. Crowe, 914 S.W.2d 933, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Jan. 8, 1996).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction of aggravated assault involving an automobile accident. State v. Gillon, 15 S.W.3d 492, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1024 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's reckless aggravated assault convictions where there was absolutely no proof of bodily injury to either of the victims; in addition, reckless aggravated assault could not be a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault based on knowingly or recklessly causing another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated assault conviction where the evidence showed that defendant was served with an order of protection and notice of hearing, and several witnesses testified that they saw defendant hit the victim so hard that the victim's head smashed into a courtroom wall. State v. Armstrong, 256 S.W.3d 243, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault because the proof at trial established that defendant held the two victims at gunpoint and threatened to shoot them. One victim testified that he was terrified, while the second testified that he was afraid and thought that one or both of them were going to be killed. State v. Parsons, 437 S.W.3d 457, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. May 23, 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because he admitted to hitting the victim in the face, breaking her nose; he hit the victim on the head with the butt of a gun; he pushed the victim into the bathroom with tremendous force, causing her to collide with the vanity; the victim testified concerning her loss of consciousness, pain, scars, and permanent physical conditions; and medical personnel discussed the severity of the victim's injuries. State v. Feaster, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2014), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015).

Facts were sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree premeditated murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and aggravated assault because the victim identified defendant soon after the shooting and again in court, and the jury heard the evidence and was able to gauge the victim's credibility. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence that defendant turned back towards the victim, pulled out a pocketknife and threatened the victim, and waived the knife at the victim causing injury was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault. State v. Moffitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault as a party to the offenses where it showed that defendant was driving with his co-defendant and a passenger, the co-defendant and the passenger exited the car, and the co-defendant displayed a gun at the victims. The evidence that defendant stopped the vehicle in a traffic lane for his co-defendant to exit was sufficient to show that defendant knowingly and voluntarily shared in the criminal intent of the crime and promoted its commission. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because the victim testified that she remained in the hospital for two days following the attack, that she sustained numerous cuts and stab wounds, that she was heavily medicated for weeks following the assault, and that she was still unable to bend her thumbs due to the severity of the injury to her hands. State v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2016).

Evidence that the victim and defendants were all members of a street gang, that one defendant possessed a handgun, that defendants beat the victim until he was unconscious, and that the victim was in a medically-induced coma for nine weeks and needed physically therapy to walk and talk again was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because defendant struck the victim with a wooden beam multiple times, and the victim sustained bodily injury; the victim testified in detail about his injuries, and his testimony was supported by the photographs received as an exhibit. State v. Tiger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because defendant either intended to use a deadly weapon to cause bodily injury to the second victim or was aware that his conduct of shooting into the front seat of the vehicle where the second victim was sitting beside the first victim was reasonably certain to result in bodily injury to the second victim. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because defendant acted at least knowingly in causing the two backseat passengers to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury as defendant was aware that his conduct of using a deadly weapon to shoot into the victim's vehicle was reasonably certain to cause the other passengers in the vehicle to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because defendant involved himself in an altercation between the victim and defendant's friend; during the altercation, defendant left the friend's porch, approached the victim, and struck him in the head with a brick; once the victim was on the ground, defendant struck him an additional three or four times; as a result of the incident, the victim suffered multiple facial fractures, requiring three surgical procedures; and the trial court charged the jury on the issue of self-defense, and the jury chose to reject that defense, as was its prerogative. State v. Benfield, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping because the jury credited the victim's testimony, and the testimony of other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated her account; the victim reported defendant's abuse to an officer, who noted injuries to her face and redness to her neck, and the injuries were observable in the photographs admitted at trial. State v. Baxter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Defendant's act of waiving his gun around an announcing that “this is a robbery,” demanding the women undress, and hitting a victim until she lost consciousness, and testimony that such action caused the victims to fear for their lives supported defendant's aggravated assault convictions. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon because, without a prior disagreement or provocation, defendant drew a gun while the victim's back was turned, pointed it at the victim, and shot him when he attempted to escape, the shooting was a substantial step toward killing the victim, firing the gun was an intentional act, the victim believed that defendant intended to rob him, defendant did not attempt to render aid to the victim, left the scene, and hid in his mother's attic, and the parties stipulated that defendant had two prior felony convictions involving violence and/or drugs. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016).

In an aggravated assault case involving two defendants, the evidence was sufficient to support the second defendant's conviction. The jury could reasonably conclude that the second defendant acted with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of aggravated assault. State v. Henderson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2016).

In an aggravated assault case involving two defendants, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that first defendant was holding a gun and that the gun was clearly visible to the victim. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the first defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury and that he did so by use or display of a deadly weapon. State v. Henderson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2016).

Jury could have inferred that defendant intentionally used his motor vehicle in a way that caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent harm, and thus the evidence supported defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and vandalism; defendant first encountered the victim at the mailboxes in the subdivision and parked bumper to bumper with her car, as she had parked in the wrong direction, and when she tried to back out, he rammed his car into her car, and as she drove away, he followed her and rammed her car again, and the damage to her car was more than $ 1,000. State v. Windrow, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2016).

Evidence defendant approached the victims with a gun visible and ordered them to show their pockets allowed a jury to find that his assault of the victims involved the display of a deadly weapon and supported convictions for aggravated assault. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault where the driver testified that defendant pulled a black and silver gun from his pants and pointed it at her, and she was terrified. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault; although the victim had bruising prior to her death, testimony was clear the victim died from blunt force injuries to her head that would have occurred on a certain date, and the victim would not have acted normally after sustaining the injuries. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault because defendant used his vehicle to ram into a victim several times, injuring her severely; defendant drove his vehicle at another victim, who fell while trying to get away but was able to get up and run away, and that victim specifically testified that he was scared when defendant was driving toward him. State v. Rush, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2016).

Evidence defendant hit the adult victim in the head with a gun, causing a bleeding wound, and threatened to harm one of the children, while brandishing a knife and poking him with it, was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault. State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, sexual battery, and assault where it showed that he broke into his estranged wife's house, choked her, repeatedly threatened to kill her, coerced her into having oral sex and sexual intercourse with him multiple times, the wife had bruises and marks on her throat, a DNA swab from the victim was consistent with defendant's DNA profile, and defendant had a bite mark on his forearm, marks on his cheeks, and scrapes on his head and elbow. State v. Blanton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016).

Child victim's testimony that she thought defendant was going to shoot her mother and her, and testimony defendant pointed the gun at his girlfriend's car while she and the child were inside it and threatened to kill them supported convictions for aggravated assault and attempted aggravated assault, and the girlfriend's admission that a year later she could not remember whether defendant actually threatened to kill her did not create reasonable doubt, nor did her ongoing relationship with him. State v. Abujaber, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Defendant's conduct during the incident showed he intentionally or knowingly caused the victim bodily injury by striking her head repeatedly with a gun and shooting her and was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault. State v. Vinson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's two convictions for aggravated assault because the State proved he intended to cause the officers to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the display of a deadly weapon; the officers testified that they were scared when defendant pointed a shotgun in their director, and a jury could have found that defendant was aware that his conduct caused the officers to fear injury. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2016).

Victim's testimony that defendant tried repeatedly to hit her with a stick while she was seated in her car and that she was afraid, and an officer's testimony that defendant stated he had attempted to hit the victim with a stick was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. State v. Shettles, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault where it showed that the victim had to have part of his intestines, his gallbladder, and half of his liver removed, he was still unable to run or ride a bicycle as a result of his injuries, and defendant was armed with a gun. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. Defendant's attack left the victim bleeding profusely from the side of her neck that required medical attention, including stitches and pain medication, and defendant further endangered the victim by throwing her cellular phone out of her reach to prevent her from calling for help. State v. Heath, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Although the victim was unable to identify defendant as one of the perpetrators at the preliminary hearing, there was sufficient evidence of his identity, as the jury chose to credit the victim's trial testimony that defendant was one of the men who fled in a vehicle from her rental home, knocking her down in the process, and there was evidence that the vehicle that fled the scene was registered to defendant's mother and defendant had access to the vehicle and had driven it on another occasion. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Feb. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault; defendant was left alone with the infant victim, and when the mother returned, the victim was unresponsive, plus while at the hospital, defendant told the mother to say the victim had been with her the whole time, and the victim's injuries were caused by blunt force injuries to her head. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault by use of a skillet as a deadly weapon because the victim, defendant's then spouse, after arguing and consuming alcohol with defendant for some time before falling asleep on a sofa was jarred awake when defendant struck the victim in the head with an iron skillet, causing the victim pain and leaving the victim with a large knot and a cut on the top of the victim's head. State v. Lamb, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault where the victim testified that he believed defendant was trying to kill him after he was robbed and after being shot point blank in the face the victim began running while defendant continued to shoot at him. State v. Vaughn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016).

Evidence that two defendants fired their guns into a crowd of people, causing one of the crowd to fear for her life, was sufficient to sustain the aggravated assault convictions as to two defendants and to sustain a conviction based upon criminal responsibility as to the other defendant. State v. Burgess, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because the victim offered extensive testimony at trial regarding being cut by defendant, and the jury accredited that testimony; a doctor testified that the victim's injuries were extensive and required surgery, and without treatment, the victim would have likely died. State v. Pittman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support petitioner's convictions of vehicular assault and reckless aggravated assault because it showed that petitioner did not apply his brakes until just before the collision, petitioner hit the truck with enough force to cause it to go airborne and land directly in front of the victim's van which was traveling in the oncoming lane of traffic, the victim suffered serious bodily injuries, and petitioner's blood was found to contain cocaine. Stewart v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2017).

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of aggravated assault because the State's evidence established that he assaulted a correctional officer by striking the officer over thirty time; the proof powerfully established that defendant's attack on the officer resulted in serious bodily injury and that defendant assaulted the officer with intent and knowledge that his actions would result in serious bodily injury; State v. Armstrong, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault as the victim suffered serious bodily injury because the victim was intentionally assaulted by defendant when he exited the market and refused to share his beer and/or cigarettes; two men got the victim on the ground and proceeded to kick and punch him; the beating resulted in a broken nose, a dislocated jaw, a torn eyelid, a detached optical nerve, and multiple bruises; the victim had blood squirting out of his eye nearly a day after the incident; the victim rated his pain as above 10; and the victim required jaw surgery and was now permanently blind in one eye. State v. Palmer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because defendant was aware of but consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim would be seriously injured; defendant, while being repositioned in his hospital bed, looked the victim directly in the eye, lifted both legs, and kicked her beneath her chin, and a nurse and officer testified that defendant stated he intended to kick the male nurse rather than the victim. State v. Day, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 873 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault and child abuse because defendant and the child's mother were the sole caretakers of the one-month-old victim; defendant solely cared for the victim while the mother worked; both defendant and the mother admitted to becoming frustrated with the victim when he became fussy; at two-months-old, x-rays revealed numerous fractures throughout the victim's body; a doctor testified about the 23 fractures in various stages of healing to the victim's rib cage, legs, and arms and opined that the injuries were sustained through abuse; and defendant admitted to the police that he handled the victim roughly when frustrated and even heard a “pop” sound during one such incident. State v. Crawford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 870 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence including the victim's testimony that defendant pulled the victim out of her car and strangled her while she was on the ground and defendant's admission to another that he choked the victim was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault by strangulation. State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction because it showed defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused a victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by pointing a gun at the victim, and (2) did not act in self-defense. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault because it showed that defendant grabbed the victim around the neck and hit her in the face several times with a closed fist, he later displayed a box cutter and hit the victim with its handle, defendant fled the scene, and the victim suffered bruising to her face, neck, and arms along with swelling to both sides of her face. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2017), aff'd, 558 S.W.3d 633, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because based on the testimony of the victim alone–that defendant had a gun in defendant's hand, held the gun out the window of defendant's vehicle, and fired a shot at the victim and that, as a result, the victim feared for the victim's life–a reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the use or display of a deadly weapon. State v. Tiller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and of three counts of aggravated assault as defendant substantially interfered with the victims'  liberty by the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon and the victims had a reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury by the use of a deadly weapon because defendant terrorized the three victims for hours by confining them to the bedroom and hitting two of the victims with his fists; the victims were not allowed to leave the bedroom; defendant was armed with a knife and a beer bottle, which he used to threaten the victims; and all three victims testified that they feared for their safety. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 951 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault; the jury was free to find the victim's testimony credible, plus the State introduced physical evidence corroborating at least parts of the victim's testimony, and her multiple injuries were well-documented and a box cutter was found at the scene. State v. Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2018).

Testimony from the victim and another witness that defendant produced a knife during a confrontation and evidence that a knife was recovered from defendant's vehicle was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, as required for an aggravated assault conviction. State v. Stanley, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because the State of Tennessee presented evidence that defendant acted recklessly in discharging a deadly weapon into a house, causing bodily injury to the victim of the gunshot. Furthermore, defendant's admissible statements to the police established defendant's identity as the shooter. State v. Butts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because the 12-year-old victim testified that defendant pointed a gun at him while standing near the television stand in the living room before any gunshots were fired. State v. Grant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Evidence that defendant entered the victim's residence through a window, shot the victim, and later gave a written statement admitting to breaking and entering into the residence and shooting the victim supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Stitts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated assault because while acting in concert with at least 10 other individuals, he intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to the victim by beating him severely with brass knuckles until the victim suffered facial fractures and temporarily lost consciousness, plus defendant handed a gun to his brother and told him to shoot the victim. State v. Gomez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault, because despite the alibi testimony of defendant's mother, the jury chose not to accredit her testimony and resolve all conflicts in favor of the State and the victim's testimony identifying defendant as one of the shooters without hesitation. State v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018).

Evidence that defendant and codefendant ambushed the victims as they entered their home, defendant demanded money from a victim while codefendant subdue the other victims, defendant shot one victim when he attempted to fight back and later shot the other victims, and the bullets recovered from the victims were fired from a weapon that defendant sold to someone and had fired a month before the murders was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for murder, attempted murder, robbery and aggravated assault. State v. Wade, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 523 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Nov. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault by strangulation because the victim testified that defendant put his hand around the front of her neck and choked her, she told the officer at the scene that she had trouble breathing and had lost consciousness, she told the 911 operator that defendant had “choked her out, ” photographic evidence showed red marks around the victim's neck, and the officer testified that the victim had a handprint around her neck that was consistent with someone who had been strangled. State v. Maney, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 3, 2018).

Evidence that the victim ordered defendant out of his residence and locked the front door and defendant returned and busted the door in, began hitting the victim in the face and eye with a wooden stick and knocked the victim unconscious, requiring a hospital visit and six months in an “old folks home” was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. State v. Sanders, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 6, 2018).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was proper, as he said he intentionally rammed the victims'  small car with his tractor-trailer because the driver pulled out in front of him and then tapped her brakes, plus defendant caused bodily injury to both victims with the use of a deadly weapon, his tractor-trailer; defendant's statement that he intentionally hit the vehicle was sufficient to establish the reckless mens rea. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault of the second victim under the theory of criminal responsibility because the second victim testified that he was shot in the hand and that scars remained on his hand from the gunshot wound; he identified co-defendant as the shooter; the jury could conclude that co-defendant either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fired his gun, a deadly weapon, thereby causing bodily injury to the second victim; and the jury could conclude that defendant and co-defendant were working together to rob the victims as defendant pointed his gun at the first victim and ordered him to give him everything while co-defendant pointed his gun at the second victim and told him to drop everything. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because defendant intentionally caused serious bodily injury to the victim by hitting him with a baseball bat which resulted in a broken ulna and dislocated fingers; defendant admitted as such; and the jury clearly did not buy into defendant's theory of self-defense. State v. London, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 643 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

Evidence that defendant grabbed merchandise from a store and left without paying for it, that a loss prevention employee approached defendant and brought him back to his office, that defendant was knocking over tables and yelling profanity and threatened to kill the employee, and that while in the employee's office, defendant used a telephone cord to strangle the employee until he lost consciousness was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and theft. State v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 679 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault because it showed that he used a gun to shoot multiple shots towards the vehicle as the victim drove away and several of the shots hit the vehicle. State v. Battle, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated assault for two victims because one victim was shot in the leg and another victim testified she ducked and hid to avoid being shot. State v. Battle, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's multiple reckless aggravated assault convictions because defendant acted recklessly as a witness testified that defendant was driving in the wrong direction on an interstate highway when defendant's SUV hit the victims'  car head-on and crash reconstructionists testified that defendant's SUV was driving in the wrong direction and that the SUV's crash data recording system reflected that the SUV accelerated just before impact. State v. Pena, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 761 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault because the victim testified that defendant squirted lighter fluid on him and attempted to ignite it, and defendant admitted to a detective and a deputy chief that she had been the aggressor. State v. Dunavant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2018).

Conviction for aggravated assault by strangulation was supported by evidence defendant choked the victim by placing his thumbs on the front of her throat and applying pressure so she was not able to breathe, grabbed the victim in a headlock and caused her to lose consciousness, continued to choke the victim after she regained consciousness by pushing on her neck until she was able to kick him in the ribs, and the redness, bruising, and abrasions on the victim's neck and shoulders seen in photos. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated assault conviction; one employee testified that she was standing next to a co-worker while defendant pointed his gun at him, and had he not complied with defendant's demands for money, the employee would have intervened and complied, and although she admitted the gun was not directly pointed at her, she said she feared for her life and was scared to move. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2018).

Doctor's testimony that the victim's subdural hematoma, or brain bleed, was life-threatening and that, if it grew, it had the potential to become even more dangerous, thus, requiring the victim to be place in the intensive care unit, was sufficient to establish serious bodily injury to sustain defendant's conviction of aggravated assault. State v. Ingram, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault because it showed that the victim, defendant's ex-wife, had obtained an order of protection against defendant, the order was in effect on the date of the incident, defendant went to the home of the victim's friend, he approached her car, and screamed and threatened to kill her while banging on the window. The victim stated that she believed defendant would kill or harm her. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated assault because, although neither shooting victim directly testified the victim was in fear during the shooting, the jury was entitled to infer the victims'  fear of imminent bodily injury as the victims were forced to hide behind vehicles as defendant began shooting at them, one victim testified to ducking and dodging bullets while attempting to shoot back at defendant, and, after the shooting ended, the victims called 911 and followed defendant until police arrived. State v. Juarez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony because the evidence showed defendant fired numerous shots at victims in the parking lot of a crowded shopping mall. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault because it showed that during the argument defendant produced a gun and said he knew “the code” and would “blow” the boyfriend's “chest out.” State v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault because a police officer found cartridge cases fired from the same unknown gun at the scene of a shooting in a club, the victim testified that defendant shot the victim, and defendant admitted to shooting defendant's gun—which defendant threw away—multiple times in the club. A reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant recklessly caused bodily injury to the victim while using or displaying a deadly weapon. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on two law enforcement officers because defendant intentionally and knowingly used his vehicle as a deadly weapon, causing both officers to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury as defendant placed his vehicle into reverse and rammed into the officers'  vehicle with enough force to cause it to spin over 90 degrees; and an automobile could be considered a deadly weapon. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the first defendant of aggravated assault because the victim testified that the first defendant kicked him in the eye; and the victim and a witness testified that the first defendant held a gun on the victim. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to find the second defendant criminally responsible for aggravated assault as he hit and kicked the victim while the first defendant held a gun on the victim; and the victim sustained a collapsed lung and contusions from the beating. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, based upon a theory of criminal responsibility, because the evidence established that defendant was involved in planning the robbery of the victim in the victim's home, provided a BB gun and supplied a Sharpie for the purpose of painting the BB gun so that it would look like a real gun knowing that the BB gun was going to be used to rob the victim, provided the wrench which was used to repeatedly hit the victim during the robbery, and took a share of the stolen marijuana. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault because defendant did not reside at the victim's house and he entered without the victim's effective consent as he did not have a key to the victim's house, and he entered by throwing a cinder block through a window; and the victim suffered serious bodily injury as she had significant swelling and pain, a broken nose, a fractured jaw, multiple contusions, and permanent vision impairment. State v. Fykes, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2019).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault including that defendant texted an accomplice about a robbery, defendant dropped off the accomplices at the pawn shop where they robbed the store and customers, the accomplices ran to an abandoned house and changed clothes before defendant picked them up, and the offenders were all tracked using a GPS placed in one of the jewelry cases taken during the robbery. State v. Wise, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2019).

Evidence that the victim suffered a broken nose and fractured orbital bone and experienced pain at a 10 out of 10 level for two weeks was sufficient to support a finding that the victim suffered serious bodily injury as required for defendant's aggravated assault conviction. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

Defendant failed to establish that “display” as used in the statute was ambiguous, the rule of lenity did not apply, and the evidence was sufficient to support his aggravated assault convictions, as his obtaining control of the gun and placing his hand on the grip and trigger during the struggle was sufficient to show he displayed the weapon. State v. Sweeney, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2019).

Evidence that defendant stood one to two feet away from the victims and pointed a gun at them and told them to get on the ground, and that one victim testified he was scared and though he could die was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault against the scared victim. State v. Wilkins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault because it showed that he violently used a mallet to strike the victims'  bedroom door while threatening their lives and the victims testified his conduct put them in fear and caused them to call 911. State v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated assault because both victims expressed their fear for their lives based on defendant's firing his gun into the vehicle in which both were passengers. State v. Stinnett, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2020).

Where several of the State's witnesses saw defendant threaten the victim with a gun and defendant's use of a gun was corroborated by the presence of gunshot residue on his hands, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's aggravated assault conviction. State v. Hurt, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2020).

Defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder and other offenses because witnesses testified that the victim was the primary aggressor failed because a reasonable juror could have found that defendant's self-defense claim was not well-founded given the victim's testimony that he had not drawn his gun when defendant opened fire and that defendant turned and walked toward the victim when the victim came outside, engaging further rather than continuing to walk away. State v. Cole, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim's identification of defendant in a photographic lineup and at trial was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator, and the jury could consider defendant's accomplice's testimony because it was sufficiently corroborated by the victim's testimony. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions because it showed that a co-defendant and defendant made a plan to “hit a lick” on Hispanic people, obtained a working magazine for the malfunctioning handgun, armed themselves, and asked another co-defendant to drive them around town to identify vulnerable targets. After choosing a house, the co-defendant and defendant walked back to the house, fired two shots into the air, and ordered the victims onto the ground, one of the men took a victim's wallet, and when they were surprised by the victims inside the house opening the door, the co-defendant and defendant opened fire, striking the house and four people present. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated assault, including evidence that defendant brandished a knife and walked toward the victim inside an apartment and continued toward the victim as the victim walked backward, reasonably fearing imminent bodily injury as a result of defendant's conduct, and that defendant used a knife, a deadly weapon, to inflict bodily injury on the victim. State v. Parrish, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and domestic assault, where the evidence showed that the victim and defendant were dating and had a sexual relationship, during a tussle defendant ended up on top of the victim with his hands around her neck, and after the incident a police officer saw scratches on the victim's neck and other parts of the body. State v. Cartwright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 2, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated and domestic assault; defendant used his vehicle to cause the victim to reasonably fear injury, defendant attempted to strike the victim's car, causing her to drive off of the roadway to prevent a collision and potential injury, she expressed fear that something would happen to her and called the police during the incident, her testimony was alone sufficient, and she was a domestic abuse victim because she and defendant had been in a romantic relationship and shared a child. State v. Alexander, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the jury clearly chose to credit the victim's version of events, rejecting defendant's testimony supporting self-defense; the victim testified specifically about the manner in which defendant and co-defendant began to follow him, about his attempts to get help through 911, about the shooting, about his fleeing the scene, and about his abandoning his own weapon to seek. State v. Manning, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping because it showed that during an argument defendant forced the victim into a chair, he blocked the victim from leaving the residence and grabbed her by the neck, and when the victim tried to leave again defendant brandished a knife and told her she would only leave in a body bag. State v. Stevens, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault and domestic assault because the victim suffered serious bodily injury after being hit and then kicked in the face multiple times by defendant; her left eye was swollen shut, and the left side of her face was heavily bruised; the victim testified that she still experienced facial pain from the assault, and her eye still did not completely open; defendant and the victim had been dating for approximately two years and had been living together; and defendant did not act in self-defense as he was not in danger of death or serious bodily injury at the time he dragged the victim out of the truck and then kicked her in the face multiple times. State v. Porter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

16. —Insufficient.

Where the trial court convicted defendant of reckless aggravated assault based on police testimony of the deceased victim's hearsay statements made at the crime scene, defendant's conviction could not be sustained. State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Anderson v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 828, 127 S. Ct. 47, 166 L. Ed. 2d 49, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5944 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated assault conviction because a rational jury could have found that he knowingly caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the manner in which he displayed a deadly weapon, the baseball bat, because he approached the victim in an aggressive manner, the victim feared he would be struck and jumped into a nearby car to avoid harm, and based on defendant's threats earlier in the day it was reasonable for the victim to believe that defendant presented a real, immediate threat to his safety. State v. Fisher, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because defendant became upset with the victim at a party, when the victim approached defendant and asked for the return of the victim's keys, defendant threatened the victim and lunged toward the victim, during the altercation defendant pulled out a knife and stabbed the victim, defendant chased the victim while still holding the knife, and defendant yelled that defendant was going to kill the victim. Furthermore, the jury rejected defendant's claim of self-defense. State v. Wood, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

Evidence did not establish that the victim constructively possessed any of the property taken from an apartment because the evidence did not support a conclusion that the victim had any interest in or right to the items taken from the apartment, and the victim's presence as a guest did not establish that the victim had a greater right to possess the items than defendant. Likewise, the lack of evidence regarding from where the items were taken precluded a conclusion that the items were taken from the victim's immediate presence and control. Boatwright v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2020).

17. Enhancement Factors.

The sentence enhancement factor that personal injury inflicted upon the victim was “particularly great” is an element of the offense of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and could not be used to enhance defendant's sentence. State v. Jones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. 1994).

The sentence enhancement factors that defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the “risk to human life was high” and that the “potential for bodily injury” to a victim was great” are not elements of the offense of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, and can be used for enhancement purposes if the facts of the case warrant such use. State v. Jones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Crowe, 914 S.W.2d 933, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Jan. 8, 1996).

The use of a deadly weapon is not an essential element of an aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, and thus can be used as an enhancement factor in sentencing following conviction. State v. Carter, 986 S.W.2d 596, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Where the affidavit of complaint states that defendant struck a police officer on the head with his fist during a traffic stop, he necessarily committed aggravated assault under Tennessee law. When defendant pleaded guilty to a federal offense for possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, the federal district court did not err by designating him as a career offender because his prior Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault was properly counted as a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2). In re Smith, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23525 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2016).

Victim's testimony that his pain was such that he was unable to lie down or sleep for the first two days following the assault and that he experiences such extreme vertigo that he repeatedly vomited was sufficient for the jury to find that the victim suffered a serious bodily injury as required for aggravated assault. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 618 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017).

18. Sentencing.

Defendant's ninety-four-month sentence for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute and for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(2), relating to the illegal reentry of removed aliens, was improperly enhanced by sixteen levels pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because his prior conviction for vehicular assault pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-106(a), which required proof of the reckless use of force against a person or property of another, was not a crime of violence based on cases examining 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), which contained identical language to the guideline's catch-all provision. Moreover, the enhancement could not be sustained via the enumerated list of crimes in § 2L1.2(b)(1) by analogizing it to aggravated assault under T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(2) because only enumerated offenses could trigger the enhancement. United States v. Portela, 469 F.3d 496, 2006 FED App. 430P, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28733 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2006).

Defendant's 10-year maximum sentence for aggravated assault that resulted in a permanent head injury to the victim was appropriate under T.C.A. § 40-35-114 given defendant's lack of potential for rehabilitation, his past felony causing death, and the past failure of alternatives to incarceration. State v. Jones, 341 S.W.3d 318, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011).

Trial court did not err by refusing to apply mitigating factors because defendant grabbed a wooden beam, struck the victim numerous times, caused extensive injuries to the victim's head and face, and stated numerous times during the attack that he was going to kill the victim; although the victim fell on the ground after the first strike, terminating any threat by the victim, defendant continued hitting the victim while he lay on the ground. State v. Tiger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences for defendant's convictions of reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault; defendant was found to be a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high, plus consecutive sentences were reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and necessary to protect the public. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

In a case where defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated assault, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing concurrent maximum sentences of 15 years for a persistent offender because defendant had a very lengthy history of criminal convictions beyond those necessary to establish the appropriate range; he had a history of failing to comply with the conditions of release into the community based on over 20 previous revocations of probation or parole; and he was on bail when he committed the current crimes; however, the trial court erred by failing to merge all three convictions into a single conviction as they were based on the same occurrence and were indicted as alternative theories of the same offense. State v. Baxter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

Trial court found that defendant was a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human life, and consecutive sentences were reasonably related to the severity of the offenses committed and were necessary to protect the public, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences; however, defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault had to merge into his conviction for reckless homicide, resulting in a total effective sentence of four years. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to an effective seven years'  confinement for two counts of aggravated assault or in denying his request for alternative sentencing as confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offenses and to deter other individuals from similar acts because defendant assaulted the victim three times, culminating with a severe beating that merited a one-week hospitalization; the final assault occurred while defendant was released on bond for the first assault; in jail telephone calls, defendant discussed beating the victim, and he and a friend laughed about it; and defendant's laughter in the context of the jail conversation indicated a lack of remorse. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 947 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Others were in the area when defendant began shooting, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement factor regarding no hesitation to commit a crime when the risk to human life was high, plus nothing established that the trial court wholly departed from the statutes in applying the various enhancement factors and within-range sentences; thus, there was no abuse of discretion in defendant's sentences of 23 years for aggravated robbery, five years for aggravated assault, and four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Steed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to serve six years for vehicular homicide and four years for reckless aggravated assault, after considering defendant's history of criminal behavior, the fact that the offenses included more than one victim, and defendant's good work history. State v. Lutrell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 592 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2017).

Defendant had more than enough prior convictions to be considered a career offender because the prior aggravated assaults he committed were Class C felonies in which a statutory element of the offense was serious bodily injury, State v. Kirk, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and child abuse, and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of six and four years, for a total effective sentence of 10 years, the evidence supported the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences under the dangerous offender category because defendant, the two-month-old victim's caretaker, was frustrated with the victim's fussiness and was rough with him; the victim sustained 23 fractures throughout his body; defendant admitted to hearing a “pop” sound when aggressively handling the infant; and the trial court found it was necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct and, in particular, any young child that defendant might come in contact with. State v. Crawford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 870 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Trial court properly imposed a sentence of ten years'  confinement because the sentence was within the statutory range and presumed reasonable; as a Range II, multiple offender, defendant was subject to a sentencing range of six to ten years for aggravated assault, a Class C felony. State v. Lyczkowski, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated assault because while acting in concert with at least 10 other individuals, he intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to the victim by beating him severely with brass knuckles until the victim suffered facial fractures and temporarily lost consciousness, plus defendant handed a gun to his brother and told him to shoot the victim. State v. Gomez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2018).

Defendant's 15-year sentence for two counts of aggravated assault was proper, as the sentence was within the range for a Range III offender and the record supported the trial court's application of enhancement factor for cruelty; defendant's conduct of striking the victim on the head once with the pipe supported defendant's conviction, and his striking the victim a second time while he was unable to defend himself supported a finding that defendant's conduct was for the purpose of inflicting pain or suffering for its own sake. State v. Hughes, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2018).

Trial court's order of confinement was supported by the record, as defendant had a prior history of criminal offenses and had previously failed to successfully complete parole, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion by ordering defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

Defendant's effective 13-year sentence for aggravated assault was proper; it was within the discretion of the trial court to enhance defendant's sentences based on his failure to comply with the conditions of his previous release on parole, and the trial court properly found that defendant had an extensive record of criminal activity, which alone supported the imposition of consecutive sentencing. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

Defendant, having received no properly filed notice of the State's intent to seek enhanced punishment, was entitled to relief, and his offender classification was modified from career offender to Range I, standard offender; enhancement factors applied, considering his lengthy criminal record, plus he did not file any mitigating factors, and thus his six-year sentence for aggravated assault was proper. State v. Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2018).

Inherent dangers of strangulation cannot form the basis of a finding that the circumstances of the offense are particularly exaggerated when the conviction offense is assault by strangulation; the legislature has seen fit to make aggravated assault by strangulation, even of one's romantic partner, an offense eligible for judicial diversion, and thus the fact of the defendant's having committed that offense cannot support a denial of judicial diversion. The record did not support the denial in this case. State v. Hatfield, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 3, 2019).

Trial court did not err in effectively sentencing defendant to 12 years for his aggravated assault and aggravated robbery convictions because defendant was sentenced to a within-range sentence as defendant faced a sentence of eight to 12 years for the aggravated robbery, and three to six years for the aggravated assault; the trial court properly applied enhancement factors based on defendant's prior offense of theft of property, his role as a leader in the commission of the crime, his failure to complete judicial diversion, and his status on judicial diversion at the time of the commission of the offense; and the trial court thoroughly and completely applied the statutory sentencing principles. State v. Godwin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2019).

Defendant's sentence was not an abuse of discretion because (1) defendant's firearm offense sentence was statutorily set, (2) the aggravating factor for particularly great injury was properly applied to defendant's aggravated assault sentence based on the victim's written statement describing specific, objective examples of the long-lasting and significant effects defendant's conduct had and continued to have on the victim, (3) the sentence was within the range defendant faced as a Range I offender, and (4) defendant did not state what mitigating factors defendant believed the court should have applied. State v. Blackmon, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 435 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the maximum sentence for each conviction of aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping because it articulated on the record its reasons for imposing the sentences, it found that defendant's prior convictions were significant and established a history to enhance his sentence because they were very violent attacks on the victim. The trial court found that defendant had previously failed to comply with the conditions of his probation for his prior California convictions. State v. Olivera, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2019).

Trial court ordered defendant to serve his 10-year sentence for aggravated assault consecutively to his outstanding federal sentence, finding that consecutive sentencing was mandatory pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A); however, defendant was on supervised release for a federal felony conviction when he committed the instant offenses, and because federal supervised release was not analogous to parole, Rule 32(c)(3)(A) did not apply. State v. Sweeney, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2019).

Trial court did not err in ordering defendant to serve his 10-year sentence for aggravated assault consecutively to his outstanding federal sentence, as consecutive sentencing was warranted pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)(B), as good cause did not exist to run the sentences concurrently; defendant had an extensive criminal history that included convictions for violent offenses, had been on probation on multiple occasions, and had his probation revoked multiple times. State v. Sweeney, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the maximum sentence for aggravated assault within the defendant's applicable range as a Range II multiple offender; the trial court considered and applied enhancement factors, found no mitigating factors applied, and considered the applicable sentencing principles, and defendant's claim that the trial court placed too much weight on the enhancement factors was not a ground for appeal. State v. Sweeney, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2019).

Record amply supported the application of the statute to the Defendant's sentences for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault convictions; the trial court noted that the 25-year-old defendant had a criminal history of multiple violent offenses, mostly committed with firearms, and he committed the offenses in this case while on release into the community. State v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2020).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant to a within range sentence of eight years and six months for aggravated assault and 11 months, 29 days for both reckless endangerment and domestic assault because, as a Range II offender multiple offender, defendant was subject to a sentencing range of six to 10 years for aggravated assault, and 11 months, 29 days for the Class A misdemeanors of reckless endangerment and domestic assault; defendant had a history of criminal convictions in addition to those necessary to establish the range; and he was on release from a federal sentence when he committed the offenses. State v. Porter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

19. Election of Offenses.

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction had to be reversed because the State's failure to elect an offense as to the aggravated assault charge, and the trial court's failure to require the State to do so, resulted in plain error; because the State failed to elect the specific instance for which it wanted the jury to consider for the charge, a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached, and defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was adversely affected. State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Because the State adduced proof of more than one incident that each matched the allegations of the charging instrument, the election of offenses doctrine was implicated; the State's proof at trial allowed the jury to consider two incidents as each matching the single charge in the indictment for an aggravated assault, committed by violating an order of protection. State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Defendant repeatedly punched and choked the victim until she punched him, defendant then threatened to kill her if he could not find his marijuana and exited the room, and then defendant returned moments later and struck the victim on the head with a revolver; defendant's actions occurred in such close temporal and geographic proximity that they constituted one act of aggravated assault, and the State was not required to make an election of offenses. State v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2017).

20. Verdicts.

Defendant claimed the verdicts on his convictions for reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault were inconsistent, but he failed to cite authority for this, which could result in waiver; in any event, inconsistent verdicts were not a basis for relief. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

Because the jury's verdict did not reflect the mens with which it found defendant acted, it was unclear whether the jury unanimously found that defendant either intentionally or knowingly assaulted the victim causing serious bodily injury; because of this deficiency, defendant's conviction for Class C felony aggravated assault could not stand, but because the mens rea of reckless is a lesser mens rea of intentional or knowing, and the jury was properly instructed and was unanimous in finding, at a minimum, that defendant was guilty of reckless aggravated assault, the court imposed that conviction to do substantial justice. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

21. Merger.

Reckless aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of reckless homicide under part (b) of the State v. Burns  test as reckless aggravated assault fails to meet the definition of a lesser included offense of reckless homicide under Burns  part (a) only in the respect that it contains a statutory element establishing a less serious harm (serious bodily injury versus death) to the same person; thus, defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault had to merge into the conviction for reckless homicide. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Failure to merge defendant's aggravated assault convictions, one based on a violation of a court order and one based on the use or display of a deadly weapon, constituted plain error. State v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2017).

Trial court did not err by refusing to merge the conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter into the conviction of aggravated assault because, while the convictions arose from the same act or transaction, both of the offenses contained elements that the other did not, and there was no evidence that the legislature intended to prohibit multiple punishments in such circumstances. Accordingly, defendant's dual convictions did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Golden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2020).

22. Premeditation.

Defendant was properly convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault because, inter alia, defendant's mental defect did not prevent him from comprehending what was being said during his interview and his inquiry as to when a lawyer could come was not an unequivocal request for counsel, defendant admitted that he shot one person, had a motive for the shooting, procured a gun, fled the scene, disposed of the gun, tried to remove gunshot residue, and attempted to hide from police, and the jury could reasonably infer that, when he sprayed 32 bullets in the two assault victims'  direction, they reasonably feared for their lives. State v. Simmon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2018).

39-13-103. Reckless endangerment.

  1. A person commits an offense who recklessly engages in conduct that places or may place another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.
    1. Reckless endangerment is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. Reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon is a Class E felony.
    3. Reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm or antique firearm into a habitation, as defined under § 39-14-401, is a Class C felony, unless the habitation was unoccupied at the time of the offense, in which event it is a Class D felony.
    4. In addition to the penalty authorized by this subsection (b), the court shall assess a fine of fifty dollars ($50.00) to be collected as provided in § 55-10-412(b) and distributed as provided in § 55-10-412(c).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2011, ch. 409, § 1; 2012, ch. 1048, § 2; 2013, ch. 154, §§ 53, 54; 2019, ch. 279, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section proscribes reckless conduct which places another in a position of danger.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “or antique firearm” following “discharging a firearm” in (b)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 279, § 5. May 2, 2019.

Cross-References. Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Felonies and misdemeanors distinguished, § 39-11-110.

Penalties for Class C, D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Title definitions, § 39-11-106.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

Attorney General Opinions. Municipality unable to prohibit state authorized hunting, OAG 98-038 (2/9/98).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Elements.

Defendant could not be convicted of felony reckless endangerment, T.C.A. § 39-13-103, as a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder in a case where defendant stabbed defendant's former wife four times outside a bar during an altercation; application of the Burns test dictated that felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense because it requires a different element of proof than does attempted second degree murder and its intent requirement does not indicate a lesser culpability or less serious risk of harm than does attempted second degree murder. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 2001).

Defendant could not be convicted of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, T.C.A. § 39-13-103, as a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder in a case where defendant stabbed defendant's former wife four times outside a bar during an altercation; application of the Burns test for determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense dictated that misdemeanor reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense because it requires only a lesser degree of culpability—recklessness as opposed to knowledge—than does attempted second degree murder and its intent requirement requires a lesser culpability or less serious risk of harm than does attempted second degree murder. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 2001).

Because proof of a deadly weapon is always required for a felony reckless endangerment conviction, and because the deadly weapon element does not reflect an intent requirement indicating lesser culpability or a less serious risk of harm, felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 2001).

Misdemeanor reckless endangerment includes all of the elements of felony reckless endangerment except for the element requiring use of a deadly weapon; therefore, misdemeanor reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 2001).

2. —Recklessness.

Defendant's conduct in firing shots at a house, where occupants were not his intended victims, constituted reckless endangerment but was not ‘intentional or knowing’ so as to rise to the level of aggravated assault. State v. Wilson, 924 S.W.2d 648, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. 1996).

Defendant's mere discharge of a gun into the air or up into a tree top was not sufficient to constitute the commission of reckless endangerment. State v. Fox, 947 S.W.2d 865, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Driver who had a couple of drinks and approached a blind curve at night at such speed that he could not stop in time to avoid hitting a car in his lane attempting to make a legal left turn was reckless and was aware of the risk created by his driving, but consciously disregarded it. State v. Lewis, 978 S.W.2d 558, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1105 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support reckless endangerment conviction where testimony indicated defendant was driving fifteen to twenty miles over the speed limit and “whipped up into” an unsuspecting man's driveway, such that the man had to run to avoid being run over. State v. Neely, 1 S.W.3d 679, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Crime of attempted reckless endangerment did not exist, and therefore defendant's conviction was vacated, because in order to find defendant guilty, defendant would have had to have the intent to act recklessly. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2020).

3. —Threat of Harm.

Reckless endangerment will occur even if the victim does not suffer the threatened harm. State v. Baggett, 836 S.W.2d 593, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Ramsey, 903 S.W.2d 709, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

For the threat of bodily injury to be imminent, the person must be placed in a reasonable probability of danger as opposed to a mere possibility of danger. State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. 1999).

4. —Conduct Victimizing More Than One Person.

Even though defendant's reckless conduct victimized more than one person, where the facts showed that it was one continuous act, a single course of conduct, it did not justify multiple convictions. State v. Ramsey, 903 S.W.2d 709, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

5. —Conduct Victimizing the Public at Large.

The term “public at large” may be used in an indictment for reckless endangerment to designate that class of persons occupying the zone of danger. State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. 1999).

Reckless endangerment can be committed against the public at large where the state shows that a representative of that group was in an area in which a reasonable probability of danger existed. State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. 1999).

6. Double Jeopardy.

Double jeopardy did not attach in a prosecution for reckless endangerment and driving while under the influence (DUI), where each conviction was based upon distinct conduct; the state's proof to the charge of DUI did not include proof of defendant's reckless driving; and the offenses neither had identical statutory elements, nor were lesser mutually inclusive. State v. Boggs, 865 S.W.2d 920, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Convictions for the offenses of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment did not violate double jeopardy since each offense required proof of an additional fact that the other did not. State v. Brooks, 909 S.W.2d 854, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Appellate court erred by holding that defendant's convictions of evading arrest, T.C.A. § 39-16-603(b), and reckless endangerment, T.C.A. § 39-13-103, violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy in the Fifth Amendment and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10 because the crimes did not constitute the same offense nor was one a lesser included offense of the other for the purpose of the Blockburger  test. Reckless endangerment did not require the State to prove any of the elements of evading arrest, reckless endangerment simply required proof of imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to another person, evading arrest did not require the use of a deadly weapon as reckless endangerment did, and the State did not need to prove that the danger was to a person who was an innocent bystander or third party in order to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of reckless endangerment. State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Even though defendant's convictions of criminally negligent homicide and felony reckless endangerment were inconsistent, they did not have to be set aside because the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 776 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017).

7. Zone of Danger.

The “zone of danger” is that area in which a reasonable probability exists that the defendant's conduct would place others in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury if others were present in that zone or area. State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. 1999).

Evidence showing that defendant shot spouse at close range, while the victim of the reckless endangerment charge was standing within defendant's line of fire and near the spouse, was sufficient to convict defendant under this statute. State v. Alder, 71 S.W.3d 299, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 771 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

8. Lesser Included Offense.

In a felony reckless endangerment case, failure to charge the jury with the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment was reversible error because evidence at trial would have supported a jury instruction on the lesser included offense. State v. Nelson, 275 S.W.3d 851, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2008).

Because reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault committed by intentionally or knowingly causing another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by use or display of a deadly weapon, the trial court committed plain error by charging reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense of reckless endangerment. Defendant was entitled to a new trial on aggravated assault. State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Defendant did not show it was plain error not to instruct a jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment because the jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of attempted second degree murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter but chose to convict defendant of attempted first degree murder, so defendant did not show a reasonable probability that a reasonable jury would have convicted defendant of misdemeanor reckless endangerment instead of attempted first degree murder. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

9. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's reckless endangerment conviction where defendant left his shotgun, which he knew to be loaded and cocked, in woods that were 50 feet behind a house; at the time he left the gun, defendant was fleeing from the police, and while there were no children or other persons in the woods at that time, defendant had seen children playing at a nearby residence. State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment because he temporarily pinned the officer between the victim's car and another car. State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's reckless endangerment conviction because it showed that: (1) Defendant sped past two vehicles in no passing zones on blind curves while being chased by a deputy sheriff in a marked cruiser with its flashing lights and siren engaged; (2) He did so on a road with a 45 mile per hour speed limit while accelerating to speeds of 80 to 90 miles per hour; and (3) There were at least two other drivers that were placed in the zone of danger by defendant's conduct. State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Evidence that defendant swerved his vehicle toward an officer's vehicle, trying to force it into oncoming traffic, was sufficient to permit jury to find defendant committed reckless endangerment under T.C.A. § 39-13-103. State v. Houston, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. May 8, 2013), cert. denied, Houston v. Tennessee, 189 L. Ed. 2d 747, 134 S. Ct. 2704, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3967 (U.S. 2014).

There was overwhelming circumstantial evidence that defendant was the perpetrator of the offenses of misdemeanor reckless endangerment and vandalism because three witnesses testified that they saw defendant's car shortly after the shootings, and when defendant was arrested, he had a shotgun in his lap and an over half-empty box of shotgun shells and shotgun shells in his car. State v. Robertson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment against his two-month-old daughter where it showed that he shot into the driver's car while his daughter was strapped in her infant carrier in the backseat, defendant knew that the victim was in the vehicle because he had placed her there, he recklessly shot through the window of the car on the passenger side, and he walked around to the driver's side and fired multiple shots into the car. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for reckless endangerment because one victim was placed in a reasonable probability of imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury when defendant drove his truck in such a way that the victim thought he was going to hit her; defendant drive into another victim's apartment, which placed that victim in a reasonable probability of imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. State v. Rush, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon because whether defendant intended to harm the investigator was immaterial as defendant used his vehicle in a manner capable of inflicting serious bodily injury to the investigator because defendant swerved into the investigator's lane at the moment of their passing; the investigator's testimony evinced that defendant looked directly ahead as he shifted half of his vehicle into the investigator's lane; had it not been for the investigator's evasive action, it could be reasonably concluded that the vehicles would have collided head-on; and defendant's act undoubtedly placed the investigator in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. State v. Boaz, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2016).

In a case where one passenger was killed and the others were injured, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of vehicular homicide by intoxication, vehicular assault with intoxication, and reckless endangerment because, although defendant initially asked other passengers to drive his vehicle, he later assumed control of the vehicle with the knowledge that not all of the passengers had access to seat belts; at that time, according to a passenger, defendant's speech was slurred and his eyes appeared glassy; defendant drove at a high rate of speed, clipped a culvert by a driveway, and lost control of and flipped the vehicle; and an analysis of defendant's blood showed the presence of drugs that affected his central nervous system. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence that defendant shot approximately 15 bullets in to the victims'  house, at least one bullet hole was found in the headboard of a victim's bed and others were found throughout the house, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless endangerment. State v. Lagrone, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 751 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment where it showed that, despite a do not enter sign, defendant drove west in an eastbound lane of a highway and struck the victim's car. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 776 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. Defendant's attack left the victim bleeding profusely from the side of her neck that required medical attention, including stitches and pain medication, and defendant further endangered the victim by throwing her cellular phone out of her reach to prevent her from calling for help. State v. Heath, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence strongly supported defendant's convictions for the lesser included offenses of reckless endangerment and attempted especially aggravated robbery because the proof adduced at trial established that defendant accosted the victim, pointed a handgun at him, shot him once in the lower left leg, and stole his cellular telephone and cash; both the victim and a witness positively identified defendant in a photographic lineup one month after the incident. State v. Thaxton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2016).

Evidence that two defendants opened fire into a crowd of people, placing them in imminent danger of death or serious injury was sufficient to support convictions for reckless endangerment. State v. Burgess, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

State established reckless endangerment and evading arrest by showing that defendant led police on a seven-mile, high-speed chase which put police officers'  and other motorists'  lives in imminent danger, plus defendant intentionally failed to stop when officers activated lights and sirens, which placed the officers and other motorists in danger; the jury viewed three dash-cam videos of the high-speed chase, showing defendant weaving through vehicles and crossing into oncoming lanes of traffic, and he reached speeds of up to 117 miles per hour. State v. McCommon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2017).

State presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon because the jury accredited both the victim's testimony regarding being cut by defendant with a box cutter, and a doctor's testimony that the victim's lacerations were caused by a razor-sharp blade; any credibility questions raised by the victim's insobriety were within the province of the jury, and the court of criminal appeals could not reevaluate the victim's credibility. State v. Pittman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon because his intoxication proximately caused a car crash that killed his son and injured his nephew, while his convictions for vehicular assault and reckless endangerment both stemmed from the crash, his DUI conviction should merge with the vehicular assault conviction since it was a lesser-included offense and he could not be punished separately for one act of DUI that caused serious bodily injury, and the trial court properly considered the aggregating, mitigating, and sentencing factors. State v. Steelman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless endangerment because defendant engaged in reckless conduct that placed the victim in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury when he used a pocketknife to slash the victim four times; the jury acted within its province if it rejected defendant's testimony that he merely acted to defend himself by reaching for and using his knife to injure the unarmed victim, who punched defendant; and the jury was within its province if it determined that defendant's use of a knife was an unreasonable response to the use or threatened use of unlawful force by the victim or that defendant's use of deadly force was not based upon reasonable beliefs. State v. Dixon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless endangerment because the State of Tennessee presented evidence that defendant placed the numerous occupants of a home into imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury by recklessly firing a rifle through the walls of the home. Furthermore, defendant's admissible statements to the police established defendant's identity as the shooter. State v. Butts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless endangerment because the 12-year-old victim testified that after he ran out of the house, he observed bullets flying past him and heard bullets ricocheting off the truck he was hiding behind. State v. Grant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless endangerment because the proof established that defendant twice struck a restaurant building with his 5,746 pound vehicle, causing the patrons who were seated mere feet away to scream and the glass separating the vehicle from the patrons to rattle; and defendant then recklessly drove through the restaurant parking lot, nearly striking an individual in the process. State v. Hamm, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon; the accomplice witness testimony was sufficiently corroborated, plus the evidence established that while driving past a bar, defendant handed a loaded firearm to the accomplice, who was so intoxicated he had been kicked out of the same bar minutes earlier, and signaled for him to shoot, and at the time, the bar was full of patrons, such that defendant acted recklessly. State v. Katz, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony because the evidence showed defendant fired numerous shots at victims in the parking lot of a crowded shopping mall. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment because it showed that he fired two shots from a handgun at the boyfriend, who was standing behind and near the ex-wife, which placed her in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. In so doing, defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the ex-wife would be injured or killed by a stray bullet. State v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's reckless endangerment convictions because a police officer found cartridge cases fired from the same unknown gun at the scene of a shooting in a club, defendant admitted to shooting defendant's gun—which defendant threw away—multiple times in the club, and the victims were shot in the club. A reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that placed the victims in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury while using or displaying a deadly weapon. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

All three defendants were involved in the events that led up to and included the victim's murder, and there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that an accomplice's testimony was corroborated and to sustain the convictions for each defendant for first degree murder, conspiracy, attempt, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment; they all met to discuss killing someone in retaliation for the murder of one defendant's sister earlier that day, and witnesses identified them. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of reckless endangerment because it showed that two troopers each inspected defendant's truck's brake box and break-away device, and each deemed the trailer's brakes to be in operable, but despite being so advised defendant drove the trailer on a highway at interstate speeds without the required brakes while other motorists were also on the road. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2020).

evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for reckless endangerment because it showed that defendant fired his gun into the vehicle toward his wife who was holding one baby and was sitting next to the other baby. State v. Stinnett, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2020).

Defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder and other offenses because witnesses testified that the victim was the primary aggressor failed because a reasonable juror could have found that defendant's self-defense claim was not well-founded given the victim's testimony that he had not drawn his gun when defendant opened fire and that defendant turned and walked toward the victim when the victim came outside, engaging further rather than continuing to walk away. State v. Cole, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of misdemeanor reckless endangerment as he showed a complete disregard for the victim's well-being because she testified that she lost consciousness after being assaulted by defendant; he left her lying injured in the middle of the highway in the dark with impaired vision and no shoes or cell phone; there were no street lights for 2.4 miles; and she walked 3.8 miles barefooted to a restaurant to get help. State v. Porter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

10. Sentencing.

Trial court properly imposed concurrent, three-year terms after defendant pled guilty to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon under T.C.A. § 39-13-103 and theft of merchandise over five hundred dollars under T.C.A. § 39-14-146 and denied probation where: (1) defendant was a Range II, multiple offender, had repeatedly violated past probation conditions and continued to commit other crimes; (2) she was on probation when she committed these crimes; (3) the conduct of defendant and her accomplices could have cost the victim her life; and (4) defendant did not show an abuse of discretion or overcome the presumption of reasonableness. State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 824 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

Trial court properly imposed two-year sentences for defendant's convictions of criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment, even though it erred by applying the use of a deadly weapon enhancement factor to the reckless endangerment conviction, because the trial court properly applied several other enhancement factors. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 776 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017).

Trial court's sentences for three years for Class D felony theft, two years for Class E felony reckless endangerment, and three months for Class A misdemeanor escape were entitled to a presumption of reasonableness because they were within the appropriate range under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-105, 39-13-103, 39-16-605, 40-35-111, 40-35-112; no error was found. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant to a within range sentence of eight years and six months for aggravated assault and 11 months, 29 days for both reckless endangerment and domestic assault because, as a Range II offender multiple offender, defendant was subject to a sentencing range of six to 10 years for aggravated assault, and 11 months, 29 days for the Class A misdemeanors of reckless endangerment and domestic assault; defendant had a history of criminal convictions in addition to those necessary to establish the range; and he was on release from a federal sentence when he committed the offenses. State v. Porter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

11. Relationship to Federal Sentencing Laws.

Defendant was resentenced for drug trafficking convictions to a term of 300 months because he should not have been sentenced as a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 4B1.1 in that his prior conviction for reckless endangerment under T.C.A. § 39-13-103 was not a crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2; however his criminal history and risk to the public under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) required a sentence five years beyond the applicable range. United States v. Johnson, 631 F. Supp. 2d 946, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45989 (E.D. Tenn. June 2, 2009).

Defendant's sentence was vacated and remanded because based on current case law, defendant's prior conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-103 could not be considered a “crime of violence” under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2) because it did not involve the type of “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” conduct as burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives. United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 2009 FED App. 97P, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5351 (6th Cir. Mar. 16, 2009).

12. Jury Instructions.

The jury instructions were not improper because the trial court did not err in its instruction to the jury regarding criminal responsibility. Moreover, the verdict form listed the charged offense for each count, gave the jury the option of finding defendant not guilty or guilty, and allowed the jury to set the amount of the fine and did the same for each of the charged lesser included offenses. State v. Tipler, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2015).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's request for a special jury instruction regarding criminally negligent homicide and reckless vehicular homicide because the jury instructions given conveyed that the death had to be likely and foreseeable. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 776 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017).

39-13-104. Effective consent.

When conduct is charged to constitute an offense under this part because it causes or threatens bodily injury, effective consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such injury is a defense, if:

  1. The bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious bodily injury; or
  2. The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards:
    1. Of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport; or
    2. For any concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law.

Acts 1992, ch. 673, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Effective consent is a defense to the assault offenses where the injury consented to is minor or where the conduct and injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of sports or other lawful activities, such as medical treatments, scientific experiments or an occupation. “Effective consent” is defined in § 39-11-106.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-13-105. Other offenses — Physical injury to victim.

In addition to the enumerated offenses, crimes against the person shall be any violent offense that results or could have resulted in physical injury to the victim, including, but not limited to, rape, sexual battery and kidnapping.

Acts 1993, ch. 524, § 3.

39-13-106. Vehicular assault.

  1. A person commits vehicular assault who, as the proximate result of the person's intoxication as set forth in § 55-10-401, recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another person by the operation of a motor vehicle. For the purposes of this section, “intoxication” includes alcohol intoxication as defined by § 55-10-411(a), drug intoxication, or both.
    1. Vehicular assault is a Class D felony.
    2. Any sentence imposed for a first violation of this section shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of forty-eight (48) consecutive hours of incarceration. The person shall not be eligible for release from confinement on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the person has served the entire forty-eight-hour minimum mandatory sentence.
    3. If at the time of sentencing for a violation of this section, the person has one (1) prior conviction for an alcohol-related offense, any sentence imposed by the judge shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of forty-five (45) consecutive days of incarceration. The person shall not be eligible for release from confinement on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the person has served the entire forty-five-day minimum mandatory sentence.
    4. If at the time of sentencing for a violation of this section, the person has any combination of two (2) prior convictions for an alcohol-related offense, any sentence imposed by the judge shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days of incarceration. The person shall not be eligible for release from confinement on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the person has served the entire one hundred twenty-day mandatory minimum sentence.
    5. If at the time of sentencing for a violation of this section, the person has any combination of three (3) or more prior convictions for an alcohol-related offense, any sentence imposed by the judge shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of one hundred fifty (150) consecutive days of incarceration. The person shall not be eligible for release from confinement on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the person has served the entire one hundred fifty-day mandatory minimum sentence.
    6. As used in this subsection (b), “alcohol-related offense” means a conviction for a violation of § 55-10-401, this section, § 39-13-213(a)(2), or § 39-13-218.
    7. For purposes of sentencing under this subsection (b), a prior conviction for an alcohol-related offense may be used to enhance the mandatory minimum sentence regardless of whether it occurred before or after July 1, 2015, as long as the violation of this section occurs on or after July 1, 2015.
  2. Upon the conviction of a person for the first offense of vehicular assault, the court shall prohibit the convicted person from driving a vehicle in this state for a period of one (1) year. For the second such conviction, the court shall prohibit the convicted person from driving a vehicle in this state for a period of two (2) years. For the third such conviction, the court shall prohibit the convicted person from driving a vehicle in this state for a period of three (3) years. For fourth and subsequent convictions, the court shall prohibit the person from driving a vehicle in this state for a period of five (5) years.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 14; 1999, ch. 368, § 1; 2013, ch. 154, § 49; 2015, ch. 125, § 2.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Juvenile court jurisdiction; vehicular assault, OAG 92-14 (2/19/92).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bodily Injury.

T.C.A. § 39-13-111(b) does not categorically qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Violation of a statute that builds on T.C.A. § 39-13-101 but makes it a crime only to cause “bodily injury,” serious or not, does not require the use of violent force.  United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d 582, 2012 FED App. 344P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 19635 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 2012).

2. Nondivertible Offense.

In a prosecution for vehicular assault, holding that the charge was a nondivertible offense was proper because driving under the influence (DUI) (at the time nondivertible pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-15-105) was a lesser included offense of vehicular assault and the prohibition of pretrial diversion for DUI applied to vehicular assault as well. State v. Burdine, 888 S.W.2d 463, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 1994).

3. Lesser Included Offenses.

Vehicular assault includes driving under the influence (DUI) as a lesser included offense; thus, for double jeopardy purposes, a person cannot be punished separately for DUI and vehicular assault for one act of driving under the influence that causes serious bodily injury. State v. Rhodes, 917 S.W.2d 708, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

4. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 989 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In a case where police arrived at the scene of a three-car accident, defendant was found outside the truck while his friend was found in the passenger seat, and defendant's blood alcohol content was .30%, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for vehicular assault and aggravated vehicular homicide where one motorist was injured and another motorist died. State v. Bowman, 327 S.W.3d 69, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. June 15, 2009), cert. denied, Bowman v. Tennessee, 175 L. Ed. 2d 388, 130 S. Ct. 559, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8080 (U.S. 2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault where the driver testified that defendant pulled a black and silver gun from his pants and pointed it at her, and she was terrified. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

In a case where one passenger was killed and the others were injured, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of vehicular homicide by intoxication, vehicular assault with intoxication, and reckless endangerment because, although defendant initially asked other passengers to drive his vehicle, he later assumed control of the vehicle with the knowledge that not all of the passengers had access to seat belts; at that time, according to a passenger, defendant's speech was slurred and his eyes appeared glassy; defendant drove at a high rate of speed, clipped a culvert by a driveway, and lost control of and flipped the vehicle; and an analysis of defendant's blood showed the presence of drugs that affected his central nervous system. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for vehicle assault due to intoxication because it showed that his blood alcohol was .08% after the accident, it was likely between .10 and .12 at the time of the accident, defendant was traveling in the center lane of a three lane roadway and he decided to turn right, crossing one lane of traffic when so doing, and he hit the victims at such a speed and with such force that they were both thrown a great distance from the motorcycle. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon because his intoxication proximately caused a car crash that killed his son and injured his nephew, while his convictions for vehicular assault and reckless endangerment both stemmed from the crash, his DUI conviction should merge with the vehicular assault conviction since it was a lesser-included offense and he could not be punished separately for one act of DUI that caused serious bodily injury, and the trial court properly considered the aggregating, mitigating, and sentencing factors. State v. Steelman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

5. Sentencing.

Since causing “serious bodily injury” to the victim is an element of vehicular assault, the sentence enhancement factor that the personal injuries inflicted upon the victim were particularly great did not apply in sentencing for that offense. State v. Rhodes, 917 S.W.2d 708, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Trial court erred in applying the enhancement factor of defendant with previous convictions to defendant in connection with defendant's conviction for vehicular assault in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-106(a); in order to show intoxication, the State relied on defendant's prior driving under the influence conviction to reduce the presumptive level of intoxication to. 08 percent pursuant to T.C.A. § 55-10-408(b), and thus the prior conviction became a necessary element of the offense, which made the application of the enhancement factor improper. State v. Keathly, 145 S.W.3d 123, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

Trial court erred in applying the multiple victim enhancement factor to defendant in connection with defendant's conviction for vehicular assault in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-106(a); because defendant was convicted of an offense involving a specifically named victim in the indictment, the trial court improperly applied this enhancement factor. State v. Keathly, 145 S.W.3d 123, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

Because there was no proof concerning the amount of the victim's property loss resulting from a collision, the State was required on remand to provide proof of “particularly great” property loss to support the application of the great amount of property damage enhancement factor to defendant in connection with defendant's conviction of vehicular assault in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-106(a). State v. Keathly, 145 S.W.3d 123, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

Trial court properly applied the high risk to life in crime enhancement factor to defendant in connection with defendant's conviction for vehicular assault in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-106(a) because when defendant collided with the victim's vehicle, the vehicle clipped the truck trailer in front of the victim, leaving the truck driver in danger due to defendant's driving. State v. Keathly, 145 S.W.3d 123, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

Defendant's ninety-four-month sentence for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute and for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(2), relating to the illegal reentry of removed aliens, was improperly enhanced by sixteen levels pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because his prior conviction for vehicular assault pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-106(a), which required proof of the reckless use of force against a person or property of another, was not a crime of violence based on cases examining 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), which contained identical language to the guideline's catch-all provision. Moreover, the enhancement could not be sustained via the enumerated list of crimes in § 2L1.2(b)(1) by analogizing it to aggravated assault under T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(2) [now (a)(1)(B)] because only enumerated offenses could trigger the enhancement. United States v. Portela, 469 F.3d 496, 2006 FED App. 430P, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28733 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2006).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the Department of Corrections for eight years following his guilty pleas of vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, and vehicular assault, a Class D felony, because defendant was not eligible for a sentence of full probation due to the statutorily imposed minimum jail terms. State v. Key, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 27, 2019).

39-13-107. Fetus as victim.

  1. For the purposes of this part, “another,” “individuals,” and “another person” include a human embryo or fetus at any stage of gestation in utero, when any such term refers to the victim of any act made criminal by this part.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to amend § 39-15-201, or §§ 39-15-203 — 39-15-205 and 39-15-207.
  3. Nothing in subsection (a) shall apply to any act or omission by a pregnant woman with respect to an embryo or fetus with which she is pregnant, or to any lawful medical or surgical procedure to which a pregnant woman consents, performed by a health care professional who is licensed to perform such procedure.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2011, ch. 408, § 1; 2012, ch. 1006, §§ 3, 4; 2014, ch. 820, §§ 1, 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section represents a major change in Tennessee law. See § 39-13-214.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Pursuant to Article III, Section 18 of the Constitution of Tennessee, Acts 2014, ch. 820 took effect on April 28, 2014.

The 2014 amendment, effective until July 1, 2016, substituted “lawful act or lawful omission” for “act or omission” at the beginning of (c)(1) and added (c)(2) and (c)(3) which read: “(c)(2) Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(1), nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a woman for assault under § 39-13-101 for the illegal use of a narcotic drug, as defined in § 39-17-402, while pregnant, if her child is born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic drug and the addiction or harm is a result of her illegal use of a narcotic drug taken while pregnant.

”(c)(3) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution permitted by subdivision (c)(2) that the woman actively enrolled in an addiction recovery program before the child is born, remained in the program after delivery, and successfully completed the program, regardless of whether the child was born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic drug.”

Cross-References. Fetus as victim, § 39-13-214.

Law Reviews.

Denying the Dyad: How Criminalizing Pregnant Drug Use Harms the Baby, Taxpayers and Vulnerable Women, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 745 (2015).

No Safe Harbors: Examining the Shift From Voluntary Treatment Options to Criminalization of Maternal Drug Use in Tennessee, 46 U. Mem. L. Rev. 203 (2015).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of including a non-viable fetus as a victim of certain crimes.  OAG 10-69, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 75 (5/20/10).

Liability for infants born with narcotic drug dependency.  OAG 13-01 (revised),  2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 12 (2/1/13).

39-13-108. Rules and regulations regarding transmission of HIV — Quarantine — Violations.

  1. The department of health, acting pursuant to § 68-10-109, shall promulgate rules regarding transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The rules shall include specific procedures for quarantine or isolation, as may be necessary, of any person who clearly and convincingly demonstrates willful and knowing disregard for the health and safety of others, and who poses a direct threat of significant risk to the health and safety of the public regarding transmission of HIV.
  2. The department is authorized to quarantine or isolate a person within a secure facility, after exercising other appropriate measures, if the person continues to pose a direct threat of significant risk to the health and safety of the public. Any person so quarantined or isolated within a secure facility, who intentionally escapes from the facility, commits a Class E felony.

Acts 1993, ch. 322, § 2.

Cross-References. Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

HIV screening, title 68, ch. 5, part 7.

HIV testing of persons convicted of sexual offenses, § 39-13-521.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Sexual offenses, title 39, ch. 13, part 5.

Sexually transmitted diseases, title 68, ch. 10.

Attorney General Opinions. The district attorney general is not an “appropriate state agency,” under T.C.A. § 68-10-113(3), to receive health department records regarding a person who has HIV, unless the district attorney general is prosecuting, or is considering prosecuting, an individual under T.C.A. § 39-13-108 or 68-10-111; unless such a circumstance exists, the district attorney general must obtain a court order under T.C.A. § 68-10-113(6), to obtain access to health department records regarding a person who has HIV, OAG 01-146 (9/14/01).

Absent a consent under T.C.A. § 68-10-113(2) or a court order under T.C.A. § 68-10-113(6), a health department employee is prohibited from talking to the district attorney general either about the mens rea of a criminal defendant whom the district attorney general either is prosecuting, or is considering prosecuting, for knowingly exposing someone to HIV or factual information regarding an HIV patient which is not noted in the patient's chart, but which would go to the patient's intention to commit a crime, OAG 01-146 (9/14/01).

39-13-109. Criminal exposure to HIV, HBV, HCV — Defenses — Penalty.

  1. A person commits the offense of criminal exposure of another to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), to hepatitis B virus (HBV), or to hepatitis C virus (HCV) when, knowing that the person is infected with HIV, with HBV, or with HCV, the person knowingly:
    1. Engages in intimate contact with another;
    2. Transfers, donates, or provides blood, tissue, semen, organs, or other potentially infectious body fluids or parts for transfusion, transplantation, insemination, or other administration to another in any manner that presents a significant risk of HIV, HBV or HCV transmission; or
    3. Dispenses, delivers, exchanges, sells, or in any other way transfers to another any nonsterile intravenous or intramuscular drug paraphernalia.
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “HIV” means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome;
    2. “Intimate contact with another” means the exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in any manner that presents a significant risk of HIV, HBV or HCV transmission; and
    3. “Intravenous or intramuscular drug paraphernalia” means any equipment, product, or material of any kind that is peculiar to and marketed for use in injecting a substance into the human body.
    1. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section, which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person exposed to HIV knew that the infected person was infected with HIV, knew that the action could result in infection with HIV, and gave advance consent to the action with that knowledge.
    2. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section, which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person exposed to HBV knew that the infected person was infected with HBV, knew that the action could result in infection with HBV, and gave advance consent to the action with that knowledge.
    3. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section, which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person exposed to HCV knew that the infected person was infected with HCV, knew that the action could result in infection with HCV, and gave advance consent to the action with that knowledge.
    1. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the actual transmission of HIV in order for a person to have committed the offense of criminal exposure of another to HIV.
    2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the actual transmission of HBV in order for a person to have committed the offense of criminal exposure to HBV.
    3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the actual transmission of HCV in order for a person to have committed the offense of criminal exposure to HCV.
    1. Criminal exposure of another to HIV is a Class C felony.
    2. Criminal exposure of another to HBV or HCV is a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), restitution to the victim or victims, or both a fine and restitution. The clerk shall transmit all money collected from a fine imposed for a violation of this section to the criminal injuries compensation fund created pursuant to § 40-24-107. In addition, a victim of criminal exposure HBV or HCV may maintain an action for the expenses and the actual loss of service resulting from such exposure.

Acts 1994, ch. 952, § 2; 2011, ch. 185, §§ 1-7.

Cross-References. Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

General defenses, title 39, ch. 11, part 5.

HIV screening, title 68, ch. 5, part 7.

HIV testing of persons convicted of sexual offenses, § 39-13-521.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Sexual offenses, title 39, ch. 13, part 5.

Sexually transmitted diseases, title 68, ch. 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for criminal exposure of another to HIV where the evidence showed that defendant knew he was infected with HIV when he anally penetrated the victim during an aggravated rape. State v. Bonds, 189 S.W.3d 249, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1043 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence that defendant was aware of his HIV status, was educated in the ways it could be transmitted, and penetrated multiple orifices of the victim was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for criminal exposure to HIV. State v. Hogg, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 448 S.W.3d 877, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

Defendant's convictions for criminal exposure to HIV were upheld if the risk related to the charged conduct was more definite than a faint, speculative risk, as shown by expert medical proof. State v. Hogg, 448 S.W.3d 877, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminal exposure to HIV because defendant and the victim engaged in both oral and vaginal sex; forensic testing confirmed the presence of defendant's semen in the victim's vagina and mouth; it was generally known that HIV was spread by the transfer of bodily fluids such as blood, genital secretions, and perhaps saliva; and the act of penetration, whether vaginal or oral, was itself sufficient evidence of exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that presented a significant risk of HIV transmission. State v. Person, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2018).

2. Multiple Counts.

Convictions for multiple counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation, criminal exposure to HIV, and aggravated statutory rape for various sex crimes were upheld, because defendant penetrated multiple orifices of the victim, including the victim's anus and mouth, and each act defendant performed was capable of producing its own fear, humiliation, pain, and damage to the victim. State v. Hogg, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 448 S.W.3d 877, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

3. Joinder of Offenses.

Defendant's conviction for criminal exposure to HIV was vacated as the mandatory joinder rule barred the State from bringing that charge against defendant to trial because the State was aware of defendant's HIV status at the time of the first trial on the aggravated rape charge; the State had already obtained an indictment charging defendant with criminally exposing the victim to HIV during the same sexual encounter that gave rise to the aggravated rape charge; and the assistant district attorney general who conducted the aggravated rape trial acknowledged that she was aware of the indictment and actively elected not to pursue consolidation of the indictments and engaged in the type of “saving back” prohibited by the mandatory joinder rule. State v. Person, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2018).

4. Severance of Offenses.

Trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to sever the offenses because the trial court concluded, without any analysis of a proper basis for admission, that evidence of defendant's HIV status would have been relevant and admissible as proof that he committed the aggravated rape as alleged by the victim, but the record did not support that conclusion as no evidence suggested that defendant's HIV positive status made any fact of consequence with regard to the aggravated rape charge more or less likely. State v. Person, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2018).

39-13-110. Female genital mutilation.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Facilitate” means raising, soliciting, collecting, or providing material support or resources with intent that such will be used, in whole or in part, to plan, prepare, carry out, or aid in any act of female genital mutilation or hindering the prosecution of an act of female genital mutilation or the concealment of an act of female genital mutilation;
    2. “Female genital mutilation,” “mutilate,” or “mutilation” means:
      1. The excision, infibulation or circumcision, in whole or in part, of the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of another;
      2. The narrowing of the vaginal opening through the creation of a covering seal formed by cutting and repositioning the inner or outer labia, with or without the removal of the clitoris; or
      3. Any harmful procedure to the genitalia, including pricking, piercing, incising, scraping, or cauterizing; provided, however, that body piercing, pursuant to title 62, chapter 38, part 3, when performed on a consenting adult, is not female genital mutilation;
    3. “Hindering the prosecution of female genital mutilation” includes, but is not limited to, the following:
      1. Harboring or concealing a person who is known or believed by the facilitator to be planning to commit an act of female genital mutilation;
      2. Warning a person who is known or believed by the facilitator to be planning to commit an act of female genital mutilation of impending discovery or apprehension; or
      3. Suppressing any physical evidence that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of a person who is known or believed by the facilitator to be planning to commit an act of female genital mutilation; and
    4. “Material support or resources” means currency or other financial securities, financial services, instruments of value, lodging, training, false documentation or identification, medical equipment, computer equipment, software, facilities, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets.
  2. It is an offense for a person to:
    1. Knowingly mutilate a female;
    2. Knowingly facilitate the mutilation of a female; or
    3. Knowingly transport or facilitate the transportation of a female for the purpose of mutilation.
  3. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class D felony.
  4. It shall not be a defense to prosecution for a violation of subsection (b) that a female genital mutilation procedure is:
    1. Required as a matter of belief, custom, or ritual;
    2. Consented to by the minor on whom the procedure is performed; or
    3. Consented to by the parent or legal guardian of the minor on whom the procedure is performed.
  5. A procedure is not a violation of subsection (b) if the procedure is:
    1. Necessary to the physical health of the person on whom the procedure is performed;
    2. Performed on a person who is in labor or who has just given birth for medical purposes connected with that labor or birth; or
    3. Cosmetic rejuvenation and reconstruction in accordance with the standards of the American college of obstetrics and gynecology.
  6. Any physician, physician in training, certified nurse or midwife, or any other medical professional who performs, participates in, or facilitates a female genital mutilation procedure that does not fall under an exception listed in subsection (e) shall, in addition to the criminal penalties under this section, be subject to disciplinary action by the appropriate licensing board.
  7. Nothing in this section prohibits prosecution under any other law.
  8. All property, including money, used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through, conduct in violation of subsection (b) is subject to civil forfeiture in accordance with §§ 39-11-701 — 39-11-717.
    1. A victim of female genital mutilation may bring an action under this subsection (i) against a person or an entity who:
      1. Knowingly mutilated or attempted to mutilate the victim;
      2. Knowingly facilitated the victim's mutilation; or
      3. Knowingly transported or facilitated the victim's transportation outside of this state for the purpose of mutilation.
    2. In an action under this subsection (i), the court may award all of the following:
      1. Damages, including, but not limited to, damages or loss due to pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, physical disfigurement, loss of society and companionship, and loss of consortium;
      2. Two (2) times the amount of damages sustained; and
      3. Reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
    3. If the victim is a minor whose legal guardian is alleged to have committed or facilitated the female genital mutilation, then a court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor.
  9. Any person or entity who knowingly commits an act of female genital mutilation, knowingly facilitates an act of female genital mutilation, or intentionally coerces, induces, or solicits a person who commits an act of female genital mutilation, shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages, attorney's fees, and costs awarded under subsection (i).
    1. Notwithstanding § 28-3-104, a victim of female genital mutilation may commence an action under this section to recover damages sustained because of the female genital mutilation at any time prior to five (5) years after the commission of the act of female genital mutilation or, if the victim was a child at the time of the act, before the victim reaches twenty-one (21) years of age, whichever occurs later.
    2. If a criminal prosecution under this section proceeds against any person who committed the act of female genital mutilation, facilitated the actions of the person who committed the act of female genital mutilation, or coerced, induced, or solicited the person who committed the act of female genital mutilation, the running of the period shall be suspended during the pendency of such prosecution.
  10. A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding under this section shall preclude the defendant from denying the essential facts established in that proceeding in any subsequent civil action pursuant to chapter 268 of the Public Acts of 2019.

Acts 1996, ch. 857, § 2; 2019, ch. 268, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1996, ch. 857, § 1 provided that the act enacting this section shall be known and may be cited as the “Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1996.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote the section which read: “(a)  Except as otherwise permitted in subsection (b), whoever knowingly circumcises, excises or infibulates, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora or clitoris of another commits a Class D felony. Consent to the procedure by a minor on whom it is performed or by the minor's parent is not a defense to a violation of this section.“(b)  A surgical procedure is not a violation of subsection (a), if the procedure is:“(1)  Necessary to the health of the person on whom it is performed and is performed by a licensed physician or physician-in-training under supervision of a licensed physician; or“(2)  Performed on a person who is in labor or who has just given birth and is performed for medical purposes connected with that labor or birth by a licensed physician or a physician-in-training under the supervision of a licensed physician.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 268, § 5. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Child abuse, title 39, ch. 15, part 4.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

General defenses, title 39, ch. 11, part 5.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

Spousal abuse, title 36, ch. 3, part 6.

39-13-111. Domestic assault.

  1. As used in this section, “domestic abuse victim” means any person who falls within the following categories:
    1. Adults or minors who are current or former spouses;
    2. Adults or minors who live together or who have lived together;
    3. Adults or minors who are dating or who have dated or who have or had a sexual relationship, but does not include fraternization between two (2) individuals in a business or social context;
    4. Adults or minors related by blood or adoption;
    5. Adults or minors who are related or were formerly related by marriage; or
    6. Adult or minor children of a person in a relationship that is described in subdivisions (a)(1)-(5).
  2. A person commits domestic assault who commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101 against a domestic abuse victim.
    1. A first conviction for domestic assault and a second or subsequent conviction for domestic assault committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(2) and (a)(3) is punishable the same as assault under § 39-13-101, and additionally, as provided in subdivisions (c)(2) and (c)(3) and subsections (d) and (e) of this section.
    2. A second conviction for domestic assault committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(1) is punishable by a fine of not less than three hundred fifty dollars ($350) nor more than three thousand five hundred dollars ($3,500), and by confinement in the county jail or workhouse for not less than thirty (30) consecutive days, nor more than eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days.
    3. A third or subsequent conviction for domestic assault committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(1) is punishable by a fine of not less than one thousand one hundred dollars ($1,100) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), and by confinement in the county jail or workhouse for not less than ninety (90) consecutive days, nor more than eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days; provided, however, that if the domestic assault victim's relationship with the defendant falls within the categories defined in subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(3), or the victim is the minor child of any person in such categories, and the defendant has at least two (2) prior convictions for domestic assault committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(1) prior to or at the time of committing the offense, the offense is a Class E felony, with a mandatory confinement of not less than ninety (90) consecutive days in the county jail or workhouse.
    4. For purposes of this section, a person who is convicted of a violation of § 39-13-111 committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(1), shall not be subject to the enhanced penalties prescribed in this subsection (c), if ten (10) or more years have elapsed between the date of the present violation and the date of any immediately preceding violation of §  39-13-111, committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(1), that resulted in a conviction for such offense.
    5. In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of this section, if, as determined by the court, the defendant possesses the ability to pay a fine in an amount not in excess of two hundred twenty-five dollars ($225), then the court shall impose a fine at the level of the defendant's ability to pay, but not in excess of two hundred twenty-five dollars ($225). The additional fine shall be paid to the clerk of the court imposing sentence, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fine to the general fund. All fines so credited to the general fund shall be subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the exclusive purpose of funding family violence shelters and shelter services. This appropriation shall be in addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to § 67-4-411.
    6. If a defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty of a domestic violence offense, as defined by this section or in § 40-14-109, the judge shall immediately order that the defendant:
      1. Terminate physical possession of all firearms in the defendant's possession within forty-eight (48) hours of the conviction by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms; and
        1. Complete an affidavit of firearms dispossession form and return it to the court in which the defendant was convicted when all firearms have been lawfully dispossessed as required by subdivision (c)(6)(A);
        2. The defendant may obtain the affidavit of dispossession from the court or court clerk or the defendant may be directed to obtain a copy from the website of the administrative office of the courts.
    7. In addition to all other fines, fees, costs, and punishments now prescribed by law, the court shall assess each person convicted of domestic assault an electronic monitoring indigency fee of ten dollars ($10.00). All proceeds collected pursuant to this subdivision (c)(7) shall be transmitted to the treasurer for deposit in the electronic monitoring indigency fund, established in § 55-10-419.
  3. As part of a defendant's alternative sentencing for a violation of this section, the sentencing judge may direct the defendant to complete a drug or alcohol treatment program or available counseling programs that address violence and control issues including, but not limited to, a batterer's intervention program that has been certified by the domestic violence state coordinating council. Completion of a noncertified batterer's intervention program shall only be ordered if no certified program is available in the sentencing county. No batterer's intervention program, certified or noncertified, shall be deemed complete until the full term of the program is complete, and a judge may not require a defendant to attend less than the full term of a program as part of a plea agreement or otherwise. The defendant's knowing failure to complete such an intervention program shall be considered a violation of the defendant's alternative sentence program and the sentencing judge may revoke the defendant's participation in such program and order execution of sentence.
  4. A person convicted of a violation under this section shall be required to serve at least the minimum sentence day for day. All persons sentenced under this section shall, in addition to service of at least the minimum sentence, be required to serve the difference between the time actually served and the maximum sentence on supervised probation.

Acts 2000, ch. 824, § 1; 2002, ch. 649, § 3; 2008, ch. 744, § 1; 2009, ch. 455, § 4; 2010, ch. 1061, §§ 1, 2; 2012, ch. 931, § 1; 2012, ch. 987, § 1; 2014, ch. 693, §§ 1-4; 2016, ch. 906, § 4; 2017, ch. 127, § 2; 2018, ch. 596, § 1; 2018, ch. 1046, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2016, ch. 906, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Public Safety Act of 2016.”

Acts 2017, ch. 127, § 3 provided that the  affidavit of firearms dispossession form required by § 39-13-111(c)(6)(B)(i) following a conviction for a domestic violence offense shall be developed by the domestic violence state coordinating council, in consultation with the administrative office of the courts. Upon completion, the form shall be posted on the website of the administrative office of the courts where it can be copied by defendants or provided to them by the court or court clerk  upon conviction.

Acts 2018, ch. 1046, § 12 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to  offenses committed on or after July 1, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment by ch. 596 inserted “by this section or” in the introductory language of (c).

The 2018 amendment by ch. 1046 added (c)(7).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 596, § 2. March 23, 2018.

Acts 2018, ch. 1046, § 12. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Sexual offenses, title 39, ch. 13, part 5.

Spousal abuse, title 36, ch. 3, part 6.

Law Reviews.

Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment to Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction With Other Law.

Defendant's convictions for assault and domestic assault violated double jeopardy under U.S. Const. amend. VI and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10 because all of the elements of assault were included in domestic assault and even though domestic assault included an element that assault did not the reverse was not true. State v. Freitas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2016).

2. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence that defendant, who was in a romantic relationship with and lived with the victim, forced himself on the victim, penetrating her vagina with his penis, told her not to leave the room after the rape and raised his hand in a threatening manner when she tried to leave was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for rape, false imprisonment, and domestic assault. State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 389 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of assault and domestic assault where it showed that the victim had a slight abrasion on her nose and slight discoloration on her neck, the jury heard the victim's testimony and saw photographs of her injuries, the jury could have found that the victim reasonably feared bodily injury when defendant charged her and forced her to the ground, and the victim and defendant had a child together. State v. Freitas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2016).

In rejecting defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his convictions for aggravated kidnapping by bodily injury and domestic assault by bodily injury, the court of criminal appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the victim's removal and confinement had criminal significance beyond that necessary to consummate the domestic assault. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. July 18, 2017).

Criminal court properly convicted defendant of domestic assault because, during an argument, he grabbed the victim with both of his hands, lifted her off of the couch where she had been sitting, and jerked her to the floor, the victim experienced pain and suffered bruising on her arms from the incident, two days later, the victim called 911 and told the operator that defendant had physically assaulted her, when the police officers arrived at the victim's home, she told them how defendant had been physically abusive to her and showed them the bruises on her arms, and the police officers believed that the victim's testimony was consistent with her injuries. State v. Downey, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2017).

Although defendant argued that defendant acted in self-defense, the evidence supported defendant's conviction for domestic assault because the victim and eyewitnesses testified that defendant struck the victim, whom defendant had dated at times over the years, but never married, during an exchange of custody of their infant son in a store parking lot. The victim suffered cuts to the victim's nose in the altercation. State v. Glenn, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of domestic assault of the victim, his wife, because he grabbed the victim by the hair, spat in her face, forced her to the ground, straddled her, and slapped her in the face and tried to hit her; the victim recalled having bruises on her arms, shoulder, and legs, as well as a cut on her hand; and the victim's testimony was sufficient to establish the elements of the offense without the need for any photographic evidence. State v. Keast, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 255 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2019).

Evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for domestic assault, as it establish that defendant intentionally struck his mother numerous times on the arm and chest and choked her. State v. Steele, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2020).

Evidence of domestic assault was insufficient because the State of Tennessee failed to establish that defendant's spouse reasonably feared imminent bodily injury. Although defendant's spouse testified that the spouse was in the spouse's car speaking to defendant on the phone when defendant threatened kill the spouse by putting a bomb in the car if the spouse did not drop the charges against defendant, the spouse did not testify that the spouse feared imminent bodily injury, did not call the police and drove the car several hours later. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and domestic assault, where the evidence showed that the victim and defendant were dating and had a sexual relationship, during a tussle defendant ended up on top of the victim with his hands around her neck, and after the incident a police officer saw scratches on the victim's neck and other parts of the body. State v. Cartwright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 2, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated and domestic assault; defendant used his vehicle to cause the victim to reasonably fear injury, defendant attempted to strike the victim's car, causing her to drive off of the roadway to prevent a collision and potential injury, she expressed fear that something would happen to her and called the police during the incident, her testimony was alone sufficient, and she was a domestic abuse victim because she and defendant had been in a romantic relationship and shared a child. State v. Alexander, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault and domestic assault because the victim suffered serious bodily injury after being hit and then kicked in the face multiple times by defendant; her left eye was swollen shut, and the left side of her face was heavily bruised; the victim testified that she still experienced facial pain from the assault, and her eye still did not completely open; defendant and the victim had been dating for approximately two years and had been living together; and defendant did not act in self-defense as he was not in danger of death or serious bodily injury at the time he dragged the victim out of the truck and then kicked her in the face multiple times. State v. Porter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

3. Lesser-included Offense Jury Instruction.

Trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact during his trial for domestic assault where defendant's actions of using a tree branch to strike the victim's backside and leaving visible bruising was not the type of action that could be characterized as offensive or provocative. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 2016).

4. Sentencing.

Trial court properly sentenced defendant to a within range sentence of eight years and six months for aggravated assault and 11 months, 29 days for both reckless endangerment and domestic assault because, as a Range II offender multiple offender, defendant was subject to a sentencing range of six to 10 years for aggravated assault, and 11 months, 29 days for the Class A misdemeanors of reckless endangerment and domestic assault; defendant had a history of criminal convictions in addition to those necessary to establish the range; and he was on release from a federal sentence when he committed the offenses. State v. Porter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2020).

39-13-112. HIV testing for assault victims — Reporting — Payment for testing.

    1. If a person is initially arrested for a violation of § 39-13-102, and if the victim of the assault suffered actual contact with the blood or other body fluid of the arrestee, then the arrestee shall undergo human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing immediately, upon the request of the victim. A licensed medical laboratory shall perform the test at the expense of the arrestee. The arrestee shall obtain a confirmatory test when necessary. The arrestee shall be referred to appropriate counseling.
    2. For purposes of this section, “victim of the assault” is limited to a law enforcement officer; firefighter; correctional officer; youth services officer; probation and parole officer; an employee of the department of correction or the department of children's services; provided, that the officer or employee was performing an official duty; or an emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, or paramedic, whether compensated or acting as a volunteer; provided, that such technician or worker was performing an official duty.
    1. The licensed medical laboratory shall report the results of the HIV test required under this section immediately to the victim of the assault.
    2. The result of the HIV test required under this section is not a public record and shall be available only to:
      1. The victim of the assault;
      2. The parent or guardian of a minor or incapacitated victim;
      3. The attending physician of the person tested and of the victim;
      4. The department of health;
      5. The department of correction;
      6. The person tested; and
      7. The district attorney general prosecuting the case.
  1. If the arrestee's test indicates that the arrestee is infected with HIV, then the arrestee shall be responsible for the victim's medical bills, laboratory bills and other expenses related to the victim's exposure to HIV, upon a finding that the exposure was from the arrestee.

Acts 2000, ch. 932, § 1.

39-13-113. Violation of an order of protection or restraining order — Violation of no contact order.

  1. It is an offense to knowingly violate:
    1. An order of protection issued pursuant to title 36, chapter 3, part 6; or
    2. A restraining order issued to a victim as defined in § 36-3-601.
  2. A person violating this section may be arrested with or without a warrant as provided in § 36-3-611, and the arrest shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements of § 36-3-619.
  3. A person who is arrested for a violation of this section shall be considered within the provisions of § 40-11-150(a) and subject to the twelve-hour holding period authorized by § 40-11-150(h).
  4. After a person has been arrested for a violation of this section, the arresting officer shall inform the victim that the person has been arrested and that the person may be eligible to post bond for the offense and be released until the date of trial for the offense.
  5. Neither an arrest nor the issuance of a warrant or capias for a violation of this section in any way affects the validity or enforceability of any order of protection, restraining order, or no contact order.
  6. In order to constitute a violation of subsection (a):
    1. The person must have received notice of the request for an order of protection or restraining order;
    2. The person must have had an opportunity to appear and be heard in connection with the order of protection or restraining order; and
    3. The court made specific findings of fact in the order of protection or restraining order that the person committed domestic abuse, sexual assault or stalking as defined in § 36-3-601.
  7. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. Notwithstanding § 40-35-111(e)(1), a violation of subsection (a) is punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), and any sentence of incarceration imposed shall be served consecutively to the sentence for any other offense that is based in whole or in part on the same factual allegations. However, the sentencing judge or magistrate may specifically order the sentences for the offenses arising out of the same facts to be served concurrently.
    1. It is an offense and a violation of an order of protection for a person to knowingly possess a firearm while an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is entered against that person and in effect, or any successive order of protection containing the language of § 36-3-606(f) and that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is entered against that person and in effect.
    2. For purposes of this subsection (h), the determination of whether a person possesses firearms shall be based upon the factors set out in § 36-3-625(f) if the firearms constitute the business inventory or are subject to the National Firearms Act, (26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq.).
    3. A violation of this subsection (h) is a Class A misdemeanor and each violation constitutes a separate offense.
    4. If a violation of subsection (h) also constitutes a violation of § 36-3-625(h) or § 39-17-1307(f), the respondent may be charged and convicted under any or all such sections.
    1. It is an offense to knowingly violate a no contact order, issued prior to a defendant's release on bond, following the defendant's arrest for any criminal offense defined in this chapter, in which the alleged victim of the offense is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601.
    2. A violation of subdivision (i)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. A sentence imposed must be served consecutively to the sentence for the offense for which the defendant was originally arrested, unless the sentencing judge or magistrate specifically orders the sentences for the offenses to be served concurrently.

Acts 2006, ch. 920, § 1; 2008, ch. 902, § 1; 2009, ch. 455, § 5; 2019, ch. 393, §§ 2-5; 2019, ch. 422, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 393, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Leigh Ann Act.”

Acts 2019, ch. 393, § 6 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to violations occurring on or after July 1, 2019.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by ch. 393, in (e), substituted “section in any way affects the validity or enforceability” for “section shall in any way affect the validity or enforceability” and added “, or no contact order”; in (f), substituted “a violation of subsection (a)” for “a violation of this section”; in (g), substituted “A violation of subsection (a)” for “A violation of this section”; and added (i).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 422 rewrote former (g) which read: “A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor, and any sentence imposed shall be served consecutively to the sentence for any other offense that is based in whole or in part on the same factual allegations, unless the sentencing judge or magistrate specifically orders the sentences for the offenses arising out of the same facts to be served concurrently.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 393, § 6. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 422, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Violation of protection order, restraining order or court-approved consent agreement, § 36-3-612.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of violation of an order of protection; a ban on indirect communication was intended by the issuing court, and defendant violated it, and his threat that he was going to “get” the victim and that it would hurt the victim more if something happened to his children could have been interpreted as a threat of physical harm. State v. Bullington, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 1, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for violating an order of protection because defendant was ordered at a hearing defendant did not attend following a continuance to stay away from defendant's child, the court made specific findings about abuse at the hearing and issued an order of protection instructing defendant to have no contact and to stay away from the parties'  child, the order was mailed to defendant but returned as undeliverable, and defendant violated the order by going to the child's school to see the child. State v. Richardson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 448 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2020).

3. Sentence.

Defendant's sentence of 11 months, 29 days at 75 percent for violation of an order of protection was not an abuse of discretion; the trial court considered the appropriate purposes of sentencing, defendant had previously violated the victim's order of protection three times, alternative sentencing did not deter defendant from disregarding the court's instructions, and his probation had been revoked. State v. Bullington, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 1, 2016).

39-13-114. Communicating a threat concerning a school employee.

  1. For purposes of this section, “school” means any:
    1. Elementary school, middle school or high school;
    2. College of applied technology or postsecondary vocational or technical school; or
    3. Two-year or four-year college or university.
  2. A person commits the offense of communicating a threat concerning a school employee if:
    1. The person communicates to another a threat to cause the death of or serious bodily injury to a school employee and the threat is directly related to the employee's scope of employment;
    2. The threat involves the use of a firearm or other deadly weapon;
    3. The person to whom the threat is made reasonably believes that the person making the threat intends to carry out the threat; and
    4. The person making the threat intentionally engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in the commission of the threatened act and the threatened act and the substantial step when taken together:
      1. Are corroborative of the person's intent to commit the threatened act; and
      2. Occur close enough in time to evidence an intent and ability to commit the threatened act.
  3. Communicating a death threat concerning a school employee is a Class B misdemeanor punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of thirty (30) days.

Acts 2008, ch. 1141, § 1; 2013, ch. 473, § 10.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-13-115. Aggravated vehicular assault.

  1. As used in this section, “prior conviction” means an offense for which the person was convicted prior to the aggravated vehicular assault charge. This definition includes prior convictions from this state or any other state, district, or territory of the United States within the last twenty (20) years.
  2. A person commits aggravated vehicular assault who:
      1. Commits vehicular assault, as defined in § 39-13-106; and
        1. Has two (2) or more prior convictions for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, as defined in § 55-10-401; or
        2. Has one (1) or more prior convictions for:
          1. Vehicular assault;
          2. Vehicular homicide, as defined in § 39-13-213(a)(2); or
          3. Aggravated vehicular homicide, as defined in § 39-13-218; or
      1. Had an alcohol concentration in the person's blood or breath of twenty-hundredths of one percent (0.20%) or more at the time of the offense; and
      2. Has one (1) prior conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, as defined in § 55-10-401.
  3. The indictment, in a separate count, shall specify, charge, and give notice of the required prior conviction or convictions. If the person is convicted of vehicular assault under § 39-13-106, the trier-of-fact shall separately consider whether the person has the required aggravating factors necessary to commit aggravated vehicular assault.
  4. For the purpose of determining if a person has sufficient aggravating factors to qualify for aggravated vehicular assault, applicable prior convictions occurring prior to July 1, 2015, may be used; provided, that the conduct constituting aggravated vehicular assault occurs on or after July 1, 2015.
  5. A violation of this section is a Class C felony, and there shall additionally be imposed a fine of not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000).
  6. Upon conviction for aggravated vehicular assault, the court shall prohibit the convicted person from driving a vehicle in this state pursuant to § 39-13-106(c).

Acts 2015, ch. 477, § 1; 2019, ch. 486, §§ 1, 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (b)(1)(B)(i), substituted “for driving” for “for: (a ) Driving”, and deleted former (b ), which read: “A violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender law, as defined in § 55-10-603; or”; and in (b)(2)(B), substituted “for driving” for “for: (i) Driving”, and deleted former (ii), which read: “A violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender law, as defined in § 55-10-603.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 486, § 15. July 1, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. License Revocation.

In a case in which the trial court imposed on defendant a lifetime ban from driving, the case was remanded for entry of a corrected judgment of defendant's aggravated vehicular homicide conviction to reflect that defendant's license was to be revoked for a period that would extend for the term of defendant's sentence pursuant to the license revocation statute. State v. Solomon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

2. Sentence Upheld.

In an aggravated vehicular homicide, aggravated vehicular assault, and leaving the scene of an accident case, defendant's effective sentence of 33 years was appropriate because the trial court considered the risk and needs assessment in determining defendant's sentence, but did not err in declining to give it any weight as the assessment's conclusion that defendant had a low risk of reoffending was inconsistent with the evidence of his four driving under the influence convictions and other drug- and alcohol-related convictions, his multiple failed attempts at rehabilitation, his continued use of drugs, and the fact that he ran over two people in broad daylight while so intoxicated that he was unable to stay awake. State v. Solomon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

39-13-116. Assault against first responder — “First responder” defined — Penalties.

  1. A person commits assault against a first responder, who is discharging or attempting to discharge the first responder's official duties, who:
    1. Knowingly causes bodily injury to a first responder; or
    2. Knowingly causes physical contact with a first responder and a reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or provocative, including, but not limited to, spitting, throwing, or otherwise transferring bodily fluids, bodily pathogens, or human waste onto the person of a first responder.
  2. A person commits aggravated assault against a first responder, who is discharging or attempting to discharge the first responder's official duties, who knowingly commits an assault under subsection (a), and the assault:
    1. Results in serious bodily injury to the first responder;
    2. Results in the death of the first responder;
    3. Involved the use or display of a deadly weapon; or
    4. Involved strangulation or attempted strangulation.
    1. Assault under subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a mandatory fine of five thousand dollars ($5,000) and a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty (30) days incarceration. The defendant shall not be eligible for release from confinement until the defendant has served the entire thirty-day mandatory minimum sentence.
    2. Aggravated assault under subsection (b) is a Class C felony, and shall be punished by a mandatory fine of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) and a mandatory minimum sentence of ninety (90) days incarceration. The defendant shall not be eligible for release from confinement until the defendant has served the entire ninety-day mandatory minimum sentence.
  3. For purposes of this section, “first responder”:
    1. Means a firefighter, emergency services personnel, POST-certified law enforcement officer, or other person who responds to calls for emergency assistance from a 911 call; and
    2. Includes capitol police officers, Tennessee highway patrol officers, Tennessee bureau of investigation agents, Tennessee wildlife resources agency officers, and park rangers employed by the division of parks and recreation in the department of environment and conservation.

Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which enacted this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Part 2
Criminal Homicide

39-13-201. Criminal homicide.

Criminal homicide is the unlawful killing of another person, which may be first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1991, ch. 377, § 1; 1995, ch. 460, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section recognizes that homicide may be first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide. Prior categories of homicide are preserved, with the exception of the elimination of “involuntary manslaughter” and its replacement with the new offense of “criminally negligent homicide.”

[Subsection (b) was deleted by 1995 amendment.]

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Conspiracy to take human life, § 39-12-103.

Prosecutor not required for indictment for homicide, § 40-13-104.

Restoration of voting rights to convicted felons, title 40, ch. 29, part 2.

Use of force defending residence against intruder, § 39-11-611.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Automobiles, § 33; 14 Tenn. Juris., Homicide, §§ 2, 17.

Law Reviews.

Recent Developments — Tennessee Homicide Law, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 675 (1993).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Second Degree Murder.

Removing the second degree murder presumption will help clarify the law and avoid confusion; accordingly, while the Tennessee supreme court abandoned the second degree murder presumption, such abandonment of the second degree murder presumption is not a new constitutional rule which must be given retroactive application. State v. Jackson, 173 S.W.3d 401, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. 2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second-degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) as the evidence established that, before the attack, defendant became angry at the victim after she told him that she had given him AIDS; that defendant admitted that he had used his hands to choke the victim; that the victim suffered a total of twenty-six separate stab wounds to her body, which were mostly located on her torso and abdomen; and that defendant recalled possessing knives to stab himself even though he did not recall stabbing the victim. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2013).

2. Evidence.

Petitioner failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an accident reconstruction expert to testify because the expert's testimony would not have been helpful, as the State was not required to prove that petitioner intentionally ran over the victim for the jury to convict him of second-degree murder and therefore, if the expert had testified that petitioner did not kill the victim intentionally, his testimony supported a theory that petitioner killed her knowingly because petitioner, a trained professional truck driver, failed to stop and continued turning right after the victim jumped out of his truck when he could not see her on the ground or control the direction his rear tires were traveling. Hudson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2020).

3. —Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder because the jury could infer that defendant traveled about one-fourth of one mile on foot from a church to the victim's house, where he placed a barrel under a window, removed the screen, entered the house through the open window, shot the victim in the head with a .22 caliber weapon, left through the front door, went to his mother's house, and waited until the body had been discovered the next day before initiating any contact with the authorities; and because defendant's actions were inconsistent with a conclusion he was incapable, due to intoxication, of premeditating the victim's killing. State v. Rayfield, 507 S.W.3d 682, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of first degree murder where it showed that defendant and his family had a lengthy disagreement with the victims and their friends, defendant told a witness he would put a bullet through one of the victim's head, both victims were shot in the head, bullets found in defendant's truck were consistent with the caliber of bullets found at the scene, documents of email and social media messages relative to the desire to kill the victims and defendant's willingness to help found shredded in defendant's truck, and defendant implicated himself in the crimes during a phone call with his wife. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence that defendant walked up to the female victim's car with a loaded gun as she was using the ATM and pointed the gun at her, demanded she exit the car, and shot her at point-blank range without hesitation when she did not comply and attempted to drive away was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. State v. Holmes, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Conviction for first degree murder was supported by evidence defendant decided to confront the victim, obtained the victim's gun, walked to the sleeping victim's bedroom, shot the victim, failed to render aid or call for assistance, ransacked the house to make it look as if the killing occurred during a burglary, fled the scene, and secured a brick to the gun and threw it into a pond. State v. Self, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017), cert. denied, Self v. Tennessee, 198 L. Ed. 2d 666, 137 S. Ct. 2224, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3666 (U.S. June 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator for the offenses of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, attempt to commit first degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery where two victims identified him in a photograph lineup and they testified that they were able to see his face during the crimes. State v. Hawthorne, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder because a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with premeditation as defendant shot the victim twice after an argument, defendant testified that when a pistol jammed as defendant attempted to disengage its safety defendant picked up a rifle, loaded it, and shot the victim a third time, and that defendant shot the victim a fourth time in the face when the victim returned fire, resulting in the victim's death. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first degree premeditated murder conviction because defendant requested a witness to drive defendant to the scene of a fight where the victim and a group of men were fighting, defendant spoke angrily to the victim and provoked the fighting, defendant admitted to chasing the victim into the woods, defendant admitted to shooting once at the victim who died from a gunshot wound, and defendant appeared to lack emotion after the shooting, disposed of the weapon, and fled the jurisdiction. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because it showed that defendant and his codefendant lured the victims to the cemetery under the pretext of purchasing drugs, defendant threatened to kill the victim and before the crimes pulled a gun on him, defendant made jailhouse admissions and bragged about the crimes, and he provided information in a federal proffer that included details about the crimes that had not been released to the public. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2019).

4. —Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's premeditated first degree murder conviction where, although the record reflected that defendant shot the unarmed victim twice in the back of his head, the pathologist was unable to ascertain the locations of the parties at the time of the shooting but opined that the muzzle was more than three feet away from the victim's head; based upon the evidence, the evidence did not show that defendant killed the victim execution-style while the victim was kneeling, he did not clean the apartment where the killing occurred, nor did he bring with him any of the items he used to attempt to conceal the crime. State v. Jackson, 173 S.W.3d 401, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. 2005).

State failed to adduce sufficient proof to establish that defendant killed the victim with premeditation where there was no proof in the record indicating that defendant procured or used a deadly weapon on the victim; no proof that defendant ever declared an intent to kill the victim; no proof of preparations to conceal the crime prior to committing it; and no proof that defendant destroyed or secreted evidence of the killing. State v. Larkin, 443 S.W.3d 751, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2013).

5. Culpable Mental State.

Failure to consult a mental health expert and to obtain an evaluation of petitioner was deficient performance, as the State was required to prove a premeditated, intentional killing, but defendant was not prejudiced because the doctor's testimony was not admissible and prompt consultation would not have affected the defense; he only said it was a possibility that due to a mental disease, petitioner lacked capacity, and evidence of certain diagnoses was not relevant and admissible without an opinion regarding the ultimate issue of petitioner's capacity to form the required mens rea, such that he was not entitled to post-conviction relief. Williamson v. State, 476 S.W.3d 405, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. July 21, 2015).

39-13-202. First degree murder.

  1. First degree murder is:
    1. A premeditated and intentional killing of another;
    2. A killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, act of terrorism, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, physical abuse in violation of § 71-6-119, aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult in violation of § 39-15-508, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child or aircraft piracy; or
    3. A killing of another committed as the result of the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
  2. No culpable mental state is required for conviction under subdivision (a)(2) or (a)(3), except the intent to commit the enumerated offenses or acts in those subdivisions.
  3. A person convicted of first degree murder shall be punished by:
    1. Death;
    2. Imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or
    3. Imprisonment for life.
  4. As used in subdivision (a)(1), “premeditation” is an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment. “Premeditation” means that the intent to kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill preexist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 15; 1991, ch. 377, § 2; 1993, ch. 338, § 1; 1993, ch. 473, § 1; 1994, ch. 883, § 1; 1995, ch. 460, § 1; 1998, ch. 1040, § 3; 2002, ch. 849, § 2a; 2007, ch. 158, § 2; 2018, ch. 1050, § 6.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1993, ch. 473, § 16 provided that the amendment by that act shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993.

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2018.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to acts committed on or after January 1, 2019.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, inserted “, physical abuse in violation of § 71-6-119, aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult in violation of § 39-15-508” in (a)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17. January 1, 2019; provided that for purposes of promulgating rules the act took effect May 21, 2018.

Cross-References. Abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse, § 37-5-512.

Airport and aircraft security, § 39-17-109.

Arson, title 39, ch. 14, part 3.

Burglary, title 39, ch. 14, part 4.

Child abuse, title 39, ch. 15, part 4.

Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Kidnapping, title 39, ch. 13, part 3.

Post-conviction DNA analysis, title 40, ch. 30, part 3.

Robbery, title 39, ch. 13, part 4.

Sexual offenses, title 39, ch. 13, part 5.

Terrorism Prevention and Response Act, title 39, ch. 13, part 8.

Theft, title 39, ch. 14, part 1.

Transfer from juvenile court, sentence of death prohibited, § 37-1-134.

Use of force defending residence against intruder, § 39-11-611.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 4.3, 15.9, 32.30.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris, Appeal and Error, §§ 151, 190, 233; 11 Tenn. Juris., Evidence, §§ 80.1, 185; 14 Tenn. Juris., Homicide, §§ 2, 6, 8, 9, 13-17.

Law Reviews.

Adjudicating Claims of Innocence for the Capitally Condemned in Tennessee: Embracing a Truth Forum (Dwight Aarons), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 511 (2009).

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

Criminal Procedure — Capital Punishment — Motions to Reopen Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 389 (2014).

Recent Developments — Tennessee Homicide Law, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 675 (1993).

Tennessee's Death Penalty: An Overview of the Procedural Safeguards, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 779 (2001).

The Trexler Saga: Hale & Middlebrooks (Gary R. Wade), 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 319 (1993).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality, OAG 94-31 (3/14/94).

Minimum length of service for life sentences after July 1, 1995, OAG 97-098 (7/1/97).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Convictions for both first degree murder and armed robbery could stand even when the convictions arose out of the same incident, where the indictment, in common law form, charges that the murder was willful, deliberate, premeditated, and malicious. The test for the application of double jeopardy principles is whether there is a separate indictment for murder in the common law form. Where there was, both the first degree murder conviction and that of armed robbery could stand. Welch v. State, 836 S.W.2d 586, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. May 26, 1992).

The automatic imposition of a life sentence upon a conviction of first degree murder, where the death penalty is not sought, is not arbitrary or irrational in violation of the equal protection clause. State v. Ray, 880 S.W.2d 700, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

The statutory form of first degree murder committed while in the perpetration of a designated felony is a legitimate and constitutional legislative function; thus, even though a showing of premeditation, deliberation, and intent to kill is not required for conviction of felony murder in the first degree, and defendant cannot rely on certain defenses afforded defendants and charged with other forms of first degree murder, there is no denial of due process. State v. Walker, 893 S.W.2d 429, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. 1995).

Because the statute clearly provides more than ample fair warning to a defendant concerning what conduct is prohibited, the statute is not void for vagueness. State v. Torres, 82 S.W.3d 236, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. 2002).

2. In General.

Prior to the 1998 amendment of T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2), which added the term “aggravated child neglect,” the legislature intended for the term “child abuse”, as used in T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2), to include child neglect. State v. Hodges, 7 S.W.3d 609, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

3. Double Jeopardy.

After a mistrial, double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial on the charge of conspiracy to commit first degree murder after a conviction on the charge of criminal responsibility for criminally negligent homicide because the elements were not the same under the test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306, 1932 U.S. LEXIS 875 (1932). State v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2007).

Where the child abuse murder statute under which defendant was convicted, former § 39-2-202(a)(2) (Supp. 1988), was declared unconstitutional, and evidence presented at trial would have supported conviction of lesser included offenses, the state and federal constitutions' prohibitions against double jeopardy did not preclude the state from retrying defendant on the lesser included offenses. State v. Maupin, 859 S.W.2d 313, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. 1993).

Defendant's sentences of incarceration and death did not constitute multiple punishments for the same conduct in violation of the U.S. Const. amend. 5 because the Blockburger  test was satisfied, as first-degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) required proof of a killing but did not require proof of an argument to commit a killing, as required under T.C.A. § 39-12-103(a). State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. 2006).

The first degree murder statute is intended to deter premeditated, intentional killings, while the conspiracy statute is intended to deter agreements to commit any criminal offense. Accordingly, the double jeopardy clause of the Tennessee Constitution was not violated by sentencing the defendant for both conspiracy and first degree murder or by applying the T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(4) aggravating circumstance to impose the death penalty for the murder of defendant's wife.State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. 2006).

Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V, and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10 barred defendant's retrial on first-degree premeditated murder after the conviction was reversed by the appellate court for insufficient evidence, the appellate court reduced the conviction to second-degree murder, the state did not appeal, and the state's highest court reversed the second-degree murder and abuse of a corpse convictions; defendant could be tried again for second-degree murder and abuse of a corpse. State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery were all based on discrete acts or involved multiple victims; therefore, they did not satisfy the threshold inquiry of the Blockburger test, and double jeopardy did not bar defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary along with his convictions for aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Indictment charging defendants with attempted first degree murder was sufficient to protect defendants against double jeopardy even though it did not identify the victims because the indictments specified the day on which the shooting happened, specifically referenced the surveillance videos that captured the shooting on film, and specifically differentiated the victims by the clothing that they were wearing. If the victims were to come forward after the current prosecution had ended, the State and defendants would have enough information to determine that the victims were speaking of the same shooting, thereby precluding a second prosecution for the same offenses. State v. Bowen, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

4. Elements.

Malice and an intent to kill are not elements of felony murder. State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994).

Where the state bore the burden of proving defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt and failed to present any relevant evidence which addressed an essential element of the legal test of insanity, murder conviction was repugnant to due process and warranted reversal. State v. Hammock, 867 S.W.2d 8, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), rehearing denied,  State v. Hammock, 867 S.W.2d 8, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Indictment for first degree murder resulting from aggravated child abuse did not have to allege the culpable mental state required for aggravated child abuse, since the indictment did allege the mens rea required for first degree murder. State v. Roberson, 988 S.W.2d 690, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

The law does not require that the felony necessarily precede the murder in order to support a felony murder conviction as long as the intent to commit the underlying felony existed prior to or concurrent with the commission of the act causing the victim's death. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 707 (Tenn. 1999).

On retrial after defendant was convicted of felony murder where the court found that the victims were shot to death in their home during the commission of an aggravated burglary, and his conviction for aggravated burglary was affirmed on appeal but his conviction for felony murder was reversed, the prosecution was not permitted to use collateral estoppel against the defendant to establish the underlying offense of aggravated burglary; this would violate defendant's right to trial by jury as to every element of the charged offense. State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 650, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1044 (Tenn. 2005).

Although defendant asserted that because of a mental disease or defect he was unable to form the requisite culpable mental states for the offense of attempted first degree premeditated murder, the State presented substantial proof showing defendant was capable of forming the culpable mental states required because defendant and victim had been arguing about their divorce the day of the attack; just before the attack, defendant, in a very calm, rational voice told the unarmed victim that when he started hitting her she was not going to get up and that he was going to kill her; and defendant's protracted 9-1-1 call showed his calmness immediately after the attack. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

5. —Deliberation.

Even if intent (or purpose to kill) and premeditation (design) may be formed in an instant, deliberation requires some period of reflection, during which the mind is free from the influence of excitement, or passion. State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. Aug. 3, 1992), superseded by statute as stated in, Hensley v. Cerza, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2010).

Deliberation requires that the killing be done with a cool purpose—in other words, that the killer be free from the passions of the moment. State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. 1992).

6. —Premeditation.

Failure to report shooting to the police failed to establish premeditation and deliberation in advance of murder. State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. 1992).

While the concealment of evidence discredits defendant's self-defense excuse, it does not provide evidence of premeditation. State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. 1992).

Evidence that the victim sustained multiple blows and that the phone in the victim's home was ripped off the wall did not support the jury's findings of the necessary elements of premeditation or deliberation. State v. Darnell, 905 S.W.2d 953, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

There was no proof in the record to indicate premeditation where there was little prior relationship between the defendant and the victim, no evidence of motive, the victim was killed with his own gun and there was no proof that the defendant was aware that the victim had a gun. State v. Schafer, 973 S.W.2d 269, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1243 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Whether a defendant has acted with premeditation is a question for the finder of fact to determine, and it may be inferred from the manner and circumstances of the killing. State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2000).

It may not be assumed that a defendant suffering from paranoid schizophrenia accompanied by delusions is necessarily incapable of premeditated murder. State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2000).

Factors which may indicate premeditation include: (1) The use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; (2) The particular cruelty of a killing; (3) Any threats or declarations of intent to kill made by the defendant; (4) The procurement of a weapon; (5) Any preparation to conceal the crime which are undertaken before the crime is committed; and (6) Calmness immediately following a killing. State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. May 16, 2000), cert. denied, Keough v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 886, 121 S. Ct. 205, 148 L. Ed. 2d 144, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6053 (2000).

While proof did not necessarily reflect that the defendant intended to kill the victim when he initially stopped at a fast food restaurant where he saw victim's car, the proof was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant acted with premeditation at the time of the murder. State v. Suttles, 30 S.W.3d 252, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Suttles v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 967, 121 S. Ct. 401, 148 L. Ed. 2d 310, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 7184 (2000).

Evidence of “repeated blows” is not sufficient, by itself, to establish premeditated murder. State v. Millsaps, 30 S.W.3d 364, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 2000).

Calmness immediately after a crime is relevant in determining the element of premeditation. State v. Millsaps, 30 S.W.3d 364, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 2000).

Some facts which may be indicative of the existence of premeditation include: the use of a deadly weapon on an unarmed victim; the shooting of the victim after he had turned to retreat or escape; the lack of provocation on the part of the victim; the defendant's declaration of his intent to kill; and the defendant's failure to render aid to the victim. State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

The fact that evidence is subsequently hidden from the police reveals nothing about a criminal's state of mind before the crime. State v. Long, 45 S.W.3d 611, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

The jury could have reasonably concluded the defendant intended to murder the victim with premeditation where defendant shot the victim during a violent home invasion in which the perpetrator continued to climb the stairs of the victim's home, even after the victim told the defendant there was no money and that children were asleep in the house. State v. Cowan, 46 S.W.3d 227, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

A rational jury could have concluded that the defendant's act was premeditated where the victim and the defendant had previously threatened to kill each other, and knowing that the victim might arrive at defendant's house, the defendant loaded a gun. State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. May 14, 2001), review denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2002).

Defendant acted with premeditation burglarizing victim's home and intentionally killing the victim to eliminate the victim as a witness to the crime. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Sims v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S. Ct. 357, 151 L. Ed. 2d 270, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9558 (2001).

Evidence for premeditation in murder was sufficient where defendant had complained about wife, defendant had taken notes documenting defendant's sexual frustration with wife, defendant had other areas of disagreement with wife, shot wife twice — the gun trigger requiring more than a little pressure, defendant admitted to the killing, wife had obtained a restraining order against defendant, and abundant evidence countered psychological expert's testimony that defendant had a closed head injury mental defect. State v. Coulter, 67 S.W.3d 3, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), overruled in part, State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1051 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 3, 2013).

Evidence of marital difficulties between defendant and the victim, the victim's threat of divorce, lethal cyanide levels in the victim's blood, the defendant's access to cyanide gas, the absence of cyanide in the victim's stomach or injection sites, and the defendant's access to the victim prior to the victim's death, demonstrated premeditation under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(d) and sufficiently supported the defendant's first degree murder conviction. State v. Robinson, 73 S.W.3d 136, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

Although circumstantial, the evidence in the case wove a “web of guilt” around defendant, as the testimony demonstrated that she had decided to move out of state with her lover, that she had repeatedly expressed concern that she would be unable to take her son because of the victim's objections, that the victim died from brain swelling brought about by a profound hypoglycemic episode, one of several such episodes, that the victim, who was not diabetic, had been injected with synthetic insulin, and that the defendant was both a nurse and a diabetic with a supply of insulin. State v. Wilson, 164 S.W.3d 355, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 841 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2004).

Where the prosecution failed to prove that defendant's motive for the first degree premeditated murder of his girlfriend was to make the victim unavailable as a witness, the trial court's admission of the victim's hearsay statements violated Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) and required reversal of defendant's conviction under former Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52 (see now T.R.A.P. 36(b)); the improperly admitted evidence was particularly damaging to the defense because the finding of premeditation under T.C.A. § 39-13-202 was affected by the admission of the victim's hearsay statements to her aunt that defendant had been beating her all day and threatened to kill her. State v. Brooks, 249 S.W.3d 323, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 177 (Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008).

In defendant's first-degree murder trial for the killing of his wife, the evidence supported a finding of premeditation because it showed that defendant was having an extramarital affair, which indicated that there was trouble in the marriage and provided a motive for the murder; that the beating death was particularly cruel, with the medical examiner identifying a minimum of 74 separate blows to the victim's body; and that the medical examiner testified that the beating lasted for an extended period of time, that the victim's death was not instantaneous, that the victim fractured fingers on both hands and bone was visible, and that the victim would have been in constant pain from sustaining the initial injury until her death. In addition, the evidence showed that defendant went to great lengths to conceal his crime, that defendant cleaned himself up and discarded the clothing that he wore during the beating, that defendant attempted to mislead the police into thinking that someone else had committed the murder by taking the victim's belongings and leaving a trail, and that defendant attempted to hide the murder weapon; these factors supported the jury's conclusion that defendant killed his wife with premeditation. State v. Brock, 327 S.W.3d 645, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2010), cert. denied, Brock v. Tennessee, , 562 U.S. 850, 131 S. Ct. 101, 178 L. Ed. 2d 64, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5883 (U.S. 2010).

Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder was proper under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a) and (d) because the evidence showed that defendant bound the victims, sat down for about five minutes and smoked a cigarette, then returned with kerosene that he poured throughout the trailer. He also unplugged each fire alarm and started a fire. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010), cert. denied, Hester v. Tennessee, 179 L. Ed. 2d 896, 563 U.S. 939, 131 S. Ct. 2096, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3140 (U.S. 2011), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2013).

Defendant's conviction for attempt to commit first-degree murder in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a) and 39-12-101 was appropriate because, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the crimes committed against the victim in the course of the robbery, carjacking, and assault, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant and his co-perpetrator, with premeditation, planned and intended to kill the victim, T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(d), 39-11-302(a). State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2011).

Where defendant was convicted, as an aider and abettor, of attempted first-degree murder, evidence that his companion took a loaded gun from him before going to a cabin, used it to shoot an armed man, and shot a second unarmed man as he tried to flee was sufficient to establish that the companion acted with premeditation. State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 777 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to establish the element of premeditation in defendant's convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder because: (1) defendant shot the adult victims multiple times and then repeatedly stabbed and beat the young children, moving from room to room to do so; and (2) defendant altered the scene to make it appear as if the murders were drug or gang-related, moved bodies, disposed of or hid kitchen knives and handles, and collected the cartridge casings. State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2013), aff'd, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to have determined that defendant acted with premeditation; defendant threatened to kill the victim prior to the shooting and was angry with the victim on the morning of the incident, defendant admitted shooting at the victim, who was hit at least twice in the head, the jury could have inferred that defendant exercised reflection and judgment in forming the intent to kill the victim, and the jury rejected defendant's claim of self-defense. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2016).

Defendant repeatedly battered the victim, an unarmed, 81-year-old woman, in the head with an object and used pantyhose from a dresser drawer to strangle her to death, and afterwards, defendant did not attempt to call for aid for the victim, but instead collected cash, jewelry, and coins from the victim's house and stole her car; the jury could reasonably have found that defendant's killing of the victim was a premeditated and deliberate act and that defendant was sufficiently free from excitement and passion when he decided to kill the victim. State v. Smithson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder, given that while armed with a borrowed weapon, defendant got out of the vehicle, followed the victim's vehicle, approached the driver's side door, and fired multiple shots at the victim before fleeing and later returning the weapon to the person from whom it was borrowed; this evidence was more than sufficient to support a finding that the shooting was premeditated. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2016).

Defendant made several declarations of his intent to kill the victim, defendant testified that he shot the unarmed victim five times, and defendant did not attempt to contact police after the shooting, and this evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found that defendant acted with premeditation in shooting the victim, for purposes of his first degree premeditated murder conviction. State v. Hudgins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 753 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant acted with premeditation where it showed that a knife and a sledgehammer with the victim's blood on them were found next to her diary, the last diary entry indicated that she intended to break up with defendant, and after the attack defendant was arrested after an accident in the victim's vehicle wearing clothing stained with the victim's blood. State v. Peden, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 976 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of first-degree (premeditated) murder because after spending the day with the victim, defendant shot him in the back of the head with a shotgun, stripped off his clothing, dumped his body down an embankment, had his wife bandage a cut, left the state, told his wife to report his truck as stolen, and the wound was inconsistent with a struggle. State v. Daniels, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to establish premeditation as an element of first degree premeditated murder, given that defendant and his co-defendants waited until they were at a remote location before confronting the victim about being an informant, they beat the victim, defendant struck the victim several times in the head and face with a hammer until the victim stopped making noises, and defendant boasted about killing the victim. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2017).

Rational jury could have found that defendant's killing of the victim was premeditated and intentional under T.C.A. § 39-13-202; defendant confessed to strangling the victim, then checking her pulse to confirm she was dead, he never attempted to render first aid to the victim, the manner of her death strongly supported a finding of premeditation, plus his calm demeanor after the killing supported the finding of premeditation. State v. Pearman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Defendant acted with premeditation because witnesses testified that defendant chased seven unarmed victims, with no evidence of provocation presented, fired at least eleven gunshots at the victims, and one of the victims died as the result of a gunshot wound to the victim's neck, which was fired at the victim in relatively close proximity. State v. Sims, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of the first-degree murder because the evidence was sufficient to show premeditation where defendant, armed with a handgun, accused the unarmed victim of giving him counterfeit money, discharged his weapon several times, striking the victim twice, once in the upper back and once in the abdomen, and three eyewitnesses positively identified defendant in a photo line-up and at trial as the shooter State v. Boswell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1011 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant premeditatedly and intentionally killed the victim because defendant acquired a gun prior to the victim's killing, he drove around for approximately thirty minutes observing the victim before he exited his car and shot the victim in the back of the head, and he fled the scene and threw the murder weapon in a lake; defendant testified that upon seeing the victim, he knew he was going to shoot the victim. State v. Crowley, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2018).

In a case in which defendant was charged with first degree premeditated murder, but convicted of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not err in denying defendant alternative sentencing, and in holding that confinement was appropriate due to defendant's history of criminal conduct and to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense because the record supported the determination that defendant had a long history of criminal conduct, including continued long-term use of illegal drugs, which did not cease even after the victim's death. State v. Jarman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2018), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. July 6, 2020).

Element of premeditation was proven as the evidence showed that the killing took place over a span of time, even if the medical examiner did not explicitly state such; there were both stabbing and slashing wounds and different directions in which the wounds were inflicted, plus the victim, defendant's  grandmother, aspirated and swallowed her own blood. The jury was free to reject the argument that the killing was the result of defendant's excited and disordered mind. State v. Morgan, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because it showed that defendant was angry with the victim, defendant made comments in what could be inferred as an attempt to bait the victim, defendant stabbed the victim for several minutes before finally slitting his throat, and the victim had 40 stab wounds. After the killing, defendant washed his clothes and disposed of the knife. State v. Whitaker, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2020).

7. Sufficiency of Indictment.

Habeas court properly dismissed petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus because the indictment charging petitioner with felony murder was valid since it referenced the statute defining felony murder, T.C.A. § 39-13-202, and described the offense, which provided notice to petitioner of the charged offense; because the indictment set forth the specific underlying felony supporting the felony murder charge, the requisite mental state was obtainable by reviewing the robbery statute, T.C.A. § 39-13-401, providing adequate notice to petitioner of the charge against him. Cooper v. Carlton, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2012), cert. denied, Cooper v. Sexton, 185 L. Ed. 2d 203, 133 S. Ct. 1260, 568 U.S. 1171, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1298 (U.S. 2013).

For purposes of T.C.A. § 40-13-202, the indictment for attempted first degree murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-202 was legally sufficient, as the indictment referenced the murder statute, named the victim, and provided a time period during which the State alleged the offense occurred; although the indictment did not state the means by which the State alleged defendant committed the offense, such was not required in order to provide him with notice. State v. Fisher, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Because a count of the indictment alleged an attempted felony murder, which was not an offense in Tennessee, petitioner's conviction for that count had to be reversed and the indictment dismissed; there was nothing in the record that indicated the indictment was amended to attempted first degree premeditated murder before petitioner entered his plea of guilt. Wi v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2019).

Defendants'  argument that the Clark decision did not apply to the indictment charging them with attempted first-degree murder because a bill of particulars could not provide them with the names of the victims, as the State did not know who they were and could not provide them in a bill of particulars, was unavailing because a bill of particulars would be superfluous as the indictment provided the date and location of the offense, the clothing each victim was wearing, and identified the surveillance video that showed the exact conduct charged. State v. Bowen, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

Indictment charging defendants with attempted first-degree murder was not insufficient for failing to name the victims because the identity of the victim was not an essential element of the offense. State v. Bowen, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

7.5 Severance of Offenses.

Trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to sever his first-degree murder charge from offenses concerning a second victim because the evidence presented at the severance hearings failed to establish that the offenses were part of a common scheme or plan, as they involved separate acts against different victims the occurred at different times by different means. The error was not harmless because the failure to sever the offenses allowed the State to bolster its proof of the murder charge, for which the proof was not overwhelming, with evidence of the other offenses and more probably than not affected the verdict. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2019).

Trial court did not err by declining the sever the homicide charges from the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge because the offenses were subject to mandatory joinder as they arose from the same conduct and defendant chose to stipulate to his criminal record which mitigated any prejudicial effect that substantive evidence of his convictions would have had. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2019).

8. Lesser Included Offenses.

It is constitutionally permissible for a defendant to be convicted of both first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. June 20, 1994), overruled, State v. Mitchell, 137 S.W.3d 630, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

In a prosecution for first degree murder, although the evidence of provocation was slight, voluntary manslaughter should have been charged to the jury as a lesser included offense and the issue of causation would also have required an instruction on the issue of attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Where the indictment charged that defendant “did unlawfully, intentionally. deliberately and with premeditation attempt to commit First Degree Murder,” defendant was not entitled to an instruction that aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of the crime charged. State v. Nix, 922 S.W.2d 894, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. May 6, 1996).

Aggravated assault by a parent or custodian is not a lesser included offense of first-degree murder by aggravated child abuse. State v. Roberson, 988 S.W.2d 690, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Where there is no evidence of the lesser offense other than the very same evidence which supports the greater offense, that is, that reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser-included offense, the trial court is not obliged to give the lesser-included offense instruction. State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

Court's error in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses was harmless because defendant shot the victim, an armored truck guard, in the back of the head and stole the victim's money deposit bag, he was identified as one of two men fleeing from the scene, and his criminal conduct was filmed by a surveillance camera. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Thomas v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 125, 163 L. Ed. 2d 131, 546 U.S. 855, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6959 (U.S. 2005).Because the inmate affirmatively requested a jury instruction on the offense of aggravated assault, even though he was in error in believing that it was a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree murder, he effectively agreed to amend the indictment to include aggravated assault; therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to convict the inmate of aggravated assault, his conviction was not void, and he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Demonbreun v. Bell, 226 S.W.3d 321, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. May 8, 2007), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. May 25, 2007).

Where defendant was convicted of felony murder, T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2), and based on the evidence the jury could have found that defendant committed second degree murder, reckless homicide, or criminally negligent homicide, the trial court committed a non-structural constitutional error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses, and it was not established that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 530 (Tenn. May 27, 2010).

Because the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the first degree premeditated murder conviction, defendant was not entitled to voluntary manslaughter conviction because the record did not demonstrate that she acted in a state of passion and that the highest offense she could be guilty of was voluntary manslaughter. State v. Slimick, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2016).

Relative to defendant's claim that he acted based upon a state of passion produced by adequate provocation because he feared the victim due to a prior incident in which the victim shot defendant in the leg and because the victim threatened him on the day of the shooting, nothing showed that the victim's conduct on the day of the shooting produced adequate provocation, and the jury was instructed on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and rejected it. State v. Richardson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Defendant was not entitled at defendant's trial for first degree premeditated murder to a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter because the unarmed victim did nothing to provoke defendant before defendant shot the victim. There was no evidence that defendant killed the victim while in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner, and there was no proof that the victim was involved in the earlier shooting of defendant's sibling. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

9. —Facilitation of Felony Murder.

Knowledge of the specific felony required under § 39-11-403 is met in a felony murder prosecution not by knowledge of the felony murder, but by knowledge that the other person was going to commit the underlying felony; thus, defendant could be guilty of facilitation of felony murder because he knew his codefendant was planning on committing a robbery. State v. Lewis, 919 S.W.2d 62, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled, State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1998).

Failure to charge the defendant as criminally responsible instead of jointly liable as a principal was insignificant, and therefore, facilitation of felony murder was a lesser-included offense. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. 2001).

10. Felony Murder.

Evidence held sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder, where murder was committed in the perpetration of kidnapping. State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. 1992), cert. dismissed, Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 124, 114 S. Ct. 651, 126 L. Ed. 2d 555, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7942 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 1064, 114 S. Ct. 740, 126 L. Ed. 2d 702, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 402 (1994), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 963 (Tenn. 2008).

The evidence clearly established that the crime was a planned, premeditated and deliberate homicide committed by the defendant in the perpetration of a robbery. State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994).

The evidence was held sufficient to establish to a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered the grocery where the killing occurred intending to commit the felony of robbery. State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. June 28, 1993), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S. Ct. 561, 126 L. Ed. 2d 461, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7408 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994).

Attempt to commit felony-murder does not exist as an offense in Tennessee. State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. 1996).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder where the murder was committed by an accomplice of defendant in the course of a robbery. State v. Utley, 928 S.W.2d 448, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The evidence was sufficient to establish felony murder even though the defendant did not take the victim's leather jacket or wallet or demand victim's necklace prior to shooting the victim where defendant ordered victim to turn car off main road and pull up behind a store, pulled a gun on the unarmed victim and shot him. State v. Addison, 973 S.W.2d 260, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1164 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder where the murder was committed by an accomplice of defendant in the course of a robbery. State v. Utley, 928 S.W.2d 448, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of first degree murder in the perpetration of theft, a court must determine whether the killing is closely connected to the initial taking of the property in time, place, causation and continuity of action. State v. Pierce, 23 S.W.3d 289, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 357 (Tenn. 2000).

Although the felony murder analysis must focus upon the relationship between the felony and the murder, it is not required that the felony be committed either before or contemporaneously with the murder. State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Morris v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 1082, 121 S. Ct. 786, 148 L. Ed. 2d 682, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 301 (2001), cert. denied, Brown v. Utah, 148 L. Ed. 2d 676, 121 S. Ct. 778, 531 U.S. 1079, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 250 (2001).

Consideration of such factors as time, place, and causation is helpful in determining whether a murder was committed in the perpetration of a particular felony. State v. Hinton, 42 S.W.3d 113, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. 2001).

Arming a codefendant with a loaded gun and a ski mask to use during the perpetration of a robbery certainly makes any ensuing death or injury foreseeable, even if not specifically contemplated. State v. Hinton, 42 S.W.3d 113, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. 2001).

Premeditated murder and felony murder are not designated by T.C.A. § 39-13-202 as separate and distinct offenses but rather as alternative means by which criminal liability for first degree murder may be imposed; the mental state required for the commission of felony murder is intent to commit the alleged felony; T.C.A. § 39-13-202(b); while this is a different mental state than that required for premeditated murder, in terms of culpability it equates with the intent required for the commission of premeditated murder; one who commits felony murder is held to the same level of culpability as one who commits premeditated murder. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 600 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Bowers v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 979, 122 S. Ct. 408, 151 L. Ed. 2d 310, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9880 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to show that four gang members who engaged in the kidnapping of two gang members were criminally responsible for the ensuing death of one of the gang members. Proof of premeditation was abundant; deadly weapons were used and witnesses testified that defendants were part of the crowd beating the unarmed victim with bats, jack irons, crowbars, and hammers. State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Sept. 2, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's felony murder conviction, where defendant shot and killed his landlord and stole money from him. State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

Testimony that defendant admitted pointing a rifle at the victim, demanding his money, shooting him, and taking money from his pocket established that defendant shot and killed the victim during a robbery, which satisfied the elements necessary to support defendant's felony murder conviction. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Oct. 10, 2012).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for felony murder, as defendant admitted shooting the victim more than once with the weapon defendant brought to a drug buy; the jury accredited the prosecution's theory and proof that defendant shot the victim during the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, robbery. State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 746 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2012).

Proof was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of a robbery, as defendant admitted that defendant took the victim's car, a witness testified that defendant acted alone in attacking the victim, and all of the medical testimony reflected that the victim died as a result of the injuries sustained during the attack. State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), cert. denied, Pruitt v. Tennessee, 189 L. Ed. 2d 839, 134 S. Ct. 2874, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4624 (U.S. 2014).

Both the theft and the killing occurred in the same place, after the killing, defendant took the victim's cash, jewelry, and coin collection worth over $ 1,000 from inside the apartment, and then defendant fled, taking the victim's car, and the jury could have reasonably inferred that the killing and theft were part of a continuous course of action and not isolated events. State v. Smithson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for felony murder because after defendant murdered the victim, he left the scene in the victim's car. State v. Moody, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendants'  convictions of felony murder perpetrated during the commission of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect; in part, the victim suffered many non-accidental injuries, the timing of which placed one defendant at the apartment when the injuries occurred, and the other defendant was present all day with the victim. State v. Starner, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence defendant shot the victim in the perpetration of the aggravated burglary supported a conviction for felony murder. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

Evidence that the victim had been given $1,300 and a gun days before the murder and within days after defendant arranged to sell a gun like that the victim had been given to the acquaintances and had approximately $1,000 in his wallet, despite his not usually having cash, supported the conviction for felony murder. State v. Thompson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 1, 2016).

Jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant had the intent to commit the robbery prior to, or concurrent with, the killing of the victim, and thus the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of first degree felony murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2); defendant planned to rob the victim, a known drug dealer, of drugs and money, witnesses saw defendant holding a baseball bat and standing over the victim's body before defendant and his partner searched the victim's house, and defendant bragged about robbing and killing the victim after the fact. State v. Hopkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 859 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2017).

Defendant's conviction of facilitation of felony murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-11-403, with kidnapping and theft as the underlying felonies under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-302, 39-14-103 was affirmed, as jurors could have found that defendant and his accomplice intended to deprive the victim of his vehicle when they forced him into the backseat, and the kidnapping and theft were still in progress at the time the victim was shot because he was still resisting confinement and refusing to consent to the taking of his property. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery because even if the jury surmised that a co-defendant fired the fatal shot, the jury was instructed on criminal responsibility and could have determined that defendant aided the co-defendant's commission of the robbery with the intent to promote, assist, or benefit in the proceeds of the offense and defendant's flight to Alabama and resisting arrest when he was finally apprehended could be considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt. State v. Nesbit, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the first-degree, felony murder of the first victim, his estranged wife, committed during the first-degree, attempted murder of the second victim because defendant's course of action in obtaining a gun in advance of the shooting, lying in wait, undetected outside of the home, attacking the first victim by grabbing her and pointing a gun to her head, threatening to shoot both victims, shooting the first victim, and then fleeing the scene established his conscious objective was to kill both victims; defendant admitted that he intended to kill the second victim; and the State established defendant committed the first-degree, attempted murder of the second victim with sufficient evidence. State v. Beverly, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1029 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery because defendant and codefendants entered the victim's apartment, beat the victim until the victim was unconscious, removed the victim's money from the victim's wallet, dragged the unconscious victim into a bathroom, and bound the victim with neckties. A doctor stated that blunt force trauma was the ultimate cause of the elderly victim's later death. State v. Buford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 181 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for felony murder because a jury could have inferred that defendant had the intent to commit a robbery prior to, or concurrent with, the killing of the victim based on his own conduct or the conduct of his accomplices, for which he was criminally responsible; defendant admitted he planned to rob the victim, he provided the gun used in the offense, he participated in the robbery, and he fled in the victim's car after the victim was shot. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018), cert. denied, Collins v. Tennessee, — L. Ed. 2d —, — S. Ct. —, — U.S. —, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 7182 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018).

As evidence supported the jury's determination that the defendant was guilty of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, and a doctor opined the victim died as a result of his injuries, so the evidence supported the jury's verdict on the felony murder counts. State v. Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for first degree felony murder; defendant killed the victim during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery, and the killing was connected in time, place, and continuity of action to defendant's attempt to rob the victims. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Evidence that defendant admitted striking the victim in the head with a rock multiple times and leaving him face down in a river embankment, defendant returned to his car and put on gloves, then opened the door and trunk of the victim's car and took the victim's keys, phone and a tin can of money, and returned to his car and left was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for felony murder. State v. Barish, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for the first degree felony murders of the two victims during the perpetration of a robbery because it showed that defendant used violence to accomplish the theft of two billfolds from one victim and the theft of money, credit cards, and jewelry from the other victim, and the proof further established that the victims died as a result of injuries sustained from defendant's use of violence. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Jan. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony murder because it showed that he and an accomplice entered the victim's apartment after seeing her in the hallway and stole money from her wallet and purse, the accomplice hit the victim after which defendant noticed that she was no longer moving while on the floor, defendant and the accomplice left the victim's apartment, and she was found dead a number of hours later, and the State's witness testified that the cause of her death was homicide. State v. Garland, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's felony murder conviction because the evidence showed defendant killed a victim during the attempted perpetration of a robbery. State v. Toles, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder because it showed that defendant and his codefendant planned and executed a robbery or attempted robbery of the victims while armed with a shotgun and the victims both suffered fatal shotgun wounds during the robbery. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder because the second car theft was sufficiently connected to the killing such that it could form the basis of felony murder, as the victim had used his spare key to open the car door, thereby reacquiring control over the car, and immediately after defendant shot the victim he and another man drove away in the car. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

Although defendant claimed that defendant shot the victim in self-defense, the evidence supported defendant's felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary conviction because defendant admitted to looking for the victim to recoup money, surveillance footage showed defendant approach the victim's car with a gun drawn and open the door, a cartridge casing was found inside the car, and casings ejected to the right side of defendant's gun. Defendant's hand or the gun entered the car, accompanied by an intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault. State v. Glass, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2020).

Although defendant claimed that defendant shot the victim in self-dense, the evidence supported defendant's felony murder in the perpetration of a theft or robbery conviction because defendant admitted that defendant intended to confront the victim about money, surveillance video showed that defendant was armed as defendant approached the victim's car, defendant admitted that the victim thrust money at defendant, the surveillance video captured defendant picking something up from the ground, and no money was discovered in or near the car. State v. Glass, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony murder because it showed he entered the market wearing a mask and carrying a gun, he approached the victim with his gun drawn and threatened the victim, when the victim did not comply with his demands defendant fired at the victim's head twice fatally wounding him, and he jumped over the counter and attempted to open the cash register. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

11. —Lesser Included Offenses.

Where defendant's convictions on three counts of first-degree felony murder were reversed and remanded for proceedings on lesser included offenses, reindictment on second-degree murder charges was not proper because second-degree murder is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. State v. Gilliam, 901 S.W.2d 385, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The only lesser included offenses of first-degree felony murder are reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. State v. Gilliam, 901 S.W.2d 385, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on facilitation of felony murder where the evidence showed that defendant and accomplices met and planned a robbery and the murder was committed by an accomplice of defendant in the course of the robbery. State v. Utley, 928 S.W.2d 448, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Even though the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide relative to the felony murder charge, as the key issue in the case was defendant's mental state, the error was harmless because the jury was properly instructed on all lesser-included offenses in the first degree premeditated murder count, including reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide, and the jury's guilty verdict in that count entailed finding that defendant acted with premeditation, rejecting that he acted recklessly or in self-defense. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

12. —Child Abuse.

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder by aggravated child abuse based upon defendant's knowing neglect of stepchild in his care who was in apparent and urgent need of emergency attention. State v. Hodges, 7 S.W.3d 609, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Reading Tennessee's child abuse and neglect, aggravated child abuse, and felony murder statutes together, the legislative intent to allow cumulative punishment is clear; therefore, aggravated child abuse is not a lesser included offense of felony murder and dual convictions are permissible in a given context. State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 809 (Tenn. 2001).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder by aggravated child abuse, T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2), where the proof showed that defendant knowingly treated the child in such a manner as to inflict injury, either as principal or as one criminally responsible for the conduct of another, and the autopsy report, photographs of the injuries, and defendant's flight were especially probative. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2011).

Evidence sufficiently established the victim's cause of death as strangulation, to support defendant's conviction for felony murder via aggravated child abuse; experts agreed, to varying degrees, that some of the victim's injuries could not have been caused accidentally, and a doctor concluded that the victim suffered from battered child syndrome and that the victim ultimately died from strangulation. State v. Mathis, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2013), cert. denied, Mathis v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 51, 134 S. Ct. 60, — U.S. —, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 5552 (U.S. 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony murder committed in the perpetration of or attempted perpetration of aggravated child abuse because the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated child abuse and the evidence at trial established that the infant died. State v. Demeza, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

13. Election of Offenses.

Proof did not show multiple acts that could separately constitute the offense of attempted first degree murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-202, and thus the trial court did not err in not ordering the State to provide an election; the State theorized that defendant embarked upon a course of conduct that collectively constituted the attempted first degree murder of his wife, and the State's response to the motion for a bill of particulars informed defendant of the course-of-conduct theory. State v. Fisher, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

14. Mutually Exclusive Offenses Not Found.

Defendant's convictions for felony murder and for aggravated criminal trespass were not mutually exclusive because the relevant offenses did not involve different mental states. For both aggravated burglary, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder conviction, and for aggravated criminal trespass, the State was required to prove that defendant acted with intent, knowledge, or recklessness. State v. Snipes, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Snipes v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 796, 134 S. Ct. 920, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 94 (U.S. 2014).

15. Aggravating Circumstances.

Where defendant received death sentence following first degree murder conviction, the aggravating circumstance — the defendant employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration — did not duplicate the elements of the offense, even incorporating the criminal responsibility statutes and therefore constitutional narrowing was accomplished. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. June 20, 1994), overruled, State v. Mitchell, 137 S.W.3d 630, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

When a defendant is convicted of first-degree felony murder, genuine narrowing as required by Tenn. Const., art. I, § 16 and U.S. Const., amend. 8, is not accomplished by the broad definition of first-degree felony murder in T.C.A. § 39-13-202; thus, the aggravating circumstance set out in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(7), which merely duplicates the elements of the offense and does not accomplish the genuine narrowing required by the constitution, may not be relied upon by the state to seek imposition of the death penalty. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. 1994).

Prosecutor erred during closing argument by stating that defendant committed aggravated burglary before murdering the victims, as the argument should have been confined to the single aggravating circumstance alleged in the notice seeking the death penalty—that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, identifying with, or preventing arrest or prosecution (T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6)). State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 29, 2012).

16. Burden of Proof.

A homicide, once proven, is presumed to be second degree murder, and the state has the burden of proving the elements of premeditation and deliberation to raise the offense to first degree murder. State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Dec. 27, 1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 837, 121 S. Ct. 98, 148 L. Ed. 2d 57, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5346 (2000).

Failure to consult a mental health expert and to obtain an evaluation of petitioner was deficient performance, as the State was required to prove a premeditated, intentional killing, but defendant was not prejudiced because the doctor's testimony was not admissible and prompt consultation would not have affected the defense; he only said it was a possibility that due to a mental disease, petitioner lacked capacity, and evidence of certain diagnoses was not relevant and admissible without an opinion regarding the ultimate issue of petitioner's capacity to form the required mens rea, such that he was not entitled to post-conviction relief. Williamson v. State, 476 S.W.3d 405, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. July 21, 2015).

Trial court did not err by admitting the photograph of the victim, which was used during testimony of the medical examiner to identify the victim and to show the victim was deceased, which the State had the burden of proving in this first degree premeditated murder trial; the photograph was not gruesome, showed only the victim's head and upper chest area, and did not show any blood or injuries, and thus the probative value of the photograph was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2016).

17. Evidentiary Rulings.

Testimony that described the murder victim as lying in a pool of blood an inch deep was not irrelevant, inflammatory or prejudicial. State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. June 28, 1993), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S. Ct. 561, 126 L. Ed. 2d 461, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7408 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994); State v. Zirkle, 910 S.W.2d 874, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 481 (Tenn. Aug. 28, 1995), dismissed, Zirkle v. Carlton, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123960 (E.D. Tenn. June 12, 2013).

In a prosecution for first-degree murder by aggravated child abuse, evidence of prior injuries to the child was admissible as relevant to the issue of causation, and to show intent and absence of accident. State v. Dubose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. 1997).

To the extent that the state was attempting to prove that defendant was guilty of first-degree murder by aggravated child abuse through his neglect of a child, child's non-fatal bruising was relevant to establish what defendant had known about her physical condition and to negate any ignorance or mistake on his part as to whether she needed medical attention. State v. Roberson, 988 S.W.2d 690, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

In a first degree murder prosecution, evidence of defendant's sexual abuse of a murder victim's child, proffered to show defendant's motive to kill, should have been excluded under Tenn. R. Evid. 403 because: (1) defendant's motive had been clearly established through other evidence; and (2) the allegations of sexual misconduct were highly inflammatory. State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 29, 2012).

In a first degree murder prosecution, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's sexual abuse of a murder victim's child under Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) to show defendant's motive to kill; because of the inherent unreliability of a witness's hearsay recollections of the child's allegations of sexual abuse, defendant's commission of that crime was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 29, 2012).

Where there was evidence that fragments taken from the murder victims were consistent with a .22 bullet, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting defendant's inoperable .22 rifle that was not alleged to be the murder weapon, as this evidence: (1) tended to explain why defendant found it necessary to obtain a rifle from an acquaintance; and (2) suggested that defendant was familiar with a .22 caliber rifle. State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 29, 2012).

Trial court did not err in admitting the bloody clothes of the victim's daughter because the clothes helped the State establish that defendant attempted to kill the victim by completing a substantial step in the commission of the offense of attempted first degree premeditated murder and that defendant acted with premeditation; the clothes corroborated the daughter's testimony about the incident and suggested that had she not intervened, the defendant would have killed the victim; and the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

18. —Admissibility.

In a felony murder case, the trial court erred in excluding evidence that, two days after a witness testified against defendant, the State dismissed forgery and theft charges against that witness, as this evidence was relevant to show his bias, but the error was harmless in view of defendant's admission to shooting the victim. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Oct. 10, 2012).

In a felony murder case, the trial court abused its discretion by preventing defense counsel from cross-examining an investigator about his advising defendant that he could face “life in jail,” because T.C.A. § 40-35-201(b) merely prohibited trial judges, the state, and the defense from commenting to the jury on possible penalties for the offense charged; it neither mandated nor justified limitations on cross-examination. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Oct. 10, 2012).

In an attempted first degree premeditated murder case, the trial court did not err in admitting the victim's testimony that she called her divorce attorney after informing defendant about the divorce to tell her attorney that she was more than a little afraid of going home because that testimony qualified as a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, was relevant, and made it less likely that the victim provoked defendant; and it explained why the victim avoided defendant upon arriving home and declined to respond to him when he tried to talk to her. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Interrogation at the crime scene occurred approximately 40 minutes after defendant invoked his rights, and his statement was a direct result of the detective's failure to scrupulously honor defendant's prior invocation of his right to remain silent, and thus his confession was not voluntary and his statement to the detectives should have been suppressed; however, given the overwhelming evidence that supported his first-degree murder conviction, the error was harmless. State v. Pike, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Defendant claimed the prosecutor's remarks about his intent to kill the victim's parents were improper, and while the State conceded this, the State argued that the comments were harmless under T.R.A.P. 36 in light of the curative instruction given by the trial court; while the comments were extremely improper and careless, in light of the curative instruction and the evidence of defendant's guilt of first-degree murder, these comments did not negatively affect the verdict. State v. Pearman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Statements were not offered to prove the victim's mental state but were instead offered to prove defendant's premeditation under T.C.A. § 39-13-202, and because the evidentiary rule does not contemplate that a third party's conduct is provable by this hearsay exception, the trial court erred in admitting these statements under the exception; however, because of the evidence of premeditation presented at trial, the admission of these statements was harmless under T.R.A.P. 36. State v. Pearman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Defendant attempted to use the victim's purported indecision regarding the divorce to argue against premeditation under T.C.A. § 39-13-202, and thus the victim's statements regarding her state of mind and intent to make defendant leave became relevant to rebut his claim that they planned to stay together, and the statements were not unfairly prejudicial because defendant placed the state of their relationship in issue; even if the admission was error, in light of the evidence of premeditation, any error was harmless under T.R.A.P. 36. State v. Pearman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

In defendant's trial for attempted first degree murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-202, the chief's testimony was rationally based on his perception, but his opinion that he thought defendant was going to kill his wife if he had not been apprehended was closely intertwined with the ultimate issue of whether defendant had taken a substantial step toward killing his wife; the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, but it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against defendant. State v. Fisher, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence video footage from the ambulance that portrayed defendant immediately after her arrest because its probative value outweighed any prejudice in the first-degree murder case where the primary issue at trial was whether defendant acted with premeditation. The video showed that defendant was visibly emotional and belligerent, she yelled about the abuse she suffered, claimed that she was to blame, and told the officer how long she had been drinking. State v. Sherlin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 24, 2018).

19. —Photographs of Victim.

Historically, photographs depicting a victim's injuries have been held admissible to establish torture or serious physical abuse under the aggravating circumstance described in § 39-13-204(i)(5). State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Dec. 27, 1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 837, 121 S. Ct. 98, 148 L. Ed. 2d 57, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5346 (2000).

Trial court did not err in admitting two photographs of the victim's body taken at the scene, given that they were relevant to the nature and extent of the victim's injuries and the issue of premeditation and to support the testimony of two witnesses, plus the photographs were passed around to the jurors after being admitted and a curative instruction regarding the nature of the photographs was given; defendant failed to establish that the probative value of the photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2017).

There was no error in the trial court's decision to admit the frontal autopsy photograph that showed a comprehensive view of the injuries to the victim's throat; the photograph was highly probative of the nature of the victim's injuries, it was offered to illustrate the medical examiner's testimony, it was relevant to the issue of defendant's premeditation and intent, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its gruesome or horrifying character. State v. Morgan, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2020).

20. Evidence Sufficient.

Corroborative evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the defendant helped plan the victim's murder. State v. Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d 546, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. June 7, 1993).

Evidence was sufficient to establish deliberation where the state proved that defendant had a grudge against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and its employees and for some time had stated his intentions to kill TVA employees who came on his property and where, on the date of the shooting, defendant observed the TVA vehicle enter his property, went to his residence and armed himself, waited for the arrival of the employees and, after a brief confrontation, pointed his gun in the face of the victim and fired several shots at point blank range. State v. Gentry, 881 S.W.2d 1, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Abrams, 935 S.W.2d 399, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Kendricks, 947 S.W.2d 875, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. May 5, 1997); State v. Pulliam, 950 S.W.2d 360, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 672 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder and of aggravated rape. State v. Gregory, 862 S.W.2d 574, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Evidence was sufficient to establish deliberation where the state proved that defendant had a grudge against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and its employees and for some time had stated his intentions to kill TVA employees who came on his property and where, on the date of the shooting, defendant observed the TVA vehicle enter his property, went to his residence and armed himself, waited for the arrival of the employees and, after a brief confrontation, pointed his gun in the face of the victim and fired several shots at point blank range. State v. Gentry, 881 S.W.2d 1, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Evidence showing that defendant obtained the victim's shotgun earlier in the day, entered the victim's bedroom at night, aimed the shotgun at the victim's face, and, after the victim pushed the shotgun away, aimed again at the victim's face and began to pull the trigger was sufficient to prove attempted first degree murder. State v. Nix, 922 S.W.2d 894, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. May 6, 1996).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of attempted first-degree murder. State v. Alexander, 957 S.W.2d 1, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Where defendant shot victim point blank in the chest, a reasonable jury would conclude that the result he intended (death) would be caused with no further conduct on his part. State v. Adams, 973 S.W.2d 224, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

The evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for premeditated and intentional killing where there was continued animosity between defendant and the victim, and any passion that led to the initial attack was interrupted by a third party's attempt to separate the two as well as the third party's verbal warning to defendant not to kill the victim. State v. Millsaps, 30 S.W.3d 364, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 2000).

The evidence was sufficient to support premeditated murder where defendant had a motive to kill the victim and acted upon the motive by obtaining a high-powered rifle while the victim was at the defendant's house, shot the unarmed victim in the back and then calmly tried to conceal the crime. State v. Thompson, 43 S.W.3d 516, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, Thompson v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 852, 122 S. Ct. 121, 151 L. Ed. 2d 77, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 6019, 70 U.S.L.W. 3236 (2001), review or rehearing denied, 43 S.W.3d 516, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. 2001).

Defendant's conduct in approaching the victim and pointing a gun at the victim's head constituted a substantial step toward the commission of an especially aggravated robbery, during which the murder of the victim occurred; thus, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery and it was error for the trial court to merge the robbery conviction into the felony murder conviction. State v. Webster, 81 S.W.3d 244, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

Evidence showing defendant was not suffering from a severe mental illness at the time of the offense, that it was plausible defendant was malingering, and that defendant realized his conduct was wrongful supported the jury's finding defendant failed to show that, as a result of a severe mental illness or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's first-degree premeditated murder conviction where defendant waited in a bar to offer the victim a ride in order to kidnap and murder her, defendant had handcuffs in his vehicle, there were many weapons in defendant's truck, and defendant mutilated the victim's body after killing her. State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1007 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 541 U.S. 1049, 158 L. Ed. 2d 743, 124 S. Ct. 2174, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3512, 72 U.S.L.W. 3711 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's murder conviction where: (1) The victim died about 5 p.m.; (2) Defendant arrived home around 5:30; (3) It was a 15 minute walk from the victim's home to defendant's; (4) Defendant said that defendant would hurt the victim; and (5) The firearm's evidence pointed to defendant as the killer. State v. Robertson, 130 S.W.3d 842, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1068 (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, as it showed that: (1) Defendant and his co-defendant decided to rob the victims instead of paying for the weapons; (2) Defendant was overheard saying that if they robbed the victims they would have to kill them because they knew defendants; (3) They carried handcuffs, rope, and duct tape to the meeting; (4) When defendants returned to the co-defendant's apartment they had numerous assault weapons and one of the victim's cars; (5) Defendant told a friend that he had killed one victim because his co-defendant had been unable to do so; (6) Defendants burned and abandoned the victim's car in a remote location, then spent the night in a motel away from their usual abode; (7) When confronted by police the next day, both defendants fled; and (8) Following defendant's arrest, he admitted to being at the scene. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony murder, because it showed that defendant and his co-defendant openly discussed robbing and murdering the victims in the hours before acting on their intentions, defendants were seen later in possession of the victims' car, jewelry, clothing, and weapons, and both victims were shot to death with firearms. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Following evidence supported defendant's convictions for first degree murder of two victims: (1) Defendant was involved in a “gun deal” with the victims and had planned to steal the guns and a car; (2) He said that the victims would have to be killed, because they knew where he and his accomplices lived; (3) He obtained a nine millimeter handgun shortly before the offenses, and a nine millimeter handgun was used in the murders; (4) He and an accomplice were seen driving the victims' car on the night of the offenses with the victims tied up in it; (5) He and his accomplice were in possession of assault rifles, handguns, a backpack, and the victim's personal clothing and jewelry; (6) He told police that he was present when the victims were shot and killed, yet he told others that he had shot one of the victims and that the other victim had begged for his life before being shot by his accomplice; (7) He and his accomplice burned the victims' vehicle after the offenses; and (8) He tried to conceal the victim's gold necklace that he was wearing at the time of his arrest. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Davis v. Tennessee, 125 S. Ct. 1306, 161 L. Ed. 2d 123, 543 U.S. 1156, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1599 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005).

Defendant was in error when he claimed that the prosecution failed to successfully negate self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt where a videotape of the murder clearly depicted defendant was in no danger from the victim when defendant shot the beaten, unarmed, staggering victim in the back of the head while the victim was walking away from him. Stokely v. Burke, 130 Tenn. 219, 169 S.W. 763, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1914).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a premeditated murder conviction where defendant inflicted multiple wounds upon each victim during the particularly cruel killings; he used two weapons, scissors and a ligature, on each of the unarmed victims and attempted to dispose of evidence by flushing his underwear down the toilet. Defendant exhibited calmness after the murders by showering, changing his clothes, looking for valuables, and then driving to Missouri where he socialized with friends at a tavern that night. State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004), cert. denied, Leach v. Tennessee, 544 U.S. 966, 125 S. Ct. 1739, 161 L. Ed. 2d 610, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3045 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a felony murder conviction where, on the morning of the murders, defendant was evading the police because of his attack on one victim, and after the murders, defendant had the truck and money he needed to flee. From that evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant had formed the intent to rob the victims prior to their murders. State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004), cert. denied, Leach v. Tennessee, 544 U.S. 966, 125 S. Ct. 1739, 161 L. Ed. 2d 610, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3045 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a felony murder conviction where defendant admitted he was present during a robbery by an accomplice, and one victim was shot and killed during the robbery. State v. Summers, 159 S.W.3d 586, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2005).

While the evidence was for the most part circumstantial, it was clearly sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt of both murder and robbery where it established the following: (1) The victim was working at the front desk of a hotel when two men demanded money and then shot him, ultimately killing him; (2) Defendant was observed inside a room of the hotel with a gun on the night prior to the shooting, and was in and out of that room throughout the night and early morning; (3) Defendant and co-defendant were seen running from the hotel lobby close to the time that the victim was shot, carrying a bin matching the description of that used to hold money in the hotel safe; (4) Defendant made incriminating statements to two different people, claiming that he shot someone inside the hotel; and (5) The register tape from the hotel cash register showed the “no sale” button was pushed right before the victim's call to 9-1-1. State v. Bough, 152 S.W.3d 453, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 910 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1069 (Tenn. 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a premeditated murder conviction where defendant became upset because the victim was unable to pay immediately a fifteen-dollar debt that the victim owed defendant, defendant pointed the gun at the victim, told the victim to open his mouth, and then shot the victim first above the victim's left eye and then again behind the victim's left ear. By his own admission, defendant shot the victim a second time, with the gun within one inch of the victim's head, to ensure the victim's death; defendant's statements after the crime indicated that he thought about shooting the victim before doing so. State v. Cole, 155 S.W.3d 885, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Cole v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 47, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79, 546 U.S. 829, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6152 (U.S. 2005).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of premeditated first degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) and T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(18) where the evidence showed that defendant had been physically and mentally abusive toward the victim during their relationship; defendant beat the victim with a pistol; defendant threatened to kill the victim, and these actions were filmed by a surveillance camera; a passenger in the car with the victim when she was shot five times identified defendant as the shooter; another witness said the shooter resembled defendant; and several witnesses saw a car resembling defendant's car speeding from the scene. State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a woman and her lover of premeditated first degree murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 and 39-11-302(a) where the woman's version of events was inconsistent with the physical evidence because the autopsy of the victim, her husband, revealed that he had been shot six times in the head with a .22 caliber gun prior to the woman's departure for the grocery store, and there were email messages between the defendants that could be fairly characterized as an ongoing discussion of various methods of murder. State v. Watson, 227 S.W.3d 622, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. July 3, 2006).

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and for the facilitation of first-degree murder were appropriate because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, in part because defendant admitted that there had been discussion among her husband and mother about killing one of the victims because she allegedly abused her children. State v. Dych, 227 S.W.3d 21, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2007).

Proof at trial showed that, inter alia: (1) Defendant needed money to avoid being evicted from his apartment; (2) Defendant lured a victim to his apartment with the promise that an accomplice would engage in sexual relations with the victim; and (3) Defendant admitted he called the victim on the night of the murder; because the jury could have found that a witness was not an accomplice to the crimes, the witness's testimony corroborated two accomplices' testimony, and thus the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. State v. Robinson, 239 S.W.3d 211, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and facilitation of attempted first degree premeditated murder, because defendant and his accomplices formed a firing line while at least two of them aimed their weapons toward a group of unarmed persons, and without provocation opened fire; two bullets struck and killed one victim, a third bullet struck and injured another victim, and defendant rendered no aid to the victims. Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. June 4, 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a first degree murder conviction, because, prior to the murder, the victim's wife saw defendant peeping over at her house, on the day of the murder a witness encountered defendant at 7:40 a.m. walking near the victim's home, and the murder occurred between 8:30 a.m. and 9:20 a.m.; after 10:00 a.m., a witness picked up defendant at a location near a trail leading from the victim's home, and the ammunition found in defendant's home was consistent with the unusual combination of power piston wads and double aught buckshot found at the crime scene. State v. Stephens, 264 S.W.3d 719, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2008), overruled in part, State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Evidence showed that defendant and the victim had argued on the morning of the killing, and when they argued again later, defendant armed himself with a pistol and shot the unarmed victim seven times at close range; thereafter, defendant attempted to secrete or dispose of the weapon and stabbed himself to bolster a claim that he acted in self-defense, and did not alert emergency personnel to the victim's condition when they arrived on the scene but chose to dramatize and exaggerate his minor wounds instead of directing paramedics to aid the victim. State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2008).

Defendant's conviction for premeditated first-degree murder was appropriate because evidence showed that expert testimony connected defendant to a pair of jeans found at the scene of the crime and worn at the time of the attack on the victim; witness also testified that defendant took her to the crime scene and, while there, confessed to having killed the victim. State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2008).

Because the state needed to prove only that petitioner intentionally attempted to kill someone (and not necessarily anyone specifically) the evidence was plainly sufficient to support petitioner's attempted first degree murder conviction, and he was not entitled to habeas relief; the evidence produced at trial revealed that petitioner, after threatening to get a gun and return to kill either two specific individuals, or everyone, went to his house, retrieved his shotgun, and upon returning to the tavern, fired the shotgun into the tavern. Krantz v. Lindamood,  594 F.3d 896, 2010 FED App. 43P, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3008 (6th Cir. Feb. 17, 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 869, 131 S. Ct. 166, 178 L. Ed. 2d 98, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 6657 (U.S. 2010).

Defendant's conviction for attempt to commit first-degree murder in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a) and 39-12-101 was appropriate because, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the crimes committed against the victim in the course of the robbery, carjacking, and assault, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant and his co-perpetrator, with premeditation, planned and intended to kill the victim. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2011).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for felony murder, under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2), and especially aggravated kidnapping, under T.C.A. § 39-13-305, because defendant beat the victim unconscious with a baseball bat, and defendant and an accomplice tied the victim with rope and drove the victim to a creek where they drowned the victim. Furthermore, defendant's statements to investigators, which reflected a guilty knowledge on the part of defendant, taken together with the evidence of defendant's DNA which was recovered from a cigarette butt that was found at the victim's home, sufficiently corroborated the testimony of accomplices. State v. Mangrum, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2011), aff'd, 403 S.W.3d 152, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Mar. 27, 2013).

Following evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of first degree murder: (1) he told three witnesses that he committed the murders; (2) he believed one of the victims had accused him of child sexual abuse; (3) he had threatened to kill that victim; (4) he obtained a .22 rifle shortly before the victims were shot; and (5) fragments taken from the bodies were consistent with a .22 bullet. State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 29, 2012).

In a felony murder case, a witness's testimony that he saw defendant pointing a rifle at the victim, who held his hands in the air, and heard three shots fired from a .22 caliber weapon, followed by a single shot from a higher caliber gun, along with evidence that defendant used a .22 rifle and that a single shot was fired from the victim's .38 caliber revolver, was sufficient to allow the jury to reject defendant's claim of self-defense. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Oct. 10, 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's first degree murder conviction because defendant shot an unarmed victim, thereafter, he attempted to conceal his crime by disposing of the weapon, and he was calm following the killing, changing his clothes, leaving the car from the scene, and using a stranger's phone to make arrangements to go home. Defendant and the victim's relationship was one of rival gang members and the killing occurred during a fight between the two gangs. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 406 S.W.3d 121, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. June 20, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a premeditated murder conviction because defendant went to his girlfriend's home armed, upon learning that police had been called defendant said that he would “shoot in the face” the first person who walked through the door, and he then executed his plan by shooting an officer in the face as he entered the residence. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2012), aff'd, 401 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a first degree murder conviction because defendant had an intimate relationship with the victim, the relationship with the victim deteriorated, video surveillance showed the victim driving defendant's car hours before her death, and the victim's blood was found in defendant's car. The victim's body was found face down on the side of the road with two fatal gunshot wounds, and defendant admitted to both his cousin and his girlfriend that he killed the victim, providing specific facts of the case that were previously unknown. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2012), vacated, 418 S.W.3d 38, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted first degree murder because the victim said defendant demanded money and drugs and yelled, “we're going to kill you guys if you don't tell us where it's at.” Defendant hit the victim with a baton, threatened to kill everyone in the cabin if he did not receive money, and although defendant did not fire the gun, he was criminally responsible for the shootings because he sought out assistance and armed the accomplice with a gun before going to the cabin. State v. Dickson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 413 S.W.3d 735, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 777 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), dismissed, Dickson v. Leibach, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174459 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2019).

Appellant's premeditated first degree murder and felony murder convictions were affirmed because the state presented extensive evidence at trial establishing appellant's guilt and corroborating the accomplice's testimony; the medical examiner confirmed the accomplice's testimony regarding the victims' injuries and the manner in which they were killed. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2013), rev'd, 450 S.W.3d 866, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's premeditated murder conviction because defendant would inherit the victim's estate upon his death, a shot was fired into the headboard of the victim's bed before the victim was shot in the forehead, the bullet severed the victim's brain stem, killing him instantly, and the victim was unarmed, heavily sedated, and unable to defend himself. State v. Leath, 461 S.W.3d 73, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 981 (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013), cert. denied, Leath v. Tennessee, 189 L. Ed. 2d 173, 134 S. Ct. 2292, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3508 (U.S. 2014).

Evidence the victim was found lying on her bed, dead from two gunshots to her head, the phone line to her house had been cut, there were pry marks on the screen door, her car was missing, and defendant was arrested in her car with her gun under the driver's seat was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for premeditated murder, felony murder, aggravated burglary, and theft. State v. Stanhope, 476 S.W.3d 382, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2013).

Although circumstantial, evidence defendant had unexplained money roughly equal to the amount known to be in the victim's possession shortly before her death and that defendant gave his wife a large diamond ring that was positively identified as the victim's based on a unique flaw supported defendant's felony murder, aggravated arson, and theft of property convictions. State v. Garner, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 852 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2013), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2014), cert. denied, Garner v. Tennessee, 190 L. Ed. 2d 338, 135 S. Ct. 447, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 7297 (U.S. 2014).

In a death penalty case, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's first degree and felony murder convictions because defendant used weapons, including a knife and rope, upon unarmed victims who were particularly vulnerable because of their ages. Defendant killed one victim because she had seen his face, and defendant's robbery of the money, credit cards, and jewelry indicated another motive for the murders. State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

Evidence that the victim was found with her shirt ripped open, her bra rolled down to her waist, her chest exposed, her underwear rolled above her pants line, and her shorts puller higher than her waist, and that a condom was found in the area near the victim's body, which had signs of sexual trauma, was sufficient to prove the killing was committed during the perpetration of a rape. State v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2014), aff'd, 512 S.W.3d 167, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), aff'd, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 1087 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient that defendant committed first degree felony murder during kidnapping because there was evidence defendant was present at the victim's house, defendant's DNA was on the handgun replica and a condom found in the same area as a branch on which hairs consistent with the victim's head hair were found, multiple blunt force injuries occurred to the victim's head, and a drag trail existed from the victim's house leading to the area where the victim's body was found. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient that defendant committed first degree felony murder during rape because the victim's body had blunt force injuries to the victim's inner thighs, the victim's chest was exposed as the victim's shirt was torn open and the victim's bra was pulled down, and defendant's semen was contained in a condom left at the assault location. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's first-degree murder conviction, as a victim's body was discovered inside defendant's residence stuffed inside a trash can, and an autopsy established that she had been beaten and raped before being stuffed into five trash bags and then the trash can; that her cause of death was asphyxiation indicated that she was alive when placed in the trash can to die, and DNA analysis established the presence of defendant's semen in the victim's vagina and rectum and on her blue jeans. State v. Davidson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015), aff'd, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016).

Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sufficient to support his murder convictions where the victims' deaths and identities were proven and appellant's confession was trustworthy. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2015), aff'd, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Evidence that the victims arrived at defendant's house, defendant came outside with a gun, defendant shot at the unarmed victims, and police arrived to find defendant holding the weapon was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder. State v. Pruitt, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2015), aff'd, 510 S.W.3d 398, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 980 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

Minor child of the victim was controlled by defendant and was not an accomplice in this case; the testimony and the physical evidence corroborated the child's testimony implicating defendant in the premeditated first degree murder of the victim, and sufficient evidence supported his conviction. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2015), aff'd, 519 S.W.3d 1, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 1, 2017), cert. denied, Hawkins v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 288, 138 S. Ct. 388, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6432 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder because the jury could infer that defendant traveled about one-fourth of one mile on foot from a church to the victim's house, where he placed a barrel under a window, removed the screen, entered the house through the open window, shot the victim in the head with a .22 caliber weapon, left through the front door, went to his mother's house, and waited until the body had been discovered the next day before initiating any contact with the authorities; and because defendant's actions were inconsistent with a conclusion he was incapable, due to intoxication, of premeditating the victim's killing. State v. Rayfield, 507 S.W.3d 682, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of first degree murder; defendant forced the victim into her car and they drove to a separate location, where he savagely beat the victim to death, then fled, and the repeated blows inflicted upon the unarmed victim and defendant's cool planning following her death support the jury's finding of premeditation. State v. Burrows, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

Jury could have found that defendant was guilty of felony murder in perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate theft, under a theory of criminal responsibility; the proof established that defendant was an active participant in the events resulting in the victim's death and not merely present before and after the offense, as defendant assisted in the commission of the offense by purposefully blocking the victim's car so that the victim could not escape the gunman. State v. Crockett, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of first degree murder where it showed that defendant and his family had a lengthy disagreement with the victims and their friends, defendant told a witness he would put a bullet through one of the victim's head, both victims were shot in the head, bullets found in defendant's truck were consistent with the caliber of bullets found at the scene, documents of email and social media messages relative to the desire to kill the victims and defendant's willingness to help found shredded in defendant's truck, and defendant implicated himself in the crimes during a phone call with his wife. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of premeditated first degree murder because defendant was the last person known to have seen the victim alive and discovered her body; the victim's neighbor testified that she saw a person, who matched defendant's description and was driving a white van like defendant's, in the victim's driveway shortly after 12:30 p.m.; on the night of the murder, investigators noticed that defendant had scratches on his face; an expert in forensic pathology concluded that the victim died from a combination of blunt force injuries to the head and strangulation to the neck; and defendant's former cellmate testified that defendant confessed to killing the victim by hitting her in the back of the head. State v. Giles, 493 S.W.3d 504, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2016).

Evidence that defendant walked up to the female victim's car with a loaded gun as she was using the ATM and pointed the gun at her, demanded she exit the car, and shot her at point-blank range without hesitation when she did not comply and attempted to drive away was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. State v. Holmes, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder was supported by sufficient proof of her criminal responsibility for the victim's death, and her conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder was supported by sufficient proof of an agreement to commit the murder; defendant knew the killing of her husband was going to occur, she agreed to pay half of the compensation to the killer, plus defendant and her daughter were victims of abuse by the husband and wanted him dead, and they conspired to commit the murder. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), rev'd, 537 S.W.3d 892, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery because a witness testified that defendants left his house after agreeing to commit a robbery; both defendants were identified by an eyewitness as leaving the victim's apartment with him the last time he was seen alive by anyone other than defendants; the victim was shot multiple times, and his body was left in his vehicle; the bullets removed from the victim's body and shell casings found in his vehicle were fired by the type of pistol recovered from the second defendant's residence; and the jury was instructed regarding criminal responsibility and rejected the first defendant's argument that he was only present during the murder. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence that defendant left an apartment just before the victim, shot the victim in a breezeway immediately after the victim left an apartment, and three eyewitnesses saw defendant shoot the victim multiple times was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. State v. Claxton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Evidence that defendant approached the victim while his back was turned, stabbed the victim in the back, followed the victim into a restaurant to obtain the victim's car keys, and left the victim dying on the kitchen floor and drove off in the victim's car was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree felony murder. State v. Arnold, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for kidnapping-related felony murder, as it showed that defendant knowingly removed the victim from the front of her apartment and confined her inside where he strangled her with his hands and a vacuum cleaner cord until she died. State v. Rivera, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder because the accomplice testimony was adequately corroborated, by the testimony of independent witnesses, and the evidence of defendant recruiting the accomplice to assist defendant in the shooting of the victim sufficiently supported defendant's conviction. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 859 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2016).

Despite the acquittal on the attempted first degree murder charge, the State presented evidence from which a trier of fact could have found that defendants, by shooting eight times each into a nearby vehicle containing six people, committed attempted murder, and that they employed a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; thus, the evidence supported the attempted second degree murder conviction. State v. Pirtle, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence that defendant returned to an apartment where he felt disrespected, was welcomed inside, did not display a gun until he went directly to the victim and shot him, indicating the use of the element of surprise to keep the victims from defending themselves was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that defendant's killing of the victim was premeditated, as required for a conviction of first degree murder. State v. Waters, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 592 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 772 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Defendant claimed he was so intoxicated that he was incapable of premeditation and that he should have been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, but there was evidence to the contrary regarding his intoxication, and by the jury's verdict of guilty to the charge of first degree murder, the jury necessarily rejected the claim that defendant acted in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner. State v. Hudgins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 753 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

Record supported the jury's finding that defendant acted with premeditation in killing three victims and attempting to kill a fourth victim, as it showed that, after becoming angry with his girlfriend for cheating, defendant rammed a door and fired his gun at the door in an effort to get to her inside the bedroom and once inside, defendant continued shooting his gun. In addition, defendant did not render aid or summon help, fled the scene and traveled to multiple locations. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Conviction for first degree murder was supported by evidence defendant decided to confront the victim, obtained the victim's gun, walked to the sleeping victim's bedroom, shot the victim, failed to render aid or call for assistance, ransacked the house to make it look as if the killing occurred during a burglary, fled the scene, and secured a brick to the gun and threw it into a pond. State v. Self, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017), cert. denied, Self v. Tennessee, 198 L. Ed. 2d 666, 137 S. Ct. 2224, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3666 (U.S. June 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator for the offenses of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, attempt to commit first degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery where two victims identified him in a photograph lineup and they testified that they were able to see his face during the crimes. State v. Hawthorne, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant was the perpetrator of first-degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery where he admitted in a recorded telephone conversation that he shot the victim in the face and his codefendants'  testimony connected him to the crimes. State v. Tull-Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2016).

Since a photograph showed that one of the victim's pregnancy was clearly visible, a reasonable jury could have found that defendant knew she was pregnant when he and an accomplice killed her and thus, that he intentionally and with premeditation killed her baby. State v. Moss, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence, including defendant's bloody shoe prints at one scene, his DNA on a bottle of beer, that defendant and an accomplice used deadly weapons upon three unarmed women, that the crimes were particularly cruel, and that the sale of drugs provided a motive was sufficient to show that defendant and an accomplice killed the victims as part of their plan to rob the first victim. State v. Moss, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder because, although the victim was intoxicated and arguing with defendant and others, he ended the argument and attempted to leave the neighborhood; defendant procured a firearm from a vehicle parked along the street and shot at, and killed, the victim, who was unarmed and yelling out the window of the first witness's car; the first witness stated that she saw defendant and another individual holding guns; and the second witness testified that he heard gunshots, that he looked back toward the home, and that he saw gunfire coming from defendant's gun. State v. Dowdy, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony murder where it showed that as a result of the victims'  work as confidential informants defendant's nephew was indicted, defendant told his nephew not to worry about it, and defendant's girlfriend testified he went into a motel room with a gun, she heard two pops, when he returned he was carrying a cell phone, and that night he threw the phone away in one location and the gun in a different location. Defendant also confessed to the murders. State v. Wade, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Defendant's attempted murder and firearms convictions were supported by evidence that at least 15 shots were filed at the victims'  home, immediately prior to the shooting someone claiming to be defendant called an individual an asked her to get in touch with the male victim and then defendant asked the victim if he had any “beef” with defendant moments before shots were fired, and the casings recovered from the scene matched cartridge casings found in a vehicle where defendant was a passenger. State v. Lagrone, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 751 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

Evidence that a codefendant planned to rob the victim, the three defendants left a witness's apartment with handguns, and one of them shot the victim supported defendant's convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. State v. Conde-Valentino, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 753 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2016), appeal denied, State v. Conde-Valentino, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first degree premeditated murder, as there was testimony defendant drove to the house, went downstairs to the victim's bedroom shouting that he was going to kill him, produced a gun, and shot the victim, and that the victim's cause of death was complications from an abdominal gunshot wound. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

Evidence was legally sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree murder because a jury could conclude he committed the killing intentionally and with premeditation; a witness testified that she overheard defendant confess to the killing and talk to the co-defendant about disposing of evidence, defendant confessed to the mother of the victim's son that he committed the murder, and he admitted the shooting to a cellmate. State v. Sharpe, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2016).

Evidence that defendant had a grudge against the victim, that he prepared for his confrontation with the victim by putting a gun in his pocket, that he used a deadly weapon on the unarmed victim, that he administered repeated blows, that he exhibited calmness after the killing, that he hid the weapon was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. State v. Dowlen, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 828 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect because, based on the nature and extent of the victim's injuries that occurred while he was under defendant's sole custody and care and defendant's attempts to dispose of the victim's body and conceal the offenses, the evidence showed that defendant knowingly treated the victim in a manner as to inflict injury, that he acted other than by accidental means, and the victim died as a result. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because the record showed that defendant shot the victim in the face, the victim died of a gunshot wound to the head and neck, and the audio recording of the victim's phone call and witness testimony showed that defendant cursed at the victim, approached the unarmed victim sitting in his car, engaged a concealed gun, shot the victim in the face, and fled the scene. State v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 862 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence that the victim was struck three times in the back of the head with a hard, dense object that was consistent with a sledge hammer, defendant asked two acquaintances to help him rob the victim and when they refused defendant indicated he would do it himself, and a sledge hammer with defendant's girlfriend's name on it was found in the woods outside one of the acquaintance's apartment was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. State v. Thompson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 1, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery where defendant told a witness that he intended to rob the victim by creating a false drug deal, he and his two co-defendants discussed robbing the victim, defendant who was armed drove his co-defendants to the victim's home, he was inside the home while the victim was shot six times, a co-defendant's blood was found in the victim's home, defendant had blood on his hands when he returned to a witness's home, they discussed the division of the proceeds, and defendant told the witness not to say anything about the offense. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 908 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Reasonable jury could have easily found that defendant acted with premeditation when he shot the male victim three times and killed him and bound the female victim and stuffed her into a garbage can to die, and that such acts were done while also committed the rimes of kidnapping, rape, and robbery. State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 66, 138 S. Ct. 105, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5551 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for two counts of premeditated murder and one count of attempted premeditated murder because none of the shooting victims were armed, all of the victims were shot from more than five feet away, and two of the victims could not have been involved in any confrontation, even if one believed defendant's story about the third victim's threat to defendant. In addition, even if true, defendant's confession showed that defendant escalated any confrontation. State v. Pruitt, 510 S.W.3d 398, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 980 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

Reasonable jury could have determined that defendant killed the victim, his estranged wife, to prevent her from testifying regarding custody at an upcoming court hearing, that he strangled her to death, and that he undertook concealment efforts to make it seem like she had decided to abandon the children and disappear by taking her body to a remote location and setting it on fire; the evidence thus supported his conviction of first degree premeditated murder. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery because defendant's confession was corroborated by witnesses who said that he went to his mother's house for money and he repeated returned to the group with additional funds with which he purchased cocaine, other witnesses testified about defendant's hatred for his mother and his interest in her monetary affairs, defendant's statement included the specific method by which he killed her, with a hammer, and the police recovered a bloody hammer from the home. State v. Watts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder in the attempt to perpetrate a robbery and attempted especially aggravated robbery because there was proof defendant was present during the crime and assisted the other suspect in committing the crime. Defendant admitted to the witness that he assisted the suspect in the murder, an eyewitness identified defendant as being present in the apartment at the time of the shooting, and his fingerprint was found on a candle holder from the victim's living room that he used to light a cigarette. State v. Taliaferro, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. May 19, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery because there was sufficient independent evidence to corroborate his confessions to his friend and the victim's mother and substantial independent evidence the confessions were trustworthy; defendant's confession to the mother corroborated evidence that the victim had been shot in the hand, and the friend's statements matched the mother's statement. State v. Bass, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery because defendant called the victim several times around the time of his death, he admitted to seeing the victim the night of the incident, and he gave several inconsistent statements to the police to the police about his location and activities that night. State v. Bass, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of first degree murder, given that he grabbed a nine-millimeter handgun and began shooting at the victim's car when it drove near defendant, and he continued shooting until he had fired his handgun 17 times, then he drove away; the jury's verdict showed that it rejected defendant's claim that he acted to defend himself. State v. Richardson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of first degree murder, as two eyewitnesses identified defendant in a photographic lineup, defendant admitted he was at the bar on the night in question, and forensic testimony was consistent with the witness testimony; the jury's finding that defendant was the shooter would not be disturbed. State v. Vargas, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. June 7, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate aggravated child abuse, two counts of aggravated child abuse, and one count of filing a false report because the medical examiner testified that the victim suffered from battered child syndrome and her death was a homicide, defendant was alone with the victim on the day of her death, defendant's daughter testified that she saw him beat the victim, and defendant waited five hours after finding the victim before calling the police and lied about when he found her. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted robbery as the underlying felony of attempted robbery and the killing were part of a continuous transaction with no break in the chain of events, and the killing was committed in pursuance of the attempted robbery because defendant and co-defendant decided to commit a robbery on the night of the offense; although defendant claimed that he became scared and attempted to retreat from the robbery, and that the gun unintentionally discharged, a firearms expert testified that at least five pounds of pressure had to be applied to the trigger for the gun to discharge; and the victim was shot once and later died from his wound. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2017).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's first degree murder conviction; the jury heard the proof and determined that he was capable of forming the intent to kill the victim, he acknowledged that he was upset because he thought the victim had raped his girlfriend, he shot repeatedly at the unarmed victim, striking him multiple times in the back, and defendant did not seem emotional when he was arrested shortly thereafter. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree murder conviction and to reject his claim of self-defense because it showed that he was angry with the victim for taking his gun, defendant forced his way into the apartment and shot the victim several times, defendant testified that the victim fell after the first gunshot, and defendant's gun was still in the victim's waistband after the shooting. State v. Hill-Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2017), appeal denied, State v. Hill-Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

Defendant could not be excluded as a potential minor contributor of DNA found on the handcuffs fashioned out of zip ties that were removed from the victim's wrists, and although defendant testified that he had never been inside the victim's house, that he did not kill her, and that another person gave him the victim's debit card, the jury was free to reject this; the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the identity of defendant as the perpetrator of the offenses in this case, including first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-403. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree felony murder conviction because the State provided adequate corroboration of the accomplice's testimony, including a witness's identification of defendant as the man in the car driven by the accomplice, defendant's shorts collected by the police were consistent with the witness's description of the suspect's clothing and they contained blood and gunshot residue, defendant admitted that he bought marijuana from the victim, and damage to the victim's home was consistent with a struggle having occurred. State v. Cosper, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017).

Evidence was more than sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202; the record showed that the trial court considered the evidence as the thirteenth juror and clearly approved the jury's verdict. State v. Pearman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Evidence at defendant's trial was sufficient because, viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the State, the evidence showed defendant murdered a victim during an attempted especially aggravated robbery. State v. Greer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony murder where the evidence established that defendant and the co-defendant planned to rob the victim of drugs and money, defendant knew that the victim often carried prescription pills and large amounts of cash on his person, she armed herself prior to getting into the car with the victim and the co-defendant, and she acknowledged taking the victim's cash immediately after killing him. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence that second defendant wanted his wife killed, second defendant conducted several internet searches regarding the penalties for accidentally shooting and killing a person, first defendant approached a potential shooter and arranged a meeting with the shooter and second defendant, and first defendant provided the shooter with an initial payment was sufficient to sustain defendants'  convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. State v. Patel, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Jan. 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon because it showed that the victim was unarmed and seated in his car when defendant approached and fired at least five shots at him, two witnesses testified that the victim identified defendant as the shooter at the scene, defendant concealed his identity during his commission of the offenses, and he admitted he had been convicted of a felony drug offense at the time the offenses in the instant case were committed. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 808 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for first degree murder because witnesses testified that defendant, a known gang member, chased seven unarmed victims, with no evidence of provocation presented, fired at least eleven gunshots at the victims, and one of the victims died as the result of a gunshot wound to the victim's neck, which was fired at the victim in relatively close proximity. Defendant then rejoined defendant's friends and discussed the events of the night, including the fact that defendant fired shots. State v. Sims, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017).

Defendant's conviction for felony murder was supported by evidence that defendant, who wanted money for weed, and codefendant drove around searching for a possible victim to rob, defendant stopped the car, and codefendant exited the car with defendant's gun and shot and killed the victim. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 852 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2017).

Since the accomplice's testimony was corroborated as to what had occurred before, ruing, and after the murders, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for first degree murder. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2017).

Defendant's admission to being present at the time of the murders, that he carried the victims'  property out of their house and sold some of it, that a blood-stained knife was found in defendant's vehicle, and his boots were consistent with bloody shoe prints found at the scene was sufficient so support defendant's convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. State v. Bargery, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated child abuse and first-degree felony murder because he admitted in a written statement that he grabbed the victim by the shoulders and shook her, an expert testified that the victim's injuries and death resulted from abusive head trauma, the victim was solely in defendant's care in the hours before her arrival at the hospital, and prior to being left alone with defendant the victim had no visible injuries and was behaving normally. State v. Iceman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 931 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree felony murder because defendant asked codefendants to participate in a burglary, defendant admitted to stealing items from a house and, upon exiting the house, seeing a codefendant holding the victim at gunpoint, and defendant claimed that the codefendant fatally shot the victim as defendant. Furthermore, a cigarette butt with defendant's DNA was found at the scene, and, when defendant was arrested, defendant was in possession of the murder weapon. State v. Odum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 973 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the first-degree, premeditated murder of the first victim, his estranged wife, because defendant drove to his home and parked in an area beside the house where he knew his car would not be seen; defendant was armed with a gun he borrowed from his co-worker three weeks prior to the shooting; defendant waited in his car for approximately one hour; when the first victim came outside, defendant got out of his car armed with a gun, grabbed her, and pointed the gun to her head; defendant threatened to shoot both the first and second victim; and defendant then shot the first victim in the head, and the second victim ran for help. State v. Beverly, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1029 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a robbery as defendant took the victim's property by violence and put the victim in fear because he came onto the victim's porch and struck him with a metal stick with a ball on the end of it; defendant forced the victim back into the residence and onto the floor, where he continued to hit the victim; the victim later died from a heart attack induced from his injuries and the stress of the attack; and, even if the jury credited defendant's testimony that he initially struck the victim to defend another person, the jury clearly concluded that defendant's continued assault on the victim, which resulted in the victim's death, was not in defense of another person. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a burglary as he entered the victim's house without the victim's permission and committed or attempted to commit a felony, theft or assault, because he came onto the victim's porch and began hitting the victim; he then entered the victim's residence without his permission and forced the victim onto the living room floor; he continued to strike the victim and later tied the victim's wrists and legs together with an electrical cord and blind cord in a “hogtied” position; and he asked what else the victim had that he and another person could take. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a kidnapping as he came onto the victim's porch, struck the victim, and forced the victim back into the residence; he then pushed the victim to the floor and pinned the victim down by placing his knee on the victim's back; he tied the victim's wrists and legs together in the “hogtied” position; he and another person left the victim's residence while the victim was still tied up and lying on the floor; the victim sustained contusions, abrasions, broken ribs, blunt force injuries, and eventually died from a heart attack from the stress of the offenses; and defendant did not need to strike victim or tie him up to protect the other person from the victim. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a theft because another person testified that she texted defendant twice to inform him that she was going to take money from the victim and leave; after defendant struck the victim, pulled the victim into the victim's residence, and pushed the victim onto the floor, he asked it there was anything else they could take from the victim; that statement evidenced defendant's intent to steal the victim's property and occurred before defendant's criminal acts were completed and before the victim died; and defendant exercised control over the victim's property. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's first degree premeditated murder conviction because the victim's fiancée and other eyewitnesses testified that defendant approached and attempted to speak to the victim moments before the victim was shot, the driver of the car in which defendant was riding testified that defendant shot the victim, a forensic scientist testified that the bullet that was retrieved from the victim's heart was fired from defendant's pistol, and an inmate testified that defendant spoke about the shooting when they were incarcerated. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated arson and attempted first degree murder because the evidence showed (1) defendant knowingly set fire to a victim which damaged the victim's store, and (2) defendant took a substantial step toward attempted first degree murder by lighting the victim on fire. State v. Boutrous, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. June 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted first-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder because it showed that he fired at unarmed victims and an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry testified that defendant was capable of premeditating his actions and was deceptive in his interview. State v. Starks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Evidence that defendant entered the victim's residence through a window, shot the victim, and later gave a written statement admitting to breaking and entering into the residence and shooting the victim supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Stitts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence that, the night before the shooting, defendant stated that those who did not help him move forward with his invention for Homeland Security should be shot and defendant received knives and a shotgun and shot the victim while he mowed the lawn supported the conviction for first-degree murder. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery because although the evidence was based almost entirely on the testimony of an accomplice in the victim's murder, the State produced sufficient corroborating evidence to fairly and legitimately connect defendant with the commission of the crime charged; the jury rejected defendant's version of events. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's first degree and second degree murder convictions because defendant confessed that defendant and an accomplice discussed killing the victim, defendant and the accomplice purchased ammunition for the victim's gun and a box of gloves on the day of the murder, a witness testified that the victim was with defendant and the accomplice on the day of the killing, defendant confessed that both defendant and the accomplice shot the victim, defendant helped dispose of evidence, and defendant's DNA was found on evidence. State v. Briggs, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 2, 2018).

Evidence showing that defendant and the victim were engaged in a conversation, a gunshot occurred, and defendant was standing over the victim's motionless body with a revolving telling him to die was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for first degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. State v. Boyd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree murder convictions because the accomplice testimony of his codefendant was sufficiently corroborated by evidence of the victims'  injuries, DNA evidence, photographs of and evidence from the crime scene, and defendant's admission to a witness who was in police custody at the same time as defendant. State v. Cool, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 691 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2019).

Evidence that defendant and the victim had an affair, defendant's wife found, 12 days after the wife learned of the affair defendant jumped the victim and tried to rape her, the victim filed for an order of protection, defendant told someone the victim ruined his life, and the victim called defendant for a ride on the day of demise was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first-degree murder. State v. Smoot, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery because codefendant texted defendant that the victim was at her house; codefendant identified the two men that entered her house and held her and the victim at gunpoint as defendant and an accomplice; the men demanded money from the victim; defendant commanded the accomplice to shoot the victim, and then they left; and codefendant's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by text message records; a witness's testimony that she saw a couple of figures fleeing from codefendant's house immediately after hearing gunshots; and defendant's association with the cell phone number where codefendant sent her text. State v. Lester, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery based on the theory of criminal responsibility because defendant was present inside the market two minutes before two men entered; defendant's pizza order required the victim to leave the front counter; the victim stood in the pizza preparation area when the first man shot him and when the second man jumped on the front counter and removed money from one of the cash registers; and the jury could have inferred from defendant's presence and actions at the market and from his companionship with the men before and after the offenses that defendant acted with the intent to assist in the armed robbery, resulting in the victim's death. State v. Vales, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

Defendant's conviction for first degree murder was supported by evidence that defendant encouraged her father and her friend to commit the murders by conveying to them that the victims had harassed and threatened her, defendant portrayed herself as a helpless victim in need of protection, and defendant's communication with her friend intended to promote or assist in the murders. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder under the theory of criminal responsibility because it showed that defendant aided or attempted to aid her husband and her daughter's boyfriend in the victims'  murders. The jury could have inferred that defendant and her daughter convinced her husband that their daughter was the target of harassment and death threats from the victims and their friends, defendant wrote in emails that she wanted the victims dead, and she attempted to destroy evidence relating to the offenses and provided her husband with a false alibi after he carried out the murders. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Proof adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain appellant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and being a felon in possession of a weapon, where multiple witnesses identified appellant as the shooter and an autopsy revealed the victim died as a result of the gunshot wound. Regarding the felon in possession of a charge, appellant stipulated that at the time of the offenses, he had been convicted of five felonies involving the use or attempted use of violence and knew it was illegal for him to own, possess or handle a firearm. State v. Harper, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of murder and especially aggravated robbery because prior to the victim's death defendant told her sister that she wanted to get a gun to rob someone, defendant called the victim's girlfriend to set up a marijuana sale, an eyewitness testified that defendant killed the victim, the victim's belongings were found in defendant's apartment, defendant confessed to the police, and she testified at trial that she killed the victim and took his belongings and money. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. July 19, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree-murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery because defendant and co-defendant engaged in a plan to rob the victim; defendant and co-defendant brutally killed the victim by bludgeoning him in the head with a hammer, stabbing him in the neck with a screwdriver, and throwing a toolbox on top of his head; and they took the victim's guns, mason jars of marijuana, gaming system, and tablet. State v. Belt, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. July 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's rejection of defendant's claim of self-defense for the first-degree murder charge because it showed that he caught one victim by surprise and shot him mid-sentence, another victim testified that defendant put a gun to her head, pulled the trigger, and calmly walked away after the gun jammed, and the victim suffered two gunshot wounds to the back. State v. Burrow, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because immediately upon returning home from the victim's home defendant washed his clothing and shoes, defendant had on his person fresh wounds and what appeared to be blood on his arm, defendant's fingerprints were found at the crime scene and there was male DNA evidence found underneath the victim's fingernails that indicated that defendant could have been a contributor, fibers consistent with the victim's clothing were found on defendant's clothing, defendant, who said he had been trained to be a killer, had experience with knots similar to the ones tied on the victim, and he had a dream in which he was the victim's assailant and hit her in the head with a hammer and she offered him forgiveness. State v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate a burglary because he was armed and had the intent to rob the victim using his displayed handgun, when the victim opened the door defendant was caught at the entrance with his gun already pointed at the victim, and the testimony by a witness that the victim pushed defendant “out” reasonably inferred that some portion of defendant's body had entered the home. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate theft, robbery, and especially aggravated robbery because the jury could have inferred from the evidence that defendant followed the witness to the victim's apartment intending to deprive the victim of his property, as he knew the witness was going to the victim's home to purchase drugs, he asked the witness how big the victim was, when the victim opened the door he encountered defendant pointed a gun at him, and another witness testified that defendant told her that he had committed a robbery. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse because according to the medical examiner and the expert in child abuse the victim died of acute blunt force trauma, both physicians were adamant that the injuries were non-accidental and that they occurred within a very short window of time before the presentation of symptoms, during that period of time the victim was in the sole care of defendant, and defendant failed to say anything before trial about the victim's alleged fall from the bunkbed or his alleged fall onto the victim. State v. Bufford, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for facilitation of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect because defendant and the victim's mother were alone with the victim when he died, and defendant admitted that he “whooped” the victim; a doctor's testimony and photographs established that his body was covered in bruises, abrasions, and scars that evinced ongoing abuse. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder while attempting to perpetrate a robbery because defendant attempted to rob the first victim; he then attempted to rob the decedent and his brother; and, although defendant testified that he retreated from the robbery and only shot at the decedent and his brother in self-defense, the jury rejected his self-defense theory, as was its prerogative. State v. Ware, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because he was upset another man had been shot, he was on his way to the hospital to visit him when he stopped at a home where the victim was, defendant accused the victim of setting up the other man, and shot at him five or six times in front of several witnesses. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder because defendant and his accomplice were asked by a third party to steal marijuana from the victim; the accomplice fatally shot the victim using defendant's gun; and defendant intended to promote or assist in the commission of the robbery and was criminally responsible for the victim's death. State v. Dodson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2020).

State established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was criminally responsible for his codefendant's conduct because he shared in the codefendant's intent to rob the victim by approaching the passenger side of the victim's car and pointing his gun at the witness while the codefendant approached the victim's side and pointed a gun at him, and both defendant and the codefendant fired shots when the victim attempted to drive away. State v. Lawrence, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

Evidence was more than sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony because a witness observed the perpetrator next to the passenger window who she identified at trial as defendant with a gun, the accomplice observed defendant shoot his gun while standing at the passenger side of the car, and the description of the clothing worn by the perpetrator at the witness's window matched the clothing defendant was wearing in the surveillance camera video and still pictures. The evidence, excluding the accomplice's testimony, clearly established the inference that defendant was one of two persons involved in the attempted robbery of the victim, resulting in the death of the victim during the attempt by the two men to perpetrate the robbery. State v. Lawrence, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

There was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated battery and murder, including evidence that defendant and his co-defendants forced their way into the victim's apartment armed with a gun, the victim was unarmed and surrounded by the men demanding to know where her son was, and when she failed to provide an answer, a co-defendant shot the victim in the head at the defendant's direction. State v. Fletcher, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2020).

Evidence that defendant was seen in close proximity to the victims moments before he entered the back seat of one victim's car just before they were found shot in the cemetery and several inmates testified they heard defendant and/or codefendant admit to murdering and robbing the victims after luring them to the cemetery was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. State v. Alston, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony first degree murder by killing the victim after committing aggravated burglary by entering her apartment without her consent because a group of people set out to locate and confront the victim's son; defendant and the other men entered the victim's apartment without invitation; he shot the victim after she was unable to provide them with her son's whereabouts; and he had the opportunity for reflection prior to the act of killing. State v. Kelso, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions because it showed that a co-defendant and defendant made a plan to “hit a lick” on Hispanic people, obtained a working magazine for the malfunctioning handgun, armed themselves, and asked another co-defendant to drive them around town to identify vulnerable targets. After choosing a house, the co-defendant and defendant walked back to the house, fired two shots into the air, and ordered the victims onto the ground, one of the men took a victim's wallet, and when they were surprised by the victims inside the house opening the door, the co-defendant and defendant opened fire, striking the house and four people present. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's first degree premeditated murder conviction because defendant, a truck driver, solicited the victim for sex, the victim was shot by defendant's rifle, the victim's nude body was dumped in a garbage can at a truck stop and trash was placed on top of the victim, defendant's fingerprint was on a box in the trash, defendant solicited a jailhouse informant to murder witnesses, and defendant alleged that individuals who had alibis were the perpetrators. State v. Mendenhall, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020).

Evidence that defendant was in the vicinity, possessed a handgun, and planned to rob the victim and stipulated to having a felony drug conviction supported convictions for murder in the perpetration of theft and of robbery, criminal attempt of especially aggravated robbery, and felon in possession of a firearm. State v. Olivo, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Evidence supported defendants'  convictions for especially aggravated robbery and first degree felony murder because defendant contacted codefendant from a dice game and codefendant arrived at the game afterward, codefendant approached the victim with a handgun and the intent to take money from the victim, an altercation ensued, and defendant took the handgun and fatally shot the victim multiple times. Furthermore, after the shooting, the victim's cell phone used a tower located between the scene and codefendant's home. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, which were merged, based on criminal responsibility as defendant acted with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the crimes and aided or attempted to aid in the crimes because defendant initiated the robbery by placing a telephone pizza order which lured the victim to the scene; while the victim attempted to deliver the pizza order to the residence, two men waited until the victim returned to his car to approach the victim; defendant heard a gunshot coming from the direction of the men; and defendant repeatedly ran over the victim to ensure he was dead prior to taking his vehicle. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 11, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder because the victim suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen and a complex gunshot wound to his shoulder and neck, which a physician testified could be caused by a high-velocity weapon, and the physician also testified that the victim's wounds were consistent with him having been shot in the abdomen, falling to the ground, and then being shot in the back. From this evidence, as well as the testimony of two witnesses who saw defendant with the victim immediately prior to the shooting, saw defendant holding a long gun, and heard two gunshots, the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant shot the victim. State v. McKenzie, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder as he killed the victim in the perpetration of attempted robbery because co-defendant called defendant and told him that the victim had more marijuana and cash than expected; co-defendant left it up to defendant to let co-defendant make a purchase or to take everything; a surveillance video showed defendant creeping up behind the passenger side of the victim's vehicle; defendant put his gun inside the victim's car; defendant admitted to shooting the victim, and even having to clear a jam in the gun at one point; and, although defendant testified at trial that he did not intend to rob the victim, his written statement and actions during the crime strongly indicated otherwise. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2020).

Defendant was properly convicted of first-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and setting fire to personal property because the evidence established, inter alia, that defendant, the accomplice, and the victim got into a car and drove to a parking lot where, after the victim and defendant exited the car, the accomplice heard a thud on the car, defendant instructed the accomplice to open the trunk, the accomplice then saw defendant take the victim out of the trunk at another location, and after instructing the accomplice to purchase some gasoline and retrieve a rag and spray bottle with bleach, defendant wiped the car down, poured gasoline in it, and set it on fire. State v. Shuler, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder because it established that defendant and the victim argued at a party, defendant threatened to shoot the victim in the face, and defendant pulled out a concealed revolver and shot the unarmed victim in the forehead. State v. Sales, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's first-degree felony murder and robbery convictions because the forensic pathologist testified that the victim's cause of death was suffocation, blunt force injuries, and possible manual strangulation; defendant and codefendant used the victim's debit card and gift card several times; defendant's told an investigator in an interview that defendant played a part and took full responsibility and that defendant's DNA would be found on the victim's pillow; and an inmate testified that defendant confessed to the inmate. State v. Sarden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree murder conviction because it showed that he and his codefendant approached the unarmed victim and engaged in an argument, as the victim began to back away defendant pulled out a gun and shot the victim multiple times, defendant and his codefendant fled, and several months later during his arrest the murder weapon was found on the floor underneath the couch where defendant had last been seated. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder because defendant traded handguns for a high-powered assault rifle; defendant stopped defendant's car at a red light on a street, lowered the window, pointed the rifle toward an unarmed group of people on a sidewalk who did not provoke defendant, and fired a shot, paused, and fired a second shot; and defendant fled the scene and disposed of the rifle during a high-speed police pursuit. State v. Corbin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2020).

20.5 —Conspiracy

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder because when the suspect's girlfriend told defendant that the suspect needed to get rid of the two victims, who had witnessed a home invasion defendant replied “okay,” according to defendant's cell phone records he made calls on two dates when his phone utilized the cell phone tower that covered the area where the victims lived, when defendant spoke to the suspect a few days later he stated that the victims could not be located, and a man testified that defendant offered to pay him $5,000 to murder the victims. State v. Bond, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2019).

21. —Identity.

Evidence that defendant stated he located the man who stole his bicycle and damaged his tent and was going to take care of it, asked an acquaintance for a bag for his bloody clothes, asked another individual to throw the clothes in the creek and later to help move a body, and was known to carry a fixed blade knife, while circumstantial, established that defendant was the person who murdered the victim. State v. Warner, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree murder and first-degree felony murder because a jury could have determined that defendant was the perpetrator, as he was the last person with the victims at the apartment on the night they were killed, although witnesses testified there were drugs and handguns in the apartment on the night of the offense the subsequent police search did not recover any contraband, and defendant told another person that he had robbed two people, had received drugs and money from the robbery, and he had killed. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of first degree murder because he participated in the beating of the victim; he failed to render aid to the victim despite her passing out three times over the course of the four-hour beating; and, instead, every time she was revived, he resumed beating the victim until her death. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the first defendant of the first degree murder for his participation in the beating of the victim because, throughout the course of the four-hour-long beating, the victim lost consciousness three times; and, after each loss of consciousness, the first and the fourth defendants removed the victim from her position from the ceiling, revived her, and subsequently rehung her from the ceiling for the beating to continue. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to the first and second defendants of first degree, felony murder because they both participated in the especially aggravated kidnapping of the victim by hanging the victim by her arms from the ceiling, placing a ball gag in her mouth, beating the victim by kicking, punching, and wielding a metal pole, and causing the victim to lose consciousness three times; the victim suffered multiple traumatic injuries as a result of the beating inflicted by defendants during the kidnapping; and the victim ultimately died as a result of the beating. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the murder under a theory of criminal responsibility because, based on cell phone records, the evidence showed that defendant pointed the gun that was used to kill the first victim at a second victim in another area of town sometime between 6:30 p.m. when he last called the second victim and 6:49 p.m. when calls began to be exchanged between the second victim's cell phone and his brother's cell phone regarding defendant's demand for ransom. Defendant also boasted to the second victim that he had committed other murders earlier in the day. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree felony murder and second-degree murder because there was ample evidence to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the victim's murder, including a witness's testimony concerning what occurred in the victim apartment just before and after the murder, the victim's blood being found on defendant's shoes, and defendant's incriminating statements during phone calls after his arrest. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder because the proof was sufficient to establish defendant's identity, as a witness identified defendant at trial as the man who pointed a gun at her while she was seated in the victim's car. Even though she never saw his face, she described his clothing and defendant was the only person in the surveillance videos wearing that clothing. State v. Lawrence, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

Rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant inflicted the injuries that led to the victim's death because the evidence showed that the three-year-old victim died as a result of multiple blunt force trauma injuries, the victim sustained her injuries while in the defendant's care, and while defendant insisted that the victim sustained the injuries when she fell down the stairs, other evidence offered by the State sufficiently rebutted this statement. State v. Lowry, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder because the eyewitness, who knew defendant from routinely buying drugs from him, testified that she saw him shoot the victim, she identified defendant in a photo lineup and at trial as the shooter, and another witness also identified defendant. State v. McKenzie, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2020).

Evidence evidence at trial established defendant's identity as the masked assailant at the store because using a trained police dog, the officers were able to track the suspect to a nearby wooded area behind a baseball field, defendant was seen hiding in some bushes in that wooded area, and he responded to the officers'  commands to come out with death threats and profanity, after defendant was taken into custody, the police found several items in the immediate vicinity that connected him to the robbery at the store, the police also found a piece of white cloth that was consistent with the white mask worn by the assailant and that was determined to have been cut from a t-shirt found in defendant's bedroom, the clothing, gloves, revolver, and white cloth all contained defendant's DNA. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's first degree murder conviction because video surveillance showed someone in clothing similar to defendant's entering and exiting the victim's apartment, a beanie with defendant's DNA and a boot print matching defendant's boot were found nearby, the victim's computer and a knife from the apartment were found along the path taken by defendant, defendant pawned a ring from the apartment, defendant's cell phone was used to search for information about a stabbing, and defendant confessed the crime to a jail inmate. State v. McLawhorn, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2020).

22. —Attempted First Degree Murder.

Evidence was sufficient to convicted defendant, as an aider and abettor, of attempted first degree murder because the actions of his companion in firing a handgun at two unarmed men entitled the judge to find that the companion took a “substantial step” toward committing first degree murder. State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 777 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013).

Evidence that defendant held a gun to the male victim's head and told him to get out of the car and began shooting when the victim pushed the gun away, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder. State v. Holmes, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's rejection of defendant's claim that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent for attempted first-degree murder where he was able to recall details about the amount of drugs and alcohol he consumed, when and with whom he consumed them, and his exact travel route home, including the specific roads he took and which landmarks he passed. State v. Peden, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 976 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder where it showed that he shot the unarmed victim from behind and when the victim turned around shot him again, he attempted to shoot the victim a third time but his gun jammed, and he had previously threatened anyone who stepped on his turf. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury where the victim testified that he suffered five gunshot wounds, classified his pain as the worst he had felt in his life, and testified that he was still in pain a year later, had permanent scarring from the gunshot wounds, and lost complete function of his right arm. State v. Vaughn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of domestic assault because the record supported the jury's rejection of the affirmative defense of insanity because, although the State's expert witness and defendant's expert witness disagreed, the State's expert witness opined that the defendant could appreciate both the nature and wrongfulness of his actions when he attacked the victim, and his opinion was corroborated by substantial other proof offered by the State; and the victim testified that defendant calmly told her he was going to kill her before beating her and that he knew exactly what he was doing during the attack. State v. Halliburton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Evidence that second defendant possessed a gun and displayed it, and fled with the other defendants and assisted them in disposing of their firearms supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder on the theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Burgess, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted first degree murder because the victim testified that defendant confronted him while entering a barber shop and told him that he was about to die before shooting the victim; the victim was shot 14 times by defendant and co-defendant, who the victim repeatedly identified as the shooters without hesitation; the victim positively identified defendant in a photo lineup and at trial as one of the individuals who shot him; and he testified that he could clearly see defendant before defendant shot him, and that he had no doubt about defendant's identity. State v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. July 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted first-degree murder of the second victim because defendant admitted that he intended to shoot the second victim when he went to the home of the first victim, his estranged wife; and defendant took a substantial step toward killing the second victim as defendant waited with a loaded gun outside of the home where he knew the second victim to be and then threatened to shoot the second victim while holding a gun to the first victim's head; and defendant did, in fact, shoot the first victim in the head. State v. Beverly, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1029 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault, because despite the alibi testimony of defendant's mother, the jury chose not to accredit her testimony and resolve all conflicts in favor of the State and the victim's testimony identifying defendant as one of the shooters without hesitation. State v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted first degree premeditated murder because his conduct constituted a substantial step towards the killing of the victim, as evidenced by his using a gun to shoot the victim while the victim lay unarmed on the ground and attempted to crawl away; the evidence of premeditation was that defendant made multiple attempts to unjam the gun after having already shot the victim and walked away from the victim before returning to shoot him. State v. Gary, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault because it showed that he used a gun to shoot multiple shots towards the vehicle as the victim drove away and several of the shots hit the vehicle. State v. Battle, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted first degree premeditated murder as defendant's conduct constituted a substantial step towards the premeditated and intentional killing of the victim because the evidence of premeditation was that defendant and the victim were in a fight prior to the shooting, and that defendant brought a weapon to the home where he knew the victim would be, concealed the weapon in a paper bag, walked up to where the victim was standing, made a slang reference to shooting someone, and lifted his hand and fired the weapon at the victim several times; and because the victim was shot in the head and the back. State v. Burnette, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 682 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2018).

Evidence that defendant intended to take a vehicle and shot at the victim after he did not comply with defendant's demand for the vehicle's keys, the pistol misfired, the victim ran and defendant kept shooting, and the victim was wounded twice and a second victim was wounded once was sufficient for the jury to find defendant committed attempted first-degree premeditated murder. State v. Grimes, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2018).

Evidence that defendant stated that he was “fixin to get” the victim and was identified by the victim and a witness as the shooter after firing five or six rounds toward the victim was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder. State v. Russell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder (resulting in serious bodily injury), because the evidence showed that defendant and the victim were involved in a physical altercation, defendant waited for the victim to return home from work, defendant walked up to the victim and told the victim, “You know you should have killed me,” and defendant pulled a bag concealing a revolver from behind defendant's back and fired multiple times and wounded the victim. State v. Rogers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. July 25, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony because the evidence showed defendant fired numerous shots at victims in the parking lot of a crowded shopping mall. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder because it showed that, during a verbal altercation with his ex-wife and her boyfriend, defendant produced a gun, announced his intent to shot the boyfriend, and fired twice at the boyfriend, even though he was unarmed and was attempting to remove himself from the disagreement. State v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of attempted first-degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury because they opened fire on a home with people inside and were seen by an eyewitness firing shots from the car, and while the proof did not indicate which defendant actually fired the shot that injured the victim both defendants were criminally responsible for the conduct of the other. State v. Avant, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence that defendant went to a home under the guise of purchasing drugs, intending to rob the victims of the drugs, held a gun to one victim and shot another, retrieved the drugs, and fled in a vehicle taken from a third victim was sufficient to establish premeditation and intent so as to sustain a conviction for attempted first degree murder State v. Fleming, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

23. —Premeditation.

Facts were sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree premeditated murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and aggravated assault because the victim identified defendant soon after the shooting and again in court, and the jury heard the evidence and was able to gauge the victim's credibility. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder because, in the week defendant stayed at his ex-wife's house, he retrieved a pocketknife; defendant went to his ex-wife's house on the night of the murder with the knife; defendant was either carrying the knife with the blade exposed and ready for use or he extended the blade immediately prior to stabbing the victim; the victim suffered no defensive wounds, contradicting defendant's assertion that the victim attacked him and was wounded in a struggle; and, instead of disengaging from the situation when the victim called 911, defendant chose to approach the unarmed victim with a concealed weapon and participate in a violent altercation. State v. Thomason, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 476 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder where it showed that defendant was identified by multiple witnesses, while the victim was fighting with his accomplice defendant went to his car, retrieved his gun, and returned to the fight and fired multiple gunshots at the victim, defendant fled the scene, and he later told his accomplice that he had “emptied his clip” into the victim and traded the gun he used in the shooting for another weapon. State v. Hollis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder where it showed that he pulled a concealed weapon out during a fight in a bar, he shot the unarmed victim three times while the victim was running away, and defendant acknowledged that he had to shoot over the large bouncer to continue firing at the victim. State v. Lumpkin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for premeditated first degree murder because the manner of the victim's death, combined with the past acts of domestic violence and defendant's actions after the murder, were sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant acted with premeditation when he killed the victim; the prior acts of domestic violence were evidence that defendant killed the victim with premeditation. State v. Moody, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder because defendant's motive for the shooting in believing that one of the people in a house was responsible for someone breaking into defendant's car and taking defendant's property, defendant's procurement of a weapon from defendant's car and loading it, defendant's repeated use of the weapon by firing it into the house despite not being in immediate danger, and defendant's concealment of the weapon after the shooting supported a finding of premeditation. State v. Moates, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder where it showed that the victim was defendant's ex-girlfriend who he believed was pregnant with his child, he met the victim and led her to an abandoned house where his girlfriend was waiting, inside the house the victim was strangled, stabbed, and shot, the next day defendant was seen with a handgun that was the same caliber as the one used to shoot the victim, defendant confessed to witnesses to killing the victim in an abandoned house by shooting and stabbing her to death, and he made numerous phone calls and sent letters to fellow gang members and his girlfriend instructing them to destroy evidence and coordinating their stories. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2016).

Evidence that defendant admitting stabbing the victim and that defendant followed the victim into his bedroom under the pretext of engaging in sexual intercourse, procured a knife from his kitchen, stabbed the victim after he removed his prosthetic leg, and attempted to conceal the murder by setting fire to bed upon which she stabbed the victim and removing the knife and setting fire to it was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. State v. McCollum, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the premeditated first degree murder of the first victim because defendant and the second victim broke up about a month before the shooting, and she moved in with the first victim, who lived a few houses down; defendant had slashed the first victim's tires, sent him threatening text messages, assaulted the second victim, and threatened to kill the first victim in the weeks leading up to the murder; and, when the first victim drove to defendant's house to talk with him, defendant responded that he had texted the first victim previously that he would kill him when he saw him again; and defendant then shot at least five times into the vehicle, striking the first victim twice in the chest. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree murder conviction where several witnesses placed him in the vicinity of the shooting and/or testified that defendant admitted shooting the victim, the victim was unarmed, they were not engaged in altercation immediately before the shooting, and defendant came to the neighborhood looking for the victim. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence established that defendant intentionally killed the victim with premeditation; defendant was not armed during his original altercation with the victim, then later appeared without warning and shot the victim, who was unarmed, and the jury could have determined that sufficient time had passed for defendant to have acted after reflection and with premeditation, not with excitement and passion. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first degree premeditated murder because it was within the jury's prerogative to reject testimony from experts that defendant lacked the mens rea required for this offense based on his intellect, brain injuries, and intoxication by alcohol or drugs. The evidence showed that defendant and the victim had an extremely tumultuous relationship; moreover, he fled the crime scene after the stabbing and was ultimately detained by law enforcement in another state. State v. Blocker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder because he shot an unarmed victim in the head from a close distance while the victim held his hands in the air. Defendant told his mother he was going to shoot the victim in the face, and he had a calm demeanor before the shooting. State v. Levy, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 1, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 716 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree murder based on aggravated child abuse where the jury could have inferred that she had a motive to kill her newborn twins to continue hiding the fact that she had become pregnant, she made preparations to hide the births, she hid evidence of the crime by cleaning the bathroom and hiding the laundry basket where one twin was found, and she knowingly treated the twins in a manner to inflict injury by placing her hand over their mouths and suffocating them. State v. Lowe, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2016), aff'd, 552 S.W.3d 842, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder because a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with premeditation as defendant shot the victim twice after an argument, defendant testified that when a pistol jammed as defendant attempted to disengage its safety defendant picked up a rifle, loaded it, and shot the victim a third time, and that defendant shot the victim a fourth time in the face when the victim returned fire, resulting in the victim's death. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for the first degree premeditated murder of defendant's spouse because defendant acted intentionally and with premeditation in that defendant, following an argument with the victim, shot the door to the victim's apartment multiple times and then kicked open the door. Once inside, defendant repeatedly fired a gun at the unarmed victim while the victim was retreating and begging for mercy, broke into the bathroom when the victim hid in the bathroom, and shot the victim multiple times. State v. Durant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

While the jury was given an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, and the evidence supported the conviction, as the victim and defendant fought, there was a cooling-off period, then defendant asked the victim to come back over, where defendant beat the victim to death once he fell asleep; the jury rejected the theory that defendant was in a continuous state of passion after the fight with no opportunity to reflect before killing the victim, and the jury could have found that defendant acted with premeditation. State v. Pike, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree premeditated murder because it showed that defendant pulled out a gun and pointed it at the victim, as the victim was driving away defendant fired two shots at him, defendant had tried to fire a third bullet while walking toward the victim but his gun jammed, the victim never used his rifle during the altercation, after the shooting defendant washed his hands, secreted the gun in a backpack, and hid from the police in a bathroom, and when the police found defendant's gun it was fully loaded. State v. Puckett, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to establish premeditation under T.C.A. § 39-13-202, and that defendant entered the victim's apartment without her consent and with the intent to assault her, and that he killed the victim during the commission of an aggravated burglary, for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-14-403; the victim had sharp force injuries, defendant admitted to entering the victim's apartment without her consent, hitting her in the head with a hammer and stabbing her in the neck, then taking her purse and fleeing out a window, and he offered no aid to the victim. State v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to establish premeditation, that defendant entered the victim's apartment without her consent and with the intent to assault her, and he killed her during the commission of an aggravated burglary where the victim had an order of protection against defendant, defendant attempted suicide after the murder, inside his apartment police found clothing with the victim's blood on them and the victim's purse, and defendant admitted hitting the victim several times in the head with a hammer, stabbing her in the neck, and taking her purse. State v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence that defendant was angry at the victim because he blamed the victim for a failed robbery; as they returned from the failed robbery, defendant stopped the car and ordered the victim and others out of the car; defendant used a deadly weapon to shoot the unarmed victim four times, one of which was with the muzzle of the gun pressed to the victim's cheek; and after the shooting, defendant left the scene was sufficient for the jury to infer that defendant acted with premeditation. State v. Banks, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 868 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence that defendant drove by, stopped and looked at the victim and another, and started shooting at them from the car was sufficient evidence that defendant acted with premeditation, as required for convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. State v. Linzy, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 786 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation lacked merit, as the evidence established that defendant fired a deadly weapon upon four unarmed victims and there was no indication of provocation on the part of any of the victim. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Evidence presented at trial supported the jury's finding of premeditation in the shooting death of the victim because the victim was unarmed when the victim was killed, defendant did not render aid and immediately fled the scene after firing shots at the victim, eyewitness testified that three to four shots were fired without any provocation from the victim, and the victim was shot in the back. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder because the State presented numerous circumstances from which the jury could infer premeditation, as defendant procured a weapon, used the weapon on the unarmed victim, his estranged wife, he returned the weapon to the closet after the killing, and he was calm immediately after the killing. In addition, his telling his son to get away because he did not need to see it shortly before the shooting could have been construed as a declaration to kill the victim, and multiple witnesses testified that defendant was upset about the victim's partying, staying away from home, her involvement with other men, and her refusal to sign the papers for an uncontested divorce. State v. Alston, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because two witnesses testified that defendant and the intended victim were arguing immediately before the shooting, a witness saw defendant walk out of his home with a gun and shoot at the intended victim, the witness then saw the victim fall to the ground after the shot was fired, and two witnesses testified that before the shooting defendant told them to get out of the way because he was about to shoot the intended victim. State v. Williamson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2018).

Evidence defendant wanted revenge for the victim's stealing his bicycle and damaging his tent, was the last person seen with the victim, and told a witness he cut the victim's throat to keep him from screaming was sufficient evidence of premeditation. State v. Warner, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for attempted first-degree murder because defendant, who was upset over the fact that the victim, defendant's estranged spouse, had introduced their children to the v's paramour, located the victim's residence using a computer search, drove to the house, parked and started walking to the house, returned to the vehicle and retrieved a large knife, confronted the victim at the door of the house, stabbed the victim twice with the knife, returned to defendant's car, and left the scene. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because it showed that the victim suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the back of his head, it was a contact wound, a special agent testified that the shotgun only fired as designed, defendant was familiar with firearm safety, defendant used a deadly weapon on an unarmed, sleeping victim, and the jury could reasonably conclude that prior to killing the victim, defendant came up with a plan to cover up the crime she planned to commit by quickly asserting that it was an accident. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018).

Evidence that defendant was angry with the female victim for stealing his father's money and clients, defendant plotted with an accomplice to recover the money and armed himself, defendant argued with the female victim and then shot both victims while seated behind them in a car, defendant and others dumped the bodies and disposed of the victims'  belongings was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. State v. Black, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for the first degree premeditated murder of one victim and the attempted first degree murder of a second victim because there was overwhelming evidence that he acted with premeditation; defendant was involved in a verbal altercation with the victims, he made phone calls to family members, who arrived armed at an apartment complex, and he lured the unarmed victims from an apartment with a challenge to fight. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction; defendant used a weapon on the unarmed victim and hid evidence, his telling the victim that he felt sorry for her children immediately before the shooting could have been construed as a declaration to kill her, and his abandoning the conscious victim in the yard was particularly cruel, and thus the jury could have inferred premeditation. State v. Benson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2018), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Apr. 30, 2019).

Defendant's conviction for premeditated murder was supported by evidence that defendant and other met prior to the killing where defendant agreed to kill the victim in exchange for motorcycle repairs and rent money, defendant prepared for the crimes, and then beat, shot, and burned the victim, causing his death. State v. Knight, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first degree murder because the circumstances of the victim's death supported the jury's determination that the killing was premeditated, as it showed that defendant threatened to kill the victim twice before the shooting, on the night of the shooting defendant and the victim were arguing, defendant hit the victim so forcefully in the head with the gun that it fractured the victim's skull, defendant then shot the unarmed victim six times, two of the shots were to the back of the victim's head, and defendant did not attempt to help the victim but ran away from the scene and hid from the police. State v. Edwards, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's first degree murder conviction because the killing was intentional as defendant's sibling was shot minutes before the victim was shot and killed, defendant went looking for the person who shot defendant's sibling, and defendant was armed and clearly had the intent to kill the victim when defendant walked up to the unarmed victim and shot the victim multiple times. There was no proof that the victim provoked the shooting or was involved in the shooting of defendant's sibling. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's first degree murder conviction because the killing was premeditated as defendant's sibling was shot minutes before the victim was shot and killed, defendant went looking for the person who shot defendant's sibling, and defendant was armed and clearly had the intent to kill the victim when defendant walked up to the unarmed victim and shot the victim multiple times. There was no proof that the victim did anything to provoke the shooting or that the victim was involved in the shooting of defendant's sibling. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for the first degree premeditated murders of two victims because defendant's accomplice testified that he saw defendant murder one victim and saw the body of the second victim after defendant had been alone with him minutes before, defendant used a knife and a rope on the unarmed victims who where particularly vulnerable because of their ages, defendant's method of killing the victims was especially cruel, defendant told the accomplice that he killed one victim because she had seen his face, and his robbery of the victims' money, credit cards, jewelry indicated another motive for the murders, and he attempted to clean the crime scene before leaving. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Jan. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's murder conviction because it showed that the 35-year-old defendant struck the 69-year-old morbidly obese, semi-invalid victim from behind with a severe blow to the top of the head with a hammer, beat him savagely about the head and torso with the hammer, cut his jugular vein with a knife after he was rendered unconscious by the blows to his head, planted a weapon in his dead hand, cleaned the scene using latex gloves she brought with her and a bleach cleanser, removed and buried evidence, and purposefully misdirected law officers in their investigation. State v. Gregoire, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because defendant confessed that he killed the victim, he admitted that he had thought about killing the victim for some time, that he retrieved his rifle from his grandfather expressly for the purpose of shooting the victim, and that he engaged in target practice with the rifle in the days before the shooting to ensure that his aim was true, and he repeatedly emphasized that he felt no remorse for killing the victim and that he was fully aware that he would likely serve “life in the penitentiary or several years for this” and that he might even get the death penalty. State v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted first-degree murder because the State established premeditation by showing that defendant was angry with his girlfriend over her plans to move out of state, he procured a weapon, he blocked the apartment door and pretended to reach for his cell phone, he fired multiple times at the victims, he reloaded the weapon, he failed to render aid to his girlfriend and her children, and the shootings were particularly cruel, as she shot his girlfriend and her children in front of each other and other family members. State v. Woodley, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

Evidence that, following an argument, defendant and codefendant began shooting at the victims and continued to open fire on them as they attempted to flee, and pulled to next to the victims'  car once it crashed and continued shooting, was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. State v. Swift, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder (resulting in serious bodily injury), because the evidence showed premeditation in that defendant and the victim were involved in a physical altercation, defendant waited for the victim to return home from work, defendant walked up to the victim and told the victim, “You know you should have killed me,” and defendant pulled a bag concealing a revolver from behind defendant's back and fired multiple times and wounded the victim. State v. Rogers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. July 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted first-degree murder because it showed that both before and after a drug transaction defendant and the victim argued, defendant shot the victim in the face, and he disposed of the gun by throwing it from a bridge. Defendant also failed to render aid to the victim and fled the scene. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. July 18, 2019).

Record was sufficient to establish that defendant committed the premeditated murder of the victim and that his mental health did not prevent his actions from being premeditated and intentional because he walked three blocks to the victims'  house armed with two handguns, he shot two of the victims three times each, and after attempting to shoot himself he calmly walked back to his house and told a neighbor to call the police. State v. Burrow, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to show premeditation because defendant had been searching for the victim in the days leading up to the shooting, defendant removed his electronic monitoring device a few days before the shooting, defendant planned in advance to miss his scheduled court appearance on the day of the shooting, the victim sustained multiple gunshot wounds and was unarmed when he was found, there was no evidence that items had been taken from the victim, and during the abduction of a second victim defendant boasted about committing other murders that day. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for first degree murder because witnesses testified that the assault on the victim began shortly after defendant's arrival at a residence, and, by the time the victim was dumped at a cemetery, the victim had been beaten with fists, resulting in a broken nose and a variety of bruises on the victim's face, and with a tire iron, resulting in a broken rib and a collapsed lung. Defendant told a police detective that defendant then stomped the victim's head, and that's what killed the victim. State v. Massengale, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery because he discussed his plan to kill the victim and hide her body when he was previously incarcerated for assaulting the victim, witnesses testified that a maroon car was seen at the motel, the maroon car defendant was driving when he was arrested contained blood and DNA consistent with that of the victim, and defendant told an inmate that he shot the victim in the chest and the head. State v. Rimmer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first degree premeditated murder conviction because defendant requested a witness to drive defendant to the scene of a fight where the victim and a group of men were fighting, defendant spoke angrily to the victim and provoked the fighting, defendant admitted to chasing the victim into the woods, defendant admitted to shooting once at the victim who died from a gunshot wound, and defendant appeared to lack emotion after the shooting, disposed of the weapon, and fled the jurisdiction. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of first-degree murder because it showed that they fired multiple shots into a house after calling the home to see if a particular person was at the house, and the fact that they did not kill their intended victim was irrelevant. State v. Avant, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first degree murder because the evidence of defendant's calm and sober demeanor when defendant drove the victim into the middle of nowhere one night and got into the backseat to fasten a shoelace around the victim's neck when coupled with the fact that defendant pushed the victim, who was by then beginning to turn blue from lack of oxygen, out of the car with no hope of rescue established that defendant acted in a manner sufficient to satisfy the elements of intent and premeditation. State v. Ponder, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of premeditated first degree murder, as it showed that defendant exited the residence, admitted going to his vehicle, and then reentered the residence and shot the unarmed victim on the couch while trying his shoes State v. Davenport, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree murder conviction because established that defendant acted with premeditation when he intentionally killed the victim as it showed that the victim and defendant had quarreled before the murder, defendant's girlfriend overhead him talking about killing someone, defendant admitted to police that he shot the victim twice, the victim was shot twice at close range with the same 12-gauge shotgun later recovered from the girlfriend's vehicle, and after shooting the victim defendant returned to his mother's house, where he changed clothes before returning to the scene of the crime, and at the scene he caused a disturbance by trying to enter the crime scene. State v. Watison, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because it showed that defendant and the codefendant planned and executed the crimes jointly and with a common intent, and that defendant told a cellmate that he “tricked” the codefendant into killing the victim. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because it showed that defendant and his codefendant lured the victims to the cemetery under the pretext of purchasing drugs, defendant threatened to kill the victim and before the crimes pulled a gun on him, defendant made jailhouse admissions and bragged about the crimes, and he provided information in a federal proffer that included details about the crimes that had not been released to the public. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted first-degree premeditated murder because there was proof that defendant harbored animus toward one of the victims, that he retrieved his gun from his vehicle, he announced his intention of killing his wife, and he took aim and fired in the direction of his wife and the victim in the vehicle. State v. Stinnett, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's first-degree premeditated murder conviction because defendant, who faced possible dismissal at work, took a gun to work for purpose of killing defendant's manager, inquired as to other employees'  lunch plans and waited until most of the employees had left the building for lunch before shooting the victim multiple times in the victim's office, took the surveillance system at work to avoid detection, left the premises in defendant's car, and did not return from lunch or respond to colleagues'  attempts at contact. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder because the evidence of premeditation was overwhelming, as a witness heard defendant stated he was armed and ready to shoot, two witnesses testified that the victim did not draw a gun or make physical contact, the 911 recording reflected that the victim repeatedly begged for his life before being shot, and defendant did not attempt to aid the victim and fled the scene. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder because it showed that in an effort to avoid arrest defendant struggled with the officer, pushed him, and shot the officer eight times, many at close range. Defendant did not seek to render aid to the officer, but fled the scene and took a car at gunpoint. State v. Wilbourn, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder because it showed that he and the victim had been feuding, while the victim was inside the market defendant pulled into the parking lot and blocked his car, and defendant immediately began firing at the victim as the victim walked out of the market. State v. Thompson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of premeditated first-degree murder because he made preparations to conceal his identity prior to the killing by cutting a mask from a t-shirt, he used a deadly weapon against an unarmed victim, immediately prior to the shooting defendant threatened that he would shoot him in the head if the victim did not comply with defendant's demands, he fired one shot that narrowly missed the victim's head, and defendant fatally shot the victim in the back of the head. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

Defendant acted with the intent to kill and with premeditation in that defendant traded handguns for a high-powered assault rifle; defendant stopped defendant's car at a red light on a street, lowered the window, pointed the rifle toward an unarmed group of people on a sidewalk who did not provoke defendant, and fired a shot, paused, and fired a second shot; and defendant fled the scene and disposed of the rifle during a high-speed police pursuit. State v. Corbin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2020).

24. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence that failed to establish the elements of intent, premeditation, and deliberation did not support a conviction for first degree murder under the 1991 version of T.C.A. § 39-13-202, where the victim, defendant's infant child, died of malnutrition and dehydration. State v. Bordis, 905 S.W.2d 214, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's first-degree premeditated murder conviction, where there was no evidence of a weapon being recovered from the person of the victim; however, a handgun which he was known to carry in his pocket was never recovered. There was no evidence that defendant was calm after returning from the motel; in fact, he was shaken and pale, and given the lack of strong circumstantial proof of premeditation, defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder could not stand. State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's premeditated first degree murder conviction where, although the record reflected that defendant shot the unarmed victim twice in the back of his head, the pathologist was unable to ascertain the locations of the parties at the time of the shooting but opined that the muzzle was more than three feet away from the victim's head; based upon the evidence, the evidence did not show that defendant killed the victim execution-style while the victim was kneeling, he did not clean the apartment where the killing occurred, nor did he bring with him any of the items he used to attempt to conceal the crime. State v. Jackson, 173 S.W.3d 401, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. 2005).

Where defendant threw a rock from an interstate resulting in the death of a passenger in a vehicle traveling under the overpass, the rock was not a “device” for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(3); the evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for first degree murder. State v. Morgan, 271 S.W.3d 217, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2008).

Evidence was insufficient to show that defendant killed the victim with premeditation because the state presented no evidence that defendant made declarations of an intent to kill the victim, that he procured and used a deadly weapon on the unarmed victim, that the manner of the killing was particularly cruel, that he inflicted multiple wounds upon the victim, or that he prepared before the murder to conceal the crime. State v. Climer, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2011), modified, 400 S.W.3d 537, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery and first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an attempted aggravated robbery because proof that the victim was shot with the same caliber weapon defendant admitted using and that two males were seen fleeing just after the murder corroborated defendant's admission that he shot the victim. Nothing, however, corroborated defendant's admission that he went to the victim's residence to rob him. State v. Bishop, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012), rev'd, 431 S.W.3d 22, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted first degree murder because there was no evidence that the accomplice assisted defendant in planning defendant's return to the cabin, other than suggesting defendant obtain a gun; there was likewise no evidence that the accomplice asked to hold defendant's gun or that he indicated he intended to shoot anyone. State v. Dickson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 413 S.W.3d 735, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 777 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), dismissed, Dickson v. Leibach, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174459 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2019).

The state failed to adduce sufficient proof to establish that defendant killed the victim with premeditation where there was no proof in the record indicating that defendant procured or used a deadly weapon on the victim; no proof that defendant ever declared an intent to kill the victim; no proof of preparations to conceal the crime prior to committing it; and no proof that defendant destroyed or secreted evidence of the killing. State v. Larkin, 443 S.W.3d 751, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2013).

25. Jury Instructions.

In a prosecution for first degree murder, jury instructions that failed to differentiate between premeditation and deliberation were erroneous and the error was not harmless. State v. Brooks, 880 S.W.2d 390, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 616 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 761 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 1993).

The trial court did not err in instructing the jury to consider the age of the victim as an aggravating factor under § 39-13-204(i)(1) in sentencing defendant convicted of first-degree murder for reckless killing of a child less that sixteen years of age under former subdivision (a)(4) of this section. State v. Lacy, 983 S.W.2d 686, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Erroneous instruction as to the malice required for a conviction of premeditated and deliberate murder was harmless as to conviction for felony murder. Workman v. Bell, 160 F.3d 276, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27685 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 913, 120 S. Ct. 264, 145 L. Ed. 2d 221, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 6420 (1999).

In felony murder trial where defendant asserted that codefendants coerced the defendant into shooting victim, defendant was not entitled to a diminished capacity instruction through a duress defense because defendant's mental state was not in issue and the trial court did properly instruct the jury on the law of duress. State v. Webster, 81 S.W.3d 244, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

In a criminal prosecution for first degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(3), the trial court's jury instruction that the term “destructive device” could mean anything adapted for destruction or anything capable of causing destruction was erroneous. State v. Morgan, 271 S.W.3d 217, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2008).

In defendant's trial on a charge of first degree premeditated murder, T.C.A. § 39-13-202, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on defense of a third person, T.C.A. § 39-11-612, because the evidence fairly raised the possibility that defendant acted in self-defense when he fired his shotgun at the victim, but the evidence did not fairly raise the possibility that, at the moment he fired the weapon, defendant believed that pulling the trigger was “immediately necessary” to protect a third person, T.C.A. § 39-11-612(2); at trial, defendant consistently described his mental state, at the moment of pulling the trigger, as one of self-defense. State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. June 20, 2013).

Despite defendant's referring to the trial court's instruction as a material modification of the criminal responsibility and first degree murder instructions already given, it was in fact an accurate supplemental instruction in response to the jury's question, plus the trial court did admonish the jury not to place undue emphasis on the instruction. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), rev'd, 537 S.W.3d 892, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 9, 2017).

Any error in the jury instruction on aggravated burglary supporting the charge of felony murder based on burglary where the indictment charged attempted burglary was harmless, because the State was held to a higher burden and the evidence showed that defendant entered the victim's habitation without her consent and with the intent to commit an assault. State v. Rivera, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Defendant did not present any proof that the marijuana he smoked impacted his ability to form the mental state required for first degree murder, and he testified in detail about what happened and that he shot the victim for raping his girlfriend; thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to give the instruction regarding voluntary intoxication. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

In defendant's first-degree murder trial, the jury was properly instructed on the offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and thus the trial court did not err in denying the requested instruction; the instructions mirrored the statutory definitions, plus the trial court substantially comported with pattern jury instructions. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

The evidence showed that one of the defendants was an active participant in the beating, robbery, and kidnapping of the victim so that the facilitation instructions which the defendant requested were not necessary. State v. Buford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 181 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2018).

Trial court did not err in instructing the jury because defendant agreed to the proposed instructions, which contained proper statements of the law; the trial court's instructions tracked the language of the relevant statutes for first degree premeditated murder, criminal attempt, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and they followed the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions. State v. Gary, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018).

Defendant did not show it was plain error not to instruct a jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment because the jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of attempted second degree murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter but chose to convict defendant of attempted first degree murder, so defendant did not show a reasonable probability that a reasonable jury would have convicted defendant of misdemeanor reckless endangerment instead of attempted first degree murder. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

26. Sentencing.

The enabling provision of the 1993 act, which clearly states that the amendment applies to offenses committed after July 1, 1993, controls over the more general provisions of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-204(k) and 39-11-112 and the option of sentencing a defendant to life in prison without parole was thus not available to the jury where the crime was committed before July 1, 1993. State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Cauthern v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 967, 119 S. Ct. 414, 142 L. Ed. 2d 336, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6941 (1998).

The punishment of life without parole available under T.C.A. § 39-13-202 is specifically limited to offenses committed after July 1, 1993. Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. 2000).

Notwithstanding an agreement between the parties, defendant's sentence of life without parole for first degree murder committed in 1989 was illegal because it was not an authorized punishment at the time of the offense. Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. 2000).

When a prisoner committed the crimes of murder, T.C.A. § 39-13-202, and armed robbery, T.C.A. § 39-13-402, in 1986, the prisoner knew that violations of the prison disciplinary rules could put the prisoner at risk of serving a longer period of time before becoming eligible to be considered for parole and, accordingly, neither the 1989 nor the 1996 changes in the prison's disciplinary policy deprived the prisoner of a pre-existing right or enhanced the punishment for the prisoner's 1986 crimes beyond the punishment authorized by T.C.A. § 40-35-501(h); thus, applying the 1989 and 1996 versions of prison policy to the prisoner for the disciplinary offenses of escape and assault committed in 1989 and 1997 did not run afoul of the federal or state Ex Post Facto Clauses, U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1 and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 11. Utley v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 118 S.W.3d 705, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

As evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming, his convictions of two counts of first degree murder were affirmed, but due to improper striking of jurors, prejudicial errors in the admission of evidence, and improper comments by the prosecution during the guilt and penalty phases, his death sentences were set aside and the case was remanded for a new penalty hearing. State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 29, 2012).

Inmate's claim that he was ineligible for the death penalty under T.C.A. § 39-13-203 did not qualify as an actual innocence claim under T.C.A. § 40-30-117(a)(2) as: (1) to qualify as actually innocent, the inmate had to show actual innocence of the underlying crimes; (2) there was no separate offense in Tennessee for capital murder; (3) the inmate had pled guilty to first-degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202; and (4) under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i), the death penalty was a sentencing consideration for first-degree murder. Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2012), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 120, 134 S. Ct. 176, — U.S. —, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 7234 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013).

Petitioner's two consecutive life sentences to run concurrently with nine fifteen-year sentences did not violate Miller v. Alabama because neither the individual sentences nor the effective sentence was mandatory, as the trial court required to give individualized consideration to both the offender, including his youth, and the offense when crafting petitioner's effective sentence. Lowe-Kelley v. State, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 488 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court acted within its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences as to defendant's life sentence for murder and a prior sentence, as the record supported that trial court's findings with regard to defendant's extensive record of criminal activity, plus the trial court considered the principles and purposes of sentencing and found that the aggregate length of the sentences was reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense. State v. Crockett, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that defendant was a dangerous offender and imposed partial consecutive sentencing in connection with his convictions of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and felony murder; defendant was responsible for the care of the victim, who suffered bruises all over his body as well as a severe brain injury from a beating, and as his symptoms worsened, defendant did not seek medical attention. State v. Starner, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

In sentencing the first defendant, the trial court did not err in sentencing him to life imprisonment for first degree felony murder and 25 years for especially aggravated robbery and in ordering that he should serve his sentences consecutively because the first and second defendant had planned the robbery, obtained a weapon, and gone to the apartment building where the victim lived, looking for someone to prey on; defendants shot the victim multiple times at point blank range; each defendant was a leader in the offenses; the first defendant was a dangerous offender who had little or no regard for human life and did not hesitate in committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high; and he had exhibited no remorse for his crimes. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

In a case where defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder during perpetration of aggravated child abuse or neglect, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to a sentence of life imprisonment without first holding a sentencing hearing as a life sentence was the minimum sentence allowed for first degree felony murder; and in failing to object to the trial court's imposition of an illegal sentence because a sentence of life imprisonment was not an indefinite amount of time; and the trial court was not required to specify a term of years when sentencing a defendant to life imprisonment. Blake v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 554 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Defendant's sentence was not illegal because, waiver notwithstanding, defendant's sentence of life imprisonment was mandatory based on his conviction for first degree felony murder; and his two 20-year sentences for each count of especially aggravated burglary were within their applicable ranges. Fields v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence supported the imposition of defendant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole for each premeditated murder charge because defendant killed two people and wounded a third. Moreover, although defendant relied on defendant's history of gainful employment and presented evidence that defendant was raised in a broken home and had a major depressive disorder, defendant did not show that the sentence was arbitrary, so as to constitute a gross abuse of the jury's discretion. State v. Pruitt, 510 S.W.3d 398, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 980 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant's sentence for first degree felony murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) to be served consecutively under T.C.A. § 40-35-115(a) to his previously imposed federal sentence; defendant could not have received concurrent sentencing unless the trial court found that good cause existed, but such did not exist, given his extensive criminal history of property crimes along with his extremely limited employment history. State v. Hopkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 859 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2017).

Defendant's sentence of life imprisonment did not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; the United States Supreme Court has held that while the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile non-homicide offender, it does not require the State to release that offender during his or her natural life. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018), cert. denied, Collins v. Tennessee, — L. Ed. 2d —, — S. Ct. —, — U.S. —, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 7182 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentencing and a total effective sentence of life plus 24 years for first degree felony and premeditated murder, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm; defendant committed six distinct violations of the law and the trial court properly applied the dangerous offender category after making the necessary findings, which included in part his long history of being a drug dealer and being affiliated with a gang. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Movant was authorized to file second or successive § 2255 motion because he made out prima facie case, given questionable validity of 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(c)' s residual clause as well as lack of binding Sixth Circuit authority establishing that T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) categorically involved use of violent physical force. In re Wilson, — F.3d —, — FED App. —, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 4626 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2019).

Trial court properly imposed consecutive sentencing for defendant's convictions of especially aggravated robbery and first-degree murder because defendant was a dangerous offender as the trial court described in detail the horrific injuries that the victim suffered after defendant attacked him in his own home without provocation; and consecutive sentencing was reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and the need to protect the public from defendant's future criminal conduct. State v. Belt, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. July 25, 2019).

Twenty-five-year sentence defendant received for attempted first degree murder was not excessive because a 10-year sentence for the firearms offense and consecutive sentencing for the two conviction offenses of attempted first-degree murder were required. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. July 18, 2019).

Defendant challenged his life sentence, but the law surrounding the imposition of a life sentence for first degree murder was not in question and the court was bound by its previous determination that defendant's life sentence was constitutional, as the sentence did not reach the considerations of Miller v. Alabama. State v. Henderson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2019).

Petitioner did not state a colorable claim upon which relief could be granted when he claimed that his sentence of life imprisonment violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense because he received a life sentence that had early release eligibility and therefore his sentence is not unconstitutional. Siler v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2020).

27. Inconsistent Verdicts.

Jury's verdict convicting defendant of felony murder but acquitting him of aggravated burglary, though inconsistent, did not entitle defendant to relief from his felony murder conviction as the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder during the commission of an aggravated burglary and aggravated criminal trespass; thus, the court would not speculate about the jury's reasoning because the evidence supported findings of guilt with regard to both offenses. State v. Snipes, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Snipes v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 796, 134 S. Ct. 920, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 94 (U.S. 2014).

Even if the jury's finding that defendant was not guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping was inconsistent with its finding of guilt as to felony murder during the perpetration of a kidnapping, the verdict could stand. State v. Rivera, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

28. Merger.

Trial court did not err by entering two separate judgments for defendant's first degree premeditated murder and felony murder convictions; when the jury returns guilty verdicts on multiple offenses that eventually will be merged, the best practice is for the trial court to impose a sentence on each count and reflect the sentence on the respective uniform judgment document. State v. Moody, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

39-13-203. Intellectually disabled defendants — Death sentence prohibited.

  1. As used in this section, “intellectual disability” means:
    1. Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below;
    2. Deficits in adaptive behavior; and
    3. The intellectual disability must have been manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age.
  2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, no defendant with intellectual disability at the time of committing first degree murder shall be sentenced to death.
  3. The burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the defendant. The determination of whether the defendant had intellectual disability at the time of the offense of first degree murder shall be made by the court.
  4. If the court determines that the defendant was a person with intellectual disability at the time of the offense, and if the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, and if the district attorney general has filed notice of intention to ask for the sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole as provided in § 39-13-208(b), the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life. Section 39-13-207 shall govern the sentencing proceeding.
  5. If the issue of intellectual disability is raised at trial and the court determines that the defendant is not a person with intellectual disability, the defendant shall be entitled to offer evidence to the trier of fact of diminished intellectual capacity as a mitigating circumstance pursuant to § 39-13-204(j)(8).
  6. The determination by the trier of fact that the defendant does not have intellectual disability shall not be appealable by interlocutory appeal, but may be a basis of appeal by either the state or defendant following the sentencing stage of the trial.

Acts 1990, ch. 1038, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 473, § 10; 2010, ch. 734, §§ 1-3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1993, ch. 473, § 16 provided that the amendment by that act shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993.

For the Preamble to the act regarding changing the term “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability”, please refer to Acts 2010, ch. 734.

Acts 2010, ch. 734, § 1 provided that the Tennessee code commission is directed to change all references to “mental retardation”, wherever such references appear in titles 33, 39 and 41, to “intellectual disability”, as supplements are issued and volumes are replaced.

Acts 2010, ch. 734, § 7 provided that for purposes of each provision amended by the act, a reference to intellectual disability shall be considered to refer to mental retardation, as defined by that provision on the day before the date of enactment of the act.

Acts 2010, ch. 734, § 8 provided that nothing in the act shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of the act.

Cross-References. Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Mental health and intellectual and developmental disabilities, title 33.

Textbooks. Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), §§ 101.1, 802.2.

Law Reviews.

A More Intelligent and Just Atkins: Adjusting for the Flynn Effect in Capital Determinations of Mental Retardation or Intellectual Disability (Geraldine W. Young), 65 Vand. L. Rev. 615 (2012).

Capital Punishment, Cultural Competency, and Litigating Intellectual Disability (Jeffrey Usman), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 855 (2012).

Criminal Procedure — Capital Punishment — Motions to Reopen Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 389 (2014).

Tennessee's Death Penalty: An Overview of the Procedural Safeguards, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 779 (2001).

Treated Differently in Life but Not in Death: The Execution of the Intellectually Disabled After Atkins v. Virginia (Penny J. White), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 685 (2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Language “during the developmental period, or by ... 18 years of age” in T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a)(3) does not include the years past the age of 18; under the definition of “mental retardation” as set forth in T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a), both the significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (as evidenced by I.Q. scores of 70 or below), and deficits in adaptive behavior must be manifested by the age of 18. State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2007).

In a death penalty case, petitioner was not entitled to relief because this section did not create an independent cause of action allowing petitioner to challenge his eligibility for the death penalty; had the General Assembly intended to create a separate and independent cause of action in which to allege intellectual disability, they would have stated so in the statute. Payne v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1005 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2014), aff'd, 493 S.W.3d 478, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2016).

Legislature intended a claim of intellectual disability to be raised in conjunction with the capital defendant's trial, not in a collateral proceeding many years later; the legislature intended that a claim of intellectual disability be resolved before the defendant is either tried or sentenced, and thus, it did not intend the intellectual disability statute to provide a private right of action to a capital defendant who was convicted and sentenced to death prior to the statute's enactment. Payne v. State, 493 S.W.3d 478, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2016), cert. denied, Payne v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 516, 137 S. Ct. 1327, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1834 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017).

2. Evidence.

As the state appellate court's interpretation of state caselaw concerning the federal habeas petitioner's IQ and adaptive deficits was clearly contrary to state supreme court caselaw interpreting T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a) and, thus, also contrary to Atkins , the case was remanded for consideration based on the Coleman  standard. Black v. Bell, 664 F.3d 81, 2011 FED App. 313P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24798 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011).

Finding that appellant, an inmate, failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he met the requirements of T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a)(2) was improper and a remand was required because categorically excluding expert testimony was erroneous. Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 319 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2011), overruled, Dellinger v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2015).

T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a)(1) does not require that raw scores on I.Q. tests be accepted at their face value and courts may consider competent expert testimony showing that a test score does not accurately reflect a person's functional I.Q. or that the raw I.Q. test score is artificially inflated or deflated. Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 319 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2011), overruled, Dellinger v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2015).

Post-conviction court misapplied the applicable legal standard when it ruled that defendant's arguments regarding the standard margin of error concerning intelligence tests were contrary to Tennessee law and of no assistance to defendant because, under the Coleman  standard, defendant was to be afforded an opportunity to present evidence regarding his functional I.Q., and his functional intelligence quotient could not be ascertained based only upon raw I.Q. test scores. Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1152 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2011), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 184 L. Ed. 2d 48, 133 S. Ct. 104, 568 U.S. 828, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 6925 (U.S. 2012).

Defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had deficits in adaptive behavior, as a clinical psychologist expressly testified that the psychologist did not observe defendant to have any significant adaptive deficits, and the record did not indicate that defendant lived with relatives due to a deficit in adaptive behavior. State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), cert. denied, Pruitt v. Tennessee, 189 L. Ed. 2d 839, 134 S. Ct. 2874, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4624 (U.S. 2014).

3. Defendant Eligible for Death Penalty.

Evidence was sufficient to support imposition of death penalty. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. 1990), aff'd, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3821 (1991), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1005 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2014).

Trial court did not err in holding that the defendant failed to sustain his burden of proof to show that, at the time of the offense, he was “mentally retarded” under the criteria of T.C.A. § 39-13-203. State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. 1995), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S. Ct. 99, 133 L. Ed. 2d 53, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5601 (1995).

Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 319, did not create a new constitutional rule of law, but involved statutory construction based upon existing law that was practiced in relation to the interpretation of the first prong of the intellectual disability statute for death penalty purposes. Therefore, this was not a ground for reopening postconviction proceedings. Keen v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 972 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2011), aff'd, 398 S.W.3d 594, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2012).

T.C.A. § 40-30-117(a)(2) is not applicable to claims of actual innocence of the death penalty; therefore, petitioner could not rely on § 40-30-117(a)(2) in an attempt to reopen postconviction proceedings where it was argued that he was actually innocent of the death penalty due to his intellectual disability. Keen v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 972 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2011), aff'd, 398 S.W.3d 594, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2012).

Because the proof preponderated against the trial court's finding that defendant's mental retardation manifested by his 18th birthday, the supreme court held that the trial court erred in finding defendant to have been mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty. State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2007).

Inmate's motion to reopen a post-conviction petition was properly denied as Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 319 (Tenn. 2011), did not establish a new retroactive rule for proving intellectual disability in Tennessee under the Eighth Amendment or Tenn. Const. art. I, § 16 for T.C.A. § 40-30-117(a)(1) purposes, but concerned an interpretation of T.C.A. § 39-13-203, and held that the courts could consider factors other than raw test scores in determining intellectual disability. Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2012), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 120, 134 S. Ct. 176, — U.S. —, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 7234 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013).

Inmate's claim that he was ineligible for the death penalty under T.C.A. § 39-13-203 did not qualify as an actual innocence claim under T.C.A. § 40-30-117(a)(2) as: (1) to qualify as actually innocent, the inmate had to show actual innocence of the underlying crimes; (2) there was no separate offense in Tennessee for capital murder; (3) the inmate had pled guilty to first-degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202; and (4) under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i), the death penalty was a sentencing consideration for first-degree murder. Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2012), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 120, 134 S. Ct. 176, — U.S. —, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 7234 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013).

Defendant failed to establish that he was intellectually disabled and therefore not subject to the death penalty, as his expert offered no testimony that defendant's functional I.Q. was 70 or below, there was little evidence presented concerning his adaptive behavior, and he did not establish that he had an intellectual disability that manifested during his developmental period or before age 18. State v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2014), aff'd, 512 S.W.3d 167, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), aff'd, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 1087 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015).

Defendant was properly convicted and sentenced to death for first degree felony murder because the proof adduced by the defense was not sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant suffered from significant sub-average general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of 70 or below. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

In addition to the absence of any statute vesting subject matter jurisdiction in the chancery courts to adjudicate any aspect of the statute, the determination of whether the defendant had an intellectual disability at the time of the offense is a part of the prosecution and sentencing processes; the statute directs that the determination is to be made by “the court.” Payne v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Chancery court properly dismissed defendant's declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution on the ground he met the criteria for intellectual disability because sovereign immunity barred the suit; defendant's allegations, in the absence of a claim that the statute being enforced was unconstitutional, were not sufficient to state a claim against the warden and Attorney General in their individual capacities for the purposes of granting relief to defendant. Payne v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Construed together, T.C.A. §§ 39-13-203, 39-13-204, and 40-1-108 limited the chancery court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution on the ground he met the criteria for intellectual disability because the grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court had to be express, and there was no such express grant in the intellectual disability statute. Payne v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Inmate was not entitled to relief from a death sentence due to intellectual disability under T.C.A. § 39-13-203(b), barring execution of intellectually disabled defendants, because (1) the inmate's punishment was statutorily authorized when imposed, so the sentence was not illegal, and, (2) neither when sentenced nor when filing the inmate's petition was the inmate found intellectually disabled. Ivy v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. May 18, 2018).

Defendant's sentence could not be corrected because the statutory prohibition — no defendant with intellectual disability at the time of committing first-degree murder shall be sentenced to death — existed prior to the murder for which he was convicted and a death sentence was clearly authorized for first-degree murder. Dellinger v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2019), cert. denied, Dellinger v. Tennessee, 206 L. Ed. 2d 947, — S. Ct. —, — U.S. —, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2754 (U.S. May 18, 2020).

4. Interlocutory Appeal.

Interlocutory appeal pursuant to T.R.A.P. 9 is available to the state under T.C.A. § 39-13-203(f) when the trial court determines that a defendant is mentally retarded. State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2007).

5. Coram Nobis.

Petitioner failed to state a claim that was cognizable under the coram nobis statute because he attempted to challenge his death sentence based on changes in the law that occurred years after his trial; a petition for writ of error coram nobis was not the appropriate procedural mechanism for pursuing petitioner's claim that he was ineligible to be executed due to his intellectual disability. Payne v. State, 493 S.W.3d 478, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2016), cert. denied, Payne v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 516, 137 S. Ct. 1327, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1834 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017).

6. Independent Cause of Action.

Intellectual disability provisions in T.C.A. § 39-13-203 did not provide an independent cause of action allowing a prisoner to challenge the eligibility of the death penalty to which the prisoner was sentenced. Chalmers v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 956 (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2014), cert. denied, Chalmers v. Tennessee, 193 L. Ed. 2d 50, 136 S. Ct. 39, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 5599 (U.S. 2015).

Petitioner failed to establish that he had a private cause of action to pursue his claim of intellectual disability pursuant to the intellectual disability statute because the statute did not create an independent collateral cause of action for raising a claim of intellectual disability and ineligibility to be executed. Payne v. State, 493 S.W.3d 478, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2016), cert. denied, Payne v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 516, 137 S. Ct. 1327, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1834 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017).

Intellectual disability statute does not create an independent collateral cause of action for raising a claim of intellectual disability and ineligibility to be executed; the plain language of the statute indicates that it is not applicable to those defendants who were sentenced to death prior to its enactment because it prohibits those defendants who meet the definition of intellectual disability from being “sentenced to death,” not from being executed. Payne v. State, 493 S.W.3d 478, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2016), cert. denied, Payne v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 516, 137 S. Ct. 1327, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1834 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017).

8. Constitutionality.

Defendant's application for permission to appeal the denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition was denied because the statute at issue was constitutionally sound and did not bar the presentation of other proof of defendant's intellectual disability where the decision in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1007, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3615 (2014) did not announce a new rule or alter the understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, but clarified provisions in Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4648 (2002), regarding the class protected by Atkins, i.e., defendants who were intellectually disabled. Sims v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 365 (Tenn. May 6, 2016), cert. denied, Sims v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 516, 137 S. Ct. 1327, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1828 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017).

Tennessee's intellectual disability statute, as currently interpreted, is constitutionally sound under U.S. Const. amend. VIII. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

Defendant, who was sentenced to imprisonment rather than the death penalty, failed to establish that defendant had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the threshold requirement of a 70 point I.Q. for intellectual disability, because defendant's alleged injury was dependent upon conjecture and speculation. State v. Rogers, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016).

9. Jurisdiction.

Chancery court properly dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an inmate's declaratory judgment action because sovereign immunity barred his suit against the warden and state attorney general where he failed to state a claim against them in their individual capacities in the absence of a claim that the statute was unconstitutional, exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction over all crimes and misdemeanors was vested in circuit courts, the determination of whether defendant had an intellectual disability at the time of the offense was a part of the prosecution and sentencing processes, and there was no such express grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court in the intellectual disability statute. Chalmers v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 884 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Chancery court properly dismissed, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, defendant's complaint seeking a declaration that he was ineligible to be sentenced to death because the claims were barred by sovereign immunity where, in the absence of a claim that the intellectual disability statute was unconstitutional, defendant failed to state a claim against the warden and state attorney general in their individual capacity, the determination of whether defendant had an intellectual disability at the time of the offense was a part of the prosecution and sentencing processes, and there was no express grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court in intellectual disability statute. Sims v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 874 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

39-13-204. Sentencing for first degree murder.

  1. Upon a trial for first degree murder, should the jury find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall not fix punishment as part of the verdict, but the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death, to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or to imprisonment for life. The separate sentencing hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable before the same jury that determined guilt, subject to the provisions of subsection (k) relating to certain retrials on punishment.
  2. In the sentencing proceeding, the attorney for the state shall be allowed to make an opening statement to the jury and then the attorney for the defendant shall also be allowed such statement; provided, that the waiver of opening statement by one party shall not preclude the opening statement by the other party.
  3. In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the punishment, and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical condition; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (i); and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors. Any such evidence that the court deems to have probative value on the issue of punishment may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence; provided, that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements so admitted. However, this subsection (c) shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution of Tennessee. In all cases where the state relies upon the aggravating factor that the defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person, either party shall be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the facts and circumstances of the prior conviction. Such evidence shall not be construed to pose a danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury and shall not be subject to exclusion on the ground that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by prejudice to either party. Such evidence shall be used by the jury in determining the weight to be accorded the aggravating factor. The court shall permit a member or members, or a representative or representatives of the victim's family to testify at the sentencing hearing about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the family of the victim and other relevant persons. The evidence may be considered by the jury in determining which sentence to impose. The court shall permit members or representatives of the victim's family to attend the trial, and those persons shall not be excluded because the person or persons shall testify during the sentencing proceeding as to the impact of the offense.
  4. In the sentencing proceeding, the state shall be allowed to make a closing argument to the jury; and then the attorney for the defendant shall also be allowed such argument, with the state having the right of closing.
    1. After closing arguments in the sentencing hearing, the trial judge shall include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (i), which may be raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both. The trial judge shall also include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both, which shall include, but not be limited to, those circumstances set forth in subsection (j). These instructions and the manner of arriving at a sentence shall be given in the oral charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberations. However, a reviewing court shall not set aside a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole on the ground that the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury as to a requested mitigating factor that is not enumerated in subsection (j).
    2. The trial judge shall provide the jury three (3) separate verdict forms, as specified by subdivisions (f)(1), (f)(2), and (g)(2)(B). The jury shall be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life shall not be eligible for parole consideration until the defendant has served at least twenty-five (25) full calendar years of the sentence. The jury shall also be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall never be eligible for release on parole.
    1. If the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. The jury shall then return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows:

      PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE

      We, the jury, unanimously determine that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. We, the jury, therefore find that the sentence shall be imprisonment for life.

      /s/ /s/ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror

      Click to view table.

    2. If the jury unanimously determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall, in its considered discretion, sentence the defendant either to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or to imprisonment for life. The trial judge shall instruct the jury that, in choosing between the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life, the jury shall weigh and consider the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. In its verdict, the jury shall specify the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and shall return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows:

      PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE

      We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt:

      [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.]

      We, the jury, unanimously find that such statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances do not outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore:

      CHECK ONE (1) BOX ONLY

      [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or

      [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.

      /s/ /s/ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror

      Click to view table.

    1. The sentence shall be death, if the jury unanimously determines that:
      1. At least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt; and
      2. Such circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
      1. If the death penalty is the sentence of the jury, the jury shall:
        1. Reduce to writing the statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found; and
        2. Signify that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances.
      2. These findings and verdict shall be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows:

        PUNISHMENT OF DEATH

        We, the jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances:

        [Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.]

        We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances.

        Therefore, we, the jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be death.

        /s/ /s/ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror

        Click to view table.

  5. If the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, the trial judge shall inquire of the foreperson of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, the judge shall instruct the jury that in further deliberations, the jury shall only consider the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life. If, after further deliberations, the jury still cannot agree as to sentence, the trial judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury, on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment.
  6. No death penalty or sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall be imposed, except upon a unanimous finding that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one (1) or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, which are limited to the following:
    1. The murder was committed against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older;
    2. The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person;
    3. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim murdered, during the act of murder;
    4. The defendant committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
    5. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;
    6. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another;
    7. The murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
    8. The murder was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement;
    9. The murder was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties;
    10. The murder was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office;
    11. The murder was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official;
    12. The defendant committed “mass murder,” which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-month period;
    13. The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim after death;
    14. The victim of the murder was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim of the murder was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the murder the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability;
    15. The murder was committed in the course of an act of terrorism;
    16. The murder was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally killed the victim, knowing that she was pregnant;
    17. The murder was committed at random and the reasons for the killing are not obvious or easily understood; or
    18. The defendant knowingly sold or distributed a substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, or any other opiate listed in § 39-17-408(c) with the intent and premeditation to commit murder.
  7. In arriving at the punishment, the jury shall consider, pursuant to this section, any mitigating circumstances, which shall include, but are not limited to, the following:
    1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
    2. The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
    3. The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act;
    4. The murder was committed under circumstances that the defendant reasonably believed to provide a moral justification for the defendant's conduct;
    5. The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor;
    6. The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person;
    7. The youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the crime;
    8. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, which was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected the defendant's judgment; and
    9. Any other mitigating factor that is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense, at either the guilt or sentencing hearing.
  8. Upon motion for a new trial, after a conviction of first degree murder, if the court finds error in the trial determining guilt, a new trial on both guilt and sentencing shall be held; but if the court finds error alone in the trial determining punishment, a new trial on the issue of punishment alone shall be held by a new jury empanelled for that purpose. If the trial court, or any other court with jurisdiction to do so, orders that a defendant convicted of first degree murder, whether the sentence is death, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life, be granted a new trial, either as to guilt or punishment, or both, the new trial shall include the possible punishments of death, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-203; Acts 1990, ch. 1038, § 3; 1993, ch. 473, §§ 2, 4-6, 13, 14; 1995, ch. 356, § 1; 1995, ch. 377, § 1; 1996, ch. 830, § 2; 1997, ch. 139, § 1; 1997, ch. 358, § 1; 1997, ch. 491, § 1; 1998, ch. 712, § 1; 1998, ch. 915, § 1; 1998, ch. 916, § 1; 1999, ch. 504, § 1; 2002, ch. 849, § 2b; 2008, ch. 829, § 1; 2009, ch. 582, § 1; 2010, ch. 1058, § 1; 2011, ch. 47, § 30; 2011, ch. 489, § 1; 2019, ch. 231, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section closely parallels prior law concerning imposition of the death penalty. One change, which is constitutionally required, is the language appearing at the end of subsection (j), providing that the mitigating circumstances shall include “any other mitigating factor which is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense at either the guilt or sentencing hearing” (subdivision (j)(9)).

In 1993, life without the possibility of parole was added to the sentencing options of death and life imprisonment. Under this new sentencing procedure, the jury must unanimously determine that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh a mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt in order to impose the death sentence. See State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3308, 92 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1986). If the aggravating circumstance or circumstances are found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but they have not been proven to outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment or life without parole, in its discretion. If the jury finds that no aggravating circumstances have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence must be life imprisonment.

Under subdivision (e), the judge must instruct the jury that imprisonment for life means that the defendant will not be eligible for parole consideration until service of at least twenty-five (25) calendar years, and that life without the possibility of parole means that the defendant will never be released on parole.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-204, concerning waiver of jury in first degree murder trials, was transferred to § 39-13-205 in 1990.

Acts 1993, ch. 473, § 16 provided that the amendments by that act shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993.

Acts 1995, ch. 356, § 2 provided that the amendments by that act shall apply to the sentencing of all persons committing the offense of first degree murder on or after July 1, 1995.

Acts 1995, ch. 377, § 2 provided that the amendment by that act applies to offenses committed on or after May 30, 1995.

Acts 1998, ch. 712, § 2, concerning aggravating circumstance, was added as subdivision (i)(14) and shall be known as “Lottie's Law.”

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (i)(18).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 231, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse, § 37-5-512.

Airport and aircraft security, § 39-17-109.

Arson, title 39, ch. 14, part 3.

Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Burglary, title 39, ch. 14, part 4.

Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

First degree murder, § 39-13-202.

Kidnapping, title 39, ch. 13, part 3.

Mitigating factors, § 40-35-113.

Robbery, title 39, ch. 13, part 4.

Terrorism Prevention and Response Act, title 39, ch. 13, part 8.

Theft, title 39, ch. 14, part 1.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 17 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 15.9, 15.10, 25.3, 26.30, 26.47, 28.60, 28.92, 28.113, 32.11, 32.31, 32.32, 32.34-32.43, 32.45-32.48.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, §§ 46, 49; 14 Tenn. Juris., Homicide, §§ 4, 59; 14 Tenn. Juris., Indictments, Informations and Presentments, § 19; 15 Tenn. Juris., Instructions, § 15; 24 Tenn. Juris., Verdict, § 12.

Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), Rule 101.

Law Reviews.

A Survey of Tennessee Supreme Court Death Penalty Cases in the 1990s (Penny J. White), 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 733 (1994).

Adjudicating Claims of Innocence for the Capitally Condemned in Tennessee: Embracing a Truth Forum (Dwight Aarons), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 511 (2009).

Breaking the Frame: Responding to Gang Stereotyping in Capital Cases (John M. Hagedorn, Ph.D.and Bradley A. MacLean, Esq.), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1027  (2012).

Capital Prejudice (J. Richard Broughton), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 135 (2012).

Capital Punishment and the Marshall Hypothesis: Reforming a Broken System of Punishment, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 411 (2013).

Casenote: Criminal Procedure — Capital Punishment — Motions to Reopen Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 389 (2014).

Inequalities in Capital Punishment in Tennessee Based on Race: An Analytical Study of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Cases, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 823 (2001).

Pretend Justice–Defense Representation in Tennessee Death Penalty Cases, (William P. Redick, Jr., Bradley A. Maclean, and M. Shane Truett), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 303 (2008).

Tennessee's Death Penalty: An Overview of the Procedural Safeguards, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 779 (2001).

The Competency Conundrum: Problems Courts Have Faced in Applying Different Standards for Competency to be Executed, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2441 (2001).

The Constitutionality of the “Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel” Aggravating Circumstance in Death Penalty Cases and its Interpretation by Tennessee Courts, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 939 (2001).

The Crisis in Representation of Tennessee Capital Cases (William P. Redick Jr.), 29 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 22 (1993).

The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials (Dan Simon), 64 Vand. L. Rev. 143 (2011).

The Marshall Hypothesis and the Rise of Anti-Death Penalty Judges, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 381 (2013).

The Trexler Saga: Hale & Middlebrooks (Gary R. Wade), 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 319 (1993).

The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 359 (2001).

Theology in the Jury Room: Religious Discussion as “Extra Material” in the Course of Capital Punishment Deliberations, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 127 (2002).

To Kill for a Mocking Word? Richard Lloyd Odom's crimes led him to murder trials in two states (Howard H. Vogel), 37 No. 6 Tenn. B.J. 25 (2001).

Tennessee’s Death Penalty Lottery, 13 Tenn. J. L. & Pol’y 85 (2018).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of proposed aggravating circumstance of handicapped victim, OAG 97-078 (5/21/97).

Jury instructions on non-statutory mitigating circumstances in capital cases. OAG 97-081 (5/21/97).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Statutes pertaining to sentencing for first degree murder and appeal and review of a death sentence are not violative of the U.S. Const., amends. 5, 6, 8, and 14, nor of Tenn. Const., art. I, §§ 8, 9, 16, and 17, and art. II, § 2. State v. Shepherd, 902 S.W.2d 895, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. 1995).

The eighth amendment constitutional narrowing requirements and vagueness prohibitions have not been extended to cases which do not involve the death penalty. State v. Harris, 989 S.W.2d 307, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. 1999).

The “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” language is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because it is modified by the phrase “in that it involved torture or depravity of the mind” which narrows, limits and guides the sentencer in choosing the death penalty. State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. 1999).

The inclusion of “severe mental pain” within the definition of “torture” has not unconstitutionally broadened the scope of the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance. State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 907, 121 S. Ct. 1233, 149 L. Ed. 2d 142, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2043 (2001).

The fact that a mental state is absent from the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance does not render this circumstance constitutionally infirm. State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 907, 121 S. Ct. 1233, 149 L. Ed. 2d 142, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2043 (2001).

A misapplication of an aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204 in a life without parole case is not a constitutional violation because a death sentence is not a possible penalty. State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2000), cert. denied, Sturgill v. Tennessee, 149 L. Ed. 2d 478, 121 S. Ct. 1614, 532 U.S. 977, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2998 (2001).

2. Applicability.

Plain language of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) requires the prosecution to prove that defendant had: (1) A prior conviction; (2) For a felony offense; (3) Whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to a person. The statutory language has no other required elements or restrictions, and there is simply no indication that a prior conviction that meets these statutory elements must also have been committed by a defendant on or after the age of 18. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Davis v. Tennessee, 125 S. Ct. 1306, 161 L. Ed. 2d 123, 543 U.S. 1156, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1599 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005).

3. Construction.

The enabling provision of the 1993 act amending T.C.A. § 39-13-202(b), which clearly states that the amendment applies to offenses committed after July 1, 1993, controls over the more general provisions of this statute and the option of sentencing a defendant to life in prison without parole was thus not available to the jury where the crime was committed before July 1, 1993. State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Cauthern v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 967, 119 S. Ct. 414, 142 L. Ed. 2d 336, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6941 (1998).

The language of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(c) reflects that the rules of evidence do not limit the admissibility of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding; however, T.C.A. § 39-13-204 does not require a court to dispense with the evidentiary principles that are derived from and contained within the rules of evidence. State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Stout v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 998, 122 S. Ct. 471, 151 L. Ed. 2d 386, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10056 (2001).

Generally, T.C.A. § 39-13-204(c) should be interpreted to allow trial judges wider discretion than would normally be allowed under the Tennessee rules of evidence in ruling on the admissibility of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding. State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Stout v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 998, 122 S. Ct. 471, 151 L. Ed. 2d 386, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10056 (2001).

Pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 39-13-204(g), 39-13-206(c), there is no basis or rationale for applying the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony to the sentencing phase of a capital trial. State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Bane v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 1115, 122 S. Ct. 925, 151 L. Ed. 2d 888, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 557 (2002) .

By the jury's weighing of the specific aggravating and mitigating factors, it could not be said that a mandatory death penalty was imposed upon the inmate. Sutton v. Bell, 683 F. Supp. 2d 640, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5292 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 22, 2010).

Petitioner was not entitled to file second or successive habeas petition because Johnson decision did not apply to petitioner's case as language of applicable Tennessee statute was materially similar to language set forth in elements clause, rather than residual clause, of Armed Career Criminal Act. In re Sutton, — F.3d —, — FED App. —, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 24215 (6th Cir. Oct. 5, 2016).

Any statute in place before the effective date of ch. 492, with a release eligibility other than a minimum of 51 years for a life sentence is repealed as to offenses committed on or after that date and the caption of ch. 492 does not violate Tenn. Const. art. II, § 17; this is not an express repeal, but rather a repeal by implication, and both T.C.A. §§ 40-35-501(h)(1) and 39-13-204(e)(2) are repealed by implication to the extent they require a release eligibility other than a minimum. Davis v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2018).

Where the federal habeas court previously rejected a death row inmate's argument that both versions of this statute—which was modified between his commission of the crime and his trial—improperly permitted the jury to take a “case-specific” approach in determining whether a prior conviction applied, the inmate provided no basis for changing that conclusion and authorizing a successive petition. In re Nichols, — F.3d —, — FED App. —, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4662 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2020).

4. Burden of Proof.

Where crime and the trial occurred after the effective date of the 1989 amendments to the capital sentencing statute, and the trial court instructed the jury at sentencing by using the language of the pre-1989 statute, and the jury was given a pre-1989 jury verdict form, the death penalty was imposed on a lower standard of proof than that provided by law, and the result was a facially void verdict and prejudicial error. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. June 20, 1994), overruled, State v. Mitchell, 137 S.W.3d 630, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

Where an offense was committed before November 1, 1989, the effective date of the 1989 amendment changing the weighing standard, but where the trial and sentencing occur after that effective date, a trial court did not err by instructing the jury under the statute as it existed at the time the offense was committed. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. 1994).

Resentencing was required by the failure of the trial judge to properly include in the jury instructions that aggravating circumstances must be proven to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. 1994).

The former section required only a showing that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The section now requires that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Carter v. State, 958 S.W.2d 620, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 1997).

Submission of outdated jury verdict forms which required a lower standard of proof for conviction substantially affected the defendant's fundamental right to be sentenced to death based on the proper standard of proof and required remand for resentencing. State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. 1999).

5. Duty of Jury.

The Death Penalty statute requires the jury to agree only upon the absence of any mitigating factors sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1992), cert. denied, Harris v. Tennessee, 507 U.S. 954, 113 S. Ct. 1368, 122 L. Ed. 2d 746, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1703 (1993).

Order of examining jurors for sentencing hearing, with the state questioning prospective jurors first and defense going last, was constitutionally sound. State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. June 28, 1993), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S. Ct. 561, 126 L. Ed. 2d 461, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7408 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994).

Defendant did not establish that the group voir dire for sentencing hearing prejudiced him to the extent that the entire voir dire and impartiality of the jury were invalidated. State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. June 28, 1993), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S. Ct. 561, 126 L. Ed. 2d 461, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7408 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994).

Defendant had a state-created liberty interest in having a jury determine whether he should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death; thus, an appellate court could not limit an unconstitutionally vague instruction on aggravating circumstances, reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, and itself impose a death sentence without depriving defendant of a right guaranteed under the 14th amendment. The constitutional error in defendant's sentence could only be cured through a new sentencing hearing before a jury, or upon a determination that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rickman v. Dutton, 854 F. Supp. 1305, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5666 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).

In trial for first degree premeditated homicide, it was not error that jury was instructed that it must agree unanimously in order to impose a life sentence and was prohibited from verdict, and it did not violate the principal that any requirement that the jury must find a mitigating circumstance unanimously before it can be considered; a requirement of a unanimous verdict does not violate these principles for if the jury cannot ultimately agree as to punishment the trial judge shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of life imprisonment. State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, 876 S.W.2d 75, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1994), cert. denied, Brimmer v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1020, 115 S. Ct. 585, 130 L. Ed. 2d 499, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 8413 (1994).

6. Factors Properly Considered by Jury.

Jury's consideration of factors beyond the statutory aggravating circumstances did not invalidate the verdict under the eighth amendment; once a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively-defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the punishment appropriate to the offense and the individual defendant, and the factors originally listed by the jurors as based for the sentence are not irrelevant or improper but concern the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 202 (1994), cert. denied, Nichols v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1114, 115 S. Ct. 909, 130 L. Ed. 2d 791, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 589 (1995).

Neither the United States nor the Tennessee Constitution prohibits a reviewing court from upholding a death sentence that is based in part on an invalid aggravating circumstance. To guarantee that a defendant will receive an individualized sentence, however, the reviewing court must either reweigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence or conduct a harmless error review. Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. 1995).

The impact of the crime on the victim's immediate family is one of those myriad factors encompassed within the statutory language “nature and circumstances of the crime,” but the trial court may exclude evidence that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair or which poses a danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 533 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1998), cert. denied, Nesbit v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S. Ct. 1359, 143 L. Ed. 2d 520, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2382 (1999).

The state must notify the trial court of its intent to produce victim impact evidence and the court must hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of the evidence. Such evidence should not be admitted until the court determines that evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances is already present in the record. State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 533 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1998), cert. denied, Nesbit v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S. Ct. 1359, 143 L. Ed. 2d 520, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2382 (1999).

T.C.A. § 39-13-204(c) should be interpreted to allow trial judges wider discretion than would normally be allowed under the Tennessee rules of evidence in ruling on the admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing hearing. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Sims v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S. Ct. 357, 151 L. Ed. 2d 270, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9558 (2001).

In determining whether death is the appropriate punishment for the offense and for the individual defendant, the jury is free to consider a “myriad of factors” relevant to punishment, that is, relevant to establishing and assigning weight to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. 2001), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. May 18, 2001), cert. denied, Terry v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 1023, 122 S. Ct. 553, 151 L. Ed. 2d 428, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10406 (2001).

The “myriad of factors” that the jury is free to consider relevant to punishment serves to individualize the sentence imposed on each defendant to insure that the sentence is just and appropriate considering the characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime. Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. 2001), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. May 18, 2001), cert. denied, Terry v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 1023, 122 S. Ct. 553, 151 L. Ed. 2d 428, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10406 (2001).

In defendant's capital murder case, given defendant's prior conviction for a violent crime against a person, as well as the torturous manner in which he murdered the victims, a rational juror could have found that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, the death sentence was proper. State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Carter v. Tennessee, 540 U.S. 1221, 124 S. Ct. 1511, 158 L. Ed. 2d 158, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1692 (2004).

In a capital murder case, the jury's verdict form was proper where the jury found the aggravating circumstances relied upon by the state in seeking the death sentence, and the verdict mirrored and satisfied the relevant statutory language regarding the required jury verdict form in a death penalty case. State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1007 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 541 U.S. 1049, 158 L. Ed. 2d 743, 124 S. Ct. 2174, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3512, 72 U.S.L.W. 3711 (2004).

Prisoner's prosecutorial-misconduct claims in a habeas corpus petition that alleged the state wrongfully emphasized deterrence and suggested the law required a death sentence failed because the alleged misconduct did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it did not render the trial fundamentally unfair, and the prosecutor had no less right to discuss a jury's duty to impose the death penalty if legally warranted than a defense counsel had the right to discuss a jury's duty to give a life sentence if legally warranted under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(f)-(g). Strouth v. Colson,  2012 FED App. 149P, 680 F.3d 596, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10340 (6th Cir. May 23, 2012).

Death penalty was properly imposed because the victim, a police officer, was in his uniform, he arrived at the house in a patrol car, he identified himself as a police officer, and defendant, hiding in the upstairs hallway, shot and killed the officer. There was no provocation or exchange of words between them, and the officer's gun was still in its holster. State v. Johnson, 401 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013), cert. denied, Johnson v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 371, 134 S. Ct. 513, — U.S. —, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 7883 (U.S. Nov. 4, 2013).

Evidence that defendant knowingly created a risk of death to the victims when the defendant fired shots at them and that all three victims were at great risk of death during the incident was sufficient to support was sufficient for the jury to impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole. State v. Pruitt, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2015), aff'd, 510 S.W.3d 398, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 980 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

7. Harmless Error.

The jury's consideration of the invalid felony murder aggravating circumstance was harmless error in view of two remaining aggravating circumstances consisting of: (1) Defendant's prior violent felony convictions; and (2) Finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind. State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. 1995), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S. Ct. 99, 133 L. Ed. 2d 53, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5601 (1995).

On review, factual findings of the trial court inherent in a harmless error analysis are entitled to a presumption of correctness. For example, the emphasis that the prosecutor placed on the invalid aggravating circumstance in closing argument, as well as the number of remaining valid aggravating circumstances, should be considered factual findings, and determinations on the quality of mitigating evidence are also entitled to the presumption. However, a trial court's ultimate conclusion of harmlessness is not entitled to a presumption of correctness, but rather requires a de novo review, evaluated in the context of the entire record. Harries v. State, 958 S.W.2d 799, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Boyd, 959 S.W.2d 557, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Boyd v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 846, 119 S. Ct. 116, 142 L. Ed. 2d 93, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5267 (1998).

Where the jury's application of the felony-murder aggravating circumstance was duplicative of the elements of the crime and could not be used to support appellant's death sentence, such error did not automatically mandate a reversal of appellant's death sentence or require a new sentencing hearing. The court must review the record of the evidence at trial and evaluate whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the relevant factors of: (1) The number and strength of the remaining valid aggravating circumstances; (2) The extent to which the prosecutor emphasized the invalid aggravating circumstance during closing argument; (3) The evidence admitted to establish the invalid aggravator; and (4) The nature, quality, and strength of the mitigating evidence. Harries v. State, 958 S.W.2d 799, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

If the reviewing court determines that the jury would have imposed the same sentence had it given no weight to the invalid aggravating circumstance, the error is harmless and the sentence may be affirmed. Harries v. State, 958 S.W.2d 799, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Jury's reliance on an invalid aggravating circumstance was harmless error, where court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict would have been the same had no weight been given to the invalid aggravating circumstance. State v. Boyd, 959 S.W.2d 557, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Boyd v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 846, 119 S. Ct. 116, 142 L. Ed. 2d 93, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5267 (1998).

Although charging all felonies under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(7) without regard to whether the felonies are supported by the evidence is error, the error was harmless where application of the (i)(7) aggravating circumstance was amply supported by the evidence. State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1998), cert. denied, Blanton v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 1180, 119 S. Ct. 1118, 143 L. Ed. 2d 113, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1585 (1999).

A harmless error analysis is appropriate in determining whether resentencing is required as a result of an error that occurs where a defendant is convicted solely on the basis of felony murder. Coleman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 19, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), cert. denied, Coleman v. Tennessee, 528 U.S. 935, 120 S. Ct. 339, 145 L. Ed. 2d 264, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 6682 (1999).

Where the defendant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis of felony murder, the jury's use of the felony murder aggravator, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury found and properly applied three other aggravating circumstances that were strongly supported by the evidence. King v. State, 989 S.W.2d 319, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, King v. Tennessee, 528 U.S. 875, 120 S. Ct. 181, 145 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5863 (1999).

The jury's verdict was justified by two remaining valid aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances of nominal weight; additionally, the prosecution's argument did not emphasize the invalid aggravating circumstance and no additional evidence was introduced to support the invalid circumstance. King v. State, 992 S.W.2d 946, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, King v. Tennessee, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S. Ct. 505, 145 L. Ed. 2d 390, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 7586 (1999).

Although prosecutor engaged in improper argument by implying that the jury should consider the nature of the defendant's prior violent felony convictions, any constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; proof of the aggravating circumstances, even excluding the inadmissible evidence, was considerable and the mitigating evidence was slight. State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Chalmers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 925, 121 S. Ct. 1367, 149 L. Ed. 2d 295, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2269 (2001), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2014).

In defendant's capital murder case, although it was error for the trial court to exclude defendant's proffered correspondence as mitigating evidence, the error was harmless where the content of the excluded correspondence was adequately communicated to the jury through other evidence, and the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider, among other factors, “remorse,” “religious reformation,” and “spiritual development” as mitigating factors. State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Carter v. Tennessee, 540 U.S. 1221, 124 S. Ct. 1511, 158 L. Ed. 2d 158, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1692 (2004).

Trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce defendant's prior indictment for first degree murder in support of the aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) when defendant's prior conviction was for second degree murder because the prior indictment for first degree murder was not evidence of the facts and circumstances of defendant's prior conviction for second degree murder as required for admission under § 39-13-204(c). However, the error was harmless because the evidence clearly established that defendant's prior conviction was for second degree murder in that case and not for first degree murder. State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

Where defendant and his accomplice killed a fellow prison inmate, the state erred in introducing evidence of the prior convictions of defendant's accomplice and comparing the accomplice's criminal history with that of defendant in arguing that, while the accomplice was sentenced to life without parole for killing the victim, defendant should be sentenced to death because the accomplice's criminal history was not a statutorily enumerated aggravating factor to be considered by the jury. The error was harmless, however, because the juror learned of the accomplice's criminal record during the guilt phase of trial. State v. Schmeiderer, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2009), aff'd, 319 S.W.3d 607, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. 2010).

In sentencing a post-conviction petitioner on two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, an error in the admission of his prior first-degree murder conviction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and, thus, a new capital sentencing hearing was required. Berry v. State, 366 S.W.3d 160, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 812 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2012), cert. denied, Berry v. Tennessee, 184 L. Ed. 2d 71, 133 S. Ct. 145, 568 U.S. 840, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 6909 (U.S. 2012).

Given the presence of two other aggravating circumstances, the trial court's erroneous consideration of defendant's prior felony conviction for aggravated assault was harmless. State v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2014), aff'd, 512 S.W.3d 167, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), aff'd, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 1087 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015).

Although the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the defendant's prior convictions, as they did not necessarily involve the use of violence to the person, and in allowing the jury to apply twice the felony murder aggravating circumstance as a single aggravating circumstance, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's application of the heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating circumstance, as the victim's murder involved serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, so that the error was harmless. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

It was error to admit the evidence concerning a restaurant robbery for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(7) because there was no connection between that robbery in Georgia and the murder of the victim in this case, which occurred in Tennessee eight days later; however, because the State established two valid aggravating circumstances, the jury's reliance upon this invalid aggravating circumstance was not reversible error. State v. Wooten, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2020).

8. Confession.

State court's decision that a death row inmate's videotaped confession was relevant to sentencing pursuant to former T.C.A. § 39-13-203(c) (now T.C.A. § 39-13-204) because it established the nature and circumstances of the offense and that the confession was knowingly and voluntarily given after the defendant was advised of, and waived his constitutional rights. Nichols v. Bell, 440 F. Supp. 2d 730, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50972 (E.D. Tenn. 2006).

9. —Properly Admitted.

Defendant's videotaped confession to aggravated rape and to the felony murder for which he was sentenced was properly admitted and was not obtained in violation of his fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself for the taped confession was highly relevant to sentencing because it fully described the nature and circumstances of the crime. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 202 (1994), cert. denied, Nichols v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1114, 115 S. Ct. 909, 130 L. Ed. 2d 791, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 589 (1995).

10. Order of Commission of Crimes.

For purposes of aggravating circumstance that the death penalty may be imposed where the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person, the order in which the crimes were actually committed is irrelevant so long as the convictions have been entered before the sentencing hearing at which they were introduced. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 202 (1994), cert. denied, Nichols v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1114, 115 S. Ct. 909, 130 L. Ed. 2d 791, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 589 (1995).

Defendant's conviction for murder committed after the present offense was properly admitted as an aggravating circumstance, since the conviction occurred prior to the sentencing hearing at which it was introduced. State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, State v. Hodges, 522 U.S. 999, 118 S. Ct. 567, 139 L. Ed. 2d 407, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7140 (1997).

11. Aggravating Circumstances.

A finding of an aggravating circumstance other than T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(7) is necessary to support death as a penalty for felony murder; however, felony murder continues to be a death-eligible offense. (Statute was amended in 1995 to narrow the class of offenders eligible for death penalty such that (i)(7) can be sole aggravating factor). State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. 1992), cert. dismissed, Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 124, 114 S. Ct. 651, 126 L. Ed. 2d 555, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7942 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 1064, 114 S. Ct. 740, 126 L. Ed. 2d 702, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 402 (1994), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 963 (Tenn. 2008).

Even though the evidence amply supported the aggravating circumstance of the murder to be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind, the elimination of the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the perpetration of a robbery required the jury to reconsider the evidence to determine that the sentence of death was appropriate. State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994).

There was no merit to the defendant's assertion that the trial court's actions in striking the charge on the first aggravating circumstance and inserting in place of it the instruction that “the murder was especially cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind” drew undue attention to this part of the charge. State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, Caughron v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S. Ct. 475, 126 L. Ed. 2d 426, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7207 (1993).

Trial court, faced with an obvious paucity of evidence to establish a subdivision (i)(6) situation, should not have instructed the jury on this aggravating circumstance. State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d 563, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. 1993).

The degree of a defendant's involvement in an aggravated felony goes to the weight the jury is to give aggravating circumstances when determining whether they outweigh mitigating circumstances. State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. June 28, 1993), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S. Ct. 561, 126 L. Ed. 2d 461, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7408 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994).

Where defendant was found guilty of the murders of a mother and her two sons, jury's failure to return verdict of guilty on felony murder charges relating to sons' deaths did not preclude, and was not inconsistent with, finding of aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(7). State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1994), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S. Ct. 417, 130 L. Ed. 2d 333, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7536 (1994).

Multiple aggravating circumstances based on identical conduct do not necessarily render a death sentence arbitrary. Workman v. Bell, 160 F.3d 276, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27685 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 913, 120 S. Ct. 264, 145 L. Ed. 2d 221, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 6420 (1999).

Use of the victim's age as an aggravating circumstance was proper since the age of the victim does narrow the class of death eligible defendants, such that offenders who kill young victims during rape are a distinct subset of all murderers, and even a subset of felony murderers. Irick v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. June 15, 1998), cert. denied, Irick v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 895, 119 S. Ct. 219, 142 L. Ed. 2d 180, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5976 (1998).

Although the aggravating circumstances analysis under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(7) must focus upon the relationship between the felony and the murder, it is not required that the felony be committed either before or contemporaneously with the murder. State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Morris v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 1082, 121 S. Ct. 786, 148 L. Ed. 2d 682, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 301 (2001), cert. denied, Brown v. Utah, 148 L. Ed. 2d 676, 121 S. Ct. 778, 531 U.S. 1079, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 250 (2001).

A plain reading of T.C.A. § 39-13-204 only requires that the jury unanimously agree that the aggravating circumstance in question is present; it does not require that the jury agree as to all facts establishing the presence of that circumstance when different theories are available for consideration. State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 907, 121 S. Ct. 1233, 149 L. Ed. 2d 142, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2043 (2001).

Under this statutory scheme, when a sentence is based upon one or more invalid aggravating circumstances, but at least one valid aggravating circumstance remains, reliance upon the invalid aggravating circumstance is not reversible error under either former Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (see now T.R.A.P. 36(b)) or Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b) unless there is a gross abuse of discretion by the arbitrary imposition of the sentence. State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2000), cert. denied, Sturgill v. Tennessee, 149 L. Ed. 2d 478, 121 S. Ct. 1614, 532 U.S. 977, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2998 (2001).

In determining whether aggravating circumstances might be vicariously applied to defendants who did not actually fire the fatal shots, the court considers whether their degree of participation in the felony was “major” and whether they displayed reckless indifference to human life. State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2000), cert. denied, Sturgill v. Tennessee, 149 L. Ed. 2d 478, 121 S. Ct. 1614, 532 U.S. 977, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2998 (2001).

“Mutilation” as used in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(13) has a broader definition than just destroying or severing of body parts; “mutilation” also includes to cut up or alter radically so as to make imperfect. State v. Thompson, 43 S.W.3d 516, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, Thompson v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 852, 122 S. Ct. 121, 151 L. Ed. 2d 77, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 6019, 70 U.S.L.W. 3236 (2001), review or rehearing denied, 43 S.W.3d 516, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. 2001).

The trial court did not err in applying mutilation as an aggravating factor where, after the victim died, the defendant stabbed the victim four times in the back with a knife, slit the victim's throat, cut the victim's forehead and legs, and fractured both of the victim's legs by exerting great pressure from behind. State v. Thompson, 43 S.W.3d 516, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, Thompson v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 852, 122 S. Ct. 121, 151 L. Ed. 2d 77, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 6019, 70 U.S.L.W. 3236 (2001), review or rehearing denied, 43 S.W.3d 516, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. 2001).

Where DNA and other evidence raised a strong claim of actual innocence, a federal habeas court certified questions to the state supreme court in order to ascertain whether there remained a state avenue open to process petitioner's claim of actual innocence; in addition to raising questions about the aggravating factors used at sentencing, the DNA evidence also undermined the state's only proffered motive for the crime and its stated basis for establishing the element of premeditation or malice aforethought. House v. Bell, 311 F.3d 767, 2002 FED App. 406P, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23930 (6th Cir. Tenn. Nov. 22, 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 937, 123 S. Ct. 2575, 156 L. Ed. 2d 622, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4764 (June 16, 2003).

In a first degree murder case, the evidence was sufficient to find a prior violent felony aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), as defendant pled guilty to an indictment alleging that defendant and codefendant violently by the use of a deadly weapon robbed the victim. State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. 2002), cert. denied, McKinney v. Tennessee, 537 U.S. 926, 123 S. Ct. 321, 154 L. Ed. 2d 219, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 6923 (2002).

Court, in defendant's murder case, properly applied aggravating factor T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(11) where the evidence showed that defendant killed the victim to create a vacancy in a state senatorial position for which defendant was a candidate. State v. Looper, 118 S.W.3d 386, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, Looper v. Tennessee, 540 U.S. 1060, 124 S. Ct. 836, 157 L. Ed. 2d 717, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8789 (2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. 2003).

In reviewing defendant's death sentence, the court determined that: (1) The sentencing hearing proceeded according to the established statutory and regulatory procedures; (2) A thorough review of the evidence showed that it was sufficient to support the jury's findings of the aggravating circumstances under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (i)(6), and (i)(7); (3) The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, given defendant's multiple prior convictions for violent crimes, as well as the advance, cold-blooded planning to eliminate the victims as witnesses after the robbery; and (4) Defendant's death sentence was proportionate to the penalty imposed in other cases. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant committed murders for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest, because the record revealed that defendant told others that a fake “gun deal” was set up in order to steal guns and a car from the victims, and an accomplice heard defendant say that the victims would have to be killed, because they knew who stole their guns and where they lived; therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of aggravated circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Davis v. Tennessee, 125 S. Ct. 1306, 161 L. Ed. 2d 123, 543 U.S. 1156, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1599 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005).

“Felony murder” aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(7) may be applied to convictions for premeditated first degree murder. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Davis v. Tennessee, 125 S. Ct. 1306, 161 L. Ed. 2d 123, 543 U.S. 1156, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1599 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005).

In defendant's murder case, the death penalty was properly imposed, where defendant brutally beat, stabbed, and strangled two elderly women, raped one victim as she was dying, and the murders were committed during a robbery motivated by defendant's desire to obtain the means for fleeing. Defendant had a prior criminal history, including convictions for aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary, he cooperated minimally with authorities, expressed no remorse about the murders, and despite childhood problems, defendant experienced periods of relative calm in his life when he was gainfully employed. State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004), cert. denied, Leach v. Tennessee, 544 U.S. 966, 125 S. Ct. 1739, 161 L. Ed. 2d 610, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3045 (2005).

In defendant's capital murder case, a court did not violate defendant's constitutional rights by instructing the jury that the statutory elements of defendant's prior convictions involved violence to the person because the aggravating circumstance required only that the statutory elements of the prior felony involved the use of violence to the person. The Sims procedure authorized trial judges merely to examine the facts, record, and evidence underlying the prior conviction to ascertain which “statutory elements” served as the basis of the prior felony conviction, and that was a legal determination that neither required nor allowed trial judges to make factual findings as to whether the prior conviction involved violence. State v. Cole, 155 S.W.3d 885, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Cole v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 47, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79, 546 U.S. 829, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6152 (U.S. 2005).

In a capital murder case, the trial court properly polled each juror pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-204(f), and that polling revealed that each juror considered only the statutory aggravating factors under § 39-13-204(g) when determining whether a death row inmate was death-eligible and that each juror found the statutory aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstance. Nichols v. Bell, 440 F. Supp. 2d 730, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50972 (E.D. Tenn. 2006).

Death penalty was properly imposed where defendant was convicted in 1986 for first degree murder, in 1992 for first degree murder, and in 1998 for criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, and defendant stabbed the victim, who he knew was a prison counselor, a total of thirty-six times; twelve of the wounds were fatal. State v. Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d 356, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. 2006).

In a capital murder case, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the aggravated circumstances findings where defendant robbed and murdered the eighty-one year-old victim to obtain money for drugs, and defendant viciously assaulted the victim and stabbed the victim more than twenty times in order to leave no witnesses; although, certified copies of 1996 aggravated assault convictions were the only proof offered to establish an invalid aggravating circumstance, the prosecution did not emphasize the invalid aggravating circumstance, and therefore, the death penalty was properly imposed. State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d 553, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Rollins v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 866, 127 S. Ct. 162, 166 L. Ed. 2d 115, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6933 (2006).

The first degree murder statute is intended to deter premeditated, intentional killings, while the conspiracy statute is intended to deter agreements to commit any criminal offense. Accordingly, the double jeopardy clause of the Tennessee Constitution was not violated by sentencing the defendant for both conspiracy and first degree murder or by applying the T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(4) aggravating circumstance to impose the death penalty for the murder of defendant's wife.State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. 2006).

Defendant's death sentence after he was convicted of first-degree murder was proper because the sentence was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion; the evidence supported the jury's findings that the State proved the aggravating circumstances in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5), (i)(14) beyond a reasonable doubt; and the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances offered by defendant. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010), cert. denied, Hester v. Tennessee, 179 L. Ed. 2d 896, 563 U.S. 939, 131 S. Ct. 2096, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3140 (U.S. 2011), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2013).

Imposition of the death penalty was proper because defendant had committed a prior murder, the victim was murdered during a robbery, and the state presented evidence describing defendant's escape from prison and his prior theft and robbery convictions, both of which were committed after his escape. State v. Odom, 336 S.W.3d 541, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2011), cert. denied, Odom v. Tennessee, 132 S. Ct. 397, 181 L. Ed. 2d 255, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7329 (U.S. 2011).

In defendant's death penalty case, prosecutor did not commit misconduct regarding aggravating circumstances because the prosecutor's references to the victim's slight weight, the fear she must have felt, and the content of the photographs of the body related to the “nature and circumstances” of the crime. That the victim had a check in her hand at the time of her death was further evidence that the murder was committed in the perpetration of robbery. State v. Odom, 336 S.W.3d 541, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2011), cert. denied, Odom v. Tennessee, 132 S. Ct. 397, 181 L. Ed. 2d 255, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7329 (U.S. 2011).

Death sentence was properly imposed because defendant told an officer that the victim “had to die” because she had seen his face, defendant had previously committed an aggravated robbery, and defendant's statements indicated that he and his cohorts planned to steal the victim's car so that they could use it to commit additional robberies. State v. Freeland, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2013), aff'd, 451 S.W.3d 791, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2014).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to strike the T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(3) and T.C.A. § 39-13-204 (i)(12) aggravating circumstances as duplicitous because each of these aggravating circumstances relied upon different policy justifications for rendering a defendant eligible for the death penalty. State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2013), aff'd, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014).

In a death penalty case in which the jury convicted defendant of six counts of premeditated first degree murder for killing his brother, three other adults, and two of his brother's minor sons, the aggravating circumstances as to each of the murders, which included mass murder, murder committed to avoid being sent back to jail, the murders of two of his nephews, who were two and four years old at the time, and murders that were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel based on the repeated stabbing severe beating of defendant's two minor nephews, outweighed any mitigating circumstances and justified imposition of the death penalty. State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014), cert. denied, Dotson v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 565, 135 S. Ct. 1535, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1830 (U.S. 2015).

The imposition of the death penalty for the murder of three individuals was not excessive or disproportionate, as the jury found that defendant crated a great risk of death to two or more persons in the presence of a child and he committed a mass murder. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported the aggravating circumstances the trial court applied in sentencing defendant to death because it showed that defendant had prior convictions for robbery and kidnapping, battery of a law enforcement officer, and aggravated battery, the killings were heinous, atrocious, or cruel as both victims were bound and strangled before their throats were cut multiple times and one victim's head was almost completely severed from her body, the accomplice testified that when he asked defendant why he killed one victim defendant responded that it was because she had seen his face, defendant took large amounts of cash, at least one credit card, and jewelry from the victims, and defendant murdered a third victim within days of murdering the two instant victims. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Jan. 30, 2019).

With regard to defendant's conviction for premeditated first degree murder, the record supported the jury's finding that the murder was committed while defendant had a substantial role in attempting to commit a robbery because the killing of the victim occurred between defendant's demand for money and his attempt to open the cash register. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

12. —Incomplete Verdict.

The jury's reliance upon one incomplete aggravating circumstance was harmless error where one valid aggravating circumstance remained to support the defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. State v. Harris, 989 S.W.2d 307, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. 1999).

While a jury's incomplete findings with respect to the aggravating circumstances would have implicated constitutional vagueness concerns had the jury imposed the death penalty, those same constitutional concerns do not apply outside the death penalty context and are not implicated in an appeal from a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. State v. Harris, 989 S.W.2d 307, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. 1999).

13. —Felony Murder.

Consideration of underlying felony used to establish felony murder conviction as aggravating circumstance in sentencing defendant was harmless error where evidence of guilt was overwhelming, there were four other aggravating circumstances, defendant admitted evidence was sufficient to support three aggravating circumstances on direct appeal, and supreme court had found fourth aggravating circumstance was established by evidence. Workman v. State, 868 S.W.2d 705, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, Workman v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 1171, 114 S. Ct. 1207, 127 L. Ed. 2d 555, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 2037 (1994).

When a defendant is convicted of first-degree felony murder, genuine narrowing as required by Tenn. Const., art. I, § 16 and U.S. Const., amend. 8, is not accomplished by the broad definition of first-degree felony murder in T.C.A. § 39-13-202; thus, the aggravating circumstance set out in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(7), (but see 1995 amendment) which merely duplicates the elements of the offense and does not accomplish the genuine narrowing required by the constitution, may not be relied upon by the state to seek imposition of the death penalty. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. 1994).

The holding of State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (1992), that when a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder solely on the basis of felony murder, the felony murder aggravating circumstance in this section did not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers sufficiently and, thus, was unconstitutional, was applied retroactively under the rule in Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748 (1993). Barber v. State, 889 S.W.2d 185, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. 1994), cert. denied, Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1184, 115 S. Ct. 1177, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1129, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 907 (1995).

Where a felony other than that used to prove the substantive offense is used to establish the aggravating circumstance, there is no constitutional prohibition against the use of the felony murder aggravating circumstance to support the imposition of the death penalty for felony murder. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. 1995), cert. denied, Hines v. Tennessee, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S. Ct. 133, 136 L. Ed. 2d 82, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 5179 (1996).

Application of the felony murder aggravating circumstance is inappropriate only if the defendant is convicted solely on the basis of felony murder. Implicit in that statement is the recognition that the circumstance properly may be applied if a defendant is convicted of premeditated first degree murder. State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 524 U.S. 941, 118 S. Ct. 2348, 141 L. Ed. 2d 718, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4097 (1998).

When a defendant is convicted of first degree murder solely on the basis of felony murder, use of the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a felony fails to sufficiently narrow the class of death-eligible murderers. Because use of this aggravating circumstance in a felony-murder conviction to assess the death penalty duplicates the elements of the offense, it violates the Tennessee Constitution, and therefore, in order to support death as a penalty for the crime of felony murder, a finding of at least one of the other statutory aggravating circumstances is necessary. Harries v. State, 958 S.W.2d 799, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

The constitutional mandate of State v Middlebrooks , that a felony murder aggravating circumstance may not be used to support a death sentence when the defendant is convicted of felony murder, is not implicated in non-death-penalty cases such as life imprisonment and life without the possibility of parole. State v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. 1998).

Felony murder aggravator was improperly applied to support a death sentence in a felony murder case, but the application of the aggravator was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Irick v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. June 15, 1998), cert. denied, Irick v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 895, 119 S. Ct. 219, 142 L. Ed. 2d 180, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5976 (1998).

The mere fact that multiple felonies were listed by the state to support the felony murder aggravator does not eliminate the possible duplication error under State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. 1992). Where there is no clear showing which felonies the jury considered in imposing the felony murder aggravator, the court cannot presume that no Middlebrooks error occurred. King v. State, 989 S.W.2d 319, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, King v. Tennessee, 528 U.S. 875, 120 S. Ct. 181, 145 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5863 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant knowingly killed a victim so as to support the felony murder aggravating circumstance, as expert testimony detailing three separate skull fractures and eleven fractures to eight different ribs established that defendant violently beat the victim. State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), cert. denied, Pruitt v. Tennessee, 189 L. Ed. 2d 839, 134 S. Ct. 2874, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4624 (U.S. 2014).

14. —Previous Conviction of a Felony.

Application of the aggravating circumstance of previous conviction of a felony involving violence to the person was erroneous where the previous conviction had been reversed and remanded for a new trial. State v. Shepherd, 902 S.W.2d 895, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. 1995).

A defendant's previous conviction for second degree burglary should not be admitted as an aggravating factor since the elements of this offense do not involve the use of violence to the person. State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Cribbs v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 932, 119 S. Ct. 343, 142 L. Ed. 2d 283, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6525 (1998), dismissed, Cribbs v. Chapman, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184814 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 21, 2014).

Because the attempt statute requires the perpetrator to act with the kind of culpability that would otherwise be required for the principal offense, a defendant's previous convictions for attempted second degree murder may be admitted as an aggravating factor since the elements of the offense involve the use of violence to the person. State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Cribbs v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 932, 119 S. Ct. 343, 142 L. Ed. 2d 283, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6525 (1998), dismissed, Cribbs v. Chapman, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184814 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 21, 2014).

The state did not err by presenting testimony of the victim of the defendant's prior violent felony of especially aggravated robbery, where the prosecutors' intent was not to unfairly increase the weight of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance but rather to establish an entirely separate aggravating circumstance it was relying on. State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Stout v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 998, 122 S. Ct. 471, 151 L. Ed. 2d 386, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10056 (2001).

In regard to proof required for T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) aggravator, certified copies of prior violent felony judgments creating permissive inferences of identification, when combined with testimony of assistant district attorney, was sufficient. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. 2002), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. 2002), cert. denied, Dellinger v. Tennessee, 537 U.S. 1090, 123 S. Ct. 695, 154 L. Ed. 2d 635, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 9295 (2002).

In reviewing defendant's death sentence, the court determined that: (1) The sentencing hearing proceeded according to the established statutory and regulatory procedures; (2) A thorough review of the evidence showed that it was sufficient to support the jury's findings of the aggravating circumstances under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (i)(6), and (i)(7); (3) The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, given defendant's multiple prior convictions for violent crimes, as well as the advance, cold-blooded planning to eliminate the victims as witnesses after the robbery; and (4) The court determined that defendant's death sentence was proportionate to the penalty imposed in other cases. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's application of the aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) where the prosecution established that defendant was previously convicted of second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, because second degree murder requires a knowing killing of another under T.C.A. § 39-13-210, and especially aggravated robbery requires a robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon where the victim suffered serious bodily injury under T.C.A. § 39-13-403(a). State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

Trial court erred in instructing the jury that two of defendant's prior convictions for aggravated assault involved violence to the person in support of the T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) aggravating circumstance because the indictments in these cases alleged only that defendant had used a deadly weapon and had caused the victims to fear bodily injury. However, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury was properly instructed that defendant had been convicted of second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, and these prior convictions, particularly second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, were objectively reliable and qualitatively persuasive. State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

Challenged questions and statements made by a prosecutor in a capital murder case were relevant to the proof of statutory aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) in that it explained the weapons used by a death row inmate to commit the prior aggravated rapes under former T.C.A. § 39-2-603(a) (now T.C.A. § 39-13-502 and established that the felonies used as aggravating circumstance were in fact, crimes of violence or involved the threat of violence; the prosecutor did not extensively refer to the facts of the underlying felonies supporting the aggravating circumstance. Nichols v. Bell, 440 F. Supp. 2d 730, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50972 (E.D. Tenn. 2006).

Death sentence was proper because defendant, an estranged boyfriend, murdered an ex-girlfriend, whose testimony had sent him to prison for rape, while in prison defendant confided to other inmates his intentions to harm the victim, and the threats defendant made suggested that the murder was a premeditated act of vengeance; the proof established that on the night of the murder, defendant sought out the victim at her place of employment, murdered her, and disposed of her body, which was never recovered. State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2008), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2008), cert. denied, Rimmer v. Tennessee, 555 U.S. 852, 129 S. Ct. 111, 172 L. Ed. 2d 88, 77 U.S.L.W. 3200, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6756 (U.S. 2008).

Two cases at issue were tried in two different counties and there was no proof that the respective prosecutors purposely engineered the trial of the second case to take place after the first's murder conviction; even presupposing that two different prosecutors planned the chronological order of the two separate trials, it remained that the inmate did not cite any U.S. Supreme Court precedent finding such actions to be unconstitutional. Thus, the state court's resolution of the claim, namely the conclusion that trying the inmate's cases out of chronological order did not violate his constitutional rights. Sutton v. Bell, 683 F. Supp. 2d 640, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5292 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 22, 2010).

In a death penalty case involving first degree murder, with regards to the murders of defendant's brother, the three other adults in the residence, and two of defendant's minor nephews, the evidence supported the statutory aggravating circumstances that defendant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person as he had committed other murders; that defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons in the course of murdering his brother as there were others victims present in the room where defendant's brother was shot multiple times; and that defendant had been convicted of mass murder as he murdered six persons in the same criminal episode. State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014), cert. denied, Dotson v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 565, 135 S. Ct. 1535, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1830 (U.S. 2015).

Sentence of life without parole was appropriate for defendant's felony murder conviction because the State of Tennessee proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the felony murder charge, the statutory elements of which involved the use of violence to the person, as the State introduced proof of defendant's previous convictions for robbery and two convictions for aggravated assault in Georgia. State v. Odum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 973 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2018).

Trial court erred in permitting defendant's prior conviction for aggravated assault to establish the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance, as the State failed to meet its burden presenting the trial court with a proper basis from which to determine that the statutory elements of the prior conviction involved the use of violence to a person. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's application of the aggravating factor for a prior conviction for a crime that involved violence because the trial court reviewed the aggravated assault indictments and determined that the underlying facts involved the use of violence and to establish the prior convictions the State introduced judgments for each conviction. State v. Rimmer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2019).

Rational trier of fact could have found that the aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction for a crime that involved violence outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt because the record contained little, if any, evidence that could mitigate defendant's actions, and the State presented sufficient evidence of defendant's prior felonies as an aggravating factor. State v. Rimmer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2019).

Evidence supported the jury's finding that defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony because the State admitted into evidence a certified judgment of defendant's 2009 conviction for aggravated robbery in Madison County, as well as a written statement from defendant admitting his role in that robbery. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

15. —Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel.

Proof that the victim suffocated after being buried alive would warrant the jury making a finding of torture and depravity. State v. Shepherd, 902 S.W.2d 895, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. 1995).

Giving of a jury instruction on the aggravating circumstance regarding heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder in the language of the 1989 statute rather than the law as it existed when the offense was committed was harmless error under the circumstances. State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d — 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Apr. 28, 1997), cert. denied, Bush v. Tennessee, 522 U.S. 953, 118 S. Ct. 376, 139 L. Ed. 2d 293, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6545 (1997).

The 1989 amendment changing the statutory language defining the aggravating factor that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel, was a substantive one in that it imposes not a different level of proof on the state but different factors of proof and, therefore, the prior version of this provision should be applied where the offense was committed before the date of the amendment. State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Cauthern v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 967, 119 S. Ct. 414, 142 L. Ed. 2d 336, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6941 (1998).

Medical evidence that the victim could have remained alive for as long as fifteen minutes during the brutal attack or after receiving her wounds was clearly sufficient to support a finding of torture under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5). State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1998), cert. denied, Blanton v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 1180, 119 S. Ct. 1118, 143 L. Ed. 2d 113, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1585 (1999).

In proving that torture occurred under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5), the state, necessarily, also proves that the murder involved depravity of mind. A finding of depravity of mind was amply supported by evidence of multiplicity of wounds, the infliction of gratuitous violence and evidence of torture. State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1998), cert. denied, Blanton v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 1180, 119 S. Ct. 1118, 143 L. Ed. 2d 113, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1585 (1999).

The torture prong of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5) merely requires a jury finding that the victim remained conscious and sustained severe physical or mental pain and suffering between the infliction of the wounds and the time of death. Whether the defendant intended the victim's suffering is irrelevant under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5). State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1998), cert. denied, Blanton v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 1180, 119 S. Ct. 1118, 143 L. Ed. 2d 113, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1585 (1999).

Where child victim was raped twice, both anally and vaginally, and murdered by “violent” strangulation by her own father, evidence was sufficient to establish that murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Vann v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1071, 119 S. Ct. 1467, 143 L. Ed. 2d 551, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2664 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to establish torture where child victim was murdered by her own father as he perpetrated anal and vaginal rape upon her. These facts were certainly sufficient to establish that the victim suffered severe mental pain. State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Vann v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1071, 119 S. Ct. 1467, 143 L. Ed. 2d 551, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2664 (1999).

The proof was sufficient to support a finding that both severe physical and mental pain were inflicted on the victim while she remained alive and conscious where jurors, using their common knowledge and experience, could have assessed the degree of physical and mental pain the victim suffered over the course of six hours when she was burned and beaten in her own home in the presence of four of her young children. State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 533 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1998), cert. denied, Nesbit v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S. Ct. 1359, 143 L. Ed. 2d 520, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2382 (1999).

The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death even though the cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the head because burns and bruises were inflicted on the victim over a six-hour period prior to her death. State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 533 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1998), cert. denied, Nesbit v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S. Ct. 1359, 143 L. Ed. 2d 520, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2382 (1999).

Assault that lasted more than an hour and included repeated slashing of the victim's throat, four heavy blows to the head, and carving on the victim's chest while she was still alive, conscious and begging for her life was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied,  State v. Pike, — S.W.3d— , 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Pike v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1147, 119 S. Ct. 2025, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1036, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 3718 (1999).

Circumstance (i)(5) does not require a mens rea, as the aspect of torture focuses on the circumstances of the killing. State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. 1999).

The anticipation of physical harm to oneself is torturous, and this mental torment is intensified when a victim either watches or hears a spouse, parent, or child being harmed or killed, or anticipates the harm or killing of that close relative and is helpless to assist. State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. 1999).

Anticipation of physical harm to one's self or a loved one constitutes mental torture. State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Dec. 27, 1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 837, 121 S. Ct. 98, 148 L. Ed. 2d 57, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5346 (2000).

T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5) aggravating circumstances shown where the victim suffered mental torture over the welfare of her children as her husband beat her in their presence, and after hearing the defendant's threats to kill her if the children went for help, she most certainly would have feared for her own fate as well. State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Dec. 27, 1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 837, 121 S. Ct. 98, 148 L. Ed. 2d 57, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5346 (2000).

Murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel where defendant's brutal and fatal attack of his estranged girlfriend with a knife was excessive and far beyond that necessary to produce death. State v. Suttles, 30 S.W.3d 252, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Suttles v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 967, 121 S. Ct. 401, 148 L. Ed. 2d 310, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 7184 (2000).

Following a determination of major participation combined with reckless indifference to human life, an aggravating factor may be applied vicariously to a defendant if he was not the actor responsible for the aggravating circumstance. Owens v. State, 13 S.W.3d 742, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, Owens v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 846, 121 S. Ct. 116, 148 L. Ed. 2d 73, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5474 (2000).

Considering the nature and extent of the injuries, including the fact that manual strangulation or blunt trauma to the head could have caused death, the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the defendant inflicted serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to cause the victim's death. State v. Millsaps, 30 S.W.3d 364, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 2000).

Evidence supported a finding of torture; in addition, the multiple blows to victim's body in addition to the gunshot wound to victim's head supported a finding of serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Sims v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S. Ct. 357, 151 L. Ed. 2d 270, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9558 (2001).

Where defendant planned the robbery of the victim, repeatedly beat the victim, strangled the victim, and held the victim's face and head underwater with a plunger, the victim's murder was especially atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture and depravity of the mind as contemplated by T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5). State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Bane v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 1115, 122 S. Ct. 925, 151 L. Ed. 2d 888, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 557 (2002) .

Where the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder victim was conscious when mortal blows were being dealt by defendant, there was sufficient proof to establish that the aggravated circumstance of torture occurred. State v. Carpenter, 69 S.W.3d 568, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), cert. denied, Carpenter v. Tennessee, 535 U.S. 995, 122 S. Ct. 1557, 152 L. Ed. 2d 480, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 2493 (2002).

In accordance with the mandatory review required by T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1), the state supreme court found that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury's finding of aggravating circumstances, by T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5), (i)(7), to support defendant's death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt after defendant, a gang member, was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. The jury based imposition of the death penalty upon two aggravating circumstances: (1) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, because the victim was beaten and shot several times and had begged for his life, cried out after being shot, and appeared very frightened; and (2) The murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by defendant, while defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, because defendant ordered other gang members to “snatch up” the victim, beat the victim himself, and ordered other gang members to take the victim “fishing.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Robinson v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 1429, 164 L. Ed. 2d 132, 546 U.S. 1214, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1839 (2006).

T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5) aggravating circumstance may be vicariously applied, because the statutory language focuses upon the nature and circumstances of the crime, rather than the actions, intent, and conduct of the defendant. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Robinson v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 1429, 164 L. Ed. 2d 132, 546 U.S. 1214, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1839 (2006).

Court must look beyond the instruction given to the jury in order to determine if a defendant's eighth amendment right was violated by the use of a heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator under T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982) (repealed, current version at T.C.A. § 39-13-204). Even where the jury is given an unconstitutionally vague instruction, if on appeal the state court applies a narrowing construction of the aggravator, and that construction is constitutional, then there is no eighth amendment violation. Payne v. Bell, 418 F.3d 644, 2005 FED App. 314A, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14952 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 908,126 S. Ct. 2931, 165 L. Ed. 2d 958, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4986, 74 U.S.L.W. 3721 (2006).

Given the facts cited by the Tennessee supreme court on victim's awareness during his strangulation and circumstances of the murder, and given Tennessee's definition of torture, Tennessee courts'  rulings on the facts were sufficient to establish a heinous and cruel murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-204 so as to justify imposition of the death penalty. Hodges v. Bell, 548 F. Supp. 2d 485, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25780 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2008), aff'd, Hodges v. Colson, 711 F.3d 589, 2013 FED App. 75P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6050 (6th Cir. Mar. 26, 2013).

Petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief on his claim that the trial court used the incorrect version of the aggravating factor statute because any error was harmless as the trial court gave instructions defining heinous, atrocious, or cruel according to the correct standard, and it also defined torture correctly; the only error in the trial court's instructions was the substitution of “serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death” in place of the older “depravity of mind” language, but that error was inconsequential given the ample evidence of torture. Cauthern v. Colson, 736 F.3d 465, 2013 FED App. 329P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22944 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 2013).

Evidence overwhelmingly supported the application of the T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5) aggravating circumstance, as the evidence established that a victim was forced to walk barefoot over gravel, half-naked, to railroad tracks where he suffered three gunshot wounds, and another victim was kept alive inside a residence and repeatedly sexually assaulted and beaten before she was stuffed, alive, into five trash bags and then a trash can. State v. Davidson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015), aff'd, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to establish “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death” aggravating circumstance where after appellant killed one victim, appellant kept a second alive for more than one day and during that time the second victim was stripped of her clothing, and her hands and feet were bound with zip-ties. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2015), aff'd, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstance of torture where it suggested that the victim was alive to witness her husband's murder and was kept alive after that for at least a day before she was killed, she was striped naked and bound at the ankles and wrists, and she was beaten and gagged. State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016), cert. denied, Willis v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 466, 137 S. Ct. 1224, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1710 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017).

Finding murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel was supported by evidence that they involved torture and serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to cause death, including evidence that the male victim was raped, forced to walk barefoot to a desolate area, tied up and shot, and the female victim was robbed, tied up, brutally raped by more than one assailant, and then killed. State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 66, 138 S. Ct. 105, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5551 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).

16. —Avoidance of Arrest.

It is not necessary that prevention of arrest and prosecution must be the “dominant motive” for murder. State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1994), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S. Ct. 417, 130 L. Ed. 2d 333, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7536 (1994).

Where defendant was found guilty of the murders of a mother and her two sons, for purposes of applying circumstance that murders of sons were committed to avoid, interfere with or prove mother was killed first; it was sufficient that proof supported finding that at least one motive for killing sons was the threat they posed of defendant's apprehension, regardless of the time of mother's death. State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1994), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S. Ct. 417, 130 L. Ed. 2d 333, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7536 (1994).

The aggravating circumstance regarding the avoidance of arrest or prosecution as a motive for murder does not have to be proved by the state as part of the offense; therefore the circumstance does not duplicate the elements of the underlying offense and sufficiently narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d — 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Apr. 28, 1997), cert. denied, Bush v. Tennessee, 522 U.S. 953, 118 S. Ct. 376, 139 L. Ed. 2d 293, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6545 (1997).

By its terms, this statute does not limit the aggravating circumstance only to those instances in which a defendant kills a victim because the victim knows or can identify the defendant. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Quintero v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2892 (1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2893 (1999).

While the victim's ability to identify the murderer may be evidence supporting a finding of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6), a victim's inability to identify the murderer does not preclude its application where one of the purposes motivating the murder was a desire to avoid, interfere with, or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution of him or herself or another. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Quintero v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2892 (1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2893 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of the T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6) aggravating circumstance where the proof strongly indicated that the defendants were attempting to avoid being discovered and arrested for numerous thefts they had committed in the area, and proof supported the theory that the defendants murdered the victims to prevent the thefts from being reported. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Quintero v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2892 (1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2893 (1999).

The jury's application of the T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6) aggravator was strengthened by the fact that the defendants had escaped from prison. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Quintero v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2892 (1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2893 (1999).

The evidence supported the jury's finding of a murder committed to avoid arrest or prosecution where the defendant told police that while she was assaulting the victim, she heard a voice telling her to keep the victim from reporting the crime and sending her to jail. State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied,  State v. Pike, — S.W.3d— , 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Pike v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1147, 119 S. Ct. 2025, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1036, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 3718 (1999).

The aggravating circumstance in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6), the desire to avoid arrest or prosecution, need not be the sole motive for murder, so long as it is one of the motives in the killing. State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Henderson v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 934, 121 S. Ct. 320, 148 L. Ed. 2d 257, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6754 (2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1101 (Tenn. 2005).

Aggravating circumstance of avoidance of arrest applies to the murder, and not the specific conduct of a particular defendant. State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2000), cert. denied, Sturgill v. Tennessee, 149 L. Ed. 2d 478, 121 S. Ct. 1614, 532 U.S. 977, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2998 (2001).

There was sufficient evidence to support the court's charge pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6) where there was testimony that the defendant stated the defendant “got caught,” “figured out [the defendant] was busted,” and that the defendant killed the victim after having been “caught in the act.” State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2001).

In order to apply T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6), there must be sufficient proof to establish that avoiding arrest or prosecution was a motivation for the killing. State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. 2001).

Court properly imposed the death penalty against defendant where defendant followed the victim for 50 miles, abducted the victim in a driveway, and drove to a secluded area with the victim in the trunk before killing the victim. State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Powers v. Tennessee, 538 U.S. 1038, 123 S. Ct. 2083, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1071, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 3797 (Tenn. May 19, 2003).

Prosecutor erred during closing argument by stating that defendant committed aggravated burglary before murdering the victims, as the argument should have been confined to the single aggravating circumstance alleged in the notice seeking the death penalty—that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, identifying with, or preventing arrest or prosecution (T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6)). State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 29, 2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(6), where it was established that defendant attacked the victim at a convenience store; defendant followed the victim as she went to swear out a warrant on defendant and threatened to kill her if she got the police involved; and two days later defendant shot the victim five times at close range. State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

Defendant's death sentence was proper and not disproportionate because he killed the victim to avoid arrest; defendant took the victim's automobile because he wanted to commit robberies, he displayed a weapon, ordered the victim to drive to a secluded road against her will, and then shot the victim in the head and drove away in her vehicle. State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2014), cert. denied, Freeland v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 389, 135 S. Ct. 1428, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1112 (U.S. 2015).

In a death penalty case involving first degree murder, with regards to the murders of three other adults at the residence of defendant's brother and defendant's minor nephews, in addition to the aggravating factors of prior felony convictions, knowingly creating a great risk of death to two or more persons, and mass murder, the evidence supported the aggravating factors that defendant committed the murders for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution as defendant wanted to avoid returning to jail and the victims were killed because they could identify him; and that defendant knowingly committed the murders while he had a substantial role in committing the first degree murder of his brother. State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014), cert. denied, Dotson v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 565, 135 S. Ct. 1535, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1830 (U.S. 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstance of avoiding arrest or prosecution where it indicated that the victim was a witness to her husband's murder, she was kept alive for at least a day after her husband was killed, and from the sequence of events it could reasonably be inferred that the victim was not defendant's primary target but he decided to kill her to eliminate her as a witness. State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016), cert. denied, Willis v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 466, 137 S. Ct. 1224, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1710 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017).

Finding murders were committed to avoid arrest was supported by evidence that defendant wiped down the stolen vehicle to remove fingerprints, removed identifying decals from the vehicle, sprayed bleach in the female victim's mouth to attempt to destroy DNA, and poured gasoline over the male victim's body and set in on fire to attempt to his his identity and destroy DNA. State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 66, 138 S. Ct. 105, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5551 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).

Sentence of life without parole was appropriate for defendant's felony murder conviction because defendant told authorities that the victim interrupted the burglary of a home and that codefendant covered the victim's head with a bag and shot and killed the victim when defendant asked codefendant to leave. State v. Odum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 973 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2018).

17. —Risk of Death to Two or More Persons.

The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons other than the victim during the crime when he, acting in concert with others, fired his weapon inside a car containing four unarmed men and fired shots at one of the fleeing victims imperiling four other individuals playing basketball in the area. State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Burns v. Tennessee, 527 U.S. 1039, 119 S. Ct. 2402, 144 L. Ed. 2d 801, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4496 (1999).

The aggravating circumstance regarding causing a great risk of death to two or more persons found in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(3) contemplates either multiple murders or threats to several persons at or shortly prior to or shortly after an act of murder upon which the prosecution is based. State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Henderson v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 934, 121 S. Ct. 320, 148 L. Ed. 2d 257, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6754 (2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1101 (Tenn. 2005).

Because T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(3) requires that two or more people, other than the victim murdered, be placed in great risk of death, the court refused to adopt a per se rule that would automatically allow this aggravating circumstance in all felony murder cases where the defendant is armed with a pistol and others are present. Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 2001).

Under the circumstances, a withheld report was still material, even if other evidence supported application of the aggravating circumstances of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(3), because the fact of its suppression significantly undermined the court's confidence in the jury's sentence of death. Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 2001).

Because the habeas petitioner went on a murderous rampage in a confined space with a knife where there were three people present, two of whom were small children, killing two and seriously injuring the third, the jury's application of the “great risk of death” aggravator under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(3) did not violate the petitioner's U.S. Const. amends. VI, VIII, or XIV rights. Payne v. Bell, 194 F. Supp. 2d 739, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5599 (W.D. Tenn. 2002), aff'd, 418 F.3d 644, 2005 FED App. 314A, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14952 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005), rev'd, 399 F.3d 768, 2005 FED App. 22P, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 604 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005).

Evidence supported the imposition of defendant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole for each premeditated murder charge because defendant killed two people and wounded a third. Moreover, although defendant relied on defendant's history of gainful employment and presented evidence that defendant was raised in a broken home and had a major depressive disorder, defendant did not show that the sentence was arbitrary, so as to constitute a gross abuse of the jury's discretion. State v. Pruitt, 510 S.W.3d 398, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 980 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

18. —Age of Victim.

The trial court did not err in instructing the jury to consider the age of the victim as an aggravating factor pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(1) in sentencing defendant convicted of first-degree murder for reckless killing of a child less that sixteen years of age. State v. Lacy, 983 S.W.2d 686, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

There are no constitutional or statutory prohibitions to relying upon the victim's age as an aggravating circumstance for defendants charged with felony murder based on aggravated child abuse. State v. Hodges, 7 S.W.3d 609, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

The aggravating circumstance applying only to victims less than 12 years old sufficiently and meaningfully narrows the class of death-eligible defendants, even defendants who have been convicted of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 809 (Tenn. 2001).

Since the victim's age was not a statutory element of the offense, the use of the victim's age as a statutory aggravating circumstance was not improper. State v. Stanhope, 476 S.W.3d 382, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2013).

In a death penalty case involving first degree murder, with regards to the murder of two of defendant's minor nephews, not only did the evidence support the jury's findings of the five statutory aggravating circumstances committed in the four other murders, the evidence supported the aggravating factors that those victims were less than 12 years old at the time of the murders, as they were four and two years old, and defendant was over 18 years old; and that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that they involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death as each victim was stabbed repeatedly and severely beaten with wooden boards. State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014), cert. denied, Dotson v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 565, 135 S. Ct. 1535, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1830 (U.S. 2015).

19. —Murder Committed During Escape.

“During” as used in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(8) means “throughout the continuance of,” and the end of the escape marks the beginning of one's status as an escapee. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Quintero v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2892 (1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2893 (1999).

Where the murders were committed four days after the defendants fled confinement and while the defendants were in the process of obtaining the victims' automobile to further their escape, the murders were simply a step toward accomplishing their escape to Mexico, and thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of this aggravating factor. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Quintero v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2892 (1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2893 (1999).

The aggravating circumstance regarding the murder being committed by the defendant while escaping from a place of lawful confinement does not apply any time the proof establishes that a murder was committed by a person on escape status. Without more, defendant's escapee status is not sufficient to support this aggravating circumstance. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Quintero v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2892 (1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2893 (1999).

20. —Mass Murder.

The “mass murder” aggravating circumstance was appropriate for a series of separate but related homicides committed as part of a common scheme or plan. State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1994), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S. Ct. 417, 130 L. Ed. 2d 333, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7536 (1994).

Trial court erred in applying the aggravating circumstance regarding mass murder where there was no proof that the defendant fired any shots; however, the misapplication of that circumstance was harmless because at least one aggravating circumstance was present as to each of the three murders. State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2000), cert. denied, Sturgill v. Tennessee, 149 L. Ed. 2d 478, 121 S. Ct. 1614, 532 U.S. 977, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2998 (2001).

In the sentencing phase of defendant's capital murder case, a court did not err by allowing proof of defendant's prior murder convictions in order to establish the mass murder aggravating circumstance because each of the murders took place at a franchised, fast food restaurant, the crimes were committed when the restaurants were closed but while the employees remained inside, there were robberies at each location, the victims in each instance were moved to an isolated area, ordered to the floor, and shot twice in the head; in addition, the offenses occurred within thirty-five days of each other. State v. Reid, 213 S.W.3d 792, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1203 (Tenn. 2006), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 17, (Tenn. 2007), cert. denied, Reid v. Tennessee,  169 L. Ed. 2d 305, 128 S. Ct. 437, 552 U.S. 974,  2007 U.S. LEXIS 11530 (2007).

Trial counsel's concession that the mass murder aggravating circumstance applied and the fact that, prior to the penalty phase, defendant had been convicted of murdering three people during the same criminal episode was sufficient to support the application of the aggravating circumstance. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

21. —Mutilation.

Destruction, in whole or in part, by fire is certainly one of the most offensive forms of corpse desecration, and as such, it falls within the purview of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(13). State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2001).

Aggravating circumstance for mutilation narrowed class of death-eligible defendants where during the penalty phase, the State was required to prove that appellant knowingly mutilated the victim after his death. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2015), aff'd, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstance of mutilation of the victim's body after death where it established that defendant severed the victim's head and both hands and then cut through the bones of the victim's legs to position the body in a storage bin. State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016), cert. denied, Willis v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 466, 137 S. Ct. 1224, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1710 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017).

Fact that the male victim's body was covered with gasoline and set on fire was sufficient to support the finding that defendant knowingly mutilated the body after death. State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 66, 138 S. Ct. 105, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5551 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).

22. Jury Instructions.

Jury instruction that the jury could not impose the death sentence unless it found that “the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that involved torture or depravity of mind” was valid; however, it is preferable that juries be fully instructed as to the definition of these terms. Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. 1995).

Jury instructions are critical in enabling the jury to make a sentencing determination that is demonstrably reliable. To insure this reliability, the jury must be given specific instructions on those circumstances offered by the capital defendant as justification for a sentence less than death. In this regard, the party desiring such an instruction must submit the requested instruction in writing to the trial court. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 1996), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Sept. 9, 1996).

T.C.A. § 39-13-204(e)(1) is profoundly significant. It requires that the instructions be drafted so that when they are considered by the jury, the statutory mitigating circumstances are indistinguishable from the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 1996), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Sept. 9, 1996).

If the statutory mitigating circumstances are submitted to the jury in writing as T.C.A. § 39-13-204 requires, then any other mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence and proffered by a defendant as having mitigating value must, upon defendant's timely and proper request, also be submitted to the jury in writing. As a corollary, the trial court is prohibited from revealing to the jury that a request was made, nor should the trial judge identify the party making the request. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 1996), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Sept. 9, 1996).

Trial court properly refused to give defendant's proposed instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances because they left the impression that the judge made findings of fact in violation of the Tennessee Constitution, and, by their specificity, they were impermissibly distinguishable from the statutory mitigating circumstances. State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, State v. Hodges, 522 U.S. 999, 118 S. Ct. 567, 139 L. Ed. 2d 407, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7140 (1997).

Charge to the jury to consider only “proven” mitigating circumstances was erroneous; however, because it was given contextual meaning by subsequent explanatory instructions, the error was harmless. State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, State v. Hodges, 522 U.S. 999, 118 S. Ct. 567, 139 L. Ed. 2d 407, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7140 (1997).

Jury instruction that complied with the requirements of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(g)(1) fully satisfied Eighth Amendment concerns. State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Dec. 27, 1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 837, 121 S. Ct. 98, 148 L. Ed. 2d 57, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5346 (2000).

The trial court was not required to give an additional unanimity instruction as to the particular theory supporting the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance, because its general unanimity instruction with regard to the aggravating circumstance as a whole was adequate. State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 907, 121 S. Ct. 1233, 149 L. Ed. 2d 142, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2043 (2001).

Because the evidence supporting the torture prong of the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance was composed entirely of circumstantial evidence, as the jury had to infer from other evidence presented to them that victim suffered severe mental and physical pain, the trial court was required to instruct the jury on the weighing of circumstantial evidence. State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 907, 121 S. Ct. 1233, 149 L. Ed. 2d 142, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2043 (2001).

Even though the trial court erred by instructing the jury as two separate aggravating circumstances that defendant had killed the victim both while he had a substantial role in her committing her kidnapping and while he had a substantial role in committing her husband's murder, rather than instructing the jury on a single aggravating circumstance, the error was harmless where the jury had ample evidence to support two other aggravating circumstances. State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016), cert. denied, Willis v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 466, 137 S. Ct. 1224, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1710 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017).

23. Applicability of Prior Law.

T.C.A. § 40-35-117 does not govern the issue whether changes in capital sentencing by the 1989 amendments, as contained in T.C.A. § 39-13-204, apply to persons who committed offenses prior to November 1, 1989; rather the controlling provision is T.C.A. § 39-11-112. Thus, since the amendments did not provide for a lesser penalty, but merely changed the procedures to be followed at the sentencing hearing, where the offense occurred prior to the amendments, a jury instruction under the pre-1989 law was appropriate. State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. 1995), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S. Ct. 99, 133 L. Ed. 2d 53, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5601 (1995).

Under current law, a sentencing hearing may be conducted to determine whether the sentence should be life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, even if the state does not seek the death penalty. Under prior law, a penalty hearing was sought only if the state sought the death penalty. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, Bland v. Tennessee, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S. Ct. 1536, 140 L. Ed. 2d 686, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (1998).

If a murder was committed prior to the 1989 amendment of the statute, it is error to instruct the jury in accordance with the amended portion of the statute defining aggravating circumstances since the amendment was a substantive one which imposes not a different level of proof on the state but different factors of proof. State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Cauthern v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 967, 119 S. Ct. 414, 142 L. Ed. 2d 336, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6941 (1998).

The jury was properly charged as to the aggravating circumstance as defined by the pre-1989 statute, where the defendant murdered the victims in 1988 prior to the effective date of the 1989 revisions. State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1998), cert. denied, Blanton v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 1180, 119 S. Ct. 1118, 143 L. Ed. 2d 113, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1585 (1999).

Court's erroneous application of the 1998 amendment to T.C.A. § 39-13-204 in defendant's 1992 felony murder case was not harmless where it led directly to the prosecution's introduction of detailed and graphic evidence of prior violent felonies committed by defendant. The law as it existed at the time of the offense prohibited such evidence, and moreover, the prosecution heavily relied upon the inadmissible evidence underlying defendant's prior felonies in arguing that the jury should impose the death penalty for defendant's offense. State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 2004).

24. Exculpatory Evidence.

At the sentencing hearing, defendant had the right to present evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime or the aggravating or mitigating circumstances, including evidence that might show that defendant did not kill the victim, so long as it was probative on the issue of defendant's punishment. State v. Teague, 897 S.W.2d 248, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. 1995).

25. Mitigating Circumstances.

Defendant is entitled to have the jury consider all statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances which are raised by the evidence. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1992), cert. denied, Harris v. Tennessee, 507 U.S. 954, 113 S. Ct. 1368, 122 L. Ed. 2d 746, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1703 (1993).

Subsections (f) and (h) did not cause the jurors to be misled or prevent them, as individuals, from giving effect to defendant's mitigating evidence when deciding the ultimate question of an appropriate punishment. State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. June 28, 1993), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S. Ct. 561, 126 L. Ed. 2d 461, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7408 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994).

To assure reliability in determination that death is appropriate punishment in a capital case, state must permit sentencer to make individualized determination on basis of character of defendant and circumstances of crime; thus, defendant is entitled to present and have sentencer fully consider all relevant evidence in mitigation of sentence. State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, Howell v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S. Ct. 1339, 127 L. Ed. 2d 687, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 2487 (1994).

Any evidence relevant to the issue of the defendant's culpability should be admitted as mitigating circumstances during the penalty stage of a capital trial. Once evidence has been admitted as relevant on the issue of whether mitigating circumstances exist, the jury has the freedom to give independent mitigating weight to those aspects of a defendant's character and record and to the circumstances of the offense as they see fit. The trial court is not free to, in effect, give it no weight by excluding such evidence from the jury's consideration. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 1996), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Sept. 9, 1996).

Once the trial court has determined that a circumstance is a mitigating one, it must decide whether the circumstance has been “raised by the evidence.” The defendant has a right to have every issue of fact raised by the evidence and material to his defense submitted to the jury upon proper instructions by the judge. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 1996), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Sept. 9, 1996).

There is no provision in the capital sentencing scheme requiring a jury instruction that the state has the burden to disprove mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, State v. Hodges, 522 U.S. 999, 118 S. Ct. 567, 139 L. Ed. 2d 407, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7140 (1997).

In a capital sentencing hearing, any relevant mitigating evidence is allowed regardless of the rules of evidence. Owens v. State, 13 S.W.3d 742, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, Owens v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 846, 121 S. Ct. 116, 148 L. Ed. 2d 73, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5474 (2000).

Otherwise admissible evidence should not be excluded during a capital sentencing hearing based upon the fact that it is hearsay; however, defendant waived the issue of exclusion of mitigating hearsay evidence by failing to make an offer of proof or to raise this assignment of error in a motion for a new trial. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Sims v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S. Ct. 357, 151 L. Ed. 2d 270, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9558 (2001).

Fact that defendants are human beings is not relevant mitigating evidence in that it does not relate to the uniqueness of the individual defendant nor does the species of defendants bear on their character or prior record, or the circumstances of the offense. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. 2002), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. 2002), cert. denied, Dellinger v. Tennessee, 537 U.S. 1090, 123 S. Ct. 695, 154 L. Ed. 2d 635, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 9295 (2002).

Rules of evidence did not govern the admissibility of evidence under T.C.A. § 39-13-204, as a finding that mitigating evidence was cumulative did not make such evidence inadmissible; where a witness's hearsay testimony was duplicative, the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence. State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. 2002), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2002), cert. denied, Austin v. Tennessee, 538 U.S. 1001, 123 S. Ct. 1899, 155 L. Ed. 2d 829, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 3289 (2003).

Record did not support an instruction on the mitigating circumstance in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(j)(7), i.e., the youthfulness of a defendant, given that petitioner was a 28-year-old high school graduate with an honorable discharge from the military. Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. 2002).

Statutory mitigating circumstance instruction under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(j)(7) regarding youthfulness of a defendant was not applicable to a death row inmate who was twenty-eight years old, a high school graduate, and described as bright; there was no evidence to support such an instruction, and thus counsel's failure to request such instruction was not deficient performance. Nichols v. Bell, 440 F. Supp. 2d 730, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50972 (E.D. Tenn. 2006).

Statutory mitigating circumstance instruction under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(j) regarding the alleged substantial impairment of a defendant was given during the penalty phase of a murder trial of a death row inmate; thus, the inmate's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request such instruction was frivolous. Nichols v. Bell, 440 F. Supp. 2d 730, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50972 (E.D. Tenn. 2006).

District court did not err in denying a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to a death-sentenced Tennessee prisoner who was convicted of hiring an individual to murder her husband; although prisoner argued that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to overcome the state's hearsay objection to testimony of one of her penalty-phase witnesses which would have been admissible under earlier law, the failure was not prejudicial because the testimony would not have established the kind of extreme abuse that could have made the prisoner less culpable in the eyes of the jury. Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 2008 FED App. 440P, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24987 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 2008), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, — FED App. (6th Cir.) —, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24169 (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 2009), cert. denied, Owens v. Steele, 558 U.S. 879, 130 S. Ct. 281, 175 L. Ed. 2d 135, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 5960 (U.S. 2009).

26. —Mental Problems.

The qualifiers “extreme” and “substantially” used in the provisions pertaining to the mitigating circumstances of mental or emotional disturbance or mental impairment do not unconstitutionally limit the sentencers to a standard that precludes consideration of evidence of defendant's mental and intellectual problems. State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. 1995), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S. Ct. 99, 133 L. Ed. 2d 53, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5601 (1995).

Counsel was ineffective in a capital case where — due to his errors — instructions permitting the jury to consider that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, or that the murder was committed while the defendant was under extreme mental disturbance, were rejected. Brimmer v. State, 29 S.W.3d 497, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 984 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Where the prosecution failed to disclose witness statements and reports supporting a defendant's assertion that the defendant suffered from acute psychosis caused by drug addiction, while the likelihood that the suppressed evidence would have affected the jury's finding with regard to the defendant's insanity defense was remote, the suppressed evidence was potentially material to the defendant's sentence of death; in considering the death penalty, the jury was required under former T.C.A. § 39-2-203(j)(8) (repealed; now T.C.A. § 39-13-204(j)(8)) to consider whether the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct was substantially impaired by a mental condition which substantially affected the defendant's judgment, even though the mental condition was insufficient to establish a defense. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 173 L. Ed. 2d 701, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 3298 (Apr. 28, 2009).

Inmate's claim that he was ineligible for the death penalty under T.C.A. § 39-13-203 did not qualify as an actual innocence claim under T.C.A. § 40-30-117(a)(2) as: (1) to qualify as actually innocent, the inmate had to show actual innocence of the underlying crimes; (2) there was no separate offense in Tennessee for capital murder; (3) the inmate had pled guilty to first-degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-202; and (4) under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i), the death penalty was a sentencing consideration for first-degree murder. Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2012), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 120, 134 S. Ct. 176, — U.S. —, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 7234 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013).

Counsel was ineffective for failing to present psychological mitigating evidence during sentencing, and therefore defendant's death sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for a new capital sentencing hearing, where counsel possessed several decades worth of Tennessee Department of Correction records that habitually characterized defendant as mentally ill, including his diagnosis of schizophrenia. Post-conviction counsel's experts opined that defendant had the reasoning skills of a nine or ten-year-old, they believed that records showed that his brain had atrophied, and described his social and emotional development as stunted. Davidson v. State, 453 S.W.3d 386, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 918 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2014), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 768, 135 S. Ct. 1897, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 2976 (U.S. 2015).

27. —Disadvantaged Background.

Evidence of a defendant's background and character are considered relevant because defendants who come from a disadvantaged background or who have emotional and/or mental problems may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 1996), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Sept. 9, 1996).

28. Residual Doubt.

By definition, residual doubt is established by proof that casts doubt on the defendant's guilt; it is not limited to proof that mitigates the defendant's culpability for the crime. State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. 2001).

Trial court erred in refusing to admit defendant's proffered evidence relevant to establishing residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance. State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. 2001).

Studies show that residual doubt is one of the most compelling mitigating circumstances a capital defendant can establish to improve the defendant's chances of receiving a life sentence. State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. 2001).

Polygraph results are inadmissible to establish residual doubt about the defendant's guilt. State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. 2001).

Although the inmate challenged counsel's failure to appeal the instruction that residual doubt was not a mitigating circumstance when residual doubt was the main theme of his sentencing trial, the inmate did not testify in his own defense at trial and he failed to note any particular evidence supporting a residual doubt instruction. The trial court did not err in denying the requested residual doubt instruction and that, even if the evidence supported such an instruction, its omission was harmless in view of the trial court's general instruction encompassing any lingering doubt of the petitioner's guilt. Sutton v. Bell, 683 F. Supp. 2d 640, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5292 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 22, 2010).

29. Evidence Admissible.

Photographs of the victim's body were properly admitted during the penalty phase because they were relevant to prove that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind. State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. 1992), cert. dismissed, Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 124, 114 S. Ct. 651, 126 L. Ed. 2d 555, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7942 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 1064, 114 S. Ct. 740, 126 L. Ed. 2d 702, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 402 (1994), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 963 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1994), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S. Ct. 417, 130 L. Ed. 2d 333, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7536 (1994).

T.C.A. § 39-13-204(c), the evidentiary standard used during sentencing, does not violate the due process or confrontation clauses of the fifth and sixth amendments. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

The state was allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant's conviction and sentence for first degree murder in a prior case concerning the same set of facts (but which was reversed) at the sentencing phase of his trial, even though he was not directly involved in any threat or act of violence against the victim. State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. June 28, 1993), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S. Ct. 561, 126 L. Ed. 2d 461, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7408 (1993), cert. denied, Tennessee v. Bane, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 682, 126 L. Ed. 2d 650, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 63 (1994).

Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting two photographs of the victim in the sentencing phase of defendant's felony murder case where the first photograph, which was three-by-five inches in size, showed the victim in the back seat floorboard of her car and the multiple stab wounds and bleeding she suffered. The second photograph, which was also three-by-five inches in size, showed the victim on the floorboard with her head facing the rear of the car and a rolled up check in her hand; in sum, the photographs were relevant for the prosecution to show the “nature and circumstances” of the crime, i.e., the position of the victim's body, the location of the offense, the defendant's actions, and the injuries suffered by the victim. State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 2004).

It was not an error for the trial court to allow the state to read into the sentencing record the former testimony of two witnesses, each of whom testified at defendant's first trial that he had offered to pay them to kill his wife, because Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) did not apply to the resentencing hearing. State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs where (1) photographs were relevant to the issue of premeditation, to supplement the testimony of the medical examiner regarding the victims'  injuries, and to supplement testimony; and (2) the photographs were relevant to support the aggravating circumstance that appellant knowingly mutilated the victim's body after death as alleged by the State. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2015), aff'd, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to introduce photographs depicting the face of each victim during the penalty phase, as they were relevant to establishing the mass murder aggravating circumstance, were not unduly gruesome or unfairly prejudicial in light of the other evidence presented at the trial, and the number of photographs was limited to one for each victim. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video of defendant's prior aggravated robbery during the capital sentencing phase because defendant did not make a specific argument as to how the admission of the video violated a specific constitutional right, such as the right to due process or the right to confront adverse witnesses. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

30. Evidence Inadmissible.

Results of a third party's polygraph test in sentencing phase of capital murder case were not admissible since they would have no probative value as to the issue of punishment. Irick v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. June 15, 1998), cert. denied, Irick v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 895, 119 S. Ct. 219, 142 L. Ed. 2d 180, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5976 (1998).

In the sentencing phase of defendant's felony murder case, a court erred by admitting a photograph of the victim of one of defendant's prior crimes where the photograph was intertwined with the inadmissible evidence regarding the facts and circumstances of the prior first degree murder. Moreover, although the state argued that the photograph was properly admitted to rebut the mitigating evidence, it was introduced during the state's case-in-chief and not during the state's rebuttal. State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 2004).

Because a prior indictment is not evidence of a charged offense, it cannot properly be considered evidence of the facts and circumstances of a prior conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(c). State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

In defendant's capital murder sentencing proceeding, the court properly excluded drawings purporting to show other perpetrators because the sentencing jury was made aware that the police had considered other possibilities during the investigation; the sentencing jury had the opportunity to consider those facts as indicative of reasonable doubt and yet chose to impose a death sentence. State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2008), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2008), cert. denied, Rimmer v. Tennessee, 555 U.S. 852, 129 S. Ct. 111, 172 L. Ed. 2d 88, 77 U.S.L.W. 3200, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6756 (U.S. 2008).

In defendant's capital murder sentencing proceeding, the court properly excluded residual doubt evidence because the contested proof would have had a negligible effect on whether the sentencing jury believed that defendant actually committed the first-degree murder, which was the key inquiry of residual doubt; the sentencing jury had the opportunity to consider the validity of the conviction. State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2008), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2008), cert. denied, Rimmer v. Tennessee, 555 U.S. 852, 129 S. Ct. 111, 172 L. Ed. 2d 88, 77 U.S.L.W. 3200, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6756 (U.S. 2008).

In defendant's capital murder sentencing proceeding, the court properly excluded evidence of defendant's mother regarding extortion by the victim of defendant's mother for the victim's dismissal of a rape charge against defendant because defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to the rape and also to burglary and aggravated assault; a court of competent jurisdiction approved the plea and defendant served his sentence fully without any collateral challenge to the judgment. State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2008), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2008), cert. denied, Rimmer v. Tennessee, 555 U.S. 852, 129 S. Ct. 111, 172 L. Ed. 2d 88, 77 U.S.L.W. 3200, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6756 (U.S. 2008).

Trial court did not err by refusing to allow defendant to introduce evidence regarding the cost of imposing the death penalty compared to the cost associated with imprisoning an individual for life; evidence of the expense associated with implementing the death penalty bore no relation to defendant or his crimes, and as such, it was irrelevant. State v. Davidson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015), aff'd, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016).

31. Resentencing.

Where the only remaining aggravating circumstance could not be considered upon remand, it followed that under state law, the defendant could not be sentenced to death; his sentence was set at life imprisonment. State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d 563, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. 1993).

32. Alternate Jurors.

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and aggravated arson were proper because the trial court did not err by replacing an ill juror with an alternate juror following the conclusion of the guilt phase but prior to the beginning of sentencing deliberations in his capital trial. The trial court's decision to replace an ill juror with a non-discharged alternate juror did not appear to constitute a plain error under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(a). State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010), cert. denied, Hester v. Tennessee, 179 L. Ed. 2d 896, 563 U.S. 939, 131 S. Ct. 2096, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3140 (U.S. 2011), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2013).

33. Closing Argument.

The trial court properly followed the procedure set forth in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(d), when, after defendant presented his proof, it asked each party if they wanted to present anything more and both parties responded that they did not. State v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2014), aff'd, 512 S.W.3d 167, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), aff'd, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 1087 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015).

Defendant was properly convicted and sentenced to death for first degree felony murder because the trial court did not fail to allow defense counsel to make a closing argument as the record indicated that defense counsel waived the opportunity to make a closing argument at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

34. Sentence Upheld.

Defendant's various challenges to the death penalty had already been held without merit, he lacked standing to object to the application of certain circumstances that were not sought or found in his case, and he had prior convictions; the sentence was upheld. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2015), aff'd, 519 S.W.3d 1, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 1, 2017), cert. denied, Hawkins v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 288, 138 S. Ct. 388, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6432 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2017).

Petitioner's two consecutive life sentences to run concurrently with nine fifteen-year sentences did not violate Miller v. Alabama because neither the individual sentences nor the effective sentence was mandatory, as the trial court required to give individualized consideration to both the offender, including his youth, and the offense when crafting petitioner's effective sentence. Lowe-Kelley v. State, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 488 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Defendant was not entitled to relief from the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing because there was no statutory violation, even though the State did not give notice, because it was not seeking life without possibility of parole for the instant crime and the trial court did not analyze the statutory aggravating factors. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2016).

In a case where defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder during perpetration of aggravated child abuse or neglect, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to a sentence of life imprisonment without first holding a sentencing hearing as a life sentence was the minimum sentence allowed for first degree felony murder; and in failing to object to the trial court's imposition of an illegal sentence because a sentence of life imprisonment was not an indefinite amount of time; and the trial court was not required to specify a term of years when sentencing a defendant to life imprisonment. Blake v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 554 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

39-13-205. Waiver of jury trials of first degree murder.

  1. In trials of first degree murder, the defendant, with the advice of the defendant's attorney and the consent of the court and district attorney general, may waive the right to a jury to determine guilt, in which case the trial judge shall determine guilt; provided, that such waiver will not affect the defendant's right to a jury to determine punishment, if the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder.
  2. After a verdict of first degree murder is found, the defendant, with the advice of the defendant's attorney and the consent of the court and the district attorney general, may waive the right to have a jury determine punishment, in which case the trial judge shall determine punishment as provided by this part.
  3. Reference to a jury in § 39-13-204 shall apply to a judge if the jury is waived.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-204; Acts 1990, ch. 1038, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-205, concerning review of death sentence, was transferred to § 39-13-206 in 1990.

Cross-References. First degree murder, § 39-13-202.

Law Reviews.

Special Project: Criminal Procedure as Defined by the Tennessee Supreme Court (Julian L. Bibb and Walter Sillers Weems), 30 Vand. L. Rev. (4) 691 (1977).

Theology in the Jury Room: Religious Discussion as “Extra Material” in the Course of Capital Punishment Deliberations, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 127 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Death Penalty.

Under Tennessee law, the state is free to seek the death penalty following entry of a guilty plea, and accordingly, defendant's assertion that the state violated his constitutional rights by seeking the death penalty after he rejected the plea offer and exercised his right to a jury trial was without merit. State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 1998), cert. denied, Mann v. Tennessee, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S. Ct. 2376, 141 L. Ed. 2d 743, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4345 (1998), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 6, 2007).

2. Jury Determination Required Unless Waived.

Defendant had a state-created liberty interest in having a jury determine whether he should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death; thus, an appellate court could not limit an unconstitutionally vague instruction on aggravating circumstances, reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, and itself impose a death sentence without depriving defendant of a right guaranteed under the 14th amendment. The constitutional error in defendant's sentence could only be cured through a new sentencing hearing before a jury, or upon a determination that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rickman v. Dutton, 854 F. Supp. 1305, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5666 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).

39-13-206. Appeal and review of death sentence.

    1. Whenever the death penalty is imposed for first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the Tennessee supreme court shall automatically review the conviction and the sentence of death. Upon the conviction becoming final in the trial court, the clerk shall docket the case in the supreme court and the case shall proceed in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    2. If the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, the record as to guilt and sentence shall be expeditiously filed with the Tennessee supreme court within the time limit provision of Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 24 and 25. If the defendant has been convicted of other crimes at the same trial where a death sentence is imposed, the Tennessee supreme court shall have authority to review by direct appeal the other crimes, if appealed by the defendant with the conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death.
  1. The appeal of the conviction of first degree murder and the review of the sentence of death shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard according to the rules promulgated by the Tennessee supreme court. The Tennessee supreme court shall first consider any errors assigned and then the court shall review the sentence of death.
    1. In reviewing the sentence of death for first degree murder, the Tennessee supreme court shall determine whether:
      1. The sentence of death was imposed in any arbitrary fashion;
      2. The evidence supports the jury's finding of statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances;
      3. The evidence supports the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances; and
      4. The sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant.
    2. The Tennessee supreme court may promulgate rules as it deems appropriate to establish such procedures as are necessary to enable it to properly review the death sentence.
  2. In addition to its other authority regarding correction of errors, the Tennessee supreme court, in reviewing the death sentence for first degree murder, is authorized to:
    1. Affirm the sentence of death; or
    2. Modify the punishment to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life.
  3. In the event that any provision of §§ 39-13-202 — 39-13-205 or this section, or the application of the sections, to any individual or circumstance is held to be invalid or unconstitutional so as to permanently preclude a sentence of death as to that individual, the court having jurisdiction over the individual previously sentenced to death shall cause the individual to be brought before the proper court, which shall, following a sentencing hearing conducted in accordance with § 39-13-207, sentence the person to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-205; Acts 1990, ch. 1038, § 3; 1992, ch. 952, § 5; 1993, ch. 473, §§ 11, 12; 2019, ch. 140, §§ 2, 3.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-206, concerning second degree murder, was transferred to § 39-13-210 in 1990.

Acts 1992, ch. 952, § 15 provided that the amendments by that act apply to all matters as to which a notice of appeal is filed from and after May 1, 1992.

Acts 1993, ch. 473, § 16 provided that the amendments by that act apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993.

Acts 2019, ch. 140,  § 1 provided that the act  shall be known and may be cited as the “Sergeant Daniel Baker Act”.

Acts 2019, ch. 140,  § 5 provided that the act shall apply to acts committed on or after July 1, 2019.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote (a) which read: “(a) (1)  Whenever the death penalty is imposed for first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the court of criminal appeals. The affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee supreme court. Upon the affirmance by the court of criminal appeals, the clerk shall docket the case in the supreme court and the case shall proceed in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.“(2)  If the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death and appeals that conviction and sentence, the record as to guilt and sentence shall be expeditiously filed with the court of criminal appeals within the time limit provision of Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 24 and 25. If the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, but does not appeal the conviction of first degree murder, then the trial court shall certify, within ninety (90) days after the judgment has become final, the record relating to punishment, and the record shall be transmitted by the clerk of the trial court to the court of criminal appeals. If the defendant has been convicted of other crimes at the same trial where a death sentence is imposed, the court of criminal appeals shall have authority to review by direct appeal the other crimes, if appealed by the defendant with the conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death.”; substituted “Tennessee supreme  court” for “reviewing courts” in (b) and (c)(1); substituted “court shall review” for “courts shall review” in the last sentence of (b); substituted “enable it” for “enable the reviewing courts” in (c); and, in the introductory language of (d), deleted “the court of criminal appeals and” preceding “the Tennessee supreme court” and substituted “is authorized” for “are authorized”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 140, § 5. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

First degree murder, § 39-13-202.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 12 and Rule 39 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 32.49, 33.100, 33.102.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, §§ 46, 49; 14 Tenn. Juris., Homicide, §§ 4, 59; 14 Tenn. Juris., Indictments, Informations and Presentments, § 19; 15 Tenn. Juris., Instructions, § 15.

Law Reviews.

Adjudicating Claims of Innocence for the Capitally Condemned in Tennessee: Embracing a Truth Forum (Dwight Aarons), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 511 (2009).

Breaking the Frame: Responding to Gang Stereotyping in Capital Cases (John M. Hagedorn, Ph.D.and Bradley A. MacLean, Esq.), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1027  (2012).

Capital Prejudice (J. Richard Broughton), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 135  (2012).

Capital Punishment and the Marshall Hypothesis: Reforming a Broken System of Punishment, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 411 (2013).

Death by Election (Daniel J. Foley), 37 No. 12 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2001).

Defending Life in Tennessee Death Penalty Cases (Roy B. Herron), 51 Tenn. L. Rev. 681 (1984).

Pretend Justice–Defense Representation in Tennessee Death Penalty Cases, (William P. Redick, Jr., Bradley A. Maclean, and M. Shane Truett), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 303 (2008).

Tennessee's Death Penalty: An Overview of the Procedural Safeguards, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 779 (2001).

The Competency Conundrum: Problems Courts Have Faced in Applying Different Standards for Competency to be Executed, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2441 (2001).

The Marshall Hypothesis and the Rise of Anti-Death Penalty Judges, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 381 (2013).

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals: A Study and Analysis (Daniel J. Foley), 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 427 (1999).

The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 359 (2001).

Theology in the Jury Room: Religious Discussion as “Extra Material” in the Course of Capital Punishment Deliberations, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 127 (2002).

Tennessee’s Death Penalty Lottery, 13 Tenn. J. L. & Pol’y 85 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The Tennessee Death-Penalty statute is constitutional. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1992), cert. denied, Harris v. Tennessee, 507 U.S. 954, 113 S. Ct. 1368, 122 L. Ed. 2d 746, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1703 (1993).

Statutes pertaining to sentencing for first degree murder and appeal and review of a death sentence are not violative of the U.S. Const., amends. 5, 6, 8, and 14, nor of Tenn. Const. art. I, §§ 8, 9, 16, and 17, and art. II, § 2. State v. Shepherd, 902 S.W.2d 895, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. 1995).

2. Authority of Supreme Court.

Modification of a sentence of death to life imprisonment is purely within the province of the supreme court, and it is not a matter for the attorney general's decision. State v. Shepherd, 902 S.W.2d 895, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. 1995).

In light of the supreme court's statutory duty to review capital cases, it has jurisdiction to review issues raised in an appeal despite the defendant's failure to timely file his motion for a new trial. State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 533 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1998), cert. denied, Nesbit v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S. Ct. 1359, 143 L. Ed. 2d 520, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2382 (1999).

3. Evidence.

Sentence of death was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion as there was sufficient proof to uphold the jury's finding of the aggravating circumstance that defendant hired codefendant to murder the victim; a reasonable jury could have found that the proffered mitigating circumstances of residual doubt, relative culpability for the offense, and positive prison behavior were outweighed by the aggravating circumstance. State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. 2002), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2002), cert. denied, Austin v. Tennessee, 538 U.S. 1001, 123 S. Ct. 1899, 155 L. Ed. 2d 829, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 3289 (2003).

Evidence supported jury's finding that aggravated circumstances were established and that the aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-206, because the record showed that the jury found that three aggravating circumstances had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; (2) The murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest of the defendant; and (3) The murders were knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit a robbery or kidnapping. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Davis v. Tennessee, 125 S. Ct. 1306, 161 L. Ed. 2d 123, 543 U.S. 1156, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1599 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005).

Defendant's sentences of death were not imposed in an arbitrary fashion because: (1) the jury unanimously determined that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that several aggravating circumstances applied to each of the murders committed by the defendant and that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the sentencing hearing was conducted pursuant to the applicable statutory provisions and the rules of criminal procedure. State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2013), aff'd, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014).

In a death penalty case in which the jury convicted defendant of six counts of premeditated first degree murder for killing his brother, three other adults, and two of his brother's minor sons, the aggravating circumstances as to each of the murders, which included mass murder, murder committed to avoid being sent back to jail, the murders of two of his nephews, who were two and four years old at the time, and murders that were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel based on the repeated stabbing severe beating of defendant's two minor nephews, outweighed any mitigating circumstances and justified imposition of the death penalty. State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014), cert. denied, Dotson v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 565, 135 S. Ct. 1535, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1830 (U.S. 2015).

4. —Standard.

In determining whether the evidence supports the application of an aggravating circumstance, the proper standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Henderson v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 934, 121 S. Ct. 320, 148 L. Ed. 2d 257, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6754 (2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1101 (Tenn. 2005).

5. —Accomplice Corroboration.

Pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 39-13-204(g), 39-13-206(c), there is no basis or rationale for applying the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony to the sentencing phase of a capital trial. State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Bane v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 1115, 122 S. Ct. 925, 151 L. Ed. 2d 888, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 557 (2002) .

6. —Sufficiency.

Sentencing jury's consideration of invalid felony murder aggravating circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there was one aggravating circumstance remaining, consisting of defendant's prior felony convictions, and evidence supported jury's finding of the absence of any mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh aggravating circumstance. State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, Howell v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S. Ct. 1339, 127 L. Ed. 2d 687, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 2487 (1994).

Death penalty imposed was neither arbitrary, excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed for similar crimes; where the evidence showed torture and rape of the victim at or near the time of death. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Apr. 4, 1994), cert. denied, Cazes v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S. Ct. 743, 130 L. Ed. 2d 644, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 228 (1995).

Where the entire record in a first degree felony murder case provided a thorough basis on which the case could be reviewed, a Supreme Court Rule 12 report was not necessary and the absence of such report did not preclude adequate appellate and comparative proportionality review. State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, 893 S.W.2d 908, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. 1995), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S. Ct. 99, 133 L. Ed. 2d 53, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5601 (1995).

Evidence was sufficient to support imposition of death penalty. State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d — 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Apr. 28, 1997), cert. denied, Bush v. Tennessee, 522 U.S. 953, 118 S. Ct. 376, 139 L. Ed. 2d 293, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6545 (1997); State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, Cauthern v. Tennessee, 525 U.S. 967, 119 S. Ct. 414, 142 L. Ed. 2d 336, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6941 (1998); State v. Suttles, 30 S.W.3d 252, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Suttles v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 967, 121 S. Ct. 401, 148 L. Ed. 2d 310, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 7184 (2000); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Carruthers v. Tennessee, 533 U.S. 953, 121 S. Ct. 2600, 150 L. Ed. 2d 757, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5032 (2001); State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Sims v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S. Ct. 357, 151 L. Ed. 2d 270, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9558 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstance found by the jury and was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, Bland v. Tennessee, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S. Ct. 1536, 140 L. Ed. 2d 686, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (1998).

Sentence of death was not imposed in any arbitrary fashion, and the evidence supported the jury's finding of the statutory aggravating circumstances, and that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 524 U.S. 941, 118 S. Ct. 2348, 141 L. Ed. 2d 718, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4097 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing burglary as an aggravating circumstance, and that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 1998), cert. denied, Mann v. Tennessee, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S. Ct. 2376, 141 L. Ed. 2d 743, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4345 (1998), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 6, 2007).

Multiple aggravating circumstances based on identical conduct do not necessarily render a death sentence arbitrary. Workman v. Bell, 160 F.3d 276, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27685 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 913, 120 S. Ct. 264, 145 L. Ed. 2d 221, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 6420 (1999).

Evidence that the defendant twice raped, both anally and vaginally, and murdered his own daughter by violent strangulation, was sufficient to support the jury's findings of the statutory aggravating circumstances, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and the finding that death was not imposed in any arbitrary fashion. State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Vann v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1071, 119 S. Ct. 1467, 143 L. Ed. 2d 551, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2664 (1999).

In reviewing defendant's death sentence, the court determined that: (1) The sentencing hearing proceeded according to the established statutory and regulatory procedures; (2) A thorough review of the evidence showed that it was sufficient to support the jury's findings of the aggravating circumstances under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (i)(6), and (i)(7); (3) The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, given defendant's multiple prior convictions for violent crimes, as well as the advance, cold-blooded planning to eliminate the victims as witnesses after the robbery; and (4) The court determined that defendant's death sentence was proportionate to the penalty imposed in other cases. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

In defendant's murder case, the death penalty was properly imposed where defendant brutally beat, stabbed, and strangled two elderly women, raped one victim as she was dying, and the murders were committed during a robbery motivated by defendant's desire to obtain the means for fleeing. Defendant had a prior criminal history, including convictions for aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary, he cooperated minimally with authorities, expressed no remorse about the murders, and despite childhood problems, defendant experienced periods of relative calm in his life when he was gainfully employed. State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004), cert. denied, Leach v. Tennessee, 544 U.S. 966, 125 S. Ct. 1739, 161 L. Ed. 2d 610, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3045 (2005).

In accordance with the mandatory review required by T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1), the state supreme court found that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury's finding of aggravating circumstances, by T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5), (7), to support defendant's death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt after defendant, a gang member, was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. The jury based imposition of the death penalty upon two aggravating circumstances: (1) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, because the victim was beaten and shot several times and had begged for his life, cried out after being shot, and appeared very frightened; and (2) The murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by defendant, while defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, because defendant ordered other gang members to “snatch up” the victim, beat the victim himself, and ordered other gang members to take the victim “fishing.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Robinson v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 1429, 164 L. Ed. 2d 132, 546 U.S. 1214, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1839 (2006).

Defendant's death sentence after he was convicted of first-degree murder was proper under T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1) because the sentence was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion; the evidence supported the jury's findings that the State proved the aggravating circumstances in T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5), (14) beyond a reasonable doubt; and the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances offered by defendant. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010), cert. denied, Hester v. Tennessee, 179 L. Ed. 2d 896, 563 U.S. 939, 131 S. Ct. 2096, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3140 (U.S. 2011), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2013).

Defendant was properly sentenced to death for first degree murder because the felony murder and heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating circumstances involved in the case, as the victim's murder involved serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, outweighed the mitigation proof consisting of defendant's parent testifying that the parent loved defendant and did not want to see defendant executed. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

Jury reasonably could have found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, as defendant was given numerous opportunities in life to do well, despite his numerous risk factors, and made bad choices which led to the incident at issue. State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 66, 138 S. Ct. 105, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5551 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).

Death sentence was not imposed in any arbitrary fashion, as the trial court conducted the trial according the law and Tennessee procedures, and the jury reached a unanimous verdict beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crimes crimes charged the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2017).

7. Comparative Proportionality Review.

The imposition of the death penalty was neither excessive nor disproportionate where defendant chose without provocation, prior to fleeing the robbery scene, to shoot a second, unresisting, elderly victim in the back of the head. State v. Heck Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, Heck Van Tran v. Tennessee, 511 U.S. 1046, 114 S. Ct. 1577, 128 L. Ed. 2d 220, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 3111 (1994).

Though T.C.A. § 39-13-206 is silent on the issue, the universe from which the court chooses the pool of “similar cases” for comparison includes all cases in which the defendant is convicted of first degree murder. For purposes of comparative proportionality review, the court eliminates from the “universe” and includes in the more narrow “pool” for comparison only those cases in which a capital sentencing hearing was actually conducted to determine whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death by electrocution, regardless of the sentence actually imposed. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, Bland v. Tennessee, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S. Ct. 1536, 140 L. Ed. 2d 686, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (1998).

While important as an additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious sentencing, comparative proportionality review is not constitutionally required. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, Bland v. Tennessee, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S. Ct. 1536, 140 L. Ed. 2d 686, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (1998).

Though consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is a crucial element of selecting cases from the pool for comparison, several other factors relevant to the process of identification and comparison of similar cases include: (1) The means of death; (2) The manner of death, e.g., violent, torturous, etc.; (3) The motivation for the killing; (4) The place of death; (5) The similarity of the victims' circumstances including age, physical and mental conditions, and the victims' treatment during the killing; (6) The absence or presence of premeditation; (7) The absence or presence of provocation; (8) The absence or presence of justification; and (9) The injury to and effects on nondecedent victims. Additional criteria relevant to a comparison of the characteristics of defendants which include: (1) The defendant's prior criminal record or prior criminal activity; (2) The defendant's age, race, and gender; (3) The defendant's mental, emotional or physical condition; (4) The defendant's involvement or role in the murder; (5) The defendant's cooperation with authorities; (6) The defendant's remorse; (7) The defendant's knowledge of helplessness of victim(s); and (8) The defendant's capacity for rehabilitation. While by no means an exhaustive list, examination and consideration of these and other salient factors allows the court to identify similar cases and determine whether the sentence of death in the case under review should be invalidated as disproportionate. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, Bland v. Tennessee, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S. Ct. 1536, 140 L. Ed. 2d 686, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (1998).

In conducting comparative proportionality review, a court begins with the presumption that the sentence of death is proportional to the crime of first degree murder. However, if a capital case, taken as a whole, is plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in similar cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, the sentence of death in the case being reviewed is disproportionate. Even if a defendant receives a death sentence when the circumstances of the offense are similar to those of an offense for which another defendant has received a life sentence, the death sentence is not disproportionate if the court can discern some basis for the lesser sentence given in the similar case. State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 524 U.S. 941, 118 S. Ct. 2348, 141 L. Ed. 2d 718, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4097 (1998).

Applying the analysis from State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1997), the imposition of the death penalty for the senseless, brutal, premeditated killing of an innocent elderly woman was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 1998), cert. denied, Mann v. Tennessee, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S. Ct. 2376, 141 L. Ed. 2d 743, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4345 (1998), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 6, 2007).

Where the sixty-nine year old victim had struggled to evade the brutal attack and had survived for as long as fifteen minutes following the infliction of her wounds, the imposition of the death penalty was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. The nature of the defendants' crimes, their criminal backgrounds, their infliction of unnecessary and gratuitous violence, and their complete disregard for human life placed them into that class of criminal defendants for whom a sentence of death is appropriate. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Quintero v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2892 (1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S. Ct. 1501, 143 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2893 (1999).

Applying the analysis from State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1997), the imposition of the death penalty was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases where the 19 year old defendant tortured the 20 year old victim for six hours in the presence of four of her children before he killed her with a single gun shot wound to the head. State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 533 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1998), cert. denied, Nesbit v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S. Ct. 1359, 143 L. Ed. 2d 520, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2382 (1999).

Imposition of the death sentence for the murder of 59 year old convenience store owner was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases where the jury rejected the defendant's claim that the shooting was accidental, victim was killed while trying to protect her elderly husband and the family store, the weapon the victim used for defense was a can of spray paint, the defendant and his accomplice destroyed evidence to conceal the crime, and where the record contained no evidence showing mitigation or a capacity for rehabilitation. State v. Smith, 993 S.W.2d 6, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, Smith v. Tennessee, 528 U.S. 1023, 120 S. Ct. 536, 145 L. Ed. 2d 415, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 7841 (1999), dismissed, Smith v. Westbrooks, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135626 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2016), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. 2003).

Considering similar cases in which domestic disagreements bred animosity between the defendant and the victim, the defendant usually made prior threats to kill the spouse well before actually carrying out the threats, and the defendant always attacked the victim without provocation and each victim died a horrific death, the penalty imposed by the jury was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed for similar crimes. State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Dec. 27, 1999), cert. denied, Hall v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 837, 121 S. Ct. 98, 148 L. Ed. 2d 57, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5346 (2000).

Since no two defendants and no two crimes are alike, a comparative proportionality review is not mechanical or based on a rigid formula. State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. May 16, 2000), cert. denied, Keough v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 886, 121 S. Ct. 205, 148 L. Ed. 2d 144, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6053 (2000).

Applying the analysis from State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1997), the imposition of the death penalty for the senseless execution of an unconscious police officer was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Henderson v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 934, 121 S. Ct. 320, 148 L. Ed. 2d 257, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6754 (2000), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1101 (Tenn. 2005).

Race is considered when performing comparative proportionality review to ensure that an aberrant death sentence was not imposed due to the defendant's race. State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Chalmers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 925, 121 S. Ct. 1367, 149 L. Ed. 2d 295, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2269 (2001), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2014).

Where the record supported the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstance of prior violent felony convictions outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the death sentence was not disproportionate. State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Chalmers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 925, 121 S. Ct. 1367, 149 L. Ed. 2d 295, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2269 (2001), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2014).

Applying the analysis from State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1997), the imposition of the death penalty for the forcible rape and killing by strangulation of a helpless eight year old girl, facilitated by defendant who abused his position of trust, was neither disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases nor arbitrarily applied. State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, Keen v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 907, 121 S. Ct. 1233, 149 L. Ed. 2d 142, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2043 (2001).

The imposition of the death penalty was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases where the defendant, who was the pastor of the local church, planned the murder for months, staged own death by killing the victim in defendant's own church, and, once the victim was dead, expertly dismembered and disposed of the victim's body. Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. 2001), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. May 18, 2001), cert. denied, Terry v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 1023, 122 S. Ct. 553, 151 L. Ed. 2d 428, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10406 (2001).

The imposition of the death penalty was not disproportionate or arbitrary where the defendant had accosted and forced the victim into a car, told the victim that the victim was “with the devil” and that the defendant would have to kill the victim because the victim could recognize the defendant, and when they got out of the car, the defendant shot the victim, who died approximately two days later. State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Stout v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 998, 122 S. Ct. 471, 151 L. Ed. 2d 386, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10056 (2001).

In a double first-degree murder and especially aggravated robbery case where defendant was given two death sentences and a 25-year sentence for the robbery, three aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances where defendant, while robbing a fast-food restaurant, repeatedly shot two unresisting employees as they were lying face down on the floor; the sentences of death were not imposed in an arbitrary fashion and were not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering the nature of the crime and defendant. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. 2002), cert. denied, Reid v. Tennessee, 540 U.S. 828, 124 S. Ct. 56, 157 L. Ed. 2d 52, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6131 (2003).

Court properly imposed the death penalty against defendant where defendant followed the victim for 50 miles, abducted the victim in a driveway, and drove to a secluded area with the victim in the trunk before killing the victim. State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Powers v. Tennessee, 538 U.S. 1038, 123 S. Ct. 2083, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1071, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 3797 (Tenn. May 19, 2003).

In defendant's capital murder case, the death sentence was proportional to the crimes, where the motive for the killings was robbery; although defendant acknowledged that he realized the victims were not the drug dealers he intended to rob, he nonetheless terrorized them, he ransacked the apartment looking for money or drugs while his accomplice raped one victim, and both victims were shot in the head at close range, while their young daughter was present in the apartment. State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Carter v. Tennessee, 540 U.S. 1221, 124 S. Ct. 1511, 158 L. Ed. 2d 158, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1692 (2004).

In a capital murder case, the death penalty was not disproportionate to the offense, where defendant had three prior felony convictions, he kidnapped and then killed the unarmed, unsuspecting victim, her body was later found in a remote location with lacerations and blunt trauma to her neck, her head and left hand had been severed from her body, and her torso had been sliced from navel to sternum. State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1007 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 541 U.S. 1049, 158 L. Ed. 2d 743, 124 S. Ct. 2174, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3512, 72 U.S.L.W. 3711 (2004).

Defendant's death sentence, for murders committed during a fake gun deal in which he was also convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery, was not disproportionate, under T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D), to the punishment imposed on others convicted of first degree murders for shooting offenses committed in the course of a robbery or other felony. In addition, the supreme court of Tennessee has often upheld death sentences in cases that involved the three aggravating circumstances applied in defendant's case: (1) His previous convictions for one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; (2) The murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest of the defendant; and (3) The murders were knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit a robbery or kidnapping. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Davis v. Tennessee, 125 S. Ct. 1306, 161 L. Ed. 2d 123, 543 U.S. 1156, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1599 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005).

In conducting a comparative proportionality review pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1), the state supreme court found that defendant's death sentence on his conviction for premeditated first-degree murder was not disproportionate, because it was comparable to the sentence imposed in other similar execution-style first-degree murder cases in the relevant pool. The victim's murder was planned by several gang members, including the defendant, and the lack of definitive evidence suggesting that defendant told other gang members how to commit the murder did not render the death sentence comparatively disproportionate. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Robinson v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 1429, 164 L. Ed. 2d 132, 546 U.S. 1214, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1839 (2006).

Defendant's death sentence was proper where defendant, without provocation or justification, and with premeditation, shot the helpless, unarmed, retreating victim in the head. After the murder, defendant admitted that he had killed the victim because the victim owed him fifteen dollars and because the victim failed to show him respect. State v. Cole, 155 S.W.3d 885, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Cole v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 47, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79, 546 U.S. 829, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6152 (U.S. 2005).

Death sentence was upheld where the evidence showed that defendant shot the victim in the back of his head and stole the victim's money deposit bag, he was identified as one of two men fleeing from the scene, and the shooting was filmed by a surveillance camera and shown to the jury. Defendant later divided the contents of the deposit bag with his co-defendant, and he told a witness that he killed the guard, who suffered extensive injuries and extreme pain and disability from the injuries for over two years before his death. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Thomas v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 125, 163 L. Ed. 2d 131, 546 U.S. 855, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6959 (U.S. 2005).

Discussion of T.C.A. § 39-13-205 (current version at T.C.A. § 39-13-206) clearly took the case out of the realm of those in which there was an affirmative indication that the state supreme court did not apply a narrowing construction. Accordingly, the court had to presume that the Tennessee supreme court applied a narrowing construction of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator. Payne v. Bell, 418 F.3d 644, 2005 FED App. 314A, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14952 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 908,126 S. Ct. 2931, 165 L. Ed. 2d 958, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4986, 74 U.S.L.W. 3721 (2006).

Death sentence was not excessive or disproportionate when compared to defendants in other cases under T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(A), (C), and (D), where the court reviewed the nature of the offense including defendant's abuse of the victim and that he shot her as she sat helpless and unarmed in a car; defendant had prior convictions of second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and three aggravated assaults; the court had upheld death sentences in numerous similar cases where the defendant shot a victim one or more times; the court had upheld numerous death sentences in cases involving a defendant with prior convictions for felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, i.e., one of the aggravating circumstances applied by the jury in this case; and the court had upheld the death penalty in similar cases involving the other aggravating circumstances applied by the jury, i.e., the murder was committed to avoid or prevent the defendant's arrest or prosecution. State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

Death sentence was proportional where defendant armed himself with a weapon he had created specifically to use against another human being, walked up behind the seated and unarmed victim, a corrections counselor, and began repeatedly stabbing him, aiming initially for the victim's vital organs; defendant stabbed the victim thirty-six times and twelve of the wounds were lethal. State v. Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d 356, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. 2006).

Defendant's sentence of death was not disproportionate where defendant planned to rob the victim, defendant lured the eighty-one year-old victim from his camper under the pretense of purchasing bait, attacked the victim while the victim was in a vulnerable position, and defendant slashed the victim's neck and stabbed the victim at least twenty-seven times. State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d 553, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Rollins v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 866, 127 S. Ct. 162, 166 L. Ed. 2d 115, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6933 (2006).

Defendant's death sentence for premeditated first degree murder was valid pursuant to court's review under T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1), because it was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Young v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 1081, 127 S. Ct. 730, 166 L. Ed. 2d 567, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 9303 (2006).

In a capital murder case, defendant's death sentence was not disproportionate because, while the mitigating evidence of defendant's childhood and mental illness was compelling, the proof of the aggravating circumstances was simply overwhelming; defendant had several convictions for violent felonies, witnesses testified that defendant, who was experiencing financial difficulties, talked about robbing a fast food restaurant in the middle of the night and leaving no witnesses, the murders were perpetrated during a robbery, and defendant had killed several other people in a similar fashion thirty-five days previously. State v. Reid, 213 S.W.3d 792, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1203 (Tenn. 2006), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 17, (Tenn. 2007), cert. denied, Reid v. Tennessee,  169 L. Ed. 2d 305, 128 S. Ct. 437, 552 U.S. 974,  2007 U.S. LEXIS 11530 (2007).

Defendant's death sentence was not disproportionate because defendant entered the residence, forced the victim from his bedroom, the victim was shot first in the groin, rendering him nearly helpless, several witnesses testified that someone had offered a $10,000 “bounty” on the head of the victim, defendant expressed a need and desire for the money, defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving violence, and defendant expressed no remorse for the victim's death. State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. May 23, 2007).

Death sentence was proper because defendant, an estranged boyfriend, murdered an ex-girlfriend, whose testimony had sent him to prison for rape, while in prison defendant confided to other inmates his intentions to harm the victim, and the threats defendant made suggested that the murder was a premeditated act of vengeance; the proof established that on the night of the murder, defendant sought out the victim at her place of employment, murdered her, and disposed of her body, which was never recovered. State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2008), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2008), cert. denied, Rimmer v. Tennessee, 555 U.S. 852, 129 S. Ct. 111, 172 L. Ed. 2d 88, 77 U.S.L.W. 3200, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6756 (U.S. 2008).

Proportionality review was adequately conducted under the mandatory review rule of T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1) in that, during petitioner inmate's second direct appeal, the highest state court cited to T.C.A. § 39-2-205 and ruled: “We have carefully reviewed the sentence of death to determine whether it is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.” Miller v. Bell, 655 F. Supp. 2d 838, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82557 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2009), aff'd, Miller v. Colson, 694 F.3d 691, 2012 FED App. 333P (6th Cir.), 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 19213 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2012).

Imposition of the death penalty was proper because defendant had committed a prior murder, the victim was murdered during a robbery, and the state presented evidence describing defendant's escape from prison and his prior theft and robbery convictions, both of which were committed after his escape. State v. Odom, 336 S.W.3d 541, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2011), cert. denied, Odom v. Tennessee, 132 S. Ct. 397, 181 L. Ed. 2d 255, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7329 (U.S. 2011).

Defendant's death sentence was properly imposed because defendant shot in the face, at point blank range, a uniformed law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duties for no reason other than defendant's desire to go to prison for murder and not for the statutory rape of his girlfriend. Defendant at no point expressed remorse, and defendant committed the crime after having served a sentence for a prior violent felony; defendant had no potential for rehabilitation. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2012), aff'd, 401 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Death penalty was properly imposed because the victim, a police officer, was in his uniform, he arrived at the house in a patrol car, he identified himself as a police officer, and defendant, hiding in the upstairs hallway, shot and killed the officer. There was no provocation or exchange of words between them, and the officer's gun was still in its holster. State v. Johnson, 401 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013), cert. denied, Johnson v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 371, 134 S. Ct. 513, — U.S. —, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 7883 (U.S. Nov. 4, 2013).

Defendant's sentence of death was not disproportionate, as the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant struck repeated blows to an elderly victim, who suffered three separate skull fractures and broken ribs, in the process of stealing the victim's car; the victim died as a result of these injuries. State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2013), cert. denied, Pruitt v. Tennessee, 189 L. Ed. 2d 839, 134 S. Ct. 2874, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4624 (U.S. 2014).

Death penalties imposed for appellant's brutal murders of the victims were affirmed because (1) The jury concluded that the State successful proved four statutory aggravating circumstances; (2) The evidence was sufficient to establish the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance with regard to the murders of both victims; and (3) The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a sentence of death in cases that shared similarities with this case and appellant. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2013), rev'd, 450 S.W.3d 866, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

Death sentence was properly imposed because defendant told an officer that the victim “had to die” because she had seen his face, defendant had previously committed an aggravated robbery, and defendant's statements indicated that he and his cohorts planned to steal the victim's car so that they could use it to commit additional robberies. State v. Freeland, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2013), aff'd, 451 S.W.3d 791, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2014).

Penalty imposed by the jury was clearly not disproportionate to the penalty imposed for similar crimes because: (1) the sentence of death had been upheld in numerous cases in which defendant committed mass murder; and (2) sentence of death had been upheld in numerous cases in which the victim was a young child who was either well-acquainted with the defendant or related to defendant. State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2013), aff'd, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014).

Defendant's death sentence was proper and not disproportionate because he killed the victim to avoid arrest; defendant took the victim's automobile because he wanted to commit robberies, he displayed a weapon, ordered the victim to drive to a secluded road against her will, and then shot the victim in the head and drove away in her vehicle. State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2014), cert. denied, Freeland v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 389, 135 S. Ct. 1428, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1112 (U.S. 2015).

In a death penalty case in which the jury convicted defendant of six counts of premeditated first degree murder for killing his brother, three other adults, and two of his brother's minor sons, the sentences of death were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases as the proof showed that defendant shot and killed his brother and three other adults; defendant then stabbed and beat with wooden boards his four nephews and his niece, who ranged in age from nine years to two months old; two of defendant's nephews were killed during the attacks on the children; the unprovoked attacks on the children were both cruel and brutal; and defendant never attempted to render aid or summon help. State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014), cert. denied, Dotson v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 565, 135 S. Ct. 1535, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1830 (U.S. 2015).

Sentence of death imposed for defendant's brutal murder of the victim was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed for similar crimes under similar circumstances because defendant forced the victim, who was a spouse and a parent, to the assault area, killed the victim through a combination of blunt force trauma and strangulation, and, at some point during the assault, defendant engaged in some form of sexual activity with the victim. Furthermore, there was no apparent motivation, provocation, or justification for the murder. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

Death sentences in this case were not excessive or disproportionate when compared to the penalty imposed in similar cases where the Tennessee Supreme Court has upheld the death penalty in numerous cases involving killings in the course of a kidnapping. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2015), aff'd, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Death sentences for murders of defendant's girlfriend and her parents were not excessive or disproportionate when compared to the death penalty imposed in similar cases. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Sentence of death in this case was proportionate to the sentences imposed in similar cases, and the application of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance gave further support to the conclusion that the sentence imposed was proportionate to sentences imposed in similar cases. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2015), aff'd, 519 S.W.3d 1, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 1, 2017), cert. denied, Hawkins v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 288, 138 S. Ct. 388, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6432 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2017).

Defendant's death sentences were not excessive or disproportionate to other cases, given that defendant forcibly robbed, kidnapped, and abduced the victims in one victim's vehicle, brutally raped both victim, and killed both victims in a heinous manner. State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 66, 138 S. Ct. 105, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5551 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).

Death penalty was not disproportionate to the offense, premeditated first-degree murder, given that defendant stabbed and strangled the victim and had his 12-year-old daughter help dispose of the dismembered remains. State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 1, 2017).

Death sentence for two murders was not disproportionate to the penalties imposed for similar crimes. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2017).

8. Post-Conviction Relief.

Comparative proportionality review is a creature of statute and is not constitutionally required; therefore, it affords no basis for post-conviction relief. Heck Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, Heck Van Tran v. Tennessee, 529 U.S. 1091, 120 S. Ct. 1728, 146 L. Ed. 2d 648, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2938 (2000).

Because burden-shifting jury instructions were not one of the criteria specified in the state's mandatory review statute, there was no reason to believe that such instructions were reviewed under the mandatory review rule of T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1). Therefore, petitioner inmate could not rely on “implicit review” to avoid a procedural default of a claim not listed in the statute and not fairly presented to the state courts. Miller v. Bell, 655 F. Supp. 2d 838, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82557 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2009), aff'd, Miller v. Colson, 694 F.3d 691, 2012 FED App. 333P (6th Cir.), 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 19213 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2012).

9. Harmless Error.

Harmless error review of sentencing jury's decision requires complete examination of record for factors which potentially influence sentence including number and strength of remaining valid aggravating circumstances, prosecutor's argument at sentencing, evidence admitted to establish invalid aggravator, and nature, quality and strength of mitigating evidence. State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, Howell v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S. Ct. 1339, 127 L. Ed. 2d 687, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 2487 (1994).

10. Instructions.

To uphold a sentence of death based upon an illegal verdict form returned by a jury whose discretion was guided by contradictory and confusing instructions incompletely and inaccurately reciting the applicable law would countenance a degree of arbitrariness and capriciousness in the defendant's death sentence incompatible with the court's duty under this section. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. June 20, 1994), overruled, State v. Mitchell, 137 S.W.3d 630, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

11. Jury Determination Required.

Defendant had a state-created liberty interest in having a jury determine whether he should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death; thus, an appellate court could not limit an unconstitutionally vague instruction on aggravating circumstances, reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, and itself impose a death sentence without depriving defendant of a right guaranteed under the 14th amendment. The constitutional error in defendant's sentence could only be cured through a new sentencing hearing before a jury, or upon a determination that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rickman v. Dutton, 854 F. Supp. 1305, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5666 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).

12. Liberty Interest.

Former section did not create a liberty interest. Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 1998 FED App. 336P, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28786 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 842, 120 S. Ct. 110, 145 L. Ed. 2d 93, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5360 (1999).

13. Death Sentence Not Imposed In Arbitrary Fashion.

Defendant's death sentences were not imposed in an arbitrary fashion because he was not denied the right to the assistance of attorneys, as his knowing waiver of the right to counsel and insistence on proceeding resulted in his waiver of the right to the attorneys, and although he was denied the assistance of a mitigation expert, he chose to waive the presentation of any mitigation evidence during sentencing even though he had access to the mitigation evidence. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Jan. 30, 2019).

13.5 Aggravating Factors Outweighed Mitigating Factors.

Rational trier of fact could have found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt because the experts agreed that defendant was capable of formulating and carrying out a plan to rob the the store and that he made a voluntary choice to kill the victim, this was not the first time that defendant was involved in the armed robbery of a convenience store, he had only been out of prison for about six months at the time of this incident, and he responded with profanities and death threats when he was confronted by the police. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

39-13-207. Sentencing where death penalty is not sought.

  1. In any first degree murder case in which the state does not seek the death penalty, but is seeking imprisonment for life without possibility of parole as the maximum punishment, should the jury find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing proceeding, to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life. The sentencing proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with § 39-13-204, excluding references to the death penalty.
  2. If the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, as set forth in § 39-13-204(i), the jury shall return its verdict to the judge on the form described in § 39-13-204(f)(1), and the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life.
  3. If the jury unanimously determines that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt one (1) or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in § 39-13-204(i), the jury shall, in its considered discretion, sentence the defendant either to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or to imprisonment for life.
  4. The jury shall be instructed that, in imposing sentence, it shall weigh and consider the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances.
  5. The jury shall then return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows:

    PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT  POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven the following listed statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: (Here list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found) CHECK ONE (1) BOX ONLY [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or [ ] We, the jury, unanimously agree that the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. /s/ /s/ Jury Foreperson Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror /s/ /s/ Juror Juror

    Click to view form.

  6. If the jury cannot ultimately agree as to punishment, the judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury, on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment.
  7. When a defendant has been sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, the defendant may appeal the sentence to the Tennessee court of criminal appeals. The court of criminal appeals shall first consider any errors assigned and then the court shall review the appropriateness of the sentence. A sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall be considered appropriate if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance contained in § 39-13-204(i), and the sentence was not otherwise imposed arbitrarily, so as to constitute a gross abuse of the jury's discretion.

Acts 1993, ch. 473, § 7.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section sets forth the sentencing procedures where the state does not seek the death penalty, but does seek the penalty of life without parole. It provides that such procedures shall be in accordance with § 39-13-204, excluding references to the death penalty. If the aggravating circumstance or circumstances are found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but they have not been proven to outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment or life without parole, in its discretion. The judge must instruct the jury to weigh and consider any aggravating or mitigating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt in reaching its decision. If the jury finds that no aggravating circumstances have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence must be life imprisonment.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-207, concerning voluntary manslaughter, was transferred to § 39-13-211 in 1990.

Acts 1993, ch. 473, § 16 provided that this section shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

First degree murder, § 39-13-202.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Role of Jury.

T.C.A. §§ 39-13-204 and 39-13-207 combine to set forth the jury's role in fixing the appropriate life sentence. If the jury unanimously finds the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury may sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment or life without the possibility of parole. State v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. 1998).

2. Aggravating Circumstances.

Nothing in the text of T.C.A. § 39-13-207 or § 39-13-204 prohibits the jury from considering an aggravating circumstance when the aggravator duplicates an element of the underlying offense. Thus, the felony murder aggravator can be used to enhance a sentence to life without the possibility of parole when the defendant is convicted of felony murder. State v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. 1998).

Evidence supported the imposition of defendant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole for each premeditated murder charge because defendant killed two people and wounded a third. Moreover, although defendant relied on defendant's history of gainful employment and presented evidence that defendant was raised in a broken home and had a major depressive disorder, defendant did not show that the sentence was arbitrary, so as to constitute a gross abuse of the jury's discretion. State v. Pruitt, 510 S.W.3d 398, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 980 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

3. Notice Not to Seek Death Penalty.

When the state chooses not to seek the death penalty, a separate notice of its intention to seek life without parole must be given before the state may seek that punishment. State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. 2000).

39-13-208. Notice of penalty to be sought for capital offenses.

  1. Written notice that the state intends to seek the death penalty, filed pursuant to Rule 12.3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, shall constitute notice that the state also intends to seek, as a possible punishment, a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.
  2. Where a capital offense is charged in the indictment or presentment and the district attorney general intends to ask for the sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, written notice shall be filed not less than thirty (30) days prior to trial. If the notice is filed later than this time, the trial judge shall grant the defendant, upon motion by the defendant, a reasonable continuance of the trial. The notice shall specify that the state intends to seek the sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, and the notice shall specify the aggravating circumstance or circumstances the state intends to rely upon at a sentencing hearing. Specification may be complied with by a reference to the citation of the circumstance or circumstances. Such notice shall be in writing and filed with the court and served on counsel.
  3. If notice is not filed pursuant to subsection (a) or (b), the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life by the court, if the defendant is found guilty of murder in the first degree.
  4. The defendant and the state of Tennessee may enter into a plea agreement whereby the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Acts 1993, ch. 473, § 8.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section parallels Rule 12.3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for written notice that the state intends to seek the death penalty. Subsection (a) provides that written notice of intent to seek the death penalty also serves as notice of intent to seek the sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Under subsection (b), written notice of intent to seek the sentence of life without the possibility of parole, with the aggravating factors on which the state intends to rely, must be filed within thirty (30) days of trial. Failure to file notice will result in a sentence of life imprisonment, if the defendant is found guilty.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1993, ch. 473, § 16 provided that this section applies to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993.

Former § 39-13-208, concerning criminally negligent homicide, was transferred to § 39-13-212 in 1990.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee's Death Penalty: An Overview of the Procedural Safeguards, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 779 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

When the state chooses not to seek the death penalty, a separate notice of its intention to seek life without parole must be given before the state may seek that punishment. State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. 2000).

A lack of actual prejudice does not excuse a failure to give notice. State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. 2000).

Modification of defendant's sentence from life without the possibility of parole to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after she was convicted of first-degree murder and the facilitation of first-degree murder was appropriate because lack of written notice by the state pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-208 mandated a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. State v. Dych, 227 S.W.3d 21, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2007).

Case was remanded for resentencing under T.C.A. § 40-35-202 for aggravated rape under T.C.A. § 39-13-502(a)(2) as it was plain error under T.R.A.P. 36(b) to allow a post-trial sentencing position to cure a deficient pre-trial T.C.A. § 40-35-120(i)(2) notice, which had failed to state that defendant was a repeat violent offender, or to set forth the nature of the sodomy conviction as a qualifying prior conviction and the dates of the prior period of incarceration; the severity of the sentence required a result similar to that imposed for defective notices under T.C.A. 39-13-208(c). State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 870 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2010).

Defendant was not entitled to relief from the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing because there was no statutory violation, even though the State did not give notice, because it was not seeking life without possibility of parole for the instant crime and the trial court did not analyze the statutory aggravating factors. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2016).

2. Withdrawal of Notice.

The state's withdrawal of its original notice of its intention to seek the death penalty, without more, also operated to withdraw notice of its intention to seek life without parole. State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. 2000).

3. Life Sentence.

In a case where defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder during perpetration of aggravated child abuse or neglect, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to a sentence of life imprisonment without first holding a sentencing hearing as a life sentence was the minimum sentence allowed for first degree felony murder; and in failing to object to the trial court's imposition of an illegal sentence because a sentence of life imprisonment was not an indefinite amount of time; and the trial court was not required to specify a term of years when sentencing a defendant to life imprisonment. Blake v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 554 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

39-13-209. Sentencing where violation was committed by discharging firearm from within motor vehicle and victim was minor.

  1. Notwithstanding this part, a person convicted of a violation of § 39-13-211, § 39-13-212, or § 39-13-215 shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is otherwise provided if the violation occurred as provided in subsection (b).
  2. This section applies if:
    1. The violation was committed by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle, as defined by § 55-1-103; and
    2. The victim was a minor at the time of the violation.

Acts 2019, ch. 485, § 3.

Code Commission Notes.

Former § 39-13-209 (Acts 2007, ch. 549, §§ 1-7; 2008, ch. 1122, § 1), concerning the special committee to study the administration of the death penalty, was deleted as obsolete by the code commission in 2010.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 485, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “JaJuan Latham Act”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 485, § 4. July 1, 2019.

39-13-210. Second degree murder.

  1. Second degree murder is:
    1. A knowing killing of another;
    2. A killing of another that results from the unlawful distribution of any Schedule I or Schedule II drug, when the drug is the proximate cause of the death of the user; or
    3. A killing of another by unlawful distribution or unlawful delivery or unlawful dispensation of fentanyl or carfentanil, when those substances alone, or in combination with any substance scheduled as a controlled substance by the Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1989, compiled in chapter 17, part 4 of this title and in title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4, including controlled substance analogs, is the proximate cause of the death of the user.
  2. In a prosecution for a violation of this section, if the defendant knowingly engages in multiple incidents of domestic abuse, assault or the infliction of bodily injury against a single victim, the trier of fact may infer that the defendant was aware that the cumulative effect of the conduct was reasonably certain to result in the death of the victim, regardless of whether any single incident would have resulted in the death.
    1. Second degree murder is a Class A felony.
    2. Notwithstanding the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, compiled in title 40, chapter 35, a person convicted of a violation of subdivision (a)(2) where the victim is a minor shall be punished from within one (1) range higher than the sentencing range otherwise appropriate for the person.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-206; Acts 1990, ch. 980, § 6; 1990, ch. 1038, § 4; 1995, ch. 460, § 2; 2006, ch. 967, § 2; 2018, ch. 934, § 2; 2018, ch. 995, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section defines second degree murder and makes clear that the requisite mens rea for second degree murder is the “knowing” killing of another or that the killing be done recklessly as a result of unlawful distribution of a Schedule I or Schedule II drug. This section should always be read in conjunction with the first degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide statutes.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-210, concerning a viable fetus as victim, was transferred to § 39-13-214 in 1990.

Acts 2006, ch. 967, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the Christina Robinson Act of 2006.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2018, ch. 934, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as “Henry's Law.”

Amendments. The 2018 amendment by ch. 934 added (c)(2).

The 2018 amendment by ch. 995 added (a)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 934 § 3. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2018, ch. 995 § 2. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Admission to bail pending appeal, § 40-11-113.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

Schedule I and Schedule II drugs, §§ 39-17-406, 39-17-408.

Transfer from juvenile court, § 37-1-134.

Use of force defending residence against intruder, § 39-11-611.

Written request for charge on lesser included offense, § 40-18-110.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 32.3.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Automobiles, § 33; 14 Tenn. Juris., Homicide, §§ 12, 18, 60.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

Instructing the Jury on the Defense of Voluntary Intoxication in Tennessee, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 479 (1971).

Recent Developments — Tennessee Homicide Law, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 675 (1993).

Attorney General Opinions. Intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct will establish the culpable mental state for second-degree murder by unlawful distribution of illegal drugs.  As a practical matter, however, the mental-state element is recklessness. The standard of “conscious indifference” announced in State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984)  is not applicable.  OAG 14-72, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 74 (7/23/14)

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Elements.

2. —Knowing.

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's application of the aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) where the prosecution established that defendant was previously convicted of second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, because second degree murder requires a knowing killing of another under T.C.A. § 39-13-210, and especially aggravated robbery requires a robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon where the victim suffered serious bodily injury under T.C.A. § 39-13-403(a). State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

Once defendant shot the victim, he had committed a knowing killing and his actions and those of the officers after that point were not relevant to defendant's claim of self-defense; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the officer's statements. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

3. —Cause of Death.

The victim's decision to refuse medical care and court-ordered removal of artificial life support was not a superseding cause of death. State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

4. Presumption Abandoned.

Removing the second degree murder presumption will help clarify the law and avoid confusion; accordingly, while the Tennessee supreme court abandoned the second degree murder presumption, such abandonment of the second degree murder presumption is not a new constitutional rule which must be given retroactive application. State v. Jackson, 173 S.W.3d 401, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. 2005).

5. Lesser Included Offenses.

Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser charge of second-degree murder. State v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. 1996).

In a prosecution for first-degree murder, in which defendant was convicted for second-degree murder, it was reversible error not to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense, in light of the evidence of provocation by the victim. State v. Summerall, 926 S.W.2d 272, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1009 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Where evidence used to prove the offenses of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault was the same, defendant's convictions for both offenses were the “same” for purposes of Tenn. Const., art. I, § 10, prohibiting double jeopardy. State v. Hall, 947 S.W.2d 181, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Because the mental states required for the lesser offenses differ only in the level of culpability attached to each in terms of seriousness and punishment, the offense of second degree homicide is a lesser included offense of felony murder. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. 2001).

Reckless aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 2001).

Felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder; however, misdemeanor reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of second degree murder. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 2001).

Defendant could not be convicted of reckless aggravated assault on the theory it was a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder as application of the three-part Burns analysis for determining what constitutes a lesser included offense dictated reckless aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense; reckless aggravated assault requires proof of elements not required to prove attempted second degree murder and reckless aggravated assault does not involve a less serious harm or risk of harm to a person—indeed, it always involves bodily injury—whereas attempted second degree murder sometimes involves no injury at all to the victim. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 2001).

Court's error in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses was harmless because defendant shot the victim, an armored truck guard, in the back of the head and stole the victim's money deposit bag, he was identified as one of two men fleeing from the scene, and his criminal conduct was filmed by a surveillance camera. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Thomas v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 125, 163 L. Ed. 2d 131, 546 U.S. 855, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6959 (U.S. 2005).

In defendant's felony murder case, a trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder was waived for post-conviction relief because the trial court's error under State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 310, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. 1996), could have been presented on direct appeal but was not; additionally, the analysis in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 572 (Tenn. 1999), and State v. Ely , 48 S.W.3d 710, 721 (Tenn. 2001), was not applicable because there was no language in defendant's pre-Burns conviction suggesting that the court fashioned a new constitutional rule for retroactive application in post-conviction cases. Wiley v. State, 183 S.W.3d 317, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. 2006).

Regardless of whether part (b) of the test for lesser included offenses is abrogated by the statute, voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second degree murder and contains a statutory element establishing a different mental state indicating a lesser degree of culpability. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

While the facts of the case, defendant's sole act of firing one bullet toward the occupants of the apartment, would support a conviction for reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation or reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, these crimes are not lesser-included offenses of attempted second degree murder, with which defendant was charged. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

6. Attempt.

An attempt to commit second degree murder is a criminal offense in Tennessee. State v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 638, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Because the jury could have found that the defendant's conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim's death, that the defendant was not acting in self-defense, and that the defendant intended to kill the victim based upon the use of a deadly weapon, and the seriousness of the wounds inflicted, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of attempted second degree murder. State v. Inlow, 52 S.W.3d 101, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

Based on the character of and the circumstances surrounding the offense, specifically the number of times the victim was shot, the jury could conclude that the gun was not fired accidentally but that defendant knowingly shot the victim. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted second degree murder. State v. Henderson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempt to commit second degree murder. A reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant intentionally shot the victim with the knowledge that shooting the victim was reasonably certain to kill him. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for attempted second degree murder because the victim and eyewitnesses testified that the victim was standing on the sidewalk by the street with the victim's back to defendant and was unarmed when defendant crossed the street, called to the victim, and shot the victim as the victim was turning around. The victim and the eyewitnesses all testified that neither the victim, nor the victim's family had approached or yelled at defendant immediately prior to the shooting and that they were all unarmed. State v. Floyd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Defendant was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal because sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for attempted second-degree murder, as the evidence showed defendant approached the victim from behind and slashed the victim's throat from ear to ear. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018).

Evidence that defendant grabbed merchandise from a store and left without paying for it, that a loss prevention employee approached defendant and brought him back to his office, that defendant was knocking over tables and yelling profanity and threatened to kill the employee, and that while in the employee's office, defendant used a telephone cord to strangle the employee until he lost consciousness was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and theft. State v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 679 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2018).

Evidence that defendant, by his own admission, was in the middle of a heated argument with the victim when he went to the closet, retrieved his gun, turned, and fired multiple shots directly at her was sufficient to support his conviction for attempted second degree murder. State v. Dean, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

7. Multiple Offenses.

Offenses of second degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in a felony are separate and distinct, and merger of convictions would not be appropriate. Dixon v. State, 934 S.W.2d 69, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

8. Transferred Intent.

Court rejects as inapplicable any theory of transferred intent; the question remains, however, whether a wayward single-shot scenario that results in no injuries may ever result in multiple convictions for attempt to commit a murder, and such a question is resolved by analyzing the circumstances of each given case. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

9. Double Jeopardy.

Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V, and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10 barred defendant's retrial on first-degree premeditated murder after the conviction was reversed by the appellate court for insufficient evidence, the appellate court reduced the conviction to second-degree murder, the State did not appeal, and the state's highest court reversed the second-degree murder and abuse of a corpse convictions; defendant could be tried again for second-degree murder and abuse of a corpse. State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Defendant only employed the firearm one time and thus multiple convictions of attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony would have run afoul of the prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

In denying defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, because especially aggravated robbery had to involve a theft, be accomplished with a deadly weapon, and result in serious bodily injury to the victim, but second-degree murder involved the intent to kill someone, separate convictions for especially aggravated robbery and attempted second-degree murder did not violate principles of double jeopardy, and trial counsel's failure to seek merger or appellate counsel's failure to argue such as error on appeal did not constitute deficient performance. Dickerson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2020).

10. Evidence.

The crime of second degree murder can be established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Collins, 986 S.W.2d 13, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Nov. 2, 1998).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain a second degree murder conviction because the only proof that defendant caused a head injury to the victim were the victim's reports that defendant “put her to the ground” and that she subsequently suffered a headache; there was no proof that defendant was aware that his treatment of the victim was “reasonably certain” to cause her death. State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2011).

11. —Prior Convictions.

In a prosecution for second-degree murder, it was error to admit evidence of a prior felony, also a murder, to impeach defendant's credibility, since a prior murder does not necessarily go to defendant's credibility; however, since the nature of the prior felony was not revealed to the jury, and since evidence of another attempted felony conviction was presented at trial, the error was harmless. State v. Summerall, 926 S.W.2d 272, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1009 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

12. —Sufficient.

Where the victim, defendant's infant child, died of malnutrition and dehydration, evidence showing that defendant lived in the same household with the victim, that deterioration of the child was evident and the need for medical attention apparent, and that defendant elected not to seek medical assistance, would have been sufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder had there been no other error in the trial. State v. Bordis, 905 S.W.2d 214, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of second-degree murder, a knowing killing of another, beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Summerall, 926 S.W.2d 272, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1009 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Meade, 942 S.W.2d 561, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for attempted second-degree murder. State v. Freeman, 943 S.W.2d 25, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Person can act knowingly irrespective of desire that conduct or result will occur when that person is aware of nature of conduct or where conduct is reasonably certain to cause result. State v. Gray, 960 S.W.2d 598, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support conviction of defendant whose full-term infant drowned in a commode minutes after defendant gave birth to the child. State v. Collins, 986 S.W.2d 13, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Nov. 2, 1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second degree murder where defendant shot at victim's car from a distance of one to one and one-half car lengths, which is reasonably certain to result in the death of an occupant. State v. Kelley, 34 S.W.3d 471, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2000).

Habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief under 28 USCS § 2254 for his conviction of second-degree murder because a state appellate court was not unreasonable in determining that although the evidence was all circumstantial, it was not so deficient that no rational trier of fact could have found the inmate guilty of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt; the petitioner had fired shots at a crowded club and one of those shots penetrated a board-covered window and struck and killed the victim standing in the back of the club. Eady v. Morgan,  515 F.3d 587, 2008 FED App. 73P, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3084 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2008), cert. denied, 172 L. Ed. 2d 232, 129 S. Ct. 321555 U.S. 933, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6200 (U.S. 2008).

Evidence that there were conflicts between the victim and defendant because of defendant's continuing use of illegal drugs and indifferent attitude towards her education; that defendant had expressed an interest in the amount of the victim's assets, their disposition in the case of the victim's death, and wanting money from the victim; that there was a two-hour block of time on the night in question when defendant's cell phone was silent and she had the opportunity to commit the crime; that defendant suffered an injury to her hand on the night in question, for which she gave varying explanations; and that defendant lacked surprise or shock in the days following the crime supported defendant's conviction for second degree murder. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1003 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012), modified, 444 S.W.3d 554, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Aug. 22, 2014).

Evidence that defendant shot the victim in the abdomen at close range, which was likely to cause the victim's death, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for second degree murder and reckless homicide. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2013), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 49, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. June 3, 2015).

Reasonable jury could have found that defendant was guilty of second degree murder based on evidence that defendant purchased a gun and bullets the day before the shooting shot the victim two times in the heart and the head. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 920 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2015), cert. denied, Taylor v. Tennessee, 192 L. Ed. 2d 158, 135 S. Ct. 2368, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3523 (U.S. 2015).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction because, although defendant claimed that a shotgun accidentally discharged, a law enforcement agent performed function tests on the shotgun and found that it would not accidentally discharge as defendant claimed. The doctor who performed an autopsy of the victim testified that the doctor believed that the victim was lying flat on floor when shot, and defendant held a baseball bat to demonstrate how the shotgun was pointed downward when the shot was fired. State v. Ramsey, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2015), cert. denied, Ramsey v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2809, 192 L. Ed. 2d 853, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3727 (U.S. June 8, 2015).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for second degree murder and reckless homicide because (1) the evidence showed defendant shot the victim in the torso at close range, supporting second degree murder, and (2) evidence sufficient to support second degree murder was also sufficient to support a conviction for reckless homicide. State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. June 3, 2015).

Evidence that the victim and defendants were all members of a street gang, that one defendant possessed a handgun, that defendants beat the victim until he was unconscious, and that the victim was in a medically-induced coma for nine weeks and needed physically therapy to walk and talk again was sufficient to support defendants' convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Evidence that defendant shot the victim once in the chest from a distance of less than 18 inches following an argument was sufficient to support his conviction for second-degree murder. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

Since defendant conceded that he shot the victims and the jury could have inferred that he acted knowingly by firing multiple shots at the victims from relatively close range, the jury was not required to credit defendant's claim that he could not formulate the necessary mens rea, and the evidence supported defendant's convictions for second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. State v. Bonsky, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's second degree murder conviction because the evidence showed defendant knowingly killed his wife, her twin sister, and his wife's lover and did not kill these victims in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation; although defendant claimed he killed the victims in a state of passion after discovering all three women engaged in sexual activity, no DNA evidence supported his claim that the victims were engaged in such activity, and all victims were fully clothed at the time of their death and were killed in three separate areas of the apartment, plus the victims'; injuries were consistent with knowing killings. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because defendant and one of the victims had a dispute over money; on the day of the incident, defendant sped through traffic to cut off the vehicle carrying the two victims; defendant waved a handgun and exited his vehicle, demanding money; defendant took money given to him by one of the victims; he then shot the decedent four times, several times while the victim was already down, shot the other victim once, and fired at least nine rounds; and defendant then discarded his handgun, fled the scene, and hid inside of a truck. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon because, without a prior disagreement or provocation, defendant drew a gun while the victim's back was turned, pointed it at the victim, and shot him when he attempted to escape, the shooting was a substantial step toward killing the victim, firing the gun was an intentional act, the victim believed that defendant intended to rob him, defendant did not attempt to render aid to the victim, left the scene, and hid in his mother's attic, and the parties stipulated that defendant had two prior felony convictions involving violence and/or drugs. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second-degree murder where, by defendant's own admission, the victim was in the car with the door shut when he walked up and shot the passenger-side window out of the vehicle where the victim was sitting, there was no testimony that the victim was attempting to threaten defendant at that time, and defendant walked around to the front of the car, told the driver to move, and then shot the unarmed victim several more times. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of attempted second degree murder because defendant intentionally chased after one victim with his truck and unsuccessfully attempted to hit that victim; defendant also intentionally chased after a second victim with his truck and successfully struck her several times and caused her injury, and he did not after making explicit and implicit threats. State v. Rush, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2016).

Evidence defendant waited for the victim in a parking lot, walked to his car while she loaded groceries and returned with a gun, was angry and repeatedly struck her in the head with his gun, and shot the victim's hands and abdomen supported a conviction for attempted second degree murder. State v. Vinson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's second-degree murder conviction where it showed that he knowingly shot the unarmed victim in the head causing her death, as he admitted to several witness that he was holding the weapon when the victim was shot, there had been an argument, and after the shooting defendant took his children to a neighbor's house before calling 911 and hiding the weapon. State v. Cundiff, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016).

Evidence supported convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, and the employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous offense, as defendant admitted helping plan the robbery, driving the assailants to the victim's home, and that he expected to be compensated, and the jury determined the offenses against the victim's friend were a natural and probable consequence of attempting to rob the murder victim at gunpoint. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 714 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2017).

Verbal altercation between the victim and defendant and the victim's threats to kill defendant, standing alone, could not provide sufficient provocation for taking a life, and the victim's breaking of a glass or turning toward defendant were not sufficient provocation to have caused defendant to act in an irrational manner; it was within the province of the jury to reject voluntary manslaughter, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for second degree murder. State v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 871 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2016).

Evidence that defendant went to a residence and asked the victim to come outside to settle some business, the victim came out, defendant pulled out a handgun and pointed it at the victim, the victim charged, and defendant fired the gun, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted second degree murder. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2016), modified, 538 S.W.3d 431, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Nov. 30, 2017).

Defendant's conviction for second degree murder was supported by sufficient evidence; defendant and his friend fired into a crowd of people multiple times, striking and killing the victim, and defendant later admitted his involvement in the shooting. State v. Waller, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 935 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's second-degree murder conviction because a jury could reasonably infer that defendant knowingly killed the victim. State v. Hollingsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's second degree murder conviction because (1) any reasonable belief of imminent danger of death or serious injury, mutual combat, or adequate provocation ended when defendant got control of the victim's gun, and (2) nothing showed a gun was fired at defendant. State v. Birchfield, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (Tenn. June 7, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second-degree murder because a witness and the victim gave accounts of witnessing defendant stab the victim multiple times after an argument, and a paramedic testified that the victim had to be transported to the hospital for immediate surgery. State v. Rahman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017).

Conviction for the attempted second degree murder of one victim was affirmed, as she was standing visibly in the window and made eye contact with defendant before he fired the shot. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  second-degree murder convictions where it established that defendants approached the victim and his friends at an apartment complex, produced guns, fired multiple shots at the victim, and fled the scene. State v. Flynn, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 600 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder, rather than voluntary manslaughter, because it showed that in the months prior to the shooting arguments between defendant and his wife had escalated, defendant admitted to policy that after escaping his wife with the knife he retrieved his loaded handgun from the shed and aimed it at his wife, an agent concluded that the handgun was not malfunctioning, and a physician testified that the gun had been fired from between six inches and three feet. State v. Langston, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Evidence that the victim challenged defendant to a “one on one,” the victim took off his shirt in preparation for the fight, then defendant reached for a concealed gun in his pants and shot the victim and attempted to shoot another individual, and the victim was unarmed was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second-degree murder. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of second-degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery because it showed that defendant and his friend accosted the victim outside the victim's residence, defendant forced the victim to the ground at gunpoint and rifled through his pockets before fleeing with his friend, a short time later while the victim and another man were driving around searching for the robbers defendant fired 14 gunshots from a semiautomatic handgun at the victim's vehicle and struck the victim in the head, killing him. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 652 (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted second degree murder as the State proved that he acted knowingly when he shot one of the victims in the back during the robbery because the two victims were lured to an apartment complex under the pretext of buying a gaming system and a television; defendant pointed a gun at them and robbed them; as they ran away, defendant fired gunshots in their direction; one of the bullets hit one of the victims in the back; and the jury was at liberty to infer that defendant knew that firing a gun in the direction of the victims as they attempted to escape the robbery could have resulted in their deaths. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 840 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Evidence that defendant shot eleven bullets at the vehicle the victims were riding in was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. State v. Donaldson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's identity as the shooter because the victim knew defendant, the victim testified regarding his unique haircut and gait, the jury was presented with video of the shooter as well as video of defendant filmed with the same equipment at the same location under similar circumstances, the shooter's appearance was consistent with defendant's in physique, movement, and general hairstyle, both had a similarly shaped tattoo in the same location, the shooter and defendant appeared to be wearing the same shoes, and the victim testified that he was certain the shooter depicted on film was defendant. State v. Myles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 787 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence that defendant and codefendant fired 19 shots at the victim while the victim ran and continued to shoot at the victim after he fell to the ground, hitting him a total of 13 times and leaving him paralyzed and in a wheelchair, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted second-degree murder. State v. Cunningham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder because he was home with the victim, his mother, on the morning she died; defendant's wife saw him in the victim's room in the hours before her death; the wife heard a scream and, when she questioned defendant about what had happened, he responded, from the victim's room, that the victim had fallen and that he would take care of her; the victim was found hours later in her bedroom having been beaten to death; the day before her death, defendant sold the victim's jewelry for cash; the victim's blood was found on defendant's clothes; and it was defendant who was last seen with the victim in the hours shortly before she died. State v. Knight, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for facilitation of attempted second degree murder under T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1), 39-12-101(a), 39-11-403; a reasonable juror could have found that defendant knew his accomplice intended to knowingly kill the victim and defendant substantially assisted his accomplice by handing him the gun, and the victim's eventual death did not mean that defendant's conviction for attempt could not stand. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Defendant's argument that he could not form the requisite specific intent to commit the offenses due to his alleged intoxication was rejected by the jury, and thus, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated burglary, burglary of a vehicle, two counts of theft, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Goss, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder because the 12-year-old victim testified that his mother, the murder victim, placed her handgun on the kitchen counter, that defendant was the only person with a weapon at the time of the shooting, and that he heard gunshots fired and heard his mother scream as he ran away from their home; two neighbors testified that they heard gunshots and then saw defendant standing outside before she returned to her home and turned out the lights; a special agent testified that the bullet that was recovered from the murder victim's body was fired by defendant's pistol; and defendant admitted that she pulled out her pistol and shot the murder victim several times. State v. Grant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second degree murder because it showed that defendant approached the victims after they left a store, he pulled out his gun, the victims began walking backwards, defendant attempted to hit one victim with a glass bottle, both victims fell, and when the second victim reached for the gun defendant shot him. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder because it showed that he shot the victim several times after he greeted the victim at his door, the victim identified his shooter using a known nickname for defendant, the casings recovered from the crime scene matched the weapon owned by defendant, and the medical examiner testified that the victim's cause of death was the result of multiple gunshot wounds. State v. Starks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted first-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder because it showed that he fired at unarmed victims and an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry testified that defendant was capable of premeditating his actions and was deceptive in his interview. State v. Starks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second degree murder because defendant, unlawfully armed with a gun, went to an apartment unit unannounced and in violation of a trespass notification to see defendant's children and engaged in an argument with their mother, shot the unarmed victim in the chest, ultimately causing the victim's death, and fled the scene, disposed of the weapon, and hid from police. Although there was evidence that defendant was fearful and acted in self-defense, the jury rejected this theory. State v. Jennings, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of second-degree murder because when he exited the club, someone handed him a handgun, and he immediately turned and shot the unarmed victims, killing them. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2018).

Evidence that defendant and his accomplice fired at least 12 shots at the victims was sufficient to show that defendant intentionally shot the victims with the knowledge that shooting them was reasonably certain to kill them and thus, supported defendant's convictions for attempted second-degree murder and unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. State v. Orozco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted second-degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because, in an apparent fit of road rage, defendant pulled an AK-47 style weapon from his van and shot into the passenger side of the victim's semi-tractor trailer truck, striking him in both legs, and while defendant argued that he was trying to send the victim a message by shooting the engine of the truck, any rational juror could have concluded that he intentionally engaged in conduct that would have, if completed, resulted in the knowing killing of the victim. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018).

Evidence that defendant and the victim got into an argument in a club, defendant left, got his gun, put it in his pants, returned to an area outside a club, and then fired multiple shots at the victim, who was unarmed, when the victim was about five feet from defendant was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second degree murder. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder because she admitted that she grabbed the rifle out of the closet and shot the victim, the medical testimony was that the victim died of a single gunshot wound to the front of his torso, defendant sent text messages to multiple people claiming that she “shot him,” a rifle was found near the victim's body, and a single shell casing was found at the end of the main hallway of the house. State v. Sherlin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 24, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's first degree and second degree murder convictions because defendant confessed that defendant and an accomplice discussed killing the victim, defendant and the accomplice purchased ammunition for the victim's gun and a box of gloves on the day of the murder, a witness testified that the victim was with defendant and the accomplice on the day of the killing, defendant confessed that both defendant and the accomplice shot the victim, defendant helped dispose of evidence, and defendant's DNA was found on evidence. State v. Briggs, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 2, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for second degree murder and aggravated child abuse because both a pediatrician, who treated the victim, and a forensic pathologist, who performed the victim's autopsy, testified that the infant victim's death was the result of physical abuse. Furthermore, defendant admitted to a jail inmate that defendant shook the victim multiple times because the victim would not stop crying and then threw the victim onto a mattress during which time the victim possibly hit the victim's head on a wall. State v. Russell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 3, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

Evidence that the victim identified defendant as the assailant, witnesses testified that defendant and the victim both dated the same girl and there was animosity between them because of it, defendant's car matched the description of the vehicle used during the killing, the victim's cell phone was located near defendant's car, and defendant shut off his cell phone and video surveillance systems during the time of the murder was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second-degree murder. State v. Wiggins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder because it showed that after an argument, defendant fired multiple shots at the unarmed victim who was attempting to run, both of the shots into the victim's back would have been fatal, and defendant left the scene and threw away his weapon. The jury rejected defendant's argument that he had adequate provocation for the shooting. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of attempted second degree murder because defendant knowingly fired at least four rounds into the tow truck containing the two victims; the evidence presented at trial established that defendant was not standing in front of the tow truck when he fired his weapon; the jury rightfully rejected defendant's argument that his actions were justified because he was in state of passion caused by the towing of his brother's truck; one victim was permanently paralyzed from the armpits down; and it was apparent from the record that the jury heard and rejected defendant's self-defense argument at trial. State v. Proffitt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's second-degree murder conviction because it showed that the night before the murder defendant had spent the night with another woman, when he returned to the victim's home she had thrown his clothes outside and told him to get out which angered defendant, he retrieved his gun and returned to the victim's apartment, they argued, and defendant shot the victim in the head. Tenn. v. Satterfield, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder because he testified that he hit the victim with a machete; the doctor who performed the autopsy testified that it would have been difficult for the victim to have inflicted the wounds on her back, head, and hands; and a jury could have concluded that defendant's hitting the victim with the machete multiple times was reasonably certain to cause her death. State v. Simpson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Evidence that defendant and two others drove to meet the victim, the victim was behind a dumpster and defendant approached the victim and fired multiple shots at the victim as he tried to run away, which was corroborated by accomplice testimony and proof of details concerning how the offense occurred, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second-degree murder. State v. Pruitt, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 212 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder because it showed that defendant was forbidden from coming to the victims'  house while his ex-girlfriend was staying there,he walked into the victims'  house and shot one victim three times in the back as she stood in the living room, and he then proceeded to shoot her son before searching for for the ex-girlfriend. State v. Burrow, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree felony murder and second-degree murder because there was ample evidence to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the victim's murder, including a witness's testimony concerning what occurred in the victim apartment just before and after the murder, the victim's blood being found on defendant's shoes, and defendant's incriminating statements during phone calls after his arrest. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's second degree murder conviction because defendant admitted to stabbing the victim; defendant told a police investigator that defendant shoved the victim down, stabbed the victim in the back of the neck, and held the victim until the victim quit moving; the knife was found in defendant's possession; the victim did not have any defensive wounds; and, according to the medical examiner, the evidence was consistent with defendant's being behind the victim and stabbing the victim in the back of the head. State v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2019).

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant knowingly killed one victim and attempted to kill a second victim, including evidence that defendant, armed with a semiautomatic pistol, lay in wait until an accomplice moved away and then opened fire on the victims, followed the victims as they tried to escape, and stated he would have kept shooting if his gun had not jammed. State v. Wren, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's second-degree murder conviction because defendant and defendant's family had been harassing the victim and victim's family for a long period of time by constantly recording them and defendant and defendant's adult son routinely displaying weapons while walking in front of the victim's home in an attempt to intimidate the victim. The evidence supported the inference that the victim was shot multiple times close to where defendant's body was discovered in a ditch on the victim's side of a highway. State v. Waggoner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of second-degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide because her friend's testimony established that defendant pulled the trigger on the gun that killed the three victims, the testimony was corroborated by the fact that defendant's fingerprint was on a receipt recovered from one victim's vehicle, a witness testified that defendant entered his home with blood on her clothes and a pistol that was not fully loaded, and the pistol was one of the types of pistol that could have fire the bullets recovered from the crime scene. State v. Isaac, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's second degree murder conviction because there was direct evidence in defendant's varying statements concerning the victim's death and circumstantial evidence, which included the testimony by the victim's parent that defendant argued with the victim hours before the victim's death, expert medical testimony that the victim's gunshot wounds were not self-inflicted as defendant claimed, and a police sergeant's testimony that the pistol used to kill the victim—with whom defendant was living—had likely been wiped off. State v. Dodd, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2019).

Evidence that defendant entered the home and pointed a handgun at the victims, chased the victims when they fled, and returned fire when shot at was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempt to commit second degree murder. State v. Wilkins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder as defendant's injecting the victim with a drug was a proximate cause of her death because the victim was not incapacitated due to drug use prior to defendant's injecting her with the drug, in that she was able to drive and hold a conversation; defendant injected the victim with the drug, after which the victim immediately slumped over on a couch; the victim died shortly thereafter; the victim had more than seven times the amount of a lethal dose of the drug in her system; and the jury was free to reject defendant's testimony regarding the amount of the drug purchased and injected into the victim. State v. Rutherford, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for second-degree murder because defendant knowingly killed the victim beyond a reasonable doubt as defendant approached the victim when the victim was walking, defendant confronted the victim about a rumor of the victim hitting defendant's sibling, the victim put the victim's arm around defendant in a friendly way, and defendant fatally shot the victim. Although defendant claimed that he shot the victim in self-defense, the victim was neither acting aggressively towards defendant, nor carrying a gun. State v. Branch, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's second degree murder conviction; the victim did not want defendant to leave and pushed him as he attempted to walk by her, defendant looked for a knife, stabbed the victim twice in the back, placed the knife in a drawer and he immediately left the scene. The jury was instructed on defendant's claim of self-defense, but the jury clearly discredited his testimony, as was the jury's prerogative. State v. Land, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2020).

Defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder and other offenses because witnesses testified that the victim was the primary aggressor failed because a reasonable juror could have found that defendant's self-defense claim was not well-founded given the victim's testimony that he had not drawn his gun when defendant opened fire and that defendant turned and walked toward the victim when the victim came outside, engaging further rather than continuing to walk away. State v. Cole, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim's identification of defendant in a photographic lineup and at trial was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator, and the jury could consider defendant's accomplice's testimony because it was sufficiently corroborated by the victim's testimony. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions because it showed that a co-defendant and defendant made a plan to “hit a lick” on Hispanic people, obtained a working magazine for the malfunctioning handgun, armed themselves, and asked another co-defendant to drive them around town to identify vulnerable targets. After choosing a house, the co-defendant and defendant walked back to the house, fired two shots into the air, and ordered the victims onto the ground, one of the men took a victim's wallet, and when they were surprised by the victims inside the house opening the door, the co-defendant and defendant opened fire, striking the house and four people present. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder because it established that defendant went to the victim's house and shot the victim in the back of the head at a range of three to four inches while the victim was washing dishes. Defendant admitted shooting the victim, and, although defendant testified that he shot the victim in self-defense after the victim threatened him with a knife, the State presented evidence that contradicted defendant's testimony. State v. Donaldson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020).

Testimony that defendant drove the vehicle from which two weapons fired multiple gunshots and evidence that three victims were shot and one died from her wounds permitted the jury to infer defendant knew that firing a gun at the home which he knew to be filled with people could have resulted in any of their deaths and thus supported defendant's convictions for second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and possession of a firearm during the attempt. State v. Parham, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's second degree murder conviction because codefendant brought a handgun to take money from the victim, an altercation occurred, defendant obtained the gun during the altercation, defendant pointed the gun at the victim and fired it multiple times, and the gunshot wounds resulted in the victim's death. Defendant acted with an awareness that defendant's conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim's death. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of second degree murder and unlawful possession of a handgun because the surveillance video showed defendant near the sidewalk outside the club when he started shooting the victim, there were no witnesses that testified the victim made any threats, verbal or otherwise, toward defendant, and the surveillance video did not show the victim in the possession of a weapon, and the only weapon found near the scene was the handgun which contained defendant's DNA. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder because defendant's conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim's death based upon the use of a big carving knife to stab the victim twice; the depth of those wounds, as well as the significant force needed to inflict the frontal wound; and his failure to seek immediate medical assistance for the victim. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for second-degree murder because he admitted to shooting the victim numerous times, after defendant knocked on the front door the victim indicated he did not want the defendant in the home and an altercation ensued, defendant fired two gunshots, as the victim ran defendant fired two additional gunshots at the victim's back, defendant then approached the victim, who was incapacitated on the ground, and shot him in the chest. State v. Walton, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

Evidence that the surviving victim saw defendant with a gun, saw the deceased victim grab his chest, and defendant shot the surviving victim in the face and knee was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted second degree murder because the video from the store's security cameras showed that defendant looked in the store employee's direction prior to approaching the service counter and demanding money from the victim, and after shooting the victim, defendant turned and fired his gun once in the direction of the fleeing employee. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly attempted to kill a deputy where it showed that the deputy spotted the defendant speeding and attempted to effectuate a traffic stop, defendant failed to stop and led the deputy on a chase for approximately 20 minutes, and when defendant stopped his car, he exited his vehicle while holding a gun in his left hand and fired at least one shot in the direction of the deputy, who was outside of his vehicle at that point. State v. Ochoa-Puentes, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 643 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2020).

13. —Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's second-degree murder conviction as the State failed to prove that the victim used methamphetamine and that her use of the drug was the proximate cause of her death. No witness testified regarding the cause in fact of the victim's death. State v. Pack, 421 S.W.3d 629, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2013).

Defendant's sole act of firing one bullet toward the occupants of an apartment was not sufficient to support three convictions for attempted second degree murder, as the evidence did not show that he acted with the objective to cause the killing of three victims or that he believed firing one bullet would cause the killing of three victims, who were spread out across two rooms, without further conduct on his part. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018).

14. Enhancement Factors.

Exceptional cruelty is not an element of attempted second-degree murder and may be considered as an enhancement factor in the commission of the offense. State v. Hall, 947 S.W.2d 181, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

15. Defenses.

Language in the second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes, is unambiguous: both statutes are devoid of any indication that voluntary manslaughter is a defense or partial defense to the crime of second degree murder; instead, these statutes make it clear that voluntary manslaughter is a separate criminal offense rather than a defense to second degree murder. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Statute does not identify state of passion as a defense to first or second degree murder and does no more than generally describe defenses within the context of the State's burden of proof; the legislature plainly intended for state of passion produced by adequate provocation to be an element of the separate offense of voluntary manslaughter, not a defense to second degree murder. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's second degree murder conviction because (1) the State provided sufficient evidence refuting defendant's claim that defendant acted in self-defense, and (2) the verdict showed the jury found defendant's account lacking. State v. Lackey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's second-degree murder conviction and the jury properly rejected his self-defense claim; despite defendant's claim that he never heard the numerous police announcements of a search warrant, he also admitted that he could not see what was going on and just grabbed his gun and shot, and the jury could have found that defendant did not have a reasonable belief of imminent danger of death or serious bodily. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

16. Sentencing.

Partially consecutive sentence of 30 years was justified under the circumstances of this case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the dangerous offender classification; the dangerous offender factor was certainly applicable to defendant's three convictions for second degree murder, and his sentence was necessary to protect the public from further crimes by him. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Length of defendant's sentences for second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction were appropriate because the sentences were within the applicable ranges; and the trial court identified several enhancing factors on the record as defendant had one prior felony and one prior misdemeanor drug conviction in addition to a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault, and he was on probation at the time of the current offense and previously had a sentence of probation revoked. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Defendant's consecutive sentences for second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction were appropriate because the sentence for employment of a firearm was statutorily required to be consecutive to the sentence for the accompanying dangerous felony conviction; as for the other two convictions, defendant was a dangerous offender as his behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high; and the extended confinement was necessary to protect society from defendant's behavior and was reasonably related to the underlying offenses. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Defendant did not show defendant's 22-year sentence was excessive because, (1) as a range I offender convicted of a class A felony, defendant's sentence range was 15 to 25 years, (2) any inadequacy in the court's articulation of the reasons for imposing the sentence did not negate the sentence's presumption of correctness, and (3) the record belied defendant's claim that the trial court's reasons for imposing the sentence were inadequate, as the court systematically went through attendant statutory requirements, and the court weighed and imposed mitigating and enhancement factors. State v. Lackey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016).

Trial court did not err by imposing the maximum sentence for defendant's second-degree murder conviction where it found three enhancement factors, including defendant's prior history of criminal convictions, his employing a firearm during the commission of the offense, and being on probation at the time of the offense, and it clearly stated that it had considered all of the relevant sentencing information. State v. Cundiff, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a mid-range, 20-year sentence for second-degree murder; the trial court, in considering the purposes of sentencing, gave great weight to the fact that defendant employed a firearm during the commission of the offense and some weight to the fact that defendant had no hesitation about committing the offense when the risk to human life was high, and he did not overcome the presumption of reasonableness granted to the in-range sentence. State v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 871 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing one defendant to the maximum 25-year sentence and the second defendant to 24 years because the sentences were within range, the first defendant's disagreement with the trial court's weighing of the enhancement factors was not a ground for appeal, and the second defendant did not identify the mitigating factors that he believed the trial court should have applied. State v. Flynn, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 600 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Defendant's mid-range sentence of 20 years for his second-degree murder conviction was not excessive where the record did not support the application of any mitigating factors, the trial court applied the enhancement factors that defendant possessed or employed a firearm during the commission of the offense and two children where present when he shot his wife, and the trial court properly considered the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Langston, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentencing for defendant's attempted second degree murder and aggravated robbery convictions because defendant was eligible for consecutive sentencing based upon his extensive criminal history and the determination that he was a dangerous offender; defendant was previously convicted of criminal attempt, car-jacking, where he violated his diversion, by picking up a weapons offense; defendant robbed the victims at gunpoint and fired multiple shots at them as they attempted to escape; and the trial court found that the circumstances of the offenses were aggravated and stated that the length of the sentence was reasonably related to the offenses for which defendant was convicted. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 840 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Trial court could not have predicated the application of the enhancement factor under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(10), related to defendant having no hesitation when the risk to human life was high, on the risk to the victim's own life, but the risk to the life of the victim's son might qualify, as he was inside the residence at the time of the shooting and that the victim was shot from behind; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying this factor in connection with defendant's second-degree murder conviction. State v. Flippen, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 594 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 682 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

In connection with defendant's second-degree murder conviction, nothing in the record supported a finding that the victim's son was injured, killed, had property stolen, or had property destroyed, and thus the trial court erred in applying the enhancement factor under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(3), that the offense involved multiple victims. State v. Flippen, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 594 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 682 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

Even if the trial court misapplied certain enhancements, that was not a basis for reversal, as the trial court properly considered the statutory criteria and properly applied other enhancement factors, and the 20-year sentence for second-degree murder was consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Flippen, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 594 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 682 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to 22 years in prison for second-degree murder because the record showed that it carefully considered the evidence as well has the proposed enhancement and mitigating factors, and it applied three enhancement factors based on defendant's criminal history, his use of a firearm during the offense, and his release on probation five days before murdering the instant victim. Tenn. v. Satterfield, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Despite the trial court's misapplication of the enhancement factor based on selecting the victim based upon her gender, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to a within-range sentence of 25 years for second degree murder because the trial court properly applied the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. State v. Simpson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Sentence of 24 years for second degree murder was supported by finding that defendant had a history of criminal convictions and behavior, was a leader in the commission of the offense involving two or more actors, previously failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community, possessed a firearm during the offense, had no hesitation about committing a crime where the risk to human life was high, and was on probation when the felony offense wss committed. State v. Pruitt, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 212 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2019).

Defendant's 22-year sentence for second degree murder was not excessive because the sentence was within the 15 to 25-year statutory range; the trial court did not place significant weight upon the number of firearm crimes and deaths in the county in imposing a sentence but placed significant weight on defendant's use of a firearm in killing the victim as an enhancement factor; in considering defendant's statement, the trial court did not err in determining that defendant failed to accept responsibility for his actions, and that he, thus, was not remorseful as his claim that the victim's death was accidental was not supported by the evidence; and the trial court considered all relevant sentencing principles when imposing the sentence. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2019).

For defendant's conviction for second-degree murder and other crimes, while the trial court did not include the word severity in its sentencing analysis, it was clear the trial court properly considered the case law factors and did not abuse its discretion in ordering consecutive terms. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

For defendant's sentence for second-degree murder and other crimes, the trial court properly considered the sentencing principles and guidelines and meticulously reviewed each conviction and the statutory enhancement and mitigating factors applicable to each conviction, such that defendant failed to show how the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. State v. Campbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to 20 years in prison for second-degree murder because defendant's sentencing range was 15-25 years, the trial court found one enhancement factor, that defendant used a firearm in the commission of the offense, and it gave a lot of credit to that very strong enhancing factor that a firearm was taken into the victim's house and he was shot in the back of the head at a distance of three to four inches. State v. Donaldson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020).

Trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to 22 years incarceration for his conviction of second-degree murder because it was a within-range sentence and it properly determined that the use of a deadly weapon and exceptional cruelty enhancement factors outweighed any mitigating factors, as defendant fired numerous fatal shots at the victim, first in the back and then, after consideration, in the chest, from a close range. State v. Walton, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

17. Inconsistent Verdicts.

Inconsistent verdicts convicting defendant of both second degree murder and reckless homicide did not entitle defendant to relief because (1) inconsistent verdicts were not a basis for relief, and (2) the proper merger of reckless homicide into second degree murder avoided a double jeopardy violation. State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. June 3, 2015).

18. Instructions.

Trial court distinguished the offenses of voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder and provided clarity; the jury was informed of the differences between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter at the moment when they were considering whether defendant was guilty of second degree murder, and thus his argument that the sequential jury instructions prevented the jury from ever finding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter was unpersuasive. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Jury instructions regarding second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter fairly submitted the legal issues and contained a proper statement of the applicable law; the instructions, which advised the jury as to the issue of passion upon adequate provocation in the description of second degree murder, did not alone infect the entire trial or result in a conviction that violated due process, and the instructions given were substantively the same as those suggested in pattern instructions, which had been upheld in the past. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

In defendant's first-degree murder trial, the jury was properly instructed on the offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and thus the trial court did not err in denying the requested instruction; the instructions mirrored the statutory definitions, plus the trial court substantially comported with pattern jury instructions. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Sequential jury instructions did not violate defendant's right to due process and a trial by jury by preventing the jury from considering the offense of voluntary manslaughter during his second-degree murder trial because the instructions were consistent with the instructions outlined in State v. Page  and substantially followed the 2001 version of the pattern jury instructions. State v. Langston, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

39-13-211. Voluntary manslaughter.

  1. Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional or knowing killing of another in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner.
  2. Voluntary manslaughter is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-207; Acts 1990, ch. 1038, § 4.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

While the terminology is slightly different from the common law definition of voluntary manslaughter, the basic principles of voluntary manslaughter remain intact in this section. First, the defendant's “passions” must be produced by “adequate provocation” which would lead a “reasonable person” to act in an irrational manner. The latter phrase “irrational manner” is utilized so as to encompass a broad consideration of mental states produced by adequate provocation. This section should also be read in conjunction with § 39-13-201, which defines a “deliberate act” as one performed with a cool purpose [definition deleted by 1995 amendment of § 39-13-201]. If the state proves a premeditated and deliberate killing of another, meaning that the state has proven the absence of passion or provocation, then, under § 39-13-202, the defendant should be adjudged guilty of first degree murder. The fact-finder may consider lesser included offenses of second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Use of force defending residence against intruder, § 39-11-611.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Automobiles, §§ 33, 35; 14 Tenn. Juris., Homicide, §§ 19, 61.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

Homicide: An Enlightened Step Forward in Revitalization of the Tennessee Penal Code (Randall M. Pais), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 687.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Provocation.

Defendant testified that he was trying to protect the victim from being robbed and had no intent to harm the victim, who said he was familiar with defendant and testified that he did not know of any reason for defendant to try to kill him; there was insufficient evidence to support the element of adequate provocation. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

None of the shooters involved could be guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter of one victim, as the offense requires the act of the slayer be the result of provocation instigated by the person slain; there was no credible evidence that anyone was adequately provoked by the victim that day. State v. North, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016).

Verbal altercation between the victim and defendant and the victim's threats to kill defendant, standing alone, could not provide sufficient provocation for taking a life, and the victim's breaking of a glass or turning toward defendant were not sufficient provocation to have caused defendant to act in an irrational manner; it was within the province of the jury to reject voluntary manslaughter, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for second degree murder. State v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 871 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2016).

Defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter was modified to reckless homicide because the three-year-old victim's refusal to eat or urinating and defecating on himself was not adequate provocation to sustain the manslaughter conviction. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2018).

In a case in which defendant was charged with first degree premeditated murder, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter because, based on defendant's statement to the 911 operator that the victim pointed the gun at him, and on the evidence that the death was a homicide, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot the victim as a result of adequate provocation. State v. Jarman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2018), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. July 6, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder because it showed that after an argument, defendant fired multiple shots at the unarmed victim who was attempting to run, both of the shots into the victim's back would have been fatal, and defendant left the scene and threw away his weapon. The jury rejected defendant's argument that he had adequate provocation for the shooting. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2018).

2. Lesser Included Offenses.

In a prosecution for first-degree murder, although the evidence of provocation was slight, voluntary manslaughter should have been charged to the jury as a lesser included offense and the issue of causation would also have required an instruction on the issue of attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In a prosecution for first-degree murder, in which defendant was convicted for second-degree murder, it was reversible error not to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense, in light of the evidence of provocation by the victim. State v. Summerall, 926 S.W.2d 272, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1009 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Tenn. Const., art. I, § 10, prohibiting double jeopardy, barred defendant's conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter because the offense was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. 1996), overruled, State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012), overruled, State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012), overruled, State v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Brawner, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2012), overruled, State v. Buford, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2012), overruled, State v. Readus, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2012), overruled, State v. Alston, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2013), overruled, State v. Hollins, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), overruled, State v. Ralph, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1125 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2013), overruled, Garrett v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2014), overruled, State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2014), overruled in part, State v. Isabell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2014), overruled, State v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2014), overruled, State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2015), overruled, State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015), overruled in part, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), overruled, State v. Freitas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2016), overruled, State v. Jernigan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), overruled in part, State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), overruled, Johnson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), overruled, State v. Steelman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

In a prosecution for first degree murder, even though the evidence of provocation may have lacked credibility, voluntary manslaughter should have been charged as a lesser grade of offense. State v. Belser, 945 S.W.2d 776, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide in a case where defendant testified that he only fired a warning shot at a man who was threatening him with a knife, because voluntary manslaughter was not an appropriate lesser-included offense of first-degree murder if the jury found that no provocation existed. State v. Wilson, 92 S.W.3d 391, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 707 (Tenn. 2002).

Regardless of whether part (b) of the test for lesser included offenses is abrogated by the statute, voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second degree murder and contains a statutory element establishing a different mental state indicating a lesser degree of culpability. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder, rather than voluntary manslaughter, because it showed that in the months prior to the shooting arguments between defendant and his wife had escalated, defendant admitted to policy that after escaping his wife with the knife he retrieved his loaded handgun from the shed and aimed it at his wife, an agent concluded that the handgun was not malfunctioning, and a physician testified that the gun had been fired from between six inches and three feet. State v. Langston, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Evidence did not warrant an instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that defendant acted in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation as the victim and eyewitnesses testified that defendant's shooting of the victim was unprovoked in that the victim was standing on a sidewalk when defendant approached the victim from behind, called out to the victim, and shot the victim as the victim was turning around. Neither the victim, nor the victim's family members were armed. State v. Floyd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of attempted second degree murder because defendant knowingly fired at least four rounds into the tow truck containing the two victims; the evidence presented at trial established that defendant was not standing in front of the tow truck when he fired his weapon; the jury rightfully rejected defendant's argument that his actions were justified, for purposes of attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions instead, because he was in state of passion caused by the towing of his brother's truck; one victim was permanently paralyzed from the armpits down; and it was apparent from the record that the jury heard and rejected defendant's self-defense argument at trial. State v. Proffitt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2018).

Defendant was not entitled at defendant's trial for first degree premeditated murder to a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter because the unarmed victim did nothing to provoke defendant before defendant shot the victim. There was no evidence that defendant killed the victim while in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner, and there was no proof that the victim was involved in the earlier shooting of defendant's sibling. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

Trial court did not plainly err by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter during his trial for attempted premediated murder because it was a lesser-included offense and the court had determined that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2019).

3. Defenses.

State may utilize evidence of state of passion offered by the defense when proving the offense of voluntary manslaughter; although a defendant may choose to present evidence of state of passion produced by adequate provocation, which indicates a lesser degree of culpability, in order to obtain a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, the State bears the burden of proving the mental state for the charged offense and any lesser included offenses, and the instruction, which properly placed the burden of proof on the State to prove the elements of voluntary manslaughter, was not in error. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Language in the second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes, is unambiguous: both statutes are devoid of any indication that voluntary manslaughter is a defense or partial defense to the crime of second degree murder; instead, these statutes make it clear that voluntary manslaughter is a separate criminal offense rather than a defense to second degree murder. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that defendant—who had been drinking heavily and sent multiple inflammatory text messages to the victim before the victim came to defendant's home—did not act in self-defense—either because defendant did not have a reasonable, actual fear of imminent bodily harm, or because defendant's use of lethal force was not reasonable when defendant shot the unarmed victim before the victim set foot on defendant's property. Moreover, defendant also was calm during a 9-1-1 call. State v. Manis, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2020).

4. —Mutual Combat.

Mutual combat is not a statutory defense and whether acts constituted a “knowing killing” (second degree murder) or a killing due to adequate provocation (voluntary manslaughter) was a question for the jury. State v. Johnson, 909 S.W.2d 461, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 324 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The doctrine of mutual combat will not compel, as a matter of law, the reduction of murder to voluntary manslaughter. Proof of mutual combat may, however, provide the evidence necessary for the fact finder to convict the defendant of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. State v. Williams, 38 S.W.3d 532, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (Tenn. 2001).

5. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because defendant and one of the victims had a dispute over money; on the day of the incident, defendant sped through traffic to cut off the vehicle carrying the two victims; defendant waved a handgun and exited his vehicle, demanding money; defendant took money given to him by one of the victims; he then shot the decedent four times, several times while the victim was already down, shot the other victim once, and fired at least nine rounds; and defendant then discarded his handgun, fled the scene, and hid inside of a truck. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Evidence that defendant got out of the car to commit the aggravated assaults, chose to get up off the ground and return fire, and he and his accomplice fired numerous shots allowed the jury to reject the self-defense claim and convict him of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during attempt to commit a dangerous felony. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because defendant shot the unarmed victim three times and fled the scene when the victim raised his hands after approaching defendant regarding a recent break-in and theft at the victim's home where defendant was in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner and he intended to go armed when he shot the victim. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant had words with the victim's friend over a debt the friend allegedly owed defendant; defendant returned to the scene later that evening and confronted the victim about the friend's debt; the victim testified that the discussion became heated, but he considered it over when he walked away, however, defendant returned moments later and shot the unarmed victim in the leg; when the victim attempted to escape into the store, defendant pursued him firing two more shots at the victim; and the victim testified that defendant stated that he was going to make the victim pay for his friend's debt and threatened to kill the victim. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 2, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant and a codefendant in the car which defendant was driving exchanged gunfire with codefendants in another car. Several eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from defendant's car, while the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of others. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from the defendant's car, the forensic evidence established that the victim was likely hit by a bullet that came from defendant's car, and the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of others, which was not second-guessed on appeal; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and the corresponding counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Defendant and his other passengers exchanged fire with others and attempted to kill them; defendant was criminally responsible for his own conduct and for the conduct of the others inside his vehicle, and thus the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's separate convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Evidence sufficiently established that defendant engaged in a shoot-out and, acting in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation because of being shot at after attempting to stop a robbery, he shot back at the car in which four rival gang members rode, and he attempted to kill the occupants therein; his convictions of three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter against two co-defendants and one victim was proper. State v. North, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as to the first victim because it showed that they had two separate altercations prior to the shooting, during the fight defendant pulled a gun from his boot and aimed it at the victim, and when he fired the gun through the wall it missed the victim and hit the second victim. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2019).

Evidence that defendant, who was angry with the victim, took the shotgun out of its case when the victim knocked on his door, opened the door to his apartment, reiterated that he told to the victim to get away from the door, and fired the shotgun was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. McKinnie, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2019).

The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant's prior altercation with the shooting victim, a bouncer at a club who asked defendant to leave the club at closing time, served as adequate provocation when defendant became angry with the victim and subsequently returned and fired gunshots at the victim. State v. Juarez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter because, when a crowd began fighting in a club, defendant saw defendant's sibling in the fight (which provided adequate provocation), pulled out defendant's gun, and shot toward the victim and another person. Defendant then chased the victim, who was unarmed, into the parking lot, shot the victim in the back, stood over the victim, and shot the victim several more times as the victim was lying on the ground. State v. Pettis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter because the jury could have viewed the on-going hostile relationship between defendant and the victim and defendant's reaction to the victim's refusal to leave the scene of the family gathering prior to the funeral as evidence of adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to react in an irrational manner. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2019).

5.5. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support one of defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because the doctrine of transferred intent was inapplicable to the conviction when the victim on a sidewalk was shot while defendant and a codefendant in the car which defendant was driving exchanged gunfire with codefendants in another car. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

None of the shooters involved could be guilty of the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter of the victim, which requires the act of the slayer be the result of provocation instigated by the person slain; there was no credible evidence to suggest that anyone was adequately provoked by the victim that day, and thus there was no offense committed by the conduct of another for which defendant could be found guilty. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

While the jury was given an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, and the evidence supported the conviction, as the victim and defendant fought, there was a cooling-off period, then defendant asked the victim to come back over, where defendant beat the victim to death once he fell asleep; the jury rejected the theory that defendant was in a continuous state of passion after the fight with no opportunity to reflect before killing the victim, and the jury could have found that defendant acted with premeditation. State v. Pike, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Because the child's losing her sock could not have adequately provoked defendant, his conviction for voluntary manslaughter had to be vacated. State v. Benesch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 766 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter as to second victim because no evidence showed she provoked defendant prior to her death, as defendant had been involved in altercations with first victim, who he had shot at but mistakenly hit second victim. However, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of reckless homicide as to the second victim because defendant was intoxicated when he fired the gun into an apartment filled with guests. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2019).

6. Jury Instructions.

Where petitioner death row inmate argued for habeas relief under the eighth amendment because no lesser-included offenses jury instruction was given, since the jury chose to convict him for felony murder over the charge of second-degree murder, there was no basis to believe it would have opted for an even lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. Abdus-Samad v. Bell, 420 F.3d 614, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18250 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 952, 127 S. Ct. 380, 166 L. Ed. 2d 269, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 7515 (2006).

Trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense because it was fairly raised by the testimony, where defendant picked up the intoxicated victim, they argued, the victim reached down to her ankle holster where defendant saw a gun, defendant fired his gun to prevent the victim from using her gun, in doing so he caused property damage but no physical damage to anyone, he remained at the scene and cooperated fully when approached by authorities, and the jury's verdict of attempted voluntary manslaughter indicated the jury's belief that defendant acted under adequate provocation. State v. Lunsford, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Sept. 27, 2016).

Sequential jury instructions did not violate defendant's right to due process and a trial by jury by preventing the jury from considering the offense of voluntary manslaughter during his second-degree murder trial because the instructions were consistent with the instructions outlined in State v. Page  and substantially followed the 2001 version of the pattern jury instructions. State v. Langston, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was nothing in the proof presented at trial to show that defendant acted in an irrational manner in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation, as defendant and the co-defendant approached the victim's car with guns as the unarmed victim and the witness were sitting in the car talking and shot the victim in the back of the head, and there was no evidence that the victim did anything whatsoever to provoke defendant at the time of the shooting. State v. Lawrence, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

7. Sentencing.

Defendant's consecutive sentences for second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction were appropriate because the sentence for employment of a firearm was statutorily required to be consecutive to the sentence for the accompanying dangerous felony conviction; as for the other two convictions, defendant was a dangerous offender as his behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high; and the extended confinement was necessary to protect society from defendant's behavior and was reasonably related to the underlying offenses. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Length of defendant's sentences for second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction were appropriate because the sentences were within the applicable ranges; and the trial court identified several enhancing factors on the record as defendant had one prior felony and one prior misdemeanor drug conviction in addition to a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault, and he was on probation at the time of the current offense and previously had a sentence of probation revoked. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Record supported the trial court's findings that defendant was a dangerous offender, as the offense took place during the day in a public location, and the trial court found that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to serve his sentences for especially aggravated robbery and attempted voluntary manslaughter consecutively. State v. Steed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017).

Others were in the area when defendant began shooting, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement factor regarding no hesitation to commit a crime when the risk to human life was high, plus nothing established that the trial court wholly departed from the statutes in applying the various enhancement factors and within-range sentences; thus, there was no abuse of discretion in defendant's sentences of 23 years for aggravated robbery, five years for aggravated assault, and four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Steed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017).

Trial court did not err in imposing the maximum sentence of six years for voluntary manslaughter as it was within the statutory range; defendant had a history of criminal behavior; he possessed and employed a firearm during the offense; and he did not hesitate in committing a crime when the risk to human life was high. State v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2018).

In a voluntary manslaughter case, although defendant was eligible for probation because his sentence was 10 years or less and because the offense was not specifically excluded by statute, defendant was not deserving of an alternative sentence as the seriousness of the particular facts of his offense required confinement in order to deter similar behavior; there was no evidence of provocation and that the evidence adduced at trial could have supported a conviction of first degree murder; there was no evidence of self-defense; and defendant failed to prove that he was suitable for probation or that probation would serve the best interests of himself and the public. State v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2018).

In a voluntary manslaughter case, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for judicial diversion because, although defendant asserted that he was the perfect candidate, the record reflected that several factors weighed against defendant, including the seriousness of the offense, amenability to correction, and deterrence value; and those factors outweighed the other factors considered by the court. State v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2018).

In a case in which defendant was charged with first degree premeditated murder, but convicted of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not err in denying defendant alternative sentencing, and in holding that confinement was appropriate due to defendant's history of criminal conduct and to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense because the record supported the determination that defendant had a long history of criminal conduct, including continued long-term use of illegal drugs, which did not cease even after the victim's death. State v. Jarman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2018), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. July 6, 2020).

Record amply supported the application of the statute to the Defendant's sentences for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault convictions; the trial court noted that the 25-year-old defendant had a criminal history of multiple violent offenses, mostly committed with firearms, and he committed the offenses in this case while on release into the community. State v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2020).

7.5 Merger.

Trial court did not err by refusing to merge the conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter into the conviction of aggravated assault because, while the convictions arose from the same act or transaction, both of the offenses contained elements that the other did not, and there was no evidence that the legislature intended to prohibit multiple punishments in such circumstances. Accordingly, defendant's dual convictions did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Golden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2020).

8. Double Jeopardy.

Because aggravated assault and attempted voluntary manslaughter each required proof of a fact not required in proving the other, the offenses were not multiplicitous and defendant's dual convictions did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Feaster, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2014), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015).

Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not merging the sentences for his voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault convictions, but the issue was waived as defense counsel did not raise any double jeopardy issue at trial and the issue was not raised in a motion for new trial. Furthermore, relief via plain error was unwarranted as these offenses were not multiplicitous because they each required proof of a fact not required in proving the other, and thus defendant could not establish that a clear rule of law has been breached. State v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2020).

9. Elements.

Statute does not identify state of passion as a defense to first or second degree murder and does no more than generally describe defenses within the context of the State's burden of proof; the legislature plainly intended for state of passion produced by adequate provocation to be an element of the separate offense of voluntary manslaughter, not a defense to second degree murder. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Defendant claimed he was so intoxicated that he was incapable of premeditation and that he should have been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, but there was evidence to the contrary regarding his intoxication, and by the jury's verdict of guilty to the charge of first degree murder, the jury necessarily rejected the claim that defendant acted in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner. State v. Hudgins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 753 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

Given the lack of provocation on the part of the victim towards any of the defendants, the State could base a conviction for the attempted manslaughter conviction of the victim on the other's actions under a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

10. Instructions.

Jury instructions regarding second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter fairly submitted the legal issues and contained a proper statement of the applicable law; the instructions, which advised the jury as to the issue of passion upon adequate provocation in the description of second degree murder, did not alone infect the entire trial or result in a conviction that violated due process, and the instructions given were substantively the same as those suggested in pattern instructions, which had been upheld in the past. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

Trial court distinguished the offenses of voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder and provided clarity; the jury was informed of the differences between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter at the moment when they were considering whether defendant was guilty of second degree murder, and thus his argument that the sequential jury instructions prevented the jury from ever finding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter was unpersuasive. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Moore v. Tennessee, 197 L. Ed. 2d 711, 137 S. Ct. 1580, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2514 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2017).

In defendant's first-degree murder trial, the jury was properly instructed on the offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and thus the trial court did not err in denying the requested instruction; the instructions mirrored the statutory definitions, plus the trial court substantially comported with pattern jury instructions. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Trial court did not err in excluding the testimony of expert witnesses regarding defendant's mental health and in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that the victim provoked defendant; the testimony of the expert witnesses was not relevant to the issue of voluntary manslaughter because the provocation had to be caused by the victim. State v. Crowley, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2018).

39-13-212. Criminally negligent homicide.

  1. Criminally negligent conduct that results in death constitutes criminally negligent homicide.
  2. Criminally negligent homicide is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-208; Acts 1990, ch. 1038, § 4.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Criminally negligent homicide is an offense which is new to Tennessee. It replaces involuntary manslaughter. The mens rea for criminally negligent homicide is defined in § 39-11-302(d), which makes clear that simple negligence, as defined in civil law, is insufficient for criminal liability. Rather, criminal negligence requires “a substantial and unjustifiable risk” and the risk must be of such a nature and degree that “the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the person's standpoint.”

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Jury may provide for punishment for less than one year, § 40-20-103.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

Instructing the Jury on the Defense of Voluntary Intoxication in Tennessee, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 479 (1971).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Elements in General.

After a mistrial, double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial on the charge of conspiracy to commit first degree murder after a conviction on the charge of criminal responsibility for criminally negligent homicide because the elements were not the same under the test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306, 1932 U.S. LEXIS 875 (1932). State v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2007).

The elements of criminally negligent homicide are the accused's guilt of criminal negligence, as defined in T.C.A. § 39-11-302, and a finding that the criminally negligent act, or omission, was the proximate cause of death. State v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 757, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 781 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

To prove a criminally negligent homicide, the evidence can show an intentional or knowing killing which is unjustified or a killing which was proximately caused by reckless or criminally negligent conduct. State v. Butler, 880 S.W.2d 395, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's request for a special jury instruction regarding criminally negligent homicide and reckless vehicular homicide because the jury instructions given conveyed that the death had to be likely and foreseeable. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 776 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017).

2. Negligence.

The level of gross negligence necessary to sustain a conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-212 requires showing that the defendant failed to perceive that her conduct presented an unjustifiable risk to the victim; and the failure to perceive the risk must be a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under the circumstances. State v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 757, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 781 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

The statutory definition of criminal negligence is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Butler, 880 S.W.2d 395, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Intentionally shooting a firearm in the general direction of another person, particularly when the exact location of the other person is unknown, constitutes such a substantial risk of bodily harm or death that a jury would be easily justified to conclude that a failure to perceive the risk is a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all of the circumstances. State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

For conduct to constitute criminal negligence the accused must know, or should know, that his or her conduct, or the result of that conduct, will imperil the life of another given the circumstances that exist when the conduct takes place. State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d 471, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

3. Lesser Included Offenses.

The only lesser included offenses of first-degree felony murder are reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. State v. Gilliam, 901 S.W.2d 385, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser charge of second-degree murder. State v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. 1996).

Because the mental states required for the lesser offenses differ only in the level of culpability attached to each in terms of seriousness and punishment, the offense of criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of felony murder. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. 2001).

Court's error in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses was harmless because defendant shot the victim, an armored truck guard, in the back of the head and stole the victim's money deposit bag, he was identified as one of two men fleeing from the scene, and his criminal conduct was filmed by a surveillance camera. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Thomas v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 125, 163 L. Ed. 2d 131, 546 U.S. 855, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6959 (U.S. 2005).

4. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient for conviction of criminally negligent homicide where it was established that the child victim was incapable of inflicting the severe brain injuries she suffered, that a fall from a bed would not cause the injuries, and that defendant, the only person capable of inflicting the injuries, was the only person who interacted with the victim on the day of her death. State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d 471, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Evidence of vehicular homicide held sufficient where defendant disregarded a stop sign and entered a four-lane, divided highway, and without slowing down, crossed through a median connector, and thereby posed a risk of injury that was “substantial and unjustifiable.” State v. Gillon, 15 S.W.3d 492, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1024 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's reckless endangerment conviction where defendant left his shotgun, which he knew to be loaded and cocked, in woods that were 50 feet behind a house, at the time he left the gun, defendant was fleeing from the police, and while there were no children or other persons in the woods at that time, defendant had seen children playing at a nearby residence. State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. 2004).

Defendant's conduct in resisting arrest was not legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for criminally negligent homicide of police officer who died of a heart attack. State v. Slater, 841 S.W.2d 841, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 726 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain a criminally negligent homicide conviction because defendant's act of holding her child on her lap in the front passenger seat was not a gross deviation from the standard of care at the time of the accident; articles entered into evidence illustrated how new the risk of air bags was at the time of the accident, in 1998, and the fact that there was a need for a large-scale public information campaign aimed at educating parents about child car safety indicated how many people were not using child safety restraints at the time of the accident. State v. Jones, 151 S.W.3d 494, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 992 (Tenn. 2004).

While defendant was caring for the five-year-old victim, he consumed beer and marijuana and took the victim swimming at a lake without notifying his parents or supervising his activities; upon the victim's death by drowning, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for criminally negligent homicide under T.C.A. § 39-13-212(a). State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for criminally negligent homicide. His conduct in traveling at a slow speed with his hazard flashers on due to a blown tire on his tractor-trailer did not constitute the gross deviation from the standard of care that was necessary to find criminal negligence under T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(4). State v. Briggs, 343 S.W.3d 106, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment where it showed that, despite a do not enter sign, defendant drove west in an eastbound lane of a highway and struck the victim's car. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 776 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for criminally negligent homicide because it showed that an officer saw defendant drinking alcohol shortly before the car accident, he drove after consuming alcohol, while turning into a gas station he hit a motorcycle, more than two hours after the accident defendant's blood alcohol was still .08 %, and the victim was killed when he was thrown from the motorcycle. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminally negligent homicide and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery because defendant went to the apartment of the victim's first son in search of drugs; he was wearing a black hoodie and a cap; the victim, his wife, and his second son left the apartment to go home, but, as they were leaving in their vehicle, three men wearing black hoodies approached the vehicle to rob them; the victim's sons recognized defendant as one of the three men as he was wearing the same clothing that he wore earlier to the apartment; the second son testified that defendant shot the victim; and the first son testified that he was 100% percent sure that defendant was the person he saw committing the robbery. State v. Gergish, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child neglect convictions because, based on defendant's testimony, the jury could have found that defendant acted knowingly when defendant took medication, placed the infant victim in a bed in an unsafe sleeping environment, and fell asleep which resulted in the victim's death. Moreover, the jury could have determined that defendant was criminally negligent in that the victim should have known that the victim's actions were a gross deviation from the standard of care. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of second-degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide because her friend's testimony established that defendant pulled the trigger on the gun that killed the three victims, the testimony was corroborated by the fact that defendant's fingerprint was on a receipt recovered from one victim's vehicle, a witness testified that defendant entered his home with blood on her clothes and a pistol that was not fully loaded, and the pistol was one of the types of pistol that could have fire the bullets recovered from the crime scene. State v. Isaac, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's criminally negligent homicide conviction because defendant arrived and approached the victim at a dice game with a handgun and the intent to take money from the victim, an altercation ensued, and codefendant took the handgun and shot the victim multiple times. Defendant was aware of, but disregarded, the risk created by displaying a firearm at the victim and defendant's failure to perceive the risk was a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would have exercised. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

5. Double Jeopardy.

Even though defendant's convictions of criminally negligent homicide and felony reckless endangerment were inconsistent, they did not have to be set aside because the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 776 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017).

6. Sentence.

Trial court properly imposed two-year sentences for defendant's convictions of criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment, even though it erred by applying the use of a deadly weapon enhancement factor to the reckless endangerment conviction, because the trial court properly applied several other enhancement factors. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 776 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017).

39-13-213. Vehicular homicide.

  1. Vehicular homicide is the reckless killing of another by the operation of an automobile, airplane, motorboat or other motor vehicle, as the proximate result of:
    1. Conduct creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to a person;
    2. The driver's intoxication, as set forth in § 55-10-401. For the purposes of this section, “intoxication” includes alcohol intoxication as defined by § 55-10-411(a), drug intoxication, or both;
    3. As the proximate result of conduct constituting the offense of drag racing as prohibited by title 55, chapter 10, part 5; or
    4. The driver's conduct in a posted construction zone where the person killed was an employee of the department of transportation or a highway construction worker.
    1. Vehicular homicide under subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(3) is a Class C felony.
      1. Vehicular homicide under subdivision (a)(2) is a Class B felony.
      2. Any sentence imposed for a first violation of subdivision (a)(2) shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of forty-eight (48) consecutive hours of incarceration. The person shall not be eligible for release from confinement on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the person has served the entire forty-eight-hour minimum mandatory sentence.
      3. If at the time of sentencing for a violation of subdivision (a)(2), the person has one (1) prior conviction for an alcohol-related offense, any sentence imposed by the judge shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of forty-five (45) consecutive days of incarceration. The person shall not be eligible for release from confinement on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the person has served the entire forty-five-day minimum mandatory sentence.
      4. If at the time of sentencing for a violation of subdivision (a)(2), the person has any combination of two (2) prior convictions for an alcohol-related offense, any sentence imposed by the judge shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days of incarceration. The person shall not be eligible for release from confinement on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the person has served the entire one hundred twenty-day mandatory minimum sentence.
      5. If at the time of sentencing for a violation of subdivision (a)(2), the person has any combination of three (3) or more prior convictions for an alcohol-related offense, any sentence imposed by the judge shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of one hundred fifty (150) consecutive days of incarceration. The person shall not be eligible for release from confinement on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the person has served the entire one hundred fifty-day mandatory minimum sentence.
      6. As used in this subdivision (b)(2), “alcohol-related offense” means a conviction for a violation of subdivision (a)(2), § 55-10-401, § 39-13-106, or § 39-13-218.
      7. For purposes of sentencing under this subdivision (b)(2), a prior conviction for an alcohol-related offense may be used to enhance the mandatory minimum sentence regardless of whether it occurred before or after July 1, 2015, as long as the violation of this section occurs on or after July 1, 2015.
    2. Vehicular homicide under subdivision (a)(4) is a Class D felony.
  2. The court shall prohibit a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide from driving a vehicle in this state for a period of time not less than three (3) years nor more than ten (10) years.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-209; Acts 1990, ch. 1038, § 4; 1995, ch. 415, § 1; 2006, ch. 971, §§ 2, 3; 2010, ch. 1120, §§ 2, 3; 2013, ch. 154, § 50; 2015, ch. 125, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is very similar to prior law except that it requires the killing to be reckless.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2006, ch. 971, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as Courtney's law.

Acts 2010, ch. 1120, § 1 provided that the act, which added subdivisions (a)(4) and (b)(3), shall be known and may be cited as the “Rachel Clawson Act of 2010.”

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Blood alcohol tests as evidence, § 55-10-406.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Mandatory revocation of driver's license for vehicular homicide, § 55-50-501.

Penalties for Class B, C and D felonies, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 26.47.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Automobiles and Other Vehicles, §§ 32, 32.1, 35; 14 Tenn. Juris., Homicide, §§ 2, 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

The physical facts rule was not applicable to vehicular homicide and reckless driving case, where the physical evidence at the accident scene could support either the defendant's or the state's version of the accident; thus a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hornsby, 858 S.W.2d 892, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 279 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 989 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In a case where police arrived at the scene of a three-car accident, defendant was found outside the truck while his friend was found in the passenger seat, and defendant's blood alcohol content was .30%, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for vehicular assault and aggravated vehicular homicide where one motorist was injured and another motorist died. State v. Bowman, 327 S.W.3d 69, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. June 15, 2009), cert. denied, Bowman v. Tennessee, 175 L. Ed. 2d 388, 130 S. Ct. 559, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8080 (U.S. 2009).

In a case where one passenger was killed and the others were injured, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of vehicular homicide by intoxication, vehicular assault with intoxication, and reckless endangerment because, although defendant initially asked other passengers to drive his vehicle, he later assumed control of the vehicle with the knowledge that not all of the passengers had access to seat belts; at that time, according to a passenger, defendant's speech was slurred and his eyes appeared glassy; defendant drove at a high rate of speed, clipped a culvert by a driveway, and lost control of and flipped the vehicle; and an analysis of defendant's blood showed the presence of drugs that affected his central nervous system. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of vehicular homicide by intoxication because he was driving on the same road where the victim was observed to be standing on a bridge near the guardrail; another driver in the opposite lane, saw a flash of white as a vehicle drifted over the line, and the victim's body was propelled over the rail; the victim's friend saw the victim in midair going over the bridge while a white blur traveled across the bridge; defendant's blood alcohol content was 0.373; and the victim, who died as a result of blunt force trauma to the head and neck, sustained an injury to his left leg that the pathologist opined was consistent with his having been in a standing position at the time he was struck by a vehicle. State v. Hamm, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's vehicular homicide by reckless conduct and reckless aggravated assault convictions because defendant acted recklessly as a witness testified that defendant was driving in the wrong direction on an interstate highway when defendant's SUV hit the victims'  car head-on and crash reconstructionists testified that defendant's SUV was driving in the wrong direction and that the SUV's crash data recording system reflected that the SUV accelerated just before impact. State v. Pena, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 761 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for vehicular homicide because the State of Tennessee established that defendant was driving defendant's vehicle while defendant's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was three times more than the limit established by statute and a doctor testified that such a BAC would have impaired defendant's ability to drive. Thus, it was reasonable for a jury to conclude that defendant was driving in the wrong lane of traffic because defendant's level of intoxication impaired defendant's ability to drive safely. State v. Oaks, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2019).

There was sufficient evidence supporting the element of intoxication in defendant's conviction for vehicular homicide by intoxication because it established that he had consumed heroin, hydrocodone, and amphetamine, he attempted to conceal his consumption of the substances by not acknowledging their use to medical personnel or law enforcement and by attempting to secrete the syringes, and he drove erratically and caused a collision by swerving into oncoming traffic. State v. Dye, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 652 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to establish intoxication and, consequently, vehicular homicide. Defendant's main complaint on appeal went to the weight and credibility of the evidence, but these tasks were for the jury to determine. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the crash because his urine tested positive for his urine tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and oxycodone, in addition to the cognitive and speech problems observed by medical personnel at the hospital defendant was loud, uncooperative, and aggressive, he admitted to nurses that he was an IV drug user, and he admitted to taking oxycodone 38 hours before the crash. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2020).

2. Enhancement Factors.

Upon a conviction for vehicular homicide by recklessness, the enhancement factor pertaining to the risk to life may be applied where the defendant creates a high risk to the life of a person other than the victim; conversely, if there is no risk to the life of a person other than the victim, the factor would be encompassed by the proof necessary to establish an essential element of the offense, and it would not apply. State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 592 (Tenn. Oct. 2, 1995), overruled in part, State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 535 (Tenn. 2000), overruled in part, State v. Walker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2017).

Since death of the victim was an offense element, the circuit court erred by applying the great personal injury aggravating factor. State v. Trent, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

3. Sentencing.

Defendant was eligible for probation because each sentence for vehicular homicide by intoxication was 10 years or less and the offenses were not specifically excluded by statute, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying full probation; because the sentence resulted from convictions for Class B felonies, defendant was not a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing, the crimes involved numerous victims and incarceration was necessary because a sentence of full probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense, and thus defendant failed to establish that his sentence was improper. State v. Naifeh, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 714 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2016).

For three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, the 10-year sentence was within the statutory range, and the trial court considered all factors and properly enhanced the sentence as defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high; defendant, a defense attorney, operated his vehicle while under the influence of multiple drugs, which resulted in the death of three people, and although one mitigating factor in light of defendant's brain damage was applied, it was within the trial court's discretion to determine the weight, and he was not entitled to relief. State v. Naifeh, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 714 (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2016).

Trial court's within range sentence of 10 years for vehicular homicide was proper because defendant had multiple arrests and convictions for driving-related and drug or alcohol-related offenses; he elected to drive a vehicle at a high rate of speed, knowing that not all of the occupants had seat belts; defendant's blood analysis revealed the presence of drugs affecting the central nervous system; he placed the five other passengers in his vehicle in danger as well as other drivers on the roadway; his actions resulted in the death of a 14-year-old boy and severe injury to another passenger; and, although he expressed his remorse over the injuries caused to his passengers, he was arrested for DUI on the Friday before the current trial began. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Before a trial court can deny probation solely on the basis of the offense itself, the circumstances of the offense as particularly committed in the case under consideration must demonstrate the defendant committed the offense in some manner more egregious than is contemplated simply by the elements of the offense; ergo, that a defendant killed someone while driving intoxicated is not sufficient, in and of itself, to deny probation because this crime is probation-eligible. State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Nov. 3, 2017).

Defendant, because he was a standard offender convicted of a Class B felony, was entitled to be considered for probation in spite of the fact that he committed vehicular homicide by intoxication. State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Nov. 3, 2017).

It was not appropriate to affirmatively order that defendant be placed on probation because the record was not capable of meaningful appellate review, and thus, the proper remedy was a remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing; the trial court made no findings regarding the particular circumstances surrounding defendant's commission of vehicular homicide by intoxication, and it failed to explain on the record determinations it made regarding defendant's amenability to correction. State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Nov. 3, 2017).

Based on defendant's sentence of 11 years for vehicular homicide by intoxication, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant an alternative sentence because defendant was not eligible for an alternative sentence and could not have received a sentence of split confinement as the sentence imposed was for more than 10 years. State v. Bishop, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

In a case where defendant pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, because the trial court imposed a sentence within the applicable range of eight to 12 years, and the sentence was consistent with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act, the sentence was presumed reasonable, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a sentence of 11 years. State v. Bishop, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to serve six years for vehicular homicide and four years for reckless aggravated assault, after considering defendant's history of criminal behavior, the fact that the offenses included more than one victim, and defendant's good work history. State v. Lutrell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 592 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying alternative sentencing and by revoking defendant's probation on a prior conviction, when defendant pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, because defendant's conviction was for a Class B felony. Moreover, the court found that confinement was necessary to protect society because defendant had a long history of criminal conduct and measures less restrictive than confinement were unsuccessfully applied as defendant was sentenced to probation days before the auto accident occurred. State v. Privett, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2018).

Trial court erred by imposing its sentence not for the offense of reckless homicide, to which defendant pleaded guilty, but for reckless vehicular homicide, and therefore defendant's sentence was reversed, because the record showed that the trial court was laboring under a fundamental misapprehension about the nature of the offense, reflected in its numerous references to “reckless vehicular homicide,” its omission in informing defendant of the ranger of punishment she faced under the amended indictment, its statement that defendant was entering a guilty plea to reckless vehicular homicide, the erroneous completion of the judgment form, and the trial court's statement that revocation of defendant's license for three years was mandatory. State v. Panchikal, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the Department of Corrections for eight years following his guilty pleas of vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, and vehicular assault, a Class D felony, because defendant was not eligible for a sentence of full probation due to the statutorily imposed minimum jail terms. State v. Key, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 27, 2019).

Trial court erred by not granting defendant full probation for his vehicular homicide conviction because it concluded that the trial court based its decision solely on the seriousness of the offense, it did not find that the instant vehicular homicides were especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of excessive or exaggerated degree, defendant's lack of a criminal record, social history, and physical and mental health were Electropating factors favoring probation, and defendant was amenable to correction. State v. Oxendine, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 85 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2020).

Circuit court erred in ordering defendant to serve eight years in incarceration for vehicular homicide by intoxication; the circuit court stated without legal authority that driving while using a prescription pain medication had to come to a strict liability standard, and these conclusions were based upon speculation and personal opinions. Defendant was at low risk for recidivism and he was a candidate for alternative sentencing. Amended judgment was to show a sentence of spilt confinement of time served with the remainder to be served on probation. State v. Trent, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Trial court erred in denying defendant's request for probation based on depreciating the seriousness of the offense and the deterrence value to others because reckless conduct by defendant that resulted in the death of the victim were elements of the conviction offense of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, and those alone were insufficient to deny probation. State v. Pinhal, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2020).

3.5 Judicial Diversion.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's request for judicial diversion after he pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by recklessness because it took into consideration all of the Parker and Electorplating factors, it denied defendant's request based primarily on the deterrence value to others and whether it would serve the interest of the public, and it found that the circumstances of the offense and the deterrence value to defendant did not favor diversion. The record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings. State v. Kobeck, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

39-13-214. “Another” and “another person” to include fetus of a human being.

  1. For the purposes of this part, “another” and “another person” include a human embryo or fetus at any stage of gestation in utero, when any such term refers to the victim of any act made criminal by this part.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to amend § 39-15-201, or §§ 39-15-203 — 39-15-205 and 39-15-207.
  3. Nothing in subsection (a) shall apply to any act or omission by a pregnant woman with respect to an embryo or fetus with which she is pregnant, or to any lawful medical or surgical procedure to which a pregnant woman consents, performed by a health care professional who is licensed to perform such procedure.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-210; Acts 1990, ch. 1038, § 4; 2011, ch. 408, § 2; 2012, ch. 1006, §§ 1, 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section represents a major change in Tennessee law. See § 39-13-107.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Abortion, title 39, ch. 15, part 2.

Fetus as victim, § 39-13-107.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of including a non-viable fetus as a victim of certain crimes.  OAG 10-69, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 75 (5/20/10).

Liability for infants born with narcotic drug dependency.  OAG 13-01 (revised),  2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 12 (2/1/13).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence.

In a prosecution for vehicular homicide, where it was not stipulated that the infant victim was viable within the meaning of T.C.A. § 39-13-214, testimony of the grandfather of the infant and a photograph were relevant to the issue and the probative value thereof was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 989 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

2. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. § 39-13-214 was not violative of defendant's right to equal protection under the law, because defendant and a pregnant woman were not similarly situated. State v. Donaldson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2017).

3. Vagueness.

T.C.A. § 39-13-214 was not void for vagueness, as the legislature's intent in amending the statute was clear - they removed the viability requirements and replaced it with language to include a human embryo or fetus at any stage of gestation in utero and thus, if a human embryo existed it was protected by statute. State v. Donaldson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2017).

39-13-215. Reckless homicide.

  1. Reckless homicide is a reckless killing of another.
  2. Reckless homicide is a Class D felony.

Acts 1993, ch. 306, § 2.

Cross-References. Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Lesser Included Offenses.

The only lesser included offenses of first-degree felony murder are reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. State v. Gilliam, 901 S.W.2d 385, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Because the mental states required for the lesser offenses differ only in the level of culpability attached to each in terms of seriousness and punishment, the offense of reckless homicide is a lesser included offense of felony murder. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. 2001).

Court's error in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses was harmless because defendant shot the victim, an armored truck guard, in the back of the head and stole the victim's money deposit bag, he was identified as one of two men fleeing from the scene, and his criminal conduct was filmed by a surveillance camera. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Thomas v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 125, 163 L. Ed. 2d 131, 546 U.S. 855, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6959 (U.S. 2005).

Even though the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide relative to the felony murder charge, as the key issue in the case was defendant's mental state, the error was harmless because the jury was properly instructed on all lesser-included offenses in the first degree premeditated murder count, including reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide, and the jury's guilty verdict in that count entailed finding that defendant acted with premeditation, rejecting that he acted recklessly or in self-defense. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

2. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence that defendant shot the victim in the abdomen at close range, which was likely to cause the victim's death, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for second degree murder and reckless homicide. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2013), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 49, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. June 3, 2015).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for second degree murder and reckless homicide because (1) the evidence showed defendant shot the victim in the torso at close range, supporting second degree murder, and (2) evidence sufficient to support second degree murder was also sufficient to support a conviction for reckless homicide. State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. June 3, 2015).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault; although the victim had bruising prior to her death, testimony was clear the victim died from blunt force injuries to her head that would have occurred on a certain date, and the victim would not have acted normally after sustaining the injuries. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault; defendant was left alone with the infant victim, and when the mother returned, the victim was unresponsive, plus while at the hospital, defendant told the mother to say the victim had been with her the whole time, and the victim's injuries were caused by blunt force injuries to her head. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse because it showed that defendant was alone in the room with the five-year-old victim who suffered injuries that medical experts equated with having been injured in a car accident or while skydiving. State v. Cooke, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter as to second victim because no evidence showed she provoked defendant prior to her death, as defendant had been involved in altercations with first victim, who he had shot at but mistakenly hit second victim. However, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of reckless homicide as to the second victim because defendant was intoxicated when he fired the gun into an apartment filled with guests. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's reckless homicide conviction because the evidence showed defendant mishandled a firearm defendant knew was loaded, resulting in a victim's death. State v. Lane, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 600 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of second-degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide because her friend's testimony established that defendant pulled the trigger on the gun that killed the three victims, the testimony was corroborated by the fact that defendant's fingerprint was on a receipt recovered from one victim's vehicle, a witness testified that defendant entered his home with blood on her clothes and a pistol that was not fully loaded, and the pistol was one of the types of pistol that could have fire the bullets recovered from the crime scene. State v. Isaac, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of reckless homicide because she consciously disregarded a substantial and justifiable risk that the baby would suffocate by placing her hand over the baby's mouth and nose after birth, and the risk was of such a nature and degree that its disregard constituted a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2020).

3. Sentencing.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences for defendant's convictions of reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault; defendant was found to be a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high, plus consecutive sentences were reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and necessary to protect the public. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

Trial court found that defendant was a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human life, and consecutive sentences were reasonably related to the severity of the offenses committed and were necessary to protect the public, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences; however, defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault had to merge into his conviction for reckless homicide, resulting in a total effective sentence of four years. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Trial court erred by imposing its sentence not for the offense of reckless homicide, to which defendant pleaded guilty, but for reckless vehicular homicide, and therefore defendant's sentence was reversed, because the record showed that the trial court was laboring under a fundamental misapprehension about the nature of the offense, reflected in its numerous references to “reckless vehicular homicide,” its omission in informing defendant of the ranger of punishment she faced under the amended indictment, its statement that defendant was entering a guilty plea to reckless vehicular homicide, the erroneous completion of the judgment form, and the trial court's statement that revocation of defendant's license for three years was mandatory. State v. Panchikal, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2019).

Defendant's sentence of four years for reckless homicide was appropriate because the baby was particularly vulnerable based on her age as she was unable to defend herself; and defendant abused a position of private trust in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission of the offense as she did not disclose her pregnancy to the victim's father or anyone else until after she gave birth and had killed the victim. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2020).

In a reckless homicide case in which defendant smothered her newborn baby by placing her hand over the baby's mouth and nose after she was born, the trial court did not err in denying defendant judicial diversion because the trial court was particularly concerned with defendant's lack of remorse, which the trial court obviously believed militated against defendant's potential for rehabilitation. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2020).

In a reckless homicide case, defendant was not a suitable candidate for probation and incarceration was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense because the trial court noted the very serious nature of the offense as defendant smothered her newborn baby by placing her hand over the baby's mouth and nose after she was born; defendant killed her very quickly indicating no hesitation about committing the offense and then placed the baby in a garbage bag; and defendant showed no remorse for her actions. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2020).

4. Double Jeopardy.

Applying the Blockburger  test, the court concluded that reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse were not the same offense because their elements differed; reckless homicide required proof of a killing; aggravated child abuse did not. Aggravated child abuse required proof that the victim was a “child,” that is, a person less than 18 years of age; reckless homicide had no age-based element. Therefore, defendant's dual convictions did not violate either the federal or the state constitutional double jeopardy prohibition. State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Unlawful killing of a person is a crime distinctly different from that of an assault upon a person, and although serious bodily injury is an element of assault it is not an element of murder and assault resulting in serious bodily injury and second degree murder are completely separate offenses; thus, reckless aggravated assault contains an element (serious bodily injury) not contained in the reckless homicide statute and that reckless homicide contains an element (killing) not required for a conviction for reckless aggravated assault, and defendant's convictions for both could stand under the double jeopardy analysis. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

It had previously been held that the 2009 amendment of the statute abrogated part (b) of the State v. Burns double jeopardy test; thus, reckless aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of reckless homicide under the statute and dual convictions are proper, and defendant was not entitled to relief. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

Crimes occurred on the same day and in the same location, and thus the reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault clearly arose from the same conduct; however, reckless aggravated assault contains an element (serious bodily injury) not contained in the reckless homicide statute and that reckless homicide contains an element (killing) not required for a conviction for reckless aggravated assault, and thus defendant's convictions for both could stand under the Blockburger double jeopardy analysis. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

6. Inconsistent Verdicts.

Inconsistent verdicts convicting defendant of both second degree murder and reckless homicide did not entitle defendant to relief because (1) inconsistent verdicts were not a basis for relief, and (2) the proper merger of reckless homicide into second degree murder avoided a double jeopardy violation. State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. June 3, 2015).

Defendant claimed the verdicts on his convictions for reckless homicide and reckless aggravated assault were inconsistent, but he failed to cite authority for this, which could result in waiver; in any event, inconsistent verdicts were not a basis for relief. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2016).

7. Merger.

Reckless aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of reckless homicide under part (b) of the State v. Burns test as reckless aggravated assault fails to meet the definition of a lesser included offense of reckless homicide under Burns part (a) only in the respect that it contains a statutory element establishing a less serious harm (serious bodily injury versus death) to the same person; thus, defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault had to merge into the conviction for reckless homicide. State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

39-13-216. Assisted suicide.

  1. A person commits the offense of assisted suicide who:
    1. Intentionally provides another person with the means by which such person directly and intentionally brings about such person's own death; or
    2. Intentionally participates in a physical act by which another person directly and intentionally brings about such person's own death; and
    3. Provides the means or participates in the physical act with:
      1. Actual knowledge that the other person intends to bring about such person's own death; and
      2. The clear intent that the other person bring about such person's own death.
  2. It is not an offense under this section to:
    1. Withhold or withdraw medical care as defined by § 32-11-103;
    2. Prescribe, dispense, or administer medications or perform medical procedures calculated or intended to relieve another person's pain or discomfort but not calculated or intended to cause death, even if the medications or medical procedures may hasten or increase the risk of death; or
    3. Fail to prevent another from bringing about that person's own death.
  3. This section shall not in any way affect, impair, impede, or otherwise limit or render invalid the rights, privileges, and policies set forth in the Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act, compiled in title 32, chapter 11; the provisions for the durable power of attorney for health care, compiled in title 34, chapter 6, part 2; or the do not resuscitate (DNR) regulations of the Tennessee board for licensing health care facilities issued pursuant to § 68-11-224.
  4. A cause of action for injunctive relief may be maintained against any person who is reasonably believed about to violate or who is in the course of violating subsection (a), by any person who is:
    1. The spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the person who would bring about such person's own death;
    2. Entitled to inherit from the person who would bring about such person's own death;
    3. A health care provider or former health care provider of the person who would bring about such person's own death; or
    4. A public official with appropriate jurisdiction to prosecute or enforce the laws of this state.
  5. A cause of action for civil damages against any person who violates or attempts to violate subsection (a) may be maintained by any person given standing by subsection (d) for compensatory damages and exemplary damages, whether or not the plaintiff consented to or had prior knowledge of the violation or attempt. Any compensatory damages awarded shall be paid as provided by law, but exemplary damages shall be paid over to the department of revenue for deposit in the criminal injuries compensation fund, pursuant to § 40-24-107.
  6. Reasonable attorney's fees shall be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in a civil action brought pursuant to this section. If judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant and the court finds that the plaintiff's suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to the defendant.
  7. Assisted suicide is a Class D felony.

Acts 1993, ch. 405, §§ 2, 3.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Injunctions, title 29, ch. 23, part 1.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

Remedies, title 29, ch. 23.

Law Reviews.

Assisted Suicide, Morality, and Law: Why Prohibiting Assisted Suicide Violates the Establishment Clause (Edward Rubin), 63 Vand. L. Rev. 763 (2010).

Grandma's Pain: Should Claims of Under-Medication Arise in New Theories of Elder Abuse Statutes or Medical Malpractice Negligence? (Timothy McIntire), 40 No. 10 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2004).

In Search of a Right to Die: Preventing Government Infliction of Pain, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 245 (1997).

39-13-217. Priority in case docketing.

The trial courts of this state and the Tennessee supreme court shall give first priority in docketing to cases where the state has given notice of intent to seek the death penalty pursuant to Rule 12.3(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, or the defendant has been sentenced to death.

Acts 1995, ch. 338, § 1; 2019, ch. 140, § 4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 140,  § 1 provided that the act  shall be known and may be cited as the “Sergeant Daniel Baker Act”.

Acts 2019, ch. 140,  § 5 provided that the act shall apply to acts committed on or after July 1, 2019.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “The trial courts of this state and the Tennessee supreme court” for “The trial and appellate courts of this state” at the beginning of the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 140, § 5. July 1, 2019.

39-13-218. Aggravated vehicular homicide.

  1. Aggravated vehicular homicide is vehicular homicide, as defined in § 39-13-213(a)(2), where:
    1. The defendant has two (2) or more prior convictions for:
      1. Driving under the influence of an intoxicant;
      2. Vehicular assault; or
      3. Any combination of such offenses;
    2. The defendant has one (1) or more prior convictions for the offense of vehicular homicide; or
    3. There was, at the time of the offense, twenty-hundredths of one percent (0.20%), or more, by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood and the defendant has one (1) prior conviction for:
      1. Driving under the influence of an intoxicant; or
      2. Vehicular assault.
    1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “prior conviction” means an offense for which the defendant was convicted prior to the commission of the instant vehicular homicide and includes convictions occurring prior to July 1, 1996.
    2. “Prior conviction” includes convictions under the laws of any other state, government, or country that, if committed in this state, would have constituted one (1) of the three (3) offenses enumerated in subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2). In the event that a conviction from a jurisdiction other than Tennessee is not specifically named the same as one (1) of the three (3) offenses enumerated in subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2), the elements of the offense in the other jurisdiction shall be used by the Tennessee court to determine if the offense constitutes one (1) of the prior convictions required by subsection (a).
  2. If the defendant is charged with aggravated vehicular homicide, the indictment, in a separate count, shall specify, charge and give notice of the required prior conviction or convictions. If the defendant is convicted of vehicular homicide under § 39-13-213(a)(2), the jury shall then separately consider whether the defendant has the requisite number and types of prior offenses or level of blood alcohol concentration necessary to constitute the offense of aggravated vehicular homicide. If the jury convicts the defendant of aggravated vehicular homicide, the court shall pronounce judgment and sentence the defendant from within the felony classification set out in subsection (d).
  3. Aggravated vehicular homicide is a Class A felony.

Acts 1996, ch. 902, § 1.

Cross-References. Blood alcohol tests as evidence, § 55-10-406.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

Sentence range, § 40-35-112.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

In a case where police arrived at the scene of a three-car accident, defendant was found outside the truck while his friend was found in the passenger seat, and defendant's blood alcohol content was .30%, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for vehicular assault and aggravated vehicular homicide where one motorist was injured and another motorist died. State v. Bowman, 327 S.W.3d 69, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. June 15, 2009), cert. denied, Bowman v. Tennessee, 175 L. Ed. 2d 388, 130 S. Ct. 559, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8080 (U.S. 2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide because a paramedic supervisor and a trooper testified that they found defendant pinned into the wrecked vehicle in the driver's seat; the trooper and a sergeant testified that defendant had a strong odor of alcohol about his person; a forensic scientist testified that defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of testing was 0.21; the State submitted direct evidence of defendant's three prior DUI convictions; and it was within the province of the jury to infer that defendant had driven and wrecked the vehicle while intoxicated and that the victims died as a proximate result of defendant's intoxicated driving and the resulting crash. State v. Luthringer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon because his intoxication proximately caused a car crash that killed his son and injured his nephew, while his convictions for vehicular assault and reckless endangerment both stemmed from the crash, his DUI conviction should merge with the vehicular assault conviction since it was a lesser-included offense and he could not be punished separately for one act of DUI that caused serious bodily injury, and the trial court properly considered the aggregating, mitigating, and sentencing factors. State v. Steelman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of three counts of vehicular homicide, as he consumed Hydrocodone as prescribed the morning of the accident, then before the accident, he consumed both alcohol and cocaine, then drove his vehicle, multiple witnesses described the roadway where the accident occurred as horribly narrow, and the trooper at the scene believed speed was a factor in the accident. State v. Fleming, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

2. Sentencing.

Trial court did not err in ordering that defendant's two 24 year sentences for two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of 48 years, because defendant had 16 prior convictions; he was a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high; an extended sentence was necessary to protect the public from defendant as he had three previous driving under the influence convictions, which showed a disregard for the safety of others; and the consecutive sentences were reasonably related to the severity of defendant's offenses because two people died as a result of defendant's conduct. State v. Luthringer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Defendant did not show that his 42-year sentence for one count of driving under the influence, fourth offense, and three counts of aggravated vehicular homicide was improper; the trial court sentenced defendant to a within range sentence, the trial court filed detailed findings of facts to support defendant's sentence, including his criminal history and failure to comply with conditions of a sentence, and the trial court considered the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. State v. Fleming, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

In an aggravated vehicular homicide, aggravated vehicular assault, and leaving the scene of an accident case, defendant's effective sentence of 33 years was appropriate because the trial court considered the risk and needs assessment in determining defendant's sentence, but did not err in declining to give it any weight as the assessment's conclusion that defendant had a low risk of reoffending was inconsistent with the evidence of his four driving under the influence convictions and other drug- and alcohol-related convictions, his multiple failed attempts at rehabilitation, his continued use of drugs, and the fact that he ran over two people in broad daylight while so intoxicated that he was unable to stay awake. State v. Solomon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

Part 3
Kidnapping and False Imprisonment

39-13-301. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Advertisement” means a notice or an announcement in a public medium promoting a product, service, or event, or publicizing a job vacancy;
  2. “Blackmail” means threatening to expose or reveal the identity of another or any material, document, secret or other information that might subject a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, loss of employment, social status or economic harm;
  3. “Coercion” means:
    1. Causing or threatening to cause bodily harm to any person, physically restraining or confining any person or threatening to physically restrain or confine any person;
    2. Exposing or threatening to expose any fact or information that, if revealed, would tend to subject a person to criminal or immigration proceedings, hatred, contempt or ridicule;
    3. Destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating or possessing any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of any person; or
    4. Providing a controlled substance, as defined in § 39-17-402, or a controlled substance analogue, as defined in § 39-17-454, to a person;
  4. “Commercial sex act” means:
    1. Any sexually explicit conduct for which anything of value is directly or indirectly given, promised to or received by any person, which conduct is induced or obtained by coercion or deception or which conduct is induced or obtained from a person under eighteen (18) years of age; or
    2. Any sexually explicit conduct that is performed or provided by any person, which conduct is induced or obtained by coercion or deception or which conduct is induced or obtained from a person under eighteen (18) years of age;
  5. “Deception” means:
    1. Creating or confirming another person's impression of an existing fact or past event that is false and that the accused knows or believes to be false;
    2. Maintaining the status or condition of a person arising from a pledge by that person of personal services as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined, or preventing a person from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition of the debt; or
    3. Promising benefits or the performance of services that the accused does not intend to deliver or perform or knows will not be delivered or performed. Evidence of failure to deliver benefits or perform services standing alone shall not be sufficient to authorize a conviction under this part;
  6. “Financial harm” includes extortion as defined by § 39-14-112, criminal violation of the usury laws as defined by § 47-14-112 or employment contracts that violate the statute of frauds as defined by § 29-2-101(b);
  7. “Forced labor or services” means labor or services that are performed or provided by another person and are obtained or maintained through the defendant's:
    1. Causing or threatening to cause serious harm to any person;
    2. Physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain another person;
    3. Abusing or threatening to abuse the law or legal process;
    4. Knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating or possessing any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of another person;
    5. Blackmail; or
    6. Causing or threatening to cause financial harm to in order to exercise financial control over any person;
  8. “Involuntary servitude” means the condition of a person who is compelled by force, coercion or imprisonment and against the person's will to labor for another, whether paid or not;
  9. “Labor” means work of economic or financial value;
  10. “Maintain” means, in relation to labor or services, to secure continued performance of labor or services, regardless of any initial agreement on the part of the victim to perform such type of service;
  11. “Minor” means an individual who is less than eighteen (18) years of age;
  12. “Obtain” means, in relation to labor or services, to secure performance of labor or services;
  13. “Services” means an ongoing relationship between a person and the defendant in which the person performs activities under the supervision of or for the defendant;
  14. “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated:
    1. Sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
    2. Bestiality;
    3. Masturbation;
    4. Lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person;
    5. Flagellation or torture by or upon a person who is nude;
    6. Condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of a person who is nude;
    7. Physical contact in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification with any person's unclothed genitals, pubic area or buttocks or with a female's nude breasts;
    8. Defecation or urination for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer; or
    9. Penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object except when done as part of a recognized medical procedure; and
  15. “Unlawful” means, with respect to removal or confinement, one that is accomplished by force, threat or fraud, or, in the case of a person who is under the age of thirteen (13) or incompetent, accomplished without the consent of a parent, guardian or other person responsible for the general supervision of the minor's or incompetent's welfare.

Acts 1990, ch. 982, § 1; 2008, ch. 1140, § 2; 2012, ch. 848, § 13; 2012, ch. 1075, § 1; 2013, ch. 465, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-301 was transferred to § 39-13-304 in 1990.

Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Human Trafficking Act of 2007.”

Cross-References. Child abuse, title 39, ch. 15, part 4.

Kidnapping, §§ 39-13-30339-13-305.

Mental health and intellectual and developmental disabilities, title 33.

Spousal abuse, title 36, ch. 3, part 6.

Law Reviews.

Abolishing Child Sex Trafficking on the Internet: Imposing Criminal Culpability on Digital Facilitators (Ryan Dalton), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1097  (2013).

Justice for Victims of Human Trafficking and Forced Labor: Why Current Theories of Corporate Liability Do Not Work, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1047 (2013).

Prosecuting Demand as a Crime of Human Trafficking: The Eighth Circuit Decision in United States v. Jungers, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 917 (2013).

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

Using Commercial Driver Licensing Authority to Combat Human Trafficking Related Crimes on America's Highways, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 969 (2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

The evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's guilt of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. State v. Boling, 840 S.W.2d 944, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 530 (Tenn. Aug. 31, 1992).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping because he beat the victim and kept her inside her home for almost 24 hours, the victim testified that she attempted to flee when defendant left the house but was stopped by defendant's return, and defendant had a loaded gun that he threatened her with. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2019).

2. Multiple Convictions.

Where the victim's abduction and confinement were far from incidental to being robbed, the multiple convictions and punishments imposed for aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery did not violate defendants' right to due process and against double jeopardy. State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, Meeks v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 1168, 114 S. Ct. 1200, 127 L. Ed. 2d 548, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1998 (1994).

3. Unlawful Confinement.

Under T.C.A. § 39-13-301, removal or confinement is not “unlawful” if it is accomplished with the consent of a “parent,” and thus defendant, the minor child's father, could not be prosecuted under T.C.A. § 39-13-305(a)(2) of especially aggravated kidnapping because the indictment failed to allege that defendant removed or confined the child by force, threat, or fraud, and the removal or confinement was not accomplished without the consent of a parent because defendant was the child's father. State v. Goodman, 90 S.W.3d 557, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. 2002).

4. “Parent.”

Under T.C.A. § 39-13-301, removal or confinement is not “unlawful” if it is accomplished with the consent of a “parent”; defendant was the minor's natural father; and the court interpreted the statute to mean either parent not “custodial parent”, so the removal and confinement of the minor was not “unlawful”. State v. Goodman, 90 S.W.3d 557, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. 2002).

39-13-302. False imprisonment.

  1. A person commits the offense of false imprisonment who knowingly removes or confines another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other's liberty.
  2. False imprisonment is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-303; Acts 1990, ch. 982, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section codifies the Tennessee common law on false imprisonment. Derived from Model Penal Code § 212.3, it broadly addresses any situation where there is an interference with another's liberty. False imprisonment is used as the basic offense for the kidnapping statutes. The specific situation in which a relative abducts a child or incompetent person after an award of custody to another is now addressed in § 39-13-306.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-302 was transferred to § 39-13-302 in 1990.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Kidnapping, § 39-13-303 et seq.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Two Crimes For The Price of One: The Problem With Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond  (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The general assembly intended for this offense to proscribe a continuing course of conduct. State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1999).

2. As Related to Other Crimes.

When a defendant robs one victim there is no inherent necessity to confine a separate victim; as such, the due process concerns that are implicated when a defendant is charged with kidnapping and robbing the same victim are not implicated when a defendant is charged with kidnapping one victim while robbing another. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

Trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise the issue that petitioner's double jeopardy protections were violated when the jury was allowed to consider the charges for both especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault because the convictions did not violate double jeopardy; given that the elements of the offenses were different, they were two separate crime. Hubbard v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2015).

3. Lesser Included Offense.

It was error that was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the trial court instructed the jury on felony murder and the facilitation of felony murder but did not instruct the jury on the offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide because there was evidence that, if believed, showed that defendant could have potentially been convicted of any one of the three offenses. State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d 663, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. 2002).

4. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's aggravated kidnapping conviction, where he handcuffed and chained the victim to the passenger seat in his truck in order to prevent her escape before killing her; furthermore, defendant's suggestion that the victim might have been chained to a tree also supported a finding that she was kidnapped. State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1007 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 541 U.S. 1049, 158 L. Ed. 2d 743, 124 S. Ct. 2174, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3512, 72 U.S.L.W. 3711 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's aggravated kidnapping conviction because defendant told investigators that he and accomplices approached the victim's vehicle, got into the passenger seat, and ordered the victim to drive. Defendant said that he entered the car and ordered the victim to drive and he held the gun on his lap. State v. Freeland, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2013), aff'd, 451 S.W.3d 791, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's felony-murder conviction that was based upon kidnapping because defendant had guns in the car, he asked the victim to get into the car, defendant did not stop the car, and after the victim exited the car, defendant shot him. State v. Carey, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Jan. 21, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping where the jury received the full White instruction, defendant and two others entered the victim's home, held the three victims at gunpoint for eight to 10 hours, and took property from all three, defendant sexually assaulted two of the victims, and the confinement lasted much longer than the time necessary to commit the other acts of robbery and sexual assault. State v. Cornelius Banks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Evidence that defendant, who was in a romantic relationship with and lived with the victim, forced himself on the victim, penetrating her vagina with his penis, told her not to leave the room after the rape and raised his hand in a threatening manner when she tried to leave was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for rape, false imprisonment, and domestic assault. State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 389 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping because the jury credited the victim's testimony, and the testimony of other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated her account; the victim reported defendant's abuse to an officer, who noted injuries to her face and redness to her neck, and the injuries were observable in the photographs admitted at trial. State v. Baxter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Evidence defendant held the adult victim at gunpoint, ordered him to the ground and bound him with a cord from an iron allowed a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly removed or confined the victim unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty, and supported a false imprisonment conviction. State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's second-degree murder conviction where it showed that he knowingly shot the unarmed victim in the head causing her death, as he admitted to several witness that he was holding the weapon when the victim was shot, there had been an argument, and after the shooting defendant took his children to a neighbor's house before calling 911 and hiding the weapon. State v. Cundiff, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted second degree murder because defendant possessed the intent to knowingly kill the victim and, by repeatedly stabbing her and slamming her head into the toilet, he took a substantial step toward doing so. State v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2016).

Defendant's conviction of facilitation of felony murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-11-403, with kidnapping and theft as the underlying felonies under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-302, 39-14-103 was affirmed, as jurors could have found that defendant and his accomplice intended to deprive the victim of his vehicle when they forced him into the backseat, and the kidnapping and theft were still in progress at the time the victim was shot because he was still resisting confinement and refusing to consent to the taking of his property. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping of victim three; defendant forced the victim to tie herself with ropes, chained her to his truck, jerked the truck in drive, and pulled the rope tight around her ankles, and defendant's confinement of the victim went far beyond what was necessary to commit the attempted aggravated assault that occurred on the second day of the ordeal. State v. Shields, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2019).

Defendant's convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping of victims one and two were supported by sufficient evidence; defendant's own conduct, separate and apart from the conduct of co-defendant, was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant kidnapped the victims, as he helped hold them at gunpoint against their will and told the victims he would shoot them if they tried to escape. State v. Shields, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2019).

State proved that the especially aggravated kidnappings were not incidental to the aggravated robberies, and therefore defendant's convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping were affirmed, because, while the victims may have felt no more confined than they would have in a normal robbery, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the purpose of forcing the victims to disrobe was to prevent their summoning assistance or for the purpose of deterring any attempt to thwart the robbery. State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 616 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for kidnapping because the victim, defendant's paramour, testified that defendant strangled the victim following an argument until the victim lost consciousness and hit the victim with a motorcycle helmet, threatened to kill the victim, blocked the victim's exit from a bedroom with a large mirror, hit the victim and tried to have sex with the victim, turned the lights off and told the victim to stay in bed with defendant until the morning, and allowed the victim to go into the kitchen the next morning. State v. Mansir, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2020).

5. Jury Instructions.

Conviction for false imprisonment was reversed and the cause was remanded for a new trial because, when defendant was convicted of both false imprisonment and assault, the jury was not adequately charged on the question of whether the victim's removal or confinement, as an element of false imprisonment, was essentially incidental to the assault, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

Trial court did not err in declining to give the instruction used when the jury had to determine whether the removal or confinement was incidental to the accompanying felony or was significant enough, standing alone, to support a conviction; the instruction is not required when a defendant is charged with the kidnapping and robbery of different victims. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

Instruction used when the jury had to determine whether the removal or confinement was incidental to the accompanying felony or was significant enough to support a conviction was not required because defendant did not stand the risk of being convicted of kidnapping a victim he confined only long enough to rob; the due process concerns were not present as the kidnapping of one or more victims could never be essentially incidental to an offense perpetrated against a different victim or victims. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

39-13-303. Kidnapping.

  1. Kidnapping is false imprisonment as defined in § 39-13-302, under circumstances exposing the other person to substantial risk of bodily injury.
  2. Kidnapping is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-302; Acts 1990, ch. 982, § 1; 2008, ch. 1140, § 4.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section defines the offense of kidnapping as false imprisonment plus either of the added elements of (1) substantial risk of bodily injury or (2) involuntary servitude.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-303 was transferred to § 39-13-302 in 1990.

Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Human Trafficking Act of 2007.”

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Transfer from juvenile court, § 37-1-134.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.93.

Law Reviews.

Two Crimes For The Price of One: The Problem With Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond  (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction With Other Law.

Whether the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, establishes each and every element of kidnapping, as defined by statute, is a question for the jury properly instructed under the law. The jury must evaluate the proof offered at trial and determine whether the State has met its burden. An appellate court's task of assessing the sufficiency of the convicting evidence qualifies as the ultimate component of this constitutional safeguard. The separate due process test articulated first in State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), and subsequently refined in State. v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997), and its progeny, is, therefore, no longer necessary to the appellate review of a kidnapping conviction accompanied by a separate felony. Anthony and the entire line of cases including a separate due process analysis in appellate review are expressly overruled. State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

2. During Accompanying Felony.

Every robbery, by definition, involves some detention against the will of the victim, if only long enough to take goods or money from the person of the victim. This does not mean that the legislature intended that every robbery should also constitute a kidnapping, even though a literal reading of the statute might suggest otherwise. The courts' task is to apply the statute narrowly, so as to make its reach fundamentally fair and to protect the due process rights of every citizen, even those charged with robbery, rape, or the like. (overruled as to the test to be applied in determining whether kidnapping can be charged as a separate offense) State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. 1991), overruled in part, Taylor v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 2009), overruled in part, State v. Middlebrooks, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 20, 2011), overruled, State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012), overruled, State v. Powell, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2012), overruled, State v. Cecil, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2012), overruled, State v. Savage, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2012), overruled, State v. Hancock, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2012), overruled, State v. Raymer, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2012), overruled in part, State v. Osby, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Scott, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 923 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2012), overruled, State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 948 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 16, 2012), overruled, State v. Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2012), overruled, State v. Copeland, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1069 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 21, 2012), overruled, State v. Swett, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2013), overruled, State v. Hulse, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2013), overruled, State v. Bush, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2013), overruled, State v. Dowell, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2013), overruled, State v. Barnett, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2013), overruled, State v. Alston, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2013), overruled, State v. Burdick, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 11, 2013), overruled, Camp v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2013), overruled, State v. Keller, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2013), overruled, State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013), overruled in part, State v. Waldroup, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2013), overruled, State v. Bowman, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2013), overruled, State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2013), overruled, Majors v. Sexton, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166310 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 22, 2013), overruled, State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2013), overruled, State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2014), overruled, State v. Teats, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2014), overruled, State v. Holman, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2014), overruled in part, Simpkins v. Holloway, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23622 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 2014), overruled, State v. Waller, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 255 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2014), overruled, State v. Pryor, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2014), overruled, State v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2014), overruled, Fielder v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 851 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2014), overruled, State v. Weilacker, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 875 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2014), overruled, State v. Keller, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2014), overruled, State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2015), overruled, State v. Alston, 465 S.W.3d 555, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. May 5, 2015), overruled, State v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2015), overruled, State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015), overruled, State v. Pryor, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1024 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2015), overruled, Thorne v. Lester, 2016 FED App. 93N, 641 Fed. Appx. 541, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2534 (6th Cir. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2016), overruled, Porter v. Johnson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18433 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2016), overruled in part, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), overruled in part, Morris v. Ford, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116087 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2016), overruled, Guillen v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 878 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 2016), overruled, Porter v. Genovese, 2017 FED App. 35P (6th Cir.), 676 Fed. Appx. 428, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 924 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2017), overruled, State v. King, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 423 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2017), overruled, State v. Frost, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 510 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 2017), overruled, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017), overruled, State v. Tittle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

Kidnapping statutes, construed according to the fair import of their terms, T.C.A. § 39-11-104, and coupled with their derivation from the Model Penal Code, evince a legislative intent to punish as kidnapping only those instances in which the removal or confinement has criminal significance above and beyond that necessary to consummate some underlying offense, such as robbery or rape. State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Defendant's kidnapping convictions did not violate due process because the movement of two restaurant managers during a robbery was not necessary to consummate the underlying robbery, and the additional movement prevented the victims from summoning help, lessened the risk of defendant's detection, and created a significant danger or increased the victim's risk of harm. (overruled as to due process test to be applied) State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. May 7, 2008), cert. denied, Richardson v. Tennessee, 172 L. Ed. 2d 465, 129 S. Ct. 608, 555 U.S. 1036, 77 U.S.L.W. 3296, — U.S. —, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8497 (U.S. 2008), overruled in part, State v. Osby, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Hulse, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2013), overruled, State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2013), overruled, State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2013), overruled, State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2014), overruled, State v. Teats, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2014), overruled, State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2014), overruled, State v. Holman, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2014), overruled, Thorne v. Hollway, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125191 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2014), overruled, State v. Keller, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2014), overruled in part, Porter v. Johnson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45910 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 8, 2015), overruled, Porter v. Johnson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18433 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2016), overruled, Porter v. Genovese, 2017 FED App. 35P (6th Cir.), 676 Fed. Appx. 428, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 924 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2017).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's aggravated kidnapping conviction, where he handcuffed and chained the victim to the passenger seat in his truck in order to prevent her escape before killing her; furthermore, defendant's suggestion that the victim might have been chained to a tree also supported a finding that she was kidnapped. State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1007 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 541 U.S. 1049, 158 L. Ed. 2d 743, 124 S. Ct. 2174, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3512, 72 U.S.L.W. 3711 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's felony-murder conviction that was based upon kidnapping because defendant had guns in the car, he asked the victim to get into the car, defendant did not stop the car, and after the victim exited the car, defendant shot him. State v. Carey, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Jan. 21, 2016).

Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sufficient to support his murder convictions where the victims'  deaths and identities were proven and appellant's confession was trustworthy. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2015), aff'd, 496 S.W.3d 653, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a kidnapping as he came onto the victim's porch, struck the victim, and forced the victim back into the residence; he then pushed the victim to the floor and pinned the victim down by placing his knee on the victim's back; he tied the victim's wrists and legs together in the “hogtied” position; he and another person left the victim's residence while the victim was still tied up and lying on the floor; the victim sustained contusions, abrasions, broken ribs, blunt force injuries, and eventually died from a heart attack from the stress of the offenses; and defendant did not need to strike victim or tie him up to protect the other person from the victim. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for kidnapping because the victim, defendant's paramour, testified that defendant strangled the victim following an argument until the victim lost consciousness and hit the victim with a motorcycle helmet, threatened to kill the victim, blocked the victim's exit from a bedroom with a large mirror, hit the victim and tried to have sex with the victim, turned the lights off and told the victim to stay in bed with defendant until the morning, and allowed the victim to go into the kitchen the next morning. State v. Mansir, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2020).

4. Kidnapping and Accompanying Felony.

When a defendant robs one victim there is no inherent necessity to confine a separate victim; as such, the due process concerns that are implicated when a defendant is charged with kidnapping and robbing the same victim are not implicated when a defendant is charged with kidnapping one victim while robbing another. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

39-13-304. Aggravated kidnapping.

  1. Aggravated kidnapping is false imprisonment, as defined in § 39-13-302, committed:
    1. To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter;
    2. To interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function;
    3. With the intent to inflict serious bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
    4. Where the victim suffers bodily injury; or
    5. While the defendant is in possession of a deadly weapon or threatens the use of a deadly weapon.
    1. Aggravated kidnapping is a Class B felony.
    2. If the offender voluntarily releases the victim alive or voluntarily provides information leading to the victim's safe release, such actions shall be considered by the court as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-301; Acts 1990, ch. 982, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section defines the offense of aggravated kidnapping as false imprisonment plus one of the five elements listed in subsection (a). Subdivision (a)(5) punishes a kidnapping involving the possession or threatened use of a deadly weapon. For example, during the kidnapping, if the defendant had a deadly weapon in his or her pocket but did not mention or use it, or if he or she did not have a deadly weapon in his or her possession, but threatened the victim with the use of a deadly weapon, the offense would be punishable as an aggravated kidnapping under this section. If the defendant actually used a deadly weapon or used something other than a deadly weapon but convinced the victim that it was a deadly weapon, the offense would be punishable as an especially aggravated kidnapping under § 39-13-305(a)(1).

Subsection (b) requires the court to consider the voluntary safe release of the victim as a mitigating factor. This provision reflects the concern for the safety of the victim.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-304 was transferred to § 39-13-306 in 1990.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. False imprisonment, § 39-13-302.

Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Kidnapping defined, § 39-13-303.

Missing Children Recovery Act, title 37, ch. 10, part 2.

Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

Transfer from juvenile court, § 37-1-134.

Written request for charge on lesser included offense, § 40-18-110.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 28.93, 28.114.

Law Reviews.

Two Crimes For The Price of One: The Problem With Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond  (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Serious Bodily Injury.

Forcing restaurant employees into a freezer substantially increased the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery defendant subject to an independent prosecution for kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping. State v. Rolland, 861 S.W.2d 840, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

2. Continuing Course of Conduct.

The General Assembly intended for this offense to proscribe a continuing course of conduct. State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1999).

3. Removal or Confinement.

Kidnapping statutes, construed according to the fair import of their terms, T.C.A. § 39-11-104, and coupled with their derivation from the Model Penal Code, evince a legislative intent to punish as kidnapping only those instances in which the removal or confinement has criminal significance above and beyond that necessary to consummate some underlying offense, such as robbery or rape. State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

When a defendant robs one victim there is no inherent necessity to confine a separate victim; as such, the due process concerns that are implicated when a defendant is charged with kidnapping and robbing the same victim are not implicated when a defendant is charged with kidnapping one victim while robbing another. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

Rational trier of fact could have found that the aggravated assault was accomplished when defendant put a knife to the victim's throat at the roadside and that the attempted aggravated kidnapping involved a separate attempted removal or confinement when defendant dragged the victim down the driveway; thus, there was no due process violation as there was no basis to disturb the determination of the jury that any removal or confinement was beyond that necessary to commit the aggravated assault. State v. Tittle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

4. Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's aggravated kidnapping conviction, where he handcuffed and chained the victim to the passenger seat in his truck in order to prevent her escape before killing her; furthermore, defendant's suggestion that the victim might have been chained to a tree also supported a finding that she was kidnapped. State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1007 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 541 U.S. 1049, 158 L. Ed. 2d 743, 124 S. Ct. 2174, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3512, 72 U.S.L.W. 3711 (2004).

5. —Admissibility.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling inadmissible testimony of a psychologist that defendant did not have the “propensity” to commit crimes involving the sexual abuse of children since the testimony would not substantially assist the jury to understand the proof adduced at the trial. State v. Campbell, 904 S.W.2d 608, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

6. —Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping where the jury received the full White instruction, defendant and two others entered the victim's home, held the three victims at gunpoint for eight to 10 hours, and took property from all three, defendant sexually assaulted two of the victims, and the confinement lasted much longer than the time necessary to commit the other acts of robbery and sexual assault. State v. Cornelius Banks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping because the jury credited the victim's testimony, and the testimony of other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated her account; the victim reported defendant's abuse to an officer, who noted injuries to her face and redness to her neck, and the injuries were observable in the photographs admitted at trial. State v. Baxter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping; although the storage unit and vehicle were not locked, the victim testified that she remained in both because of defendant's threats to kill himself, and defendant was the victim's biological father and had custody of her and her siblings, and thus his threats especially resonated with her. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence that defendant bound the children and forced them to move about the residence at gunpoint was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated kidnapping. State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

In rejecting defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his convictions for aggravated kidnapping by bodily injury and domestic assault by bodily injury, the court of criminal appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the victim's removal and confinement had criminal significance beyond that necessary to consummate the domestic assault. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. July 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant committed aggravated rape, carjacking, robbery, and aggravated kidnapping because the State proved he was the perpetrator; because the victim viewed defendant under such circumstances that would permit a positive identification, her testimony alone would be sufficient to support his convictions, but the State presented additional evidence confirming the identification, and forensic evidence supported the identification. State v. Nelson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 2017).

Evidence sufficiently established that defendant committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping because the victim testified that defendant dragged the victim by the victim's hair and arm to defendant's truck, that defendant punched the victim in the back and in the head while forcing the victim against the victim's will into the truck, and that these actions caused the victim pain. Moreover, an eyewitness testified that defendant appeared to be beating the victim within an inch of the victim's life. State v. Horton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping because the State established the element of substantial interference, as the victim testified that the victim suffered abuse by defendant for roughly two hours, she attempted to go upstairs to get away from defendant but he followed her, she tried to find her cell phone to call the police so she could leave the apartment, and that she could not escape because defendant would not let her. The victim's testimony was corroborated by her 911 call, during which she exclaimed that she had been held against her will by defendant for over two hours. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 861 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2018).

Evidence that the victim was physically attacked with a taser and kicked in the face, defendant and her accomplices stole the victim's pants and personal items, defendant only got back in the car because he thought they would run him over, and defendant, under threat of harm, provided access to his bank account supported defendant's conviction for aggravated kidnapping. State v. Lobbins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping because he beat the victim and kept her inside her home for almost 24 hours, the victim testified that she attempted to flee when defendant left the house but was stopped by defendant's return, and defendant had a loaded gun that he threatened her with. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping because it showed that he choked the victim from behind, he did not attempt to retrieve any of her scattered belongings, he threatened to snap her neck unless she stopped screaming and got into the vehicle, the victim briefly lost consciousness and when she came to she was partially inside the vehicle, an eyewitness saw two men trying push a woman into a vehicle, the victim did not escape until defendant fled, and she sustained injuries to her head, and scratches, and bruises. State v. Green, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated kidnapping conviction because it was not essentially incidental to the aggravated assault as the victim was bound with zip ties around her ankles and wrists and hog tied, and her confinement to the bedroom had criminal significance above and beyond that necessary to consummate the aggravated assault by strangulation. State v. Olivera, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping because it showed that during an argument defendant forced the victim into a chair, he blocked the victim from leaving the residence and grabbed her by the neck, and when the victim tried to leave again defendant brandished a knife and told her she would only leave in a body bag. State v. Stevens, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2020).

7. Jury Instructions.

Trial court did not err in declining to give the instruction used when the jury had to determine whether the removal or confinement was incidental to the accompanying felony or was significant enough, standing alone, to support a conviction; the instruction is not required when a defendant is charged with the kidnapping and robbery of different victims. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

Instruction used when the jury had to determine whether the removal or confinement was incidental to the accompanying felony or was significant enough to support a conviction was not required because defendant did not stand the risk of being convicted of kidnapping a victim he confined only long enough to rob; the due process concerns were not present as the kidnapping of one or more victims could never be essentially incidental to an offense perpetrated against a different victim or victims. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

Trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the pattern instruction for aggravated kidnapping in effect at the time of trial and did not define the key element, substantial interference with the victim's liberty, as requiring a finding that the victim's removal or confinement was not essentially incidental to the felony offense; even if counsel was deficient for failing to raise an instruction issue, petitioner was not prejudiced, given that his confinement of the victim was not incidental to the aggravated rape and was not subject to different interpretations, and petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief. Guillen v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 878 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. May 19, 2017).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's request for a jury instruction pursuant to the White case because he was charged with four counts of aggravated kidnapping but not with an accompanying felony, and therefore he was never at risk for being convicted of two crimes, one of which was essentially incidental to the other. State v. Green, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2019).

8. Sentencing.

In connection with his convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping, defendant did not challenge the application of three enhancement factors, and his only complaint was that the trial court discounted the mitigating factor that his conduct neither caused nor threatened serious injury; while it was arguable whether a migraine headache fit the definition of serious injury, the trial court did not err in giving no weight to this proposed mitigating factor, the sentences imposed were within the appropriate ranges, and the trial court adequately considered the purposes of sentencing. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

In connection with the defendant's convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping, partially consecutive sentencing was proper; the trial court imposed sentences it deemed justly deserved, and there was no showing of a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

In an aggravated kidnapping case, the trial court properly declined to apply the mitigating factor found in this statute because the record contained no proof that defendant released the victim as the victim was left duct-taped to a tree. State v. Blaylock, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2019).

Evidence established defendant's repeat violent offender status as he was convicted of aggravated kidnapping in the instant case and had a prior conviction in Oklahoma for rape in the first degree that, if committed in Tennessee, would have constituted the predicate offense of rape under the repeat violent offender statute; and he had at least one separate period of incarceration for the commission of the predicate offense before he committed the current offense; thus, the trial court erred in failing to sentence defendant to life without possibility of parole for his aggravated kidnapping conviction. State v. Blaylock, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the maximum sentence for each conviction of aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping because it articulated on the record its reasons for imposing the sentences, it found that defendant's prior convictions were significant and established a history to enhance his sentence because they were very violent attacks on the victim. The trial court found that defendant had previously failed to comply with the conditions of his probation for his prior California convictions. State v. Olivera, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2019).

11. Double Jeopardy.

Although the offenses arose from the same act or transaction of defendant's act of putting a knife to the victim's throat and then dragging her 20-30 feet down a dark driveway toward a scrap yard, aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense of attempted aggravated kidnapping and the offenses were not the same for the purposes of double jeopardy as each crime contained an element that the other did not because attempted aggravated kidnapping required a specific intent to commit the crime of aggravated kidnapping, including a removal or confinement of the victim; and aggravated assault contained an element of fear and required the State to show that defendant caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. State v. Tittle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

39-13-305. Especially aggravated kidnapping.

  1. Especially aggravated kidnapping is false imprisonment, as defined in § 39-13-302:
    1. Accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon;
    2. Where the victim was under the age of thirteen (13) at the time of the removal or confinement;
    3. Committed to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or
    4. Where the victim suffers serious bodily injury.
    1. Especially aggravated kidnapping is a Class A felony.
    2. If the offender voluntarily releases the victim alive or voluntarily provides information leading to the victim's safe release, such actions shall be considered by the court as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing.

Acts 1990, ch. 982, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section defines the offense of especially aggravated kidnapping as false imprisonment plus one of the four elements listed in subsection (a). Subdivision (a)(1) punishes a kidnapping in which a deadly weapon is actually used to threaten the victim. If a weapon is in the defendant's possession but is not used, the kidnapping is punishable pursuant to § 39-13-304, aggravated kidnapping.

Subsection (b) requires the court to consider the voluntary safe release of the victim as a mitigating factor. This provision reflects the concern for the safety of the victim.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

Transfer from juvenile court, § 37-1-134.

Law Reviews.

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem With Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond  (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Due Process.

Because the statutory defense of T.C.A. § 39-12-105(c) could be waived in a voluntary guilty plea as it was non-jurisdictional, the inmate stood convicted at most by a voidable, but not void, judgment; therefore, he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief from his conviction of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping under T.C.A. § 39-13-305. State v. Cook, 250 S.W.3d 922, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008).

Trial courts have the obligation to provide clear guidance to the jury with regard to the statutory language; specifically, trial courts must ensure that juries return kidnapping convictions only in those instances in which the victim's removal or confinement exceeds that which is necessary to accomplish the accompanying felony. Instructions should be designed to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly to criminalize only those instances in which the removal or confinement of a victim is independently significant from an accompanying felony, such as rape or robbery; when jurors are called upon to determine whether the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, or especially aggravated kidnapping, trial courts should specifically require a determination of whether the removal or confinement is, in essence, incidental to the accompanying felony or, in the alternative, is significant enough, standing alone, to support a conviction; an instruction of this nature is necessary in order to assure that juries properly afford constitutional due process protections to those on trial for kidnapping and an accompanying felony. State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Whether the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, establishes each and every element of kidnapping, as defined by statute, is a question for the jury properly instructed under the law; the jury, whose primary obligation is to ensure that a criminal defendant has been afforded due process, must evaluate the proof offered at trial and determine whether the State has met its burden. An appellate court's task, therefore, of assessing the sufficiency of the convicting evidence qualifies as the ultimate component of this constitutional safeguard; the separate due process test articulated first in State v. Anthony, and subsequently refined in State. v. Dixon, and its progeny, is, therefore, no longer necessary to the appellate review of a kidnapping conviction accompanied by a separate felony; to be clear, Anthony and the entire line of cases including a separate due process analysis in appellate review are expressly overruled. State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

It was only after the victim escaped that defendant took control of the vehicle and drove away with the lawnmower, thus completing the robbery, and the restraint of the victim did substantially interfere with his liberty and was not incidental to the robbery, such that defendant's convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping under T.C.A. § 39-13-305(a)(1) and robbery under T.C.A. § 39-13-401(a) did not violate due process. State v. Greca, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1015 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

2. Removal or Confinement.

Kidnapping statutes, construed according to the fair import of their terms, T.C.A. § 39-11-104, and coupled with their derivation from the Model Penal Code, evince a legislative intent to punish as kidnapping only those instances in which the removal or confinement has criminal significance above and beyond that necessary to consummate some underlying offense, such as robbery or rape. State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

3. Kidnapping and Accompanying Felony.

In a home invasion case were the defendants were also convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, defendants'  separate convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping of victim did not violate due process where the confinement of the victim was beyond that necessary to commit robbery, where it lessened the risk of defendant's detection, and where it increased the victim's risk of harm. (overruled as to application of due process test) State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Fuller v. Tennessee, 547 U.S. 1164, 126 S. Ct. 2321, 164 L. Ed. 2d 842, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4190 (2006), overruled in part, State v. Osby, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Hulse, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2013), overruled, State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013), overruled, State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2013), overruled, State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2013), overruled in part, Fuller v. Barbee, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137295 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014).

When a defendant robs one victim there is no inherent necessity to confine a separate victim; as such, the due process concerns that are implicated when a defendant is charged with kidnapping and robbing the same victim are not implicated when a defendant is charged with kidnapping one victim while robbing another. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

4. Evidence.

5. —Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping, because: (1) It showed that defendant and his co-defendant left the co-defendant's apartment carrying handcuffs, rope, and duct tape; (2) There was evidence, including defendant's own statement, that the victims were bound and transported to a construction site where their bodies were eventually found; and (3) Rope found at the murder scene was further evidence that the victims had been bound. It was clear that defendant played an active role in planning, preparing, and executing the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of the victims, and the evidence was certainly sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of especially aggravated kidnapping under at least a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Evidence, which demonstrated that defendant kidnapped two victims with the use or display of deadly weapons, was sufficient to support his convictions for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping under T.C.A. § 39-13-305(a). State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Davis v. Tennessee, 125 S. Ct. 1306, 161 L. Ed. 2d 123, 543 U.S. 1156, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1599 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for felony murder, under T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2), and especially aggravated kidnapping, under T.C.A. § 39-13-305, because defendant beat the victim unconscious with a baseball bat, and defendant and an accomplice tied the victim with rope and drove the victim to a creek where they drowned the victim. Furthermore, defendant's statements to investigators, which reflected a guilty knowledge on the part of defendant, taken together with the evidence of defendant's DNA which was recovered from a cigarette butt that was found at the victim's home, sufficiently corroborated the testimony of accomplices. State v. Mangrum, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2011), aff'd, 403 S.W.3d 152, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Mar. 27, 2013).

Evidence that defendant placed the victim in a chokehold while pointing a gun to her head, forced her into the kitchen, and shot her during a struggle was sufficient to support a conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping; defendant moved the victim and no specific distance was required. State v. Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's aggravated kidnapping conviction because defendant told investigators that he and accomplices approached the victim's vehicle, got into the passenger seat, and ordered the victim to drive. Defendant said that he entered the car and ordered the victim to drive and he held the gun on his lap. State v. Freeland, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2013), aff'd, 451 S.W.3d 791, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2014).

Codefendant's convictions for felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery were supported by evidence that codefendant tied up the victim, took the victim's debit cards, withdrew money from an ATM using the debit cards, and that during the perpetration of the robbery, the victim was shot and killed. State v. Doss, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2014), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2014), cert. denied, Doss v. Tennessee, 192 L. Ed. 2d 169, 135 S. Ct. 2382, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3684 (U.S. 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping because there was evidence defendant was present at the victim's house, defendant's DNA was on the handgun replica and a condom found in the same area as a branch on which hairs consistent with the victim's head hair were found, multiple blunt force injuries occurred to the victim's head, and a drag trail existed from the victim's house leading to the area where the victim's body was found. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, as defendant and others who were charged in the case initially encountered the victims in the parking lot of an apartment complex where the couple were preparing for an evening out, and the perpetrators took one victim's car at gunpoint, forcing both victims to go with them. State v. Davidson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015), aff'd, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and assault where he entered the victim's bedroom armed with a handgun and a knife, punched the victim, and after threatening her parents left the house with her and drove her a few hours away. State v. Edmonston, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2016).

Defendant's convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault were proper because the trial court did not err in finding that the victim's injuries qualified as serious bodily injury since the victim suffered extreme physical pain and obvious disfigurement. In part, the victim testified that defendant punched her continuously in her eyes, she received multiple fractures, and photographs taken two days later showed that her eyes remained black and swollen and that the entire right side of her face was bruised and swollen. State v. Cary, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Mar. 24, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping, as defendant forced the victim against her will from a house and into the victim's car, even as the victim shouted for him to stop, and the pair drove to a second location, where defendant beat the victim to death. State v. Burrows, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

Evidence that defendant, after demanding the victim's property at gunpoint and taking her cell phone and her driver's license, kept his gun pointed at the victim's head as she drove to the Walmart to comply with his demand that she take him to get the money order cashed was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Defendant's identity was sufficiently proven where the victim's description of the assailant matched defendant's physical appearance, defendant's DNA was found on gloves discovered in the victim's car after the incident and that were not in the car before it was stolen, and officers identified defendant as the driver of a car that had crashed before the incident, near the victim's home, who fled and was not apprehended. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping his two children where he held the children and their mother at gunpoint and prevented them from leaving the apartment, putting the children in great danger. State v. Dobson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 927 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, as defendant and a friend, wearing masks, went armed to the victim's house, cut her telephone lines, disabled the house phones, broke her cell phone, took her computer, confined her to the bathroom, and ultimately left with property in one of her vehicles and drove away; their actions were designed to prevent the victim from summoning help and were not necessary in order to effectuate the robbery. State v. Doree, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's two convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, as he and co-defendants held the victims at gunpoint and bound them with cords and tape, and even if the victims were not physically bound, they were held captive by the defendants'  demands and threats of violence, and thus defendant one unlawfully confined the victims and this confinement was not merely incidental to the robberies. State v. Sherrod, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 607 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Defendant's actions in holding two victims at gunpoint in the front of the house and pointing a gun at a third victim while making him unplug a device before taking it were sufficient to support the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted especially aggravated robbery. State v. King, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 423 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and of three counts of aggravated assault as defendant substantially interfered with the victims'  liberty by the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon and the victims had a reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury by the use of a deadly weapon because defendant terrorized the three victims for hours by confining them to the bedroom and hitting two of the victims with his fists; the victims were not allowed to leave the bedroom; defendant was armed with a knife and a beer bottle, which he used to threaten the victims; and all three victims testified that they feared for their safety. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 951 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2017).

Despite the acquittal on the aggravated robbery charge, the State presented evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant committed especially aggravated kidnapping under T.C.A. § 39-13-305 and that he employed a firearm during the commission of that crime, and thus defendant was not entitled to relief on his inconsistent verdict claim. State v. Greca, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1015 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Defendant's especially aggravated kidnapping conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-305(a)(1) was supported by the evidence, given the victim's testimony that defendant entered his vehicle without permission and with a gun, and while holding the gun on the victim, defendant directed the victim to drive him several places; while the event only lasted around 20 minutes, the statutory elements of especially aggravated kidnapping did not require a finding that the defendant moved the victim any specific distance or restrained him for any particular length of time. State v. Greca, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1015 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated kidnapping because he came onto the victim's porch, struck the victim, and forced the victim back into the residence; he then pushed the victim to the living room floor and pinned the victim down by placing his knee on the victim's back; he tied the victim's wrists and legs together in the “hogtied” position; he and another person left the victim's residence while the victim was still tied up and lying on the floor; the victim sustained contusions, abrasions, broken ribs, blunt force injuries, and eventually died from a heart attack from the stress of the offenses; and the jury could have found that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping because it showed that defendant barged into the victim's residence brandishing a firearm, she took another victim's wallet and phone, she forced the four victims into the bathroom, she forced a victim into a car, took him to a convenience store, forced him to retrieve money from an ATM, and took another victim's necklace. State v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Because defendant could have stolen the vehicle without keeping the victim inside at gun point, the evidence supported a conviction for attempted kidnapping. State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping because it showed that defendant entered the victim's home while she was sleeping, and then, while wielding a gun and at times pointing it at the victim, confined the victim to her home and later to her vehicle. State v. Stumbo, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the first, second, and third defendants of especially aggravated kidnapping because defendants knowingly confined the victim by hanging her by her arms from the ceiling in order to inflict serious bodily injury upon her; and, although each defendant argued that the victim voluntarily submitted to the BDSM (bondage and discipline, dominance and submission, and sadism and masochism) lifestyle and her role as a house slave, the evidence did not support the argument that the victim consented to having her liberty restricted so that she could be beaten to death. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to the first and second defendants of first degree, felony murder because they both participated in the especially aggravated kidnapping of the victim by hanging the victim by her arms from the ceiling, placing a ball gag in her mouth, beating the victim by kicking, punching, and wielding a metal pole, and causing the victim to lose consciousness three times; the victim suffered multiple traumatic injuries as a result of the beating inflicted by defendants during the kidnapping; and the victim ultimately died as a result of the beating. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping of victim three; defendant forced the victim to tie herself with ropes, chained her to his truck, jerked the truck in drive, and pulled the rope tight around her ankles, and defendant's confinement of the victim went far beyond what was necessary to commit the attempted aggravated assault that occurred on the second day of the ordeal. State v. Shields, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2019).

Defendant's convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping of victims one and two were supported by sufficient evidence; defendant's own conduct, separate and apart from the conduct of co-defendant, was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant kidnapped the victims, as he helped hold them at gunpoint against their will and told the victims he would shoot them if they tried to escape. State v. Shields, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's five convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping because defendant and one of the perpetrators entered the home in the middle of the night, the perpetrator entered the victims'  bedroom and held them at gunpoint with a shotgun, defendant stood in the doorway in the living room and held two other victims at gunpoint using a pistol, and two witnesses testified that they did not feel as if they could move around in or leave the residence while defendant pointed the pistol at them. State v. Kiser, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated kidnapping because co-defendant forced the victim from his home and drove him to another house, where defendant was inside; inside the house, defendant held the victim at gunpoint and bound his hands with an extension cord; and, after the victim got away and led the police to the house, defendant fled and, during his flight, discarded a handgun matching that described by the victim. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2020).

State proved that the especially aggravated kidnappings were not incidental to the aggravated robberies, and therefore defendant's convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping were affirmed, because, while the victims may have felt no more confined than they would have in a normal robbery, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the purpose of forcing the victims to disrobe was to prevent their summoning assistance or for the purpose of deterring any attempt to thwart the robbery. State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 616 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish serious bodily injury, and therefore defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping was affirmed, because the record showed that defendant repeatedly struck the victim resulting in her losing consciousness multiple times, defendant had to support her while walking, she could not shower or walk from the shower to the hotel bed unassisted, her eyes were so swollen from the beating that she could not see the hotel telephone and had to feel around for the cord, and she suffered a laceration on her head that bled, a hematoma to the back of the head, extremely swollen facial features that prevented paramedics from examining the victim's eyes and mouth, a broken nose and eye socket that required surgery, and a neck sprain. State v. Evans, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

6. —Insufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping where the jury received the full White instruction, defendant and two others entered the victim's home, held the three victims at gunpoint for eight to 10 hours, and took property from all three, defendant sexually assaulted two of the victims, and the confinement lasted much longer than the time necessary to commit the other acts of robbery and sexual assault. State v. Cornelius Banks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

7. Jury Instructions.

Instruction to the jury on the “substantial interference” element of especially aggravated kidnapping should provide as follows: to establish whether the defendant's removal or confinement of the victim constituted a substantial interference with his or her liberty, the State must prove that the removal or confinement was to a greater degree than that necessary to commit the offense of [insert offense], which is the other offense charged in this case. In making this determination, you may consider all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, including, but not limited to, the following factors: (1) The nature and duration of the victim's removal or confinement by the defendant; (2) Whether the removal or confinement occurred during the commission of the separate offense; (3) Whether the interference with the victim's liberty was inherent in the nature of the separate offense; (4) Whether the removal or confinement prevented the victim from summoning assistance, although the defendant need not have succeeded in preventing the victim from doing so; (5) Whether the removal or confinement reduced the defendant's risk of detection, although the defendant need not have succeeded in this objective; and (6) Whether the removal or confinement created a significant danger or increased the victim's risk of harm independent of that posed by the separate offense. State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Defendant was entitled to a new trial with the appropriate instructions as to the especially aggravated kidnapping charge because the evidence could be interpreted in different ways and the jury was not properly instructed on the question of whether the victim's removal or confinement was essentially incidental to an accompanying felony. State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on attempted especially aggravated kidnapping as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping, because the evidence showed defendant placed the victim in a chokehold while pointing a gun to her head, forced her into the kitchen, and shot her during a struggle; thus, the kidnapping was completed and there was no attempt. State v. Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2013).

Trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury properly on the especially aggravated kidnapping of the victim because the issue of whether defendant substantially interfered with the victim's liberty in the accompaniment of especially aggravated robbery was fairly raised by the evidence but was not included in the jury instruction, and defendant's confinement of the victim occurred during the accompanying robbery, was limited to one room, and ended as soon as defendants exercised control of the safe. State v. Bowman, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (Tenn. Feb. 11, 2014), overruled in part, State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

Trial court was not in error for failing to instruct the jury on attempted false imprisonment as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping because, given that the evidence very clearly demonstrated that the act was completed, an attempt instruction was not required. Moore v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

Trial court's failure to instruct the jury on aggravated kidnapping as the lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping constituted reversible error because it could not be said beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would not have convicted the inmate of aggravated kidnapping instead of especially aggravated kidnapping. Moore v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

Trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to false imprisonment and kidnapping was not reversible error because the evidence was overwhelming and uncontroverted that a gun was used to accomplish the acts regarding all seven victims. Moore v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

Defendants were charged with especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery, a pairing of crimes warranting a White instruction about whether the removal or confinement was to a greater degree than that necessary to commit the aggravated robbery offense, but the trial court did not instruct the jury pursuant to White; however, the error was harmless because the result of the trial would have been the same as defendants completed the offense of aggravated robbery of the victim's purse before proceeding to commit the especially aggravated kidnapping by ordering the victim into her house and confining her to the couch; and their conduct constituting the kidnapping was beyond that necessary to consummate the aggravated robbery offense. State v. Alston, 465 S.W.3d 555, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. May 5, 2015).

Trial court did not err in declining to give the instruction used when the jury had to determine whether the removal or confinement was incidental to the accompanying felony or was significant enough, standing alone, to support a conviction; the instruction is not required when a defendant is charged with the kidnapping and robbery of different victims. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

Instruction used when the jury had to determine whether the removal or confinement was incidental to the accompanying felony or was significant enough to support a conviction was not required because defendant did not stand the risk of being convicted of kidnapping a victim he confined only long enough to rob; the due process concerns were not present as the kidnapping of one or more victims could never be essentially incidental to an offense perpetrated against a different victim or victims. State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. July 14, 2015).

8. Sentence.

Trial court erred by enhancing defendant's especially aggravated kidnapping sentence with the factor for lack of hesitation to commit the offense when the risk to human life was high because it focused solely on the fact that each defendant possessed a firearm. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2016).

Inmate was not entitled to post-conviction relief for counsel's failure to object to the State's sentencing statements that the inmate's crimes involved more than one victim, due to a victim's pregnancy, after which the sentencing court allegedly misapplied the multiple victim sentencing enhancement factor, because the inmate showed no prejudice, by clear and convincing evidence, as (1) the State had a good faith basis for asking about the inmate's knowledge of the victim's pregnancy, (2) the inmate's sentences were within applicable ranges, (3) three other enhancement factors were properly applied, and (4) the court properly heard testimony that the inmate held a knife to the victim's stomach and saw video footage showing the victim was visibly pregnant. Bush v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 18, 2017).

Defendant argued that his sentence would not have been as severe if he had only been convicted of the other indicted offenses and not three counts of Class A felony especially aggravated kidnapping; however, defendant was indicted for and convicted of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and his due process argument as it related to his alleged disproportionately high sentence was without merit. State v. Shields, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to 21 years'  confinement for each especially aggravated kidnapping conviction because the sentences were within-range, the trial court considered the arguments and evidence presented at trial and the sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed the presentence report, defendant's criminal history, the violent nature of defendant's crime, and appropriate enhancement and mitigating factors, and it articulated why the enhancement factors outweighed the mitigating factors. State v. Kiser, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2020).

Defendant's contention that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating factor of voluntarily releasing the victims alive was rejected because the record showed that the trial court properly considered this mitigating factor in sentencing and found that it was outweighed by the other enhancement factors submitted the State. State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 616 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

9. Joinder of Offenses.

It was error to dismiss an indictment because counts of sexual exploitation of a minor were not based on the same conduct and did arise from the same episode as the offenses for which defendant was tried, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault; there was no proof images shown to the victim were the images that led to the indictment for sexual exploitation, and there was no overlap in the evidence necessary to prove the other offenses and sexual exploitation. State v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

39-13-306. Custodial interference.

  1. It is the offense of custodial interference for a natural or adoptive parent, step-parent, grandparent, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew of a child younger than eighteen (18) years of age to:
    1. Remove the child from this state knowing that the removal violates a child custody determination as defined in § 36-6-205, the rightful custody of a mother as defined in § 36-2-303, or a temporary or permanent judgment or court order regarding the custody or care of the child;
    2. Detain the child within this state or remove the child from this state after the expiration of the noncustodial natural or adoptive parent or guardian's lawful period of visitation, with the intent to violate the rightful custody of a mother as defined in § 36-2-303, or a temporary or permanent judgment or a court order regarding the custody or care of the child;
    3. Harbor or hide the child within or outside this state, knowing that possession of the child was unlawfully obtained by another person in violation of the rightful custody of a mother as defined in § 36-2-303, or a temporary or permanent judgment or a court order;
    4. Act as an accessory to any act prohibited by this section; or
    5. Detain the child within or remove the child from this state during the noncustodial parent's lawful period of visitation, with the intent to violate the court-ordered visitation of the noncustodial parent, or a temporary or permanent judgment regarding visitation with the child.
  2. It is also the offense of custodial interference for a natural or adoptive parent, step-parent, grandparent, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew of an incompetent person to:
    1. Remove the incompetent person from this state knowing that the removal violates a temporary or permanent judgment or a court order regarding the custody or care of the incompetent person;
    2. Harbor or hide the incompetent person within or outside this state, knowing that possession of the incompetent person was unlawfully obtained by another person in violation of a temporary or permanent judgment or a court order; or
    3. Act as an accessory to any act prohibited by this section.
  3. It is a defense to custodial interference:
    1. That the person who removed the child or incompetent person reasonably believed that, at the time the child or incompetent was removed, the failure to remove the child or incompetent person would have resulted in a clear and present danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the child or incompetent person; or
    2. That the individual detained or moved in contravention of the rightful custody of a mother as defined in § 36-2-303, or of the order of custody or care, was returned by the defendant voluntarily and before arrest or the issuance of a warrant for arrest.
  4. If conduct that is in violation of this section is also a violation of § 39-13-304 or § 39-13-305(a)(1), (a)(3), or (a)(4), the offense may be prosecuted under any of the applicable statutes.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (e)(2), custodial interference is a Class E felony, unless the person taken from lawful custody is returned voluntarily by the defendant, in which case custodial interference is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. Custodial interference under subdivision (a)(5) is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-13-304; Acts 1990, ch. 982, § 1; 2004, ch. 834, § 1; 2016, ch. 725, §§ 1, 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section addresses interference with the custody of any minor or incompetent person by detaining or moving the individual in violation of a court order or judgment. Prior code § 39-2-303 [repealed] only protected children under the age of sixteen.

Prosecution for this offense is available only when the defendant is related to the individual in one of the familial relationships listed in subsection (a). If one of these relationships is not present, the defendant must be prosecuted under §§ 39-13-30239-13-305. If one of these familial relationships is present but an aggravating factor exists, pursuant to subsection (c) the defendant may be prosecuted under the aggravated kidnapping or especially aggravated kidnapping statutes.

Subsection (b) provides a defense if the individual is returned by the defendant voluntarily before arrest or the issuance of a warrant for arrest. If the individual is returned voluntarily by the defendant after arrest or the issuance of a warrant, the punishment is lowered to a Class A misdemeanor. These provisions are designed to encourage the return of the individual detained or moved.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

False imprisonment, § 39-13-302.

Kidnapping, title 39, ch. 13, part 3.

Mental health and intellectual and developmental disabilities, title 33.

Missing Children Recovery Act, title 37, ch. 10, part 2.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Schools or day care centers, change in physical custody of child, § 36-6-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.114.

Law Reviews.

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Venue.

Trial courts of the county in which the custodial parent resides have venue in cases of custodial interference, irrespective of where the alleged detention of the child actually occurs. Spina v. State, 99 S.W.3d 596, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

In custodial interference case, proper venue was in the county where custodial father resided, irrespective of the fact that the alleged detention of the child by defendant, the child's adoptive mother, actually occurred in another county. Spina v. State, 99 S.W.3d 596, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

2. Parent as Kidnapper.

Defendant was not subject to custodial interference under T.C.A. § 39-13-306(c), because defendant violated no court order when defendant removed or confined defendant's minor child. State v. Goodman, 90 S.W.3d 557, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. 2002).

3. Sufficiency of Evidence.

In a case in which defendant was indicted for the offense of custodial interference but a jury convicted defendant of custodial interference with voluntary return of the child, the evidence showed that defendant intentionally violated a custody order by not returning the child to the father at the end of her scheduled weekend visitation, in violation of a custody order, although defendant voluntarily returned the child following her arrest. The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. State v. Sallie, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 600 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 784 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

39-13-307. Involuntary labor servitude — Restitution.

  1. A person commits the offense of involuntary labor servitude who knowingly subjects, or attempts to subject, another person to forced labor or services by:
    1. Causing or threatening to cause serious bodily harm to the person;
    2. Physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain the person;
    3. Abusing or threatening to abuse the law or legal process;
    4. Knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating or possessing any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of the person;
    5. Using blackmail or using or threatening to cause financial harm for the purpose of exercising financial control over the person;
    6. Facilitating or controlling the person's access to an addictive controlled substance; or
    7. Controlling the person's movements through threats or violence.
  2. In addition to any other amount of loss identified or any other punishment imposed, the court shall order restitution to the victim or victims in an amount equal to the greater of:
    1. The gross income or value to the defendant of the victim's labor or services; or
    2. The value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.), or the minimum wage required in this state, whichever is higher.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the defendant from also being prosecuted for the theft of the victim's labor or services by involuntary servitude or for any other appropriate criminal statute violated by the defendant's conduct.
    1. Involuntary servitude is a Class C felony.
    2. Involuntary servitude is a Class B felony if:
      1. The violation resulted in the serious bodily injury or death of a victim;
      2. The period of time during which the victim was held in servitude exceeded one (1) year;
      3. The defendant held ten (10) or more victims in servitude at any time during the course of the defendant's criminal episode; or
      4. The victim was under thirteen (13) years of age.

Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 3; 2012, ch. 1074, §§ 1-3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Human Trafficking Act of 2007.”

Cross-References. Penalties for Class B and C felonies, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

39-13-308. Trafficking for forced labor or services.

  1. A person commits the offense of trafficking persons for forced labor or services who knowingly:
    1. Recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, or attempts to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, or obtain by any means, another person, intending or knowing that the person will be subjected to involuntary servitude; or
    2. Benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture that has engaged in an act described in § 39-13-307.
  2. In addition to any other amount of loss identified or any other punishment imposed, the court shall order restitution to the victim or victims in an amount equal to the greater of:
    1. The gross income or value of the benefit received by the defendant as the result of the victim's labor or services; or
    2. The value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.), or the minimum wage required in this state, whichever is higher.
  3. Trafficking for forced labor or services is a Class C felony.

Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Human Trafficking Act of 2007.”

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Justice for Victims of Human Trafficking and Forced Labor: Why Current Theories of Corporate Liability Do Not Work, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1047 (2013).

Modern-Day Slavery: Lawyers Help Fight Human Trafficking In Tennessee, 49 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2013).

Prosecuting Demand as a Crime of Human Trafficking: The Eighth Circuit Decision in United States v. Jungers, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 917 (2013).

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

Using Commercial Driver Licensing Authority to Combat Human Trafficking Related Crimes on America's Highways, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 969 (2013).

39-13-309. Trafficking for commercial sex act.

  1. A person commits the offense of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act who:
    1. Knowingly subjects, attempts to subject, benefits from, or attempts to benefit from another person's provision of a commercial sex act;
    2. Recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, purchases, or obtains by any other means, another person for the purpose of providing a commercial sex act; or
    3. Commits the acts in this subsection (a) when the intended victim of the offense is a law enforcement officer or a law enforcement officer eighteen (18) years of age or older posing as a minor.
  2. For purposes of subdivision (a)(2), such means may include, but are not limited to:
    1. Causing or threatening to cause physical harm to the person;
    2. Physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain the person;
    3. Abusing or threatening to abuse the law or legal process;
    4. Knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating or possessing any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of the person;
    5. Using blackmail or using or threatening to cause financial harm for the purpose of exercising financial control over the person; or
    6. Facilitating or controlling a person's access to a controlled substance.
  3. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class B felony, except where the victim of the offense is a child under fifteen (15) years of age, or where the offense occurs on the grounds or facilities or within one thousand feet (1,000') of a public or private school, secondary school, preschool, child care agency, public library, recreational center, or public park, a violation of subsection (a) is a Class A felony.
  4. It is not a defense to a violation of this section that:
    1. The intended victim of the offense is a law enforcement officer;
    2. The victim of the offense is a minor who consented to the act or acts constituting the offense; or
    3. The solicitation was unsuccessful, the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or the law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense.

Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 3; 2012, ch. 1075, § 2; 2013, ch. 465, § 2; 2016, ch. 634, § 1; 2019, ch. 123, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Human Trafficking Act of 2007.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (a)(3) and (d)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 123, § 7. July 1,  2019.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and B felonies, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Filling the Gap: Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation to Address the Problem of Pimping, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 961  (2015).

Justice for Victims of Human Trafficking and Forced Labor: Why Current Theories of Corporate Liability Do Not Work, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1047 (2013).

Modern-Day Slavery: Lawyers Help Fight Human Trafficking In Tennessee, 49 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2013).

Pimps Down: A Prosecutorial Perspective on Domestic Sex Trafficking, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1013 (2013).

Prosecuting Demand as a Crime of Human Trafficking: The Eighth Circuit Decision in United States v. Jungers, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 917 (2013).

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

Using Commercial Driver Licensing Authority to Combat Human Trafficking Related Crimes on America's Highways (Alicia Wilson), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 969 (2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence.

trial court did not err by admitting defendant's prior bad acts into evidence because evidence that defendant's livelihood was based on his continued act of prostituting the victim was relevant to his motive and intent for committing the sex trafficking and assault offenses. In addition, evidence that defendant had previously physically abused the victim and routinely threatened her with a gun was relevant to explain why the victim had not left defendant even though she testified that she was not physically restrained. State v. Jeffries, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act; the victim was required to give defendant all the money she made working as a prostitute, defendant took suggestive pictures of her and posted them in an advertisement for sexual services, he controlled where the victim lived, ate, and what she wore, and he used physical violence to exert control over her. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

2. Double Jeopardy.

Both promoting prostitution and trafficking a person for a commercial sex act require the defendant to cause the victim to perform sexual activities in exchange for something of value, and although the trafficking statute contains the additional requirement that the victim be coerced, the promoting prostitution statute does not contain an essential element that the trafficking statute does not. Any additional differences in the wording of the statutes do not constitute separate elements and defendant's convictions had to merge. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

3. Lesser-Incured Offense.

All of the statutory elements of promoting prostitution are included within the statutory elements of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act; thus, the trial court erred in determining promoting prostitution was not a lesser-included offense of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act, and defendant's convictions were to be merged. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

39-13-310. Separate offenses — §§ 39-13-308 and 39-13-309.

Each violation of §§ 39-13-308 and 39-13-309 shall constitute a separate offense.

Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Human Trafficking Act of 2007.”

Law Reviews.

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

39-13-311. Violations by corporations.

A corporation may be prosecuted for a violation of §§ 39-13-308 and 39-13-309 for an act or omission constituting a crime under this part only if an agent of the corporation performs the conduct that is an element of the crime while acting within the scope of the agent's office or employment and on behalf of the corporation and the commission of the crime was either authorized, requested, commanded, performed or within the scope of the agent’s employment on behalf of the corporation or constituted a pattern of illegal activity that an agent of the company knew or should have known was occurring.

Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2008, ch. 1140, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Human Trafficking Act of 2007.”

Law Reviews.

Crime & Punishment: Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Advice Regarding Plea Offers (Wade V. Davies), 49 Tenn. B.J. 28 (2013).

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

39-13-312. Manner in which proceeds from forfeitures are distributed and used.

  1. Chapter 11, part 7 of this title shall govern the procedure by which property subject to forfeiture pursuant to § 39-11-703(c) is forfeited, and this section shall govern the manner in which proceeds from forfeitures are distributed and used.
  2. Notwithstanding § 39-11-713, the proceeds from all forfeitures made pursuant to § 39-11-703(c) shall first be applied to the reasonable expenses of the forfeiture proceeding, including the expenses of the district attorney general, and the costs of seizing and maintaining custody of the forfeited property. Parties seeking repayment for forfeiture-related expenses shall file a request detailing the expenses incurred in the forfeiture procedure with the judge of the court in which the forfeiture occurred. The judge shall, if such judge is satisfied that the expenses claimed were both incurred and reasonable, direct the clerk to pay such expenses from the proceeds prior to transmitting them to the state general fund.
  3. The clerk of the court where the forfeiture occurs shall transmit forty percent (40%) of the proceeds from all forfeitures made pursuant to § 39-11-703(c) as follows:
    1. Twenty percent (20%) to the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation that resulted in the forfeiture for use in training and equipment for the enforcement of the human trafficking laws; and
    2. Twenty percent (20%) to the district attorneys general conference for education, expenses, expert services, training or the enhancement of resources for the prosecution of and asset forfeiture in human trafficking cases.
  4. The clerk of the court where the forfeiture occurs shall retain five percent (5%) of the proceeds from all forfeitures made pursuant to § 39-11-703(c).
  5. The clerk shall transmit the remainder of the proceeds to the state general fund, where there is established a general fund reserve to be allocated through the general appropriations act, which shall be known as the anti-human trafficking fund. The fund shall be managed by the treasurer and moneys from the fund shall be expended to fund activities authorized by this section. Any revenues deposited in this reserve shall remain in the reserve until expended for purposes consistent with this section, and shall not revert to the general fund at the end of the fiscal year. Any excess revenues or interest earned by the revenues shall not revert at the end of the fiscal year, but shall remain available for appropriation in subsequent fiscal years. Any appropriation from the reserve shall not revert to the general fund at the end of the fiscal year, but shall remain available for expenditure in subsequent fiscal years.
    1. The general assembly shall appropriate, through the general appropriations act, moneys from the anti-human trafficking fund to the department of finance and administration for the department to provide grants to agencies or groups that are incorporated as a not-for-profit organization, are tax-exempt under § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 501), and that have provided services to victims of human trafficking for at least six (6) months prior to the application for funds under this subsection (f). The commissioner of finance and administration shall promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, for the distribution and use of the grant funds provided by it.
    2. The grants shall be for the purpose of:
      1. Providing direct services to victims of human trafficking;
      2. Conducting programs for the prevention of human trafficking; or
      3. Conducting education, training, or public outreach programs about human trafficking.

Acts 2011, ch. 354, § 2.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2011, ch. 435, § 1 purported to enact a new section § 39-13-312. Section 39-13-312 was previously enacted by Acts 2011, ch. 354, § 2; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2011, ch. 435, § 1 was designated as § 39-13-313 by the code commission.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 354, § 3 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to all applicable offenses committed on or after July 1, 2011.

Law Reviews.

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

39-13-313. Tennessee Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline Act.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline Act.”
  2. There is created the Tennessee human trafficking resource center hotline to be established and maintained by the Tennessee bureau of investigation in a manner consistent with this section.
  3. Any governmental entity or private business or establishment that provides or offers a place of assembly or entertainment, transportation, lodging, dining, educational, medical or leisure activities or services, or any business or establishment that is licensed by the state or any political subdivision thereof, or that is engaged in commerce in this state is strongly encouraged to post a sign indicating certain information regarding the Tennessee human trafficking resource center hotline in a location within the governmental entity or establishment where it is visible to employees and the general public. The sign shall be no smaller than eight and one-half inches by eleven inches (8 ½" x 11"). Unless stated otherwise in this section, it may be posted near the entrance of the establishment or prominently where notices are usually posted. The sign shall state the following:

    Tennessee Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline at 1-855-588-6484.

    If you or someone you know is being forced to engage in any activity and cannot leave — whether it is commercial sex, housework, farm work or any other activity — call the Tennessee Human Trafficking Hotline to access help and services.

    Victims of human trafficking are protected under United States and Tennessee law.

    The hotline is:

    Anonymous and confidential

    Available 24/7

    Toll free

    Available to Non-English speaking callers through assistance of Interpreters

  4. All calls made to the human trafficking resource center hotline, the content of any conversation thereon and the telephone number from which the call was made is confidential, is not an open record and not available for public inspection except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction when necessary in a pending criminal investigation.
    1. Any entity or establishment posting a sign pursuant to this section may post the sign in English, Spanish and any other language mandated by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, P.L. 89-110 (42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.), in the county where the sign will be posted.
    2. The title of the sign, the Tennessee human trafficking resource center hotline at 1-855-588-6484, shall be boldfaced, underlined and no smaller than twenty-eight (28) point font size.
    3. The department of labor and workforce development shall provide the sign authorized by this section on its internet website for entities or establishments to print as needed.
    4. The department of labor and workforce development shall periodically send an electronic notification to any business or establishment that is licensed by the state or any political subdivision thereof that encourages posting pursuant to this section.

Acts 2011, ch. 435, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2011, ch. 435, § 1 purported to enact a new section § 39-13-312. Section 39-13-312 was previously enacted by Acts 2011, ch. 354, § 2; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2011, ch. 435, § 1 was designated as § 39-13-313 by the code commission.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning the National Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline Act, please refer to Acts 2011, ch. 435.

Law Reviews.

Modern-Day Slavery: Lawyers Help Fight Human Trafficking in Tennessee, 49 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2013).

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking defendant's probation because the evidence did not preponderate against a determination that defendant failed to stay away from his wife and violated the terms and conditions of his probation. Even though defendant's initial encounter with his wife at a store was happen-stance, he then approached her and her boyfriend, made multiple comments, and took a photograph that he later posted on a social media website for the purpose of intimidating the wife. State v. Caraker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2018).

39-13-314. Offense of human trafficking.

  1. As used in this part, unless the context otherwise indicates:
    1. “Human trafficking offense” means the commission of any act that constitutes the criminal offense of:
      1. Involuntary labor servitude, under § 39-13-307;
      2. Trafficking persons for forced labor or services, under § 39-13-308;
      3. Trafficking for commercial sex act, under § 39-13-309; or
      4. Promoting the prostitution of a minor, under § 39-13-512; and
    2. “Trafficked person” means a victim of a human trafficking offense.
    1. A trafficked person may bring a civil action for actual damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, any combination of those or any other appropriate relief.
    2. A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.
  2. Restitution under this section shall include items covered by the criminal injuries compensation fund under § 40-24-107 and any of the following, if not already covered by the court's restitution order:
    1. Costs of medical and psychological treatment, including physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation, at the court's discretion;
    2. Costs of necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care, at the court's discretion;
    3. Attorney's fees and other court-related costs such as victim advocate fees;
    4. The greater of:
      1. The value of the victim’s labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (compiled in 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.), or state equivalent; or
      2. The gross income or value to the defendant of the victim's labor or services or of any commercial sex acts engaged in by the victim while in the human trafficking situation;
    5. Return of property, cost of damage to property, or full value of property if destroyed or damaged beyond repair;
    6. Compensation for emotional distress, pain, and suffering;
      1. Expenses incurred by a victim and any household members or other family members in relocating away from the defendant or the defendant's associates, including, but not limited to, deposits for utilities and telephone service, deposits for rental housing, temporary lodging and food expenses, clothing, and personal items;
      2. Expenses incurred pursuant to subdivision (c)(7)(A) shall be verified by law enforcement to be necessary for the personal safety of the victim or household or family members, or by a mental health treatment provider to be necessary for the emotional well-being of the victim;
    7. Repatriation of the victim to the victim's home country, if applicable; and
    8. Any and all other losses suffered by the victim as a result of human trafficking offenses.
    1. A legal guardian, family member, representative of the trafficked person or court appointee may represent the trafficked person or the trafficked person's estate if deceased.
    2. If the trafficked person dies as a result of a human trafficking offense, a surviving spouse of the trafficked person is eligible for restitution. If no surviving spouse exists, restitution shall be paid to the trafficked person's issue or their descendants per stirpes. If no surviving spouse, issue, or descendants exist, restitution shall be paid to the trafficked person's estate.
  3. A person named in this section may not receive any funds from restitution if such person engaged in violations of a human trafficking offense.

Acts 2012, ch. 613, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2012, ch. 1075, § 3 purported to enact a new section § 39-13-314. Section 39-13-314 was previously enacted by Acts 2012, ch. 613, § 1; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2012, ch. 1075, § 3 was designated as  § 39-13-315 by authority of the code commission.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2012, ch. 1075, § 2 rewrote the provisions of § 39-13-309, referred to in this section, to refer now to trafficking for commercial sex act.

Law Reviews.

Abolishing Child Sex Trafficking on the Internet: Imposing Criminal Culpability on Digital Facilitators (Ryan Dalton), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1097  (2013).

Filling the Gap: Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation to Address the Problem of Pimping, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 961  (2015).

Justice for Victims of Human Trafficking and Forced Labor: Why Current Theories of Corporate Liability Do Not Work, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1047 (2013).

Modern-Day Slavery: Lawyers Help Fight Human Trafficking In Tennessee, 49 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2013).

Pimps Down: A Prosecutorial Perspective on Domestic Sex Trafficking, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1013 (2013).

Prosecuting Demand as a Crime of Human Trafficking: The Eighth Circuit Decision in United States v. Jungers, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 917 (2013).

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

Using Commercial Driver Licensing Authority to Combat Human Trafficking Related Crimes on America's Highways, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 969 (2013).

39-13-315. Offense of advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor.

  1. A person commits the offense of advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor if the person knowingly sells or offers to sell an advertisement that would appear to a reasonable person to be for the purpose of engaging in what would be a commercial sex act, as defined in § 39-13-301, with a minor.
    1. Advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor is a Class C felony.
    2. In addition to any authorized period of incarceration, advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor is punishable by a minimum fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
  2. In a prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that the defendant did not know the age of the minor depicted in the advertisement. It is a defense, which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that at the time of the offense, the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor appearing in the advertisement by requiring, prior to publication of the advertisement, production of a driver license, marriage license, birth certificate, or other governmental or educational identification card or paper of the minor depicted in the advertisement and did not rely solely on oral or written allegations of the minor’s age or the apparent age of the minor.

Acts 2012, ch. 1075, § 3.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2012, ch. 1075, § 3 purported to enact a new section § 39-13-314. Section 39-13-314 was previously enacted by Acts 2012, ch. 613, § 1; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2012, ch. 1075, § 3 was designated as  § 39-13-315 by authority of the code commission.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Abolishing Child Sex Trafficking on the Internet: Imposing Criminal Culpability on Digital Facilitators (Ryan Dalton), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1097  (2013).

Two Crimes for the Price of One: The Problem with Kidnapping Statutes in Tennessee and Beyond (Melanie A. Prince), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 789 (2009).

Part 4
Robbery

39-13-401. Robbery.

  1. Robbery is the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.
  2. Robbery is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 16.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This part distinguishes robbery offenses and the resulting punishment based upon the potential for harm or actual harm to the victim. This section changes prior Tennessee law by adding the mens rea requirement.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Killing committed in perpetration of robbery is murder in first degree, § 39-13-202.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Prisoners to whom probation and parole is applicable, § 40-28-113.

Procedure to revoke suspension or probation, § 40-35-311.

Written request for charge on lesser included offense, § 40-18-110.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 16.120.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 22 Tenn. Juris., Robbery, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law — State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to Retain the Natural and Probable Consequence Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 273 (1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction With Other Law.

Tennessee conviction for robbery is a predicate offense under the use-of-force clause of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act. United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2015), 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21660, 2015 FED App. 292p (6th Cir.).

Defendant's prior Tennessee robbery convictions were violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because, even though robbery under the Tennessee statute could be committed in two manners, both variants constituted violent felonies; defendant's two predicate convictions were distinct for ACCA purposes because the judgments and indictments established that the robberies occurred at two different business locations.  866 F.3d 364, 2017 FED App. 111P, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9208 (6th Cir. May 8, 2017).

2. Elements.

Categorical approach that was used to determine the nature of prior felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), applied to defendant's juvenile convictions; however, while his aggravated assault conviction and his involvement in several drive-by shootings constituted two offenses qualifying as violent felonies given the underlying facts and his admissions, neither his adjudication of delinquency based upon a plea to the charge of attempted robbery nor his adjudication of delinquency based upon a charge of aggravated assault could be used as a third qualifying conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes. United States v. Wells, 473 F.3d 640, 2007 FED App. 8P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 360 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2007).

Tennessee legislature rejected the language of the federal carjacking statute; given that the relevant language of the federal statute “from the person or presence of another” closely resembles Tennessee's robbery statute, it is significant that the Tennessee general assembly also rejected this terminology. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

Legislature chose to use different language in the carjacking statute than it used in the robbery statutes or than Congress used in the federal carjacking statute; a comparison of the differing terminology persuades the supreme court of Tennessee that the general assembly intended carjacking to include forcible takings of motor vehicles from victims even when the victim is some distance from his or her car at the time of the taking. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

3. —Identification of Property.

In a prosecution for aggravated robbery, proof that the property taken was the property recovered was unnecessary because it is not an element of the offense. State v. Claybrooks, 910 S.W.2d 868, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

4. —Violence.

Testimony by the victim that he was not fearful of the defendant was irrelevant to conviction where the defendant was indicted and convicted of robbery by violence, not robbery by placing the victim in fear. State v. Ball, 987 S.W.2d 859, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 862 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

The plain meaning of the element of violence as used in T.C.A. § 39-13-401 is evidence of physical force unlawfully exercised so as to damage, injure or abuse. State v. Fitz, 19 S.W.3d 213, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. 2000).

T.C.A. § 39-13-401 by using the term “violence” and not “force,” sharpens the focus on the necessary element of violence to establish robbery. State v. Fitz, 19 S.W.3d 213, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. 2000).

An act of violence or of putting a person in fear must precede or be contemporaneous with the taking of property from the person to constitute robbery under T.C.A. § 39-13-401. State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. 2000).

Pointing a deadly weapon at a victim constitutes “violence” as used in the offense of robbery. State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. 2002).

Simple robbery, and aggravated robbery by extension, may be accomplished by either violence or putting the victim in fear. State v. Seiber, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

For purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-401, attempt to commit a robbery through violence or by putting a person in fear also includes a threat of bodily injury. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because the victim was ambushed as he entered the motel room of the accomplice; defendant pointed a handgun at the victim and demanded that the victim give him everything he had; after initially attempting to fight his way out of the room, the victim gave up after defendant struck him with the handgun; defendant and the accomplice stole the victim's cash, cellular telephone, and wallet; defendant was arrested a short time later in possession of a handgun and over $500 in cash; the State was free to prove that defendant accomplished the crime by violence; and pointing a deadly weapon at the victim was sufficient proof of violence. State v. Hardy, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2017).

5. Indictments.

Where defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-401(a) and two counts of robbery in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a)(1), (2), trial court reversibly erred by consolidating the indictments, as the multiple charges and testimony inevitably hung in the backdrop as each particular offense was presented to the jury; it was unlikely that the jury examined each charge on its own proof. State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Apr. 28, 2008).

Habeas court properly dismissed petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus because the indictment charging petitioner with felony murder was valid since it referenced the statute defining felony murder, T.C.A. § 39-13-202, and described the offense, which provided notice to petitioner of the charged offense; because the indictment set forth the specific underlying felony supporting the felony murder charge, the requisite mental state was obtainable by reviewing the robbery statute, T.C.A. § 39-13-401, providing adequate notice to petitioner of the charge against him. Cooper v. Carlton, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2012), cert. denied, Cooper v. Sexton, 185 L. Ed. 2d 203, 133 S. Ct. 1260, 568 U.S. 1171, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1298 (U.S. 2013).

6. —Identity of Victim.

Because aggravated or attempted aggravated robbery is not classified as an offense based upon its perpetration against certain classes of individuals, such as police officers or children under a specified age, the indictment was not defective merely for failing to identify the victim. State v. Clark, 2 S.W.3d 233, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1153 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

7. Accompanying Kidnapping.

Defendant's conviction for kidnapping was not precluded because defendant's movement of a victim and the victim's confinement was not necessary to consummate the crime of especially aggravated robbery. (overruled as to application of due process test) State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. May 7, 2008), cert. denied, Richardson v. Tennessee, 172 L. Ed. 2d 465, 129 S. Ct. 608, 555 U.S. 1036, 77 U.S.L.W. 3296, — U.S. —, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8497 (U.S. 2008), overruled in part, State v. Osby, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Hulse, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2013), overruled, State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2013), overruled, State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2013), overruled, State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2014), overruled, State v. Teats, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2014), overruled, State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2014), overruled, State v. Holman, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2014), overruled, Thorne v. Hollway, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125191 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2014), overruled, State v. Keller, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2014), overruled in part, Porter v. Johnson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45910 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 8, 2015), overruled, Porter v. Johnson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18433 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2016), overruled, Porter v. Genovese, 2017 FED App. 35P (6th Cir.), 676 Fed. Appx. 428, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 924 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2017).

8. Lesser Included Offense.

Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery and aggravated robbery. State v. Hayes, 7 S.W.3d 52, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Attempted theft is a lesser included offense of attempted robbery. State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery; thus, in a robbery trial where evidence existed which would support an instruction of theft, it was error for the trial court not to instruct the jury regarding that offense and defendant had to receive a new trial on the robbery conviction. State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. 2001), review or rehearing denied, State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Nov. 5, 2001).

Trial court's failure to give lesser included instructions on robbery and theft was not plain error because robbery and theft were not lesser included offenses of carjacking; the definition of theft contained a statutory element that was not included within the statutory elements of carjacking, namely an intent to deprive another of his or her motor vehicle, and because robbery included all of the elements of theft within its statutory elements, robbery was also not a lesser included offense of carjacking. State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. 2007).

9. Evidence.

Erroneous admission of two other rapes and robberies was not harmless because the evidence more probably than not affected the outcome of the trial; the evidence connecting defendant to the offenses against the victim primarily consisted of the victim's testimony, no forensic evidence tied defendant to the offenses, and the improperly admitted evidence was extremely prejudicial in that it was detailed and involved the same offenses for which defendant was on trial. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Erroneous admission of two other rapes and robberies was not harmless because the evidence more probably than not affected the outcome of the trial; the evidence connecting defendant to the offenses against the victim primarily consisted of the victim's testimony, no forensic evidence tied defendant to the offenses, and the improperly admitted evidence was extremely prejudicial in that it was detailed and involved the same offenses for which defendant was on trial. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

10. —Victim Testimony.

The victim's testimony need not be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction for robbery. State v. Ball, 987 S.W.2d 859, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 862 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

11. —Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Edwards, 868 S.W.2d 682, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Where codefendant was never identified by either of the victims of a robbery, no incriminating statements were made by either defendant implicating themselves or each other, and the only evidence against codefendant was the fact that two hours after the crime he was in bed in the same room in which the fruits of the crime were hidden, there was simply insufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McMahan, 650 S.W.2d 383, 1983 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).

Record demonstrated that elements of both of the offenses of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery occurred in county where force and coercion were used by appellants to obtain entry into victim's vehicle and take her away; with regard to the offense of aggravated robbery, appellant entered the vehicle with a deadly weapon, and with regard to the offense of aggravated rape, the force and coercion began, and in addition, appellants aided and abetted each other and used force, in beginning series of offenses in county. State v. Davis, 872 S.W.2d 950, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993), appeal denied, Tipton v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993).

Testimony of victim, as corroborated by her statements to medical personnel and to the police, clearly support the verdict of guilty of aggravated robbery and aggravated rape against appellant; when shown a photo array which included the appellant, she clearly identified the appellant as her second assailant, and although no other witnesses identified appellant as being with the victim during any of the incidents, the testimony of the victim was clearly sufficient to convict the appellant. State v. Davis, 872 S.W.2d 950, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993), appeal denied, Tipton v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993).

Where defendant shoved convenience store clerk with both hands in an aggressive manner, knocking the clerk backward into a cigarette display, then grabbed cash from the register and fled, the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the element of violence and support a conviction for robbery, even though the clerk was not hurt but was stunned and afraid. State v. Fitz, 19 S.W.3d 213, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. 2000).

Where defendant took property without paying, ran for at least five blocks, stopped, dropped the property, turned toward the person who had given chase and brandished a box cutter, the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction for robbery because the use of violence or fear was subsequent to the taking and temporally remote. State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. 2000).

While the evidence was for the most part circumstantial, it was clearly sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt of both murder and robbery where it established the following: (1) The victim was working at the front desk of a hotel when two men demanded money and then shot him, ultimately killing him; (2) Defendant was observed inside a room of the hotel with a gun on the night prior to the shooting, and was in and out of that room throughout the night and early morning; (3) Defendant and co-defendant were seen running from the hotel lobby close to the time that the victim was shot, carrying a bin matching the description of that used to hold money in the hotel safe; (4) Defendant made incriminating statements to two different people, claiming that he shot someone inside the hotel; and (5) The register tape from the hotel cash register showed the “no sale” button was pushed right before the victim's call to 9-1-1. State v. Bough, 152 S.W.3d 453, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 910 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1069 (Tenn. 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery where defendant, armed with a handgun, demanded that the victims “lay things out,” and someone in defendant's group took the items that the victims surrendered. That the evidence was controverted at trial was not fatal to the state's case; the jury chose to accredit that evidence. State v. Summers, 159 S.W.3d 586, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2005).

Court of criminal appeals erred by modifying defendant's conviction from robbery in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-401(a) to theft based on the victim's testimony that he did not see a weapon, as the jury could reasonably infer the victim was placed in fear based on evidence that defendant threatened to shoot and he reached for his pocket or belt; evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for robbery. State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Apr. 28, 2008).

Appellant's premeditated first degree murder and felony murder convictions were affirmed because the State presented extensive evidence at trial establishing appellant's guilt and corroborating the accomplice's testimony; the medical examiner confirmed the accomplice's testimony regarding the victims' injuries and the manner in which they were killed. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2013), rev'd, 450 S.W.3d 866, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

In a death penalty case, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's first degree and felony murder convictions because defendant used weapons, including a knife and rope, upon unarmed victims who were particularly vulnerable because of their ages. Defendant killed one victim because she had seen his face, and defendant's robbery of the money, credit cards, and jewelry indicated another motive for the murders. State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated robbery because, even though no money was taken from a store employee personally, a clerk operating a cash register was considered the “owner” of property for purposes of aggravated robbery. Moreover, defendant was apprehended a few blocks from the store wearing a torn t-shirt, the victim's wallet and store receipts were found near defendant, the victim identified defendant as the perpetrator, and a clothing fragment found in the store's parking lot matched the hole in defendant's t-shirt. State v. Minter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 439 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery where it showed that he pushed his way into the victim's apartment while holding what the victim believed was a pistol, held the victim down, put the gun to the victim's head, demanded drugs and money, instructed his accomplice to take two laptop computers, and took $100 from the victim's wallet. Defendant drove a van with his accomplice and the computers to another apartment complex and took the computers out of the van, and his fingerprint was found on the power cord of one of the stolen computers. State v. Wisdom, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery because defendant was identified by the victims in a photographic lineup and in court, even though defendant had a very different appearance during the trial. The victims testified to the same general sequence of events relating to crimes that were committed against them during an attempt to purchase marijuana, with minor discrepancies. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2016).

Rational trier of fact could have found that the defendants were the perpetrators of the crimes charged, including robbery and aggravated robbery; certain victims identified defendants as the perpetrators, plus on the top of kitchen cabinets where defendants were arrested, police found one of the guns that fired eight bullets at the crime scene. State v. Pirtle, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of robbery; by simultaneously taking the gun and pointing it at the victim, fear or violence to complete the taking was used. State v. Pirtle, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's robbery conviction where it showed that he put the victim in fear of injury if he resisted the demand for his wallet, defendant wanted the money from the victim to satisfy a debt to someone, and he took the victim's driver's license, social security card, and a dollar bill and did not return them. State v. Fisk, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 2, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of robbery because, at trial, the victim was honest that he could not recall the person who robbed him over three years prior; the jury heard the victim's description of the robber and the fact that the victim was able to make an identification from a photographic lineup only 15 days after the robbery; the victim testified that he was 80 percent certain that the person he selected from the photographic lineup was the person who robbed him; the victim was also able to identify defendant at the preliminary hearing one month after the robbery; and defendant was found in possession of the victim's car key and GPS unit. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 973 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

There was evidence showing that a robbery occurred, and therefore the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery, where the jury could have found defendant guilty based on his own conduct or that of his codefendants, as defendant admitted he shot the victim in the head, one codefendant's statements showed that defendant participated in the robbery, and the other codefendant's testimony established that defendant admitted he had shot the victim and shared in the proceeds from the robbery. State v. Tull-Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2016).

State presented sufficient evidence of identity to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery because the evidence showed that defendant ordered the victims to the ground at gunpoint and demanded their wallets and cell phones, he threatened to kill the victims, he attempted to sell both cells phones, he used one victim's credit cards, he deposed of the victims'  property in his garbage can, a gun matching the description provided by the victims was found in defendant's residence, and the victim's identified defendant in a photographic lineup. State v. Wilkerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 837 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery where it showed that defendant approached the victims from behind a car and, while pointing a gray and black handgun at them, demanded their belongings, the victims identified defendant as the perpetrator in a photographic lineup, and defendant was arrested after officers found him hiding in an attic with a gun matching the description of the gun used in the robbery. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery because there was sufficient independent evidence to corroborate his confessions to his friend and the victim's mother and substantial independent evidence the confessions were trustworthy; defendant's confession to the mother corroborated evidence that the victim had been shot in the hand, and the friend's statements matched the mother's statement. State v. Bass, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery because defendant called the victim several times around the time of his death, he admitted to seeing the victim the night of the indicent, and he gave several inconsistent statements to the police to the police about his location and activities that night. State v. Bass, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted robbery as the underlying felony of attempted robbery and the killing were part of a continuous transaction with no break in the chain of events, and the killing was committed in pursuance of the attempted robbery because defendant and co-defendant decided to commit a robbery on the night of the offense; although defendant claimed that he became scared and attempted to retreat from the robbery, and that the gun unintentionally discharged, a firearms expert testified that at least five pounds of pressure had to be applied to the trigger for the gun to discharge; and the victim was shot once and later died from his wound. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's robbery conviction because the victim repeatedly testified that she was terrified and in fear of her life during her ordeal, even though defendant did not use a weapon or threaten to harm her, as defendant had just raped her at least twice and had tried to rape her a third time. State v. Batts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction because the State provided adequate corroboration of the accomplice's testimony, including a witness's identification of defendant as the man in the car driven by the accomplice, defendant's shorts collected by the police were consistent with the witness's description of the suspect's clothing and they contained blood and gunshot residue, defendant admitted that he bought marijuana from the victim, and damage to the victim's home was consistent with a struggle having occurred. State v. Cosper, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017).

Evidence at defendant's trial was sufficient because, viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the State, the evidence showed defendant murdered a victim during an attempted especially aggravated robbery. State v. Greer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2017).

Three witnesses plus the victim identified defendant as the individual who approached the victim in a home and asked him to go outside, and once outside, a group of men surrounded the victim and forced him to the ground while others took his boots and cash; a rational jury could have found that defendant facilitated the robbery of the victim, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401(a), 39-11-403(a). State v. Shane, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's robbery conviction because the victim testified that she was scared, she was afraid of defendant and of what the two other people with defendant in the car might do, and after defendant ripped the strap from the victim's purse, she screamed for help and ran away from him. State v. Ketchum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's identity as the perpetrator of an aggravated robbery because, although the victim was unable to identify defendant from a photographic array prior to trial, the victim identified defendant in court as the perpetrator, while the victim of an affiliated robbery identified defendant from a photographic array as well as in court. As was its province, it was apparent that the jury accredited the identifications of defendant by the victims. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendants'  robbery convictions because (1) the evidence showed the victim was threatened contemporaneously with a taking, (2) the victim's statement that the taking would have occurred despite the threat did not defeat a conviction, and (3) defendants acted in concert with one another when one tried to distract the victim while the other two stole property, which all three put in their pockets. State v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 765 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

It was only after the victim escaped that defendant took control of the vehicle and drove away with the lawnmower, thus completing the robbery, and the restraint of the victim did substantially interfere with his liberty and was not incidental to the robbery, such that defendant's convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping under T.C.A. § 39-13-305(a)(1) and robbery under T.C.A. § 39-13-401(a) did not violate due process. State v. Greca, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1015 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery because even if the jury surmised that a co-defendant fired the fatal shot, the jury was instructed on criminal responsibility and could have determined that defendant aided the co-defendant's commission of the robbery with the intent to promote, assist, or benefit in the proceeds of the offense and defendant's flight to Alabama and resisting arrest when he was finally apprehended could be considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt. State v. Nesbit, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a robbery as defendant took the victim's property by violence and put the victim in fear because he came onto the victim's porch and struck him with a metal stick with a ball on the end of it; defendant forced the victim back into the residence and onto the floor, where he continued to hit the victim; the victim later died from a heart attack induced from his injuries and the stress of the attack; and, even if the jury credited defendant's testimony that he initially struck the victim to defend another person, the jury clearly concluded that defendant's continued assault on the victim, which resulted in the victim's death, was not in defense of another person. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim identified defendant, officers recovered the victim's scarf from the apartment where defendant was staying and recovered a gun and a cellular phone which the victim recognized as similar to the ones possessed by defendant during the attack, and DNA consistent with the victim's DNA was found on swabs taken from defendant. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim identified defendant as the perpetrator in both a photographic line-up following the offenses and at trial; the victim stated that she recognized defendant as the perpetrator by his eyes, and she identified a photograph of the gun that defendant possessed during the attack. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for felony murder because a jury could have inferred that defendant had the intent to commit a robbery prior to, or concurrent with, the killing of the victim based on his own conduct or the conduct of his accomplices, for which he was criminally responsible; defendant admitted he planned to rob the victim, he provided the gun used in the offense, he participated in the robbery, and he fled in the victim's car after the victim was shot. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018), cert. denied, Collins v. Tennessee, — L. Ed. 2d —, — S. Ct. —, — U.S. —, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 7182 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery because although the evidence was based almost entirely on the testimony of an accomplice in the victim's murder, the State produced sufficient corroborating evidence to fairly and legitimately connect defendant with the commission of the crime charged; the jury rejected defendant's version of events. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery because the victim and two convenience store cashiers testified that defendant and co-defendant assaulted the victim together inside a convenience store, the cashiers testified that defendant had a knife, surveillance video showed that a box cutter fell to the floor in the struggle, defendant recovered items from the victim's wallet that fell to the floor and ran, and the victim's social security card and a check stub were found inside defendant's vehicle hours later. State v. Bingham, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 760 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Evidence that defendant placed the 79-year-old victim in fear by parking behind the victim's car, insisted upon being paid a large sum of money for different, more extensive work than that to which the victim consented, looked “real mean” at the victim while demanding payment, entered the victim's home uninvited in an effort to obtain money, and instructed the victim to pay defendant almost all of the balance in the victim's home equity account was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for robbery. State v. Small, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's identity and to convict him of robbery and theft because defendant demanded the keys from the victim and drove away in her car, which was valued at $5000; two police officers saw defendant driving the stolen car less than 25 minutes after it was reported stolen; when defendant was taken into custody, he was wearing clothing similar to those in the description given by the victim and several officers; and one officer was 100% certain that defendant was the person who wrecked the victim's car and ran on foot. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

Evidence that defendant created a plan to rob the victim of his money and forced him inside a vehicle, drove him to an ATM and forced him to give them his PIN to withdraw money from his account was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for robbery. State v. Lobbins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate theft, robbery, and especially aggravated robbery because the jury could have inferred from the evidence that defendant followed the witness to the victim's apartment intending to deprive the victim of his property, as he knew the witness was going to the victim's home to purchase drugs, he asked the witness how big the victim was, when the victim opened the door he encountered defendant pointed a gun at him, and another witness testified that defendant told her that he had committed a robbery. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery, based upon a theory of criminal responsibility, because the evidence established that defendant was involved in planning the robbery of the victim in the victim's home, provided a BB gun and supplied a Sharpie for the purpose of painting the BB gun so that it would look like a real gun knowing that the BB gun was going to be used to rob the victim, provided the wrench which was used to repeatedly hit the victim during the robbery, and took a share of the stolen marijuana. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's especially aggravated robbery conviction, where the victim saw an object in defendant's hand that looked to him like the handle of a gun, the victim suffered painful injuries to one side of his face, which he testified was “shattered,” and the victim's injuries took two months to heal. State v. Clay, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated robbery conviction because defendant acknowledged in a statement that defendant entered a convenience store with defendant's hand in defendant's pocket to look like defendant had a gun, the clerk testified that defendant made a gesture to indicate that defendant had a gun, and defendant threatened to shoot the clerk. The jury could have inferred that the clerk was afraid as, after defendant threatened to shoot the clerk, the clerk put the clerk's hands up and the surrendered the cash in the register. State v. Rollins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2020).

Evidence supported defendants'  aggravated robbery convictions because surveillance videos and testimony showed that defendants drove a car belonging to the parent of one of defendants to a convenience store; defendants entered the store wearing tightly pulled hoodies; one defendant pointed a handgun at the clerk; the clerk, who was frightened, gave the defendant money and begged for defendants not to kill the clerk. Hoodies, handguns, and shoes that matched those worn by the perpetrators were found in searches of defendants'  homes and the car. State v. Sturghill, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, which were merged, based on criminal responsibility as defendant acted with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the crimes and aided or attempted to aid in the crimes because defendant initiated the robbery by placing a telephone pizza order which lured the victim to the scene; while the victim attempted to deliver the pizza order to the residence, two men waited until the victim returned to his car to approach the victim; defendant heard a gunshot coming from the direction of the men; and defendant repeatedly ran over the victim to ensure he was dead prior to taking his vehicle. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 11, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim testified to being robbed by masked and armed men in the victim's home, a police officer saw an individual matching the description of one of the assailants, a police dog tracked the individual to where defendant came out from behind a shed and said, “I give up,” a gun was found in a nearby trash can, the victim identified defendant in a show-up identification, and defendant made incriminating statements during recorded telephone calls while in jail. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's first-degree felony murder and robbery convictions because the forensic pathologist testified that the victim's cause of death was suffocation, blunt force injuries, and possible manual strangulation; defendant and codefendant used the victim's debit card and gift card several times; defendant told an investigator in an interview that defendant played a part and took full responsibility and that defendant's DNA would be found on the victim's pillow; and an inmate testified that defendant confessed to the inmate. State v. Sarden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2020).

12. —Insufficient.

Trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury on aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of rape of a child because it was not a lesser included offense as a result of the amendment to T.C.A. § 40-18-110, defendant had not agreed to an amended indictment, and because the evidence was insufficient to prove the lesser-included offense of child abuse, as there was no proof that the victim suffered actual injury from defendant touching his penis to her vagina, and therefore defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery was vacated. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2016).

Victim stated that she was cut on her finger and on her head during the robbery, and while defendant argued that he was not armed during the offense and was therefore guilty of only simple robbery, it was within the province of the jury to accredit the testimony of the victim and witness and find defendant guilty of aggravated robbery. State v. Agnew, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

13. Sentencing.

Defendant's prior conviction in Tennessee of facilitation of armed robbery constituted a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882, 2007 FED App. 126P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8000 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2007), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, — FED App. —, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20455 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007), cert. denied, 169 L. Ed. 2d 532, 128 S. Ct. 680, 552 U.S. 1052, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 12533 (2007).

Five year sentence, one year beyond the minimum under T.C.A. § 40-35-112(b)(4) for facilitation of robbery under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401(a), 39-11-403(a) was proper; the trial court properly considered the factors under T.C.A. § 40-35-210(b) and applied enhancement factors under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1), (8), (13)(C) related to defendant's criminal history, his failure to comply with conditions of a sentence involving release into the community, and the fact that he was released on federal probation at the time he committed the offense. State v. Shane, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 19, 2017).

Defendant's seven-year sentence for robbery was not excessive because it was within the sentence range for a Range II multiple offender and the presentence report supported the trial court's application of an enhancement factor for defendant's history of criminal convictions. State v. Ketchum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2017).

Because both of defendant's prior convictions for attempted robbery and facilitation of first degree murder, under T.C.A. §§ 39-11-117, 39-11-403(a), 39-11-402(2), 39-12-101, 39-13-401, included an element of actual or threatened bodily injury or serious bodily injury, the trial court properly considered them to be separate convictions and found that defendant was a Range II multiple offender under T.C.A. § 40-35-106. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

In a case in which defendant pled guilty to one count of robbery and two counts of assault, and received a total effective sentence of eight years, 11 months and 29 days, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence of confinement because, although defendant received a sentence of less than 10 years, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender and, thus, he was not a favorable candidate for probation; defendant was not eligible for community corrections as he was convicted of the felony offense of robbery, a crime against the person; defendant had prior probation and community corrections sentences revoked; and defendant's criminal record and the seriousness of the offense supported a sentence of confinement. State v. Churchwell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 722 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2017).

Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to the maximum sentence of six years for robbery, four years for felony evading arrest, and 11 months and 29 days for misdemeanor evading arrest because he had multiple arrests in his two years as an adult; he possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense; he previously failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community; he was released on bail or pretrial release when he committed the crime; and the offense of felony evading arrest involved more than one victim as the proof showed defendant crashed into a car containing multiple people. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of robbery, theft, felony evading arrest, and misdemeanor evading arrest, the trial court did not err in denying him an alternative sentence because defendant had failed at probation on at least one prior occasion; and he was ineligible for community corrections as he committed robbery, a violent crime. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

14. Felony Murder.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for first degree felony murder; defendant killed the victim during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery, and the killing was connected in time, place, and continuity of action to defendant's attempt to rob the victims. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for the first degree felony murders of the two victims during the perpetration of a robbery because it showed that defendant used violence to accomplish the theft of two billfolds from one victim and the theft of money, credit cards, and jewelry from the other victim, and the proof further established that the victims died as a result of injuries sustained from defendant's use of violence. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Jan. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony murder because it showed that he and an accomplice entered the victim's apartment after seeing her in the hallway and stole money from her wallet and purse, the accomplice hit the victim after which defendant noticed that she was no longer moving while on the floor, defendant and the accomplice left the victim's apartment, and she was found dead a number of hours later, and the State's witness testified that the cause of her death was homicide. State v. Garland, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's felony murder conviction because the evidence showed defendant killed a victim during the attempted perpetration of a robbery. State v. Toles, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2019).

Evidence was more than sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony because a witness observed the perpetrator next to the passenger window who she identified at trial as defendant with a gun, the accomplice observed defendant shoot his gun while standing at the passenger side of the car, and the description of the clothing worn by the perpetrator at the witness's window matched the clothing defendant was wearing in the surveillance camera video and still pictures. The evidence, excluding the accomplice's testimony, clearly established the inference that defendant was one of two persons involved in the attempted robbery of the victim, resulting in the death of the victim during the attempt by the two men to perpetrate the robbery. State v. Lawrence, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

State established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was criminally responsible for his codefendant's conduct because he shared in the codefendant's intent to rob the victim by approaching the passenger side of the victim's car and pointing his gun at the witness while the codefendant approached the victim's side and pointed a gun at him, and both defendant and the codefendant fired shots when the victim attempted to drive away. State v. Lawrence, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

15. Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's convictions for robbery and theft violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy because the convictions for theft and robbery arose out of the same act or transaction as defendant approached the victim at a movie rental machine, demanded her keys, and ultimately drove away with her car with her purse and other belongings inside; and the theft of the victim's car and purse was subsumed by the robbery. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

39-13-402. Aggravated robbery.

  1. Aggravated robbery is robbery as defined in § 39-13-401:
    1. Accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon; or
    2. Where the victim suffers serious bodily injury.
  2. Aggravated robbery is a Class B felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section defines the offense of aggravated robbery as a robbery committed under one of two circumstances: either (1) accomplished with a deadly weapon or an article the victim reasonably believes to be a deadly weapon; or (2) where the victim is seriously injured. If a deadly weapon is used in a robbery and the victim suffers serious bodily injury, the offense is an especially aggravated robbery pursuant to § 39-13-403.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

Transfer from juvenile court, § 37-1-134.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law — State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to Retain the Natural and Probable Consequence Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 273 (1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Serious Bodily Injury.

Convictions of especially aggravated robbery, T.C.A. § 39-13-403(a)(1), (2), were vacated because there was insufficient proof that the victim's gunshot wound was a serious bodily injury; serious bodily injury was not established under T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(34)(B)-(E) because there was no evidence that the injury involved a loss of consciousness, no proof that the victim suffered extreme physical pain, and nothing supported an inference that the injury involved protracted or obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. Finally, serious bodily injury was not established under § 39-11-106(a)(34)(A) because courts had to look to the injury that occurred rather than the injury that could have occurred or the manner in which it occurred. State v. Farmer, 380 S.W.3d 96, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. Aug. 22, 2012).

2. Use of Deadly Weapon.

Record demonstrated that elements of both of the offenses of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery occurred in county where force and coercion were used by appellants to obtain entry into victim's vehicle and take her away; with regard to the offense of aggravated robbery, appellant entered the vehicle with a deadly weapon, and with regard to the offense of aggravated rape, the force and coercion began, and in addition, appellants aided and abetted each other and used force, in beginning series of offenses in county. State v. Davis, 872 S.W.2d 950, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993), appeal denied, Tipton v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993).

Testimony of victim, as corroborated by her statements to medical personnel and to the police, clearly support the verdict of guilty of aggravated robbery and aggravated rape against appellant; when shown a photo array which included the appellant, she clearly identified the appellant as her second assailant, and although no other witnesses identified appellant as being with the victim during any of the incidents, the testimony of the victim was clearly sufficient to convict the appellant. State v. Davis, 872 S.W.2d 950, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993), appeal denied, Tipton v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993).

3. —Enhancement Factors.

The offense of aggravated robbery necessarily entails a high risk to human life and a potential for great bodily harm, thus, the trial court's application of such enhancement factors in sentencing was error. State v. Claybrooks, 910 S.W.2d 868, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant, a Range II, multiple offender, to 15 years of imprisonment for aggravated robbery because the sentence was within the statutory range, the trial court carefully considered the arguments of the parties, the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, and the statutory factors that defendant had three prior felony convictions for aggravated robbery and had been on probation for the second offense at the time he committed the third, his actions were motivated by a desire to buy more drugs, he was not a candidate for alternative sentencing, he was the leader of two actors in the commission of the aggravated robbery at issue, and he did not establish that the sentence was improper. State v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. June 7, 2017).

4. Indictment.

Because aggravated or attempted aggravated robbery is not classified as an offense based upon its perpetration against certain classes of individuals, such as police officers or children under a specified age, the indictment was not defective merely for failing to identify the victim. State v. Clark, 2 S.W.3d 233, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1153 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Where defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-401(a) and two counts of robbery in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a)(1), (2), trial court reversibly erred by consolidating the indictments, as the multiple charges and testimony inevitably hung in the backdrop as each particular offense was presented to the jury; it was unlikely that the jury examined each charge on its own proof. State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Apr. 28, 2008).

5. Proper Unit of Prosecution.

The proper unit of prosecution for aggravated robbery in Tennessee is the number of thefts rather than the number of victims, because the language of the robbery statute does not clearly and unambiguously designate the number of victims as the proper unit of prosecution. State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, State v. Sandridge, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1302 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2003).

Defendants' convictions on two counts of aggravated robbery each violated double jeopardy principles, because the proper unit of prosecution for aggravated robbery in Tennessee is the number of thefts rather than the number of victims; therefore, because defendants committed a single theft, albeit in the presence of two persons, they each committed one aggravated robbery, not two. State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, State v. Sandridge, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1302 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2003).

6. Multiple Offenses.

Court of criminal appeals erred in relying on Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(2) to dismiss an aggravated robbery charge because the two charges against defendant, aggravated robbery, T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a), and initiating a false police report, T.C.A. § 39-16-502, were not part of the same criminal episode since they did not occur simultaneously or in close sequence and did not occur in the same place or in closely situated places; defendant initiated the false police report twelve hours after he allegedly robbed the victim, and the proof of the aggravated robbery did not necessarily involve, and was not inextricably connected to, the proof of initiation of a false report to a law enforcement officer. State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (Tenn. May 26, 2011).

7. Lesser Included Offense.

Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery and aggravated robbery. State v. Hayes, 7 S.W.3d 52, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Facilitation of robbery, under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401 and 39-11-403, is a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, because it is the facilitation of an offense which is lesser included because all its statutory elements are included in the statutory elements of aggravated robbery. State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. 2002).

Failure to give a lesser-included offense instruction on facilitation of robbery, where aggravated robbery was charged, was not harmless error where the evidence that defendant shared accomplice's intent to commit robbery was controverted and was not overwhelming. State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. 2002).

Categorical approach that was used to determine the nature of prior felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), applied to defendant's juvenile convictions; however, while his aggravated assault conviction and his involvement in several drive-by shootings constituted two offenses qualifying as violent felonies given the underlying facts and his admissions, neither his adjudication of delinquency based upon a plea to the charge of attempted robbery nor his adjudication of delinquency based upon a charge of aggravated assault could be used as a third qualifying conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes. United States v. Wells, 473 F.3d 640, 2007 FED App. 8P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 360 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2007).

8. Solicitation of Offense.

As a matter of law, solicitation to commit aggravated robbery under Tennessee law is a crime of violence for purposes of establishing career offender status under the federal sentencing guidelines. United States v. Walker, 181 F.3d 774, 1999 FED App. 228P, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13692 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 980, 120 S. Ct. 435, 145 L. Ed. 2d 340, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 7328 (1999).

9. Conspiracy.

The record supported a finding that the defendant was guilty of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery where the defendant and codefendant admitted calling the victim from a pay phone prior to the commission of the crime in order to determine whether the victim was home, and the defendant possessed a tire iron when entering the victim's residence, implying that the defendant anticipated a confrontation. State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2001).

10. Evidence.

Successor judge, who heard only defendant's motion for a new trial after his appointment under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1), could not properly act as a thirteenth juror in this case because credibility was an overriding issue. The validity of defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated burglary depended upon the credibility determinations by the jury and ultimately the judge, acting as a thirteenth juror; other than the victims' own statements, no one provided any independent knowledge of what was taken from the victims, that it was taken at gunpoint, or that defendant entered the residence forcibly. State v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 262 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2013), rev'd, 453 S.W.3d 889, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2015).

Erroneous admission of two other rapes and robberies was not harmless because the evidence more probably than not affected the outcome of the trial; the evidence connecting defendant to the offenses against the victim primarily consisted of the victim's testimony, no forensic evidence tied defendant to the offenses, and the improperly admitted evidence was extremely prejudicial in that it was detailed and involved the same offenses for which defendant was on trial. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Erroneous admission of two other rapes and robberies was not harmless because the evidence more probably than not affected the outcome of the trial; the evidence connecting defendant to the offenses against the victim primarily consisted of the victim's testimony, no forensic evidence tied defendant to the offenses, and the improperly admitted evidence was extremely prejudicial in that it was detailed and involved the same offenses for which defendant was on trial. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

In an aggravated robbery case, the trial court properly admitted recordings of defendant's jail phone calls into evidence. The jail phone calls were probative of defendant's identity and involvement in the instant offense. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 2018).

11. —Sufficient.

Elements necessary to support a conviction for aggravated robbery were established by the victim's testimony that while accompanying defendant on a test drive of an automobile, he had driven him to a church, had presented a weapon which frightened him, and had driven away in the automobile. State v. King, 905 S.W.2d 207, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled, State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1998).

Evidence amply supported finding that defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's injuries where the victim fell when she quickly exited her house to scream for help, an action that was normal and instinctive under the circumstances. State v. Echols, 919 S.W.2d 634, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 746 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Evidence that defendant assaulted the victim in his bedroom for the purpose of both exercising and obtaining control over the victim's property that was in the same room was sufficient to find defendant guilty of aggravated robbery. State v. Nix, 922 S.W.2d 894, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. May 6, 1996).

The evidence was sufficient to find that defendant was guilty of aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated assault where defendant aided juvenile in the commission of the these offenses by driving the juvenile to the pharmacy where the juvenile committed aggravated robbery and then provided a means for the juvenile to escape by picking him up and driving him home. State v. Harris, 30 S.W.3d 345, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1072 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions, because the first defendant admitted to having been the driver in the robbery and an accomplice testified that the robbery had been the first defendant's idea; and regarding the second defendant, the accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by witness identifications, proof that he purchased a car a few days after the robbery, and his presence at the first defendant's wife's residence a few days later. State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, State v. Sandridge, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1302 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated robbery conviction, where defendant shot and killed his landlord and stole money from him. State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery where defendant, armed with a handgun, demanded that the victims “lay things out,” and someone in defendant's group took the items that the victims surrendered. That the evidence was controverted at trial was not fatal to the state's case; the jury chose to accredit that evidence. State v. Summers, 159 S.W.3d 586, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated robbery because, even though no money was taken from a store employee personally, a clerk operating a cash register was considered the “owner” of property for purposes of aggravated robbery. Moreover, defendant was apprehended a few blocks from the store wearing a torn t-shirt, the victim's wallet and store receipts were found near defendant, the victim identified defendant as the perpetrator, and a clothing fragment found in the store's parking lot matched the hole in defendant's t-shirt. State v. Minter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 439 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated robbery conviction given that defendant pointed a gun at the victims, took money and cellular telephones from them, and they gave their property to defendant because they were in fear of being shot. State v. Seiber, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery where it showed that he pushed his way into the victim's apartment while holding what the victim believed was a pistol, held the victim down, put the gun to the victim's head, demanded drugs and money, instructed his accomplice to take two laptop computers, and took $100 from the victim's wallet. Defendant drove a van with his accomplice and the computers to another apartment complex and took the computers out of the van, and his fingerprint was found on the power cord of one of the stolen computers. State v. Wisdom, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery where there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that the victim reasonably believed that defendant's air pistol was real and therefore a deadly weapon. Defendant pointed the pistol at the victim and threatened to kill her, and the victim testified the gun looked real, that it reminded her of a BB gun, she was scared defendant would hurt her son, and she dropped everything she was holding in order to protect herself. State v. Bailey, —S.W.3d—,  2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because defendant, who was armed with a gun, and another individual approached the victim at his residence; defendant pointed the gun at the victim, hit him in the head with the gun, and ordered him to turn around; defendant then took $1200 in cash and the victim's phone from his pockets; although the victim initially reported to the police a different name then defendant's as the person who robbed him at gunpoint, both he and another witness identified defendant as the gunman from photographic lineups; and a detective explained that she thought the victim was confused about defendant's name. State v. Key, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery; the jury accredited the witness's identification of defendant, and the jury was able to view the security camera footage, which showed defendant looking directly into the camera on several occasions, and thus the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity. State v. Thirkill, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 231 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2016).

Evidence that the victim identified defendant as one the perpetrators who exited a vehicle armed with guns and demanded defendant's money, that the victim was almost certain that defendant was the perpetrator with the assault rifle who threatened to shoot him in the back because the victim did not have any money, and defendant's admission that he was present when the robbery occurred was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Grace, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and attempt to commit aggravated robbery where one victim identified defendant as the perpetrator at the scene of the robbery, both victims chased the reddish-color car from the scene of the robbery, and an officer identified defendant as the passenger in the reddish-color car who fled the scene of the traffic stop. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery based on criminal responsibility because the gas station cashier alerted the victim that someone was getting inside his car; when the victim approached his car, co-defendant, who had already closed the driver's side door, brandished a weapon, causing the victim to retreat; co-defendant then drove away in the victim's car; the theft of the victim's car by violence occurred contemporaneously with the taking of that automobile; co-defendant intended to use violence against the victim, if necessary, in order to take the victim's car; defendant instructed co-defendant to get the car; and defendant was arrested driving the stolen vehicle, and he was accompanied by co-defendant. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery because defendant was identified by the victims in a photographic lineup and in court, even though defendant had a very different appearance during the trial. The victims testified to the same general sequence of events relating to crimes that were committed against them during an attempt to purchase marijuana, with minor discrepancies. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2016).

Evidence existed that reasonable minds could accept that defendant committed aggravated robbery because the victim testified that defendant pointed a pistol at her, she identified defendant in the video holding an object in his right hand as he approached her, and she identified the object as a pistol; an expert in the area of latent print identification and examination determined that a print lifted from the cash drawer of the register was made by defendant's left ring finger and no other. State v. Drummond, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2016).

Rational trier of fact could have found that defendant was guilty of facilitating the aggravated robbery, as he opened the back door of the store to allow an accomplice to enter and screamed, fell to the floor, and threw his wallet, cell phone, and car keys on the floor, effectively providing the accomplice with a means of escape. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated robbery conviction where the victim testified that defendant and his accomplice passed the gun to each other twice, a witness testified that both defendant and his accomplice had guns during the robbery, and the evidence established that the accomplice used a gun during the robbery, and therefore the jury could have found him guilty as the principle offender or under a theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Doak, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 625 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 880 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated robbery conviction, given that, in addition to the victim's identification of defendant, his fingerprint was found on the car where the surveillance video and testimony indicated that the robber had touched it, and defendant provided a statement to police admitting his involvement in the robbery. State v. Booker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Evidence that the defendant pointed a gun at the terrified victim's face and demanded her purse and cash, defendant got into the backseat of her vehicle and ordered her to take him somewhere to cash the money order, and demanded and took at gunpoint from the victim her cell phone and driver's license was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Testimony of the victims and surveillance video footage of defendant holding the door while his accomplice plundered the cash register and defendant's statement to police that there was a preconceived plan to rob the store and he knew the accomplice had a gun allowed the jury to conclude that defendant was a willing participant in the robbery and thus, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. McKnight, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 975 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of the aggravated robbery of the victim under a theory of criminal responsibility. Defendant searched the victim's pockets and took approximately $300 from the victim before fleeing with one of his companions while the gunman stayed behind long enough to fire gunshots in the air before fleeing himself. State v. Stepheny, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence defendant conspired with another to rob the victim, acted with the intent to rob the victim through the use of a deadly weapon, and was in possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed on a college campus supported his convictions for aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm on a college campus. State v. Spicer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2016).

State presented sufficient evidence of identity to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery because the evidence showed that defendant ordered the victims to the ground at gunpoint and demanded their wallets and cell phones, he threatened to kill the victims, he attempted to sell both cells phones, he used one victim's credit cards, he deposed of the victims'  property in his garbage can, a gun matching the description provided by the victims was found in defendant's residence, and the victim's identified defendant in a photographic lineup. State v. Wilkerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 837 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery where the victim identified defendant as one of the robbers in a pretrial photo lineup and again at trial, she testified she knew defendant prior to the robbery because he came into the store daily, and defendant's fingerprint was found on one of the cigarette packs disturbed by the robbers. State v. Bowen, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 859 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2016).

There was enough evidence in the form of the victim's and a witness's testimonies, and the video and photographs from the security camera from which the jury could have determined that the testimony of codefendants, that defendant, who was the shortest, held the gun in the store, was sufficiently corroborated, and thus, to support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Grant, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2016).

Post-conviction court properly denied defendant's petition for relief because, even if trial counsel had retrieved the cell phone records of defendant and the victim, the records would have only corroborated their prior relationship and that the victim recovered his cell phone at some point during the night of the aggravated robbery and carjacking, defendant's testimony was sufficient to establish that he took the victim's property, which satisfied the elements of aggravated robbery, and even if trial counsel were deficient in failing to procure the cell phone records, such deficiency did not result in prejudice. Taylor v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 950 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery where it showed that defendant approached the victims from behind a car and, while pointing a gray and black handgun at them, demanded their belongings, the victims identified defendant as the perpetrator in a photographic lineup, and defendant was arrested after officers found him hiding in an attic with a gun matching the description of the gun used in the robbery. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because the victim advertised shoes for sale on the internet; defendant and the victim met to complete a sale in an alley behind a store; the victim got out of his car and opened the trunk; defendant and his friend walked to the back of the car; a witness with the victim could see defendant and his friend in the rearview mirror; defendant pointed a gun at the victim's side, and he and his friend took four pairs of shoes from the victim's trunk; and, although the victim and the witness were unable to identify defendant from a photographic lineup, they both positively identified him in court as the robber with the gun. State v. Ridley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary as either a principal offender or under a theory of criminal responsibility; defendant and her friend entered the victim's apartment without her consent, defendant hit the victim on the head with a gun and demanded drugs, guns, and money, while the friend searched the apartment and took property, defendant was found with the victim's wallet in her sleeve and a handgun on her person, and the victim positively identified defendant and her friend as the robbers. State v. Sullivan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 85 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated robbery conviction because the victim testified that he would not have pulled money out of his pocket after being commanded to do so had defendant not been holding a gun; defendant subsequently used the gun to knock the victim unconscious; and the taking was simultaneous with the use of violence as, inter alia, defendant held the gun in plain sight throughout his encounter with the victim, and hit the victim in the face with his gun. State v. Abraham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2017).

Victim stated that she was cut on her finger and on her head during the robbery, and while defendant argued that he was not armed during the offense and was therefore guilty of only simple robbery, it was within the province of the jury to accredit the testimony of the victim and witness and find defendant guilty of aggravated robbery. State v. Agnew, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery as he was a participant in the crime because, when the victim and defendant arrived at co-defendant's house, the victim noticed the would-be gunman standing in the driveway; when the victim was outside preparing to make a phone call and leave, the gunman approached and ordered him to the ground, held him at gunpoint, and directed him not to look; the victim felt the gunman standing next to him and holding the gun against his head, while two other people moved around him and two different sized hands rummaged through his pockets and took his money; and, immediately after the robbery, the victim saw defendant with co-defendant and the gunman running away and giggling. State v. Morgan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 279 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery as he entered the victim's home brandishing a weapon; pointed the gun at her and told her that he would kill her if she moved; and, without the victim's consent, took laptop computers and a guitar from her home, forced her into a bathroom, and left the victim's home in her car. State v. Bertrand, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated burglary because the evidence showed that defendant broke into the victim's apartment for the purpose of sexually assaulting her and that he took the victim's purse and phone as he exited the apartment after the sexual assault; the victim offered defendant her debit cards and money after he broke into her apartment and held her at knife-point without indicating what he wanted; and the victim mentioned those items to the armed intruder as a strategy to get defendant to leave her apartment, as she was in fear for her life, and not out of goodwill or charity. State v. Gwin, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 604 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of second-degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery because it showed that defendant and his friend accosted the victim outside the victim's residence, defendant forced the victim to the ground at gunpoint and rifled through his pockets before fleeing with his friend, a short time later while the victim and another man were driving around searching for the robbers defendant fired 14 gunshots from a semiautomatic handgun at the victim's vehicle and struck the victim in the head, killing him. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 652 (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because defendant pulled out a gun and asked where the money was; scared and in a state of shock, the victim replied that there was $100 in his car; defendant called for another person from a back room and told her to get the money from the victim's car; when she returned with more than $100, defendant asked the victim why he had lied and instructed him to beg for his life before finally being allowed to leave; the robbery statute did not require a taking; and defendant, via direction to the other person, asserted control over the victim's property while placing the victim in fear and using a deadly weapon. State v. Granderson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated robbery conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a)(1), given in part that defendant brandished a weapon and demanded the victim's personal items, including Mexican currency, the victim identified defendant in a lineup, and when defendant was apprehended, he had Mexican currency on his person. State v. Farris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because the victim was ambushed as he entered the motel room of the accomplice; defendant pointed a handgun at the victim and demanded that the victim give him everything he had; after initially attempting to fight his way out of the room, the victim gave up after defendant struck him with the handgun; defendant and the accomplice stole the victim's cash, cellular telephone, and wallet; defendant was arrested a short time later in possession of a handgun and over $500 in cash; the State was free to prove that defendant accomplished the crime by violence; and pointing a deadly weapon at the victim was sufficient proof of violence. State v. Hardy, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the second defendant's aggravated robbery conviction because both the victim and the witness identified him at trial, the victim testified that both defendants forcibly entered the motel room he rented for the witness and attacked him while holding guns, and the three left together taking his pants, wallet, $60, bank cards, truck, and work tools. State v. Thirkill, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017).

Evidence that defendant and his co-defendant approached the victim in the driveway of his parent's home, pointed a gun at his head and ordered him to the ground, they drove away in the victim's car, they were apprehended a short distance from the victim's wrecked car, and defendant matched the victim's description of the perpetrator was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, carjacking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Perkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 892 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminally negligent homicide and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery because defendant went to the apartment of the victim's first son in search of drugs; he was wearing a black hoodie and a cap; the victim, his wife, and his second son left the apartment to go home, but, as they were leaving in their vehicle, three men wearing black hoodies approached the vehicle to rob them; the victim's sons recognized defendant as one of the three men as he was wearing the same clothing that he wore earlier to the apartment; the second son testified that defendant shot the victim; and the first son testified that he was 100% percent sure that defendant was the person he saw committing the robbery. State v. Gergish, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of aggravated rape, facilitation of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated robbery because it showed that not only did defendants both rape the victim, they did so absent any force or coercion from the co-defendant, they joined their co-defendants in taking cell phones, TVs, and a laptop from the victims, although the co-defendant wielded a gun during the crimes it was never turned on defendants, and the co-defendant's threats of violence were directed solely at the victims. State v. Denton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because there was proof that defendant watched the ATM looking for someone to rob; he waited until the victim retrieved money from the ATM, and then he covered his face with a cloth to disguise himself and fashioned a rag upon his hand in an effort to lead the victim to believe he held a weapon; defendant announced twice to the victim his intent to rob her; it was not necessary to display an actual weapon in order to meet the requirements of the aggravated robbery statute; and the victim stated her belief that defendant was armed and her fear that he would shoot her. State v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 785 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery, two counts of felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of convicted felon in possession of handgun because the victim identified defendant as the person who robbed him at the crime scene, when he gave a statement to the sergeant, and in the courtroom at trial; the victim testified that he had no difficulty seeing defendant and that he recognized defendant's voice; the victim testified that defendant pointed a pistol at him during the robbery; and the parties stipulated to the underlying prior felonies necessary to support the three weapon counts. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 888 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Victim testified he was positive that defendant was the perpetrator who pointed a gun at him and demanded his property, and the jury heard the proof and clearly resolved the issue of credibility in the State's favor, and thus the State adduced sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery under T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a)(1). State v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 939 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because the victim clearly testified that the only reason he turned over his wallet, phone, and cash to defendant was because defendant pulled a gun on him. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 988 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because, the day before the robbery, the victim and defendant had a conversation about the victim's gun; early the next morning when the victim was leaving for work, he saw defendant and an unidentified man sitting on some steps outside his apartment; while the victim talked to defendant, the unidentified man came up behind the victim and placed a gun to the victim's back; the men demanded that the victim turn over his gun and cash; the victim reported the crime to the police, and identified defendant as one of the robbers in a photographic array a few weeks later; and the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1039 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery as a principal actor because defendant sent the victim a text message asking him to pick her up; when the victim arrived, defendant told the victim where to park, entered the truck, and turned off the truck; she then sent a text message; codefendant and a second man then approached the victim's truck; the second man pointed a gun at the victim and placed it on his stomach, and removed the victim's cell phone from his jacket pocket; the victim's GPS device, cell phone, and debit card were taken without the victim's consent; and the victim's stolen debit card was found at a nearby townhome, where defendant and the second man were found after the robbery. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 3, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 17, 2018).

Testimony from the victim that he was attempting to buy drugs when he was truck in the eye with a handgun, fell to the ground, and had a gun held to his head by defendant while codefendant removed money from his pocket was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Moss, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. May 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because the victim testified that two men came at him from behind some bushes and robbed him at gunpoint; the victim claimed that one of the men placed the gun against his head and that the victim turned his head and saw defendant's face; the victim testified that he recognized defendant and that prior to the incident, he had seen defendant on multiple occasions at the apartment complex; the victim said that he saw defendant driving away from the apartment complex in a black truck, which he had observed defendant driving on multiple occasions prior to the robbery; and both the victim and a witness identified defendant in a photographic lineup. State v. Perez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping because it showed that defendant barged into the victim's residence brandishing a firearm, she took another victim's wallet and phone, she forced the four victims into the bathroom, she forced a victim into a car, took him to a convenience store, forced him to retrieve money from an ATM, and took another victim's necklace. State v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was the perpetrator where the victim identified defendant in both a photographic line-up following the offenses and at trial, although a portion of defendant's face was covered during the attack the victim could see his eyes, the victim said that she recognized defendant as the perpetrator by his eyes and that she was 100 percent sure he was her attacker, the victim also identified a photograph of the that he possessed during the attack, officers found the gun in defendant's apartment, and he admitted it belonged to him. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim identified defendant, officers recovered the victim's scarf from the apartment where defendant was staying and recovered a gun and a cellular phone which the victim recognized as similar to the ones possessed by defendant during the attack, and DNA consistent with the victim's DNA was found on swabs taken from defendant. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault under a theory of criminal responsibility because it showed that shortly after his co-defendant approached one victim with the gun, defendant approached the second victim, asked for her cellphone, and told her not to move. Defendant admitted that the purpose for his actions was to prevent the second victim from calling the police. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 594 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery because it showed that he pointed a loaded revolver to the victim's head and took $400 from him along with his car keys. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 594 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery because a store clerk testified that defendant entered the store where the clerk worked, pointed a gun at the clerk, ordered the clerk to open the cash register and place the money in a bag, and left the store with the money, beer, and cigarettes. The clerk became distraught and feared for the clerk's life and identified defendant from a photographic spread and also in court. State v. Chandler, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary of the victim while employing a firearm because the victim testified he woke up bound on his couch with a handgun pointed to the back of his head as men raided his apartment; the men stole the victim's 12-gauge shotgun, AK-47, .22 long rifle, computers, tablets, and his wallet; defendant's ex-girlfriend testified that she saw defendant in her apartment with a shotgun, a ski mask, a duffle bag carrying a handgun, and a check with the victim's name on it; and, upon searching the ex-girlfriend's apartment, officers found the victim's shotgun and ammunition, his military ID, and his small computer, and they also found a handgun and a ski mask. State v. Loyde, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery because it showed that defendant took the victim's television without her consent from her living room and put it into her vehicle; this was accomplished while the Defendant wielded the weapon. The television was later found in the backseat of the victim's vehicle, which defendant had driven away from her home, also while brandishing the weapon. State v. Stumbo, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted aggravated robbery of the second victim under the theory of criminal responsibility because the jury could conclude that co-defendant intended to take property from the second victim when he brandished a gun and demanded that the second victim drop everything; co-defendant's actions constituted a substantial step towards the completion of aggravated robbery; and the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant and co-defendant were working together to rob the victims as defendant pointed his gun at the first victim and ordered him to give him everything while co-defendant pointed his gun at the second victim and told him to drop everything. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because defendant pulled out a gun and pointed it at the victim's head; while defendant was pointing the gun to the victim's head, the victim removed a cell phone, cigarettes, and between $700 and $800 from his pockets and gave the items to defendant; both of the victims identified defendant at trial and in photographic displays following the robbery; the victim testified that it was not so dark that he could not identify defendant as the perpetrator; and the victim stated that he stopped drinking when he arrived at the residence several hours before the robbery occurred. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Evidence that defendant held the victims at gun point and intentionally took property from each of them without either person's consent, support a finding that he committed aggravated robbery by using a deadly weapon to intentionally or knowingly exercise control over the property of another without the owner's consent. State v. Richardson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 30, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because two witnesses testified that both defendant and the accomplice were armed with guns; the victim testified that defendant hit him in the face, held him down, and instructed his accomplice to take the victim's wallet; and the use of a BB gun by the accomplice supported the guilty verdict as it was an article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2018).

Evidence that the victim identified defendant as the individual who threatened him with a gun and robbed him both on a photographic lineup and at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Gray, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery because, though circumstantial, there was enough evidence in the form of testimony from the store's employees and the officers, as well as security footage, to show that defendant was the robber. Officers'  found approximate $207 in defendant's pocket, the same amount stolen from the store, and a gun hidden in the glove compartment of the vehicle he was a passenger of, they found black clothing and white plastic grocery bag matching the description that a witness gave of the robber and the bag, and defendant was the same height as the robber. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2018).

Whether defendant succeeded in taking property from one victim was of no consequence in determining if he committed attempted aggravated robbery with respect to the other victims; the act of demanding money while pointing a gun at the victims was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted aggravated robbery. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Victim was shot after defendant completed the underlying theft of the victim's property, and thus the evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for especially aggravated robbery; however, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery, the first lesser-included offense that was charged to the jury, and his conviction was modified. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery because the victim and two convenience store cashiers testified that defendant and co-defendant assaulted the victim together inside a convenience store, the cashiers testified that defendant had a knife, surveillance video showed that a box cutter fell to the floor in the struggle, defendant recovered items from the victim's wallet that fell to the floor and ran, and the victim's social security card and a check stub were found inside defendant's vehicle hours later. State v. Bingham, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 760 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Defendant drove to the gas station and drove around the store to ensure that there were no customers, then parked while his co-defendant went inside the store with a toy gun; when he returned with money, defendant drove to purchase drugs, and thus the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant aided in his co-defendant's commission of the aggravated robbery. State v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Proof adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain appellant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and being a felon in possession of a weapon, where multiple witnesses identified appellant as the shooter and an autopsy revealed the victim died as a result of the gunshot wound. Regarding the felon in possession of a charge, appellant stipulated that at the time of the offenses, he had been convicted of five felonies involving the use or attempted use of violence and knew it was illegal for him to own, possess or handle a firearm. State v. Harper, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2019).

Evidence that defendant approached the victim, who he knew was responsible for making a nightly deposit for her employer, in a parking lot as she walked toward codefendant's car, pointed a gun at her, struck her on the head with the gun, and took a deposit bag containing approximately $978 was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. June 21, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery because a detective showed the bag of marijuana to defendant; when the detective asked for the money, defendant pointed a gun at him, snatched the marijuana from his hand, and fled; the detective testified that he was in fear for his life and scared; and, although a gun could not be seen in the video of the drug transaction, the jury chose to accredit the detective's testimony that defendant pointed a gun at him, and officers found a gun underneath defendant immediately after the robbery. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery under a theory of criminal responsibility because he arranged a meeting with the victim to purportedly sell clothing, during the sale two men approached and attacked the victim, taking cash and a cell phone, defendant admitted he knew one of the robbers, defendant fled the scene in a red car, which picked up the two robbers minutes later, and defendant admitted he received a cell phone and posted it for sale. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of aggravated robbery because the victim testified that after arriving at his store where the alarm had been activated, he was approached by two men with masks over the lower part of their faces, one pointed a gun at him, and they demanded money and took his cell phone. The victim testified that he recognized defendants from their eyes and voices as they were frequent customers of his store, one defendant's mask slipped during the crime, and the police quickly found defendants and their discarded clothing a short distance from the store; the victim confirmed that defendants were the perpetrators at a show-up identification. State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery because he discussed his plan to kill the victim and hide her body when he was previously incarcerated for assaulting the victim, witnesses testified that a maroon car was seen at the motel, the maroon car defendant was driving when he was arrested contained blood and DNA consistent with that of the victim, and defendant told an inmate that he shot the victim in the chest and the head. State v. Rimmer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery, based upon a theory of criminal responsibility, because the evidence established that defendant was involved in planning the robbery of the victim in the victim's home, provided a BB gun and supplied a Sharpie for the purpose of painting the BB gun so that it would look like a real gun knowing that the BB gun was going to be used to rob the victim, provided the wrench which was used to repeatedly hit the victim during the robbery, and took a share of the stolen marijuana. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery because the pharmacist testified that defendant, with his hand in his pocket, told her to give him a prescription drug and not to call police or push any buttons or he would “blow her brains out,” he shook his hand while it was in his pocket, and she believed he had a gun. Because the pharmacist feared for her life and the lives of her staff she complied, while speaking to the pharmacist defendant swallowed five tablets, and the surveillance video of the robbery supported her testimony. State v. Keen, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the first defendant of aggravated robbery because he took the victim's necklace, rings, money, wallet, cell phones, and tattoo equipment at gunpoint. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of facilitation of aggravated robbery because the second defendant provided substantial assistance to the first defendant by beating the victim while the first defendant held him at gunpoint and then robbed him of his necklace, rings, money, wallet, cell phones, and tattoo equipment. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as a perpetrator of the armed robbery and provided sufficient corroboration of the codefendant's testimony because it showed that defendant entered the market brandishing a shotgun and wearing a ski mask and gloves, he pointed the shotgun at the victim and demanded that she give him the money bag, defendant was picked up by his codefendant which was captured on video, the codefendant admitted that he was the driver and provided the police with the location of the ski mask and a glove, and defendant was the primary contributor of DNA obtained from the mask and glove. State v. Judkins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2019).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault including that defendant texted an accomplice about a robbery, defendant dropped off the accomplices at the pawn shop where they robbed the store and customers, the accomplices ran to an abandoned house and changed clothes before defendant picked them up, and the offenders were all tracked using a GPS placed in one of the jewelry cases taken during the robbery. State v. Wise, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2019).

Evidence that defendant made multiple statements indicating his intention to take the victim's property and his use of a baseball bat when ordering the victim to drop his property was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of aggravated robbery. State v. Vincent, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated robbery conviction because defendant acknowledged in a statement that defendant entered a convenience store with defendant's hand in defendant's pocket to look like defendant had a gun, the clerk testified that defendant made a gesture to indicate that defendant had a gun, and defendant threatened to shoot the clerk. The jury could have inferred that the clerk was afraid as, after defendant threatened to shoot the clerk, the clerk put the clerk's hands up and the surrendered the cash in the register. State v. Rollins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2020).

Evidence supported defendants'  aggravated robbery convictions because surveillance videos and testimony showed that defendants drove a car belonging to the parent of one of defendants to a convenience store; defendants entered the store wearing tightly pulled hoodies; one defendant pointed a handgun at the clerk; the clerk, who was frightened, gave the defendant money and begged for defendants not to kill the clerk. Hoodies, handguns, and shoes that matched those worn by the perpetrators were found in searches of defendants'  homes and the car. State v. Sturghill, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2020).

Defendant's confession, the amount of money found in his pocket, the location of the weapon in the vehicle, the apprehension of defendant close in time and location to the robbery, and the victim's statement and identification of defendant from a photo line-up all supported defendant's aggravated robbery conviction. State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions because it showed that a co-defendant and defendant made a plan to “hit a lick” on Hispanic people, obtained a working magazine for the malfunctioning handgun, armed themselves, and asked another co-defendant to drive them around town to identify vulnerable targets. After choosing a house, the co-defendant and defendant walked back to the house, fired two shots into the air, and ordered the victims onto the ground, one of the men took a victim's wallet, and when they were surprised by the victims inside the house opening the door, the co-defendant and defendant opened fire, striking the house and four people present. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated robbery because she pulled a gun on the victims, demanded their property, and use of the car they were in, the prosecutor provided a facially race-neutral reason for the challenges to the five non-Caucasian jurors, defendant made no offer of proof regarding any “mental disorder” that was caused by a traumatic event that happened to her while she was in the backseat of a vehicle, and she did not preserve her argument regarding the issue of her interview with law enforcement after arrest. State v. Horton, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery because the victim testified defendant approached him at the cash register and placed a gun against his back, the victim believed the gun felt and looked like a .38 caliber revolver, defendant demanded the money in the cash register and threatened the victim, and because the victim was afraid defendant would shoot him, he gave defendant the money from the cash register. State v. Nix, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2020).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to support defendant's conviction on one of the counts. The victim testified that she was in the kitchen when the assailants broke into the house and pointed a gun at her while ordering her to the floor, and defendant himself admitted that one of his accomplices took eighty dollars from her. State v. Banks, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support second and third defendants'  convictions for aggravated robbery, theft, conspiracy, aggravated burglary, and firearms offenses, as it showed that first defendant devised a paln to conduct a home invasion and steal stuff, he enlisted others, including second and third defendants, to carry o ut the plan, and the group carried out the plan, which included the use of masks, gloves, and a gun to take the items from the victim's home. State v. Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's first-degree felony murder and robbery convictions because the forensic pathologist testified that the victim's cause of death was suffocation, blunt force injuries, and possible manual strangulation; defendant and codefendant used the victim's debit card and gift card several times; defendant told an investigator in an interview that defendant played a part and took full responsibility and that defendant's DNA would be found on the victim's pillow; and an inmate testified that defendant confessed to the inmate. State v. Sarden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2020).

12. —Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery and first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an attempted aggravated robbery because proof that the victim was shot with the same caliber weapon defendant admitted using and that two males were seen fleeing just after the murder corroborated defendant's admission that he shot the victim. Nothing, however, corroborated defendant's admission that he went to the victim's residence to rob him. State v. Bishop, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012), rev'd, 431 S.W.3d 22, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, there was no evidence of any bodily injury to one of the victims. Therefore, the conviction on that count was subject to reversal in its entirely and dismissal with prejudice due to insufficient evidence. State v. Banks, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

13. —Identity.

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's identity as the perpetrator of an aggravated robbery because, although the victim was unable to identify defendant from a photographic array prior to trial, the victim identified defendant in court as the perpetrator, while the victim of an affiliated robbery identified defendant from a photographic array as well as in court. As was its province, it was apparent that the jury accredited the identifications of defendant by the victims. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim identified defendant as the perpetrator in both a photographic line-up following the offenses and at trial; the victim stated that she recognized defendant as the perpetrator by his eyes, and she identified a photograph of the gun that defendant possessed during the attack. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Witness positively identified defendant from a photograph lineup, at a preliminary hearing, and at trial, and any inconsistencies in the witness's testimony were not significant enough to disturb the jury's verdict; the State adduced sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's aggravated robbery conviction. State v. Crowell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated robbery and theft of $ 1,000 or less convictions, as his identity was sufficiently established; a store employee positively identified defendant as the perpetrator before and during trial, and DNA from the discarded cigarette butt at the scene matched defendant's DNA. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim testified to being robbed by masked and armed men in the victim's home, a police officer saw an individual matching the description of one of the assailants, a police dog tracked the individual to where defendant came out from behind a shed and said, “I give up,” a gun was found in a nearby trash can, the victim identified defendant in a show-up identification, and defendant made incriminating statements during recorded telephone calls while in jail. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2020).

14. Jury Instructions.

Trial court's failure to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses to aggravated robbery was not error, as all the victims involved testified that both the inmate and his codefendants had guns, demanded money, and that the inmate was an active and willing participant in the crimes. Moore v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

Defendants were charged with especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery, a pairing of crimes warranting a White instruction about whether the removal or confinement was to a greater degree than that necessary to commit the aggravated robbery offense, but the trial court did not instruct the jury pursuant to White; however, the error was harmless because the result of the trial would have been the same as defendants completed the offense of aggravated robbery of the victim's purse before proceeding to commit the especially aggravated kidnapping by ordering the victim into her house and confining her to the couch; and their conduct constituting the kidnapping was beyond that necessary to consummate the aggravated robbery offense. State v. Alston, 465 S.W.3d 555, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. May 5, 2015).

15. Sentencing.

Following defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the district court properly found that defendant had three prior convictions for violent felonies and that he therefore qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); the U.S. government carried its burden of proving the existence of defendant's juvenile conviction for aggravated robbery in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-402 and using defendant's procedurally sound juvenile conviction as an ACCA predicate did not violate due process or run afoul of Apprendi . United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 2007 FED App. 245P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15156 (6th Cir. June 26, 2007), cert. denied, 169 L. Ed. 2d 739, 128 S. Ct. 880, 552 U.S. 1105, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 314 (2008).

Although defendant was eligible for consecutive sentencing, the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing that resulted in a total sentence of 44 years for defendant's crimes of aggravated robbery, theft by shoplifting, and attempted aggravated robbery; the robberies were committed with a toy gun, no one was injured, two victims knew the gun was plastic, defendant was 49 years old and already serving a 12-year sentence, and the sentence was in effect a sentence of life imprisonment, was not justly deserved, and was not the least severe measure necessary. State v. Biggs, 482 S.W.3d 923, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences following defendant's aggravated robbery conviction where it found that defendant had an extensive criminal record, he was a dangerous offender, he was a professional criminal, and it made the requisite Wilkerson findings. State v. Bailey, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2016).

Defendant's eight-year and six month sentence at 85 percent for aggravated robbery was within the applicable range and received the proper release eligibility, and assuming that consideration of defendant's gang affiliation was improper, the trial court's application of one enhancement factor was still supported by the record because defendant has a prior misdemeanor conviction of theft under $ 500; the trial court did not wholly depart from the sentencing scheme, and defendant's sentence was consistent with the purposes and principles of that scheme. State v. Means, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2016).

Trial court's imposition of a sentence of ten years for aggravated robbery was presumed reasonable because the trial court clearly stated on the record its reasons for the sentences imposed, and defendant's sentence was within the appropriate range. State v. Drummond, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2016).

Inmate was not entitled to post-conviction relief for counsel's failure to object to the State's sentencing statements that the inmate's crimes involved more than one victim, due to a victim's pregnancy, after which the sentencing court allegedly misapplied the multiple victim sentencing enhancement factor, because the inmate showed no prejudice, by clear and convincing evidence, as (1) the State had a good faith basis for asking about the inmate's knowledge of the victim's pregnancy, (2) the inmate's sentences were within applicable ranges, (3) three other enhancement factors were properly applied, and (4) the court properly heard testimony that the inmate held a knife to the victim's stomach and saw video footage showing the victim was visibly pregnant. Bush v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 18, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to 12 years in prison for aggravated robbery where the sentencing range was eight to 12 years, the trial court found that multiple attempts at rehabilitation had failed, defendant had declined to seek help, and he had a significant history of criminal behavior beginning while he was a minor. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Consecutive sentencing was appropriate because the sentence for the employment of a firearm had to run consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony of aggravated burglary, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the aggravated robbery sentence should also run consecutively to the other two sentences as defendant had attempted to rob her at gunpoint on the same day, before he robbed the victim; and the presentence report included facts that recounted defendant's involvement in two other armed robberies that same week, one of which was the robbery of an elderly woman. State v. Bertrand, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 10 years and six months for aggravated robbery under T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a)(1); even if the trial court misapplied the enhancement under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(17), the trial court found § 40-35-114(1) applicable, which was an adequate basis for enhancement, and defendant did not contest this, plus the trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210, 40-35-103. State v. Farris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017).

In sentencing for aggravated robbery under T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a)(1), the record supported the trial court's application of the enhancement factor under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(2) related to being a leader in the commission of the offense; the victim testified that defendant held the gun and demanded the victim's property, and the enhancement did not require that defendant be the sole leader. State v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 939 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

In sentencing for aggravated robbery under T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a)(1), the trial court did not err by refusing to apply the mitigating factor under T.C.A. § 40-35-113(6) related to youth and lacking substantial judgment; he already had nine misdemeanor convictions and a history of marijuana use, and he was a leader in the commission of the aggravated robbery. State v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 939 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Defendant's within-range sentence of 11 years'  incarceration for aggravated robbery was not excessive because defendant had previously been adjudicated delinquent for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery and had two pending charges in criminal court at the time of sentencing; she had previously violated probation and did not adhere to her conditions of release; and she was a leader in the commission of the offense as she initiated contact with the victim and asked him to meet her at a designated location, and she communicated with another man to determine when the robbery should occur. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 3, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 17, 2018).

Defendant's four-year sentences for felony reckless endangerment and felony evading arrest were authorized for a Range II, multiple offender and thus he failed to state a claim for relief in his motion; first, his sentences appeared to have expired, and if so, he was not entitled to relief, and in any event, there was no merit to his claim that his juvenile adjudication for aggravated robbery could not be used to classify him as a Range II offender, as he committed an act as a juvenile that would constitute a Class B felony if committed by an adult. State v. Carroll, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 18 years for aggravated robbery; defendant did not adduce any proof in support of the application of any mitigating factors, such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to apply any, plus the trial court complied with the purposes and principles of sentencing and found that defendant failed to rehabilitate and likely would continue to offend. State v. Crowell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2018).

Defendant's effective sentence of 45 years for his aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary convictions was proper because he was a career offender as he had nine previous convictions for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, one previous felony conviction for an attempted first-degree murder, a Class A felony, and two previous felony convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; the maximum sentence for the Class B felony of aggravated robbery in Range III was 30 years; the maximum sentence for the Class C felony of aggravated burglary in Range III was 15 years; and, as a career offender, he had to serve the 30 year sentence for aggravated robbery at 100%, and the 15 year sentence for aggravated burglary at 60%. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to eight years and six months for aggravated robbery because it was within the sentencing range and it properly considered defendant's criminal history. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentencing and a total effective sentence of life plus 24 years for first degree felony and premeditated murder, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm; defendant committed six distinct violations of the law and the trial court properly applied the dangerous offender category after making the necessary findings, which included in part his long history of being a drug dealer and being affiliated with a gang. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Where defendant pled guilty to two counts of robbery in case 109738 and to aggravated robbery and robbery in case 109776, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant as a Range II multiple offender to consecutive terms of eight years in case 109738 and 14 years in case 109776 because, although there was no competent evidence that there was a high risk to the life of someone other than the victim during the aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, and the trial court misapplied enhancement factor (10), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant within the appropriate range for a multiple offender convicted of Class B felony aggravated robbery and Class C felony robbery. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 840 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2018).

Trial court did not err in effectively sentencing defendant to 12 years for his aggravated assault and aggravated robbery convictions because defendant was sentenced to a within-range sentence as defendant faced a sentence of eight to 12 years for the aggravated robbery, and three to six years for the aggravated assault; the trial court properly applied enhancement factors based on defendant's prior offense of theft of property, his role as a leader in the commission of the crime, his failure to complete judicial diversion, and his status on judicial diversion at the time of the commission of the offense; and the trial court thoroughly and completely applied the statutory sentencing principles. State v. Godwin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2019).

In a case in which defendant was sentenced to 20 years for his aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the criminal history or the leader in the commission of an offense enhancement factor applied because defendant was previously convicted of 16 misdemeanors, four felonies; 11 of his prior convictions were crimes of violence, including domestic assault, assault, and aggravated assault; and the trial court determined that a top-of-range sentence was justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense and that the sentence would promote respect for the law. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2019).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant's probationary sentence because it maintained jurisdiction to correct defendant's original sentence at any time before its expiration since it was illegal; defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, and, in consequence, was ineligible for probation despite having received a sentence of 10 years or less, and he was not eligible for any form of alternative sentencing. State v. Contreras, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2019).

15.5 Guilty Pleas.

Petitioner's guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because the trial court incorrectly told petitioner three times that he was facing a 30-year sentence even though as a Range I offender he faced a potential sentence of only eight to 12 years, the trial court also misstated that aggravated robbery was a non-parolable offense, and trial counsel's assurances that petitioner would receive the maximum sentence if convicted at trial led petitioner to believe that he would be sentenced to 30 years'  incarceration without the possibility of parole if convicted of aggravated robbery at trial. Merriweather v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2019).

16. Parole Eligibility.

When a prisoner committed the crimes of murder, T.C.A. § 39-13-202, and armed robbery, T.C.A. § 39-13-402, in 1986, the prisoner knew that violations of the prison disciplinary rules could put the prisoner at risk of serving a longer period of time before becoming eligible to be considered for parole and, accordingly, neither the 1989 nor the 1996 changes in the prison's disciplinary policy deprived the prisoner of a pre-existing right or enhanced the punishment for the prisoner's 1986 crimes beyond the punishment authorized by T.C.A. § 40-35-501(h); thus, applying the 1989 and 1996 versions of prison policy to the prisoner for the disciplinary offenses of escape and assault committed in 1989 and 1997 did not run afoul of the federal or state Ex Post Facto Clauses, U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1 and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 11. Utley v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 118 S.W.3d 705, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

17. Elements.

Simple robbery, and aggravated robbery by extension, may be accomplished by either violence or putting the victim in fear. State v. Seiber, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

18. Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied as his convictions did not violate double jeopardy, and his counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that argument because defendant's conviction for attempted possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver required a finding that he attempted to possess the cocaine with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell it; and a factual finding of intent to manufacture, deliver or sell was completely absent from the crime of aggravated robbery, which required proof that the theft of the drug was accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon. Howard v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

Defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery were all based on discrete acts or involved multiple victims; therefore, they did not satisfy the threshold inquiry of the Blockburger test, and double jeopardy did not bar defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary along with his convictions for aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Because the offense of theft was wholly incorporated into the offense of aggravated robbery, the offenses were the same under Blockburger and violated principles of double jeopardy; on remand, the judgment of conviction for theft was to be merged into a single conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2018).

39-13-403. Especially aggravated robbery.

  1. Especially aggravated robbery is robbery as defined in § 39-13-401:
    1. Accomplished with a deadly weapon; and
    2. Where the victim suffers serious bodily injury.
  2. Especially aggravated robbery is a Class A felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section defines the offense of especially aggravated robbery as a robbery committed under two circumstances: (1) a deadly weapon is used and (2) the victim suffers serious bodily injury. If only one of these two circumstances is found, the offense is aggravated robbery pursuant to § 39-13-402.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

Transfer from juvenile court, § 37-1-134.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Elements.

Exceptional cruelty is not an element of especially aggravated robbery. State v. Poole, 945 S.W.2d 93, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 260 (Tenn. 1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's application of the aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) where the prosecution established that defendant was previously convicted of second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, because second degree murder requires a knowing killing of another under T.C.A. § 39-13-210, and especially aggravated robbery requires a robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon where the victim suffered serious bodily injury under T.C.A. § 39-13-403(a). State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, Ivy v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 914, 127 S. Ct. 258, 166 L. Ed. 2d 200, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6153 (2006).

In connection with defendant's charge of especially aggravated robbery, the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant took the victim's property; the State was not required to present uncontroverted or perfect proof that defendant took the victim's money, and the fact that defendant took the victim's money was a reasonable inference for the jury to draw from a witness's testimony that he saw money in the victim's hand and that the money was gone after defendant left the apartment. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

2. —Serious Bodily Injury.

Evidence that the victim of a robbery suffered a broken nose, a bruised cheekbone, and a laceration across the bridge of her nose was not sufficient proof of serious bodily injury to support a conviction of especially aggravated robbery. State v. Sims, 909 S.W.2d 46, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled, State v. Osborne, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 1999), overruled in part, State v. Osborne, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 1999), overruled, State v. Price, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1154 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 24, 1999), overruled in part, State v. Lowery, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 12, 2000).

Convictions of especially aggravated robbery, T.C.A. § 39-13-403(a)(1), (2), were vacated because there was insufficient proof that the victim's gunshot wound was a serious bodily injury; serious bodily injury was not established under T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(34)(B)-(E) because there was no evidence that the injury involved a loss of consciousness, no proof that the victim suffered extreme physical pain, and nothing supported an inference that the injury involved protracted or obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. Finally, serious bodily injury was not established under § 39-11-106(a)(34)(A) because courts had to look to the injury that occurred rather than the injury that could have occurred or the manner in which it occurred. State v. Farmer, 380 S.W.3d 96, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. Aug. 22, 2012).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery because even if the jury surmised that a co-defendant fired the fatal shot, the jury was instructed on criminal responsibility and could have determined that defendant aided the co-defendant's commission of the robbery with the intent to promote, assist, or benefit in the proceeds of the offense and defendant's flight to Alabama and resisting arrest when he was finally apprehended could be considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt. State v. Nesbit, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the element of serious bodily injury as required to establish the offense of especially aggravated robbery because as a result of the robbery, the victim suffered permanent scarring on his head and inside of his lip, and photographs of the same were admitted into evidence at trial. State v. Darvin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2019).

3. Attempt.

In order to find defendant guilty of attempted especially aggravated robbery, the state was required to prove either that: (1) The defendant attempted to commit robbery with a deadly weapon and the victim suffered serious bodily injury; or (2) The accomplice attempted to commit robbery with a deadly weapon, victim suffered serious bodily injury, and the defendant was criminally responsible. State v. Cureton, 38 S.W.3d 64, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Nov. 6, 2000).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery because even if the jury surmised that a co-defendant fired the fatal shot, the jury was instructed on criminal responsibility and could have determined that defendant aided the co-defendant's commission of the robbery with the intent to promote, assist, or benefit in the proceeds of the offense and defendant's flight to Alabama and resisting arrest when he was finally apprehended could be considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt. State v. Nesbit, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery because it showed that defendant returned to the victim's body after the shooting, stood over him, and turned out the victim's pants pocket in an attempt to take something out of that pocket. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

4. Criminally Responsible for Another.

Facts supported the conclusion that defendant acted with the intent to assist an accomplice in an attempt to rob the victim where defendant quoted the accomplice as saying, “I ought to rob the old bastard and take a whole carton of cigarettes,” defendant claimed to have waited in the car while the accomplice went back to the store, and after the accomplice returned, defendant took accomplice's ski mask to have it burned; based on this testimony, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of felony murder based on criminal responsibility. State v. Cureton, 38 S.W.3d 64, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Nov. 6, 2000).

5. Kidnapping and Robbery.

Where the victim's abduction and confinement were far from incidental to being robbed, the multiple convictions and punishments imposed for aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery did not violate defendants' right to due process and against double jeopardy. State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, Meeks v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 1168, 114 S. Ct. 1200, 127 L. Ed. 2d 548, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1998 (1994).

In a home invasion case where the defendants were also convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, defendants' separate convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping of the victim did not violate due process where the confinement of the victim was beyond that necessary to commit robbery, where it lessened the risk of defendant's detection, and where it increased the victim's risk of harm. (overruled as to application of due process test) State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, Fuller v. Tennessee, 547 U.S. 1164, 126 S. Ct. 2321, 164 L. Ed. 2d 842, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4190 (2006), overruled in part, State v. Osby, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Hulse, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2013), overruled, State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013), overruled, State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2013), overruled, State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2013), overruled in part, Fuller v. Barbee, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137295 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014).

Defendant's conviction for kidnapping was not precluded because defendant's movement of a victim and the victim's confinement was not necessary to consummate the crime of especially aggravated robbery. (overruled as to application of due process test) State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. May 7, 2008), cert. denied, Richardson v. Tennessee, 172 L. Ed. 2d 465, 129 S. Ct. 608, 555 U.S. 1036, 77 U.S.L.W. 3296, — U.S. —, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8497 (U.S. 2008), overruled in part, State v. Osby, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Hulse, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2013), overruled, State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2013), overruled, State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2013), overruled, State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2014), overruled, State v. Teats, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2014), overruled, State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2014), overruled, State v. Holman, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2014), overruled, Thorne v. Hollway, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125191 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2014), overruled, State v. Keller, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2014), overruled in part, Porter v. Johnson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45910 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 8, 2015), overruled, Porter v. Johnson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18433 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2016), overruled, Porter v. Genovese, 2017 FED App. 35P (6th Cir.), 676 Fed. Appx. 428, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 924 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2017).

6. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence that defendant, knowing that his codefendant intended to commit robbery, drove the codefendant to the place where the victim was, provided him with a gun, waited on him, and then drove him away from the scene of the crime was sufficient to find defendant guilty of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. State v. Lewis, 919 S.W.2d 62, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled, State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1998).

Defendant's conduct in approaching the victim and pointing a gun at the victim's head constituted a substantial step toward the commission of an especially aggravated robbery, during which the murder of the victim occurred; thus, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery and it was error for the trial court to merge the robbery conviction into the felony murder conviction. State v. Webster, 81 S.W.3d 244, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony murder, because it showed that defendant and his co-defendant openly discussed robbing and murdering the victims in the hours before acting on their intentions, defendants were seen later in possession of the victims' car, jewelry, clothing, and weapons, and both victims were shot to death with firearms. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 2004), writ denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Evidence that demonstrated that defendant intentionally took property belonging to the victims by using a deadly weapon and by causing serious bodily injury was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for two counts of especially aggravated robbery under T.C.A. § 39-13-403(a). State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, Davis v. Tennessee, 125 S. Ct. 1306, 161 L. Ed. 2d 123, 543 U.S. 1156, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1599 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005).

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and for the facilitation of first-degree murder were appropriate because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, in part because defendant admitted that there had been discussion among her husband and mother about killing one of the victims because she allegedly abused her children. State v. Dych, 227 S.W.3d 21, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2007).

Proof at trial showed that, inter alia: (1) Defendant needed money to avoid being evicted from his apartment; (2) Defendant lured a victim to his apartment with the promise that an accomplice would engage in sexual relations with the victim; and (3) Defendant admitted he called the victim on the night of the murder; because the jury could have found that a witness was not an accomplice to the crimes, the witness's testimony corroborated two accomplices'  testimony, and thus the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. State v. Robinson, 239 S.W.3d 211, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery because the metal flashlight as used was properly classified as a deadly weapon, and testifying co-defendant admitted that there was discussion that defendant would knock the victim out if the victim awoke. State v. Downey, 259 S.W.3d 723, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2008).

Evidence, including the tearing of the shoulder-area of the victim's shirt, supported defendant's conviction for especially aggravated robbery, as the proof supported the prosecution's theory that defendant removed the victim's backpack containing drugs after a shooting; defendant also admitted shooting the victim twice with a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol. State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 746 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2012).

Codefendant's convictions for felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery were supported by evidence that codefendant tied up the victim, took the victim's debit cards, withdrew money from an ATM using the debit cards, and that during the perpetration of the robbery, the victim was shot and killed. State v. Doss, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2014), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2014), cert. denied, Doss v. Tennessee, 192 L. Ed. 2d 169, 135 S. Ct. 2382, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3684 (U.S. 2015).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for especially aggravated robbery, as the perpetrators took one victim's car at gunpoint, forcing both victims to go with them, and items belonging to the deceased victims were later found in defendant's possession or inside his residence. State v. Davidson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015), aff'd, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery, as he used an object consistent with a hammer to cause trauma to the victim's head, and he used pantyhose to strangle her, and both items, in the manner in which they were used, were capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; the jury accepted the State's contention that defendant assaulted and killed the victim for the purpose of stealing her personal possessions, and the evidence would not be reweighed on appeal. State v. Smithson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence that defendant shot the female victim as she attempted to drive away and later told his mother he had shot a woman during an unsuccessful robbery was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery. State v. Holmes, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery because a witness testified that defendants left his house after agreeing to commit a robbery; both defendants were identified by an eyewitness as leaving the victim's apartment with him the last time he was seen alive by anyone other than defendants; the victim was shot multiple times, and his body was left in his vehicle; the bullets removed from the victim's body and shell casings found in his vehicle were fired by the type of pistol recovered from the second defendant's residence; and the jury was instructed regarding criminal responsibility and rejected the first defendant's argument that he was only present during the murder. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Since defendant conceded that he shot the victims and the jury could have inferred that he acted knowingly by firing multiple shots at the victims from relatively close range, the jury was not required to credit defendant's claim that he could not formulate the necessary mens rea, and the evidence supported defendant's convictions for second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. State v. Bonsky, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's especially aggravated robbery conviction, as the jury found the victim's injuries met at least two of the statutory factors necessary to elevate the injuries from “bodily injury” to “severe bodily injury,” as the victim's loss of vision was protracted and was a substantial impairment of a function of a bodily organ. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2016).

In a case involving two defendants, the evidence was sufficient to support both defendants'  convictions for especially aggravated robbery because the taking of property was accomplished with a deadly weapon and serious bodily injury was suffered by the victim in connection with the taking. State v. Henderson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant was the perpetrator of first-degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery where he admitted in a recorded telephone conversation that he shot the victim in the face and his codefendants'  testimony connected him to the crimes. State v. Tull-Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2016).

There was evidence showing that a robbery occurred, and therefore the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery, where the jury could have found defendant guilty based on his own conduct or that of his codefendants, as defendant admitted he shot the victim in the head, one codefendant's statements showed that defendant participated in the robbery, and the other codefendant's testimony established that defendant admitted he had shot the victim and shared in the proceeds from the robbery. State v. Tull-Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2016).

Evidence supported convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, and the employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous offense, as defendant admitted helping plan the robbery, driving the assailants to the victim's home, and that he expected to be compensated, and the jury determined the offenses against the victim's friend were a natural and probable consequence of attempting to rob the murder victim at gunpoint. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 714 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery where his girlfriend testified that on the night of the crimes, defendant went into the victims'  motel room with a gun and she heard two pops, the victims died from gunshot wounds to the head, even though one victim had a considerable amount of money earlier that evening when his body was found he had none, the girlfriend saw defendant with a cell phone after the crimes which he later disposed of, and the victim's cell phone was never found. State v. Wade, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence that a codefendant planned to rob the victim, the three defendants left a witness's apartment with handguns, and one of them shot the victim supported defendant's convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. State v. Conde-Valentino, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 753 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2016), appeal denied, State v. Conde-Valentino, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Jury could reasonably conclude that the victim actively resisted defendant's efforts to take his property prior to defendant's use of force and that the theft of the victim's car was facilitated or made less difficult by defendant's infliction of serious bodily injury upon the victim. Under these circumstances, the jury was entitled to find defendant guilty of especially aggravated robbery. State v. Rattler, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 786 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that the victim sustained serious bodily injury as an element of especially aggravated robbery. The serious bodily injury element was based on a gaping gash on the side of the victim's neck, and this injury was inarguably the result of the crime. State v. Heath, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence strongly supported defendant's convictions for the lesser included offenses of reckless endangerment and attempted especially aggravated robbery because the proof adduced at trial established that defendant accosted the victim, pointed a handgun at him, shot him once in the lower left leg, and stole his cellular telephone and cash; both the victim and a witness positively identified defendant in a photographic lineup one month after the incident. State v. Thaxton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery where defendant told a witness that he intended to rob the victim by creating a false drug deal, he and his two co-defendants discussed robbing the victim, defendant who was armed drove his co-defendants to the victim's home, he was inside the home while the victim was shot six times, a co-defendant's blood was found in the victim's home, defendant had blood on his hands when he returned to a witness's home, they discussed the division of the proceeds, and defendant told the witness not to say anything about the offense. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 908 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Evidence that defendant and others forced the victims into one victims's vehicle at gunpoint, tied their hands behind their backs, and killed them supported defendant's convictions for especially aggravated robbery. State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016), cert. denied, Davidson v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 66, 138 S. Ct. 105, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5551 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery because defendant's confession was corroborated by witnesses who said that he went to his mother's house for money and he repeated returned to the group with additional funds with which he purchased cocaine, other witnesses testified about defendant's hatred for his mother and his interest in her monetary affairs, defendant's statement included the specific method by which he killed her, with a hammer, and the police recovered a bloody hammer from the home. State v. Watts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder in the attempt to perpetrate a robbery and attempted especially aggravated robbery because there was proof defendant was present during the crime and assisted the other suspect in committing the crime. Defendant admitted to the witness that he assisted the suspect in the murder, an eyewitness identified defendant as being present in the apartment at the time of the shooting, and his fingerprint was found on a candle holder from the victim's living room that he used to light a cigarette. State v. Taliaferro, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. May 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction because the State provided adequate corroboration of the accomplice's testimony, including a witness's identification of defendant as the man in the car driven by the accomplice, defendant's shorts collected by the police were consistent with the witness's description of the suspect's clothing and they contained blood and gunshot residue, defendant admitted that he bought marijuana from the victim, and damage to the victim's home was consistent with a struggle having occurred. State v. Cosper, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017).

Evidence at defendant's trial was sufficient because, viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the State, the evidence showed defendant murdered a victim during an attempted especially aggravated robbery. State v. Greer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2017).

Defendant's actions in holding two victims at gunpoint in the front of the house and pointing a gun at a third victim while making him unplug a device before taking it were sufficient to support the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted especially aggravated robbery. State v. King, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 423 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery because the State established that defendant and her co-defendant planned to rob the victim of money and drugs, that defendant had armed herself to facilitate the robbery, and defendant shot the victim before taking his money. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of aggravated rape, facilitation of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated robbery because it showed that not only did defendants both rape the victim, they did so absent any force or coercion from the co-defendant, they joined their co-defendants in taking cell phones, TVs, and a laptop from the victims, although the co-defendant wielded a gun during the crimes it was never turned on defendants, and the co-defendant's threats of violence were directed solely at the victims. State v. Denton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence established that the witness was not an accomplice, and therefore her testimony regarding defendant's identity as the robber did not require corroboration and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery, because no evidence suggested that the witness knew defendant carried a gun or was planning a robbery when she drove the men to pick up the victim. State v. Coffee, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017).

Defendant's admission to being present at the time of the murders, that he carried the victims'  property out of their house and sold some of it, that a blood-stained knife was found in defendant's vehicle, and his boots were consistent with bloody shoe prints found at the scene was sufficient so support defendant's convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. State v. Bargery, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated robbery because he came onto the victim's porch and began hitting the victim with a metal stick with a ball on the end of it that extended; he then entered the victim's home without his permission while forcing the victim onto the living room floor; he tied the victim's wrists and legs with an electrical cord and blind cord while he kneeled on the victim's back; as a result of defendant's offenses, the victim suffered blunt force injuries, bruises, abrasions, broken ribs, internal bleeding, and eventually died from a stress heart attack; and it was within in the jury's prerogative to find that the metal stick that defendant carried was a deadly weapon. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence that defendant and codefendant ambushed the victims as they entered their home, defendant demanded money from a victim while codefendant subdue the other victims, defendant shot one victim when he attempted to fight back and later shot the other victims, and the bullets recovered from the victims were fired from a weapon that defendant sold to someone and had fired a month before the murders was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for murder, attempted murder, robbery and aggravated assault. State v. Wade, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 523 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Nov. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery because although the evidence was based almost entirely on the testimony of an accomplice in the victim's murder, the State produced sufficient corroborating evidence to fairly and legitimately connect defendant with the commission of the crime charged; the jury rejected defendant's version of events. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated robbery as the victim suffered serious bodily injury based on both an obvious disfigurement and the substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member because the victim testified that he was unable to fully perform his work duties for a year after the shooting and even needed help turning a screwdriver; he had a scar on his neck from the shooting that would continue to expand as time progressed; and he suffered a spinal fracture to his C4 vertebra. State v. Nelson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2018).

Victim's testimony that defendant held a gun to him once they were inside the vehicle until the victim disarmed defendant and threw the gun out of the car window, a video corroborating the victim's store that something was tossed out of the vehicle, and the victim's description of the gun were sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude defendant accomplished the robbery using a deadly weapon. State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery because codefendant texted defendant that the victim was at her house; codefendant identified the two men that entered her house and held her and the victim at gunpoint as defendant and an accomplice; the men demanded money from the victim; defendant commanded the accomplice to shoot the victim, and then they left; and codefendant's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by text message records; a witness's testimony that she saw a couple of figures fleeing from codefendant's house immediately after hearing gunshots; and defendant's association with the cell phone number where codefendant sent her text. State v. Lester, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery based on the theory of criminal responsibility because defendant was present inside the market two minutes before two men entered; defendant's pizza order required the victim to leave the front counter; the victim stood in the pizza preparation area when the first man shot him and when the second man jumped on the front counter and removed money from one of the cash registers; and the jury could have inferred from defendant's presence and actions at the market and from his companionship with the men before and after the offenses that defendant acted with the intent to assist in the armed robbery, resulting in the victim's death. State v. Vales, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

Proof adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain appellant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and being a felon in possession of a weapon, where multiple witnesses identified appellant as the shooter and an autopsy revealed the victim died as a result of the gunshot wound. Regarding the felon in possession of a charge, appellant stipulated that at the time of the offenses, he had been convicted of five felonies involving the use or attempted use of violence and knew it was illegal for him to own, possess or handle a firearm. State v. Harper, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2019).

Despite the inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, evidence that defendant hit the victim in the head with a gun, demanded money, shot the victim from behind in the shoulder causing the victim to be paralyzed from the waist down, and fled was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for especially aggravated robbery. State v. Conley, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of murder and especially aggravated robbery because prior to the victim's death defendant told her sister that she wanted to get a gun to rob someone, defendant called the victim's girlfriend to set up a marijuana sale, an eyewitness testified that defendant killed the victim, the victim's belongings were found in defendant's apartment, defendant confessed to the police, and she testified at trial that she killed the victim and took his belongings and money. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. July 19, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree-murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery because defendant and co-defendant engaged in a plan to rob the victim; defendant and co-defendant brutally killed the victim by bludgeoning him in the head with a hammer, stabbing him in the neck with a screwdriver, and throwing a toolbox on top of his head; and they took the victim's guns, mason jars of marijuana, gaming system, and tablet. State v. Belt, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. July 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of especially aggravated robbery because it showed that defendant and the codefendant planned and executed a robbery of the victims, one victim's pants pockets were pulled out as if someone had gone through them, two witnesses testified that the victim possessed a large amount of cash earlier in the day, defendant bragged about the crimes afterward and stated he took what the victims had because they were doing better than he was, the victims were shot with a twelve-gauge shotgun during the robbery, and they died from their injuries. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated robbery because defendant and the accomplice entered the victim's apartment in order to rob him; the accomplice pointed the gun at the victim before shooting him and taking his cell phone; and defendant was criminally responsible for the accomplice's actions as he was engaged in a criminal endeavor to rob the victim. State v. Dodson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2020).

Since the jury could have inferred based upon the size and location of the bicycles that defendant knew the bicycles were in the vehicle when he drove away in the vehicle after shooting teh driver, and that defendant crashed the vehicle and then abandoned it, there was sufficient evidence defendant obtained the bicycles with the intent to deprive the victim of them as required for a conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Fleming, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions because it showed that a co-defendant and defendant made a plan to “hit a lick” on Hispanic people, obtained a working magazine for the malfunctioning handgun, armed themselves, and asked another co-defendant to drive them around town to identify vulnerable targets. After choosing a house, the co-defendant and defendant walked back to the house, fired two shots into the air, and ordered the victims onto the ground, one of the men took a victim's wallet, and when they were surprised by the victims inside the house opening the door, the co-defendant and defendant opened fire, striking the house and four people present. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Evidence supported defendants'  convictions for especially aggravated robbery and first degree felony murder because defendant contacted codefendant from a dice game and codefendant arrived at the game afterward, codefendant approached the victim with a handgun and the intent to take money from the victim, an altercation ensued, and defendant took the handgun and fatally shot the victim multiple times. Furthermore, after the shooting, the victim's cell phone used a tower located between the scene and codefendant's home. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of especially aggravated robbery and possession of a firearm while having a prior felony conviction involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon and denied his motion to bifurcate the trial because the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity and the stipulation entered into by the parties did not describe the prior felony convictions as involving force, violence, or a deadly weapon, the trial court's jury instructions on the firearm charge were consistent with the language in the stipulation, and the trial court instructed the jury that the fact that defendant had a prior criminal conviction did not impair his presumption of innocence. State v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020).

7. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery because the victim was not questioned and did not testify relative to defendant's or the codefendant's searching her purse or attempting to take her property and the jury heard neither direct nor circumstantial evidence from which it could reasonably infer that they attempted to take property from the victim. State v. Hawthorne, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

Defendant could not be excluded as a potential minor contributor of DNA found on the handcuffs fashioned out of zip ties that were removed from the victim's wrists, and although defendant testified that he had never been inside the victim's house, that he did not kill her, and that another person gave him the victim's debit card, the jury was free to reject this; the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the identity of defendant as the perpetrator of the offenses in this case, including first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-403. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017).

Victim was shot after defendant completed the underlying theft of the victim's property, and thus the evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for especially aggravated robbery; however, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery, the first lesser-included offense that was charged to the jury, and his conviction was modified. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Defendant's trial counsel provided deficient performance by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of defendant's especially aggravated robbery conviction on the basis that the act of violence or force, which resulted in serious bodily injury to the victim and elevated the charged offense to especially aggravated robbery, occurred after the taking was complete. Boatwright v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2020).

8. Sentencing.

In sentencing the first defendant, the trial court did not err in sentencing him to life imprisonment for first degree felony murder and 25 years for especially aggravated robbery and in ordering that he should serve his sentences consecutively because the first and second defendant had planned the robbery, obtained a weapon, and gone to the apartment building where the victim lived, looking for someone to prey on; defendants shot the victim multiple times at point blank range; each defendant was a leader in the offenses; the first defendant was a dangerous offender who had little or no regard for human life and did not hesitate in committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high; and he had exhibited no remorse for his crimes. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

In sentencing the second defendant, the trial court did not err in imposing a sentence of 25 years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction because the evidence was sufficient for him to be considered a leader in the offenses; the first and second defendant discussed the robbery and dressed in appropriate clothing before shooting and killing the victim; the victim was shot multiple times as his vehicle was pulled partially off the road; and the crimes were a joint effort, meaning that each defendant could be considered a leader. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Trial court did not err in imposing a twenty-two-year sentence for defendant's especially aggravated robbery conviction because it did not wholly depart from the Sentencing Act, and it articulated other reasons consistent with the Act to support the sentence imposed. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2016).

Trial court did not err in applying the enhancement factor regarding use of a firearm because the record supported its factual determination that the factor existed, and the trial court limited its application of the factor to the aggravated burglary conviction for which use of a firearm was not an element. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2016).

Trial court did not err when it ordered the maximum sentence for defendant's aggravated robbery conviction because he conceded that the trial court properly applied two of the enhancement factors, the evidence supported the trial court's application of those factors, and the sentence was within the applicable range. State v. Watts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

Others were in the area when defendant began shooting, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement factor regarding no hesitation to commit a crime when the risk to human life was high, plus nothing established that the trial court wholly departed from the statutes in applying the various enhancement factors and within-range sentences; thus, there was no abuse of discretion in defendant's sentences of 23 years for aggravated robbery, five years for aggravated assault, and four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Steed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017).

Record supported the trial court's findings that defendant was a dangerous offender, as the offense took place during the day in a public location, and the trial court found that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to serve his sentences for especially aggravated robbery and attempted voluntary manslaughter consecutively. State v. Steed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017).

Trial court properly imposed consecutive sentencing for defendant's convictions of especially aggravated robbery and first-degree murder because defendant was a dangerous offender as the trial court described in detail the horrific injuries that the victim suffered after defendant attacked him in his own home without provocation; and consecutive sentencing was reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and the need to protect the public from defendant's future criminal conduct. State v. Belt, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. July 25, 2019).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of, inter alia, especially aggravated robbery, the trial court considered the relevant principles and sentenced defendant to a within-range sentence of eighteen years. As such, defendant was not entitled to relief. State v. Banks, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

9. Multiple Convictions for Same Act Prohibited.

Because the surviving victim's stabbing constituted the serious bodily injury elements in the especially aggravated robbery count and especially aggravated burglary count, the latter had to be reduced to aggravated burglary. State v. Tolbert, 507 S.W.3d 197, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 404 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

10. Double Jeopardy.

In denying defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, because especially aggravated robbery had to involve a theft, be accomplished with a deadly weapon, and result in serious bodily injury to the victim, but second-degree murder involved the intent to kill someone, separate convictions for especially aggravated robbery and attempted second-degree murder did not violate principles of double jeopardy, and trial counsel's failure to seek merger or appellate counsel's failure to argue such as error on appeal did not constitute deficient performance. Dickerson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2020).

39-13-404. Carjacking.

  1. “Carjacking” is the intentional or knowing taking of a motor vehicle from the possession of another by use of:
    1. A deadly weapon; or
    2. Force or intimidation.
  2. Carjacking is a Class B felony.

Acts 1995, ch. 331, § 1.

Cross-References. Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Legislative Intent.

Legislative debate occasioned during the adoption of the carjacking statute highlighted the general assembly's concern with the risks peculiar to the crime of carjacking, risks that arise even if a victim is not literally touching her car. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

General assembly recognized that: (1) A carjacking is usually committed in order to facilitate the perpetrator's flight from the scene of a prior crime; (2) The theft of the vehicle not only makes the perpetrator's escape more likely, but also puts the public at risk as the perpetrator flees; and (3) The theft of the vehicle deprives the victim of his or her freedom of movement; recognizing that these risks arise more frequently in carjackings than in simple robberies, the legislature designated all carjackings to be Class B felonies. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

2. Elements.

3. —Possession.

Defendant's conviction of carjacking was affirmed because the supreme court of Tennessee held that, although defendant accosted the victim in a retail parking lot when she was several yards away from her parked car, the victim was in actual “possession” of her car and was not too far away from it to have been in possession of it. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

To address adequately the legislature's concerns with the risks, the supreme court of Tennessee must construe “from the possession of another” to include the possessory interest retained by a victim who is, at the time of the taking, in the process of leaving or returning to the immediate vicinity of her vehicle. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

That the victim and his or her car may be separated by some distance does not lessen the threat to the victim's personal safety caused both by the perpetrator's demand and the perpetrator's subsequent taking of the car; additionally, the distance between victim and car does nothing to lessen the dangers to the public once the assailant gains possession and control of the car. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

Supreme court of Tennessee's construction of the term “possession” to include some physical distance between victim and vehicle is congruent with one of the evils at which the proscription against carjacking is aimed: the instantaneous or nearly instantaneous taking of a vehicle from another's possession so as to create the dangers inherent in a rapid getaway. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

Prosecutor's focus should be not only on the victim's physical proximity to his or her vehicle, but also on the time involved between the attack on the victim and the taking of the car; if the duration of this period can be measured in seconds rather than minutes, and if the victim, but for the force or intimidation used, would otherwise be able to return to the vehicle and resist the taking, the taking may constitute a carjacking. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

Where the victim had parked her car, retained possession of her car keys, and walked a few yards from her vehicle when she was accosted by defendant, she was thus in such physical proximity to her car at the time of the taking that she could have immediately become in, on, or adjacent to her car; pursuant to the construction of the term “possession” by the Tennessee supreme court as used in the carjacking statute, the victim was in possession of her car when defendant confronted her, knowingly obtained her keys by intimidation, and drove off in her car. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

Tennessee legislature rejected the language of the federal carjacking statute; given that the relevant language of the federal statute “from the person or presence of another” closely resembles Tennessee's robbery statute, it is significant that the Tennessee general assembly also rejected this terminology. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

Legislature chose to use different language in the carjacking statute than it used in the robbery statutes or than Congress used in the federal carjacking statute; a comparison of the differing terminology persuades the supreme court of Tennessee that the general assembly intended carjacking to include forcible takings of motor vehicles from victims even when the victim is some distance from his or her car at the time of the taking. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

If the legislature had meant to limit carjacking to the taking of a vehicle from the victim's actual possession or from the victim's immediate presence, it would have used the same terminology it used in the robbery statute; alternatively, the legislature could have written the carjacking statute to preclude the taking of a motor vehicle “from the actual possession or presence of another.” State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

General assembly chose to use less limiting language, requiring the supreme court of Tennessee to construe “possession” to include situations in which the victim is separated from her car by some distance. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

4. Lesser Included Offenses.

Trial court's failure to give lesser included instructions on robbery and theft was not plain error because robbery and theft were not lesser included offenses of carjacking; the definition of theft contained a statutory element that was not included within the statutory elements of carjacking, namely an intent to deprive another of his or her motor vehicle, and because robbery included all of the elements of theft within its statutory elements, robbery was also not a lesser included offense of carjacking. State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. 2007).

5. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's carjacking conviction because an officer testified that defendant inched up under the victim and that the victim appeared very surprised and was excited and upset; another officer testified that when defendant entered the victim's vehicle, the victim looked frantic and upset. State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. 2007).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for carjacking because the victim was able to clearly see defendant and the gun when he told the victim to get out of the car, the police found two traffic tickets issued to defendant inside the victim's car when it was recovered, and the officers who issued the tickets testified defendant was driving the car at the time he was ticketed. State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2015), aff'd, 505 S.W.3d 492, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2016).

Evidence defendant got into the male victim's car, held a gun to his head, and told him to get out of the car supported defendant's conviction for carjacking under T.C.A. § 39-13-404. State v. Holmes, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence that defendant and his co-defendant approached the victim in the driveway of his parent's home, pointed a gun at his head and ordered him to the ground, they drove away in the victim's car, they were apprehended a short distance from the victim's wrecked car, and defendant matched the victim's description of the perpetrator was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, carjacking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Perkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 892 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence that defendant was armed and ordered the third victim out of the vehicle, shot him twice when he resisted, removed him from the vehicle, and drove away supported the convictions for carjacking through the use of force and through the use of intimidation. State v. Fleming, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

6. Jury Instructions.

Supreme court of Tennessee suggests that a trial court include the following instruction in its charge to the jury in a carjacking case: “From the possession of another” means that the person from whom the motor vehicle was taken was in, on, or adjacent to the motor vehicle at the time of the taking, or was in such physical proximity to the motor vehicle at the time of the taking that he or she could have immediately become in, on, or adjacent to the motor vehicle but for the defendant's actions in accosting the person and/or taking the motor vehicle. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007).

7. Sentence.

Following a guilty plea to carjacking, the trial court did not err in ordering that defendant serve his agreed-upon sentence of eight years in confinement as defendant was not a suitable candidate for probation because defendant had an extensive juvenile record; on multiple occasions, defendant was granted alternative sentencing in juvenile court, and, on multiple occasions, he violated the conditions of release; and he engaged in criminal behavior two weeks after pleading guilty in the current case as the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that defendant had possessed a gun. State v. Brewer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016).

Part 5
Sexual Offenses

39-13-501. Definitions for §§ 39-13-501 — 39-13-511.

As used in §§ 39-13-50139-13-511, except as specifically provided in § 39-13-505, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Coercion” means threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to be performed immediately or in the future or the use of parental, custodial, or official authority over a child less than fifteen (15) years of age;
  2. “Intimate parts” includes semen, vaginal fluid, the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock or breast of a human being;
  3. “Mentally defective” means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of the person's conduct;
  4. “Mentally incapacitated” means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling the person's conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic or other substance administered to that person without the person's consent, or due to any other act committed upon that person without the person's consent;
  5. “Physically helpless” means that a person is unconscious, asleep or for any other reason physically or verbally unable to communicate unwillingness to do an act;
  6. “Sexual contact” includes the intentional touching of the victim's, the defendant's, or any other person's intimate parts, or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's, the defendant's, or any other person's intimate parts, if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification;
  7. “Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim's, the defendant's, or any other person's body, but emission of semen is not required; and
  8. “Victim” means the person alleged to have been subjected to criminal sexual conduct and includes the spouse of the defendant.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 256, § 2; 2005, ch. 456, § 1; 2013, ch. 172, § 1.

Cross-References. Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Criminal injuries compensation claim procedure for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-108.

Criminal injuries compensation for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-106.

Criminal injuries compensation fund privilege tax upon persons committing sexual offenses upon children, § 40-24-107.

Extortion, § 39-14-112.

Kidnapping, title 39, ch. 13, part 3.

Limitation of actions in prosecutions for offenses committed against children, § 40-2-101.

Mental health and intellectual and developmental disabilities, title 33.

Sexual offender registration and monitoring, title 40, ch. 39.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 30.61, 28.94.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Evidence § 154; 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, §§ 1, 3, 4; 22 Tenn. Juris., Sodomy, § 1.

Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), § 412A.2.

Law Reviews.

Constitutional Law — Campbell v. Sundquist: Tennessee's Homosexual Practices Act Violates the Right to Privacy, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 311 (1997).

Equal Protection — Validity of Gender-Specific Statutory Rape Law, 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 947.

Sex in Prison (Ronald G. Turner), 36 No. 8 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2000).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Double Jeopardy.

Attempted rape and sexual battery constituted the same offense under the double jeopardy clause where the victim's testimony that the defendant placed his hand on her inner thigh and made a statement of desire was the essential evidence used to establish both offenses, and the case involved only one victim and one discrete act of touching. State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. 1999).

Defendant's convictions of rape and attempted rape did not violate due process or double jeopardy because each count involved a different type of sexual penetration, as the victim testified that defendant forced her to perform oral sex on him, that he performed oral sex on her, and that he tried to penetrate her vaginally. State v. Batts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

2. Coercion.

Juvenile detention center guard's conduct (entering inmate's room and touching her buttocks) did not rise to the level of coercion or force as defined by statute. Halton v. Hesson, 803 F. Supp. 1272, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16010 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).

In prosecutions for rape and sexual battery, evidence that defendant threatened to tell people that victim was a homosexual if he did not cooperate was sufficient for the jury to find the element of coercion. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

Where defendant performed oral sex and anal intercourse upon 13-year-old victim without force or threat, there was no “coercion,” and a rape conviction was modified to statutory rape. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

A finding of penetration was authorized by testimony of the victim which established that defendant performed cunnilingus. State v. Hoyt, 928 S.W.2d 935, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 965 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled in part, Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. 2000).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the victim did not consent to defendant's anally penetrating him because the victim testified that defendant told him to perform various sex acts, defendant was the disciplinarian of the household, the victim testified that anal penetration did not feel right and sometimes hurt him, and a nurse testified that when she examined the victim two days after the incident she observed a three and one-half inch tear at the top of the victim's buttocks consistent with them having been forcefully jerked apart. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's rape conviction because there was no evidence of force or coercion, as the victim recanted her allegation at trial, defendant's confession included no details that could be construed as force or coercion, and the State was not permitted to use the victim's statements contained on a video recording as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt as it did not satisfy the requirements of Tenn. R. Evid. 803(26) and it did not seek the admission of the video. State v. Wyse, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2020).

3. Sexual Penetration.

Defendant was properly convicted of child rape in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-522(a), given the definition of sexual penetration in T.C.A. § 39-13-501(7); the evidence showed that: (1) The victim was 11 years old at the time of the attacks; (2) The victim testified that during the second attack, defendant raped the victim; and (3) While there were inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, the inconsistencies were not such as to create a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. 2003), dismissed, Elkins v. Sexton, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131508 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2011).

Given the overwhelming evidence against defendant and the proof of sexual penetration even assuming that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on aggravated sexual battery in connection with defendant's trial on the charges of child rape, the court concluded that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. 2003).

In a rape of a child case, the trial court properly denied defendant's lesser-included offense instruction for attempted rape, as intrusion into the victim's mouth was not required to accomplish fellatio. State v. Marcum, 109 S.W.3d 300, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. 2003).

State erred in its election of penetration by cunnilingus because the victim did not testify to penetration by cunnilingus but rather penetration by fellatio; however, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim's articulate and particularized testimony of a single act of penetration by fellatio under very specific circumstances was enough to satisfy the requirement of jury unanimity despite the State's inaccurate election. State v. Knowles, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 426 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2014), aff'd, 470 S.W.3d 416, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. July 31, 2015).

Defendant was not entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine because the inaccuracy in the State's election regarding the facts relied upon to establish the element of sexual penetration was not so significant that it probably changed the outcome of the trial; the State's election and the jury instruction identified a date and location and referenced a meaningful event in the victim's life. State v. Knowles, 470 S.W.3d 416, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. July 31, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant committed the unlawful sexual penetration of the minor victim because the victim testified that defendant sexually abused the victim and that the victim recalled one incident in which the victim was in defendant's bedroom and defendant placed defendant's penis inside of victim's “private.” The victim later noticed blood in the victim's underwear, and the victim's parent also noticed blood in the victim's underwear. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016).

Defendant claimed that the State made an improper election in the sexual battery by an authority figure count because the State alleged that he committed two discrete acts, but he was not entitled to plain error relief; the trial court properly instructed the jury that incest required sexual penetration, and that sexual battery by an authority figure required sexual contact, and the jury defendant guilty of sexual battery but not guilty of incest, and thus the jury understood the sexual act required for each crime. State v. Whitehair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, the victim's step-father, of rape and statutory rape by an authority figure as the State established the element of penetration because the victim testified that defendant's mouth was on her vagina; and cunnilingus was defined as a sex act accomplished by placing the mouth or tongue in the vagina of another where there was any intrusion, however slight. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child because, although imperfect, a partial DNA profile obtained from sperm samples which were recovered from the victim's genitalia tended to prove defendant's identity as the contributor and the victim, defendant's stepchild, testified as to sexual penetration in that defendant on different occasions touched the victim inside the slit of the victim's private part and forced the victim to perform fellatio. State v. Guevara, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 965 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated rape because the aggravated rapes occurred when defendant rubbed defendant's hand and penis against the victim's vagina and placed defendant's penis in the victim's vagina. There was no requirement that proof of an actual emission have occurred. State v. Bowles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2017).

There is no statutory requirement that penetration must be proven by forensic evidence. State v. Bowles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted rape because, although the victim said that defendant did not try to insert his penis into her vagina, she said that she thought he was going to rape her and that she kicked him off of her; and a reasonable jury could infer from the facts that defendant intended to sexually penetrate the victim and that his forcing her onto the bed, telling her to shut up, and pulling her tights and underwear down to her ankles constituted a substantial step toward accomplishing the act. State v. Durham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child because the victim's testimony, when the victim was fifteen years old, reflected that the victim provided details about the nature of the incident, the sequence of events, and the type of sexual penetration involved. The victim testified that defendant penetrated the victim's vagina with defendant's finger and that the victim was age eight or nine at the time of the incident. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for rape of a child because the testimony of the minor victim, a forensic interviewer, and a nurse examiner, as well as defendant's confession, showed that defendant went into the victim's bedroom, began touching the victim's genital area while the victim was sleeping in the victim's bed, pulled down the victim's pants and began kissing the victim's vagina, moved the victim from the bed onto the floor, and put the tip of defendant's penis into the victim's vagina. State v. Gonzales, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2018).

Sexual penetration existed because codefendant and the victim testified that they twice engaged in sexual intercourse. State v. Sherrill, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape of a child conviction; the victim testified that defendant licked her private part, and a jury could easily have inferred that the victim was referring to her vagina, and thus a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of rape of a child. State v. Zarate, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 5, 2019).

4. Sexual Contact.

Where defendant admitted rubbing the 12 year old victim's chest, kissing the victim on the mouth, rubbing the genitals against the victim, and expressly admitted having sexual fantasies about children, it could be reasonably construed that the sexual contact was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Jan. 8, 2001).

If an entire instance of sexual contact occurs quickly and virtually simultaneously, then only one offense has occurred, even if more than one touching has occurred, and the prosecution need not elect which touch it is relying upon to establish sexual contact as an element of sexual battery in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-505. State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. 2001).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, the victim's step-father, of sexual battery by an authority figure as the evidence supported the jury's finding of sexual contact because the victim testified that she awoke to find defendant on top of her; that defendant's mouth was on her vagina; and that he had her shorts and underwear pulled to the side of her vagina with his hand. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child because, although imperfect, a partial DNA profile obtained from sperm samples which were recovered from the victim's genitalia tended to prove defendant's identity as the contributor and the victim, defendant's stepchild, testified as to sexual contact in that defendant on different occasions touched the victim inside the slit of the victim's private part and forced the victim to perform fellatio. State v. Guevara, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 965 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that the victim touched defendant's erect penis while the victim was attempting to push defendant away from the victim. State v. Black, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2017).

State presented sufficient proof that defendant sexually penetrated the victim, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-501, and his convictions of rape under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522(a), 39-13-503(a)(2), were supported; the victim testified that defendant sexually penetrated her on several occasions, including when she was four years old, in kindergarten, and when she was nine or 10, 12, and a freshman in high school. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery because the minor victim testified that the victim awoke after falling asleep while watching television to find that defendant had reached under the victim's dress and touched the victim's “wrong spot,” which the victim identified as the victim's vagina, over the victim's underwear. State v. Ware, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated sexual battery convictions because the minor victim identified on diagrams of a boy and girl the body parts with which defendant inappropriately touched the victim and a DVD which was played of the forensic interview of the victim detailed the extent of defendant's sexual abuse of the victim by defendant forcing the victim to touch defendant's genitalia with the victim's hands in an up and down motion and by defendant rubbing and patting defendant's genitalia on the victim's genitalia and buttocks. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 26, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated sexual battery because, although defendant at trial denied any sort of sexual contact with the victim, the evidence in the case, including defendant's acknowledgement in an interview with a police detective of intentionally unzipped the victim's pants, established that defendant's act of touching the victim's intimate parts was intentional. Thus, no substantial right of defendant was adversely affected by the jury instruction as any error in the instruction as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Canales, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery because the testimony of the minor victim, a forensic interviewer, and a nurse examiner, as well as defendant's confession, showed that defendant went into the victim's bedroom, began touching the victim's genital area while the victim was sleeping in the victim's bed, pulled down the victim's pants and began kissing the victim's vagina, moved the victim from the bed onto the floor, and put the tip of defendant's penis into the victim's vagina. State v. Gonzales, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated sexual battery conviction because the ten-year-old victim testified to defendant's repeated acts of sexual contact by having contact with the victim's genital area. State v. Copeland, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that when the victim was six-years-old defendant pulled down the victim's shorts and underwear and licked the victim's private part with defendant's mouth and that it happened more than once during the same weekend. The victim also stated in a forensic interview that defendant took out defendant's private area and put it inside the victim's private area and used dolls to demonstrate. State v. Gleason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2020).

5. Mental Disability.

Neither an emotional problem, psychiatric counseling, nor admission to special education programs equates with being mentally defective. Proof that meets the statutory definition of mentally defective should ordinarily come from a psychologist, psychiatrist or other expert medical personnel. State v. Schaller, 975 S.W.2d 313, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1130 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape and incest convictions, under a criminal responsibility theory, because codefendant and the victim, who was mentally incapacitated by an intellectual disability to an extent that the son was incapable of consenting, testified that they twice engaged in sexual intercourse in defendant's presence at the insistence of defendant. State v. Sherrill, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2018).

6. Lesser Included Offense.

Defendant's convictions for attempted aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery did not merge where the proof in the case clearly and separately supported the convictions; nor were principles of double jeopardy and duplicity violated since the offenses required separate types of contact and proof of facts not used to prove the other. State v. Binion, 947 S.W.2d 867, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 476 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Class B misdemeanor assault is a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery. State v. Swindle, 30 S.W.3d 289, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. 2000), overruled in part, State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d 663, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. 2002).

Because the jury was charged with and rejected the intervening lesser-included offense of rape, petitioner could not show any prejudice from the failure to charge sexual battery or aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated rape; given that the proof established that the victim was sexually penetrated and sustained injuries, there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted petitioner on any lesser-included offenses, and thus he was not entitled to post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance. Medlock v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 792 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2017).

Petitioner failed to show that, but for trial counsel's deficiency, the jury would have convicted him of misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery because the State presented proof that petitioner's unlawful sexual contact with the victim was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification; the victim's mother testified that she saw petitioner rubbing the victim's vagina over her clothes and that he had an erection. Townsend v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

Trial counsel was deficient for not requesting lesser-included offenses because he testified that he was aware a written request for lesser-included offenses was required and simply filed to make such a request; petitioner failed to show that, but for trial counsel's deficiency, the jury would have convicted him of child abuse as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child because the physician who examined the victim found no signs of bleeding or bruising. Townsend v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

7. Election Required.

Defendant was not entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine because the inaccuracy in the State's election regarding the facts relied upon to establish the element of sexual penetration was not so significant that it probably changed the outcome of the trial; the State's election and the jury instruction identified a date and location and referenced a meaningful event in the victim's life. State v. Knowles, 470 S.W.3d 416, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. July 31, 2015).

8. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery against the older victim because, although the older victim did not remember the incident, the younger victim testified that defendant made her touch the older child's private area with her hand and made the older child touch her the same way. State v. Osborne, 251 S.W.3d 1, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's six convictions of rape of a child under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522(a) and 39-13-501(7) as: (1) defendant taped the less than 13-year-old victim to his bed and penetrated her vagina; (2) while on an old sofa in the victim's bedroom, defendant penetrated the victim's vagina, causing her to bleed; (3) when defendant was reading a book on her bed, defendant penetrated the victim in the anus; (4) when the victim was watching television, defendant penetrated the victim in the vagina; (5) when the victim was in her mother and defendant's bedroom looking at some of her dead grandmother's pictures, defendant again penetrated the victim's anus; and (6) when the victim was recovering from a motorcycle injury, defendant penetrated her vagina. State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated sexual battery conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a)(4) and 39-13-501(2) where: (1) defendant laid his penis on the victim's vaginal area and took photographs of it; (2) the victim testified that the position which defendant sought to emulate in these photographs was similar to a picture he had previously showed to her in a pornographic magazine; and (3) the victim was less than 13 years old when defendant took the pictures. State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

State presented sufficient proof to support the convictions for rape of a child; although the proof in this case did not include corroboration of every element of each conviction offense as to each victim, the victims'  testimony identifying specific incidents during the time period alleged by the indictment sufficiently corroborated defendant's admissions that he touched the victims and penetrated them digitally. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2012), aff'd, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014).

In an aggravated statutory rape case, no corroboration of the victim's testimony was required because she did not qualify as an accomplice as a minor could not consent to statutory rape and a victim of statutory rape could not be charged with that offense. The victim's testimony and the other evidence adduced that demonstrated multiple incidents of sexual penetration between the fourteen-year-old victim and the forty-two-year-old defendant was sufficient to establish the elements of the offense. State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Collier v. Tennessee, 188 L. Ed. 2d 128, 134 S. Ct. 1034, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 967 (U.S. 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery where it showed that he lured the victim into his bedroom, got into bed with her, placed his hand inside her pajama pants and underwear and touched the skin of her “private part,” when asked to identify where she had been touched on a diagram the victim drew an “X” over the diagram's vagina, and the parties acknowledged that the victim was less than 13 years old at the time of the offense. State v. Klein, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child where both of the victims described specific instances of sexual contact, the evidence showed that on four separate occasions defendant sexually abused one victim, he digital penetrated the victim twice, and he sexually assaulted the second victim, and the second victim's testimony established that defendant implicitly admitted to the abuse. State v. Church, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated rape because a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant attempted to penetrate the victim's vagina with his penis without her consent and caused bodily injury to the victim; defendant demanded sexual intercourse from the victim, and when she refused defendant grabbed her throat, punched her in the head, climbed on top of her, and penetrated the victim's vagina with his penis. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery where it established that while living in the mobile home defendant touched the naked victim's chest with his mouth, hand, and penis and that he touched her vagina with his tongue. State v. Pillars, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child where the victim testified that while living at the mobile home defendant touched her vagina “on the inside” with his fingers and tongue and that two separate incidents occurred at the duplex, one in which the defendant touched her vagina with his tongue, hand, and penis, and one in which the defendant forced the victim to engage in fellatio. State v. Pillars, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of attempted rape of a child because, with respect to the rape of a child counts, the victim described defendant penetrating her vagina with his penis and his fingers, and she testified that it went on for a long time and that she was raped almost every day; and, with respect to the attempted rape of a child counts, the victim described one occasion of attempted anal penetration where defendant tried to put his penis in her butt, but was unsuccessful; and both the victim and the step-brother testified that defendant tried to get the step-brother to have sex with the victim, but the step-brother freaked out when he could not get an erection and left. State v. Irwin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape where it showed that the victim was given alcohol at defendant's house and began feeling impaired, he was placed on defendant's bed, defendant penetrated the victim's anus with his finger, and the victim did not consent. State v. Berkley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of statutory rape by an authority figure and sexual battery by an authority figure where it showed that defendant engaged in unlawful sexual contact with the victim on three separate occasions when the victim was 15 years old and defendant was 31, he paid her after the incidents, and defendant was the pastor of the church the victim attended and used the church facilities for at least two of the incidents. State v. Berkley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape because the victim went to sleep at her aunt's house, after locking the back door after her uncle's visit; she was awakened in the middle of the night by defendant, who was inside the house; defendant forcibly held her down on the sofa where she lay, pinning her shoulders down by holding her leg up; he pulled the victim's pants down and then he penetrated her vagina with his penis; the victim told him no and used her leg to kick defendant in the face; defendant then kissed her and left the house; and physical evidence was not required to corroborate the victim's testimony that she was raped. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 426 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery where it showed that defendant touched his penis to the five-year-old victim's vagina, the victim's uncorroborated testimony was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, and the jury did not err by concluding that the touching could reasonably be construed as for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2016).

Evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was more than sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of rape of a child beyond a reasonable doubt because the minor inconsistencies between the victim's testimony and the testimony of other witnesses did not detract from the victim's unwavering testimony of the crime; the victim testified that defendant, who was her mother's ex-husband, licked her on her private area. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 935 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child where the victim testified that she lived in Memphis until she was 12 years old, the events in question happened when she still lived in Memphis, defendant made several sexual advances toward the victim, including asking her to put her mouth on his penis, trying to kiss her, and “rubbing on” her feet, when the victim rebuffed each advance defendant climbed on top of the victim on the couch, removed her leggings, and put his mouth against her vagina, he then took off his own pants, inserted his penis inside the victim's vagina, and “started pushing it in and out” for approximately five minutes, and after the encounter, the victim saw “white stuff” on her leggings and on defendant's shirt. State v. Benton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016).

State presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for rape because defendant, the victim's stepfather, performed oral sex on the thirteen-year-old victim; the victim's mother observed the victim lying on her back with her pants off and legs up and saw the back of defendant's head between the victim's legs with his mouth on the victim's vagina. State v. Bernal, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery based on the victim's uncorroborated testimony because defendant touched his penis to the victim's vagina for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery because defendant sexually penetrated the seven-year-old victim through fellatio and anal intercourse as the victim testified that defendant put his sexual organ in the victim's butt and in his mouth; the victim consistently reported that to his medical providers and the child advocacy center; the uncorroborated testimony of a child victim of sexual abuse was sufficient to support defendant's convictions; and questions regarding the victim's credibility and the weight and value to be given to his testimony were to be determined by the trier of fact and not the appellate court. State v. Norton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for rape of a child because the victim, defendant's minor child, described occasions when the victim was visiting with defendant, who was divorced, during which defendant, in the pretext of teaching the victim about sex, performed oral sex on the victim, placed the victim's fingers inside defendant's vagina, and on one occasion started to pull the victim's penis to press inside defendant's vagina. The jury found the victim's testimony to be credible and resolved any inconsistencies. State v. Montgomery, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 800 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 1, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted rape of a child because the victim testified that, after the victim refused defendant's requests to engage in sexual intercourse with defendant, defendant flipped the victim over onto the victim's stomach on a bed, removed the victim's pajama pants and underwear, placed Vaseline on defendant's erect penis, and repeatedly attempted to penetrate the victim with defendant's penis from behind. State v. Black, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2017).

Rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty of rape of a child because the victim testified that defendant licked her private part and did so while she was sitting on his face. State v. Farr, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was indicted for five counts of rape by force or coercion, but was convicted of only two counts of sexual battery, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of sexual battery because the victim testified that before the first instance of digital penetration of her privates she told defendant not to do it and that defendant had her wrist restrained when he went underneath her tights and shoved his fingers inside her; she testified that in the second incident defendant pushed her back down on the bed and violently shoved his hand inside her, with an angry, scowling look on his face; and a rational jury could reasonably conclude that defendant's unlawful sexual contact was accomplished with the use of force. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 3, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that, when she was nine years old, defendant touched her lower area where her underwear was; that he then removed the victim's clothing and again touched her lower area, using his hands to touch the inside and the outside of her private parts; that he then removed his own clothing and had the victim lie on the bed, where he proceeded to touch her private areas with his private areas; and her description of her lower area where her underwear was and her private parts could reasonably be construed as including her primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, or buttock. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of rape because the proof was sufficient for the jury to determine that sexual penetration was accomplished by defendant without the consent of the victim and that defendant knew or had reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent; the victim stated that it did not feel good, that she did not want it to happen, and that she asked the Defendant to stop, but he did not. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of rape because the proof was sufficient for the jury to determine that defendant used force or coercion through his parental authority to sexually penetrate the victim, his daughter after she turned thirteen years old but before she became fifteen years old; the victim stated that when she was thirteen or fourteen years of age defendant penetrated her vaginally with his penis. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child because the jury accepted the victim's testimony that defendant sexually penetrated her when she was under the age of thirteen, and it rejected defendant's testimony that the victim was over thirteen years of age when defendant had sexual intercourse with his daughter. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of rape because the proof was sufficient for the jury to determine that defendant used force or coercion through his parental authority to sexually penetrate the victim, his daughter, after she turned thirteen years old but before she became fifteen years old; the victim testified that when she was thirteen or fourteen years of age defendant penetrated her anally. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of rape because the proof was sufficient for the jury to determine that defendant used force or coercion to sexually penetrate the victim when she was thirteen or fourteen years old; the jury was free to believe the victim's testimony that defendant digitally penetrated her and then penetrated her with his fingers and penis. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to uphold the verdicts finding defendant guilty of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against the victim because there were no inconsistencies in the victim's testimony so unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt; the victim's testimony amounted to an assertion that defendant raped her on two occasions and that she then went home and recorded the assaults in a diary. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for rape of a child because the victim, who was seven at the time of the offenses, testified that on three separate occasions defendant covered her head with an orange towel and penetrated her vagina, and her testimony was corroborated in various ways by witnesses, who confirmed the configuration of defendant's homes, his ownership of an orange towel, the victim's presence in his home, and the victim's physical injury resulting from the first rape. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child because the victim testified that defendant kissed her breast, attempted to penetrate her vaginally, and penetrated her orally, she testified that there was enough light for defendant to see and that defendant would have realized that it was her and not her sister performing fellatio, and defendant acknowledged all three instances of sexual contact between himself and the victim during his interview with an investigator. State v. Langlinais, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated sexual battery convictions because the minor victim identified on diagrams of a boy and girl the body parts with which defendant inappropriately touched the victim and a DVD which was played of the forensic interview of the victim detailed the extent of defendant's sexual abuse of the victim by defendant forcing the victim to touch defendant's genitalia with the victim's hands in an up and down motion and by defendant rubbing and patting defendant's genitalia on the victim's genitalia and buttocks. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 26, 2018).

Defendant's rape conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, as the jury could have determined that defendant engaged in sexual penetration by means of cunnilingus, fellatio, and vaginal intercourse; defendant raped the minor victim almost every other night over four years, the victim specifically testified as to three instances of sexual abuse by defendant, and the jury accredited the victim's account of abuse and rejected defendant's denial of the same, as was its prerogative. Little v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Sufficient evidence existed to support defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery; defendant's placing his hands on the victim's hips and pressing himself against her was sufficient to show unlawful sexual contact, plus defendant's actions could be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, especially in light of his having an erection. State v. Nicholson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the rape of his intellectually disabled niece because the victim testified that defendant rubbed inside of her and that she told her parents that he touched her in her body; the victim stated that defendant's hand went inside her body; the victim stated that she hurt while defendant was touching her inside her body; the victim said that defendant touched the inside area around her “hole” with his hand; the entering of the vuvla or labia was sufficient for sexual penetration; and, although the victim's testimony included inconsistencies about whether sexual penetration occurred, her credibility was an issue for the jury, which credited the victim's testimony that digital penetration occurred. State v. O'Rourke, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape conviction because the victim testified that defendant forcibly held him down and raped him while the two were alone at his babysitter's house, both the victim's mother and a therapist testified that the victim revealed to them that defendant had raped him, and defendant's cellmate testified that defendant admitted to him that he had sex with a male under the age of 14 and that it occurred at the babysitter's house. State v. Moss, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of sexual battery because the victim testified that during the offenses defendant's body was on top of hers and she was unable to move. Defendant's actions of leaving to purchase a condom, forcing the victim onto the bed, holding her on the bed, and ejaculating on her provided ample evidence for the jury to have inferred that defendant's sexual contact with the victim's intimate parts was intentional and for the purpose of sexual gratification. State v. Haney, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 841 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of child rape because the victim testified that she awoke to find defendant lying on top of her and penetrating her vagina with his penis and his fingers, a witness testified that he saw defendant lying on top of the victim, that he recognized what was going on, and that defendant admitted having had sexual intercourse with the victim as well as having “fingered” her, and defendant admitted in his statements to police that he had penetrated the victim with his penis and with his fingers and that he knew at the time that she was only 12 years old. State v. Branch, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child because defendant told an officer that he had the seven-year-old victim suck his sexual organ; the victim told a nurse that defendant put his sexual organ in her mouth; and defendant's semen was found on the victim's underwear. State v. Rimmer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape because the 13-year-old victim testified that defendant pulled down her underwear, got down on his hands and knees, and licked her vagina “several” times, and the jury could have inferred that the rape occurred without the victim's consent because defendant pulled her underwear down. State v. Bardin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of sexual battery because the victim testified that defendant pulled down his pants, grabbed her hand, and put her hand on his erect penis, and it occurred without the victim's consent because defendant pulled down his pants and grabbed the victim's hand to initiate the sexual contact. State v. Bardin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than 13 years of age because the victim was three years of age; she testified that defendant kissed her private parts; she provided details about the nature of the incident, the sequence of events, and the type of action that took place; the grandmother testified that the victim told her that she and defendant were playing a game called “kissy peepee” or “kiss his peepee;” the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; and the jury was within their authority to construe defendant's touching of the victim's private parts over her clothing with his mouth as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Welch, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of statutory rape because the overwhelming evidence presented at trial showed that defendant knew the victim was a minor when he sexually penetrated her, and the jury, by its verdict, chose not to accredit defendant's testimony that the victim had lied to him about her age, as was its prerogative. State v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Reasonable jury could conclude that defendant committed rape of a child and incest because during the recorded interview, played for the jury at trial, the victim, who was defendant's son, again disclosed that defendant had forced him to lick her private parts, and the victim confirmed at trial that the statements he provided in the recorded interview were true; the victim's twin sister also testified that defendant would take the victim into a room and shut the door. State v. Ray, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child because the victim testified that when she was 12 years old and spending the night with defendant she awoke, defendant was on top of her, and his penis was in her vagina. A sexual assault nurse examiner testified that the redness she found around the victim's genital area was consistent with her disclosure and that when she touched the victim's hymen with a Q-tip she saw a small amount of blood. State v. Barnett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that when she was eight and nine years old, defendant had her touch his penis with her hand, she stated that she and defendant were sitting on his bed, defendant's pants were “down to his knees and his underwear was down and he had me touch his penis with lotion.” The victim said that the lotion came from a dresser in defendant's bedroom and that, after she touched his penis, white “stuff came out” of it. State v. Barnett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for sexual battery because defendant forced the victim to make unlawful sexual contact when he touched her hand to his genital area, and he forced such action for the purpose of sexual gratification; the trial court acted within its prerogative when it found the victim to be a more credible witness, and each element of the offense of sexual battery was, therefore, satisfied by her testimony. State v. Rodriguez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that when he was five years old defendant exposed himself and made the victim put his hands on defendant's “private part,” defendant made the victim “go up and down on [defendant's] private part,” and then “stuff came out of [defendant's] private part.” State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that when he was 11 years old he and defendant were playing video games when defendant grabbed his arm, bent him over, pulled down his pants, and “stuck his thumb in his butt.” The victim's cousin testified that she entered the living room and saw defendant trying to stick his hand into the victim's pants, she pushed defendant off the victim, and she and the victim left the apartment. State v. Golden, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape because it showed that he paid the victim $60 for vaginal sex, he penetrated her vagina with her consent but then penetrated her anus without her consent, when she protested he put his hand over her mouth, and when the victim told defendant she was going to call the police he stabbed her. State v. Gary, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated rape because the victim testified that she was forced to perform fellatio at gunpoint; an expert in forensic serology testified that degradation would result in an inability to get a full DNA profile or perhaps any profile at all, but that degradation of DNA would not change the profile itself; defendant's DNA matched the sperm in both sets of swabs taken from the victim's mouth shortly after the rape; the probability of an unrelated individual matching the DNA exceeded the world's population many times; the victim gave a detailed account of the assault; and law enforcement found physical corroboration of an assault, including stains on the victim's shirt and carpet. State v. Lindsey, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 14, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of rape by way of sexual penetration of the victim without the victim's consent because it showed that the victim awoke in her bed after consuming alcohol to find defendant undressing her, he inserted his fingers into her vagina and then his penis, the victim testified that she felt a tearing sensation in her vagina, and the physician's physical examination revealed the presence of signs of traumatic penetration. State v. Wallace, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 14, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child because the victim identified defendant as her rapist; defendant repeatedly confessed to consensual sex with the victim when she was less than 13 years old; the victim described defendant putting his penis into her vagina, resulting in two pregnancies; and the victim testified that defendant's identical twin was not staying with her family on the occasions that defendant touched her and had sex with her. State v. Brady, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of sexual battery by an authority figure because it showed that after giving the victim pills defendant tried to put the victim's mother's lacy bra on the victim and asked her to put on thong underwear, when the victim refused to wear the thong, defendant undressed her completely, and defendant then squeezed the victim's bare breasts, claiming he was checking for breast cancer. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child because, one night in September 2010, defendant pulled the victim onto his lap, pulled out his sexual organ, and asked the victim to play with it; defendant penetrated the victim's private parts with his sexual organ; and the victim was 12 years old at the time. State v. Fields, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape as defendant had parental authority over the victim as he raised the victim from the time she was three years old; the victim agreed that she was not close with her father and that she viewed defendant as a second father; defendant abused his parental authority - a position of extraordinary trust - and began to groom the victim to become a sexual partner at the age of 11, if not earlier; and defendant engaged in extreme emotional manipulation to convince the victim that she was in a healthy dating relationship, when in fact she was abused and controlled by defendant such that she felt her home to be a prison. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated sexual battery because, during the first incident, defendant held up her legs, touched her breasts below her shirt, and ejaculated; and, during the second incident, defendant held up her legs, touched her breasts above her clothes, and ejaculated. State v. Breeden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of rape of a child because, as to the first incident, defendant rubbed his sexual organ on her privates, he unsuccessfully attempted to insert his sexual organ into her privates, and she described pain every time that he tried, from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that penetration, however slight, occurred; as to the second incident, defendant rubbed his sexual organ on her privates and attempted to insert his sexual organ into her privates, and the victim described pain during the incident; and, as to the third incident, defendant pushed the victim's head down, and had her place her mouth on his sexual organ. State v. Breeden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery; while the seven-year-old victim was alone taking a bath, defendant entered the bathroom and touched her genital area, and at the time the victim's mother was out of the house and her godmother was listening to music and unable to hear activity in the bathroom. A jury could have reasonably construed the touching as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Gardner, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted rape of a child because defendant sent text messages to the nine-year-old victim asking when she wanted to have sex with him; a detective began posing as the victim; defendant messaged the victim to meet him at a specific location; when defendant arrived at the meeting location and was arrested, he had a tube of petroleum jelly, a condom, and an inflatable mattress in his car; and the State was only required to prove that defendant believed he was going to have sex with a child under the age of 13. State v. Holbrooks, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2020).

9. Instructions.

Even if the trial court erred by instructing the jury on aggravated sexual battery, any error regarding the “reckless” or “knowing” mens rea was harmless because neither the State nor defendant presented evidence that his behavior might have been done recklessly or knowingly. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 1028 (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2014), cert. denied, Clark v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2846, 192 L. Ed. 2d 882, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3937 (U.S. June 15, 2015).

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, because the jury instructions provided by the trial court were a complete and accurate statement of the law, as it followed the language of the statute defining “sexual penetration” and the pattern jury instruction on the definition of cunnilingus, and defendant's requested jury instruction was not an accurate statement of law, the trial court did not err by refusing to provide defendant's requested jury instruction. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel was properly denied because there was no reasonable probability that a jury instruction which clarified the mens rea elements of the crime of aggravated sexual battery would have resulted in acquittal on any of the offenses as the evidence established only an intentional touching, and there was no evidence that defendant's numerous sexual crimes against his daughter were committed knowingly or recklessly but not intentionally. Crim v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

10. Intimate Parts.

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated sexual battery convictions because the minor victim identified on diagrams of a boy and girl the body parts with which defendant inappropriately touched the victim and a DVD which was played of the forensic interview of the victim detailed the extent of defendant's sexual abuse of the victim by defendant forcing the victim to touch defendant's genitalia with the victim's hands in an up and down motion and by defendant rubbing and patting defendant's genitalia on the victim's genitalia and buttocks. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 26, 2018).

39-13-502. Aggravated rape.

  1. Aggravated rape is unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances:
    1. Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act and the defendant is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon;
    2. The defendant causes bodily injury to the victim;
    3. The defendant is aided or abetted by one (1) or more other persons; and
      1. Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act; or
      2. The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.
  2. Aggravated rape is a Class A felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 3; 1992, ch. 878, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Former subdivision (a)(4), concerning rape of a child less than thirteen years of age, has been moved to § 39-13-522.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 20(b) provided that the Tennessee Code commission is requested to insert a cross reference in §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-505, 39-13-506, 39-13-522, 39-14-302 and 39-14-408 to § 40-35-114 stating that the enhancement factor formerly found in each such section was moved to § 40-35-114 so that all enhancement factors are located in one (1) section.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Criminal injuries compensation claim procedure for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-108.

Criminal injuries compensation for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-106.

Criminal injuries compensation fund privilege tax upon persons committing sexual offenses upon children, § 40-24-107.

Criminal sentencing enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

HIV testing of persons convicted of violation of this section, § 39-13-521.

Limitation of actions in prosecutions for offenses committed against children, § 40-2-101.

Mental health and intellectual and developmental disabilities, title 33.

Multiple rapists, § 39-13-523.

Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

Restoration of voting rights to convicted felons, title 40, ch. 29.

Restrictions on release on parole, § 40-35-503.

Termination of parental rights for commission of aggravated rape upon child, § 37-1-147.

Transfer from juvenile court, § 37-1-134.

Written request for charge on lesser included offense, § 40-18-110.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 28.94, 27.104.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, §§  3, 42; 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, §§ 2, 4, 8, 9.

Law Reviews.

“Let’s Talk About Sexting, Baby”: A Mens Rea-Centered Approach to the Sexting Issue in Tennessee (Emily Long), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1139  (2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

The offense of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than 13 years of age was a crime in January 1993, and was punishable under T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (which at the time made reference to T.C.A. § 39-13-502), even though a 1992 amendment had amended T.C.A. § 39-13-502 to delete a subsection that prohibited unlawful sexual penetration involving a victim less than 13 years of age and had created a new Class A felony charge of rape of a child. State v. Case, 884 S.W.2d 146, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Defendant had sufficient due process notice of the age aggravating circumstance for conduct constituting aggravated sexual battery in July, 1992, even though, at that time, T.C.A. § 39-13-504 referred to the aggravating circumstances in T.C.A. § 39-13-502, which had been amended to delete the victim's age as an aggravating circumstance for rape; the amendment did not work a similar change to the aggravated sexual battery section by its reference to the aggravated rape statute. State v. Hayes, 899 S.W.2d 175, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Challenged questions and statements made by a prosecutor in a capital murder case were relevant to the proof of statutory aggravating circumstance under T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) in that it explained the weapons used by a death row inmate to commit the prior aggravated rapes under former T.C.A. § 39-2-603(a) (now T.C.A. § 39-13-502) and established that the felonies used as aggravating circumstance were, in fact, crimes of violence or involved the threat of violence; the prosecutor did not extensively refer to the facts of the underlying felonies supporting the aggravating circumstance. Nichols v. Bell, 440 F. Supp. 2d 730, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50972 (E.D. Tenn. 2006).

2. Commencement of Prosecution.

Prosecution for attempted aggravated rape was properly and timely commenced within the eight-year statute of limitations by the filing of the “John Doe” arrest warrant because The “John Doe” designation in the warrant, coupled with the detailed DNA profile of the assailant, identified defendant with “reasonable certainty” as required by the Fourth Amendment, Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7, T.C.A. § 40-6-208, and Tenn. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(1)(B). State v. Burdick, 395 S.W.3d 120, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2012).

3. Bodily Injury.

In a prosecution for aggravated rape, proof that defendant cause the victim to suffer excruciating pain, caused a bruise on her leg, broke a scab on her knee causing it to bleed, scratched her neck when he choked her, and injured her lip established “bodily injury” within the meaning of the statute. State v. McPherson, 882 S.W.2d 365, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Before an accused may be convicted of aggravated rape the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) sexually penetrated the victim, in an unlawful manner; and (2) caused bodily injury to the victim. State v. Smith, 891 S.W.2d 922, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Evidence, including the victim's testimony, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated rape because the first count of aggravated rape was accomplished through force or coercion when defendant threatened the victim at knifepoint and the second count of aggravated rape was accomplished when the victim suffered bodily injury through cuts to the hand. Furthermore, other witnesses testified as to how distraught the victim appeared, while a police officer testified to finding a knife in the bedroom where the incident occurred. State v. Bowles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2017).

4. Culpable Mental State.

In a prosecution for aggravated rape, statutory language required that “intentional,” “knowing,” or “reckless” all should have been charged to the jury as such elements related to “reckless” behavior favored the defense and did not affect the results of the trial. State v. Jones, 889 S.W.2d 225, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Oct. 10, 1994), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Proof of intent, knowledge or recklessness is required to sustain a conviction for aggravated rape. State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. 1997).

An indictment charging aggravated rape in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-502 met constitutional requirements of notice and form and was valid, even though it failed to allege a culpable mental state. State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. 1997).

5. Victim's Age.

Consent is never a defense to a sex offense when the victim is less than 13 years of age. The term “unlawful,” as used in T.C.A. § 39-13-502, does not afford the defendant any relief. State v. Jones, 889 S.W.2d 225, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Oct. 10, 1994), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In a prosecution for aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery, mere recklessness as to the age of the victim was sufficient evidence to establish defendant's guilt for either crime. State v. Parker, 887 S.W.2d 825, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

An offender who sexually abuses a child is more culpable than an offender who commits the same act against an adult, and therefore, for this greater culpability, the offender faces an increased penalty. State v. Walton, 958 S.W.2d 724, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 628 (Tenn. 1997).

6. Lesser Included Offenses.

Trial court's failure to charge jury on the lesser included offense of rape was error where the crime of rape, according to the account of victim, had been fully accomplished well before the assault. State v. Tutton, 875 S.W.2d 295, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

It was reversible error for the trial court not to charge attempted incest as a lesser included offense of incest even though the defendant did not request an instruction. State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Defendant's convictions for attempted aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery did not merge where the proof in the case clearly and separately supported the convictions; nor were principles of double jeopardy and duplicity violated since the offenses required separate types of contact and proof of facts not used to prove the other. State v. Binion, 947 S.W.2d 867, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 476 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Sexual battery is a lesser included offense of aggravated rape because the statutory scheme treats rape as a more serious, blameworthy offense than sexual battery; an intentional, knowing, or reckless unlawful sexual penetration which causes bodily injury to the victim, whether done in the pursuit of sexual gratification or not, establishes a more culpable mental state and a more physically intrusive contact (and thereby more serious harm) to the victim than an intentional touching for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. 2001), review or rehearing denied, State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Nov. 5, 2001).

Defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated rape was not barred by the statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 40-2-101(b)(1)-(2), because the John Doe arrest warrant and DNA profile commenced the prosecution against defendant in a timely fashion and tolled the statute of limitations until he was identified and apprehended; a John Doe warrant coupled with a DNA profile of an unknown suspected offender obtained before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations may validly commence a criminal prosecution and toll the statute of limitations. State v. Burdick, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 2011), aff'd, 395 S.W.3d 120, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 903 (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2012).

Since there was no evidence presented which reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser-included offenses for aggravated rape, given that the victim was clearly penetrated in both instances, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury as to such offenses. Moore v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

Because the jury was charged with and rejected the intervening lesser-included offense of rape, petitioner could not show any prejudice from the failure to charge sexual battery or aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated rape; given that the proof established that the victim was sexually penetrated and sustained injuries, there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted petitioner on any lesser-included offenses, and thus he was not entitled to post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance. Medlock v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 792 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2017).

Distinguishing element between the crimes of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery is that one requires unlawful sexual contact, while the other requires unlawful sexual penetration. Medlock v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 792 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2017).

7. Multiple Acts in Evidence.

Jury's finding of aggravated sexual battery was not an impermissible “patchwork” verdict where the evidence supported a finding of aggravated rape and the jury was instructed that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser included offense of aggravated rape. State v. Bolin, 922 S.W.2d 870, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. 1996).

8. Evidence.

Where defendant was convicted of aggravated rape of an 82-year-old victim in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-502, the trial court erred by admitting the victim's hearsay statements to police officers describing the assault; because defendant was not given a right to cross-examine the victim, his confrontation rights were violated, and thus the supreme court of Tennessee reversed his conviction. State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. Apr. 29, 2008).

Because rape was a startling event or condition for purposes of the excited utterance exception, the victim testified that she immediately ran to a witness's house and was crying and banging on the door, and the witness stated on the 911 recording that the victim was pretty messed up, and pretty upset, the victim's statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception; in addition, the witness's statements, made shortly after the victim knocked on his door and told him that she had been raped, were also admissible under the excited utterance exception as the victim's announcement of the rape was a startling event sufficient to suspend the normal, reflective thought process of the person who heard it. State v. Mervan Eyup Ibrahim, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016), appeal denied, State v. Ibrahim, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Trial court reversibly erred by admitting evidence of defendant's two other rapes and robberies during his trial for aggravated rape and robbery because the modus operandi of the offenses for which defendant was on trial was not substantially identical to the modus operandi of the prior crimes, as there was testimony that defendant appeared to be fantasizing that he was romantically involved with the prior victims while raping them, but that the instant victim testified that defendant “softened” and was not “as mean” while asking her if she wanted him to perform oral sex and that he then threatened to shoot her because she continued to cry. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2018).

Erroneous admission of two other rapes and robberies was not harmless because the evidence more probably than not affected the outcome of the trial; the evidence connecting defendant to the offenses against the victim primarily consisted of the victim's testimony, no forensic evidence tied defendant to the offenses, and the improperly admitted evidence was extremely prejudicial in that it was detailed and involved the same offenses for which defendant was on trial. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Erroneous admission of two other rapes and robberies was not harmless because the evidence more probably than not affected the outcome of the trial; the evidence connecting defendant to the offenses against the victim primarily consisted of the victim's testimony, no forensic evidence tied defendant to the offenses, and the improperly admitted evidence was extremely prejudicial in that it was detailed and involved the same offenses for which defendant was on trial. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

9. —Fresh Complaint.

Under the doctrine of “fresh complaint,” the fact a complaint was made is admissible in the state's case-in-chief to rebut the possible negative inference created by the victim's silence. Once the credibility of the victim has been attacked, the details of the complaint are admissible to show that the victim related the same story soon after the incident. State v. Kendricks, 891 S.W.2d 597, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. 1994).

10. —Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain an aggravated rape conviction where defendant unlawfully sexually penetrated the victim when defendant “stuck his penis in the victim's anus,” and the victim was being held down by another participant who was much larger than the victim. State v. Bonds, 189 S.W.3d 249, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1043 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated rape based solely on DNA evidence where the victim suffered bleeding as a result of the attack, the report of analysis showed that DNA collected from the victim's anal swabs matched that of defendant, and the probability of finding defendant's profile was at least 1 in 5 billion, 128 million. State v. Toomes, 191 S.W.3d 122, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1278 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. 2006).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under T.C.A. § 39-13-502(a)(2) as: (1) The jury credited the victim's testimony that defendant choked her, that defendant had vaginal sex with her against her will, that she told defendant to stop and that defendant was hurting her, and that she believed that defendant would kill her if she did not cooperate; and (2) Police photographs of the victim taken the day after the rape showed red marks on her neck and scratches on her face. State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 870 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2010).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted aggravated rape because defendant stated his intent to have sex with the victim, he threatened and stabbed her with a knife, he repeatedly slammed her head into the toilet, and he attempted to penetrate her with his penis. State v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated rape because a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant attempted to penetrate the victim's vagina with his penis without her consent and caused bodily injury to the victim; defendant demanded sexual intercourse from the victim, and when she refused defendant grabbed her throat, punched her in the head, climbed on top of her, and penetrated the victim's vagina with his penis. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Aggravated rape conviction was supported by testimony that defendant, holding a gun, took a victim into the bedroom and forced her to perform oral sex on a codefendant while defendant sexually penetrated her vagina from behind. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated rape, given that defendant used force when he held down the victim, his 14-year-old daughter, and placed his hand over her nose and mouth to the point that she could not breathe, and defendant used his parental authority over the victim to lure her to the storage unit and keep her there by threatening to kill himself; even though defendant did not point the gun at the victim, he used both force and coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration of the victim. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated rape as the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to establish that she felt physical pain while defendant penetrated her mouth and her anus because the victim testified that defendant smacked her two or three times while he forced his sexual organ inside her mouth, that her head hurt a little bit from being hit, and that it continued to hurt until she was able to go home and sleep; and the victim testified at trial that it hurt when defendant penetrated her anus, and that it hurt for about a week afterward, and a detective testified that the victim appeared to be in pain and was having trouble sitting when he spoke to her on the night of the rape. State v. Mervan Eyup Ibrahim, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016), appeal denied, State v. Ibrahim, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Defendant's identity was sufficiently proven where the victim's description of the assailant matched defendant's physical appearance, defendant's DNA was found on gloves discovered in the victim's car after the incident and that were not in the car before it was stolen, and officers identified defendant as the driver of a car that had crashed before the incident, near the victim's home, who fled and was not apprehended. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 2016).

Evidence, including the victim's testimony, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated rape because the first count of aggravated rape was accomplished through force or coercion when defendant threatened the victim at knifepoint and the second count of aggravated rape was accomplished when the victim suffered bodily injury through cuts to the hand. Furthermore, other witnesses testified as to how distraught the victim appeared, while a police officer testified to finding a knife in the bedroom where the incident occurred. State v. Bowles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions of aggravated rape, facilitation of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated robbery because it showed that not only did defendants both rape the victim, they did so absent any force or coercion from the co-defendant, they joined their co-defendants in taking cell phones, TVs, and a laptop from the victims, although the co-defendant wielded a gun during the crimes it was never turned on defendants, and the co-defendant's threats of violence were directed solely at the victims. State v. Denton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was the perpetrator where the victim identified defendant in both a photographic line-up following the offenses and at trial, although a portion of defendant's face was covered during the attack the victim could see his eyes, the victim said that she recognized defendant as the perpetrator by his eyes and that she was 100 percent sure he was her attacker, the victim also identified a photograph of the that he possessed during the attack, officers found the gun in defendant's apartment, and he admitted it belonged to him. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim identified defendant, officers recovered the victim's scarf from the apartment where defendant was staying and recovered a gun and a cellular phone which the victim recognized as similar to the ones possessed by defendant during the attack, and DNA consistent with the victim's DNA was found on swabs taken from defendant. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim identified defendant as the perpetrator in both a photographic line-up following the offenses and at trial; the victim stated that she recognized defendant as the perpetrator by his eyes, and she identified a photograph of the gun that defendant possessed during the attack. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated rape because it showed that defendant entered the victim's home and forced her at gunpoint into her vehicle, ordered her to take her clothes off, smothered her head with a pillow, and proceeded to vaginally penetrate her with his penis four different times before he ejaculated on her, DNA evidence supported that the Defendant's semen was found inside the victim, and defendant, who argued that the sex was consensual, was wielding a gun during the rapes. State v. Stumbo, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's rape and incest convictions, under a criminal responsibility theory, because defendant's wife, who was the mother of their teenage son, and defendant's son, who was mentally incapacitated by an intellectual disability so that the son was incapable of consenting, testified that they engaged in sexual intercourse in defendant's presence at the insistence of defendant, who threatened defendant's wife and on one occasion assaulted defendant's wife. Furthermore, defendant was aware of the intellectual disability. State v. Sherrill, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2018).

Evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated rape because the alleged victim testified that defendant forced the victim to engage in sexual intercourse in the backseat of a car while defendant held a gun to the victim's head and DNA evidence established that defendant's DNA matched a sample of the victim's vaginal swab. Furthermore, the jury rejected defendant's argument that defendant and the victim engaged in consensual sex in exchange for money. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated rape because to the extent the victim's physical helplessness was a necessary element of the underlying rape offense, a rational jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim was physically helpless when defendant sexually penetrated her; the victim testified that she “blacked out” and that when she awoke defendant was sexually penetrating her, and the jury, by its verdict, accredited her testimony. State v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Proof was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated rape based on his own act of sexually penetrating the victim because the jury accredited the victim's testimony that defendant sexually penetrated her without her consent and that defendant caused the bodily injury to the victim; photographs admitted at trial corroborated a nurse's testimony regarding the victim's injury to her vagina. State v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated rape because defendant was charged under subsection (a)(2) of the aggravated rape statute, not with aggravated rape under subsection (a)(3) of the statute; consequently, the victim's physical helplessness was not an element of the charged offense of aggravated rape. State v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for aggravated rape, as the State presented a video showing defendant squeezing the water bottle into the victim's anus and the jury resolved an question as to penetration against defendant. State v. Banks, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 181 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated rape because the victim testified that she was forced to perform fellatio at gunpoint; an expert in forensic serology testified that degradation would result in an inability to get a full DNA profile or perhaps any profile at all, but that degradation of DNA would not change the profile itself; defendant's DNA matched the sperm in both sets of swabs taken from the victim's mouth shortly after the rape; the probability of an unrelated individual matching the DNA exceeded the world's population many times; the victim gave a detailed account of the assault; and law enforcement found physical corroboration of an assault, including stains on the victim's shirt and carpet. State v. Lindsey, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 14, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated rape because the two victims each testified that defendant held them down on the bed and took turns vaginally penetrating them, physical evidence matching defendant's DNA profile and one of the victim's DNA profile was found at the scene, and each victim testified that they felt pain during the rape. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2020).

11. Sentencing.

As defendant committed the crime of rape of a child prior to the 2005 amendments to Tennessee's Sentencing Reform Act, and there was no ex post facto waiver in the record, he was subject to sentencing under the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Act in accordance with Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 542 U.S. 296, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4573, and State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 884 (Tenn. 2007). Because of the error in sentencing, his sentences had to be reduced to the presumptive term of 20 years. State v. Kelley, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2012).

Case was remanded for resentencing under T.C.A. § 40-35-202 for aggravated rape under T.C.A. § 39-13-502(a)(2) as it was plain error under T.R.A.P. 36(b) to allow a post-trial sentencing position to cure a deficient pre-trial T.C.A. § 40-35-120(i)(2) notice, which had failed to state that defendant was a repeat violent offender, or to set forth the nature of the sodomy conviction as a qualifying prior conviction and the dates of the prior period of incarceration; the severity of the sentence required a result similar to that imposed for defective notices under T.C.A. 39-13-208(c). State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 870 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2010).

In connection with his convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping, defendant did not challenge the application of three enhancement factors, and his only complaint was that the trial court discounted the mitigating factor that his conduct neither caused nor threatened serious injury; while it was arguable whether a migraine headache fit the definition of serious injury, the trial court did not err in giving no weight to this proposed mitigating factor, the sentences imposed were within the appropriate ranges, and the trial court adequately considered the purposes of sentencing. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

In connection with his convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping, partially consecutive sentencing was proper; the trial court imposed sentences it deemed justly deserved, and there was no showing of a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Consecutive service of aggravated rape sentences was amply merited because defendant had an extensive criminal history, which the trial court correctly found in the context of the length of his sentences; defendant's nine felony convictions in the case would independently qualify as an extensive criminal history, and defendant had previous convictions in three states. State v. Atha, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 588 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2020).

12. Criminal Responsibility.

Although the inmate was not the actual perpetrator for the aggravated rape of one victim, he was properly convicted on the basis of criminal responsibility, as the evidence showed that he saw the victim being forced to give codefendant oral sex. Moore v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

13. Instructions.

It was not plain error to include “recklessness” in an aggravated rape instruction because this had been held proper, so no clear rule of law was violated. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Oct. 22, 2014).

Evidence did not fairly raise an issue as to the existence of self-defense; the elements of aggravated rape were established and the offense was completed before the victim grabbed defendant's testicles, and defendant was not acting in self-defense when he engaged in what he claimed was a consensual sexual encounter with the victim. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2019).

14. “Armed With A Weapon.”

Statute does not require that a defendant employ the weapon or directly threaten the victim with the weapon; defendant had the gun in his possession, showed it to the victim, placed it in her lap so that she would know that it was real, and threatened to use the gun on himself, and thus he was clearly armed with a weapon. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence, including the victim's testimony, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated rape because the first count of aggravated rape was accomplished through force or coercion when defendant threatened the victim at knifepoint and the second count of aggravated rape was accomplished when the victim suffered bodily injury through cuts to the hand. Furthermore, other witnesses testified as to how distraught the victim appeared, while a police officer testified to finding a knife in the bedroom where the incident occurred. State v. Bowles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2017).

15. Joinder of Offenses.

It was error to dismiss an indictment because counts of sexual exploitation of a minor were not based on the same conduct and did arise from the same episode as the offenses for which defendant was tried, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault; there was no proof images shown to the victim were the images that led to the indictment for sexual exploitation, and there was no overlap in the evidence necessary to prove the other offenses and sexual exploitation. State v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

39-13-503. Rape.

  1. Rape is unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances:
    1. Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act;
    2. The sexual penetration is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent;
    3. The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless; or
    4. The sexual penetration is accomplished by fraud.
  2. Rape is a Class B felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1995, ch. 484, § 1; 1997, ch. 406, § 1; 2005, ch. 353, § 11.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 18 provided that the act shall apply to sentencing for criminal offenses committed on or after June 7, 2005. Offenses committed prior to June 7, 2005, shall be governed by prior law, which shall apply in all respects. However, for defendants who are sentenced after June 7, 2005, for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1982, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the provisions of the act by executing a waiver of such defendant's ex post facto protections. Upon executing such a waiver, all provisions of the act shall apply to the defendant.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 19 provided that that act shall have no application to sentencing for persons convicted of murder in the first degree, which shall be governed by the provisions of §§ 39-13-20239-13-208.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 20(b) provided that the Tennessee Code Commission is requested to insert a cross reference in §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-505, 39-13-506, 39-13-522, 39-14-302 and 39-14-408 to § 40-35-114 stating that the enhancement factor formerly found in each such section was moved to § 40-35-114 so that all enhancement factors are located in one (1) section.

Cross-References. Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Criminal injuries compensation claim procedure for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-108.

Criminal injuries compensation for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-106.

Criminal injuries compensation fund privilege tax upon persons committing sexual offenses upon children, § 40-24-107.

Criminal sentencing enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

HIV testing of persons convicted of violation of this section, § 39-13-521.

Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Instruction on the prevention of hate crimes and sexual offenses, § 49-7-137.

Limitation of actions in prosecutions for offenses committed against children, § 40-2-101.

Mental health and intellectual and developmental disabilities, title 33.

Multiple rapists, § 39-13-523.

Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

Transfer from juvenile court, § 37-1-134.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.94.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, §§ 2, 3, 8.

Law Reviews.

“Let’s Talk About Sexting, Baby”: A Mens Rea-Centered Approach to the Sexting Issue in Tennessee (Emily Long), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1139  (2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Due Process.

Convictions for both rape and incest arising out of the same act did not violate due process under the Tennessee or United States Constitutions because neither offense was “essentially incidental” to the other. State v. Beauregard, 32 S.W.3d 681, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. 2000).

2. Double Jeopardy.

Attempted rape and sexual battery constituted the same offense under the double jeopardy clause where the victim's testimony that the defendant placed his hand on her inner thigh and made a statement of desire was the essential evidence used to establish both offenses, and the case involved only one victim and one discrete act of touching. State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. 1999).

The statutory offenses of rape and incest have a related but separate legislative purpose and achieve contrasting policy objectives; accordingly, there is no double jeopardy impediment to convicting and sentencing a defendant for both incest and criminal sexual penetration arising out of the same act. State v. Beauregard, 32 S.W.3d 681, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. 2000).

Defendant's convictions of rape and attempted rape did not violate due process or double jeopardy because each count involved a different type of sexual penetration, as the victim testified that defendant forced her to perform oral sex on him, that he performed oral sex on her, and that he tried to penetrate her vaginally. State v. Batts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

Although defendant's convictions of attempted rape and sexual battery arose out of the same transaction, defendant's dual convictions did not violate double jeopardy because the state supreme court had already determined that sexual battery was not a lesser-included offense of attempted rape; and the elements of the offenses are not the same; thus, the trial court committed plain error by merging the convictions for attempted rape and sexual battery. State v. Durham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

3. Coercion.

In prosecutions for rape and sexual battery, evidence that defendant threatened to tell people that one of his victims was a homosexual if he did not cooperate was sufficient for the jury to find the element of coercion. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

Where defendant performed oral sex and anal intercourse upon one of his 13-year-old victims without force or threat, there was no “coercion,” and a rape conviction was modified to statutory rape. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

4. Force.

Where there was proof that defendant “held down” one of his 13-year-old victims and performed oral sex on him, the jury could have found “force” sufficient for conviction of rape. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

5. Lesser Included Offenses.

In a prosecution for rape by force or coercion, defendants could be convicted of the lesser included offense of assault where the touching of the victim, i.e., acts of sexual intercourse, was offensive but did not rise to the level of rape. State v. Buckmeir, 902 S.W.2d 418, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Since the offense of statutory rape includes an age element whereas the offense of rape does not, and the offense of rape includes the element of force whereas the offense of statutory rape does not, statutory rape was not a lesser included offense in a prosecution for rape by force or coercion. State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Statutory rape contains an age element that is not included within the statutory elements of rape; therefore, statutory rape is not a lesser included offense of rape. State v. Stokes, 24 S.W.3d 303, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 382 (Tenn. 2000).

Sexual battery cannot be a lesser included offense of attempted rape because sexual battery requires proof that the sexual contact be for the purpose of sexual gratification, an element not required to prove attempted rape, and because sexual battery does not constitute the facilitation, attempt, or solicitation of attempted rape. State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. 2001), review or rehearing denied, State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Nov. 5, 2001).

Because Class B misdemeanor assault was not a lesser-included offense of attempted rape, as assault as charged in defendant's case always involved an unlawful sexual contact whereas attempted rape did not, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on Class B misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted rape. State v. Durham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Trial court improperly merged aggravated statutory rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest into the rape convictions because each of the convictions required elements pertaining to the ages of the victim and defendant and relationship that rape did not, and they did not require proof of non-consent. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

6. Prior Violent Felony.

Habeas petitioner's prior conviction for attempted rape, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-503, § 39-12-101, qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because attempted rape fell squarely within the class of crimes that presented a serious risk of physical injury to another, as contemplated by the Act. Dawson v. United States, 702 F.3d 347, 2012 FED App. 417P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26099 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012).

7. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape and aggravated burglary because: (1) a conclusive match was made between defendant's DNA and the DNA of the victim's rapist; (2) at trial, the victim identified defendant as her attacker after providing a general description of him; and (3) an investigator officer testified about a similar description given by the victim on the morning of the attack. State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence supported defendant's rape conviction; the victim testified that defendant forced her onto the bed on her stomach, and while penetrating her, defendant forcibly held her down using his hands on the center of her back, and a doctor identified the sperm found inside the victim's anus as a match to defendant's DNA. State v. Dickerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

Evidence that defendant, who was in a romantic relationship with and lived with the victim, forced himself on the victim, penetrating her vagina with his penis, told her not to leave the room after the rape and raised his hand in a threatening manner when she tried to leave was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for rape, false imprisonment, and domestic assault. State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 389 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Jury accredited the victim's testimony, and DNA evidence proved that the defendant sexually penetrated her while she was incapacitated and, thus, he did not have her consent, such that defendant's rape conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. State v. Watts, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape where it showed that the victim was given alcohol at defendant's house and began feeling impaired, he was placed on defendant's bed, defendant penetrated the victim's anus with his finger, and the victim did not consent. State v. Berkley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape where the victim testified that he was 13 when he stayed over at defendant's house, after falling asleep he awoke to defendant fellating him, and the next morning defendant asked the victim if he had done “anything weird last night” and the victim said he had not out of fear of defendant's reaction. State v. Berkley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape because the victim went to sleep at her aunt's house, after locking the back door after her uncle's visit; she was awakened in the middle of the night by defendant, who was inside the house; defendant forcibly held her down on the sofa where she lay, pinning her shoulders down by holding her leg up; he pulled the victim's pants down and then he penetrated her vagina with his penis; the victim told him no and used her leg to kick defendant in the face; defendant then kissed her and left the house; and physical evidence was not required to corroborate the victim's testimony that she was raped. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 426 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2016).

Defendant's rape convictions were supported by the evidence, as the victim did not consent to the sexual contact and defendant knew she was mentally incapacitated or physically helpless during the attack based on her intoxication. State v. Reinsberg, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 893 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence sufficiently established that defendant used his parental authority over the victim to commit the offenses of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure because defendant, the victim's step-father, cultivated a close relationship with the victim after she moved into the home he shared with the victim's mother; he was often alone with the victim and, by his own admission, he wanted to develop a bond with the victim over their shared interest in cheerleading; and he testified that he wanted to try to control the situation a little bit and get the victim comfortable with him so that the victim would not tell her mother about the incident of his placing his mouth on the victim's vagina. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, the victim's step-father, of rape and statutory rape by an authority figure as the State established the element of penetration because the victim testified that defendant's mouth was on her vagina; and cunnilingus was defined as a sex act accomplished by placing the mouth or tongue in the vagina of another where there was any intrusion, however slight. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, sexual battery, and assault where it showed that he broke into his estranged wife's house, choked her, repeatedly threatened to kill her, coerced her into having oral sex and sexual intercourse with him multiple times, the wife had bruises and marks on her throat, a DNA swab from the victim was consistent with defendant's DNA profile, and defendant had a bite mark on his forearm, marks on his cheeks, and scrapes on his head and elbow. State v. Blanton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016).

State presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for rape because defendant, the victim's stepfather, performed oral sex on the thirteen-year-old victim; the victim's mother observed the victim lying on her back with her pants off and legs up and saw the back of defendant's head between the victim's legs with his mouth on the victim's vagina. State v. Bernal, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape and incest where the victims testified that they were defendant's biological children and they told their grandmother and the police that defendant had raped them. State v. Colwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence that defendant admitted to engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with the victim and was the only male in the house that matched the description by the victim was sufficient to support a rape conviction, where identity was the only basis on which defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 882 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape and incest because the lack of forensic medical evidence did not corroborate defendant's denial of sexual contact with the victim, the victim testified against defendant, and defendant admitted during an interview that his penis penetrated the victim's vagina. State v. Belt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape because defendant inserted his tongue into the victim's vagina and put one or two fingers into her anus, and the victim testified that she never consented to defendant's actions; the fact that the victim's testimony was refuted by defendant does not preclude a rape conviction. State v. Pompa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. July 28, 2017).

Evidence that defendant mixed rum and soda and the victim drank two cups, defendant showed the victim and his friend pornography on a television, the victim stated he did not want to try anything with defendant, defendant penetrated the victim's butt with his penis while the victim was face down, and the friend told defendant to stop, was sufficient to support the conviction for rape. State v. Thornton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2017).

State presented sufficient proof that defendant sexually penetrated the victim, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-501, and his convictions of rape under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522(a), 39-13-503(a)(2), were supported; the victim testified that defendant sexually penetrated her on several occasions, including when she was four years old, in kindergarten, and when she was nine or 10, 12, and a freshman in high school. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted rape because, although the victim said that defendant did not try to insert his penis into her vagina, she said that she thought he was going to rape her and that she kicked him off of her; and a reasonable jury could infer from the facts that defendant intended to sexually penetrate the victim and that his forcing her onto the bed, telling her to shut up, and pulling her tights and underwear down to her ankles constituted a substantial step toward accomplishing the act. State v. Durham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of rape because the proof was sufficient for the jury to determine that defendant used force or coercion through his parental authority to sexually penetrate the victim, his daughter after she turned thirteen years old but before she became fifteen years old; the victim stated that when she was thirteen or fourteen years of age defendant penetrated her vaginally with his penis. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of rape because the proof was sufficient for the jury to determine that sexual penetration was accomplished by defendant without the consent of the victim and that defendant knew or had reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent; the victim stated that it did not feel good, that she did not want it to happen, and that she asked the Defendant to stop, but he did not. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of rape because the proof was sufficient for the jury to determine that defendant used force or coercion through his parental authority to sexually penetrate the victim, his daughter, after she turned thirteen years old but before she became fifteen years old; the victim testified that when she was thirteen or fourteen years of age defendant penetrated her anally. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of rape because the proof was sufficient for the jury to determine that defendant used force or coercion to sexually penetrate the victim when she was thirteen or fourteen years old; the jury was free to believe the victim's testimony that defendant digitally penetrated her and then penetrated her with his fingers and penis. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape and theft because the victim testified that she awoke to find defendant standing at the foot of her bed, he attacked her when she reached for her cell phone, he fondled her chest and stuck his finger inside her vagina, and when he finished he took $60 from her wallet. The victim also testified that she was able to see defendant's face during the attack, and a detective testified that he saw defendant the next morning walking in the victim's neighborhood wearing clothing that matched the description of the suspect. State v. Ramey, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Defendant's conviction for rape was supported by evidence that defendant put his penis in the victim's anus. State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. Sept. 14, 2018).

Evidence that defendant sexually penetrated the victim without his consent, when the victim was unconscious and thus, physically helpless by definition, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions rape. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated statutory rape and rape because the victim attempted to resist by rolling onto her side, and she told defendant “no;” defendant sexually penetrated the victim; a medical examination showed injury to the victim's vagina; DNA testing revealed defendant's semen in her underwear; and the uncorroborated testimony of the minor victim was sufficient to sustain a conviction for forcible or coercive sex offenses such as simple rape. State v. Danoff, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the rape of his intellectually disabled niece because the victim testified that defendant rubbed inside of her and that she told her parents that he touched her in her body; the victim stated that defendant's hand went inside her body; the victim stated that she hurt while defendant was touching her inside her body; the victim said that defendant touched the inside area around her “hole” with his hand; the entering of the vuvla or labia was sufficient for sexual penetration; and, although the victim's testimony included inconsistencies about whether sexual penetration occurred, her credibility was an issue for the jury, which credited the victim's testimony that digital penetration occurred. State v. O'Rourke, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape conviction because the victim testified that defendant forcibly held him down and raped him while the two were alone at his babysitter's house, both the victim's mother and a therapist testified that the victim revealed to them that defendant had raped him, and defendant's cellmate testified that defendant admitted to him that he had sex with a male under the age of 14 and that it occurred at the babysitter's house. State v. Moss, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape and incest convictions, under a criminal responsibility theory, because defendant's wife, who was the mother of their teenage son, and defendant's son, who was mentally incapacitated by an intellectual disability to an extent that the son was incapable of consenting, testified that they twice engaged in sexual intercourse in defendant's presence at the insistence of defendant, who threatened defendant's wife and on one occasion assaulted defendant's wife. State v. Sherrill, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape because the 13-year-old victim testified that defendant pulled down her underwear, got down on his hands and knees, and licked her vagina “several” times, and the jury could have inferred that the rape occurred without the victim's consent because defendant pulled her underwear down. State v. Bardin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape conviction because it showed that after hitting and kicking the victim, stomping on her head, pointing a loaded gun at her and pulling the trigger, beating her with a belt, and making her dance while beating her with a belt, defendant came up behind the victim and penetrated her vagina with his penis, the victim testified that she did not consent to this penetration, did not know the location of the gun, and believed defendant still had access to the belt while penetrating her, and the victim said that when defendant told her to perform oral sex on him, she felt like she did not have a choice. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for rape because the proof supports the jury's finding that defendant knew the victim was physically helpless at the time that the unlawful sexual penetration occurred; a nurse testified that any individual sustaining a vaginal laceration like the victim's would withdraw from the person responsible for causing this injury, and defendant admitted that he knew the victim was very intoxicated before he had sex with her. State v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for rape because the proof presented at trial supported the jury's finding that the victim never consented to defendant's sexual penetration of her; a nurse testified that she had never seen someone with a vaginal laceration like the victim's that had been caused by consensual sex. State v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's rape conviction because the evidence showed defendant knew or had reason to know the victim did not consent and was physically helpless due to being intoxicated. State v. Lockhart, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape because it showed that he paid the victim $60 for vaginal sex, he penetrated her vagina with her consent but then penetrated her anus without her consent, when she protested he put his hand over her mouth, and when the victim told defendant she was going to call the police he stabbed her. State v. Gary, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2020).

First victim's testimony that defendant regularly checked her vagina, between the ages of ten and twelve, by using his fingers to open the labia and defendant would touch her clitoris and move his finger around the creases, and second victim's testimony that defendant touched her vagina on more than one occasion between the ages of twelve and thirteen and would spread open her labia and use his middle finger to rub her clitoris was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for two counts of rape. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2020).

Evidence that defendant, the victim's father, took the victim to a hotel and left and returned pushed the victim's face-down onto the bed and forcibly raped her, along with the fact that a rape kit revealed defendant's sperm on the victim's vaginal swabs was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape and incest. State v. Rudd, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape as defendant had parental authority over the victim as he raised the victim from the time she was three years old; the victim agreed that she was not close with her father and that she viewed defendant as a second father; defendant abused his parental authority - a position of extraordinary trust - and began to groom the victim to become a sexual partner at the age of 11, if not earlier; and defendant engaged in extreme emotional manipulation to convince the victim that she was in a healthy dating relationship, when in fact she was abused and controlled by defendant such that she felt her home to be a prison. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's rape conviction because there was no evidence of force or coercion, as the victim recanted her allegation at trial, defendant's confession included no details that could be construed as force or coercion, and the State was not permitted to use the victim's statements contained on a video recording as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt as it did not satisfy the requirements of Tenn. R. Evid. 803(26) and it did not seek the admission of the video. State v. Wyse, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2020).

Evidence that defendant, using a knife, forced the victim to perform fellatio and penetrated her vaginally, and that he threatened to kill her if she did not comply, was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Embry, 915 S.W.2d 451, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled in part, State v. Winfield, 23 S.W.3d 279, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. June 20, 2000).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape because circumstantial evidence of the victim's level of intoxication and inability to give consent was proved at trial, and a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant knew or had reason to know that the victim was too mentally incapacitated to consent to sexual penetration as one witness testified that she had to help the victim into an apartment before she passed out on the floor; and another witness testified that the victim was in a bed unconscious, and he had to carry her to his car. State v. Valentine, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 3, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of rape by way of sexual penetration of the victim without the victim's consent because it showed that the victim awoke in her bed after consuming alcohol to find defendant undressing her, he inserted his fingers into her vagina and then his penis, the victim testified that she felt a tearing sensation in her vagina, and the physician's physical examination revealed the presence of signs of traumatic penetration. State v. Wallace, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 14, 2020).

8. Sentencing.

Defendant's sentences to sixteen years in prison for his rape conviction and a concurrent term of fifteen years for his aggravated burglary conviction were imposed in compliance with the sentencing act and were in compliance with U.S. Const. amend. 6. State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. 2006).

While the trial court failed to make the requisite findings in consideration of the dangerous offender factor, only one consecutive sentencing factor needs to exist to support the imposition of consecutive sentences; testimony supported the conclusion that defendant was on probation when he committed this offense, which supported the application of consecutive sentencing factor six, plus the trial court considered the relevant principles and sentenced defendant to a within-range sentence of 10-years to be served consecutively to his prior sentences, which was not excessive. State v. Dickerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant as a Range II offender to a 15-year sentence for the rape because defendant was a multiple offender, with multiple convictions beyond those necessary to establish the appropriate range; defendant's history of criminal convictions, both felony and misdemeanor, in multiple counties, was lengthy; no evidence of mitigation was presented at the sentencing hearing; and the requirement that defendant serve 100 percent of his sentence was statutorily required. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 426 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2016).

Trial court properly considered the evidence, stated what enhancement and mitigating factors were considered, including that the victim was vulnerable due to her intoxication, plus defendant, a police officer in the area where the victim worked, abused a position of public trust, but his conduct did not cause or threaten serious bodily injury; the trial court complied with the purposes of sentencing and imposed a within range sentence, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in enhancing defendant's sentence for rape. State v. Reinsberg, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 893 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, defendant's total effective sentence of 12 years'  incarceration was not excessive because defendant had a previous history of criminal behavior, as evidenced by his admission of daily drug use both at trial and in the presentence report and by his offering perjured testimony; defendant violated a position of trust; the trial court found no mitigating factors; and the sentence was within the statutory ranges. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Sentence imposed on defendant was not excessive because the trial court properly considered the circumstances in evaluating defendant's motive for committing the offense of rape; the trial court properly applied the enhancement factor that defendant committed the offense to gratify his desire for pleasure or excitement because he waited until the other family members went to bed before carrying the victim to the living room to perform oral sex on her, his thirteen-year-old step-daughter. State v. Bernal, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by enhancing defendant's sentence where it found that he abused a position of private trust as the victims'  father, the victims were 14 and 15 at the time the abuse was reported, and one victim testified defendant made grunting noises indicating pleasure during the rape. State v. Colwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to serve his sentences for each rape conviction consecutively under T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(5) where it noted that defendant raped the victims by various methods over a prolonged period of time and that the victims were defendant's children. State v. Colwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Defendant's sentences of 20 years for rape and 10 years for incest were not excessive because he had eight prior felonies, the trial court found that he committed the offenses to gratify his desire for pleasure or excitement, there were multiple instances when he failed to comply with the conditions of release into the community, and he abused a position of private trust. State v. Belt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2017).

Trial court did not err in imposing partial consecutive sentences because defendant's convictions satisfied at least one of the categories for consecutive sentencing; defendant was convicted of four statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter, and the aggravating circumstances surrounding the convictions clearly warranted consecutive sentencing because the victim testified at length about the physical and mental damage she suffered as a result of defendant's actions. State v. Pompa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. July 28, 2017).

Record supported the maximum sentence within range for rape of a child under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, 39-13-503(a)(2), plus aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); the trial court considered all the relevant principles associated with sentencing under T.C.A. § 40-35-103, when imposing the sentences in this case. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Record supported the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms under T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(5) for rape of a child, aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, 39-13-503(a)(2), 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); defendant was convicted for two or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Defendant's within-range sentence of 10 years and six months for rape was proper, as he was not eligible for probation, the trial court considered all relevant factors, and the trial court properly applied the enhancements for abusing a position of trust, as defendant was a pastor, and the offense was committed to gratify defendant's desire for pleasure, as he orchestrated the absence of others, including his daughter, when taking the victim to an isolated area, and the only mitigating factor was the conduct did not threaten bodily injury. State v. Zeigler, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 7, 2019).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, sexual battery by an authority figure, and 11 counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, and rape, defendant's effective sentence of 52 years'  incarceration was not excessive because the trial court correctly applied the enhancement factors that defendant, the victim's stepfather, abused a position of private trust; and, although the court found that defendant's girlfriend was an emotionally troubled young lady who was taken advantage of by defendant, and that her testimony did not serve as mitigating evidence, the court did not consider her testimony against defendant as evidence supporting enhancement. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Because the defendant's sentence was 10 years or less and because rape was not listed as an offense for which probation was not available, the trial court was required to consider probation as a sentencing alternative, and its failure to do so justified a remand for a new sentencing hearing. State v. Wyse, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2020).

9. Jury Instructions.

Because the offense of rape did not specify a requisite mental state, it was not error for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could find defendant guilty if he acted recklessly in relation to the element of unlawful sexual penetration. State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 389 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, because the jury instructions provided by the trial court were a complete and accurate statement of the law, as it followed the language of the statute defining “sexual penetration” and the pattern jury instruction on the definition of cunnilingus, and defendant's requested jury instruction was not an accurate statement of law, the trial court did not err by refusing to provide defendant's requested jury instruction. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

10. Construction.

Statute criminalizes the unlawful sexual penetration of those whom a defendant knows to be mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless. Haynes v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

11. Constitutional Claims.

Petitioner has waived his argument that the statute was vague and overbroad because he failed to raise it in his petition for post-conviction relief; counsel was not ineffective for failing to receive a ruling on constitutional issues surrounding the statute and preserve the issues, as counsel raised the issue on direct appeal that the petitioner lacked knowledge of the victims'  mental impairment, plus counsel made a constitutional claim on direct appeal, and thus petitioner failed to prove that counsel performed deficiently or that any deficiency caused him prejudice. Haynes v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

12. Prejudicial Exclusion of Evidence.

Disclosure to the jury that the State's expert witness's license had been previously suspended and was in probationary status when he evaluated the victim was prejudicial to the State in this rape case, as the information bore on the expert's credibility, and the State failed to establish exclusion of the suspension; the trial court was required to weigh the probative value of the license suspension, not the precipitating acts of misconduct, against the countervailing factors identified in the rule, and erred in failing to do so. State v. Zeigler, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 7, 2019).

Excluding deficiencies in the expert's qualifications, as the trial court did here, effectively shielded the expert from the purpose of cross-examination, which was to test the reliability of an expert's opinion; a new trial was necessary because the court was unable to conclude that the error in precluding defendant from cross-examining the State's key witness did not impact the verdict in this case. State v. Zeigler, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 7, 2019).

13. Evidence Properly Excluded.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the negative test to a sexually transmitted disease performed one year after the rape because the evidence was not relevant to defendant's case as he had already admitted he had sex with the victim. State v. Valentine, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 3, 2020).

39-13-504. Aggravated sexual battery.

  1. Aggravated sexual battery is unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances:
    1. Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act and the defendant is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon;
    2. The defendant causes bodily injury to the victim;
    3. The defendant is aided or abetted by one (1) or more other persons; and
      1. Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act; or
      2. The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless; or
    4. The victim is less than thirteen (13) years of age.
  2. Aggravated sexual battery is a Class B felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1993, ch. 289, § 1.

Cross-References. Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Criminal injuries compensation claim procedure for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-108.

Criminal injuries compensation for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-106.

Criminal injuries compensation fund privilege tax upon persons committing sexual offenses upon children, § 40-24-107.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Instruction on the prevention of hate crimes and sexual offenses, § 49-7-137.

Limitation of actions in prosecutions for offenses committed against children, § 40-2-101.

Mental health and intellectual and developmental disabilities, title 33.

Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

Written request for charge on lesser included offense, § 40-18-110.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

The offense of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than 13 years of age was a crime in January 1993, and was punishable under T.C.A. § 39-13-502 (which at the time made reference to § 39-13-502), even though a 1992 amendment had amended T.C.A. § 39-13-502 to delete a subsection that prohibited unlawful sexual penetration involving a victim less than 13 years of age and had created a new Class A felony charge of rape of a child. State v. Case, 884 S.W.2d 146, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Defendant had sufficient due process notice of the age aggravating circumstance for conduct constituting aggravated sexual battery in July, 1992, even though, at that time, T.C.A. § 39-13-502 referred to the aggravating circumstances in T.C.A. § 39-13-502, which had been amended to delete the victim's age as an aggravating circumstance for rape; the amendment did not work a similar change to this section by its reference to the aggravated rape statute. State v. Hayes, 899 S.W.2d 175, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

2. Requisite Elements.

Indictment, which failed to contain element that the defendant was aided or abetted by another person, did not charge aggravated sexual battery. State v. Schaller, 975 S.W.2d 313, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1130 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

3. —Coercion.

In prosecutions for rape and sexual battery, evidence that defendant threatened to tell people that one of his victims was a homosexual if he did not cooperate was sufficient for the jury to find the element of coercion. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

4. —Intent.

In a prosecution for aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery, mere recklessness as to the age of the victim was sufficient evidence to establish defendant's guilt for either crime. State v. Parker, 887 S.W.2d 825, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Instructions that the offense of aggravated sexual battery included the mens rea element “that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly” were incorrect; this mental state applies to the element as to whether the victim was less than thirteen years of age. Under T.C.A. § 39-13-504, the act itself - i.e., the touching - must be intentional. State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), overruled, State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1998).

To establish the offense of aggravated sexual battery, the perpetrator must have acted with intent. Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. 1998), dismissed, Smith v. McAllister, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45016 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 7, 2015).

5. —Unlawful Sexual Contact.

Where defendant admitted rubbing the 12 year old victim's chest, kissing the victim on the mouth, rubbing the genitals against the victim, and expressly admitted having sexual fantasies about children, it could be reasonably construed that the sexual contact was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Jan. 8, 2001).

6. Indictment.

Where the indictment charging defendant with aggravated sexual battery alleged that he engaged in unlawful sexual contact with a child less than 13 years of age in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-504, it met the constitutional and statutory requirements of notice and form, as a culpable mental state could be logically inferred from such language. State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. 1999), overruled in part, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Presentment was not defective because it clearly referenced the correct code section for the offense of aggravated sexual battery, contained sufficient facts to provide defendant with notice of the subsection of the statute under which he was being charged, and furnished the trial court with an adequate basis for entry of a proper judgment and to protect defendant from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense; it was obvious that he was well aware of the statutory elements of the crime with which he was charged based on his defense at trial and his own testimony, in which defendant emphasized that any touching that might have occurred was not intentional. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 981 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 2017).

Indictment was not sufficient to allege aggravated child abuse as to one count because it did not allege that defendant treated the victim in such a manner as to inflict injury, which is an element of child abuse,and it was insufficient as to a second count because it failed to allege that defednatn treated the victim in such a manner as to inflict injury. State v. Sharp, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2019).

7. Election Required.

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery of his eight-year-old daughter, although the State should have been required to make a proper election of offenses and the trial court should have given a jury instruction on election of offenses, no plain error occurred in failing to make the election and give the instruction as both the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments concentrated on the offense that occurred in the living room, and not the offense that occurred in the bedroom. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 981 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 2017).

Defendant did not argue prior to appeal that the State was required to make an election, which waived the issue, but in any event, he would not be able to show that his substantial rights were violated because he elected to proceed with a bench trial and thus he could not claim that his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated. Furthermore, the State only offered proof of one rape, and no election was required, and the trial court clearly identified the factual bases for the two aggravated sexual battery convictions. State v. Haven, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020).

Although the evidence was sufficient to support two convictions for aggravated sexual battery, defendant's convictions were reversed as there was not a proper election because the prosecutor's closing argument improperly stated that defendant touched the victim's breasts above her clothes during the incident involving oral penetration, and confused the incidents in which defendant touched the victim's breasts above her clothes and under her clothes; and, although the trial court instructed the jury that defendant touched the victim's bests with his mouth, the trial evidence did not establish that defendant touched the victim's breasts with his mouth during any of the incidents. State v. Breeden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2020).

8. Election Not Required.

Defendant's contention that the State failed to make a proper election of the offenses for any of the charged offenses of three counts of attempted rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery was rejected because the victim testified about three incidents of sexual contact, she did not testify about any additional incidents, the jury verdict form stated which incidents related to which counts. State v. Mabe, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 920 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017).

Trial court did not commit plain error when it allowed the State to elect an offense at the close of its case-in-chief because the child victim could not pinpoint the date of each specific act and even changed his allegations between various interviews and his testimony at trial, and therefore the State was confined to a “wait and see” approach. State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

9. Multiple Acts in Evidence.

Jury's finding of aggravated sexual battery was not an impermissible “patchwork” verdict where the evidence supported a finding of aggravated rape and the jury was instructed that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser included offense of aggravated rape. State v. Bolin, 922 S.W.2d 870, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. 1996).

Dual conviction of a defendant for both aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child did not violate due process or double jeopardy protections. State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. 1999), overruled in part, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence that father engaged in severe child abuse because: (1) Several child witnesses stated that they observed him raping and/or sexually assaulting his daughter and one of her friends, both under the age of 13; (2) Children's testimony was corroborated by medical experts and the testimony of other professionals; (3) Children's statements were validated by numerous exhibits, photographs, magazines, videos, and “sex toys,” which the children accurately identified; (4) Father's 10-year-old son witnessed him having sex with the daughter; and (5) Father exposed the boys to his sexual abuse of at least two minor girls, to “sex toys,” to the parents'  sexual activity, and to numerous and varied pornographic materials; thus, circuit court properly found that the children were dependent and neglected because the children were severely abused, father injured or endangered the morals or health of his children or others, and father was unfit to care for them. In re H.L.F., 297 S.W.3d 223, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2009).

10. Lesser Included Offense.

In a prosecution for aggravated sexual battery, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of child abuse where the evidence showed that defendant clearly committed the charged crime. State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Defendant's convictions for attempted aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery did not merge where the proof in the case clearly and separately supported the convictions; nor were principles of double jeopardy and duplicity violated since the offenses required separate types of contact and proof of facts not used to prove the other. State v. Binion, 947 S.W.2d 867, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 476 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Class B misdemeanor assault is a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery. State v. Swindle, 30 S.W.3d 289, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. 2000), overruled in part, State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d 663, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. 2002).

Given the overwhelming evidence against defendant and the proof of sexual penetration even assuming that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on aggravated sexual battery in connection with defendant's trial on the charges of child rape, the court concluded that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. 2003).

While attempted aggravated sexual battery is a lesser included offense of rape of a child under T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101(a), (b) and 39-13-504(a)(4) and there was sufficient information to raise the issue of attempt, the lack of that instruction did not result in plain error because there was testimony by the victim that she was touched by defendant and testimony by the mother of the compromising circumstances in which she found defendant and the victim. State v. Biggs, 218 S.W.3d 643, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1167 (Tenn. 2006).

Charges of rape of a child under T.C.A. § 39-13-522 were improperly severed from charges of aggravated sexual battery of a child under thirteen years of age under T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a)(4) because the rape counts met the criteria for mandatory joinder under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(1)(A); the severance of the offenses was not necessary pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(2)(A) because that state's reasons for moving to sever the offenses were insufficient, and the state did not explain why a limiting instruction to the jury would not have preserved a fair determination of defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense. State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2007), modified, 230 S.W.3d 88, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2007).

Trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury on aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of rape of a child because it was not a lesser included offense as a result of the amendment to T.C.A. § 40-18-110, defendant had not agreed to an amended indictment, and because the evidence was insufficient to prove the lesser-included offense of child abuse under T.C.A. § 39-15-401, as there was no proof that the victim suffered actual injury from defendant touching his penis to her vagina, and therefore defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery was vacated. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2016).

Because the jury was charged with and rejected the intervening lesser-included offense of rape, petitioner could not show any prejudice from the failure to charge sexual battery or aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated rape; given that the proof established that the victim was sexually penetrated and sustained injuries, there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted petitioner on any lesser-included offenses, and thus he was not entitled to post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance. Medlock v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 792 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2017).

Distinguishing element between the crimes of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery is that one requires unlawful sexual contact, while the other requires unlawful sexual penetration. Medlock v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 792 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2017).

Because the attempt to commit a crime is a lesser-included offense of the completed crime, attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery is also a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Petitioner failed to show that, but for trial counsel's deficiency, the jury would have convicted him of misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery because the State presented proof that petitioner's unlawful sexual contact with the victim was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification; the victim's mother testified that she saw petitioner rubbing the victim's vagina over her clothes and that he had an erection. Townsend v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

11. Evidence.

Because the aggravated sexual battery convictions, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 39-2-606(a) (repealed) and 39-13-504(a), returned by the jury involved alleged instances in which the victim's accounts were completely corroborated by a sister who had shared a bed with the victim on the separate occasions, even if the prosecution erred in asking questions which led to a response that defendant had leaned over another sister for a few minutes, pursuant to former Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a) and T.R.A.P. 36(b), the error did not merit reversal of defendant's conviction based on admission of evidence in violation of Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). State v. Jordan, 116 S.W.3d 8, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

Although the testimony of the victim's brother that he followed defendant and the victim toward the bathroom after the victim told him that defendant gave her a strange vibe was potentially prejudicial, the testimony was clearly relevant to explain the circumstances surrounding the offense of aggravated sexual battery because it was offered to show that defendant and the victim were alone together in the bathroom and that the victim's brother followed them to the bathroom before the defendant shut the door; thus, the admission of that evidence did not constitute plain error. State v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, even if the statements challenged by defendant were improperly admitted, any error was harmless as none of the statements in the video recording of the victim's forensic interview were so prejudicial that they more probably than not affected the jury's decision making because, although the victim talked about other behavior by defendant, such behavior did not involve children, and the victim stated that he was unsure if the allegations involving others were true; men spending time with other men had no inherent negative sexual connotation; and the other statements by the interviewer were simply statements of empathy. State v. Alvarado, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, the victim's forensic interview was properly admitted as the statutory requirements were met because the victim testified under oath that the video was a true and correct recording of the events, and he was subjected to cross-examination by defense counsel; the forensic interviewer testified, and the trial court determined that she met the requirements of this statute; and the trial court determined that the video recording had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. State v. Alvarado, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2017).

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, defendant's request to introduce evidence of the child victim's knowledge of sexual matters was properly denied as the witnesses'  testimony was irrelevant because the sexual behavior admissible was expressly limited to the victim's sexual activity, but defendant did not introduce evidence that the victim was one of the children engaged in the act of “hunching” with his clothes down; and, while the witnesses testified that they understood “hunching” to be a sexual activity, defendant did not provide any evidence that “hunching” resembled the sexual acts the victim accused defendant of engaging in with him. State v. Norton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

12. —Sufficient.

In reviewing the factual sufficiency of defendant's aggravated sexual battery convictions, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery under the former sexual battery statute, T.C.A. § 39-2-606(a) (repealed), and the current sexual battery statute, T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a), because: (1) The father and the victim testified that the victim was under 13 years of age at the time of the sexual offense as required by T.C.A. §§ 39-2-603(a)(4) (repealed) and 39-13-502(a)(4); (2) The victim testified as to defendant's actions and the incident which met the definition of sexual contact with the victim's intimate parts as required by T.C.A. § 39-2-602 (repealed) and T.C.A. § 39-13-501; and (3) Defendant's sister testified regarding the incident. State v. Jordan, 116 S.W.3d 8, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery against the older victim because, although the older victim did not remember the incident, the younger victim testified that defendant made her touch the older child's private area with her hand and made the older child touch her the same way. State v. Osborne, 251 S.W.3d 1, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008).

One count against defendant alleged that he rubbed his privates over a minor victim's privates while she was on the couch in the living room of defendant's apartment, but at trial the victim only stated that defendant rubbed his privates on her privates in the living room but did not state that the incident occurred on the couch; however, the victim testified as to only one incident involving defendant rubbing her privates with his privates and the location of the incident occurred in the living room and therefore the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery. State v. Osborne, 251 S.W.3d 1, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008).

State presented sufficient proof to support the convictions for rape of a child; although the proof in this case did not include corroboration of every element of each conviction offense as to each victim, the victims'  testimony identifying specific incidents during the time period alleged by the indictment sufficiently corroborated defendant's admissions that he touched the victims and penetrated them digitally. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2012), aff'd, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated sexual battery conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a)(4) and 39-13-501(2) where: (1) defendant laid his penis on the victim's vaginal area and took photographs of it; (2) the victim testified that the position which defendant sought to emulate in these photographs was similar to a picture he had previously showed to her in a pornographic magazine; and (3) the victim was less than 13 years old when defendant took the pictures. State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

Defendant's daughters testimony adequately corroborated defendant's incriminating statements to his wife and based on defendant's admissions the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery as their testimony provided prima facie evidence that a sex crime had occurred and their testimony provided substantial independent evidence that defendant's confession was trustworthy. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 1028 (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2014), cert. denied, Clark v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2846, 192 L. Ed. 2d 882, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3937 (U.S. June 15, 2015).

Evidence that the victim was found with her shirt ripped open, her bra rolled down to her waist, her chest exposed, her underwear rolled above her pants line, and her shorts puller higher than her waist, and that a condom was found in the area near the victim's body, which had signs of sexual trauma, was sufficient to establish aggravated sexual battery. State v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2014), aff'd, 512 S.W.3d 167, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), aff'd, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 1087 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery because the corpus delicti rule did not apply where defendant testified at trial and adopted his extrajudicial statement and the trustworthiness of defendant's extrajudicial statement—that he touched the clothing covering a seven-year-old child's vagina—was sufficiently corroborated by his own testimony and by that of the prosecution witnesses. State v. Frausto, 463 S.W.3d 469, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Apr. 1, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery because the murder victim, whose shirt was open and with the victim's bra pulled down around to the victim's waist, had bruises to the victim's inner thighs. Furthermore, a handgun replica, which defendant could have used as a means of force or coercion, and a condom containing defendant's semen was found at the assault location. State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Bell v. Tennessee, 195 L. Ed. 2d 221, 136 S. Ct. 2006, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3192 (U.S. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery because defendant sexually penetrated the seven-year-old victim's vagina with his penis, his finger, and his tongue; he kissed the victim's bare chest; the victim's testimony surrounding the events was very detailed and was in line with the description of the abuse the victim provided to a forensic social worker; and, although a nurse practitioner found no evidence of injury during her physical examination of the victim, she testified that such results were typical due, in part, to the elasticity of the vaginal tissue. State v. Dickerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2016).

Defendant conceded that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest, and the victim provided detailed testimony about all three of the offenses for which the State elected to prosecute, and her account of what transpired proved all elements of each offense. State v. Pilate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child where both of the victims described specific instances of sexual contact, the evidence showed that on four separate occasions defendant sexually abused one victim, he digital penetrated the victim twice, and he sexually assaulted the second victim, and the second victim's testimony established that defendant implicitly admitted to the abuse. State v. Church, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Victim's testimony that defendant touched her vaginal area and evidence the victim relayed the same information to an investigator and defendant instructed the victim not to tell was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated sexual battery conviction. State v. Horn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of incest, aggravated sexual battery, attempted rape, and sexual battery by an authority figure; the victim testified about the sexual abuse that occurred for years, and witness testimony corroborated events that gave credence to the victim's claims, and credibility was for the jury to determine. State v. Whitehair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery where it established that while living in the mobile home defendant touched the naked victim's chest with his mouth, hand, and penis and that he touched her vagina with his tongue. State v. Pillars, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery because the 12-year-old victim's testimony established that defendant was alone with her in the bathroom where he used both hands to squeeze her breasts, hugged her, grabbed her buttocks, and made a grunting sound; defendant denied the accusations and, on appeal, challenged the credibility of the victim and her brother, but the credibility of the witnesses was a question for the jury; and no corroboration of the victim's testimony was required. State v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery where it showed that defendant touched his penis to the five-year-old victim's vagina, the victim's uncorroborated testimony was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, and the jury did not err by concluding that the touching could reasonably be construed as for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child because, although imperfect, a partial DNA profile obtained from sperm samples which were recovered from the victim's genitalia tended to prove defendant's identity as the contributor and the victim, defendant's stepchild, testified that defendant on different occasions touched the victim inside the slit of the victim's private part and forced the victim to perform fellatio. State v. Guevara, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 965 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery because (1) the victim testified defendant touched the victim and inserted defendant's hand in the victim's vagina and, on another day, penetrated the victim's mouth with defendant's penis and ejaculated, (2) no corroboration of the victim's testimony was required, and (3) a jury was made aware of any inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, which were not so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. State v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery based on the victim's uncorroborated testimony because defendant touched his penis to the victim's vagina for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Criminal court properly convicted defendant of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery because, although the victim could not recall the details of the first incident during his trial testimony, the forensic interview, admitted as substantive evidence, reflected that the victim provided details about the nature of the incident, the sequence of events, the type of sexual contact, and where his mother and sisters were at the time, the credibility of the witnesses and any inconsistencies in the testimony were resolved by the jury, and the evidence regarding the first incident was sufficient to support the State's election of the offense. State v. Bostick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery because defendant sexually penetrated the seven-year-old victim through fellatio and anal intercourse as the victim testified that defendant put his sexual organ in the victim's butt and in his mouth; the victim consistently reported that to his medical providers and the child advocacy center; the uncorroborated testimony of a child victim of sexual abuse was sufficient to support defendant's convictions; and questions regarding the victim's credibility and the weight and value to be given to his testimony were to be determined by the trier of fact and not the appellate court. State v. Norton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery because it showed that the victim was six years old at the time of the abuse, testimony showed that defendant digitally penetrated the victim, and the abuse occurred in December. State v. Klein, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that the victim touched defendant's erect penis while the victim was attempting to push defendant away from the victim. State v. Black, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of three counts of attempted rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that on one occasion defendant touched her genitals and buttocks and penetrated her, and on a second occasion he touched her genitals. State v. Mabe, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 920 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery of his eight-year-old daughter because the physician who examined the victim at the hospital found her to be consistent in her account that defendant had pulled her pants down and tickled her private; the story the victim provided to the physician was also consistent with the story she told her mother and with the straightforward account she provided of the incident during her trial testimony; and, in contrast, defendant provided varying versions of the episode in his conversations with his co-workers, to a detective during his interview, and during his trial testimony. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 981 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified, when the victim was fifteen years-old, that the victim recalled when defendant touched the victim's vagina over the victim's clothes when the victim was eight or nine years old. Defendant's touching the victim's vagina over the victim's clothes could have been reasonably construed by the jury as having been for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that, when she was nine years old, defendant touched her lower area where her underwear was; that he then removed the victim's clothing and again touched her lower area, using his hands to touch the inside and the outside of her private parts; that he then removed his own clothing and had the victim lie on the bed, where he proceeded to touch her private areas with his private areas; and her description of her lower area where her underwear was and her private parts could reasonably be construed as including her primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, or buttock. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery because the minor victim, who was ten years old at the time of the alleged incident, testified that the victim awoke after falling asleep while watching television to find that defendant, who with defendant's paramour was sharing a house with the victim, the victim's parent, and the victim's grandparent, had reached under the victim's dress and touched the victim's “wrong spot,” which the victim identified as the victim's vagina, over the victim's underwear. State v. Ware, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to uphold the verdicts finding defendant guilty of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against the victim because there were no inconsistencies in the victim's testimony so unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt; the victim's testimony amounted to an assertion that defendant raped her on two occasions and that she then went home and recorded the assaults in a diary. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery was supported by evidence that, when the victim was six years old, defendant unbuckled his pants, took her hand, and shoved her arm down the front of his pants inside his clothing so that her hand touched his bare skin on what the victim thought was defendant's inner thigh but could have been defendant's penis. State v. Gossett, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery was supported by the victim's testimony defendant gave her “special hugs” during which he grabbed her buttocks and pulled her against his body with no space between them State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. Sept. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated sexual battery based on the allegations that he touched the victim's intimate parts with his hand and that he penetrated the victim's anus with his penis because the jury could have inferred that he intended to sexually touch the victim as the victim stated that he showed her explicit photographs of minors; the jury could have inferred that defendant intended to sexually touch the victim as the victim stated that he touched her intimate areas multiple times; the testimony of a minor victim alone was sufficient to uphold a conviction; and the jury impliedly credited the victim's statements that defendant intentionally made sexual contact with her intimate areas. State v. Freels, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 520 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2018).

Evidence that defendant stood behind the victim while she made a sandwich and touched her front and back private areas, later pushed her into her mother's bedroom and kissed and sucked on her neck, causing hickies, and pulled down her pants and underwear and touched her front private part, and a swab from the victim's neck tested positive for defendant's saliva was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for child abuse and aggravated sexual battery. State v. Ortiz, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 6, 2018).

Sufficient evidence existed to support defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery; defendant's placing his hands on the victim's hips and pressing himself against her was sufficient to show unlawful sexual contact, plus defendant's actions could be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, especially in light of his having an erection. State v. Nicholson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest because the 11-year-old victim testified that she was forced to perform fellatio on defendant, her grandfather; she recalled the abuse in detail, was unequivocal in her testimony, and identified a unique birthmark on defendant's upper thigh; and the inconsistencies pointed to by defendant involved the victim's terminology of sexually explicit terms, and were in no way material to the elements of the offense. State v. Harrah, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than 13 years of age because the victim was three years of age; she testified that defendant kissed her private parts; she provided details about the nature of the incident, the sequence of events, and the type of action that took place; the grandmother testified that the victim told her that she and defendant were playing a game called “kissy peepee” or “kiss his peepee;” the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; and the jury was within their authority to construe defendant's touching of the victim's private parts over her clothing with his mouth as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Welch, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Evidence that defendant shaved a child's vaginal area while her legs were open and touched the inside of her vaginal area with his finger was sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. State v. Sharp, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of rape and four counts of aggravated sexual battery; the victim testified to the acts of abuse by defendant over the course of several days, and despite his argument to the contrary, it was within the jury's province to accredit the victim's testimony and convict him upon that proof. State v. Lancaster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated sexual battery and solicitation of a minor convictions because defendant (1) told the victim what sex felt like and how to enhance oral sex, and (2) exposed his penis to the victim and asked the victim to touch it. State v. Todd, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated sexual battery, incest, and rape of a child because the victim testified that defendant, her father, kissed and touched her vagina and breasts, put his penis in her mouth, licked her vagina, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. State v. Cooper, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that when she was eight and nine years old, defendant had her touch his penis with her hand, she stated that she and defendant were sitting on his bed, defendant's pants were “down to his knees and his underwear was down and he had me touch his penis with lotion. The victim said that the lotion came from a dresser in defendant's bedroom and that, after she touched his penis, “white stuff came out” of it. State v. Barnett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and misdemeanor child abuse; the victim, who was four years old at the time of the offenses, was consistent in her statements that defendant placed his penis in her mouth and anus and that he made her wrap her hands around his penis and move it up and down, and the victim's trial testimony was also consistent with what she told the forensic interviewer. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that when he was five years old defendant exposed himself and made the victim put his hands on defendant's “private part,” defendant made the victim “go up and down on defendant's private part,” and then “stuff came out of defendant's private part. State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that when he was 11 years old he and defendant were playing video games when defendant grabbed his arm, bent him over, pulled down his pants, and “stuck his thumb in his butt.” The victim's cousin testified that she entered the living room and saw defendant trying to stick his hand into the victim's pants, she pushed defendant off the victim, and she and the victim left the apartment. State v. Golden, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated sexual battery conviction because the ten-year-old victim testified to defendant's repeated acts of sexual contact by having contact with the victim's genital area. State v. Copeland, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that when the victim was six-years-old defendant pulled down the victim's shorts and underwear and licked the victim's private part with defendant's mouth and that it happened more than once during the same weekend. The victim also stated in a forensic interview that defendant took out defendant's private area and put it inside the victim's private area and used dolls to demonstrate. State v. Gleason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2020).

Evidence that defendant masturbated the victim and yanked on his penis was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery. State v. Ledbetter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

Although the victim testified she touched defendant's penis because he kept pushing toward her, which could have allowed for a finding that the touching was accidental, a reasonable jury could have found that the touching was intentional and for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification from defendant's perspective and thus, sufficient to show sexual contact as required to prove aggravated sexual battery. Black v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2020).

Testimony from the eleven-year-old victim that defendant squeezed her butt when she was in the bathroom and from the ten-year-old victim that defendant rubbed up against her butt with his hand, tried to kiss her, and tried to make her suck his “middle part” was sufficient to support each conviction of aggravated sexual battery. State v. Brittenum, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2020).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual battery were supported by evidence that defendant touched both victims'  breasts and second victim's vagina, and kissed both victims inappropriately on the mouth. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2020).

Convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery were supported by evidence that, during a hide-and-seek game, the victim hid under covers with defendant and defendant inserted his finger into her vagina and wiggled it around inside her vagina and that it felt uncomfortable and the victim's cousin discovered the victim and defendant under the covers and saw defendant's penis outside his pants. On another occasion defendant made her get on top of him on her own father's bed, wrapped his arms around her and moved her up and down on his penis for what seemed like a long time. State v. Roby, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery; both stepchildren testified that defendant sexually assaulted them, inconsistencies in their testimony were not so improbable or unsatisfactory as to have created reasonable doubt as a matter of law, and their testimony did not have to be corroborated by medical testimony. State v. Haven, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated sexual battery because the victim stated that the shower game and the kissing occurred before she turned 13; and, although the victim stated that she was 12 or 13 when the kissing and sexual touching began, relative to the incident elected for Count 1, the victim specifically stated that it happened when she was in sixth grade, meaning that she was between 11 and 12 years old. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child were supported by sufficient evidence, including evidence that defendant began sexually abusing the victim when she was six or seven, continued the abuse of some years, the abuse included instances where defendant penetrated the victim vaginally and forced her to perform fellatio, and the victim suffered from chlamydia and a torn hymen. State v. Terrell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated sexual battery because, during the first incident, defendant held up her legs, touched her breasts below her shirt, and ejaculated; and, during the second incident, defendant held up her legs, touched her breasts above her clothes, and ejaculated. State v. Breeden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery; while the seven-year-old victim was alone taking a bath, defendant entered the bathroom and touched her genital area, and at the time the victim's mother was out of the house and her godmother was listening to music and unable to hear activity in the bathroom. A jury could have reasonably construed the touching as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Gardner, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2020).

13. —Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery because defendant was prosecuted for the completed offense of aggravated sexual battery and not attempt, which was an improperly charged lesser-included offense. The only defense presented at trial was that no crime ever occurred. The evidence presented at trial led to only two possible factual scenarios - that defendant either completed the offense or he did not. State v. Edwards, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2012), overruled in part, State v. Thorpe, 463 S.W.3d 851, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2015).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest as to incidents that occurred in a bedroom and a basement at a certain address because the State's elected dates between which the incident occurred and the victim's age were not sufficiently proven. There was no proof of a temporal marker that confirmed whether the incidents occurred before the State's elected date of September 22, 2014 and no questions were asked regarding whether the events occurred prior to the victim's 13th birthday in December 2014. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

14. Jury Arguments.

In a case where defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 39-2-606(a) (repealed) and 39-13-504(a), defendant was not entitled to relief, because, pursuant to T.R.A.P. 36(a), even if the prosecutor's closing arguments to the jury constituted error, defendant did not object to the comments after they were made and defendant did not ask for a curative instruction; also, the prosecutor's comments did not affect the outcome of the trial to defendant's detriment. State v. Jordan, 116 S.W.3d 8, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

15. Sentencing.

Inmate's guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-504 was reversed because he was unaware of the mandatory nature of his sentences and that he was not eligible for probation or community corrections under T.C.A. § 40-35-303, not only during the course of the plea negotiations and at the time of his guilty pleas, but also during his sentencing hearing and throughout his direct appeal to the court of criminal appeals. Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Oct. 30, 2009).

Defendant was properly sentenced to consecutive sentences for his six rape of a child convictions under T.C.A. § 39-13-522 and aggravated sexual battery conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-504 as the trial court did not impose consecutive sentencing based upon a finding that defendant was a dangerous offender and did not have to make the Wilkerson findings; defendant was sentenced based on his abuse of the minor victim over a seven-month period, and the impact of the sexual relationship on the victim. State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

Defendant's 18-year sentences for rape of a child, a Class A felony under T.C.A. § 39-13-522, and 10-year sentence for aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony under T.C.A. § 39-13-504, were within the statutory range under T.C.A. § 40-35-112(a) and were proper as: (1) defendant had a previous criminal history for T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1) purposes; (2) the victim's injuries were particularly great for § 40-35-114(6) purposes; (3) defendant abused a position of private trust under § 40-35-114(14); and (4) there was no evidence that any mitigating factors applied under T.C.A. § 40-35-113. State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences where defendant was convicted of two counts of rape of a child and six counts of aggravated sexual battery, defendant had a history of criminal convictions, the victims were particularly vulnerable because of their age, the offenses were committed for sexual gratification, defendant had failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community, the relationship between defendant and the victims established that he was in a position of trust as he was the boyfriend of one victim's grandmother, and the trial court found that the psychological harm was maybe even greater than physical harm. State v. Church, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences for defendant's convictions of three counts of child rape and aggravated sexual battery where it found that defendant abused his relationship with the victim, his stepdaugher, and referenced the length of that relationship, and it considered the victim impact statements. State v. Pillars, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the minimum sentence of 25 years for each of the three child rape convictions and the maximum sentence of 12 years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction where it applied the enhancement factor that defendant abuse a position of public or private trust, as he was the victim's stepfather, it considered all relevant principles associated with sentencing, and the sentences were within range. State v. Pillars, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of 10 years aggravated sexual battery because defendant had at least seven prior misdemeanors, including multiple convictions for driving on a suspended, cancelled, or revoked license; and, even if the trial court misapplied the enhancement factor of abusing a position of private trust, or failed to consider a mitigating factor, that did not invalidate defendant's within-range sentence as the trial court properly considered at least one other enhancement factor, and the record supported the findings of the trial court. State v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

In an aggravated sexual battery case, defendant's sentence of 11 years'  confinement at 100% was not excessive because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying enhancement factor number one that defendant had a previous history of criminal behavior as the victim testified defendant touched him on one of the church trips in such a way that made him uncomfortable, the trial court referenced several such accusations by the victim in a recorded phone call and his medical records, and defendant put on no proof that those allegations were false; defendant abused a position of public or private trust; and the trial court, as was its prerogative, declined to take into account any of defendant's mitigating evidence. State v. Alvarado, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2017).

Defendant's 22-year sentence for three counts of aggravated sexual battery was not excessive because his 11-year sentences were within range, he had previous convictions for theft and attempted sale of a controlled substance, and he conceded that he abused a position of trust based on the fact that the victim was his stepdaughter. State v. Mabe, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 920 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a five-year sentence because defendant was eligible for a sentence of three to six years; and, although the trial court misapplied the enhancement factor that defendant committed the crime to gratify his desire for pleasure or excitement as that factor was an element of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the trial court properly found as a separate enhancement factor that defendant abused a position of trust when he terminated the parental rights of the victim's biological parents and then subsequently sexually abused her. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2018).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant probation because, while he pled guilty to the reduced charge of attempted aggravated sexual battery, the evidence supported the conclusion that he committed more than one completed aggravated sexual battery on his adopted daughter while she was under 13 years old; he obtained custody of the victim, removing her from the guardianship of others who could have protected her from him; and the trial court's finding that the presentence report was very disturbing supported the conclusion that it found the crime to be especially shocking, reprehensible, offensive, and of an exaggerated degree. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2018).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, in which the convictions were merged, defendant's 12-year sentence, although the maximum, was not excessive because he had a history of criminal convictions in addition to those necessary to establish his range; and he occupied a position of private trust with respect to the victim as the testimony at trial from the victim, her mother, her stepbrother, and defendant himself established that he was the victim's stepfather and that he lived with the victim and her family for several years prior to the incident. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2018).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of 25 years as a persistent offender with 100% service, for a total effective sentence of 50 years, because he had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range; he had an extensive criminal record; he had a history of committing violent offenses; the 20-30 range was appropriate based on defendant being a persistent offender convicted of a Class B felony; and consecutive sentences were appropriate as defendant had been convicted of two or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor. State v. Freels, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 520 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2018).

Defendant's 10-year sentence as a Range I offender for aggravated sexual battery was proper; his sentence fell within the applicable sentencing range and was presumed reasonable, the trial court properly weighed the applicable enhancement factors and found no mitigating factors applied, and the State provided sufficient facts to establish that defendant abused a position of private trust, which he conceded. State v. Bergum, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2018).

Trial court's sentence of 10 years was not excessive because the sentencing range was eight to 12 years, and the sentence was presumed reasonable because the trial court considered the evidence at trial and sentencing, the presentencing report, the principles of sentencing, the parties'  arguments, the nature and characteristics of the crime, and evidence of mitigating and enhancement factors. State v. Golden, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in enhancing defendant's sentences for aggravated sexual battery above the statutory minimum because the court imposed a within-range sentence after considering the evidence, the presentence report, the principles of sentencing, the parties'  arguments, the nature and characteristics of the crimes, and the evidence of mitigating and enhancement factors. The court also found that defendant had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior and abused a position of private trust. State v. Gleason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2020).

Defendant's sentence of 30 years fell within the statutory range for rape and his sentence of 10 years fell within the range for aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court considered the evidence mandated by statute and found the sentences in part based on defendant's relationship with the victims, his stepchildren; even though the trial court committed errors in application of enhancement factors, which the State conceded as there were no multiple victims and vulnerability was not proven, the sentences were not an abuse of discretion. State v. Haven, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, sexual battery by an authority figure, and 11 counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, and rape, defendant's effective sentence of 52 years'  incarceration was not excessive because the trial court correctly applied the enhancement factors that defendant, the victim's stepfather, abused a position of private trust; and, although the court found that defendant's girlfriend was an emotionally troubled young lady who was taken advantage of by defendant, and that her testimony did not serve as mitigating evidence, the court did not consider her testimony against defendant as evidence supporting enhancement. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

16. Instructions.

Even if the trial court erred by instructing the jury on aggravated sexual battery, any error regarding the “reckless” or “knowing” mens rea was harmless because neither the State nor defendant presented evidence that his behavior might have been done recklessly or knowingly. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 1028 (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2014), cert. denied, Clark v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2846, 192 L. Ed. 2d 882, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3937 (U.S. June 15, 2015).

Upon remand and reconsideration, the appellate court found that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser-included offense of rape of a child because the state supreme court had held that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel was properly denied because there was no reasonable probability that a jury instruction which clarified the mens rea elements of the crime of aggravated sexual battery would have resulted in acquittal on any of the offenses as the evidence established only an intentional touching, and there was no evidence that defendant's numerous sexual crimes against his daughter were committed knowingly or recklessly but not intentionally. Crim v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated sexual battery because, although defendant at trial denied any sort of sexual contact with the victim, the evidence in the case, including defendant's acknowledgement in an interview with a police detective of intentionally unzipped the victim's pants, established that defendant's act of touching the victim's intimate parts was intentional. Thus, no substantial right of defendant was adversely affected by the jury instruction as any error in the instruction as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Canales, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2018).

Petitioner's conviction for aggravated sexual battery was reversed because trial counsel's failure to request an instruction on misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child was prejudicial to petitioner since given the proof, a properly instructed jury could have found petitioner guilty of misdemeanor assault; the victim's mother testified that she did not see petitioner doing anything to the victim, and the jury discredited the victim's claim of penetration. Townsend v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

17. Dependency Proceeding.

Trial court did not err in finding that the three-year-old child was a victim of severe child abuse by aggravated sexual battery, in finding both of the father's children to be dependent and neglected, in enjoining him from having any contact with his two daughters, and in placing sole custody of the children with the mother because the evidence presented to the trial court against the father rose to the level of clear and convincing as the child made multiple disclosures to multiple people that the father poked, rubbed, and otherwise touched her privates; the child's privates were irritated upon return from visitation with the father; and the child had consistently identified only the father as the perpetrator of those actions. In re Emmalee O., 464 S.W.3d 311, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. June 12, 2015), cert. denied, Overton v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 193 L. Ed. 2d 230, 136 S. Ct. 330, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 6517 (U.S. 2015).

In a dependency and neglect proceeding in which the child was found to be a victim of severe child abuse by aggravated sexual battery, the trial court did not err in admitting the out of court statements of the child because those statements were sufficiently bolstered by indicia of reliability so as to render them admissible as the disclosures of the child to the forensic interviewer, a licensed clinical social worker, her pediatrician, the grandmother, and the mother corroborated and sustained the reliability of the statements; and the father had ample opportunity to question and examine the conveyors of the disclosures. In re Emmalee O., 464 S.W.3d 311, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. June 12, 2015), cert. denied, Overton v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 193 L. Ed. 2d 230, 136 S. Ct. 330, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 6517 (U.S. 2015).

In a case where the trial court found that the three-year-old child was a victim of severe child abuse by aggravated sexual battery, the trial court acted within its authority in ordering the father not to contact the mother; and in denying the father visitation with his daughters. In re Emmalee O., 464 S.W.3d 311, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. June 12, 2015), cert. denied, Overton v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 193 L. Ed. 2d 230, 136 S. Ct. 330, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 6517 (U.S. 2015).

18. Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's convictions for attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child arose out of the same act or transaction because the contact between defendant's penis and the victim's buttocks and genitals occurred simultaneously and with no change in position; defendant's touching of the victim's buttocks with his penis was not an act independent of his rape of her genital area but, rather, was merely incidental to the genital penetration. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Case involved a multiple description claim because defendant was convicted of violating two different statutes, the statute proscribing aggravated sexual battery and the statute proscribing rape of a child. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Court of criminal appeals did not err by ordering the merger of defendant's convictions for attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child because attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery was a lesser-included offense of rape of a child, and the dual convictions violated double jeopardy; the appropriate remedy for the double jeopardy violation was the merger of the lesser offense into the greater offense. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

19. Termination of Parental Rights.

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights for sexual child abuse because it was undisputed that the father pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. In re Anna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

20. Merger.

Because the touching of the victim's buttocks which was the basis for the charge of attempted aggravated sexual battery was incidental to accomplishing the rape, the two counts arising from the same incident should have been merged. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, zol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Defendant's failure to raise the claim that the aggravated sexual battery conviction should have merged into the rape of a child conviction at the trial level resulted in waiver, and no clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached because the conviction for aggravated sexual battery was premised on the assault of the victim while she was on a couch, whereas the rape of a child conviction was premised on a separate assault which occurred in the bathroom at a different time. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Trial court did not err by failing to merge defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery into his conviction for rape of a child because the convictions did not arise from the same act or transaction, as the incidents occurred in two separate rooms, there was no proof the incidents occurred on the same day, and defendant used two different body parts, his penis and his fingers, to contact the victim's body. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2020).

21. Venue.

While the record contained evidence from which it could be inferred that the offenses at the home occurred in Obion County, the record did not support the conclusion that the touching that was the basis of the conviction occurred at the home; defendant's stepdaughter's testimony at trial clarified that the incident she had described, which formed the basis of the charge, occurred elsewhere, and thus venue was not established by a preponderance of the evidence as to this aggravated sexual battery conviction. State v. Haven, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020).

39-13-505. Sexual battery.

  1. Sexual battery is unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances:
    1. Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act;
    2. The sexual contact is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the contact that the victim did not consent;
    3. The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless; or
    4. The sexual contact is accomplished by fraud.
  2. As used in this section, “coercion” means the threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to be performed immediately or in the future.
  3. Sexual battery is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1995, ch. 484, § 2; 1996, ch. 675, § 74; 1997, ch. 256, § 3; 1997, ch. 406, § 3; 2005, ch. 353, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 18 provided that the act shall apply to sentencing for criminal offenses committed on or after June 7, 2005. Offenses committed prior to June 7, 2005, shall be governed by prior law, which shall apply in all respects. However, for defendants who are sentenced after June 7, 2005, for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1982, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the provisions of the act by executing a waiver of such defendant's ex post facto protections. Upon executing such a waiver, all provisions of the act shall apply to the defendant.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 19 provided that that act shall have no application to sentencing for persons convicted of murder in the first degree, which shall be governed by the provisions of §§ 39-13-20239-13-208.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 20(b) provided that the Tennessee Code Commission is requested to insert a cross reference in §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-505, 39-13-506, 39-13-522, 39-14-302 and 39-14-408 to § 40-35-114 stating that the enhancement factor formerly found in each such section was moved to § 40-35-114 so that all enhancement factors are located in one (1) section.

Cross-References. Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Criminal injuries compensation claim procedure for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-108.

Criminal injuries compensation for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-106.

Criminal injuries compensation fund privilege tax upon persons committing sexual offenses upon children, § 40-24-107.

Criminal sentencing enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Instruction on the prevention of hate crimes and sexual offenses, § 49-7-137.

Limitation of actions in prosecutions for offenses committed against children, § 40-2-101.

Mental health and intellectual and developmental disabilities, title 33.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Assault and Battery, § 2; 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, §§  1-4, 7.

Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), § 412A.2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Double Jeopardy.

Attempted rape and sexual battery constituted the same offense under the double jeopardy clause where the victim's testimony that the defendant placed his hand on her inner thigh and made a statement of desire was the essential evidence used to establish both offenses, and the case involved only one victim and one discrete act of touching. State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. 1999).

Although defendant's convictions of attempted rape and sexual battery arose out of the same transaction, defendant's dual convictions did not violate double jeopardy because the state supreme court had already determined that sexual battery was not a lesser-included offense of attempted rape; and the elements of the offenses are not the same; thus, the trial court committed plain error by merging the convictions for attempted rape and sexual battery. State v. Durham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

2. Lesser Included Offenses.

Sexual battery is a lesser included offense of aggravated rape because the statutory scheme treats rape as a more serious, blameworthy offense than sexual battery and that an intentional, knowing, or reckless unlawful sexual penetration which causes bodily injury to the victim, whether done in the pursuit of sexual gratification or not, establishes a more culpable mental state and a more physically intrusive contact (and thereby more serious harm) to the victim than an intentional touching for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. 2001), review or rehearing denied, State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Nov. 5, 2001).

Sexual battery cannot be a lesser included offense of attempted rape because sexual battery requires proof that the sexual contact be for the purpose of sexual gratification, an element not required to prove attempted rape, and because sexual battery does not constitute the facilitation, attempt, or solicitation of attempted rape. State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. 2001), review or rehearing denied, State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Nov. 5, 2001).

3. Election of Facts.

Where defendant was convicted of sexual battery for touching two parts of the victim's body during a single incident, and the entire instance of sexual contact occurred quickly and virtually simultaneously, only one offense occurred and defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict was not violated by the prosecution's failure to elect the facts on which it was relying to establish the offense. State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. 2001).

4. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, sexual battery, and assault where it showed that he broke into his estranged wife's house, choked her, repeatedly threatened to kill her, coerced her into having oral sex and sexual intercourse with him multiple times, the wife had bruises and marks on her throat, a DNA swab from the victim was consistent with defendant's DNA profile, and defendant had a bite mark on his forearm, marks on his cheeks, and scrapes on his head and elbow. State v. Blanton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016).

In a case in which defendant was indicted for five counts of rape by force or coercion, but was convicted of only two counts of sexual battery, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of sexual battery because the victim testified that before the first instance of digital penetration of her privates she told defendant not to do it and that defendant had her wrist restrained when he went underneath her tights and shoved his fingers inside her; she testified that in the second incident defendant pushed her back down on the bed and violently shoved his hand inside her, with an angry, scowling look on his face; and a rational jury could reasonably conclude that defendant's unlawful sexual contact was accomplished with the use of force. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 3, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery because the testimony of the minor victim, a forensic interviewer, and a nurse examiner, as well as defendant's confession, showed that defendant went into the victim's bedroom, began touching the victim's genital area while the victim was sleeping in the victim's bed, pulled down the victim's pants and began kissing the victim's vagina, moved the victim from the bed onto the floor, and put the tip of defendant's penis into the victim's vagina. State v. Gonzales, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of sexual battery because the victim testified that during the offenses defendant's body was on top of hers and she was unable to move. Defendant's actions of leaving to purchase a condom, forcing the victim onto the bed, holding her on the bed, and ejaculating on her provided ample evidence for the jury to have inferred that defendant's sexual contact with the victim's intimate parts was intentional and for the purpose of sexual gratification. State v. Haney, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 841 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of sexual battery because the victim testified that defendant pulled down his pants, grabbed her hand, and put her hand on his erect penis, and it occurred without the victim's consent because defendant pulled down his pants and grabbed the victim's hand to initiate the sexual contact. State v. Bardin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Defendant was properly convicted of, and sentenced for, aggravated burglary and sexual battery because the evidence showed that he entered the victims'  apartment in the early morning hours, grabbed one victim on the buttocks while she was asleep, was in possession of an alarm clock belonging to another victim when confronted by the residents of the apartment, and, while two of the witnesses were unable to identify him at trial, nearly each witness who encountered him around the time of the offense testified that his appearance had changed at the time of trial, and the trial court considered relevant factors and imposed a sentence consistent with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for sexual battery because defendant forced the victim to make unlawful sexual contact when he touched her hand to his genital area, and he forced such action for the purpose of sexual gratification; the trial court acted within its prerogative when it found the victim to be a more credible witness, and each element of the offense of sexual battery was, therefore, satisfied by her testimony. State v. Rodriguez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted sexual battery because the victim tried to get away from defendant, but he followed her; defendant then grabbed her bottom; the victim's mother testified that when she went to her daughter after her daughter hollered out, her daughter informed her that defendant had just grabbed her, which provided some level of corroboration; and completion of the attempted offense was not a defense to prosecution for criminal attempt. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

5. Jury Instructions.

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of sexual battery and statutory rape in defendant's trial for incest, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and two counts of aggravated rape of his daughters. State v. Hallock, 875 S.W.2d 285, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Trial court's failure to charge jury on the lesser included offense of rape was error where the crime of rape, according to the account of victim, had been fully accomplished well before the assault. State v. Tutton, 875 S.W.2d 295, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

In a case in which defendant was indicted for five counts of rape by force or coercion, but was convicted of only two counts of the lesser offense of sexual battery, defendant's convictions were reversed as the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to the lesser-included offense of assault by extremely provocative or offensive physical contact because, by acquitting defendant of three of the indicted offenses and convicting him of the lesser-included offense of sexual battery on two of the counts, the jury obviously found much of the victim's testimony incredible; and there was a reasonable probability that the jury, if instructed on the lesser-included offense, would have convicted him on that offense rather than sexual battery. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 3, 2017).

6. Sentencing.

Defendant's prior sexual battery conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-505(a)(2) was a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2), so enhancement of defendant's sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm was proper. The sexual battery offense created a substantial risk of a violent confrontation and involved purposeful, violent, and aggressive behavior. United States v. Craig, 630 F.3d 717, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 297 (8th Cir. Jan. 5, 2011).

7. —Admissibility.

In a case in which defendant was convicted of unlawful photography and attempted sexual battery, defendant's statement that he did not grab the victim's behind and that he had been frequently videoing blonde-haired women was properly admitted into evidence as his identity was placed at issue because there was no surveillance video obtainable from the store, the identification of defendant rested solely on the victim's and her mother's testimony, and the reliability of their testimony was challenged by the defense; and his statement provided evidence that defendant filmed the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

39-13-506. Mitigated statutory rape — Statutory rape — Aggravated statutory rape.

  1. Mitigated statutory rape is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant, or of the defendant by the victim when the victim is at least fifteen (15) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is at least four (4) but not more than five (5) years older than the victim.
  2. Statutory rape is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by the victim when:
    1. The victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than fifteen (15) years of age and the defendant is at least four (4) years but less than ten (10) years older than the victim; or
    2. The victim is at least fifteen (15) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is more than five (5) but less than ten (10) years older than the victim.
  3. Aggravated statutory rape is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant, or of the defendant by the victim when the victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is at least ten (10) years older than the victim.
    1. Mitigated statutory rape is a Class E felony.
      1. Statutory rape is a Class E felony.
      2. In addition to the punishment provided for a person who commits statutory rape for the first time, the trial judge may order, after taking into account the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense, including the offense for which the person was originally charged and whether the conviction was the result of a plea bargain agreement, that the person be required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to title 40, chapter 39, part 2.
    2. Aggravated statutory rape is a Class D felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 4; 1994, ch. 719, § 1; 2005, ch. 487, § 4; 2006, ch. 890, § 5; 2007, ch. 594, § 7; 2012, ch. 883, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section provides that the defendant must be at least four years older than the victim. The defense of promiscuity of the victim, which was formerly found in subsection (b), was repealed in 1994.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 20(b) provided that the Tennessee Code commission is requested to insert a cross reference in §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-505, 39-13-506, 39-13-522, 39-14-302 and 39-14-408 to § 40-35-114 stating that the enhancement factor formerly found in each such section was moved to § 40-35-114 so that all enhancement factors are located in one (1) section.

Acts 2006, ch. 890, § 1 provided that the provisions of the act may be collectively known as the “Child Protection Act of 2006.”

For the Preamble to the act regarding criminal penalties, procedure and sentencing, please refer to Acts 2007, ch. 594.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Criminal sentencing enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

Penalties for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.94.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Incest, § 1; 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, §§ 2-6, 8.

Law Reviews.

“Let’s Talk About Sexting, Baby”: A Mens Rea-Centered Approach to the Sexting Issue in Tennessee (Emily Long), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1139  (2012).

“No Provincial or Transient Notion”: The Need for a Mistake of Age Defense in Child Rape Prosecutions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 693 (2004).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Lesser Included Offenses.

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of sexual battery and statutory rape in defendant's trial for incest, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and two counts of aggravated rape of his daughters. State v. Hallock, 875 S.W.2d 285, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Promiscuity defense requires a showing not only of multiple partners but indiscriminate, casual conduct not involving love or similar emotionally intimate aspect. State v. Hood, 868 S.W.2d 744, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Promiscuity defense provides a general defense which must only be fairly raised by proof before being considered by trier of fact and any reasonable doubt on issue requires acquittal; defendant need not prove defense by preponderance of evidence. State v. Hood, 868 S.W.2d 744, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Where trial court heard case without jury and made findings and rendered decision based on incorrect interpretation of promiscuity defense, remand for reconsideration was required. State v. Hood, 868 S.W.2d 744, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Since the offense of statutory rape includes an age element whereas the offense of rape does not, and the offense of rape includes the element of force whereas the offense of statutory rape does not, statutory rape was not a lesser included offense in a prosecution for rape by force or coercion. State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Statutory rape is not a lesser included offense of rape of a child, nor is it a lesser grade offense of rape of a child. State v. Ealey, 959 S.W.2d 605, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Statutory rape contains an age element that is not included within the statutory elements of rape; therefore, statutory rape is not a lesser included offense of rape. State v. Stokes, 24 S.W.3d 303, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 382 (Tenn. 2000).

Trial court improperly merged aggravated statutory rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest into the rape convictions because each of the convictions required elements pertaining to the ages of the victim and defendant and relationship that rape did not, and they did not require proof of non-consent. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

2. Multiple Counts.

Convictions for multiple counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation, criminal exposure to HIV, and aggravated statutory rape for various sex crimes were upheld, because defendant penetrated multiple orifices of the victim, including the victim's anus and mouth, and each act defendant performed was capable of producing its own fear, humiliation, pain, and damage to the victim. State v. Hogg, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 448 S.W.3d 877, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

Since each count of aggravated statutory rape included a separate incident of sexual penetration within the meaning of aggravated statutory rape law, the evidence was sufficient to support all six convictions. State v. Hogg, 448 S.W.3d 877, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

3. Attempted Statutory Rape.

Where defendant stated that he wanted a young boy for “straight sex” and subsequently paid an undercover cop 200 dollars for an underage male, the defendant's conduct constituted the commission of attempted statutory rape. State v. Fowler, 3 S.W.3d 910, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. 1999).

4. Corroboration.

Where victims consented to defendant's sexual advances and, thus, were accomplices, there was sufficient corroboration for statutory rape convictions where the testimony of the victims was supported by the testimony of other victims, there was evidence of a common scheme or plan, and corroborating proof was offered by investigating officer. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 1995), overruled, State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

In an aggravated statutory rape case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee specifically overruled decisions requiring corroboration of the testimony of victims of statutory rape, including: State v. Anderson, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. Lexis 823; State v. Smith, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. Lexis 673; State v. Rainey, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. Lexis 502; State v. Ballinger, 93 S.W.3d 881, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1003; State v. Reeves, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. Lexis 290; State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 759; and State v. Garner, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. Lexis 4. State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Collier v. Tennessee, 188 L. Ed. 2d 128, 134 S. Ct. 1034, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 967 (U.S. 2014).

In an aggravated statutory rape case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held no corroboration of the victim's testimony was required because she did not qualify as an accomplice under the general accomplice rule as a minor could not consent to statutory rape and a victim of statutory rape could not be charged with that offense. State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Collier v. Tennessee, 188 L. Ed. 2d 128, 134 S. Ct. 1034, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 967 (U.S. 2014).

5. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Defendant's convictions of child rape and statutory rape were affirmed, given that both victims testified as to defendant's unlawful sexual penetration and defendant confessed to the crimes. State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. 2003).

Even though a fourteen-year-old victim who consented to having sexual intercourse with defendant, who was more than ten years older than the victim, was legally considered to be an accomplice to her own statutory rape, defendant's conviction for aggravated statutory rape in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-506(c) was supported by sufficient evidence as required by T.R.A.P. 13(e) because a police officer's testimony regarding a search of defendant's home sufficiently corroborated the victim's testimony and there was evidence of penetration of the victim by defendant. State v. Collier, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2012), aff'd, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013).

In an aggravated statutory rape case, the victim's testimony and the other evidence adduced at trial that demonstrated multiple incidents of sexual penetration between the fourteen-year-old victim and the forty-two-year-old defendant was sufficient to establish the elements of the offense. State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Collier v. Tennessee, 188 L. Ed. 2d 128, 134 S. Ct. 1034, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 967 (U.S. 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of statutory rape by an authority figure and sexual battery by an authority figure where it showed that defendant engaged in unlawful sexual contact with the victim on three separate occasions when the victim was 15 years old and defendant was 31, he paid her after the incidents, and defendant was the pastor of the church the victim attended and used the church facilities for at least two of the incidents. State v. Berkley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated statutory rape and rape because the victim attempted to resist by rolling onto her side, and she told defendant “no;” defendant sexually penetrated the victim; a medical examination showed injury to the victim's vagina; DNA testing revealed defendant's semen in her underwear; and the uncorroborated testimony of the minor victim was sufficient to sustain a conviction for forcible or coercive sex offenses such as simple rape. State v. Danoff, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of solicitation of a minor to engage in aggravated statutory rape because it showed that he sent multiple text message to the 14-year-old victim over the course of a few days in an attempt to induce her to meet him for sex in a park. Defendant admitted at trial that he was attempting to induce the victim to meet him in the park to show his son that she was willing to cheat on him with defendant, and defendant admitted that he intentionally sent the text messages knowing that he was more than 10 years older than the victim. State v. Weldon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of statutory rape because the overwhelming evidence presented at trial showed that defendant knew the victim was a minor when he sexually penetrated her, and the jury, by its verdict, chose not to accredit defendant's testimony that the victim had lied to him about her age, as was its prerogative. State v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child and aggravated statutory rape because the victim acknowledged that defendant's penis went inside her vagina, she said that he used a condom, and in text messages exchanged the following day, the victim and defendant discussed defendant's use of a condom, that the victim's vagina was hurting, and that defendant only “put [it] in one time.” State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2020).

6. Sentencing.

Where defendant was a Department of Human Services counselor for a 16 year old female and he exploited the relationship by smoking marijuana and having sexual intercourse with her on multiple occasions, sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences under § 40-35-115(b)(5). State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 430 (Tenn. 1999).

Defendant's sentence was vacated because the district court improperly used the categorical approach in determining that defendant's prior conviction of statutory rape under T.C.A. § 39-13-506(a) was a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), as T.C.A. § 39-13-506(a) included more victims and did not contain aggravating factors. United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 2005 FED App. 255P, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11032 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 457, 163 L. Ed. 2d 347, 546 U.S. 950, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7535 (U.S. 2005).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 20 years in confinement for a standing aggravated rape conviction. The trial court's sentence fell within the statutory range for defendant's standing aggravated rape conviction. State v. McDowell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 2, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing judicial diversion because it considered the sentencing law and principles, weighed the required factors, and recited the relevant factors; the trial court explained on the record why it denied defendant's request for judicial diversion and why the circumstances of the offense, statutory rape and solicitation of a minor, outweighed the other factors and concluded judicial diversion would not serve the interests of the public or defendant. State v. Hodges, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017).

In sentencing defendant for statutory rape and solicitation of a minor, the trial court properly applied the enhancement fact that defendant abused a position of public or private trust because the victim was a friend of defendant's son, and defendant's first sexual encounter with the victim occurred while the victim was in her care while at her home visiting her son. State v. Hodges, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017).

Trial court properly used defendant's six prior convictions in Florida to sentence defendant as a Range III, career offender to 12 years in confinement for aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, because reliable hearsay was admissible in a sentencing hearing; and a presentence report was considered reliable hearsay. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 209 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Trial court properly used defendant's six prior convictions in Florida to sentence defendant as a Range III, career offender to 12 years in confinement for aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, because reliable hearsay was admissible in a sentencing hearing; and a presentence report was considered reliable hearsay. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 209 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

7. Sex Offender Registration.

Under either the de novo or abuse of discretion standard, the trial court did not err in ordering defendant to register as a sex offender; defendant's psychosexual evaluation revealed that the she was attempting to minimize her problems, she admitted that in the past she had sexually molested a child and had sex with a child, her child molestation score was in the problem range, indicating that she manifested some pedophilic interests, her sexual assault score was in the problem risk range, and the doctor opined that defendant presented a moderate risk to reoffend. State v. Bickford, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 210 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Trial court's consideration of evidence relating to the nolled count of the indictment, sexual exploitation of a minor for possession of pornographic images, did not violate defendant's right to substantive due process because the trial court could utilize criminal behavior shown by a preponderance of the evidence to enhance a sentence without violating federal or state due process principles. State v. Broadrick, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 678 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring defendant to register as a sex offender after he pleaded guilty to statutory rape because its comments at the hearings indicated that it considered the circumstances surrounding the offense, including that defendant pleaded guilty to facts establishing the greater offense of solicitation of a minor and he was aware of the victim's age when he sent the text message, it provided sufficient articulation of its reasons for requiring defendant to register, and defendant's possession of child pornography was established by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Broadrick, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 678 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2019).

Trial court did not err by concluding that this section authorized it to consider evidence of images found on defendant's cell phone, a separate, unrelated offense, or the presentence report following defendant's guilty plea to statutory rape because when making a decision to place a defendant on the sex offender registry, trial courts had to consider “the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense” and may consider any additional relevant factors. State v. Broadrick, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 678 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2019).

Appropriate standard of appellate review for a trial court's determination regarding whether a defendant should be required to register as a sex offender is an abuse of discretion accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Broadrick, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 678 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring defendant, who had pled guilty to statutory rape and child abuse, to register as a sex offender, given that the facts clearly established that defendant committed aggravated statutory rape and considering defendant's deceptiveness and risk to reoffend, which was higher than other similarly situated individuals his age. State v. Nave, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 18, 2020).

After a trial court denied judicial diversion when defendant entered a best interest plea to statutory rape, although the court did not repeat or emphasize its findings as to the offense in the context of its sex offender registry determination, the court did not abuse its discretion in requiring defendant to register as a sex offender because the court considered the relevant factors and made findings in support of its decision regarding the denial of judicial diversion and the record was sufficient to support the decision as to registration. State v. Rankins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 1, 2020).

8. State Allowed to Reopen Its Proof.

Trial court did not err in allowing the State to reopen its proof and to recall the investigator in order to present additional proof of defendant's age an injustice was not done to defendant because, for purposes of aggravated statutory rape, the State was required to prove that defendant was 10 years older than the victim; and the State already had presented circumstantial evidence that defendant was at least 10 years older than the victim. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 209 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Trial court did not err in allowing the State to reopen its proof and to recall the investigator in order to present additional proof of defendant's age an injustice was not done to defendant because, for purposes of aggravated statutory rape, the State was required to prove that defendant was 10 years older than the victim; and the State already had presented circumstantial evidence that defendant was at least 10 years older than the victim. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 209 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

39-13-507. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-13-507 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 5; 1997, ch. 480, § 1; 1998, ch. 1068, § 1), concerning the limited spousal exclusion, was repealed by Acts 2005, ch. 456, § 2, effective June 18, 2005.

39-13-508. Abolition of common law offenses of seduction and criminal conversation.

  1. No cause of action shall be maintained that is based upon the common law torts of seduction or criminal conversation, and those torts are abolished.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting a cause of action based upon a sexual offense, which offenses include, but are not limited to, those set out in this part.

Acts 1990, ch. 1056, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1990, ch. 1056, § 4 provided that any action filed prior to January 1, 1991, may be maintained under the law in effect on the date of such filing.

Cross-References. Domestic relations, divorce and annulment, title 36, ch. 4.

Law Reviews.

Family Law — Tennessee Courts — Retroactive Abolition of the Common Law Tort of Criminal Conversation, Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942, 112 S. Ct. 381, 116 L. Ed. 2d 332, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 6263, 60 U.S.L.W. 3342 (1991) (No. 91-525), 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 159 (1991).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Power to Abolish Criminal Conversation.

The statutory exception (Acts 1990, ch. 1056, § 4, see Compiler's Notes) for previously filed actions was merely a legislative recognition of the constitutionally-required separation of legislative and judicial powers, and did not deprive the supreme court of the power to abolish criminal conversation actions filed prior to January 1, 1991. Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. 1991), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. May 20, 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942, 112 S. Ct. 381, 116 L. Ed. 2d 332, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 6263 (1991).

39-13-509. Sexual contact with a minor — Sexual contact by an authority figure.

  1. It is an offense for a defendant to engage in unlawful sexual contact with a minor when:
    1. The minor is less than eighteen (18) years of age;
    2. The defendant is at least four (4) years older than the victim; and
    3. The defendant was, at the time of the offense, in a position of trust, or had supervisory or disciplinary power over the minor by virtue of the defendant's legal, professional, or occupational status and used the position of trust or power to accomplish the sexual contact; or
    4. The defendant had, at the time of the offense, parental or custodial authority over the minor and used the authority to accomplish the sexual contact.
  2. As used in this section, “sexual contact” means the defendant intentionally touches or kisses the minor's lips with the defendant's lips if such touching can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.
  3. Sexual contact by an authority figure is a Class A misdemeanor with a mandatory minimum fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  4. Each instance of unlawful sexual contact shall be considered a separate offense.

Acts 2011, ch. 88, § 1; 2016, ch. 1038, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-13-510. [Unconstitutional.]

Code Commission Notes.

Section 39-13-510 was ruled unconstitutional by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); the Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently denied appellant's application for appeal. Accordingly, this section has been removed from the Tennessee Code Annotated as unconstitutional.

Law Reviews.

Constitutional Law — Campbell v. Sundquist: Tennessee's Homosexual Practices Act Violates the Right to Privacy, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 311 (1997).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The Homosexual Practices Act, codified in T.C.A. § 39-13-510, is an unconstitutional violation of the fundamental right of privacy; this right encompasses Tennessee citizens' rights to engage in consensual, private, non-commercial, sexual conduct, because that activity involves intimate questions of personal and family concern. Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

39-13-511. Indecent exposure.

    1. A person commits the offense of indecent exposure who:
      1. In a public place or on the private premises of another, or so near thereto as to be seen from the private premises:
        1. Intentionally:
          1. Exposes the person's genitals or buttocks to another; or
          2. Engages in sexual contact or sexual penetration as defined in § 39-13-501; and
        2. Reasonably expects that the acts will be viewed by another and the acts:
        1. Knowingly invites, entices or fraudulently induces the child of another into the person's residence for the purpose of attaining sexual arousal or gratification by intentionally engaging in the following conduct in the presence of the child:
          1. Will offend an ordinary viewer; or
          2. Are for the purpose of sexual arousal and gratification of the defendant; or
          3. Exposure of such person's genitals, buttocks or female breasts; or
          4. Masturbation; or
        2. Knowingly engages in the person's own residence, in the intended presence of any child, for the defendant's sexual arousal or gratification the following intentional conduct:
          1. Exposure of the person's genitals, buttocks or female breasts; or
          2. Masturbation.
    2. No prosecution shall be commenced for a violation of subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii)(a )  based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a witness who shares with the accused any of the relationships described in § 36-3-601(5).
    3. For subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i)  or (a)(1)(B)(ii)  to apply, the defendant must be eighteen (18) years of age or older and the child victim must be less than thirteen (13) years of age.
    1. “Indecent exposure,” as defined in subsection (a), is a Class B misdemeanor, unless subdivision (b)(2), (b)(3) or (b)(4) applies.
    2. If the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, indecent exposure is a Class A misdemeanor.
    3. If the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, and the defendant has any combination of two (2) or more prior convictions under this section or § 39-13-517, or is a sexual offender, violent sexual offender or violent juvenile sexual offender, as defined in § 40-39-202, the offense is a Class E felony.
    4. If the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, and the offense occurs on the property of any public school, private or parochial school, licensed day care center or other child care facility during a time at which a child or children are likely to be present on the property, the offense is a Class E felony.
    1. A person confined in a penal institution, as defined in § 39-16-601, commits the offense of indecent exposure who with the intent to abuse, torment, harass or embarrass a guard or staff member:
      1. Intentionally exposes the person's genitals or buttocks to the guard or staff member; or
      2. Engages in sexual contact as defined in § 39-13-501.
    2. For purposes of this subsection (c):
      1. “Guard” means any sheriff, jailer, guard, correctional officer, or other authorized personnel charged with the custody of the person; and
      2. “Staff member” means any other person employed by a penal institution or who performs ongoing services in a penal institution, including, but not limited to, clergy, educators, and medical professionals.
    3. Notwithstanding subsection (b), a violation of this subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  1. This section does not apply to a mother who is breastfeeding her child in any location, public or private.
  2. As used in this section, “public place” means a place to which the public or a group of persons has access and includes, but is not limited to, highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, places of business, playgrounds and hallways, lobbies, and other portions of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence, and a restroom, locker room, dressing room, or shower, designated for multi-person, single-sex use. An act is deemed to occur in a public place if it produces its offensive or proscribed consequences in a public place.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 33; 1994, ch. 542, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 755, § 1; 1999, ch. 189, § 1; 2006, ch. 617, § 2; 2007, ch. 209, § 1; 2009, ch. 414, §§ 1, 2; 2011, ch. 91, § 2; 2012, ch. 885, § 1; 2012, ch. 1076, § 1; 2019, ch. 45, §§ 1, 2; 2019, ch. 251, §§ 1, 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The offense of indecent exposure, found in subsection (b), expands prior law by including acts of sexual contact or sexual penetration in a public place, as defined in § 39-11-106, or on the private premises of another, or where the activity may be seen from the private premises of another. Additionally, under subdivision (b)(1)(B), the defendant must reasonably expect the acts to be viewed by another and the offended person must be an “ordinary viewing person.”

In 1994, the general assembly created a new offense of public indecency, which is codified in subsection (a).

This section expands prior law by including acts of sexual contact or sexual penetration in a public place or on the private premises of another, or where the activity may be seen from the private premises of another. Additionally, under subdivision (a)(2) (now (b)(1)(B)), the defendant must reasonably expect the acts to be viewed by another and the offended person must be an “ordinary viewing person.”

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1994, ch. 542, § 4 provided that if any provision of the amendments by that act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, then all provisions and applications of this section by that act are invalid and void.

Acts 2012, ch. 1076, § 1, effective May 21, 2012, and Acts 2012, ch. 885, § 1, effective July 1, 2012, amended this section. Chapter 1076 rewrote subdivision (b)(2). From May 21, 2012, until July 1, 2012, subsection (b)(2) read: “(2) ‘Indecent exposure’ as defined in subdivision (b)(1), is a Class B misdemeanor, unless the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, in which event, indecent exposure is a Class A misdemeanor. Additionally, ‘indecent exposure’ as defined in subdivision (b)(1) is a Class E felony when the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older, the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, and the defendant has any combination of two (2) or more prior convictions under this section or is a sexual offender, violent sexual offender or violent juvenile sexual offender, as defined in § 40-39-202.” Chapter 885 rewrote this section to read as set out above; however, the amendments to subsection (b) by ch. 1076 remained effective.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, by ch. 45, in (c), substituted “guard or staff member” for “guard” in the introductory language of (c)(1) and (c)(1)(A); and rewrote (c)(2) which read: “For purposes of this subsection (c), “guard” means any sheriff, jailer, guard, correctional officer or other authorized personnel charged with the custody of the person.”

The 2019 amendment by ch. 251 deleted “, as defined in § 39-11-106,” following “In a public place” at the beginning of (a)(1)(A); and added (e).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 45, § 3. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 251, § 3. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse, § 37-5-512.

Breastfeeding, § 68-58-101 et seq.

Child abuse, title 39, ch. 15, part 4.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Exposure of child to nudist colony prohibited, § 36-6-304.

Obscenity, title 39, ch. 17, part 9.

Penalties for Class A and B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of public indecency law, OAG 93-39 (4/28/93).

A person who has been convicted of three or more counts of indecent exposure in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-511 is a sexual offender as defined in T.C.A. § 40- 39-202(17)(A)(vii) and is therefore required to register pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-39-203, OAG 07-164 (12/13/07).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. § 39-13-511, the Tennessee Public Indecency Act, has been upheld in the face of First Amendment challenges. See Re: State of Tennessee Public Indecency Statute, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 535 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1999). Russell v. Giles County, 105 F. Supp. 2d 841, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10711 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).

2. Adult Entertainers.

Municipal ordinance which prohibited adult entertainers from being closer than six feet to the customer was not a burden on First Amendment freedoms greater than was essential to further a legitimate governmental interest. DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 894 F. Supp. 1140, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041 (E.D. Tenn. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 403, 1997 FED App. 66P, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2859 (6th Cir. 1997).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

Where the defendant was clad only in a T-shirt and fishnet stockings and had a leather strap adorned with spikes wrapped around genitals, and was sitting in a parked car with the door open in a park, sufficient evidence existed to convict the defendant of indecent exposure. State v. Eddinger, 112 S.W.3d 148, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 774 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

State presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for indecent exposure because defendant exposed his penis to the victim, and surveillance footage corroborated the victim's testimony about her two encounters with defendant during her work day; the jury by its verdict accredited the testimony of the victim. State v. Nelson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's indecent exposure conviction because defendant could reasonably expect defendant's exposed buttocks to be seen and to offend an ordinary viewer. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2019).

4. Sufficient Indictment.

Indictment stating an incorrect mens rea for indecent exposure was not invalid because (1) the indictment stated the correct statute and information on the crime's elements, giving sufficient notice of the crime and mens rea, and (2) defendant did not seek more specific information. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2019).

5. Indictment Not Duplicitous.

After making no pre-trial motion alleging an indictment was duplicitous, defendant did not show the indictment plainly erred because defendant did not show (1) a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached, (2) defendant's substantial right was adversely affected, or (3) consideration of the error was necessary to do substantial justice, as the indictment's reference to the display of “genitals or buttocks” was simply alternate theories. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2019).

39-13-512. Prostitution — Definitions.

As used in §§ 39-13-51239-13-515, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “House of prostitution” means any place where prostitution or the promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one (1) or more persons under the control, management or supervision of another;
  2. “Inmate” means, within the meaning of this part concerning prostitution, a person who engages in prostitution in or through the agency of a house of prostitution;
  3. “Patronizing prostitution” means soliciting or hiring another person with the intent that the other person engage in prostitution, or entering or remaining in a house of prostitution for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity;
    1. “Promoting prostitution” means:
      1. Owning, controlling, managing, supervising, or in any way keeping, alone or in association with others, a business for the purpose of engaging in prostitution, or a house of prostitution;
      2. Procuring an inmate for a house of prostitution;
      3. Encouraging, inducing, or otherwise purposely causing another to become a prostitute;
      4. Soliciting a person to patronize a prostitute;
      5. Procuring a prostitute for a patron; or
      6. Soliciting, receiving, or agreeing to receive any benefit for engaging in any of the activities defined in subdivisions (4)(A)(i)-(v); and
    2. “Promoting prostitution” does not include a person who solicits, procures, induces, encourages, or attempts to cause another to patronize a prostitute if:
      1. The person promoting the prostitute and the prostitute being promoted are the same person; and
      2. The intent of the promotion is the solicitation of business for only the prostitute engaging in the promotion;
  4. “Promoting prostitution of a minor” means engaging in any of the activities described in subdivision (4) when one (1) or more of the persons engaged in prostitution is less than eighteen (18) years of age or has an intellectual disability;
  5. “Prostitution” means engaging in, or offering to engage in, sexual activity as a business or being an inmate in a house of prostitution or loitering in a public place for the purpose of being hired to engage in sexual activity; and
  6. “Sexual activity” means any sexual relations including homosexual sexual relations.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1995, ch. 296, § 1; 2011, ch. 377, § 3; 2016, ch. 979, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 377, § 5 provided that the act, which added the definition of “promoting prostitution of a minor”, shall apply to any acts committed on or after June 1, 2011.

Law Reviews.

Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 291 (2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sexual Relations.

Language of the prostitution statute did not give sufficient warning that acts involving nude dancing by two defendants, where there was no touching of the genitals between them and only the touching of the finger of the patron, would constitute prohibited “sexual relations.” State v. Boyd, 925 S.W.2d 237, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The legislature clearly did not intend for prostitution to be limited to those instances where sexual penetration or intercourse occurs. State ex rel. Gibbons v. Jackson, 16 S.W.3d 797, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), aff'd, Haney v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 1999).

2. Sexual Activity.

Because activities taking place at nude dancing establishment satisfied the standard of sexual activity as a business, there was no error in ruling that “lap dancing,” as conducted at defendant's place of business, constituted “prostitution” as that term is used in T.C.A. § 39-13-512. State ex rel. Gibbons v. Jackson, 16 S.W.3d 797, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), aff'd, Haney v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 1999).

3. Promoting Prostitution.

In order to be convicted of promoting prostitution, an accused need not be found to have owned the premises. Merely supervising or managing can lead to a conviction. State v. Bell, 832 S.W.2d 583, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), appeal denied, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (Tenn. Jan. 27, 1992).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction of promoting prostitution; defendant approached the victims, offering to protect them and provide them with drugs if they worked for him as prostitutes, he took suggestive photographs of them and posted the pictures in advertisements for sexual services, he provided cash to pay for the hotel rooms rented for prostitution, and all money the victims made went directly to defendant. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

4. Double Jeopardy.

Both promoting prostitution and trafficking a person for a commercial sex act require the defendant to cause the victim to perform sexual activities in exchange for something of value, and although the trafficking statute contains the additional requirement that the victim be coerced, the promoting prostitution statute does not contain an essential element that the trafficking statute does not. Any additional differences in the wording of the statutes do not constitute separate elements and defendant's convictions had to merge. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

5. Lesser-Incured Offense.

All of the statutory elements of promoting prostitution are included within the statutory elements of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act; thus, the trial court erred in determining promoting prostitution was not a lesser-included offense of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act, and defendant's convictions were to be merged. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

39-13-513. Prostitution — Defenses.

  1. A person commits an offense under this section who engages in prostitution.
    1. Prostitution is a Class B misdemeanor.
    2. Prostitution committed within one hundred feet (100') of a church or within one and one-half (1½) miles of a school, such distance being that established by § 49-6-2101, for state-funded school transportation, is a Class A misdemeanor.
    3. A person convicted of prostitution within one and one-half (1½) miles of a school shall, in addition to any other authorized punishment, be sentenced to at least seven (7) days of incarceration and be fined at least one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  2. As used in subsection (b), “school” means all public and private schools that conduct classes in any grade from kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12).
  3. Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, if it is determined after a reasonable detention for investigative purposes, that a person suspected of or charged with a violation of this section is under eighteen (18) years of age, that person shall be immune from prosecution for prostitution as a juvenile or adult. A law enforcement officer who takes a person under eighteen (18) years of age into custody for a suspected violation of this section shall, upon determination that the person is a minor, provide the minor with the telephone number for the Tennessee human trafficking resource center hotline and release the minor to the custody of a parent or legal guardian or transport the minor to a shelter care facility designated by the juvenile court judge to facilitate the release of the minor to the custody of a parent or legal guardian.
  4. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that a person charged with a violation of this section was so charged for conduct that occurred because the person was a victim of an act committed in violation of § 39-13-307 or § 39-13-309, or because the person was a victim as defined under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. § 7102).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1995, ch. 118, § 1; 2011, ch. 377, § 1; 2012, ch. 891, § 1; 2015, ch. 67, § 1; 2015, ch. 264, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 377, § 5 provided that the act, which added subsection (d), shall apply to any acts committed on or after June 1, 2011.

Cross-References. Citations in lieu of continued custody of arrested person, § 40-7-118.

Definitions, § 39-13-512.

HIV testing for persons violating section, § 39-13-521.

Penalties for Class A and B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Punishment for solicitation for prostitution near school or church, § 39-13-514.

Law Reviews.

Filling the Gap: Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation to Address the Problem of Pimping, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 961  (2015).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Promoting Prostitution.

In order to be convicted of promoting prostitution, an accused need not be found to have owned the premises. Merely supervising or managing can lead to a conviction. State v. Bell, 832 S.W.2d 583, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), appeal denied, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (Tenn. Jan. 27, 1992).

2. Sexual Relations.

Language of T.C.A. § 39-13-513 did not give sufficient warning that acts involving nude dancing by two defendants, where there was no touching of the genitals between them and only the touching of the finger of the patron, would constitute prohibited “sexual relations.” State v. Boyd, 925 S.W.2d 237, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

39-13-514. Patronizing prostitution — Unacceptable defenses.

  1. A person commits an offense under this section:
    1. Who patronizes prostitution; or
    2. When a person patronizes prostitution where the subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer or a law enforcement officer eighteen (18) years of age or older posing as a minor.
    1. Patronizing prostitution is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. Patronizing prostitution within one and one-half (1.5) miles of a school shall, in addition to any other authorized punishment, be punished by no less than seven (7) days of incarceration and by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
      1. Patronizing prostitution from a person who is younger than eighteen (18) years of age or has an intellectual disability is punishable as trafficking for commercial sex acts under § 39-13-309.
      2. Nothing in this subdivision (b)(3) shall be construed as prohibiting prosecution under any other applicable law.
  2. As used in subsection (b), “school” means all public and private schools that conduct classes in any grade from kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12).
  3. It is not a defense to a violation of this section that:
    1. The subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer;
    2. The victim of the offense is a minor and consented to the offense; or
    3. The solicitation was unsuccessful, the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or the law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1995, ch. 118, § 2; 2011, ch. 377, § 2; 2014, ch. 957, §§ 1, 2; 2017, ch. 169, § 1; 2019, ch. 123, §§ 3, 4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 377, § 5 provided that the act, which added subdivision (b)(4) [now (b)(3)], shall apply to any acts committed on or after June 1, 2011.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (a)(2) and (d)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 123, § 7. July 1,  2019.

Cross-References. Definitions, § 39-13-512.

Penalties for Class A misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Using Commercial Driver Licensing Authority to Combat Human Trafficking Related Crimes on America’s Highways (Alicia Wilson), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 969  (2013).

39-13-515. Promoting prostitution – Unacceptable defenses.

  1. A person commits an offense under this section:
    1. Who promotes prostitution; or
    2. Who promotes prostitution where the subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer or is a law enforcement officer eighteen (18) years of age or older posing as a minor.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (c), promoting prostitution is a Class E felony.
  3. Promoting prostitution is punishable as:
    1. Trafficking for a commercial sex act under § 39-13-309 if the person being promoted is less than eighteen (18) years of age; or
    2. A Class D felony if the person being promoted has an intellectual disability as defined in § 33-1-101.
  4. It is not a defense to a violation of this section that:
    1. The subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer;
    2. The victim of the offense is a minor and consented to the offense; or
    3. The solicitation was unsuccessful, the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or a law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2011, ch. 377, § 4; 2013, ch. 485, § 1; 2014, ch. 646, § 1; 2018, ch. 1019, § 1; 2019, ch. 123, §§ 5, 6.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 377, § 5 provided that the act, which added subsection (b), shall apply to any acts committed on or after June 1, 2011.

Acts 2018, ch. 1019, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to offenses committed on and after July 1, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote (c) which read: “Promoting prostitution of a minor is punishable as trafficking for a commercial sex act under § 39-13-309.”

The 2019 amendment added (a)(2) and (d)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1019, § 2. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 123, § 7. July 1,  2019.

Cross-References. Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Definitions, § 39-13-512.

Penalty for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004, Definitions, § 40-39-202.

Use of citations in lieu of arrest, § 40-7-118.

Law Reviews.

Filling the Gap: Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation to Address the Problem of Pimping, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 961  (2015).

39-13-516. Aggravated prostitution.

  1. A person commits aggravated prostitution when, knowing that such person is infected with HIV, the person engages in sexual activity as a business or is an inmate in a house of prostitution or loiters in a public place for the purpose of being hired to engage in sexual activity.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “HIV” means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require that an infection with HIV has occurred in order for a person to have committed aggravated prostitution.
  4. Aggravated prostitution is a Class C felony.

Acts 1991, ch. 281, § 2.

Cross-References. Acute care hospitals, ambulatory surgical treatment centers, policies for testing for AIDS, § 68-11-222.

AIDS education programs, prevention of AIDS or other sexually transmitted diseases, § 49-6-1008.

AIDS, HIV testing of persons convicted of rape or aggravated rape, § 39-13-521.

AIDS, restriction on blood donors, § 68-32-104.

Blood and plasma collecting facilities to test for AIDS, § 68-32-102.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

39-13-517. Public indecency.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Nudity” or “state of nudity” means the showing of the bare human male or female genitals or pubic area with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of the areola, or the showing of the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. Nudity or state of nudity does not include a mother in the act of nursing the mother's baby; and
        1. “Public place” means any location frequented by the public, or where the public is present or likely to be present, or where a person may reasonably be expected to be observed by members of the public. Public place includes, but is not limited to, streets, sidewalks, parks, beaches, business and commercial establishments, whether for profit or not-for-profit and whether open to the public at large or where entrance is limited by a cover charge or membership requirement, bottle clubs, hotels, motels, restaurants, night clubs, country clubs, cabarets and meeting facilities utilized by any religious, social, fraternal or similar organizations;
        2. For purposes of subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), “public place” includes a public restroom, whether single sex or not;
      1. Premises used solely as a private residence, whether permanent or temporary in nature, are not deemed to be a public place. Public place does not include enclosed single sex functional showers, locker or dressing room facilities, enclosed motel rooms and hotel rooms designed and intended for sleeping accommodations, doctors' offices, portions of hospitals and similar places in which nudity or exposure is necessarily and customarily expected outside of the home and the sphere of privacy constitutionally protected therein; nor does it include a person appearing in a state of nudity in a modeling class operated by a proprietary school, licensed by this state, a college, junior college, or university supported entirely or partly by taxation, or a private college or university where such private college or university maintains and operates educational programs in which credits are transferable to a college, junior college, or university supported entirely or partly by taxation or an accredited private college. Public place does not include a private facility that has been formed as a family-oriented clothing optional facility, properly licensed by the state.
  2. A person commits the offense of public indecency who, in a public place, knowingly or intentionally:
    1. Engages in sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation, or other ultimate sex acts;
    2. Fondles the genitals of the person, or another person; or
    3. Appears in a state of nudity or performs an excretory function.
  3. A person does not violate subsection (b) if the person makes intentional and reasonable attempts to conceal the person from public view while performing an excretory function, and the person performs the function in an unincorporated area of the state.
  4. Public indecency is punishable as follows:
    1. A first or second offense is a Class B misdemeanor punishable only by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500) unless otherwise specified under subdivision (d)(3);
    2. Unless subdivision (d)(3) applies, a third or subsequent offense is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) or confinement for not more than eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days, or both; and
      1. Notwithstanding subdivisions (d)(1) and (2), where the offense involves the defendant engaging in masturbation by self-stimulation, or the use of an inanimate object, on the property of any public school, private or parochial school, licensed day care center, or other child care facility, and the defendant knows or reasonably should know that a child or children are likely to be present on the property at the time of the conduct, the offense is a Class E felony;
      2. Where a person is charged with a violation under subdivision (d)(3)(A), and the court grants judicial diversion under § 40-35-313, the court shall order, as a condition of probation, that the person be enrolled in a satellite-based monitoring program for the full extent of the person's term of probation, in a manner consistent with the requirements of § 40-39-302.
  5. If a person is arrested for public indecency while working as an employee or a contractor, the employer or principal may be held liable for a fine imposed by subdivision (d); provided, however, the employer may not be held liable under this section unless it is shown the employer knew or should have known the acts of the employee or contractor were in violation of this section.
  6. This section does not apply to any theatrical production that contains nudity performed in a theater by a professional or amateur theatrical or musical company that has serious artistic merit; provided, that the production is not in violation of chapter 17, part 9 of this title.
  7. This section shall not affect in any fashion the ability of local jurisdictions or this state to regulate any activity where alcoholic beverages, including malt beverages, are sold for consumption.

Acts 2012, ch. 885, § 2.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and Class B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

2. Reasonable Suspicion.

Police officer had reasonable suspicion to seize defendant because, based upon the officer's observations, the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant was urinating in public and thus committing the offense of public indecency. The officer observed defendant in an empty parking lot of a public business, standing next to a vehicle and facing away from the street, holding defendant's hands in front of defendant's groin area with shoulders bent over, and saw fluid flowing from the location where defendant had been standing. State v. Fuqua, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 181 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. July 25, 2017).

39-13-518. Continuous sexual abuse of a child — Felony offense — Penalties — Notice identifying multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child” means:
        1. Engaging in three (3) or more incidents of sexual abuse of a child involving the same minor child on separate occasions; provided, that at least one (1) such incident occurred within the county in which the charge is filed and that one (1) such incident occurred on or after July 1, 2014;
        2. Engaging in at least one (1) incident of sexual abuse of a child upon three (3) or more different minor children on separate occasions; provided, that at least one (1) such incident occurred within the county in which the charge is filed and that one (1) such incident occurred on or after July 1, 2014; or
        3. Engaging in five (5) or more incidents of sexual abuse of a child involving two (2) or more different minor children on separate occasions; provided, that at least one (1) such incident occurred within the county in which the charge is filed and that one (1) such incident occurred on or after July 1, 2014; and
      1. The victims of the incidents of sexual abuse of a child share distinctive, common characteristics, qualities or circumstances with respect to each other or to the person committing the offenses, or there are common methods or characteristics in the commission of the offense, allowing otherwise individual offenses to merge into a single continuing offense involving a pattern of criminal activity against similar victims. Common characteristics, qualities or circumstances for purposes of this subdivision (a)(1)(B) include, but are not limited to:
        1. The victims are related to the defendant by blood or marriage;
        2. The victims reside with the defendant; or
        3. The defendant was an authority figure, as defined in § 39-13-527(a)(3), to the victims and the victims knew each other; and
    2. “Sexual abuse of a child” means to commit an act upon a minor child that is a violation of:
      1. § 39-13-502, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
      2. § 39-13-503, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
      3. § 39-13-504;
      4. § 39-13-522;
      5. § 39-13-527;
      6. § 39-13-529(a);
      7. § 39-13-531; or
      8. § 39-13-532.
  2. A person commits continuous sexual abuse of a child who:
    1. Over a period of ninety (90) days or more, engages in multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child as defined in subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i) or (a)(1)(A)(ii); or
    2. Over a period of less than ninety (90) days, engages in multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child as defined in subdivision (a)(1)(A)(iii).
    1. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class A felony if at least three (3) of the acts of sexual abuse of a child constitute violations of any of the following:
      1. § 39-13-502, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
      2. § 39-13-503, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
      3. § 39-13-504;
      4. § 39-13-522;
      5. § 39-13-529(a); or
      6. § 39-13-531.
    2. If one (1) of the three (3) or more violations under subdivision (c)(1) would be punished as a Class B felony if it were a single conviction, then the punishment for a violation of subsection (b) shall be a Class B felony.
    3. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class B felony if there are less than three (3) acts of sexual abuse of a child under the following subdivisions (c)(3)(A) — (F) but there are at least three (3) acts under any combination of subdivision (c)(1) and this subdivision (c)(3):
      1. § 39-13-502, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
      2. § 39-13-503, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
      3. § 39-13-504;
      4. § 39-13-522;
      5. § 39-13-529(a); or
      6. § 39-13-531.
    4. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class C felony if at least three (3) of the acts of sexual abuse of a child constitute violations of the following:
      1. § 39-13-527; or
      2. § 39-13-532.
  3. At least thirty (30) days prior to trial, the state shall file with the court a written notice identifying the multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child upon which the violation of this section is based. The notice shall include the identity of the victim and the statutory offense violated. Upon good cause, and where the defendant was unaware of the predicate offenses listed in the notice, the trial court may grant a continuance to facilitate proper notification of the incidents of sexual abuse of a child and for preparation by the defense of such incidents specified in the statement.
  4. The jury must agree unanimously that the defendant:
      1. During a period of ninety (90) or more days in duration, committed three (3) or more acts of sexual abuse of a child; or
      2. During a period of less than ninety (90) days in duration, committed five (5) or more acts of sexual abuse of a child against at least two (2) different children; and
    1. Committed at least three (3) of the same specific acts of sexual abuse within the specified time period if prosecution is under subdivision (e)(1)(A) and at least five (5) of the same specific acts of sexual abuse within the specified time period if prosecution is under subdivision (e)(1)(B).
  5. The state may charge alternative violations of this section and of the separate offenses committed within the same time period. The separate incidents shall be alleged in separate counts and joined in the same action. A person may be convicted either of one (1) criminal violation of this section, or for one (1) or more of the separate incidents of sexual abuse of a child committed within the county in which the charges were filed, but not both. The state shall not be required to elect submission to the jury of the several counts. The jury shall be instructed to return a verdict on all counts in the indictment. In the event that a verdict of guilty is returned on a separate count that was included in the notice of separate incidents of sexual abuse of a child and the jury returns a verdict of guilty for a violation of this section, at the sentencing hearing the trial judge shall merge the separate count into the conviction under this section and only impose a sentence under this section. A conviction for a violation of this section bars the prosecution of the individual incidents of sexual abuse of a child as separate offenses described in the pretrial notice filed by the state and presented to the jury. A prosecution for a violation of this section does not bar a prosecution in the same action for individual incidents of sexual abuse not identified in the state's pretrial notice. The state shall be required to elect as to those individual incidents of sexual abuse not contained in the pretrial notice prior to submission to the jury. A conviction for such elected offenses shall not be subject to merger at sentencing.
  6. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a person convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished by imprisonment and shall be sentenced from within the full range of punishment for the offense of which the defendant was convicted, regardless of the range for which the defendant would otherwise qualify.

Acts 2014, ch. 940, § 2; 2018, ch. 719, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2014, ch. 940, § 1 provided that the act  shall be known and may be cited as the “Child Protection Act.”

Acts 2018, ch. 719, § 3 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, substituted “for the offense of which the defendant was convicted, regardless of the range for which the defendant would otherwise qualify” for “the offense, between Ranges I — III” at the end of (g).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 719, § 3. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and Class B felonies, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Proposed criminal offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child. OAG 13-35, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 34 (4/29/13).

39-13-519. Forensic medical examination of victims of sexually oriented crime — Protocol for collection and processing of sexual assault evidence kits and hold kits.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Forensic medical examination” means an examination by any healthcare provider who provides medical care and gathers evidence of a sexually oriented crime in a manner suitable for use in a court of law, provided to a victim reporting a sexually oriented crime to a healthcare provider;
    2. “Hold kit” means a sexual assault evidence collection kit of an adult victim that is coded with a number rather than a name pending the victim's decision to report the crime to law enforcement authorities, and has not been submitted to the state crime lab or similar qualified laboratory;
    3. “Law enforcement agency” means:
      1. An established state or local agency that:
        1. Is responsible and has the duty to prevent and detect crime and enforce laws or local ordinances; and
        2. Has employees who are authorized to make arrests for crimes while acting within the scope of their authority; and
      2. A campus security force created by an institution of higher education pursuant to § 49-7-118;
    4. “Sexual assault evidence collection kit” means evidence collected from the victim of a sexually oriented crime with a sexual assault evidence collection kit provided by the state;
    5. “Sexually oriented crime” means those crimes listed in § 29-13-118(b); and
    6. “Victim” means a victim of a sexually oriented crime as defined in § 29-13-118(b).
  2. A victim of a sexually oriented crime is entitled to a forensic medical examination without charge to the victim as provided in § 29-13-118. Upon the conclusion of the forensic examination, the resulting sexual assault evidence collection kit or hold kit shall be released to a law enforcement agency by a healthcare provider for storage or transmission to the state crime lab or other similar qualified laboratory for either serology or deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.
    1. If an adult victim elects not to report the alleged offense to police at the time of the forensic medical examination, the sexual assault evidence collection kit becomes a hold kit, and the healthcare provider shall assign a number to identify the kit rather than use the victim's name. The healthcare provider shall provide the victim with the identifying number placed on the victim's hold kit, information about where and how long the kit will be stored, and the procedures for making a police report. The hold kit shall be released to the appropriate law enforcement agency for storage pursuant to subdivision (d)(2).
    2. If an adult victim reports the alleged offense to the police, or the victim is a minor, the healthcare provider shall attach the victim's name to the sexual assault evidence collection kit, and it shall be released to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
    1. The law enforcement agency shall, within sixty (60) days of taking possession of the sexual assault evidence collection kit with the victim's name affixed to it, submit the kit to the Tennessee bureau of investigation or similar qualified laboratory for either serology or deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.
    2. Upon receipt of a hold kit with only an identification number attached to it, the law enforcement agency shall store the hold kit for a minimum of three (3) years or until the victim makes a police report, whichever event occurs first. Once the victim makes a police report, the law enforcement agency shall have sixty (60) days from the date of the police report to send the sexual assault evidence collection kit to the state crime lab or other similar qualified laboratory for either serology or deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing. However, no hold kit shall be submitted to the state crime lab or similar laboratory for testing until the victim has made a police report.

Acts 2015, ch. 253, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. 2015, ch. 253, § 3 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to all sexual assault evidence collected on or after April 24, 2015.

39-13-520. Creation of model policy for handling, maintenance and testing of sexual assault evidence kits and hold kits.

  1. To provide for the implementation and efficient operation of § 39-13-519 and to ensure a uniform policy for the handling, maintenance, and testing of sexual assault evidence kits and hold kits, the domestic violence state coordinating council shall create a model policy for law enforcement agencies responding to reports of sexually oriented crimes.
  2. The model policy shall include guidelines for officers on:
    1. Investigating reports of sexually oriented crimes;
    2. Providing victim assistance;
    3. Collaborating with victim advocates, healthcare providers, and victim service agencies; and
    4. Collecting, storing, and submitting sexual assault evidence kits to the state crime lab or similar qualified laboratory for either serology or deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.
  3. The model policy shall be distributed to all law enforcement agencies that are likely to encounter reports of sexually oriented crimes on or before January 1, 2016.
  4. All law enforcement agencies that are likely to encounter reports of sexually oriented crimes shall establish written policies and procedures on responding to reports of sexually oriented crimes. An agency may adopt the model policy developed by the domestic violence state coordinating council or an agency may adopt its own policy; provided, that the policy includes the same or higher standards as the model policy developed by the council. Each agency shall adopt its written policy on or before July 1, 2016.

Acts 2015, ch. 253, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. 2015, ch. 253, § 3 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to all sexual assault evidence collected on or after April 24, 2015.

39-13-521. HIV testing of persons convicted of sexual offenses — Release of test results.

  1. When a person is initially arrested for violating § 39-13-502, § 39-13-503, § 39-13-506, § 39-13-522, § 39-13-531 or § 39-13-532 that person shall undergo human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing immediately, or not later than forty-eight (48) hours after the presentment of the information or indictment, with or without the request of the victim. A licensed medical laboratory shall perform the test at the expense of the person arrested. The person arrested shall obtain a confirmatory test when necessary and shall be referred to appropriate counseling.
    1. The licensed medical laboratory shall report the results of the HIV test required under this section immediately to the victim.
    2. The result of any HIV test required under this section is not a public record and shall be available only to:
      1. The victim;
      2. The parent or guardian of a minor or incapacitated victim;
      3. The attending physician of the person tested and of the victim;
      4. The department of health;
      5. The department of correction;
      6. The person tested; and
      7. The district attorney general prosecuting the case.
  2. If the arrestee is convicted, the court shall review the HIV test results prior to sentencing.
    1. For purposes of this section, “HIV” means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
    2. For purposes of this section, “HIV test” means a test of an individual for the presence of human immunodeficiency virus, or for antibodies or antigens that result from HIV infection, or for any other substance specifically indicating infection with HIV. The department of health shall promulgate rules designating the proper test method to be used for this purpose.
    3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the actual transmission of HIV in order for the court to consider it as a mandatory enhancement factor.
  3. Upon the conviction of the defendant for a violation of § 39-13-513, § 39-13-514 or § 39-13-515, the court shall order the convicted person to submit to an HIV test. The test shall be performed by a licensed medical laboratory at the expense of the defendant. The defendant shall obtain a confirmatory test when necessary. The defendant shall be referred to appropriate counseling. The defendant shall return a certified copy of the results of all tests to the court. The court shall examine results in camera and seal the record. For the sole purpose of determining whether there is probable cause to prosecute a person for aggravated prostitution under § 39-13-516, the district attorney general may view the record, notwithstanding subdivision (b)(2). The district attorney general shall be required to file a written, signed request with the court stating the reason the court should grant permission for the district attorney general to view the record. If the test results indicate the defendant is infected with HIV, then the district attorney general may use the results of the test in a prosecution for aggravated prostitution.

Acts 1991, ch. 25, § 1; 1992, ch. 948, § 1; 1994, ch. 989, § 2; 1994, ch. 995, § 1; 2002, ch. 655, § 1; 2005, ch. 353, § 13; 2007, ch. 257, § 1; 2011, ch. 269, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1991, ch. 25, § 2 provided that this section applies to persons charged with such offenses on or after July 1, 1991.

Acts 1992, ch. 948, § 2 provided that the amendment by that act applies to all persons convicted for the offense of prostitution on or after July 1, 1992.

Acts 1994, ch. 989, § 1, provided that the amendments by that act shall be cited as the “Rape Victims' Rights Act of 1994.”

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 18 provided that the act shall apply to sentencing for criminal offenses committed on or after June 7, 2005. Offenses committed prior to June 7, 2005, shall be governed by prior law, which shall apply in all respects. However, for defendants who are sentenced after June 7, 2005, for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1982, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the provisions of the act by executing a waiver of such defendant's ex post facto protections. Upon executing such a waiver, all provisions of the act shall apply to the defendant.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 19 provided that that act shall have no application to sentencing for persons convicted of murder in the first degree, which shall be governed by the provisions of §§ 39-13-20239-13-208.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 20(b) provided that the Tennessee Code Commission is requested to insert a cross reference in §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-505, 39-13-506, 39-13-522, 39-14-302 and 39-14-408 to § 40-35-114 stating that the enhancement factor formerly found in each such section was moved to § 40-35-114 so that all enhancement factors are located in one (1) section.

Cross-References. AIDS, aggravated prostitution, § 39-13-516.

AIDS, patient testing by hospitals, § 68-11-222.

Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Criminal sentencing enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

Prohibition on AIDS victims donating blood, § 68-32-104.

Sexually transmitted diseases, confidentiality of records and information, § 68-10-113.

Testing for AIDS, contaminated blood, cause of action for AIDS infection from untested blood, § 68-32-102.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of statute requiring HIV testing of individuals convicted of prostitution, OAG 93-31 (4/2/93).

39-13-522. Rape of a child.

  1. Rape of a child is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim, if the victim is more than eight (8) years of age but less than thirteen (13) years of age.
    1. Rape of a child is a Class A felony.
      1. Notwithstanding title 40, chapter 35, a person convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished as a Range II offender;  however, the sentence imposed upon such person may, if appropriate, be within Range III but in no case shall it be lower than Range II.
      2. Section 39-13-525(a) shall not apply to a person sentenced under this subdivision (b)(2).
      3. Notwithstanding any  law to the contrary, the board of parole may require, as a mandatory condition of supervision for any person convicted under this section, that the person be enrolled in a satellite-based monitoring program for the full extent of the person's term of supervision consistent with the requirements of § 40-39-302.

Acts 1992, ch. 878, § 1; 1997, ch. 406, § 2; 2005, ch. 353, § 14; 2006, ch. 890, § 22; 2007, ch. 501, § 1; 2011, ch. 306, § 1; 2020, ch. 588, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 18 provided that the act shall apply to sentencing for criminal offenses committed on or after June 7, 2005. Offenses committed prior to June 7, 2005, shall be governed by prior law, which shall apply in all respects. However, for defendants who are sentenced after June 7, 2005, for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1982, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the provisions of the act by executing a waiver of such defendant's ex post facto protections. Upon executing such a waiver, all provisions of the act shall apply to the defendant.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 19 provided that that act shall have no application to sentencing for persons convicted of murder in the first degree, which shall be governed by the provisions of §§ 39-13-20239-13-208.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 20(b) provided that the Tennessee Code Commission is requested to insert a cross reference in §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-505, 39-13-506, 39-13-522, 39-14-302 and 39-14-408 to § 40-35-114 stating that the enhancement factor formerly found in each such section was moved to § 40-35-114 so that all enhancement factors are located in one (1) section.

Acts 2006, ch. 890, § 1 provided that: “The provisions of this act, even though not codified together, may collectively be known as the ‘Child Protection Act of 2006’.”

Acts 2012, ch. 727, § 1 amended § 4-3-104, which concerns name changes of departments and divisions, to provide that references to the board of probation and parole, formerly referred to in subdivision (b)(2)(C), are deemed references to the board of parole.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment substituted “eight (8) years of age” for “three (3) years of age” in (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 588, § 3. July 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Child abuse, title 39, ch. 15, part 4.

Criminal sentencing enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

Law Reviews.

“Let’s Talk About Sexting, Baby”: A Mens Rea-Centered Approach to the Sexting Issue in Tennessee (Emily Long), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1139  (2012).

“No Provincial or Transient Notion”: The Need for a Mistake of Age Defense in Child Rape Prosecutions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 693 (2004).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1 Application.

Trial court erred by sentencing defendant pursuant to the enhanced sentencing provision of T.C.A. § 39-13-522, because no proof was presented at trial regarding the individual dates of the offenses and thus, the record failed to reflect that the enhanced version of § 39-13-522, which went into effect during the time period alleged, applied. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, zol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

2. Requisite Elements.

Trial court properly determined defendant to be a repeat violent offender for T.C.A. § 40-35-120(g) purposes as a certified Oregon judgment constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had previously served a separate period of incarceration since the 1995 judgment stated that defendant was sentenced to the custody of the Corrections Division of the State of Oregon for the crime of sodomy in the first degree, 3 counts, for a period not to exceed 111 months; defendant admitted that Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.405 had similar elements to T.C.A. § 39-13-522. State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 870 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2010).

3. Indictment.

An indictment charging rape of a child in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-522 met constitutional requirements of notice and form and was valid, even though it failed to allege a culpable mental state. State v. Stokes, 954 S.W.2d 729, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. 1997).

T.C.A. § 39-13-502, (prior to the 1992 amendments) prohibiting aggravated rape, and T.C.A. § 39-13-522, prohibiting child rape, proscribe the same conduct and the defendant was not prejudiced by the fact that the time period indicated in the indictment covered a period before the enactment of the child rape law because his alleged conduct was still prohibited under the aggravated rape statute which was the original indicted charge. State v. Gibson, 973 S.W.2d 231, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Where the indictment charging defendant with rape of a child alleged that he caused a child less than 13 years of age to engage in unlawful sexual penetration of the defendant in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-522, it met the constitutional and statutory requirements of notice and form, as a culpable mental state could be logically inferred from such language. State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. 1999), overruled in part, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Time of the offense is not an essential element of rape of a child, nor is it a required component of an indictment generally; because the amended indictments covered the time frame of the offenses elected by the State, there was no fatal variance. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

4. Election Required.

State erred in its election of penetration by cunnilingus because the victim did not testify to penetration by cunnilingus but rather penetration by fellatio; however, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim's articulate and particularized testimony of a single act of penetration by fellatio under very specific circumstances was enough to satisfy the requirement of jury unanimity despite the State's inaccurate election. State v. Knowles, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 426 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2014), aff'd, 470 S.W.3d 416, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. July 31, 2015).

For both counts, the State chose a single rape that was described by each victim with enough detail to ensure that the jury deliberated and reached a verdict on the same act; the State made a proper election of offenses. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Because both Count One, alleging penile/vaginal penetration, and Count Three, alleging penile/digital penetration, were described by the victim as happening in the bedroom of defendant on many occasions during the period of time described in the indictment, the testimony that the victim provided constituted generic evidence; thus, the strict election requirement did not apply, and a modified unanimity instruction that allowed a conviction only if the jury unanimously agreed that defendant committed all the acts described by the victim was properly given. State v. Irwin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2016).

Although the State's failure to elect the offenses for which rape of a child convictions were sought and the trial court's failure to provide an instruction consistent with an election resulted in error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the prosecutor's closing argument effectively elected the specific incidents for which the State sought each conviction. State v. Breeden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2020).

5. Election Not Required.

Defendant's contention that the State failed to make a proper election of the offenses for any of the charged offenses of three counts of attempted rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery was rejected because the victim testified about three incidents of sexual contact, she did not testify about any additional incidents, the jury verdict form stated which incidents related to which counts. State v. Mabe, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 920 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017).

Defendant did not argue prior to appeal that the State was required to make an election, which waived the issue, but in any event, he would not be able to show that his substantial rights were violated because he elected to proceed with a bench trial and thus he could not claim that his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated. Furthermore, the State only offered proof of one rape, and no election was required, and the trial court clearly identified the factual bases for the two aggravated sexual battery convictions. State v. Haven, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020).

Failure to make an election on the rape of a child charge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim provided detailed testimony about only one incident of penetration during the timeframe of Count One; and the victim's testimony with regard to the rape that occurred on September 2010 was sufficiently specific and detailed with regard to time, place, and method that there was no reasonable likelihood that some of the jurors might have convicted defendant based on her vague and generalized assertions that it happened on other, unspecified occasions. State v. Fields, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

6. Lesser Included Offenses.

In trial against defendant who was charged with aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery, jury should have been advised that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser included offense of aggravated rape; the charge should also have instructed the jury as to the order and method of consideration of the lesser included offenses instead of being advised that the two offenses were separate and required separate verdicts. State v. Banes, 874 S.W.2d 73, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Under some circumstances the offense of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery, though lesser included offenses, would support separate charges and separate convictions; the determination requires an analysis of the allegations of the indictment, the proof, and the elements of the offense. State v. Banes, 874 S.W.2d 73, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Statutory rape is not a lesser included offense of rape of a child, nor is it a lesser grade offense of rape of a child. State v. Ealey, 959 S.W.2d 605, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Court affirmed defendant's conviction of attempted child rape, in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522(a), 39-12-101; given that the second attack was similar in nature and within two weeks of the first attack, and that the victim testified that defendant raped the victim during the second attack, it was permissible for the jury to have inferred that defendant intended to rape the victim the first time. State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. 2003), dismissed, Elkins v. Sexton, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131508 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2011).

In a rape of a child case, the trial court properly denied defendant's lesser-included offense instruction for attempted rape, as intrusion into the victim's mouth was not required to accomplish fellatio. State v. Marcum, 109 S.W.3d 300, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. 2003).

Charges of rape of a child under T.C.A. § 39-13-522 were improperly severed from charges of aggravated sexual battery of a child under thirteen years of age under T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a)(4) because the rape counts met the criteria for mandatory joinder under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(1)(A); the severance of the offenses was not necessary pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(2)(A) because that state's reasons for moving to sever the offenses were insufficient, and the state did not explain why a limiting instruction to the jury would not have preserved a fair determination of defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense. State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2007), modified, 230 S.W.3d 88, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2007).

Trial court instructed the jury on aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child pursuant to case law, and the amendment to the statute that held that aggravated sexual battery was no longer a lesser included offense of rape of a child did not take effect until 2009, after the offenses in this case; thus, the appellant has failed to show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached, and no plain error was found. State v. Whitehair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury on aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of rape of a child because it was not a lesser included offense as a result of the amendment to T.C.A. § 40-18-110, defendant had not agreed to an amended indictment, and because the evidence was insufficient to prove the lesser-included offense of child abuse under T.C.A. § 39-15-401, as there was no proof that the victim suffered actual injury from defendant touching his penis to her vagina, and therefore defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual battery was vacated. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2016).

Rape of a child was not a lesser included offense of aggravated rape of a child, as each required a different element, a victim of a different age. State v. Bolden, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 428 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2017).

Because the attempt to commit a crime is a lesser-included offense of the completed crime, attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery is also a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the State failed to prove that the victim was less than 13 years old was properly denied because counsel testified that, after consulting with and preparing for trial with defendant, she chose to pursue a defense that the facts failed to show he committed the alleged offenses; a strategy of arguing that the facts failed to show that defendant had sexually penetrated the victim did not turn on a question of the age of the victim; and counsel's strategy proved somewhat successful in that defendant was acquitted of rape of a child and was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted rape of a child. Russell v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2018).

7. Multiple Convictions.

Dual conviction of a defendant for both aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child did not violate due process or double jeopardy protections. State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. 1999), overruled in part, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Defendant's convictions for rape of a child related to digital and oral penetration during one incident did not violate due process, as the digital penetration was not incidental to the oral penetration. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, zol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Defendant's two convictions for rape of a child did not violate his due process rights because defendant was convicted of rape of a child in Count One by inserting his penis into the victim's vagina; defendant was convicted of rape of a child in Count Three by inserting his fingers inside the victim's vagina; the victim testified that the abuse occurred over the course of several years; and there was nothing in the record to suggest that defendant performed both of those acts during a single criminal episode. State v. Irwin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2016).

Defendant's convictions for attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child arose out of the same act or transaction because the contact between defendant's penis and the victim's buttocks and genitals occurred simultaneously and with no change in position; defendant's touching of the victim's buttocks with his penis was not an act independent of his rape of her genital area but, rather, was merely incidental to the genital penetration. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Case involved a multiple description claim because defendant was convicted of violating two different statutes, the statute proscribing aggravated sexual battery and the statute proscribing rape of a child. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Court of criminal appeals did not err by ordering the merger of defendant's convictions for attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child because attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery was a lesser-included offense of rape of a child, and the dual convictions violated double jeopardy; the appropriate remedy for the double jeopardy violation was the merger of the lesser offense into the greater offense. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

8. Evidence.

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, defendant's request to introduce evidence of the child victim's knowledge of sexual matters was properly denied as the witnesses'  testimony was irrelevant because the sexual behavior admissible was expressly limited to the victim's sexual activity, but defendant did not introduce evidence that the victim was one of the children engaged in the act of “hunching” with his clothes down; and, while the witnesses testified that they understood “hunching” to be a sexual activity, defendant did not provide any evidence that “hunching” resembled the sexual acts the victim accused defendant of engaging in with him. State v. Norton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Trial court erred by allowing defendant's wife to be cross-examined about another alleged rape during defendant's trial for rape of a child because it failed to comply with the requirements of this rule as the State failed to present proof that the other accuser had reported her allegation prior to the instant victim's allegations, and the trial court failed to give a limiting instruction regarding the cross-examination. The error was not harmless because the only evidence of defendant's guilt was the victim's testimony. State v. Mendez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2019).

9. —Sufficient.

Where victim testified that she was 11 years of age at the time that she and appellant had sexual intercourse, that proof was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the appellant committed the offense of aggravated rape. State v. Banes, 874 S.W.2d 73, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Defendant was properly convicted of child rape in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-522(a), given the definition of sexual penetration in T.C.A. § 39-13-501(7); the evidence showed that: (1) The victim was 11 years old at the time of the attacks, (2) The victim testified that during the second attack, defendant raped the victim; and (3) While there were inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, the inconsistencies were not such as to create a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. 2003), dismissed, Elkins v. Sexton, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131508 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2011).

Defendant's convictions of child rape and statutory rape were affirmed, given that both victims testified as to defendant's unlawful sexual penetration and defendant confessed to the crimes. State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. 2003).

There was clear and convincing evidence that father engaged in severe child abuse because: (1) Several child witnesses stated that they observed him raping and/or sexually assaulting his daughter and one of her friends, both under the age of 13; (2) Children's testimony was corroborated by medical experts and the testimony of other professionals; (3) Children's statements were validated by numerous exhibits, photographs, magazines, videos, and “sex toys,” which the children accurately identified; (4) Father's 10-year-old son witnessed him having sex with the daughter; and (5) Father exposed the boys to his sexual abuse of at least two minor girls, to “sex toys,” to the parents'  sexual activity, and to numerous and varied pornographic materials; thus, circuit court properly found that the children were dependent and neglected because the children were severely abused, father injured or endangered the morals or health of his children or others, and father was unfit to care for them. In re H.L.F., 297 S.W.3d 223, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2009).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's six convictions of rape of a child under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522(a) and 39-13-501(7) as: (1) defendant taped the less than 13-year-old victim to his bed and penetrated her vagina; (2) .while on an old sofa in the victim's bedroom, defendant penetrated the victim's vagina, causing her to bleed; (3) when defendant was reading a book on her bed, defendant penetrated the victim in the anus; (4) when the victim was watching television, defendant penetrated the victim in the vagina; (5) when the victim was in her mother and defendant's bedroom looking at some of her dead grandmother's pictures, defendant again penetrated the victim's anus; and (6) when the victim was recovering from a motorcycle injury, defendant penetrated her vagina. State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

State presented sufficient proof to support the convictions for rape of a child; although the proof in this case did not include corroboration of every element of each conviction offense as to each victim, the victims'  testimony identifying specific incidents during the time period alleged by the indictment sufficiently corroborated defendant's admissions that he touched the victims and penetrated them digitally. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2012), aff'd, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014).

Testimony of the victim, her sister, and her cousin that the elected offense occurred on the night before the victim began menstruating at the age of nine was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child. State v. Herron, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 461 S.W.3d 890, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2015).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for rape of a child because the State established the elements by showing the sexual penetration of the victim; the victim testified that defendant forced her to perform fellatio. State v. Knowles, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 426 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2014), aff'd, 470 S.W.3d 416, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. July 31, 2015).

Defendant's daughters testimony adequately corroborated defendant's incriminating statements to his wife and based on defendant's admissions the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery as their testimony provided prima facie evidence that a sex crime had occurred and their testimony provided substantial independent evidence that defendant's confession was trustworthy. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 1028 (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2014), cert. denied, Clark v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2846, 192 L. Ed. 2d 882, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3937 (U.S. June 15, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery because defendant sexually penetrated the seven-year-old victim's vagina with his penis, his finger, and his tongue; he kissed the victim's bare chest; the victim's testimony surrounding the events was very detailed and was in line with the description of the abuse the victim provided to a forensic social worker; and, although a nurse practitioner found no evidence of injury during her physical examination of the victim, she testified that such results were typical due, in part, to the elasticity of the vaginal tissue. State v. Dickerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2016).

Victim one testified that the first time defendant raped her happened when she was 11 or 12 years old and in the fifth grade; by its verdict, the jury clearly accredited victim one's testimony and found that she was less than 13 years of age at the time of the elected offense, and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Injuries to victim two were consistent with her report of sexual assault and by its verdict, the jury clearly accredited the testimony of victim two that she had been raped by defendant, and thus the State presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's rape convictions. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Defendant conceded that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest, and the victim provided detailed testimony about all three of the offenses for which the State elected to prosecute, and her account of what transpired proved all elements of each offense. State v. Pilate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child where both of the victims described specific instances of sexual contact, the evidence showed that on four separate occasions defendant sexually abused one victim, he digital penetrated the victim twice, and he sexually assaulted the second victim, and the second victim's testimony established that defendant implicitly admitted to the abuse. State v. Church, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of rape of a child because the victim testified that defendant sexually abused the victim and that the victim recalled one incident in which the victim was in defendant's bedroom and defendant placed defendant's penis inside of defendant's private. The victim later noticed blood in the victim's underwear, and the victim's parent also noticed blood in the victim's underwear. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of incest, aggravated sexual battery, attempted rape, and sexual battery by an authority figure; the victim testified about the sexual abuse that occurred for years, and witness testimony corroborated events that gave credence to the victim's claims, and credibility was for the jury to determine. State v. Whitehair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence that defendant put his penis between the victim's legs from behind and moved it back and forth and that his penis touched a little bit inside her private part, and that, another time, defendant used his fingers to separate her private part and touch the inside of it, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for rape of a child. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, zol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child where the victim testified that while living at the mobile home defendant touched her vagina “on the inside” with his fingers and tongue and that two separate incidents occurred at the duplex, one in which the defendant touched her vagina with his tongue, hand, and penis, and one in which the defendant forced the victim to engage in fellatio. State v. Pillars, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Victim's testimony that, when she was 11 years old, she was sleeping on the couch when defendant woke her up, placed his penis in her mouth, and moved it around until it emitted a white substance that was warm and sticky was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of attempted rape of a child because, with respect to the rape of a child counts, the victim described defendant penetrating her vagina with his penis and his fingers, and she testified that it went on for a long time and that she was raped almost every day; and, with respect to the attempted rape of a child counts, the victim described one occasion of attempted anal penetration where defendant tried to put his penis in her butt, but was unsuccessful; and both the victim and the step-brother testified that defendant tried to get the step-brother to have sex with the victim, but the step-brother freaked out when he could not get an erection and left. State v. Irwin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2016).

Victim's testimony that defendant “stuck his privates in my butt” and made him feel “really bad pain” permitted the jury to determine defendant penetrated the victim's anus, as required for a rape of a child conviction. State v. Reyes, 505 S.W.3d 890, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child where it showed that defendant put the mouth of the five-year-old victim on his penis. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2016).

Rational jury could have found defendant guilty of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Minor inconsistencies between the victim's testimony and her friend's testimony did not create reasonable doubt. State v. Webb, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 900 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence that defendant moved in with the victim and her family and would come into her room and force her to perform fellatio on him to the point that he would ejaculate, and that DNA testing found the presence of the victim's DNA on defendant's penis was sufficient to show that the defendant unlawfully penetrated the then six-year old victim when he forced her to perform fellatio on him, supporting his conviction for rape of a child. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 929 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Victim's testimony that defendant penetrated her vagina with his fingers, that a second, similar incident occurred after she made the cheerleading squad, that on defendant's birthday one year he forced her to perform fellatio, and that defendant forced her to perform fellatio in a church van despite her request to stop because it made her “feel gross” was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for rape of a child. State v. Curtis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2016).

Evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was more than sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of rape of a child beyond a reasonable doubt because the minor inconsistencies between the victim's testimony and the testimony of other witnesses did not detract from the victim's unwavering testimony of the crime; the victim testified that defendant, who was her mother's ex-husband, licked her on her private area. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 935 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child where the victim testified that she lived in Memphis until she was 12 years old, the events in question happened when she still lived in Memphis, defendant made several sexual advances toward the victim, including asking her to put her mouth on his penis, trying to kiss her, and “rubbing on” her feet, when the victim rebuffed each advance defendant climbed on top of the victim on the couch, removed her leggings, and put his mouth against her vagina, he then took off his own pants, inserted his penis inside the victim's vagina, and “started pushing it in and out” for approximately five minutes, and after the encounter, the victim saw “white stuff” on her leggings and on defendant's shirt. State v. Benton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child because, although imperfect, a partial DNA profile obtained from sperm samples which were recovered from the victim's genitalia tended to prove defendant's identity as the contributor and the victim, defendant's stepchild, testified that defendant on different occasions touched the victim inside the slit of the victim's private part and forced the victim to perform fellatio. State v. Guevara, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 965 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child where the victim testified that defendant came into her bedroom, told her to lower her pants, lay her on the bed, and penetrated her vagina with his penis, a physician testified that in most cases of child sexual abuse the victim's physical examination was normal, and forensic analysis showed the presence of semen on the crotch area of a pair of the victim's panties and a blanket from her bed. State v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery because (1) the victim testified defendant touched the victim and inserted defendant's hand in the victim's vagina and, on another day, penetrated the victim's mouth with defendant's penis and ejaculated, (2) no corroboration of the victim's testimony was required, and (3) a jury was made aware of any inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, which were not so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. State v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2016).

Supreme Court concluded, based on the proof in the record on appeal, that defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child was supported by the evidence should be reinstated. State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2016).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of two counts of rape of a child involving two different victims because, while the sexual assault examinations of the victims neither confirmed nor discounted sexual assault, forensic evidence was not required to establish proof of rape, the victims'  testimony was sufficient evidence of their rapes, the record reflected that several days had passed between the rapes and victims'  disclosure to their mother, and the inconsistencies pointed out by defendant were not so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of his guilt. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 951 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 223 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child because defendant put the mouth of the victim, who was five years old or younger at the time, on his penis; and he admitted that his penis was in her mouth. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Criminal court properly convicted defendant of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery because, although the victim could not recall the details of the first incident during his trial testimony, the forensic interview, admitted as substantive evidence, reflected that the victim provided details about the nature of the incident, the sequence of events, the type of sexual contact, and where his mother and sisters were at the time, the credibility of the witnesses and any inconsistencies in the testimony were resolved by the jury, and the evidence regarding the first incident was sufficient to support the State's election of the offense. State v. Bostick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child, as the evidence overwhelmingly established defendant's sexual penetration of the victim. Although defendant denied all abuse and questioned the victim's conflicting testimony about penetration, such matters of witness credibility and evidentiary weight were within the exclusive province of the trier of fact. State v. Cruz, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child because the victim testified that when she was between eight and nine years old, defendant stayed with her family for a period of months and one night he woke her in the middle of the night, told her to go to the bathroom, locked the door, took off their clothing, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Notwithstanding the victim's failure to identify “Daddy Carl” in the courtroom during the trial, there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “Daddy Carl” committed the offense of rape of a child and that “Daddy Carl” was defendant. State v. Adkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery because defendant sexually penetrated the seven-year-old victim through fellatio and anal intercourse as the victim testified that defendant put his sexual organ in the victim's butt and in his mouth; the victim consistently reported that to his medical providers and the child advocacy center; the uncorroborated testimony of a child victim of sexual abuse was sufficient to support defendant's convictions; and questions regarding the victim's credibility and the weight and value to be given to his testimony were to be determined by the trier of fact and not the appellate court. State v. Norton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for rape of a child because the victim, defendant's minor child, described occasions when the victim was visiting with defendant, who was divorced, during which defendant, in the pretext of teaching the victim about sex, performed oral sex on the victim, placed the victim's fingers inside defendant's vagina, and on one occasion started to pull the victim's penis to press inside defendant's vagina. The jury found the victim's testimony to be credible and resolved any inconsistencies. State v. Montgomery, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 800 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 1, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempted rape of a child because the victim testified that, after the victim refused defendant's requests to engage in sexual intercourse with defendant, defendant flipped the victim over onto the victim's stomach on a bed, removed the victim's pajama pants and underwear, placed Vaseline on defendant's erect penis, and repeatedly attempted to penetrate the victim with defendant's penis from behind. State v. Black, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2017).

Rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty of rape of a child because the victim testified that defendant licked her private part and did so while she was sitting on his face. State v. Farr, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of three counts of attempted rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery because the victim testified that on one occasion defendant touched her genitals and buttocks and penetrated her, and on a second occasion he touched her genitals. State v. Mabe, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 920 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017).

Victim's description of defendant having put his fingers inside the two parts, touching the line on her pee pee and swinging it around, “digging,” and moving his hand from side to side, combined with the drawing utilized in the forensic interview, established penetration, in the legal sense, of the victim's vulva and labia, as required to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child. State v. Clymer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2017).

State presented sufficient proof that defendant sexually penetrated the victim, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-13-501, and his convictions of rape under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522(a), 39-13-503(a)(2), were supported; the victim testified that defendant sexually penetrated her on several occasions, including when she was four years old, in kindergarten, and when she was nine or 10, 12, and a freshman in high school. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child because the victim's testimony, when the victim was fifteen years old, reflected that the victim provided details about the nature of the incident, the sequence of events, and the type of sexual penetration involved. The victim testified that defendant penetrated the victim's vagina with defendant's finger and that the victim was age eight or nine at the time of the incident. State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child because the jury accepted the victim's testimony that defendant sexually penetrated her when she was under the age of thirteen, and it rejected defendant's testimony that the victim was over thirteen years of age when defendant had sexual intercourse with his daughter. State v. Sisco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to uphold the verdicts finding defendant guilty of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against the victim because there were no inconsistencies in the victim's testimony so unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt; the victim's testimony amounted to an assertion that defendant raped her on two occasions and that she then went home and recorded the assaults in a diary. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for rape of a child because the victim, who was seven at the time of the offenses, testified that on three separate occasions defendant covered her head with an orange towel and penetrated her vagina, and her testimony was corroborated in various ways by witnesses, who confirmed the configuration of defendant's homes, his ownership of an orange towel, the victim's presence in his home, and the victim's physical injury resulting from the first rape. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child because the victim testified that defendant kissed her breast, attempted to penetrate her vaginally, and penetrated her orally, she testified that there was enough light for defendant to see and that defendant would have realized that it was her and not her sister performing fellatio, and defendant acknowledged all three instances of sexual contact between himself and the victim during his interview with an investigator. State v. Langlinais, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2018).

Evidence that the victim was defendant's biological daughter, was 11 or 12 years old at the time of the abuse, and testified that defendant used his tongue to lick the inside of her vagina and his hand to touch her vagina supported defendant's convictions for rape of a child and incest. State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. Sept. 14, 2018).

Victim's testimony that defendant told the victim to take off his pajamas and get on top of defendant and that defendant “raised up” and put the victim's penis in defendant's mouth was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child. State v. Bogle, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2018).

Defendant's rape conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, as the jury could have determined that defendant engaged in sexual penetration by means of cunnilingus, fellatio, and vaginal intercourse; defendant raped the minor victim almost every other night over four years, the victim specifically testified as to three instances of sexual abuse by defendant, and the jury accredited the victim's account of abuse and rejected defendant's denial of the same, as was its prerogative. Little v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest because the 11-year-old victim testified that she was forced to perform fellatio on defendant, her grandfather; she recalled the abuse in detail, was unequivocal in her testimony, and identified a unique birthmark on defendant's upper thigh; and the inconsistencies pointed to by defendant involved the victim's terminology of sexually explicit terms, and were in no way material to the elements of the offense. State v. Harrah, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for rape of a child because the testimony of the minor victim, a forensic interviewer, and a nurse examiner, as well as defendant's confession, showed that defendant went into the victim's bedroom, began touching the victim's genital area while the victim was sleeping in the victim's bed, pulled down the victim's pants and began kissing the victim's vagina, moved the victim from the bed onto the floor, and put the tip of defendant's penis into the victim's vagina. State v. Gonzales, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of child rape because the victim testified that she awoke to find defendant lying on top of her and penetrating her vagina with his penis and his fingers, a witness testified that he saw defendant lying on top of the victim, that he recognized what was going on, and that defendant admitted having had sexual intercourse with the victim as well as having “fingered” her, and defendant admitted in his statements to police that he had penetrated the victim with his penis and with his fingers and that he knew at the time that she was only 12 years old. State v. Branch, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2018).

In the death row prisoner's habeas corpus petition, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child as there appeared to be human semen found inside the victim's shorts, which were clean when she left the house; and her clothing was apparently removed, suggesting sexual activity. Rogers v. Westbrooks, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49452 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child because defendant told an officer that he had the seven-year-old victim suck his sexual organ; the victim told a nurse that defendant put his sexual organ in her mouth; and defendant's semen was found on the victim's underwear. State v. Rimmer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of rape and four counts of aggravated sexual battery; the victim testified to the acts of abuse by defendant over the course of several days, and despite his argument to the contrary, it was within the jury's province to accredit the victim's testimony and convict him upon that proof. State v. Lancaster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's rape of a child conviction because (1) the victim testified to multiple acts of penetration, and (2) the victim's testimony was corroborated. State v. Todd, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

Reasonable jury could conclude that defendant committed rape of a child and incest because during the recorded interview, played for the jury at trial, the victim, who was defendant's son, again disclosed that defendant had forced him to lick her private parts, and the victim confirmed at trial that the statements he provided in the recorded interview were true; the victim's twin sister also testified that defendant would take the victim into a room and shut the door. State v. Ray, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated sexual battery, incest, and rape of a child because the victim testified that defendant, her father, kissed and touched her vagina and breasts, put his penis in her mouth, licked her vagina, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. State v. Cooper, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape of a child because the victim testified that when she was 12 years old and spending the night with defendant she awoke, defendant was on top of her, and his penis was in her vagina. A sexual assault nurse examiner testified that the redness she found around the victim's genital area was consistent with her disclosure and that when she touched the victim's hymen with a Q-tip she saw a small amount of blood. State v. Barnett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2019).

Victim's testimony that defendant took her into the bathroom, blindfolded her, told her to kneel on the ground with her hands behind her back, placed his penis in her mouth, and told her to suck on his penis as hard as she could was sufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child. State v. Blackwell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2019).

Victim's testimony that defendant took her into the bathroom, blindfolded her, told her to kneel on the ground with her hands behind her back, placed his penis in her mouth, and told her to suck on his penis as hard as she could was sufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child. State v. Blackwell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and misdemeanor child abuse; the victim, who was four years old at the time of the offenses, was consistent in her statements that defendant placed his penis in her mouth and anus and that he made her wrap her hands around his penis and move it up and down, and the victim's trial testimony was also consistent with what she told the forensic interviewer. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2019).

Evidence that the victim was younger then 13 years old when defendant, who lived with the victim's mother, covered the victim's head with a pillow and penetrated her vagina with his penis was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of rape of a child. State v. Mayberry, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape of a child conviction; the victim testified that defendant licked her private part, and a jury could easily have inferred that the victim was referring to her vagina, and thus a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of rape of a child. State v. Zarate, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 5, 2019).

Defendant's convictions of four counts of rape of a child and four counts of incest were supported by sufficient evidence; the victim detailed several incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while she lived with defendant, her father, which alone was sufficient. While no corroboration was needed, medical evidence also supported her testimony, plus one eyewitness testified to seeing the victim perform a sex act on defendant. State v. Vest, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the victim did not consent to defendant's anally penetrating him because the victim testified that defendant told him to perform various sex acts, defendant was the disciplinarian of the household, the victim testified that anal penetration did not feel right and sometimes hurt him, and a nurse testified that when she examined the victim two days after the incident she observed a three and one-half inch tear at the top of the victim's buttocks consistent with them having been forcefully jerked apart. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish the victim's age for the rape of a child convictions pertaining the three incidents because the victim's date of birth was December 14, 2001, meaning that his 13th birthday was December 14, 2014, and it was undisputed that defendant was the victim's stepfather at the time the incidents occurred. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

Evidence that defendant pushed the victim onto the futon, applied lubricant to the victim's penis, got on top of the victim, and placed the victim's penis inside the Defendant's anus when the victim was older than age three and younger than age 13 was ufficien to support a conviction for rape of a child. State v. Ledbetter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

Evidence that defendant placed the victim's erect penis in defendant's mouth and that the victim was older than age three and younger than age 13 when the event occurred was sufficient to support a conviction for rape of a child. State v. Ledbetter, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child and incest because it was undisputed that defendant was the victim's natural father, the victim testified that he was nine when he was abused by his father, and in addition to telling his grandparents that defendant raped him, he wrote it on a piece of paper at school. State v. Strange, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Defendant's convictions for rape and rape of a child were supported by evidence that defendant touched first victim's vagina when she was 11 using his fingers, when first victim was 12 defendant inserted his fingers into her vagina to show her where her “cherry” was located, defendant regularly checked first victim's vagina with his fingers, and defendant touched second victim's vagina and clitoris with his fingers when she was 10 or 11, touched second victim's vagina on multiple occasions when she was between 10 and 12. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child and aggravated statutory rape because the victim acknowledged that defendant's penis went inside her vagina, she said that he used a condom, and in text messages exchanged the following day, the victim and defendant discussed defendant's use of a condom, that the victim's vagina was hurting, and that defendant only “put [it] in one time.” State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of rape of a child; the jury obviously accredited the victim's testimony that defendant vaginally penetrated her. State v. Chaves-Abrego, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 18, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery; both stepchildren testified that defendant sexually assaulted them, inconsistencies in their testimony were not so improbable or unsatisfactory as to have created reasonable doubt as a matter of law, and their testimony did not have to be corroborated by medical testimony. State v. Haven, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child because, one night in September 2010, defendant pulled the victim onto his lap, pulled out his sexual organ, and asked the victim to play with it; defendant penetrated the victim's private parts with his sexual organ; and the victim was 12 years old at the time. State v. Fields, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child were supported by sufficient evidence, including evidence that defendant began sexually abusing the victim when she was six or seven, continued the abuse of some years, the abuse included instances where defendant penetrated the victim vaginally and forced her to perform fellatio, and the victim suffered from chlamydia and a torn hymen. State v. Terrell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of rape of a child because, as to the first incident, defendant rubbed his sexual organ on her privates, he unsuccessfully attempted to insert his sexual organ into her privates, and she described pain every time that he tried, from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that penetration, however slight, occurred; as to the second incident, defendant rubbed his sexual organ on her privates and attempted to insert his sexual organ into her privates, and the victim described pain during the incident; and, as to the third incident, defendant pushed the victim's head down, and had her place her mouth on his sexual organ. State v. Breeden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted rape of a child because defendant sent text messages to the nine-year-old victim asking when she wanted to have sex with him; a detective began posing as the victim; defendant messaged the victim to meet him at a specific location; when defendant arrived at the meeting location and was arrested, he had a tube of petroleum jelly, a condom, and an inflatable mattress in his car; and the State was only required to prove that defendant believed he was going to have sex with a child under the age of 13. State v. Holbrooks, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2020).

Victim's testimony that when the victim was eight years old the mother took the victim to his grandmother's house, defendant was there and came into the victim's room, immobilized him, pulled down his parent, and forced his private part into the victim's anus was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape of a child. Contrary to defendant's claim, the date of the offense was not an element of the offense. State v. Golden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2020).

Two victims provided similar accounts to a sexual assault nurse examiner, whose physical examinations revealed mild redness in the first victim's genital area and severe redness throughout the second victim's genital area. Inasmuch as this was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant sexually penetrated each victim, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to sustain defendant's child rape and incest convictions. State v. Henson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 697 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2020).

9.5. —Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest as to incidents that occurred in a bedroom and a basement at a certain address because the State's elected dates between which the incident occurred and the victim's age were not sufficiently proven. There was no proof of a temporal marker that confirmed whether the incidents occurred before the State's elected date of September 22, 2014 and no questions were asked regarding whether the events occurred prior to the victim's 13th birthday in December 2014. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

10. —Suppression.

Where defendant charged with rape of a child filed a motion to suppress certain statements he made to the polygraph examiner after the polygraph test, the supreme court of Tennessee held that the statements were admissible; defendant received Miranda warnings, defendant executed a written waiver of his constitutional rights, and the evidence did not establish, nor even suggest, that defendant's potentially incriminating statements resulted from police coercion or overreaching rather than his own free will. State v. Damron, 151 S.W.3d 510, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 993 (Tenn. 2004).

11. Instructions.

Given the overwhelming evidence against defendant and the proof of sexual penetration even assuming that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on aggravated sexual battery in connection with defendant's trial on the charges of child rape, the court concluded that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. 2003).

Supreme Court of Tennessee finds that, regarding the crime of rape of a child, a court accurately instructs the jury when it presents the elements of the crime, and instructs the jury that it may find the defendant guilty if the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally in relation to both elements of the offense. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 1028 (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2014), cert. denied, Clark v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2846, 192 L. Ed. 2d 882, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3937 (U.S. June 15, 2015).

Trial court properly instructed the jury on rape of a child where it court instructed the jury that defendant could be found guilty of the crime only if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2014), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 1028 (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2014), cert. denied, Clark v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2846, 192 L. Ed. 2d 882, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3937 (U.S. June 15, 2015).

Upon remand and reconsideration, the appellate court found that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser-included offense of rape of a child because the state supreme court had held that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. State v. Corbitt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Petitioner's conviction for aggravated sexual battery was reversed because trial counsel's failure to request an instruction on misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child was prejudicial to petitioner since given the proof, a properly instructed jury could have found petitioner guilty of misdemeanor assault; the victim's mother testified that she did not see petitioner doing anything to the victim, and the jury discredited the victim's claim of penetration. Townsend v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

Trial counsel was deficient for not requesting lesser-included offenses because he testified that he was aware a written request for lesser-included offenses was required and simply filed to make such a request; petitioner failed to show that, but for trial counsel's deficiency, the jury would have convicted him of child abuse as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child because the physician who examined the victim found no signs of bleeding or bruising. Townsend v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

12. Merger.

Because the touching of the victim's buttocks which was the basis for the charge of attempted aggravated sexual battery was incidental to accomplishing the rape, the two counts arising from the same incident should have been merged. State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016), aff'd, zol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2017).

Defendant's failure to raise the claim that the aggravated sexual battery conviction should have merged into the rape of a child conviction at the trial level resulted in waiver, and no clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached because the conviction for aggravated sexual battery was premised on the assault of the victim while she was on a couch, whereas the rape of a child conviction was premised on a separate assault which occurred in the bathroom at a different time. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Trial court did not err by failing to merge defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery into his conviction for rape of a child because the convictions did not arise from the same act or transaction, as the incidents occurred in two separate rooms, there was no proof the incidents occurred on the same day, and defendant used two different body parts, his penis and his fingers, to contact the victim's body. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2020).

13. Sentence.

Where defendant was indicted for rape of a child after impregnating a 12-year-old girl, he pleaded guilty to attempted rape of a child and received a sentence of eight years. The trial court erred in relying on polygraph test results to deny defendant probation; however, the other factors showed that defendant was not suitable for probation: defendant had a sexual preference for minors, a poor work history, and a moderate risk for re-offending. State v. Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2004).

As referenced in T.C.A. § 40-35-501(i)(3), T.C.A.§ 39-13-523 provides that defendants convicted of rape of a child are ineligible to receive the benefit of sentence reduction credits and have to serve their entire sentences undiminished by credits of up to 15 percent; per 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 878, § 1, the effective date of § 39-13-523, was July 1, 1992, and one of petitioner's crimes occurred after that date, while a second straddled the date; however, the “Special Conditions” portion of each judgment specified, in relevant part, that “no sentence reduction credits authorized would exceed 15 percent,” (possible under former law, where child rape was indistinguishable from aggravated rape). Thus, the ultra vires provisions for sentence reduction credits in the promulgated child rape convictions voided the judgments, petitioner demonstrated a basis for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, and the matter was remanded for new proceedings to ensure that petitioner was advised of a factual basis for any guilty pleas. Coleman v. Morgan, 159 S.W.3d 887, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1182 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2004).

Where defendant appealed a sentencing issue, the court of criminal appeals erred in vacating his conviction of incest because its finding of plain error was erroneous; factor (a) under the plain error test was not met and the record strongly suggested that defendant pleaded guilty to incest, a lower grade offense than rape of a child that he was originally charged with, for tactical reasons, and by his plea of guilty, defendant accepted the benefit of a lower sentence for a lower-grade offense. Studdard v. State, 182 S.W.3d 283, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1046 (Tenn. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. 2006).

Defendant was properly sentenced to consecutive sentences for his six rape of a child convictions under T.C.A. § 39-13-522 and aggravated sexual battery conviction under T.C.A. § 39-13-504 as the trial court did not impose consecutive sentencing based upon a finding that defendant was a dangerous offender and did not have to make the Wilkerson findings; defendant was sentenced based on his abuse of the minor victim over a seven-month period, and the impact of the sexual relationship on the victim. State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

Defendant's 18-year sentences for rape of a child, a Class A felony under T.C.A. § 39-13-522, and 10-year sentence for aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony under T.C.A. § 39-13-504, were within the statutory range under T.C.A. § 40-35-112(a) and were proper as: (1) defendant had a previous criminal history for T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1) purposes; (2) the victim's injuries were particularly great for § 40-35-114(6) purposes; (3) defendant abused a position of private trust under § 40-35-114(14); and (4) there was no evidence that any mitigating factors applied under T.C.A. § 40-35-113. State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 898 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences where defendant was convicted of two counts of rape of a child and six counts of aggravated sexual battery, defendant had a history of criminal convictions, the victims were particularly vulnerable because of their age, the offenses were committed for sexual gratification, defendant had failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community, the relationship between defendant and the victims established that he was in a position of trust as he was the boyfriend of one victim's grandmother, and the trial court found that the psychological harm was maybe even greater than physical harm. State v. Church, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the minimum sentence of 25 years for each of the three child rape convictions and the maximum sentence of 12 years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction where it applied the enhancement factor that defendant abuse a position of public or private trust, as he was the victim's stepfather, it considered all relevant principles associated with sentencing, and the sentences were within range. State v. Pillars, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences for defendant's convictions of three counts of child rape and aggravated sexual battery where it found that defendant abused his relationship with the victim, his stepdaugher, and referenced the length of that relationship, and it considered the victim impact statements. State v. Pillars, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Total effective sentence of 35 years for defendant's convictions for two counts of rape of a child, two counts of attempted rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of incest was proper because defendant abused a position of private trust as the biological father of the victim; with regard to consecutive sentencing, the trial court determined that defendant was convicted of two or more statutory crimes of sexual abuse that were sustained over a period of time; the child suffered extensive damage to her mental and emotional health; and society needed to be protected from defendant who had abused a child beginning when the child was approximately four years of age. State v. Irwin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2016).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of rape of a child, defendant's 27-year sentence was not excessive. When imposing sentence, the trial court considered all the relevant principles associated with sentencing, including the enhancement and mitigating factors. State v. Cruz, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Trial court erred in applying the sentencing provisions of the statute as modified in 2012 because there was no proof that the offense occurred after the amendment to the statute; although defense counsel conceded at the sentencing hearing that Range II was the appropriate sentencing range for defendant's rape of a child conviction, the evidence did not establish a specific date for the offense beyond the time period contained in the indictment of July 1, 2011 to July 1, 2012. State v. Farr, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2017).

Offenses involved a victim and were committed to gratify defendant's desire for pleasure, he abused a position of trust, and the victim was vulnerable, for purposes of the enhancement factors under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(4), (7), (14); the record supported the mid-range sentence of 20 for rape of a child under T.C.A. § 39-15-522, the minimum sentences of five and eight years, respectively, for aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1). State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Record supported the maximum sentence within range for rape of a child under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, 39-13-503(a)(2), plus aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); the trial court considered all the relevant principles associated with sentencing under T.C.A. § 40-35-103, when imposing the sentences in this case. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Record supported the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms under T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(5) for rape of a child, aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, 39-13-503(a)(2), 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); defendant was convicted for two or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Trial court sentenced defendant in the appropriate range for all three sentences for rape of a child and did not abuse its discretion in determining the length of sentences or the partially consecutive alignment because it considered the purposes and principles of sentencing; the trial court was presented with evidence that defendant committed a fourth rape for which he was not charged and considered the aggravating circumstances arising from the relationship between defendant and the victim. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's “Motion to Discharge Community Supervision” because defendant could not satisfy the procedural requirements necessary to petition for the requested relief where the judgment form for his guilty plea to attempted rape of a child reflected the imposition of community supervision for life, and since defendant's community supervision sentence began upon the completion of his nine-year probationary sentence, his motion was premature by approximately 14 years, he failed to meet the statutory requirements for an illegal sentence, and could not establish a colorable claim that would require a hearing. State v. Benny S. Towns, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

Trial court properly considered enhancing defendant's rape of a child sentences on the bases of his position of trust and the physiological injuries to the victim from the repeated sexual abuse, which resulted in an unwanted pregnancy and an abortion; the 35-year sentence was consistent with the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act. State v. Kimble, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2018).

In connection with defendant's rape of a child convictions, the victim viewed defendant as being her father and the victim was made captive because if she refused defendant's advances, she would be punished, and thus the record supported the application of the violation of a position of private trust enhancement factor. State v. Kimble, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2018).

In connection with defendant's rape of a child convictions, while the trial court did not specifically address the defendant's motive for committing these offenses against his step-daughter, the record supported application of the factor under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(7) given that the step-daughter's pregnancy indicated that defendant achieved climax and the transactional nature of the relationship as described by the step-daughter. State v. Kimble, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2018).

In connection with defendant's rape of a child convictions, the record did not support the application of the vulnerability enhancement factor; the trial court applied this factor because the victim was at best 11 years of age and in middle school when the abuse began and because she viewed defendant as her father, such that the trial court's only additional consideration beyond the victim's age was the nature of the relationship between the two. State v. Kimble, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2018).

Because the rape of a child necessarily involved mental suffering — or at least a threat of such — within the meaning of serious bodily injury, the mitigating factor under T.C.A. § 40-35-113(1) was inapplicable to defendant's offenses. State v. Kimble, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2018).

Defendant's within-range 40-year sentence for rape of a child was upheld; although the trial court was incorrect in stating that defendant raped the victim vaginally, this did not negate his sentence, as the trial court considered the appropriate principles and enhancement factors, including that defendant abused a position of trust, and the enhancement factors, which defendant did not contest, were appropriately applied. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2019).

Defendant was statutorily mandated to be sentenced as a Range II offender and evidence that defendant was in a position of trust at the time of the crime, having lived with the victim and her mother, supported the imposition of the maximum sentence in the range. State v. Mayberry, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Defendant's 30-year sentence for rape of a child was upheld; it was within the range, defendant did not challenge the trial court's consideration of two enhancement factors, and the trial court considered the relevant principles of sentencing. State v. Zarate, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 5, 2019).

As a Range II multiple offender convicted of a Class A felony, defendant was subject to a sentencing range of 25-40 years for his rape of a child convictions, and his sentence of 33 years for each rape conviction and five years for each incest conviction, with two 33-year sentences to run consecutively, was upheld; defendant had a prior history of misdemeanor convictions and he occupied a position of trust, and given the physical and mental damage the victim suffered, consecutive sentencing was appropriate. State v. Vest, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2019).

Because defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender with a sentence maximum of 25 years for a Class A felony, and because the 2009 and 2010 versions of the sentencing range statute required a minimum sentence of 25 years, the trial court properly sentenced defendant to 25 years on both counts of rape of a child. State v. Brady, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2020).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant's sentences to be run consecutively because defendant was convicted of two or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor, specifically rape of a child; defendant was the victim's father figure; and the victim had contemplated suicide. State v. Brady, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2020).

Defendant's 30-year sentence for rape of a child was presumptively reasonable, as it was less than six months above the mean sentence for all similar offenders as shown in defendant's statistical evidence, which disparity was not excessive. The sentence was also within the range of punishment for a Range II offender and he did not contest the trial court's applicability of the position of trust enhancement factor or the trial court's conclusion that he lacked potential for rehabilitation or treatment. State v. Chaves-Abrego, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 18, 2020).

Defendant's sentence of 30 years fell within the statutory range for rape and his sentence of 10 years fell within the range for aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court considered the evidence mandated by statute and found the sentences in part based on defendant's relationship with the victims, his stepchildren; even though the trial court committed errors in application of enhancement factors, which the State conceded as there were no multiple victims and vulnerability was not proven, the sentences were not an abuse of discretion. State v. Haven, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020).

Because defendant was a Range I offender, and the rape of a child offense occurred before January 1, 2012, under a former version of this statute, the minimum statutory sentence of 25 years for defendant was also the maximum possible sentence, and the trial court erred in imposing a Range II sentence of 28 years. State v. Fields, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentencing because defendant committed two or more offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor during a two-day period; and the victim stated that she had been emotionally scarred and that the abuse destroyed her life and mental health. State v. Breeden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2020).

39-13-523. Punishment for certain sex offenders.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Aggravated rapist” means a person convicted of violating § 39-13-502;
    2. “Child rapist” means a person convicted one (1) or more times of rape of a child as defined by § 39-13-522;
    3. “Child sexual predator” means a person who:
      1. Is convicted in this state of committing an offense on or after July 1, 2007, that is classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense; and
      2. Has one (1) or more prior convictions for an offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) as a predatory offense;
    4. “Multiple rapist” means a person convicted two (2) or more times of violating § 39-13-503, or a person convicted at least one (1) time of violating § 39-13-502 and at least one (1) time of violating § 39-13-503;
    5. “Predatory offenses” means:
      1. Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-13-504(a)(4);
      2. Statutory rape by an authority figure under § 39-13-532;
      3. Sexual battery by an authority figure under § 39-13-527;
      4. Solicitation of a minor to commit a sex offense under § 39-13-528;
      5. Solicitation of a minor to perform sex acts under § 39-13-529; and
      6. Aggravated statutory rape under § 39-13-506(c);
      1. “Prior convictions” means that the person serves and is released or discharged from a separate period of incarceration or supervision for the commission of a predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5) prior to committing another predatory offense classified in subdivision (a)(5).
      2. “Prior convictions” includes convictions under the laws of any other state, government or country that, if committed in this state, would constitute a predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5). If a felony from a jurisdiction other than Tennessee is not a named predatory offense as classified in subdivision (a)(5) in this state, it shall be considered a prior conviction if the elements of the felony are the same as the elements for an offense classified as a predatory offense; and
    6. “Separate period of incarceration or supervision” includes a sentence to any of the sentencing alternatives set out in § 40-35-104 (c)(3)-(9). Any offense designated as a predatory offense pursuant to subdivision (a)(5) shall be considered as having been committed after a separate period of incarceration or supervision if the predatory offense was committed while the person was:
      1. On probation, parole or community correction supervision for a predatory offense;
      2. Incarcerated for a predatory offense;
      3. Assigned to a program whereby the person enjoys the privilege of supervised release into the community, including, but not limited to, work release, educational release, restitution release or medical furlough for a predatory offense; or
      4. On escape status from any correctional institution when incarcerated for a predatory offense;
  2. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or a child rapist shall be required to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court undiminished by any sentence reduction credits the person may be eligible for or earn. A child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or a child rapist shall be permitted to earn any credits for which the person is eligible and the credits may be used for the purpose of increased privileges, reduced security classification, or for any purpose other than the reduction of the sentence imposed by the court.
  3. Title 40, chapter 35, part 5, regarding release eligibility status and parole, shall not apply to or authorize the release of a child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or child rapist prior to service of the entire sentence imposed by the court.
  4. Nothing in title 41, chapter 1, part 5 shall give either the governor or the board of parole the authority to release or cause the release of a child sexual predator, aggravated rapist, multiple rapist or child rapist prior to service of the entire sentence imposed by the court.
    1. The provisions of this section requiring child sexual predators to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if at least one (1) of the required offenses occurs on or after July 1, 2007.
    2. The provisions of this section requiring multiple rapists to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if at least one (1) of the required offenses occurs on or after July 1, 1992.
    3. The provisions of this section requiring aggravated rapists to serve the entire sentence imposed by the court shall only apply if the required offense occurs on or after July 1, 2012.

Acts 1992, ch. 878, § 1; 1998, ch. 1049, § 10; 2007, ch. 525, § 1; 2012, ch. 1073, §§ 2-5.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2012, ch. 1073, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as “Kimberlee's Law.”

Acts 2012, ch. 727, § 1 amended § 4-3-104, which concerns name changes of departments and divisions, to provide that references to the board of probation and parole, formerly referred to in subsection (d), are deemed references to the board of parole.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability, OAG 94-023 (3/9/94).

Applicability of (b) to offenses prior to July 1, 1992, OAG 94-023 (3/9/94).

Retroactive custodial parole hearing authorized for first of consecutive sentences, OAG 98-089 (4/15/98).

Effect of trial court judgment contrary to release eligibility statutes, OAG 98-0126 (7/20/98).

Department of correction authority to alter illegal court judgment, OAG 98-0126 (7/20/98).

Modification of judgment orders by the Tennessee department of correction, OAG 99-197 (9/28/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

T.C.A. § 39-13-523 does not operate ex post facto in that it only enhances the penalty for the triggering offense, rather than punishing acts committed under the prior law, and is not vague or unclear in that it requires that only one conviction occur after July 1, 1992. State v. Johnson, 970 S.W.2d 500, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

2. Applicability.

Defendant convicted of four counts of child rape should have been sentenced under this statute rather than under T.C.A. § 39-13-502 for the three offenses that occurred after July 1, 1992, the effective date of T.C.A. § 39-13-523. State v. Gibson, 973 S.W.2d 231, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

T.C.A. §§ 39-13-523 and 40-35-203(e) dealt with two different types of sentence enhancements, where § 40-35-203(e) referred to T.C.A. § 40-35-111, which outlined the authorized terms of imprisonment and fines for felonies and misdemeanors, and T.C.A. § 39-13-523 addressed release eligibility of a defendant who was classified as a multiple rapist; thus, § 39-13-523 did not require the multiple rapist classification for parole eligibility purposes to be included in the indictment. Thurmond v. Carlton, 202 S.W.3d 131, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2006), appeal denied, Thurmond v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 798 (Tenn. Aug. 28, 2006).

3. Sentencing.

Where defendant was indicted for rape of a child after impregnating a 12-year-old girl, he pleaded guilty to attempted rape of a child and received a sentence of eight years. The trial court erred in relying on polygraph test results to deny defendant probation; however, the other factors showed that defendant was not suitable for probation: defendant had a sexual preference for minors, a poor work history, and a moderate risk for re-offending. State v. Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2004).

As referenced in T.C.A. § 40-35-501(i)(3), T.C.A. § 39-13-523 provides that defendants convicted of rape of a child are ineligible to receive the benefit of sentence reduction credits and have to serve their entire sentences undiminished by credits of up to 15 percent; per 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 878, § 1, the effective date of § 39-13-523, was July 1, 1992, and one of petitioner's crimes occurred after that date, while a second straddled the date; however, the “Special Conditions” portion of each judgment specified, in relevant part, that “no sentence reduction credits authorized would exceed 15 percent,” (possible under former law, where child rape was indistinguishable from aggravated rape). Thus, the ultra vires provisions for sentence reduction credits in the promulgated child rape convictions voided the judgments, petitioner demonstrated a basis for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, and the matter was remanded for new proceedings to ensure that petitioner was advised of a factual basis for any guilty pleas. Coleman v. Morgan, 159 S.W.3d 887, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1182 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2004).

Supreme court granted inmate's petition for writ of habeas corpus because the inmate's sentence was illegal and void; the inmate entered a guilty plea to child rape, and he could not be granted early release; the sentence was required to be served day by day. Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 837 (Tenn. 2006).

Inmate qualified as a multiple rapist where he was convicted of two counts of aggravated rape and he had an additional prior rape conviction; however, the inmate's classification as a multiple rapist for the attempted aggravated rape sentence and aggravated sexual battery were in direct contravention of T.C.A. § 39-13-523(a)(2) because it expressly incorporated aggravated rape and rape only; therefore, the classification as a multiple rapist was inapplicable to the offenses of attempted aggravated rape or aggravated sexual battery. Thurmond v. Carlton, 202 S.W.3d 131, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2006), appeal denied, Thurmond v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 798 (Tenn. Aug. 28, 2006).

Where defendant's four judgment orders designated him as a Multiple 35 percent Range 2 offender, not a Multiple Rapist, defendant's sentences on four aggravated rape convictions, were illegal and void. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-523(b), (c), defendant's convictions of multiple counts of aggravated rape rendered him ineligible for early release on parole. The Multiple Rapist classification was mandatory rather than discretionary. Thus, defendant's four judgment orders did not correctly reflect his statutorily-required sentencing status, and the error was not clerical. Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 746 (Tenn. Aug. 1, 2011).

39-13-524. Sentence of community supervision for life.

  1. In addition to the punishment authorized by the specific statute prohibiting the conduct, a person shall receive a sentence of community supervision for life who, on or after:
    1. July 1, 1996, commits a violation of § 39-13-502, § 39-13-503, § 39-13-504, or §  39-13-522;
    2. July 1, 2010, commits a violation of § 39-13-531; or
    3. The applicable date as provided in subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2) attempts to commit a violation of any of the sections enumerated in subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2).
  2. The judgment of conviction for all persons to whom subsection (a) applies shall include that the person is sentenced to community supervision for life.
  3. The sentence of community supervision for life shall commence immediately upon the expiration of the term of imprisonment imposed upon the person by the court or upon the person's release from regular parole supervision, whichever first occurs.
    1. A person on community supervision shall be under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the department of correction in the same manner as a person under parole supervision. The department is authorized on an individual basis to establish such conditions of community supervision as are necessary to protect the public from the person's committing a new sex offense, as well as promoting the rehabilitation of the person.
    2. The department is authorized to impose and enforce a supervision and rehabilitation fee upon a person on community supervision similar to the fee imposed by § 40-28-201. To the extent possible, the department shall set the fee in an amount that will substantially defray the cost of the community supervision program. The department shall also establish a fee waiver procedure for hardship cases and indigency.

Acts 1996, ch. 972, § 1; 1998, ch. 1049, § 11; 2010, ch. 646, § 1; 2012, ch. 727, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1996, ch. 972, § 4 provided that the provisions of that act shall apply to all persons committing applicable sex offenses on or after July 1, 1996.

For the preamble to the act concerning transfers of certain functions relating to probation and parole services and the community correction grant program from the board of probation and parole to the department of correction, please refer to Acts 2012, ch. 727.

Acts 2012, ch. 727, § 63 provided that the implementation of the act, which amended subsection (d), shall be fully accomplished on or before January 1, 2013.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Law Reviews.

Crime & Punishment: Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Advice Regarding Plea Offers (Wade V. Davies), 49 Tenn. B.J. 28 (2013).

Attorney General Opinions. The proper court for prosecution of a knowing violation of a condition of community supervision is the court with criminal jurisdiction in the county where the violation occurred, OAG 03-126 (9/29/03).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Statutes governing community supervision for life did not violate the ex post facto clause because plaintiff sex offender was on notice that the supervising agency could establish individualized or specialized conditions of supervision to protect the public from him and to promote his rehabilitation; the conditions of his supervision were not fixed at the time he committed his last offense or somehow limited to those then-imposed on regular parolees; and the Sex Offender Directives did not inflict greater punishment than the law allowed when the crimes were committed as plaintiff was sentenced to community supervision for life with individualized conditions, and he remained under supervision for life with individualized conditions. Nunn v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

Statutes governing community supervision for life were not unconstitutionally vague as plaintiff sex offender was subject to the Sex Offender Directives and any specialized conditions imposed by his supervising officer; he had been made aware of the individualized conditions imposed on him by each supervising officer and had not been charged with violating any condition of his community supervision due to any inadvertent violation; over the years, he had received sufficient notice of his individualized conditions and what the statutes required of him; and the statutes did not authorize arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Nunn v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

2. In General.

Ward v. State, which states that trial courts have an affirmative duty, before accepting a guilty plea to a crime carrying a mandatory sentence of community supervision for life, to inform the defendant of the consequence of lifetime supervision, is not retroactive for purposes of tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations. Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2014).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's “Motion to Discharge Community Supervision” because defendant could not satisfy the procedural requirements necessary to petition for the requested relief where the judgment form for his guilty plea to attempted rape of a child reflected the imposition of community supervision for life, and since defendant's community supervision sentence began upon the completion of his nine-year probationary sentence, his motion was premature by approximately 14 years, he failed to meet the statutory requirements for an illegal sentence, and could not establish a colorable claim that would require a hearing. State v. Benny S. Towns, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

3. Authority and Jurisdiction.

Tennessee Claims Commission properly dismissed a father's complaint for negligent care, custody, and control of persons under T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) because the claim was for negligent deprivation of statutory rights based upon the failure to adhere to T.C.A. § 39-13-524, which did not confer a private right of action; the claim was predicated upon the alleged failure of the Tennessee Department of Correction to ensure compliance with § 39-13-524. Hale v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017).

4. Guilty Plea.

Mandatory sentence of lifetime supervision imposed in addition to other statutorily authorized punishment is a direct and punitive consequence of a plea of guilty to the crimes enumerated in T.C.A. § 39-13-524(a); consequently, trial courts have an affirmative duty to ensure that a defendant is informed and aware of the lifetime supervision requirement prior to accepting a guilty plea. Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. July 7, 2010).

Denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was inappropriate pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-524(a) because the trial court failed to warn defendant of the mandatory nature of lifetime community supervision and the state was unable to establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2011).

Prisoner's case did not warrant due process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations because he did not diligently pursue his rights when did not file his petition in the intervening years after his discovery of the undisclosed sentence. Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2014).

Trial court erred by summarily dismissing defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; the trial court did not explain how the issue of defendant not being advised of community supervision for life could have been previously litigated when no court ever held a hearing to address it. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2020).

5. Illegal Sentence.

Post-conviction court properly found that petitioner's sentence was facially valid and thus, the rule did not apply, because community supervision for life was required for the petitioner's conviction; accordingly, petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief. Harris v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2016).

Defendant's rape sentence was not illegal because (1) the sentence was statutorily authorized, and (2) a failure to advise defendant of the consequences of lifetime community supervision before pleading guilty did not make the sentence illegal, as this was a new constitutional rule that did not apply retroactively to defendant, and this was a constitutional challenge to the voluntariness of defendant's plea, to which Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1 did not apply. State v. Whitaker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Habeas corpus court properly dismissed defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus relief because he failed to show any illegality on the face of the judgment, any argument that he was adequately advised regarding the community supervision for life requirement was not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding, the voluntariness of his plea was not a cognizable basis for habeas corpus relief inasmuch as it required proof beyond the face of the judgment, and he was not entitled to tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations or the due process clause. Jordan v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 921 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2018).

Judgment did not provide for a sentence including community supervision for life, which rendered petitioner's sentence illegal, and because the judgment was void, the trial court had jurisdiction to amend or correct that judgment; however, the amended judgment, which properly provided for community supervision for life, was not void, and the fact that petitioner was unaware of the amendment did not render the amended judgment void, and he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Fish v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2019).

6. Miscellaneous.

Community supervision for life was a mandatory component of petitioner's sentence, and the fact that subsequent judgments, meant to correct clerical errors, failed to indicate the lifetime supervision requirement did not render the original judgment void or the sentence illegal; the original judgment was a valid final judgment, the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief began to run 30 days after its entry, and petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Hartley v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

39-13-525. Release from community supervision.

  1. After a person sentenced to community supervision pursuant to § 39-13-524 has been on supervision for a period of fifteen (15) years, the person may petition the sentencing court for release from community supervision.
  2. Upon receiving a petition, the court shall, at least thirty (30) days prior to a hearing on the petition, cause the office of the district attorney general responsible for prosecuting the person to be notified of the person's petition for release from supervision. Upon being notified, the district attorney general shall conduct a criminal history check on the person to determine if the person has been convicted of a criminal offense during the period of community supervision. The district attorney general shall report the results of the criminal history check to the court, together with any other comments the district attorney general may have concerning the person's petition for release. The district attorney general may also appear and testify at the hearing, in lieu of, or in addition to, submitting written comments.
  3. Between the date the petition is filed with the court and the date established by the court for a hearing on the petition, if the person is entitled to a hearing, the person shall be examined and evaluated by a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist with health service designation approved by the board. The cost of the examination and evaluation shall be the sole responsibility of the person petitioning for release from supervision. No hearing on the petition may be conducted until the person has been examined and evaluated in accordance with this subsection (c).
    1. If the report of the district attorney general indicates that the petitioner has been convicted of a criminal offense while under community supervision, the court shall deny the petition without conducting a hearing.
    2. If the report of the district attorney general indicates that the petitioner has not been convicted of a criminal offense while under community supervision, the court shall conduct a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, the court shall call such witnesses, including the examining psychiatrist or licensed psychologist with health service designation or the prosecuting district attorney general, as the court deems necessary to reach an informed and just decision on whether the petitioner should be released from community supervision. The petitioner may offer such witnesses and other proof at the hearing as is relevant to the petition.
    3. If a petition for release from supervision is denied by the court, the person may not file another such petition for a period of three (3) years.

Acts 1996, ch. 972, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1996, ch. 972, § 4 provides that the provisions of that act shall apply to all persons committing applicable sex offenses on or after July 1, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Time Limit.

Circuit court properly denied defendant's “Motion to Discharge Community Supervision” because defendant could not satisfy the procedural requirements necessary to petition for the requested relief where the judgment form for his guilty plea to attempted rape of a child reflected the imposition of community supervision for life, and since defendant's community supervision sentence began upon the completion of his nine-year probationary sentence, his motion was premature by approximately 14 years, he failed to meet the statutory requirements for an illegal sentence, and could not establish a colorable claim that would require a hearing. State v. Benny S. Towns, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

39-13-526. Violations of community supervision — Venue for violations.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly violate a condition of community supervision imposed upon the person pursuant to § 39-13-524.
    1. If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision does not constitute a criminal offense, the violation is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision also constitutes a criminal offense that is classified as a misdemeanor, the violation is a Class A misdemeanor.
    3. If the conduct that is a violation of a condition of community supervision also constitutes a criminal offense that is classified as a felony, the violation is a Class E felony.
    4. Each violation of a condition of community supervision constitutes a separate offense.
  2. If the violation of community supervision involves the commission of a new offense, the sentence for a violation of this section shall be served consecutive to any sentence received for commission of the new offense.
    1. The venue for a violation of community supervision shall be in the county where the person was being supervised at the time of the violation and this venue shall include those persons placed on supervision in this state but who are being monitored in another state.
    2. For purposes of prosecuting a violation of community supervision, the probation and parole officer assigned to the person may act as the affiant when seeking an affidavit of complaint against the person.

Acts 1996, ch. 972, § 1; 2009, ch. 115, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1996, ch. 972, § 4 provides that the provisions of that act shall apply to all persons committing applicable sex offenses on or after July 1, 1996.

Cross-References. Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Statutes governing community supervision for life were not unconstitutionally vague as plaintiff sex offender was subject to the Sex Offender Directives and any specialized conditions imposed by his supervising officer; he had been made aware of the individualized conditions imposed on him by each supervising officer and had not been charged with violating any condition of his community supervision due to any inadvertent violation; over the years, he had received sufficient notice of his individualized conditions and what the statutes required of him; and the statutes did not authorize arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Nunn v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

Statutes governing community supervision for life did not violate the ex post facto clause because plaintiff sex offender was on notice that the supervising agency could establish individualized or specialized conditions of supervision to protect the public from him and to promote his rehabilitation; the conditions of his supervision were not fixed at the time he committed his last offense or somehow limited to those then-imposed on regular parolees; and the Sex Offender Directives did not inflict greater punishment than the law allowed when the crimes were committed as plaintiff was sentenced to community supervision for life with individualized conditions, and he remained under supervision for life with individualized conditions. Nunn v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2017).

39-13-527. Sexual battery by an authority figure.

  1. Sexual battery by an authority figure is unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim accompanied by the following circumstances:
    1. The victim was, at the time of the offense, thirteen (13) years of age or older but less then eighteen (18) years of age; or
    2. The victim was, at the time of the offense, mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, regardless of age; and,
      1. The defendant was at the time of the offense in a position of trust, or had supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the defendant's legal, professional or occupational status and used the position of trust or power to accomplish the sexual contact; or
      2. The defendant had, at the time of the offense, parental or custodial authority over the victim and used the authority to accomplish the sexual contact.
  2. Sexual battery by an authority figure is a Class C felony.

Acts 1997, ch. 256, § 1; 1998, ch. 1034, § 1; 2005, ch. 478, § 1; 2006, ch. 897, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of criminal attempt to commit sexual battery by an authority figure because defendant intended to commit a sexual battery upon the victim and he took substantial steps toward that end as he sent text messages to the victim telling her to change her clothes to make it easier for him to access her intimate parts; he sent text messages to the victim about what he intended to do; and he kissed her on the inside of her legs; and because defendant was an authority figure as he was responsible for disciplining the victim and her brother while the mother was at work. State v. Thorpe, 463 S.W.3d 851, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2015).

Defendant conceded that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest, and the victim provided detailed testimony about all three of the offenses for which the State elected to prosecute, and her account of what transpired proved all elements of each offense. State v. Pilate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of incest, aggravated sexual battery, attempted rape, and sexual battery by an authority figure; the victim testified about the sexual abuse that occurred for years, and witness testimony corroborated events that gave credence to the victim's claims, and credibility was for the jury to determine. State v. Whitehair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of statutory rape by an authority figure and sexual battery by an authority figure where it showed that defendant engaged in unlawful sexual contact with the victim on three separate occasions when the victim was 15 years old and defendant was 31, he paid her after the incidents, and defendant was the pastor of the church the victim attended and used the church facilities for at least two of the incidents. State v. Berkley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2016).

Evidence sufficiently established that defendant used his parental authority over the victim to commit the offenses of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure because defendant, the victim's step-father, cultivated a close relationship with the victim after she moved into the home he shared with the victim's mother; he was often alone with the victim and, by his own admission, he wanted to develop a bond with the victim over their shared interest in cheerleading; and he testified that he wanted to try to control the situation a little bit and get the victim comfortable with him so that the victim would not tell her mother about the incident of his placing his mouth on the victim's vagina. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, the victim's step-father, of sexual battery by an authority figure as the evidence supported the jury's finding of sexual contact because the victim testified that she awoke to find defendant on top of her; that defendant's mouth was on her vagina; and that he had her shorts and underwear pulled to the side of her vagina with his hand. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

First victim's testimony that defendant touched her breasts between the ages of thirteen and fourteen almost twice and second victim's testimony that, between the ages of thirteen and fourteen, defendant touched her breasts on more than one occasion was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of sexual battery by an authority figure because it showed that after giving the victim pills defendant tried to put the victim's mother's lacy bra on the victim and asked her to put on thong underwear, when the victim refused to wear the thong, defendant undressed her completely, and defendant then squeezed the victim's bare breasts, claiming he was checking for breast cancer. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2020).

2. Sentencing.

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, defendant's total effective sentence of 12 years'  incarceration was not excessive because defendant had a previous history of criminal behavior, as evidenced by his admission of daily drug use both at trial and in the presentence report and by his offering perjured testimony; defendant violated a position of trust; the trial court found no mitigating factors; and the sentence was within the statutory ranges. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Four-year sentences were within the statutory range and presumed reasonable because defendant was a Range I, Standard Offender and subject to a sentencing range of three to six years for the offenses of sexual battery by an authority figure and statutory rape by an authority figure, both Class C felonies; although the trial court erroneously applied the vulnerable victim enhancement factor, the sentences were supported by the record and consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Pompa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. July 28, 2017).

Trial court did not err in imposing partial consecutive sentences because defendant's convictions satisfied at least one of the categories for consecutive sentencing; defendant was convicted of four statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter, and the aggravating circumstances surrounding the convictions clearly warranted consecutive sentencing because the victim testified at length about the physical and mental damage she suffered as a result of defendant's actions. State v. Pompa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. July 28, 2017).

Trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing because the record supported its conclusion that the nature and scope of the sexual contact warranted consecutive sentencing; defendant did not contest the victim's version of events and admitted sending several photographs of his penis to the victim, and the victim testified that as a result of the abuse, she developed depression, anxiety, and insomnia, began losing her hair due to the stress, and stopped eating. State v. Patton, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2020).

Because the enhancement factor in T.C.A. § 40-35-114(7) was an essential element of both sexual battery and soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, the trial court could not use it to enhance defendant's sentences; however, it did not err by sentencing defendant because the abuse occurred over an extended period of time and in defendant's patrol car, and with regard to soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, the trial court also applied the enhancement factor in § 40-35-114(14). State v. Patton, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2020).

Alternative sentences was not appropriate because confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense and particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; defendant was a forty-five-year-old police officer and the father of the fifteen-year-old victim's friend, and the psychosexual assessment was not particularly favorable to his potential for rehabilitation. State v. Patton, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2020).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, sexual battery by an authority figure, and 11 counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, and rape, defendant's effective sentence of 52 years'  incarceration was not excessive because the trial court correctly applied the enhancement factors that defendant, the victim's stepfather, abused a position of private trust; and, although the court found that defendant's girlfriend was an emotionally troubled young lady who was taken advantage of by defendant, and that her testimony did not serve as mitigating evidence, the court did not consider her testimony against defendant as evidence supporting enhancement. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

3. Lesser Included Offenses.

Because criminal attempt is available as a lesser-included offense of any charged offense in every case in which the charged offense has a requisite intent element, and in which the proof has fairly raised the completed offense, the trial court did not err by including the attempt charge in its jury instruction in defendant's case charging him with sexual battery by an authority figure as the offense had a requisite intent element, and the proof fairly raised the issue of the charged offense. State v. Thorpe, 463 S.W.3d 851, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2015).

Defendant's convictions of sexual battery by an authority figure should have been merged to reflect three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure because each offense did not contain a distinct element from the other. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

Trial court improperly merged aggravated statutory rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest into the rape convictions because each of the convictions required elements pertaining to the ages of the victim and defendant and relationship that rape did not, and they did not require proof of non-consent. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

4. Election of Offense.

In a case where defendant was convicted of all 37 counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, the omission of the modified unanimity instruction, informing the jury that it had to unanimously agree that defendant committed all the acts described by the victim in order to convict defendant, in a generic evidence case where election of a single specific incident was not possible was harmless because both victims testified that defendant made unlawful sexual contact with each of them and they described the type of sexual contact; both victims testified that the sexual contact occurred at least once during the time periods charged in the indictment; and the record showed that defendant committed all the acts described by the victims. State v. Qualls, 482 S.W.3d 1, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2016).

5. Indictment.

Defendant claimed that the State made an improper election in the sexual battery by an authority figure count because the State alleged that he committed two discrete acts, but he was not entitled to plain error relief; the trial court properly instructed the jury that incest required sexual penetration, and that sexual battery by an authority figure required sexual contact, and the jury defendant guilty of sexual battery but not guilty of incest, and thus the jury understood the sexual act required for each crime. State v. Whitehair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

6. Jury Instructions.

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, because the jury instructions provided by the trial court were a complete and accurate statement of the law, as it followed the language of the statute defining “sexual penetration” and the pattern jury instruction on the definition of cunnilingus, and defendant's requested jury instruction was not an accurate statement of law, the trial court did not err by refusing to provide defendant's requested jury instruction. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

7. Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's conviction of sexual battery by an authority figure did not violate double jeopardy because defendant could not show that he was punished twice for the same conduct, an inconsistent jury verdict was not a basis for relief, and he was found not guilty of a touching regarding one part of the victim's body and guilty of a touching regarding another part of the victim's body. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2020).

39-13-528. Offense of solicitation of a minor.

  1. It is an offense for a person eighteen (18) years of age or older, by means of oral, written or electronic communication, electronic mail or internet services, directly or through another, to intentionally command, request, hire, persuade, invite or attempt to induce a person whom the person making the solicitation knows, or should know, is less than eighteen (18) years of age, or solicits a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, and whom the person making the solicitation reasonably believes to be less than eighteen (18) years of age, to engage in conduct that, if completed, would constitute a violation by the soliciting adult of one (1) or more of the following offenses:
    1. Rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-522;
    2. Aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-502;
    3. Rape, pursuant to § 39-13-503;
    4. Aggravated sexual battery, pursuant to § 39-13-504;
    5. Sexual battery by an authority figure, pursuant to § 39-13-527;
    6. Sexual battery, pursuant to § 39-13-505;
    7. Statutory rape, pursuant to § 39-13-506;
    8. Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1005;
    9. Sexual activity involving a minor, pursuant to § 39-13-529;
    10. Trafficking for commercial sex acts, pursuant to § 39-13-309;
    11. Patronizing prostitution, pursuant to § 39-13-514;
    12. Promoting prostitution, pursuant to § 39-13-515; or
    13. Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1004.
  2. It is no defense that the solicitation was unsuccessful, that the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or that the law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense. It is no defense that the minor solicited was unaware of the criminal nature of the conduct solicited.
  3. A violation of this section shall constitute an offense one (1) classification lower than the most serious crime solicited, unless the offense solicited was a Class E felony, in which case the offense shall be a Class A misdemeanor.
  4. A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the person solicited the conduct of a minor located in this state, or solicited a law enforcement officer posing as a minor located within this state.

Acts 1998, ch. 1007, § 1; 2000, ch. 944, § 1; 2005, ch. 496, § 5; 2013, ch. 436, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of solicitation of a minor to engage in aggravated statutory rape because it showed that he sent multiple text message to the 14-year-old victim over the course of a few days in an attempt to induce her to meet him for sex in a park. Defendant admitted at trial that he was attempting to induce the victim to meet him in the park to show his son that she was willing to cheat on him with defendant, and defendant admitted that he intentionally sent the text messages knowing that he was more than 10 years older than the victim. State v. Weldon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated sexual battery and solicitation of a minor convictions because defendant (1) told the victim what sex felt like and how to enhance oral sex, and (2) exposed his penis to the victim and asked the victim to touch it. State v. Todd, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of solicitation of a minor because, given defendant's direct request for a photograph of the victim's breasts, and the victim's role in the photography, the evidence showed that defendant attempted to induce the victim to produce a lascivious exhibition of her breasts. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

4. Sentencing.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing judicial diversion because it considered the sentencing law and principles, weighed the required factors, and recited the relevant factors; the trial court explained on the record why it denied defendant's request for judicial diversion and why the circumstances of the offense, statutory rape and solicitation of a minor, outweighed the other factors and concluded judicial diversion would not serve the interests of the public or defendant. State v. Hodges, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017).

In sentencing defendant for statutory rape and solicitation of a minor, the trial court properly applied the enhancement fact that defendant abused a position of public or private trust because the victim was a friend of defendant's son, and defendant's first sexual encounter with the victim occurred while the victim was in her care while at her home visiting her son. State v. Hodges, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, sexual battery by an authority figure, and 11 counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, and rape, defendant's effective sentence of 52 years'  incarceration was not excessive because the trial court correctly applied the enhancement factors that defendant, the victim's stepfather, abused a position of private trust; and, although the court found that defendant's girlfriend was an emotionally troubled young lady who was taken advantage of by defendant, and that her testimony did not serve as mitigating evidence, the court did not consider her testimony against defendant as evidence supporting enhancement. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

39-13-529. Offense of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor — Exploitation of a minor by electronic means.

  1. It is an offense for a person eighteen (18) years of age or older, by means of oral, written or electronic communication, electronic mail or internet service, including webcam communications, directly or through another, to intentionally command, hire, persuade, induce or cause a minor to engage in simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive or in sexual activity, where such simulated sexual activity or sexual activity is observed by that person or by another.
  2. It is unlawful for any person eighteen (18) years of age or older, directly or by means of electronic communication, electronic mail or internet service, including webcam communications, to intentionally:
    1. Engage in simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive or in sexual activity for the purpose of having the minor view the simulated sexual activity or sexual activity, including circumstances where the minor is in the presence of the person, or where the minor views such activity via electronic communication, including electronic mail, internet service and webcam communications;
    2. Display to a minor, or expose a minor to, any material containing simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive or sexual activity if the purpose of the display can reasonably be construed as being for the sexual arousal or gratification of the minor or the person displaying the material; or
    3. Display to a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, and whom the person making the display reasonably believes to be less than eighteen (18) years of age, any material containing simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive or sexual activity, if the purpose of the display can reasonably be construed as being for the sexual arousal or gratification of the intended minor or the person displaying the material.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(4)(B), it is an exception to the application of this subsection (b) that the victim is at least fifteen (15) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is no more than four (4) years older than the victim.
      2. Subdivision (b)(4)(A) shall not apply or be an exception to the application of this subsection (b), if the defendant intentionally commanded, hired, induced or caused the victim to violate this subsection (b).
  3. A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the conduct involved a minor located in this state or the solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor located in this state.
  4. As used in this section:
    1. “Community” means the judicial district, as defined by § 16-2-506, in which a violation is alleged to have occurred;
    2. “Material” means:
      1. Any picture, drawing, photograph, undeveloped film or film negative, motion picture film, videocassette tape or other pictorial representation;
      2. Any statue, figure, theatrical production or electrical reproduction;
      3. Any image stored on a computer hard drive, a computer disk of any type, or any other medium designed to store information for later retrieval; or
      4. Any image transmitted to a computer or other electronic media or video screen, by telephone line, cable, satellite transmission, or other method that is capable of further transmission, manipulation, storage or accessing, even if not stored or saved at the time of transmission;
    3. “Patently offensive” means that which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters; and
    4. “Sexual activity” means any of the following acts:
      1. Vaginal, anal or oral intercourse, whether done with another person or an animal;
      2. Masturbation, whether done alone or with another human or an animal;
      3. Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, physical contact with or touching of a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or breasts in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or sexual abuse;
      4. Sadomasochistic abuse, including flagellation, torture, physical restraint, domination or subordination by or upon a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of any person;
      5. The insertion of any part of a person's body or of any object into another person's anus or vagina, except when done as part of a recognized medical procedure by a licensed professional;
      6. Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, conduct, representations, depictions or descriptions of excretory functions; or
      7. Lascivious exhibition of the female breast or the genitals, buttocks, anus or pubic or rectal area of any person.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class B felony.
    2. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony; provided, that, if the minor is less than thirteen (13) years of age, the violation is a Class C felony.
  5. It shall not be a defense to a violation of this section that a minor victim of the offense consented to the conduct that constituted the offense.

Acts 2005, ch. 496, § 6; 2011, ch. 393, § 1; 2012, ch. 732, §§ 1, 2; 2012, ch. 876, § 1; 2013, ch. 337, § 2; 2013, ch. 350, § 1; 2013, ch. 416, § 2.

Cross-References. Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Obscenity, title 39, ch. 17, part 9.

Penalties for Class B, C, and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Testimony of all five victims identifying defendant at trial was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions. State v. Frederick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2017).

2. Double Jeopardy.

Although the especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor convictions required the State to establish that defendant persuaded or encouraged the victim to take sexually explicit photographs of herself, no such proof was required for the sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means conviction. The offenses contain different elements, and therefore, convictions for both offenses did not violate principles of double jeopardy. State v. Jernigan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017).

3. Mens Rea.

While the indictment erroneous stated that sexual exploitation of a minor required a knowing mens rea rather than an intentional one, the jury was correctly instructed on the intentional requirements in T.C.A. § 39-13-529(b)(1), and thus, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for arrest of judgment. State v. Frederick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2017).

4. Sentencing.

Trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing because the record supported its conclusion that the nature and scope of the sexual contact warranted consecutive sentencing; defendant did not contest the victim's version of events and admitted sending several photographs of his penis to the victim, and the victim testified that as a result of the abuse, she developed depression, anxiety, and insomnia, began losing her hair due to the stress, and stopped eating. State v. Patton, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2020).

Alternative sentences was not appropriate because confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense and particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; defendant was a forty-five-year-old police officer and the father of the fifteen-year-old victim's friend, and the psychosexual assessment was not particularly favorable to his potential for rehabilitation. State v. Patton, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2020).

Because the enhancement factor in T.C.A. § 40-35-114(7) was an essential element of both sexual battery and soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, the trial court could not use it to enhance defendant's sentences; however, it did not err by sentencing defendant because the abuse occurred over an extended period of time and in defendant's patrol car, and with regard to soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, the trial court also applied the enhancement factor in § 40-35-114(14). State v. Patton, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2020).

39-13-530. Forfeiture of any conveyance or real or personal property used in a sexual offense committed against minors — Child abuse fund.

    1. Any conveyance or real or personal property used in the commission of an offense under this part, is subject to judicial forfeiture under chapter 11, part 7 of this title; provided, however, that the offense is committed against a person under eighteen (18) years of age and was committed on or after July 1, 2006.
    2. Any conveyance or personal property used in the commission of a violation of § 40-39-211 committed on or after July 1, 2012, by a sexual offender or violent sex offender, as defined in § 40-39-202, whose victim was a minor, is, upon conviction, subject to judicial forfeiture as provided in chapter 11, part 7 of this title.
  1. The proceeds from all forfeitures made pursuant to this section shall be transmitted to the general fund, where there is established a general fund reserve to be allocated through the general appropriations act, which shall be known as the child abuse fund. Moneys from the fund shall be expended to fund activities authorized by this section. Any revenues deposited in this reserve shall remain in the reserve until expended for purposes consistent with this section, and shall not revert to the general fund at the end of the fiscal year. Any excess revenues or interest earned by the revenues shall not revert at the end of the fiscal year, but shall remain available for appropriation in subsequent fiscal years. Any appropriation from the reserve shall not revert to the general fund at the end of the fiscal year, but shall remain available for expenditure in subsequent fiscal years.
  2. The general assembly shall appropriate, through the general appropriations act, fifty percent (50%) of the moneys from the child abuse fund to the department of finance and administration for the child advocacy center fund to be used for child advocacy centers. The appropriations shall be specifically earmarked for the purposes set out in subsection (d).
  3. All moneys appropriated from the child advocacy center fund shall be used exclusively by the department to provide grants to child advocacy centers that are incorporated as a not-for-profit organization, are tax-exempt under § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code, and that have provided child advocacy services for at least six (6) months prior to the application for funds under this subsection (d). The commissioner of finance and administration shall promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, for the distribution and use of the grant funds provided by it. The grants shall be for the purpose of providing funding for the continuation of existing programs and services, the creation of new programs and services and the training of personnel in child advocacy centers.
  4. The general assembly shall appropriate, through the general appropriations act, twenty-five percent (25%) of the moneys from the child abuse fund to the department of finance and administration for the court appointed special advocate (CASA) fund. The appropriations shall be specifically earmarked for the purposes set out in subsection (f).
  5. All moneys appropriated from the CASA fund shall be used exclusively by the department to provide grants to CASA programs that are incorporated as a not-for-profit organization, are tax-exempt under § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code and that have provided CASA services for at least six (6) months prior to the application for funds under this subsection (f). The commissioner of finance and administration shall promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act for the distribution and use of the grant funds provided by it. The grants shall be for the purpose of providing funding for the continuation of existing programs and services, the creation of new programs and services and the training of personnel and volunteers in CASA programs.
  6. The general assembly shall appropriate, through the general appropriations act, twenty-five percent (25%) of the moneys from the child abuse fund to the department of finance and administration for the child abuse prevention fund. The appropriations shall be specifically earmarked for the purposes set out in subsection (h).
  7. All moneys appropriated from the child abuse prevention fund shall be used exclusively by the department to provide a grant to Prevent Child Abuse Tennessee; provided, that it is incorporated as a not-for-profit organization, is tax-exempt under § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 501), and that it has provided child abuse prevention services for at least six (6) months prior to the application for funds under this subsection (h). The commissioner of finance and administration shall promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act for the distribution and use of the grant funds provided by it. The grants shall be for the purpose of providing funding for the continuation of existing programs and services, the creation of new programs and services and the training of personnel to plan and carry out a comprehensive statewide child abuse prevention program that includes emphasis on primary and secondary prevention strategies and includes evaluation strategies to assess the effectiveness of prevention activities.
  8. All recipients of funding from the child abuse fund and its subsidiary funds, the child advocacy centers fund, the CASA fund and the child abuse prevention fund, shall collaborate with each other and also with the department of children's services, the department of children's services' child abuse prevention advisory committee, the child sexual abuse task force established by § 37-1-603(b)(1), the commission on children and youth, the governor's office of children's care coordination, and other appropriate state and local service providers in the planning and implementation of multi-disciplinary, multi-agency approaches to address child abuse, including primary, secondary and tertiary child abuse prevention, investigation and intervention in child abuse cases, and needed treatment and timely permanency for victims of child abuse.
  9. All recipients of funding from the child abuse fund and its subsidiary funds, the child advocacy centers fund, the CASA fund and the child abuse prevention fund, shall report annually to the health and welfare and judiciary committees of the senate, the committee of the house of representatives having oversight over children and families, and the fiscal review committee, regarding their use of child abuse fund moneys, their collaborative efforts to address the spectrum of child abuse issues, and their recommendations for additional improvements in the child abuse prevention and response system in Tennessee.

Acts 2006, ch. 960, § 1; 2011, ch. 410, § 3(cc); 2012, ch. 882, §§ 1, 2; 2013, ch. 236, § 23; 2019, ch. 345, § 52.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2006, ch. 960, § 6 provided that this section applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2006.

For the Preamble to the act concerning the prohibition against establishment of a special committee if there is a standing committee on the same subject, please refer to Acts 2011, ch. 410.

Acts 2012, ch. 882, § 3, which amended subsections (a) and (b), provided that the act shall apply to any applicable offense committed on or after July 1, 2012.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (j), substituted “the health and welfare and judiciary committees of the senate, the committee of the house of representatives having oversight over children and families, and the fiscal review committee” for “the health and welfare committee of the senate and the civil justice committee of the house of representatives, the judiciary committee of the senate, and the fiscal review committee”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

39-13-531. Aggravated rape of a child.

  1. Aggravated rape of a child is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim, if the victim is eight (8) years of age or less.
    1. Aggravated rape of a child is a Class A felony.
    2. The applicable sentencing provisions of title 40, chapter 35, apply to the offense prohibited by this section except:
      1. A sentencing hearing shall not be conducted as required by § 40-35-209; and
      2. After a defendant is found guilty of aggravated rape of a child, the judge shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.

Acts 2006, ch. 890, § 23; 2019, ch. 211, § 1; 2020, ch. 588, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2006, ch. 890, § 1 provided that: “The provisions of this act, even though not codified together, may collectively be known as the ‘Child Protection Act of 2006’.”

Acts 2019, ch. 211, § 4 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to violations occurring on or after July 1, 2019.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote (b) which read: “(b)  Aggravated rape of a child is a Class A felony and shall be sentenced within Range III, as set forth in title 40, chapter 35.”

The 2020 amendment substituted “if the victim is eight (8) years of age or less” for “if the victim is three (3) years of age or less” in (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 211, § 4. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 588, § 3. July 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

“Let’s Talk About Sexting, Baby”: A Mens Rea-Centered Approach to the Sexting Issue in Tennessee (Emily Long), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1139  (2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Testimony from the victim's mother that the victim was one week shy of two years and nine months when the rape occurred, in addition to evidence that the rape occurred, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated rape of a child. State v. Bolden, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 428 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2017).

39-13-532. Statutory rape by an authority figure.

  1. Statutory rape by an authority figure is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by the victim when:
    1. The victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
    2. The defendant is at least four (4) years older than the victim; and
      1. The defendant was, at the time of the offense, in a position of trust, or had supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the defendant's legal, professional, or occupational status and used the position of trust or power to accomplish the sexual penetration; or
      2. The defendant had, at the time of the offense, parental or custodial authority over the victim by virtue of the defendant's legal, professional, or occupational status and used the position to accomplish the sexual penetration.
  2. Statutory rape by an authority figure is a Class B felony.
  3. No person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty to the offense shall be eligible for probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 or judicial diversion pursuant to § 40-35- 313.

Acts 2006, ch. 973, § 1; 2016, ch. 1086, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of statutory rape by an authority figure and sexual battery by an authority figure where it showed that defendant engaged in unlawful sexual contact with the victim on three separate occasions when the victim was 15 years old and defendant was 31, he paid her after the incidents, and defendant was the pastor of the church the victim attended and used the church facilities for at least two of the incidents. State v. Berkley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2016).

Evidence sufficiently established that defendant used his parental authority over the victim to commit the offenses of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure because defendant, the victim's step-father, cultivated a close relationship with the victim after she moved into the home he shared with the victim's mother; he was often alone with the victim and, by his own admission, he wanted to develop a bond with the victim over their shared interest in cheerleading; and he testified that he wanted to try to control the situation a little bit and get the victim comfortable with him so that the victim would not tell her mother about the incident of his placing his mouth on the victim's vagina. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, the victim's step-father, of rape and statutory rape by an authority figure as the State established the element of penetration because the victim testified that defendant's mouth was on her vagina; and cunnilingus was defined as a sex act accomplished by placing the mouth or tongue in the vagina of another where there was any intrusion, however slight. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

2. Sentencing.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing partially consecutive sentences for an effective sentence of 106 years in connection with defendant's plea of guilty to 59 counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor; the trial court discussed all aggravating circumstances, including the abuse of trust, the long period of time the offenses went undetected, and the scope of the abuse, plus defendant made unrepentant and flippant statements blaming the victim for his sexual abuse against her. State v. Perry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 2016).

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, defendant's total effective sentence of 12 years' incarceration was not excessive because defendant had a previous history of criminal behavior, as evidenced by his admission of daily drug use both at trial and in the presentence report and by his offering perjured testimony; defendant violated a position of trust; the trial court found no mitigating factors; and the sentence was within the statutory ranges. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Four-year sentences were within the statutory range and presumed reasonable because defendant was a Range I, Standard Offender and subject to a sentencing range of three to six years for the offenses of sexual battery by an authority figure and statutory rape by an authority figure, both Class C felonies; although the trial court erroneously applied the vulnerable victim enhancement factor, the sentences were supported by the record and consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Pompa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. July 28, 2017).

Trial court did not err in imposing partial consecutive sentences because defendant's convictions satisfied at least one of the categories for consecutive sentencing; defendant was convicted of four statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter, and the aggravating circumstances surrounding the convictions clearly warranted consecutive sentencing because the victim testified at length about the physical and mental damage she suffered as a result of defendant's actions. State v. Pompa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. July 28, 2017).

Trial court's imposition of probation for a strictly non-probatable offense was in direct contravention of the statute, and thus, the trial court's sentence, as pronounced at the sentencing hearing, was illegal; however, the trial court properly corrected the illegal sentence with the judgment form because it re-assigned the consecutive probation sentence from the statutory rape conviction to the sexual battery conviction. State v. Pompa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. July 28, 2017).

Trial court improperly merged aggravated statutory rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest into the rape convictions because each of the convictions required elements pertaining to the ages of the victim and defendant and relationship that rape did not, and they did not require proof of non-consent. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

Defendant's convictions of sexual battery by an authority figure should have been merged to reflect three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure because each offense did not contain a distinct element from the other. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, sexual battery by an authority figure, and 11 counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, and rape, defendant's effective sentence of 52 years'  incarceration was not excessive because the trial court correctly applied the enhancement factors that defendant, the victim's stepfather, abused a position of private trust; and, although the court found that defendant's girlfriend was an emotionally troubled young lady who was taken advantage of by defendant, and that her testimony did not serve as mitigating evidence, the court did not consider her testimony against defendant as evidence supporting enhancement. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

3. Jury Instructions.

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, because the jury instructions provided by the trial court were a complete and accurate statement of the law, as it followed the language of the statute defining “sexual penetration” and the pattern jury instruction on the definition of cunnilingus, and defendant's requested jury instruction was not an accurate statement of law, the trial court did not err by refusing to provide defendant's requested jury instruction. State v. Falcon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

39-13-533. Offense of promoting travel for prostitution.

  1. A person commits the offense of promoting travel for prostitution if the person sells or offers to sell travel services that the person knows to include travel for the purpose of engaging in what would be prostitution if occurring in the state.
  2. “Travel services” means, but is not limited to, transportation by air, sea, road or rail, related ground transportation, hotel accommodations, or package tours, whether offered on a wholesale or retail basis.
  3. Promoting travel for prostitution is a Class D felony.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit prosecution under any other law.

Acts 2013, ch. 465, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-110.

Law Reviews.

Filling the Gap: Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation to Address the Problem of Pimping, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 961  (2015).

Part 6
Invasion of Privacy

39-13-601. Wiretapping and electronic surveillance — Prohibited acts — Exceptions.

    1. Except as otherwise specifically provided in §§ 39-13-601 — 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3, a person commits an offense who:
      1. Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
      2. Intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when:
        1. The device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or
        2. The device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of the communication;
      3. Intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection (a); or
      4. Intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication in violation of this subsection (a).
    2. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) shall be punished as provided in § 39-13-602 and shall be subject to suit as provided in § 39-13-603.
    1. It is lawful under §§ 39-13-601 — 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 for an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communications service, or a telecommunications company, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose or use that communication in the normal course of employment while engaged in any activity that is necessary to the rendition of service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service. Nothing in §§ 39-13-601 — 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 shall be construed to prohibit a telecommunications or other company from engaging in service observing for the purpose of maintaining service quality standards for the benefit of consumers.
    2. Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communications service, their officers, employees, or agents, landlords, custodians, or other persons are authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications, if the provider, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian or other specified person has been provided with a court order signed by the authorizing judge of competent jurisdiction that:
      1. Directs the assistance;
      2. Sets forth a period of time during which the provision of the information, facilities, or technical assistance is authorized; and
      3. Specifies the information, facilities, or technical assistance required.
    3. No provider of wire or electronic communications service, officer, employee, or agent thereof, or landlord, custodian or other specified person shall disclose the existence of any interception or surveillance or the device used to accomplish the interception or surveillance with respect to which the person has been furnished a court order, except as may otherwise be required by legal process, and then only after prior notification to the attorney general and reporter or to the district attorney general or any political subdivision of a district, as may be appropriate. Any such disclosure shall render the person liable for the civil damages provided for in § 39-13-603. No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic communications service, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order under §§ 39-13-601 — 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3.
    4. It is lawful under §§ 39-13-601 — 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 for a person acting under the color of law to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication, where the person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.
    5. It is lawful under §§ 39-13-601 — 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where the person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception, unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of this state.
    6. It is unlawful to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication for the purpose of committing a criminal act.
    7. It is lawful, unless otherwise prohibited by state or federal law, for any person:
      1. To intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that the electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public;
      2. To intercept any radio communication that is transmitted by:
        1. Any station for the use of the general public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress;
        2. Any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile, or public safety communications system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public;
        3. Any station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio services; or
        4. Any marine or aeronautical communications system;
      3. To intercept any wire or electronic communication, the transmission of which is causing harmful interference with any lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of such interference; or
      4. For other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of such system, if such communication is not scrambled or encrypted.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (c)(2), a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication, other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof, while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.
    2. A person or entity providing electronic communication service to the public may divulge the contents of any such communication:
      1. As otherwise authorized in subdivisions (b)(1)-(3) or § 40-6-306;
      2. With the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or intended recipient of such communication;
      3. To a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used, to forward such communication to its destination; or
      4. That were inadvertently obtained by the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, if the divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency.
  1. Notwithstanding any provision of this part to the contrary, this section shall not apply to a person who installs software on a computer the person owns if such software is intended solely to monitor and record the use of the internet by a minor child of whom such person is a parent or legal guardian.

Acts 1994, ch. 964, § 4; 2011, ch. 460, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1994, ch. 964, § 2 provides that §§ 39-13-60139-13-603 are included in the “Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act of 1994,” which also enacted title 40, chapter 6, part 3.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Culpability, title 39, ch. 11, part 3.

Legislative purpose, § 40-6-302.

Penalty for violation, § 39-13-601.

Wiretapping and electronic surveillance by law enforcement, warrants for, title 40, ch. 6, part 3.

Law Reviews.

Checked In: Decreasing Fourth Amendment Protection Against Real-time Geolocation Surveillance, 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 561 (2015).

Electronic Surveillance in Family Law, 50 Tenn. B.J. 28 (2014).

“Official” Explanation: Defining “Official Capacity” and Related “Color of Office” Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law (Steven J. Mulroy), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 587 (2008).

Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment to Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statute of Limitations.

This action brought under the federal Wiretap Act and the Tennessee Wiretap Act was not barred by the applicable limitations period because plaintiff wrote defendant an email on August 27, 2007 that he believed defendant had been “trolling around” in his email after defendant confronted plaintiff about having dinner with a woman in Mississippi and plaintiff filed this action on June 6, 2009. Klumb v. Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100836 (E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2012).

2. Intercept.

Unless an e-mail is actually acquired in its split second transmission over a computer network, it cannot be “intercepted” as that term is reasonably understood. Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84713 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2008).

Plaintiff had proven that defendant violated the federal Wiretap Act and the Tennessee Wiretap Act because defendant intentionally and automatically intercepted emails sent to plaintiff through the internet and forwarded copies to herself through the internet when plaintiff opened those emails for the first time from the computer. Klumb v. Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100836 (E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2012).

Trial court properly reversed the decision upholding a county airport authority's termination of a police sergeant's employment, because the sergeant had the legal right without a doctor's consent to record her communication with the doctor during a clinical interview; the sergeant's request to record the interview was consistent with her understanding from the letter of the authority's general counsel that she did not have to waive any legal right during the fitness for duty evaluation. Small v. Memphis-Shelby Cnty. Airport Auth., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, Small v. Memphis-Shelby Cnty. Airport Auth., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 942 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

3. Stolen Communication.

Satellite television provider could pursue claims against an individual for the purchase of an illegal descrambler, but a civil claim for violation of the criminal statute for possession of the device was dismissed for lack of a stolen communication. Directv, Inc. v. McCool, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20870 (M.D. Tenn. 2004).

4. Damages.

Court properly awarded plaintiff damages for defendant's illegal wiretap where defendant admitted to the activity. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 181 S.W.3d 720, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005).

5. Consent.

Record established that plaintiffs did not consent to the interception of their communications, as they believed that the audio portion of the security system had not been activated, which defendants confirmed, despite a contrary assertion contained in the 2014 minutes to a fire hall meeting; defendants'  vague assertions that they would be listening were also not enough to garner consent from plaintiffs to record their conversations via a tape recorder taped under the table. Ledford v. Sneed, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

39-13-602. Penalty for violations.

A person who violates § 39-13-601(a) commits a Class D felony.

Acts 1994, ch. 964, § 10.

Cross-References. Legislative purpose, § 40-6-302.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

Wire and electronic surveillance definitions, § 40-6-303.

39-13-603. Civil actions — Injunctive relief — Damages — Defenses — Limitation of actions.

  1. Except as provided in § 39-13-601(b)(4), any aggrieved person whose wire, oral or electronic communication is intentionally intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of § 39-13-601 or title 40, chapter 6, part 3 may in a civil action recover from the person or entity that engaged in that violation the following relief:
    1. The greater of:
      1. The sum of the actual damages, including any damage to personal or business reputation or relationships, suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation; or
      2. Statutory damages of one hundred dollars ($100) a day for each day of violation or ten thousand dollars ($10,000), whichever is greater;
    2. Punitive damages; and
    3. A reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
  2. Any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is or is about to be intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of § 39-13-601 or title 40, chapter 6, part 3 may seek to enjoin and restrain the violation and may in the same action seek damages as provided by subsection (a).
  3. It is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under § 39-13-601 or title 40, chapter 6, part 3 that there was good faith reliance on a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization, or if there was a good faith determination that § 39-13-601(c) permitted the conduct complained of.
  4. A civil action under this section or title 40, chapter 6, part 3 may not be commenced later than two (2) years after the date upon which the claimant first discovered or had a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.

Acts 1994, ch. 964, § 11.

Cross-References. Legislative purpose, § 40-6-302.

Limitation of actions, title 28.

Wiretapping and electronic surveillance by law enforcement, warrants for, title 40, ch. 6, part 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Court in a wiretapping damages suit erred by awarding less than $10,000 in statutory damages where the statute mandated that, if the court found liability, it did not have discretion to refuse an award of damages. Robinson v. Fulliton, 140 S.W.3d 312, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 122 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 790 (Tenn. Sept. 2, 2003).

2. Interception of Emails.

Plaintiff had proven that defendant violated the federal Wiretap Act and the Tennessee Wiretap Act because defendant intentionally and automatically intercepted emails sent to plaintiff through the internet and forwarded copies to herself through the internet when plaintiff opened those emails for the first time from the computer. Klumb v. Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100836 (E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2012).

3. Damages.

Court properly awarded plaintiff damages for defendant's illegal wiretap where defendant admitted to the activity. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 181 S.W.3d 720, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005).

Where plaintiff had proven that defendant violated the federal Wiretap Act and the Tennessee Wiretap Act, plaintiff was awarded $10,000 in punitive damages because defendant engaged in a concerted scheme to gain advantage over plaintiff in a divorce by 1) tricking plaintiff into signing an altered prenuptial agreement with a provision that rendered the prenuptial agreement null and void in the event that plaintiff committed adultery, 2) by secretly installing spyware on the computers regularly used by plaintiff, 3) by secretly intercepting at least three emails sent by a woman to plaintiff and altering them to look like the woman and plaintiff were having an affair, and 4) by intending to use the altered emails, the altered prenuptial agreement and the altered September 27, 2007 agreed order to obtain a significant amount of plaintiff's property to which she was not entitled in a divorce from plaintiff. Klumb v. Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100836 (E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2012).

Where plaintiff had proven that defendant violated the federal Wiretap Act and the Tennessee Wiretap Act, plaintiff was entitled to the liquidated damages sum of $10,000 only once because given the “single sum” approach per 100 days of violations, it was irrelevant that defendant installed the spyware twice, once on two different computers; defendant was still intercepting the same person's email, and plaintiff had not proven that plaintiff's emails were intercepted on more than 100 days. Klumb v. Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100836 (E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2012).

39-13-604. Interception of cellular or cordless telephone transmissions.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Cellular radio telephone” means a wireless telephone authorized by the federal communications commission to operate in the frequency bandwidth reserved for cellular radio telephones;
    2. “Communication” includes, but is not limited to, communications transmitted by voice, data, or image, including facsimile;
    3. “Cordless telephone” means a two-way, low power communication system consisting of two (2) parts, a “base” unit that connects to the public switched telephone network and a handset or “remote” unit, that are connected by a radio link and authorized by the federal communications commission to operate in the frequency bandwidths reserved for cordless telephones;
    4. “Disseminating,” as used in this section and § 39-13-605, means the playing or duplicating of the recording in a manner other than authorized in this part; and
    5. “Party” means only those individuals who participate in a conversation and whose presence as participants is known to all other participants.
    1. A person commits an offense who, without the consent of at least one (1) party to a communication, intentionally records or disseminates a communication transmitted between two (2) cellular radio telephones, a cellular radio telephone and a landline telephone, or a cordless telephone and a cellular radio telephone.
    2. A person commits an offense who intentionally disseminates a communication transmitted between two (2) cordless telephones or a cordless telephone and a landline telephone, if such dissemination is not authorized by a court order.
    1. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony, if the defendant knowingly publishes, distributes or otherwise disseminates to another the intercepted or recorded communication.
  2. This section does not apply to the following:
    1. Any public utility or wireless communications provider engaged in the business of providing communications services and facilities, or to the officers, employees, or agents thereof, where the acts otherwise prohibited are for the purpose of construction, maintenance, conduct, technological research, or operation of the services and facilities of the public utility;
    2. The use of any instrument, equipment, facility, or service furnished and used pursuant to the tariffs of the public utility; and
    3. Any telephonic communication system used for communication exclusively within a state, county or municipal correctional facility.
  3. The judge of a court of record having domestic relations jurisdiction may authorize any individual to intercept, record, disseminate and use communications that would otherwise be prohibited by this section and § 39-13-605, upon an ex parte showing by the investigator that there is probable cause to believe that the health, safety and welfare of a minor are in jeopardy.
    1. A law enforcement officer or other person with judicial purview, while in the course of the person's employment, may record a protected communication, where preservation and retention of the recorded communication are pertinent to a criminal investigation; provided, that the officer follows the procedure set out in this subsection (f).
    2. When an officer or other authorized person records a protected communication, the officer or other authorized person shall label each recording with the following information:
      1. The name of the officer or other authorized person making the recording; and
      2. The date and time the recording is made.
    3. Within forty-eight (48) hours of a law enforcement officer or other authorized person recording a protected communication, the officer or other authorized person shall apply to a judge authorized to issue a search warrant for an order authorizing continued recording and preservation and retention of the recordings already made. No dissemination or duplication of the recording shall be made prior to the receipt of a court order.
    4. The officer or other authorized person shall certify to the judge in a written application under oath that the recording is pertinent to a criminal investigation, the nature of the offense under investigation, and the address, if known, of the location of the cordless or cellular telephone communication intercepted.
    5. If the judge finds that the information contained in the officer's or other authorized person's written application complies with subdivision (f)(4), the judge shall issue a court order authorizing the preservation, retention or continued recording of protected communications. The order shall include the date and time of the recording, the nature of the crime under investigation, and the address, if known, of the location of the cordless or cellular telephone intercepted. An application and order under this section shall be sealed, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Custody of the sealed application and order shall be wherever the judge directs.
    6. If no application for an order is made authorizing the preservation and retention of recorded protected communications within the forty-eight hour period, or if the officer or other authorized person does not comply with subdivision (f)(4), the recording shall be destroyed.
    7. No recording of a protected communication, or any information contained in the recording, may be used as evidence, unless the recording was obtained in accordance with this section; provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude the introduction of evidence derived independently from sources other than the recording.
  4. A judge vested with the authority to issue an order permitting recordation of cellular or cordless telephone conversations as provided in this section may permit other individuals to record and disseminate recordings of such protected communications upon a sworn petition by a licensed cordless or cellular telephone agency or other private individual showing probable cause that a felony has been or is about to be committed. The court issuing the order shall determine in the order the length of time that recording shall be permitted and shall likewise order the final disposition of all recordings taken pursuant to this section.

Acts 1994, ch. 970, §§ 1, 4.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Wiretapping and electronic surveillance by law enforcement, warrants for,  title 40, ch. 6, part 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutional Issues.

Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an individual's Fourth Amendment claim because the law was not clearly established that a user of an analog cordless phone had a reasonable expectation of privacy under 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., or T.C.A. § 39-13-604. Frierson v. Goetz, 227 F. Supp. 2d 889, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19415 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), aff'd, 99 Fed. Appx. 649, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10037 (2004).

Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d)(1) from an individual's claim that the interception of communications via a cordless telephone violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., where the officer relied on T.C.A. § 39-13-604 authorizing the interception of cordless telephone communications, followed that statute's procedures, and received a court order authorizing the retention and continuation of the recordings. Frierson v. Goetz, 227 F. Supp. 2d 889, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19415 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), aff'd, 99 Fed. Appx. 649, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10037 (2004).

39-13-605. Unlawful photographing in violation of privacy.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly photograph, or cause to be photographed an individual, when the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, without the prior effective consent of the individual, or in the case of a minor, without the prior effective consent of the minor's parent or guardian, if the photograph:
    1. Would offend or embarrass an ordinary person if such person appeared in the photograph; and
    2. Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant.
    1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “photograph” means any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape or live television transmission of any individual.
    2. As used in this section, an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of the location where a photograph is taken, if:
      1. The photograph is taken in a manner that would offend or embarrass a reasonable person; and
      2. The photograph depicts areas of the individual's body, clothed or unclothed, that would not be visible to ordinary observation but for the offensive or embarrassing manner of photography.
  2. All photographs taken in violation of this section shall be confiscated and, after their use as evidence, destroyed.
    1. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of this section is a Class E felony if:
      1. The defendant disseminates or permits the dissemination of the photograph to any other person; or
      2. The victim of the offense is under thirteen (13) years of age at the time of the offense.
    3. A violation of this section is a Class D felony if:
      1. The defendant disseminates or permits the dissemination of the photograph to any other person; and
      2. The victim of the offense is under thirteen (13) years of age at the time of the offense.
  3. Nothing in this section shall preclude the state from electing to prosecute conduct in violation of this section under any other applicable section, including chapter 17, parts 9 and 10 of this title.
  4. In addition to the punishment provided for a person who commits the misdemeanor unlawful photographing in violation of privacy, the trial judge may order, after taking into account the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense, including the offense for which the person was originally charged and whether the conviction was the result of a plea bargain agreement, that the person be required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004, compiled in title 40, chapter 39, part 2.

Acts 1994, ch. 970, § 2; 1997, ch. 469, §§ 1, 2; 2000, ch. 667, § 2; 2010, ch. 1124, §§ 1, 2; 2014, ch. 977, § 1; 2016, ch. 941, § 1; 2018, ch. 866, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2014, ch. 977, § 4 provided that the act shall apply only to offenses occurring on or after July 1, 2014.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (b)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 866, § 2. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. “Disseminating” defined, § 39-13-604.

Penalties for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Because it was well established that a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy when the person had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and society was willing to view the individual's subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances, this statute, prohibiting unlawful photography, did not prohibit conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence had to necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application; thus, defendant's constitutional challenge to this statute was properly denied. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Because it was well established that a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy when the person had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and society was willing to view the individual's subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances this statute, prohibiting unlawful photography, did not prohibit conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence had to necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application; thus, defendant's constitutional challenge to this statute was properly denied. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Because it was well established that a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy when the person had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and society was willing to view the individual's subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances, this statute prohibiting unlawful photography did not prohibit conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence had to necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application; thus, defendant's constitutional challenge to this statute was properly denied. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Because it was well established that a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy when the person had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and society was willing to view the individual's subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances, this statute prohibiting unlawful photography did not prohibit conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence had to necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application; thus, defendant's constitutional challenge to this statute was properly denied. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

2. —Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of attempted unlawful photography because the victim was fully clothed in a public place; and the victim had no reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of unlawful photography because the victim was fully-clothed in full view of any person present in a store; and the victim did not have a subjective expectation of privacy. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of unlawful photography because victim was fully clothed and in a public place; and no photograph or video recording of the victim was ever discovered in defendant's possession or disseminated by defendant in any way. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

3. —Admissibility.

In an unlawful photography case, defendant's statement that he filmed women was improperly admitted into evidence because defendant's identity was not an issue as he was captured on a store's surveillance video and conclusively identified by the victim; he did not make the issue of motive material; nothing in his statement suggested that his conduct was motivated by a desire for sexual gratification; he did not assert either accident or mistake of fact as a defense to the charged offense; and the State's argument that his admission to videotaping other women proved that either a photograph or video existed, despite that no video or photograph of the victim was ever recovered, was precisely the type of inference prohibited by this rule. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of unlawful photography and attempted sexual battery, defendant's statement that he did not grab the victim's behind and that he had been frequently videoing blonde-haired women was properly admitted into evidence as his identity was placed at issue because there was no surveillance video obtainable from the store, the identification of defendant rested solely on the victim's and her mother's testimony, and the reliability of their testimony was challenged by the defense; and his statement provided evidence that defendant filmed the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

In an unlawful photography case, the trial court erred by admitting defendant's statement that he filmed women into evidence because his identity was not an issue as he was captured on a store's surveillance video and conclusively identified by the victim; he did not make the issue of motive material; nothing in the statement suggested that defendant's conduct was motivated by a desire for sexual gratification; he did not assert either accident or mistake of fact as a defense to the charged offense; and the State wanted to admit defendant's statement to prove that since he had videotaped other women, he had necessarily videotaped or photographed the victim, which was precisely the type of inference prohibited by this rule. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

4. Jury Instructions.

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motions for special jury instructions because the 2018 amendment defining when an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy was not what the law when defendant committed his alleged offense of unlawful photography in 2016; and the record showed that the trial court gave a complete and accurate charge of the law. State v. Lambert, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

39-13-606. Electronic tracking of motor vehicles.

      1. Except as provided in subsection (b), it is an offense for a person to knowingly install, conceal or otherwise place an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle without the consent of all owners of the vehicle for the purpose of monitoring or following an occupant or occupants of the vehicle.
      2. It is an offense for a person who leases a motor vehicle to knowingly install, conceal, or otherwise place an electronic tracking device in or on the motor vehicle without the consent of the lessee of the vehicle.
    1. As used in this section:
      1. “Lease” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-14-147;
      2. “Owner” includes a person who has purchased a motor vehicle using a loan; and
      3. “Person” does not include the manufacturer of the motor vehicle.
    1. It shall not be a violation if the installing, concealing or placing of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is by, or at the direction of, a law enforcement officer in furtherance of a criminal investigation and is carried out in accordance with applicable state and federal law.
    2. If the installing, concealing or placing of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is by, or at the direction of, a parent or legal guardian who owns or leases the vehicle, and if the device is used solely for the purpose of monitoring the minor child of the parent or legal guardian when the child is an occupant of the vehicle, then the installation, concealment or placement of the device in or on the vehicle without the consent of any or all occupants in the vehicle shall not be a violation.
    3. It shall also not be a violation of this section if the installing, concealing or placing of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is for the purpose of tracking the location of stolen goods being transported in the vehicle or for the purpose of tracking the location of the vehicle if it is stolen.
  1. This section shall not apply to a tracking system installed by the manufacturer of a motor vehicle.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1997, ch. 339, § 1; 2014, ch. 790, § 1; 2016, ch. 860, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2016, ch. 860, § 3 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to prohibited conduct occurring on or after July 1, 2016.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Wiretapping and electronic surveillance by law enforcement, warrants for,  title 40, ch. 6, part 3.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of requiring owners' consent before installation of auto tracking device, OAG 98-0143 (8/7/98).

39-13-607. Observation without consent.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly spy upon, observe or otherwise view an individual, when the individual is in a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, without the prior effective consent of the individual, if the viewing:
    1. Would offend or embarrass an ordinary person if the person knew the person was being viewed; and
    2. Was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant.
  2. It is not a defense to a violation of this section that the defendant was lawfully on the premises where the offense occurred.
  3. If the person being viewed is a minor, this section is violated regardless of whether the minor or the minor's parent or guardian consented to the viewing.
    1. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of this section is a Class E felony if the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age at the time the offense is committed.
  4. Nothing in this section shall preclude the state from electing to prosecute conduct in violation of this section under any other applicable section.

Acts 2000, ch. 667, § 1; 2014, ch. 977, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2014, ch. 977, § 4 provided that the act shall apply only to offenses occurring on or after July 1, 2014.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-13-608. Offense of interception of radio frequency transmission to flee from criminal offense.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly intercept any radio frequency transmission with the intent to use the intercepted transmission to commit, facilitate, or aid in the flight from a criminal offense.
  2. For purposes of this section, “radio frequency transmission” means any radio transmission made by a law enforcement, fire fighting, emergency medical, federal, state or local corrections or homeland security official during the course of the official's duties.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 2010, ch. 953, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A, misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-13-609. Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act — Use of drones to gather evidence or information — Standing to initiate civil action against law enforcement agency.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act.”
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “Drone” means a powered, aerial vehicle that:
      1. Does not carry a human operator and is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft;
      2. Uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift;
      3. Can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely; and
      4. Can be expendable or recoverable; and
    2. “Law enforcement agency” means a lawfully established state or local public agency that is responsible for the prevention and detection of crime, local government code enforcement, and the enforcement of penal, traffic, regulatory, game, or controlled substance laws.
  3. The use of a drone, or other substantially similar device, by a law enforcement agency to search for and collect evidence or obtain information or other data shall constitute a search unless authorized by and used in compliance with this subsection (c) or subsection (d). A drone may be used for such purposes:
    1. If used in compliance and consistent with applicable federal aviation administration rules, exemptions, or other authorizations; and
      1. If the agency first obtains a search warrant signed by a judge authorizing the use of a drone; or
      2. If a judicially recognized exception to the warrant requirement exists at the time of use.
  4. A drone, or other substantially similar device, may be used for the purposes described in subsection (c) without a search warrant or recognized warrant exception if used:
    1. In compliance and consistent with applicable federal aviation administration rules, exemptions, or other authorizations; and
      1. To counter a high risk of a terrorist attack by a specific individual or organization if the United States secretary of homeland security determines that credible intelligence indicates that there is such a risk;
      2. To prevent imminent danger to life where there is reasonable suspicion that, under particular circumstances, immediate action is needed;
      3. To provide continuous aerial coverage when law enforcement is searching for a fugitive or escapee or is monitoring a hostage situation;
      4. To provide more expansive aerial coverage when deployed for the purpose of searching for a missing person;
      5. To investigate motor vehicle accidents that occur within the traffic right-of-way or an area open to the public;
      6. Where a criminal offense has occurred on publicly owned property, as defined in § 6-54-127(b), or where the law enforcement agency has reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense has occurred on such property; or
      7. At the scene of a fire investigation.
    1. Any law enforcement agency that uses a drone, or other substantially similar device, to collect evidence or obtain information or other data shall comply in all respects with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Constitution of Tennessee, Article I, § 7.
    2. Any evidence, information, or other data collected or obtained by use of a drone shall:
      1. Be deleted within three (3) business days of collection unless it is directly relevant to both the lawful reason the drone was being used and to an ongoing investigation or criminal prosecution. If the evidence, information, or other data collected or obtained is directly relevant to both, it shall be retained and deleted by the collecting law enforcement agency in accordance with the same criteria, policies, and procedures used by the agency for evidence collected by methods other than a drone;
      2. Not be admissible as evidence in a criminal prosecution in any court of law in this state if it was collected or obtained in violation of subsection (c) or (d); and
      3. Not be used as probable cause to obtain a search or arrest warrant or reasonable suspicion to detain a person or vehicle if evidence, information, or other data was collected or obtained that was, at the time of collection, unrelated to and discovered only because of the lawful reason the drone was being used.
  5. Any person aggrieved by the use of a drone in violation of this section may initiate a civil action against a law enforcement agency to obtain all appropriate relief, including injunctive relief, destruction of the evidence, information or other data obtained, damages, and reasonable attorney fees.

Acts 2013, ch. 470, § 1; 2018, ch. 970, § 1.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added “and” to the end of (b)(1)(D) and rewrote (c)-(g) which read: “(c) Except as provided in subsection (d), no law enforcement agency shall use a drone to gather evidence or other information.

“(d) This section shall not prohibit the use of a drone: “(1) To counter a high risk of a terrorist attack by a specific individual or organization if the United States secretary of homeland security determines that credible intelligence indicates that there is such a risk;“(2) If the law enforcement agency first obtains a search warrant signed by a judge authorizing the use of a drone;“(3) If the law enforcement agency possesses reasonable suspicion that, under particular circumstances, swift action is needed to prevent imminent danger to life; “(4) To provide continuous aerial coverage when law enforcement is searching for a fugitive or escapee or is monitoring a hostage situation; or“(5) To provide more expansive aerial coverage when deployed for the purpose of searching for a missing person. “(e) An aggrieved party may initiate a civil action against a law enforcement agency to obtain all appropriate relief, as determined by the court, in order to prevent or remedy a violation of this section.“(f) No data collected on an individual, home, or areas other than the target that justified deployment may be used, copied or disclosed for any purpose. Such data must be deleted as soon as possible, and in no event later than twenty-four (24) hours after collection.“(g)(1) The use of a drone to gather evidence or information shall constitute a search. Any law enforcement agency that uses a drone, or other substantially similar device to gather evidence or obtain information, shall comply in all respects with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article I, § 7, of the Constitution of Tennessee. “(2) Absent exigent circumstances or another authorized exception to the warrant requirement, evidence obtained or collected in violation of this section shall not be admissible as evidence in a criminal prosecution in any court of law in this state.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 970, § 2. July 1, 2018.

Law Reviews.

Droning On and On: A Tort Approach to Regulating Hobbyist Drones, 46 U. Mem. L. Rev. 695 (2016).

39-13-610. Search warrant required to obtain location information of an electronic device — Exceptions to warrant requirement — Admissibility into evidence.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Electronic communication service” means a service that provides to users of the service the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications;
    2. “Electronic device” means a device that enables access to or use of an electronic communication service, remote computing service, or location information service;
    3. “Governmental entity” means a state or local government agency, including, but not limited to, any law enforcement agency that is a lawfully established state or local public agency responsible for the prevention and detection of crime, local government code enforcement, or the enforcement of penal, traffic, regulatory, game, or controlled substance laws. A governmental entity also includes any other investigative entity, agency, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or an individual acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of a state or local agency;
    4. “Location information” means information concerning the location of an electronic device that, in whole or in part, is generated or derived from or obtained by the operation of an electronic device on a cellular telephone network or a location information service, rather than obtained from a service provider; and
    5. “Location information service” means the provision of global positioning service or other mapping, locational, or directional information service.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (c), no governmental entity shall obtain the location information of an electronic device without a search warrant issued by a duly authorized court.
  3. A government entity may obtain location information of an electronic device without obtaining a search warrant under any of the following circumstances:
    1. If the electronic device is reported stolen by the owner;
    2. If necessary to respond to the user's call for emergency services;
    3. To prevent imminent danger to the life of the owner or user;
    4. To prevent imminent danger to the public;
    5. With the informed, affirmative consent of the owner or user of the electronic device;
    6. If the user has posted the user's location within the last twenty-four (24) hours on a social media website; or
    7. If exigent circumstances justify obtaining location information for the electronic device without a warrant.
  4. Any evidence obtained in violation of this section is not admissible in a civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding and shall not be used in an affidavit of probable cause in an effort to obtain a search warrant.
    1. This section shall not be construed to apply to any smart meter gateway device.
    2. For purposes of this subsection (e), “smart meter gateway device” means any electric or natural gas utility meter, utility meter component, utility meter load control device, or any device ancillary to the utility meter, which is located at an end-user's residence or business and which serves as a communication gateway or portal to electrical or natural gas powered appliances, equipment, or devices within the end-user's residence or business, or which otherwise communicates with, monitors, measures, records, reports, stores, restricts, or regulates such electrical or natural gas powered appliances, equipment, or devices.

Acts 2014, ch. 991, § 1.

Cross-References. Unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const., amend. 4.

39-13-611. Aggravated unlawful photographing of minor.

  1. A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful photographing when the person knowingly photographs, or causes to be photographed a minor, when the minor has a reasonable expectation of privacy, if the photograph:
    1. Depicts the minor in a state of nudity; and
    2. Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant.
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “Nudity” has the meaning given in § 39-17-901; and
    2. “Photograph” has the meaning given in § 39-13-605.
  3. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class C felony.
  4. Nothing in this section shall preclude the state from electing to prosecute conduct in violation of this section under any other applicable section, including chapter 17, parts 9 and 10 of this title.

Acts 2019, ch. 437, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 437, § 3. May 22, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Part 7
Standardized Treatment for Sex Offenders

39-13-701. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Standardized Treatment Program for Sex Offenders.”

Acts 1995, ch. 353, § 2.

39-13-702. Legislative intent.

  1. The general assembly hereby declares that the comprehensive evaluation, identification, treatment, and continued monitoring of sex offenders who are subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system are necessary in order to work toward the elimination of recidivism by the offenders.
  2. Therefore, the general assembly hereby creates a program that standardizes the evaluation, identification, treatment, and continued monitoring of sex offenders at each stage of the criminal justice system, so that the offenders will curtail recidivistic behavior, and so that the protection of victims and potential victims will be enhanced. The general assembly recognizes that some sex offenders cannot or will not respond to treatment and that, in creating the program described in this part, the general assembly does not intend to imply that all sex offenders can be successful in treatment.

Acts 1995, ch. 353, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Revocation.

Trial court properly revoked defendant's deferred diversion and extended defendant's probation to allow for the completion of defendant's sex offender treatment program because substantial evidence supported the court's finding that defendant violated a condition of defendant's probation when defendant was discharged from the treatment program for failing to meet program goals. State v. Albright, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2018).

Revocation warrant put defendant on notice of the charges against defendant, and, as demonstrated by defendant's simultaneous request to be relieved of the requirement that defendant attend sex offender treatment for the duration of defendant's probation, defendant undoubtedly knew in advance of the revocation hearing that defendant's untimely discharge from treatment was the basis for defendant's alleged probation violation. State v. Albright, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2018).

39-13-703. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Board” means the sex offender treatment board created in § 39-13-704;
  2. “Sex offender” means any person who is convicted in this state, on or after January 1, 1996, of any sex offense, or if such person has been convicted in another state of an offense that would constitute a sex offense in this state, and who is subject to parole or probation supervision by the department of correction pursuant to an interstate compact;
  3. “Sex offense” means any felony or misdemeanor offense described as follows:
    1. The commission of any act that, on or after January 1, 1996, constitutes the criminal offense of:
      1. Rape of a child, as defined in § 39-13-522;
      2. Aggravated rape, as defined in § 39-13-502;
      3. Rape, as defined in § 39-13-503;
      4. Aggravated sexual battery, as defined in § 39-13-504;
      5. Sexual battery, as defined in § 39-13-505;
      6. Statutory rape, as defined in § 39-13-506;
      7. Incest, as defined in § 39-15-302;
      8. Criminal attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the offenses specified in this subdivision (3)(A); and
      9. Criminal responsibility for the facilitation of a felony when the specific felony facilitated is any of the offenses specified in this subdivision (3)(A); or
    2. The commission of any act that, on or after July 1, 2008, constitutes the criminal offense of:
      1. Sexual battery by an authority figure, as defined in § 39-13-527;
      2. Solicitation of a minor, as defined in § 39-13-528;
      3. Exploitation of a minor by electronic means, as defined in § 39-13-529; provided, that the victim of the offense is less than thirteen (13) years of age;
      4. Aggravated rape of a child, as defined in § 39-13-531;
      5. Statutory rape by an authority figure, as defined in § 39-13-532;
      6. Sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in § 39-17-1003;
      7. Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in § 39-17-1004;
      8. Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in § 39-17-1005;
      9. Criminal attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the offenses specified in this subdivision (3)(B); and
      10. Criminal responsibility for the facilitation of a felony when the specific felony facilitated is any of the offenses specified in this subdivision (3)(B); and
  4. “Treatment” means therapy and supervision of any sex offender that conforms to the standards created by the board pursuant to § 39-13-704.

Acts 1995, ch. 353, § 4; 1996, ch. 968, § 1; 1998, ch. 1049, § 12; 2008, ch. 1015, § 1; 2012, ch. 727, § 6.

Compiler's Notes. For the preamble to the act concerning transfers of certain functions relating to probation and parole services and the community correction grant program from the board of probation and parole to the department of correction, please refer to Acts 2012, ch. 727.

Acts 2012, ch. 727, § 63 provided that the implementation of the act, which amended the definition of “sex offender”, shall be fully accomplished on or before January 1, 2013.

39-13-704. Sex offender treatment board — Creation — Membership — Term — Duties — Immunity from liability.

  1. There is created, in the department of correction, a sex offender treatment board, which shall consist of thirteen (13) members. The membership of the board shall consist of the following persons:
    1. One (1) member representing the judicial branch, appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court;
    2. Two (2) members representing the department of correction, appointed by the commissioner of correction;
    3. One (1) member representing the Tennessee bureau of investigation, appointed by the director;
    4. One (1) member representing the department of children's services, appointed by the commissioner of children's services;
    5. One (1) member, appointed by the commissioner of correction, who is a licensed mental health professional with recognizable expertise in the treatment of sex offenders;
    6. One (1) member, appointed by the commissioner of correction, who is a district attorney general;
    7. One (1) member, appointed by the commissioner of correction, who is a member of a community corrections advisory board;
    8. One (1) member, appointed by the commissioner of correction, who is a public defender;
    9. One (1) member, appointed by the commissioner of correction, who is a representative of law enforcement;
    10. Two (2) members, appointed by the commissioner of correction who are recognized experts in the field of sex abuse, and who can represent sex abuse victims and victims' rights organizations; and
    11. One (1) member, appointed by the presiding officer of the sex offender treatment board, who is a representative of the board of parole.
  2. The commissioner of correction shall appoint a presiding officer for the board from among the board members appointed pursuant to subsection (a). The presiding officer shall serve as such at the pleasure of the commissioner.
    1. Any member of the board who is appointed pursuant to subdivisions (a)(1)-(4) shall serve at the pleasure of the official who appointed that member, for a term that shall not exceed four (4) years. Those members shall serve without additional compensation.
    2. Any member of the board created in subsection (a) who is appointed pursuant to subdivisions (a)(5)-(10) shall serve for a term of four (4) years. Those members shall serve without compensation.
  3. The board shall carry out the following duties:
    1. The board shall develop and prescribe a standardized procedure for the evaluation and identification of sex offenders. The procedure shall provide for an evaluation and identification of the offender and recommend behavior management monitoring and treatment based upon the knowledge that sex offenders are extremely habituated and that there is no known cure for the propensity to commit sex abuse. The board shall develop and implement measures of success based upon a no-cure policy for intervention. The board shall develop and implement methods of intervention for sex offenders that have as a priority the physical and psychological safety of victims and potential victims and that are appropriate to the needs of the particular offender; provided, that there is no reduction of the safety of victims and potential victims;
    2. The board shall develop guidelines and standards for a system of programs for the treatment of sex offenders that can be utilized by offenders who are placed on probation, incarcerated with the department of correction, placed on parole, or placed in community corrections. The programs developed shall be as flexible as possible, so that such programs may be utilized by each offender to prevent the offender from harming victims and potential victims. The programs shall be structured in a manner that the programs provide a continuing monitoring process, as well as a continuum of treatment programs for each offender as that offender proceeds through the criminal justice system, and may include, but shall not be limited to, polygraph examinations by therapists and probation and parole officers, group counseling, individual counseling, outpatient treatment, inpatient treatment, or treatment in a therapeutic community. The programs shall be developed in a manner that, to the extent possible, the programs may be accessed by all offenders in the criminal justice system. The procedures for evaluation, identification, treatment, and continued monitoring required to be developed shall be implemented only to the extent that funds are available in the sex offender treatment fund created in § 39-13-708;
    3. The board shall develop a plan for the allocation of moneys deposited in the sex offender treatment fund created pursuant to § 39-13-708, among the judicial branch, the department of correction, and the department of children's services. In addition, the board shall coordinate the expenditure of funds from the sex offender treatment fund with any funds expended by any of the departments listed in this subdivision (d)(3) for the identification, evaluation, and treatment of sex offenders; and
    4. The board shall research and analyze the effectiveness of the evaluation, identification, and treatment procedures and programs developed pursuant to this part. The board shall also develop and prescribe a system for tracking offenders who have been subjected to evaluation, identification, and treatment pursuant to this part. In addition, the board shall develop a system for monitoring offender behaviors and offender adherence to prescribed behavioral changes. The results of the tracking and behavioral monitoring shall be a part of any analysis made pursuant to this subdivision (d)(4).
  4. The board and the individual members of the board shall be immune from any liability, whether civil or criminal, for the good faith performance of the duties of the board.

Acts 1995, ch. 353, § 5; 1996, ch. 968, §§ 2-4; 1996, ch. 1079, § 123; 1998, ch. 1049, § 13.

Compiler's Notes. The sex offender treatment board, created by this section, terminates June 30, 2026. See §§ 4-29-112, 4-29-247.

Acts 2012, ch. 727, § 1 amended § 4-3-104, which concerns name changes of departments and divisions, to provide that references to the board of probation and parole, formerly referred to in this section, are deemed references to the board of parole.

Law Reviews.

Penile Polygraphy: The Admissibility of Penile-Plethysmograph Results at Sentencing in Tennessee, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 353 (January 2019).

Attorney General Opinions. Responsibilities of sex offender treatment board, OAG 06-117 (7/26/06).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Polygraph Test Results.

Trial courts may not consider polygraph examination results or any portion of a risk assessment report that relies upon polygraph examination results when imposing sentences. State v. Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2004).

Where defendant was indicted for rape of a child after impregnating a 12-year-old girl, he pleaded guilty to attempted rape of a child and received a sentence of eight years; the trial court erred in relying on polygraph test results to deny defendant probation. State v. Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2004).

39-13-705. Evaluation and identification.

  1. On and after January 1, 1996, each sex offender who is to be considered for probation or any other alternative sentencing shall be required to submit to an evaluation for treatment, risk potential, procedures required for monitoring of behavior to protect victims and potential victims, and an identification under the procedures developed pursuant to § 39-13-704(d)(1).
  2. Those offenders found guilty at trial or who pled guilty without an agreement as to length of sentence, probation, or alternative sentencing that are to have a presentence report prepared for submission to the court shall be required to submit to the evaluation referred to in subsection (a). The evaluation shall be included as part of the presentence report and shall be considered by the court in determining the sentencing issues stated in this section. If the court grants probation or alternative sentencing, any plan of treatment recommended by the evaluation shall be a condition of the probation or alternative sentencing. Those offenders who, as part of a negotiated settlement of their case, are to be placed on probation or alternative sentencing shall be required to submit to the evaluation referred to in subsection (a) as a condition of their probation or alternative sentencing; and any plan of treatment recommended by the evaluation shall be a condition of probation or alternative sentencing.
  3. The evaluation and identification required by subsection (a) shall be at the expense of the offender evaluated, based upon the offender's ability to pay. The plan of treatment and behavior management shall be at the expense of the offender based upon the offender's ability to pay.

Acts 1995, ch. 353, § 6; 1996, ch. 968, § 5; 1998, ch. 971, § 1.

Cross-References. Release and parole, title 40, ch. 35, part 5.

Community Corrections Act, title 40, ch. 36.

Sentencing alternatives, § 40-35-104.

Presentence report, § 40-35-207.

Law Reviews.

Penile Polygraphy: The Admissibility of Penile-Plethysmograph Results at Sentencing in Tennessee, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 353 (January 2019).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Polygraph Test Results.

Trial courts may not consider polygraph examination results or any portion of a risk assessment report that relies upon polygraph examination results when imposing sentences. State v. Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2004).

Where defendant was indicted for rape of a child after impregnating a 12-year-old girl, he pleaded guilty to attempted rape of a child and received a sentence of eight years; the trial court erred in relying on polygraph test results to deny defendant probation. State v. Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2004).

2. Consideration of Sex Offender Evaluation.

Trial court's denial of alternative sentencing had to be remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court improperly considered some factors, neglected to consider others, and no psychosexual evaluation was conducted. The trial court did not consider mitigating or enhancement factors on the record and defendant did not have a long history of criminal conduct. State v. Reno, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 18, 2017).

3. Probation Revocation.

Tennessee Supreme Court overrules State v. Gillman, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 818, that a sex offender placed on probation, including sex offender treatment, must be given actual, definite notice that his probation may be revoked if he refuses to admit during treatment that he engaged in the underlying criminal conduct, regardless of the plea entered; defendant pleaded nolo contendere and had at least implied notice that he would need to acknowledge he had engaged in criminal conduct, and actual, definite notice was not required. State v. Albright, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2018).

Revocation of defendant's probation after he was convicted of sex offenses was appropriate pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-705(b), because a condition of his probation required him to be enrolled in a sex offender treatment program and he was terminated from the program due to his dishonesty and due to the fact that he continued to blame the victim. State v. Reams, 265 S.W.3d 423, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2007).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's deferred diversion and extended defendant's probation to allow for the completion of defendant's sex offender treatment program because substantial evidence supported the court's finding that defendant violated a condition of defendant's probation when defendant was discharged from the treatment program for failing to meet program goals. State v. Albright, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2018).

Revocation warrant put defendant on notice of the charges against defendant, and, as demonstrated by defendant's simultaneous request to be relieved of the requirement that defendant attend sex offender treatment for the duration of defendant's probation, defendant undoubtedly knew in advance of the revocation hearing that defendant's untimely discharge from treatment was the basis for defendant's alleged probation violation. State v. Albright, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2018).

Although defendant did not verbally admit at his plea hearing to the underlying facts that resulted in the charge of soliciting a minor, his plea of nolo contendere had the same effect as a plea of guilty insofar as the prosecution and his disposition were concerned; a defendant pleading nolo contendere to a sex offense may nonetheless be mandated to participate in sex offender treatment which may require admissions to the conduct underlying the conviction(s). State v. Albright, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2018).

If due process does not require a defendant pleading guilty to a sex offense to be informed about the requirements of the Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act and the potential penalties for failing to comply with the Act, it makes no sense to require a trial court to inform a defendant pleading guilty or nolo contendere to a sex offense that failing to comply with the requirements of his required sex offender therapy may lead to the revocation of his probation. State v. Albright, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2018).

39-13-706. Treatment and monitoring of offenders.

  1. Each sex offender sentenced by the court for an offense committed on or after January 1, 1996, is required, as a part of any sentence to probation, community corrections, or incarceration with the department of correction, to undergo treatment to the extent appropriate to the offender based upon the recommendations of the evaluation and identification made pursuant to § 39-13-705, or based upon any subsequent recommendations by the department of correction, the judicial branch or the department of children's services, whichever is appropriate. Any treatment and monitoring shall be at the person's own expense, based upon the person's ability to pay for the treatment.
  2. Each sex offender placed on parole by the state board of parole on or after January 1, 1996, is required, as a condition of parole, to undergo treatment to the extent appropriate to the offender based upon the recommendations of the evaluation and identification pursuant to § 39-13-705 or any evaluation or subsequent reevaluation regarding the person during the person's incarceration or any period of parole. Any treatment shall be at the person's expense, based upon the person's ability to pay for such treatment.

Acts 1995, ch. 353, § 7; 1996, ch. 1079, § 123; 1998, ch. 1049, § 14.

Compiler's Notes. Compiler’s notes. Acts 2012, ch. 727, § 1 amended § 4-3-104, which concerns name changes of departments and divisions, to provide that references to the board of probation and parole, formerly referred to in this section, are deemed references to the board of parole.

39-13-707. Treatment services to conform with board standards.

The department of correction, the judicial branch, or the department of children's services shall not employ or contract with any individual or entity to provide treatment services pursuant to this part, unless the treatment services to be provided by the individual or entity conform with the standards developed pursuant to § 39-13-704(d)(2).

Acts 1995, ch. 353, § 8; 1996, ch. 1079, § 123.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

T.C.A. § 39-13-707's prohibition against state contracting with non-conforming entities is directed toward those entities which provide treatment services, and does not speak to the qualifications of a provider whose activity is evaluative only, nor does it preclude a court from considering the information and knowledge of any qualified expert witness in making its sentencing determinations. State v. Mounger, 7 S.W.3d 70, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

2. Board Certification.

T.C.A. § 39-17-707 does not per se authorize nor mandate the sex offender treatment board to certify anyone. State v. Mounger, 7 S.W.3d 70, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Forensic and clinical psychology professor's lack of certification as a treatment provider by the sex offender treatment board should not have precluded him from testifying as an expert on defendant's behalf where the professor was not seeking to treat or monitor the defendant but to critique the findings of the court-ordered evaluation. State v. Mounger, 7 S.W.3d 70, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

39-13-708. Surcharge.

  1. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “convicted” and “conviction” means an adjudication of guilt of a sex offense as defined in this part as follows:
    1. Plea of guilty, including a plea of guilty entered pursuant to § 40-35-313;
    2. Verdict of guilty by a judge or jury;
    3. Plea of no contest; and
    4. Best interest plea.
  2. On and after July 1, 1996, each person who is convicted of a sex offense as defined in this part shall pay a tax to the clerk of the court in which the conviction occurs, in an amount not to exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000), as determined by the court for each conviction as defined by this part.
  3. The clerk of the court shall allocate the tax required by subsection (b) as follows:
    1. Five percent (5%) of the tax paid shall be retained by the clerk for administrative costs incurred pursuant to this subsection (c); and
    2. Ninety-five percent (95%) of the tax paid under this section shall be deemed a litigation tax imposed pursuant to § 67-4-602, and shall be includible as an amount subject to apportionment pursuant to § 67-4-606.
  4. There is created in the state treasury a sex offender treatment fund, which shall consist of moneys received by the state treasurer pursuant to this part. All interest derived from the deposit and investment of this fund shall be credited to the general fund. Any moneys not appropriated by the general assembly shall remain in the sex offender treatment fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund of the state at the end of any fiscal year. All moneys in the fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly to the judicial branch, the department of correction, and the department of children's services, after consideration of the plan developed pursuant to § 39-13-704(d)(3), to cover the direct and indirect costs associated with the evaluation, identification, and treatment and the continued monitoring of sex offenders.
  5. The court may waive all or any portion of the tax required by this section if the court finds that a person convicted of a sex offense is indigent or financially unable to pay.
  6. For the purposes of collecting any unpaid balance of the tax imposed by this part, the department of correction shall deduct from the trust fund account of any sex offender who is in custody of the department of correction those moneys necessary to satisfy the unpaid tax.

Acts 1995, ch. 353, § 10; 1996, ch. 968, § 6; 1996, ch. 1079, § 123; 2005, ch. 429, § 21; T.C.A. § 39-13-709.

Code Commission Notes.

This section was renumbered from § 39-17-709 by authority of the Code Commission in 2018.

Part 8
Terrorism Prevention and Response Act of 2002

39-13-801. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Terrorism Prevention and Response Act of 2002.”

Acts 2002, ch. 849, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey of Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 177 (1999).

39-13-802. Legislative intent.

  1. The general assembly finds and declares that the threat of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, including, but not limited to, biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents, is a compelling public safety and health concern. The general assembly recognizes that terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction could result in a disaster placing residents of Tennessee in great peril. The general assembly finds it necessary to sanction the possession, manufacture, use, or threatened use of chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons, as well as the intentional use or threatened use of industrial or commercial chemicals as weapons, to take other steps to prevent the occurrence of terrorist acts to the fullest extent possible, and to respond rapidly and effectively to any terrorist acts. The general assembly further finds and declares that hoaxes involving terrorist threats create a substantial drain on governmental resources and are a significant disruption to the operation of government, as well as a disruption of the right of persons to a sense of personal security.
  2. The general assembly further finds and declares that the threat from terrorism arises from a variety of sources and means other than through the utilization of weapons of mass destruction. The general assembly finds that this state has a compelling state interest in preventing terrorism within its borders, and the targeted prohibitions set forth in this part are meant to be a focused and least intrusive method for this state to protect its residents from such threats. The general assembly further declares that this part neither targets, nor incidentally prohibits or inhibits, the peaceful practice of any religion.

Acts 2002, ch. 849, § 1; 2011, ch. 497, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 497, § 1 provided that §§ 2-5 of the act, which amended §§ 39-13-802, 39-13-803 and 39-13-807 and enacted § 39-13-809, shall be known and may be cited as the “Material Support to Designated Entities Act of 2011.”

39-13-803. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Act of terrorism” means an act or acts constituting a violation of this part, any other offense under the laws of Tennessee, or an act or acts constituting an offense in any other jurisdiction within or outside the territorial boundaries of the United States that contains all of the elements constituting a violation of this part or is otherwise an offense under the laws of such jurisdiction, that is intended, directly or indirectly, to:
    1. Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
    2. Influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion; or
    3. Affect the conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination, torture, kidnapping, or mass destruction;
  2. “Biological warfare agents” mean agents intended for use in war or other attack to cause disease or death in humans, animals, or plants that depend for their effect on multiplication within the target organism, and includes, but is not limited to, the following agents, or any analog of these agents:
    1. Bacteria
      1. Bacillus anthracis  (anthrax);
      2. Bartonella quintana  (trench fever);
      3. Brucella  species (brucellosis);
      4. Burkholderia mallei  (glanders);
      5. Burkholderia pseudomallei  (meliodosis);
      6. Franciscella tularensis  (tularaemia);
      7. Salmonella typhi  (typhoid fever);
      8. Shigella  species (shigellosis);
      9. Vibrio cholerae  (cholera);
      10. Yersinia pestis  (plague);
      11. Coxiella burnetii  (Q fever);
      12. Orientia tsutsugamushi  (scrub typhus);
      13. Rickettsia prowazeki  (typhus fever);
      14. Rickettsia rickettsii  (Rocky Mountain spotted fever);
      15. Chlamydia psittaci  (psittacosis);
      16. Clostridium botulinum  (botulism);
      17. Mycobacterium tuberculosis  (tuberculosis);
      18. Staphylococcus aureus  (staphylococcal enterotoxin B); and
      19. Escherichia coli  (E. coli);
    2. Fungi
      1. Coccidiodes immitis  (coccidioidomycosis);
      2. Histoplasma capsulata  (histoplasmosis); and
      3. Aflatoxin
    3. Viruses
      1. Hantaan/Korean haemorrhagic fever and related viruses;
      2. Sin Nombre;
      3. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever;
      4. Rift Valley fever;
      5. Ebola fever;
      6. Marburg;
      7. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis;
      8. Junin (Argentinian haemorrhagic fever);
      9. Machupo (Bolivian haemorrhagic fever);
      10. Lassa fever;
      11. Tick-borne encephalitis/Russian spring-summer encephalitis;
      12. Dengue;
      13. Yellow fever;
      14. Omsk haemorrhagic fever;
      15. Japanese encephalitis;
      16. Western equine encephalomyelitis;
      17. Eastern equine encephalomyelitis;
      18. Chikungunya;
      19. O'nyong-nyong;
      20. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis;
      21. Variola major (smallpox);
      22. Monkey pox;
      23. White pox (variant of variola virus);
      24. Influenza; and
      25. Hantavirus;
    4. Protozoa
      1. Naeglaeria fowleri  (naegleriasis);
      2. Toxoplasma gondii  (toxoplasmosis);
      3. Schistosoma  species (bilharziasis); and
      4. Cryptosporidium parvum  (cryptosporidiosis); and
    5. Other toxins, including, but not limited to:
      1. Ricin; and
      2. Saxitoxin;
  3. “Chemical warfare agents” include, but are not limited to, the following agents, or any analog of these agents, intended for use in war or other attack to cause disease or death in humans, animals, or plants:
    1. Nerve agents, including, but not limited to:
      1. Ethyl NN- dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate (Tabun, or GA);
      2. O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (Sarin, or GB);
      3. O-1,2,2-trimethylpropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (Soman, or GD);
      4. O-cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridate (cyclosarin, or GF);
      5. O-ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate (VX);
      6. O-ethyl S-2-dimethylaminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate (medemo); and
      7. O-isobutyl S-2-diethylaminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate (VR);
    2. Blood agents, including, but not limited to:
      1. Hydrogen cyanide (AC);
      2. Cyanogen chloride (CK); and
      3. Arsine (SA);
    3. Blister agents, including, but not limited to:
      1. Mustards (H, HD (sulfur mustard), HN-1, HN-2, HN-3 (nitrogen mustard));
      2. Arsenicals, including, but not limited to, Lewisite (L);
      3. Urticants, including, but not limited to, CX;
      4. Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl) ether (agent T); and
      5. Incapacitating agents, including, but not limited to, BZ; provided, however, that “incapacitating agents” shall not include any agent, the possession of which is otherwise lawful, that is intended for use for self-defense or defense of others;
    4. Choking agents, including, but not limited to:
      1. Phosgene (CG);
      2. Diphosgene (DP); and
      3. Chloropicrin;
    5. Pesticides;
    6. Dioxins;
    7. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs);
    8. Flammable industrial gases and liquids, including, but not limited to:
      1. Gasoline; and
      2. Propane; and
    9. Tear gases and other disabling chemicals, including, but not limited to:
      1. 10-chloro-5, 10-dihydrophenarsazine (adamsite, or DM);
      2. 1-chloroacetophenone (CN);
      3. a-bromophenylacetonitrile (larmine, BBC or CA);
      4. 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS);
      5. Dibenzoxazepine (CR);
      6. Oleoresin capsicum (OC); and
      7. 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ); provided, however, that “tear gases and other disabling chemicals” shall not include any agent, the possession of which is otherwise lawful, that is intended for use for self-defense or defense of others;
  4. “Designated entity” means any entity designated by the United States department of state as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1189), or by the United States department of the treasury as a specially designated national in accordance with 31 CFR part 500;
  5. “Expert advice or assistance”:
    1. Means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical, legal or other specialized knowledge; and
    2. Does not mean legal services provided to a defendant in relation to any action brought pursuant to this part, or pursuant to federal or state law;
  6. “Financial institution” shall have the meaning provided in 31 CFR chapter X;
  7. “Material support or resources”:
    1. Means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, transportation, and personnel; and
    2. Does not include medicine or religious materials;
  8. “Nuclear or radiological agents” includes, but is not limited to:
    1. Any explosive device designed to cause a nuclear yield, also known as an improvised nuclear device (IND);
    2. Any explosive device utilized to spread radioactive material, also known as a radiological dispersal device (RDD); and
    3. Any act or container designed to release radiological material as a weapon without an explosion, also known as a simple radiological dispersal device (SRDD);
  9. “Training” means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge;
  10. “Weapon of mass destruction” includes chemical warfare agents, biological or biologic warfare agents, weaponized agents, weaponized biological or biologic warfare agents, nuclear agents, radiological agents, or the intentional release of industrial agents as a weapon;
  11. “Weaponization” is the deliberate processing, preparation, packaging, or synthesis of any substance for use as a weapon or munition;
  12. “Weaponized agents” are those agents or substances prepared for dissemination through any explosive, thermal, pneumatic, or mechanical means; and
  13. “Weaponized biological or biologic warfare agents” include, but are not limited to, weaponized pathogens, such as bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, yeasts, fungi, or genetically engineered pathogens, toxins, vectors, and endogenous biological regulators (EBRs).

Acts 2002, ch. 849, § 1; 2011, ch. 497, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 497, § 1 provided that §§ 2-5 of the act, which amended §§ 39-13-802, 39-13-803 and 39-13-807 and enacted § 39-13-809, shall be known and may be cited as the “Material Support to Designated Entities Act of 2011.”

39-13-804. Intentional release of dangerous chemical or hazardous material with intent of causing harm.

  1. The intentional release of a dangerous chemical or hazardous material utilized in a lawful industrial or commercial process shall be considered use of a weapon of mass destruction when a person knowingly utilizes those agents with intent and for the purpose of causing harm to persons either directly or indirectly through harm to animals or the environment. The release of dangerous chemicals or hazardous materials for any purpose shall remain subject to regulation under federal and state environmental laws.
  2. The lawful use of chemicals for legitimate mineral extraction, industrial, agricultural, commercial, or private purposes, such as gasoline used to power engines or propane used for heating or cooking, is not proscribed by this part.
  3. No university, research institution, private company, individual, hospital, or other health care facility shall be subject to this part for actions taken in furtherance of objectives undertaken for a lawful purpose; provided, that such actions are taken in connection with scientific or public health research or are necessary for therapeutic or clinical purposes, and, as required, are licensed or registered with the centers for disease control and prevention pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) or other applicable authorities.

Acts 2002, ch. 849, § 1.

39-13-805. Commission of act of terrorism.

  1. It is an offense for any person to commit an act of terrorism in this state.
  2. An act of terrorism is a Class A felony.

Acts 2002, ch. 849, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

39-13-806. Weapons of mass destruction.

  1. It is an offense for any person, without lawful authority, to possess, develop, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, weaponize, or retain any weaponized agent, biological warfare agent, weaponized biological or biologic warfare agent, chemical warfare agent, nuclear or radiological agent, or any other weapon of mass destruction.
  2. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class B felony.

Acts 2002, ch. 849, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

39-13-807. Provision of support or resources to designated entity or to persons committing or attempting an act of terrorism — Exception.

  1. It is an offense for any person to provide material support or resources, or attempt or conspire to provide material support or resources, to:
    1. Any person known by the person providing such material support or resources to be planning or carrying out an act of terrorism in this state, or concealing or attempting to escape after committing or attempting to commit an act of terrorism; or
    2. A designated entity; provided, the person must have actual knowledge that the entity is a designated entity.
  2. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A felony.
  3. This section shall not apply to any financial service, funds transfer, or securities transaction conducted in the ordinary course of business by a financial institution subject to the information sharing, suspicious activity reporting, or currency transaction reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.), or the U.S.A. Patriot Act (PL 107-56); provided, that any such institution that acts with the intent to assist, aid, or abet any person planning or carrying out an act of terrorism in this state, or concealing or attempting to escape after committing or attempting to commit an act of terrorism, shall remain liable under subsection (a).
  4. A person prosecuted under subdivision (a)(2) shall be afforded the same due process rights as are afforded to persons prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
  5. The district attorney general shall notify the United States department of state, and any other appropriate federal department or agency, of a violation of subsection (a).

Acts 2002, ch. 849, § 1; 2011, ch. 497, § 4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 497, § 1 provided that §§ 2-5 of the act, which amended §§ 39-13-802, 39-13-803 and 39-13-807 and enacted § 39-13-809, shall be known and may be cited as the “Material Support to Designated Entities Act of 2011.”

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

39-13-808. Distribution or delivery of any substance as an act of terrorism or as a hoax.

  1. It is an offense for any person to distribute or to deliver, as an act of terrorism or as a hoax, any substance that is intended to, or that such person has reason to believe may, create a fear or apprehension on the part of any other person that such substance may be a biological warfare agent, a chemical warfare agent, or a nuclear or radiological agent, without regard to whether such substance is in fact a biological warfare agent, chemical warfare agent, or a nuclear or radiological agent.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) as an act of terrorism is a Class A felony.
    2. A violation of subsection (a) as a hoax is a Class C felony.
  2. In addition to the penalties otherwise provided by law, any person convicted of a violation of subsection (a), either as an act of terrorism or as a hoax, shall make restitution of the costs incurred by any public or private entity or person resulting from such offense.

Acts 2002, ch. 849, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and C felonies, § 40-35-111.

39-13-809. Religious justification for violence or criminal activity prohibited.

Religious justification for violence or criminal activity prohibited by this part shall not be considered a justification or a defense pursuant to chapter 11, part 6 of this title, nor shall it prohibit prosecution pursuant to this part.

Acts 2011, ch. 497, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 497, § 1 provided that §§ 2-5 of the act, which amended §§ 39-13-802, 39-13-803 and 39-13-807 and enacted § 39-13-809, shall be known and may be cited as the “Material Support to Designated Entities Act of 2011.”

39-13-810. Forfeiture of property associated with terrorist acts.

  1. All property, both personal and real, including money, vehicles, and other property used, or intended for use, in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of this part, is subject to seizure and forfeiture to the state.
    1. The following people or agencies may make a claim with the court where the conviction occurs for reimbursement for damages caused by or costs associated with the investigation and prosecution of the criminal violations, or the seizure and forfeiture of property under this part:
      1. Any person who suffers personal injury or property damage from the offense or any person entitled to bring suit pursuant to § 20-5-106 for death resulting from the offense; or
      2. The law enforcement agency or other governmental agency that participated in the investigation, mitigation, or prosecution of the criminal offense or that participated in the seizure and forfeiture.
    2. No interest in real or personal property, money, or other assets seized shall be subject to forfeiture pursuant to this section if the court finds at least one (1) of the following:
      1. The owner or interest holder acquired the property before the conduct alleged to give rise to its forfeiture; or
      2. The owner or interest holder acquired the property during or after the conduct alleged to give rise to its forfeiture, and the owner or interest holder acquired this interest as a good faith purchaser for value, or acquired this interest in a commercially reasonable manner, and the owner or interest holder:
        1. Acted reasonably to prevent the conduct giving rise to forfeiture; or
        2. Did not know of the acts giving rise to forfeiture.
    3. No interest in real or personal property, money, or any other item subject to forfeiture under this section shall be seized or forfeited, unless the owner or interest holder is convicted of a crime or crimes prohibited by this part. If the owner or interest holder is an entity other than a natural person, the property shall not be forfeited unless the entity's officer, employee, or agent is convicted of the crime or crimes under this part, and the state shall also have the burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the following additional elements:
      1. The conviction is based on acts by the defendant in the course of and within the scope of the defendant's employment; and
      2. The entity knew or had reason to know from information in the entity's possession, other than through its convicted officer, employee, or agent, of the criminal nature of the acts.
    4. If the owner or interest holder in the seized property is not convicted of a violation of this part and is no longer subject to prosecution for the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture action, the property shall be returned to the owner or interest holder, unless the property is otherwise subject to forfeiture. The owner or interest holder may subsequently file a petition with the court that had jurisdiction over the forfeiture claim to recover reasonable attorney's fees and any actual damages resulting from the seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
  2. The state may stipulate that the interest of an owner or interest holder is exempt from forfeiture upon presentation of proof of the claim as provided in § 39-11-704.
  3. All property seized and forfeited pursuant to this section shall be sold at public auction, and the proceeds from the sale shall be distributed as follows:
    1. Any victim of the offense may file a claim with the court prior to the defendant's determination of guilt. Any claim the court finds to be verified and a result of the offense shall be approved by the court and paid first from the proceeds. The court shall determine the proper amount of damages using the restitution procedure in § 40-35-304, but this section and §  39-13-811 shall prevail with regard to the scope of damages for which a victim may claim;
    2. The costs of investigation shall be paid to the law enforcement agency or governmental agency that conducted the investigation; provided:
      1. If more than one (1) law enforcement agency or governmental agency equally conducted the investigation, the costs of investigation shall be paid equally to the law enforcement agencies and governmental agencies conducting the investigation; and
      2. If one (1) law enforcement agency or governmental agency primarily conducted the investigation, the costs of investigation first shall be paid to that law enforcement agency or governmental agency, with actual vouchered costs reimbursed on a pro rata basis to the other law enforcement agencies or governmental agencies participating in the investigation, not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the costs of investigation allocated to the primary law enforcement agency or governmental agency;
    3. The remainder of the proceeds shall be paid on a pro rata basis to a law enforcement agency or governmental agency that participated in the mitigation, seizure, or forfeiture process.

Acts 2015, ch. 441, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2015, ch. 441, § 2 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to prohibited conduct occurring on or after July 1, 2015.

39-13-811. Civil action available to victims.

  1. Notwithstanding whether criminal prosecution is commenced, or a conviction is obtained for a violation of this part, a victim of a violation of this part shall have a civil cause of action against the person responsible for the violation for both economic and noneconomic damages, up to the limits provided in § 29-39-102, for any personal injury, death, or property damage proximately caused by the violation.
  2. If the victim prevails in the action, the victim shall be entitled to all necessary costs incurred in bringing the action, including reasonable attorney's fees, and shall be eligible for punitive damages up to the limits set in § 29-39-104.
  3. Notwithstanding § 28-3-104, an action under this section shall be commenced within five (5) years of the date the cause of action accrued.
  4. If the victim prevailed and is awarded a judgment for damages, the judgment shall be offset by any amount the victim actually receives from the proceeds of assets forfeited pursuant to § 39-13-810 or from the criminal injuries compensation fund. If the amount of damages the criminal court judge determines to be appropriate pursuant to § 39-13-810(d)(1) and the amount of any judgment awarded the victim pursuant to this section are different, for the purpose of determining the total amount of damages to which the victim is entitled, the higher amount shall prevail.

Acts 2015, ch. 441, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2015, ch. 441, § 2 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to prohibited conduct occurring on or after July 1, 2015.

39-13-812. Immunity for report of suspicious activity or behavior.

  1. A person who in good faith makes a report of suspicious activity or behavior shall be immune from civil and criminal liability for the making of the report if the report is based on articulable suspicion.
  2. As used in this section, “report of suspicious activity or behavior” means any communication to a law enforcement officer or agency or other appropriate authority of the behavior or activity of another person if the report is made with the articulable belief that the behavior or activity constitutes or is in furtherance of an act of terrorism.
  3. This section shall not apply to the intentional making of a report known to be false, including a violation of § 39-16-502, or to a report made with reckless disregard for the truth of the report.

Acts 2017, ch. 208, § 1.

Part 9
Surveillance by Unmanned Aircraft

39-13-901. Part definitions.

As used in this part:

  1. “Image” means any capturing of sound waves, thermal, infrared, ultraviolet, visible light, or other electromagnetic waves, odor, or other conditions existing on or about real property in this state or an individual located on that property; and
  2. “Unmanned aircraft” means an airborne device that is operated without an individual in or on the device.

Acts 2014, ch. 876, § 2.

39-13-902. Lawful capture of images — Use for lawful purposes.

  1. Notwithstanding § 39-13-903, it is lawful to capture an image using an unmanned aircraft in this state:
    1. For purposes of professional or scholarly research and development by a person acting on behalf of an institution of higher education, as defined by § 49-7-802, including a person who:
      1. Is a professor, employee, or student of the institution; or
      2. Is under contract with or otherwise acting under the direction or on behalf of the institution;
    2. In airspace designated as a test site or range authorized by the federal aviation administration for the purpose of integrating unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace;
    3. As part of an authorized operation, exercise, or mission of any branch of the United States military, consistent with the Constitution of the United States;
    4. If the image is captured for the purposes of mapping; provided, the image of any person or thing on private property captured in the course of mapping shall be subject to § 39-13-905 as an image captured incidental to the lawful capturing of an image;
    5. If the image is captured for the practice of land surveying, as defined in § 62-18-102, by a duly registered land surveyor, pursuant to title 62, chapter 18, part 1; provided, the image of any person or thing on private property captured in the course of land surveying shall be subject to § 39-13-905 as an image captured incident to the lawful capturing of an image;
    6. If the image is captured by or for an electric or natural gas utility:
      1. For operations and maintenance of utility facilities for the purpose of maintaining utility system reliability and integrity;
      2. For inspecting utility facilities to determine repair, maintenance, or replacement needs during and after construction of such facilities;
      3. For assessing vegetation growth for the purpose of maintaining clearances on utility easements; or
      4. For utility facility routing and siting for the purpose of providing utility service;
    7. With the consent of the individual who owns or lawfully occupies the real property captured in the image;
    8. For law enforcement purposes, as permitted by § 39-13-609;
    9. If the image is captured by state or local law enforcement authorities, or a person who is under contract with or otherwise acting under the direction or on behalf of state authorities, for the purpose of:
      1. Surveying the scene of a catastrophe or other damage to determine whether a state of emergency should be declared;
      2. Preserving public safety, protecting property, or surveying damage or contamination during a lawfully declared state of emergency; or
      3. Conducting routine air quality sampling and monitoring, as provided by state or local law;
    10. At the scene of a spill, or a suspected spill, of hazardous materials;
    11. For the purpose of fire suppression;
    12. For the purpose of rescuing a person whose life or well-being is in imminent danger;
    13. If the image is captured by a Tennessee licensed real estate broker in connection with the marketing, sale, or financing of real property, provided that no individual is identifiable in the image;
    14. Of public real property or a person on that property;
    15. If the image is captured by the owner, operator or agent, or a person under contract with the owner, operator or agent, of an oil, gas, water, or other pipeline for the purpose of inspecting, maintaining, or repairing pipelines or other related facilities, and is captured without the intent to conduct surveillance on an individual or real property located in this state;
    16. In connection with oil and gas pipeline and well safety and protection;
    17. In connection with port authority surveillance and security;
    18. As authorized or permitted by the federal aviation administration for use in a motion picture, television or similar production where the filming is authorized by the property owner and a state or local film permit agency, if required;
    19. As a part of a commercial service that has received authorization from the federal aviation administration to use unmanned aircraft or an unmanned aircraft operating under regulations promulgated by the federal aviation administration for commercial use of unmanned aircraft;
    20. If the image is captured by the department of transportation, or a person under contract with or otherwise acting under the direction of or on behalf of the department of transportation, for the purpose of planning, locating, designing, constructing, maintaining, or operating transportation programs or projects; provided, the image of any person or thing on private property captured by or for the department of transportation pursuant to this subdivision (a)(20) shall be subject to § 39-13-905 as an image captured incident to the lawful capturing of an image; or
    21. If the image is captured for the practice of photogrammetric mapping by an individual who holds the “certified photogrammetrist” designation of the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing or other national scientific organization having a process for certifying photogrammetrists; provided, the image of any person or thing on private property captured in the course of photogrammetric mapping shall be subject to § 39-13-905 as an image captured incident to the lawful capturing of an image.
  2. An image captured for law enforcement purposes by a state or local law enforcement agency, or by a person who is under contract with or otherwise acting under the direction of or on behalf of such agency, shall be handled in accordance with § 39-13-609 and shall not be used for any purpose other than the lawful purpose for which the image was captured as permitted by this section.

Acts 2014, ch. 876, § 3; 2016, ch. 900, §§ 1-5.

39-13-903. Unlawful capture of image with intent to conduct surveillance a misdemeanor offense — Defense.

  1. Subject to the exceptions set forth in § 39-13-902(a), a person commits an offense if the person:
    1. Uses an unmanned aircraft to capture an image of an individual or privately owned real property in this state with the intent to conduct surveillance on the individual or property captured in the image;
    2. Knowingly uses an image in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-902(b);
    3. Without the venue owner or operator's consent, uses an unmanned aircraft to intentionally capture an image of an individual or event at, or drop any item or substance into, an open-air event venue wherein more than one hundred (100) individuals are gathered for a ticketed event;
      1. Knowingly uses an unmanned aircraft within or over a designated fireworks discharge site, fireworks display site, or fireworks fallout area during an event as defined in § 68-104-202, without the consent of the owner or operator of the event; and
      2. For purposes of this subdivision (a)(4):
        1. “Discharge site” means the area immediately surrounding the fireworks mortars used for an outdoor fireworks display;
        2. “Display site” means the immediate area where a fireworks display is conducted, including the discharge site, the fallout area, and the required separation distance from mortars to spectator viewing areas, but not including the spectator viewing areas or vehicle parking areas; and
        3. “Fallout area” means the designated area in which hazardous debris is intended to fall after a pyrotechnic device, including display fireworks, is fired;
    4. Knowingly uses an unmanned aircraft over the grounds of a correctional facility; or
      1. Without the business operator's written consent, knowingly uses an unmanned aircraft within two hundred fifty feet (250') of the perimeter of any critical infrastructure facility for the purpose of conducting surveillance of, gathering evidence or collecting information about, or photographically or electronically recording, critical infrastructure data;
      2. As used in this subdivision (a)(6), “critical infrastructure facility” means:
        1. An electrical power generation system; electrical transmission system, either as a whole system or any individual component of the transmission system; or electrical distribution substation;
        2. A petroleum refinery;
        3. A manufacturing facility that utilizes any hazardous substance, as defined in § 68-131-102, either in storage or in the process of manufacturing;
        4. A chemical or rubber manufacturing facility;
        5. A petroleum or chemical storage facility;
        6. A water or wastewater treatment facility;
        7. Any facility, equipment, or pipeline infrastructure utilized in the storage, transmission, or distribution of natural gas or propane;
        8. Railroad yards and facilities not open to the general public; and
        9. A communication service facility;
      3. This subdivision (a)(6) shall not prohibit an unmanned aircraft system from operating for commercial purposes in compliance with authorization granted by the Federal Aviation Administration.
    1. An offense under subdivisions (a)(1)-(5) is a Class C misdemeanor.
    2. An offense under subdivision (a)(6) is a Class E felony.
  2. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the person destroyed the image:
    1. As soon as the person had knowledge that the image was captured in violation of this section; and
    2. Without disclosing, displaying, or distributing the image to a third party.

Acts 2014, ch. 876, § 4; 2015, ch. 240, §§ 1-3; 2016, ch. 788, § 1; 2019, ch. 40, § 1; 2019, ch. 60, §§ 1, 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by ch. 40, inserted “, or drop any item or substance into,” in (a)(3).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 60, added (a)(6)(B)(ix); added (b)(2); and in present (b)(1), substituted “subdivisions (a)(1)-(5) is a Class C misdemeanor” for “this section is a Class C misdemeanor”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 40 § 2. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 60, § 3. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-13-904. Possession or distribution and use of unlawfully captured images — Misdemeanor offenses — Separate images constitute separate offenses — Defenses.

  1. A person commits an offense if the person:
    1. Captures an image in violation of § 39-13-903; and
      1. Possesses that image; or
      2. Discloses, displays, distributes, or otherwise uses that image.
    1. An offense under subdivision (a)(2)(A) is a Class C misdemeanor.
    2. An offense under subdivision (a)(2)(B) is a Class B misdemeanor.
  2. Each image a person possesses, discloses, displays, distributes, or otherwise uses in violation of this section is a separate offense.
  3. It is a defense to prosecution under this section for the possession of an image that the person destroyed the image as soon as the person had knowledge that the image was captured in violation of § 39-13-903.
  4. It is a defense to prosecution under this section for the disclosure, display, distribution, or other use of an image that the person stopped disclosing, displaying, distributing, or otherwise using the image as soon as the person had knowledge that the image was captured in violation of § 39-13-903.

Acts 2014, ch. 876, § 5.

Cross-References.  Penalties for Class B and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

39-13-905. Use of unlawfully captured images as evidence — Disclosure of images limited.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by subsection (b), an image captured in violation of § 39-13-903, or an image captured by an unmanned aircraft that was incidental to the lawful capturing of an image:
    1. May not be used as evidence in any criminal or juvenile proceeding, civil action, or administrative proceeding;
    2. Is not subject to disclosure, inspection, or copying under title 10, chapter 7; and
    3. Is not subject to discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for its release.
  2. An image described by subsection (a) may be disclosed and used as evidence to prove a violation of this part and is subject to discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for that purpose.

Acts 2014, ch. 876, § 6.

39-13-906. Applicability of part.

This part shall not apply to the manufacture, assembly, distribution, or sale of an unmanned aircraft.

Acts 2014, ch. 876, § 7.

39-13-907. Construction of part.

Nothing in this part shall be construed as permitting any act prohibited by other law.

Acts 2014, ch. 876, § 8.

Chapter 14
Offenses Against Property

Part 1
Theft

39-14-101. Consolidation of theft offenses.

Conduct denominated as theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the separate offenses referenced before 1989 as embezzlement, false pretense, fraudulent conversion, larceny, receiving or concealing stolen property, and other similar offenses.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This part represents a major structural change in Tennessee theft law by replacing antiquated and confusing statutes with a modern easily understood language.

This section clearly provides that the new generic offense of theft includes and replaces the traditional theft offenses of embezzlement, false pretense, fraudulent conversion, larceny, receiving or concealing stolen property, and shoplifting.

Code Commission Notes.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Alleging embezzlement, § 40-13-221.

Fees in criminal prosecutions, §§ 40-3-204.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The distinction between the various theft offenses is unimportant; the crime is complete when a person takes property, without the owner's consent with the intent to deprive the owner of the property. State v. Amanns, 2 S.W.3d 241, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

39-14-102. Part definitions.

The following definitions apply in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Cable television company” means any franchise or other duly licensed company which is operated or intended to be operated to perform the service of receiving and amplifying the signals broadcast by one (1) or more television stations and redistributing such signals by wire, cable or other device or means for accomplishing such redistribution to members of the public who subscribe to such service, or distributing through such company's antennae, poles, wires, cables, conduits or other property used in providing service to its subscribers and customers any television signals whether broadcast or not;
  2. “Credit card” means any real or forged instrument, writing or other evidence, whether known as a credit card, credit plate, charge plate or by any other name, which purports to evidence an understanding to pay for property or services delivered or rendered to or upon the order of a designated person or bearer;
  3. “Debit card” means any real or forged instrument, writing or other evidence known by any name issued with or without a fee by an issuer for the use of a depositor in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value, payment of which is made against funds previously deposited in an account with the issuer;
  4. “Expired” credit or debit card means a card which is no longer valid because the term shown on it has expired;
  5. “Issuer” means the business organization or financial institution or its duly authorized agent which issues a credit or debit card;
  6. “Library” means any:
    1. Public library;
    2. Library of educational, historical or eleemosynary institution, organization or society;
    3. Archives; or
    4. Museum;
  7. “Library material” includes any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, broadside, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microfilm, sound recording, audio-visual materials in any format, magnetic or other tapes, electronic data, processing records, artifacts or other documentary, written or printed materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, belonging to or on loan to or otherwise in the custody of a library;
  8. “Microwave multi-point distribution system station” or “MDS” means any franchise or other duly licensed company which is operated or intended to be operated to perform the service of receiving and amplifying the signals broadcast by one (1) or more television stations, and redistributing such signals by microwave transmissions to members of the public who subscribe to such service, or distributing through such company's antennae, conduits, or other property used in providing service to its subscribers and customers any television signals whether broadcast or not;
  9. “Receiving” includes, but is not limited to, acquiring possession, control, title or taking a security interest in the property; and
  10. “Revoked” credit or debit card means a card which is no longer valid because permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Credit cards, title 47, ch. 22.

39-14-103. Theft of property.

  1. A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner's effective consent.
    1. As a condition of pretrial diversion, judicial diversion, probation or parole for a violation of subsection (a) when the violation occurs as set out in subdivision (b)(2), the person may be required to perform debris removal, clean-up, restoration, or other necessary physical labor at a location within the area affected by the disaster or emergency that is in the county where the offense occurred.
    2. The condition of pretrial diversion, judicial diversion, probation or parole containing the requirement set out in subdivision (b)(1) may be used if the violation of subsection (a) occurs:
      1. During or within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of a tornado, flood, fire, or other disaster or emergency, as defined in § 58-2-101;
      2. Within the area affected by the disaster or emergency; and
      3. When, as a result of the disaster or emergency, the owner of the property taken, or the person charged with custody of the property, is unable to adequately guard, secure or protect the property from theft.
    3. Subdivision (b)(2) shall apply regardless of whether a state of emergency has been declared by a county, the governor, or the president of the United States at the time of or subsequent to the theft.
    4. Any period of physical labor required pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) shall not exceed the maximum sentence authorized pursuant to § 39-14-105.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2011, ch. 322, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is the primary generic theft statute. It punishes theft of property as defined in § 39-11-106. Special provisions concerning theft of property from a retail merchant are found in § 39-14-146.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 322, § 2 provided that the act, which added subsection (b), shall apply to violations committed on or after May 27, 2011.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Alleging embezzlement and breach of trust, § 40-13-221.

Arson, § 39-14-301.

Burglary, § 39-14-402.

Clerk of court, embezzlement by, § 18-2-105.

Criminal conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

Criminal impersonation, § 39-16-301.

Criminal simulation, § 39-14-115.

Destruction of valuable papers with intent to defraud, § 39-14-130.

Failure of tax collector to pay money into state treasury, penalty, § 67-1-1625.

Forfeiture of conveyances used in receiving stolen goods, title 40, ch. 33.

Forgery, § 39-14-114.

Hindering secured creditors, § 39-14-116.

Jury may provide punishment for less than year, § 40-20-103.

Military property, § 58-1-623.

Restitution ordered on conviction, § 40-20-116.

Search warrant for stolen property, § 40-6-102.

Taxing costs after settlement of prosecution for embezzlement, § 40-25-128.

Theft, detention of suspect, § 40-7-116.

Theft in retail or wholesale establishment — Arrest by peace officer without warrant, § 40-7-117.

Theft of property; merchandise, § 39-14-146.

Theft of services, § 39-14-104.

Use of citations in lieu of continued custody of an arrested person, § 40-7-118.

Vandalism, § 39-14-408.

Vandalism of caves or caverns, § 11-5-108.

Worthless checks, § 39-14-121.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 751.

Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 15.13, 16.20, 18.158, 22.34, 27.97, 28.91, 30.66, 32.131.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Bailments, § 6; 10 Tenn. Juris., Double Jeopardy, § 11; 17 Tenn. Juris., Larceny and Theft, §§ 1-5, 11, 12.

Law Reviews.

Out of Sight, Out of Mind, The Plight of the Habitual Criminal (Ray L. Jenkins), 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 259 (1959).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Generally.

Theft of property may be accomplished in one of two manners: (1) Taking or obtaining property without consent and with the intent to deceive; or (2) Exercising control over property without consent and with the intent to deceive. State v. Byrd, 968 S.W.2d 290, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. June 22, 1998).

In order to obtain a conviction for theft, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) Knowingly obtained or exercised control over property; (2) Did not have the owner's effective consent; and (3) Intended to deprive the owner of the property. State v. Amanns, 2 S.W.3d 241, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

With the enactment of T.C.A. § 39-14-103, the legislature eliminated the traditional distinctions between various unlawful takings in favor of one general theft statute. State v. Amanns, 2 S.W.3d 241, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Theft by obtaining property and theft by exercising control over the same property are the same offense. State v. Kennedy, 7 S.W.3d 58, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Contrary to defendant's argument, Tennessee v. Fluellen does not establish that a defendant may be convicted of burglary under T.C.A. § 39-14-402 simply by admitting that he obtained or exercised control over property of another, which is the definition of theft found in T.C.A. § 39-14-103. United States v. Eason, 643 F.3d 622, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13777 (8th Cir. July 7, 2011), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, — FED App. — (6th Cir.), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26295 (8th Cir. Mo. Aug. 12, 2011), cert. denied, 181 L. Ed. 2d 772, 565 U.S. 1132, 132 S. Ct. 1053, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 237.

2. Construction.

Plain reading of the theft statute indicates no intent on the part of the legislature to exclude real property from the theft statute. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Tennessee's consolidated theft statute included theft of real property because the statute did not distinguish between movable and immovable property or otherwise contain limitations barring such an application. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

3. Lesser Included Offense.

Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery and aggravated robbery. State v. Hayes, 7 S.W.3d 52, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Attempted theft is a lesser included offense of attempted robbery. State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

Theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery and evidence existed which would support an instruction on the lesser-included offense of theft; thus, it was error for the trial court not to instruct the jury regarding theft and defendant had to receive a new trial on the robbery conviction. State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. 2001), review or rehearing denied, State v. Curry, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Nov. 5, 2001).

Trial court's failure to give lesser included instructions on robbery and theft was not plain error because robbery and theft were not lesser included offenses of carjacking; the definition of theft contained a statutory element that was not included within the statutory elements of carjacking, namely an intent to deprive another of his or her motor vehicle, and because robbery included all of the elements of theft within its statutory elements, robbery was also not a lesser included offense of carjacking. State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. 2007).

4. Merger.

Separate convictions for burglary and theft of the same automobile did not violate due process principals. State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. 1999).

Trial court should have merged the offenses of theft of property between the value of $ 1,000 and $10,000 upon conviction and sentencing because the charged offenses were the same offense with the same elements, and the State alleged two alternative theories for the charges; because the jury convicted defendant of the same offense for the same transaction on two alternate theories, the trial court violated double jeopardy by not merging the convictions at sentencing. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Because the offense of theft was wholly incorporated into the offense of aggravated robbery, the offenses were the same under Blockburger and violated principles of double jeopardy; on remand, the judgment of conviction for theft was to be merged into a single conviction for aggravated robbery. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2018).

Because, under T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3), the crime of burglary was not complete until the person committed or attempted to commit a felony, theft, or assault, under a double jeopardy analysis, the statutory violations of theft and burglary in defendant's case arose from the same act or transaction, and the trial court was required to merge the theft and assault convictions into the burglary conviction. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2020).

5. Misappropriation of Funds.

Accountant's admission that he had misappropriated funds from clients and failed to report the amount on his federal income tax established that he committed theft of property under T.C.A. § 39-14-103 since he had “deprived” the owners of their property even if he had intended to return it. United States v. Parrott, 148 F.3d 629, 1998 FED App. 200P, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15001 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1998).

Given the findings that an attorney intentionally committed serious criminal conduct the Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility was correct in identifying the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions as an appropriate guidepost for selecting the presumptive sanction; the hearing panel also found that the attorney acted intentionally to conceal transactions from his partners even though he believed he was entitled to those funds. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn. v. Daniel, 549 S.W.3d 90, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

Defendant's conviction for theft of misappropriated legal fees from his law firm was affirmed where he specifically told clients to pay the fees directly to him to fund the opening of his new office and made no agreement with the firm to terminate his employment and allocate the fees; theft effectively was of currency. State v. March, 293 S.W.3d 576, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2008).

6. Fraudulent Breach of Trust.

In order to obtain a conviction for fraudulent breach of trust, the state is required to establish that the defendant was bound to deliver or return the thing received or its proceeds. State v. Amanns, 2 S.W.3d 241, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

7. Aggregation of Value.

The aggregation of the value of stolen property is permissible to establish the degree of the offense when a defendant simultaneously exercises possession or control over stolen property belonging to different owners. State v. Byrd, 968 S.W.2d 290, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. June 22, 1998).

Aggregation of thefts was appropriate because each of the separate thefts arose from a common scheme, purpose, intent or enterprise; on each occasion, defendant worked fitness trackers free of theft deterrent devices, walked around until the coast was clear before returning to retrieve the merchandise, concealed the purloined merchandise, and left the store, and defendant wore nearly identical clothing during each of the offenses and sold the fitness trackers. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2018).

8. Fair Market Value.

Jury was properly instructed on how to assess the value of the stolen property, that the value of the stolen comic books was the fair market value at the time of the offense; the jury heard the expert's testimony concerning his methodology for ascertaining value and determined that the fair market value was more than $ 60,000, and the evidence was sufficient to support that determination. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for Class C felony theft because, while the evidence was more than sufficient to show that defendant was the perpetrator; he was found standing on a ladder with a ratchet wrench with a socket attached and a screwdriver in his pocket and five air conditioners on the roof of the owner's building had been stripped of their copper pipe and coils; the State made no attempt to establish the value of the removed items and the owner did not know their value. State v. Malone, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

9. Evidence.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of a lay witness about the issue of adverse possession in defendant's theft and aggravated burglary trial, given that the witness was not qualified as an expert witness, and further cross-examination on the issue might have confused and misled the jury. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

In a felony theft case, the court of criminal appeals concluded that defendant intended to deprive the victim of a car by knowingly obtaining it without the victim's consent. Although defendant argued on appeal that the evidence showed that another person was, in fact, the guilty party, such matters of witness credibility and evidentiary weight were within the exclusive province of the trier of fact. State v. Vance, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2017).

10. —Sufficient.

Sufficient evidence corroborated accomplice's testimony regarding defendant's involvement in the theft to support defendant's conviction. State v. Anderson, 985 S.W.2d 9, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1296 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

There was ample evidence to support a conviction for theft where defendant took property without paying, ran for at least five blocks, stopped, dropped the property, turned toward the person who had given chase and brandished a box cutter. State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. 2000).

Based on the testimony of the victims and other witnesses, it was evident that even if defendant did not steal the four-wheeler, she did exercise control over it; further, the jury could have inferred that defendant knew that the four-wheeler was stolen because she admitted that she was trying to protect her boyfriend when she lied to the police, such that sufficient evidence was presented to convict defendant of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. State v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. 2005).

In a case where the victim testified that his pickup truck, valued between $6,000 and $9,000, was taken from him, police later notified him that his truck was involved in an accident, and defendant admitted to taking the truck and driving it on the day of the accident, the jury was permitted to discredit defendant's testimony that he intended to return the truck; thus, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property. State v. Bowman, 327 S.W.3d 69, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. June 15, 2009), cert. denied, Bowman v. Tennessee, 175 L. Ed. 2d 388, 130 S. Ct. 559, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8080 (U.S. 2009).

There was ample circumstantial evidence to support defendant's conviction for burglary in violation of T.C.A. § 39-14-402 and theft in violation of T.C.A. § 39-14-103, as the fact that a large table was moved indicated more than one person committed the crimes, and there had been an ongoing relationship between defendant and the person who had pleaded guilty; that evidence, along with defendant's shirt, when taken in a light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to infer defendant committed the crimes. State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. June 4, 2010), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. July 15, 2010).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary, under T.C.A. § 39-14-403(b), and theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, under T.C.A. § 39-14-105(4) (now (a)(4)), because circumstantial evidence showed: (1) defendant, a smoker, lived near the burglarized house; (2) the victims gave defendant no permission to enter the home and were not smokers; (3) the victims were absent when the house was burglarized; (4) items stolen from the home were worth about $40,000, while a stolen car was worth $26,000; (5) a partly smoked cigarette containing defendant's DNA was found in the home when police discovered the burglary; (6) the chances that DNA belonged to someone else were less than one in six billion; (7) the cigarette was not crumpled or flattened as if tracked into the house, and investigating officers ensured the officers did not track debris into the crime scene; (8) when police went to defendant's home to arrest defendant on another charge and ask defendant about the burglary, defendant ran; and (9) this circumstantial evidence was equally as probative as direct evidence. State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 596 (Tenn. June 15, 2011).

Evidence the victim was found lying on her bed, dead from two gunshots to her head, the phone line to her house had been cut, there were pry marks on the screen door, her car was missing, and defendant was arrested in her car with her gun under the driver's seat was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for premeditated murder, felony murder, aggravated burglary, and theft. State v. Stanhope, 476 S.W.3d 382, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2013).

Although circumstantial, evidence defendant had unexplained money roughly equal to the amount known to be in the victim's possession shortly before her death and that defendant gave his wife a large diamond ring that was positively identified as the victim's based on a unique flaw supported defendant's felony murder, aggravated arson, and theft of property convictions. State v. Garner, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 852 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2013), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2014), cert. denied, Garner v. Tennessee, 190 L. Ed. 2d 338, 135 S. Ct. 447, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 7297 (U.S. 2014).

Defendant was properly convicted of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000 because the evidence was sufficient to establish the value of the property defendant stole from a department store because loss prevention officers at the store testified as to observing defendant shoplift items from the store, a computer-generated report of stolen items was created by scanning the price tags of the items in defendant's possession, and defendant signed a statement of admission which listed the same items and the total price. State v. Shotwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery where it showed that he pushed his way into the victim's apartment while holding what the victim believed was a pistol, held the victim down, put the gun to the victim's head, demanded drugs and money, instructed his accomplice to take two laptop computers, and took $100 from the victim's wallet. Defendant drove a van with his accomplice and the computers to another apartment complex and took the computers out of the van, and his fingerprint was found on the power cord of one of the stolen computers. State v. Wisdom, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for felony murder because after defendant murdered the victim, he left the scene in the victim's car. State v. Moody, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000 as defendant intended to deprive the victims of their property because the first victim observed defendant walking alone in the street wearing his son's baseball cap, which was distinctive due to its custom lettering; when an officer approached defendant, the first victim looked inside defendant's bags and identified his items; defendant had a store receipt for perishable goods; and the last four digits of the debit card used in the store transaction matched the last four digits of the second victim's missing debit card. State v. Leonard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

There was sufficient evidence to support a theft conviction where defendant left the scene of the murder in a truck with a plate that was stolen, and the identification number of a truck that was found in Arkansas was traced to the truck defendant used to flee a murder scene. State v. Blocker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property valued over $500 because the evidence of defendant's identity was sufficient as the victim noticed that his trailer had been taken; on that day, defendant came to the owner of a trailer business with a used trailer that he wanted to sell; the business owner gave defendant $665 for the trailer; and the business owner positively identified defendant from a photographic lineup and in court. State v. Mims, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2016).

Evidence that the victim left her diamond ring in her master bathroom, the ring went missing after defendant worked in the bathroom, the day the ring went missing defendant had tried to sell one or more rings at a local pawn shop, the ring reappeared at the victim's home after an officer questioned defendant about the ring and asked that he return to the station with the ring to discuss the charged that would be brought against him was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft. State v. Pipes, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 722 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of theft of property valued at $1000 or more, but less than $10,000, because, while the evidence was not overwhelming, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant unlawfully received travel reimbursements from the VA where he failed to provide documentation of his Tupelo address and a comparison of a Memphis mission's records to the VA hospital's itemized list of travel reimbursements paid to defendant showed that on at least 19 occasions defendant received reimbursement for travel between Tupelo and Memphis on the same date the mission listed him as a resident in its dormitories. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of theft of property valued over $ 250,000, given that defendant exercised exclusive control over the bank's residential property, entered without permission, barred entry of the lawful owner, placed signs around the property indicating her right to deprive the owner of the property, and the property sold for $ 2.4 million dollars. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $ 500 or less, given that defendant's identity as the perpetrator was established; officers saw defendant, holding a shotgun, exiting the victim's apartment through broken glass, both officers identified defendant as the perpetrator at the preliminary hearing and at trial, DNA on the red shirt worn by the perpetrator matched defendant's DNA, and the blood on the floor of the apartment was consistent with defendant' DNA. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2016).

Evidence that three witnesses positively identified defendant as the man who sold a buyer the stolen car, fingerprints matching those of defendant were found on the bill of sale given to the buyer after he purchased the vehicle, the car was valued at $6,999, yet the buyer paid $2,500, and the VIN number on the car the buyer purchased matched the VIN number from the stolen car allowed the jury to infer defendant had stolen the vehicle based on his possession of it the day after it was stolen. State v. Alexander, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2017).

Defendant stole the victim's wallet from her handbag, and the victim testified that the wallet contained $ 900 in cash and that the wallet itself was worth $ 160; in finding defendant guilty of theft of property valued at $ 1,000 or more but less than $ 10,000, the jury accredited the victim's valuation of the property, as was its prerogative, and this evidence supported defendant's theft conviction. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

Although the victim was unable to identify defendant as one of the perpetrators at the preliminary hearing, there was sufficient evidence of his identity, as the jury chose to credit the victim's trial testimony that defendant was one of the men who fled in a vehicle from her rental home, knocking her down in the process, and there was evidence that the vehicle that fled the scene was registered to defendant's mother and defendant had access to the vehicle and had driven it on another occasion. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Feb. 28, 2017).

Defendant was properly convicted for theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 because defendant intended to deprive the victim of the victim's money by deceiving the victim into purchasing a counterfeit ring for $8,000 which was worth no more than $2,000, and defendant acted knowingly. Despite opportunities to do so, defendant never provided the victim with an appraisal for the ring. State v. Dixon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

Evidence that defendant pawned three tree stands, identified by the victims as the ones discovered missing from their hunting lease based on unique characteristics, and testimony that the victims did not give defendant permission to take or pawn the tree stands and were missing over $500 in proper was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000. State v. Thompson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2016).

Defendant's identity was sufficiently proven where the victim's description of the assailant matched defendant's physical appearance, defendant's DNA was found on gloves discovered in the victim's car after the incident and that were not in the car before it was stolen, and officers identified defendant as the driver of a car that had crashed before the incident, near the victim's home, who fled and was not apprehended. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for misdemeanor theft because a store employee saw defendant acting suspiciously and carrying two pairs of earplugs with a value of $34.96 as if trying to conceal them, the employee saw defendant put the earplugs in defendant's pocket and watched as defendant paid for drinks but not the ear plugs, and, when the employee followed defendant and asked defendant to walk with the employee to the store office, defendant stopped on the way and threw the earplugs on a display counter and ran out of the store. State v. McCaig, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft of real property because the evidence showed defendant (1) sought to obtain record title to the property, and (2) physically occupied the property, showing an intent to permanently deprive a bank of the property. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

There was sufficient evidence that the fair market value of the stolen property exceeded $ 10,000, given that the victim testified that the value of all of the items that were stolen was between $ 12,000 and $ 13,000, and while she agreed that she submitted a list to the police department stating that 40 pairs of shoes had been stolen, she explained that there had always been at least 100 pairs of shoes in storage, and the trier of fact was free to accredit the victim's testimony. State v. Firestone, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of theft because the store's employee testified that he saw defendant walking around the store, the next morning the employee realized that the two tablets that had been sitting in the counter were missing, and when the employee reviewed the video surveillance he identified defendant as the person who stole the tablets. State v. Trammell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 2017).

Evidence that defendant was seen unhooking the victim's trailer and moving it a couple of feet from the victim's truck and that the victim did not give defendant permission to take the trailer or the equipment it contained was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property. State v. Sappington, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendants'  robbery convictions because (1) the evidence showed the victim was threatened contemporaneously with a taking, (2) the victim's statement that the taking would have occurred despite the threat did not defeat a conviction, and (3) defendants acted in concert with one another when one tried to distract the victim while the other two stole property, which all three put in their pockets. State v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 765 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for felony theft of property, valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, because defendant visited a car lot and expressed an interest in purchasing a particular pickup truck valued at $1,600 to $1,800, the same truck was taken later that night without permission and found in defendant's possession at a nearby market, and defendant told a witness that the truck was defendant's and that defendant planned to buy it. Moreover, defendant started the truck and invited the witness to ride with defendant. State v. Houser, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 940 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property valued over $10,000 but less than $60,000 because defendant was driving the truck that had been reported stolen by the owner; when stopped near a repair shop, defendant told officers that he thought the truck belonged to another individual and that he was taking it for repairs; and the reasons given by defendant for driving the truck were contradicted by the other individual's testimony at trial that he did not operate a trucking company at the time and did not employ defendant as a driver or repairman. State v. Richards, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017).

Defendant's conviction of facilitation of felony murder under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-11-403, with kidnapping and theft as the underlying felonies under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-302, 39-14-103 was affirmed, as jurors could have found that defendant and his accomplice intended to deprive the victim of his vehicle when they forced him into the backseat, and the kidnapping and theft were still in progress at the time the victim was shot because he was still resisting confinement and refusing to consent to the taking of his property. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017).

Defendant's argument that he could not form the requisite specific intent to commit the offenses due to his alleged intoxication was rejected by the jury, and thus, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated burglary, burglary of a vehicle, two counts of theft, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Goss, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a theft because another person testified that she texted defendant twice to inform him that she was going to take money from the victim and leave; after defendant struck the victim, pulled the victim into the victim's residence, and pushed the victim onto the floor, he asked it there was anything else they could take from the victim; that statement evidenced defendant's intent to steal the victim's property and occurred before defendant's criminal acts were completed and before the victim died; and defendant exercised control over the victim's property. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000 because when a trooper stopped defendant's vehicle he was transporting two utility vehicles, the physical descriptions and VINS of the utility vehicles matched the utility vehicles stolen from the victim, and the victim testified that his business from which the utility vehicles were stolen was located in a particular county. State v. Demling, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. June 6, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for burglary of an automobile and misdemeanor theft. Regardless of whether attempts at harmonization represented the correct interpretation of the events, the mere fact that there were reasonable ways of reconciling testimonies proved that they were not necessarily in conflict. State v. Stutts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape and theft because the victim testified that she awoke to find defendant standing at the foot of her bed, he attacked her when she reached for her cell phone, he fondled her chest and stuck his finger inside her vagina, and when he finished he took $60 from her wallet. The victim also testified that she was able to see defendant's face during the attack, and a detective testified that he saw defendant the next morning walking in the victim's neighborhood wearing clothing that matched the description of the suspect. State v. Ramey, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Trial court did not err when it determined that the evidence proved that defendant did not purchase a second toaster oven, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant knowingly, with intent to deprive a store, obtained or exercised control over its property without its effective consent; a store employee saw defendant re-enter the store after leaving and watched him walk out of the store with the toaster oven. State v. Horne, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft of property valued at $1,000 or more than but less than $10,000 because defendant was defendant's paramour and asset protection managers for a retail store identified defendant in the store's video surveillance recording removing items from the store without playing for them in two incidents. The asset protection managers'  testimony sufficiently established the aggregate value of the items that were taken during the two incidents. State v. Keese, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Proof admitted at trial was clearly legally sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for theft over $ 1,000 and forgery over $ 1,000 because the State presented evidence that defendant falsified loan documents and pocketed money supposedly loaned to individuals whose names were on the documents. State v. McCullough, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 268 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the value of the stolen goods was over than $1,000 because the victim testified that the value of the laptop was between $900 and $1,000 and the value of the camera was approximately $300. State v. Rembert, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for felony murder because a jury could have inferred that defendant had the intent to commit a robbery prior to, or concurrent with, the killing of the victim based on his own conduct or the conduct of his accomplices, for which he was criminally responsible; defendant admitted he planned to rob the victim, he provided the gun used in the offense, he participated in the robbery, and he fled in the victim's car after the victim was shot. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018), cert. denied, Collins v. Tennessee, — L. Ed. 2d —, — S. Ct. —, — U.S. —, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 7182 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's confession to a detective corroborated the accomplice's testimony; defendant confessed that at some point after the burglary he had possession of the stolen handgun, and the accomplice's testimony established that he knowingly obtained or exercised control over the stolen items when he assisted her in the burglary. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's constructive possession of the stolen goods corroborated the accomplice's testimony; the accomplice was the sole lessee of the apartment where the stolen items were found, and none of defendant's belongings were found in her apartment even though he told a detective that he was staying at the accomplice's apartment. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Evidence that defendant took the victim's money, in several installments, over approximately six-months, knowing that he was having medical and personal problems that would prevent him from completing the work he agreed to do permitted a jury to find the victim's consent to give defendant her money was obtained by deception and thus, supported his conviction for theft. State v. Summers, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Sept. 14, 2018).

Defendant's convictions for theft were supported by evidence that first defendant took the victim diamond ring and second defendant took it out of state to sell it and that the ring was valued at $10,150. State v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property valued at $ 1,000 or more because witnesses'  testimony established the total value of all the fitness trackers taken during the five thefts; both witnesses testified that they were charged with keeping track of the fitness trackers and that they maintained logs of the items, and both testified to the manufacturer's suggested retail price of the fitness trackers at the time they were taken. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 where a bank branch manager's testimony estimated the amount in the ATM at $60,000, but admitted on cross-examination that it could have been $58,000, and a rational trier of fact could had found from that testimony that the value of the property taken was more than $10,000. State v. Dunn, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2018).

Evidence that defendant grabbed merchandise from a store and left without paying for it, that a loss prevention employee approached defendant and brought him back to his office, that defendant was knocking over tables and yelling profanity and threatened to kill the employee, and that while in the employee's office, defendant used a telephone cord to strangle the employee until he lost consciousness was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and theft. State v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 679 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property valued at less than $500 because the store's owner testified that someone smashed in the front door of the store and took two .175, approximately half a gallon, containers of vodka from just inside the entrance to the right of the front door; the store's owner testified that the value of the bottles was less than $75 and that the value of the broken door was $285; both a detective and the store's owner identified defendant from the surveillance video as the perpetrator; and the jury, as was its prerogative, rejected defendant's claim that he did not take anything from the store after smashing the window. State v. Amail John Land, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 665 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2018).

Evidence supported a taking in defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery because the victim and convenience store cashiers testified that defendant and co-defendant assaulted the victim together inside a convenience store, the cashiers testified that defendant had a knife, surveillance video showed that a box cutter fell to the floor in the struggle, defendant recovered items from the victim's wallet that fell to the floor and ran, and the victim's social security card and a check stub were found inside defendant's vehicle hours later. State v. Bingham, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 760 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated robbery and theft of $ 1,000 or less convictions, as his identity was sufficiently established; a store employee positively identified defendant as the perpetrator before and during trial, and DNA from the discarded cigarette butt at the scene matched defendant's DNA. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2018).

Evidence supported conviction for attempted theft as a reasonable juror could have concluded that defendant, a city mayor, intended to deprive the city of property when he paid city employees to pick up a truck being purchased for defendant's personal use, used city funds to pay for the tow of a city-owner truck and trailer, and the trucker's repair, and the tow of the newly purchased truck after the city truck broke down, and repaid funds only after being caught. State v. Loveless, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's identity and to convict him of robbery and theft because defendant demanded the keys from the victim and drove away in her car, which was valued at $5000; two police officers saw defendant driving the stolen car less than 25 minutes after it was reported stolen; when defendant was taken into custody, he was wearing clothing similar to those in the description given by the victim and several officers; and one officer was 100% certain that defendant was the person who wrecked the victim's car and ran on foot. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property; defendant's transfer of property stolen during the burglary was a rational connection between his possession of the stolen property and his participation in the aggravated burglary, and regardless of who went inside, defendant benefitted from the proceeds of the aggravated burglary and theft and aided his co-defendant in the commission of the offenses. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Evidence that defendant admittedly did not pay for a battery that he put in shopping cart and exited the store with was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property valued at $500 or less. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property over $1,000 because the victim returned home to find multiple items missing, including a flat screen TV and printer; the victim's neighbor saw defendant climbing over a fence with a flat screen TV and found a printer, which the victim later identified as the one stolen from the victim's home, with blood on it; the blood on the printer was a match to defendant's DNA; and the victim filed an insurance claim listing the total value of the stolen items at $1,765. State v. Cole-Pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property because the victim reported that he could not find his wallet to the credit card company and to the police; he did not give defendant permission to use the credit card; surveillance recordings showed defendant purchasing items with a credit card; and the transaction information reflected that the victim's credit card was used for payment. State v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to have determined that defendant entered a store and committed a theft because an asset protection associate of the store observed defendant select five pairs of scrubs, conceal them in his pants, and proceed to the exit. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate theft, robbery, and especially aggravated robbery because the jury could have inferred from the evidence that defendant followed the witness to the victim's apartment intending to deprive the victim of his property, as he knew the witness was going to the victim's home to purchase drugs, he asked the witness how big the victim was, when the victim opened the door he encountered defendant pointed a gun at him, and another witness testified that defendant told her that he had committed a robbery. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more because the trial court was justified in finding that defendant knowingly exercised control over the victim's car without his consent and with the intent to deprive the victim of his property; defendant admitted during her testimony that she took the victim's car without his permission, State v. Chandler, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property because defendant was in possession of the vehicle just five days after it was stolen; a photograph of defendant loading groceries into the vehicle was posted on social media after the victim reported the vehicle as stolen; the victim said that he did not give defendant consent to take and use his vehicle and that he did not even know defendant; defendant never produced a name or contact information for the person whom he claimed dropped off the vehicle for repairs; and the jury was free to reject defendant's explanation and to infer that defendant had gained possession of the recently stolen vehicle through theft or that he had knowledge that the property had been stolen. State v. Millican, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of theft; she participated in a scheme to obtain money from the human services department through a ministry becoming a sponsor in a summer food services program. Defendant claimed to be the program administrator but auditors found no evidence that she purchased large volumes of food, and while a church employee claimed defendant was not involved, the jury could have found defendant was directing or assisting that employee in taking the money. State v. Jives-Nealy, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder because the second car theft was sufficiently connected to the killing such that it could form the basis of felony murder, as the victim had used his spare key to open the car door, thereby reacquiring control over the car, and immediately after defendant shot the victim he and another man drove away in the car. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated robbery conviction because defendant acknowledged in a statement that defendant entered a convenience store with defendant's hand in defendant's pocket to look like defendant had a gun, the clerk testified that defendant made a gesture to indicate that defendant had a gun, and defendant threatened to shoot the clerk. The jury could have inferred that the clerk was afraid as, after defendant threatened to shoot the clerk, the clerk put the clerk's hands up and the surrendered the cash in the register. State v. Rollins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary, theft, and assault because defendant had been informed he was no longer allowed inside the store or on the store's property; defendant, without the store's consent, entered the store and attempted to leave with a cup of ice and a bag of peanuts without paying for the items; and, when confronted by a store employee, defendant hit him in the face. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim testified to being robbed by masked and armed men in the victim's home, a police officer saw an individual matching the description of one of the assailants, a police dog tracked the individual to where defendant came out from behind a shed and said, “I give up,” a gun was found in a nearby trash can, the victim identified defendant in a show-up identification, and defendant made incriminating statements during recorded telephone calls while in jail. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support second and third defendants'  convictions for aggravated robbery, theft, conspiracy, aggravated burglary, and firearms offenses, as it showed that first defendant devised a plan to conduct a home invasion and steal stuff, he enlisted others, including second and third defendants, to carry o ut the plan, and the group carried out the plan, which included the use of masks, gloves, and a gun to take the items from the victim's home. State v. Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

In the light most favorable to the State, the victim provided sufficient testimony for the jury to find that defendant stole property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000. Even assuming that the value of stolen laptop computers was zero, the stated value of the remainder of the stolen property was $835, which was consistent with the jury's finding. State v. Moats, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2020).

11. —Insufficient.

Evidence that the defendant was with the person who cashed a forged check at the time the check was cashed and that the defendant shared a residence with that person was not sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. State v. Knight, 969 S.W.2d 939, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of theft based on his possession of a stolen pistol because the burglary during which the pistol was taken occurred 16 months before defendant was found in possession of it, at the time of the burglary defendant was incarcerated, and the state presented no evidence regarding the circumstances under which defendant obtained the pistol. Evidence that defendant was aware that the pistol's serial number had been scratched through was insufficient to show that he knew that the pistol was stolen. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2019).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property valued at $1,000 or less because, although a police officer testified that the officer learned that the handgun which defendant possessed in a robbery was stolen when the officer ran the serial number of the gun through a database, the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant was the one who stole the weapon. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 413 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Defendant was entitled to relief as to the attempted theft of property conviction because defendant could not be convicted of attempted theft of something she owned. While the garagekeeper had a lien on the car, he had not perfected his ownership of the car because he did not satisfy the requirements of T.C.A. §§ 66-19-102 to 104 and while the gargekeeper held a possessory, statutory lien on the car, the garagekeeper was specifically excluded as an owner as defined under the theft statute, T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(28). State v. Schmitz, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

12. Jury Instructions.

In defendant's robbery case, a court did not err by providing the result-of-conduct and nature-of-conduct definitions of “intentional” and did not err by providing the result-of-conduct, nature-of-conduct, and nature-of-circumstances definitions of “knowing,” where each definition of both intentional and knowing was relevant for the jury's consideration of the offense. State v. Summers, 159 S.W.3d 586, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2005).

13. Sentencing.

Where defendant pled guilty to two counts of misdemeanor theft in violation of T.C.A. § 39-14-103, he received probated sentences of 11 months and 29 days; court of criminal appeals remanded the case to trial court to enter corrected judgments showing that defendant's sentences were to be served consecutively. State v. Poole, 279 S.W.3d 602, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 29, 2008).

Although defendant was eligible for consecutive sentencing, the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing that resulted in a total sentence of 44 years for defendant's crimes of aggravated robbery, theft by shoplifting, and attempted aggravated robbery; the robberies were committed with a toy gun, no one was injured, two victims knew the gun was plastic, defendant was 49 years old and already serving a 12-year sentence, and the sentence was in effect a sentence of life imprisonment, was not justly deserved, and was not the least severe measure necessary. State v. Biggs, 482 S.W.3d 923, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2015).

Fines the trial court imposed for defendant's felony theft and evading arrest convictions were not excessive because they were permitted by the sentencing statutes; the trial court considered the presentence report when making its sentencing determinations, and defendant had an extensive criminal history and low potential for rehabilitation. State v. Crenshaw, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2016).

Although defendant was indicted for offenses and convicted at trial, she was not released from jail on bond for those offenses at the time she committed the current offenses, theft and aggravated burglary, and thus there was no basis for mandatory consecutive sentencing in this case, nor was there a discretionary basis for ordering such. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

In a case where defendant was convicted of theft of property valued at $500 or less, defendant's request for judicial diversion was properly denied because, after defendant discovered he was unwittingly part of a theft operation, he failed to return the stolen property and attempted to maintain control of the truck until the victim paid a fee, which the victim was not obligated to pay as defendant unlawfully took the truck without the victim's consent; defendant showed a lack of remorse or awareness that his actions constituted a criminal offense; defendant continued to insist through counsel that he had not committed a crime; and the denial of diversion was necessary to deter defendant from similar behavior in the future. State v. Morgan, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2016).

Fully-incarcerative, within range sentence imposed by the trial court upon defendant for theft of property by deceiving the victim into purchasing a counterfeit ring was not excessive, given defendant's failure to take responsibility for defendant's actions and the court's concerns over depreciating the seriousness of the offense and effectively deterring others. Furthermore, the court considered the presentence report, the principles of sentencing, the evidence of enhancing and mitigating factors, and defendant's potential for rehabilitation. State v. Dixon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

When defendant was convicted of theft of real property, the property was correctly valued at over $250,000, for sentencing purposes, because (1) the property's rental value was not the correct measure, as such a valuation was not statutorily authorized and defendant did not only intend to permanently deprive a bank of the property's rental value, and (2) the property was appraised at $3 million. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Trial court ordered defendant to serve four years for his Class D burglary conviction and to serve five years for his Class C theft of property conviction; because the trial court ordered sentences within the proper range, the sentences were presumptively reasonable and would not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Firestone, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2017).

In a theft of property case valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, the trial court did not err in imposing the maximum sentence of 12 years because the trial court properly applied enhancement factors (1), (8), and (13) as defendant had multiple criminal convictions in addition to those rendering him a Range III, persistent offender, defendant was serving a sentence on probation at the time of the present offense, and defendant had previous probation and parole violations; defendant's criminal history had spanned 20 years; the sentence for a Range III, persistent offender for a Class D felony was not less than eight years and not more than 12 years; and the sentence imposed was within range. State v. Buckner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 716 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 875 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Defendant's sentence was not excessive as he was on parole at the time he committed the current offense and had already failed at parole at least twice before; his nearly 42 years of criminal activity and his past failures at rehabilitation weighed in favor of lengthy incarceration despite the fact that no serious bodily injury resulted from the theft of the truck; defendant's sentence was within the appropriate range after a consideration of the principles and purposes of sentencing; and defendant did not show that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an effective sentence of 15 years. State v. Richards, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to 15 years as a Range III persistent offender for theft because the trial court's findings that he had a prior history of criminal convictions or behavior and he had failed to comply with the conditions of release into the community were supported by defendant's presentence report. State v. Demling, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. June 6, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant for theft of merchandise of $500 or less because the held a hearing and considered defendant's prior felony theft conviction and the facts of defendant's theft of merchandise from a retail store, defendant's problem with stealing things, and defendant's medical records and sentenced defendant to a within-range sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, ordering defendant to serve six months in incarceration. State v. Craig, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 530 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2018).

Grading defendant's theft conviction as a Class E felony and imposing a Class E felony, Range II offender sentence of two years constituted plain error because prior to his sentencing hearing, the statute was amended to provide that the theft of property valued at $ 1,000 or less was a Class A misdemeanor. The sentence was vacated and modified. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of nine years'  imprisonment because there was no dispute that defendant was a Range II, multiple offender, with a sentencing range of 4-12 years, the sentence was within the statutory range and presumed reasonable, the record showed the trial court noted only that the location of the offense, a funeral, had “some bearing” on the vulnerability of the victim, and the trial court properly applied several other enhancement factors, including defendant's extensive criminal history, the fact that previous efforts at rehabilitation had failed, and the fact that defendant committed the offense while on parole. State v. Henson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019).

Trial court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing defendant to an effective sentence of 24 years for theft and money laundering; the trial court considered proper sentencing factors and defendant did not contest that the trial court properly relied on certain enhancement factors, including a history of convictions, being on probation when the current offenses took place, and being a leader in the commission of the offense, and the application of these factors was supported by the record. State v. Jives-Nealy, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

Trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering defendant's sentences for theft and money laundering to be served consecutively as she was a professional criminal and used her position as a pastor to steal large sums of money from the funds provided by the state department for human services; while the trial court failed to make the requisite findings necessary to support the imposition of consecutive sentences, only one consecutive sentencing factor needed to exist, which did here. State v. Jives-Nealy, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

14. Prior Convictions.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the probative value of defendant's convictions for passing worthless checks outweighed the unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues in her trial because the probative value of defendant's prior convictions was high, and her prior convictions were not substantially similar to the offense for which she was on trial, theft over $ 1,000 but less than $ 10,000 pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 and 39-14-105; the prior offense to which defendant pleaded guilty involved passing a check knowing that the check would not be paid, but the offense for which defendant was indicted did not involve passing a check. State v. Russell, 382 S.W.3d 312, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

15. Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's conviction for forgery did not violate his double jeopardy rights as the offenses of theft of property and forgery contained at least one element not found in the other because theft of property required the intent to deprive the owner of property by exercising control over the property without the owner's consent, while forgery contained the element of forging a writing in order to defraud another. State v. Dockery, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2016).

Defendant's convictions for robbery and theft violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy because the convictions for theft and robbery arose out of the same act or transaction as defendant approached the victim at a movie rental machine, demanded her keys, and ultimately drove away with her car with her purse and other belongings inside; and the theft of the victim's car and purse was subsumed by the robbery. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

16. Continuous Course of Action.

Both the theft and the killing occurred in the same place, after the killing, defendant took the victim's cash, jewelry, and coin collection worth over $ 1,000 from inside the apartment, and then defendant fled, taking the victim's car, and the jury could have reasonably inferred that the killing and theft were part of a continuous course of action and not isolated events. State v. Smithson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

39-14-104. Theft of services.

  1. A person commits theft of services who:
    1. Intentionally obtains services by deception, fraud, coercion, forgery, false statement, false pretense or any other means to avoid payment for the services;
    2. Having control over the disposition of services to others, knowingly diverts those services to the person's own benefit or to the benefit of another not entitled thereto; or
    3. Knowingly absconds from establishments where compensation for services is ordinarily paid immediately upon the rendering of them, including, but not limited to, hotels, motels and restaurants, without payment or a bona fide offer to pay.
  2. Any individual directly or indirectly harmed by a violation of subsection (a) shall have legal standing to report such violations to law enforcement and testify in support of corresponding criminal charges.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2011, ch. 348, § 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section punishes theft of services, as defined in § 39-11-106. Communication theft is punished pursuant to § 39-14-149.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Civil liability for fraud, theft or intentional destruction of utility property or services, title 65, ch. 35.

Communication theft, § 39-14-149.

Destruction or interference with utility lines, fixtures or appliances, § 39-14-411.

Possession of burglary tools, § 39-14-701.

Unauthorized water connections, § 65-27-107.

Law Reviews.

The Proposed Tennessee Criminal Code — General Interpretive Provisions and Culpability, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 131 (1973).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Aggregation of Value.

The value of services taken from separate individuals cannot be aggregated for purposes of establishing the grade of the offense charged. State v. Cattone, 968 S.W.2d 277, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. 1998).

2. Stolen Communications.

Satellite television provider could pursue claims against an individual for the purchase of an illegal descrambler, but a civil claim for violation of the criminal statute for possession of the device was dismissed for lack of a stolen communication. Directv, Inc. v. McCool, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20870 (M.D. Tenn. 2004).

39-14-105. Grading of theft.

  1. Theft of property or services is:
    1. A Class A misdemeanor if the value of the property or services obtained is one thousand dollars ($1,000) or less;
    2. A Class E felony if the value of the property or services obtained is more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) but less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500);
    3. A Class D felony if the value of the property or services obtained is two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) or more but less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000);
    4. A Class C felony if the value of the property or services obtained is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more but less than sixty thousand dollars ($60,000);
    5. A Class B felony if the value of the property or services obtained is sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) or more but less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000); and
    6. A Class A felony if the value of the property or services obtained is two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) or more.
    1. In a prosecution for theft of property, theft of services, and any offense for which the punishment is determined pursuant to this section, the state may charge multiple criminal acts committed against one (1) or more victims as a single count if the criminal acts arise from a common scheme, purpose, intent or enterprise.
    2. The monetary value of property from multiple criminal acts which are charged in a single count of theft of property shall be aggregated to establish value under this section.
  2. Venue in a prosecution for any offense punishable pursuant to this section shall be in the county where one (1) or more elements of the offense occurred, or in the county where an act of solicitation, inducement, offer, acceptance, delivery, storage, or financial transaction occurred involving the property, service or article of the victim.
  3. Notwithstanding subsection (a), theft of a firearm shall be punished by confinement for not less than thirty (30) days in addition to any other penalty authorized by law.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2012, ch. 1080, § 1; 2016, ch. 906, § 5; 2019, ch. 486, § 8.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section provides the punishment for the offenses of theft. These offenses are punished according to the value of the property or services obtained. Value is defined in § 39-11-106.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2016, ch. 906, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Public Safety Act of 2016.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 486, § 15. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Civil liability in lieu of criminal penalty for theft of retail merchandise, §§ 39-14-144, 39-14-145.

Penalties for Class A, B, C, D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Aggregation of Value.

The aggregation of the value of stolen property is permissible to establish the degree of the offense when a defendant simultaneously exercises possession or control over stolen property belonging to different owners. State v. Byrd, 968 S.W.2d 290, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. June 22, 1998).

State was justified in aggregating all the theft allegations into one indictment. State v. Sanders, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2015).

State does not have to make an election of offenses in prosecutions for theft and vandalism as the State is permitted to aggregate the value of the stolen and vandalized property and prosecute the multiple thefts and acts of vandalism as a single offense. Because the indictment charged defendant with one count of theft and one count of vandalism that occurred between the fall of 2011 and January 2012, even though multiple acts of theft and vandalism might have occurred during that time, the acts were against the same owner, from the same location, and were committed pursuant to a continuing criminal impulse or a single sustained larcenous scheme, and the State could aggregate all of the theft and vandalism allegations into one indictment. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2018).

Aggregation of thefts was appropriate because each of the separate thefts arose from a common scheme, purpose, intent or enterprise; on each occasion, defendant worked fitness trackers free of theft deterrent devices, walked around until the coast was clear before returning to retrieve the merchandise, concealed the purloined merchandise, and left the store, and defendant wore nearly identical clothing during each of the offenses and sold the fitness trackers. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2018).

2. Prior Convictions.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the probative value of defendant's convictions for passing worthless checks outweighed the unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues in her trial because the probative value of defendant's prior convictions was high, and her prior convictions were not substantially similar to the offense for which she was on trial, theft over $ 1,000 but less than $ 10,000 pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 and 39-14-105; the prior offense to which defendant pleaded guilty involved passing a check knowing that the check would not be paid, but the offense for which defendant was indicted did not involve passing a check. State v. Russell, 382 S.W.3d 312, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

3. Evidence Sufficient for Grade.

Defendant's conviction for theft of misappropriated legal fees from his law firm was affirmed where he specifically told clients to pay the fees directly to him to fund the opening of his new office and made no agreement with the firm to terminate his employment and allocate the fees; theft effectively was of currency. State v. March, 293 S.W.3d 576, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2008).

Defendant was properly convicted of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000 because the evidence was sufficient to establish the value of the property defendant stole from a department store because loss prevention officers at the store testified as to observing defendant shoplift items from the store, a computer-generated report of stolen items was created by scanning the price tags of the items in defendant's possession, and defendant signed a statement of admission which listed the same items and the total price. State v. Shotwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2016).

Jury was properly instructed on how to assess the value of the stolen property, that the value of the stolen comic books was the fair market value at the time of the offense; the jury heard the expert's testimony concerning his methodology for ascertaining value and determined that the fair market value was more than $ 60,000, and the evidence was sufficient to support that determination. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of Class C felony vandalism because, although the owner did not provide any information from which the fair market value of the destroyed units could be determined, the replacement value was clearly was over $10,000. State v. Malone, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of theft of property valued over $ 250,000, given that defendant exercised exclusive control over the bank's residential property, entered without permission, barred entry of the lawful owner, placed signs around the property indicating her right to deprive the owner of the property, and the property sold for $ 2.4 million dollars. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for misdemeanor theft because a store employee saw defendant acting suspiciously and carrying two pairs of earplugs with a value of $34.96 as if trying to conceal them, the employee saw defendant put the earplugs in defendant's pocket and watched as defendant paid for drinks but not the ear plugs, and, when the employee followed defendant and asked defendant to walk with the employee to the store office, defendant stopped on the way and threw the earplugs on a display counter and ran out of the store. State v. McCaig, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2016).

There was sufficient evidence that the fair market value of the stolen property exceeded $ 10,000, given that the victim testified that the value of all of the items that were stolen was between $ 12,000 and $ 13,000, and while she agreed that she submitted a list to the police department stating that 40 pairs of shoes had been stolen, she explained that there had always been at least 100 pairs of shoes in storage, and the trier of fact was free to accredit the victim's testimony. State v. Firestone, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2017).

Jury could have inferred that the value of the property was between $10,000 and $60,000 from the victim's testimony regarding the value of the trailer and the equipment it contained and thus, the evidence was sufficient to support conviction as a Class C felony. State v. Sappington, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

For purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-14-146, 39-14-105, 39-11-302(b), the evidence was sufficient to show defendant intended to deprive the store of the laptop and knowingly caused it to be removed from the store, and a jury could have found that the laptop had a fair market value of $ 750, given the testimony; defendant exited the store with a man carrying the laptop, refused the store employee's request to inspect the contents of the bag, and drove away. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017).

There was ample evidence to support defendant's conviction for theft of property over $ 500, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-14-146, 39-14-105; defendant challenged the reliability of his identification by two witnesses, but this credibility finding was not disturbed on appeal, plus a rational jury could have found that stolen laptop was $ 873, as one witness testified. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017).

When defendant was convicted of theft of real property, the property was correctly valued at over $250,000, for sentencing purposes, because (1) the property's rental value was not the correct measure, as such a valuation was not statutorily authorized and defendant did not only intend to permanently deprive a bank of the property's rental value, and (2) the property was appraised at $3 million. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the value of the stolen goods was over than $1,000 because the victim testified that the value of the laptop was between $900 and $1,000 and the value of the camera was approximately $300. State v. Rembert, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of knowingly exercising dominion or control over the victim's personal property between the value of $ 1,000 and $ 10,000, without her effective consent and with the intent to deprive her of the property, because defendant constructively possessed the stolen items at his accomplice's apartment; defendant's constructive possession of recently stolen goods gave rise to an inference he had stolen them. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

4. Evidence Insufficient for Grade.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for Class C felony theft because, while the evidence was more than sufficient to show that defendant was the perpetrator; he was found standing on a ladder with a ratchet wrench with a socket attached and a screwdriver in his pocket and five air conditioners on the roof of the owner's building had been stripped of their copper pipe and coils; the State made no attempt to establish the value of the removed items and the owner did not know their value. State v. Malone, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016).

5. Evidence Sufficient for Conviction.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property valued over $500 because the evidence of defendant's identity was sufficient as the victim noticed that his trailer had been taken; on that day, defendant came to the owner of a trailer business with a used trailer that he wanted to sell; the business owner gave defendant $665 for the trailer; and the business owner positively identified defendant from a photographic lineup and in court. State v. Mims, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $ 500 or less, given that defendant's identity as the perpetrator was established; officers saw defendant, holding a shotgun, exiting the victim's apartment through broken glass, both officers identified defendant as the perpetrator at the preliminary hearing and at trial, DNA on the red shirt worn by the perpetrator matched defendant's DNA, and the blood on the floor of the apartment was consistent with defendant's DNA. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2016).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, because the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant acted knowingly and that the value of the property taken from the store was $1000 or more where defendant made 14 fraudulent transactions at the same cash register, mostly when her friend was the cashier, during times when the store managers were on their breaks, and the value of the property listed on the store receipts showed a total loss of over $3000. State v. Gardenhire, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 953 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft of property valued over $10,000 but less than $60,000 because defendant was driving the truck that had been reported stolen by the owner; when stopped near a repair shop, defendant told officers that he thought the truck belonged to another individual and that he was taking it for repairs; and the reasons given by defendant for driving the truck were contradicted by the other individual's testimony at trial that he did not operate a trucking company at the time and did not employ defendant as a driver or repairman. State v. Richards, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017).

Trial court did not err when it determined that the evidence proved that defendant did not purchase a second toaster oven, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant knowingly, with intent to deprive a store, obtained or exercised control over its property without its effective consent; a store employee saw defendant re-enter the store after leaving and watched him walk out of the store with the toaster oven. State v. Horne, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of theft of property over the value of $60,000 because he stipulated at trial that he admitted to police to forging the deeds that conveyed the three properties to him, two appraisals of the properties—one using a cost approach and the other a market value approach—determined the value of property at $60,000 or more, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing lay witnesses to testify that they believed that the appraised values of the properties were low. State v. Sears, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of property over $1,000 because the victim returned home to find multiple items missing, including a flat screen TV and printer; the victim's neighbor saw defendant climbing over a fence with a flat screen TV and found a printer, which the victim later identified as the one stolen from the victim's home, with blood on it; the blood on the printer was a match to defendant's DNA; and the victim filed an insurance claim listing the total value of the stolen items at $1,765. State v. Cole-Pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant to seven years in the Department of Correction after a jury convicted him of felony theft of property over $10,000 because, given defendant's confusing and hard to believe depiction of the events in his statement, the evidence showed that defendant knew what package thefts entailed, the trial court gave jury instructions regarding the proper consideration of any evidence of prior crimes defendant might have committed, and the victim qualified as “owner” within the terms of the statute where she constructively possessed the package that was stolen from her doorstep, and the stolen items were posted for sale under defendant's social media account. State v. Bennett, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 16, 2020).

7. Sentencing.

Defendant was convicted of theft of property valued at $ 60,000 or more, a Class B felony and thus she was not considered a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options; the trial court carefully considered the sentencing principles and noted that defendant had stolen over $ 200,000 from her three law firm employers, and past efforts of rehabilitation had not successful, such that the trial court did not err in denying alternative sentencing and imposing a sentence of confinement. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2016).

Trial court ordered defendant to serve four years for his Class D burglary conviction and to serve five years for his Class C theft of property conviction; because the trial court ordered sentences within the proper range, the sentences were presumptively reasonable and would not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Firestone, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2017).

When defendant was found guilty of felony theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, the trial court correctly imposed a sentence for a Class D felony, rather than the new Class E felony, because the amended version of the sentencing statute had not yet gone into effect at the time of the sentencing hearing. State v. Houser, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 940 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Trial court's four and one half years'  sentence for defendant's conviction of theft of property was entitled to a presumption of reasonableness because the trial court ordered a sentence within the appropriate range under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-105(a)(4), 40-35-112(a)(3); a trial court's weighing of various mitigating and enhancement factors was left to the trial court's sound discretion and there was no abuse of discretion here. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Trial court did not err in ordering the Class E felony theft count under § 39-14-105 to be served consecutively under T.C.A. § 40-35-115 to the Class C felony theft count as the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that defendant's history of criminal activity was extensive and she committed the current offenses while on probation. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Trial court's sentences for three years for Class D felony theft, two years for Class E felony reckless endangerment, and three months for Class A misdemeanor escape were entitled to a presumption of reasonableness because they were within the appropriate range under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-105, 39-13-103, 39-16-605, 40-35-111, 40-35-112; no error was found. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Denial of probation under T.C.A. § 40-35-303 for the theft offense under T.C.A. § 39-14-105 was not error requiring relief; the record supported the trial court's consideration under T.C.A. § 40-35-103 of defendant's criminal record and history of criminal behavior, as well as her lack of potential for rehabilitation and the fact that she was on probation when she committed the current offenses. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Trial court exceeded its authority by the application of the amended version of a sentencing statute, which provided for the grading of theft offenses, before the effective date in calculating defendant's sentence. Because the conviction offense was committed before the effective date of the amendment, and the sentencing occurred before the effective date of the statute, not even the date of the sentencing supplanted the date of the offenses as the controlling date in the case. State v. Keese, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Trial court erred by applying the amended version of a sentencing statute, which provided the grading of theft offenses, to modify the class of defendant's conviction offense following the revocation of defendant's probation. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the trial court was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. State v. Tolle, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2018).

Trial court appropriately sentenced defendant for a Class E felony after applying the criminal saving's statute to the vandalism conviction because the punishment applicable to defendant's vandalism conviction moved from a Class D felony to a Class E felony under the amended theft statute, which provided defendant with a “lesser penalty” for his vandalism conviction; the victim stated defendant inflicted $ 2,000 in damages on her van. State v. Swinford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2018).

Theft statute is applicable to a defendant who has committed vandalism at the punishment phase; the vandalism statute specifically provides that after determining value, the defendant shall be punished as for theft under T.C.A. § 39-14-105, and the theft statute is, in effect, a sentencing statute. State v. Swinford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2018).

Court of appeals declined to treat the State's appeal as a common law writ of certiorari because the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction or act illegally in sentencing defendant, the a sentencing hearing was held consistent with the laws and principles of sentencing, and both parties participated meaningfully in the hearing; the trial court's decision to sentence defendant pursuant to the amended statutory grading of theft statute was not a plain and palpable abuse of discretion. State v. Cross, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2018).

Amendment to T.C.A. § 39-14-105 altered only the relationship between the value of property taken during a theft and the class of the resulting offense and did not alter the law setting sentencing ranges; therefore, the State had no statutory right to appeal. State v. Cross, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2018).

Grading defendant's theft conviction as a Class E felony and imposing a Class E felony, Range II offender sentence of two years constituted plain error because prior to his sentencing hearing, the statute was amended to provide that the theft of property valued at $ 1,000 or less was a Class A misdemeanor. The sentence was vacated and modified. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

By agreeing to entry of a judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to a six-year sentence for a Class E felony, defendant rendered his argument that the trial court, defense counsel, and prosecutor were confused about the sentence moot; defendant faced a twelve-year sentence and should not have received the lesser six-year sentence under the criminal savings statute. State v. Birdwell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 711 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2019).

Inasmuch as defendant's sentencing hearing was held after the enactment of the amended theft grading statute, the trial court should have classified defendant's theft convictions in counts 3 and 4 as Class A misdemeanors. The trial court's failure to apply the amended theft grading statute at sentencing was plain error, requiring that defendant's six-year, Class E felony sentences be vacated. State v. Moats, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2020).

8. —Consecutive Sentencing.

The trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences to defendant convicted of one count of burglary and one count of theft over $1,000 was appropriate where the defendant had an extensive record of criminal activity, and where he was on probation at the time of offenses. State v. Brewer, 875 S.W.2d 298, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 837 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Apr. 4, 1994).

9. Construction With Burglary Statute.

Dismissal of the burglary count in defendant's case was upheld on independent due process grounds; given the legislative history, T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3) was never intended to cover buildings open to the public, and by charging individuals with burglary, a Class D felony, when they should only be prosecuted for misdemeanor theft or shoplifting under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-105, 39-14-146, prosecutors are abusing their charging discretion by unreasonably expanding the reach of the burglary statute, and charging of burglary in these instances is unreasonable, unjust, and violative of due process. State v. Jensen, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017).

10. Amendment Application.

Since the Tennessee General Assembly did not indicate a specific intention that Section 5 of the Public Safety Act, which amended this section, operate retrospectively, the appellate court had to presume that the Tennessee General Assembly intended for Section 5 to operate prospectively. State v. Menke, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2018).

Defendant's conviction for theft was to be modified from a Class D felony to a Class E felony because the Tennessee Public Safety Act of 2016, 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 906, modified the grading of theft offenses to provide for a lesser penalty. While at the time of defendant's crime and indictment defendant's actions amounted to a charge and conviction of a Class D felony for theft, by the time of defendant's sentencing hearing, the Act had taken effect, and therefore, defendant's actions constituted a Class E felony for theft. State v. Cole-Pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Savings statute was applicable to the revisions providing for penalties for violation of the theft statute and thus, defendant's offense was reduced to a Class E felony rather than a Class D felony. State v. Goldberg, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2019).

Trial court properly denied the State's Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1 motion to correct defendant's sentence for two merged convictions of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 where the grading of theft statute had been amended after defendant's conviction, the amended statute, T.C.A. § 39-14-105(a) (2018), was effective at the time of the sentencing hearing, under judicial precedent, the amended version of the grading of theft statute applied even where the offense occurred before the amendment's effective date, as long as the amended version was effective at the time of sentencing, and the record reflected that the trial court imposed Range III sentences for a Class E felony. As a result, the corrected judgments did not reflect illegal sentences, and the trial court did not err by denying the State's Rule 36.1 motion. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 27, 2019).

T.C.A. § 39-11-112, the criminal savings statute, applies to the amendments of the theft grading statute. State v. Ruben, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2020).

State's claim that the trial court erred in applying the Criminal Savings Statute to defendant's conviction for theft over $500 lacked merit because the amended version of the theft grading statute provided for a lesser penalty for defendant's theft conviction than the prior version of the statute and thus, the condition provided in the Criminal Savings Statute was satisfied. State v. Crosland, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2020).

39-14-106. Unauthorized use of automobiles and other vehicles — Joyriding.

A person commits a Class A misdemeanor who takes another's automobile, airplane, motorcycle, bicycle, boat or other vehicle without the consent of the owner and the person does not have the intent to deprive the owner thereof.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is a modern version of the prior joyriding statute.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Lesser Included Offense.

In a prosecution for theft, where defendant took a vehicle under circumstances that could lead to the conclusion that the taking was without intent to deprive the owner as contemplated for theft under the definition of “deprive”, the defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on both theft and joyriding. State v. Brooks, 909 S.W.2d 854, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Trial court's failure to instruct on unauthorized use of an automobile, joyriding, as a lesser-included offense was not plain error because there was no evidence presented by defendant to support a conclusion that he ever intended to return the vehicle or that he lacked the necessary intent to deprive the victim of the automobile as the vehicle was taken at gunpoint and defendant was apprehended while driving it; and any error in failing to give a lesser-included instruction on unauthorized use of an automobile was harmless because defendant was found guilty of the highest offense, aggravated robbery, and in so doing, the jury necessarily rejected all of the other lesser-included offenses charge. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2016).

2. Value.

Jury was properly instructed on how to assess the value of the stolen property, that the value of the stolen comic books was the fair market value at the time of the offense; the jury heard the expert's testimony concerning his methodology for ascertaining value and determined that the fair market value was more than $ 60,000, and the evidence was sufficient to support that determination. State v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Collateral References.

Joyriding or similar charge as lesser-included offense of larceny or similar charge. 78 A.L.R.5th 567.

39-14-107. Claim of right.

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under §§ 39-14-103, 39-14-104 and 39-14-106 that the person:

  1. Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved;
  2. Acted in the honest belief that the person had the right to obtain or exercise control over the property or service as the person did; or
  3. Obtained or exercised control over property or service honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 19.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The 1990 amendment made this section an affirmative defense to the offenses of theft of property, theft of services and joyriding.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-14-108. Pawned or conveyed rental property.

  1. With respect to the theft of rental property, evidence of any of the following shall create an inference of intent to deprive the owner of the rental property, as provided in § 39-14-103:
    1. The person leasing or renting the property has pawned or otherwise conveyed the property;
    2. The person leasing or renting the property pursuant to a written agreement presents identification to the owner at the time of the execution of the written agreement which bears a fictitious name, telephone number or address; or
    3. The person leasing or renting the property pursuant to a written agreement designating the principal location at which the property is to be used, and specifying the date and time when the same is to be returned, fails to return the property to the owner on or before such return date and within ten (10) days after the date of mailing of written notice to return the property sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, deliver to addressee only, and the property is not to be found at the location designated in the lease or rental agreement as the principal place of use of the property.
  2. Any leased or rented tangible personal property that has been sold, pawned or otherwise disposed of by the person renting or leasing the property during the period of the lease or rental agreement shall be returned to the owner of the property if the property is properly marked and identified as leased or rental property and is no longer needed as evidence against the person, and if the owner of the property can, by serial number, manufacturer's identification number or other sufficient means, demonstrate ownership of the property.
    1. Each owner of rental property shall conspicuously mark and identify the property as rented or leased property. The markings shall include, but not be limited to, the name and address of the rental company and the serial number of the property.
    2. Subdivision (c)(1) does not apply to motor vehicles, as defined in title 55.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 796, § 1; 1992, ch. 992, § 1; 1995, ch. 482, §§ 1, 2.

Cross-References. Certified mail in lieu of registered mail, § 39-14-108.

39-14-109. Stone or rock wall — Warning sign.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the state or any county or municipality is authorized to post the following signage along the right-of-way of any state or local roadway located in close proximity to a stone or rock wall:

WARNING!

IT CONSTITUTES THE CRIME OF THEFT TO KNOWINGLY REMOVE, WITHOUT OWNER CONSENT, ANY PORTION OF A STONE OR ROCK WALL LOCATED ON THE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY OR ON PRIVATE PROPERTY! SANCTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL!

Acts 2002, ch. 622, § 1.

39-14-110. Unauthorized recording of theatrical motion pictures.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly operate an audiovisual recording function of a device in a facility where a motion picture is being exhibited for the purpose of recording a theatrical motion picture and without the consent of the owner or lessee of the facility.
  2. The term “audiovisual recording function” means the capability of a device to record or transmit a motion picture or any part of a motion picture by means of any technology now known or later developed.
  3. An owner or lessee of a facility where a motion picture is being exhibited, or the authorized agent or employee of such owner or lessee, or the licensor of the motion picture being exhibited or the licensor's agent or employee, or a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has violated this section, may detain such person on or off the premises of the motion picture establishment, if such detention is done for any or all of the following purposes:
    1. To question the person, investigate the surrounding circumstances, obtain a statement, or any combination thereof;
    2. To request or verify identification, or both;
    3. To inform a law enforcement officer of the detention of such person, or surrender that person to the custody of a law enforcement officer, or both;
    4. To inform a law enforcement officer, the parent or parents, guardian or other private person charged with the welfare of a minor of the detention and to surrender the minor to the custody of such person; or
    5. To institute criminal proceedings against the person.
  4. Probable cause to suspect that a person has committed or is attempting to commit a violation of this section may be based on, but not limited to:
    1. Personal observation, including observation via closed circuit television or other visual device; or
    2. Report of a personal observation from another patron or employee.
  5. An owner or lessee of a facility where a motion picture is being exhibited, or the authorized agent or employee of the owner or lessee, or the licensor of the motion picture being exhibited or the licensor's agent or employee, or a law enforcement officer who detains, questions, or causes the arrest of any person suspected of a violation of this section shall not be criminally or civilly liable for any legal action relating to the detention, questioning, or arrest if the owner or lessee of a facility where a motion picture is being exhibited, or the authorized agent or employee of the owner or lessee, or the licensor of the motion picture being exhibited or the licensor's agent or employee, merchant or merchant's employee or agent or law enforcement officer:
    1. Has probable cause to suspect that the person has committed or is attempting to commit a violation of this section;
    2. Acts in a reasonable manner under the circumstances; and
    3. Detains the suspected person for a reasonable period of time.
  6. The owner or lessee of a facility where a motion picture is being exhibited, or the authorized agent or employee of the owner or lessee, or the licensor of the motion picture being exhibited or the licensor's agent or employee, may use a reasonable amount of force necessary to protect the owner, agent, employee or licensor, to prevent escape of the person detained, or to prevent the loss or destruction of property.
  7. A reasonable period of time, for the purposes of this section, is a period of time long enough to accomplish the purpose set forth in this section, and shall include any time spent awaiting the arrival of a law enforcement officer or the parents or guardian of a juvenile suspect, if the owner or lessee of a facility where a motion picture is being exhibited, or the authorized agent or employee of the owner or lessee, or the licensor of the motion picture being exhibited or the licensor's agent or employee has summoned such law enforcement officer, parents, or guardian.
  8. This section does not prevent any lawfully authorized investigative, law enforcement protection, or intelligence gathering employee or agent, of the state or federal government, from operating any audiovisual recording device in any facility where a motion picture is being exhibited, as part of a lawfully authorized investigative, protective, law enforcement, or intelligence gathering activity.
  9. This section shall not apply to a person who operates the audiovisual recording function of a device in a retail establishment for the sole purpose of demonstrating the use and operation of the device for a prospective customer.
  10. For purposes of this section, “facility” shall not be construed to include a personal residence.
    1. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting prosecution under any other applicable provision of law.

Acts 2004, ch. 471, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-111. [Repealed.]

Acts 2015, ch. 187, § 1; repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 3, effective July 1, 2017.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 1 provided that the act, which repealed this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 8. July 1, 2017; provided that, for purposes of promulgating rules required by the act, the act took effect May 25, 2017.

39-14-112. Extortion.

  1. A person commits extortion who uses coercion upon another person with the intent to:
    1. Obtain property, services, any advantage or immunity;
    2. Restrict unlawfully another's freedom of action; or
      1. Impair any entity, from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the Constitution of Tennessee, the United States Constitution or the laws of the state, in an effort to obtain something of value for any entity;
      2. For purposes of this section, “something of value” includes, but is not limited to, a neutrality agreement, card check agreement, recognition, or other objective of a corporate campaign;
      3. For purposes of this section, “corporate campaign” means any organized effort to unlawfully bring pressure on an entity, other than through collective bargaining, or any other activity protected by federal law.
  2. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for extortion that the person reasonably claimed:
    1. Appropriate restitution or appropriate indemnification for harm done; or
    2. Appropriate compensation for property or lawful services.
  3. Extortion is a Class D felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2014, ch. 982, § 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section penalizes the use of coercion, defined in § 39-11-106, for the purposes of obtaining property, any advantage, or an immunity, or to restrict unlawfully another's freedom of action.

Because the harm is the use of coercion for the above purposes, the offense is committed even though the offender's efforts are unsuccessful and, for example, do not result in obtaining any property. In addition, because of the potential for violence that results from coercion, a reasonable claim of right for appropriate restitution or compensation is made an affirmative defense, placing a heavier burden of proof on the defendant. See the comment to § 39-11-204. The use of threats to obtain such restitution or compensation, even if rightfully claimed by the defendant, should be discouraged.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2014, ch. 982, § 5 provided that the act shall apply only to all offenses occurring on or after July 1, 2014.

Cross-References. Offenses by public officers and employees (“Little Hatch Act”), title 2, ch. 19, part 2.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 25; 13 Tenn. Juris., Extortion, §§ 1, 3; 23 Tenn. Juris., Threats, §§ 2, 3.

Law Reviews.

“Official” Explanation: Defining “Official Capacity” and Related “Color of Office” Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law (Steven J. Mulroy), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 587 (2008).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of 2014 amendments to bribery, extortion, riot, and trespass laws.  OAG 14-44, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 46 (4/7/14).

Constitutionality of amended legislation (House Bill 1687/Senate Bill 1662 enacted as 2014 Acts, ch. 982) regarding bribery, extortion, and riot. OAG 14-45, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 45 (4/8/14).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

Crime of attempted extortion exists in Tennessee because the crime of extortion does not include every attempt to complete the crime. Parris v. State, 236 S.W.3d 173, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2007).

2. Attempted Extortion.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's attempted extortion convictions because defendant admitted that he was attempting to obtain a more satisfactory divorce settlement, defendant sent a list of demands connected to the divorce to the attorney who was handling the divorce for defendant's ex-wife, and the list of demands was addressed to the attorney's husband, who was a judge seeking re-election; the list included a draft of a complaint against the attorney and defendant stated that he would campaign against the husband/judge in the upcoming election if the divorce was not settled to his satisfaction. Parris v. State, 236 S.W.3d 173, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2007).

3. Affirmative Defense.

Court failed to properly instruct the jury on the affirmative defense for extortion found in T.C.A. § 39-14-112(b) because defendant inquired into the possibility of a more favorable divorce settlement, his wife's lawyer told defendant that his only option was to appeal, he then made a “list of demands,” and that evidence “fairly raised” the proposition that defendant reasonably believed that there was “harm done” to him and that his demands were “appropriate restitution”; the issue should have been submitted to the jury for them to determine if defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his actions were a result of a reasonable claim for appropriate restitution for harm done. Parris v. State, 236 S.W.3d 173, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2007).

39-14-113. Organized Retail Crime Prevention Act.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Organized Retail Crime Prevention Act.”
  2. For purposes of this section, “stored value card” means any card, gift card, instrument, or device issued with or without fee for the use of the cardholder to obtain money, goods, services, or anything else of value. Stored value cards include, but are not limited to, debit cards issued for use as a stored value card or gift card, and an account identification number or symbol used to identify a stored value card. “Stored value card” does not include a prepaid card usable at multiple, unaffiliated merchants or at automated teller machines, or both.
  3. A person commits the offense of organized retail crime when the person:
    1. Acts in concert with one (1) or more individuals to commit theft of any merchandise with a value greater than one thousand dollars ($1,000) aggregated over a ninety-day period with the intent to:
      1. Sell, barter, or trade the merchandise for monetary or other gain; or
      2. Fraudulently return the merchandise to a retail merchant; or
    2. Receives, possesses, sells, or purchases, by physical or electronic means, any merchandise or stored value cards obtained from a fraudulent return with the knowledge that the property was obtained in violation of § 39-14-103 or § 39-14-146.
    1. A violation of subsection (c) is punished as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105.
    2. A violation of subsection (c) is punished one (1) classification higher than provided in § 39-14-105 if the defendant exercised organizational, supervisory, financial, or management authority over the activity of one (1) or more other persons in furtherance of a violation of this section.
  4. Any interest in property acquired or maintained in violation of this section shall be subject to forfeiture as provided by chapter 11, part 7 of this title.
    1. Any sale or purchase of stored value cards by persons or merchants, other than the issuer or the issuer's authorized agent, including any transaction that occurs in this state or with a person in the state who transacts online, requires that the appropriate information contained in this subsection be recorded and a copy of the record shall be maintained for at least three (3) years. Regardless of the method by which the transaction is conducted, the merchant shall record the following information for each transaction:
      1. The time, date, and place of the transaction;
      2. A complete and accurate description of the stored value card sold or purchased, including, if available, the name of the original issuer, the face value of the stored value card when sold or purchased, the acquired price of the stored value card, and the stored value card serial number;
      3. Pin numbers shall be provided for specific individuals upon the request of law enforcement; and
      4. A signed statement or digital affirmation by the seller of the stored value card, if applicable, verifying that the seller is the rightful owner of the stored value card or is authorized to sell, consign, or trade the stored value card.
    2. If the transaction is completed in person or by any method other than in a kiosk or online, the record shall include:
      1. The information required in subdivision (f)(1);
      2. A copy, digital swipe, or scan of a valid government issued identification card, such as a driver license, state identification card, or military identification card, of the person who purchased the stored value card, or the person to whom stored value card was sold;
      3. A thumbprint of the person who sold the stored value card; and
      4. A description of the person who sold the stored value card including the person's full name, current residential address, phone number, height, weight, date of birth, or other identifying marks.
    3. If the transaction is completed at a kiosk, the record shall include:
      1. The information required in subdivision (f)(1);
      2. A digital swipe or scan of a valid government issued identification card, such as a driver license, state identification card, or military identification card, of the person who purchased the stored value card, or sold the stored value card; and
      3. A thumbprint of the person who sold the stored value card.
    4. If the transaction is completed online the record shall include:
      1. The information required by subdivision (f)(1);
      2. A verified email address;
      3. The IP address or digital device identification used to access the website or app of the seller;
      4. Data collected about the person who purchased the stored value card, or sold the stored value card, including name and mailing address used to remit payment; and
      5. A token identifier for a validated credit or debit card and billing zip code.
    5. Local law enforcement agencies shall notify merchants known to sell stored value cards of the recording and reporting requirements required by subdivisions (f)(1)-(4). The notification to merchants shall be in writing and shall state the law enforcement agency's policy regarding how the information is to be reported in the applicable jurisdiction and certify that any data collected from the merchant will be stored in a secure and confidential manner. All records shall be delivered to the appropriate law enforcement agency or its designated reporting database in an electronic or other report format approved by that same agency within twenty-four (24) hours from the date of the transaction. The information shall be stored on a law enforcement owned, operated, and housed server. Any gift card database software should be free for state law enforcement agencies; state, county, and city government agencies; and for the merchants that are reporting.
      1. A merchant commits a Class A misdemeanor who knowingly fails to follow the reporting and recording requirements pursuant to this subsection (f). However, for a merchant to be charged or convicted under this subsection (f), the law enforcement agency must have first notified the merchant in writing of the reporting obligations in that jurisdiction. If the violation is committed by the owner, stockholder, or managing partner of a business selling a stored value card, then the business license may be suspended or revoked at the discretion of the city or county clerk.
      2. Any person who knowingly provides false information in response to the reporting requirements of this section commits a Class A misdemeanor.
      3. Any fines derived from violations of this subsection (f) shall be earmarked for law enforcement purposes if the law enforcement entity shows proof of notification of reporting requirements signed by the person or agent of the entity in violation.
    6. Notwithstanding this section to the contrary, the comptroller of the treasury is authorized to request and receive from a law enforcement agency any data or information received by the law enforcement agency pursuant to this subsection (f).
  5. All information gathered pursuant to subsection (f) shall remain confidential. If a local law enforcement agency utilizes a third party, including, but not limited to, a third-party database or software company, to keep records or to analyze stored value card transactions, the third party must agree to keep all information confidential and only share the information with law enforcement agencies, the comptroller of the treasury, or the original issuer of the stored value card.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2011, ch. 322, § 1; 2020, ch. 620, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2020, ch. 620, § 1, amended this section, in part, by substituting “39-14-106” for “39-14-146” in (c)(2); however, that change was not implemented in text as it was a manifest typographical error which was corrected.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, in (c)(1), substituted “Acts in concert with one (1) or more people” for “Works with one (1) or more persons” preceding “to commit”; in present (d)(1), substituted “subsection (c) is” for “this section shall be” preceding “punished”; added (d)(2); rewrote (f) which read: “Any sale or purchase of stored value cards by persons or merchants other than the original issuer or the issuer's authorized agent shall be subject to the recording procedures provided by the Tennessee Pawnbroker's Act of 1988, compiled in title 45, chapter 6, part 2.”; and added (g).

The 2020 amendment, in (c)(1), substituted “individuals” for “people”, substituted “greater than” for “exceeding”, deleted “sell that property” following “intent to”; added the (c)(1)(A) and (B) designations; in present (c)(1)(A), added “Sell, barter, or trade the merchandise” and in (c)(2), inserted “sells,”, inserted “, by physical or electronic means,”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 472, § 2. July 1, 2017.

Acts 2018, ch. 993, § 5. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2020, ch. 620, § 2. July 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-114. Forgery.

  1. A person commits an offense who forges a writing with intent to defraud or harm another.
  2. As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Forge” means to:
      1. Alter, make, complete, execute or authenticate any writing so that it purports to:
        1. Be the act of another who did not authorize that act;
        2. Have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case; or
        3. Be a copy of an original when no such original existed;
      2. Make false entries in books or records;
      3. Issue, transfer, register the transfer of, pass, publish, or otherwise utter a writing that is forged within the meaning of subdivision (b)(1)(A); or
      4. Possess a writing that is forged within the meaning of subdivision (b)(1)(A) with intent to utter it in a manner specified in subdivision (b)(1)(C); and
    2. “Writing” includes printing or any other method of recording information, money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, and symbols of value, right, privilege or identification.
  3. An offense under this section is punishable as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105, but in no event shall forgery be less than a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Under this section, most forgeries are punished as theft. However, all forgeries are at least Class E felonies because of the extensive possible harm.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Alcoholic beverage tax stamps, penalty for forging, § 57-3-412.

Allegation in indictment of intent to pass counterfeit money, § 40-13-215.

Certificates of mine employees, penalty for forging, § 59-4-207.

Disfranchisement on conviction, § 40-20-112.

Jury may provide punishment for less than one year, § 40-20-103.

Misuse of documents in connection with healing arts licensing law, § 63-1-123.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Tobacco tax stamps, penalty for forging, § 67-4-1007.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 16.19.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 10 Tenn. Juris., Double Jeopardy, § 11; 13 Tenn. Juris., Forgery and Counterfeiting, §§ 2, 5-8.

Attorney General Opinions. Recovery of attorney fees and costs by deferred presentment service provider, OAG 98-070 (3/25/98).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Defendant's money laundering conviction was reversed and dismissed, and defendant's forgery conviction was reinstated, based upon the fact that the Tennessee legislature did not intend that conduct such as simple forgery and attempting to pass forged instruments would also constitute the crime of money laundering. State v. Jackson, 124 S.W.3d 139, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

2. Venue.

In a prosecution for forgery, circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish that the allegedly forged instrument was executed in Morristown, Tennessee, and that, therefore, venue was proper in Hamblen County. State v. Smith, 926 S.W.2d 267, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 993 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

Accomplice testimony and handwriting analysis evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 926 S.W.2d 267, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 993 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

State established that the forged receipts had value where the evidence at trial established that the receipts had value within the county's purchase card program, as they were needed to verify and document that purchases were for legitimate county business, and the forged receipts had an apparent value of the purchase amounts listed on them. State v. Finch, 465 S.W.3d 584, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. June 24, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's forgery conviction because the jury could have inferred that defendant intended to defraud or harm the county when she submitted the forged receipts for her county purchase card, as she provided the store manager a list of the specific dates and amounts to be listed on the forged receipts and should could not explain discrepancies between the forged receipts and her purchase card statements. State v. Finch, 465 S.W.3d 584, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. June 24, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of forgery because defendant's signature, driver's license number, and date of birth were written on the check; and defendant had already pled guilty to stealing the check. State v. Dockery, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2016).

Circumstantial evidence supported a finding that defendant forged the check with the intent to defraud the victim or was criminally responsible for the forgery; although no direct evidence tied defendant to the forgery of the victim's check in the amount of $ 900, the check was dated and cashed on the day after defendant stole the victim's wallet that contained her checkbook. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

Evidence that defendant signed the victim's name when the officer ordered her to sign the citation supported defendant's conviction for forgery. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 885 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for forgery of $500 or less because the evidence showed that defendant intended to misrepresent defendant's true identity when defendant obtained a learner permit under the name of a different person and signed the driver license application and the learner permit in the name of the other person to falsely obtain the permit. Furthermore, there was no lawful authority to use a person's identifying information to commit an unlawful act, such as falsely obtaining a learner permit. State v. McDonald, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2017).

Proof admitted at trial was clearly legally sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for theft over $ 1,000 and forgery over $ 1,000 because the State presented evidence that defendant falsified loan documents and pocketed money supposedly loaned to individuals whose names were on the documents. State v. McCullough, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 268 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2018).

4. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence that the defendant was with the person who cashed a forged check at the time the check was cashed and that the defendant shared a residence with that person was not sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. State v. Knight, 969 S.W.2d 939, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Defendant's money laundering conviction was reversed and dismissed, and defendant's forgery conviction was reinstated because defendant's attempt to purchase merchandise by passing a forged check was an act of forgery, not money laundering, as there was no proof that defendant was attempting to conceal anything other than his own identity; defendant was not trying to launder the check, but rather was trying to negotiate it by pretending that he was the victim. State v. Jackson, 124 S.W.3d 139, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

5. Jury Instructions.

Trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the definition of “value” the apparent value of the forged writing was an essential element the State had to prove with respect to the count regarding the $1,759 purchase in order for that offense to rise to the level of a Class D felony. Defense counsel's belief that the State failed to prove the apparent value of the forged writing did not alleviate the trial court of its duty to provide a correct and complete charge of the law. State v. Finch, 465 S.W.3d 584, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. June 24, 2014).

6. Sentence.

A sentence of two concurrent four-year terms was an appropriate penalty for convictions on two counts of forgery, where evidence of several enhancement factors was presented by the state and not challenged by the defendant. State v. Smith, 926 S.W.2d 267, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 993 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The legislature did not intend for forgery convictions to be exempt from a sentence of continuous confinement in the department of correction. State v. Elam, 7 S.W.3d 103, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 768 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

7. Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's conviction for forgery did not violate his double jeopardy rights as the offenses of theft of property and forgery contained at least one element not found in the other because theft of property required the intent to deprive the owner of property by exercising control over the property without the owner's consent, while forgery contained the element of forging a writing in order to defraud another. State v. Dockery, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2016).

8. Intent to Defraud.

Because the homeowners presented a dearth of evidence that when the bank or its agent altered the date of the homeowners'  signature on the rescission notice and affixed the homeowners'  initials to the alteration without authorization, the act was performed with an intent to defraud the homeowners, and, thus, the bank did not commit the offense of forgery. Tenn. State Bank v. Mashek, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2020).

39-14-115. Criminal simulation.

    1. A person commits the offense of criminal simulation who, with intent to defraud or harm another:
      1. Makes or alters an object, in whole or in part, so that it appears to have value because of age, antiquity, rarity, source or authorship that it does not have;
      2. Possesses an object so made or altered, with intent to sell, pass or otherwise utter it; or
      3. Authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as genuine or as different from what it is.
    2. A person commits the offense of criminal simulation who, with knowledge of its character, possesses:
      1. Any machinery, plates or other contrivances designed to produce instruments reporting to be credit or debit cards of an issuer who had not consented to the preparation of the cards; or
      2. Any instrument, apparatus or contrivance designed, adapted or used for commission of any theft of property or services by fraudulent means.
  1. Criminal simulation is punishable as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105, but in no event shall criminal simulation be less than a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2009, ch. 408, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section combines a number of prior Tennessee laws. This offense includes counterfeit clothing labels and music recordings.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Averments in indictment of intent, § 40-13-215.

Forgery of living wills, § 32-11-109.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Theft of property, § 39-14-103.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Commercial Law, § 96; 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 43; 13 Tenn. Juris., Forgery and Counterfeiting, § 9.1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Relation to Fifth Amendment.

Jury was properly permitted to draw an adverse inference from a mortician's invocation of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. V, in his deposition, even if the mortician's guilty plea to criminal simulation under T.C.A. § 39-14-115 of the son's body was not conclusive as to liability, where: (1) the parents presented a video taken during an investigation wherein the mortician pointed to a body on the floor of a building and identified it with the son's last name; (2) although it was later proved that the body was not that of the son, the video evidence indicated that the mortician believed he did not fully cremate the son's body; (3) the cremation did not comply with either industry standards or any reasonable notion of common decency and respect for the dead and the living who had lost a loved one; (4) metal objects were found in the cremains that were allegedly the son's that did not belong to the son; and (5) given the son's size, the amount of ashes returned to the parents was approximately one-third to one-half what it should have been. Akers v. Prime Succession of Tenn., Inc., 387 S.W.3d 495, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2012), cert. denied, Marsh v. Akers, 185 L. Ed. 2d 364, 133 S. Ct. 1464, 568 U.S. 1194, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1728 (U.S. 2013).

39-14-116. Hindering secured creditors.

  1. A person who claims ownership of or interest in any property which is the subject of a security interest, security agreement, deed of trust, mortgage, attachment, judgment or other statutory or equitable lien commits an offense who, with intent to hinder enforcement of that interest or lien, destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise harms or reduces the value of the property.
  2. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Remove” means transport, without the effective consent of the secured party, from the state or county in which the property was located when the security interest or lien attached; and
    2. “Security interest” means an interest in personal property or fixtures that secures payment or performance of an obligation.
  3. An offense under this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

See § 39-11-106 for the definition of “property” found in this section.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Fraudulent sale of pledged property, venue of prosecution, § 40-1-104.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Uniform Commercial Code, Secured Transactions, title 47, ch. 9.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 30.66.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Bankruptcy, § 41.

Law Reviews.

Commercial Transactions and Personal Property — 1963 Tennessee Survey (John A. Spanogle Jr.), 17 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1964).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality, OAG 94-070 (5/19/94).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence that defendant took her car from the garagekeeper knowing she owed him money and hid the car and would not return it was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for hindering a secured creditor. State v. Schmitz, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

39-14-117. Fraud in insolvency.

  1. A person commits an offense who, when proceedings have been or are about to be instituted for the appointment of a trustee, receiver, or other person entitled to administer property for the benefit of creditors, or when any other assignment, composition, or liquidation for the benefit of creditors has been or is about to be made:
    1. Destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise harms or reduces the value of the property with intent to defeat or obstruct the operation of a law relating to administration of property for the benefit of creditors;
    2. Intentionally falsifies any writing or record relating to the property or any claim against the debtor; or
    3. Intentionally misrepresents or refuses to disclose to a trustee or receiver, or other person entitled to administer property for the benefit of creditors, the existence, amount, or location of the property, or any other information that the person could legally be required to furnish in relation to the administration.
  2. An offense under this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-14-118. Illegal possession or fraudulent use of credit or debit card.

  1. A person commits the crime of illegal possession of a credit or debit card who, knowing the person does not have the consent of the owner or issuer, takes, exercises control over or otherwise uses that card or information from that card.
  2. A person commits the crime of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card who uses, or allows to be used, a credit or debit card or information from that card, for the purpose of obtaining property, credit, services or anything else of value with knowledge that:
    1. The card is forged or stolen;
    2. The card has been revoked or cancelled;
    3. The card has expired and the person uses the card with fraudulent intent; or
    4. For any other reason the use of the card is unauthorized by either the issuer or the person to whom the credit or debit card is issued.
    1. Fraudulent use of a credit or debit card is punishable as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105, depending on the amount of property, credit, goods or services obtained.
    2. If no property, credit, goods, or services are actually received or obtained, illegal possession or fraudulent use of a credit card is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2008, ch. 851, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is a combination of prior laws concerning credit and debit cards. The offense is a middle level misdemeanor unless there is an actual loss. In the case of a loss, the offense, like other theft offenses, is graded according to the amount of the loss. See § 39-14-105.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Definition of expired credit and debit cards, issuer, and revoked, § 39-14-102.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of fraudulent use of a credit card because, when an officer searched defendant, he was holding a receipt in his hand; the receipt reflected a purchase made with a debit card with the last four digits 4923; defendant's bag contained the items described on the purchase receipt; the second victim testified that the last four digits of her stolen debit card were 4923 and that her account connected to the missing card reflected unauthorized charges; and a reasonable jury could have found that the debit card belonged to the second victim and that defendant used the card to make a purchase knowing the card was stolen. State v. Leonard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

39-14-119. Reporting of credit or debit card lost, stolen or mislaid.

  1. Any person who reports or attempts to report a credit or debit card as being lost, stolen, or mislaid knowing the report to be false violates this subsection (a).
  2. Any person who, with intent to defraud, uses a credit or debit card or information from such card, which has previously been reported lost, stolen or mislaid, violates this subsection (b).
  3. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This offense is new to Tennessee law.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Definition of credit card and debit card, § 39-14-102.

Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-120. Issuing false financial statement.

  1. A person commits the crime of issuing a false financial statement who, with intent to defraud:
    1. Knowingly makes or utters a written instrument which purports to describe the financial condition or ability of the person or some other person to pay and which is inaccurate in some material respect; or
    2. Represents in writing that a written instrument purporting to describe a person's financial condition or ability to pay is accurate with respect to that person's current financial condition or ability to pay, knowing or having reason to believe the instrument to be materially inaccurate in that respect.
  2. Issuing a false financial statement is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This offense is designed to promote the integrity of business decisions by encouraging accurate financial statements. This section punishes the making or adoption of an inaccurate financial statement with the intent to defraud. Detrimental reliance is not necessary for this offense.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Trial court properly relied on financial statements prepared by husband in finding the value of the husband's businesses. Powell v. Powell, 124 S.W.3d 100, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1075 (Tenn. 2003).

39-14-121. Worthless checks.

    1. A person commits an offense who, with fraudulent intent or knowingly:
      1. Issues or passes a check or similar sight order for the payment of money for the purpose of paying any fee, fine, tax, license or obligation to any governmental entity or for the purpose of obtaining money, services, labor, credit or any article of value, knowing at the time there are not sufficient funds in or on deposit with the bank or other drawee for the payment in full of the check or order, as well as all other checks or orders outstanding at the time of issuance; or
      2. Stops payment on a check or similar sight order for the payment of money for the purpose of paying any fine, fee, tax, license or obligation to any governmental entity or for the purpose of obtaining money, services, labor, credit or any article of value; provided, that the money, credit, goods or services were as represented at the time of the issuance of the check or similar sight order.
    2. This subsection (a) shall not apply to a post-dated check or to a check or similar sight order where the payee or holder knows or has good and sufficient reason to believe the drawer did not have sufficient funds on deposit to the drawer's credit with the drawee to ensure payment.
  1. For purposes of this section, the issuer's or passer's fraudulent intent or knowledge or both of insufficient funds may be inferred if:
    1. The person had no account with the bank or other drawee at the time the person issued or passed the check or similar sight order; or
    2. On presentation within thirty (30) days after issuing or passing the check or similar sight order, payment was refused by the bank or other drawee for lack of funds, insufficient funds or account closed after issuing or passing the check or order, and the issuer or passer fails to make good within ten (10) days after receiving notice of that refusal.
  2. For purposes of subdivision (b)(2), notice shall be in writing, and, if the address is known, sent by certified mail with return receipt requested, and addressed to the issuer or passer at the address shown:
    1. On the check or similar sight order if given; or
    2. If not shown on the check or similar sight order, on the records of the bank or other drawee if available.
  3. If notice is given in accordance with subsection (c), it may be inferred that the notice was received no later than five (5) days after it was mailed.
  4. Notice shall not be required:
    1. In the event the situs of the drawee is not in Tennessee;
    2. If the drawer is not a resident of Tennessee or has left the state at the time the check, draft or order is dishonored; or
    3. If the drawer of the check, draft or order did not have an account with the drawee of the check, draft or order at the time the check, draft or order was issued or dishonored.
  5. The offense of issuing or passing worthless checks is punishable as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105. Value shall be determined by the amount appearing on the face of the check on the date of issue.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed as amending or repealing the Fraud and Economic Crimes Prosecution Act, compiled in title 40, chapter 3, part 2.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 20; 1992, ch. 962, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is a consolidation of former title 39, chapter 3, part 3. As with prior law, a defendant is liable for criminal sanctions for passing a check knowing there are insufficient funds on account to make payment or for stopping payment on a check when the value obtained was at the time the check was issued. The 1992 amendment prohibits the payment of fees, fines, or taxes to the government by a worthless check.

Subsection (b) allows an inference of fraudulent intent or knowledge if the defendant had no account with the drawee bank at the time or if the defendant fails to make the check good within ten (10) days after notice of refusal. Prior law allowed a similar inference after refusal and nonpayment within five (5) days after notice.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Use of citations in lieu of arrest, § 40-7-118.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Bankruptcy, § 8; 13 Tenn. Juris., False Pretenses and Cheats, § 6; 25 Tenn. Juris., Witnesses, § 37.1.

Law Reviews.

Implied Malice—The Coming Constitutional Crises in Tennessee (Kenneth F. Berg), 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 369 (1985).

Attorney General Opinions. Worthless checks; jurisdiction, OAG 92-13 (2/19/92).

Worthless checks, § 39-14-121, OAG 00-061 (4/3/00).

Aggregation of offenses is not permissible for multiple worthless check offenses, OAG 07-031 (3/22/07).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Fraudulent Intent.

The worthless check statute is not a per se crime of dishonesty as found by the district court, and without inquiry into the factual circumstances underlying the defendant's convictions, there was no evidence that the convictions involved dishonesty or false statement so as to be admitted against her in sentencing her for a later wire fraud conviction. United States v. Barb, 20 F.3d 694, 1994 FED App. 110P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6469 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1994).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of one count of issuing a worthless check, fraudulent intent was not established as a matter of law because the State's witness was relying on defendant's promise at the time of issuance to make the check good by agreeing to hold it for two days. Defendant's conviction could not stand because the fraudulent intent needed to establish the issuance of a worthless check was negated as a matter of law. State v. Tucker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2017).

2. Payee's Knowledge of Insufficient Funds.

A post dated check may be used to commit offenses involving theft, deception, and fraud; however, the passing of a post dated check does not subject the maker to conviction under the worthless check law. State v. Stooksberry, 872 S.W.2d 906, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. 1994).

Even though the payee was aware that he could not cash defendant's check until the defendant's bank opened three days later, there was no evidence that the payee had reason to know that the check was not good on the day that the exchange took place. State v. Sneed, 908 S.W.2d 408, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

3. Impeachment.

Person who commits the offense of passing worthless checks with “fraudulent intent” satisfies the “dishonesty” requirement of Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2), and a person who passes a check knowing that there are insufficient funds to pay the check has made a misrepresentation to the payee and therefore meets the requirement of “dishonesty or false statement under Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); a person who cancels a check with knowledge that the goods or services received were as represented at the time the check was issued has knowingly failed to pay for those goods or services. Knowingly canceling payment for goods or services received when those goods or services were as represented is dishonest. State v. Russell, 382 S.W.3d 312, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the probative value of defendant's convictions for passing worthless checks outweighed the unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues in her trial because the probative value of defendant's prior convictions was high, and her prior convictions were not substantially similar to the offense for which she was on trial; the prior offense to which defendant pleaded guilty involved passing a check knowing that the check would not be paid, but the offense for which defendant was indicted did not involve passing a check. State v. Russell, 382 S.W.3d 312, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

Statute setting forth the crime of passing worthless checks, T.C.A. § 39-14-121, does not criminalize an honest mistake; a prior conviction for passing worthless checks pursuant to § 39-14-121 therefore is probative of a witness's honesty. State v. Russell, 382 S.W.3d 312, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

Because the crime of passing worthless checks in violation of T.C.A. § 39-14-121 involved an element of dishonesty or false statement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant's prior conviction could be used to impeach her credibility pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). State v. Russell, 382 S.W.3d 312, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

39-14-122. Immunity for false arrest or imprisonment.

  1. Any person causing the arrest of the drawer of a check, draft or order shall not be criminally or civilly liable for false arrest or false imprisonment if the person, firm or corporation relies in good faith upon the permissible inferences set forth in § 39-14-121(b) and notice is given, if required, to the drawer of the check.
  2. To rely on the civil or criminal immunity, the drawee of any check, draft, or other order for the payment of money, before refusing to pay same to the holder upon presentation, shall also cause to be written, printed, or stamped in plain language thereon or attached thereto, the reason for the drawee's dishonor or refusal of the same.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This new provision protects people who rely in good faith on the worthless check law and cause the arrest of a drawer of a check.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-14-123 — 39-14-126. [Reserved.]

  1. A person commits an offense who, with intent to deceive, in the course of business:
    1. Uses or possesses for use a false weight or measure, or any other device for falsely determining or recording any quality or quantity;
    2. Sells, offers or exposes for sale, or delivers less than the represented quantity of any commodity or service;
    3. Takes or tends to take more than the represented quantity of any commodity or service when as buyer the person furnished the weight or measure;
    4. Sells, offers or exposes for sale adulterated or mislabeled commodities;
      1. “Adulterated” means varying from the standard of composition or quality prescribed by or pursuant to any statute providing criminal penalties for such variance or set by established commercial usage; and
      2. “Mislabeled” means varying from the standard of disclosure in labeling prescribed by or pursuant to any statute providing criminal penalties for such variance or set by established commercial usage;
    5. Makes a false or misleading statement in any advertisements addressed to the public or to a substantial segment thereof for the purposes of promoting the purchase or sale of property or services;
    6. Makes false or deceptive representations in any advertisement or solicitation for services or products that those services or products have sponsorship, approval, affiliation or connection with a bank, savings and loan association, savings bank or subsidiary or affiliate thereof;
    7. Uses the trade name or trademark, or a confusingly similar trade name or trademark, of any bank, savings and loan association, savings bank or subsidiary or affiliate of any bank, saving and loan association, saving bank or subsidiary in a solicitation for the offering of services or products if such use is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the source of origin, affiliation or sponsorship of such products or services; or, uses the trade name or trademark, or confusingly similar trade name or trademark, of any bank, savings and loan association, savings bank or subsidiary or affiliate of any bank, saving and loan association, saving bank or subsidiary in any manner in a solicitation for the offering of services or products unless the solicitation clearly and conspicuously states the following in bold-face type on the front page of the solicitation:
      1. The name, address and telephone number of the person making the solicitation;
      2. A statement that the person making the solicitation is not affiliated with the bank, savings and loan association, savings bank or subsidiary or affiliate of any bank, saving and loan association, saving bank or subsidiary; and
      3. A statement that the solicitation is not authorized or sponsored by the bank, savings and loan association, savings bank or subsidiary or affiliate of any bank, saving and loan association, saving bank or subsidiary; or
    8. Uses the trade name or trademark, or a confusingly similar trade name or trademark of any place of entertainment, or the name of any event, person, or entity scheduled to perform at a place of entertainment in the domain of a ticket marketplace URL. It is not a violation of this subdivision (a)(8) if the ticket marketplace obtained written authorization from the place of entertainment, event, person, or entity scheduled to perform at a place of entertainment to use the trade name, trademark, or name in the domain of the URL prior to the use. For purposes of this subdivision (a)(8):
      1. “Domain” means the portion of text in a URL that is to the left of the top-level domains such as .com, .net, or .org;
      2. “Place of entertainment” means an entertainment facility in this state, such as a theater, stadium, museum, arena, amphitheater, racetrack, or other place where performances, concerts, exhibits, games, athletic events, or contests are held;
      3. “Ticket” means a printed, electronic, or other type of evidence of the right, option, or opportunity to occupy space at, to enter, or to attend a place of entertainment, even if not evidenced by any physical manifestation of the right, option, or opportunity; and
      4. “Ticket marketplace” means a website that provides a forum for or facilitates the buying and selling, or reselling, of a ticket.
  2. “Commodity,” as used in this section, means any tangible or intangible personal property.
  3. Deceptive business practices is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 21; 2003, ch. 31, §§ 1-3; 2011, ch. 89, § 1; 2018, ch. 930, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is not intended to cover casual personal transactions.

Compiler's Note. Acts 2018, ch. 930, § 4 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply  to actions occurring on or after May 15, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (a)(8).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 930, § 4. May 15, 2018.

Cross-References. Advertising with intent not to sell or with intent to sell limited quantity, § 47-18-104(b)(9) and (10).

Civil liability for sale of cotton or tobacco product containing foreign objects, § 43-18-109.

Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

State flag or banners, § 4-1-301.

Vandalism, § 39-14-408.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 10 Tenn. Juris., Electricity, § 5; 25 Tenn. Juris., Weights and Measures, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Enforcement of State Deceptive Trade Practice Statutes (John A. Sebert, Jr.), 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 689 (1975).

39-14-128. Creating false impression of death.

  1. It is an offense for any person to intentionally and falsely create the impression that any person is deceased.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 537.

39-14-129. [Repealed.]

Acts 1989, ch. 591, §  1; repealed by Acts 2015, ch. 338, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-14-129 concerned the offense of failure to put the name of a grower or packer on a produce container.

Acts 2015, ch. 338, § 2 provided that conduct committed prior to July 1, 2015, that constitutes the offense repealed by the act remains subject to prosecution and conviction.

39-14-130. Destruction of valuable papers with intent to defraud.

  1. Any person who takes or destroys any valuable papers with intent to injure or defraud shall be punished as if for theft. If the value of the papers is not ascertainable, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “valuable papers” includes:
    1. Any bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, order, or certificate;
    2. Any book of accounts respecting goods, money or other things;
    3. Any deed or contract in force;
    4. Any receipt, release, or defeasant;
    5. Any instrument of writing whereby any demand, right or obligation is created, ascertained, increased, extinguished or diminished; or
    6. Any other valuable paper writing.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-131. Destruction or concealment of will.

Any person who destroys or conceals the last will and testament of a testator, or any codicil thereto, with intent to prevent the probate thereof or defraud any devisee or legatee, commits a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 317.

39-14-132. Misrepresentation of mileage on used motor vehicle odometer.

  1. No person or agent of any person shall misrepresent the mileage on a used motor vehicle which is offered for sale, trade-in or exchange by changing the mileage registering instrument of a used motor vehicle so as to show a lesser mileage reading than that recorded by the instrument; provided, that this shall not be construed to prevent the service, repair or replacement of the mileage registering instrument, which, by reason of normal use, wear or through damage, requires service, repair or replacement.
    1. A person may service, repair, or replace an odometer of a motor vehicle if the mileage registered by the odometer remains the same as before the service, repair or replacement. If the mileage cannot remain the same after every reasonable attempt to set the odometer to the mileage registered prior to the service, repair or replacement:
      1. The person shall adjust the odometer to read zero (0); and
      2. The owner of the vehicle or agent of the owner shall affix to the left door frame of the vehicle a secure, permanent plate or sticker conforming with federal standards which contains the mileage before the service, repair or replacement and the date of the service, repair or replacement.
    2. A person may not, with intent to defraud, remove or alter a notice attached to a motor vehicle as required by this section.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 234, § 1; 1998, ch. 714, § 1.

Cross-References. Odometer defined, § 55-1-121.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-133. False or fraudulent insurance claims.

Any person who intentionally presents or causes to be presented a false or fraudulent claim, or any proof in support of such claim, for the payment of a loss, or other benefits, upon any contract of insurance coverage, or automobile comprehensive or collision insurance, or certificate of such insurance or prepares, makes or subscribes to a false or fraudulent account, certificate, affidavit or proof of loss, or other documents or writing, with intent that the same may be presented or used in support of such claim, is punished as in the case of theft.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This new section broadens coverage of prior law to include all types of insurance.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Fraudulent statements in application or claim under industrial or fraternal insurance, § 56-7-708.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Baron, 659 S.W.2d 811, 1983 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of initiating a false police report and filing a fraudulent insurance claim because he told the owner he could make the motorcycle disappear, he told the owner to leave the motorcycle at his body shop, he instructed the owner to report the motorcycle stolen, defendant, a police officer, responded to the call, at defendant's suggestion the owner filed an insurance claim for the loss of the motorcycle, and the insurance company paid more than $8,000 to the lienholder. State v. Millan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 810 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of filing a false insurance claim because he did not initiate a claim, as he did not file the necessary and required documentation pursuant to the policy, including a proof of loss, in the requisite time period. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 888 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2018).

Evidence that defendant intentionally presented a false or fraudulent claim when he made verbal representations to the insurer, signed the advance payment agreement, and accepted the $1,000 advance payment was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that defendant violated the false or fraudulent insurance claims statute. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2019).

2. Evidence Insufficient.

State failed to adduce sufficient proof to support defendant's conviction of insurance fraud as charged in this case where other than an exclusion for death by suicide within two years of the issue date, it did not appear that death benefits were limited to accidental deaths. State v. Larkin, 443 S.W.3d 751, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2013).

39-14-134. Alteration of item's permanent distinguishing numbers — Sale or possession of such item.

  1. A person commits a Class A misdemeanor who knowingly and with the intent to conceal or misrepresent the identity of an item:
    1. Alters, covers, defaces, destroys or removes the permanent serial number, manufacturer's identification plate or other permanent distinguishing number from such item; or
    2. Sells, buys or has possession of such item.
  2. This section does not in any way affect §§ 55-5-111 and 55-5-112, relative to motor vehicles.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Alteration of automobile engine serial number, § 55-5-112.

Identification numbers for vessels, §§ 69-9-206, 69-9-207.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-135. Manufacture, sale or possession of farm implement without serial number.

    1. No new tractor-drawn major farm implement manufactured as a self-contained unit after December 31, 1968, and designed to be pulled by or attached to a farm tractor and sold as a complete unit, shall be sold or offered for sale at wholesale or retail unless a manufacturer's serial number shall be prominently stamped on the equipment or on a piece of metal securely affixed to the equipment.
    2. It shall be the responsibility of the manufacturer to see that such an implement is properly supplied with a serial number.
  1. Any person who manufactures, distributes, sells or transfers any tractor-drawn major farm implement subject to the requirements of this section without a serial number prominently stamped on the equipment or on a piece of metal securely affixed thereto commits a Class A misdemeanor.
  2. This section shall not apply to the sale of parts, components or accessories for major farm implements where serial numbers are not required by law.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-136. Falsifying of educational and academic documents.

  1. A person commits the offense of falsifying educational and academic documents who buys, sells, creates, duplicates, alters, gives or obtains a diploma, academic record, certificate of enrollment or other instrument which purports to signify merit or achievement conferred by an institution of education with the intent to use fraudulently that document or to allow the fraudulent use of the document.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1990, ch. 983, § 3.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-137. Fraudulent qualifying for programs for disadvantaged or minority businesses.

  1. No person shall knowingly commit or engage in any false or fraudulent conduct, representation or practice in order to qualify, or assist another to qualify, for participation in any program administered by or through an agency of state or local government intended to specifically encourage and enhance economic development of the following:
    1. Disadvantaged businesses, as described by § 4-26-102(6);
    2. Small businesses, as described by § 12-3-1102;
    3. Minority-owned businesses, as described by § 12-3-1102; or
    4. Disadvantaged business concerns and enterprises, as described by or pursuant to § 54-1-124.
  2. A violation of subsection (a) is punishable as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105.
  3. Any contract entered into as a direct result of a violation of subsection (a) shall be null and void and the court shall order repayment of all governmental funds paid pursuant thereto which may be reasonably construed as constituting net profit or personal enrichment for the guilty party or parties. Repayment of funds pursuant to this subsection (c) shall be in addition to payment of any fine imposed pursuant to subsection (b).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1993, ch. 488, § 3; 1997, ch. 46, § 1.

39-14-138. Theft of trade secrets.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Article” means any object, material, device, or substance or copy thereof, including any writing, record, recording, drawing, sample, specimen, prototype, model, photograph, micro-organism, blueprint or map;
    2. “Copy” means any facsimile, replica, photograph or other reproduction of an article, and any note, drawing or sketch made of or from an article;
    3. “Representing” means describing, depicting, containing, constituting, reflecting or recording; and
    4. “Trade secret” means the whole or any portion or phrase of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or improvement which is secret and of value. The trier of fact may infer a trade secret to be secret when the owner thereof takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes.
  2. A person is guilty of theft and shall be punished pursuant to § 39-14-105 who, with intent to deprive or withhold from its owner the control of the trade secret, or with intent to appropriate a trade secret to the person's own use or to the use of another:
    1. Steals or embezzles an article representing a trade secret; or
    2. Without authority makes or causes to be made a copy of an article representing a trade secret.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Keep your Friends Close:  A Framework for Addressing Rights to Social Media Contacts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1459 (2014).

The Law of Competition in Tennessee (Michael Richards), 35 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 22 (1999).

39-14-139. Recorded device.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Aggregate wholesale value” means the average wholesale value of lawfully manufactured and authorized recordings corresponding to the number of nonconforming recordings involved in the offense. Proof of the specific wholesale value of each nonconforming recording shall not be required;
    2. “Fixed” means embodied in a recording or other tangible medium of expression, by or under the authority of the author, so that the matter embodied is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration;
    3. “Live performance” means a recitation, rendering or playing of a series of images, musical, spoken or other sounds, or a combination of images and sounds, in an audible sequence;
    4. “Manufacturer” means the person who actually makes the recording or causes the recording to be made. “Manufacturer” does not include a person who manufactures a medium upon which sounds or images can be recorded or stored, or who manufactures the cartridge or casing itself, unless the person actually makes the recording or causes the recording to be made;
    5. “Owner” means a person who owns the sounds fixed in a master phonograph record, master disc, master tape, master film or other recording on which sound is or can be recorded and from which the transferred recorded sounds are directly or indirectly derived; and
    6. “Recording” means a tangible medium on which sounds, images, or both are recorded or otherwise stored, including an original phonograph record, disc, tape, audio or video cassette, wire, film, memory card, flash drive, hard-drive, data storage device, or other medium now existing or developed later on which sounds, images, or both are or can be recorded or otherwise stored, or a copy or reproduction that duplicates, in whole or in part, the original.
    1. It is unlawful for any person to:
      1. Knowingly reproduce for sale or cause to be transferred any recording with intent to sell it or cause it to be sold or use it or cause it to be used for commercial advantage or private financial gain through public performance without the consent of the owner;
      2. Transport within this state, for commercial advantage or private financial gain, a recording with the knowledge that the sounds on the recording have been reproduced or transferred without the consent of the owner; or
      3. Advertise, offer for sale, sell or rent, cause the sale, resale or rental of, or possess for one (1) or more of these purposes any recording that the person knows has been reproduced or transferred without the consent of the owner.
    2. Subdivision (b)(1) does not apply to audiovisual recordings and applies only to sound recordings that were initially fixed before February 15, 1972.
    1. It is unlawful for any person to:
      1. For commercial advantage or private financial gain, advertise, offer for sale, sell, rent, transport, cause the sale, resale, rental, or transportation of, or possess for one (1) or more of these purposes a recording containing sounds of a live performance with the knowledge that the live performance has been recorded or fixed without the consent of the owner; or
      2. With the intent to sell for commercial advantage or private financial gain, record or fix or cause to be recorded or fixed on a recording a live performance with the knowledge that the live performance has been recorded or fixed without the consent of the owner.
    2. In the absence of a written agreement or law to the contrary, the performer or performers of a live performance may be presumed to own the rights to record or fix those sounds.
  2. It is unlawful for any person to, for commercial advantage or private financial gain, knowingly advertise, offer for sale, sell, rent or transport, cause the sale, resale, rental or transportation of, or possess for any of these purposes a recording if the outside cover, box, jacket or label of the recording does not clearly and conspicuously disclose the actual name and address of the manufacturer.
  3. Any violation of this section constitutes a:
    1. Class D felony, accompanied by a fine of no less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), if:
      1. The violation involves one hundred (100) or more recordings during a one hundred eighty-day period; or
      2. The defendant has been previously convicted under this section;
    2. Class E felony, accompanied by a fine of no less than five hundred dollars ($500), if the violation involves more than fifty (50) but less than one hundred (100) recordings during a one hundred eighty-day period; or
    3. Class A misdemeanor, accompanied by a fine of no less than two hundred dollars ($200), for any other offense.
  4. If a person is convicted of a violation of this section, the court may order the person to make restitution to any owner or lawful producer of a master recording that has suffered injury resulting from the crime, or to the trade association representing the owner or lawful producer. An order of restitution may be based on the aggregate wholesale value of lawfully manufactured and authorized recordings corresponding to the number of nonconforming recordings involved in the offense unless a greater value can be proven. An order of restitution may also include investigative costs relating to the offense.
  5. All recordings involved in the offense, implements, devices and equipment used or intended to be used in the manufacture of recordings on which the offense is based, proceeds and any and all contraband associated with the offense are subject to forfeiture and destruction or other disposition pursuant to § 39-11-703.
  6. The penalties provided by this section are in addition to any other penalties provided under any other law. This section does not affect the rights and remedies of a party in private litigation.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1000, §§ 1-4; 2009, ch. 408, § 2.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class D and E felonies and Class A misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Happy Together? The Uneasy Coexistence of Federal and State Protection for Sound Recordings, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 167  (2014).

Attorney General Opinions. Under T.C.A. § 39-14-139(b)(2), it is not unlawful to create or sell pirated movies and  pirated music that were originally recorded after February 15, 1972. T.C.A. § 39-14-139 does not  decriminalize the creation and sale of bootleg movie and music recordings unless the copy was created to look like an original commercial recording.  OAG 10-82, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 88 (6/11/10).

39-14-140. Forfeiture.

Any electronic or communications equipment, and any other devices used, sold, transferred or possessed to violate this part are considered contraband subject to seizure and forfeiture under the same procedures used for the forfeiture of conveyances pursuant to title 40, chapter 33.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2009, ch. 408, § 3.

39-14-141. [Reserved.]

39-14-143. Unauthorized solicitation for police, judicial or safety association.

  1. It is an offense for a person to solicit or accept a fee, consideration, donation, or to offer for sale or sell advertising as a representative, or under the guise of representing, a police, judicial or safety association, partnership or corporation unless the person is employed by or is a member of an organization composed of persons elected, employed or appointed pursuant to law, to engage in police, judicial or safety work or activities, except that the commissioner of safety may authorize in writing any person to engage in such activities until the authority is revoked in writing by the commissioner.
  2. “Police,” as used in this section, includes any person duly elected, appointed, or employed as provided by law to engage in law enforcement work.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
  4. This section does not apply to any police, judicial or safety association directed or regulated by any agency, department or branch of state government. Neither does this section apply to associations composed of duly constituted law enforcement or judicial officers.
  5. Notwithstanding subsection (c) to the contrary, any person, persons, corporation or corporations violating this section, which violation is accomplished through the use of some form of communication across the boundaries of this state, commits a Class E felony, whether such communication is:
    1. By mail;
    2. By the use of any electronic device, including, but not limited to, the use of a telephone or telegraph; or
    3. By any other means.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-14-144. Civil liability of adult, parent or guardian for theft of retail merchandise by minor.

  1. If the appropriate district attorney general consents to use of this section as provided in subsection (i), in lieu of any criminal penalties imposed by § 39-14-105 for theft offenses, any adult or parent or guardian of a minor who willfully takes possession of merchandise from a retail merchant with the intent to convert the merchandise to personal use without paying the purchase price is subject to civil liability, should the merchant prevail, as follows:
    1. For the adult or emancipated minor:
      1. The greater of one hundred dollars ($100) or an amount three (3) times the listed retail price of the merchandise taken if the merchant does not recover the merchandise;
      2. The greater of one hundred dollars ($100) or an amount three (3) times the difference between the value of the damaged merchandise and the value of the merchandise prior to its conversion if the merchant recovers the merchandise but it is in a damaged state; or
      3. The greater of one hundred dollars ($100) or an amount twice the listed retail price of the merchandise if the merchant recovers the merchandise in the same condition it was in prior to the conversion; or
    2. For the parent or legal guardian having custody of an unemancipated minor who has been negligent in the supervision of the unemancipated minor:
      1. The greater of one hundred dollars ($100) or an amount three (3) times the listed retail price of the merchandise taken if the merchant does not recover the merchandise;
      2. The greater of one hundred dollars ($100) or an amount three (3) times the difference between the value of the damaged merchandise and the value of the merchandise prior to its conversion if the merchant recovers the merchandise but it is in a damaged state; or
      3. The greater of one hundred dollars ($100) or an amount twice the listed retail price of the merchandise if the merchant recovers the merchandise in the same condition it was in prior to the conversion.
  2. Civil liability under this section is not limited by any other law concerning the liability of parents or guardians or minors.
  3. A conviction for the offense of shoplifting is not a prerequisite to the maintenance of a civil action authorized by this section.
  4. The fact that a mercantile establishment may bring an action against an individual as provided in this section shall not limit the right of the establishment to demand, orally or in writing, that a person who is liable for damages and penalties under this section remit the damages prior to the consideration of the commencement of any legal action.
  5. An action for recovery of damages and penalties under this section may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction, including a court of general sessions, if the total damages do not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the court involved.
  6. If a written agreement is entered into between the merchant and the person responsible for damages and penalties pursuant to this section concerning the liability of the person and the payment of the damages and penalties, the agreement and the contents of the agreement shall remain confidential as long as the parties to the agreement continue to adhere to its terms.
  7. The civil remedy conferred upon merchants by this section shall not apply if the listed retail price of the merchandise taken was in excess of five hundred dollars ($500).
  8. Use of the civil remedy conferred upon merchants by this section shall not be construed to be a violation of § 39-16-604, prohibiting the compounding of an offense.
  9. Any demand in writing or other document sent to the adult, parent or guardian of a minor covered by this section shall also be sent to the district attorney general of the judicial district in which the offense occurred. If the appropriate district attorney general has not, within ten (10) days from the date the document was sent, objected to the use of this section in lieu of criminal prosecution, the district attorney general is deemed to have consented to the use of this section by the mercantile establishment. If the mercantile establishment does not send a written demand or other document to the adult, parent or guardian, the district attorney general must be notified and must consent, either orally or in writing, to the use of this section in lieu of criminal prosecution.
  10. Whenever a retail merchant, the merchant's agent, or the merchant's employee apprehends an adult or minor who has committed theft as described in subsection (a), the merchant, agent, or employee shall not at that time enter into any written agreement to accept civil damages in lieu of criminal penalties or actually accept any civil damages.

Acts 1990, ch. 1007, § 1; 1991, ch. 288, §§ 1, 3, 4, 6, 8.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Under subsection (a), proceedings under this section serve as a bar to criminal prosecutions.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Circumstances under which parent or guardian liable, § 37-10-103.

Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability to theft of cash, checks or credit cards, OAG 91-64 (7/3/91).

Misdemeanor theft from a retail merchant, OAG 91-100 (12/17/91).

39-14-145. Civil liability of employees for theft of retail merchandise.

  1. If the appropriate district attorney general consents to use of this section as provided in subsection (e), in lieu of any criminal penalties imposed by § 39-14-105 for theft offenses, any employee of a retail merchant who willfully takes possession of merchandise from the retail merchant with the intent to convert the merchandise to personal use without paying the purchase price shall be subject to civil liability should the merchant prevail as follows:
    1. The greater of one hundred dollars ($100) or an amount three (3) times the listed retail price of the merchandise taken if the merchant does not recover the merchandise;
    2. The greater of one hundred dollars ($100) or an amount three (3) times the difference between the value of the damaged merchandise and the value of the merchandise prior to its conversion if the merchant recovers the merchandise but it is in a damaged state; or
    3. The greater of one hundred dollars ($100) or an amount twice the listed retail price of the merchandise if the merchant recovers the merchandise in the same condition it was in prior to the conversion.
  2. The civil remedy conferred upon merchants by this section shall not apply if the listed retail price of the merchandise taken was in excess of five hundred dollars ($500).
  3. If a written agreement is entered into between the merchant and the person responsible for damages and penalties pursuant to this section concerning the liability of the person and the payment of the damages and penalties, the agreement and the contents thereof shall remain confidential as long as the parties to the agreement continue to adhere to its terms.
  4. Use of the civil remedy conferred upon merchants by this section shall not be construed to be a violation of § 39-16-604, prohibiting the compounding of an offense.
  5. Any demand in writing or other document sent to an employee covered by this section shall also be sent to the district attorney general of the judicial district in which the offense occurred. If the appropriate district attorney general has not, within ten (10) days from the date the document was sent, objected to the use of this section in lieu of criminal prosecution, the district attorney general shall be deemed to have consented to the use of this section by the mercantile establishment. If the mercantile establishment does not send a written demand or other document to the employee, the district attorney general must be notified and must consent, either orally or in writing, to the use of this section in lieu of criminal prosecution.
  6. Whenever a retail merchant, the merchant's agent or the merchant's employee apprehends an employee who has committed theft as described in subsection (a), the merchant, agent or employee shall not at such time enter into any written agreement to accept civil damages in lieu of criminal penalties or actually accept any such civil damages.

Acts 1990, ch. 1007, § 2; 1991, ch. 288, §§ 2, 5, 7, 8.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Under subsection (a), proceedings under this section serve as a bar to criminal prosecutions.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

39-14-146. Theft of property — Conduct involving merchandise.

  1. For purposes of § 39-14-103, a person commits theft of property if the person, with the intent to deprive a merchant of the stated price of merchandise, knowingly commits any of the following acts:
    1. Conceals the merchandise;
    2. Removes, takes possession of, or causes the removal of merchandise;
    3. Alters, transfers or removes any price marking, or any other marking which aids in determining value affixed to the merchandise;
    4. Transfers the merchandise from one (1) container to another;
    5. Causes the cash register or other sales recording device to reflect less than the merchant's stated price for the merchandise;
    6. Removes, destroys, deactivates, or evades any component of an anti-shoplifting or inventory control device to commit or facilitate a theft;
    7. Uses any artifice, instrument, container, device, or other article to commit or facilitate a theft; or
    8. Activates or interferes with a fire alarm system to commit or facilitate a theft.
  2. In a theft prosecution under this section, unless applicable, the state is not required to prove that the defendant obtained or exercised control over the merchandise as required in a prosecution under § 39-14-103.
  3. Notwithstanding any other law, a fifth or subsequent conviction in a two-year period shall be punished one (1) classification higher than provided by § 39-14-105, and subject to a fine of not less than three hundred dollars ($300) nor more than the maximum fine established for the appropriate offense classification.

Acts 1991, ch. 237, § 1; 2017, ch. 184, §§ 1, 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sentencing.

Trial court properly imposed concurrent, three-year terms after defendant pled guilty to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon under T.C.A. § 39-13-103 and theft of merchandise over five hundred dollars under T.C.A. § 39-14-146 and denied probation where: (1) defendant was a Range II, multiple offender, had repeatedly violated past probation conditions and continued to commit other crimes; (2) she was on probation when she committed these crimes; (3) the conduct of defendant and her accomplices could have cost the victim her life; and (4) defendant did not show an abuse of discretion or overcome the presumption of reasonableness. State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 824 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2012).

Although defendant was eligible for consecutive sentencing, the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing that resulted in a total sentence of 44 years for defendant's crimes of aggravated robbery, theft by shoplifting, and attempted aggravated robbery; the robberies were committed with a toy gun, no one was injured, two victims knew the gun was plastic, defendant was 49 years old and already serving a 12-year sentence, and the sentence was in effect a sentence of life imprisonment, was not justly deserved, and was not the least severe measure necessary. State v. Biggs, 482 S.W.3d 923, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2015).

Trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences under T.C.A. § 40-35-115 for defendant's two counts of theft of property over $ 500 under T.C.A. § 39-14-146; defendant's lengthy record consisted of at least 20 prior convictions, including numerous robbery and theft convictions, plus at the time of defendant's trial, he had two additional theft cases pending. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017).

Subsection (c) did not apply because it became effective after defendant was charged with burglary. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

2. Evidence Sufficient.

There was ample evidence to support defendant's conviction for theft of property over $ 500, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-14-146, 39-14-105; defendant challenged the reliability of his identification by two witnesses, but this credibility finding was not disturbed on appeal, plus a rational jury could have found that stolen laptop was $ 873, as one witness testified. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017).

For purposes of T.C.A. §§ 39-14-146, 39-14-105, 39-11-302(b), the evidence was sufficient to show defendant intended to deprive the store of the laptop and knowingly caused it to be removed from the store, and a jury could have found that the laptop had a fair market value of $ 750, given the testimony; defendant exited the store with a man carrying the laptop, refused the store employee's request to inspect the contents of the bag, and drove away. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of shoplifting because it showed that she obtained a cosmetics bag, removed the price tag, and placed numerous cosmetics items in it. State v. Gaines, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft because video surveillance showed someone in clothing similar to defendant's entering and exiting the victim's apartment, a gray beanie with defendant's DNA and a boot print matching defendant's boot were found nearby, the victim's computer and a knife from the apartment were found along the path taken by defendant, defendant pawned a ring from the apartment, defendant's cell phone was used to search for information about a stabbing, and defendant confessed the crime to a jail inmate. State v. McLawhorn, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2020).

3. Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's theft convictions under T.C.A. § 39-14-146 arose as the result of two separate takings occurring over nine hours apart, and thus defendant's protections against double jeopardy had not been violated. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2017).

4. Construction With Burglary Statute.

Dismissal of the burglary count in defendant's case was upheld on independent due process grounds; given the legislative history, T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3) was never intended to cover buildings open to the public, and by charging individuals with burglary, a Class D felony, when they should only be prosecuted for misdemeanor theft or shoplifting under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-105, 39-14-146, prosecutors are abusing their charging discretion by unreasonably expanding the reach of the burglary statute, and charging of burglary in these instances is unreasonable, unjust, and violative of due process. State v. Jensen, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017).

There is no conflict between the repeat shoplifting statute and the burglary statute because regardless of the reason for the ban from the retail establishment or whether a person had the requisite number of prior convictions for shoplifting, a person who enters a building without the effective consent of the owner and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or assault may be prosecuted for burglary. If that person has four or more prior convictions for shoplifting in a two-year period, they may also be subject to enhanced punishment. State v. Welch, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

Burglary statute and the serial shoplifting statute prohibit different criminal offenses; the two offenses have different elements and the two statutes punish different wrongs. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

39-14-147. Fraudulent transfer of motor vehicle — Definitions — Defenses — Penalties — Civil liability.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Lease” means the grant of use and possession of a motor vehicle for consideration, whether or not the grant includes an option to buy the vehicle;
    2. “Motor vehicle” means a device in, on, or by which a person or property is or may be transported or drawn on a highway, except a device used exclusively on stationary rails or tracks;
    3. “Security interest” means an interest in personal property or fixtures that secures payment or performance of an obligation;
    4. “Third party” means a person other than the actor or the owner of the vehicle; and
    5. “Transfer” means to transfer possession, whether or not another right is also transferred, by means of a sale, lease, sublease, lease assignment or other property transfer.
  2. A person commits an offense if the person acquires, accepts possession of, or exercises control over the motor vehicle of another under a written or oral agreement to arrange for the transfer of the vehicle to a third party and:
    1. Knowing the vehicle is subject to a security interest, lease or lien, the person transfers the vehicle to a third party without first obtaining written authorization from the vehicle's secured creditor, lessor or lienholder;
    2. Intending to defraud or harm the vehicle's owner, the person transfers the vehicle to a third party;
    3. Intending to defraud or harm the vehicle's owner, the person disposes of the vehicle in a manner other than by transfer to a third party; or
    4. The person does not disclose the location of the vehicle on the request of the vehicle's owner, secured creditor, lessor or lienholder.
  3. For the purposes of subdivision (b)(2), the actor is presumed to have intended to defraud or harm the motor vehicle's owner if the actor does not take reasonable steps to determine whether or not the third party is financially able to pay for the vehicle.
  4. It is a defense to prosecution under subdivision (b)(1) that the entire indebtedness secured by or owned under the security interest, lease or lien is paid or satisfied in full not later than the thirtieth day after the date that the transfer was made.
  5. It is not a defense to prosecution under subdivision (b)(1) that the motor vehicle's owner has violated a contract creating a security interest, lease or lien in the motor vehicle.
  6. A violation of subdivision (b)(1), (2) or (3) is:
    1. A Class E felony if the value of the motor vehicle is less than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000); or
    2. A Class D felony if the value of the motor vehicle is twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) or more.
  7. A violation of subdivision (b)(4) is a Class B misdemeanor.
  8. In addition to any criminal penalties imposed by this section, a person who is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have violated any part of this section shall be subject to civil liability to a vehicle owner, secured creditor, lessor or lienholder who prevails in an action brought under this section for the following:
    1. Three (3) times the actual value of the motor vehicle; and
    2. Reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by the person instituting the action.

Acts 1991, ch. 479, §§ 2-9.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-148. False statement in obtaining surety bond — Penalty.

Any person who makes a false statement or representation of a material fact knowing it to be false or knowingly fails to disclose a material fact, in order to obtain a surety bond, either for that person or for any other person, commits a Class A misdemeanor. Each such false statement or representation or failure to disclose a material fact constitutes a separate offense.

Acts 1994, ch. 874, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-149. Communication theft — Sale of illegal devices — Penalties — Mitigating factors — Aggravating factors — Multipurpose devices.

  1. A person commits communication theft who, with the intent to defraud a communication service provider of any lawful compensation for providing a communication service, knowingly:
    1. Acquires, transmits, or retransmits a communication service;
    2. Makes, distributes, possesses with the intent to distribute or uses a communication device or modifies, programs or reprograms a communication device in such a manner that it is designed, adapted for use or used for the commission of communication theft in violation of subdivision (a)(1);
    3. Makes or maintains any modification or alteration to any communication device installed with the express authorization of a communication service provider for the purpose of intercepting any program or other service carried by the provider that the person is not authorized by the provider to receive;
    4. Makes or maintains connections, whether physical, electrical, acoustical or by any other means, with cables, wires, components or other devices used for the distribution of communication services without the authority of the communication services provider;
    5. Sells, possesses, or otherwise delivers to another or offers for sale any:
      1. Communication device or unlawful access device, or plans or instructions for making the same, under circumstances evincing an intent to use the communication device or unlawful access device, or to allow the same to be used, for a purpose prohibited by this section; or
      2. Material, including hardware, cables, tools, data, computer software or other information or equipment, knowing that the purchaser or a third person intends to use the material in the manufacture or development of a communication device or unlawful access device in violation of this section;
    6. Publishes the number or code of an existing, cancelled, revoked or nonexistent telephone number, credit number or other credit device, or method of numbering or coding which is employed in the issuance of telephone numbers, credit numbers or other credit devices knowing that it may be used to avoid the payment of any lawful telephone or telegraph toll charge under circumstances evincing an intent to have the telephone number, credit number, credit device or method of numbering or coding so used; or
    7. Assists another in committing an act prohibited by this section in a manner that would make such person criminally responsible for the act under § 39-11-402.
  2. Any communication device or unlawful access device and other related items and equipment pertaining to a violation of this section may be seized under warrant or incident to a lawful arrest. Upon conviction for such a violation, the court may order the sheriff of the county in which the person was convicted to destroy as contraband or to otherwise lawfully dispose of any devices or other related items used in violation of this section.
  3. If conduct that violates this section:
    1. Also constitutes a violation of § 39-14-104 relative to theft of services, that conduct may be prosecuted under either, but not both, statutes as provided in § 39-11-109; and
    2. Is either commenced or consummated in this state, that conduct may be prosecuted in this state as provided in § 39-11-103.
    1. A violation of this section shall be punished as theft and graded in accordance with § 39-14-105.
    2. A person's first violation of this section shall be punished by fine only if the value of the services obtained is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000). However, the trier of fact may impose a fine of double the amount otherwise authorized by § 40-35-111 for the appropriate offense class.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (d)(3)(B), each communication device or unlawful access device involved in a violation of this section shall constitute a separate offense and each activity prohibited by this section found to have occurred shall constitute a separate offense regardless of whether the activity involves one (1) or more than one (1) communication device or unlawful access device.
      2. If a defendant commits multiple violations of this section but such violations represent a single, continuous course of conduct by the defendant, such multiple violations, shall, for purposes of this section, be considered one (1) violation and shall be punished as such.
    3. In addition to any other sentence authorized by this section, the court may order a person convicted of violating this section to make restitution for the offense in accordance with the procedure set out in § 40-35-304.
      1. A communication service provider aggrieved by a violation of this section may institute a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain appropriate relief. Whether the conduct giving rise to a violation of this section occurs wholly in this state, is commenced outside the state but consummated in this state, or is commenced in this state but consummated outside this state, venue for the action shall be in any county in which conduct constituting a violation of this section occurs.
      2. An action shall be filed within two (2) years of the aggrieved communication service provider's actual knowledge of the violation, but in no event shall the action be filed more than five (5) years from the date of the violation.
    1. The court, in its discretion:
      1. May award declaratory relief and other equitable remedies, including preliminary and final injunctions to prevent or restrain violations of this section;
      2. At any time while an action is pending, on the terms it deems reasonable, may order the impounding of any communication device or unlawful access device that is in the custody or control of the violator and that the court has reasonable cause to believe was involved in the alleged violation of this section;
      3. Award actual or statutory damages as authorized in subdivision (e)(3); and
      4. As part of a final judgment or decree finding a violation of this section, order the remedial modification or destruction of any communication device or unlawful access device, or any other devices or equipment involved in the violation, that is in the custody or control of the violator, or that has been impounded under subdivision (e)(2)(B).
    2. At any time before final judgment is entered, the aggrieved party may elect to have any damages that may be awarded to that party computed according to either of the following methods:
      1. The actual damages suffered by the party as a result of violations of this section and all profits of the violator that are attributable to all violations of this section against the aggrieved party;
        1. Except as provided in subdivision (e)(3)(B)(ii), in lieu of actual damages and the violator's profits as provided in subdivision (e)(3)(A), statutory damages in an amount of not less than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) may be awarded for each communication device or unlawful access device involved in the action or each violation of this section found to have occurred. The trier of fact shall determine the appropriate amount of statutory damages from within the range available in this subdivision (e)(3)(B) as it deems equitable and just;
        2. If a person commits multiple violations of this section but the violations represent a single, continuous course of conduct by that person, those multiple violations, shall, for purposes of this section, be considered one (1) violation and statutory damages awarded as such;
      2. Notwithstanding subdivision (e)(3)(B), if the trier of fact finds that there are mitigating factors present as to a particular defendant's involvement in a violation of this section, it may reduce the amount of statutory damages awarded below the minimum amount established in subdivision (e)(3)(B). Mitigating factors may include, but shall not be limited to:
        1. The defendant's role in the violation was minor;
        2. The defendant assisted the aggrieved party in uncovering violations of this section committed by other persons or in detecting other persons who had committed violations of this section;
        3. The defendant assisted the aggrieved party in locating other communication devices, unlawful access devices or equipment used to violate this section;
        4. The defendant's violation of this section was committed solely for personal or household use;
        5. The defendant acted under a good faith belief that the defendant's violations of this section were lawful and ceased the violations upon learning that they were not; and
        6. Any other factor consistent with this subdivision (e)(3)(C) that would cause the trier of fact to believe that the interests of justice require the amount of damages awarded to be below the statutory minimum set out in subdivision (e)(3)(B);
      3. Notwithstanding subdivision (e)(3)(B), if the trier of fact finds that there are aggravating factors present as to a particular defendant's involvement in a violation of this section, it may increase the amount of damages awarded up to an amount not to exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). Aggravating factors may include, but shall not be limited to:
        1. The defendant committed the offense willfully and for the purpose of commercial advantage or financial gain;
        2. The defendant has a previous history of committing communication theft whether in this state, another state or under federal jurisdiction;
        3. The defendant was the leader in the commission of a violation of this section involving two (2) or more other parties;
        4. Violations of this section were also committed against other communication service providers on or about the same time as the violations against the aggrieved party;
        5. The value of the services taken from or damage done to the aggrieved party was particularly great; and
        6. Any other factor consistent with this subdivision (e)(3)(D) that would cause the trier of fact to believe that the interests of justice require the amount of damages awarded be in excess of the statutory maximum set out in subdivision (e)(3)(B) or that the amount should be added to any actual damages proven; and
      4. If the defendant prevails in a civil action brought pursuant to this section, the court may tax all costs of the action against the plaintiff and award the defendant reasonable attorney fees and the reasonable costs of defending the action if the court finds that the plaintiff brought the action:
        1. In bad faith; and
        2. For the purpose of impeding or stifling lawful competition; or
        3. For the purpose of harassing or intimidating lawful competition.
  4. This section shall not be construed to prohibit:
    1. The manufacture, use, advertisement or sale of a multipurpose device, or the possession of a multipurpose device for any of the purposes mentioned in this section, unless the person acts with the intent required to violate this section and the person knows that:
      1. The primary use or purpose for which the device was designed, manufactured, sold or licensed is for a violation of this section;
      2. The device has only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than as an unlawful access device or for the commission of a violation of this section; or
      3. The device is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person and with that person's knowledge, for use as an unlawful access device or for the purpose of committing a violation of this section;
    2. The use of a communication device to connect one (1) or more multipurpose devices at the person's residence or business premises, unless the device causes substantial electronic or physical harm to the communication service provider's network, system or facility; and
    3. The use of a communication device that is not selected by a communication service provider, unless the device causes substantial electronic or physical harm to the communication service provider's network, system or facility.
  5. Breach of a service contract between a person and a communication service provider that establishes terms and conditions for the attachment of a communication device to a communication service provider's network, system, or facility shall not, in and of itself, be sufficient proof that the person acted with the intent required to commit a violation of this section. However, conduct that constitutes a breach of a service contract may also constitute a violation of this section if the person knowingly commits an act prohibited by this section with the intent to defraud a communication service provider of any lawful compensation for providing a communication service.
    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or language contained in this section to the contrary, a person does not commit either a civil or criminal violation of this section unless the person acts with the intent to defraud, as defined in subdivision (i)(4), a communication service provider of any lawful compensation for providing a communication service in conjunction with some other conduct prohibited by this section.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, any entity that has a collectively bargained contract that provides for residual payments to performers, or any entity that licenses the public performing rights with a communications service provider and who is engaged in the distribution of royalty or residual payments, operating in the ordinary course of business to monitor residual payments or the performing right in musical works, sound recordings or audiovisual works provided by a communication service provider, may engage in those monitoring activities under this section where the activities are intended and carried out for the sole purpose of distributing royalties or residuals to songwriters, music publishers, artists or performers or monitoring unauthorized performances.
    3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a nonprofit library, archive, or educational institution from engaging in circulation, course reserves, and inter-library and other lending services; classroom and instructional uses; or archiving and preservation to the extent those activities are permitted under the federal copyright law as compiled in title 17 of the United States Code.
  6. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Communication device” means any:
      1. Machine, equipment, technology or software that is capable of intercepting, transmitting, retransmitting, decrypting or receiving a communication service, or any part thereof; or
      2. Computer circuit or chip, electronic mechanism or other component that is capable of facilitating the interception, transmission, retransmission, decryption, or reception of any communication service;
    2. “Communication service” means any service lawfully provided for a charge or compensation to facilitate the lawful origination, transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, data, writings, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by telephone of any type, wire, wireless, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical systems, networks or facilities; and any service lawfully provided for a charge or compensation by any radio, photo-optical, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, electric power, fiber optic, cable television, satellite, microwave, data transmission, wireless or internet-based distribution system, network or facility, including, but not limited to, any and all electronic, data, video, audio, internet access, telephonic, microwave and radio communications, transmissions, signals and services, and any such communications, transmissions, signals and services lawfully provided directly or indirectly by or through any of the systems mentioned in this subdivision (i)(2), networks or facilities;
    3. “Communication service provider” means any person or entity:
      1. Providing a communication service, whether directly or indirectly as a reseller, that, for a fee, supplies the facility, cell site, mobile telephone switching office or other equipment or communication service;
      2. Owning or operating any fiber optic, photo-optical, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, cable television, satellite, internet-based, telephone, wireless, microwave, data transmission or radio distribution system, network or facility; or
      3. Providing any communication service directly or indirectly by or through any such distribution systems, networks or facilities;
    4. “Intent to defraud” means a person uses, in whole or in part, deceit, trickery, misrepresentation or subterfuge for the purpose of depriving a communication service provider of the lawful compensation to which it is entitled for providing a communication service;
    5. “Multipurpose device” means a communication device that is capable of more than one (1) function, at least one (1) of which is lawful, and includes any component thereof, and any plans or instructions for developing or making the device or any component thereof; and
    6. “Unlawful access device” means any type of machine, equipment, technology or software that is primarily designed, manufactured, sold, possessed, used or advertised, for the purpose of defeating or circumventing any effective technology, device or software, or any component or part thereof, used by the provider, owner or licensee of any communication service or of any data, audio or video programs or transmissions, to protect any communication, data, audio or video services, programs or transmissions from unauthorized receipt, decryption, communication, transmission or retransmission.

Acts 1996, ch. 800, § 1; 2004, ch. 770, § 1.

Cross-References. Library defined, § 39-14-102.

39-14-150. Identity theft victims' rights.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Identity Theft Victims' Rights Act of 2004.”
    1. A person commits the offense of identity theft who knowingly obtains, possesses, buys, or uses, the personal identifying information of another:
      1. With the intent to commit any unlawful act including, but not limited to, obtaining or attempting to obtain credit, goods, services or medical information in the name of such other person; and
        1. Without the consent of such other person;
        2. Without the lawful authority to obtain, possess, buy or use that identifying information; or
        3. To commit a violation of § 53-11-402 or § 53-11-416 by using a prescription for a controlled substance represented as having been issued by a physician, nurse practitioner, or other health care provider.
    2. For purposes of the offense of identity theft, an activity involving a possession, use or transfer that is permitted by the Tennessee Financial Records Privacy Act, compiled in title 45, chapter 10; Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102; or the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as amended by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactional Act, (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) shall not be considered an “unlawful act”.
    1. A person commits the offense of identity theft trafficking who knowingly sells, transfers, gives, trades, loans or delivers, or possesses with the intent to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver, the personal identifying information of another:
      1. With the intent that the information be used by someone else to commit any unlawful act including, but not limited to, obtaining or attempting to obtain credit, goods, services or medical information in the name of the other person; or
      2. Under circumstances such that the person should have known that the identifying information would be used by someone else to commit any unlawful act including, but not limited to, obtaining or attempting to obtain credit, goods, services or medical information in the name of the other person; and
      3. The person does not have the consent of the person who is identified by the information to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver, or possess with the intent to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver, that information; and
      4. The person does not have lawful authority to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver, or possess with the intent to sell, transfer, give, loan or deliver, the personal identifying information.
    2. For purposes of the offense of identity theft trafficking, an activity involving a possession, use or transfer that is permitted by the Tennessee Financial Records Privacy Act; Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; or the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as amended by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactional Act, shall not be considered an “unlawful act”.
  2. In a prosecution under subsection (c), the trier of fact may infer from the defendant's simultaneous possession of the personal identifying information of five (5) or more different individuals that the defendant possessed the personal identifying information with the intent to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver the information. However, if the defendant had the consent of one (1) or more of the individuals to possess the personal identifying information of that individual, the consenting individual shall not be counted in determining whether an inference of possession for sale may be drawn by the trier of fact.
  3. As used in this section, “personal identifying information” means any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including:
    1. Name, social security number, date of birth, official state or government issued driver license or identification number, alien registration number, passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number;
    2. Unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation;
    3. Unique electronic identification number, address, routing code or other personal identifying data which enables an individual to obtain merchandise or service or to otherwise financially encumber the legitimate possessor of the identifying data;
    4. Telecommunication identifying information or access device; or
    5. Any name, number, information, medical prescribing pad, electronic message, or form used by a physician, nurse practitioner, or other health care provider for prescribing a controlled substance.
    1. The general assembly recognizes that an offense under this section may result in more than one (1) victim. While a company or business that loses money, merchandise, or other things of value as a result of the offense is a victim, it is equally true that the person whose identity is stolen is also a victim. The person whose identity is stolen suffers definite and measurable losses including expenses necessary to cancel, stop payment on, or replace stolen items such as credit cards, checks, driver licenses, and other documents, costs incurred in discovering the extent of the identity theft, in repairing damage from the theft such as credit ratings and reports and preventing further damages from the theft, long distance telephone charges to law enforcement officials, government offices, and businesses in regard to the theft, and lost wages from the time away from work required to obtain new personal identifying information and complete all of the tasks set out in this subdivision (f)(1). In addition to measurable losses, the person whose identity is stolen also suffers immeasurable damages such as stress and anxiety as well as possible health problems resulting from or aggravated by the offense.
    2. For the reasons set out in subdivision (f)(1), the general assembly declares that any person whose identity is unlawfully obtained in violation of subsection (b) or (c) is a victim of crime within the meaning of Article 1, § 35 of the Constitution of Tennessee and title 40, chapter 38.
    1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, if a private entity or business maintains a record that contains any of the personal identifying information set out in subdivision (g)(2) concerning one of its customers, and the entity, by law, practice or policy discards such records after a specified period of time, any record containing the personal identifying information shall not be discarded unless the business:
      1. Shreds or burns the customer's record before discarding the record;
      2. Erases the personal identifying information contained in the customer's record before discarding the record;
      3. Modifies the customer's record to make the personal identifying information unreadable before discarding the record; or
      4. Takes action to destroy the customer's personal identifying information in a manner that it reasonably believes will ensure that no unauthorized persons have access to the personal identifying information contained in the customer's record for the period of time between the record's disposal and the record's destruction.
    2. As used in this subsection (g), “personal identifying information” means a customer's:
      1. Social security number;
      2. Driver license identification number;
      3. Savings account number;
      4. Checking account number;
      5. PIN (personal identification number) or password;
      6. Complete credit or debit card number;
      7. Demand deposit account number;
      8. Health insurance identification number; or
      9. Unique biometric data.
      1. A violation of this subsection (g) shall be considered a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, compiled in title 47, chapter 18, and may be punishable by a civil penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) for each record containing a customer's personal identifying information that is wrongfully disposed of or discarded; provided, however, that no total penalty may exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for any one (1) customer.
      2. It is an affirmative defense to any civil penalty imposed pursuant to this subsection (g) that the business used due diligence in its attempt to properly dispose of or discard the records.
    3. The methods of destroying the personal identifying information of a customer set out in this subsection (g) shall be considered the minimum standards. If a private entity or business by law, practice or policy currently is required to have or otherwise has in place more stringent methods and procedures for destroying the personal identifying information in a customer's record than are required by this subsection (g), the private entity or business may continue to destroy the identifying information in the more stringent manner.
    4. To the extent that this subsection (g) conflicts with applicable federal law, this subsection (g) shall not apply to an entity that is subject to the enforcement authority of the federal banking agencies, the national credit union administration, the federal trade commission or the securities and exchange commission. For any such entity, the applicable federal law shall govern the proper disposition of records containing consumer information, or any compilation of consumer information, derived from consumer reports for a business purpose.
    5. Notwithstanding subdivision (g)(5), this subsection (g) shall not apply to any financial institution that is subject to the privacy and security provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, as amended, and as it existed on January 31, 2002.
    1. The following property shall be subject to seizure and judicial forfeiture to the state in the manner provided:
      1. Any property, real or personal, directly or indirectly acquired by or received in violation of this section;
      2. Any property, real or personal, received as an inducement to violate this section;
      3. Any property, real or personal, traceable to the proceeds from the violation;
      4. Any property, real or personal, used in connection with or to facilitate a violation of this section; and
      5. All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, in the commission of or escape from a violation of this section and any money, merchandise or other property contained in those conveyances.
    2. Property seized pursuant to this subsection (h) shall be seized and forfeited pursuant to the procedure set out in  chapter 11, part 7 of this title.
    3. Notwithstanding § 39-11-713, property seized pursuant to this subsection (h) shall be disposed of as follows:
      1. All property ordered forfeited shall be sold at public auction. The proceeds from all property forfeited and sold at public auction shall be disposed of by the court as directed by this section. The attorney general and reporter shall first be compensated for all expenses incident to the litigation, as approved by the court. Any costs for appeals shall be provided for by the trial court upon conclusion of the litigation. The attorney general and reporter shall then direct that any public agency be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses resulting from the investigation, seizure and storage of the forfeited property;
      2. Out of the proceeds remaining, the court shall order restitution be made to the person or persons whose identity was stolen for any identifiable losses resulting from the offense; and
      3. The court shall then award the remainder of the funds as follows:
  4. In the event that the investigating and seizing agency was a state agency, then ten percent (10%) of the funds shall be distributed to the state treasurer who shall deposit the funds in a designated account for the agency to be used in its identity theft operations;
    1. For purposes of this subsection (j), “victim” means the person whose personal identifying information was obtained, possessed, bought or used in violation of subsection (b), or sold, transferred, given, traded, loaned, delivered or possessed in violation of subsection (c).
    2. Identity theft is a continuing offense because the offense involves an unlawful taking and use of personal identifying information that remains in the lawful possession of a victim wherever the victim currently resides or is found. As provided in this section, such unlawful taking and use are elements of the offense of identity theft and occur wherever the victim resides or is found.
    3. Pursuant to § 39-11-103 and subdivision (j)(2), if a victim of identity theft resides or is found in this state, an essential element of the offense is committed in this state and a defendant is subject to prosecution in this state, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in this state.
    4. Venue for the offense of identity theft shall be in any county where an essential element of the offense was committed, including but not limited to, in any county where the victim resides or is found, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in such county.
    1. For purposes of this subsection (k):
      1. “Reencoder” means an electronic device that places encoded information from the computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a payment card, driver license or state or local government-issued identification card, onto the computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a different payment card, driver license, or state or local government-issued identification card, or any other electronic medium that allows an authorized transaction to occur; and
      2. “Scanning device” means a scanner, reader or any other electronic device that is used to access, read, scan, obtain, memorize, or store, temporarily or permanently, information encoded on a computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a payment card, driver license, or state or local government-issued identification card.
      1. It is an offense for a person to use a scanning device or reencoder without the permission of the holder of the card or license from which information is being scanned or reencoded with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any criminal offense.
      2. It is an offense for a person who possesses any device, apparatus, equipment, software, material, good, property, or supply that is designed or adapted for use as a scanning device or reencoder with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any criminal offense.
      3. A violation of this subsection (k) is a class A misdemeanor.

In the event that the investigating and seizing agency is the Tennessee bureau of investigation, then ten (10%) of the funds shall be distributed to the state treasurer who shall deposit the funds in a designated account for the agency to be used in its identity theft operations;

In the event that the investigating and seizing agency is a local public agency, then twenty-five percent (25%) of the funds shall be distributed to its local government for distribution to the law enforcement agency for use in the enforcement of this section. When more than one (1) local public agency participated in the investigation and seizure of forfeited property as certified by the attorney general and reporter, then the court shall order a distribution of ten percent (10%) of the funds according to the participation of each local public agency. Accounting procedures for the financial administration of the funds shall be in keeping with those prescribed by the comptroller of the treasury; and

The remainder of the funds shall be distributed to the state treasurer who shall deposit the funds in the general fund to defray the incarceration costs associated with the offense of identity theft trafficking defined in subsection (c).

For purposes of this subsection (h), a “local public agency” includes any county or municipal law enforcement agency or commission, the district attorney general, or any department or agency of local government authorized by the attorney general and reporter to participate in the investigation.

Funds awarded under this section may not be used to supplement salaries of any public employee or law enforcement officer. Funds awarded under this section may not supplant other local or state funds.

(1)  Identity theft as prohibited by subsection (b) is a Class D felony.

Identity theft trafficking as prohibited by subsection (c) is a Class C felony.

Acts 1999, ch. 57, § 1; 2004, ch. 911, § 1; 2011, ch. 299, § 1; 2013, ch. 151, §§ 1, 2; 2014, ch. 669, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 299, § 2 provided that the act, which added subsection (j), shall apply to offenses that occur on or after July 1, 2011.

Acts 2013, ch. 151, § 5 provided that the act, which added subdivisions (b)(1)(B)(iii) and (e)(5), shall apply to offenses that occur on or after July 1, 2013.

Cross-References. Criminal impersonation, § 39-16-301.

Identity theft prevention, title 47, ch. 18, part 21.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalties for Class C and D felonies, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Facing Identity Theft: New Victims' Rights Act Imposes New Rules to Protect You (Kristin E. Solomon), 40 No. 12 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2004).

Protecting Sensitive Employee Information (Edward G. Phillips), 43 Tenn B.J. 18 (2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of identity theft because, when an officer searched defendant, he was holding a store receipt in his hand; the receipt reflected a purchase of food items made with a debit card with the last four digits 4923; the victim testified that the last four digits of her stolen card were 4923 and that unauthorized charges were reflected in the account connected to her missing card; and a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the debit card belonged to the victim and that defendant used the victim's card without her consent. State v. Leonard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016).

Defendant stole the victim's wallet, which contained her credit cards, which were used in six unauthorized transactions, and although no direct evidence tied defendant to the credit card transactions, the circumstantial evidence supported a finding that he knowingly obtained the victim's personal identifying information with the intent to commit an unlawful act, and in any event, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he was criminally responsible for the actions of another in the unauthorized use of the victim's credit cards and was therefore guilty of identity theft. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

Defendant stole the victim's wallet, which contained her credit cards, which were used in six unauthorized transactions, and although no direct evidence tied defendant to the credit card transactions, the circumstantial evidence supported a finding that he knowingly obtained the victim's personal identifying information with the intent to commit an unlawful act, and in any event, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he was criminally responsible for the actions of another in the unauthorized use of the victim's credit cards and was therefore guilty of identity theft. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016).

Evidence that defendant used the victim's name and birth date to falsely identify herself to an officer in order to avoid prosecution from criminal charges amounted to an unlawful act and was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for identify theft. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 885 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for identity theft because the evidence showed that defendant intended to misrepresent defendant's true identity when defendant obtained a learner permit under the name of a different person and signed the driver license application and the learner permit in the name of the other person to falsely obtain the permit. Furthermore, there was no lawful authority to use a person's identifying information to commit an unlawful act, such as falsely obtaining a learner permit. State v. McDonald, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of identity theft because the surveillance recording showed defendant making four purchases; the transaction information showed that the last four digits of the credit card used by defendant were identical to the last four digits of the victim's credit card; and the transaction information reflected that the victim's credit card was used for payment; thus, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the credit card used by defendant belonged to the victim and that defendant used the card and its identifying information to obtain goods without the victim's consent as the victim did not give defendant permission to use the credit card. State v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019).

2. Sentencing.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring defendant to serve in confinement her 10-year sentence for 19 counts of prescription medication fraud and 36 counts of identity theft because she had a long history of criminal conduct, as she was taking prescription medication from patients as early as February 2011, and the trial court believed there was a need to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense and a need for deterrence, as the record established that defendant was a nurse who took prescription pain medication from hospice patients who were entrusted in her care. State v. Walls, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2017).

In a case in which defendant was convicted upon his guilty pleas of four counts of identity theft, pled guilty as a Range II offender, and agreed to an effective eight-year sentence, the trial court did not err by imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence because he was not entitled to the presumption that he was a favorable candidate for an alternative sentence; his criminal history spanned three states and involved multiple theft-and burglary-related offenses; he had served time in confinement for his previous convictions, but continued to engage in burglary-and theft-related offenses; he lacked the potential to rehabilitate; and there was a need to deter others from committing similar offenses. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2020).

39-14-151. Suspension of driver license for gasoline theft.

    1. In addition to the fine and imprisonment authorized by law for the offense of theft, the court may order the suspension of the driver license of a person convicted of theft for a first time for a period not to exceed six (6) months, if the theft conviction involved a person driving the person's motor vehicle off the premises of an establishment where gasoline is offered for retail sale, after dispensing gasoline or motor vehicle fuel into the fuel tank of that person's motor vehicle and failing to remit payment or make an authorized charge for the gasoline or motor vehicle fuel that was dispensed.
    2. In addition to the fine and imprisonment authorized by law for the offense of theft, the court shall order the suspension of the driver license of a person convicted of theft for a second time for a period of six (6) months if both such theft convictions involved are of the type of theft specified in subdivision (a)(1).
    3. In addition to the fine and imprisonment authorized by law for the offense of theft, the court shall order the suspension of the driver license of a person convicted of theft for a third or subsequent time for a period of one (1) year if all of such theft convictions involved are of the type of theft specified in subdivision (a)(1).
  1. If a person's driver license has been suspended under subsection (a), the court is vested with the authority and discretion to allow the continued use of a restricted driver license for the purpose of going to and from and working at the person's regular place of employment or, in the case of a student enrolled full time in a college or university, going to and from that college or university. The same restrictions and requirements for obtaining the license contained in § 55-50-502(c)(3) or (4) shall also apply to restricted licenses issued under this subsection (b).
    1. Whenever a person is convicted of an offense under subsection (a) and the court orders the suspension of the driver license of that person, the court in which the conviction is had shall confiscate the license being suspended and forward it to the department of safety together with a report of the license suspension. If the court is unable to take physical possession of the license, the court shall nevertheless forward the report to the department. The report shall include the complete name, address, birth date, eye color, sex, and driver license number, if known, of the person whose license has been suspended, and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension period. If the person is the holder of a license from another state, the court shall not confiscate the license but shall notify the department, which shall notify the appropriate licensing officials in the other state. The court shall, however, suspend the person's nonresident driving privileges for the appropriate length of time. “Conviction” has the same meaning as defined in § 55-50-503.
    2. Upon receiving the record and the driver license from the court, the department shall suspend the driver license of the person for those periods specified in subsection (a).
    3. At the end of the period of time established in subsection (a) and prior to reinstatement of the license, the person upon applying for reinstatement of the license shall pay the restoration fee to the department as required under § 55-12-129(b).

Acts 2000, ch. 855, § 1.

39-14-152. Use of a counterfeit mark or logo.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Counterfeit mark” means:
      1. Any knowingly unauthorized reproduction or copy of intellectual property; or
      2. Intellectual property affixed to any item knowingly sold, offered for sale, manufactured, or distributed, or identifying services offered or rendered, without the authority of the owner of the intellectual property;
    2. “Intellectual property” means any trademark, service mark, trade name, label, term, device, design or word adopted or used by a person to identify that person's goods or services, and all rights protected by title 47, chapter 25, part 11; and
    3. “Retail value” means the counterfeiter's regular selling price for the item or service bearing or identified by the counterfeit mark. In the case of items bearing a counterfeit mark which are components of a finished product, the retail value shall be the counterfeiter's regular selling price of the finished product on or in which the component would be utilized.
    1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly manufacture any item or services bearing or identified by a counterfeit mark.
    2. It is an offense for a person to use, display, advertise, distribute, offer for sale, sell, or possess with the intent to sell or distribute any item or service knowing the item or service bears or is identified by a counterfeit mark.
  2. In determining whether a person who possesses an item bearing or identified by a counterfeit mark possesses the item with the intent to sell or distribute it in violation of subdivision (b)(2), the trier of fact may infer from the possession, custody or control of more than twenty-five (25) items bearing a counterfeit mark that the person possesses the items with the intent to sell or distribute them.
    1. A violation of subdivision (b)(1) shall be punished the same as is provided in § 39-14-115 for the offense of criminal simulation. In addition to that punishment, a person who violates subdivision (b)(1) shall be fined an amount up to three (3) times the retail value of the items bearing, or services identified by, a counterfeit mark, or the amount authorized in § 40-35-111 for the appropriate class of felony, whichever amount is greater.
    2. A violation of subdivision (b)(2) shall be punished as theft and graded in accordance with § 39-14-105; provided, all violations of subdivision (b)(2) shall be punished by fine only, except with respect to violations involving distribution, selling, offering for sale, or possessing with the intent to sell, in which case all methods and manner of punishment in § 39-14-105 shall apply.
  3. For purposes of determining the appropriate offense grade for a defendant violating subdivision (b)(2), the quantity or retail value of all items bearing, or services identified by, every counterfeit mark the defendant used, displayed, advertised, distributed, offered for sale, sold or possessed with the intent to sell or distribute at the time of the offense shall be aggregated.
  4. All personal property, including, but not limited to, any items bearing a counterfeit mark, or any items, objects, tools, machines, equipment, instrumentalities or vehicles of any kind, employed or used in connection with a violation of this section shall be subject to judicial forfeiture pursuant to chapter 11, part 7 of this title. If the intellectual property owner does not request release of seized items bearing a counterfeit mark, those items shall be destroyed unless the intellectual property owner consents to another disposition.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting an owner of intellectual property from seeking relief under any other law, including the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, compiled in title 47, chapter 18, part 1; title 47, chapter 25, part 5; or the Personal Rights Protection Act of 1984, compiled in title 47, chapter 25, part 11; provided, a defendant prosecuted under this section may not also be prosecuted for criminal simulation under § 39-14-115 based upon the same conduct.

Acts 2000, ch. 980, § 1; 2005, ch. 395, §§ 1, 2, 3.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2009, ch. 325, § 2 purported to enact a new section § 39-14-152. Section 39-14-152 was previously enacted by Acts 2000, ch. 980, § 1; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2009, ch. 325, § 2 was designated as § 39-14-153 by the code commission.

39-14-153. False information or concealment of information in applying for or receiving dwelling accommodations in housing project.

  1. It is an offense for a person who is applying for or the recipient of dwelling accommodations in any housing project operated by a housing authority as defined in § 13-20-102 to obtain or attempt to obtain the dwelling accommodations by means of a statement, representation or impersonation the person knows to be false, or by knowingly concealing any material fact if the false statement, representation, impersonation or concealment results in:
    1. The person meeting the housing authority's income qualification standards established pursuant to § 13-20-113; or
    2. The person's lease or rental payment being less than the person would otherwise be required to pay under the housing authority's income qualification standards established pursuant to § 13-20-113.
  2. It is a violation of this section if a person obtains or attempts to obtain dwelling accommodations specified in subsection (a) by means of a statement, representation or impersonation made by another, or by another concealing any material fact, if the person knows the statement, representation or impersonation to be false or the person knows that a material fact has been concealed.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by fine only. The amount of the fine imposed shall be graded as provided in § 39-14-105. In grading the offense, the value of the benefit the defendant derived from the prohibited conduct shall be used to determine the grade of fine.

Acts 2009, ch. 325, § 2.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2009, ch. 325, § 2 purported to enact a new section § 39-14-152. Section 39-14-152 was previously enacted by Acts 2000, ch. 980, § 1; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2009, ch. 325, § 2 was designated as § 39-14-153 by the code commission.

Acts 2010, ch. 1055, § 1 purported to enact a new section § 39-14-153. Section 39-14-153 was previously enacted by Acts 2009, ch. 325, § 2; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2010, ch. 1055, § 1 was designated as § 39-14-154 by the code commission.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-154. Actions by home improvement services provider that constitute offense.

  1. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Contract for home improvement services” means a contractual agreement, written or oral, between a person performing home improvement services and a residential owner, and includes all labor, services, and materials to be furnished and performed under such agreement;
    2. “Home buyer” means a person who intends to enter into a new home construction contract on behalf of any person;
    3. “Home improvement services” means the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, or addition to any residential property, and includes, but is not limited to, the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, or addition to driveways, swimming pools, porches, garages, landscaping, fences, fall-out shelters, and roofing;
    4. “Home improvement services provider” means any person or entity, whether or not licensed pursuant to title 62, chapter 6, who undertakes to, attempts to, or submits a price or bid or offers to construct, supervise, superintend, oversee, schedule, direct, or in any manner assume charge of home improvement services for a fee. Home improvement services provider specifically includes, but is not limited to, a residential contractor as defined in § 62-6-102 when such contractor is performing home improvement services and a home improvement contractor as defined in § 62-6-501;
    5. “New home contractor” means any person who offers or provides new home construction services as a general contractor or a subcontractor, including, but not limited to, an architect or engineer;
    6. “New home construction” means the erection, installation, design work, engineering work, permitting through a governmental entity, architectural design, obtaining construction financing, or construction of a dwelling on a fixed foundation on land which is owned or purchased by a home buyer;
    7. “New home construction contract” means a contractual agreement, written or oral, between a new home contractor and a home buyer whereby the new home contractor agrees to provide new home construction services in exchange for tender of money or other consideration of value by a home buyer or by any lending institution on behalf of the home buyer to a new home contractor as part of a new home construction contract;
    8. “Possession” means actual care, custody, control, or management of residential property, but shall not include occupancy of residential property through a lease or rental agreement;
    9. “Residential owner” means a person who has legal possession of residential real property, including any person authorized by such residential owner to act on the residential owner's behalf; and
    10. “Residential property” means the building structure where a person abides, lodges, resides, or establishes a living accommodation, or where a home buyer or residential owner intends to abide, lodge, reside, or establish a living accommodation following the completion of new home construction or home improvement services made pursuant to a new home construction contract or a contract for home improvement services, and includes the land on or adjacent to such building structure.
  2. It is an offense for a new home construction contractor or home improvement services provider with intent to defraud to:
      1. Fail to refund amounts paid under a new home construction contract or a contract for home improvement services within ten (10) days of:
        1. The acceptance of a written request for a refund either hand delivered or mailed certified mail return receipt attached;
        2. The refusal to accept the certified mail sent to the last known address of the new home contractor or home improvement services provider by the home buyer or residential owner; or
        3. The return of the certified mail to the home buyer or residential owner indicating that the addressee is unknown at the address or a similar designation if the provider failed to provide to the home buyer, residential owner, or the United States postal service a correct current or forwarding address;
      2. A violation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) is an offense only if:
        1. No substantial portion of the new home construction or home improvement services work has been performed at the time of the request;
        2. More than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the starting date of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; and
        3. A copy of the written request for a refund was sent by the home buyer or residential owner to the consumer protection division of the office of the attorney general;
    1. Deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in any material respect that are contained in a new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services; provided, that the home buyer or residential owner did not provide written consent for the new home contractor or home improvement services provider to deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in the contract and such deviation or disregard caused substantial damage to the home buyer or residential owner's property in that the value of the new construction was less than the value had it been built in accordance with the plan and contract. Such deviation includes, but is not limited to:
      1. The amount billed for the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services is substantially greater than the amount quoted in the contract; or
      2. The materials used in the project are of a substandard quality but the home buyer or residential owner was charged for higher quality materials.
    1. A violation of subsection (b) is punishable as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105. Value for a violation of subsection (b), shall be determined by the monetary amount of the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services that is paid, minus the value of any work performed, plus the cost to repair any damage to the home buyer or residential owner's property caused by the new home contractor or home improvement services provider.
    2. If a person is convicted of a violation of subsection (b), the court may order the person to make restitution to any home buyer or residential owner that has suffered injury resulting from the crime. Vehicles used to commit this offense are subject to seizure and forfeiture under the same procedures used for forfeitures set out in chapter 11, part 7 of this title.
    3. All fines collected as a result of a violation of subsection (b) shall be allocated as follows:
      1. First to remaining unpaid court costs assessed in the case;
      2. Then to restitution ordered by the court pursuant to subdivision (c)(2); and
      3. Any remaining money shall be transmitted to the state board of licensing contractors for purposes of carrying out § 62-6-139.
    4. In addition, such a violation shall be construed to constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice affecting the conduct of trade or commerce under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, compiled in title 47, chapter 18, and as such, the private right of action remedy under that act shall be available to any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated as a result of such violation.
  3. Upon a conviction for a violation of this section, the court shall notify the state board of licensing contractors of the new home contractor or home improvement services provider's conviction. If the new home contractor or home improvement services provider is licensed by the board, the board shall revoke the new home contractor or home improvement services provider's license pursuant to § 62-6-118.
  4. Prosecution under subsection (b) shall not bar prosecution under any other applicable criminal statute nor shall it bar the commencement of any applicable civil cause of actions, including, but not limited to, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 or title 62, chapter 6.
  5. The district attorney general in conjunction with any law enforcement agency shall have the authority to investigate and to institute criminal proceedings for any violation of subsection (b) regardless of any actions taken or not taken by the board of licensing contractors.

Acts 2010, ch. 1055, § 1; 2012, ch. 802, § 1; 2017, ch. 310, § 1; 2018, ch. 547, §§ 1-3.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2010, ch. 1055, § 1 purported to enact a new section § 39-14-153. Section 39-14-153 was previously enacted by Acts 2009, ch. 325, § 2; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2010, ch. 1055, § 1 was designated as § 39-14-154 by the code commission.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1055, § 7 provided that the act shall apply to any contract for home improvement services entered into on or after July 1, 2010.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, inserted “, design work, engineering work, permitting through a governmental entity, architectural design, obtaining construction financing,” in the definition of “new home construction” in (a); substituted “new home construction or home improvement services work” for “contracted work” in (b)(1)(B)(i); and rewrote (b)(2) which read: “(2)  Deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in any material respect that are contained in a new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services. Such deviation includes, but is not limited to:“(A)  The amount billed for the new home construction contract or contract for home improvement services is substantially greater than the amount quoted in the contract;“(B)  The materials used in the project are of a substandard quality but the home buyer or residential owner was charged for higher quality materials; or“(C) (i)  The home buyer or residential owner did not provide written consent for the new home contractor or home improvement services provider to deviate from or disregard plans or specifications in the contract; and“(ii)  Such deviation or disregard caused substantial damage to the home buyer or residential owner's property.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 547, § 4. July 1, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Relation to Bankruptcy.

As creditors' request for a refund of their retainer was presented to debtors after they had filed their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, bankruptcy law would not have allowed debtors to turnover estate funds post-petition to one creditor based on a demand letter sent pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Thus, while in bankruptcy, debtors'  failure to comply with the demand letter was not a violation of the TCPA. Poole v. Batson (In re Batson), 568 B.R. 281, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 549 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 2017).

2. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence that defendant unilaterally and without the victim's consent covered a large area of the victim's concrete driveway with a thin, patchy layer of asphalt that the victim had removed shortly thereafter was sufficient to support the home improvement fraud conviction. State v. Small, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2018).

Part 2
Animals

39-14-201. Definitions for animal offenses.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Animal” means a domesticated living creature or a wild creature previously captured;
  2. “Livestock” means all equine as well as animals which are being raised primarily for use as food or fiber for human utilization or consumption including, but not limited to, cattle, sheep, swine, goats, and poultry;
  3. “Non-livestock animal” means a pet normally maintained in or near the household or households of its owner or owners, other domesticated animal, previously captured wildlife, an exotic animal, or any other pet, including but not limited to, pet rabbits, a pet chick, duck, or pot bellied pig that is not classified as “livestock” pursuant to this part; and
  4. “Torture” means every act, omission, or neglect whereby unreasonable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted, but nothing in this part shall be construed as prohibiting the shooting of birds or game for the purpose of human food or the use of animate targets by incorporated gun clubs.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 90, §§ 2, 5.

Cross-References. Tennessee Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act, title 39, ch. 14, part 8.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Tennessee's lethal injection protocol does not violate the Non-livestock Humane Death Act, T.C.A. § 44-17-301 et seq., because the plain language of the Act is applicable only to certain public and private agencies set out in T.C.A. § 44-17-302, which group does not include the Department of Correction; also, the plain language in the statutory definition of a non-livestock animal as provided in T.C.A. § 39-14-201(3) does not include human beings. Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 828 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1147, 126 S. Ct. 2288, 164 L. Ed. 2d 813, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 3970 (2006).

39-14-202. Cruelty to animals.

  1. A person commits an offense who intentionally or knowingly:
    1. Tortures, maims or grossly overworks an animal;
    2. Fails unreasonably to provide necessary food, water, care or shelter for an animal in the person's custody;
    3. Abandons unreasonably an animal in the person's custody;
    4. Transports or confines an animal in a cruel manner; or
    5. Inflicts burns, cuts, lacerations, or other injuries or pain, by any method, including blistering compounds, to the legs or hooves of horses in order to make them sore for any purpose including, but not limited to, competition in horse shows and similar events.
  2. A person commits an offense who knowingly ties, tethers, or restrains a dog in a manner that results in the dog suffering bodily injury as defined in § 39-11-106.
  3. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the person was engaged in accepted veterinary practices, medical treatment by the owner or with the owner's consent, or bona fide experimentation for scientific research.
  4. Whenever any person is taken into custody by any officer for violation of subdivision (a)(4), the officer may take charge of the vehicle or conveyance, and its contents, used by the person to transport the animal. The officer shall deposit these items in a safe place for custody. Any necessary expense incurred for taking charge of and sustaining the same shall be a lien thereon, to be paid before the same can lawfully be recovered; or the expenses, or any part thereof, remaining unpaid may be recovered by the person incurring the same of the owners of the animal in an action therefor.
  5. In addition to the penalty imposed in subsection (g), the court making the sentencing determination for a person convicted under this section shall order the person convicted to surrender custody and forfeit the animal or animals whose treatment was the basis of the conviction. Custody shall be given to a humane society incorporated under the laws of this state. The court may prohibit the person convicted from having custody of other animals for any period of time the court determines to be reasonable, or impose any other reasonable restrictions on the person's custody of animals as necessary for the protection of the animals.
    1. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the owner of a farm animal or someone acting with the consent of the owner of that animal from engaging in usual and customary practices which are accepted by colleges of agriculture or veterinary medicine with respect to that animal.
    2. It is an offense for a person other than a law enforcement officer acting with probable cause to knowingly interfere with the performance of any agricultural practices permitted by subdivision (f)(1).
    3. An offense under subdivision (f)(2) is a Class B misdemeanor.
    1. Cruelty to animals is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A second or subsequent conviction for cruelty to animals is a Class E felony.
    3. Violation of any prohibition or restriction imposed by the sentencing court pursuant to subsection (e) is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1991, ch. 223, § 1; 1992, ch. 840, § 1; 1997, ch. 90, § 4; 2004, ch. 940, § 6; 2007, ch. 535, § 1; 2010, ch. 816, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 940, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “General Patton Act of 2003”.

Acts 2004, ch. 940, § 7 provided that notwithstanding any provision of § 55-4-290 [now § 55-4-317] to the contrary, a sum sufficient from the special fund created pursuant to § 55-4-290 shall be annually transferred to the general fund for the sole purpose of funding increased incarceration costs resulting from the provisions of the act.

Acts 2004, ch. 940, § 8 provided that the provisions of this act shall not apply to any animal while that animal is being used for training, for an occupational purpose, or for hunting.

Acts 2007, ch. 535, § 2 provided that the act shall apply to all such offenses committed on or after July 1, 2007.

Cross-References. Licensing of dealers and purchasers of livestock, title 44, ch. 10, pt. 2.

Penalties for Class A and B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Animal Lex, 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 471 (1958).

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

Fresh from the Farm: Regulating Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations for Antibiotic Abuse in Tennessee, 48 U. Mem. L. Rev. 281 (2017).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

Safe Haven Conundrum: The Use of Special Bailments To Keep Pets Out of Violent Households, 12 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 79 (2017).

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. § 39-14-202(c) does not curtail the lien granted to a humane society pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-14-210(e); instead, it supplements or provides an alternate remedy to such lien, OAG 00-163 (10/19/00).

Any local law enforcement agency or agent of a properly chartered humane society may investigate animal abuse cases, OAG 06-149 (10/2/06).

A sheriff's department or police department has authority to arrest or cite a person pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-14-202, OAG 07-011 (1/31/07).

The term “officer,” as used in T.C.A. § 39-14-202(c), refers to any law enforcement officer who, under the laws of this state, can take a person into custody for violating T.C.A. § 39-14-202(a)(4), OAG 07-011 (1/31/07).

A second or subsequent conviction for cruelty to animals is considered a Class E Felony, regardless of whether either or both convictions involved livestock, OAG 07-011 (1/31/07).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Defendant's convictions for animal cruelty were appropriate in part because the use of the plural in the separate penalty provision in T.C.A. § 39-14-202(d) did not create any ambiguity in the definition of the offense in T.C.A. § 39-14-202(a), which clearly provided that a single animal could form the basis for an offense. State v. Siliski, 238 S.W.3d 338, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 878 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

2. Miscellaneous.

Assistant district attorney general's (ADAG's) consideration of proposed legislation to amend the companion animal cruelty statute, T.C.A. § 39-14-212, to make it applicable to horses, was irrelevant in assessing whether the public would favor granting pretrial diversion to defendant, who was accused of cruelty to his horses; however, because the ADAG did not give undue consideration to this evidence, he did not abuse his discretion in considering it. Stanton v. State, 395 S.W.3d 676, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2013).

Assistant district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's application for pretrial diversion; while defendant was not required to admit he violated the animal cruelty law, T.C.A. § 39-14-202, his failure to admit wrongdoing or to accept responsibility for his actions was a relevant consideration. Stanton v. State, 395 S.W.3d 676, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2013).

General forfeiture procedures applied to the case because T.C.A. § 39-14-202(e) was silent regarding the disposition of property belonging to innocent owners and other interested third parties. In re Tenn. Walking Horse Forfeiture Litig., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of cruelty to animals because an officer and an agent observed that the pony did not have adequate shelter, defendant was issued a warning and told to fix the enclosure, and when the officer returned, the tarp that covered one side of the enclosure did not comply with the officer's instructions. State v. Edwards, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of cruelty to animals because at the initial visit the deputy noted that the dog did not have access to food and was malnourished, when a detective returned a week later she testified that the dog did not have access to food or water and the dog's shelter was muddy, and when a veterinarian examined the dog a few weeks later he testified that the dog had an acute case of vomiting and diarrhea, was pretty thin, and the dog's living conditions were inappropriate and unsanitary. State v. Edwards, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2018).

39-14-203. Cock and animal fighting — Cock fighting paraphernalia.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to:
    1. Own, possess, keep, use or train any bull, bear, dog, cock, swine or other animal, for the purpose of fighting, baiting or injuring another such animal, for amusement, sport or gain;
    2. Cause, for amusement, sport or gain, any animal referenced in subdivision (a)(1) to fight, bait or injure another animal, or each other;
    3. Permit any acts stated in subdivisions (a)(1) and (2) to be done on any premises under the person's charge or control, or aid or abet those acts;
    4. Be knowingly present, as a spectator, at any place or building where preparations are being made for an exhibition for the fighting, baiting or injuring of any animal, with the intent to be present at the exhibition, fighting, baiting or injuring;
    5. Knowingly cause a person under eighteen (18) years of age to attend an animal fight; or
    6. Possess, own, buy, sell, transfer, or manufacture cock fighting paraphernalia with the intent that the paraphernalia be used in promoting, facilitating, training for, or furthering cock fighting.
  2. It is the legislative intent that this section shall not apply to the training or use of hunting dogs for sport or to the training or use of dogs for law enforcement purposes.
    1. Except for any offense involving a cock, an offense under subdivisions (a)(1)-(3) is a Class E felony. Notwithstanding § 40-35-111, in addition to any other penalty imposed, the court shall prohibit the defendant from having custody of any companion animal, as defined in § 39-14-212(b), for a period of at least two (2) years from the date of conviction and may impose a lifetime prohibition. The court shall prohibit any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this subdivision (c)(1) from having custody of any companion animal for the person's lifetime.
    2. An offense involving a cock under subdivisions (a)(1)-(3) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. A violation of subdivision (a)(4) or (a)(6) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of subdivision (a)(5) is a Class A misdemeanor. Notwithstanding § 40-35-111(e)(1), the fine for a violation of subdivision (a)(5) shall be not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).
  3. It is not an offense to own, possess or keep cocks, or aid or abet the ownership, possession or keeping of cocks, for the sole purpose of selling or transporting cocks to a location in which possession or keeping of cocks is legal, as long as it does not violate any other part of this section or federal law.
    1. For purposes of this section, “cock fighting paraphernalia” means gaffs, slashers, heels, or any other sharp implement designed to be attached in place of the natural spur of a cock or game fowl.
    2. In determining whether a particular object is cock fighting paraphernalia, the court or other authority making that determination may, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, consider the following:
      1. Statements by the owner or anyone in control of the object concerning its use;
      2. Prior convictions, if any, of the owner or of anyone in control of the object for violation of any state or federal law relating to cock fighting or any other violation of this part;
      3. The presence and condition of any animal on the same property;
      4. Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use;
      5. Descriptive materials accompanying the object that explain or depict its use;
      6. The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
      7. The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the community; and
      8. Expert testimony concerning its use.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 625, §§ 1, 2; 2007, ch. 216, § 1; 2007, ch. 555, § 1; 2015, ch. 406, §§ 1-3; 2019, ch. 164, §§ 1-3; 2020, ch. 570, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

In the 1990 amendment, the general assembly lowered the penalty for cockfighting from a felony to a Class A misdemeanor and decriminalized the ownership and possession of cocks for breeding purposes.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

For the Preamble to the act concerning offenses against animals, see Acts 2020, ch. 570.

Acts 2020, ch. 570, § 4 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2020.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (a)(6); inserted “or (a)(6)” in (d)(1); and added (f).

The 2020 amendment added the second and third sentences in (c)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 164, § 4. July 1,  2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 570, § 4. July 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A, B and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-204. Dyed baby fowl and rabbits.

    1. It is unlawful for any person to:
      1. Sell, offer for sale, barter or give away baby chickens, ducklings or goslings of any age, or rabbits under two (2) months of age, as pets, toys, premiums or novelties, if those fowl or rabbits have been colored, dyed, stained or otherwise had their natural color changed; or
      2. Bring or transport such fowl or rabbits into the state for the purposes mentioned in subdivision (a)(1)(A).
    2. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the sale or display of baby chickens, ducklings, or other fowl or rabbits in proper facilities by breeders or stores engaged in the business of selling for purposes of commercial breeding and raising or laboratory testing.
    3. Each baby chicken, duckling, other fowl or rabbit sold, offered for sale, bartered or given away in violation of this section constitutes a separate offense.
  1. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-205. Intentional killing of animal.

      1. It is an offense to knowingly and unlawfully kill the animal of another without the owner's effective consent.
      2. A violation of subdivision (a)(1)(A) is theft of property, graded according to the value of the animal, and punished in accordance with § 39-14-105.
      1. In determining the value of a police dog, fire dog, search and rescue dog, service animal or police horse under § 39-14-105, the court shall consider the value of the police dog, fire dog, search and rescue dog, service animal or police horse as both the cost of the animal and any specialized training the animal received.
      2. Notwithstanding subdivision (a)(1)(B), a violation of subdivision (a)(1)(A) with respect to a police dog, fire dog, search and rescue dog, or police horse shall be a Class E felony, unless the offense would be a higher classification based on the animal's value, in which case the violation shall be graded pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(B).
  1. A person is justified in killing the animal of another if the person acted under a reasonable belief that the animal was creating an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to that person or another or an imminent danger of death to an animal owned by that person. A person is not justified in killing the animal of another if at the time of the killing the person is trespassing upon the property of the owner of the animal. The justification for killing the animal of another authorized by this subsection (b) shall not apply to a person who, while engaging in or attempting to escape from criminal conduct, kills a police dog that is acting in its official capacity. In that case subsection (a) shall apply to the person.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1996, ch. 927, §§ 1, 2; 2004, ch. 957, § 1; 2007, ch. 466, § 1; 2008, ch. 1172, § 1; 2015, ch. 409, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section provides a justification for killing an animal in self-defense, defense of another or defense of an animal, if the offender is not a trespasser.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2015, ch. 409, § 2 provided that the act, which amended (a)(2), shall be known and may be cited as “Aron's Law”.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure (William D. Warren), 6 Vand. L. Rev. 1179 (1953).

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-206. Taking fish caught by another.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to take fish out of the box, net, basket or off the hook of another person, or to raise any box, net, basket, or trot-line, without the consent of the owner of the device, unless the fish is taken by an officer to be used as evidence in the prosecution of a violation of the game and fish laws.
  2. Any violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-207. Feeding of impounded animals — Care provided by humane society — Recovery of expenses.

  1. In case any impounded animal is without necessary food and water for more than twelve (12) successive hours, it is lawful for any person, as often as necessary, to enter any place in which any animal is so confined, and to supply it with necessary food and water so long as it remains so confined. That person shall not be liable to any action for entry, and the reasonable cost of the food and water may be collected from the owner or keeper of the animal. The animal shall not be exempt from levy and sale upon execution issued upon a judgment therefor.
  2. In case any animal is injured, diseased, suffering from the elements, or malnourished, and is found at large by any agent of any humane society chartered by the state, the agent may cause adequate veterinary treatment or shelter or nourishment to be furnished to the animal. The society shall have a right of action against the owner of the animal for all necessary and reasonable expenses so incurred. Within forty-eight (48) hours after taking custody of the animal, the society shall make reasonable efforts to notify the owner of the animal's whereabouts and condition. Nothing in this subsection (b) shall affect the right of action of the veterinarian or furnisher of goods or services against the person or persons with whom the veterinarian or furnisher of goods or services contracted for payment of charges. Any such right of action by a humane society may be voided by an owner who elects to forfeit the animal to the society rather than pay for the goods or services rendered.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. § 39-14-207(b) does not curtail the lien granted to a humane society pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-14-210(e); instead, it supplements or provides an alternate remedy to such lien, OAG 00-163 (10/19/00).

Before treatment can be rendered to a livestock animal, (1) the animal must be considered “at large” and be injured, suffering from the elements, or malnourished; or (2) confined, and subjected to an examination by the proper official prior to, or at the same time, as aid is rendered, OAG 07-011 (1/31/07).

Because T.C.A. § 39-14-207 merely refers to an “impounded animal,” both livestock and non-livestock animals are included, OAG 07-011 (1/31/07).

Authority of humane society under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-207 and 39-14-210. OAG 13-79, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 80 (10/22/13).

39-14-208. Actions deemed theft of guide dogs.

A person who intentionally or knowingly unlawfully injures the guide dog of another and, thereby, permanently deprives the owner of the use of the guide dog's services commits theft of that animal and shall be punished under § 39-14-105. In determining the value of the guide dog for purposes of § 39-14-105, the court shall consider the value of the guide dog as both the cost of the dog as well as the cost of any specialized training the guide dog received.

Acts 2004, ch. 957, § 2.

Cross-References. Aggravated cruelty to animals, § 39-14-212.

Recovery for death or injury to guide dogs, § 44-17-404.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-209. Horse shows.

  1. It is the duty of any person designated and acting as a ringmaster of any horse show or similar event to disqualify any horse determined by the ringmaster to be suffering from the causes set out in § 39-14-202(a)(5) from further participation in the show, and to make a report of the same, including the name of the horse, the owner of the horse, and the exhibitor of the horse, to the manager or chair of the show, who in turn shall report the same in writing to the district attorney general of the judicial district wherein the incident occurred for appropriate action.
  2. A violation of this duty is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-210. Societies for prevention of cruelty to animals — Power of governmental agencies working with victimized animals.

  1. The agents of any society which is incorporated for the prevention of cruelty to animals, upon being appointed thereto by the president of such a society in any county, may, within that county, make arrests, and bring before any court thereof offenders found violating this part with regard to non-livestock animals.
  2. Any officers, agents, or members of such society may lawfully interfere to prevent the perpetration of any act of cruelty upon any animal in that person's presence. Any person who interferes with or obstructs any officer, agent, or member in the discharge of this duty commits a Class C misdemeanor.
  3. Any agent or officer of a society may lawfully destroy, or cause to be destroyed, any animal found abandoned or otherwise:
    1. Which is not properly cared for, appearing, in the judgment of two (2) reputable citizens, who are experts, called to view the same in the agent's or officer's presence, to be glandered, injured or diseased past humane recovery; or
    2. After a holding period of not less than seventy-two (72) hours and after having made a reasonable effort to locate and notify the owners, for the purpose of animal population control. If the animal bears any notification information on an identification tag or collar, or on a chip, if the agent or officer of the society has the use of a chip reader, the reasonable effort to locate and notify the animal's owners must be made within forty-eight (48) hours of the time that the society takes custody of the animal or, if the animal is taken into custody on a Friday, within two (2) business days of the date that the society takes custody of the animal.
  4. All fines, penalties and forfeitures imposed and collected in any county, under provisions relating to or in any way affecting animals, shall inure to the society in aid of the purpose for which it was incorporated, and no injunction shall be granted against the society or attorney or its officers or agents, except upon motion, after due notice and hearing.
  5. Any humane society chartered by the state, into whose custody shall lawfully come any animal, shall have a lien on that animal for the reasonable value of the goods and services necessarily rendered by, or at the instance of, the society to that animal.
  6. Upon seizure by law enforcement, custody of any animal victimized under this part shall be placed with any governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee. The governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee shall assist the animal and preserve evidence for prosecution.
      1. Any governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee into whose custody any animal victimized under this part is placed, may petition the court requesting that the person from whom the animal is seized, or the owner of the seized animal, be ordered to post security.(B)  The security shall be in an amount sufficient to secure payment of all reasonable expenses expected to be incurred by the governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee in caring and providing for the animal pending disposition of the criminal charges.(C)  Reasonable expenses include, but are not necessarily limited to, the estimated costs of veterinary care and treatment for the animal as well as the estimated costs of boarding and otherwise caring for the animal.(D)  The amount of security shall be determined by the court after taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances of the case. If the posting of security is ordered pursuant to this subsection (g), then the governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee may draw from the security the actual costs incurred in caring and providing for the seized animal pending disposition of criminal charges.(2)  If the person from whom the animal is seized is the owner of the animal and the person has not posted the security ordered pursuant to subdivision (g)(1) within ten (10) business days following the issuance of a security order, the animal shall be deemed to have been abandoned and shall be forfeited to the governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee for disposition in accordance with reasonable practices for the humane treatment of animals. However, if the person from whom the animal was seized is not the owner of the animal and the person has not posted the court-ordered security within fifteen (15) days, the court shall order the governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee to make all reasonable efforts to determine who the owner of the animal is and to notify the owner of the pending proceeding.(3)  No animal shall be deemed to have been abandoned and forfeited to the governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee until reasonable attempts to determine and notify the owner have been made. If the owner of the animal cannot be located after reasonable efforts or the owner is located and notified but does not post, within ten (10) business days, the court-ordered security plus the costs reasonably incurred by the governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee for housing and caring for the animal since its seizure, the animal shall be deemed to have been abandoned and shall be forfeited to the governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee for disposition in accordance with reasonable practices for the humane treatment of animals. (4)  Nothing in this subsection (g) shall be construed to prevent the voluntary, permanent relinquishment of any animal by its owner to a governmental animal control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee in lieu of posting security. The voluntary relinquishment has no effect on the outcome of the criminal charges.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 90, § 1; 2004, ch. 920, § 2; 2007, ch. 128, §§ 1, 2; 2013, ch. 157, § 1; 2017, ch. 206, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Animals, §§  11, 39.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. §§ 39-14-202(c) and 39-14-207(c) do not curtail the lien granted to a humane society pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-14-210(e); instead, it supplements or provides an alternate remedy to such lien, OAG 00-163 (10/19/00).

T.C.A. § 39-14-207(b) does not curtail the lien granted to a humane society pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-14-210(e); instead, it supplements or provides an alternate remedy to such lien, OAG 00-163 (10/19/00).

A humane society may solicit a donation in lieu of payment of a lien, OAG 00-163 (10/19/00).

Any local law enforcement agency or agent of a properly chartered humane society may investigate animal abuse cases, OAG 06-149 (10/2/06).

Duly-appointed agents of government-funded animal control agencies, privately funded humane societies, and law enforcement officers, including sheriffs and sheriffs’ deputies, may enforce T.C.A. § 39-14-210 with regard to non-livestock; For livestock animals, only law enforcement officers may enforce this provision, OAG 07-011 (1/31/07).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-14-210(f), an allegedly victimized animal may be placed with any state-chartered humane society prior to the offender's arrest, OAG 07-011 (1/31/07).

Authority of humane society under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-207 and 39-14-210. OAG 13-79, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 80 (10/22/13).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Regarding restitution in an animal cruelty case, the humane society was a victim within the meaning of T.C.A. § 40-38-203(1), because T.C.A. § 39-14-210(f), by requiring that victimized animals be placed with state-chartered humane societies, created an obligation that removed the humane society from the status of a volunteer or Good Samaritan and resulted in costs and expenses to a society as a result of the mandated responsibility. State v. Webb, 130 S.W.3d 799, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1233 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Feb. 2, 2004).

In an animal cruelty case, where the defendants were convicted of 47 counts of animal cruelty, combining T.C.A. § 39-14-210(f) with T.C.A. § 39-14-202(d), the appellate court concluded that the trial court had the authority to order the forfeiture of animals which were the subjects of not guilty verdicts. State v. Webb, 130 S.W.3d 799, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1233 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Feb. 2, 2004).

2. Security and Abandonment.

Bond and abandonment provisions of subsection (g)(2) do not incorporate title 40's forfeiture statutes nor do they follow the strict procedural requirements of the forfeiture statutes. State v. Tillilie, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Caretaker's appeal of an order requiring her to post security for the care of horses pending the resolution of criminal charges for cruelty to horses was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the action described in subsection (g)(2) is not a forfeiture, but rather, its security and abandonment provisions are part of the criminal procedure pending trial and are therefore not within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. State v. Tillilie, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Unlike civil forfeitures, which are typically post-conviction actions, the security and abandonment provisions of the statute are part of the pre-judgment criminal procedure; the purpose of security is to provide for expected expenses in caring for and boarding the victimized animals, and civil forfeitures do not allow an individual convicted of a covered crime to provide security to prevent having his or her property forfeited. State v. Tillilie, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

39-14-211. Examination of livestock by commissioner of agriculture or other persons.

  1. No entry onto the property of another, arrest, interference with usual and customary agricultural or veterinary practices, confiscation, or any other action authorized by this part or any other law shall be taken in response to an allegation that this part has been violated with regard to livestock unless, prior to or at the time of such action:
    1. The livestock in question has been examined by:
      1. The commissioner of agriculture or the commissioner's duly authorized agent trained to conduct livestock cruelty examinations;
      2. A graduate of an accredited college of veterinary medicine specializing in livestock practice; or
      3. A graduate of an accredited college of agriculture with a specialty in livestock; and
    2. Upon examination of the livestock, the commissioner, commissioner's agent, or graduate has probable cause to believe that a violation of this part has occurred with regard to the livestock.
  2. If a person authorized by this section to make a probable cause examination of livestock does not examine the livestock within twenty-four (24) hours of receiving the allegation, a licensed veterinarian may make the inspection, and the veterinarian's findings shall be afforded the same presumption and effect as an examination conducted by a person authorized pursuant to subsection (a).

Acts 1997, ch. 90, § 3; 2016, ch. 740, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

Attorney General Opinions. Before treatment can be rendered to a livestock animal, (1) the animal must be considered “at large” and be injured, suffering from the elements, or malnourished; or (2) confined, and subjected to an examination by the proper official prior to, or at the same time, as aid is rendered, OAG 07-011 (1/31/07).

There is no limitation regarding who has the authority to make the request for examination of livestock, OAG 07-011 (1/31/07).

39-14-212. Aggravated cruelty to animals — Definitions — Construction — Penalty.

  1. A person commits aggravated cruelty to animals when, with aggravated cruelty and with no justifiable purpose, the person intentionally kills or intentionally causes serious physical injury to a companion animal.
  2. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Aggravated cruelty” means conduct which is done or carried out in a depraved and sadistic manner and which tortures or maims an animal, including the failure to provide food and water to a companion animal resulting in a substantial risk of death or death;
    2. “Companion animal” means any non-livestock animal as defined in § 39-14-201;
    3. “Elderly” means any person sixty-five (65) years of age or older; and
    4. “Minor” means any person under eighteen (18) years of age.
  3. Subsection (a) is not to be construed to prohibit or interfere with the following endeavors:
    1. Dispatching an animal in any manner absent of aggravated cruelty;
    2. Engaging in lawful hunting, trapping, or fishing activities, including activities commonly associated with the hunting of small game as defined in § 70-1-101(a);
    3. Dispatching rabid or diseased animals;
    4. Dispatching animals posing a clear and immediate threat to human safety;
    5. Performing or conducting bona fide scientific tests, experiments or investigations within or for a bona fide research laboratory, facility or institution;
    6. Performing accepted veterinary medical practices or treatments;
    7. Dispatching animals in accordance with § 44-17-403(e);
    8. Engaging, with the consent of the owner of a farm animal, in usual and customary practices which are accepted by colleges of agriculture or veterinary medicine with respect to that animal;
    9. Dispatching wild or abandoned animals on a farm or residential real property; or
    10. Applying methods and equipment used to train animals.
  4. Aggravated cruelty to animals is a Class E felony.
  5. In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (d), the sentencing court shall order the defendant to surrender custody and forfeit all companion animals as defined in subdivision (b)(2), and may award custody of the animals to the agency presenting the case. Notwithstanding § 40-35-111, the court shall prohibit the defendant from having custody of companion animals for at least two (2) years from the date of conviction and may impose a lifetime prohibition. The court may also impose any other reasonable restrictions on the person's custody of other animals as is necessary for the protection of the animals. The court shall prohibit any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this section from having custody of any companion animal for the person's lifetime.
  6. In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (d), the court may require the defendant to undergo psychological evaluation and counseling, the cost to be borne by the defendant. If the defendant is indigent, the court may, where practicable, direct the defendant to locate and enroll in a counseling or treatment program with an appropriate agency.
  7. If a defendant convicted of a violation of this section resides in a household with minor children or elderly individuals, the court may, within fifteen (15) days, send notification of the conviction to the appropriate protective agencies.
  8. In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (d), the defendant may be held liable to the impounding officer or agency for all costs of impoundment from the time of seizure to the time of proper disposition of the case.
    1. In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (d), the defendant may be held liable to the owner of the animal for damages.
    2. If an unlawful act resulted in the death or permanent disability of a person's guide dog, then the value of the guide dog shall include, but shall not necessarily be limited to, both the cost of the guide dog as well as the cost of any specialized training the guide dog received.
  9. If a juvenile is found to be within the court's jurisdiction, for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be a criminal violation involving cruelty to animals or would be a criminal violation involving arson, then the court may order that the juvenile be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric or psychological treatment. If the court determines that psychiatric or psychological treatment is appropriate for that juvenile, then the court may order that treatment.
  10. This section does not preclude the court from entering any other order of disposition allowed under this chapter.
  11. This section is not to be construed to change, modify, or amend any provision of title 70, involving fish and wildlife.
  12. This section does not apply to activities or conduct that are prohibited by § 39-14-203.
  13. This section does not apply to equine animals or to animals defined as livestock by § 39-14-201.

Acts 2002, ch. 858, §§ 1, 2; 2004, ch. 920, § 1; 2004, ch. 940, § 5; 2004, ch. 957, § 4; 2020, ch. 570, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 940, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “General Patton Act of 2003”.

Acts 2004, ch. 940, § 7 provided that notwithstanding any provision of § 55-4-290 [now § 55-4-317] to the contrary, a sum sufficient from the special fund created pursuant to § 55-4-290 shall be annually transferred to the general fund for the sole purpose of funding increased incarceration costs resulting from the provisions of the act.

Acts 2004, ch. 940, § 8 provided that the provisions of this act shall not apply to any animal while that animal is being used for training, for an occupational purpose, or for hunting.

For the Preamble to the act concerning  offenses against animals, see Acts 2020, ch. 570.

Acts 2020, ch. 570, § 4 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment rewrote (e) which read: “In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (d), the sentencing court may order the defendant to surrender custody and forfeit all companion animals as defined in subdivision (b)(2), and may award custody of the animals to the agency presenting the case. The court may prohibit the defendant from having custody of other animals for any period of time the court determines to be reasonable, or impose any other reasonable restrictions on the person's custody of animals as is necessary for the protection of the animals.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 570, § 4. July 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Animal Abuse and Domestic Violence: Why the Connection Justifies Increased Protection, 47 U. Mem. L. Rev. 359 (2016).

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

Safe Haven Conundrum: The Use of Special Bailments To Keep Pets Out of Violent Households, 12 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 79 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Equines.

Trial court lacked the authority to allow the continued prosecution of defendant by instructing the jury on the offense of cruelty to animals because the indictments charging aggravated cruelty to animals failed to charge an offense where the statute provided that it did not apply, inter alia, to equine animals. State v. Robertson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016).

39-14-213. Removal of transmitting collars or microchip implants from dogs.

  1. A person who removes from a dog an electronic or radio transmitting collar or microchip implant without the permission of the owner of the dog and with the intent to prevent or hinder the owner from locating the dog commits a Class B misdemeanor, punishable by fine only; provided, however, that, if the dog wearing an electronic or radio transmitting collar or microchip implant is lost or killed as the proximate result of the removal of the collar or implant, the person commits a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by fine only.
  2. Upon conviction for a violation of this section, the court shall order that the violator pay as restitution to the owner the actual value of a dog lost or killed as a result of the removal of an electronic or radio transmitting collar or microchip implant from the dog by the violator. The court may also order the violator to pay as restitution to the owner any breeding revenues forfeited due to the loss or death of a dog.

Acts 2007, ch. 70, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2007, ch. 70, § 2 provided that the act shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 2007.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A and B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-214. Criminal offenses against animals.

  1. A person commits an offense who knowingly:
    1. Engages in any sexual activity with an animal;
    2. Causes, aids, or abets another person to engage in any sexual activity with an animal;
    3. Permits any sexual activity with an animal to be conducted on any premises under the person's charge or control;
    4. Engages in, organizes, promotes, conducts, advertises, aids, abets, participates in as an observer, or performs any service in the furtherance of an act involving any sexual activity with an animal for a commercial or recreational purpose; or
    5. Photographs or films, for purposes of sexual gratification, a person engaged in a sexual activity with an animal.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class E felony.
  3. In addition to the penalty imposed in subsection (b):
    1. The court may order that the convicted person do any of the following:
      1. Not harbor or own animals or reside in any household where animals are present;
      2. Participate in appropriate counseling at the defendant's expense; or
      3. Reimburse the animal shelter or humane society for any reasonable costs incurred for the care and maintenance of any animals taken to the animal shelter or humane society as a result of conduct proscribed in subsection (a); and
    2. Notwithstanding § 40-35-111, the court shall prohibit the convicted person from having custody of any companion animal, as defined in § 39-14-212(b), for a period of at least two (2) years from the date of conviction and may impose a lifetime prohibition. The court shall prohibit any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this section from having custody of any companion animal for the person's lifetime.
  4. Nothing in this section may be considered to prohibit accepted animal husbandry practices or accepted veterinary medical practices.
  5. If the court has reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of this section has occurred, the court may order the seizure of all animals involved in the alleged violation as a condition of bond of a person charged with a violation.
  6. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Animal” has the same meaning as the term is defined in § 63-12-103;
    2. “Photographs” or “films” means the making of a photograph, motion picture film, videotape, digital image, or any other recording, sale, or transmission of the image; and
    3. “Sexual activity” means physical sexual contact between the person and the animal.

Acts 2007, ch. 510, § 1; 2020, ch. 570, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning  offenses against animals, see Acts 2020, ch. 570.

Acts 2020, ch. 570, § 4 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, in (c), redesignated former (c)(1) — (c)(3) as present (c)(1)(A) — (c)(1)(C), and added (c)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 570, § 4. July 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions (Joseph J. Anclien), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-215. Limitation of liability.

  1. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Animal control agency” means a county or municipal animal shelter, dog pound, or animal control agency, private humane society, state, county or municipal law enforcement agency, or any combination thereof, that temporarily houses stray, unwanted or injured animals;
    2. “Emergency” means a natural disaster, including earthquake, fire, flood, or storm; a hazardous chemical or substance incident; a vehicular collision with an animal, or other transportation accident where an animal is injured or in need of assistance to protect its health or life;
    3. “Emergency care” means medical and other health treatment, services, or accommodations that are provided to an injured or ill animal for a medical condition or injury of such a nature that the failure to render immediate care would reasonably likely result in the deterioration of a sick or injured animal's condition or in the animal's death;
    4. “Livestock” means all equine as well as animals which are being raised primarily for use as food or fiber for human utilization or consumption including, but not limited to, cattle, sheep, swine, goats, and poultry;
    5. “Non-livestock animal” means a pet normally maintained in or near the household or households of its owner or owners, other domesticated animal, previously captured wildlife, an exotic animal, or any other pet, including, but not limited to, pet rabbits, a pet chick, duck, or pot-bellied pig that is not classified as “livestock” pursuant to this part;
    6. “Running at large” means that a non-livestock animal goes uncontrolled by the animal's owner upon the premises of another without the consent of the owner of the premises, or other person authorized to give consent, or goes uncontrolled by the owner upon a highway, public road, street, or any other place open to the public generally; and
    7. “Stray animal” means that a non-livestock animal is roaming with no physical restraint without an identification tag, collar, or chip and that has no record of ownership.
    1. Any person who in good faith and without compensation for services provides, renders, or obtains emergency care for a non-livestock animal that is running at large, abandoned, injured or in distress due to an emergency, or for a stray non-livestock animal, shall not be subject to civil liability for any injuries or harm to such animal resulting from the rendering or obtaining of emergency care, or any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further emergency care for such animal, if such person's actions do not constitute malice, gross negligence, or criminal misconduct.
      1. If a person fails to take reasonable steps to locate the owner of such animal prior to rendering or obtaining emergency care, then subdivision (b)(1) shall not apply.
      2. Taking reasonable steps to locate the owner of such animal includes:
        1. Attempting to contact the owner using any notification information located on the animal's identification tag, collar, or chip within forty-eight (48) hours of the time that the person takes custody of the animal or, if the animal is taken into custody on a Friday, within two (2) business days of the date that the person takes custody of the animal; and
        2. (a)  Providing notice to an appropriate animal shelter, dog pound, animal control agency or humane shelter operated by the municipality, county, or other governmental agency located where the person resides that the animal is in the custody of the person. The person shall also notify an appropriate shelter in the location where the person took custody of the animal, if the location is outside of the municipality or county where the person resides.
          1. (ii)  (a)  Providing notice to an appropriate animal shelter, dog pound, animal control agency or humane shelter operated by the municipality, county, or other governmental agency located where the person resides that the animal is in the custody of the person. The person shall also notify an appropriate shelter in the location where the person took custody of the animal, if the location is outside of the municipality or county where the person resides.
          2. The person shall give to the shelter or shelters such person's contact information.
      3. This subdivision (b)(2) shall not apply if the animal is determined by a licensed veterinarian to:
        1. Need immediate emergency care to alleviate pain or save the life of the animal; or
        2. Exhibit visible signs of recent abuse as described in § 39-14-202.
  2. Notwithstanding § 63-12-142, a licensed veterinarian, or ancillary veterinary personnel employed by and working under the direct supervision of a licensed veterinarian, who, in good faith, at the request of someone other than the owner renders:
    1. Emergency care to an ill or injured non-livestock animal is not liable to the owner of the animal for any civil damages arising from the treatment provided to the animal except in cases of malice, gross negligence, or criminal misconduct; or
    2. Treatment other than emergency care to a non-livestock animal is not liable to the owner of the animal for any civil damages arising from the treatment provided to the animal except in cases of malice, gross negligence, or criminal misconduct, only if the person requesting the treatment certifies in writing to the veterinarian, or ancillary veterinary personnel, that such person has taken reasonable steps to locate the owner as provided in subdivision (b)(2).
  3. An animal control agency or an employee of an animal control agency acting within the scope of such employment, who, in good faith, takes into its custody and cares for a stray or abandoned non-livestock animal, or a non-livestock animal running at large for which reasonable steps to locate the owner of such animal are taken, that has been delivered to such agency or employee by an individual or group of individuals not affiliated with the agency, shall not be subject to civil liability for its care of such animal if the agency or employee's actions do not constitute malice, gross negligence or criminal misconduct.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (c), this section shall not in any way limit the application of, or supersede, § 44-17-203, § 44-17-403(e) or § 63-12-142.

Acts 2010, ch. 775, § 1; 2017, ch. 206, § 2.

Law Reviews.

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-216. Service animals.

    1. As used in this section, “service animal” means:
      1. Any animal that is individually trained, or being trained by an employee or puppy raiser from a recognized training agency or school to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability; and
      2. Any police dog, fire dog, search and rescue dog, or police horse.
    2. Other species of animals not specified in this subsection (a), whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition.
    3. For purposes of a service animal as defined under subdivision (a)(1)(A), the work or tasks performed by the service animal must be directly related to the handler’s disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing nonviolent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of the animal’s presence and the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of subdivision (a)(1)(A).
  1. It is an offense to knowingly:
    1. Maim or otherwise inflict harm upon a service animal;
    2. Attempt to maim or otherwise inflict harm upon a service animal; or
    3. Permit an animal that the person owns or is in the immediate control of to maim or otherwise inflict harm upon a service animal.
  2. It is an offense to recklessly maim or otherwise inflict harm upon a service animal or permit an animal that the person owns or is in the immediate control of to maim or otherwise inflict harm upon a service animal.
  3. It is an offense to knowingly interfere with a service animal in the performance of its duties, or permit an animal that the person owns or is in control of to interfere with a service animal in the performance of its duties.
    1. A violation of subsection (b) or (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of subsection (d) is a Class C misdemeanor.
    1. In addition to any other penalty provided by this section, a person convicted of a violation of subsection (b), (c) or (d) shall be ordered by the court to make full restitution for all damages that arise out of or are related to the offense, including incidental and consequential damages incurred by the service animal's handler or the recognized training agency or school.
    2. “Restitution,” for purposes of this section, includes:
      1. The value of the service animal if the animal is disabled or can no longer perform service animal duties;
      2. Replacement and training or retraining expenses of the service animal or handler if necessary to restore the animal to service animal capabilities;
      3. Veterinary and other medical and boarding expenses for the service animal;
      4. Medical expenses for the handler; and
      5. Lost wages or income incurred by the handler during any period that the handler is without the services of the service animal.
  4. If the violation of this section involves a guide dog and the offense results in injury to the dog that permanently deprives the owner of the use of the guide dog's services, nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution and conviction for such conduct under § 39-14-208.

Acts 2012, ch. 910, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2012, ch. 1084, § 1 purported to enact a new section § 39-14-216. Section 39-14-216 was previously enacted by Acts 2012, ch. 910, § 1; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2012 ch. 1084, § 1 was designated as § 39-14-217 by authority of the code commission.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-217. Aggravated cruelty to livestock animals.

  1. As used in this section only, “livestock” means all equine as well as animals which are being raised primarily for use as food or fiber for human utilization or consumption, including, but not limited to, cattle, sheep, swine, and goats.
  2. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), a person commits aggravated cruelty to a livestock animal who, in a depraved and sadistic manner, intentionally engages in any of the conduct described in subdivisions (c)(1)-(12), the conduct results in serious bodily injury to the animal or the death of the animal, and is without justifiable or lawful purpose.
  3. The following conduct constitutes aggravated cruelty to livestock animals if accomplished in the manner described in subsection (b):
    1. Setting an animal on fire;
    2. Burning an animal with any hot object;
    3. Cutting or stabbing an animal with any object;
    4. Causing blunt force trauma to an animal;
    5. Securing an animal to a vehicle and dragging it;
    6. Blinding an animal;
    7. Applying acid or other caustic substance or chemical to any exposed area of an animal or forcing the animal to ingest the substance;
    8. Hanging a living animal;
    9. Skinning an animal while it is still alive;
    10. Administering electric shock to an animal;
    11. Drowning an animal; or
    12. Shooting an animal with a weapon.
  4. Subsections (b) and (c) shall not be construed to apply to, prohibit or interfere with the following:
    1. Any provision of title 70, involving fish and wildlife, or any hunting, trapping, or fishing activities lawful under such title;
    2. Activities or conduct that are prohibited by § 39-14-203; or
    3. Dispatching an animal in any manner not prohibited by this section.
  5. The following shall not be construed as aggravated cruelty to a livestock animal as defined in this section:
    1. Dispatching rabid, diseased, sick or injured livestock animals;
    2. Dispatching livestock animals posing a clear and immediate threat to human safety;
    3. Performing or conducting bona fide scientific tests, experiments or investigations within or for a bona fide research laboratory, facility or institution;
    4. Performing accepted veterinary medical practices or treatments;
    5. Engaging, with the consent of the owner of a livestock animal, in usual and customary practices which are accepted by colleges of agriculture or veterinary medicine with respect to that animal;
    6. Dispatching wild or abandoned livestock animals on a farm or residential real property; or
    7. Applying methods and equipment used to train livestock animals.
  6. In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (j), the defendant may be held liable to:
    1. The owner of the livestock animal for damages; and
    2. The impounding officer or agency for all costs of impoundment from the time of seizure to the time of proper disposition of the case.
  7. In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (j), the sentencing court may order the defendant to surrender custody and forfeit all livestock animals, and may award custody of the animals to the agency presenting the case. The court may prohibit the defendant from having custody of other livestock animals for any period of time the court determines to be reasonable, or impose any other reasonable restrictions on the person's custody of livestock animals as is necessary for the protection of the animals.
  8. In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (j), the court may require the defendant to undergo psychological evaluation and counseling, the cost to be borne by the defendant. If the defendant is indigent, the court may, where practicable, direct the defendant to locate and enroll in a counseling or treatment program with an appropriate agency.
  9. This section does not preclude the court from entering any other order of disposition allowed under this chapter.
  10. Aggravated cruelty to a livestock animal is a Class E felony.

Acts 2012, ch. 1084, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2012, ch. 1084, § 1 purported to enact a new section § 39-14-216. Section 39-14-216 was previously enacted by Acts 2012, ch. 910, § 1; therefore, the enactment by Acts 2012, ch. 1084, § 1 was designated as § 39-14-217 by authority of the code commission.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion (Laurie Serafino), 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1119 (2011).

39-14-218. “Cremation” for animals defined — Receipt.

  1. As used in this section, “cremation” means the heating process by which the remains of a deceased animal are reduced to bone fragments through combustion and evaporation; provided, however, that “cremation” does not include any reduction of animal remains to bone fragments that is incidental to the preparation of food or any manufacturing process.
  2. No person who, for remuneration, engages in the cremation of animal remains in this state, shall fail to ensure that a written receipt is provided to each person who delivers animal remains to such person for cremation. The receipt shall be signed by both the person who receives the animal remains and the person who delivered the animal remains for cremation and shall indicate:
    1. The name of the deceased animal, if any;
    2. The date and time of delivery;
    3. The name of the person who delivered the animal remains for cremation; and
    4. The name of the person who received the animal remains for cremation from the person identified in subdivision (b)(3).
  3. At the time of releasing the cremated remains of an animal, a person who, for remuneration, engages in the cremation of animal remains in this state shall ensure that a written receipt signed by both the person who released the cremated animal remains and the person who received the cremated animal remains is provided to the person who received the cremated animal remains. The receipt shall indicate:
    1. The name of the deceased animal, if any;
    2. The date and time of the release;
    3. The name of the person to whom the cremated animal remains were released; and
    4. The name of the person who released the cremated animal remains to the person identified in subdivision (c)(3).
  4. The requirements of this section shall not apply to veterinarians licensed to practice in this state in accordance with the Tennessee Veterinary Practice Act, compiled in title 63, chapter 12.
  5. Failure to provide a receipt as required by subsection (b) or (c) is a Class E felony. In addition to any authorized period of incarceration, failure to provide a receipt as required by subsection (b) or (c) is punishable by a fine in the amount of no less than five hundred dollars ($500).

Acts 2014, ch. 1002, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Part 3
Arson—Explosives

39-14-301. Arson.

  1. A person commits an offense who knowingly damages any structure or farm equipment by means of a fire or explosion:
    1. Without the consent of all persons who have a possessory, proprietary or security interest therein; or
    2. With intent to destroy or damage any structure to collect insurance for the damage or destruction or for any unlawful purpose.
    1. Arson is a Class C felony.
    2. Arson of a place of worship is a Class B felony.
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “Farm equipment” means any farm tractor as defined in § 55-1-104(a), farm implement designed to be operated with a farm tractor, and motorized farm machinery used in the commercial production of farm products or nursery stock; and
    2. “Place of worship” means any structure that is:
      1. Approved, or qualified to be approved, by the state board of equalization for property tax exemption pursuant to § 67-5-212, based on ownership and use of the structure by a religious institution; and
      2. Utilized on a regular basis by such religious institution as the site of congregational services, rites, or activities communally undertaken for the purpose of worship.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1991, ch. 19, § 1; 1997, ch. 284, § 1; 2020, ch. 810, §§ 1, 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section requires an act to be done “knowingly” as defined in § 39-11-302. This changes prior law. The mens rea element of prior law was “willful and malicious,” which had been interpreted to require that a person act intentionally and desire a certain result. Crow v. State, 136 Tenn. 333, 189 S.W. 687 (1916).

Subsection (a) punishes an offender who, by fire, “damages any structure.” This replaces prior law, which covered “any house, or outhouse, or any building, or any other structure the property of himself or another.”

Subdivision (a)(2) expressly includes people whose motive is to collect insurance payments. See Thompson v. State, 171 Tenn. 156, 101 S.W.2d 467 (1937).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, in (a), substituted “knowingly damages any structure or farm equipment by means of a fire or explosion” for “knowingly damages any structure by means of a fire or explosion”; deleted (b)(2)(B), defining "place of worship", now redesignated as (c)(2); redesignated (b)(2)(A) as (b)(2); and added (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 810, § 3. October 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

Fraudulent insurance claims, § 39-14-133.

Jury may provide punishment for less than one year, § 40-20-103.

Penalties for Class B and C felonies, § 40-35-111.

Vandalism, § 39-14-408.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Arson, §§ 1-4; 13 Tenn. Juris., Explosions and Explosives, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey of Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 177 (1999).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions bar multiple convictions for aggravated arson of a single structure containing several apartment units, because the word “structure,” as used T.C.A. § 39-14-301, means the entire structure, and therefore since defendant burned a portion of a single structure in the course of one arsonous act, only one count of aggravated arson can successfully withstand double jeopardy scrutiny. State v. Lewis, 958 S.W.2d 736, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. 1997).

In common speech, vandalism and arson were separate and distinct activities; Tennessee's criminal statutes also distinguish between vandalism and arson, defining each as a separate and distinct offense, and as the insurer in this insurance case relied on the criminal statutes, the trial court did not err in considering these statutes. Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 474 S.W.3d 660, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2015), appeal denied, Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Phillips, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).

2. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence that defendant claimed responsibility for two points of origin of the fire, the victim's bed and closet supported defendant's arson conviction. State v. McCollum, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

There was sufficient evidence corroborating codefendants'  testimony implicating defendant of arson, including the insurance agent's unsuccessful attempt to inspect the property after defendant stated he needed to burn the building down before it was inspected and the fact that a vehicle and a boat were moved into the building to provide fuel for the fire. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated arson because defendant, after an altercation with defendant's spouse at the home of the person with whom the spouse was residing, was identified by eyewitnesses as leaving the occupied home at night when a fire destroyed the home. Additionally, a fire investigator found the driver's license belonging to defendant near where the fire was deliberately set, defendant's hair was singed, and the police officer who arrested defendant testified that defendant smelled “smokey.” State v. Covington, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated arson conviction because sufficient evidence in the form of a witness's testimony, which a jury permissibly chose to credit, established defendant's identity as the perpetrator, as the evidence showed the witness saw defendant pouring what appeared to be lighter fluid on a burning structure. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant to 15 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction after he was convicted of one count of arson because defendant admitted to having set fire to the victim's house, the only evidence that another person hired him to do so was defendant's statement to an agent for the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, which the jury was free to disregard, defendant's 15-year sentence was within range for a Range III offender convicted of a Class C felony, and the trial court properly considered the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Tidwell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of arson; the evidence showed that defendant and the church had argued over his possession of the home and had entered into an agreement wherein defendant would sell it, defendant obtained an insurance policy that did not list the church as the beneficiary as required by the agreement, investigators found a flammable liquid on the hardwood floor, which created a burn pattern indicative of arson, and investigators eliminated electricity, smoking, and weather as a cause of the ignition of the flammable liquid. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 888 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2018).

39-14-302. Aggravated arson.

  1. A person commits aggravated arson who commits arson as defined in § 39-14-301 or § 39-14-303:
    1. When one (1) or more persons are present therein; or
    2. When any person, including firefighters and law enforcement officials, suffers serious bodily injury as a result of the fire or explosion.
  2. Aggravated arson is a Class A felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 284, § 2; 2005, ch. 353, § 15.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section prescribes the circumstances necessary to elevate arson into aggravated arson.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 18 provided that the act shall apply to sentencing for criminal offenses committed on or after June 7, 2005. Offenses committed prior to June 7, 2005, shall be governed by prior law, which shall apply in all respects. However, for defendants who are sentenced after June 7, 2005, for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1982, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the provisions of the act by executing a waiver of such defendant's ex post facto protections. Upon executing such a waiver, all provisions of the act shall apply to the defendant.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 19 provided that the act shall have no application to sentencing for persons convicted of murder in the first degree, which shall be governed by the provisions of §§ 39-13-20239-13-208.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 20(b) provided that the Tennessee Code Commission is requested to insert a cross reference in §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-505, 39-13-506, 39-13-522, 39-14-302 and 39-14-408 to § 40-35-114 stating that the enhancement factor formerly found in each such section was moved to § 40-35-114 so that all enhancement factors are located in one (1) section.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Criminal conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

Criminal sentencing enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The plain language of T.C.A. § 39-14-302 includes not only victims of aggravated arson but also the perpetrator of the act of arson. State v. Nelson, 23 S.W.3d 270, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 224 (Tenn. 2000).

Where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as a result of an arson committed by that defendant, a conviction for aggravated arson, pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-14-302(a)(2), is possible. State v. Nelson, 23 S.W.3d 270, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 224 (Tenn. 2000).

Use of the “multiple victim” enhancement factor contained in T.C.A. § 40-35-114 is well suited to T.C.A. § 39-14-302 which does not permit multiple convictions in spite of the fact that multiple persons were victimized by the fire. State v. Lewis, 44 S.W.3d 501, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. 2001).

2. Aggravating Factors.

The aggravating factors were quite clearly met where the victim died of smoke inhalation as a result of the fire. State v. Caldwell, 977 S.W.2d 110, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated arson because defendant, after an altercation with defendant's spouse at the home of the person with whom the spouse was residing, was identified by eyewitnesses as leaving the occupied home at night when a fire destroyed the home. Additionally, a fire investigator found the driver's license belonging to defendant near where the fire was deliberately set, defendant's hair was singed, and the police officer who arrested defendant testified that defendant smelled “smokey.” State v. Covington, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated arson and attempted first degree murder because the evidence showed (1) defendant knowingly set fire to a victim which damaged the victim's store, and (2) defendant took a substantial step toward attempted first degree murder by lighting the victim on fire. State v. Boutrous, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. June 6, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated arson conviction because sufficient evidence in the form of a witness's testimony, which a jury permissibly chose to credit, established defendant's identity as the perpetrator, as the evidence showed the witness saw defendant pouring what appeared to be lighter fluid on a burning structure. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated arson and other crimes because it showed that defendant, who had been drinking and using drugs, intended to set the loveseat on fire, as her boyfriend testified that she wanted him to leave, she poured lighter fluid on the chair he was sitting in before lighting the lighter fluid, and she knew her grandchildren were asleep in the house. Defendant's alleged belief that the fire on the loveseat had been extinguished before rekindling did not negate her culpability for setting the fire in the first place. State v. Dunavant, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2019).

4. Merger.

Trial court erred in failing to merge two counts of aggravated arson, because this section did not permit multiple convictions for multiple victims, as arson offenses are confined to the burning of a structure or property. State v. Foust, 482 S.W.3d 20, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2015).

5. Federal Sentencing.

Defendant's Tennessee conviction for attempted aggravated arson qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act because it was akin to and possessed the same kind of risk as arson, which was an enumerated offense under the statute. United States v. Fallins, 777 F.3d 296, 2015  U.S. App. LEXIS 959, 2015 FED App. 12P (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2015).

6. Jury Instructions.

Even though the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on aggravated arson, the error did not amount to plain error because the error served only to increase the state's burden of proof and defendant did not contest the fact that he did not have permission to burn the building, which was omitted from the instructions. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the offense of setting fire to personal property or land, or its attempt, as a lesser-included offense during defendant's aggravated arson trial because setting fire to personal property or land was not a lesser-included offense of arson. State v. Dunavant, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2019).

7. Relevant Evidence.

Trial court did not err by admitting into evidence statements showing that the victims were hospitalized for smoke inhalation after the fire because it was relevant under Tenn. R. Evid. 401, as it tended to make the existence of one element of the crime of aggravated arson, that one or more persons were present in the building, more probable than it would have been without the evidence. State v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

39-14-303. Setting fire to personal property or land.

  1. A person commits arson who knowingly damages any personal property, land, or other property, except buildings or structures covered under § 39-14-301, by means of a fire or explosion:
    1. Without the consent of all persons who have a possessory or proprietary interest therein; or
    2. With intent to destroy or damage any such property for any unlawful purpose.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Controlled burns, burning woods, § 68-102-146.

Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Power to forbid starting fires during drought, § 8-1-108.

39-14-304. Reckless burning.

  1. A person commits reckless burning who:
    1. Recklessly starts a fire on the land, building, structure or personal property of another;
    2. Starts a fire on the person's own land, building, structure or personal property and recklessly allows the fire to escape and burn the property of another; or
    3. Knowingly starts an open air or unconfined fire in violation of a burning ban as provided in § 39-14-306(b).
  2. Reckless burning is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1991, ch. 46, § 1; 2008, ch. 786, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section changes prior Tennessee law by requiring the burning to be reckless, rather than negligent or careless.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Controlled burns, burning woods, § 68-102-146.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Power to forbid starting fires during drought, § 8-1-108.

Law Reviews.

The Proposed Tennessee Criminal Code — General Interpretive Provisions and Culpability, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 131 (1973).

39-14-305. Leaving fire near woodland unattended.

  1. It is unlawful for any person who originates or uses an open fire to leave that fire unattended without totally extinguishing the same within one hundred fifty feet (150') of forest or woodlands or within one hundred fifty feet (150') of other inflammable material, the setting fire to which inflammable material would naturally and proximately result in the fire being conveyed to forest or woodlands.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Controlled burns, burning woods, § 68-102-146.

Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Power to forbid starting fires during drought, § 8-1-108.

Law Reviews.

The Proposed Tennessee Criminal Code — General Interpretive Provisions and Culpability, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 131 (1975).

39-14-306. Setting fires at certain times without permit.

    1. It is unlawful for any person to start an open-air fire between October 15 and May 15, inclusive, within five hundred feet (500') of any forest, grasslands or woodlands without first securing a permit from the state forester or the state forester's duly authorized representative. Depending upon the potential for hazardous burning conditions, the state forester may prescribe a period other than October 15 to May 15 within which a permit must be obtained prior to starting an open-air fire.
    2. A violation of this subsection (a) is a Class C misdemeanor.
    1. In extreme fire hazard conditions, the commissioner of agriculture, in consultation with the state forester and the county mayors of impacted counties, may issue a burning ban prohibiting all open air fire in any area of the state.
    2. A violation of this subsection (b) is reckless burning and punishable as a Class A misdemeanor as provided in § 39-14-304.
  1. This section shall not apply to fires that may be set within the corporate limits of any incorporated town or city that has passed ordinances controlling the setting of fires.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1991, ch. 46, § 2; 1999, ch. 209, § 1; 2008, ch. 786, § 2.

Cross-References. Controlled burns, burning woods, § 68-102-146.

Penalty for Class A and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Power to forbid starting fires during drought, § 8-1-108.

39-14-307. Forfeiture.

All vehicles or property used by the sole owner in the commission of an offense under § 39-14-301, § 39-14-302, § 39-14-303 or § 39-14-304, and anything of value received as compensation for the commission of the offense are subject to forfeiture.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The procedures for forfeiture under this section are governed by title 40, chapter 33, part 2.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Forfeitures, procedure, title 39, ch. 11, part 7.

Part 4
Burglary and Related Offenses

39-14-401. Definitions for burglary and related offenses.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Habitation”:
    1. Means any structure, including buildings, module units, mobile homes, trailers, and tents, which is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons;
    2. Includes a self-propelled vehicle that is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons and is actually occupied at the time of initial entry by the defendant; and
    3. Includes each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle and each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle;
  2. “Occupied” means the condition of the lawful physical presence of any person at any time while the defendant is within the habitation or other building; and
  3. “Owner” means a person in lawful possession of property whether the possession is actual or constructive. “Owner” does not include a person, who is restrained from the property or habitation by a valid court order or order of protection, other than an ex parte order of protection, obtained by the person maintaining residence on the property.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2000, ch. 906, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

There are three clauses of T.C.A. § 39-14-401(1)(C). The first clause addresses “separately secured or occupied portion[s] of the structure or vehicle”; the court read “structure” and “vehicle” to refer to sections (A) and (B) -- structures or vehicles that are “designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons.” United States v. Lara, 590 Fed. Appx. 574, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21283, 2014 FED App. 836N (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2014).

Court declined to read the words “appurtenant to” and “connected with” in T.C.A. § 39-13-401(1)(C) as synonyms because that approach fails to give effect to each clause of the statute. United States v. Lara, 590 Fed. Appx. 574, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21283, 2014 FED App. 836N (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2014).

2. Habitation.

Comments clarify the scope of the first clause of T.C.A. § 39-14-401(1)(C): a habitation “includes each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure.” The second clause does not restrict application to “separately secured or occupied” appurtenant structures. United States v. Lara, 590 Fed. Appx. 574, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21283, 2014 FED App. 836N (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2014).

Habitation under T.C.A. § 39-14-401(1)(C) could be a tool shed, outhouse, bathhouse, smokehouse, or other uninhabited outbuildings that belong to or serve the principal structure. Thus, T.C.A. § 39-14-403 is not categorically a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). United States v. Lara, 590 Fed. Appx. 574, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21283, 2014 FED App. 836N (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2014).

Words “appurtenant to” can mean that an object is physically attached to another object, but it can also imply a relationship between two objects; it follows that an unattached shed, for example, is appurtenant to a house because the shed belongs to the house. Thus, Tennessee's definition of a “habitation” includes structures that would not be considered “places of habitation” under the generic formulation of the statute. United States v. Lara, 590 Fed. Appx. 574, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21283, 2014 FED App. 836N (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2014).

Where defendant appealed his 168-month sentence for bank robbery, the district court did not err when it concluded he was a career offender on account of having at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2; he pled guilty to burglarizing dwellings, the Tennessee aggravated burglary statute, T.C.A. § 39-14-403, was divisible under the Descamps decision, and the district court could consult Shepard materials. United States v. Ozier,  796 F.3d 597, 2015 FED App. 178P, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13637 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2015).

3. Sufficient Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant entered the victim's house or intended to commit theft because the victim's door was forced open, window screens were cut, one was removed, and a television was taken; defendant's fingerprints were located on one of the windows with a cut screen, and defendant's cell phone was found in the victim's backyard twenty feet from the entry door. State v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated burglary conviction under T.C.A. § 39-14-403 where the victim testified that the house on the property had been rented to a couple for 25 years when they moved out a few months before the crime, the victim testified that he did not know defendant and did not give him permission to be on the property or remove the wiring, wires in the house had been cut and the walls were damaged, and a witness saw defendant carrying two buckets of wire. State v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's burglary conviction, given that defendant broke into the front door of a residential home owned by the bank with the intent to commit a theft of the home, and defendant added locks to the residence and chained the front gate, and she had no permission to enter the property. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for reckless endangerment because the State of Tennessee presented evidence that defendant placed the numerous occupants of a home into imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury by recklessly firing a rifle through the walls of the home. Furthermore, defendant's admissible statements to the police established defendant's identity as the shooter. State v. Butts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's confession to a detective corroborated the accomplice's testimony; defendant confessed that at some point after the burglary he had possession of the stolen handgun, and the accomplice's testimony established that he knowingly obtained or exercised control over the stolen items when he assisted her in the burglary. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's constructive possession of the stolen goods corroborated the accomplice's testimony; the accomplice was the sole lessee of the apartment where the stolen items were found, and none of defendant's belongings were found in her apartment even though he told a detective that he was staying at the accomplice's apartment. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated burglary because he conceded he entered the boarding house illegally by using a mallet to break the lock on the front door and the victim's ownership interest in his bedroom extended to the common areas, including the main door. State v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

4. Indictment.

Although defendant contended that the corporate owner of a building was improperly identified in the indictment for vandalism and burglary of a building, the indictment listed the statute of the offenses for which defendant was indicted, giving defendant sufficient notice of the charges against defendant. The evidence introduced at trial did not substantially vary from the information on the indictment, and there was no evidence that defendant's efforts at defending against the charges were hampered by the notice given by the indictment. Walton v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

5. Sentencing.

District court properly applied 16-level enhancement to defendant's sentence because defendant's prior Tennessee conviction for aggravated burglary constituted a “crime of violence”; district court properly treated Tennessee's aggravated burglary statute as divisible, and under modified categorical approach, plea colloquy showed that defendant's conviction necessarily rested on entry of house rather than shed as factual basis of his plea suggested that he only entered house. United States v. Castro-Martinez, 624 Fed. Appx. 357, — F.3d —, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14763, 2015 FED App. 592N (6th Cir. Tenn. 2015).

Defendant's Tennessee aggravated burglary convictions were categorically violent felonies under the enumerated-offense clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act such that the modified categorical approach could not be used to determine whether the aggravated burglaries were generic offenses; defendant was properly sentenced as an armed career criminal due to his previous six aggravated burglary convictions. United States v. Stitt, 637 Fed. Appx. 927, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2501, 2016 FED App. 91N (6th Cir.).

39-14-402. Burglary.

  1. A person commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the property owner:
    1. Enters a building other than a habitation (or any portion thereof) not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault;
    2. Remains concealed, with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault, in a building;
    3. Enters a building and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault; or
    4. Enters any freight or passenger car, automobile, truck, trailer, boat, airplane or other motor vehicle with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault or commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault.
  2. As used in this section, “enter” means:
    1. Intrusion of any part of the body; or
    2. Intrusion of any object in physical contact with the body or any object controlled by remote control, electronic or otherwise.
  3. Burglary under subdivision (a)(1), (2) or (3) is a Class D felony.
  4. Burglary under subdivision (a)(4) is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 22; 1995, ch. 496, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section and the subsequent burglary statutes are a major change from the prior law. The former distinctions between burglary, burglary in the second degree and burglary in the third degree are eliminated. In addition, the day and night distinction which was previously used for gradation was abandoned because the risks and types of intrusions were the same whether they occurred in the daylight or at night. The requirement of a breaking has also been eliminated.

Intrusion with the intent to commit misdemeanor theft is included in burglary because of the practical impossibility of proving that a trespasser intended to steal property of sufficient value to constitute a felony theft. Intrusions with intent to commit misdemeanors other than theft are punishable as attempts or trespasses if the intended offense is not completed.

This section, burglary, applies only to intrusions involving buildings that are not habitations and those involving motor vehicles.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Use of force defending residence against intruder, § 39-11-611.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 26.85, 32.131, 32.192.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 5 Tenn. Juris., Burglary and Housebreaking, §§ 3-5; 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 43; 25 Tenn. Juris., Weapons, § 5.

Law Reviews.

Burglary at Walmart: Innovative Prosecutions of Banned Shoplifters under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-14-402, 11 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 81 (2016).

The Habitual Offender Laws of Tennessee (Steven W. Feldman), 14 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 293 (1984).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction with Other Law.

Contrary to defendant's argument, Tennessee v. Fluellen did not establish that a defendant may be convicted of burglary under T.C.A. § 39-14-402 simply by admitting that he obtained or exercised control over property of another, which was the definition of theft found in T.C.A. § 39-14-103. United States v. Eason, 643 F.3d 622, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13777 (8th Cir. July 7, 2011), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, — FED App. — (6th Cir.), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26295 (8th Cir. Mo. Aug. 12, 2011), cert. denied, 181 L. Ed. 2d 772, 565 U.S. 1132, 132 S. Ct. 1053, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 237.

For purposes of the burglary statute, a retail store does not effectively consent to a banned person's entry into the store simply because that individual enters the store to carry on a commercial activity; and the failure to detect or to even prosecute a criminal act, criminal trespass, does not prohibit enforcement or prosecution of subsequent criminal act. A retail store's failure to recognize a banned individual who enters its buildings does not amount to assent in fact, whether express or apparent, for the banned individual to enter the retail store based on the statutory definition of effective consent. State v. Ivey, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 245 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

There is no conflict between the repeat shoplifting statute and the burglary statute because regardless of the reason for the ban from the retail establishment or whether a person had the requisite number of prior convictions for shoplifting, a person who enters a building without the effective consent of the owner and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or assault may be prosecuted for burglary. If that person has four or more prior convictions for shoplifting in a two-year period, they may also be subject to enhanced punishment. State v. Welch, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

Burglary statute and the serial shoplifting statute prohibit different criminal offenses; the two offenses have different elements and the two statutes punish different wrongs. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

2. Relationship to Federal Law.

Violation of T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(1)-(3) fits squarely within the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of generic burglary. United States v. Eason, 643 F.3d 622, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13777 (8th Cir. July 7, 2011), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, — FED App. — (6th Cir.), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26295 (8th Cir. Mo. Aug. 12, 2011), cert. denied, 181 L. Ed. 2d 772, 565 U.S. 1132, 132 S. Ct. 1053, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 237.

Defendant was properly sentenced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act because defendant's burglary conviction under T.C.A. § 39-3-403 counted as a “violent felony” since Tennessee's second degree burglary statute fit within the enumerated offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). United States v. Jones, 673 F.3d 497, 2012 FED App. 71P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4700 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012).

In a felon in possession of a firearm case in which the federal district court sentenced defendant to 235 months of imprisonment, defendant's four convictions for burglary under T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3) qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act. United States v. Moore, 578 Fed. Appx. 550, — F.3d —, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17276, 2014 FED App. 680N (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2014).

Defendant was properly sentenced to mandatory-minimum sentence of 180 months under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act because the district court correctly found that four of defendant's prior convictions constituted violent felonies under the Act's enumerated-offense and use-of-force clauses; given that defendant pleaded guilty to a Class D felony under this section, defendant must have been charged with violating one of three subsections which qualified as generic burglary. The three qualifying subsections involved unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2015), 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21660, 2015 FED App. 292p (6th Cir.).

Judgments in defendant's burglary convictions indicated that he was thrice convicted of the Class D variant of Tennessee burglary. Accordingly, United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 2015 FED App. 0292p, 2015 FED App. 292p, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21660 (6th Cir. 2015), dictated that his three burglary convictions were violent felonies, and the district court's finding that he was an armed career criminal was proper.  United States v. Ferguson,  686 F.3d 514, 2017 FED App. 191P, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15930 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2017).

Defendant was improperly granted relief under § 2255 because it was once again law of circuit that defendant's Tennessee aggravated burglary convictions categorically qualified as violent felonies under Armed Career Criminal Act, and defendant could not meet his burden of proving that two of his convictions occurred on same occasion. United States v. Brown,  957 F.3d 679, 2020 FED App. 0126P (6th Cir.), 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13269 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2020).

2.5. Prosecution.

Court declined to depart from precedent that permitted defendant to be charged with burglary because defendant could be prosecuted for theft of a retail establishment that was otherwise open to the public but that had banned defendant. State v. Lawson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2019).

3. Federal Assimilation.

Defendants who broke into and stole property from motor vehicles parked within national forest were improperly sentenced under T.C.A. § 39-14-402 following conviction under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13. The criminal conduct involved in this case was more analogous to theft than burglary. United States v. Couch, 65 F.3d 542, 1995 FED App. 284P, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 26333 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1995).

4. Intent.

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant entered the victim's home with the intent to rape the victim. State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

In the absence of an acceptable excuse, a jury may reasonably and legitimately infer that by breaking and entering a building containing valuable property, the defendant intended to commit theft. State v. Ingram, 986 S.W.2d 598, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

The crime of burglary is complete when entry has been made into an automobile without the owner's consent and with an intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault; thus, consummation of the intended felony, theft, or assault is not necessary. State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. 1999).

5. Automobiles.

The automobile burglary statute applies to salvaged cars. State v. Rice, 973 S.W.2d 639, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

6. Multiple Offenses.

Defendant's convictions for felony murder and for aggravated criminal trespass were not mutually exclusive because the relevant offenses did not involve different mental states. For both aggravated burglary, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder conviction, and for aggravated criminal trespass, the State was required to prove that defendant acted with intent, knowledge, or recklessness. State v. Snipes, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Snipes v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 796, 134 S. Ct. 920, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 94 (U.S. 2014).

7. Lesser Included Offenses.

In a prosecution for burglary, where there was a question as to defendant's intent at the time he entered the premises, he was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. State v. Boyce, 920 S.W.2d 224, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Because the evidence clearly demonstrated that multiple offenses were committed upon immediately the inmate's entry of the home and that the inmate committed the offenses while armed, the evidence did not support instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense of aggravated burglary. Moore v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

Attempted theft was a lesser included offense of burglary indicted under subsection (a)(3) because it would have been impossible for the State to have proven defendant guilty of burglary without proving defendant attempted to commit theft; for the same reason, criminal trespass was also a lesser included offense. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Defendant waived for tactical reasons his argument that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted theft because defendant's cross-examination of the State's witnesses and arguments to the jury focused on the criminal trespass element of burglary, not the attempt to commit theft element for which there was overwhelming evidence; as such, there were advantages to an “all or nothing” instruction where only burglary was charged. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Because defendant failed to make a written request for a jury instruction on attempted theft as a lesser included offense of burglary and failed to raise the issue in his motion for new trial, defendant waived the issue. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

8. Merger.

Separate convictions for burglary and theft of the same automobile did not violate due process principals. State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. 1999).

Because, under T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3), the crime of burglary was not complete until the person committed or attempted to commit a felony, theft, or assault, under a double jeopardy analysis, the statutory violations of theft and burglary in defendant's case arose from the same act or transaction, and the trial court was required to merge the theft and assault convictions into the burglary conviction. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2020).

9. Consent.

Defendant relied upon the false impression he had created and reinforced to get inside the victim's home, and, once inside, accomplished the felonious deed which prompted his entry. Thus, having peaceably gained entry by deception, defendant's entry into the victim's home cannot be deemed with “effective consent.” State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Defendant's three burglary convictions, arising from his entry into a laundromat during regular business hours and his subsequent stealing of money from video game machines and a soap dispenser, were reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, as defendant had the owners'  effective consent to enter the laundromat; the laundry facility, which was often unattended, was open and unlocked for persons to enter the premises, and it was apparent to a person who approached the laundromat during the hours it was open for business that the person had the owners' consent to enter. State v. Ferguson, 229 S.W.3d 312, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2007).

Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to specify whether “effective consent” related to entry into the building or to the theft because the jury instructions were clear enough for the jury to determine that defendant did not have consent to enter a store or to steal property; an asset protection associate of the store testified that defendant did not have permission to enter the store and did not have permission to conceal merchandise down his pants. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Because the jury charge on effective consent was at worst incomplete, not erroneous, and the issue was waived by defendant's failure to make a contemporaneous objection. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

10. Self-Defense.

Vacation of petitioner's, an inmate's, convictions was improper because the courts below erred in concluding that counsel performed deficiently by exclusively pursuing a theory of self-defense because, if successful, the self-defense strategy trial counsel pursued would have resulted in a complete acquittal of the attempted first-degree murder charge, T.C.A. § 39-11-203(d), and likely would have resulted in an acquittal of the aggravated burglary charge by negating an essential element of the offense, T.C.A. §§ 39-14-402 and 39-14-403. Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1060 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2011).

11. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for automobile burglary where an accomplice testified against defendant, a police officer spotted the defendant looking into salvaged cars and found tools in defendant's possession, and defendant admitted in a taped statement that he had taken speakers from the automobile. State v. Rice, 973 S.W.2d 639, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of one count of burglary of a vehicle under T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(4) because the proof at trial established that defendant entered the victim's pickup truck without consent and committed the theft of the victim's holster. State v. Parsons, 437 S.W.3d 457, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. May 23, 2012).

Because the jury was entitled to reject the alibi testimony presented by defendant and accredit the identification testimony by the victim, the evidence sufficiently established defendant's guilt of aggravated robbery. State v. Pope, 427 S.W.3d 363, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1086 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated burglary, attempted theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, and vandalism of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, where it showed that defendant entered the victim's residence without his consent with the intent to commit theft, he used a wood file to disengage a lock on a door, he admitted that he intended to take three guns from the victim's house, he had removed the guns from the gun cabinet and placed them on the sofa, and the victim testified that they were valued at $800. State v. Watson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant entered the victim's house or intended to commit theft because the victim's door was forced open, window screens were cut, one was removed, and a television was taken; defendant's fingerprints were located on one of the windows with a cut screen, and defendant's cell phone was found in the victim's backyard twenty feet from the entry door. State v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated burglary conviction because the evidence was sufficient to show defendant entered the victim's property with the intent to commit theft. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Evidence that a man kicked open the victim's door, struggled with the victim causing injuries, fled out the front door, that a glove with defendant's DNA was left in the home, and that a car matching the description of the one the assailant left in was found at his fiance's home was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary, vandalism, and assault. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Defendant's argument that he could not form the requisite specific intent to commit the offenses due to his alleged intoxication was rejected by the jury, and thus, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated burglary, burglary of a vehicle, two counts of theft, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Goss, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for burglary of an automobile and misdemeanor theft. Regardless of whether attempts at harmonization represented the correct interpretation of the events, the mere fact that there were reasonable ways of reconciling testimonies proved that they were not necessarily in conflict. State v. Stutts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the burglary because he and his codefendant were at a market located near the schools hours after the burglary, a detective recovered tools, clothing, and gloves from defendant's vehicle, the clothes matched those worn by the masked perpetrators, defendant admitted ownership of the tools, the tools contained pain scrapings consistent with the pain of the ATM, and the tools created some of the markings found on the ATM. State v. Way, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim identified defendant, officers recovered the victim's scarf from the apartment where defendant was staying and recovered a gun and a cellular phone which the victim recognized as similar to the ones possessed by defendant during the attack, and DNA consistent with the victim's DNA was found on swabs taken from defendant. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim identified defendant as the perpetrator in both a photographic line-up following the offenses and at trial; the victim stated that she recognized defendant as the perpetrator by his eyes, and she identified a photograph of the gun that defendant possessed during the attack. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's constructive possession of the stolen goods corroborated the accomplice's testimony; the accomplice was the sole lessee of the apartment where the stolen items were found, and none of defendant's belongings were found in her apartment even though he told a detective that he was staying at the accomplice's apartment. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's confession to a detective corroborated the accomplice's testimony; defendant confessed that at some point after the burglary he had possession of the stolen handgun, and the accomplice's testimony established that he knowingly obtained or exercised control over the stolen items when he assisted her in the burglary. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted aggravated burglary because he entered a townhouse through a window that he had left unlocked for the express purpose of entering the townhouse, claimed he was coming inside to retrieve some clothes he had left in a kitchen cabinet above the refrigerator when the resident confronted him, and the trial court discredited defendant's excuse that he was entering the townhouse to retrieve his clothes as was his prerogative. State v. Lockridge, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary because the State was not required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a store was not open to the public; the evidence admitted at trial showed that defendant had received two notices from the store that he was prohibited from entering any store property. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to have determined that defendant entered a store and committed a theft because an asset protection associate of the store observed defendant select five pairs of scrubs, conceal them in his pants, and proceed to the exit. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate a burglary because he was armed and had the intent to rob the victim using his displayed handgun, when the victim opened the door defendant was caught at the entrance with his gun already pointed at the victim, and the testimony by a witness that the victim pushed defendant “out” reasonably inferred that some portion of defendant's body had entered the home. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary, based upon a theory of criminal responsibility, because the evidence established that defendant was involved in planning the robbery of the victim in the victim's home, provided a BB gun and supplied a Sharpie for the purpose of painting the BB gun so that it would look like a real gun knowing that the BB gun was going to be used to rob the victim, provided the wrench which was used to repeatedly hit the victim during the robbery, and took a share of the stolen marijuana. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Because defendant entered the retail establishment without the effective consent of the establishment and subsequently committed a theft therein, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for burglary and defendant's claim that the establishment effectively consented because he had previously been in the store lacked merit. State v. Lawson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary of a motor vehicle as the evidence established defendant's identity; surveillance video showed defendant opening the door to the owner's vehicle and rummaging around inside, the owner testified that he did not give anyone permission to be inside his vehicle and take his change, and a detective and a courtesy officer at the apartment complex both identified defendant as the suspect. State v. Ervin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2020).

Although defendant claimed that defendant shot the victim in self-defense, the evidence supported defendant's felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary conviction because defendant admitted to looking for the victim to recoup money, surveillance footage showed defendant approach the victim's car with a gun drawn and open the door, a cartridge casing was found inside the car, and casings ejected to the right side of defendant's gun. Defendant's hand or the gun entered the car, accompanied by an intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault. State v. Glass, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary, theft, and assault because defendant had been informed he was no longer allowed inside the store or on the store's property; defendant, without the store's consent, entered the store and attempted to leave with a cup of ice and a bag of peanuts without paying for the items; and, when confronted by a store employee, defendant hit him in the face. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's burglary conviction under T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3) where the proof adduced at trial revealed that he was served with a notice that he was banned from all Walmart properties for life, he then entered a Walmart store, took various items, exited the store, and fled when confronted by the police, and stolen merchandise discovered in his possession was worth approximately $43. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 469 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim testified to being robbed by masked and armed men in the victim's home, a police officer saw an individual matching the description of one of the assailants, a police dog tracked the individual to where defendant came out from behind a shed and said, “I give up,” a gun was found in a nearby trash can, the victim identified defendant in a show-up identification, and defendant made incriminating statements during recorded telephone calls while in jail. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2020).

12. Sentencing.

District court correctly determined that a defendant's prior conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of facilitation of aggravated burglary constituted a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because the crime presented a risk of physical injury sufficient to be classified as a “violent felony.” United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 2005 FED App. 255P, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11032 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 457, 163 L. Ed. 2d 347, 546 U.S. 950, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7535 (U.S. 2005).

Defendant's prior conviction in Tennessee of aggravated burglary represented a generic burglary capable of constituting a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882, 2007 FED App. 126P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8000 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2007), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, — FED App. —, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20455 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007), cert. denied, 169 L. Ed. 2d 532, 128 S. Ct. 680, 552 U.S. 1052, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 12533 (2007).

Allegations of defendant's habeas corpus petition and attached documents failed to establish that the judgment classifying him as a persistent offender and imposing a nine-year, Range III, sentence for burglary was void under Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15 and T.C.A. § 29-21-101. Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2008).

Defendant's sentencing range properly included a career offender enhancement because defendant's 1997 burglary conviction for violating former T.C.A. § 39-14-402 was a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2). United States v. Eason, 643 F.3d 622, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13777 (8th Cir. July 7, 2011), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, — FED App. — (6th Cir.), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26295 (8th Cir. Mo. Aug. 12, 2011), cert. denied, 181 L. Ed. 2d 772, 565 U.S. 1132, 132 S. Ct. 1053, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 237.

Trial court ordered defendant to serve four years for his Class D burglary conviction and to serve five years for his Class C theft of property conviction; because the trial court ordered sentences within the proper range, the sentences were presumptively reasonable and would not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Firestone, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2017).

Petitioner failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's use of his Louisiana convictions to classify him as a Range II offender because at least one of his prior burglary convictions would be classified as a Class D felony and the other would be classified as either a Class D or E felony. Petitioner failed to prove that his status as a minor would have prohibited the trial court using his Louisiana convictions during sentencing. Hayes v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 643 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder in perpetration of a burglary as he entered the victim's house without the victim's permission and committed or attempted to commit a felony, theft or assault, because he came onto the victim's porch and began hitting the victim; he then entered the victim's residence without his permission and forced the victim onto the living room floor; he continued to strike the victim and later tied the victim's wrists and legs together with an electrical cord and blind cord in a “hogtied” position; and he asked what else the victim had that he and another person could take. State v. Keene, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2018).

Twelve-year sentence imposed upon defendant for his conviction for vandalism was not excessive because the trial court properly addressed the statutory factors it considered and the reasons for the sentence; the trial court determined that the level of damage defendant imposed was particularly great and that defendant demonstrated no remorse of any kind and posed a high risk for violence and thus, found the enhancing factors severely outweighed the applicable mitigating factors. State v. Swinford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2018).

13. —Consecutive Sentencing.

The trial court imposed the consecutive sentences to defendant convicted of one count of burglary and one count of theft over $1,000 was appropriate where the defendant had an extensive record of criminal activity, and that he was on intensive probation at the time of offenses. State v. Brewer, 875 S.W.2d 298, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 837 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Apr. 4, 1994).

14. Dismissal.

Dismissal of the burglary charge under T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3) was proper, as the delay in charging defendant with burglary was attributable to the State because it had evidence of defendant's ban from the store in question prior to her first trial and failed to investigate it, and the State's deficiencies did not provide a sound basis for burdening defendant with the addition of a felony offense after a mistrial. State v. Jensen, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017).

Dismissal of the burglary charge under T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3) was proper as the State failed to rebut the presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, regardless of whether the trial court explicitly relied on such; the State admitted it charged defendant with burglary following defendant's first mistrial because it intended use its discretionary charging authority to prosecute all banned, repeat shoplifters like defendant with burglary, which was retaliatory and violative of due process. State v. Jensen, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017).

15. Due Process Violation.

Dismissal of the burglary count in defendant's case was upheld on independent due process grounds; given the legislative history, T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(3) was never intended to cover buildings open to the public, and by charging individuals with burglary, a Class D felony, when they should only be prosecuted for misdemeanor theft or shoplifting under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-105, 39-14-146, prosecutors are abusing their charging discretion by unreasonably expanding the reach of the burglary statute, and charging of burglary in these instances is unreasonable, unjust, and violative of due process. State v. Jensen, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017).

Subsection (a)(3) does not violate the fair warning doctrine merely because it has not been for a significant period of time employed to the prosecution of burglaries where a person entered a building open to the public, without the consent of the owner, and committed or attempted to commit a felony, theft, or assault; the court presumes the legislature purposely included the phrase “not open to the public” in subsection (a)(1) and purposely excluded the same phrase from subsection (a)(3). State v. Bowens, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

Because the word “building” in subsection (a)(3) is not ambiguous, there is no ambiguity to resolve in favor of defendant under the rule of lenity; subsection (a) is not vague and a person of common intelligence is not forced to speculate and therefore has fair warning about the conduct prohibited by subsection (a)(3). State v. Bowens, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

It was not the obvious intent of the legislature to limit the word “building” in subsection (a)(3) to buildings not open to the public; “building” is not ambiguous, and the plain meaning of “building” is a structure with walls and a roof, including buildings open to the public. State v. Bowens, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of felony burglary, the appellate court found that defendant's state and federal constitutional rights to due process were not violated because the burglary statute was not unconstitutionally vague and provided fair warning to a person of common intelligence that the person could be convicted of burglary for committing theft after entering a building open to the public, knowing the owner had revoked its effective consent for the person to enter; and defendant knew that he had been banned from the stores. State v. Ivey, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 245 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

This statute is not unconstitutionally vague and provides fair warning to a person of common intelligence that a person commits burglary if the person enters a building and commits a felony, theft, or assault after the owner revokes its consent for the person to enter. Thus, a person can burglarize a building open to the public under this statute. State v. Ivey, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 245 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

16. Constitutionality.

Burglary statute was not unconstitutionally vague because the term “building” as used in subsection (a)(3) was not limited to places “not open to the public” as it was in subsection (a)(1), and subsection (a)(3) was clear that when a person entered any building that was not a habitation, including one otherwise open to the public, without the effective consent of the owner and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or assault therein, they may be prosecuted for burglary. State v. Welch, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

17. Construction.

Legislature acted purposefully by omitting “not open to the public” from subsection (a)(3). State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Subsection (a)(3) is not ambiguous or vague, and provides fair warning to individuals who enter a building without the owner's effective consent and commit a felony, theft, or assault; subsection (a)(3) is applicable to both buildings open to the public and buildings not open to the public. State v. Hefner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2019).

Burglary statute was properly applied to defendants who entered a store without the effective consent of the owner and therein committed a theft, felony, or assault, the statute was not vague as applied, and it was not ambiguous and provided fair warning to individuals who enter a building without the owner's effective consent and commit a felony, theft, or assault. The court found no due process violation in construing the statute to be applicable to buildings open to the public, such as a retail stores, when consent to enter has been expressly revoked. State v. Welch, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Feb. 19, 2020).

39-14-403. Aggravated burglary.

  1. Aggravated burglary is burglary of a habitation as defined in §§ 39-14-401 and 39-14-402.
  2. Aggravated burglary is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 23.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section defines the offense of aggravated burglary as a burglary of a habitation. The term “habitation,” defined in § 39-14-401, is broader than “building” because it includes vehicles and structures other than buildings, such as modular units, mobile homes, trailers, campers and tents that are “adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons.” “Habitation” also includes garages and other outbuildings that are “separately secured and occupied portions” of a habitation.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Lesser Included Offenses.

In a prosecution for aggravated burglary, failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass denied defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury. State v. Vance, 888 S.W.2d 776, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

2. Multiple Convictions.

By virtue of the prosecution and conviction of defendant for aggravated rape, T.C.A. § 39-14-404 prohibits his prosecution and conviction for especially aggravated burglary. Accordingly, defendant's conviction for especially aggravated burglary was modified to a conviction for aggravated burglary. State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Two counts for aggravated burglary should have been merged, because the evidence presented at trial reflected that the sole theft occurred during defendant's first entry into the apartment and thus, the evidence was insufficient to support two convictions. State v. Tolbert, 507 S.W.3d 197, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 404 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

3. Self-Defense.

Vacation of petitioner's, an inmate's, convictions was improper because the courts below erred in concluding that counsel performed deficiently by exclusively pursuing a theory of self-defense because, if successful, the self-defense strategy trial counsel pursued would have resulted in a complete acquittal of the attempted first-degree murder charge, T.C.A. § 39-11-203(d), and likely would have resulted in an acquittal of the aggravated burglary charge by negating an essential element of the offense, T.C.A. §§ 39-14-402 and 39-14-403. Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1060 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2011).

4. Evidence Sufficient.

The record clearly supported the trial judge's findings in sentencing defendant for aggravated burglary. State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Where the defendant did not contest his two convictions for arson and vandalism, the evidence was sufficient to find that he entered the residence to commit these felonies and was guilty of aggravated burglary. State v. Chrisman, 885 S.W.2d 834, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

The evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant entered the duplex without the effective consent of the person in lawful possession of the property, where, although that person had previously let him stay in the duplex, hers was the only name on the lease and she was lawfully entitled to refuse him entry on the night in question. State v. Langford, 994 S.W.2d 126, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. 1999).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape and aggravated burglary because: (1) A conclusive match was made between defendant's DNA and the DNA of the victim's rapist; (2) At trial, the victim identified defendant as her attacker after providing a general description of him; and (3) An investigator officer testified about a similar description given by the victim on the morning of the attack. State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated burglary conviction; during regular business hours on the day immediately following a night-time burglary, defendant had possession of car keys, a stolen vehicle, and the car title. State v. James, 315 S.W.3d 440,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. June 24, 2010).

Because the jury was entitled to reject the alibi testimony presented by defendant and accredit the identification testimony by the victim, the evidence sufficiently established defendant's guilt of aggravated robbery. State v. Pope, 427 S.W.3d 363, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1086 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2013).

Evidence the victim was found lying on her bed, dead from two gunshots to her head, the phone line to her house had been cut, there were pry marks on the screen door, her car was missing, and defendant was arrested in her car with her gun under the driver's seat was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for premeditated murder, felony murder, aggravated burglary, and theft. State v. Stanhope, 476 S.W.3d 382, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated burglary, attempted theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, and vandalism of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, where it showed that defendant entered the victim's residence without his consent with the intent to commit theft, he used a wood file to disengage a lock on a door, he admitted that he intended to take three guns from the victim's house, he had removed the guns from the gun cabinet and placed them on the sofa, and the victim testified that they were valued at $800. State v. Watson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant entered the victim's house or intended to commit theft because the victim's door was forced open, window screens were cut, one was removed, and a television was taken; defendant's fingerprints were located on one of the windows with a cut screen, and defendant's cell phone was found in the victim's backyard twenty feet from the entry door. State v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated burglary conviction under T.C.A. § 39-14-403 (2010) where the victim testified that the house on the property had been rented to a couple for 25 years when they moved out a few months before the crime, the victim testified that he did not know defendant and did not give him permission to be on the property or remove the wiring, wires in the house had been cut and the walls were damaged, and a witness saw defendant carrying two buckets of wire. State v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's burglary conviction, given that defendant broke into the front door of a residential home owned by the bank with the intent to commit a theft of the home, and defendant added locks to the residence and chained the front gate, and she had no permission to enter the property. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, sexual battery, and assault where it showed that he broke into his estranged wife's house, choked her, repeatedly threatened to kill her, coerced her into having oral sex and sexual intercourse with him multiple times, the wife had bruises and marks on her throat, a DNA swab from the victim was consistent with defendant's DNA profile, and defendant had a bite mark on his forearm, marks on his cheeks, and scrapes on his head and elbow. State v. Blanton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated burglary conviction where all three eyewitnesses testified that defendant entered the apartment with his accomplice. State v. Doak, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 625 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 880 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $ 500 or less, given that defendant's identity as the perpetrator was established; officers saw defendant, holding a shotgun, exiting the victim's apartment through broken glass, both officers identified defendant as the perpetrator at the preliminary hearing and at trial, DNA on the red shirt worn by the perpetrator matched defendant's DNA, and the blood on the floor of the apartment was consistent with defendant's DNA. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2016).

Testimony that defendant pushed past a witness and entered the house without consent and went downstairs hollering at the victim was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant entered the house with the intent to assault the victim and supported a conviction for aggravated burglary. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated burglary, given that after forcefully entering the room, defendant continued to press further and further into the room, and he retreated only after seeing that there was another person in the room and the victim started screaming, and thus it was shown that defendant entered the room without consent and that he intended to cause fear of bodily injury, if not actual injury. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary as either a principal offender or under a theory of criminal responsibility; defendant and her friend entered the victim's apartment without her consent, defendant hit the victim on the head with a gun and demanded drugs, guns, and money, while the friend searched the apartment and took property, defendant was found with the victim's wallet in her sleeve and a handgun on her person, and the victim positively identified defendant and her friend as the robbers. State v. Sullivan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 85 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated burglary because a witness, who had been with defendant, confirmed that he saw defendant, who was armed, go toward the victim's home shortly before the offense with the intent to get gas money; and defendant entered the victim's home, threatened her with a weapon and stole items from her, leaving in her car. State v. Bertrand, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to establish premeditation, that defendant entered the victim's apartment without her consent and with the intent to assault her, and he killed her during the commission of an aggravated burglary where the victim had an order of protection against defendant, defendant attempted suicide after the murder, inside his apartment police found clothing with the victim's blood on them and the victim's purse, and defendant admitted hitting the victim several times in the head with a hammer, stabbing her in the neck, and taking her purse. State v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied because, although counsel's advice to plead guilty constituted deficient performance, as by pleading guilty to aggravated burglary, defendant acknowledged that he intended to possess cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver it, and that he actually possessed the cocaine, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance as he did not show a reasonable probability that the jury would have entertained reasonable doubt regarding the drug charge had he not acknowledged guilt of the aggravated burglary charge because he entered an apartment that appeared to function solely as a cocaine dispensary with co-defendant, who had cocaine, a gun, and two sets of scales. McCathern v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, McCathern v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the burglary because he and his codefendant were at a market located near the schools hours after the burglary, a detective recovered tools, clothing, and gloves from defendant's vehicle, the clothes matched those worn by the masked perpetrators, defendant admitted ownership of the tools, the tools contained pain scrapings consistent with the pain of the ATM, and the tools created some of the markings found on the ATM. State v. Way, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim identified defendant, officers recovered the victim's scarf from the apartment where defendant was staying and recovered a gun and a cellular phone which the victim recognized as similar to the ones possessed by defendant during the attack, and DNA consistent with the victim's DNA was found on swabs taken from defendant. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim identified defendant as the perpetrator in both a photographic line-up following the offenses and at trial; the victim stated that she recognized defendant as the perpetrator by his eyes, and she identified a photograph of the gun that defendant possessed during the attack. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary of the victim while employing a firearm because the victim testified he woke up bound on his couch with a handgun pointed to the back of his head as men raided his apartment; the men stole the victim's 12-gauge shotgun, AK-47, .22 long rifle, computers, tablets, and his wallet; defendant's ex-girlfriend testified that she saw defendant in her apartment with a shotgun, a ski mask, a duffle bag carrying a handgun, and a check with the victim's name on it; and, upon searching the ex-girlfriend's apartment, officers found the victim's shotgun and ammunition, his military ID, and his small computer, and they also found a handgun and a ski mask. State v. Loyde, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence that defendant entered the victim's residence through a window, shot the victim, and later gave a written statement admitting to breaking and entering into the residence and shooting the victim supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Stitts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's confession to a detective corroborated the accomplice's testimony; defendant confessed that at some point after the burglary he had possession of the stolen handgun, and the accomplice's testimony established that he knowingly obtained or exercised control over the stolen items when he assisted her in the burglary. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's constructive possession of the stolen goods corroborated the accomplice's testimony; the accomplice was the sole lessee of the apartment where the stolen items were found, and none of defendant's belongings were found in her apartment even though he told a detective that he was staying at the accomplice's apartment. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted aggravated burglary because he entered a townhouse through a window that he had left unlocked for the express purpose of entering the townhouse, claimed he was coming inside to retrieve some clothes he had left in a kitchen cabinet above the refrigerator when the resident confronted him, and the trial court discredited defendant's excuse that he was entering the townhouse to retrieve his clothes as was his prerogative. State v. Lockridge, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated burglary because it showed that defendant entered the victim's home through a locked door while the victim was sleeping, he woke the victim in her bed while pointing a gun at her, and later robbed, raped, and kidnapped her. State v. Stumbo, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

Victim's testimony that he was staying at a residence, a house, when defendant threatened him with the gun and robbed him was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary. State v. Gray, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2018).

Defendant entered the victims'  apartment armed with a handgun and pointed the gun at the victims while demanding money, and thus the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated burglary. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Defendant entered the victims'  apartment without their consent with the intent to commit a theft, and thus the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated burglary. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Evidence that the victim saw defendant, who she knew, and others driving around in her neighborhood despite not knowing anyone who lived there, saw defendant hiding behind a tree in her yard acting as a lookout, and then saw the vehicle they had been driving in pull into her driveway and two others run from the side of her home was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for facilitation of aggravated burglary. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property; defendant's transfer of property stolen during the burglary was a rational connection between his possession of the stolen property and his participation in the aggravated burglary, and regardless of who went inside, defendant benefitted from the proceeds of the aggravated burglary and theft and aided his co-defendant in the commission of the offenses. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Defendant was properly convicted of, and sentenced for, aggravated burglary and sexual battery because the evidence showed that he entered the victims'  apartment in the early morning hours, grabbed one victim on the buttocks while she was asleep, was in possession of an alarm clock belonging to another victim when confronted by the residents of the apartment, and, while two of the witnesses were unable to identify him at trial, nearly each witness who encountered him around the time of the offense testified that his appearance had changed at the time of trial, and the trial court considered relevant factors and imposed a sentence consistent with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of facilitation of aggravated burglary, as the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that defendant provided substantial assistance in the burglary by opening the window but he did not originally intend to benefit from the proceeds of the burglary. State v. Kiser, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary, based upon a theory of criminal responsibility, because the evidence established that defendant was involved in planning the robbery of the victim in the victim's home, provided a BB gun and supplied a Sharpie for the purpose of painting the BB gun so that it would look like a real gun knowing that the BB gun was going to be used to rob the victim, provided the wrench which was used to repeatedly hit the victim during the robbery, and took a share of the stolen marijuana. State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated burglary because he conceded he entered the boarding house illegally by using a mallet to break the lock on the front door and the victim's ownership interest in his bedroom extended to the common areas, including the main door. State v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2020).

Evidence that defendant was seen in close proximity to the victims moments before he entered the back seat of one victim's car just before they were found shot in the cemetery and several inmates testified they heard defendant and/or codefendant admit to murdering and robbing the victims after luring them to the cemetery was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. State v. Alston, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony first degree murder by killing the victim after committing aggravated burglary by entering her apartment without her consent because a group of people set out to locate and confront the victim's son; defendant and the other men entered the victim's apartment without invitation; he shot the victim after she was unable to provide them with her son's whereabouts; and he had the opportunity for reflection prior to the act of killing. State v. Kelso, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim testified to being robbed by masked and armed men in the victim's home, a police officer saw an individual matching the description of one of the assailants, a police dog tracked the individual to where defendant came out from behind a shed and said, “I give up,” a gun was found in a nearby trash can, the victim identified defendant in a show-up identification, and defendant made incriminating statements during recorded telephone calls while in jail. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support second and third defendants'  convictions for aggravated robbery, theft, conspiracy, aggravated burglary, and firearms offenses, as it showed that first defendant devised a plan to conduct a home invasion and steal stuff, he enlisted others, including second and third defendants, to carry o ut the plan, and the group carried out the plan, which included the use of masks, gloves, and a gun to take the items from the victim's home. State v. Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated burglary because defendant forced his way into the second victim's house on April 13, 2018, by kicking in the back door; once inside, he took a jewelry box; after defendant was apprehended at the scene of that burglary, the authorities discovered he possessed coins and gift cards taken in an April 10, 2018 burglary of the first victim's house; the first victim identified the coins and gift cards as hers; defendant admitted in pretrial statements to the police that he committed both offense; and the jury chose to credit the State's proof over defendant's claims that he had not committed the offenses and that a detective had testified untruthfully. State v. Eaker, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2020).

5. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to establish premeditation under T.C.A. § 39-13-202, and that defendant entered the victim's apartment without her consent and with the intent to assault her, and that he killed the victim during the commission of an aggravated burglary, for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-14-403; the victim had sharp force injuries, defendant admitted to entering the victim's apartment without her consent, hitting her in the head with a hammer and stabbing her in the neck, then taking her purse and fleeing out a window, and he offered no aid to the victim. State v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017).

6. Sentencing.

District court correctly determined that a defendant's prior conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of facilitation of aggravated burglary constituted a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because the crime presented a risk of physical injury sufficient to be classified as a “violent felony.” United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 2005 FED App. 255P, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11032 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 457, 163 L. Ed. 2d 347, 546 U.S. 950, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7535 (U.S. 2005).

Defendant's sentences to sixteen years in prison for his rape conviction and a concurrent term of fifteen years for his aggravated burglary conviction were imposed in compliance with the sentencing act and were in compliance with U.S. Const. amend. 6. State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. 2006).

Defendant's prior conviction in Tennessee of aggravated burglary represented a generic burglary capable of constituting a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882, 2007 FED App. 126P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8000 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2007), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, — FED App. —, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20455 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007), cert. denied, 169 L. Ed. 2d 532, 128 S. Ct. 680, 552 U.S. 1052, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 12533 (2007).

Habitation under T.C.A. § 39-14-401(1)(C) could be a tool shed, outhouse, bathhouse, smokehouse, or other uninhabited outbuildings that belong to or serve the principal structure. Thus, T.C.A. § 39-14-403 is not categorically a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). United States v. Lara, 590 Fed. Appx. 574, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21283, 2014 FED App. 836N (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2014).

District court properly applied 16-level enhancement to defendant's sentence because defendant's prior Tennessee conviction for aggravated burglary constituted a “crime of violence”; district court properly treated Tennessee's aggravated burglary statute as divisible, and under modified categorical approach, plea colloquy showed that defendant's conviction necessarily rested on entry of house rather than shed as factual basis of his plea suggested that he only entered house. United States v. Castro-Martinez, 624 Fed. Appx. 357, — F.3d —, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14763, 2015 FED App. 592N (6th Cir. Tenn. 2015).

Defendant's Tennessee aggravated burglary convictions were categorically violent felonies under the enumerated-offense clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act such that the modified categorical approach could not be used to determine whether the aggravated burglaries were generic offenses; defendant was properly sentenced as an armed career criminal due to his previous six aggravated burglary convictions. United States v. Stitt, 637 Fed. Appx. 927, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2501, 2016 FED App. 91N (6th Cir.).

Although defendant was indicted for offenses and convicted at trial, she was not released from jail on bond for those offenses at the time she committed the current offenses, theft and aggravated burglary, and thus there was no basis for mandatory consecutive sentencing in this case, nor was there a discretionary basis for ordering such. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Trial court reviewed the presentence report, considered enhancement and mitigating factors and found three and two factors that applied, respectively, weighed defendant's prior criminal history, and compared his post-arrest efforts to the offense charged, and the 13-year sentence for aggravated burglary was within the applicable range and was not an abuse of discretion; the trial court properly considered the relevant purposes and principles of Tennessee's sentencing statutes. State v. Phifer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 963 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

In a case where defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary, as a Range I standard offender, the trial court did not err in denying alternative sentencing to defendant and in sentencing him to a term of imprisonment because defendant had already received two sentences to be served on probation and he failed to comply with the terms of his probation on at least two occasions; although the trial court did not properly find that there was a need for deterrence, the trial court determined that defendant's long history of criminal conduct made imprisonment necessary to protect society; and the trial court was only required under the Sentencing Act to find one reason to properly confine defendant to prison and deny alternative sentencing. State v. Allen, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2017).

Consecutive sentencing was appropriate because the sentence for the employment of a firearm had to run consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony of aggravated burglary, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the aggravated robbery sentence should also run consecutively to the other two sentences as defendant had attempted to rob her at gunpoint on the same day, before he robbed the victim; and the presentence report included facts that recounted defendant's involvement in two other armed robberies that same week, one of which was the robbery of an elderly woman. State v. Bertrand, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Defendant's convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary could not serve as Armed Career Criminal (ACCA) predicates because conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary was not violent felony for purposes of ACCA.  — F.3d —, 2018 FED App. 0153N, 2018 FED App. 153N, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 7181 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentencing and a total effective sentence of life plus 24 years for first degree felony and premeditated murder, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm; defendant committed six distinct violations of the law and the trial court properly applied the dangerous offender category after making the necessary findings, which included in part his long history of being a drug dealer and being affiliated with a gang. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

7. Miscellaneous.

T.C.A. § 39-14-403 is a divisible statute. United States v. Lara, 590 Fed. Appx. 574, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21283, 2014 FED App. 836N (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2014).

Where defendant appealed his 168-month sentence for bank robbery, the district court did not err when it concluded he was a career offender on account of having at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2; he pled guilty to burglarizing dwellings, the Tennessee aggravated burglary statute, T.C.A. § 39-14-403, was divisible under the Descamps decision, and the district court could consult Shepard materials. United States v. Ozier,  796 F.3d 597, 2015 FED App. 178P, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13637 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2015).

Tennessee conviction for aggravated burglary is categorically a violent felony under the enumerated-offense clause of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act. The Tennessee aggravated burglary statute is a generic version of the crime of burglary. United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2015), 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21660, 2015 FED App. 292p (6th Cir.).

Where a defendant appealed his 135-month sentence for violating 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g)(1), which was enhanced under 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(e), the district court did not err in concluding that his three March 30 burglaries, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-14-403, were committed on occasions different from one another. United States v. Pledge, 821 F.3d 1035, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8138 (2016), cert. denied, 196 L. Ed. 2d 195, 137 S. Ct. 258, — U.S. —, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 4505 (2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of a lay witness about the issue of adverse possession in defendant's theft and aggravated burglary trial, given that the witness was not qualified as an expert witness, and further cross-examination on the issue might have confused and misled the jury. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's judgment that a defendant who was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 922, was not subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years'  imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because his conviction under T.C.A. § 39-14-403 did not fall within the ACCA's definition of “burglary”; as used in the ACCA, the term “burglary” included burglary of a structure or a vehicle that had been adapted or was customarily used for overnight accommodation. United States v. Stitt, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 399, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 7167 (Dec. 10, 2018).

Defendant had to be resentenced for violating 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) because, under the Nance decision, a Tennessee conviction for aggravated burglary was a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. United States v. Herron, — F.3d —, — FED App. —, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 1831 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 2020).

8. Jury Instructions.

Kidnapping charge accompanied by an aggravated burglary charge, standing alone, does not warrant a White instruction about whether the removal or confinement was to a greater degree than that necessary to commit the offense of the accompanying felony because a period of confinement is not inherent to the offense of aggravated burglary, which is only an offense against property; and there is no danger that the kidnapping statute could literally overrun the crime of aggravated burglary. State v. Alston, 465 S.W.3d 555, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. May 5, 2015).

39-14-404. Especially aggravated burglary.

  1. Especially aggravated burglary is:
    1. Burglary of a habitation or building other than a habitation; and
    2. Where the victim suffers serious bodily injury.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “victim” means any person lawfully on the premises.
  3. Especially aggravated burglary is a Class B felony.
  4. Acts which constitute an offense under this section may be prosecuted under this section or any other applicable section, but not both.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 24.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section defines the offense of especially aggravated burglary as a burglary where the victim suffers serious bodily injury. “Victim” means any person lawfully on the premises, including guests or employees.

Under this section, it makes no difference whether the burglary was committed in a habitation or any other building, since the aggravating factor is the injury to the victim. However, this section does not apply to burglaries of motor vehicles under § 39-14-402(a)(4).

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Serious Bodily Injury.

A head injury which was so severe that it first led the victim and others to believe she had suffered a fractured skull, and caused severe pain and dizziness in the victim constituted “serious bodily injury” within the meaning of §§ T.C.A. 39-11-106 and 39-14-404. State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Kidnapping victim who suffered bruising to her shoulder and back, a knot on her head and four stitches did not suffer serious bodily injury sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for especially aggravated burglary. State v. Zonge, 973 S.W.2d 250, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1017 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1079 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

2. Multiple Convictions for Same Act Prohibited.

By virtue of the defendant's prosecution and conviction for murder, T.C.A. § 39-14-404(d) prevented the defendant's prosecution and conviction for especially aggravated burglary. State v. Oller, 851 S.W.2d 841, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

By virtue of the prosecution and conviction of defendant for aggravated rape, T.C.A. § 39-14-404 prohibits his prosecution and conviction for especially aggravated burglary. Accordingly, defendant's conviction for especially aggravated burglary was modified to a conviction for aggravated burglary. State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Sua sponte modification of the conviction, sentence, and fine was necessary to do substantial justice, in a case where defendant was improperly convicted of both especially aggravated burglary and aggravated rape. State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Because defendant was convicted of both especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault based on the same serious bodily injury to the victim, defendant's especially aggravated burglary conviction had to be reduced to aggravated burglary. State v. Fykes, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2019).

3. Sentencing Factors.

Serious bodily injury is not included as element of offense, and it is therefore appropriate to apply particularly serious injury enhancement factor in determining sentence. State v. Alvarado, 961 S.W.2d 136, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Defendant's sentence was not illegal because, waiver notwithstanding, defendant's sentence of life imprisonment was mandatory based on his conviction for first degree felony murder; and his two 20-year sentences for each count of especially aggravated burglary were within their applicable ranges. Fields v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Trial court did not err by applying enhancement factor three to defendant's convictions for especially aggravated burglary, employment of a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony, especially aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit especially aggravated burglary because the jury found that defendant caused serious bodily injuries to the husband and the wife, making them both victims for the offenses. State v. Calles, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

4. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault because defendant did not reside at the victim's house and he entered without the victim's effective consent as he did not have a key to the victim's house, and he entered by throwing a cinder block through a window; and the victim suffered serious bodily injury as she had significant swelling and pain, a broken nose, a fractured jaw, multiple contusions, and permanent vision impairment. State v. Fykes, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's burglary conviction because video surveillance showed someone in clothing similar to defendant's entering and exiting the victim's apartment, a gray beanie with defendant's DNA and a boot print matching defendant's boot were found nearby, the victim's computer and a knife from the apartment were found along the path taken by defendant, defendant pawned a ring from the apartment, defendant's cell phone was used to search for information about a stabbing, and defendant confessed the crime to a jail inmate. State v. McLawhorn, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2020).

5. Elements.

Although evidence of defendant's threat approximately two or three hours before the assault did not constitute a prior bad act, even if the evidence constituted a prior bad act, the record would support a finding that it was admissible to show defendant's intent when he entered the victim's house because a conviction for especially aggravated burglary required the State to prove that defendant entered the victim's house with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault. State v. Fykes, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2019).

39-14-405. Criminal trespass.

  1. A person commits criminal trespass if the person enters or remains on property, or any portion of property, without the consent of the owner. Consent may be inferred in the case of property that is used for commercial activity available to the general public or in the case of other property when the owner has communicated the owner's intent that the property be open to the general public.
  2. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that:
    1. A person entered or remained on property that the person reasonably believed to be property for which the owner's consent to enter had been granted;
    2. The person's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use of the property; and
    3. The person immediately left the property upon request.
  3. The defenses to prosecution set out in subsection (b) shall not be applicable to a person violating this section if the property owner:
    1. Posts the property with signs that are visible at all major points of ingress to the property being posted and the signs are reasonably likely to come to the attention of a person entering the property; or
    2. Places identifying purple paint marks on trees or posts on the property; provided, that at least one (1) sign is posted at a major point of ingress to the property in a manner that is reasonably likely to come to the attention of a person entering the property and that the sign includes language describing that the use of purple paint signifies “no trespassing.” If purple paint is used, then purple paint must be vertical lines of not less than eight inches (8") in length and not less than one inch (1") in width; placed so that the bottom of the mark is not less than three feet (3') or more than five feet (5') from the ground; and placed at locations that are reasonably likely to come to the attention of a person entering the property.
  4. For purposes of this section, “enter” means intrusion of the entire body or when a person causes an unmanned aircraft to enter that portion of the airspace above the owner's land not regulated as navigable airspace by the federal aviation administration.
  5. Entering or remaining on railroad or utility right-of-way property by an adjoining landowner for usual and customary activities of the type defined in §§ 1-3-105(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii), (B) and (C) and 43-1-113(a), (b)(1)(A) and (B), (b)(2) and (b)(3) shall not be considered trespass under this section. This subsection (e) shall not apply if the railroad or utility right-of-way owner, by a personal communication or posting at the site by someone with either actual authority or apparent authority to act for the railroad or utility right-of-way owner, has communicated to the adjoining landowner that the activity is not permitted.
    1. The secretary of state shall establish a no trespass public notice list identifying employers in this state who have requested established private property rights to be recognized and recorded against a trespasser under subsection (a).
    2. To be included on the list, an employer shall provide to the secretary of state copies of appropriate documents that establish the employer's private property rights, including the address and legal description of the property to which it has legal control. An employer that records its private property rights shall pay a recording fee as determined by the secretary of state.
    3. Beginning January 15, 2015, and every January 15 and July 15 thereafter, the secretary of state shall:
      1. Make the list available to the public in the office of the secretary of state and publish the list on the website maintained by the secretary of state; and
      2. Distribute the no trespass public notice list to every law enforcement agency in this state.
    4. Publication of the no trespass public notice list as prescribed in subdivision (f)(3) establishes a presumption that members of the general public have notice of the establishment of private property rights of all employers and properties listed.
    5. Each law enforcement agency in this state shall maintain the most recent no trespass public notice list received from the secretary of state for its use in responding to complaints of criminal trespass under subsection (a). If a property is identified on the list, the responding law enforcement officer:
      1. Is not required to further establish an employer's property rights before taking action against a person committing criminal trespass; and
      2. May take appropriate and lawful action against a person committing criminal trespass to have such person leave the property or cease blocking ingress to or egress from the property.
    6. If the employer's property is listed on the no trespass public notice list, an owner may seek an expedited injunction to restrain repeated or continuing trespass.
    7. This subsection (f) shall not affect or limit any existing rights of an owner whose property is not included on the no trespass public notice list.
  6. Criminal trespass is a Class C misdemeanor.
  7. For purposes of this section, there shall be no inference of the owner's consent nor shall the defense in subsection (b) be available to a person entering and remaining on the grounds, or in the common areas, such as lobbies, hallways, courtyards, and parking lots, of a housing or apartment complex having signs posted in compliance with subsection (c) unless the person:
    1. Has the actual consent of the owner;
    2. May lawfully enter the property by virtue of the person's occupational duties; or
    3. Has a contractual right to enter the property or is an invitee of someone with a contractual right to make invitations to enter the property.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2005, ch. 297, §§ 1-3; 2009, ch. 510, § 1; 2014, ch. 876, § 9; 2014, ch. 956, § 1; 2017, ch. 135, § 1; 2017, ch. 286, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section consolidates several different provisions of prior law.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2014, ch. 956, § 2 provided that the secretary of state is authorized to promulgate rules to effectuate the purposes of the act. All rules shall be promulgated in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

Cross-References. Obstruction of justice, title 39, ch. 16, part 6.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Persons improperly on school premises, § 49-6-2008.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 1.8, 28.95.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 10 Tenn. Juris., Eavesdropping and Prowling, §  1; 24 Tenn. Juris., Trespass, § 14.

Law Reviews.

Selected Tennessee Legislation of 1986, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 457 (1987).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of 2014 amendments to bribery, extortion, riot, and trespass laws.  OAG 14-44, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 46 (4/7/14).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Entry onto Property.

Defendants were guilty of criminal trespass where, without consent, they chained themselves to a clinic's fence so that their torsos were within the area owned by the clinic and their legs extended into a driveway leading from the street. State v. Hollingsworth, 944 S.W.2d 625, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

2. Lesser Included Offense.

In a prosecution for aggravated burglary, failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass denied defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury. State v. Vance, 888 S.W.2d 776, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Because the statutory definition of criminal trespass now omits any reference to “breach of the peace,” criminal trespass can be a lesser included offense of burglary. State v. Boyce, 920 S.W.2d 224, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In a prosecution for burglary, where there was a question as to defendant's intent at the time he entered the premises, he was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. State v. Boyce, 920 S.W.2d 224, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In a trial for aggravated burglary, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on criminal trespass; the defendant clearly intended to and did commit a felony inside the house after he was denied entrance by the owner, by firing a shot at the owner through the living room window and then forcibly entering the house and shooting the victim as she hid in a closet. State v. Langford, 994 S.W.2d 126, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. 1999).

3. Notice.

A specific order by an owner to a person to stay away from the owner's property constitutes notice sufficient to make a knowing return by the person to the property a violation of T.C.A. § 39-14-405. State v. Ash, 12 S.W.3d 800, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

It is questionable to infer guilty knowledge of trespassing when the person is on property open to the public and acting innocuously — thus, the need for a person to be asked to leave. State v. Ash, 12 S.W.3d 800, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

4. Enforcement.

If an officer knows that a person has been ordered to stay off housing project property and subsequently sees the person on the prohibited property, the officer can lawfully arrest the person for criminal trespass. State v. Ash, 12 S.W.3d 800, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

The use of the “police team” approach which provides that an act taking place within the view of one officer is in legal effect within the presence and view of other cooperating officers, is a viable doctrine in Tennessee and may be applied where arresting officers witness defendant's presence on the property, but learn of the fact that the defendant had been previously warned to stay off the property from a list generated by the police for officers patrolling the area. State v. Ash, 12 S.W.3d 800, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

5. Defenses.

Trial court committed no error in verbalizing to the jury that the implied conjunction at the end of former T.C.A. § 39-14-405(b)(1) is “and” rather than “or”; thus, defendant's contention that the court combined two distinct defenses into one was without merit. State v. Abou-Sakher, 34 S.W.3d 878, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, Abou-Sakher v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 1022, 121 S. Ct. 1963, 149 L. Ed. 2d 758, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3634 (2001).

6. Probable Cause.

There was probable cause for arrest under T.C.A. § 39-14-405 where individual admitted knowing for years that the individual's name was on the no-trespass list and that the individual would be subject to charges of criminal trespass if the individual entered onto the property. Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 2001 FED App. 160P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8959 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001).

As an officer had probable cause to believe appellant had committed criminal trespass, appellant's arrest was proper; the officer arrived on the scene and observed that a crate of cats and kittens was placed on appellee's driveway, and he then interviewed appellee, who communicated to him that she had not wanted appellant to drop the cats off on her property, but that appellant had done so anyway. Weser v. Goodson,  — F.3d —, 2020 FED App. 214P, 2020 FED App. 0214P (6th Cir.), 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 21967 (6th Cir. July 15, 2020).

7. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminal trespass on October 3, 2013, because the proof at trial established that defendant entered the National Guard Armory without the consent of those in charge of the Armory; the proof showed that defendant had been issued a warning, two weeks prior to his October 3 trespass, to stay away from the Armory; and defendant, by his own admission, testified that no one had given him permission to enter onto the Armory's property on October 3. State v. Novikov, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 2016).

Evidence that defendant applied for Social Security retirement using an assumed name and a birth certificate for that person, showing that he was six years older than he was, and that he received benefits and, later, S.S.I. benefits based on that information was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. State v. Apfel, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2016).

39-14-406. Aggravated criminal trespass.

  1. A person commits aggravated criminal trespass who enters or remains on property when:
    1. The person knows the person does not have the property owner's effective consent to do so; and
    2. The person intends, knows, or is reckless about whether such person's presence will cause fear for the safety of another;
    3. The person, in order to gain entry to the property, destroys, cuts, vandalizes, alters or removes a gate, signage, fencing, lock, chain or other barrier designed to keep trespassers from entering the property; or
    4. The person, while on the property, recklessly damages the property or personal property thereon.
  2. For purposes of this section, “enter” means intrusion of the entire body.
    1. Aggravated criminal trespass is a Class B misdemeanor except as provided in subdivisions (c)(2) and (3).
    2. Aggravated criminal trespass that was committed in a habitation, in a building of any hospital, on state property, or on the campus, property, or facilities of any private or public school is a Class A misdemeanor.
    3. Aggravated criminal trespass is a Class E felony when committed:
      1. On residential property belonging to or occupied by a law enforcement officer, active duty member of the military, judge, or elected or appointed federal, state, or local official; and
      2. With intent to harass a person described in subdivision (c)(3)(A) due to the person's status as a law enforcement officer, active duty member of the military, judge, or elected or appointed federal, state, or local official.
    1. A person also commits aggravated criminal trespass who enters or remains on the real property, including the right-of-way, of a railroad:
      1. With the intent to do harm to the property or to railroad property located on the property; or
      2. With the intent to do harm to another person or knowing that their presence will harm another person.
    2. Aggravated criminal trespass on railroad property is a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. A person also commits aggravated criminal trespass who trespasses upon a construction site, or property used or owned by a public or private utility or an electric or telephone cooperative, with the intent to steal, deface, destroy, tamper with, alter or remove any equipment, supplies or other property found on the site or property.
      1. In order for subdivision (e)(1) to apply, the construction, utility, or electric or telephone cooperative property must be posted by use of a sign of a size that is plainly visible to the average person at all gates or entrances to the property and shall contain language substantially similar to the following:

        UNLAWFUL ENTRY ON THIS PROPERTY CONSTITUTES THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND IS PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT FOR UP TO ONE YEAR AND A $2,500 FINE.

      2. If the proof shows that the defendant entered the posted property at some place other than a gate or entrance, it is not a defense to this subsection (e) that the defendant did not know that the property was posted against trespass.
    2. Aggravated criminal trespass on a construction site is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2006, ch. 668, § 1; 2008, ch. 690, § 3; 2011, ch. 302, § 1; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, §§ 4, 5.

Compiler's Note. For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 added (a)(4); and rewrote (c), which read: “Aggravated criminal trespass is a Class B misdemeanor unless it was committed in a habitation, in a building of any hospital, or on the campus, property, or facilities of any private or public school, in which event it is a Class A misdemeanor.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Mutually Exclusive Offenses Not Found.

Defendant's convictions for felony murder and for aggravated criminal trespass were not mutually exclusive because the relevant offenses did not involve different mental states. For both aggravated burglary, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder conviction, and for aggravated criminal trespass, the State was required to prove that defendant acted with intent, knowledge, or recklessness. State v. Snipes, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Snipes v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 796, 134 S. Ct. 920, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 94 (U.S. 2014).

2. Inconsistent Verdicts.

Jury's verdict convicting defendant of felony murder but acquitting him of aggravated burglary, though inconsistent, did not entitle defendant to relief from his felony murder conviction as the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder during the commission of an aggravated burglary and aggravated criminal trespass; thus, the court would not speculate about the jury's reasoning because the evidence supported findings of guilt with regard to both offenses. State v. Snipes, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2013), cert. denied, Snipes v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 796, 134 S. Ct. 920, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 94 (U.S. 2014).

3. Evidence.

Evidence that the room where the offense occurred was rented in the victim's name and the victim paid weekly rent, defendant was staying there with the victim but did not have a key, the victim revoked her consent to defendant to be present when she expressly instructed him to leave her house, and defendant did not leave after entering using the victim's keys which had taken without permission supported defendant's conviction for aggravated criminal trespass. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated criminal trespass because the victim testified defendant broke into his room, and police officers subsequently photographed a broken lock on the exterior door leading into the victim's room; through its finding of guilt, the jury accredited the testimony of the victim, and the court of appeals would not reweigh his credibility on appeal. State v. Pittman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

In connection with defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, aggravated criminal trespass of a habitation, and two counts of assault, the victim's co-worker's testimony qualified as fresh complaint evidence, as he testified about the details of the incident, and defendant had vigorously attacked the victim's credibility prior to the co-worker's testimony; the victim's statements were timely and any error in admitting the testimony was harmless. State v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated criminal trespass because his ex-girlfriend testified that she moved into the victim's house two weeks prior to the shooting, because they were ending their romantic relationship the victim would not allow defendant to come to the house while the ex-girlfriend was there, and on the afternoon of the shooting defendant entered the house without permission and proceeded to shoot the victims before attempting to shoot the ex-girlfriend. State v. Burrow, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated criminal trespass conviction; the victim was the sole owner of the home, defendant was told to leave, and the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant entered the home without consent. When defendant refused to leave, the victim moved and was afraid to return home, plus defendant had threatened her numerous times and knew that his presence in the home would have caused her to fear for her safety. State v. Alexander, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2020).

4. Construction.

Retail store does not effectively consent to a banned person's entry into the store simply because that individual enters the store to carry on a commercial activity; failure to detect or prosecute a criminal act, criminal trespass, does not prohibit enforcement or prosecution of subsequent criminal act, and a retail store's failure to recognize a banned individual who enters its buildings does not amount to assent in fact, whether express or apparent, for the individual to enter the store. State v. Bowens, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

Because the phrase “a building of any hospital” necessarily includes a building of a public hospital, the aggravated criminal trespass statute implies that consent to enter a hospital building open to the public can be revoked; thus, an owner of property, including a building that is open to the public, can revoke its consent for a person to enter. State v. Bowens, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

39-14-407. Trespass by motor vehicle.

  1. Any person who drives, parks, stands, or otherwise operates a motor vehicle on, through or within a parking area, driving area or roadway located on privately owned property which is provided for use by patrons, customers or employees of business establishments upon that property, or adjoining property or for use otherwise in connection with activities conducted upon that property, or adjoining property, after the person has been requested or ordered to leave the property or to cease doing any of the foregoing actions commits a Class C misdemeanor with no incarceration permitted. A request or order under this section may be given by a law enforcement officer or by the owner, lessee, or other person having the right to the use or control of the property, or any authorized agent or representative thereof, including, but not limited to, private security guards hired to patrol the property.
  2. As used in this section, “motor vehicle” includes an automobile, truck, van, bus, recreational vehicle, camper, motorcycle, motor bike, moped, go-cart, all terrain vehicle, dune buggy, and any other vehicle propelled by motor.
  3. A property owner, lessee or other person having the right to the use or control of property may post signs or other notices upon a parking area, driving area or roadway giving notice of this section and warning that violators will be prosecuted; provided, that the posting of signs or notices shall not be a requirement to prosecution under this section and failure to post signs or notices shall not be a defense to prosecution hereunder.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-408. Vandalism.

  1. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Damage” includes, but is not limited to:
      1. Destroying, polluting, or contaminating property;
      2. Tampering with property and causing pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience to the owner or a third person;
      3. Intentionally spilling, pouring, or otherwise administering chemicals or other toxic substances to or on the merchandise with the intent to:
        1. Render the merchandise unusable or unsellable; or
        2. Alter the merchandise from its original or intended form;
      4. Destroying, harming, or decreasing the value of merchandise offered for sale by a retail merchant in any other manner; or
      5. Intentionally marring, marking upon, or defacing, in a temporary or permanent manner, state or local government property or any entrance or curtilage to or fixture on the property, with the exception of temporary marking of sidewalks;
    2. “Merchandise” includes any goods, chattels, foodstuffs, or wares of any type of description, regardless of the value;
    3. “Polluting” means the contamination by man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, or radiological integrity of the atmosphere, water, or soil to the material injury of the right of another. Pollutants include dredged soil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste;
    4. “Retail merchant” means any person primarily engaged in the business of making retail sales. For purposes of this subdivision (a)(4), “primarily” means that at least fifty percent (50%) of the taxable gross sales of the business are retail sales; and
    5. “Retail sale” or “sale at retail” means any sale other than a wholesale sale.
  2. A person commits the offense of vandalism who knowingly:
    1. Causes damage to or the destruction of any real or personal property of another or of the state, the United States, any county, city, or town knowing that the person does not have the owner's effective consent;
    2. Solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another to commit vandalism of a retail merchant, while acting with the intent to promote or assist the commission of vandalism of a retail merchant, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense;
    3. Damages merchandise offered for retail sale by a retail merchant; or
    4. Facilitates commission of vandalism of a retail merchant or acts as an accessory after the fact to vandalism of a retail merchant.
      1. A person violating subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(3) is a principal under § 39-11-401 and shall be punished as for theft under § 39-14-105, after determining value under § 39-11-106.
      2. In addition to any sentence imposed for a violation of subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(3), the court shall include an order of restitution for any property damage or loss or cleaning and restoration expenses incurred as a result of the offense.
    1. A person violating subdivision (b)(2) is a principal under § 39-11-402 and shall be punished as for theft under § 39-14-105, after determining value under § 39-11-106.
    2. A person violating subdivision (b)(4) by facilitating a felony act of vandalism committed under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(3), shall be punished one (1) classification lower than the value of the act of vandalism committed under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(3).
    3. A person violating subdivision (b)(4) as an accessory after the fact, under § 39-11-411, to a felony act of vandalism committed under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(3) commits a Class E felony.
    4. Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(1)(A), a person violating subdivision (b)(1) by intentionally marring, marking upon, or defacing, in a temporary or permanent manner, state or local government property or any entrance or curtilage to or fixture on state or local government property, where the value determination under § 39-11-106 is less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), commits a Class A misdemeanor, unless the state or local government property is designated as a historic landmark or listed on the national register of historic places, in which case the violation shall be punished in accordance with subdivision (c)(1). In addition, a second or subsequent violation of subdivision (b)(1) with respect to state or local government property shall be punished by a mandatory fine of five thousand dollars ($5,000).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 284, § 3; 2005, ch. 353, § 16; 2015, ch. 183, § 1; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, §§ 6-8.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Prior code §§ 39-3-1316, 39-3-131839-3-1320 and 39-3-132239-3-1327 prohibited a wide variety of destructive acts, including injuring, defacing or destroying buildings or fixtures; monuments, works of art or ornamental trees or shrubs; goods, chattels or valuable papers; monuments, fences or structures on battlefields; camp grounds; boundary monuments; land or line marks; plant beds; material in caves or caverns; wire fences; trees or other growth on public lands; buildings or fences on public lands; timber on the land of another; and products on the land of another.

This section is a consolidation and simplification of these former code sections. It is written broadly to include damage or destruction of any property without the consent of the owner, and also includes pollution of property. Vandalism is classified according to the value of the damage done to the property and is punished as theft pursuant to § 39-14-103. Vandalism is no less than a Class A misdemeanor.

Special vandalism statutes are included in §§ 39-14-411, 39-14-412 and 39-14-413.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 18 provided that the act shall apply to sentencing for criminal offenses committed on or after June 7, 2005. Offenses committed prior to June 7, 2005, shall be governed by prior law, which shall apply in all respects. However, for defendants who are sentenced after June 7, 2005, for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1982, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the provisions of the act by executing a waiver of such defendant's ex post facto protections. Upon executing such a waiver, all provisions of the act shall apply to the defendant.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 19 provided that the act shall have no application to sentencing for persons convicted of murder in the first degree, which shall be governed by the provisions of §§ 39-13-20239-13-208.

Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 20(b) provided that the Tennessee Code Commission is requested to insert a cross reference in §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-505, 39-13-506, 39-13-522, 39-14-302 and 39-14-408 to § 40-35-114 stating that the enhancement factor formerly found in each such section was moved to § 40-35-114 so that all enhancement factors are located in one (1) section.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 added (a)(1)(E), (c)(1)(B), and (c)(5).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Abuse of corpse, § 39-17-312.

Outdoor advertising on certain interstate highways prohibited, § 54-21-115.

Alleging grave-robbing, § 40-13-220.

Arson, title 39, ch. 14, part 3.

Criminal sentencing enhancement factors, § 40-35-114.

Criminal trespass, § 39-14-405.

Desecration of venerated object, § 39-17-311.

Destruction of valuable papers, § 39-14-130.

Disorderly conduct, § 39-17-305.

Failure of cemetery corporation to establish improvement fund, § 46-1-304.

False reports, § 39-16-502.

Indictment without prosecutor, § 40-13-104.

Interference with county meridian markers, penalty, § 8-12-114.

Jury may provide punishment for less than year, § 40-20-103.

Liability for damage to cemetery, § 46-2-102.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Pollution of streams, title 69, ch. 3, part 1, § 70-4-206.

Trespass or injury to cemetery property, § 46-1-313.

Violation of boating safety act, § 69-9-219.

Violation of graves indictable without prosecutor, § 40-13-104.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 7.6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 5 Tenn. Juris., Cemeteries, § 10; 10 Tenn. Juris., Double Jeopardy, § 12; 13 Tenn. Juris., Fences, § 1; 18 Tenn. Juris., Maliciously Secreting Property, § 1; 18 Tenn. Juris., Malicious Mischief, §§ 3, 4; 24 Tenn. Juris., Trees and Timber, § 5; 24 Tenn. Juris., Trespass, § 14.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Water Law, You Never Miss the Water Till the Well Runs Dry (Vincent A. Sikora), 24 No. 5 Tenn. B.J. 12 (1988).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

In a prosecution for five counts of vandalism involving damage to a truck, three police cars and other separate property, evidence was sufficient to show that the damage involved totaled more than $1,000. State v. Brooks, 909 S.W.2d 854, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-14-408, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of misdemeanor vandalism where the state proved that defendant intentionally urinated in the back seat of the sheriff's patrol car and damaged the car by contaminating it; by his conduct he tampered with the patrol car in a manner that caused substantial inconvenience to the person who had to clear up the mess that he made. State v. McAnally, 209 S.W.3d 639, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Aug. 28, 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of vandalism because the proof established that defendant had, over at least 16 months, dumped massive amounts of construction and demolition debris on the victims'  properties without the consent of any of the victims. The state presented sufficient proof of the value of the damaged properties because a geologist testified about the cost to remove and dispose of the debris defendant dumped on the victims'  property and the cost to fill the pits on the properties, and an operations manager for an industrial and environmental contractor testified that one victim's property no longer held any value due to the amount of damage caused by the dumping. State v. Bolton, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated burglary, attempted theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, and vandalism of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, where it showed that defendant entered the victim's residence without his consent with the intent to commit theft, he used a wood file to disengage a lock on a door, he admitted that he intended to take three guns from the victim's house, he had removed the guns from the gun cabinet and placed them on the sofa, and the victim testified that they were valued at $800. State v. Watson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

There was overwhelming circumstantial evidence that defendant was the perpetrator of the offenses of misdemeanor reckless endangerment and vandalism because three witnesses testified that they saw defendant's car shortly after the shootings, and when defendant was arrested, he had a shotgun in his lap and an over half-empty box of shotgun shells and shotgun shells in his car. State v. Robertson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of vandalism where the record showed that the victim saw defendant on her property at 1:45 a.m., defendant wore a backpack sprayer, the victim saw defendant spray her plants which later died, the victim testified that a recording showed defendant speaking to her, she testified that she had not hired defendant to spray her plants and he did not have permission to be on her property, and defendant acknowledged that he was the man depicted in the recording wearing a backpack sprayer. State v. Butler, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 423 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of vandalism because the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant caused damage to the screens and the doors of the victim's house during the course of a burglary; defendant's fingerprints were found on one of the windows with a cut screen, and his cell phone was found twenty feet from the back door, which had been forced open. State v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2016).

Jury could have inferred that defendant intentionally used his motor vehicle in a way that caused the victim to reasonably fear imminent harm, and thus the evidence supported defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and vandalism; defendant first encountered the victim at the mailboxes in the subdivision and parked bumper to bumper with her car, as she had parked in the wrong direction, and when she tried to back out, he rammed his car into her car, and as she drove away, he followed her and rammed her car again, and the damage to her car was more than $ 1,000. State v. Windrow, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for vandalism in an amount between $ 1,000 and $ 10,000 because defendant drove his vehicle through the breezeway of the apartment building, causing notable damage; an employee of the apartment complex's leasing office testified that it cost around $ 8,000 to repair the damage done to the apartment building. State v. Rush, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's vandalism conviction where it showed that the victim and two other testified to large amounts of wire being cut and removed from the house and a witness testified that the estimated cost of repair was $12,600. State v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016).

Evidence that defendant kicked the victim's car, causing a dent was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for vandalism. State v. Abujaber, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Although the victim was unable to identify defendant as one of the perpetrators at the preliminary hearing, there was sufficient evidence of his identity, as the jury chose to credit the victim's trial testimony that defendant was one of the men who fled in a vehicle from her rental home, knocking her down in the process, and there was evidence that the vehicle that fled the scene was registered to defendant's mother and defendant had access to the vehicle and had driven it on another occasion. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Feb. 28, 2017).

Evidence that a man kicked open the victim's door, struggled with the victim causing injuries, fled out the front door, that a glove with defendant's DNA was left in the home, and that a car matching the description of the one the assailant left in was found at his fiance's home was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary, vandalism, and assault. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's vandalism conviction under T.C.A. § 39-14-408(b)(1), as he admitted he caused the damage to the trailer and offered to repair the damage, plus he showed the officer copper wires in his possession and acknowledged that he obtained items from the trailer; by finding defendant guilty, the jury accredited the victim's testimony, which stated that he was the owner of the trailer, for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(26). State v. Watson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of vandalism of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000 because defendant had been in a 12-year romantic relationship with a woman that the victim was seeing at the time of the offense; the victim and the woman were awakened by a noise, and discovered that the tires on the victim's vehicle had been slashed, and the video camera affixed to the corner of the woman's house had been moved so that it no longer captured the driveway area of the house; the victim armed himself with a bat and went back outside to walk around the house and saw defendant hiding in the woods behind the woman's house; and police eventually apprehended defendant near a church not far from the woman's house. State v. Beauregard, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the burglary because he and his codefendant were at a market located near the schools hours after the burglary, a detective recovered tools, clothing, and gloves from defendant's vehicle, the clothes matched those worn by the masked perpetrators, defendant admitted ownership of the tools, the tools contained pain scrapings consistent with the pain of the ATM, and the tools created some of the markings found on the ATM. State v. Way, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2018).

Conviction for vandalism was supported by sufficient evidence, as a rational trier of fact could have found from the landscaping estimate of $2,100 that the cost of performing a complete restoration of the victim's damaged garden would have exceeded $1,000, and a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant acted knowingly when she sprayed the victim's plants in the easement area with a toxin. State v. Goldberg, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's misdemeanor vandalism convictions; the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant knowingly damaged the truck and car without the owner's effective consent and that the damage to each was less than $ 1000. State v. Alexander, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony vandalism because it showed that defendant used a forklift to pick up the victim's pickup truck and flip the truck on its side, the victim stated that his truck was in excellent condition and the insurance adjuster said that the truck was an average to above-average vehicle, the adjuster estimated that the cost to repair the truck was $9,488.24, and because the adjuster determined that the truck was totaled, the victim was written a check for $12,562.83, which was determined to be the value of the truck minus a $250 deductible. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of vandalism because it showed that the victim discovered that the tires on his vehicle had been slashed, a neighbor told the victim that he had seen defendant, who lived only a few houses away from the victim, bend down and stick something near the victim's vehicle one early morning, and that when he approached defendant, defendant left the scene, defendant's sleep study report indicated that he did not go to sleep until after the crime had occurred, and the victim testified that he paid $428 to replace the slashed tires. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

1.5. Evidence Insufficient.

Defendant's vandalism conviction had to be reversed because the only testimony regarding the amount of damages was the inadmissible hearsay testimony of the victim. State v. Hurt, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2020).

2. Compared to Arson.

In common speech, vandalism and arson were separate and distinct activities, Tennessee's criminal statutes also distinguish between vandalism and arson, defining each as a separate and distinct offense, , and as the insurer in this insurance case relied on the criminal statutes, the trial court did not err in considering these statutes. Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 474 S.W.3d 660, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2015), appeal denied, Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Phillips, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).

3. Aggregation of Value.

State does not have to make an election of offenses in prosecutions for theft and vandalism as the State is permitted to aggregate the value of the stolen and vandalized property and prosecute the multiple thefts and acts of vandalism as a single offense. Because the indictment charged defendant with one count of theft and one count of vandalism that occurred between the fall of 2011 and January 2012, even though multiple acts of theft and vandalism might have occurred during that time, the acts were against the same owner, from the same location, and were committed pursuant to a continuing criminal impulse or a single sustained larcenous scheme, and the State could aggregate all of the theft and vandalism allegations into one indictment. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2018).

3.5. Measure of Value.

Cost to repair the victims'  properties in a vandalism case was an appropriate measure of value. State v. Bolton, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2014).

4. Restitution.

In a case in which defendant was convicted of vandalism of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, the trial court erred by ordering that defendant pay $2,095 in restitution because the presentence report did not contain any documentation regarding the amount of the victim's pecuniary loss; the victim did not provide any proof of the value placed on the tires by his insurance company or the precise amount of payment he received from the insurance company; the trial court failed to consider the financial resources and future ability of defendant to pay or perform; and the trial court failed to address the time for payment of the restitution. State v. Beauregard, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2018).

5. Sentence.

Trial court appropriately sentenced defendant for a Class E felony after applying the criminal saving's statute to the vandalism conviction because the punishment applicable to defendant's vandalism conviction moved from a Class D felony to a Class E felony under the amended theft statute, which provided defendant with a “lesser penalty” for his vandalism conviction; the victim stated defendant inflicted $ 2,000 in damages on her van. State v. Swinford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2018).

Theft statute is applicable to a defendant who has committed vandalism at the punishment phase; the vandalism statute specifically provides that after determining value, the defendant shall be punished as for theft under T.C.A. § 39-14-105, and the theft statute is, in effect, a sentencing statute. State v. Swinford, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2018).

39-14-409. Exceptions.

None of the provisions of this part shall be construed in any way to affect the right of eminent domain or prevent surveyors or civil engineers from making such surveys as are necessary and lawful in the discharge of their duties.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section maintains prior law and is designed to make it clear that the commission does not intend for trespass and related offenses to impair eminent domain law or the capacity of surveyors to perform their duties.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-14-410. Timber.

  1. It is the duty of any sawmill owner or operator or other person purchasing timber in the form of logs, dye wood, cord wood, hickory blocks, stave blocks, hoop poles, cross ties, shrubbery or any other kind of timber from the lands sold to the state for taxes or other state-owned land or lands belonging to an individual, firm or corporation, to obtain from the seller a bill of sale for the same or other evidence of ownership which shall be preserved by the purchaser for a period of one (1) year and shall be available for inspection to any person concerned in such timber.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Torts — 1957 Tennessee Survey (John W. Wade), 10 Vand. L. Rev. 1218 (1957).

39-14-411. Critical infrastructure vandalism.

  1. A person who knowingly destroys, injures, interrupts, or interferes with critical infrastructure or its operation commits the offense of critical infrastructure vandalism.
  2. As used in this section, “critical infrastructure” includes, but is not limited to, the infrastructure of the following services to the general public:
    1. Telephone, telegraph, television, internet, or other telecommunication services;
    2. Electric, heat, natural gas, or other power or energy services;
    3. The distribution of crude or refined liquid petroleum products or natural gas, and the pipelines, pumping stations, terminals, and equipment necessary for operation of the facility;
    4. Water, wastewater, or sewer services; and
    5. Railroads and other transportation services.
  3. The critical infrastructure of a utility or company is included in this section whether the critical infrastructure is in operation, idle, or under construction.
  4. A violation of this section shall be punished as theft under § 39-14-103, and graded in accordance with § 39-14-105. However, in no event shall punishment for a violation of this section be less than a Class E felony.

Acts 1990, ch. 844, § 1; 1992, ch. 832, § 1; 2019, ch. 370, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote this section which read: “(a)  A person who knowingly destroys, injures, interrupts, or interferes with critical infrastructure or its operation commits the offense of critical infrastructure vandalism.“(b)  As used in this section, “critical infrastructure” includes, but is not limited to, the infrastructure of the following services to the general public:“(1)  Telephone, telegraph, television, internet, or other telecommunication services;“(2)  Electric, heat, natural gas, or other power or energy services;“(3)  The distribution of crude or refined liquid petroleum products or natural gas, and the pipelines, pumping stations, terminals, and equipment necessary for operation of the facility;“(4)  Water, wastewater, or sewer services; and“(5)  Railroads and other transportation services.“(c)  The critical infrastructure of a utility or company is included in this section whether the critical infrastructure is in operation, idle, or under construction.“(d)  A violation of this section shall be punished as theft under § 39-14-103, and graded in accordance with § 39-14-105. However, in no event shall punishment for a violation of this section be less than a Class E felony.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 370, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Fraud, theft or intentional destruction of utility services or property, title 65, ch. 35.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Vandalism, § 39-14-408.

39-14-412. Mailbox tampering — Damage or defacement of government property.

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly damage, destroy, remove or otherwise tamper with a residential mailbox or other container such person knows or reasonably should know is used for the receipt or deposit of United States mail. Any person convicted of violating this subsection (a) shall be sentenced to not less than twenty-five (25) hours of public service work.
  2. It is an offense for any person to knowingly damage or deface real or personal property of the state, or a subdivision thereof, by the painting or other permanent application of graffiti directly onto the property.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class B misdemeanor. All violations shall be punished by at least twenty-five (25) hours of community service work to be determined by the court.
    2. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor. In any sentence imposed for a violation of subsection (b), the court shall include an order of restitution for any property damage or loss incurred as a result of the offense.

Acts 1990, ch. 1010, § 1; 1992, ch. 769, § 1; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 16.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3, in (c)(1), substituted “subsection (a)” for “this section” and added (c)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

39-14-413. Throwing, shooting, etc., object, missile, etc., at trains, buses, motorcycles, vessels, etc.

  1. It is an offense for a person to intentionally throw, hurl or project a stone or other hard substance, or shoot a missile, at a train, locomotive, railway car, caboose, street railway car, bus, motorcycle, steam vessel or other watercraft used for carrying passengers or freight on any of the waters within or bordering on this state.
  2. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1992, ch. 691, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-414. Equal Access to Public Property Act of 2012 — Protection of state property.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Equal Access to Public Property Act of 2012.”
  2. As used in this section, “camping” means:
    1. Any of the following at any time between ten o'clock p.m. (10:00 p.m.) and seven o'clock a.m. (7:00 a.m.):
      1. Erecting, placing, maintaining, leaving, allowing to remain, or using a piece of furniture, tent, raised tarp, or other temporary shelter, structure, or furniture;
      2. Placing or storing personal belongings for future use, including storing food for consumption; or
      3. Carrying on cooking activities, whether by fire or use of artificial means, such as a propane stove or other heat-producing portable cooking equipment;
    2. Sleeping or making preparations to sleep, including laying down a sleeping bag, blanket, or other material used for bedding;
    3. Making a fire or preparing to make a fire; or
    4. Doing any digging or earth breaking.
  3. An area of state-owned land may be designated as a camping area by the department, agency, official or officials responsible for the operation, protection or maintenance of the property in question. The area's designation as a camping area may be accomplished by means of signage, advertisement or other notice designed to make known its availability for the activity of camping.
    1. It is an offense for a person to engage in camping on property owned by the state knowing that the area on which the camping occurs is not specifically designated for use as a camping area by the department or agency responsible for the land.
    2. The department, agency, official, or officials responsible for the operation, protection, or maintenance of the property may designate an area as a camping area by means of signage, advertisement, or other notice designed to make known its availability for camping. However, a person shall not be guilty of a violation of subdivision (d)(1) unless the person was notified by an official responsible for the protection of the property in question that camping is prohibited and continued to engage in camping or returned within twenty-four (24) hours of the warning and continued to engage in camping.
    3. A person is not guilty of a violation of subdivision (d)(1) if the person was given permission or authorization by the department, agency, or official responsible for the operation, protection, or maintenance of the property to engage in camping on the property.
    4. Any items used to commit a violation of this section, including items abandoned at the location of the offense, are subject to confiscation, seizure, and claiming in accordance with subsection (e).
  4. Any property subject to confiscation or seizure under subsection (d), unclaimed in connection with a violation of subsection (d), or left unattended after arrest or issuance of a citation for camping in violation of subsection (d), and taken into state custody shall be held by the state agency or its agent in a secure location for a period of ninety (90) days. Notice containing the contact information of the state agency or agent holding the property must be posted at the nearest reasonable location to the place from which the property was removed. If the property is not claimed within ninety (90) days of being taken into custody, the property is deemed abandoned and the agency or agent may dispose of the property, unless the property is needed for evidence in a criminal proceeding. If a person claiming any such property within ninety (90) days of the property being taken into custody produces identification and signs a release form providing the person's name and contact information and swearing under oath that the property belongs to the person, the state agency or agent shall return the property to the person, unless the property is needed for evidence in a criminal proceeding, in which case the property shall be returned following the conclusion of that proceeding. The state agency or agent may charge such persons a reasonable storage fee for storing the property. The state and its employees, agents, and contractors are immune from liability for property confiscated in compliance with this subsection (e).
  5. A violation of this section is a Class E felony. In any sentence imposed for a violation of this section, the court shall include an order of restitution for any property damage or loss incurred as a result of the offense.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting or preventing a state department or agency with responsibility for state property from enacting or enforcing other lawful and reasonable rules, regulations, or statutes that concern the use of and access to state property. However, if any such rule, regulation or statute is in conflict with this section, it is the intent that this section shall prevail and the prohibition against camping on state property in areas not designated as camping areas be a uniform one.

Acts 2012, ch. 535, § 1; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, §§ 17-20.

Compiler's Notes.  For the Preamble of the act regarding equal access to public property, please refer to Acts 2012, ch. 535.

For the Preamble to the act concerning rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 rewrote (b), which read: “(b) As used in this section:“(1) ‘Camping’ means the erection or use of temporary structures such as tents, tarps, and other temporary shelters for living accommodation activities such as sleeping, or making preparations to sleep;“(2) ‘Camping’ includes, but is not limited to, the laying down of bedding for the purpose of sleeping, storing personal belongings, making any fire, doing any digging or earth breaking or carrying on cooking activities, whether by fire or use of artificial means such as a propane stove or other heat-producing portable cooking equipment.”; in (d), deleted “the activity of” preceding “camping on”, substituted “the land” for “such land” at the end, and added (d)(2)-(d)(4); rewrote (e), which read: “(e) Any items associated with camping in violation of this section, including tents, portable toilets, sleeping bags, tarps, stakes, ropes, blankets, propane heaters, cooking equipment and generators, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture by the appropriate state officials authorized to maintain and protect the land on which the camping equipment is found or other officials whose duties include enforcement of this section.”; and in (f), substituted “Class E felony” for “Class A misdemeanor” and added the second sentence.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

State parks, title 11, ch. 3.

Part 5
Litter Control

39-14-501. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Commercial purpose” means litter discarded by a business, corporation, association, partnership, sole proprietorship, or any other entity conducting business for economic gain, or by an employee or agent of the entity;
  2. “Garbage” includes putrescible animal and vegetable waste resulting from the handling, preparation, cooking and consumption of food;
  3. “Litter” includes garbage, refuse, rubbish and all other waste material, including a tobacco product as defined in § 39-17-1503 and any other item primarily designed to hold or filter a tobacco product while the tobacco is being smoked;
  4. “Refuse” includes all putrescible and nonputrescible solid waste; and
  5. “Rubbish” includes nonputrescible solid waste consisting of both combustible and noncombustible waste.

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

Cross-References. Litter prevention and control, title 4, ch. 7, part 3.

Litter removal as penalty for driving while intoxicated, § 55-10-402.

39-14-502. Offense of littering.

  1. A person commits littering who:
    1. Knowingly places, drops or throws litter on any public or private property without permission and does not immediately remove it;
    2. Negligently places or throws glass or other dangerous substances on or adjacent to water to which the public has access for swimming or wading, or on or within fifty feet (50') of a public highway; or
    3. Negligently discharges sewage, minerals, oil products or litter into any public waters or lakes within this state.
  2. Whenever litter is placed, dropped, or thrown from any motor vehicle, boat, airplane, or other conveyance in violation of this section, the trier of fact may, in its discretion and in consideration of the totality of the circumstances, infer that the operator of the conveyance has committed littering.
  3. Whenever litter discovered on public or private property is found to contain any article or articles, including, but not limited to, letters, bills, publications, or other writings that display the name of a person in such a manner as to indicate that the article belongs or belonged to that person, the trier of fact may, in its discretion and in consideration of the totality of the circumstances, infer that the person has committed littering.

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

39-14-503. Offense of mitigated criminal littering.

  1. Mitigated criminal littering is littering in an amount less than or equal to five pounds (5 lbs.) in weight or seven and one-half (7.5) cubic feet in volume.
  2. Mitigated criminal littering is a Class C misdemeanor punishable by a fine of fifty dollars ($50.00) and as provided in subsections (c) and (d).
  3. A person charged with a violation of this section may, in lieu of appearance in court, submit the applicable fifty dollar ($50.00) fine to the clerk of the court that has jurisdiction of the offense within the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed. A person paying in this manner is not subject to subsection (d), and, in the discretion of the judge, may be excused from paying court costs for the offense.
  4. In addition to the penalties established in this section, the court shall require a person convicted under this section to remove litter from the state or local highway system, public playgrounds, public parks or other appropriate public locations for not more than forty (40) hours. The court, in its discretion, may also require a person convicted under this section to work in a recycling center or other appropriate location for any stated period of time not to exceed eight (8) hours.

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-504. Offense of criminal littering.

  1. Criminal littering is littering in an amount more than five pounds (5 lbs.) in weight or seven and one-half (7.5) cubic feet in volume and less than or equal to ten pounds (10 lbs.) in weight or fifteen (15) cubic feet in volume.
  2. Criminal littering is a Class B misdemeanor.
  3. In addition to the penalties established in this section, the court shall require a person convicted under this section to remove litter from the state or local highway system, public playgrounds, public parks or other appropriate public locations for not more than eighty (80) hours. The court, in its discretion, may also require a person convicted under this section to work in a recycling center or other appropriate location for any stated period of time not to exceed eight (8) hours.

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Insufficient.

Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the criminal littering conviction under T.C.A. § 39-14-504, because the State did not present sufficient evidence that the items littered weighed over five pounds, as required for classification of the conviction as a Class B misdemeanor. McCullough v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 210 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2020).

39-14-505. Offense of aggravated criminal littering.

  1. Aggravated criminal littering is littering:
    1. In an amount exceeding ten pounds (10 lbs.) in weight or fifteen (15) cubic feet in volume; or
    2. In any amount for any commercial purpose.
  2. Aggravated criminal littering is a Class A misdemeanor; provided:
    1. If the amount of litter exceeds one hundred pounds (100 lbs.) in weight or thirty (30) cubic feet in volume, then the defendant is subject to imprisonment as provided by law or a fine not less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), nor more than four thousand dollars ($4,000), or both; and
    2. Aggravated criminal littering is a Class E felony upon:
      1. The third conviction in any amount exceeding ten pounds (10 lbs.) in weight or fifteen (15) cubic feet in volume; or
      2. The second conviction in any amount exceeding one thousand pounds (1,000 lbs.) in weight or two hundred (200) cubic feet in volume or in any amount for any commercial purpose.
  3. In addition to the penalties established in this section, the court shall require a person convicted under subsection (a) to remove litter from the state or local highway system, public playgrounds, public parks or other appropriate public locations for not more than one hundred sixty (160) hours. The court, in its discretion, may also require a person convicted under this section to work in a recycling center or other appropriate location for any stated period of time not to exceed eight (8) hours.

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1; 2014, ch. 797, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

Acts 2014, ch. 797, § 2 provided that the act, which amended subsection (b), shall apply to prohibited conduct occurring on or after July 1, 2014.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-14-506. Additional penalties.

In addition to the penalties established in this part, the court may, in its discretion, require a person convicted under this part to remove any substance listed under § 39-14-501 that was dropped, placed or discharged by the person and restore the property or waters damaged by the littering to its former condition at the person's expense.

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

39-14-507. Motor vehicles transporting litter.

    1. Any motor vehicle that transports litter or any material likely to fall or be blown off onto the highways, shall be required to have such material either in an enclosed space or fully covered by a tarpaulin.
    2. If the motor vehicle is a noncommercial, not-for-hire pickup truck, this subsection (a) shall be construed to be complied with if the material on the noncommercial, not-for-hire pickup truck is secured in such a way as to reasonably ensure it will not fall or be blown off the vehicle.
    3. All other pickup trucks and other motor vehicles are required to comply with subdivision (a)(1).
    4. Any motor vehicle having a gross weight of less than sixteen thousand pounds (16,000 lbs.) that is transporting litter to an energy recovery facility, as defined in § 68-211-501, shall be required to have the material in an enclosed space, unless it is a motor vehicle with a factory installed hydraulic lift system that lifts the entire bed of the truck.
    5. This subsection (a) does not apply to motor vehicles transporting recovered materials to a convenience center or scrap dealer for recycling.
    6. This section shall not apply to motor vehicles that transport crushed stone, fill dirt and rock, soil, bulk sand, coal, phosphate muck, asphalt, concrete, other building materials, forest products, unfinished lumber, agricultural lime and agricultural products, and that are loaded in compliance with the four inch (4") requirement of § 55-7-109. This exemption shall not apply to any load if any law enforcement officer sees any part of the material blowing off the vehicle. This section shall also not apply to motor vehicles that transport farm produce going to market, or from field to field, or from field to storage.
  1. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor. In addition to the penalties for a Class B misdemeanor, the court may, in its discretion, impose any of the penalties set forth in § 39-14-503(d).

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

Cross-References. Loose material hauled in open truck bed, § 55-7-109.

Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-508. County legislative resolutions for litter control — Regulations — Litter removal by property owners — Publication of resolution — Construction with other laws.

    1. County legislative bodies may, by resolution, impose regulations for litter control, including the placing, dropping, throwing, collection and storage of garbage, litter, refuse and rubbish on public or private property. The definitions of commercial purposes, garbage, litter, refuse, and rubbish found in § 39-14-501 may be included by reference in the resolution. The county legislative body is authorized to include in the resolution that a violation occurs if a person:
      1. Knowingly places, drops or throws litter on any public or private property without permission and does not immediately remove it; or
      2. Negligently places or throws glass, litter or other dangerous substances on or adjacent to water to which the public has access for swimming or wading, or on or within fifty feet (50') of a public highway.
    2. The regulations in subdivision (a)(1) shall be at least as stringent as this part.
    1. The regulations promulgated in accordance with subsection (a) may grant authority for the county to require property owners to conform their property to the regulations by removal of garbage, litter, refuse or rubbish. The county shall send a statement to the owner itemizing the cost of the removal. If the owner fails to reimburse the county for the cost of the removal within sixty (60) days, the statement shall constitute a lien upon the property. The statement shall constitute a lien upon the property as of the date the notice is filed and shall have priority from the date of the filing of notice, but shall not affect, or have priority over, any valid lien, right, or interest in the property duly recorded, or duly perfected by filing, prior to the filing of the notice and shall not have priority over any real estate tax liens, whether attaching on the property before or after the filing of the notice.
    2. If the property owner is aggrieved by the amount of the lien filed, the owner may submit the matter to the chancery court of the county in which the property is located to determine the appropriate amount of the lien. A decision of that court may be appealed according to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    3. The lien provided in this subsection (b) shall be entered in the records of the register of deeds of the county in which the property lies. The lien shall be satisfied to the extent of the value of the consideration received at the time of the transfer of ownership, and if the lien is not fully satisfied at the time of transfer, it shall remain a lien upon the property until it is fully satisfied.
  1. Each resolution adopted in accordance with subsection (a), or the caption and a complete summary of the resolution, shall be published after its final passage in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. No such resolution shall take effect until the publication.
  2. Any violation of the provisions of or regulations adopted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be punished by imposing a monetary penalty in accordance with § 5-1-121.
  3. This section shall not be construed as applying to any activity regulated pursuant to title 68, chapters 211 or 212 or title 69, chapter 3.

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

39-14-509. Enforcement.

All law enforcement agencies, officers, and officials of this state or any political subdivision of this state, or any enforcement agency, officer, or any official of any commission or authority of this state or any political subdivision of this state is authorized, empowered, and directed to enforce compliance with this part.

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

39-14-510. Proceeds from fines — Rewards — Role of county mayor.

  1. All proceeds from the fines imposed by this part shall be deposited in the general fund of the county where the offense occurred and designated for county operating costs with preference given to litter prevention programs and education such as those conducted by Keep America Beautiful.
  2. Any person who reports information to a law enforcement officer that leads to the apprehension and conviction of a person for mitigated criminal littering shall receive a reward of fifty dollars ($50.00). Any person who reports information to a law enforcement officer that leads to the apprehension and conviction of a person for criminal littering or aggravated criminal littering shall receive a reward of two hundred fifty dollars ($250). The county where the offense occurred shall provide the reward money from the proceeds of the mandatory fines collected under this section.
    1. The mayor of each county shall be the administrative official for this part, with the exception of the exclusions set out in § 39-14-511. The county mayor shall ensure that the program is administered according to this part.
    2. The county mayor shall be empowered to authorize disbursements from the county's general fund from the proceeds deposited under subsection (a) for enforcement of this part covering all litter prevention, control and education programs to be funded.
    3. The county mayor shall be further empowered to enter into agreements with city mayors or city managers within the mayor's county as to disbursements of moneys for violations of litter control and prevention laws that occur within municipal boundaries.
  3. Each county shall establish the necessary fiscal structure within its accounting system to provide for proper monitoring and auditing of its receipts and disbursements under subsection (c).

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1; 2009, ch. 382, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

39-14-511. Jurisdiction.

In counties with an environmental court designated pursuant to Acts 1991, chapter 426, the courts shall exercise exclusive general sessions jurisdiction,  over this part, pursuant to title 40.

Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 5, §§ 39-14-50139-14-504 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 900, §§ 1, 2; 1996, ch. 1023, § 1; 1997, ch. 192, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 680, § 1; 1999, ch. 287, § 1; 2005, ch. 214, § 1), concerning litter control, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2007, ch. 595, § 1, effective July 1, 2007.

Part 6
Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act of 2003

39-14-601. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Access” means to approach, instruct, communicate, or connect with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system, or computer network, or information exchanged from any communication between computers or authorized computer users and electronic, electromagnetic, electrochemical, acoustic, mechanical, or other means;
  2. “Authorization” means any and all forms of consent, including both implicit and explicit consent;
  3. “Computer” means a device or collection of devices, including its support devices, peripheral equipment, or facilities, and the communication systems connected to it which can perform functions including, but not limited to, substantial computation, arithmetic or logical operations, information storage or retrieval operations, capable of being used with external files, one (1) or more operations which contain computer programs, electronic instructions, allows for the input of data, and output data (such operations or communications can occur with or without intervention by a human operator during the processing of a job);
  4. “Computer contaminants” means any set of computer instructions that are designed to modify or in any way alter, damage, destroy, or disrupt the proper operation of a computer system, or computer network without the intent or authorization of the owner of the information. They include, but are not limited to, a group of computer instructions commonly called viruses or worms, which are self-replicating or self-propagating and are designed to contaminate other computer programs or computer data, consume computer resources, modify, destroy, record or transmit data, or in some other fashion usurp the normal operation of the computer, computer system, or computer network. Such contaminants may include viruses or worms, which terms shall have the following meanings:
    1. “Virus” means a migrating program which, at least, attaches itself to the operating system of any computer it enters and can infect any other computer that has access to an “infected” computer; and
    2. “Worm” means a computer program or virus that spreads and multiplies, eventually causing a computer to “crash” or cease functioning, but does not attach itself to the operating system of the computer it “infects”;
  5. “Computer network” means a set of two (2) or more computer systems that transmit data over communication circuits connecting them, and input/output devices including, but not limited to, display terminals and printers, which may also be connected to telecommunication facilities;
  6. “Computer program” means an ordered set of data that are coded instructions or statements that, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to process data;
  7. “Computer software” means a set of computer programs, procedures, and associated documentation concerned with the operation of a computer, computer system, or computer network whether imprinted or embodied in the computer in any manner or separate from it, including the supporting materials for the software and accompanying documentation;
  8. “Computer system” means a set of connected devices including a computer and other devices including, but not limited to, one (1) or more of the following: data input, output, or storage devices, data communication circuits, and operating system computer programs that make the system capable of performing data processing tasks;
  9. “Data” means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions which is being prepared or has been prepared in a formalized manner, and is intended to be stored or processed, or is being stored or processed, or has been stored or processed in a computer, computer system, or computer network;
  10. “Electronic mail service provider” means any person who:
    1. Is an intermediary in sending or receiving electronic mail; and
    2. Provides to end-users of electronic mail services the ability to send or receive electronic mail;
  11. “Financial instrument” includes, but is not limited to, any check, cashier's check, draft, warrant, money order, certificate of deposit, negotiable instrument, letter of credit, bill of exchange, credit card, debit card, marketable security, or any computer system representation thereof;
  12. “Input” means data, facts, concepts, or instructions in a form appropriate for delivery to, or interpretation or processing by, a computer;
  13. “Intellectual property” includes data, which may be in any form including, but not limited to, computer printouts, magnetic storage media, punched cards, or may be stored internally in the memory of a computer;
  14. “Local exchange company” includes telecommunications service providers as defined in § 65-4-101; competing telecommunications service providers as such term is defined in § 65-4-101; telephone cooperatives; cellular or other wireless telecommunications providers; and interactive computer service providers as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(f);
  15. “Output” means data, facts, concepts or instructions produced or retrieved by computers from computers or computer memory storage devices;
  16. “Owner” means an owner or lessee of a computer or a computer network, or an owner, lessee or licensee of computer data, computer programs, or computer software;
  17. “Property” shall include:
    1. Real property;
    2. Computers and computer networks; and
    3. Financial instruments, computer data, computer programs, computer software, and all other personal property regardless of whether they are:
      1. Tangible or intangible;
      2. In a format readable by humans or by a computer;
      3. In transit between computers or within a computer network or between any devices which comprise a computer; or
      4. Located on any paper or in any device in which it is stored by a computer or by a human;
  18. “Services” includes, but is not limited to, the use of a computer, a computer system, a computer network, computer software, computer program, or data to perform tasks;
  19. “System hacker” means any person who knowingly accesses and without authorization alters, damages, deletes, destroys, or otherwise uses any data, computer, computer system, or computer network; and
  20. “To process” means to use a computer to put data through a systematic sequence of operations for the purpose of producing a specified result.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1993, ch. 445, § 1; 2003, ch. 317, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 317, § 1, provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act of 2003.”

47 U.S.C. § 230, referred to in this section, concerns protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material.

Cross-References. Fees in criminal prosecutions, § 40-3-204.

Law Reviews.

Electronic Surveillance in Family Law, 50 Tenn. B.J. 28 (2014).

Keep your Friends Close:  A Framework for Addressing Rights to Social Media Contacts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1459 (2014).

39-14-602. Violations — Penalties.

  1. Whoever knowingly, directly or indirectly, accesses, causes to be accessed, or attempts to access any telephone system, telecommunications facility, computer software, computer program, data, computer, computer system, computer network, or any part thereof, for the purpose of:
    1. Obtaining money, property, or services for oneself or another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises violates this subsection (a) and is subject to the penalties of § 39-14-105;
    2. Causing computer output to purposely be false for, but not limited to, the purpose of obtaining money, property, or services for oneself or another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises violates this subsection (a) and is subject to the penalties of § 39-14-105; or
    3. Effecting the creation or alteration of a financial instrument or of an electronic transfer of funds with the intent to disrupt, alter, misappropriate, or commit fraud violates this subsection (a) and is subject to the penalties of § 39-14-105.
  2. Whoever intentionally and without authorization, directly or indirectly:
    1. Accesses any computer, computer system, or computer network commits a Class C misdemeanor. Operating a computer network in such a way as to allow anonymous access to that network shall constitute implicit consent to access under this part;
    2. Alters, damages, destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, or causes the disruption to the proper operation of any computer, or who performs an act which is responsible for the disruption of any computer, computer system, computer network, computer software, program, or data which resides or exists internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network is punishable as in § 39-14-105;
    3. Introduces or is responsible for the malicious input of any computer contaminant into any computer, computer system, or computer network commits a Class B misdemeanor;
    4. Accesses, causes to be accessed, or attempts to access any computer software, computer network, or any part thereof, for the purpose of maliciously gaining access to computer material or to tamper maliciously with computer security devices including, but not limited to, system hackers, commits a Class A misdemeanor; or
    5. Makes or causes to be made an unauthorized copy, in any form, including, but not limited to, any printed or electronic form of computer data, computer programs, or computer software residing in, communicated by, or produced by a computer or computer network commits an offense punishable as provided in § 39-14-105.
  3. Whoever receives, conceals, uses, or aids another in receiving, concealing, or using any proceeds resulting from a violation of either subsection (a) or subdivision (b)(2), knowing the proceeds to be the result of such violation, or whoever receives, conceals, uses, or aids another in receiving, concealing, or using any books, records, documents, property, financial instrument, computer software, program, or other material, property, or objects, knowing that the item has been used in violating either subsection (a) or subdivision (b)(2) is subject to the penalties of § 39-14-105.
  4. Any person who violates this section in connection with an act of terrorism commits a Class A felony.
  5. Any person who accesses, causes to be accessed, or attempts to access a digital asset pursuant to the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, compiled in title 35, chapter 8, is not in violation of this part.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1993, ch. 445, § 1; 2002, ch. 849, § 4; 2003, ch. 317, § 3; 2006, ch. 809, § 1; 2016, ch. 570, § 20.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 317, § 1, provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act of 2003.”

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A, B and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Generally.

Although individual's failure to tell his employer that he was planning to resign was not completely forthright, he did not misrepresent that he was employed by another company as a pressure washer engineer, and as such he had the right to view and access defendant's data; therefore, plaintiff could prove no set of facts that could have established a violation of T.C.A. § 39-14-602(a)(1). Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53021 (W.D. Tenn. July 11, 2008).

Where a sergeant for a city parks department failed to state a claim under the Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act by access to her Blackberry by others in her department because the BlackBerry was the property of the city and it was provided to her for official use only, and there was no showing that an employee retains a property interest in an employer-owned and employer-furnished BlackBerry, her claim failed because she did not allege that any defendant actually intended to destroy the information on the device. Desoto v. Bd. of Parks & Rec., — F. Supp. 2d —,  2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165714 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 25, 2014).

39-14-603. Unsolicited bulk electronic mail.

  1. It is an offense for a person without authority to falsify or forge electronic mail transmission information or other routing information in any manner in connection with the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail through or into the computer network of an electronic mail service provider or its subscribers.
  2. Transmission of electronic mail from an organization to its members shall not be deemed to be the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail as prohibited by this section.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with or prohibit terms or conditions in a contract or license related to computers, computer data, computer networks, computer operations, computer programs, computer services, or computer software or to create any liability by reason of terms or conditions adopted by or technical measures implemented by a Tennessee-based electronic mail service provider to prevent the transmission of unsolicited electronic mail in violation of this section.
  4. As used in this section, “without authority” means a person who uses a computer, a computer network, or the computer services of an electronic mail service provider to transmit unsolicited bulk mail in contravention of the authority granted by or in violation of the policies set by the electronic mail service provider.
  5. The transmission of electronic signals by a local exchange company to the extent that the local exchange company merely carries that transmission over its network shall not be deemed to be the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail as prohibited by this section.
  6. A violation of this section shall be punished according to the damage to the property of another caused by the violation and shall be graded as provided in § 39-14-105.

Acts 2003, ch. 317, §§ 4, 8.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 317, § 1, provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act of 2003.”

Former § 39-14-603, concerning venue, was transferred to § 39-14-605 in 2003.

39-14-604. Civil action — Damages, attorney fees, and costs.

  1. Any person whose property or person is injured by reason of a violation of any provision of this part may file a civil action and recover for any damages sustained and the costs of the civil action. Without limiting the generality of the term, “damages” shall include loss of profits.
  2. If the injury arises from the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail, the injured person, other than an electronic mail service provider, may also recover attorney's fees and costs, and may elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the lesser of ten dollars ($10.00) for each and every unsolicited bulk electronic mail message transmitted in violation of this part, or one thousand dollars ($1,000) per day. The injured person shall not have a cause of action against the electronic mail service provider that merely transmits the unsolicited bulk electronic mail over its computer network.
  3. If the injury arises from the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail, an injured electronic mail service provider may also recover attorney's fees and costs and may elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the greater of ten dollars ($10.00) for each and every unsolicited bulk electronic mail message transmitted in violation of this part, or one thousand dollars ($1,000) per day.
  4. At the request of any party to an action brought pursuant to this section, the court may, in its discretion, conduct all legal proceedings in such a way as to protect the secrecy and security of the computer, computer network, computer data, computer program, and computer software involved in order to prevent possible recurrence of the same or a similar act by another person and to protect any trade secrets of any party. This section shall not be construed to limit any person's right to pursue any additional civil remedy otherwise allowed by law.

Acts 2003, ch. 317, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 317, § 1, provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act of 2003.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Generally.

Assertion that the Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act only provides for criminal penalties is clearly wrong. Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84713 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2008).

Sergeant for city parks department failed to state a claim under the Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act by access to her Blackberry by others in her department because the BlackBerry was the property of the city and it was provided to her for official use only, and there was no showing that an employee retains a property interest in an employer-owned and employer-furnished BlackBerry. Desoto v. Bd. of Parks & Rec., — F. Supp. 2d —,  2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165714 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 25, 2014).

39-14-605. Venue.

For the purposes of venue under this part, any violation of this part shall be considered to have been committed:

  1. In any county in which any act was performed in furtherance of any transaction violating this part;
  2. In any county in which any violator had control or possession of any proceeds of the violation or of any books, records, documents, property, financial instrument, computer software, computer program, or other material, objects, or items which were used in furtherance of the violation; and
  3. In any county from which, to which, or through which, any access to a computer, computer system, or computer network was made, whether by wire, electromagnetic waves, microwaves, or any other means of communication.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A. § 39-14-603; Acts 2003, ch. 317, § 6.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 317, § 1, provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act of 2003.”

39-14-606. Transmission of electronic signals by a local exchange company.

The transmission of electronic signals by a local exchange company to the extent that the local exchange company merely carries that transmission over its network shall not be deemed to be the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail as prohibited by this part.

Acts 2003, ch. 317, § 8.

Part 7
Criminal Instruments

39-14-701. Possession of burglary tools.

A person who possesses any tool, machine or implement with intent to use the same, or allow the same to be used, to commit any burglary, commits a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 5 Tenn. Juris., Burglary and Housebreaking, § 3.

Law Reviews.

Selected Tennessee Legislation of 1986, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 457 (1987).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Rice, 973 S.W.2d 639, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Defendant's conviction for possession of burglary tools was supported by sufficient evidence as the evidence showed that defendant was seen approaching the officer while at the scene of the burglary with a bag and a bicycle, and a search of the bag revealed a black jacket, gloves, a mask, a sledgehammer, and screwdrivers. Moreover, the building in question had visible signs of forced entry. State v. Watkins, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1053 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. May 7, 2013).

Evidence strongly supported defendant's convictions of burglary, theft, and possession of burglary tools, given in part that the various owners' property had been stolen from their property, certain stolen items were confiscated from defendant's brother's truck or possessed by a witness, who said defendant sold him the items, defendant admitted stealing from one property, and while he denied stealing from the others, witness credibility was for the jury to determine. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 861 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 1061 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the burglary because he and his codefendant were at a market located near the schools hours after the burglary, a detective recovered tools, clothing, and gloves from defendant's vehicle, the clothes matched those worn by the masked perpetrators, defendant admitted ownership of the tools, the tools contained pain scrapings consistent with the pain of the ATM, and the tools created some of the markings found on the ATM. State v. Way, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2018).

39-14-702. Possession of explosive components.

  1. A person commits an offense who unlawfully possesses any component part of an explosive including, but not limited to, a fuse cap, detonator or wiring, with the intent to produce or manufacture an explosive device.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
  3. This section shall not apply to a component part of an explosive solely intended to be used in creating an exploding target for use in lawful sporting activity, when the part is possessed by a person eighteen (18) years of age or older.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2015, ch. 397, § 2.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-703. Possession of tools to interfere with anti-theft security devices.

  1. It is an offense to possess any device, tool, machine, implement or other item with the intent to use it or allow it to be used to unlawfully deactivate, circumvent, interfere with, remove or otherwise render inoperative a monitor, sensor, camera or other security device used or designed to prevent or deter the theft of retail merchandise.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 2009, ch. 83, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-14-704. Offense of selling, purchasing, possessing, installing, transferring or using automated sales suppression device, zapper or phantom-ware.

  1. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Automated sales suppression device” or “zapper” means a software program, carried on a memory stick or removable compact disc, accessed through an internet link, or accessed through any other means, that falsifies the electronic records of electronic cash registers and other point-of-sale systems, including, but not limited to, transaction data and transaction reports;
    2. “Electronic cash register” means a device that keeps a register or supporting documents through the means of an electronic device or computer system designed to record transaction data for the purpose of computing, compiling, or processing retail sales transaction data;
    3. “Phantom-ware” means a hidden, preinstalled, or installed at a later time programming option embedded in the operating system of an electronic cash register or hardwired into the electronic cash register that can be used to create a virtual second till or may eliminate or manipulate transaction records that may or may not be preserved in digital formats to represent the true or manipulated record of transactions in the electronic cash register;
    4. “Transaction data” means data associated with items purchased by a customer, the price for each item, a taxability determination for each item, a segregated tax amount for each of the taxed items, the amount of cash or credit tendered, the net amount returned to the customer in change, the date and time of the purchase, the name, address, and identification number of the vendor, and the receipt or invoice number of the transaction; and
    5. “Transaction report” means a report documenting data, including, but not limited to, data associated with sales, taxes collected, media totals, and discount voids at an electronic cash register that is printed on cash register tape at the end of a day or shift, or a report documenting every action at an electronic cash register that is stored electronically.
  2. It is an offense for a corporation or individual to knowingly sell, purchase, possess, install, transfer or use any automated sales suppression device, zapper or phantom-ware.
  3. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony punishable by a fine only up to one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
  4. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the person purchased, possessed, installed, transferred or used an automated sales suppression device, zapper or phantom-ware for a legitimate purpose.
  5. The offense created by this section shall be in addition to and considered a separate offense from any offense related to the nonpayment of taxes owed to the state or any political subdivision thereof.
    1. Any automated sales suppression device, zapper or phantom-ware or any device containing an automated sales suppression device, zapper or phantom-ware is contraband and is subject to seizure, confiscation and forfeiture in accordance with chapter 11, part 7 of this title.
    2. After any contraband under subdivision (f)(1) has been forfeited to the state pursuant to chapter 11, part 7 of this title, the court hearing the criminal charges resulting in the forfeiture shall order the destruction of the contraband. If the district attorney general or law enforcement agency does not believe that the contraband should be destroyed in a particular case, the district attorney general shall petition the court for an alternate disposition of the contraband. If the court finds that the proposed alternate disposition reasonably ensures that the contraband will not be used in an unlawful manner in this state, the court may grant the petition and order the disposition of the contraband in accordance with the petition.
    1. Where a person reports a violation of subsection (b) to law enforcement in good faith, the report and the identity of the person shall remain confidential, except when the court having jurisdiction determines the testimony of the person reporting to be material to an indictment or prosecution.
      1. A person who makes a report to law enforcement under subdivision (g)(1) is entitled to receive fifty percent (50%) of any fine collected by the state against an individual or corporation up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
      2. Where multiple individuals file a report under subdivision (g)(1), each individual is entitled to an equal share of any award under subdivision (g)(2)(A).

Acts 2012, ch. 741, § 1.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Class E felony punishable by fine only.  OAG 12-36, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 36 (3/13/12).

Part 8
Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection

39-14-801. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act.”

Acts 1992, ch. 782, § 2.

Cross-References. Cruelty to animals, title 39, ch. 14, part 2.

39-14-802. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Actor” means a person accused of any of the offenses defined in this part;
  2. “Animal” means any warm-blooded or cold-blooded animal or insect which is being used in food or fiber production, agriculture, research, testing, or education, including, but not limited to, hogs, equines, mules, cattle, sheep, goats, dogs, rabbits, poultry, fish, and bees. “Animal” does not include any animal held primarily as a pet;
  3. “Animal facility” means any vehicle, building, structure, pasture, paddock, pond, impoundment, or premises where an animal is kept, handled, housed, exhibited, bred, or offered for sale and any office, building, or structure where records or documents relating to an animal or to animal research, testing, production, or education are maintained;
  4. “Commissioner” means the commissioner of agriculture;
  5. “Consent” means assent in fact, whether express or implied, by the owner or by a person legally authorized to act for the owner which is not:
    1. Induced by force, threat, false pretenses, or fraud;
    2. Given by a person the actor knows, or should have known, is not legally authorized to act for the owner;
    3. Given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect, if intoxication is known, or should have been known, by the actor to be unable to make reasonable decisions; or
    4. Given solely to detect the commission of an offense;
  6. “Deprive” means unlawfully to withhold from the owner, interfere with the possession of, free, or dispose of an animal or other property;
  7. “Disrupt” means to engage in conduct that materially interferes with the operations of the animal facility in a manner such that the activities conducted by or in the facility are permanently or temporarily halted, compromised, delayed, harmed or impaired;
  8. “Owner” means a person who has title to the property, lawful possession of the property, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor;
  9. “Person” means any individual, corporation, association, nonprofit corporation, joint-stock company, firm, trust, partnership, two (2) or more persons having a joint or common interest, or other legal entity;
  10. “Possession” means actual care, custody, control, or management;
  11. “Property” means any real or personal property and includes any document, record, research data, paper, or computer storage medium; and
  12. “State” means the state of Tennessee.

Acts 1992, ch. 782, § 3; 2014, ch. 893, § 1.

39-14-803. Offenses.

  1. A person commits an offense if, without the consent of the owner, the person acquires or otherwise exercises control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility, or other property from an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of the facility, animal, or property and to disrupt the enterprise conducted at the animal facility.
  2. A person commits an offense if, without the consent of the owner, the person damages or destroys an animal facility or damages, frees, or destroys any animal or property in or on an animal facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility and the damage or loss thereto exceeds five hundred dollars ($500).
    1. A person commits an offense if, without the consent of the owner, the person damages or destroys an animal facility or damages, frees, or destroys any animal or property in or on an animal facility and the damage or loss thereto is five hundred dollars ($500) or less, or enters or remains on an animal facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility, and the person:
      1. Had notice that the entry was forbidden;
      2. Knew or should have known that the animal facility was or had closed to the public; or
      3. Received notice to depart but failed to do so.
    2. For purposes of this subsection (c), “notice” means:
      1. Oral or written communication by the owner or someone with actual or apparent authority to act for the owner;
      2. The presence of fencing or other type of enclosure or barrier designed to exclude intruders or to contain animals; or
      3. A sign or signs posted on the property or at the entrance to the building, reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders, indicating that entry is forbidden.
  3. This part does not apply to, affect, or otherwise prohibit actions taken by the department of agriculture, any other federal, state, or local department or agency, or any official, employee or agent thereof while in the exercise or performance of any power or duty imposed by law or by rule and regulation.

Acts 1992, ch. 782, §§ 4, 5.

39-14-804. Penalties.

  1. A person found to be in violation of any of the offenses defined in § 39-14-803(a) and (b) commits a Class C felony.
  2. Any person violating § 39-14-803(c) commits a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1992, ch. 782, § 5.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

39-14-805. Powers and duties of commissioner.

For purposes of enforcing this part, the commissioner:

  1. May investigate any offense under this part;
  2. May seek the assistance of any law enforcement agency of the United States, the state, or any local government in the conduct of the investigations; and
  3. Shall coordinate the investigation to the maximum extent practicable, with the investigations of any law enforcement agency of the United States, the state, or any local government.

Acts 1992, ch. 782, § 6.

39-14-806. Recovery of damages, fees, costs — Remedies — Injunctions.

  1. Any person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of this part may recover all actual and consequential damages, punitive damages, and court costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, from the person causing the damage.
  2. In addition to the remedies provided in this part or elsewhere in the laws of this state, and notwithstanding the existence of an adequate remedy at law, any person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of this part is authorized to apply to the chancery courts for an injunction or restraining order. The courts shall have jurisdiction, and for good cause shown, shall grant a temporary or permanent injunction or a temporary restraining order restraining or enjoining any person from violating or continuing to violate this part. The injunction or restraining order shall be issued without bond and may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that the violation constitutes a criminal act and notwithstanding the pendency of any criminal prosecution for the same violation.
  3. Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit the exercise of any other rights arising out of or relating to a violation of this part.

Acts 1992, ch. 782, § 7.

Part 9
Money Laundering Offenses

39-14-901. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Money Laundering Act of 1996.”

Acts 1996, ch. 1012, § 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Legislative history of the Money Laundering Act indicated that the gambling laws, T.C.A. § 39-17-501 et seq., were exempted from the definition of “specified unlawful activity” in T.C.A. §§ 39-14-903(b)(1) and 39-14-902(5)(A) and (B) (now 39-14-902(6)(A) and (B)) because a majority of the members of the Tennessee house of representatives did not feel that the money laundering statute should be applied to gambling acts which might be considered minor offenses and because, by implication, the act was designed to enable law enforcement to combat money laundering in other offenses considered to be more serious by the legislative body; thus, the legislative history supported the constitutionality of the money laundering statutes, T.C.A. §§ 39-14-90139-14-903, by establishing that the reasonableness of the classification was at least fairly debatable and, therefore, the money laundering statutes did not violate the equal protection divisions of the Tennessee Constitution, Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 8 and art. I, § 8. State v. Price, 124 S.W.3d 135, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. 2003).

2. Search and Seizure.

In a case where defendant pled guilty to aggravated statutory rape, her motion to suppress was properly denied because an investigator's affidavit stated that individuals who dealt in controlled substances often possessed photographs and/or videotapes of themselves; during the search for methamphetamine, once the officers seized evidence of drug sales and deliveries, the search warrant encompassed the seizure of an electronic storage device that contained two separate videos of what appeared to be an underage male having sex with defendant; and the warrant established a sufficient nexus between the items sought to be seized and defendant's alleged violations of the Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1989 and the Money Laundering Act. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 966 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

39-14-902. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Attorney general” means the district attorneys general and their assistants;
  2. “Financial transaction” means a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, contract, gift, payment, and also includes a withdrawal, transmission of funds, transfer between accounts or deposit, of monetary or negotiable instruments, funds or an exchange of any other property, including, but not limited to, currency, precious metals, stones or jewelry, tickets, stamps or credit in a financial institution. “Financial transaction” does not include:
    1. Any transaction conducted, or attempted, at the request of or in cooperation with any local, state or federal law enforcement official with regard to any person acting at the request of or cooperating with the official when the person knows that the official is making an official request;
    2. Any transaction conducted by a person, corporation or financial institution, in the ordinary course of business, with a duty to comply with any state or federal currency transaction reporting or recording requirements, unless the person, corporation or financial institution shall intentionally violate or circumvent the state or federal currency transaction reporting or recording requirements, but only as to that person, corporation or financial institution;
    3. Any transaction conducted, or attempted, by a person, corporation or financial institution, in the ordinary course of business, which is deemed by the person, corporation or financial institution to be a suspicious transaction or transactions, whether reportable or not under any state or federal currency transaction reporting or recording requirements, where:
      1. The person or corporation reports the suspicious transaction, or a similar transaction conducted previously, to any local, state or federal law enforcement official and the report would not violate any attorney-client privilege; or
      2. In the case of a financial institution, the financial institution reported the transaction, or a related transaction conducted previously, to the institution's primary regulator or to another regulator or law enforcement official pursuant to the directions of the institution's primary regulator; but only with regard to the person, corporation or financial institution making the report; or
    4. Bona fide legal fees received by a licensed attorney;
  3. “Knowingly uses or attempts to use proceeds derived directly or indirectly from a specified unlawful activity” means that any person or party to the transaction or act knew that the property or proceeds involved in the transaction or act represented or constituted, either in whole or in part, proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of any criminal offense under the laws of this state, or any other jurisdiction. A person, corporation or financial institution receiving funds or property in the ordinary course of business shall not have “knowledge” that the funds or property so received represented proceeds of any specified unlawful activity solely because of:
    1. The identity or reputation of the transferor of the funds or property; or
    2. The identity or reputation of an associate of the transferor;
  4. “Proceeds” includes gross profits from the commission of any specified unlawful activity, including property, real, personal or intangible of any kind, acquired or derived, directly or indirectly, from, produced through, realized through or caused by an act or omission;
  5. “Property” means anything of value, and includes any interest in property, including any benefit, privilege, claim or right with respect to anything of value, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible;
    1. “Specified unlawful activity” means any act, including any preparatory or completed offense, committed for financial gain that is punishable as a felony under the laws of this state, or if the act occurred outside this state, would be punishable by confinement for more than one (1) year under the laws of the state in which it occurred; and
    2. “Specified unlawful activity” does not mean an act, including any preparatory or completed offense, committed for financial gain that is punishable under chapter 17, part 5 of this title, or similar provisions of law in another state; and
  6. “Use” and “conduct” means to initiate, conclude, participate, negotiate, transport, conceal, or to aid or abet in such acts.

Acts 1996, ch. 1012, § 1; 2009, ch. 386, § 1; 2012, ch. 851, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Legislative history of the Money Laundering Act indicated that the gambling laws, T.C.A. § 39-17-501 et seq., were exempted from the definition of “specified unlawful activity” in T.C.A. §§ 39-14-903(b)(1) and 39-14-902(5)(A) and (B) (now 39-14-902(6)(A) and (B)) because a majority of the members of the Tennessee House of Representatives did not feel that the money laundering statute should be applied to gambling acts which might be considered minor offenses and because, by implication, the act was designed to enable law enforcement to combat money laundering in other offenses considered to be more serious by the legislative body; thus, the legislative history supported the constitutionality of the money laundering statutes, T.C.A. §§ 39-14-90139-14-903, by establishing that the reasonableness of the classification was at least fairly debatable and, therefore, the money laundering statutes did not violate the equal protection divisions of the Tennessee Constitution, Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 8 and art. I, § 8. State v. Price, 124 S.W.3d 135, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. 2003).

2. Stolen Checks.

Appellate court found that the definition of “property,” which term was referenced in the description of what it meant to “use proceeds,” was sufficiently broad to include stolen checks. State v. Jackson, 124 S.W.3d 139, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

39-14-903. Criminal penalties.

    1. It is an offense to knowingly use, conspire to use or attempt to use proceeds derived directly or indirectly from a specified unlawful activity to conduct or attempt to conduct a financial transaction or make other disposition with the intent to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the criminally derived proceeds.
    2. A violation of this subsection (a) is a Class B felony.
    1. It is an offense to knowingly use proceeds derived directly or indirectly from a specified unlawful activity with the intent to promote, in whole or in part, the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity.
    2. A violation of this subsection (b) is a Class B felony.
    1. It is an offense to knowingly conduct, conspire to conduct, or attempt to conduct a financial transaction or make other disposition involving property or proceeds represented by a law enforcement officer, or by another at the direction of a law enforcement officer, to be the property or proceeds derived from a specified unlawful activity with the intent to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the criminally derived proceeds or with the intent to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity.
    2. This section shall not apply to any transaction conducted, or attempted, by a person, corporation or financial institution, in the ordinary course of business, which is deemed by the person, corporation or financial institution to be a suspicious transaction or transactions, whether reportable or not under any state or federal currency transaction reporting or recording requirements, where:
      1. The person or corporation reports the suspicious transaction, or a similar transaction conducted previously, to any local, state or federal law enforcement official and such report would not violate any attorney-client privilege;
      2. In the case of a financial institution, the financial institution reported the transaction, or a related transaction conducted previously, to the institution's primary regulator or to another regulator or law enforcement official pursuant to the directions of the institution's primary regulator; but only with regard to the person, corporation or financial institution making the report; or
      3. In the case of any other corporation or business entity which reported the transaction or a related transaction conducted previously, to the corporation's or business entity's primary federal or state regulator, any other federal or state regulator or law enforcement official or agency. Failure to so report shall not create an inference that the transaction was a “financial transaction” under this part.
    3. A violation of this subsection (c) is a Class B felony.
    1. It is an offense for a business or other enterprise to knowingly use property, assets, funds, or accounts with intent to obtain, purchase, display, sell, conceal, comingle, or transport criminal proceeds. It is an offense for a business or other enterprise to knowingly use property, assets, funds, or accounts with intent to commit or facilitate any violation of title 71, chapter 5, part 25.
    2. A violation of subdivision (d)(1) is Class E felony punishable only by a fine of five thousand dollars ($5,000) and the forfeiture of assets as herein provided.
    1. It is an offense for a business or other enterprise to knowingly use on five (5) or more separate occasions property, assets, funds, or accounts with intent to obtain, purchase, display, sell, conceal, comingle, or transport criminal proceeds. It is an offense for an individual or business to knowingly use on five (5) or more separate occasions property, assets, funds, or accounts with intent to commit or facilitate any violation of title 71, chapter 5, part 25.
    2. A violation of subdivision (e)(1) is a Class B felony.
  1. All records of a business or enterprise that is in violation of subsection (d) or (e) wherever located shall be obtainable by search warrant or judicial subpoena. The remedies made available under chapter 12, part 2 of this title are hereby made remedies for violations of this section.
  2. All assets and proceeds used in violation of or to facilitate a violation of subsection (d) or (e) shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture. Forfeiture proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with chapter 11, part 7 of this title. Any court having criminal jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary hearing or trial of the criminal offense is empowered to order forfeiture as herein provided.
  3. As used in subsections (d) and (e):
    1. “Criminal proceeds” means items made illegal to possess or sell under chapters 14 or 17 of this title or anything of value obtained from a violation of title 71, chapter 5, part 25; and
    2. “Enterprise” means two (2) or more individuals acting in accord, agreement or in conspiracy to violate any criminal statute.

Acts 1996, ch. 1012, § 2; 2014, ch. 987, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2014, ch. 987, § 2 provided that the act shall apply to acts occurring on or after July 1, 2014.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class B and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Legislative history of the Money Laundering Act indicated that the gambling laws, T.C.A. § 39-17-501 et seq., were exempted from the definition of “specified unlawful activity” in T.C.A. §§ 39-14-903(b)(1) and 39-14-902(5)(A) and (B) (now 39-14-902(6)(A) and (B)) because a majority of the members of the Tennessee house of representatives did not feel that the money laundering statute should be applied to gambling acts which might be considered minor offenses and because, by implication, the act was designed to enable law enforcement to combat money laundering in other offenses considered to be more serious by the legislative body; thus, the legislative history supported the constitutionality of the money laundering statutes, T.C.A. §§ 39-14-90139-14-903, by establishing that the reasonableness of the classification was at least fairly debatable and, therefore, the money laundering statutes did not violate the equal protection divisions of the Tennessee Constitution, Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 8 and art. I, § 8. State v. Price, 124 S.W.3d 135, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. 2003).

2. Applicability.

Defendant's money laundering conviction was reversed and dismissed, and defendant's forgery conviction was reinstated, when it was determined that the Tennessee legislature did not intend that conduct such as simple forgery and attempting to pass forged instruments would also constitute the crime of money laundering. State v. Jackson, 124 S.W.3d 139, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant to an effective sentence of 27 years in confinement for theft of property and money laundering because, while defendant initially cooperated with the police investigation, he eventually quit cooperating with the investigation after hiring counsel, he did not call a law enforcement officer or any other witnesses to corroborate his claims of good behavior, the trial court imposed within-range sentences after considering the principles and purposes of sentencing, defendant was not entitled to probation on the money laundering offenses due to his deceit, abuse of trust, and employment in the public sector and to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. State v. Hughes, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 284 (Tenn. May 16, 2018).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's money laundering conviction as to the counts concerning the purchases of hydroponic equipment, a trailer and tires, a heat sealer, and payments for a storage unit and a rental car where it established that defendant's source of income was the sale of marijuana. State v. Lockhart, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 726 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2015), cert. denied, Lockhart v. Tennessee, 136 S. Ct. 2471, 195 L. Ed. 2d 809, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3909 (U.S. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. From the evidence presented regarding the money that was found by the police, the jury could have rationally concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the money, in whole or in part, derived from the drug trafficking conspiracy in which defendant and his son were engaged. State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of money laundering because it showed that defendant under reported his gross sales for each month in 2011, he failed to remit the appropriate amount of sales tax to the State in each of those months, the money to purchase inventory for defendant's store each month could have come from no source other than the sales at the business, including money that should have been remitted as sales tax to the State. State v. Burkes, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's money laundering verdict; she purchased a house from the seller, giving him a $ 15,000 down payment and providing him with a fake pay stub from a church, yet the State proved there had been only $ 9,000 in non-state money come into the church during this time and defendant had no other known source of income. The jury could have found that defendant used stolen state money as the down payment and that she conducted the transaction with the intent to conceal the source of the funds. State v. Jives-Nealy, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

4. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy launder money where the record failed to show that he was aware of and agreed to participate in his son's drug trafficking organization and all of the money seized from defendant's home was minted prior to 2000 which meant that it was more than likely obtained prior to the drug conspiracy. State v. Tuttle, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2015), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's money laundering conviction as to the counts concerning the purchases of a boat, a car, and theater seating where nothing indicated that defendant purchased the items with the intent to conceal or disguise the criminally derived proceeds. State v. Lockhart, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 726 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2015), cert. denied, Lockhart v. Tennessee, 136 S. Ct. 2471, 195 L. Ed. 2d 809, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3909 (U.S. 2016).

5. Sentencing.

Under the State's theory, defendant's conviction for money laundering arose out of her giving the seller $ 15,000 of the money she had stolen as a down payment on a house, and because the offense dealt with defendant giving the seller money, he did not suffer any pecuniary loss as a direct result of the money laundering, and the trial court erred by awarding the seller restitution. State v. Jives-Nealy, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

Trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering defendant's sentences for theft and money laundering to be served consecutively as she was a professional criminal and used her position as a pastor to steal large sums of money from the funds provided by the state department for human services; while the trial court failed to make the requisite findings necessary to support the imposition of consecutive sentences, only one consecutive sentencing factor needed to exist, which did here. State v. Jives-Nealy, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

Trial court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing defendant to an effective sentence of 24 years for theft and money laundering; the trial court considered proper sentencing factors and defendant did not contest that the trial court properly relied on certain enhancement factors, including a history of convictions, being on probation when the current offenses took place, and being a leader in the commission of the offense, and the application of these factors was supported by the record. State v. Jives-Nealy, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2020).

39-14-904. Joinder of offenses.

A defendant charged with a violation of one (1) or more offenses within § 39-14-903 may also be jointly charged, tried and convicted in a single prosecution for committing any related specified unlawful activity, which shall be separately punished.

Acts 1996, ch. 1012, § 3.

39-14-905. Jurisdiction and venue.

Venue in a criminal prosecution under this part shall be either in the county where one (1) or more elements of the underlying specified unlawful activity occurred, or in the county where one (1) or more elements of a violation of § 39-14-903 occurred or was attempted.

Acts 1996, ch. 1012, § 4.

39-14-906. Criminal intent.

  1. In a prosecution for an offense under this part, the state is not required to prove that the defendant actually knew that the property or proceeds were derived from a specified unlawful activity, so long as the defendant knew that the property or proceeds were derived from some form of criminal activity.
  2. A corporation, the board of directors or the executive officers shall not be responsible for the criminal acts of the corporation's employees; provided, that the corporation has exercised due diligence to prevent the criminal acts. For purposes of this part, a corporation shall be deemed to have exercised due diligence if the criminal acts committed by its employees are in violation of specific corporate policy or instructions, the corporate policy or instructions were communicated to the employees who committed the criminal acts, the corporation had implemented monitoring or supervision procedures reasonably designed to detect violations of its corporate policy or instruction, and the board of directors and executive officers of the corporation acted in good faith.

Acts 1996, ch. 1012, § 5.

39-14-907. Evidence.

In a prosecution under this part, either party may introduce the following evidence pertaining to the issue of whether the property or proceeds were known to be from some form of specified unlawful activity that:

  1. A financial transaction was conducted or structured in violation of the reporting requirements of any state or federal law;
  2. Money or any negotiable instrument was found in proximity to contraband or instrumentalities of an offense;
  3. A financial transaction was conducted with the use of a false or fictitious name; or
  4. A financial transaction was structured so as to falsely report the actual consideration or value of the transaction.

Acts 1996, ch. 1012, § 6.

39-14-908. Assistance by other agencies.

The attorney general may authorize any governmental department or agency of this state, any political subdivision thereof, or any other state or federal government to participate in the investigation into the conduct giving rise to a criminal offense under this part.

Acts 1996, ch. 1012, § 7.

39-14-909. Immunity from civil liability.

The reporting of a financial transaction by a corporation or other business entity to a regulator or law enforcement official or agency shall not create a cause of action against the person, corporation or business entity which made the report and the person, corporation or other business entity shall be immune from civil liability for such report.

Acts 1996, ch. 1012, § 10.

39-14-127. Deceptive business practices.

39-14-142. [Reserved.]

Chapter 15
Offenses Against the Family

Part 1
Nonsupport

39-15-101. Nonsupport and flagrant nonsupport.

  1. A person commits the crime of nonsupport who fails to provide support which that person is able to provide and knows the person has a duty to provide to a minor child or to a child or spouse who, because of physical or mental disability, is unable to be self-supporting.
  2. “Child” includes legitimate children and children whose parentage has been admitted by the person charged or established by judicial action.
  3. “Support” includes, but is not limited to, financial assistance, food, shelter, clothing, medical attention or, if determined elsewhere by law, other necessary care.
  4. A person commits the offense of flagrant nonsupport who:
    1. Leaves or remains without the state to avoid a legal duty of support; or
    2. Having been convicted one (1) or more times of nonsupport or flagrant nonsupport, is convicted of a subsequent offense under this section.
    1. Nonsupport under subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. Flagrant nonsupport under subsection (d) is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Alimony and child support, title 36, ch. 5.

Extradition generally, title 40, ch. 9.

Failure to comply with child support order, criminal sanctions, § 36-5-104.

Missing Children Recovery Act, title 37, ch. 10, part 2.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Prosecution on application of department of human services, § 71-3-122.

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 30.66.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, § 13; 14 Tenn. Juris., Husband and Wife, § 26.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Contempt, Jury Trial, Private Prosecutors & Child Support, (Clarke Lee Shaw), 34 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 22 (1998).

Defining the Parent's Duty After Rejection of Parent-Child Immunity: Parental Liability for Emotional Injury to Abandoned Children, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 775 (1980).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The statutory language “remains without the state” is not applicable to a nonsupporting parent who has never resided in Tennessee. State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. 1993).

2. Double Jeopardy.

Where contempt proceedings were brought against defendant in North Carolina for failure to comply with a child support order, double jeopardy concerns would not bar a subsequent prosecution in Tennessee for flagrant nonsupport. State v. Wyche, 914 S.W.2d 558, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

39-15-102. Jurisdiction.

  1. The juvenile court is vested with jurisdiction to:
    1. Try, determine, and render final judgment in all misdemeanor cases under § 39-15-101 where the person enters a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or not guilty and expressly waives indictment, presentment, grand jury investigation, and jury trial in writing. In such cases, the trial shall proceed before the court without the intervention of a jury;
    2. Conduct preliminary hearings in all felony cases under § 39-15-101(d), and if the court finds probable cause and in all other cases where the person pleads not guilty to a felony charge or does not waive the right to a jury trial, bind the person over for the action of the grand jury under appropriate bond; and
    3. Regardless of whether the person is tried in juvenile court or bound over, enter an order of protection and assistance which may require the person to:
      1. Stay away from the home, dependent child or spouse;
      2. Permit the defendant visitation with the child or children at reasonable or stated periods;
      3. Abstain from offensive conduct against the dependent child or spouse or from other acts which tend to make the home an unfit place for the dependent person to live; or
      4. Give proper attention to the care of the home.
    1. In all cases where the person pleads or is found guilty of a misdemeanor under § 39-15-101(a), the court shall sentence the person in accordance with title 40, chapter 35, and enter appropriate orders of support, protection or assistance.
    2. In the event the person's sentence is suspended, the court may require the person to give security by bond with sufficient sureties approved by the court for the payment of the order of support. Should the court subsequently find the person is able to comply with the order and fails to do so, the bond shall be forfeited and the proceeds paid into the court to be applied to the order of support, and the person shall be brought immediately before the court for enforcement of the sentence.
  2. In all cases where the person is bound over to the grand jury, the criminal court shall enforce any order of protection and assistance entered by the juvenile court, and may, if the person is convicted, include the order or modification of the order as part of the judgment and sentence.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-15-103. Appeal.

  1. An appeal from any final order or decree of the juvenile court pursuant to this part may be perfected to the court of appeals; provided, that any order of actual imprisonment except for contempt may be perfected as are appeals from any other criminal conviction pursuant to § 40-4-112.
  2. No appeal shall operate as a stay of execution, unless the person receives the court's permission, gives the security provided in § 39-15-102(b)(2) and, when necessary, executes an appearance bond.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-15-104. Procedure — Enforcement.

  1. When complaint on oath is made to the judge of any juvenile court against a person to be charged with a violation of this part, the judge must issue a warrant requiring the arrest of the person charged and that person is to be brought before the judge for examination; provided, that if the person, being duly summoned or voluntarily appearing, acknowledges the obligation of support, the court may in its discretion enter a consent order in lieu of the issuance of a warrant.
  2. No arrest warrant shall issue for the violation of any court order of support if the violation occurred during a period of time in which the person was incarcerated in any penal institution and was otherwise unable to comply with the order; provided, that this section shall not prevent the determining of arrearages under any previous order, and enforcement of the order as is consistent with the person's ability to comply.
  3. It is the duty of the governor to demand the return of any person charged under § 39-15-101(d) from the governor of any other state where the person may be found, upon proper warrant being issued or indictment being returned.
  4. Any court vested with jurisdiction to implement this part may enforce its orders and decrees by execution or in any way in which a court of equity may enforce its orders and decrees, including by imprisonment and fine for contempt. No property of the person, except all statutory homestead rights, shall be exempt from levy and sale under such execution or other process issued from the court. All provisions of title 36, chapter 5 that relate to child support or child support orders that include an order of spousal support and § 50-2-105 shall apply to support orders issued in these proceedings.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Enforcement of order or decree for support of minor, § 36-5-104.

Expedited process for support, title 36, ch. 5, part 4.

Issuance of arrest warrant, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 4.

Juveniles, title 37, ch. 2.

Persons whose compensation is contingent upon issuance or nonissuance are prohibited from issuing a search warrant or mittimus, § 40-5-106.

Statutory homestead exemptions from execution, title 26, ch. 2, part 3.

Part 2
Abortion

39-15-201. Criminal abortion and attempt to procure criminal miscarriage — Penalties — Lawful previability abortions and attempts to procure miscarriage — Requirements.

  1. For the purpose of this section:
    1. “Abortion” means the administration to any woman pregnant with child, whether the child be quick or not, of any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or the use or employment of any instrument, or other means whatever, with the intent to destroy the child, thereby destroying the child before the child's birth; and
    2. “Attempt to procure a miscarriage” means the administration of any substance with the intention to procure the miscarriage of a woman or the use or employment of any instrument or other means with such intent.
    1. Every person who performs an abortion commits the crime of criminal abortion, unless such abortion is performed in compliance with the requirements of subsection (c). Criminal abortion is a Class C felony.
    2. Every person who attempts to procure a miscarriage commits the crime of attempt to procure criminal miscarriage, unless the attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed in compliance with the requirements of subsection (c). Attempt to procure a criminal miscarriage is a Class E felony.
    3. Every person who compels, coerces, or exercises duress in any form with regard to any other person in order to obtain or procure an abortion on any female commits a misdemeanor. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
  2. No person is guilty of a criminal abortion or an attempt to procure criminal miscarriage when an abortion or an attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed under the following circumstances:
    1. During the first three (3) months of pregnancy, if the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed with the pregnant woman's consent and pursuant to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician who is licensed or certified under title 63, chapter 6 or 9; or
    2. After three (3) months, but before viability of the fetus, if the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed with the pregnant woman's consent and in a hospital as defined in § 68-11-201, licensed by the state department of health, or a hospital operated by the state of Tennessee or a branch of the federal government, by the pregnant woman's attending physician, who is licensed or certified under title 63, chapter 6 or 9, pursuant to the attending physician's medical judgment.
  3. No abortion shall be performed on any pregnant woman unless the woman first produces evidence satisfactory to the physician performing the abortion that she is a bona fide resident of Tennessee. Evidence to support the claim of residence shall be noted in the records kept by the physician and, if the abortion is performed in a hospital, in the records kept by the hospital. A violation of this subsection (d) is punished as provided by subdivision (b)(1).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2017, ch. 353, § 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Sections 39-15-201 — 39-15-208 are identical to prior code ch. 4, part 2 of this title. No substantive changes were made in these sections.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2017, ch. 353, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee lnfants Protection Act.”

Cross-References. Abortion prohibited if fetus viable, §  39-15-211.

Parental consent for abortion by minor, title 37, ch. 10, part 3.

Penalties for Class C and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Viability determination, §  39-15-212.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.63.

Law Reviews.

Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy and Birth, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 597 (1986).

The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 527 (2000).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of defining viability at specific stage of gestation, OAG 97-062 (5/5/97).

Health of the mother exception, OAG 97-062 (5/5/97).

The use of RU-486 can, depending on when the drug is administered to a given individual, fall under the definition of an “abortion” under T.C.A. § 39-15-201(a)(1); if the drug is administered before implantation of the embryo in the uterine wall, the drug is a contraceptive, but if the drug is administered after implantation of the embryo in the uterine wall, the drug serves to cause an abortion, OAG 01-30 (3/7/01).

If the Tennessee Constitution’s protection for a right to an abortion, except to save the woman’s life or if the pregnancy resulted from incest or rape, were removed and the portions of § 39-15-201 and § 39-15-202 that were held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000) were reenacted, the statutes would still be subject to strict scrutiny analysis and would be unconstitutional, OAG -04-055 (3/30/2004).

Status of abortion laws, OAG 05-071 (5/3/05).

The provisions of SB 2686/HB 2681 (Acts 2010, ch. 879) do not apply to forms of birth control that may result in the expulsion of a fertilized egg before it is implanted in the uterine lining.  However, on a case-by-case basis, administration of an abortifacient such as mifepristone could constitute an “abortion” as defined under T.C.A. § 39-15-201(a)(1) if it were used after implantation of an embryo in the uterine lining.  OAG 10-54, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 54 (4/19/10).

Passage of Amendment  No. 1 to Article I of the Tennessee Constitution (Tenn. Const. Art. I, sec. 36) supersedes the 2000 Tennessee Supreme  Court decision of Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist , 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000).  Following passage of this amendment there is no fundamental right to abortion in the Tennessee Constitution requiring a strict scrutiny analysis of any statute affecting abortion.  After passage of Amendment 1, any statute imposing restrictions upon a woman’s right to an abortion must withstand scrutiny under the United States Constitution, including scrutiny under the “undue burden” standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  It is not clear whether statutory provisions struck down by Sundquist , if reenacted, would survive scrutiny under this standard. OAG 15-13, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 13 (2/6/15).

Senate Bill 244/House Bill 108, 110th Tenn. Gen. Assem. (2017), filed in January 2017, would make certain changes to Tennessee’s criminal abortion statute. While some of the proposed changes are constitutionally defensible, the proposed prohibition on abortion, absent a medical emergency, after the detection of a fetal heartbeat and before viability of the fetus, is constitutionally suspect. OAG 17-15, 2017 Tenn. AG LEXIS 15 (3/1/2017).

House Bill 101/Senate Bill 766 would amend Tennessee’s criminal abortion statute by extending several of its existing restrictions to apply to pregnancies when the fetus has reached a gestational age of 20 weeks.  The proposed legislation is constitutionally infirm because its hospitalization requirement does not include the constitutionally-mandated medical emergency exception and because under current, controlling United States Supreme Court precedent a state may not prohibit the pre-viability termination of a pregnancy.   House Bill 1189/Senate Bill 1180 would enact a new “Tennessee Infants Protection Act.” Parts of the new Act are also constitutionally suspect, particularly with respect to the proposed post-viability abortion ban and the viability testing requirement. OAG 17-24, 2017 Tenn. AG LEXIS 22 (3/31/2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The second trimester hospitalization requirement places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion; it is not narrowly tailored to further the state's compelling interest in maternal health from the beginning of pregnancy, and thus, does not pass constitutional muster. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. 2000).

In light of the complete absence of a medical emergency exception to the hospitalization requirement, T.C.A. § 39-15-201(c)(2) is constitutionally infirm even under the federal undue burden standard. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. 2000).

39-15-202. Consent of pregnant woman required prior to abortion — Information provided by doctor — Waiting period — Penalty for violation — Requirements inapplicable in certain cases.

  1. Except in a medical emergency that prevents compliance with this subsection (a), no abortion shall be performed or induced upon a pregnant woman unless the woman has provided her informed written consent, given freely and without coercion. Such consent shall be treated as confidential.
  2. In order to ensure that a consent for an abortion is truly informed consent, except in a medical emergency that prevents compliance with this subsection (b) or any of the requirements of subdivisions (b)(1)-(5), no abortion shall be performed or induced upon a pregnant woman unless she has first been informed orally and in person by the attending physician who is to perform the abortion, or by the referring physician, of the following facts and has signed a consent form acknowledging that she has been informed as follows:
    1. That according to the best judgment of her attending physician or referring physician she is pregnant;
      1. The probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to be performed, based upon the information provided by her as to the time of her last menstrual period or after a history, physical examination, and appropriate laboratory tests;
      2. If an ultrasound is performed as part of the examination prior to performing the abortion, the person who performs the ultrasound shall offer the woman the opportunity to learn the results of the ultrasound. If the woman elects to learn the results of the ultrasound, the person who performs the ultrasound or a qualified healthcare provider in the facility performing the ultrasound shall, in addition to any other information provided, inform the woman of the presence or absence of a fetal heartbeat and document the patient has been informed;
    2. That if twenty-four (24) or more weeks have elapsed from the first day of her last menstrual period or twenty-two (22) or more weeks have elapsed from the time of conception, her unborn child may be viable, that is, capable of sustained survival outside of the womb, with or without medical assistance, and that if a viable child is prematurely born alive in the course of an abortion, the physician performing the abortion has a legal obligation to take steps to preserve the life and health of the child;
    3. That numerous public and private agencies and services are available to assist her during her pregnancy and after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have the abortion, whether she wishes to keep her child or place the child for adoption, and that her attending physician or referring physician will provide her with a list of the agencies and the services available if she so requests; and
    4. The normal and reasonably foreseeable medical benefits, risks, or both of undergoing an abortion or continuing the pregnancy to term.
  3. Except in a medical emergency that prevents compliance with this subsection (c), at the same time the attending physician or referring physician provides the information required by subsection (b), that physician shall inform the pregnant woman of the particular risks associated with her pregnancy and continuing the pregnancy to term, based upon the information known to the physician, as well as the risks of undergoing an abortion, along with a general description of the method of abortion to be used and the medical instructions to be followed subsequent to the abortion.
    1. Except in a medical emergency that prevents compliance with this subdivision (d)(1), no abortion shall be performed until a waiting period of forty-eight (48) hours has elapsed after the attending physician or referring physician has provided the information required by subsections (b) and (c), including the day on which the information was provided. After the forty-eight (48) hours have elapsed and prior to the performance of the abortion, the patient shall sign the consent form required by subsection (b).
    2. If any court temporarily, preliminarily, or permanently enjoins enforcement of subdivision (d)(1) or declares it unconstitutional, then the waiting period imposed by subdivision (d)(1) shall be twenty-four (24) hours, subject to the same medical emergency exception. If the injunction or declaration is subsequently vacated or reversed, the waiting period shall revert to forty-eight (48) hours.
  4. Except in a medical emergency that prevents compliance with subsection (b), the physician performing or inducing the abortion shall provide the pregnant woman with a duplicate copy of the consent form signed by her.
    1. For purposes of subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e), a medical emergency is a condition that, on the basis of the physician's good faith medical judgment, so complicates a medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate an immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.
    2. When a medical emergency compels the performance of an abortion, the physician shall inform the woman, prior to the abortion if possible, of the medical reasons supporting the physician's judgment that an abortion is necessary to avert her death or to avert substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.
    3. In any case in which a physician has determined that a medical emergency exists that excuses compliance with subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d), the physician shall state in the pregnant woman's medical records the basis for such determination.
  5. For purposes of this section, “the physician”, “the attending physician”, or “the referring physician” means any person who is licensed to practice medicine or osteopathy in this state.
    1. An intentional or knowing violation of subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d), or subdivision (f)(2) by a physician is a Class E felony.
    2. An intentional, knowing, or reckless violation of subsection (e) or subdivision (f)(3) by a physician is a Class A misdemeanor.
    3. In addition to subdivisions (h)(1) and (2), any physician who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly violates this section is guilty of unprofessional conduct and such physician's license for the practice of medicine and surgery or osteopathy shall be subject to suspension or revocation in accordance with the procedures provided under title 63, chapters 6 and 9.
      1. Any private physician's office, ambulatory surgical treatment center, or other facility or clinic in which abortions, other than abortions necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant female, are performed shall conspicuously post a sign in a location defined in subdivision (i)(1)(C) so as to be clearly visible to patients, which reads:

        Notice: It is against the law for anyone, regardless of the person's relationship to you, to coerce you into having or to force you to have an abortion. By law, we cannot perform an abortion on you unless we have your freely given and voluntary consent. It is against the law to perform an abortion on you against your will. You have the right to contact any local or state law enforcement agency to receive protection from any actual or threatened criminal offense to coerce an abortion.

      2. The sign required pursuant to subdivision (i)(1)(A) shall be printed in languages appropriate for the majority of clients of the facility with lettering that is legible and that is Arial font, at least 40-point bold-faced type.
      3. A facility in which abortions are performed that is a private physician's office or an ambulatory surgical treatment center shall post the required sign in each patient waiting room and patient consultation room used by patients on whom abortions are performed. A hospital or any other facility in which abortions are performed that is not a private physician's office or ambulatory surgical treatment center shall post the required sign in the admissions or registration department used by patients on whom abortions are performed.
      1. An ambulatory surgical treatment center or other licensed facility shall be assessed a civil penalty by the board for licensing health care facilities of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each day of violation in which:
        1. The sign required in subdivision (i)(1)(A) was not posted during business hours when patients or prospective patients were present; and
        2. An abortion other than an abortion necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant female was performed in the ambulatory surgical treatment center or other licensed facility.
      2. A licensed physician shall be assessed a civil penalty by the physician's title 63 medical licensing board of one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each day of violation in which:
        1. The sign required in subdivision (i)(1)(A) was not posted during business hours when patients or prospective patients were present at the private physician's office or clinic; and
        2. The physician performed an abortion in the private physician's office.
    1. The penalty provided for in subdivision (i)(2) is in addition to any other remedies applicable under other law, and subdivision (i)(2) does not preclude prosecution and conviction under any applicable criminal law.
    1. A physician may not perform an abortion unless the physician has admitting privileges at a hospital licensed under title 68 that is located:
      1. In the county in which the abortion is performed; or
      2. In a county adjacent to the county in which the abortion is performed.
    2. The physician who performs an abortion or a healthcare provider licensed pursuant to title 63 under the supervision of the physician shall notify the patient of the location of the hospital at which the physician has privileges and where the patient may receive follow-up care by the physician if complications arise.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1995, ch. 458, § 4; 2010, ch. 790, § 2; 2012, ch. 1008, § 2; 2015, ch. 473, § 1; 2018, ch. 862, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Chapter 15, part 2 of this title is identical to prior code ch. 4, part 2 of this title. No substantive changes were made in these sections.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 790, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Freedom From Coercion Act.”

Acts 2012, ch. 1008, § 1 provided that the act, which added former subsection (h), now subsection (j), shall be known and may be cited as the “Life Defense Act of 2012.”

Acts 2012, ch. 1008, § 3 provided that any provision of the act, which added former subsection (h), now subsection (j), held to be invalid or unenforceable by its terms, or as applied to any person or circumstance, shall be construed so as give it the maximum effect permitted by law, unless such holding shall be one of utter invalidity or unenforceability, in which event such provision shall be deemed severable herefrom and shall not affect the remainder hereof or the application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other, dissimilar circumstances.

Acts 2015, ch. 473, § 2 provided that the attorney general and reporter shall notify the secretary of state and the executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission upon the occurrence of any of the events described in (d)(2).

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2018, ch. 862,  § 2 provided that the department of health shall include data about the detection of heartbeats and the method employed for induced terminations of pregnancies in its annual report of selected induced termination of pregnancy data. The report shall differentiate between medical and surgical methods and, for surgical methods, shall differentiate between such methods to the extent the data permits. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the release of data in a manner that could identify individual patients.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, added (b)(2)(B).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 862, § 4. January 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, §  40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, §  40-35-111.

Infants prematurely born alive during abortion, §§ 39-15-206, 39-15-207.

Parental consent for abortion by minor, title 37, ch. 10, part 3.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.92.

Law Reviews.

Right to Privacy — Parental Notice Requirements in Abortion Statutes, 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 974 (1981).

The Last Line of Defense: The Tennessee Constitution and the Right to Privacy (Catherine Albisa), 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1994).

Attorney General Opinions. If the Tennessee Constitution’s protection for a right to an abortion, except to save the woman’s life or if the pregnancy resulted from incest or rape, were removed and the portions of § 39-15-201 and § 39-15-202 that were held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000) were reenacted, the statutes would still be subject to strict scrutiny analysis and would be unconstitutional, OAG -04-055 (3/30/2004).

Passage of Amendment  No. 1 to Article I of the Tennessee Constitution (Tenn. Const. Art. I, sec. 36) supersedes the 2000 Tennessee Supreme  Court decision of Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist , 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000).  Following passage of this amendment there is no fundamental right to abortion in the Tennessee Constitution requiring a strict scrutiny analysis of any statute affecting abortion.  After passage of Amendment 1, any statute imposing restrictions upon a woman’s right to an abortion must withstand scrutiny under the United States Constitution, including scrutiny under the “undue burden” standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (1992). It is not clear whether statutory provisions struck down by Sundquist , if reenacted, would survive scrutiny under this standard. OAG 15-13, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 13 (2/6/15).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

1. Section 37-10-303 Repealed by Implication. 2. Constitutionality. 3. —Physician-Only Counseling Requirement. 4. —Informed Consent. 5. —Two-Day Waiting Period. 6. —Medical Emergency Exceptions.

1. Section 37-10-303 Repealed by Implication.

T.C.A. § 39-15-202 [prior to its 1995 amendment] had the effect of repealing T.C.A. § 37-10-303 by implication. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. McWherter, 817 S.W.2d 13, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. 1991), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 428 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 1991) (superseded by 1995 amendment).

2. Constitutionality.

3. —Physician-Only Counseling Requirement.

Although it is important that a woman contemplating abortion be informed in accordance with the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice, the physician-only counseling requirement is not narrowly tailored to accomplish this requirement, and thus, fails to pass constitutional muster. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. 2000).

4. —Informed Consent.

Because the legislature would not have enacted the informed consent provisions in absence of the physician-only counseling requirement, the doctrine of elision cannot apply to save the remaining informed consent provisions. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. 2000).

5. —Two-Day Waiting Period.

The two-day waiting period requirement contained in T.C.A. § 39-15-202(d)(1) has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion and is therefore unconstitutional; the requirement is actually a three-day waiting period, the longest in the nation, because the patient may not sign the consent form until the third day following the day the required information was given, suggesting that the waiting period requirement is not intended as an opportunity for reflection, but is actually intended as an obstacle to abortion. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. 2000).

6. —Medical Emergency Exceptions.

As written, the medical emergency exceptions contained in T.C.A. § 39-15-202 fail to pass constitutional muster as those exceptions impermissibly impinge upon a woman's fundamental procreational autonomy because they do not contain adequate provisions that will permit immediate abortions necessary to protect a woman's health. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. 2000).

39-15-203. Records and reports of abortions — Disposition of aborted fetus or aborted fetal tissue — Method of disposition — Confidentiality.

  1. A physician performing an abortion shall keep a record of each procedure and of the disposition of the aborted fetus or aborted fetal tissue. The physician shall make a report to the commissioner of health with respect thereto at the time and in the form as the commissioner may reasonably prescribe. If the procedure is solely a medication termination and the expulsion of the aborted fetus or aborted fetal tissue does not take place at the facility or clinic where the procedure took place, the physician shall not be required to keep a record of the disposition or report such disposition to the commissioner.
    1. The physician shall note in the section regarding the disposition of the aborted fetus or aborted fetal tissue the method of disposition.
    2. If the aborted fetus or aborted fetal tissue is transferred to a third party for disposition, the name and address of that third party, and the date of the transfer, shall be included on the report.
    3. If an ultrasound was performed prior to the induced termination of pregnancy, the report shall also indicate whether or not a heartbeat was detected.
  2. The method of disposition of an aborted fetus or aborted fetal tissue shall be in conformity with the rules of the board for licensing healthcare facilities.
  3. Each record and report made pursuant to this section shall be confidential in nature and shall not be public record open for inspection.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2016, ch. 1003, § 1; 2018, ch. 862, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes. Acts 2016, ch. 1003, § 7 provided that notwithstanding this act or the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in Tennessee Code Annotated, title 4, chapter 5, any rule promulgated to implement the provisions of this act shall be provided to the chairs of the health committee of the house of representatives and the health and welfare committee of the senate by the secretary of state, after approval by the attorney general and reporter, at the same time the text of the rule is made available to the government operations committees of the senate and the house of representatives for purposes of conducting the review required by § 4-5-226 in order for the health committee of the house of representatives and the health and welfare committee of the senate to be afforded the opportunity to comment on the rule.

Acts 2018, ch. 862,  § 2 provided that the department of health shall include data about the detection of heartbeats and the method employed for induced terminations of pregnancies in its annual report of selected induced termination of pregnancy data. The report shall differentiate between medical and surgical methods and, for surgical methods, shall differentiate between such methods to the extent the data permits. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the release of data in a manner that could identify individual patients.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, added (b)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 862, § 4. January 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Parental consent for abortion by minor, title 37, ch. 10, part 3.

39-15-204. Right to refuse to perform abortions.

No physician shall be required to perform an abortion and no person shall be required to participate in the performance of an abortion. No hospital shall be required to permit abortions to be performed therein.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-15-205. Right of hospitals to refuse to accept abortion patients.

No section of this part shall be construed to force a hospital to accept a patient for an abortion.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-15-206. Rights to medical treatment of infant prematurely born alive during abortion — Penalty for violation — Limitation on wrongful death action.

  1. The rights to medical treatment of an infant prematurely born alive in the course of an abortion are the same as the rights of an infant of similar medical status prematurely born spontaneously. Any person who performs or induces an abortion of an infant shall exercise that degree of professional skill, care, and diligence in accordance with good medical practice necessary to preserve the life and health of an infant prematurely born alive in the course of an abortion, except that if it can be determined, through amniocentesis or medical observation, that the fetus is severely malformed, the use of extraneous life support measures need not be attempted.
  2. Any person who violates this section commits a Class E felony.
  3. No cause of action for wrongful death shall be brought which arises out of the death of a fetus or infant during the course of a lawful abortion, whether the fetus or infant is quick or not, so long as the abortion is performed in accordance with this part; however, once an infant is born alive, any person in attendance shall be civilly responsible for providing all reasonable and necessary care reasonable under the circumstances in the general vicinity in which the person in attendance practices.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Requirements prior to abortion: consent, information, waiting period, § 39-15-202.

Law Reviews.

The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States (Nicolas P. Terry), 39 Vand. L. Rev. 419 (1986).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

T.C.A. § 39-15-206 does not give babies born prematurely other than during an abortion a special cause of action beyond that which they are already assured under the law of medical malpractice. Hartsell v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 944, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, Hartsell v. Fort Sanders Regional Med. Ctr., S.W.2d, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Aug. 28, 1995), cert. denied, Hartsell by Upton v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Ctr., 517 U.S. 1120, 116 S. Ct. 1352, 134 L. Ed. 2d 521, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2190 (1996).

39-15-207. Custody of infant prematurely born alive during abortion.

An infant prematurely born alive in the course of a voluntary abortion is declared abandoned for purposes of custody only, and the department of children's services shall care for the infant as provided in § 34-1-103.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1996, ch. 1079, § 124.

Cross-References. Requirements prior to abortion: consent, information, waiting period, § 39-15-202.

Law Reviews.

The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States (Nicolas P. Terry), 39 Vand. L. Rev. 419 (1986).

39-15-208. Research, photography, and experimentation upon aborted fetuses — Sale of aborted fetuses or aborted fetal tissue prohibited — Penalty for violation.

  1. It is unlawful for any person, agency, corporation, partnership or association to engage in medical experiments, research, or the taking of photographs upon an aborted fetus without the prior knowledge and written consent of the mother; provided, however, that prior knowledge and consent of the mother shall not be required when a person is taking photographs of the aborted fetus for the purpose of capturing images that the person reasonably believes depict evidence of a violation of a state or federal law, rule, or regulation.
  2. No person, agency, corporation, partnership, or association shall offer money, or anything of value, for an aborted fetus or aborted fetal tissue; nor shall any person, agency, corporation, partnership, or association accept any money or anything of value for an aborted fetus or aborted fetal tissue, or offer or accept any reimbursement of any costs associated with the preparation, preservation, transfer, shipping, or handling of an aborted fetus or aborted fetal tissue.
  3. It is the express intent of the general assembly that nothing in this section shall be construed to grant to a fetus any legal right not possessed by a fetus prior to July 1, 1979.
  4. A violation of this section is punishable as a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2016, ch. 986, § 1; 2016, ch. 1003, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes. Acts 2016, ch. 1003, § 7 provided that notwithstanding this act or the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in Tennessee Code Annotated, title 4, chapter 5, any rule promulgated to implement the provisions of this act shall be provided to the chairs of the health committee of the house of representatives and the health and welfare committee of the senate by the secretary of state, after approval by the attorney general and reporter, at the same time the text of the rule is made available to the government operations committees of the senate and the house of representatives for purposes of conducting the review required by § 4-5-226 in order for the health committee of the house of representatives and the health and welfare committee of the senate to be afforded the opportunity to comment on the rule.

Cross-References. Parental consent for abortion by minor, title 37, ch. 10, part 3.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy and Birth, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 597 (1986).

39-15-209. Partial birth abortions.

  1. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery; and
    2. “Vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus” means deliberately and intentionally delivers into the vagina a living fetus, or a substantial portion of a living fetus, for the purpose of performing a procedure the physician knows will kill the fetus, and kills the fetus.
  2. No person shall knowingly perform a partial-birth abortion.
  3. Subsection (b) shall not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, illness or injury.
    1. A defendant accused of an offense under this section may seek a hearing before the state medical board that licenses the physician, on whether the physician's conduct was necessary to save the life of the mother whose life was endangered by a physical disorder, illness or injury.
    2. The findings on that issue are admissible on that issue at the trial of the defendant. Upon a motion of the defendant, the court shall delay the beginning of the trial for not more than thirty (30) days to permit the hearing to take place.
    1. Performance of a partial-birth abortion in knowing or reckless violation of this section shall be a Class C felony.
    2. A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed may not be prosecuted under this section for violating this section or any of its provisions, or for conspiracy to violate this section or any of its provisions.

Acts 1997, ch. 414, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality, OAG 97-056 (4/28/97).

An absolute ban on “partial-birth abortion” that does not contain an exception for preservation of the health of the mother is unconstitutional. If the ban also applied to a more commonly-used procedure, dilation and evacuation, as well as the dilation and extraction procedure, it would impose an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose an abortion, and would be unconstitutional, OAG 04-055 (3/30/2004).

39-15-210. Child Rape Protection Act of 2006.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Child Rape Protection Act of 2006.”
    1. When a physician has reasonable cause to report the sexual abuse of a minor pursuant to § 37-1-605, because the physician has been requested to perform an abortion on a minor who is less than thirteen (13) years of age, the physician shall, at the time of the report, also notify the official to whom the report is made of the date and time of the scheduled abortion and that a sample of the embryonic or fetal tissue extracted during the abortion will be preserved and available to be turned over to the appropriate law enforcement officer conducting the investigation into the rape of the minor.
    2. If a minor who is at least thirteen (13) but no more than seventeen (17) years of age requests a physician to perform an abortion and the physician has reasonable cause to believe there is child sexual abuse involved as defined by § 37-1-602, the physician shall report the abuse pursuant to § 37-1-605. This subdivision (b)(2) shall apply only when a physician performs elective abortion services as a part of their practice.
    1. In the transmission of the embryonic or fetal tissue sample to the appropriate law enforcement officer, in order to protect the identity and privacy of the minor, all identifying information concerning the minor shall be treated as confidential and shall not be released to anyone other than the investigating and prosecuting authorities directly involved in the case of the particular minor.
    2. Where the minor has obtained a judicial waiver of the parental notification requirements pursuant to title 37, chapter 10, part 3, confidentiality shall be maintained as provided in that part.
  2. It is an offense for a physician licensed or certified under title 63, chapter 6 or 9, or other person to knowingly fail to comply with this section or any rule or regulation adopted pursuant to this section.
    1. A first violation of this section is a civil penalty to be assessed by the provider's health related board of not less than five hundred dollars ($500);
    2. A second violation of this section is a civil penalty to be assessed by the provider's health related board of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000); and
    3. A third or subsequent violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
  3. If the person performing the abortion is a physician licensed or certified under title 63, chapter 6 or 9, the violation constitutes unprofessional conduct. The conduct subjects the physician, in addition to the penalties set out in subsection (d), to disciplinary action.

Acts 2006, ch. 845, § 1; 2019, ch. 424, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote (b), which read: “(b) When a physician has reasonable cause to report the sexual abuse of a minor pursuant to § 37-1-605, because the physician has been requested to perform an abortion on a minor who is less than thirteen (13) years of age, the physician shall, at the time of the report, also notify the official to whom the report is made of the date and time of the scheduled abortion and that a sample of the embryonic or fetal tissue extracted during the abortion will be preserved and available to be turned over to the appropriate law enforcement officer conducting the investigation into the rape of the minor.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 424, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Abortion, § 39-15-201 et seq.

Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-15-211. Abortion prohibited if fetus viable — Affirmative defense — Rebuttable presumption — Revocation of license.

  1. As used in this section and in § 39-15-212:
    1. “Abortion” means the use of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or device with intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant with intent other than to increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead fetus;
    2. “Gestational age” or “gestation” means the age of an unborn child as calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period of a pregnant woman;
    3. “Medical emergency” means a condition that, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, so complicates the woman's pregnancy as to necessitate the immediate performance or inducement of an abortion in order to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or to avoid a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman that delay in the performance or inducement of the abortion would create;
    4. “Pregnant” means the human female reproductive condition, of having a living unborn child within her body throughout the entire embryonic and fetal stages of the unborn child from fertilization to full gestation and childbirth;
    5. “Serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function” means any medically diagnosed condition that so complicates the pregnancy of the woman as to directly or indirectly cause the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. Such conditions include preeclampsia, inevitable abortion, and premature rupture of the membranes and, depending upon the circumstances, may also include, but are not limited to, diabetes and multiple sclerosis, but does not include any condition relating to the woman's mental health;
    6. “Unborn child” means an individual living member of the species, homo sapiens, throughout the entire embryonic and fetal stages of the unborn child from fertilization to full gestation and childbirth; and
    7. “Viable” and “viability” mean that stage of fetal development when the unborn child is capable of sustained survival outside of the womb, with or without medical assistance.
    1. No person shall purposely perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman when the unborn child is viable.
    2. It shall be an affirmative defense to any criminal prosecution brought under subdivision (b)(1) that the abortion was performed or induced, or attempted to be performed or induced, by a licensed physician and that the physician determined, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, that either:
      1. The unborn child was not viable; or
      2. The abortion was necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or to prevent serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman. No abortion shall be deemed authorized under this subdivision (b)(2)(B) if performed on the basis of a claim or a diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct which would result in her death or substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function or for any reason relating to her mental health.
    3. Except in a medical emergency that prevents compliance with the viability determination required by § 39-15-212, the affirmative defense set forth in subdivision (b)(2)(A) does not apply unless the physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion makes the viability determination required by § 39-15-212 and, based upon that determination, certifies in writing that, in such physician's good faith medical judgment, the unborn child is not viable.
    4. Except in a medical emergency that prevents compliance with one (1) or more of the following conditions, the affirmative defense set forth in subdivision (b)(2)(B) does not apply unless the physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion complies with each of the following conditions:
      1. The physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion certifies in writing that, in such physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, the abortion is necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or to prevent a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman;
      2. Another physician who is not associated in a practice with the physician who intends to perform or induce the abortion certifies in writing that, in such physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, the abortion is necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or to prevent a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman;
      3. The physician performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion in a hospital that has appropriate neonatal services for premature infants. This requirement does not apply if there is no hospital within thirty (30) miles with neonatal services and the physician who intends to perform or induce the abortion has admitting privileges at the hospital where the abortion is to be performed or induced;
      4. The physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion terminates or attempts to terminate the pregnancy in the manner that provides the best opportunity for the unborn child to survive, unless that physician determines, in such physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, that the termination of the pregnancy in that manner poses a significantly greater risk of the death of the pregnant woman or a significantly greater risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman than would other available methods of abortion;
      5. The physician certifies in writing the available methods or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the method or technique employed; and
      6. The physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion has arranged for the attendance in the same room in which the abortion is to be performed or induced, or attempted to be performed or induced, at least one (1) other physician who is to take control of, provide immediate medical care for, and take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the life and health of the unborn child immediately upon the child's complete expulsion or extraction from the pregnant woman.
    5. For purposes of this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that an unborn child of at least twenty-four (24) weeks gestational age is viable.
    6. A violation of subdivision (b)(1) is a Class C felony.
    7. The applicable licensing board shall revoke the license of any person licensed to practice a healthcare profession in this state who violates subdivision (b)(1), in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, without regard to whether the person has been charged with or has been convicted of having violated subdivision (b)(1) in a criminal prosecution. In any proceeding brought by the board of medical examiners or the board of osteopathic examination to revoke the license of a physician for violating subdivision (b)(1), a physician who has not been convicted in a criminal prosecution of having violated subdivision (b)(1) may raise the affirmative defense set forth in subdivision (b)(2).
    8. A pregnant woman upon whom an abortion is performed or induced, or attempted to be performed or induced, in violation of subdivision (b)(1) is not guilty of violating subdivision (b)(1), or of attempting to commit or conspiring to commit a violation of subdivision (b)(1).
  2. Neither this section nor § 39-15-212 repeals or limits § 39-15-202, § 39-15-209, or any other law that restricts or regulates the performance of an abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage.

Acts 2017, ch. 353, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 353, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Infants Protection Act.”

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Viability determination, §  39-15-212.

39-15-212. Viability determination.

  1. Except in a medical emergency that prevents compliance with this subsection (a), no physician shall perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman after the beginning of the twentieth week of pregnancy, as measured by gestational age, unless, prior to the performance or inducement of the abortion, or the attempt to perform or induce the abortion, the physician determines, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, that the unborn child is not viable. In making the good faith medical determination, the physician shall perform a medical examination of the pregnant woman and assess gestational age, weight, bi-parietal diameter, and other factors that the physician in the physician's good faith medical judgement would consider in determining whether an unborn child is viable.
  2. Except in a medical emergency that prevents compliance with this subsection (b), no physician shall perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman after the beginning of her twentieth week of pregnancy (as measured by gestational age), without first entering the determination made in subsection (a) and the associated findings of the medical examination and assessment described in subsection (a) in the medical record of the pregnant woman.
  3. A violation of subsection (a) or (b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  4. The appropriate licensing authority shall suspend, for a period of not less than six (6) months, the medical license of a physician who violates subsection (a) or (b).

Acts 2017, ch. 353, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 353, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section,  shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Infants Protection Act.”

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Viability determination, §  39-15-212.

39-15-213. Criminal abortion — Affirmative defense. [Contingent effective date, see Notes.]

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Abortion” means the use of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or device with intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant with intent other than to increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead fetus;
    2. “Fertilization” means that point in time when a male human sperm penetrates the zona pellucida of a female human ovum;
    3. “Pregnant” means the human female reproductive condition of having a living unborn child within her body throughout the entire embryonic and fetal stages of the unborn child from fertilization until birth; and
    4. “Unborn child” means an individual living member of the species, homo sapiens, throughout the entire embryonic and fetal stages of the unborn child from fertilization until birth.
  2. A person who performs or attempts to perform an abortion commits the offense of criminal abortion. Criminal abortion is a Class C felony.
  3. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under subsection (b), which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
    1. The abortion was performed or attempted by a licensed physician;
    2. The physician determined, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, that the abortion was necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or to prevent serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman. No abortion shall be deemed authorized under this subdivision (c)(2) if performed on the basis of a claim or a diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct that would result in her death or substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function or for any reason relating to her mental health; and
    3. The physician performs or attempts to perform the abortion in the manner which, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, provides the best opportunity for the unborn child to survive, unless in the physician's good faith medical judgment, termination of the pregnancy in that manner would pose a greater risk of the death of the pregnant woman or substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. No such greater risk shall be deemed to exist if it is based on a claim or diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct that would result in her death or substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function or for any reason relating to her mental health.
  4. Medical treatment provided to the pregnant woman by a licensed physician which results in the accidental death of or unintentional injury to or death of the unborn child shall not be a violation of this section.
  5. This section does not subject the pregnant woman upon whom an abortion is performed or attempted to criminal conviction or penalty.

Acts 2019, ch. 351, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 351, § 1 provided that the act, which added this section, shall be known and may be cited as “Human Life Protection Act.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 351, § 3 provided: “(a) This act shall take effect on the thirtieth day following the occurrence of either of the following circumstances, the public welfare requiring it:“(1) The issuance of the judgment in any decision of the United States Supreme Court overruling, in whole or in part, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as modified by Planned Parenthood of Southeastem Pennsylvania v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (1992), thereby restoring to the states their authority to prohibit abortion; or“(2) Adoption of an amendment to the United States Constitution that, in whole or in part, restores to the states their authority to prohibit abortion.“(b) The attorney general and reporter shall notify in writing the Tennessee code commission of the occurrence of either of the circumstances in (a)(1) or (a)(2) and what date is the thirtieth day following such occurrence.”

Cross References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

39-15-214. Findings — Purpose.

  1. Findings.  The general assembly finds:
    1. As the Supreme Court has stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992), “Abortion is a unique act” and is “fraught with consequences...for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision.” As the Supreme Court stated in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) “it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.” The Supreme Court has acknowledged, in Casey at 882, that the effect of an abortion on the life of the unborn child is “relevant, if not dispositive” information for the patient's decision;
    2. Current standards of medical care mandate the performance of an ultrasound prior to the performance of inducing of an abortion. Determining accurate information regarding gestational development is important for purposes of informed consent, as well as making essential preparation for the procedure itself;
    3. In this state ultrasounds are regularly provided to women seeking an abortion to determine if they are eligible for a medication abortion, and to review other factors related that cannot be determined prior to an examination of the patient;
    4. In the forty-seven (47) years since the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), there have been substantial advances in scientific methods and medical technology that have significantly expanded knowledge and understanding of prenatal life and development, and the effects of abortion on the physical and psychological health of women;
    5. At conception, a new and genetically distinct human being is formed;
    6. The state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the rights of all human beings, including the fundamental and absolute right of unborn human beings to life, liberty, and all rights protected by the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
    7. The presence of a fetal heartbeat is medically significant because the heartbeat is a discernible sign of life at every stage of human existence;
    8. An unborn child's heart begins to beat at five (5) weeks gestational age, and blood begins to flow during the sixth week;
    9. Depending on what type of equipment is utilized, an unborn child's heartbeat can be detected as early as six (6) to eight (8) weeks gestational age;
    10. An unborn child's heartbeat can consistently be made audible using a handheld Doppler fetal heart rate device by twelve (12) weeks gestational age;
    11. A pregnancy can be confirmed through the detection of the unborn child's heartbeat;
    12. By the beginning of the second trimester, physicians view the absence of a fetal heartbeat as an instance of fetal death;
    13. It is standard medical practice to monitor an unborn child's heartbeat throughout pregnancy and labor to measure the heart rate and rhythm of the unborn child, which averages between one hundred ten (110) and one hundred sixty (160) beats per minute. This monitoring is used as an indicator of the health of the unborn child;
    14. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, medical professionals have expanded their understanding of life in utero to include, among other indicia, the presence of a heartbeat, brain development, a viable pregnancy or viable intrauterine pregnancy during the first trimester of pregnancy, and the ability to experience pain;
    15. The presence of a fetal heartbeat is the best indicator of a viable pregnancy. The detectability of a fetal heartbeat is a strong predictor of survivability to term, especially if the heartbeat is present at eight (8) weeks gestational age or later;
    16. When a fetal heartbeat is detected between eight (8) and twelve (12) weeks gestational age, the rate of miscarriage is extremely low, with approximately ninety eight percent (98%) of naturally conceived pregnancies carrying to term;
    17. At eight (8) weeks gestational age, an unborn child begins to show spontaneous movements, and reflexive responses to touch. The majority of an unborn child's body is responsive to touch by fourteen (14) weeks gestational age;
    18. Peripheral cutaneous sensory receptors, which are the receptors that feel pain, develop in an unborn child at around seven (7) to eight (8) weeks gestational age. Sensory receptors develop in the palmar regions during the tenth week of gestational age, growing throughout the unborn child's body by sixteen (16) weeks gestational age;
    19. An unborn child's nervous system is established by six (6) weeks gestational age. At this stage, the basic pattering of the early nervous system is in place and is the basis for tremendous growth and increased complexity built upon this basic pattern. The earliest neurons of the cortical brain, responsible for thinking, memory, and higher level functions, are established by the fourth week;
    20. Synapses are formed in the seventh week, and the neural connections for the most primitive responses to pain are in place by ten (10) weeks gestation;
    21. Substance P, a peptide functioning as a neurotransmitter in the transmission of pain, is present in the spinal cord of an unborn child at eight (8) weeks gesiational age, while enkephalin peptides, which serve as neurotransmitters in pain modulation, are present at twelve (12) to fourteen (14) weeks gestational age;
    22. There is significant evidence, based on peer-reviewed scientific studies, that unborn children are capable of experiencing pain by no later than twenty (20) weeks gestational age. Pain receptor nerves are already present throughout the human body by twenty (20) weeks gestation, and the cortex, which begins development at eight (8) weeks, has a full complement of neurons at twenty (20) weeks;
    23. There is evidence that an unborn child is capable of feeling pain as early as twelve (12) to fifteen (15) weeks gestational age. The scientific evidence shows that significant cortical neuronal connections are in place by ten (10) to twelve (12) weeks gestation, and that connections between the spinal court and thalamus are nearly complete by twenty (20) weeks gestation:
    24. A growing body of medical evidence and literature supports the conclusion that an unborn child may feel pain from around eleven (11) to twelve (12) weeks gestational age, or even as early as five and a half (5½) weeks. At only eight (8) weeks gestation, an unborn child exhibits reflexive movement during invasive procedures resulting from spinal reflex neuro pathways, showing that the unborn child reacts to noxious stimuli with avoidance reactions and stress responses. By sixteen (16) weeks gestational age, pain transmission from a peripheral receptor to the cortex is possible. Significant evidence also shows hormonal stress responses by unborn children as early as eighteen (18) weeks;
    25. Mothers considering abortion express concern over the medical information on fetal neurological development and an unborn child's ability to feel pain while in utero, and providing this information to mothers who are considering abortion is an important part of empowering mothers to make a fully-informed choice on whether or not to seek an abortion;
    26. Medical evidence shows that younger infants are hypersensitive to pain. Neuronal mechanisms that inhibit or moderate pain sensations do not begin to develop until thirty-four (34) to thirty-six (86) weeks gestation and are not complete until a significant time after birth. Newborn and preterm infants are hyperresponsive to pain compared to adults or older infants;
    27. The recognition of fetal pain has led to improvements and changes in how physicians approach fetal surgery and fetal anesthesia. The presence of neural connections and the ability to feel pain as early as the fifteenth week now necessitate treating the unborn child as a separate patient from the mother for purposes of utilizing direct analgesia to fetal patients, who clearly elicit stress responses to pain;
    28. Fetal surgeons at specialized units in St. Louis, Nashville, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Boston, and elsewhere, in response to their recognition of fetal pain, routinely use anesthesia and analgesia for unborn and premature infants undergoing surgery as young as eighteen (18) weeks gestation;
    29. The leading textbook on clinical anesthesia recognizes the significant body of evidence indicating the importance of mitigating fetal stress responses to pain stimuli. It is presumed that an unborn child's ability to fully experience pain occurs between twenty (20) and thirty (30) weeks, and that the fetal experience of pain may be even greater than that of term neonate or young children due to the immaturity of neurodevelopment that helps inhibit pain;
    30. Mothers considering abortion express concern over the medical information on fetal neurological development and an unborn child's ability to feel pain while in utero;
    31. The infliction of unnecessary pain upon a living being is generally prohibited by state and federal law. The legislature has prohibited the unnecessary infliction of pain on living beings in a variety of circumstances in an effort to protect the innocent from harm;
    32. The life of an unborn child is recognized and protected from violence by federal law and by the laws of most states. The killing of an unborn child is considered homicide in thirty-eight (38) states, with at least twenty-eight (28) of those states criminalizing the act from conception. Nearly every state and the District of Columbia have wrongful death statutes that allow for liability and recovery for the death of an unborn child or subsequent death of an infant who is born and later dies because of injuries caused while in utero;
    33. The United States Supreme Court created the viability standard for evaluating abortion-related laws and regulations in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and reaffirmed this approach in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
    34. At the time Roe v. Wade was decided, the court recognized that viability was not likely until approximately twenty-eight (28) weeks gestational age;
    35. Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, advances in science, technology, and treatment methods have resulted in children surviving and thriving at younger preterm ages than ever before;
    36. In recent years, scientific advances and advances in neonatal care of lowered the gestational limits of survivability well into the second trimester;
    37. The age at which a preterm infant can survive has decreased from twenty-eight (28) weeks to less than twenty-two (22) weeks. Survival of preterm infants has increased significantly over time assuming physicians provide active care for the young infants, lowering the age of survival from twenty-eight (28) weeks to twenty-four (24) weeks. Moreover, infants born as early as twenty-two (22) weeks can survive with the provision of care and treatment. The youngest preterm infant to survive was born at only twenty-one (21) weeks and four (4) days;
    38. In 1978, the first infants weighing less than seven hundred fifty (750) grams were successfully ventilated;
    39. By the 1990s, survival of infants born weighing between five hundred (500) and seven hundred (700) grams, roughly between twenty-four (24) to twenty-six (26) weeks, became possible;
    40. Technological developments in the 1980s and 1990s, such as improved tracheal instillation of surfactant for respiratory distress syndrome and antenatal corticosteroids, resulted in survival of infants born between twenty-three (23) to twenty-four (24) weeks;
    41. In recent years, resuscitation and survival of infants born weighing less than four hundred (400) grams, or approximately twenty-two (22) to twenty-three (23) weeks gestational age, has further decreased the age of viability;
    42. The provision of active prenatal and postnatal care has significantly increased the number of prematurely born children who survive until hospital discharge;
    43. Abortions performed at any gestational age pose a risk to the mother. Abortion increases the risks of subsequent preterm birth and placenta previa, life-threatening hemorrhage, postpartum hemorrhage, and cesarean delivery;
    44. Abortions performed later in pregnancy pose an even higher medical risk to the health and life of women, with the relative risk increasing exponentially at later gestational ages after eight (8) weeks gestational age;
    45. The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at eleven (11) to twelve (12) weeks gestational age is between three (3) and four (4) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier;
    46. The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at thirteen (13) to fifteen (15) weeks gestational age is almost fifteen (15) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier;
    47. The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at sixteen (16) to twenty (20) weeks gestational age is almost thirty (30) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier;
    48. The relative risk of death for pregnant women who had an abortion performed or induced upon her at twenty-one (21) weeks gestational age or later is more than seventy-five (75) times higher than an abortion at eight (8) weeks gestational age or earlier;
    49. Women who have an abortion suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder at a rate slightly higher than veterans of the Vietnam war. Women who have an abortion have an eighty one percent (81%) increased risk of mental trauma after an abortion. Abortion has been shown to correlate with many other mental health disorders as well;
    50. The United States is one of only seven (7) countries in the world that permits elective abortion past twenty (20) weeks:
    51. Only seventeen (17) countries permit abortion without any restriction beyond week twelve (12) weeks gestational age;
    52. The United States is an outlier within the international community related to the regulation of abortion. Of the countries that permit elective abortion, nine (9) limit elective abortion before the twelfth week of gestation, thirty-six (36) limit elective abortion at twelve (12) weeks gestation, six (6) limit elective abortion between twelve (12) and twenty (20) weeks gestation, and only seven (7) permit elective abortion past twenty (20) weeks or have no gestational limit;
    53. The historical development of abortion is undeniably tied to bias and discrimination by some organizations, leaders, and policies towards impoverished and minority communities, including the imposition of forced sterilization of the intellectually disabled, poor, minority, and immigrant women. These historic policies should be rejected and left on the ash heap of history;
    54. As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his opinion concurring in the denial of certiorari in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (2019), “the use of abortion to achieve eugenic goals is not merely hypothetical.” This historical practice of abortion was rooted not in equality but in discrimination based on age, sex, and disability;
    55. In the early twentieth century, the eugenics movement had grown popular across elite institutions in the United States, with many distinguishing between so-called fit and unfit individuals along racial lines and expressing concern over the increased birth-rate among non-white populations. Such abhorrent distinctions were also made between able-bodied persons and persons eugenicists referred to as “feeble-minded,” “deformed,” “diseased,” blind, deaf, or “dependent,” a term used to included orphans and the poor. Laws were adopted prohibiting marriages between the disabled and other “unfit” individuals and requiring their sterilization. More than sixty thousand (60,000) people were involuntarily sterilized between 1907 and 1983;
    56. Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger argued in the early twentieth century that birth control would open the way to the eugenicist. Sanger argued that birth control could be used to reduce the “ever increasing, unceasingly spawning class of human beings who never should have been born at all;
    57. This argument was later adopted by abortion advocates, such as Planned Parenthood President Alan Guttmacher, who endorsed abortion for eugenic purposes. Guttmacher argued in the 1950's that abortion should be used to prevent the birth of disabled children. Legal scholar Glanville Williams, whose book was cited in the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, argued in a book published in the 1950's that a “eugenic killing by a mother …cannot confidently be pronounced immoral;
    58. Some continue to support the goal of reducing undesirable populations through selective reproduction;
    59. Today, the individualized nature of abortion creates a significant risk that prenatal screening tests and new technologies will be used to eliminate children with unwanted characteristics;
    60. There is substantial evidence from across the globe and in the United States that the elimination of children with unwanted characteristics is already occurring. The abortion rate for children diagnosed with Down syndrome in utero approaches one hundred percent (100%) in Iceland, ninety eight percent (98%) in Denmark, ninety percent (90%) in the United Kingdom, and seventy seven percent (77%) in France. Even in the United States, the abortion rate for children with Down Syndrome is sixty seven percent (67%). Widespread sex-selective abortions in Asia have led to as many as one hundred sixty (160) million “missing” women. In India, as a result of the abortion of 300,000-700,000 female unborn children each year over several decades, there are currently about fifty (50) million more men than women in the country. Recent evidence also suggests that sex-selective abortions of girls are common among certain populations in the United States;
    61. Sex-selective abortion results in an unnatural sex ratio imbalance that can impede members of the numerically predominant sex from finding partners, encourage the commoditization of humans in the form of human trafficking, and create other societal harms. Sex-selective abortion also reinforces discriminatory and sexist stereotypes toward women by devaluing and dehumanizing females;
    62. In this state, from 2008 through 2017, the rate of abortion per one thousand (1,000) women was nearly four (4) times higher for nonwhite women than white women, with a rate of 7.6 on average for all women, 4.6 for white women, and 16.0 for nonwhite women. The ratio of abortions to one thousand (1,000) live births in this state from 2008-2017 was nearly three (3) times higher for nonwhite women than white women, with an average of 138.2 for all women, 85.1 for white women, and 294.4 for nonwhite women;
    63. The use of abortion as a means to prefer one (1) sex over another or to discriminate based on disability or race is antithetical to the core values equality, freedom, and human dignity enshrined in both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The elimination of bias and discrimination against pregnant women, their partners, and their family members, including unborn children, is a fundamental obligation of government in order to guarantee those who are, according to the Declaration of Independence, “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” can enjoy “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”;
    64. This state has historically protected its interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession by enacting a comprehensive statutory framework for ensuring the integrity of the medical profession in title 63;
    65. The general assembly first adopted an act creating the Board of Medical Examiners in 1901, with the mission to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state and to ensure the highest degree of professional conduct;
    66. As the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)), “the government has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.” Under U.S. Supreme Court precedents, it is clear the State has a significant role to play in regulating the medical profession;
    67. Physician involvement in medical practices that cause fetal pain has been rejected by the international community;
    68. Physician involvement in medical practices that facilitate discrimination is antithetical to the United States and Tennessee constitutions' affirmation of equal protection under the law;
    69. The integrity and public respect of the medical profession are significantly harmed by physician involvement in practices that have been rejected by the international community, facilitate discrimination, or otherwise create a disdain for life;
    70. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in valuing and protecting unborn children;
    71. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the physical and mental health of the mother;
    72. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in promoting human dignity;
    73. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion;
    74. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in safeguarding an unborn child from the serious harm of pain by an abortion method that would cause the unborn child to experience pain;
    75. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in resolving untenable inconsistencies and incongruities in state law which permits some unborn children to be killed by abortion, while requiring that unborn children be protected and valued in non-abortion circumstances including, but not limited to, criminal provisions related to the infliction of harms against persons, state programs intended to aid prenatal healthcare, and state sponsored healthcare for unborn children;
    76. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, including by prohibiting medical practices that might cause the medical profession to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including the life of the unborn child; and
    77. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in preventing discrimination.
  2. Purpose.
    1. The purpose of this section is to provide legislative intent and reasoning underlying the enactment of laws to protect maternal health, and to preserve, promote, and protect life and potential life throughout pregnancy, including, but not limited to, §§ 39-15-215 — 39-15-217.
    2. The unique nature of abortion and its potential physical and mental health risks, as well as the ultimate result of the death of an unborn child, necessitates that this state ensure every woman considering an abortion is provided with adequate comprehensive information before deciding to obtain an abortion. The mandatory provision of an ultrasound prior to the abortion substantially furthers this compelling state interest.
    3. The presence of a fetal heartbeat is a medically significant indicator of life and the potential successful development of an unborn child. This state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting unborn children warrants the restriction of abortion in cases where the heartbeat is detectable.
    4. The unnecessary infliction of pain upon the life of an unborn child is inconsistent with Tennessee law that would otherwise protect the life and health of an unborn child, undermines the integrity of and public trust in the medical profession, and conflicts with the this state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the life of an unborn child, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, resolving the conflict in state laws intended to protect the health of the unborn child, and protecting the life, physical health, and mental health of women. Therefore, it is necessary to enact protections against the infliction of pain, and death, upon an unborn child who is capable of experiencing pain.
    5. Advances in science and medical practice have decreased the gestational age of an unborn child's viability to survive. This state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the life of an unborn child, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, resolving the conflict in state laws intended to protect the health of the unborn child, and protecting the life, physical health, and mental health of women require the enactment of a series of gestational age restrictions on the provision of an abortion.
    6. The historical use of abortion as a means to discriminatory ends is fundamentally objectionable and conflicts with this state's legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in preventing discrimination and discriminatory practices. Therefore, it is necessary for this state to enact protections that prevent sex, racial, and disability discrimination against unborn children.
    7. Life begins at conception, and nothing in this act shall be interpreted or construed to suggest that it is the intent or purpose of the legislature to condone abortion of an unborn child at any time after conception. The legislature specifically acknowledges the provisions of § 39-15-213 that will prohibit all abortion effective on the thirtieth day after issuance of a judgment overruling, in whole or in part, Roe v. Wade, as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, or adoption of an amendment to the Constitution, restoring state authority to prohibit abortion.

Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 2.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 4. July 13, 2020.

39-15-215. Section definitions — Physician requirements prior to pregnant woman giving informed consent to have abortion — Obstetric ultrasound — Affirmative defense of medical emergency — Violations — Report to board of medical examiners — Severability — Intent.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Abortion” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211;
    2. “Auscultate” means to examine by listening for sounds made by internal organs of the fetus, including a fetal heartbeat, in accordance with standard medical practice utilizing current medical technology and methodology;
    3. “Gestational age” or “gestation” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211;
    4. “Medical emergency” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211; provided, that a medical emergency does not include a claim or diagnosis related to the woman's mental health or a claim or diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct which would result in her death or substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function;
    5. “Obstetric ultrasound” or “ultrasound” means the use of ultrasonic waves for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, specifically to monitor a developing fetus; and
    6. “Ultrasound technician” means a person at least eighteen (18) years of age who:
      1. Has earned a technical certificate from a sonography program accredited by the Commission on Accreditation of Allied Health Education Programs (CAAHEP) or Canadian Medical Association (CMA);
      2. Is currently certified by the American Registry for Diagnostic Medical Sonography (ARDMS) in the specialty in which the person is currently practicing;
      3. Is currently certified by the American Registry of Radiologic Technologists (ARRT) in sonography;
      4. Is in the process of applying for registration with the ARDMS, provided that the applicant satisfies the requirements for registration within ninety (90) days of becoming employed as a sonographer; or
      5. Is in the process of applying for registration with the ARRT, provided that the applicant satisfies the requirements for registration within ninety (90) days of becoming employed as a sonographer.
  2. Prior to a pregnant woman giving informed consent to having an abortion, as required by § 39-15-202, the physician who is performing or inducing, or attempting to perform or induce, an abortion, shall:
    1. Determine the gestational age of the unborn child in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice;
    2. Inform the pregnant woman the gestational age of the unborn child;
    3. Perform an obstetric ultrasound in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice using current medical technology and methodology applicable to the gestational age of the unborn child and reasonably calculated to determine whether a fetal heartbeat exists;
    4. Auscultate the fetal heartbeat of the unborn child, if any, so that the pregnant woman may hear the heartbeat if the heartbeat is audible;
    5. Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting, which must include the presence and location of the unborn child within the uterus, the dimensions of the unborn child, the presence of external members and internal organs if present and viewable, the number of unborn children depicted, and, if the ultrasound image indicates that fetal demise has occurred, inform the woman of that fact;
    6. Display the ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may view the images;
    7. Record in the pregnant woman's medical record the presence or absence of a fetal heartbeat, the method used to test for the fetal heartbeat, the date and time of the test, and the estimated gestational age of the unborn child; and
    8. Obtain from the pregnant woman prior to performing or inducing, or attempting to perform or induce, an abortion, a signed certification that the pregnant woman was presented with the information required to be provided under this subsection (b), that the pregnant woman viewed the ultrasound images or declined to do so, and that the pregnant woman listened to the heartbeat if the heartbeat was audible or declined to do so. The signed certification must be in addition to any other documentation requirements under this part and must be on a form prescribed by the commissioner of health and be retained in the woman's medical record.
    1. The physician who is to perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion may delegate the responsibility to perform the obstetric ultrasound to an ultrasound technician, provided that the ultrasound technician is qualified and permitted by law to perform an obstetric ultrasound that complies with the requirements of subsection (b). An ultrasound technician performing an obstetric ultrasound under this subdivision (c)(1) shall perform the obstetric ultrasound in a manner that complies with subsection (b), and the physician may rely on the signed certification obtained by the qualified technician under subdivision (b)(8) to establish that an ultrasound was performed in compliance with this section, unless the physician knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that an ultrasound was not performed in accordance with this section.
    2. The physician who is to perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion may accept a certification from a referring physician that the referring physician has performed an obstetric ultrasound that complies with the requirements of subsection (b). The referring physician performing an obstetric ultrasound under this subdivision (c)(2) shall perform the obstetric ultrasound in a manner that complies with subsection (b), and the physician may rely on the signed certification obtained by the referring physician under subdivision (b)(8) to establish that an ultrasound was performed in compliance with this section, unless the physician knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that an ultrasound was not performed in accordance with this section.
  3. When the ultrasound images and heartbeat sounds are provided to and reviewed with the pregnant woman, this section shall not be construed to prevent the pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the ultrasound images or requesting the volume of the heartbeat be reduced or turned off if the heartbeat is audible. The physician or ultrasound technician performing the ultrasound shall be permitted to comply with the request of the pregnant woman. The physician, the ultrasound technician, and the pregnant woman shall not be subject to any penalty if the pregnant woman refuses to look at the displayed ultrasound images or to listen to the heartbeat if the heartbeat is audible.
    1. Subject to compliance with subdivision (e)(2), it is an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution for a violation of a provision of this section that, in the physician's reasonable medical judgment, a medical emergency prevented compliance with the provision.
    2. In order for the affirmative defense in subdivision (e)(1) to apply, a physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, an abortion because of a medical emergency must comply with each of the following conditions unless the medical emergency also prevents compliance with the condition:
      1. The physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion certifies in writing that, in the physician's good faith, reasonable medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, compliance with the provision was prevented by a medical emergency;
      2. The physician certifies in writing the available methods or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the method or technique employed;
      3. If the unborn child is presumed to be viable under § 39-15-211 or determined to be viable under § 39-15-212, the physician performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion in a hospital. The hospital must have appropriate neonatal services for premature infants unless there is no hospital within thirty (30) miles with neonatal services and the physician who intends to perform or induce the abortion has admitting privileges at the hospital where the abortion is to be performed or induced;
      4. If the unborn child is presumed viable under § 39-15-211 or determined to be viable under § 39-15-212, the physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion terminates or attempts to terminate the pregnancy in the manner that provides the best opportunity for the unborn child to survive, unless that physician determines, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, that the termination of the pregnancy in that manner poses a significantly greater risk of the death of the pregnant woman or a significantly greater risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman than would other available methods of abortion; and
      5. If the unborn child is presumed viable under § 39-15-211 or determined to be viable under § 39-15-212, the physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion has arranged for the attendance in the same room in which the abortion is to be performed or induced, or attempted to be performed or induced, at least one (1) other physician who is to take control of, provide immediate medical care for, and take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the life and health of the unborn child immediately upon the child's complete expulsion or extraction from the pregnant woman.
  4. Performing or inducing, or attempting to perform or induce, an abortion in violation of the requirements of this section is a Class C felony.
  5. A violation of subsection (c) by an ultrasound technician or referring physician whose performance of an ultrasound pursuant to subsection (c) is relied upon by a physician in performing or inducing, or attempting to perform or induce, an abortion is a Class E felony.
  6. A pregnant woman upon whom an abortion is performed or induced, or attempted to be performed or induced, in violation of this section is not guilty of violating this section or attempting to commit or conspiring to commit a violation of this section.
  7. When a physician is criminally charged with a violation of this section, the physician shall report the charge to the board of medical examiners in writing within seven (7) calendar days of acquiring knowledge of the charge. The report must include the jurisdiction in which the charge is pending, if known, and must also be accompanied by a copy of the charging documents, if available. A district attorney general shall promptly notify the board of medical examiners when a physician is charged with a violation of this section.
  8. If any provision or provisions of this section or the application thereof to any person, circumstance, or period of gestational age is found to be unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the same is hereby declared to be severable and the remainder of the section shall remain effective. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have enacted this section and each of its provisions, even if any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person, circumstance, or period of gestational age is later found to be unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid.
    1. It is the specific intent of the general assembly in this section to exercise to the greatest extent permitted by law the legitimate, substantial, and compelling state interest in protecting maternal health, and in preserving, promoting, and protecting life and potential life throughout pregnancy by enacting more protective requirements than provided for under this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020.
    2. When this section is in direct conflict with this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020, the more protective requirements of this section control over any less protective provision in this part. This section shall not be construed as a repeal, either express or implied, of any provision of this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020.
    3. The general assembly specifically intends that this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020, shall remain and be enforceable if, and for so long as, any provisions of this section, or any part or parts thereof, are enjoined or otherwise barred by a court of competent jurisdiction.
    4. This section does not repeal or modify in any way § 39-15-213, as enacted by chapter 351 of the Public Acts of 2019, which shall control upon becoming effective. This section shall remain and be enforceable if, and for so long as, any provisions of § 39-15-213, or any part or parts thereof, are enjoined or otherwise barred by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 2.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 4. July 13, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class C and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

39-15-216. Section definitions — Determination of gestational age — Fetal heartbeat — Unlawful abortions due to fetal heartbeat or gestational age — Affirmative defense of medical emergency — Report to board of medical examiners — Severability — Intent.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Abortion” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211;
    2. “Fetal heartbeat” means cardiac activity or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the heart of an unborn child;
    3. “Gestational age” or “gestation” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211;
    4. “Medical emergency” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211; provided, that a medical emergency does not include a claim or diagnosis related to the woman's mental health or a claim or diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct which would result in her death or substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function;
    5. “Unborn child” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211; and
    6. “Viable” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211.
    1. Before performing or inducing, or attempting to perform or induce, an abortion, the physician shall determine the gestational age of the unborn child in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice.
    2. A violation of subdivision (b)(1) is a Class C felony.
    1. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child has a fetal heartbeat. A violation of this subdivision (c)(1) is a Class C felony.
    2. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is six (6) weeks gestational age or older unless, prior to performing or inducing the abortion, or attempting to perform or induce the abortion, the physician affirmatively determines and records in the pregnant woman's medical record that, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, the unborn child does not have a fetal heartbeat at the time of the abortion. In making the good faith medical determination, the physician shall utilize generally accepted standards of medical practice using current medical technology and methodology applicable to the gestational age of the unborn child and reasonably calculated to determine the existence or non-existence of a fetal heartbeat. A violation of this subdivision (c)(2) is a Class C felony.
    3. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is eight (8) weeks gestational age or older. A violation of this subdivision (c)(3) is a Class C felony.
    4. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is ten (10) weeks gestational age or older. A violation of this subdivision (c)(4) is a Class C felony.
    5. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is twelve (12) weeks gestational age or older. A violation of this subdivision (c)(5) is a Class C felony.
    6. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is fifteen (15) weeks gestational age or older. A violation of this subdivision (c)(6) is a Class C felony.
    7. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is eighteen (18) weeks gestational age or order. A violation of this subdivision (c)(7) is a Class C felony.
    8. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is twenty (20) weeks gestational age or older. A violation of this subdivision (c)(8) is a Class C felony.
    9. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is twenty-one (21) weeks gestational age or older. A violation of this subdivision (c)(9) is a Class C felony.
    10. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is twenty-two (22) weeks gestational age or older. A violation of this subdivision (c)(10) is a Class C felony.
    11. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is twenty-three (23) weeks gestational age or older. A violation of this subdivision (c)(11) is a Class C felony.
    12. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman whose unborn child is twenty-four (24) weeks gestational age or older. A violation of this subdivision (c)(12) is a Class C felony.
    1. A person shall not be convicted of violating more than one (1) subdivision of subsection (c) for any one (1) abortion that the person performed, induced, or attempted to perform or induce.
    2. This section does not permit the abortion of a viable unborn child.
    1. Subject to compliance with subdivision (e)(2), it is an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution for a violation of a provision of this section that, in the physician's reasonable medical judgment, a medical emergency prevented compliance with the provision.
    2. In order for the affirmative defense in subdivision (e)(1) to apply, a physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, an abortion because of a medical emergency must comply with each of the following conditions unless the medical emergency also prevents compliance with the condition:
      1. The physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion certifies in writing that, in the physician's good faith, reasonable medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, compliance with the provision was prevented by a medical emergency;
      2. The physician certifies in writing the available methods or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the method or technique employed;
      3. If the unborn child is presumed to be viable under § 39-15-211 or determined to be viable under § 39-15-212, the physician performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion in a hospital. The hospital must have appropriate neonatal services for premature infants unless there is no hospital within thirty (30) miles with neonatal services and the physician who intends to perform or induce the abortion has admitting privileges at the hospital where the abortion is to be performed or induced;
      4. If the unborn child is presumed viable under § 39-15-211 or determined to be viable under § 39-15-212, the physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion terminates or attempts to terminate the pregnancy in the manner that provides the best opportunity for the unborn child to survive, unless that physician determines, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, that the termination of the pregnancy in that manner poses a significantly greater risk of the death of the pregnant woman or a significantly greater risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman than would other available methods of abortion; and
      5. lf the unborn child is presumed viable under § 39-15-211 or determined to be viable under § 39-15-212, the physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion has arranged for the attendance in the same room in which the abortion is to be performed or induced, or attempted to be performed or induced, at least one (1) other physician who is to take control of, provide immediate medical care for, and take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the life and health of the unborn child immediately upon the child's complete expulsion or extraction from the pregnant woman.
  2. A pregnant woman upon whom an abortion is performed or induced, or attempted to be performed or induced, in violation of any provision of this section is not guilty of violating, or of attempting to commit or conspiring to commit a violation of, this section.
  3. When a physician is criminally charged with a violation of this section, the physician shall report the charge to the board of medical examiners in writing within seven (7) calendar days of acquiring knowledge of the charge. The report must include the jurisdiction in which the charge is pending, if known, and must also be accompanied by a copy of the charging documents, if available. A district attorney general shall promptly notify the board of medical examiners when a physician is charged with a violation of this section.
  4. If any provision or provisions of this section or the application thereof to any person, circumstance, or period of gestational age is found to be unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the same is hereby declared to be severable and the remainder of the section shall remain effective. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have enacted this section and each of its provisions, even if any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person, circumstance, or period of gestational age was later found to be unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid.
    1. It is the specific intent of the general assembly in this section to exercise to the greatest extent permitted by law the legitimate, substantial, and compelling state interest in protecting maternal health, and in preserving, promoting, and protecting life and potential life throughout pregnancy by enacting more protective requirements than provided for under this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020.
    2. When this section is in direct conflict with this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020, the more protective requirements of this section control over any less protective provision of this part. This section shall not be construed as a repeal, either express or implied, of any provision of this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020.
    3. The general assembly specifically intends that this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020, shall remain and be enforceable if, and for so long as, any provisions of this section, or any part or parts thereof, are enjoined or otherwise barred by a court of competent jurisdiction.
    4. This section does not repeal or modify in any way § 39-15-213, as enacted by chapter 351 of the Public Acts of 2019, which shall control upon becoming effective. This section shall remain and be enforceable if, and for so long as, any provisions of § 39-15-213, or any part or parts thereof, are enjoined or otherwise barred by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 2.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 4. July 13, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

39-15-217. Section definitions — Unlawful abortions due to sex, race, or indication of Down syndrome — Affirmative defense of medical emergency — Violations — Report to board of medical examiners — Severability — Intent.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Abortion” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211;
    2. “Down syndrome” means a chromosome disorder associated either with an extra chromosome twenty-one or an effective trisomy for chromosome twenty-one;
    3. “Medical emergency” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211; provided, that it does not include a claim or diagnosis related to the woman's mental health or a claim or diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct which would result in her death or substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function; and
    4. “Unborn child” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-15-211.
  2. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman if the person knows that the woman is seeking the abortion because of the sex of the unborn child.
  3. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman if the person knows that the woman is seeking the abortion because of the race of the unborn child.
  4. A person shall not perform or induce, or attempt to perform or induce, an abortion upon a pregnant woman if the person knows that the woman is seeking the abortion because of a prenatal diagnosis, test, or screening indicating Down syndrome or the potential for Down syndrome in the unborn child.
    1. Subject to compliance with subdivision (e)(2), it is an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution for a violation of a provision of this section that, in the physician's reasonable medical judgment, a medical emergency prevented compliance with the provision.
    2. In order for the affirmative defense in subdivision (e)(1) to apply, a physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, an abortion because of a medical emergency must comply with each of the following conditions unless the medical emergency also prevents compliance with the condition:
      1. The physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion certifies in writing that, in the physician's good faith, reasonable medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, compliance with the provision was prevented by a medical emergency;
      2. The physician certifies in writing the available methods or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the method or technique employed;
      3. If the unborn child is presumed to be viable under § 39-15-211 or determined to be viable under § 39-15-212, the physician performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion in a hospital. The hospital must have appropriate neonatal services for premature infants unless there is no hospital within thirty (30) miles with neonatal services and the physician who intends to perform or induce the abortion has admitting privileges at the hospital where the abortion is to be performed or induced;
      4. If the unborn child is presumed viable under § 39-15-211 or determined to be viable under § 39-15-212, the physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion terminates or attempts to terminate the pregnancy in the manner that provides the best opportunity for the unborn child to survive, unless that physician determines, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, that the termination of the pregnancy in that manner poses a significantly greater risk of the death of the pregnant woman or a significantly greater risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman than would other available methods of abortion; and
      5. If the unborn child is presumed viable under § 39-15-211 or determined to be viable under § 39-15-212, the physician who performs or induces, or attempts to perform or induce, the abortion has arranged for the attendance in the same room in which the abortion is to be performed or induced, or attempted to be performed or induced, at least one (1) other physician who is to take control of, provide immediate medical care for, and take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the life and health of the unborn child immediately upon the child's complete expulsion or extraction from the pregnant woman.
  5. A violation of subsections (b)-(d) is a Class C felony.
  6. A pregnant woman upon whom an abortion is performed or induced, or attempted to be performed or induced, in violation of subsections (b)-(d), is not guilty of violating the subsections, or of attempting to commit or conspiring to commit a violation of the subsections.
  7. When a physician is criminally charged with a violation of this section, the physician shall report the charge to the board of medical examiners in writing within seven (7) calendar days of acquiring knowledge of the charge. The report must include the jurisdiction in which the charge is pending, if known, and must also be accompanied by a copy of the charging documents, if available. A district attorney general shall promptly notify the board of medical examiners when a physician is charged with a violation of this section.
  8. If any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person, circumstance, or period of gestational age is found to be unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the same is hereby declared to be severable and the remainder of this section shall remain effective. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have enacted this section and each of its provisions, even if any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person, circumstance, or period of gestational age was later found to be unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid.
    1. It is the specific intent of the general assembly in this section to exercise to the greatest extent permitted by law the legitimate, substantial, and compelling state interest in protecting maternal health, and in preserving, promoting, and protecting life and potential life throughout pregnancy by enacting more protective requirements than provided for under this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020.
    2. When this section is in direct conflict with this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020, the more protective requirements of this section control over any less protective provision in this part. This section shall not be construed as a repeal, either express or implied, of any provision of this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020.
    3. The general assembly specifically intends that this part as it existed prior to July 13, 2020, shall remain and be enforceable if, and for so long as, any provisions of this section, or any part or parts thereof, are enjoined or otherwise barred by a court of competent jurisdiction.
    4. This section does not repeal or modify in any way § 39-15-213, as enacted by chapter 351 of the Public Acts of 2019, which shall control upon becoming effective. This section shall remain and be enforceable if, and for so long as, any provisions of § 39-15-213, or any part or parts thereof, are enjoined or otherwise barred by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 2.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 4. July 13, 2020.

Cross Reference Notes Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

39-15-218. Section definitions — Posting of sign about chemical abortion — Required warning about chemical abortion — Required statement in medical discharge instructions — Required information prior to abortion due to medical emergency — Department of Health materials and website — Violations — Civil penalty — Civil action for damages — Attorney's fees — Ruling on woman's anonymity.

  1. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, for purposes of this section:
    1. “Abortion” means the use or prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or other substance or device to intentionally:
      1. Kill the unborn child of a woman known to be pregnant; or
      2. Terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant, with an intention other than:
        1. After viability, to produce a live birth and preserve the life and health of the child born alive; or
        2. To remove a dead unborn child;
    2. “Chemical abortion” means the use or prescription of an abortion-inducing drug dispensed with intent to cause the death of the unborn child;
    3. “Medical emergency” means a condition that, in reasonable medical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of the pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert the death of the pregnant woman or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function, not including psychological or emotional conditions. No condition is a medical emergency if based on a claim or diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct that the woman intends to result in the death or in substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function of the woman; and
    4. “Stable internet website” means a website that, to the extent reasonably practicable, is safeguarded from having its content altered other than by the department of health.
  2. This section applies to a private office, ambulatory surgical treatment center, as defined in § 68-11-201, or other facility, as defined in § 68-11-201, or clinic, if more than fifty (50) elective abortions were provided in the private office, ambulatory surgical treatment center, facility, or clinic, other than abortions necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman, during the previous calendar year. Each private office, ambulatory surgical treatment center, facility, or clinic shall conspicuously post a sign in a location described in subsection (d) in a manner clearly visible to patients, which reads as follows:

    Recent developing research has indicated that mifepristone alone is not always effective in ending a pregnancy. It may be possible to avoid, cease, or even reverse the intended effects of a chemical abortion utilizing mifepristone if the second pill has not been taken. Please consult with a healthcare professional immediately.

  3. The sign required pursuant to subsection (b) must be printed with lettering that is legible and at least three-quarters of an inch (0.75") boldfaced type.
  4. A private office or an ambulatory surgical treatment center shall post the required sign in each patient waiting room and patient consultation room used by patients on whom abortions are performed. A hospital or any other facility that is not a private office or ambulatory surgical treatment center shall post the required sign in each patient admission area used by patients on whom abortions are performed.
  5. Except in the case of a medical emergency, a chemical abortion involving the two-drug process of dispensing mifepristone first and then misoprostol shall not be performed or induced or attempted to be performed or induced unless the woman is informed by the physician who is to perform the abortion at least forty-eight (48) hours before the abortion, that:
    1. It may be possible to reverse the intended effects of a chemical abortion utilizing mifepristone if the woman changes her mind, but that time is of the essence; and
    2. Information on and assistance with reversing the effects of a chemical abortion utilizing mifepristone is available on the department of health website.
  6. After the first drug involved in the two-drug process is dispensed in a chemical abortion utilizing mifepristone, the physician or an agent of the physician shall provide written medical discharge instructions to the pregnant woman, which must include the following statement:

    Recent developing research has indicated that mifepristone alone is not always effective in ending a pregnancy. It may be possible to avoid, cease, or even reverse the intended effects of a chemical abortion utilizing mifepristone if the second pill has not been taken. Please consult with a healthcare professional immediately.

  7. When a medical emergency compels the performance of an abortion, the physician shall inform the woman prior to the abortion, if possible, of the medical indications supporting the physician's professional medical judgment that an abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death or that a delay of forty-eight (48) hours will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function, not including psychological or emotional conditions.
  8. Within ninety (90) days after October 1, 2020, the department of health shall publish, in English and in each language that is the primary language of two percent (2%) or more of this state's population, and make available on the department's website as provided in subsection (i), the printed materials required by this subsection (h) in a manner that ensures that the information is easily understood by the general public. The materials must be designed to inform the woman of the possibility of reversing the effects of a chemical abortion utilizing mifepristone if the woman changes her mind and information on and assistance with the resources that may be available to help reverse the effects of a chemical abortion.
  9. The department of health shall develop and maintain a stable internet website to provide the information described in subsection (h). The department shall not collect or retain any information regarding website visitors or users. The department shall monitor the website on a daily basis to prevent and correct tampering. The website must be maintained at a minimum resolution of seventy (70) dots per inch. All pictures appearing on the website must be a minimum of two hundred (200) by three hundred (300) pixels. All letters on the website must be a minimum of twelve-point font. All information and pictures must be accessible with an industry standard browser, requiring no additional plugins.
  10. Any person who knowingly or recklessly performs or induces or attempts to perform or induce an abortion in violation of this section commits a Class E felony. No penalty may be assessed against the woman upon whom the abortion is performed or induced or attempted to be performed or induced. No penalty or civil liability may be assessed for failure to comply with subdivision (e)(2) unless the department of health has made the information available on the website at the time the physician is required to inform the woman.
  11. The department of health shall assess any private office, ambulatory surgical treatment center, or other facility or clinic that negligently fails to post a sign required by subsection (b) a civil penalty of ten thousand dollars ($10,000). Each day on which an abortion, other than in the case of a medical emergency, is performed in any private office, ambulatory surgical treatment center, or other facility or clinic during which the required sign is not posted is a separate violation.
  12. Any person upon whom an abortion has been performed that was not in compliance with this section, the father of the unborn child who was the subject of the abortion, or if the woman was younger than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the chemical abortion or has died as a result of the chemical abortion, the grandparent of the unborn child may bring an action against the person who performed the abortion in knowing or reckless violation of this act for actual and punitive damages. Any person, upon whom an abortion that was in violation of this section has been attempted, may bring an action against the person who attempted to perform the abortion in knowing or reckless violation of this act for actual and punitive damages. A court shall not award damages to a plaintiff if the pregnancy resulted from the plaintiff's criminal conduct.
  13. If judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff in any action brought pursuant to this section, then the court shall also award the plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees. If judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant and the court finds that the plaintiff's suit was frivolous and brought in bad faith, then the court shall award the defendant reasonable attorney's fees.
  14. In each civil or criminal proceeding brought under this section, the court shall rule whether the anonymity of any woman upon whom an abortion has been performed or attempted must be preserved from public disclosure if the woman does not give her consent to such disclosure. The court, upon motion or sua sponte, shall make such a ruling and, upon determining that the woman's anonymity must be preserved, shall issue orders to the parties, witnesses, and counsel and direct the sealing of the record and exclusion of individuals from courtrooms or hearing rooms to the extent necessary to safeguard the woman's identity from public disclosure. The order must be accompanied by specific written findings explaining why the anonymity of the woman must be preserved from public disclosure, why the order is essential to that end, how the order is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and why no reasonable, less restrictive alternative exists. In the absence of written consent of the woman upon whom an abortion has been performed or attempted, anyone who brings an action under subsection (l ) shall do so under a pseudonym. This section must not be construed to conceal the identity of the plaintiff or witnesses from the defendant.
  15. This section does not affect a provider's legal obligations pursuant to § 39-15-202.

Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 2.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 764, § 4. October 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Part 3
Bigamy and Incest

39-15-301. Bigamy.

  1. A person commits bigamy who:
    1. Is married and purports to marry or be married to a person other than the person's spouse in this state under circumstances that would, but for the person's existing marriage, constitute a marriage; or
    2. Knows that a person other than the person's spouse is married and purports to marry or be married to the person in this state under circumstances that would, but for the person's existing marriage, constitute a marriage.
  2. It is a defense to prosecution under subdivision (a)(1) that the person reasonably believed that the person's marriage had been dissolved by death, divorce or annulment.
  3. For purposes of determining when prosecution for this offense must begin under § 40-2-101:
    1. A violation of this section is a continuing offense; and
    2. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the applicability of § 40-2-103.
  4. Bigamy is a Class A misdemeanor and, in addition to the authorized term of imprisonment, shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2013, ch. 227, §§ 1, 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section expands prior law to include all parties regardless of their prior marital status. Subsection (b) provides a defense for those persons who remarry because of a reasonable, though mistaken, belief that their prior marriage has been legally dissolved. This defense greatly expands defenses available under prior law.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Disfranchisement on conviction, § 40-20-112.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Remarriage after absence of two years and well founded belief of death, § 36-4-128.

Second marriage after absence for five years, § 36-3-102.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systemic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253 (1974).

39-15-302. Incest.

  1. A person commits incest who engages in sexual penetration as defined in § 39-13-501, with a person, knowing the person to be, without regard to legitimacy:
    1. The person's natural parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, stepparent, stepchild, adoptive parent, adoptive child; or
    2. The person's brother or sister of the whole or half-blood or by adoption.
  2. Incest is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 25.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section forbids a wider range of relationships than did prior code § 39-4-306 by adding adoptive and step-parent and step-child relationships. This change was made to promote family solidarity by prohibiting relationships with anyone with parental authority which may be abused to sexual ends. If the sexual penetration is nonconsensual, the offender could be charged with rape or aggravated rape. If one of the parties is a minor who is legally incapable of consenting, the offender may be charged with statutory rape despite consent being given.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Commission of act against child under this section deemed severe child abuse, § 37-1-102.

Criminal injuries compensation claim procedure for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-108.

Criminal injuries compensation for child sexual abuse victims, § 29-13-106.

Criminal injuries compensation fund privilege tax upon persons committing sexual offenses upon children under this section, § 40-24-107.

Disfranchisement on conviction, § 40-20-112.

Limitation of actions in prosecutions under this section for offenses committed against children, § 40-2-101.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Prohibited degrees of relationship for marriage, § 36-3-101.

Rape of a child, § 39-13-522.

Reports of incest, county human services director to notify district attorney general, § 37-1-405.

Sexual offender registration and monitoring, title 40, ch. 39.

Statutory rape, § 39-13-506.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.94.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Incest, § 1; 21 Tenn. Juris., Rape, § 5.

Law Reviews.

Use of Presumptions in Proving the Existence of Marriage Relationships in Tennessee (Richard T. Doughtie), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 409 (1975).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The state may legitimately proscribe acts which threaten public order and decency, including prohibitions against interfamilial sexual relations; thus, T.C.A. § 39-15-302 does not violate the State Constitution. Smith v. State, 6 S.W.3d 512, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

2. Timeliness of Charges.

Institution of incest charges was not timely. State v. Henry, 834 S.W.2d 273, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. 1992).

3. Culpable Mental State.

The statutory definition of incest does not expressly require, nor plainly dispense with, a culpable mental state; accordingly, intent, knowledge or recklessness will suffice to establish the culpable mental state for commission of the offense. State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Vann v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1071, 119 S. Ct. 1467, 143 L. Ed. 2d 551, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2664 (1999).

The definition of offense of incest specifically requires that the perpetrator have knowledge of the familial relationship between himself or herself and the victim. State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998), cert. denied, Vann v. Tennessee, 526 U.S. 1071, 119 S. Ct. 1467, 143 L. Ed. 2d 551, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2664 (1999).

4. Affinity.

T.C.A. § 39-15-302 does not proscribe sexual intercourse between defendant and daughter of his wife's half-sister. State v. Dodd, 871 S.W.2d 496, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

5. Lesser Included Offenses.

Where defendant appealed a sentencing issue, the court of criminal appeals erred in vacating his conviction of incest because its finding of plain error was erroneous; factor (a) under the plain error test was not met and the record strongly suggested that defendant pleaded guilty to incest, a lower grade offense than rape of a child that he was originally charged with, for tactical reasons, and by his plea of guilty, defendant accepted the benefit of a lower sentence for a lower-grade offense. Studdard v. State, 182 S.W.3d 283, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1046 (Tenn. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. 2006).

Where defendant appealed a sentencing issue, the court of criminal appeals erred in vacating defendant's conviction of incest on the grounds that incest was not a lesser included offense of child rape and because the record failed to reflect that the indictment had been amended from “rape of a child.” Studdard v. State, 182 S.W.3d 283, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1046 (Tenn. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court improperly merged aggravated statutory rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest into the rape convictions because each of the convictions required elements pertaining to the ages of the victim and defendant and relationship that rape did not, and they did not require proof of non-consent. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

6. Double Jeopardy.

The statutory offenses of incest and rape have a related but separate legislative purpose and achieve contrasting policy objectives; accordingly, there is no double jeopardy impediment to convicting and sentencing a defendant for both incest and criminal sexual penetration arising out of the same act. State v. Beauregard, 32 S.W.3d 681, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. 2000).

Convictions for both rape and incest arising out of the same act do not violate due process under the Tennessee or United States constitutions, because neither offense is “essentially incidental” to the other. State v. Beauregard, 32 S.W.3d 681, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. 2000).

7. Evidence Sufficient.

Although there was no evidence that the father ever abused his minor twins, and the mother who was also the father's stepdaughter, was not a minor when he impregnated her, termination of the imprisoned father's parental rights on grounds of severe child abuse was proper considering the irrefutable evidence of incest, and by the father's inability to categorically deny the mother's allegations of prior abuse. In re H.E.J., 124 S.W.3d 110, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, Beard v. Ass'n for Guidance, Aid, Placement and Empathy, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1180 (Tenn. 2003).

Defendant conceded that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest, and the victim provided detailed testimony about all three of the offenses for which the State elected to prosecute, and her account of what transpired proved all elements of each offense. State v. Pilate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of incest, aggravated sexual battery, attempted rape, and sexual battery by an authority figure; the victim testified about the sexual abuse that occurred for years, and witness testimony corroborated events that gave credence to the victim's claims, and credibility was for the jury to determine. State v. Whitehair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape and incest where the victims testified that they were defendant's biological children and they told their grandmother and the police that defendant had raped them. State v. Colwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape and incest because the lack of forensic medical evidence did not corroborate defendant's denial of sexual contact with the victim, the victim testified against defendant, and defendant admitted during an interview that his penis penetrated the victim's vagina. State v. Belt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to uphold the verdicts finding defendant guilty of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against the victim because there were no inconsistencies in the victim's testimony so unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt; the victim's testimony amounted to an assertion that defendant raped her on two occasions and that she then went home and recorded the assaults in a diary. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Evidence that the victim was defendant's biological daughter, was 11 or 12 years old at the time of the abuse, and testified that defendant used his tongue to lick the inside of her vagina and his hand to touch her vagina supported defendant's convictions for rape of a child and incest. State v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. Sept. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest because the 11-year-old victim testified that she was forced to perform fellatio on defendant, her grandfather; she recalled the abuse in detail, was unequivocal in her testimony, and identified a unique birthmark on defendant's upper thigh; and the inconsistencies pointed to by defendant involved the victim's terminology of sexually explicit terms, and were in no way material to the elements of the offense. State v. Harrah, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape and incest convictions, under a criminal responsibility theory, because defendant's wife, who was the mother of their teenage son, and defendant's son testified that they twice engaged in sexual intercourse in defendant's presence at the insistence of defendant. State v. Sherrill, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2018).

Reasonable jury could conclude that defendant committed rape of a child and incest because during the recorded interview, played for the jury at trial, the victim, who was defendant's son, again disclosed that defendant had forced him to lick her private parts, and the victim confirmed at trial that the statements he provided in the recorded interview were true; the victim's twin sister also testified that defendant would take the victim into a room and shut the door. State v. Ray, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated sexual battery, incest, and rape of a child because the victim testified that defendant, her father, kissed and touched her vagina and breasts, put his penis in her mouth, licked her vagina, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. State v. Cooper, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2019).

Defendant's convictions of four counts of rape of a child and four counts of incest were supported by sufficient evidence; the victim detailed several incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while she lived with defendant, her father, which alone was sufficient. While no corroboration was needed, medical evidence also supported her testimony, plus one eyewitness testified to seeing the victim perform a sex act on defendant. State v. Vest, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child and incest because it was undisputed that defendant was the victim's natural father, the victim testified that he was nine when he was abused by his father, and in addition to telling his grandparents that defendant raped him, he wrote it on a piece of paper at school. State v. Strange, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Evidence that defendant, the victim's father, took the victim to a hotel and left and returned pushed the victim's face-down onto the bed and forcibly raped her, along with the fact that a rape kit revealed defendant's sperm on the victim's vaginal swabs was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape and incest. State v. Rudd, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of incest because it established that the victim reported to her school counselor that defendant, her father, had raped her before school on October 19, 2016, the victim acknowledged that she repeated this claim to a detective, hospital personnel, a forensic interviewer, the prosecutor, and the victim-witness coordinator, when questioned by the police defendant confessed having engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim, and rorensic testing established that defendant's semen was present on the external vaginal swabs taken during the victim's examination at the hospital on October 19, 2016. State v. Wyse, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2020).

Two victims provided similar accounts to a sexual assault nurse examiner, whose physical examinations revealed mild redness in the first victim's genital area and severe redness throughout the second victim's genital area. Inasmuch as this was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant sexually penetrated each victim, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to sustain defendant's child rape and incest convictions. State v. Henson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 697 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2020).

7.5. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest as to incidents that occurred in a bedroom and a basement at a certain address because the State's elected dates between which the incident occurred and the victim's age were not sufficiently proven. There was no proof of a temporal marker that confirmed whether the incidents occurred before the State's elected date of September 22, 2014 and no questions were asked regarding whether the events occurred prior to the victim's 13th birthday in December 2014. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2020).

8. Sentence.

Defendant's sentences of 20 years for rape and 10 years for incest were not excessive because he had eight prior felonies, the trial court found that he committed the offenses to gratify his desire for pleasure or excitement, there were multiple instances when he failed to comply with the conditions of release into the community, and he abused a position of private trust. State v. Belt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2017).

As a Range II multiple offender convicted of a Class A felony, defendant was subject to a sentencing range of 25-40 years for his rape of a child convictions, and his sentence of 33 years for each rape conviction and five years for each incest conviction, with two 33-year sentences to run consecutively, was upheld; defendant had a prior history of misdemeanor convictions and he occupied a position of trust, and given the physical and mental damage the victim suffered, consecutive sentencing was appropriate. State v. Vest, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2019).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant for rape of a child and incest because his sentence of 30 years for each count of rape of a child and eight years for incest were within the applicable ranges. The trial court ordered two of the counts of rape of a child to be served consecutively to each other and concurrently to the remaining counts for an effective 60-year sentence and defendant did not challenge the imposition of consecutive sentencing. State v. Strange, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, sexual battery by an authority figure, and 11 counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, and rape, defendant's effective sentence of 52 years'  incarceration was not excessive because the trial court correctly applied the enhancement factors that defendant, the victim's stepfather, abused a position of private trust; and, although the court found that defendant's girlfriend was an emotionally troubled young lady who was taken advantage of by defendant, and that her testimony did not serve as mitigating evidence, the court did not consider her testimony against defendant as evidence supporting enhancement. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

9. Indictment.

Defendant claimed that the State made an improper election in the sexual battery by an authority figure count because the State alleged that he committed two discrete acts, but he was not entitled to plain error relief; the trial court properly instructed the jury that incest required sexual penetration, and that sexual battery by an authority figure required sexual contact, and the jury defendant guilty of sexual battery but not guilty of incest, and thus the jury understood the sexual act required for each crime. State v. Whitehair, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Defendant did not show that any variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial was material and prejudicial because there was no question that the victim was under the age of 13, the indictment alleged that the offenses were committed between September 2012 and January 10, 2014, the date of the offense was not a material ingredient of rape of a child and incest, and during his forensic interview the victim said that the offenses occurred over Christmas break. State v. Strange, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Part 4
Children

39-15-401. Child abuse and child neglect or endangerment.

  1. Any person who knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under eighteen (18) years of age in such a manner as to inflict injury commits a Class A misdemeanor; provided, however, that, if the abused child is eight (8) years of age or less, the penalty is a Class D felony.
  2. Any person who knowingly abuses or neglects a child under eighteen (18) years of age, so as to adversely affect the child's health and welfare, commits a Class A misdemeanor; provided, that, if the abused or neglected child is eight (8) years of age or less, the penalty is a Class E felony.
    1. A parent or custodian of a child eight (8) years of age or less commits child endangerment who knowingly exposes such child to or knowingly fails to protect such child from abuse or neglect resulting in physical injury or imminent danger to the child.
    2. For purposes of this subsection (c):
      1. “Imminent danger” means the existence of any condition or practice that could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious bodily injury;
      2. “Knowingly” means the person knew, or should have known upon a reasonable inquiry, that abuse to or neglect of the child would occur which would result in physical injury to the child. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary parent or legal custodian of a child eight (8) years of age or less would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the defendant’s standpoint; and
      3. “Parent or custodian” means the biological or adoptive parent or any person who has legal custody of the child.
    3. A violation of this subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. Any court having reasonable cause to believe that a person is guilty of violating this section shall have the person brought before the court, either by summons or warrant. No arrest warrant or summons shall be issued by any person authorized to issue the warrant or summons, nor shall criminal charges be instituted against a child's parent, guardian or custodian for a violation of subsection (a), based upon the allegation that unreasonable corporal punishment was administered to the child, unless the affidavit of complaint also contains a copy of the report prepared by the law enforcement official who investigated the allegation, or independent medical verification of injury to the child.
      1. As provided in this subdivision (d)(2), juvenile courts, courts of general session, and circuit and criminal courts, shall have concurrent jurisdiction to hear violations of this section.
      2. If the person pleads not guilty, the juvenile judge or general sessions judge shall have the power to bind the person over to the grand jury, as in cases of misdemeanors under the criminal laws of this state. Upon being bound over to the grand jury, the person may be prosecuted on an indictment filed by the district attorney general and, notwithstanding § 40-13-103, a prosecutor need not be named on the indictment.
      3. On a plea of not guilty, the juvenile court judge or general sessions judge shall have the power to proceed to hear the case on its merits, without the intervention of a jury, if the person requests a hearing in juvenile court or general sessions court and expressly waives, in writing, indictment, presentment, grand jury investigation and a jury trial.
      4. If the person enters a plea of guilty, the juvenile court or general sessions court judge shall sentence the person under this section.
      5. Regardless of whether the person pleads guilty or not guilty, the circuit court or criminal court shall have the power to proceed to hear the case on its merits, and, if found guilty, to sentence the person under this section.
  3. Except as expressly provided, this section shall not be construed as repealing any provision of any other statute, but shall be supplementary to any other provision and cumulative of any other provision.
  4. A violation of this section may be a lesser included offense of any kind of homicide, statutory assault, or sexual offense, if the victim is a child and the evidence supports a charge under this section. In any case in which conduct violating this section also constitutes assault, the conduct may be prosecuted under this section or under § 39-13-101 or § 39-13-102, or both.
  5. For purposes of this section, “adversely affect the child's health and welfare” may include, but not be limited to, the natural effects of starvation or dehydration or acts of female genital mutilation as defined in § 39-13-110.
  6. The court may, in addition to any other punishment otherwise authorized by law, order a person convicted of child abuse to refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense, including, but not limited to, attempted contact through internet services or social networking websites; provided, that the person has no parental rights to such victim at the time of the court's order.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 978, § 1; 1996, ch. 962, § 1; 1998, ch. 1040, § 2; 2005, ch. 487, § 1; 2006, ch. 939, § 1; 2008, ch. 1024, § 1; 2009, ch. 335, § 1; 2009, ch. 418, § 1; 2009, ch. 585, § 1; 2011, ch. 313, § 1; 2017, ch. 381, §§ 1, 2; 2019, ch. 268, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2008, ch. 1024, § 2 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Josh Osborne Law.”

Acts 2011, ch. 313, § 3 provided that the act, which added subsection (h), shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2011.

Acts 2017, ch. 381, § 3 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to offenses occurring on or after July 1, 2017.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added “or acts of female genital mutilation as defined in § 39-13-110” at the end of (g).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 268, § 5. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Aggravated child abuse and neglect, § 39-15-402.

Binding defendant over to grand jury, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5, 5.1.

Child abuse reports, title 37, ch. 1, part 4.

Failure to support child, title 39, ch. 15, part 1.

Juveniles, title 37, ch. 2.

Kidnapping children under 13, § 39-13-305.

Missing Children Recovery Act, title 37, ch. 10, part 2.

Penalties for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Rape of a child, § 39-13-522.

Selling or giving weapons to minors, § 39-17-1303.

Statutory rape, § 39-13-506.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in the text and Advisory Commission Comments of Rule 1 of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 7.1.

Law Reviews.

The Trexler Saga: Hale & Middlebrooks (Gary R. Wade), 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 319 (1993).

Attorney General Opinions. Jurisdiction of juvenile courts over misdemeanors of child abuse and neglect and contributing to delinquency, OAG 93-24 (3/29/93).

Cocaine use by pregnant woman, OAG 95-023 (3/27/95).

Violations of this section do not rise to the level of harm contemplated by T.C.A. § 40-24-107, providing for imposition of a $ 500.00 privilege tax upon conviction for any sex crime involving children, OAG 03-104 (8/19/03).

Juvenile court official's providing copies of civil petitions alleging child abuse to district attorneys general.  OAG 10-124, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 130 (12/30/10).

Liability for infants born with narcotic drug dependency.  OAG 13-01 (revised),  2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 12 (2/1/13).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. § 39-15-401 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a mother who gave her child an extra dose of Clonidine, because the statute requires that the mother know her conduct was abusive. State v. Prater, 137 S.W.3d 25, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2004).

Defendants failed to raise the issue of the constitutionality of the child neglect statute in their new trial motions, which could have resulted in waiver, but in any event, the child abuse and neglect statute had previously been upheld against a vagueness challenge, and as there was no clear rule of law that had been breached, there was no plain error. State v. Starner, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

In a case where defendant was convicted of aggravated child neglect, the child neglect statute was not unconstitutionally vague because the statute was sufficiently clear to put an ordinary person of common intelligence on notice that it was a crime to knowingly fail to provide reasonable attention or supervision to a child where such an omission resulted in an adverse effect to the health and welfare of the child. State v. Burton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 755 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

2. Construction.

Record did not justify the district court's conclusion that defendant's prior conviction was for a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 after defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); the district court erred in failing to consider only the charges in an indictment for aggravated child abuse under T.C.A. § 39-15-402 that were essential to the offense to which defendant pled guilty, which was attempted child abuse under T.C.A. § 39-12-101 and T.C.A. § 39-15-401, in finding that the prior conviction was a crime of violence. United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 2006 FED App. 412P, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27379 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2006).

3. Elements.

Age provisions of T.C.A. § 39-15-401 are essential elements of the child abuse offenses; therefore, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims were 6 years of age or less. State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2000), cert. denied, Ducker v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 1197, 121 S. Ct. 1202, 149 L. Ed. 2d 116, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1810  (2001).

The mens rea of “knowing” refers only to the conduct elements of treatment or neglect of a child under the child abuse statute, and child abuse offenses are not the result of conduct offenses. State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2000), cert. denied, Ducker v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 1197, 121 S. Ct. 1202, 149 L. Ed. 2d 116, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1810  (2001).

A conviction pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-15-401(a) requires proof of an actual, deleterious effect upon a child's health and welfare; a mere risk of harm to a child's health is insufficient. State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.3d 666, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 625 (Tenn. 2001).

For purposes of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a violation of T.C.A. § 39-15-401 constitutes a crime of violence if it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. United States v. Bass, 315 F.3d 561, 2002 FED App. 372P, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 22417 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1241, 123 S. Ct. 1373, 155 L. Ed. 2d 212, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1885 (Mar. 3, 2003).

State argued that even if the injury to the minor victim's tongue was caused by accidental means, the jury still could have found that some sharp object was left in the victim's proximity and defendant's failure to protect him amounted to child abuse or neglect; however, this argument was rejected because the mental culpability the State recited only applied to child endangerment, and establishing that a defendant's conduct was negligent or reckless is insufficient to support convictions for child abuse, child neglect, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016).

4. Indictment.

In a child neglect case alleging failure to seek medical treatment for the child, trial court improperly granted defendant's motion to dismiss the child neglect charge before trial was held because: (1) Only relevant undisputed facts were that defendant was not the biological parent of the child, not her legal guardian, and not married to the co-defendant, her mother, which was not enough information to warrant a dismissal of the indictment; (2) State could present other circumstances that might establish duty on the part of defendant arising out of in loco parentis relationship; and (3) State might be able to establish that defendant failed to perform a statutory duty to provide adequate medical care for the child. State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2008).

There was no need for an election of offenses because neglect charges were predicated upon a single, continuing course of conduct, and thus, the evidence only suggested a single criminal offense; defendant was prosecuted and convicted for continuing course of conduct that began when he caused the victim's hands to be burned and continued for as long as he failed to properly attend to her injuries, and remained true even though the course of conduct was composed of more than one discrete act. State v. Pewitte, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2016).

While failure to seek medical care, in some cases, may constitute the entirety of the allegedly criminal conduct for a charge of neglect, it does not necessarily follow that an election of offenses is required anytime a period of failure to seek medical care accompanies other discrete conduct which more directly contributes to the infliction of injury. State v. Pewitte, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2016).

5. Continuing Course of Conduct.

The offense of child abuse through neglect is a single, continuing offense; therefore, the state is not required to make an election of offenses. State v. Adams, 24 S.W.3d 289, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. 2000).

6. Separate Subsections.

Given that T.C.A. § 39-15-401(a) is separate and distinct from (d) (now (e)), incorporation of T.C.A. § 39-15-401(a) does not mean that (d) is necessarily also incorporated. State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 809 (Tenn. 2001).

7. Lesser Included Offenses.

Trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense of child abuse; because the appellate court was unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the omission of a jury instruction on child abuse did not affect the outcome of the trial, the error was not harmless, and defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery had to be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. State v. Elkins, 83 S.W.3d 706, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. 2002).

Child abuse, not aggravated sexual battery, was the proper lesser included offense of rape of a child under T.C.A. § 39-13-522(a), and there was ample proof that defendant knowingly, other than by accidental means, treated the child in such a manner as to inflict injury. State v. Ortega, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2015), overruled, Harrison v. Parris, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154841 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2016).

Defendant was improperly found guilty of aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of the indicted offense of rape of a child because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for child abuse and neither assault nor attempted assault was a lesser included offense of rape of a child. State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 504 S.W.3d 260, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2016).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was modified to reckless endangerment because (1) the jury found serious injury but did not find an adverse effect on the victim's welfare, and (2) reckless endangerment was the next properly-charged lesser-included offense the evidence supported. State v. Hodges, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Defendant's dual convictions of aggravated child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury and child abuse presented a multiple description claim; the evidence failed to show that the bruising was not part of the same transaction or occurrence as the rib fracture or subdural hematoma, and as child abuse was a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse, the court presumed that multiple convictions were not intended by the legislature and violated double jeopardy, and thus defendant's conviction of child abuse had to merge. State v. Hendrix, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2019).

Trial counsel was deficient for not requesting lesser-included offenses because he testified that he was aware a written request for lesser-included offenses was required and simply filed to make such a request; petitioner failed to show that, but for trial counsel's deficiency, the jury would have convicted him of child abuse as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child because the physician who examined the victim found no signs of bleeding or bruising. Townsend v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

Defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide and child neglect violated double jeopardy because they arose from the same act or transaction and the Legislature had declared child neglect a lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide. State v. Bible, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2020).

8. Evidence.

In a prosecution for first-degree murder by aggravated child abuse, evidence of prior injuries to the child was admissible as relevant to the issue of causation, and to show intent and absence of accident. State v. Dubose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. 1997).

Evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction of child abuse as it showed that defendant held the victim down to sexually assault the victim, the victim attempted to fight off defendant, and the victim sustained bruises as a result of defendant's conduct. State v. Elkins, 83 S.W.3d 706, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. 2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions on two counts of aggravated child abuse by use of a deadly weapon for incidents occurring on two separate dates, because the victim testified that defendant abused him with a heavy-duty extension cord wrapped with coat hangers and duct tape, because several witnesses corroborated the victim's testimony regarding injuries to his face and neck, and because the prosecution introduced photographs of these injuries at trial; however, the case was remanded for new trials because the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating the indictments. State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d 216, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. 2003).

Because the jury was told by a witness that a juvenile court judge had already determined that severe child abuse had been committed by defendant as a result of the shooting incident, which was the very issue to be decided by the jury in defendant's criminal trial for child abuse and child neglect, the testimony that a juvenile court judge had already determined that defendant had abused the child affected the jury's verdict; any probative value of the prior adjudication by the juvenile court was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and defendant's convictions for child abuse and child neglect was vacated. State v. McKinney, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2016).

9. —Sufficient.

Although the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of child abuse and child neglect, because the trial court erred in admitting evidence that a juvenile court had previously ruled that defendant was guilty of severe child abuse, the jury heard that evidence, the evidence affected the jury's verdict, and any probative value of the prior adjudication by the juvenile court was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, defendant's conviction for child abuse and child neglect was vacated. State v. McKinney, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2016).

Testimony that the two-month old victim suffered at least 30 fractures to his arms, ribs, and legs, defendant was the only person awake with the victim for four to five hours each night, defendant told the victim's mother that the injuries had to be something he had done, defendant admitted to a detective that it was all on him, and the experts did opine that some of the injuries could have been caused by the conduct defendant described in a written statement supported aggravated child abuse convictions. State v. Lowery, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree murder based on aggravated child abuse where the jury could have inferred that she had a motive to kill her newborn twins to continue hiding the fact that she had become pregnant, she made preparations to hide the births, she hid evidence of the crime by cleaning the bathroom and hiding the laundry basket where one twin was found, and she knowingly treated the twins in a manner to inflict injury by placing her hand over their mouths and suffocating them. State v. Lowe, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2016), aff'd, 552 S.W.3d 842, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2017).

Evidence that defendant placed a pillow over the victim's face while admonishing him, “I'm not going to hear this,” dropped the pillow when she saw the sitter watching her, and fled to the bathroom was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that defendant was acting with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to the victim and took a substantial step as required for attempted aggravated child abuse. State v. Hammers, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 947 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect because, based on the nature and extent of the victim's injuries that occurred while he was under defendant's sole custody and care and defendant's attempts to dispose of the victim's body and conceal the offenses, the evidence showed that defendant knowingly treated the victim in a manner as to inflict injury, that he acted other than by accidental means, and the victim died as a result. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault and child abuse because defendant and the child's mother were the sole caretakers of the one-month-old victim; defendant solely cared for the victim while the mother worked; both defendant and the mother admitted to becoming frustrated with the victim when he became fussy; at two-months-old, x-rays revealed numerous fractures throughout the victim's body; a doctor testified about the 23 fractures in various stages of healing to the victim's rib cage, legs, and arms and opined that the injuries were sustained through abuse; and defendant admitted to the police that he handled the victim roughly when frustrated and even heard a “pop” sound during one such incident. State v. Crawford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 870 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for three counts of aggravated child abuse because defendant knowingly engaged in the conduct that resulted in the victim's bone fractures; the two-month-old victim had nine bone fractures, a doctor concluded that the fractures were the result of blunt force trauma to the chest or any type of squeezing mechanism, and defendant admitted to becoming frustrated with the victim and squeezing him. State v. McDuffie, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated child neglect because the infant's severe diaper rash and diarrhea did not rise to the level of serious bodily injuries. However, because the severe diaper rash and diarrhea were medical conditions that adversely affected his health and welfare, the court reduced the aggravated child neglect conviction to child neglect. State v. Demeza, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of child abuse because the victim testified that defendant raped her when she was 12 years old and a pediatric nurse practitioner's testimony indicated that the victim experienced pain from the insertion of tampons and therefore she would have experienced pain from the insertion of a penis. State v. Earhart, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Evidence that defendant stood behind the victim while she made a sandwich and touched her front and back private areas, later pushed her into her mother's bedroom and kissed and sucked on her neck, causing hickies, and pulled down her pants and underwear and touched her front private part, and a swab from the victim's neck tested positive for defendant's saliva was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for child abuse and aggravated sexual battery. State v. Ortiz, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for child abuse. Taken in the light most favorable to the state, the proof at trial showed that defendant knowingly rubbed the victim's private area and inserted his finger inside her private area. State v. Gresham, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 14, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2018), cert. denied, Gresham v. Tennessee, 204 L. Ed. 2d 1112, 139 S. Ct. 2724, — U.S. —, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4120 (U.S. June 17, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child neglect convictions because, based on defendant's testimony, the jury could have found that defendant acted knowingly when defendant took medication, placed the infant victim in a bed in an unsafe sleeping environment, and fell asleep which resulted in the victim's death. Moreover, the jury could have determined that defendant was criminally negligent in that the victim should have known that the victim's actions were a gross deviation from the standard of care. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and misdemeanor child abuse; the victim, who was four years old at the time of the offenses, was consistent in her statements that defendant placed his penis in her mouth and anus and that he made her wrap her hands around his penis and move it up and down, and the victim's trial testimony was also consistent with what she told the forensic interviewer. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's child abuse conviction; a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant's grip around the child's neck as he held her to the wall caused the child physical pain, and the child's physical response, captured in the video recording, also supported this conclusion. State v. Addair, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated child abuse conviction because an expert in forensic pathology, who performed the one-year-old victim's autopsy, testified that the victim, defendant's stepchild, died from multiple blunt force injuries and because the jury heard recordings of defendant's statements that were made during a police interview as to what happened. It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant knowingly inflicted the victim's extensive injuries, other than by accidental means, while in defendant's sole care. State v. Batiz, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of child neglect because defendant, knowing that victim was injured, failed to immediately contact the mother or seek medical assistance for the victim. State v. Groves, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated child abuse because defendant handcuffed the victims to each other in a manner that allowed the handcuffs to continually tighten on their wrists, she hit the victim in the head with a rolling pin, causing him to fall to the ground bleeding, and she deprived the victims of food to the point of malnourishment. State v. Cox, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

9.5. —Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony child neglect because it did not show that defendant's neglect actually effected or harmed the victim's health or welfare, as there was no evidence regarding the cause of her scratches and bruises, there was no testimony she suffered any physical harm from her bug bites, although the victim had trouble speaking clearly a witness was unable to testify whether the impairment was caused by defendant's neglect, and the State presented no proof that defendant's neglect of her housekeeping duties or the victim's hygiene caused an actual deleterious effect or harm on the victim's health and welfare. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

10. Sentencing.

In a case in which defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and child abuse, and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of six and four years, for a total effective sentence of 10 years, the evidence supported the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences under the dangerous offender category because defendant, the two-month-old victim's caretaker, was frustrated with the victim's fussiness and was rough with him; the victim sustained 23 fractures throughout his body; defendant admitted to hearing a “pop” sound when aggressively handling the infant; and the trial court found it was necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct and, in particular, any young child that defendant might come in contact with. State v. Crawford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 870 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Defendant's eight-year sentence for his Class D felony conviction for child abuse was proper because the trial court determined that the statutory range for defendant's offense as a Range II, multiple offender was four to eight years; for purposes of the aggravating factors, the presentence report listed defendant's 23 prior misdemeanors and two prior felonies, and defendant testified to an extensive history of criminal activity and to violating probation twice; and, for purposes of the enhancement factors, the trial court properly considered the victim's vulnerability as the four-year-old victim was mentally disabled and autistic, and that defendant abused his position as the victim's babysitter. State v. Gerg, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1012 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2018).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant probation or an alternative sentence because, although defendant's eight-year sentence for child abuse was for less than 10 years, and he was eligible for probation, as a Range II, multiple offender, he was not considered a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing; he had an extensive prior criminal history and measures less restrictive than confinement had been unsuccessfully applied to him previously; and the trial court found confinement necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense of child abuse of a mentally handicapped child. State v. Gerg, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1012 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2018).

Defendant's sentence of three years and six months for child abuse was proper and the evidence supported the application of three enhancement factors, given defendant's multiple convictions, the victim's dependence on defendant as her father and her young age, and the fact that defendant abused a position of trust. State v. Addair, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

In connection with defendant's child abuse conviction, the trial court did not err in denying defendant an alternative sentence; from the time of his arrest, defendant failed to take responsibility for his actions and he expressed a lack of remorse and inability to understand that his actions were not justified, which showed his lack of potential for rehabilitation. State v. Addair, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

11. Relation to Civil Proceedings.

What rendered the trial court's application of collateral estoppel erroneous was the improper use of an inapplicable statute, T.C.A. § 39-15-401(c), under which subsection the mother was not convicted, to prevent her from defending against the severe child abuse statute; this holding did not disrupt the principle that criminal convictions could serve to establish severe child abuse, thereby collaterally estopping a litigant from relitigating the same issue previously litigated in a prior criminal conviction. In re Zaliyah S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2020).

Evidence supported finding that twins were dependent and neglected due to severe child abuse by the mother; trial court's application of the definition of knowingly in T.C.A. § 39-15-401(c) for collateral estoppel purposes, while error as the mother had been convicted under § 39-15-401(b), the error was harmless. Given a nurse's testimony and photographs, the twins were the victims of severe child abuse in that they were malnourished and the mother admitted her failure to properly feed them and she knew of the danger to their lives. In re Zaliyah S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2020).

39-15-402. Haley's Law — Aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect or endangerment — Definitions.

  1. A person commits the offense of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect or aggravated child endangerment, who commits child abuse, as defined in § 39-15-401(a); child neglect, as defined in § 39-15-401(b); or child endangerment, as defined in § 39-15-401(c) and:
    1. The act of abuse, neglect or endangerment results in serious bodily injury to the child;
    2. A deadly weapon, dangerous instrumentality, controlled substance or controlled substance analogue is used to accomplish the act of abuse, neglect or endangerment;
    3. The act of abuse, neglect or endangerment was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, or involved the infliction of torture to the victim; or
    4. The act of abuse, neglect or endangerment results from the knowing exposure of a child to the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine as described in § 39-17-435.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class B felony; provided, however, that, if the abused, neglected or endangered child is eight (8) years of age or less, or is vulnerable because the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or suffers from a physical disability, the penalty is a Class A felony.
  3. “Serious bodily injury to the child” includes, but is not limited to, second- or third-degree burns, a fracture of any bone, a concussion, subdural or subarachnoid bleeding, retinal hemorrhage, cerebral edema, brain contusion, injuries to the skin that involve severe bruising or the likelihood of permanent or protracted disfigurement, including those sustained by whipping children with objects and acts of female genital mutilation as defined in § 39-13-110.
  4. A “dangerous instrumentality” is any item that, in the manner of its use or intended use as applied to a child, is capable of producing serious bodily injury to a child, as serious bodily injury to a child is defined in this section.
  5. This section shall be known and may be cited as “Haley's Law”.
  6. The court may, in addition to any other punishment otherwise authorized by law, order a person convicted of aggravated child abuse to refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense, including, but not limited to, attempted contact through internet services or social networking websites; provided, that the person has no parental rights to such victim at the time of the court's order.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 978, §§ 2, 8; 1996, ch. 1069, § 1; 1998, ch. 1040, § 1; 2005, ch. 487, § 2; 2009, ch. 88, § 1; 2009, ch. 89, § 1; 2009, ch. 418, § 2; 2011, ch. 292, §§ 5-7; 2011, ch. 313, § 2; 2012, ch. 848, § 14; 2016, ch. 951, § 1; 2019, ch. 268, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section elevates behavior punished as child abuse or neglect by § 39-15-401 to aggravated child abuse if a weapon is used or if the child suffers serious bodily injury. Aggravated child abuse is a Class B felony; however, if the child is age 6 or less, the offense is punished as a Class A felony.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 292, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “I Hate Meth Act.”

Acts 2011, ch. 313, § 3 provided that the act, which added subsection (g), shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2011.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added “and acts of female genital mutilation as defined in § 39-13-110” at the end of (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 268, § 5. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Child sexual abuse, title 37, ch. 1, part 6.

Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Killing of a child as a result of aggravated child abuse, § 39-13-202.

Penalties for Class A and B felonies, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Mother May I … Live? Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment for Children Based on Religious Objections (Jennifer L. Martsell), 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 499 (1999).

The Trexler Saga: Hale & Middlebrooks (Gary R. Wade), 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 319 (1993).

Attorney General Opinions. Cocaine use by pregnant woman, OAG 95-023 (3/27/95).

Liability for infants born with narcotic drug dependency.  OAG 13-01 (revised),  2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 12 (2/1/13).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

In a case where defendant was convicted of aggravated child neglect, the child neglect statute was not unconstitutionally vague because the statute was sufficiently clear to put an ordinary person of common intelligence on notice that it was a crime to knowingly fail to provide reasonable attention or supervision to a child where such an omission resulted in an adverse effect to the health and welfare of the child. State v. Burton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 755 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

2. Elements.

State argued that even if the injury to the minor victim's tongue was caused by accidental means, the jury still could have found that some sharp object was left in the victim's proximity and defendant's failure to protect him amounted to child abuse or neglect; however, this argument was rejected because the mental culpability the State recited only applied to child endangerment, and establishing that a defendant's conduct was negligent or reckless is insufficient to support convictions for child abuse, child neglect, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016).

Defendant's mental state was a material element of the crime of aggravated child abuse, but while the trial court did not define “knowingly” as to this crime, the trial court did define knowingly within the definitions of the three other charges, and as the instructions read as a whole made the definition of “knowing” clear, defendant was not entitled to relief. State v. Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018).

3. Serious Bodily Injury.

Age provisions of T.C.A. § 39-15-402 are essential elements of the child abuse offenses; therefore, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims were 6 years of age or less. State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2000), cert. denied, Ducker v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 1197, 121 S. Ct. 1202, 149 L. Ed. 2d 116, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1810  (2001).

The mens rea of “knowing” refers only to the conduct elements of treatment or neglect of a child under the child abuse statute, and child abuse offenses are not result of conduct offenses. State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2000), cert. denied, Ducker v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 1197, 121 S. Ct. 1202, 149 L. Ed. 2d 116, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1810  (2001).

Evidence that the victim was systematically tortured over time and had four primary teeth forcibly knocked out was sufficient to show that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. State v. Wen Yee Mark, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 643 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2015), appeal denied, State v. Wen-Yee Mark, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2015), cert. denied, Mark v. Tennessee, 136 S. Ct. 2463, 195 L. Ed. 2d 800, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3867 (U.S. 2016).

Trial court did not err in finding that children were the victims of severe child abuse because it heard clear and convincing evidence that the father knowingly exposed his children or knowingly failed to protect his children from an environment that is likely to cause serious bodily injury or death; by the father's own admission, the children were present in an outbuilding where items used to manufacture methamphetamine were discovered. In re Mason E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 334 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated child neglect because the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that his entire course of conduct, which began with him neglectfully holding the victim's hands under hot water and continued through his failure to seek medical treatment, caused the victim's injuries; it was that entire course of conduct that caused the victim's burns and her accompanying extreme physical pain, which persisted until she received proper medical attention. State v. Pewitte, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2016).

One of the parents' minor child was the victim of severe abuse by both parents because the child's multiple skull fractures constituted a serious bodily injury. Furthermore, the children's counselor testified that the child suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the physical abuse which the child suffered in the home. In re Savannah F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Credible evidence supported a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that a parent committed severe child abuse because the parent was responsible for the child's injuries by the parent's knowing use of force as the child suffered a liver laceration, an injury, which a doctor opined occurred as a result of significant trauma, that constituted a serious bodily injury to the child. In re Damian M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding of severe abuse; the bruising, lacerations, and other marks on the children caused by whipping, regardless of whether the instrument used was a belt or an extension cord, constituted serious bodily injury, and the mother caused these injuries to the children. In re Tamera W., 515 S.W.3d 860, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Feb. 8, 2017).

Circuit court properly found two of the parents'  three children to be the victims of severe child abuse because they tested positive for methamphetamine during the time they were in the mother's care, whether mother exposed the children to drugs or she allowed her mother or someone else to expose the children, she failed to protect the children from exposure to drug, it was their exposure to harm that mattered, not the method or level of exposure, the express statutory language did not limit serious bodily injury to the listed conditions and did not require a finding of specific harm, and the children were the victims of severe child abuse due to drug exposure, regardless of the fact that their sibling tested negative for drugs. In re A.L.H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017).

Evidence amounted to clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of a mother's parental rights based on severe child abuse for physical and psychological damage to the child's half-siblings because the mother slapped one half-sibling and choked her making it difficult for the child to breathe; the child's other half-sibling witnessed the event, and an expert clinical psychologist testified to the harm that would result from being a victim of the assault and having witnessed it. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Evidence amounted to clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of a mother's parental rights based on severe child abuse because the mother's prenatal drug use constituted severe child abuse; the mother was advised by medical professionals to discontinue her use for the duration of her pregnancy, but she refused, and the child showed signs of developmental delays. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Evidence found by the trial court amounted to clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of a mother's parental rights based on severe child abuse because the mother drove while intoxicated with the child's half-sibling in the vehicle; that kind of reckless conduct had the potential to cause serious bodily injury and death to the child. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse because the child was severely burned on two separate occasions within a one-week period, strongly suggesting that the mother recklessly disregarded the known dangers of a curling iron and a campfire, and she failed to alleviate the child's ongoing pain by seeking appropriate medical treatment. In re E.M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2018).

Child suffered serious bodily injury in the form of broken ribs, at least one brain bleed, and retinal hemorrhaging, and, per a doctor's testimony, these injuries were caused by non-accidental trauma. In re Kyland F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Mother's act of child endangerment resulted in serious bodily injury to the child as doctors testified that the child suffered brain injuries a result of nonaccidental and abusive head trauma. In re Treylynn T., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2020).

4. Election As to Single Act.

Step-parent and caretaker of child bore a duty imposed by law to protect child from harm and to provide her with emergency medical attention where such need was obvious and urgent. State v. Hodges, 7 S.W.3d 609, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

T.C.A. § 39-15-402 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a mother who gave her child an extra dose of Clonidine, because the statute requires that the mother know her conduct was abusive. State v. Prater, 137 S.W.3d 25, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2004).

Defendant argued that the state failed to make an election of offenses to satisfy the substantial bodily injury element of aggravated child abuse and an election of the specific neglect offense to support a conviction for aggravated child neglect, but even if an election was required, the State made clear during closing argument what proof the jury should consider when deliberating on each count, and any failure to make an election did not rise to the level of plain error. State v. Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018).

5. Lesser Included Offense.

The General Assembly intended for the offense of aggravated child abuse through neglect to punish a continuing course of knowing conduct beginning with the first act or omission that causes adverse effects to a child's health or welfare. State v. Adams, 24 S.W.3d 289, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. 2000).

Because the entire period of knowing neglect of the child by defendants constituted one crime, the state was not required to make an election of offenses. State v. Adams, 24 S.W.3d 289, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. 2000).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was modified to reckless endangerment because (1) the jury found serious injury but did not find an adverse effect on the victim's welfare, and (2) reckless endangerment was the next properly-charged lesser-included offense the evidence supported. State v. Hodges, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

6. Double Jeopardy.

Applying the Blockburger  test, the court concluded that reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse were not the same offense because their elements differed; reckless homicide required proof of a killing; aggravated child abuse did not. Aggravated child abuse required proof that the victim was a “child,” that is, a person less than 18 years of age; reckless homicide had no age-based element. Therefore, defendant's dual convictions did not violate either the federal or the state constitutional double jeopardy prohibition. State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Events gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses, and thus defendants'  double jeopardy claim was without merit; the beating was the basis for the aggravated child abuse convictions and the failure to seek timely medical treatment for the victim was the basis for the aggravated child neglect convictions, and these convictions did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Starner, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Aggravated child abuse statute focuses on the act resulting in injury and the legislature did not intend for defendants charged with aggravated child abuse to be punished separately for each individual injury; instead, the unit of prosecution is the act that caused the injury. State v. Hendrix, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2019).

Defendant's two convictions of aggravated child abuse violated double jeopardy principles and had to be merged, as the state failed to show that the victim's rib one fracture and subdural hematoma were the result of separate and distinct acts. State v. Hendrix, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2019).

Defendant's dual convictions of aggravated child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury and child abuse presented a multiple description claim; the evidence failed to show that the bruising was not part of the same transaction or occurrence as the rib fracture or subdural hematoma, and as child abuse was a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse, the court presumed that multiple convictions were not intended by the legislature and violated double jeopardy, and thus defendant's conviction of child abuse had to merge. State v. Hendrix, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2019).

Dual convictions for aggravated child abuse in two counts of the indictment violated double jeopardy principles, and the imposition of dual convictions for those offenses rose to the level of plain error, because the counts charged the same act of abuse via different modalities; the remedy was not dismissal of one of the counts or a remand for a new trial but a merger of the jury verdicts for those counts. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Proper unit of prosecution for aggravated child abuse offenses is “the act of abuse” rather than the injury inflicted. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

7. Collateral Estoppel.

Aggravated child abuse under T.C.A. § 39-15-402 is a lesser-included offense of murder for the reckless killing of a child. State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2000), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2000), cert. denied, Ducker v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 1197, 121 S. Ct. 1202, 149 L. Ed. 2d 116, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1810  (2001).

Reading Tennessee's child abuse and neglect, aggravated child abuse, and felony murder statutes together, the legislative intent to allow cumulative punishment is clear; therefore, aggravated child abuse is not a lesser included offense of felony murder and dual convictions are permissible in a given context. State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 809 (Tenn. 2001).

8. Evidence.

Expert testimony as to the ultimate issue was improperly admitted because the jury could have readily drawn its own conclusion about whether defendant's conduct constituted neglect without the expert's opinion, and the admission of that evidence created a risk that the jury could have placed inordinate weight on the expert's testimony rather than relying on its own judgment; however, the admission of that evidence was harmless because the appellate court could not say that the admission of that testimony more probably than not affected the judgment as the evidence was clear that defendant's conduct was done knowingly, and he even admitted that he considered his conduct to be neglect. State v. Burton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 755 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Non-testifying codefendants'  statements circumstantially implicated defendant by placing him alone with the minor victim at the time of the injury, plus codefendants'  statements placed the children on the sofa at the time of the injury, although defendant said they were on a bed; defendant was unable to cross-examine the non-testifying codefendants and the trial court erred by admitting codefendants'  statements, which error was prejudicial because the inconsistencies in their statements were central to establishing defendant's guilt for aggravated child abuse and neglect. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016).

Trial court did not err by admitting evidence regarding bruising on the five-year-old victim's genital area because evidence that he suffered extensive bruising to his lower abdomen and genital area was highly relevant to the charge of aggravated child abuse, regardless of whether those injuries contributed to the victim's death. State v. Cooke, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

9. Evidence Sufficient.

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated child abuse, T.C.A. § 39-15-402, where the proof showed that defendant knowingly treated the child in such a manner as to inflict injury, either as principal or as one criminally responsible for the conduct of another, and the autopsy report, photographs of the injuries, and defendant's flight were especially probative. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2011).

Evidence a victim endured beatings so ferocious that they caused the victim to scream in pain and so frequent as to leave the victim with layers of bruising sufficiently established that the victim suffered extreme physical pain from beatings inflicted with a belt; as the belt, in the manner it was deployed against the victim, qualified as a deadly weapon, sufficient evidence existed to support defendant's conviction for aggravated child abuse. State v. Mathis, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2013), cert. denied, Mathis v. Tennessee, 187 L. Ed. 2d 51, 134 S. Ct. 60, — U.S. —, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 5552 (U.S. 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated child abuse conviction; the infant child suffered a spiral fracture of the humerus, and while defendant admitted that he caused the injury but maintained it to be an accident, doctors said otherwise, and the jury, by its verdict, discredited defendant's theory. State v. Isbell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendants'  convictions of felony murder perpetrated during the commission of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect; in part, the victim suffered many non-accidental injuries, the timing of which placed one defendant at the apartment when the injuries occurred, and the other defendant was present all day with the victim. State v. Starner, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated child neglect as he placed the unclothed 17-month-old victim in the back of the bathtub and left the bathroom while the hot water was running; in his absence, the victim sustained second degree burns on over seven percent of his body; and he knowingly left the victim unattended under circumstances that resulted in serious bodily injury. State v. Burton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 755 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated child neglect because the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that his entire course of conduct, which began with him neglectfully holding the victim's hands under hot water and continued through his failure to seek medical treatment, caused the victim's injuries; it was that entire course of conduct that caused the victim's burns and her accompanying extreme physical pain, which persisted until she received proper medical attention. State v. Pewitte, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree murder based on aggravated child abuse where the jury could have inferred that she had a motive to kill her newborn twins to continue hiding the fact that she had become pregnant, she made preparations to hide the births, she hid evidence of the crime by cleaning the bathroom and hiding the laundry basket where one twin was found, and she knowingly treated the twins in a manner to inflict injury by placing her hand over their mouths and suffocating them. State v. Lowe, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2016), aff'd, 552 S.W.3d 842, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2017).

Doctor testified that the minor victim's tongue injury could have been caused by either non-accidental or accidental means, which provided sufficient evidence for a jury to have found that the injury was the result of non-accidental conduct, and therefore was knowing relative to the conduct involved or to the circumstances surrounding the conduct, for purposes of defendant's aggravated child abuse conviction. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect because, based on the nature and extent of the victim's injuries that occurred while he was under defendant's sole custody and care and defendant's attempts to dispose of the victim's body and conceal the offenses, the evidence showed that defendant knowingly treated the victim in a manner as to inflict injury, that he acted other than by accidental means, and the victim died as a result. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support a knowing mens rea for aggravated child neglect because it showed that the victim was left in defendant's sole care, the mother noticed something was different when she returned home from work, a neighbor testified that defendant had called her that evening saying that things had gotten crazy during bath time, and later told her that she was worried she might lose her job while the victim was being examined by doctors. State v. Dewitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2016).

Evidence that defendant left the victim unattended in the hot water, the hot water severely burned the child's feet, defendant did not seek medical assistance for the victim for two weeks despite the victim's complaints of pain, and the failure to seek medical treatment could have caused the victim's injuries to become infected, not to heal property, and to cause immobility was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated child neglect. State v. Glass, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 954 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate aggravated child abuse, two counts of aggravated child abuse, and one count of filing a false report because the medical examiner testified that the victim suffered from battered child syndrome and her death was a homicide, defendant was alone with the victim on the day of her death, defendant's daughter testified that she saw him beat the victim, and defendant waited five hours after finding the victim before calling the police and lied about when he found her. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to show a continuing course of conduct because defendant's neglect began in late 2011 when he made the decision not to take the victim to see the specialist the hospital had recommended, made the decision to fire the home healthcare company that was helping the victim, and decided not to provide the victim with any further medical treatment. Though defendant called 911 on the day the victim died, that did not negate his obvious neglect of the victim, his child, during the preceding year and a half. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence of defendant's knowledge of the victim's deteriorating condition was overwhelming in light of the obvious nature of the victim's wounds and sores, the state of the victim's room, the smell in the house, and defendant's knowledge that the victim's feet and legs were in such a condition that the doctors felt amputation was necessary. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the victim suffered serious bodily injuries as a result of defendant's neglectful conduct and that the neglect was especially heinous, atrocious, and/or cruel because a physician testified that the victim's wounds would have been extremely painful and that she died as a result of neglected care, including infected decubitus ulcers, gangrene of the lower extremities, obesity, and hypertension. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence that the victim was already unresponsive when defendant arrived at the victim's aunt's home and told the aunt that the victim needed to go to the hospital and that the victim's injuries arose from a significant amount of force was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated child neglect. State v. Benesch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 766 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated child abuse of the three-month-old victim because, other than some slight congestion, the victim was healthy when her mother dropped her off with defendant; a video recorded on defendant's phone at 12:45 that afternoon showed the victim appearing unharmed and not displaying any symptoms of a severe brain injury; the victim's injuries were discovered around 2:03 p.m. when defendant's neighbor called 911; a child abuse pediatrician classified the injuries as non-accidental; and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant knowingly inflicted the injuries as she was the only person capable of inflicting such injuries on the victim at the time they were sustained. State v. Humphrey, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for three counts of aggravated child abuse because defendant knowingly engaged in the conduct that resulted in the victim's bone fractures; the two-month-old victim had nine bone fractures, a doctor concluded that the fractures were the result of blunt force trauma to the chest or any type of squeezing mechanism, and defendant admitted to becoming frustrated with the victim and squeezing him. State v. McDuffie, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Election of the offenses was sufficient to ensure the jury rendered a unanimous verdict on each count of the indictment because the trial court's instructions prevented any patchwork verdict and ensured jury unanimity on each count of the indictment; the jury was provided the factual basis for each count of aggravated child abuse in order to differentiate among the various incidents presented during the State's case-in-chief. State v. McDuffie, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated child abuse and first-degree felony murder because he admitted in a written statement that he grabbed the victim by the shoulders and shook her, an expert testified that the victim's injuries and death resulted from abusive head trauma, the victim was solely in defendant's care in the hours before her arrival at the hospital, and prior to being left alone with defendant the victim had no visible injuries and was behaving normally. State v. Iceman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 931 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated child abuse because it showed that he dropped the infant onto the kitchen floor, he hit the infant's head on a door frame, and he fell onto the infant and shook him causing him to suffer broken ribs, brain damage, and hemorrhaging. Defendant admitted to the incidents but claimed they were accidental, but two physicians testified the infant's injuries were not accidental. State v. Demeza, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant mother of aggravated child neglect because she acknowledged that she noticed blisters on the 10-month-old victim on a Wednesday and Thursday; defendant was told that the victim should be taken to a doctor or a children's hospital; defendant did not take the victim for medical treatment until she was forced to do so five or six days after he was injured; 15% of his total body surface was covered with second degree burns; the first two or three days of the victim's burns were the most painful; he could have been treated immediately with narcotics and steroids to lessen the swelling and decrease the pain from his eye injuries; and the lack of medical treatment caused him to suffer excruciating pain. State v. Lopez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2018).

State provided sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's aggravated child neglect conviction; defendant knew the victim was in distress, yet defendant failed to seek medical assistance, and a doctor testified that the victim's injuries were potentially survivable had he received immediate medical attention. State v. Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018).

There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict convicting the defendant of aggravated child abuse; two doctors testified that the minor victim's injuries were not consistent with an accident, and while defendant testified his actions were accidental, the jury chose not to accredit this testimony and resolved all conflicts in favor of the State. State v. Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse because it showed that defendant was alone in the room with the five-year-old victim who suffered injuries that medical experts equated with having been injured in a car accident or while skydiving. State v. Cooke, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for second degree murder and aggravated child abuse because both a pediatrician, who treated the victim, and a forensic pathologist, who performed the victim's autopsy, testified that the infant victim's death was the result of physical abuse. Furthermore, defendant admitted to a jail inmate that defendant shook the victim multiple times because the victim would not stop crying and then threw the victim onto a mattress during which time the victim possibly hit the victim's head on a wall. State v. Russell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 3, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated child abuse was supported by evidence that defendant admitted to whipping the victim with his belt and the victim was covered in bruises from head to toe. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2018).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated child neglect was supported by evidence that a subdural bleed the size of the victim's was survivable but required medical attention and defendant could not help but have known that the victim needed medical attention because he would not have been able to walk or function normally. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child neglect convictions because, based on defendant's testimony, the jury could have found that defendant acted knowingly when defendant took medication, placed the infant victim in a bed in an unsafe sleeping environment, and fell asleep which resulted in the victim's death. Moreover, the jury could have determined that defendant was criminally negligent in that the victim should have known that the victim's actions were a gross deviation from the standard of care. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse because according to the medical examiner and the expert in child abuse the victim died of acute blunt force trauma, both physicians were adamant that the injuries were non-accidental and that they occurred within a very short window of time before the presentation of symptoms, during that period of time the victim was in the sole care of defendant, and defendant failed to say anything before trial about the victim's alleged fall from the bunkbed or his alleged fall onto the victim. State v. Bufford, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Evidence supported defendant's aggravated child abuse conviction because an expert in forensic pathology, who performed the one-year-old victim's autopsy, testified that the victim, defendant's stepchild, died from multiple blunt force injuries and because the jury heard recordings of defendant's statements that were made during a police interview as to what happened. It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant knowingly inflicted the victim's extensive injuries, other than by accidental means, while in defendant's sole care. State v. Batiz, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2019).

Trial court did not err in finding that a mothers'  children were dependent and neglected, when one child was a victim of aggravated child abuse by the father, because the court considered the mother's Alford plea to child endangerment in reaching its decision that the mother committed child endangerment as to the child and in concluding that the mother's act of child endangerment resulted in serious bodily injury to the child as a doctor testified that the child suffered brain injuries a result of abusive head trauma. In re Treylynn T., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2020).

Rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant inflicted the injuries that led to the victim's death because the evidence showed that the three-year-old victim died as a result of multiple blunt force trauma injuries, the victim sustained her injuries while in the defendant's care, and while defendant insisted that the victim sustained the injuries when she fell down the stairs, other evidence offered by the State sufficiently rebutted this statement. State v. Lowry, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated child abuse because the physician testified that all of the victim's injuries were recent and non-accidental and the overwhelming evidence showed that the victim was in the sole care of defendant when he received his injuries. State v. Groves, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated child abuse because defendant handcuffed the victims to each other in a manner that allowed the handcuffs to continually tighten on their wrists, she hit the victim in the head with a rolling pin, causing him to fall to the ground bleeding, and she deprived the victims of food to the point of malnourishment. State v. Cox, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

10. Evidence Insufficient.

To the extent that the state was attempting to prove that defendant was guilty of first-degree murder by aggravated child abuse through his neglect of a child, child's non-fatal bruising was relevant to establish what defendant had known about her physical condition and to negate any ignorance or mistake on his part as to whether she needed medical attention. State v. Roberson, 988 S.W.2d 690, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

In a prosecution for aggravated child abuse, defendant mother's testimony that she did not believe that defendant father could hurt their child did not “open the door” to testimony about his prior assaults against her, as she did not make a sweeping claim of his nonviolent nature that would be contradicted by evidence of such assaults. State v. Gomez, 367 S.W.3d 237, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 291 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2012).

In a prosecution for aggravated child abuse under former T.C.A. § 39-15-402, as defendant mother's knowledge that defendant father had a propensity for violence was not an element of the crime, her testimony about his prior assaults against her was irrelevant and its admission was not harmless error in view of the weakness of the State's case against her. State v. Gomez, 367 S.W.3d 237, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 291 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2012).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect accomplished with a dangerous instrumentality were vacated; a pediatrician's testimony alone was insufficient to establish that the injury was caused by a dangerous instrumentality, given her lack of experience, and the State failed to establish that she otherwise had any specialized knowledge to support an expert opinion, plus another doctor with experience did not believe the injury was the result of abuse, and no proof showed what instrument, if any, was used, and thus there was insufficient evidence of a dangerous instrumentality. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016).

Minor victim's tongue had a one-and-one-half centimeters cut, but the injury only required observation during a six-week healing period, the victim suffered no complications, and the tongue barely had dimple after it healed; thus, for purposes of defendant's aggravated child abuse conviction resulting in serious bodily injury, although the evidence sufficiently established that the victim suffered bodily injury, a rational jury could not have found that the injury constituted serious bodily injury. State v. Love, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2016).

Evidence was insufficient to show that defendant's delay in informing the victim's parents about her injuries or in seeking medical help had an actual, deleterious effect on her health and welfare because there was no proof of any effect or that the victim suffered any injury after the initial trauma or that her condition worsened due to the passage of time. State v. Dewitt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2016).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated child neglect because the infant's severe diaper rash and diarrhea did not rise to the level of serious bodily injuries. However, because the severe diaper rash and diarrhea were medical conditions that adversely affected his health and welfare, the court reduced the aggravated child neglect conviction to child neglect. State v. Demeza, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

Judgment of acquittal for aggravated child neglect was properly granted as the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant knowingly did not feed the child or knowingly neglected her because defendant steadfastly claimed that she fed the child; the daycare provider testified that, when she saw the child a few days before her death, the child was sick but that she did not look like she did in the autopsy pictures; defendant's mother testified that the child was sick with a cold but otherwise appeared to be okay; and a medical examiner testified that she was not provided with a history of the child's being sick during the week before her death when she performed the autopsy and issued her report stating the cause of death was homicide. State v. Weems, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2020).

11. Sentencing.

Record did not justify the district court's conclusion that defendant's prior conviction was for a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 after defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); the district court erred in failing to consider only the charges in an indictment for aggravated child abuse under T.C.A. § 39-15-402 that were essential to the offense to which defendant pled guilty, which was attempted child abuse under T.C.A. § 39-12-101 and T.C.A. § 39-15-401, in finding that the prior conviction was a crime of violence. United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 2006 FED App. 412P, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27379 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2006).

While defendant was eligible to be sentenced as an especially mitigated offender for aggravated child abuse, the trial court was not obligated to make such a finding; the trial court followed the proper sentencing procedure, classified defendant as a Range I, standard offender, and sentenced him to the minimum sentence in that range, and there was no abuse of discretion. State v. Isbell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court commented on defendant's failure to accept responsibility for the infant's injury, not on defendant's failure to allocate; defendant failed to show both that a clear rule of law had been breached and consideration was necessary to do substantial justice in his aggravated child abuse trial, and thus the trial court's actions did not constitute plain error. State v. Isbell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that defendant was a dangerous offender and imposed partial consecutive sentencing in connection with his convictions of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and felony murder; defendant was responsible for the care of the victim, who suffered bruises all over his body as well as a severe brain injury from a beating, and as his symptoms worsened, defendant did not seek medical attention. State v. Starner, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Because the trial court properly applied at least two enhancement factors and imposed a within-range sentence consistent with the purposes and principles of the sentencing scheme, it did not abuse its discretion in deciding defendant's sentence; even if defendant's assertions that the trial court erroneously applied enhancement factors and failed to apply the mitigating factors, that would not remove the presumption of reasonableness afforded to the trial court's sentencing decision. State v. Pewitte, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2016).

Because aggravated child neglect was not an enumerated offense included in T.C.A. § 40-35-501(i)(2), the trial court erred by applying the statute and sentencing defendant as a violent offender at 100% release eligibility. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 886 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Defendant's 18-year sentence for aggravated child abuse was not excessive because as a Range I standard offender convicted of a Class A felony he was subject to a sentencing range of 15 to 25 years, and the trial court properly enhanced defendant's sentence based on his position of trust with the victim, namely being the victim's father. State v. Iceman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 931 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Trial court erred by merging defendant's three aggravated child abuse convictions into his aggravated child neglect convictions because they did not arise from the same act, as the State's theories for the aggravated child abuse counts were based on three distinct episodes of abuse, and its theory for the aggravated child neglect count was based on defendant's failure to obtain medical care for the infant. State v. Demeza, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to concurrent, within-range sentences for second degree murder and aggravated child abuse convictions because the court did not err in considering a jail inmate's testimony of defendant's confession in imposing the sentences. Although the court misapplied the enhancement factor that the personal injuries suffered by the victim were particularly great to defendant's aggravated child abuse conviction, the court did not wholly depart from the statutes in applying enhancement factors. State v. Russell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 3, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2018).

12. Indictments.

Indictments for aggravated child abuse and neglect adequately provided defendants with notice, as the indictments listed the date, time, and place where the offenses occurred, plus named the victim and his age and the relevant statutes and their elements. State v. Starner, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

While failure to seek medical care, in some cases, may constitute the entirety of the allegedly criminal conduct for a charge of neglect, it does not necessarily follow that an election of offenses is required anytime a period of failure to seek medical care accompanies other discrete conduct which more directly contributes to the infliction of injury. State v. Pewitte, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2016).

There was no need for an election of offenses because neglect charges were predicated upon a single, continuing course of conduct, and thus, the evidence only suggested a single criminal offense; defendant was prosecuted and convicted for continuing course of conduct that began when he caused the victim's hands to be burned and continued for as long as he failed to properly attend to her injuries, and remained true even though the course of conduct was composed of more than one discrete act. State v. Pewitte, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2016).

Defendant could not establish the prerequisites to plain error review as to the State's election of offenses because the State attempted to differentiate between the six counts of child abuse by using both the injuries inflicted upon the victim and the modalities used to inflict those injuries; the method of differentiation utilized was sufficient to ensure the jurors utilized the same set of factors to convict defendant of aggravated child abuse and of facilitation of aggravated child abuse. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Because the deficiency in the election of offenses for a count in the indictment charging defendant with aggravated child abuse was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's conviction was reverse and the case was remanded for a new trial. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated child abuse as charged in one count of the indictment was reversed because the State's election of offenses was insufficient to safeguard his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict; the election for that count contained insufficient information, such as a specific date, modality of abuse, or significant detail to allow the jury to differentiate the act of abuse alleged from the offenses described in the other counts. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).

39-15-403. Tattooing of minors.

  1. As used in this section, “tattoo” means to intentionally mark or color by pricking or inserting pigment or coloring matter into the skin so as to leave an indelible mark or figure.
  2. Except as provided by § 62-38-211, a person who, for commercial purposes, tattoos the skin of any person under eighteen (18) years of age commits a Class A misdemeanor.
  3. A person who knowingly falsifies documents for the purpose of obtaining tattooing services for a minor commits a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2008, ch. 803, § 4; 2012, ch. 981, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Tattoo studios and artists, title 62, ch. 38, part 2.

39-15-404. Enticing a child to purchase alcoholic beverages — Purchasing of alcoholic beverages for child.

  1. Except as provided in § 39-15-413:
    1. It is an offense for a person to persuade, entice or send a minor to any place where alcoholic beverages, as defined in § 57-3-101(a)(1)(A), or beer, as defined in § 57-5-101(b), are sold, to buy or otherwise procure alcoholic beverages or beer in any quantity, for the use of the minor, or for the use of any other person;
    2. It is an offense for a person to give or buy alcoholic beverages or beer for or on behalf of any minor or to cause alcohol to be given or bought for or on behalf of any minor for any purpose; and
      1. As used in this subdivision (a)(3), “underage adult” means a person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age but less than twenty-one (21) years of age;
      2. It is an offense for any owner, occupant or other person having a lawful right to the exclusive use and enjoyment of property to knowingly allow a person to consume alcoholic beverages, wine or beer on the property; provided, that the owner, occupant or other person knows that, at the time of the offense, the person consuming is an underage adult;
      3. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under subdivision (a)(3)(B) that the defendant acted upon a reasonably held belief that the underage adult was twenty-one (21) years of age or older;
      4. Subdivision (a)(3)(B) does not apply to consumption or possession of a de minimis quantity of alcohol or wine by an underage adult as permitted by § 1-3-113(b)(2);
      5. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(3) shall be construed, in any way whatsoever, to affect:
        1. Standards for imposing civil liability on social hosts pursuant to § 57-10-101;
        2. Standards, established pursuant to § 37-1-156(a), for imposing criminal liability on adults who contribute or encourage the delinquency or unruly behavior of a child, as defined in § 37-1-102(b); or
        3. Standards, established pursuant to § 39-11-404, for imposing criminal liability on corporations.
  2. As used in this section, “minor” means a person under twenty-one (21) years of age.
  3. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that any person accused of giving or buying alcoholic beverages or beer for a minor acted upon a reasonably held belief that the minor was of legal age. The belief may be acquired by virtue of the minor making a false statement or presenting false identification that indicates that the minor is twenty-one (21) years of age or older.
  4. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor and, in addition to the penalties authorized by § 40-35-111, the offender shall be sentenced to one hundred (100) hours of community service work. In addition to the penalties established in this subsection (d), the court having jurisdiction over the offender may, in its discretion, prepare and send an order for denial of the offender's driving privileges to the department of safety, driver control division. The offender may apply to the court for a restricted driver license, which may be issued in accordance with § 55-50-502. In the event an offender does not possess a valid driver license, the court having jurisdiction over the offender may, in its discretion, increase the offender's sentence to a maximum of two hundred (200) hours of community service work.
  5. If a person engages in conduct that violates this section, as well as any other section, nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the prosecution and conviction of the person under this section or any other applicable section.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect §§ 57-10-101 and 57-10-102 in any way whatsoever.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2006, ch. 900, § 1; 2009, ch. 564, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section raises the age from 18 to 21 in conformance with the age of majority for alcohol.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Sale of alcohol to minors prohibited, § 57-5-301.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Intoxicating Liquors, § 12.

39-15-405, 39-15-406. [Reserved.]

As used in §§ 39-15-40739-15-413:

  1. “Disseminate” means to sell, offer to sell, give or otherwise transfer;
  2. “Hemp” means the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof, and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of not more than three tenths of one percent (0.3 %) on a dry weight basis;
  3. “Minor” means any person under eighteen (18) years of age or, in the case of alcoholic beverages, any person under twenty-one (21) years of age;
  4. “Purchase” means to buy, attempt to buy, or offer to buy;
  5. “Smoking material” means tobacco or hemp that is offered for sale to the public with the intention that it is consumed by smoking; and
  6. “Smoking paraphernalia” means a cigarette holder, cigarette papers, smoking pipe, water pipe or other item that is designated primarily to hold smoking material while the smoking material is being smoked.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 872, § 11; 2019, ch. 303, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the definitions for “hemp” and “smoking material”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

39-15-407. Definitions for §§ 39-15-407 — 39-15-413. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

As used in §§ 39-15-40739-15-413:

  1. “Disseminate” means to sell, offer to sell, give or otherwise transfer;
  2. “Hemp” means the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof, and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of not more than three tenths of one percent (0.3 %) on a dry weight basis;
  3. “Minor” means any person under eighteen (18) years of age or, in the case of alcoholic beverages or smoking material, any person under twenty-one (21) years of age;
  4. “Purchase” means to buy, attempt to buy, or offer to buy;
  5. “Smoking material” means tobacco or hemp that is offered for sale to the public with the intention that it is consumed by smoking, as well as any noncombustible product containing nicotine or any other substance intended for use in a vapor product as defined in § 39-17-1503; and
  6. “Smoking paraphernalia” means a cigarette holder, cigarette papers, smoking pipe, water pipe, vapor product as defined in § 39-17-1503, or other item that is designated primarily to hold smoking material while the smoking material is being smoked.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 872, § 11; 2019, ch. 303, § 1; 2020, ch. 732, §§ 3-5.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the definitions for “hemp” and “smoking material”.

The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, inserted “or smoking material” in the definition of “Minor”; inserted “as well as any noncombustible product containing nicotine or any other substance intended for use in a vapor product as defined in § 39-17-1503” in the definition of “Smoking material”; and inserted “, vapor product as defined in § 39-17- 1503,” in the definition of “Smoking paraphernalia”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-15-408. Dissemination of smoking paraphernalia to minors.

  1. It is an offense for a person to disseminate smoking paraphernalia to a minor.
  2. It is an offense to persuade, entice, send, or assist a minor to purchase, acquire, receive or attempt to purchase, acquire or receive smoking paraphernalia.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1993, ch. 280, §§ 1, 2; 1994, ch. 872, § 11.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Liability of establishment's owner, OAG 94-027 (3/10/94).

39-15-409. Acquisition of smoking paraphernalia by minor prohibited. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

A minor shall not, directly or indirectly, purchase or acquire smoking paraphernalia. Any minor purchasing or acquiring smoking paraphernalia is subject to juvenile proceedings.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 7; 1994, ch. 872, § 11.

39-15-409. Acquisition of smoking paraphernalia by minor prohibited. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

A minor shall not, directly or indirectly, purchase or acquire smoking paraphernalia. Any minor purchasing or acquiring smoking paraphernalia is subject to juvenile proceedings; provided, that a violation of this section by a minor who is eighteen (18) years of age or older is a Class C misdemeanor and such minor is subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate general sessions court.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 7; 1994, ch. 872, § 11; 2020, ch. 732, § 23.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, in the second sentence, added “; provided, that a violation of this section by a minor who is eighteen (18) years of age or older is a Class C misdemeanor and such minor is subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate general sessions court.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-15-410. Identification containing proof of age. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

  1. A person contemplating the dissemination of smoking paraphernalia to an individual whom the person believes or has reason to believe may be a minor shall demand identification containing proof of age from the individual. Failure to do so is a Class C misdemeanor.
  2. A minor who presents identification pursuant to subsection (a) other than the minor's own, or that does not contain the individual's correct age or date of birth, is subject to juvenile court proceedings.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 872, § 11.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-15-410. Identification containing proof of age. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

  1. A person contemplating the dissemination of smoking paraphernalia to an individual whom the person believes or has reason to believe may be a minor shall demand identification containing proof of age from the individual. Failure to do so is a Class C misdemeanor.
  2. A minor who presents identification pursuant to subsection (a) other than the minor's own, or that does not contain the individual's correct age or date of birth, is subject to juvenile court proceedings; provided, that a violation of this subsection (b) by a minor who is eighteen (18) years of age or older is a Class C misdemeanor and such minor is subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate general sessions court.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 872, § 11; 2020, ch. 732, § 24.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, added “; provided, that a violation of this subsection (b) by a minor who is eighteen (18) years of age or older is a Class C misdemeanor and such minor is subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate general sessions court” in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-15-411. Warning sign or decal.

  1. A person who disseminates smoking paraphernalia shall prominently display in the place where the items are disseminated, either the sign required pursuant to § 39-17-1506(a) or the sign required by this section prior to April 22, 1994.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 26; 1994, ch. 872, § 11.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-15-412. Multiple violations.

  1. Any vendor of smoking paraphernalia convicted of violating §§ 39-15-408 — 39-15-411 on three (3) separate occasions is prohibited from selling smoking paraphernalia, or from possession of smoking paraphernalia for resale, for a period of five (5) years from the date of the last conviction.
  2. A violation of this prohibition is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 872, § 11.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-15-413. Law enforcement efforts. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

    1. It is not a violation of §§ 39-15-404, 39-15-410, 39-17-401 — 39-17-427, 39-17-602, 39-17-603, 39-17-901 — 39-17-908, 39-17-911, 39-17-914, 39-17-918, 39-17-1003 — 39-17-1005, 39-17-1501 — 39-17-1508, or any other offense providing a prohibition for use of or sales to a minor, for a law enforcement officer to use or send a minor, or in the case of alcohol a person under twenty-one (21) years of age, to purchase smoking material, smoking paraphernalia, any smokeless tobacco product, alcohol, illegal drugs, state lottery ticket or share, or any other prohibited material for the purpose of aiding in the enforcement of laws prohibiting sales to or use of minors so long as the law enforcement officer has obtained the prior written approval of the minor's parent or legal guardian. The consent of the minor's parent or legal guardian shall not be required where the person is eighteen (18) years of age or older.
    2. It is not a violation of § 39-15-404, § 39-15-410, or §§ 39-17-1501 — 39-17-1508, or any other statute prohibiting the use, possession or sales of alcohol, beer, lottery tickets, tobacco products, smokeless tobacco or smoking material or paraphernalia to a minor or a person under twenty-one (21) years of age, for a merchant in the business of selling alcohol, beer, lottery tickets, tobacco products, smokeless tobacco or smoking material or paraphernalia, to use or send a minor, or in the case of alcohol or beer, a person under twenty-one (21) years of age, to purchase any such product for the purpose of aiding in the enforcement of laws and policies prohibiting sales by the merchant at the merchant's place of business and preventing sales of such products to or use by individuals under age from occurring.
  1. Prior to using a minor to perform illegal or delinquent acts for the purposes of aiding in the enforcement of the laws of this state as permitted by this section, the law enforcement officer or merchant shall obtain the written approval of the minor's parent or legal guardian; provided, however, that the consent of the minor's parent or legal guardian shall not be required if the person used to make any such purchase is eighteen (18) years of age or older.
  2. In order to use a minor, or in the case of alcohol or beer, a person under twenty-one (21) years of age, for any of the purposes permitted by this section, the requirements of this subsection (c) shall apply.
    1. The minor or person under twenty-one (21) years of age shall not:
      1. Purposely disguise the person's appearance so as to misrepresent the person's actual age; and
      2. Make statements designed to trick, mislead, encourage or confuse the employee.
    2. The minor or person under twenty-one (21) years of age shall:
      1. Be photographed, both before and after the law enforcement or merchant-initiated use of the person, for the purpose of creating a record of the person's appearance during the time of the permitted use of the person;
      2. Except only for those questions relating to the person's employment or purpose for engaging in the conduct, respond truthfully to all questions posed by the location employee, including, but not limited to, inquiries concerning the person's age; and
      3. If identification is demanded by the location employee, produce only a valid state-issued card, which indicates the person's actual date of birth.
  3. No prosecution for the violation of any statute prohibiting the sale of beer for off-premises consumption to a person under twenty-one (21) years of age shall be commenced, if the prosecution is based upon the use of a person under twenty-one (21) years of age, as authorized by this section, unless the person or the law enforcement officer supervising the person obtains the name of the permit holder and the employee of the permit holder from whom the beer was purchased or attempted to be purchased. All “stings” shall be conducted in accordance to state law in order to be valid. In addition, within ten (10) days of the date the action occurred, the law enforcement officer shall notify the permit holder in writing, either by mail or hand delivery, indicating:
    1. That an action recently occurred in which a person under twenty-one (21) years of age was used to purchase or attempt to purchase beer for off-premises consumption;
    2. The date and location of the action;
    3. The name of the permit holder and the employee from whom the beer was purchased or attempted to be purchased; and
    4. Whether the person was successful in making the purchase.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 27; 1990, ch. 1092, § 9; 1992, ch. 802, § 1; 1994, ch. 872, § 11; 2003, ch. 198, §§ 1, 2; 2003, ch. 297, §§ 9, 10; 2006, ch. 864, § 13; 2007, ch. 73, § 1; 2013, ch. 319, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Subsection (a) authorizes law enforcement officials to use minors to enforce tobacco, alcohol, drug and certain obscenity laws, but also requires the written consent of both the juvenile court and the parent. However, if for example, the enforcement of alcohol laws is involved, and the “minor” is over the age of eighteen, then parental and judicial consent is not required.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Lotteries, Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 5.

Lotteries, chain letters and pyramid clubs, § 39-17-506.

Lottery not gambling, § 8-47-127.

Lottery sales, title 39, ch. 17, part 6.

Possession of gambling device or record, forfeiture, § 39-17-505.

State lottery proceeds, title 49, ch. 4, part 9.

Tennessee Education Lottery Implementation Law, title 4, ch. 51.

Tennessee Lottery Funds for Education Projects Loan Act of 2003, title 4, ch. 31, part 10.

Tennessee Responsible Vendor Act, § 57-5-601 et seq.

Attorney General Opinions. Department of agriculture enforcement agent as law enforcement officer, OAG 99-016 (2/2/99).

Procedures for use of minors in tobacco sales sting operations, OAG 99-016 (2/2/99).

Juvenile court not mandated by statute to approve request to use minor to buy tobacco in sting operation, OAG 03-059 (5/06/03).

39-15-413. Law enforcement efforts. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

    1. It is not a violation of §§ 39-15-404, 39-15-410, 39-17-401 — 39-17-427, 39-17-602, 39-17-603, 39-17-901 — 39-17-908, 39-17-911, 39-17-914, 39-17-918, 39-17-1003 — 39-17-1005, 39-17-1501 — 39-17-1508, or any other offense providing a prohibition for use of or sales to a minor or person under twenty-one (21) years of age, for a law enforcement officer to use or send a person under twenty-one (21) years of age to purchase smoking material, smoking paraphernalia, any smokeless tobacco product, alcohol, or illegal drugs, or to send a minor to purchase a state lottery ticket or share or any other prohibited material, for the purpose of aiding in the enforcement of laws prohibiting sales to or use of minors or persons under twenty-one (21) years of age so long as the law enforcement officer has obtained the prior written approval of the minor's parent or legal guardian or the person under twenty-one (21) years of age if that person is not a minor.
    2. It is not a violation of § 39-15-404, § 39-15-410, or §§ 39-17-1501 — 39-17-1508, or any other statute prohibiting the use, possession or sales of alcohol, beer, lottery tickets, tobacco products, smokeless tobacco or smoking material or paraphernalia to a minor or a person under twenty-one (21) years of age, for a merchant in the business of selling alcohol, beer, lottery tickets, tobacco products, smokeless tobacco or smoking material or paraphernalia, to use or send a minor, or in the case of alcohol, beer, tobacco products, smokeless tobacco, or smoking material or paraphernalia, a person under twenty-one (21) years of age, to purchase any such product for the purpose of aiding in the enforcement of laws and policies prohibiting sales by the merchant at the merchant's place of business and preventing sales of such products to or use by individuals under age from occurring.
  1. Prior to using a minor to perform illegal or delinquent acts for the purposes of aiding in the enforcement of the laws of this state as permitted by this section, the law enforcement officer or merchant shall obtain the written approval of the minor's parent or legal guardian; provided, however, that the consent of the minor's parent or legal guardian shall not be required if the person used to make any such purchase is eighteen (18) years of age or older.
  2. In order to use a minor, or in the case of alcohol, beer, tobacco products, smokeless tobacco, or smoking material or paraphernalia, a person under twenty-one (21) years of age, for any of the purposes permitted by this section, the requirements of this subsection (c) shall apply.
    1. The minor or person under twenty-one (21) years of age shall not:
      1. Purposely disguise the person's appearance so as to misrepresent the person's actual age; and
      2. Make statements designed to trick, mislead, encourage or confuse the employee.
    2. The minor or person under twenty-one (21) years of age shall:
      1. Be photographed, both before and after the law enforcement or merchant-initiated use of the person, for the purpose of creating a record of the person's appearance during the time of the permitted use of the person;
      2. Except only for those questions relating to the person's employment or purpose for engaging in the conduct, respond truthfully to all questions posed by the location employee, including, but not limited to, inquiries concerning the person's age; and
      3. If identification is demanded by the location employee, produce only a valid state-issued card, which indicates the person's actual date of birth.
  3. No prosecution for the violation of any statute prohibiting the sale of beer for off-premises consumption to a person under twenty-one (21) years of age shall be commenced, if the prosecution is based upon the use of a person under twenty-one (21) years of age, as authorized by this section, unless the person or the law enforcement officer supervising the person obtains the name of the permit holder and the employee of the permit holder from whom the beer was purchased or attempted to be purchased. All “stings” shall be conducted in accordance to state law in order to be valid. In addition, within ten (10) days of the date the action occurred, the law enforcement officer shall notify the permit holder in writing, either by mail or hand delivery, indicating:
    1. That an action recently occurred in which a person under twenty-one (21) years of age was used to purchase or attempt to purchase beer for off-premises consumption;
    2. The date and location of the action;
    3. The name of the permit holder and the employee from whom the beer was purchased or attempted to be purchased; and
    4. Whether the person was successful in making the purchase.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 27; 1990, ch. 1092, § 9; 1992, ch. 802, § 1; 1994, ch. 872, § 11; 2003, ch. 198, §§ 1, 2; 2003, ch. 297, §§ 9, 10; 2006, ch. 864, § 13; 2007, ch. 73, § 1; 2013, ch. 319, § 1; 2020, ch. 732, §§ 6-8.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, in (a)(1), inserted “or person under twenty-one (21) years of age,” deleted “minor, or in the case of alcohol a” following “enforcement officer to use or send a”, inserted “or to send a minor to purchase a”, inserted "or persons under twenty-one (21) years of age” and substituted “guardian or the person under twenty-one (21) years of age if that person is not a minor.” for “guardian. The consent of the minor's parent or legal guardian shall not be required where the person is eighteen (18) years of age or older.”; and in (a)(2) and the introductory language of (c), substituted “alcohol, beer, tobacco products, smokeless tobacco, or smoking material or paraphernalia,” for “alcohol or beer,”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-15-414. Offense of harboring or hiding a runaway child.

  1. A person commits an offense who, with knowledge that a child is a runaway, as defined in § 37-1-102(b)(32)(D), harbors or hides the child and:
    1. Fails to notify the child's legal custodian, legal guardian, or law enforcement authorities of the whereabouts of the child within a reasonable amount of time; provided, that no length of time in excess of twenty-four (24) hours shall be considered reasonable;
    2. Conceals the whereabouts of the child; or
    3. Aides the child in escaping from the custody of the child's legal custodian, legal guardian or law enforcement authorities.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 2010, ch. 1099, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Part 5
Elderly and Vulnerable Adults

39-15-501. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Abandonment” means the knowing desertion or forsaking of an elderly or vulnerable adult by a caregiver under circumstances in which there is a reasonable likelihood that physical harm could occur;
  2. “Abuse” means the infliction of physical harm;
  3. “Adult protective services” means the division of adult protective services of the department of human services;
  4. “Caregiver”:
    1. Means a relative or a person who has a legal duty to provide care, or who has assumed such duty by contract or conduct that a reasonable person would interpret as an assumption of the responsibility for an elderly or vulnerable adult's care; and
    2. Does not include a financial institution as a caregiver of property, funds, or other assets unless the financial institution has entered into an agreement, or has been appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, to act as a trustee with regard to the property of the adult;
  5. “Confinement”:
    1. Means the knowing and unreasonable restriction of movement of an elderly or vulnerable adult by a caregiver;
    2. Includes, but is not limited to:
      1. Placing a person in a locked room;
      2. Involuntarily separating a person from the person's living area;
      3. The use of physical restraining devices on a person; or
      4. The provision of unnecessary or excessive medications to a person; and
    3. Does not include the use of the methods or devices described in subdivision (5)(B) if used in a licensed facility in a manner that conforms to state and federal standards governing confinement and restraint;
  6. “Elderly adult” means a person seventy (70) years of age or older;
  7. “Financial exploitation” means:
    1. The use of deception, intimidation, undue influence, force, or threat of force to obtain or exert unauthorized control over an elderly or vulnerable adult's property with the intent to deprive the elderly or vulnerable adult of property;
    2. The breach of a fiduciary duty to an elderly or vulnerable adult by the person's guardian, conservator, or agent under a power of attorney which results in an appropriation, sale, or transfer of the elderly or vulnerable adult's property; or
    3. The act of obtaining or exercising control over an elderly or vulnerable adult's property, without receiving the elderly or vulnerable adult's effective consent, by a caregiver committed with the intent to benefit the caregiver or other third party;
    1. “Neglect” means:
      1. The failure of a caregiver to provide the care, supervision, or services necessary to maintain the physical health of an elderly or vulnerable adult, including, but not limited to, the provision of food, water, clothing, medicine, shelter, medical services, a medical treatment plan prescribed by a healthcare professional, basic hygiene, or supervision that a reasonable person would consider essential for the weIl-being of an elderly or vulnerable adult;
      2. The failure of a caregiver to make a reasonable effort to protect an elderly or vulnerable adult from abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation by others;
      3. Abandonment; or
      4. Confinement; and
    2. Neglect can be the result of repeated conduct or a single incident;
  8. “Physical harm” means physical pain or injury, regardless of gravity or duration;
  9. “Relative” means a spouse; child, including stepchild, adopted child, or foster child; parent, including stepparent, adoptive parent, or foster parent; sibling of the whole or half-blood; step-sibling; grandparent, of any degree; grandchild, of any degree; and aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew, of any degree, who:
    1. Resides with or has frequent or prolonged contact with the elderly or vulnerable adult; and
    2. Knows or reasonably should know that the elderly or vulnerable adult is unable to adequately provide for the adult's own care or financial resources;
  10. “Serious physical harm” means physical harm of such gravity that:
    1. Would normally require medical treatment or hospitalization;
    2. Involves acute pain of such duration that it results in substantial suffering;
    3. Involves any degree of prolonged pain or suffering; or
    4. Involves any degree of prolonged incapacity;
  11. “Serious psychological injury” means any mental harm that would normally require extended medical treatment, including hospitalization or institutionalization, or mental harm involving any degree of prolonged incapacity;
  12. “Sexual exploitation” means an act committed upon or in the presence of an elderly or vulnerable adult, without that adult's effective consent, for purposes of sexual gratification. “Sexual exploitation” includes, but is not limited to, fondling; exposure of genitals to an elderly or vulnerable adult; exposure of sexual acts to an elderly or vulnerable adult; exposure of an elderly or vulnerable adult's sexual organs; an intentional act or statement by a person intended to shame, degrade, humiliate, or otherwise harm the personal dignity of an elderly or vulnerable adult; or an act or statement by a person who knew or should have known the act or statement would cause shame, degradation, humiliation, or harm to the personal dignity of an elderly or vulnerable adult. “Sexual exploitation” does not include any act intended for a valid medical purpose, or any act reasonably intended to be a normal caregiving act, such as bathing by appropriate persons at appropriate times; and
  13. “Vulnerable adult” means a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who, because of intellectual disability or physical dysfunction, is unable to fully manage the person's own resources, carry out all or a portion of the activities of daily living, or fully protect against neglect, exploitation, or hazardous or abusive situations without assistance from others.

Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 2; 2018, ch. 1050, § 2; 2019, ch. 474, §§ 2-4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2018.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to acts committed on or after January 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2019.”

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, added the definitions of “abandonment”, “adult protective services”, “confinement”, “neglect”, “physical harm”, and “serious physical harm”.

The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, added the definitions of “abuse”, “serious psychological injury”, and “sexual exploitation”; in (C) of the definition of “financial exploitation”, inserted “, without receiving the elderly or vulnerable adult's effective consent,” and substituted “the intent” for “intent”; and substituted “from abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation” for “from neglect or financial exploitation” in (A)(ii) of the definition of “neglect”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17. January 1, 2019; provided, that for the purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 21, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 18. January 1, 2020; provided that for purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 24, 2019.

39-15-502. Offense of financial exploitation of elderly or vulnerable person.

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly financially exploit an elderly or vulnerable adult.
  2. A violation of this section shall be punished as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105; provided, however, that the violation shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is otherwise provided in § 39-14-105.
    1. If a person is charged with financial exploitation that involves the taking or loss of property valued at more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), a prosecuting attorney may file a petition with the circuit, general sessions, or chancery court of the county in which the defendant has been charged to freeze the funds, assets, or property of the defendant in an amount up to one hundred percent (100%) of the alleged value of funds, assets, or property in the defendant's pending criminal proceeding for purposes of restitution to the victim. The hearing on the petition may be held ex parte if necessary to prevent additional exploitation of the victim.
    2. Upon a showing of probable cause in the ex parte hearing, the court shall issue an order to freeze or seize the funds, assets, or property of the defendant in the amount calculated pursuant to subdivision (c)(1). A copy of the freeze or seize order shall be served upon the defendant whose funds, assets, or property has been frozen or seized.
    3. The court's order shall prohibit the sale, gifting, transfer, or wasting of the funds, assets, or property of the elderly or vulnerable adult, both real and personal, owned by, or vested in, such person, without the express permission of the court.
    4. At any time within thirty (30) days after service of the order to freeze or seize funds, assets, or property, the defendant or any person claiming an interest in the funds, assets, or property may file a motion to release the funds, assets, or property. The court shall hold a hearing on the motion no later than ten (10) days from the date the motion is filed.
  3. In any proceeding to release funds, assets, or property, the state has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show that the defendant used, was using, is about to use, or is intending to use any funds, assets, or property in any way that constitutes or would constitute an offense under subsection (a). If the court finds that any funds, assets, or property were being used, are about to be used, or are intended to be used in any way that constitutes or would constitute an offense under subsection (a), the court shall order the funds, assets, or property frozen or held until further order of the court.
  4. If the prosecution of a charge under subsection (a) is dismissed or a nolle prosequi is entered, or if a judgment of acquittal is entered, the court shall vacate the order to freeze or seize the funds, assets, or property.
  5. In addition to other remedies provided by law, an elderly or vulnerable adult in that person's own right, or by conservator or next friend, has a right of recovery in a civil action for financial exploitation or for theft of the person's money or property whether by fraud, deceit, coercion, or otherwise. The right of action against a wrongdoer shall not abate or be extinguished by the death of the elderly or vulnerable adult, but passes as provided in § 20-5-106, unless the alleged wrongdoer is a relative, in which case the cause of action passes to the victim's personal representative.

Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Defense Counsel As Necessary Witness.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the state's motion to disqualify defendant's trial counsel on the ground that counsel was a necessary witness in the prosecution of defendant for exploiting an adult because counsel's testimony was material and relevant, as he prepared a quitclaim deed giving property to defendant from the victim and a power of attorney with healthcare giving defendant power of attorney over the victim's affairs, and he received payment from defendant on a credit card that the victim jointly owned with defendant. State v. Spears, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

39-15-503. Permissive inferences.

For purposes of determining whether an offense was committed under § 39-15-502:

  1. Any transfer of property valued in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000) in a twelve-month period, whether in a single transaction or multiple transactions, by an elderly or vulnerable adult to a nonrelative whom the transferor has known for fewer than two (2) years before the first transfer and for which the transferor did not receive reciprocal value in goods or services creates a permissive inference that the transfer was effectuated without the effective consent of the owner.
  2. Subdivision (1) applies regardless of whether the transfer or transfers are denoted by the parties as a gift or loan except that it shall not apply to a valid loan evidenced in writing and which includes definite repayment dates. In the event repayment of any such loan is in default, in whole or in part, for more than sixty (60) days, the inference described in subdivision (1) applies. Subdivision (1) does not apply to persons or entities that operate a legitimate financial institution.
  3. This section does not apply to valid charitable donations to nonprofit organizations qualifying for tax exempt status under the internal revenue code.
  4. A court shall instruct jurors that they may, but are not required to, infer that the transfer of money or property was effectuated without the effective consent of the owner, with the intent to deprive the owner of the money or property, upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the facts listed in subdivision (1). The court shall also instruct jurors that they may find a defendant guilty only if persuaded that each element of the offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act.”

39-15-504. Hearing to preserve testimony of victim.

In cases where an alleged offense under this part or under title 71, chapter 6, part 1 has been committed against an elderly or vulnerable adult, upon the state's motion, the court shall conduct a hearing to preserve the testimony of the victim within sixty (60) days of the defendant's initial court appearance whether the case originates in general sessions court or criminal court.

Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act.”

39-15-505. Victim's inability to attend judicial proceedings — Affidavit — Out-of-court deposition.

  1. An elderly or vulnerable adult victim's inability to attend judicial proceedings due to illness, or other mental or physical disability, shall be considered exceptional circumstances upon the state's motion to preserve testimony pursuant to Rule 15 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  2. The court shall consider an affidavit executed by the elderly or vulnerable adult's treating physician stating that the elderly or vulnerable adult is unable to attend court due to illness or other mental or physical disability as prima facie evidence of the need to preserve witness testimony by the taking of the adult's out-of-court deposition.
  3. The court shall order the defendant's attendance to the out-of-court deposition. The defendant may waive the defendant's attendance in writing.

Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act.”

39-15-506. Placement on registry — Fine.

    1. Following a conviction for a violation of § 39-15-502, § 39-15-507(b)-(c), § 39-15-508, § 39-15-510, § 39-15-511, or § 39-15-512, or at the discretion of the court for a conviction of § 39-15-507(d), the clerk of the court shall notify the department of health of the conviction by sending a copy of the judgment in the manner set forth in § 68-11-1003 for inclusion on the registry pursuant to title 68, chapter 11, part 10.
    2. Upon receipt of a judgment of conviction for a violation of an offense set out in subdivision (a)(1), the department shall place the person or persons convicted on the registry of persons who have abused, neglected, or financially exploited an elderly or vulnerable adult as provided in § 68-11-1003(c).
    3. Upon entry of the information in the registry, the department shall notify the person convicted, at the person's last known mailing address, of the person's inclusion on the registry. The person convicted shall not be entitled or given the opportunity to contest or dispute either the prior hearing conclusions or the content or terms of any criminal disposition, or attempt to refute the factual findings upon which the conclusions and determinations are based. The person convicted may challenge the accuracy of the report that the criminal disposition has occurred, such hearing conclusions were made, or any factual issue related to the correct identity of the person. If the person convicted makes such a challenge within sixty (60) days of notification of inclusion on the registry, the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, shall afford the person an opportunity for a hearing on the matter that complies with the requirements of due process and the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.
    1. In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of § 39-15-502, § 39-15-507, § 39-15-508, § 39-15-510, § 39-15-511, or § 39-15-512, the court shall impose a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) for Class A or Class B misdemeanor convictions, and a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for felony convictions. The fine shall not exceed the maximum fine established for the appropriate offense classification.
    2. The person convicted shall pay the fine to the clerk of the court imposing the sentence, who shall transfer it to the district attorney of the judicial district in which the case was prosecuted. The district attorney shall credit the fine to a fund established for the purpose of educating, enforcing, and providing victim services for elderly and vulnerable adult prosecutions.

Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 2; 2018, ch. 1050, §§ 3, 4; 2019, ch. 474, §§ 5, 6.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 466, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2018.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to acts committed on or after January 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, §  1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2019.”

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, inserted “§ 39-15-507(a)-(c), or § 39-15-508, or at the discretion of the court for a conviction of § 39-15-507(d),” in (a)(1); and inserted “§ 39-15-507, or § 39-15-508,”, “five hundred dollars ($500) for Class A or Class B misdemeanor convictions, and a fine of not less than”, and “for felony convictions” in (b)(1).

The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, substituted “§ 39-15-502, § 39-15-507(b)-(c), § 39-15-508, § 39-15-510, § 39-15-511, or § 39-15-512” for “§ 39-15-502, § 39-15-507(a)-(c) or § 39-15-508” in (a)(1) and substituted “§ 39-15, 502, § 39-15-507, § 39-15-508, § 39-15-510, § 39-15-511, or § 39-15-512” for “§ 39-15-502, § 39-15-507, or § 39-15-508” in the first sentence of (b)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17. January 1, 2019; provided, that for the purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 21, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 18. January 1, 2020; provided that for purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 24, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

39-15-507. Offense of neglect of elderly adult — Offense of neglect of vulnerable adult.

  1. It is an offense for a caregiver to knowingly neglect an elderly or vulnerable adult, so as to adversely affect the person's health or welfare.
  2. The offense of neglect of an elderly adult is a Class E felony.
  3. The offense of neglect of a vulnerable adult is a Class D felony.
  4. If the neglect is a result of abandonment or confinement and no injury occurred, then the neglect by abandonment or confinement of an elderly or vulnerable adult is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 5; 2019, ch. 474, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2018.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to acts committed on or after January 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2019.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, deleted “willfully and” preceding “knowingly” in (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17. January 1, 2019; provided, that for the purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 21, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 18. January 1, 2020; provided that for purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 24, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class D and E felonies, and Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-15-508. Offense of aggravated neglect of elderly or vulnerable adult.

  1. A caregiver commits the offense of aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult who commits neglect pursuant to § 39-15-507, and the act:
    1. Results in serious physical harm; or
    2. Results in serious bodily injury.
  2. In order to convict a person for a violation of subdivision (a)(1), it is not necessary for the state to prove the elderly or vulnerable adult sustained serious bodily injury as required by § 39-13-102, but only that the neglect resulted in serious physical harm.
  3. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class C felony.
  4. A violation of subdivision (a)(2) is a Class B felony.

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2018.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to acts committed on or after January 1, 2019.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17. January 1, 2019; provided, that for the purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 21, 2018.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B and C felonies, § 40-35-111.

39-15-509. Report of abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation to adult protective services — Report of rape or sexual battery to adult protective services and law enforcement agency — Failure to make report.

    1. Any person having reasonable suspicion that an elderly or vulnerable adult is suffering or has suffered abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation shall report such neglect or financial exploitation to adult protective services pursuant to title 71, chapter 6.
    2. Any person having reasonable suspicion that an elderly or vulnerable adult is the victim of aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, aggravated sexual battery pursuant to § 39-13-504, or sexual battery pursuant to § 39-13-505, shall report the conduct to adult protective services pursuant to title 71, chapter 6, and to the local law enforcement agency in the jurisdiction where the offense occurred.
  1. Any person who fails to make reasonable efforts to make a report required by subsection (a) or by title 71, chapter 6, commits a Class A misdemeanor.
  2. Upon good cause shown, adult protective services shall cooperate with law enforcement to identify those persons who knowingly fail to report abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation of an elderly or vulnerable adult.
    1. This section does not apply to a financial service provider or to an employee of a financial service provider acting within the scope of the employee's employment except as provided by title 45, chapter 2, part 12.
    2. As used in subdivision (d)(1), “financial service provider” means any of the following engaged in or transacting business in this state:
      1. A state or national bank or trust company;
      2. A state or federal savings and loan association;
      3. A state or federal credit union;
      4. An industrial loan and thrift company, regulated by title 45, chapter 5;
      5. A money transmitter, regulated by title 45, chapter 7;
      6. A check casher, regulated by title 45, chapter 18;
      7. A mortgage loan lender, mortgage loan broker, mortgage loan originator, or mortgage loan servicer, regulated by title 45, chapter 13;
      8. A title pledge lender, regulated by title 45, chapter 15;
      9. A deferred presentment services provider, regulated by title 45, chapter 17;
      10. A flex loan provider, regulated by title 45, chapter 12; or
      11. A home equity conversion mortgage lender, regulated by title 47, chapter 30.
  3. Upon commencement of criminal prosecution of abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation of an elderly or vulnerable adult, adult protective services shall provide to the district attorney general a complete and unredacted copy of adult protective services' entire investigative file excluding the identity of the referral source except as provided by subsection (f).
  4. Upon return of a criminal indictment or presentment alleging abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation of an elderly or vulnerable adult, adult protective services shall provide to the district attorney general the identity of the person who made the report in accordance with § 71-6-118.

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 5; 2019, ch. 474, §§ 8-11.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2018.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to acts committed on or after January 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2019.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, substituted “suffering or has suffered abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation” for “knowingly fail to report neglect or financial exploitation” in (a)(1); substituted “knowingly fail to report abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation” for “knowingly fail to report neglect or financial exploitation” in (c); substituted “Upon commencement of criminal prosecution of abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation” for “Upon commencement of criminal prosecution of neglect or financial exploitation” at the beginning of (e); and substituted “alleging abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation” for “alleging neglect or financial exploitation” in (f).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1050, § 17. January 1, 2019; provided, that for the purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 21, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 18. January 1, 2020; provided that for purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 24, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-15-510. Offense of abuse of elderly or vulnerable adult.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly abuse an elderly or vulnerable adult.
  2. The offense of abuse of an elderly adult is a Class E felony.
  3. The offense of abuse of a vulnerable adult is a Class D felony.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 474, §  1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2019.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 18. January 1, 2020; provided that for purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 24, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

39-15-511. Offense of aggravated abuse of elderly or vulnerable adult.

  1. A person commits the offense of aggravated abuse of an elderly or vulnerable adult who knowingly commits abuse pursuant to § 39-15-510, and:
    1. The act results in serious psychological injury or serious physical harm;
    2. A deadly weapon is used to accomplish the act or the abuse involves strangulation as defined in § 39-13-102; or
    3. The abuse results in serious bodily injury.
  2. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class C felony.
  3. A violation of subdivision (a)(2) or (a)(3) is a Class B felony.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 474, §  1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2019.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 18. January 1, 2020; provided that for purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 24, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class B and C felonies, § 40-35-111.

39-15-512. Offense of sexual exploitation of elderly adult or vulnerable adult.

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly sexually exploit an elderly adult or vulnerable adult.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 474, §  1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly and Vulnerable Adult Protection Act of 2019.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 474, § 18. January 1, 2020; provided that for purposes of promulgating rules, the act took effect May 24, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-15-513. Obtaining information concerning medical condition or health of elderly adult — Sending unsolicited or specifically refused medical items — Filing claim or submitting bill with state medicaid plan.

  1. A person or an entity commits an offense if the person or entity knowingly:
    1. Uses a telephone or other communication or electronic device to obtain information concerning the medical condition or health of an elderly adult;
    2. Sends, or causes to be sent, medical supplies, medical equipment, or medicine to the elderly adult and the items sent are unsolicited or specifically refused; and
    3. Files a claim or submits a bill with the state medicaid plan for reimbursement of the value of the equipment, supplies, or medicine sent to the elderly adult.
  2. Any person who violates this section shall be punished as provided in § 71-5-2601(a)(4).

Acts 2019, ch. 417, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 417, § 2. July 1, 2019.

39-15-407. Definitions for §§ 39-15-407 — 39-15-413. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

Chapter 16
Offenses Against Administration of Government

Part 1
Bribery

39-16-101. Definitions for bribery offenses.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Juror” means any person who is a member of any jury, including a grand jury, impaneled by any court of this state or by any public servant authorized by law to impanel a jury. “Juror” also includes any person who has been summoned or whose name has been drawn to attend as a prospective juror;
  2. “Party officer” means a person who holds any position or office in a political party, whether by election, appointment or otherwise; and
  3. “Pecuniary benefit” means benefit in the form of money, property, commercial interests or anything else, the primary significance of which is economic gain.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Application for consent to petition to convene investigative grand jury, § 40-12-201.

Law Reviews.

“Official” Explanation: Defining “Official Capacity” and Related “Color of Office” Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law (Steven J. Mulroy), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 587 (2008).

The Honest-Services Surplus: Why There’s No Need (or Place) for a Federal Law Prohibiting “Criminal-esque” Conduct in the Nature of Bribes and Kickbacks, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 49 (2010).

39-16-102. Bribery of public servant.

  1. A person commits an offense who:
    1. Offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a public servant with the intent to influence the public servant's vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of discretion or other action in the public servant's official capacity; or
    2. While a public servant, solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit upon an agreement or understanding that the public servant's vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of discretion or other action as a public servant will thereby be influenced.
    1. It is no defense to prosecution under this section that the person sought to be influenced was not qualified to act in the desired way because the person had not yet assumed office, lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason.
    2. It is no defense to prosecution under this section that the person who sought to influence a public official took action on behalf of a public or private organization or any other entity, for the purpose of organizing a campaign or for any other lawful purpose.
    1. Bribery of a public servant under subdivision (a)(1) is a Class B felony.
    2. A public servant accepting or agreeing to accept a bribe under subdivision (a)(2) is a Class B felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2006 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, § 1; 2014, ch. 982, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section expands the definition of “public servant” for the purposes of bribery.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2014, ch. 982, § 5 provided that the act shall apply only to all offenses occurring on or after July 1, 2014.

Cross-References. Disfranchisement on conviction, § 40-20-112.

Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 5 Tenn. Juris., Bribery, §§ 3, 4, 5, 6.

Law Reviews.

“Official” Explanation: Defining “Official Capacity” and Related “Color of Office” Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law (Steven J. Mulroy), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 587 (2008).

Professional Responsibilities of Lobbyists (William R. Bruce), 23 Mem. St. U.L. 547 (1993).

Attorney General Opinions. Conflicts of interest involving state and county election commissions, OAG 06-159 (10/9/06).

Constitutionality of 2014 amendments to bribery, extortion, riot, and trespass laws.  OAG 14-44, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 46 (4/7/14).

39-16-103. Public servant guilty of bribery offense disqualified from holding office.

  1. Every person who is convicted under § 39-16-102 of accepting or receiving any gift, promise, benefit, or gratuity, as an executive, legislative, or judicial officer, shall forever afterwards be disqualified from holding any office under the laws or constitution of this state.
  2. Any person who is convicted after February 15, 2006, of an offense in another state or under federal law that would constitute a violation of § 39-16-102 if committed in this state shall be, from the date of such conviction, forever disqualified from holding any office under the laws or constitution of this state.
  3. If at the time of conviction for an offense specified in this section, the person still holds an office under the laws or constitution of this state, this section shall apply to such person at the end of the person's term of office, unless otherwise removed or expelled as provided by law prior to that time.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2006 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 48.

39-16-104. Soliciting unlawful compensation.

  1. A public servant commits an offense who requests a pecuniary benefit for the performance of an official action knowing that the public servant was required to perform that action without compensation or at a level of compensation lower than that requested.
  2. Solicitation of unlawful compensation is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

“Official” Explanation: Defining “Official Capacity” and Related “Color of Office” Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law (Steven J. Mulroy), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 587 (2008).

39-16-105. Buying and selling in regard to offices.

  1. The offense of buying and selling in regard to offices is committed when:
    1. Any person holding any office, or being elected to any office:
      1. Enters into any bargain and sale for any valuable consideration whatever in regard to the office;
      2. Sells, resigns or vacates the office for any pecuniary consideration whatever; or
      3. Refuses to qualify and enter upon the discharge of the duties of the office, by reason of any pecuniary consideration; or
    2. Any person:
      1. Offers to buy any office by inducing the incumbent officer to resign, to vacate, or not to qualify; or
      2. Directly or indirectly engages in corruptly procuring the resignation of any officer for any pecuniary or other valuable consideration.
  2. Buying and selling in regard to offices is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Sheriff, qualifications for office, § 8-8-102.

39-16-106. Exceptions and defenses.

  1. It is an exception to the application of §§ 39-16-102, 39-16-104 and 39-16-105, that the benefit involved is a fee prescribed by law to be received by a public servant or any other benefit to which the public servant is lawfully entitled.
  2. It is a defense to prosecution under §§ 39-16-102, 39-16-104 and 39-16-105, that the benefit involved was:
    1. A trivial benefit incidental to personal, professional, or business contacts, which involves no substantial risk of undermining official impartiality; or
    2. A lawful contribution made for the political campaign of an elective public servant when the public servant is a candidate for nomination or election to public office.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section provides that the receipt of trivial benefits and lawful election contributions do not constitute bribery.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

39-16-107. Bribing a witness.

  1. A person commits an offense who:
    1. Offers, confers or agrees to confer anything of value upon a witness or a person the defendant believes will be called as a witness in any official proceeding with intent to:
      1. Corruptly influence the testimony of the witness;
      2. Induce the witness to avoid or attempt to avoid legal process summoning the witness to testify; or
      3. Induce the witness to be absent from an official proceeding to which that witness has been legally summoned; or
    2. Is a witness or believes the person will be called as a witness in any official proceeding and solicits, accepts or agrees to accept anything of value upon an agreement or understanding that:
      1. The witness's testimony will be corruptly influenced;
      2. The witness will attempt to avoid legal process summoning the witness to testify; or
      3. The witness will attempt to be absent from an official proceeding to which the witness has been legally summoned.
  2. This section does not apply to the payment of additional compensation to an expert witness over and above the amount otherwise prescribed by law to be paid a witness.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to nullify or repeal any contempt power of any judge of any court of this state.
  4. Bribing a witness is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

39-16-108. Bribing a juror.

  1. A person commits an offense who:
    1. Offers, confers or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a juror with the intent that the juror's vote, opinion, decision or other action as a juror will be corruptly influenced; or
    2. Solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit upon any agreement or understanding that the juror's vote, opinion, decision or other action as a juror will be corruptly influenced.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to nullify or repeal any contempt power of any judge of any court of this state.
  3. Bribing a juror is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Improper influence of juror, § 39-16-509.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Waiting for the Jury (George W. Jenkins, III), 20 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 31 (1984).

Part 2
Contraband in Penal Institutions

39-16-201. Introduction or possession of weapons, ammunition, explosives, intoxicants, legend drugs, or controlled substances or controlled substance analogues into penal institution.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “telecommunication device” means any type of instrument, device, machine, or equipment that is capable of transmitting telephonic, electronic, digital, cellular or radio communications, or any part of such instrument, device, machine or equipment that is capable of facilitating the transmission of telephonic, electronic, digital, cellular or radio communications. “Telecommunication device” shall include, but not be limited to, cellular phones, digital phones and modem equipment devices.
  2. It is unlawful for any person to:
    1. Knowingly and with unlawful intent take, send, or otherwise cause to be taken into any penal institution where prisoners are quartered or under custodial supervision:
      1. Any weapon, ammunition, or explosive;
      2. Any intoxicant, legend drug, controlled substance, or controlled substance analogue found in chapter 17, part 4 of this title; or
      3. Any telecommunication device; or
    2. Knowingly and with unlawful intent possess any of the following materials while present in any penal institution where prisoners are quartered or under custodial supervision without the express written consent of the chief administrator of the institution:
      1. Any weapon, ammunition, or explosive; or
      2. Any intoxicant, legend drug, controlled substance, or controlled substance analogue found in chapter 17, part 4 of this title.
    1. A violation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) or (b)(2)(A) is a Class C felony.
    2. A violation of subdivision (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), or (b)(2)(B) is a Class D felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 629, §§ 1, 2; 2006, ch. 1006, §§ 1-3; 2012, ch. 848, § 15; 2019, ch. 486, § 7.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (b)(1), inserted a comma following “send”, and substituted the colon at the end for “any weapons, ammunition, explosives, intoxicants, legend drugs, or any controlled substances or controlled substance analogues found in chapter 17, part 4 of this title;”; added (b)(1)(A)–(b)(1)(C); in (b)(2), inserted “and with unlawful intent”, and substituted “following materials while” for “materials prohibited in subdivision (b)(1)”; added (b)(2)(A)–(B); deleted former (b)(3), which read: “Knowingly and with unlawful intent take, send or otherwise cause to be taken into any penal institution where prisoners are quartered or under custodial supervision any telecommunication device.”; in (c)(1), substituted “(b)(1)(A) or (b)(2)(A)” for “(b)(1) or (b)(2)”; and in (c)(2), substituted “(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), or (b)(2)(B) is a Class D” for “(b)(3) is a Class E”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 486, § 15. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class C and Class D felonies, §  40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.95.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. “Penal Institution.”

The term “penal institution” as used in T.C.A. § 39-16-201 should not be construed to include community correction facilities suitable for nonviolent offenders. State v. Kendrick, 10 S.W.3d 650, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 926 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

A county jail is a “penal institution” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 39-16-201. State v. Kilpatrick, 52 S.W.3d 81, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

2. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for attempting to introduce contraband into a penal facility because defendant and codefendant were discovered lying in a ditch on the side of a rural road adjacent to a prison from which defendant had been released two weeks earlier, just after midnight, at or near a known hot-spot for smuggling illegal contraband into the prison. Moreover, two large duffel bags containing cell phones, cell phone charges, tobacco, and marijuana were found one to two feet from defendant. State v. Matthews, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of contraband in a penal institution; the jury could have inferred defendant's knowledge of the contraband based on his failure to take advantage of multiple opportunities to turn over the controlled substance, the manner in which it was concealed, and defendant's control over the location where the drugs were located. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Oct. 11, 2018).

Defendant's conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal facility was supported by evidence that he did not disclose he had methamphetamine hidden in his shoe, knew he was in possession of it at the time of his arrest, knew he was being transported to jail, and had the opportunity to turn the drugs over during the booking process but did not. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2020).

3. Sentence.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to eight years for possession of contraband in a penal institution; as a Range II multiple offender, defendant's sentence range was six to ten years, the trial court did not err in applying enhancement factors as defendant failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence when the felony was committed, and the trial court also considered the mitigating factor that defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Oct. 11, 2018).

Defendant committed the offense of possession of contraband in a penal institution while he was on parole for a conviction of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and thus consecutive sentencing was mandatory. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Oct. 11, 2018).

4. Motion to Dismiss.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss; while the State had a duty to preserve a video recording as potentially exculpatory evidence, the absence of the video did not render the trial fundamentally unfair as it did not hinder defendant in the full and complete exposition of his theory to the jury, plus the evidence against him was substantial. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Oct. 11, 2018).

Part 3
False Personation

39-16-301. Criminal impersonation.

  1. A person commits criminal impersonation who, with intent to injure or defraud another person:
    1. Assumes a false identity;
    2. Pretends to be a representative of some person or organization;
    3. Pretends to be an officer or employee of the government; or
    4. Pretends to have a disability.
  2. A person commits criminal impersonation who pretends to be a law enforcement officer for the purpose of:
    1. Engaging in an activity that is ordinarily and customarily an activity established by law as a law enforcement activity; and
    2. Causing another to believe that the person is a law enforcement officer.
    1. A person commits criminal impersonation who, with the intent to obtain money, property, services, or any other tangible benefit, pretends to be an active duty member or veteran of uniformed service by:
      1. Wearing the uniform, rank, medals, devices, or insignia of a uniformed service of which the person is not a member or veteran or to which the person has not earned or been awarded;
      2. Fraudulently representing to another, or misleading another to believe, that the person is the recipient of a military rank, medal, device, insignia, award, decoration, ribbon, tab, or other service recognition that the person has not received or earned; or
      3. Presenting false identification, documentation, or certification to include, without limitation:
        1. United States department of defense identification cards;
        2. Military forms showing release or discharge from active duty, including department of defense form 214 (DD 214) or equivalent forms;
        3. United States department of veteran affairs identification cards; or
        4. Certifications or qualifications indicating uniformed service training or education.
    2. This subsection (c) shall not be construed to prevent members of organizations known as the Boy Scouts of America, or the naval militia, or such other organizations as the secretary of defense may designate, from wearing their prescribed uniforms; nor to prevent persons who in time of war have served honorably in the armed forces of the United States, from wearing the uniform as may be prescribed by the laws of the United States; nor to prevent other duly designated organizations, schools, colleges, universities, cadet corps, military societies, or instructors, from wearing the uniform as prescribed by the laws of the United States; nor to prevent the wearing of the uniform in playhouses, theaters, or motion pictures, as may be prescribed by the laws of the United States; and provided further, that the members of the military societies and instructors and members of the cadet corps mentioned in this subdivision (c)(2) shall not wear the insignia of rank prescribed to be worn by officers of the armed forces of the United States, or any similar insignia of rank.
    1. Criminal impersonation under subsection (a) is a Class B misdemeanor. However, if the criminal impersonation was committed to falsely obtain a driver license or photo identification license, the maximum fine of five hundred dollars ($500) shall be imposed. If any person commits the offense of criminal impersonation under subsection (a) while pretending to be a firefighter, medical fire responder, paramedic, emergency medical technician, or any other first responder and while operating a motor vehicle pursuant to § 55-9-201(d), § 55-9-402(g), or § 55-9-414(f), then the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. Criminal impersonation under subsection (b) or (c) is a Class A misdemeanor. However, if any person commits criminal impersonation of a law enforcement officer under subsection (b) while operating a motor vehicle pursuant to § 55-9-201(d), § 55-9-402(g), or § 55-9-414(f), then the maximum fine for the offense shall be five thousand dollars ($5,000).
    3. All revenue collected from the fines imposed for a conviction of subsection (c) must be paid into the general fund. It is the intent of the general assembly that an amount equal to the revenue collected from the fines imposed for a conviction under subsection (c) be allocated to assist in veteran property tax relief, subject to the general appropriations act.
  3. For purposes of this section, “uniformed service” means:
    1. Active and reserve components of the army, navy, air force, marine corps, or coast guard of the United States;
    2. The commissioned corps of the United States public health service;
    3. The commissioned corps of the national oceanic and atmospheric administration of the United States; or
    4. The national guard of a state.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 983, § 1; 1999, ch. 374, § 2; 2007, ch. 355, § 1; 2011, ch. 47, § 31; 2014, ch. 710, §§ 8, 9; 2018, ch. 914, § 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section broadly proscribes any sort of impersonation, provided there is the requisite intent to injure or defraud another.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2018, ch. 914, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Stolen Valor Act.”

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, added present (c)(1) and (c)(2) and  redesignated former (c)(1) and (c)(2) as present (d)(1) and (d)(2); substituted “subsection (b) or (c)” for “under subsection (b)” in present (d)(2); and added (d)(3) and (e).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 914, § 4. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and Class B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 43; 13 Tenn. Juris., Fraud and Deceit, § 48.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Forgery Law, 13 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 343 (1983).

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. § 39-16-301 is not violated if an individual submits a certificate to the commissioner of commerce and insurance that is issued by the National Rifle Association and is marked “not valid for law enforcement or security officer training,” and the individual is then licensed as a certified trainer of security guards, OAG 01-163 (11/5/01).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. False Identity.

Where defendant gave a false name at the time of his arrest, to establish the offense of criminal impersonation, the state was not required to show proof why defendant sought to defraud the police, only that he intended to misrepresent his true identity. State v. Brooks, 909 S.W.2d 854, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Metropolitan Government of Nashville Civil Service Commission's conclusion that a police officer violated Metropolitan Nashville Police Department policy was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial and material evidence because the officer engaged in conduct which constituted an offense under Tennessee law; the officer assumed a false identity or pretended to be a representative of Immigration and Customs Enforcement with the intent to injure or defraud a bonding agent. Davis v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the Metro. Gov't, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2019).

2. Crime of Dishonesty.

Trial court properly allowed defendant's prior convictions for attempt to alter a license tag and for theft into evidence for impeachment purposes, and the trial court properly found his conviction of criminal impersonation was a crime of dishonesty, as criminal impersonation under T.C.A. § 39-16-301(a) required a false statement; his credibility was at issue, and his prior convictions were highly probative of that issue, and such probative value was not outweighed by unfair prejudice. State v. Farris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for criminal impersonation because the evidence showed that defendant intended to misrepresent defendant's true identity when defendant obtained a learner permit under the name of a different person and signed the driver license application and the learner permit in the name of the other person to falsely obtain the permit. Furthermore, there was no lawful authority to use a person's identifying information to commit an unlawful act, such as falsely obtaining a learner permit. State v. McDonald, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2017).

39-16-302. Impersonation of licensed professional.

  1. It is unlawful for any person who is not licensed to do so, to practice or pretend to be licensed to practice a profession for which a license certifying the qualifications of the licensee to practice the profession is required.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-16-303. Using a false identification.

  1. A person commits the offense of using a false identification who, for the purpose of obtaining goods, services or privileges to which the person is not otherwise entitled or eligible, uses a false identification.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor; however, if a violation of § 57-5-301(d)(3) or § 57-3-412(c) also constitutes a violation of this section, the offender shall be punished in accordance with those sections.

Acts 1990, ch. 983, § 2; 2006, ch. 986, § 5.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-16-304. Misrepresentation of service animal or support animal.

  1. As used in this section, “service animal” and “support animal” have the same meanings as the terms are defined in  § 66-7-111(a).
  2. A person commits the offense of misrepresentation of a service animal or support animal who knowingly:
    1. Fraudulently represents, as a part of a request to maintain a service animal or support animal in residential rental property under § 66-7-111 or § 66-28-406, that the person has a disability or disability-related need for the use of a service animal or support animal; or
    2. Provides documentation to a landlord under § 66-7-111(c) or § 66-28-406(c) that falsely states an animal is a service animal or support animal.
  3. Misrepresentation of a service animal or support animal is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 2019, ch. 236, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 236, § 6 provided that the act shall apply to any rental agreement entered into, amended, or renewed on or after July 1, 2019, and any request for an exception to a landlord's policy that prohibits or limits animals on the property made on or after July 1, 2019.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 236, § 6. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Part 4
Misconduct Involving Public Officials and Employees

39-16-401. Definitions for public misconduct offenses.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Act” means a bodily movement, whether voluntary or involuntary, and includes speech;
  2. “Law” means the constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States, a written opinion of a court of record, a municipal ordinance, or a rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute; and
  3. “Public servant” means a person elected, selected, appointed, employed, or otherwise designated as one (1) of the following even if the public servant has not yet qualified for office or assumed the duties:
    1. An officer, employee, or agent of government;
    2. A juror or grand juror;
    3. An arbitrator, referee, or other person who is authorized by law or private written agreement to hear or determine a cause or controversy;
    4. An attorney at law or notary public when participating in performing a governmental function;
    5. A candidate for nomination or election to public office; or
    6. A person who is performing a governmental function under claim of right although not legally qualified to do so.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Application for consent to petition to convene investigative grand jury, § 40-12-201.

39-16-402. Official misconduct.

  1. A public servant commits an offense who, with intent to obtain a benefit or to harm another, intentionally or knowingly:
    1. Commits an act relating to the public servant's office or employment that constitutes an unauthorized exercise of official power;
    2. Commits an act under color of office or employment that exceeds the public servant's official power;
    3. Refrains from performing a duty that is imposed by law or that is clearly inherent in the nature of the public servant's office or employment;
    4. Violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment; or
    5. Receives any benefit not otherwise authorized by law.
  2. For purposes of subdivision (a)(2), a public servant commits an act under color of office or employment who acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of the actual or purported capacity.
    1. For purposes of subdivision (a)(5), the ways in which a public servant receives a benefit not otherwise authorized by law include, but are not limited to, a public servant who:
      1. Purchases real property or otherwise obtains an option to purchase real property with intent to make a profit if the public servant knows that such real property may be purchased by a governmental entity and such information is not public knowledge; or
      2. Acquires nonpublic information derived from such person's position as a public servant or gained from the performance of such person's official duties as a public servant and knowingly acts on such nonpublic information to acquire, or obtain an option to acquire, or liquidate, tangible or intangible personal property with intent to make a profit.
    2. Ouster provisions shall be instituted upon a conviction under subsection (a) in which the conduct described in subsection (c) is the basis of the violation. In addition any person convicted of such offense shall forever afterward be disqualified from holding any office under the laws or constitution of this state.
  3. It is a defense to prosecution for this offense that the benefit involved was a trivial benefit incidental to personal, professional or business contact, and involved no substantial risk of undermining official impartiality.
    1. An offense under subsection (a) in which the conduct described in subsection (c) is not the basis of the violation is a Class E felony.
    2. An offense under subsection (a) in which the conduct described in subsection (c) is the basis of the violation is a Class A misdemeanor and the court shall order appropriate restitution to the governmental entity harmed by the offense.
    3. If the defendant's conduct violates this section and other criminal statutes, nothing in this subsection (e) shall be construed as prohibiting prosecution and conviction for theft or any other such applicable offense in addition to or in lieu of prosecution and conviction for a violation of this section.
  4. Charges for official misconduct may be brought only by indictment, presentment or criminal information; provided, that nothing in this section shall deny a person from pursuing other criminal charges by affidavit of complaint.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 10; 2012, ch. 966, §§ 1, 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section provides a generic offense for public servants who abuse their offices for improper purposes. It consolidates prior code §§ 39-5-406, 39-5-407, 39-5-417, 39-5-418, 39-5-421, 39-5-42439-5-427 and 39-5-434. The defendant must act intentionally or knowingly, so the offense is not completed by reckless or negligent conduct.

Subsection (e) provides that charges may be brought only by indictment, presentment or criminal information. This provision ensures that the prosecutor had an opportunity to review charges of official misconduct prior to formal charge. If the prosecutor refuses to proceed, citizens may go directly to the grand jury pursuant to § 40-12-104.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Bribery of public servant, § 39-16-102.

Civil liability for receiving extra fees, § 8-21-103.

Disobedience of command of court by sheriff, § 8-8-207.

Duty of jailer to receive convicts en route to penitentiary, § 41-4-104.

Duty of warden to escort convict to and from court, § 41-21-306.

Failure to return process, penalty, § 25-3-105.

Forcible entry and detainer, refusal to execute process, penalty, § 29-18-116.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Preservation of evidence in death penalty cases, § 40-35-322.

Rights of person arrested for extradition, § 40-9-119.

Sale of office, § 39-16-105.

Suspension, removal and discharge from office, § 39-16-406.

Law Reviews.

“Official” Explanation: Defining “Official Capacity” and Related “Color of Office” Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law (Steven J. Mulroy), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 587 (2008).

The Tennessee Court System — Criminal Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 319 (1978).

Attorney General Opinions. Legality of rewards to deputy sheriffs, OAG 91-76 (8/20/91).

Constables as collections agents, OAG 97-043 (4/7/97).

Unauthorized use of city funds, OAG 99-196 (9/28/99).

A grand jury foreperson is a public servant who is subject to prosecution for official misconduct, official oppression, and misuse of official information, OAG 05-129 (8/24/05).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Unauthorized Exercise of Power.

Evidence that chief of police used his official position to alter a motor vehicle accident report to aid a relative was sufficient for conviction of official misconduct. State v. Brewer, 945 S.W.2d 803, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Jury could have found that defendant tampered with evidence, which was related to his employment as a police officer because he instigated the arrest of the men when he presented the complainant with the serial number prior to her viewing the DVD player and instructed her to claim the DVD player was her property; his official oppression conviction was proper. State v. Butler, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 786 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Trial court erred in granting defendant, a corrections officer, judgments of acquittal on three counts of official misconduct because, while he had no relationship with the three inmates at issue, did not try to confer a benefit or do harm to them, and did not receive anything from them in exchange for entering unearned work credits, the benefit was not required to accrue to defendant, but could benefit “any other person in whose welfare” he had an interest, and whether he “was interested” in the welfare of a third party for whom a benefit was obtained was a question for a properly instructed jury. State v. Stoner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 3, 2019).

2. Sexual Misconduct.

Where defendant was a Department of Human Services counselor for a 16 year old female and he exploited the relationship by smoking marijuana and having sexual intercourse with her on multiple occasions, sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences under T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(5). State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 430 (Tenn. 1999).

3. Evidence Sufficient

Jury could have found that defendant took advantage of his status as a police officer to contact his fellow officer by identifying men as individuals who had possession of stolen items with the expectation that the fellow officer would stop the men in order to investigate; defendant lacked reasonable suspicion and probable case, rendering defendant's instigating the stop through the fellow officer an action relating to his employment that exceeded his official power. State v. Butler, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 786 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

4. Indictment.

Indictment did not reference a statutory list of offenses for which defendant had not been charged, and the official misconduct charge could have been based on evidence tampering or official oppression, both of which were charged in the indictment and were violations of law relating to defendant's employment as a police officer; he was provided adequate notice relative to the possible theories of prosecution against which he had to prepare a defense. State v. Butler, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 786 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

4. Breach of Public Trust.

Defendant claimed the trial court improperly placed undue weight on the breach of the public trust, but the statute governing official misconduct does not reference a breach of the public trust, and nothing showed that the trial court believed that any form of conduct leading to an official misconduct conviction would prevent its granting judicial diversion; official misconduct can be committed by conduct that does not include sexual contact with female inmates, as in this case, the trial court found that defendant's abuse of his authority was horrendous, and the denial of judicial diversion was proper. State v. Sowers, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 871 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2016).

5. Sentence.

Trial court did not err by denying defendant alternative sentencing because defendant's argument that the trial court failed to consider the factors of T.C.A. § 40-35-103 was not supported by the record, the trial court found that confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense, it found that he was not truthful, T.C.A. § 40-35-113(7) was not applicable because the testimony about his son's health was offered to establish that defendant's absence from the household would create a hardship due to the need for a specialized caretaker, and the record did not show that the trial court denied probation based on defendant's release eligibility date. State v. Redden, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017).

39-16-403. Official oppression.

  1. A public servant acting under color of office or employment commits an offense who:
    1. Intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, stop, frisk, halt, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment or lien when the public servant knows the conduct is unlawful; or
    2. Intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power or immunity, when the public servant knows the conduct is unlawful.
  2. For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of office or employment if the public servant acts, or purports to act, in an official capacity or takes advantage of the actual or purported capacity.
  3. An offense under this section is a Class E felony.
  4. Charges for official oppression may be brought only by indictment, presentment or criminal information; provided, that nothing in this section shall deny a person from pursuing other criminal charges by affidavit of complaint.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 11.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is designed to punish public servants who intentionally use their offices to violate citizen's rights. It is similar to, but more detailed than, prior code § 39-5-404. This section should be read in conjunction with §§ 39-16-601 and 39-11-611(e).

Subsection (d) provides that charges may be brought only by indictment, presentment or criminal information. This provision ensures that the prosecutor had an opportunity to review charges of official oppression prior to formal charge. If the prosecutor refuses to proceed, citizens may go directly to the grand jury pursuant to § 40-12-104.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 8; 21 Tenn. Juris., Public Officers, § 47.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure — 1961 Tennessee Survey (Robert E. Kendrick), 14 Vand. L. Rev. 1220 (1961).

“Official” Explanation: Defining “Official Capacity” and Related “Color of Office” Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law (Steven J. Mulroy), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 587 (2008).

Attorney General Opinions. A grand jury foreperson is a public servant who is subject to prosecution for official misconduct, official oppression, and misuse of official information, OAG 05-129 (8/24/05).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence.

Defendant was not entitled to relief on the basis of inconsistent verdicts because sufficient evidence existed to support an official oppression conviction on the basis of mistreatment, notwithstanding the evidence of rape; defendant threatened the victim with the ultimatum to either have sex with him or be taken to jail, and he squeezed her arm and took her behind a building. Defendant's actions rose to the level of mistreatment of the victim while acting under the color of his employment as a police officer. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2017).

39-16-404. Misuse of official information.

  1. A public servant commits an offense who, by reason of information to which the public servant has access in the public servant's official capacity and that has not been made public, attains or aids another to attain a benefit.
  2. An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section creates a new offense under Tennessee law.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. A grand jury foreperson is a public servant who is subject to prosecution for official misconduct, official oppression, and misuse of official information, OAG 05-129 (8/24/05).

39-16-405. Purchasing property sold through court.

  1. A judge, sheriff, court clerk, court officer or employee of any court commits an offense who bids or purchases, directly or indirectly, for personal reasons or for any other person, on any kind of property sold through the court for which the judge, sheriff, court clerk, court officer, or employee discharges official duties.
  2. A bid or purchase in violation of subsection (a) is voidable at the option of the person aggrieved.
  3. An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor with no incarceration permitted.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Constable not to purchase at own sale, § 8-10-116.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Purchase of confiscated items by law enforcement officers, OAG 99-105 (5/10/99).

39-16-406. Suspension, removal and discharge from office.

  1. A public servant convicted under § 39-16-402, § 39-16-403 or § 39-16-404 shall be removed from office or discharged from the position.
  2. A public servant elected or appointed for a specified term shall be:
    1. Suspended without pay immediately upon conviction in the trial court through the final disposition of the case;
    2. Removed from office for the duration of the term during which the conviction occurred if the conviction becomes final; and
    3. Barred from holding any appointed or elected office for ten (10) years from the date the conviction becomes final.
  3. A public servant who serves at-will shall be discharged upon conviction in the trial court. Subsequent public service shall rest with the hiring or appointing authority; provided, that the authority has been fully informed of the conviction.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section mandates the removal of elected and appointed officials for the duration of the term in which the violation occurred and a ten-year period after conviction, but does not authorize a permanent removal.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Attorney general and reporter may be proceeded against for misdemeanors in office, § 8-6-107.

Official misconduct, § 39-16-402.

Restoration of rights of citizenship, § 40-29-101.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 8; 21 Tenn. Juris., Public Officers, §§ 25, 47.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systemic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253 (1974).

39-16-407. Misrepresenting information to state auditor.

  1. A public servant commits an offense who, with intent to deceive, knowingly misrepresents material information related to an audit conducted by an auditor in the department of audit.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 2005, ch. 135, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-16-408. Sexual contact with inmates.

  1. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Law enforcement officer” and “correctional employee” include a person working in that capacity as a private contractor or employee of a private contractor; and
    2. “Volunteer” means any person who, after fulfilling the appropriate policy requirements, is assigned to a volunteer job and provides a service without pay from the correctional agency, except for compensation for those expenses incurred directly as a result of the volunteer service.
  2. It is an offense for a law enforcement officer, correctional employee, vendor or volunteer to engage in sexual contact or sexual penetration, as such terms are defined in § 39-13-501, with a prisoner or inmate who is in custody at a penal institution as defined in § 39-16-601, whether the conduct occurs on or off the grounds of the institution.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 1997, ch. 388, § 1; T.C.A. § 41–21–241; Acts 2006, ch. 1005, § 2.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-16-409. Sexual contact with probationer or parolee.

  1. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Probation and parole officer” means a probation and parole officer as defined in § 40-28-102; and
    2. “Probationer or parolee” means any individual who is placed on probation or parole, as defined in § 40-28-102, and who is under the active supervision of the department of correction. For the purpose of this section only, “probationer or parolee” does not include the lawful spouse of a probation and parole officer who is placed under the supervision of the department of correction  subsequent to the marriage.
  2. It is an offense for a probation and parole officer to engage in sexual contact or sexual penetration, as defined in § 39-13-501, whether consensual or nonconsensual, with a probationer or parolee who is under the supervision of the department of correction; provided, that the probation or parole officer knows or reasonably should know the person is a probationer or parolee.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 2008, ch. 1200, § 1; 2012, ch. 727, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning transfers of certain functions relating to probation and parole services and the community correction grant program from the board of probation and parole to the department of correction, please refer to Acts 2012, ch. 727.

Acts 2012, ch. 727, § 63 provided that the implementation of the act, which amended the definition of “probationer or parolee” in (a) and amended subsection (b), shall be fully accomplished on or before January 1, 2013.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-16-410. Unlawful acts related to audits.

  1. It is an offense for a supervisor to intentionally:
    1. Instruct, direct, or encourage an employee to make a false statement, entry, notation, or report during or in relation to an audit;
    2. Alter, destroy, or conceal information, documentation, or material having evidentiary value to an audit; or
    3. Interfere with, impede, obstruct, or limit access to any information, documentation, or communication that is requested during or in relation to an audit.
  2. It is an offense for an employee to intentionally interfere with, impede, or obstruct any information, documentation, or communication that is requested during or in relation to the audit if that employee, based on experience, training, and longevity, knew or should have known what information, documentation, or communication was being requested.
  3. A violation of subsection (a) or (b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  4. Charges for a violation of subsection (a) or (b) may be brought only by indictment, presentment, or criminal information; provided, that nothing in this section shall deny a person from pursuing other criminal charges by affidavit of complaint.
  5. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Audit” means any audit or investigation conducted by or on behalf of the comptroller of the treasury;
    2. “Employee” means an individual who works under a supervisor and who receives compensation from the state;
    3. “Limit access” means any time a supervisor requires the presence of a supervisor before:
      1. Allowing information to be reviewed during the audit process; or
      2. Allowing communication between employees and auditors or investigators of the comptroller of the treasury; and
    4. “Supervisor” means an employee of the state who manages, supervises, directs, or controls the employment status, work, or responsibility of any employee. “Supervisor” includes, but is not limited to, any commissioner, executive director, or staff director.

Acts 2016, ch. 939, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Part 5
Interference with Government Operations

39-16-501. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Public servant” means a person elected, selected, employed or otherwise designated as one (1) of the following, even if the person has not yet qualified for office or assumed the duties:
    1. An officer, employee, or agent of government;
    2. A juror or grand juror;
    3. An arbitrator or other person who is authorized by law or private written contract to hear or determine a controversy;
    4. An attorney or notary public performing a governmental function; or
    5. A candidate for nomination or election to public office; and
  2. “Statement” means any representation of fact.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Application for consent to petition to convene investigative grand jury, § 40-12-201.

39-16-502. False reports.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to:
    1. Initiate a report or statement to a law enforcement officer concerning an offense or incident within the officer's concern knowing that:
      1. The offense or incident reported did not occur;
      2. The person has no information relating to the offense or incident reported; or
      3. The information relating to the offense reported is false; or
    2. Make a report or statement in response to a legitimate inquiry by a law enforcement officer concerning a material fact about an offense or incident within the officer's concern, knowing that the report or statement is false and with the intent to obstruct or hinder the officer from:
      1. Preventing the offense or incident from occurring or continuing to occur; or
      2. Apprehending or locating another person suspected of committing an offense; or
    3. Intentionally initiate or circulate a report of a past, present, or impending bombing, fire or other emergency, knowing that the report is false or baseless and knowing:
      1. It will cause action of any sort by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal with those emergencies;
      2. It will place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or
      3. It will prevent or interrupt the occupation of any building, place of assembly, form of conveyance, or any other place to which the public has access.
    1. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2) is a Class D felony.
    2. A violation of subdivision (a)(3) is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 28; 1998, ch. 690, § 1; 2000, ch. 976, § 1; 2002, ch. 849, § 6.

Cross-References. Accessory after the fact, § 39-11-411.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalties for Class C and D felonies, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Elements of Offense.

“Report” as used in T.C.A. § 39-16-502 applies to a written or oral statement initiated by a person; the term does not apply to a person's response to an inquiry by a law enforcement officer. State v. Levandowski, 955 S.W.2d 603, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. 1997).

Supreme Court of Tennessee concludes that the General Assembly intended to criminalize two distinct types of conduct when it created T.C.A. § 39-16-502(a)(1) and (a)(2). Subsection (a)(1) proscribes the initiation of a false statement or report to a law enforcement officer, and subsection (a)(2) proscribes the making of a false statement or report in response to a legitimate inquiry by a law enforcement officer. Both statutes specifically narrow the conduct to a particular “incident or offense.” State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

Unit of prosecution in T.C.A. § 39-16-502(a)(1) is the initiation of a false report or statement concerning an incident or offense and that subdivisions (a)(1)(A) through (C) are merely alternative means of violating subsection (a)(1). The Supreme Court of Tennessee similarly concludes that the unit of prosecution in subsection (a)(2) is making a false report or statement in response to a legitimate inquiry by a law enforcement officer concerning an offense or incident and that subdivisions (a)(2)(A) and (B) provide alternative means of violating subsection (a)(2). State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

Statute does not require officers'  to rely on false statements to their detriment. State v. White, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2018).

2. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction based on his report to a police dispatcher because he reported that his wife had been missing for a few hours, was diabetic, and likely needed food and insulin while knowing that the report was false, and he drove his wife's vehicle to a parking lot and therefore he knew that she was not driving the vehicle as reported. Defendant also knew that the report would result in an agency response. State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate aggravated child abuse, two counts of aggravated child abuse, and one count of filing a false report because the medical examiner testified that the victim suffered from battered child syndrome and her death was a homicide, defendant was alone with the victim on the day of her death, defendant's daughter testified that she saw him beat the victim, and defendant waited five hours after finding the victim before calling the police and lied about when he found her. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction, given that a rational juror was free to disbelieve defendant and conclude that he knew a person wanted by authorities was inside the trailer and that he told the police she was not there in an attempt to hinder the officers from locating and apprehending her; the questions asked by the corporal and the answers given by defendant were material to determining the person's location, which is all that the statute requires. State v. White, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of initiating a false police report and filing a fraudulent insurance claim because he told the owner he could make the motorcycle disappear, he told the owner to leave the motorcycle at his body shop, he instructed the owner to report the motorcycle stolen, defendant, a police officer, responded to the call, at defendant's suggestion the owner filed an insurance claim for the loss of the motorcycle, and the insurance company paid more than $8,000 to the lienholder. State v. Millan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 810 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2018).

Evidence that defendant tried to use Google to treat a woman who overdosed, told her friend not to send an ambulance, refused to speak to a detective unless he could record the conversation, and told officers he did not know what the woman had ingested was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for filing a false report. State v. Babanzadeh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2019).

3. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions based on statement he made to an officer about his wife's disappearance because the court could not conclude that defendant “initiated” the statements, as the testimony revealed that defendant repeated the statement in response to the officer's “legitimate inquiry” into defendant's report that his wife was missing. State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

4. Joinder.

Court of criminal appeals erred in relying on Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(2) to dismiss an aggravated robbery charge because the two charges against defendant, aggravated robbery, T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a), and initiating a false police report, T.C.A. § 39-16-502, were not part of the same criminal episode since they did not occur simultaneously or in close sequence and did not occur in the same place or in closely situated places; defendant initiated the false police report twelve hours after he allegedly robbed the victim, and the proof of the aggravated robbery did not necessarily involve, and was not inextricably connected to, the proof of initiation of a false report to a law enforcement officer. State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (Tenn. May 26, 2011).

5. Multiplicity.

Where defendant was convicted in charges 3 to 8 of filing false reports in connection with the disappearance of his wife, the trial court should have dismissed the charges in counts 4 and 5 as multiplicitous with count 3 because the State used the exact same proof for all of three of the offenses, and the offenses were not separated by time or location. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 481 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

When a defendant is charged with multiple counts under the same subsection of T.C.A. § 39-16-502 for statements or reports about the same incident or offense, the counts are multiplicitous only if the jury returns verdicts on more than one count. Under such circumstances, the trial court must wait until the jury returns its verdict before dismissing counts as multiplicitous. State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

Defendant's conviction of three counts of making a false statement under T.C.A. § 39-16-502 were multiplicitous because the false reports related to the same incident, the disappearance of defendant's wife, and were in furtherance of the officers' investigation into that incident, and therefore two of those counts were dismissed. State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

6. Sentencing.

Defendant did not challenge the notice to seek enhanced punishment and, in fact, stipulated the accuracy of his prior convictions; the notice to seek enhanced punishment was not materially misleading as to his false report and abuse of corpse convictions. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2015), aff'd, 519 S.W.3d 1, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 1, 2017), cert. denied, Hawkins v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 288, 138 S. Ct. 388, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6432 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2017).

Criteria are stated in the alternative and therefore only one need exist to support the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing; because the trial court provided reasons on the record establishing two of the statutory grounds, extensive criminal history and dangerous offender, the decision was afforded a presumption of reasonableness, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant's sentences for false report and abuse of corpse to run consecutively. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2015), aff'd, 519 S.W.3d 1, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 1, 2017), cert. denied, Hawkins v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 288, 138 S. Ct. 388, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6432 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2017).

7. Indictment.

Specific question the corporal posed to defendant and defendant's response were not essential elements but instead particularized details of the crime alleged, making a false report or statement, and therefore, no constructive amendment of the indictment occurred; the information contained in the indictment was sufficient to provide defendant with notice of the charges against him, irrespective of the particular question stated therein, and even if no question at all was provided. State v. White, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2018).

Fact that the corporal asked defendant several times about a person's whereabouts did not make the alleged variance material, as the indictment charged events occurring on or about November 21, 2012, there was no proof that defendant made other statements regarding a separate incident, there was no risk that he might later be charged a second time for the same offense, and there was no proof that the prosecution relied upon theories not fairly embraced in the indictment; there was no variance. State v. White, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2018).

8. Construction.

Accused's responses at a plea proceeding neither prevent the offense or incident from occurring or continuing to occur nor do they relate to apprehending or locating another person suspected of committing a criminal offense; the plain language of the statute does not apply in such situations. State v. White, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2018).

39-16-503. Tampering with or fabricating evidence.

  1. It is unlawful for any person, knowing that an investigation or official proceeding is pending or in progress, to:
    1. Alter, destroy, or conceal any record, document or thing with intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the investigation or official proceeding; or
    2. Make, present, or use any record, document or thing with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation or official proceeding.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Accessory after the fact, § 39-11-411.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Conviction of defendant under T.C.A. § 39-16-503 did not violate due process; T.C.A. § 39-16-503 provided sufficient notice of conduct that is prohibited both on its face and as applied to the facts in the case. State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 996 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

2. Elements of Offense.

The “evidence” referred to in T.C.A. § 39-16-503 is not evidence required to be ruled on by the trial judge; the making and presenting of false evidence may occur during pretrial discovery procedures. State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 996 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Term “pending” in T.C.A. § 39-16-503(a) means impending or about to take place. Once the police are notified, an investigation is in progress. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 481 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

Term “pending” in T.C.A. § 39-16-503 means “impending.” State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

Statute does not specify to whom the false evidence need be made, presented, or used, and the interpretation that one must present evidence to law enforcement is too narrow given the dual applicability of the statute to investigations and official proceedings. State v. Butler, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 786 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Statute turns on the intent of the person presenting the false evidence, not the person to whom the evidence is presented, and thus presenting false evidence by providing a serial number to a criminal complainant with instructions to give it to law enforcement to confirm ownership of the property, as in this case, sufficiently implicates the policies supporting the evidence tampering statute; the jury could have found that defendant presented the serial number to the complainant with the intention of influencing the burglary investigation. State v. Butler, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 786 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

3. Indictment.

Where the indictment charged the “making and presenting” of evidence known to be false and cited T.C.A. § 39-16-503, the jury's verdict of “fabricating evidence,” the term appearing in the heading of the section, did not render the judgment a nullity. State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 996 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Indictment was sufficient to inform defendant of the nature of the charge of tampering with the firearm he used during a shooting because the indictment informed defendant that he was accused of altering, destroying, or concealing any record, document, or thing with the intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in an investigation that he knew was taking place,and the indictment cited to subsection (a)(1). State v. Manning, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

Trial court did not err in denying the motion for acquittal based on lack of notice because defendant never moved for a bill of particulars to determine what evidence would be the subject of the tampering with evidence charge; at trial, defense counsel explicitly stated that he were not misled into believing that a vehicle would be the subject of the tampering charge, and defense counsel conceded that he merely assumed the vehicle was the focus of the charge. State v. Manning, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

4. Abandonment of Evidence.

Defendant's act of tossing aside a bag of marijuana during the course of flight from law enforcement officials did not fall within the definition of evidence tampering. State v. Patton, 898 S.W.2d 732, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Mar. 6, 1995).

5. Destruction of Evidence.

Defendant destroyed evidence under T.C.A. § 39-16-503, where officers executing a search warrant found defendant sitting on a toilet that had sixteen small zip-lock bags in it but only four of the bags contained a white powder when examined by the forensic chemist, because the jury could justifiably conclude that the defendant destroyed the contents of twelve of the bags by placing them in the toilet. State v. Logan, 973 S.W.2d 279, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

6. Jury Instructions.

Where the indictment charged “making and presenting” evidence known to be false, a jury instruction that the offense was complete if defendant “made or presented” the evidence in question, coupled with evidence of two separate offenses, resulted in a strong possibility of a composite jury verdict in violation of defendant's constitutional rights to a unanimous jury verdict. State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 996 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Pattern jury instruction for tampering with evidence provided by the trial court fairly submitted the legal issue and contained a proper statement of the applicable law. State v. Christie, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2016).

7. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence because defendant was not in the presence of police officers when he threw the gun in a location away from the shooting. His disposal of the weapon allowed him to, shortly thereafter, tell police officers that he had no weapon, which ultimately provided his opportunity to leave the scene of the crime. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 406 S.W.3d 121, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. June 20, 2013).

Trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for acquittal as to two fabricating evidence convictions under T.C.A. § 39-16-503(a)(1) and (2) based on insufficient evidence, where defendant concealed his wife's car in a parking lot with intent to alter the course of an investigation into her disappearance, knowing that an investigation was impending, and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 481 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of fabricating evidence under T.C.A. § 39-16-503 because the jury could have inferred that defendant set the investigation into his wife's disappearance in motion by initiating the missing person report and therefore he knew that an investigation was pending when he drove the vehicle to the parking lot with plans to subsequently report his wife's disappearance. State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. June 19, 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for tampering with the evidence because defendant, an attorney, deleted photos from the cell phone of defendant's adult child, which photos placed defendant's adult child with the child's estranged spouse prior to the spouse's death, before the child was indicted in the death of the estranged spouse. State v. Christie, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of destroying evidence because officers noticed that defendant was chewing up baggies of crack cocaine in his mouth; defendant told the officers that he had swallowed cocaine; and one of the baggies an officer retrieved was torn and contained only cocaine residue, and the officer was concerned that defendant had swallowed cocaine. State v. Armstrong, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1024 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Evidence that defendant knew there was an investigation pending, because the deputy asked him to hand over the baggie twice, that defendant put the baggie in his mouth in an attempt to swallow it, and that defendant acknowledged attempting to alter, destroy, or conceal the contents of the baggie was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for destroying, tampering with, or fabricating evidence. State v. King, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to corroborate defendant's employee's testimony and to support defendant's conviction of evidence tampering because the state established that defendant knew that an investigation had begun when he urged the employee to dispose of the motorcycle as its owner had reported to police that it had been stolen, and the employee testified that defendant had scratched at the VIN on the motorcycle frame with a razor blade and that she then took the frame and engine and tossed them off the side of a mountain. State v. Millan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 810 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2018).

Evidence that defendant knew an investigation was pending when he watched a woman overdose, did not call 911 but Googled how to treat her, told the woman's friend not call an ambulance, cleaned up blood and hid evidence of any other drug use was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence. State v. Babanzadeh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of tampering with evidence because it showed that while officers were executing a search warrant on her home after her husband had been arrested for murder, defendant tore up photographs and emails that had been collected by officers, and some of the emails indicated hostility towards one of the murder victims. Defendant clearly would have known that an investigation or proceeding was in progress at the time she tore up the photographs because she and her daughter were sitting on a couch in the living room where a deputy was logging evidence brought to him from other parts of the house. State v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of tampering with evidence because moments after the agent knocked at the door and was greeted by the occupant of the residence agents at the back of the house heard the flushing of the toilet and hurried movements, the occupant and defendant were the only people in the house leaving defendant as the person in possession of the drugs that were being flushed. the attempted disposal of the drugs happened after defendant was put on notice of the agents'  arrival, and these actions sufficiently displayed defendant's intent to hinder the investigation by disposing of the evidence. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2019).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of attempted tampering with evidence because a reasonable juror could conclude that between the time a police officer observed and commented on the baggies of drugs in defendant's lap and the time defendant crashed his vehicle, he destroyed most of the white powdery substance contained in one baggie in an effort to impair its availability as evidence in the investigation. State v. Colbert, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine that defendant tampered with evidence because when defendant, who had control over a cylinder of methamphetamine, realized that defendant's vehicle was being stopped by the police, defendant directed defendant's paramour to conceal the cylinder of methamphetamine. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine that defendant, knowing that an investigation was imminent, took steps to conceal evidence of a crime. State v. Ledet, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 224 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2020).

Defendant was properly convicted of first-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and setting fire to personal property because the evidence established, inter alia, that defendant, the accomplice, and the victim got into a car and drove to a parking lot where, after the victim and defendant exited the car, the accomplice heard a thud on the car, defendant instructed the accomplice to open the trunk, the accomplice then saw defendant take the victim out of the trunk at another location, and after instructing the accomplice to purchase some gasoline and retrieve a rag and spray bottle with bleach, defendant wiped the car down, poured gasoline in it, and set it on fire. State v. Shuler, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for evidence supported his conviction for tampering with the firearm he used during a shooting because the jury could have inferred that defendant was in possession of a firearm, that he concealed it somewhere to prevent police from discovering it, and that he subsequently denied his involvement with the shooting; the evidence established that defendant had a gun which he used to shoot at the victim. State v. Manning, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2020).

8. Evidence Insufficient.

There was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence because when defendant tossed the murder weapon into a location adjacent to the crime scene, where it lay in plain view and was easily found, defendant did not conceal the weapon within the meaning of T.C.A. § 39-16-503(a)(1); the evidence was not altered or destroyed, its discovery was delayed minimally, if at all, and the murder weapon retained its full evidentiary value. State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. June 20, 2013).

Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of tampering with evidence as defendant's actions of placing the bag of marijuana in his mouth in no way impaired the availability of the marijuana to be used as evidence because the deputy admitted that defendant spit a bag containing a green plant-like substance out of his mouth in plain view after being asked whether he possessed marijuana; the deputy was able to retrieve the bag; a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation identified the substance in the bag as 1.03 grams of marijuana; the bag of marijuana was used as evidence against defendant at trial; and the bag of marijuana was not altered or destroyed, and its discovery was delayed minimally, if at all. State v. Linsey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 729 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2016).

9. Sentence.

Defendant's four-year sentence for tampering with evidence was not excessive because: (1) the sentence was within the ranges for defendant's crime, making the sentence presumptively reasonable; and (2) defendant did not rebut this presumption, as defendant's credit for being a good student was outweighed, and defendant's rage and lack of impulse control made defendant dangerous. State v. Madden, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2014), cert. denied, Madden v. Tennessee, 191 L. Ed. 2d 433, 135 S. Ct. 1509, — U.S. —, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1720 (U.S. 2015).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of nine years'  imprisonment because there was no dispute that defendant was a Range II, multiple offender, with a sentencing range of 4-12 years, the sentence was within the statutory range and presumed reasonable, the record showed the trial court noted only that the location of the offense, a funeral, had “some bearing” on the vulnerability of the victim, and the trial court properly applied several other enhancement factors, including defendant's extensive criminal history, the fact that previous efforts at rehabilitation had failed, and the fact that defendant committed the offense while on parole. State v. Henson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019).

10. Construction With Other Laws.

Because the court determined that the legislature did not intend for a pawnbroker such as defendant to be prosecuted for tampering with evidence where a law enforcement official did not place a written hold order on an item that they believed to have been stolen and the pawnbroker sold the item, even if the pawnbroker knew that the item was subject to an investigation. State v. Cabe, 579 S.W.3d 343, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 879 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2018).

39-16-504. Destruction of and tampering with governmental records.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to:
    1. Knowingly make a false entry in, or false alteration of, a governmental record;
    2. Make, present, or use any record, document or thing with knowledge of its falsity and with intent that it will be taken as a genuine governmental record; or
    3. Intentionally and unlawfully destroy, conceal, remove or otherwise impair the verity, legibility or availability of a governmental record.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class E felony.
    1. Upon notification from any public official having custody of government records, including those created by municipal, county or state government agencies, that records have been unlawfully removed from a government records office, appropriate legal action may be taken by the city attorney, county attorney or attorney general, as the case may be, to obtain a warrant for possession of any public records which have been unlawfully transferred or removed in violation of this section.
    2. The records shall be returned to the office of origin immediately after safeguards are established to prevent further recurrence of unlawful transfer or removal.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1998, ch. 906, § 1; 2019, ch. 495, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 495, § 2 provided that the act shall apply to violations occurring on or after July 1, 2019.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Class E felony” for “Class A misdemeanor” in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 495, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References.  Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-16-505, 39-16-506. [Reserved.]

  1. A person commits an offense who, by means of coercion, influences or attempts to influence a witness or prospective witness in an official proceeding with intent to influence the witness to:
    1. Testify falsely;
    2. Withhold any truthful testimony, truthful information, document or thing; or
    3. Elude legal process summoning the witness to testify or supply evidence, or to be absent from an official proceeding to which the witness has been legally summoned.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class D felony.
  3. A defendant in a criminal case involving domestic assault, pursuant to § 39-13-111, or a person acting at the direction of the defendant, commits an offense who, by any means of persuasion that is not coercion, intentionally influences or attempts to influence a witness or prospective witness in an official proceeding to:
    1. Testify falsely;
    2. Withhold any truthful testimony, information, document, or evidence; or
    3. Elude legal process summoning the witness to testify or supply evidence, or to be absent from an official proceeding to which the witness has been legally summoned.
  4. A violation of subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor and, upon conviction, the sentence runs consecutively to the sentence for any other offense that is based in whole or in part on the factual allegations about which the person was seeking to influence a witness.
  5. Nothing in this section shall operate to impede the investigative activities of an attorney representing a defendant.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 8; 2019, ch. 104, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section punishes persons who, through coercion, impair the integrity or availability of witnesses who may be called to offer evidence at official proceedings. This section is not intended to apply to attorneys who merely question witnesses. The related offense of bribing a witness is prohibited by § 39-16-107.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (c)-(e).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 104, § 2. July 1,  2019.

Cross-References. Accessory after the fact, § 39-11-411.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Prospective witness who was subjected to alleged coercion was a member of the class intended to be protected by T.C.A. § 39-16-507, not the minor and his guardian; thus, there was no private right of action under the criminal statute, and the minor and guardian's claims were dismissed by summary judgment. Matthews v. Storgion, 335 F. Supp. 2d 878, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18653 (W.D. Tenn. 2004), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 174 Fed. Appx. 980, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9835 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2006).

Peer review privilege contained within the statute never was intended to allow a healthcare provider to attempt without fear of adverse consequences to force an employee to commit perjury; suborning perjury is an act not protected by the peer review statute as it is a crime and serves only to defeat the stated purpose of the statute. Reynolds v. Gray Med. Inv'rs, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 716 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

2. Application.

T.C.A. §§ 29-9-102(3) and (4), 29-9-103(a), and 39-16-507, evidence a clear public policy, as expressed by the Tennessee Legislature, that a lawfully issued subpoena shall be honored both by the person against whom it is issued and others; such a policy is in accord with society's self-evident goal of maintaining the integrity of its judicial system by insuring access to evidence necessary to the administration of justice. Thus, a claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy lies in cases where a substantial factor in an employer's decision to terminate an employee is the fact that the employee honored a lawful subpoena. Willard v. Golden Gallon-TN, LLC, 154 S.W.3d 571, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

3. Sentencing.

Trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences for defendant's conviction of bribery of a witness and coercion of a witness, as he was properly found to be a dangerous offender; defendant's prior convictions were the underlying cause for his attempt to bribe and coerce the witness in the instant case, thereby making the cases intertwined. Consecutive sentencing was also proper just based on defendant's criminal history. State v. Colbert, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 15, 2018).

5. —Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for coercion of a witness because during a phone call, defendant threatened to kill defendant's spouse by putting a bomb in the spouse's car if the spouse did not drop the spouse's charges against defendant. From this, the jury reasonably could have inferred that defendant threatened to kill defendant's spouse in an attempt to influence the spouse, as a prospective witness in the domestic assault case, to avoid testifying against defendant. State v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020).

39-16-508. Coercion of juror.

  1. A person commits an offense who by means of coercion:
    1. Influences or attempts to influence a juror in the exercise of the juror's official power or in the performance of the juror's official duty; or
    2. Influences or attempts to influence a juror not to vote or to vote in a particular manner.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Accessory after the fact, § 39-11-411.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Threats.

Actions of defendant in threatening a juror with loss of her job if she did not vote as he wished during grand jury deliberations constituted coercion of a juror. State v. Brewer, 945 S.W.2d 803, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

39-16-509. Improper influence of juror.

  1. A person commits an offense who privately communicates with a juror with intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Accessory after the fact, § 39-11-411.

Bribing a juror, § 39-16-108.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Waiting for the Jury (George W. Jenkins, III), 20 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 31 (1984).

39-16-510. Retaliation for past action.

    1. A person commits the offense of retaliation for past action who harms or threatens to harm a witness at an official proceeding, judge, district attorney general, an assistant district attorney general, an employee of the district attorney general or a law enforcement officer, clerk, employee of the clerk, juror or former juror, or a family member of any such person, by any unlawful act in retaliation for anything the witness, judge, district attorney general, assistant district attorney general, employee of the district attorney general or a law enforcement officer, clerk, employee of the clerk, or juror did in an official capacity as witness, judge, district attorney general, assistant district attorney general, employee of the district attorney general or a law enforcement officer, clerk, employee of the clerk, or juror. The offense of retaliation for past action shall not apply to an employee of a clerk who harms or threatens to harm the clerk.
    2. For purposes of subdivision (a)(1), “family member” means the spouse, parent, grandparent, stepmother, stepfather, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, adopted children of the parent, or the spouse's parents.
  1. A violation of this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 29; 1998, ch. 882, § 1; 2000, ch. 953, § 1; 2004, ch. 818, § 1; 2014, ch. 504, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This new section protects jurors, judges and witnesses at official proceedings from any sort of retaliation undertaken as a result of their official actions.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Requirement of culpable mental state, § 39-11-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence.

Evidence that defendant's wife had filed a complaint against defendant which led to issuance of a harassment warrant and defendant's additional incarceration for violation of parole, and that defendant threatened to kill his wife was sufficient to find defendant guilty of violating T.C.A. § 39-16-510. State v. Manning, 909 S.W.2d 11, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for retaliation for past action because (1) the evidence showed defendant threatened an officer when defendant was being booked, after the officer arrested and handcuffed defendant, and (2) the fact that the trial court furnished the jury with the indictment after the jury asked for the identity of the victim did not show the evidence was insufficient. State v. Ball, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of retaliation for past action because there was no dispute that defendant threatened to kill a deputy and his family—body camera footage was played for the jury during trial from both a deputy and a correction officer showing the struggle with defendant and his threats—the deputy was a “law enforcement officer” as statutorily defined, and defendant's threat was in retaliation for the deputy's attempt to restrain him, which was done in the deputy's official capacity as a corrections officer. State v. Calvera, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2019).

2. Sentencing.

District court correctly determined that a defendant's prior conviction of retaliation for a past action, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-16-510(a)(1), constituted a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because under T.C.A. § 39-16-510(a)(1), the prohibited conduct only involved threats or force made against a person. United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 2005 FED App. 255P, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11032 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 457, 163 L. Ed. 2d 347, 546 U.S. 950, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7535 (U.S. 2005).

39-16-511. Compensation for past action.

  1. A person commits an offense who offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon a juror for the juror's having exercised the juror's official power or performed the juror's official duty in favor of the person or another.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This new section punishes any person who attempts to or actually does reward a juror for a favorable verdict reached while the juror was acting in his or her official capacity as a juror.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-16-512. Receipt of compensation for past action.

  1. A person commits an offense who solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit for having exercised official power or performed official duty in favor of another as a juror.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This new section punishes any juror who attempts to benefit from any past action undertaken in his or her official capacity as a juror.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-16-513. Defense.

It is a defense to prosecution under §§ 39-16-511 and 39-16-512 that the benefit involved was a trivial benefit incidental to personal, professional, or business contacts, which involves no substantial risk of undermining official juror impartiality.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-16-514. Dismissal of employee because of jury service.

It is a Class A misdemeanor for any employer to dismiss from employment any employee because of jury service by that employee.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-16-515. Pointing a laser at a law enforcement officer or emergency personnel.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly activate and point a laser pointer or other device utilizing a laser beam at an individual known to be a law enforcement officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician or other emergency service personnel while the individual is in the performance of the individual's official duties, with the intent to place the individual in fear of serious bodily injury or death.
  2. In order for subsection (a) to apply:
    1. The law enforcement officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician, or other emergency service personnel must actually be placed in fear of serious bodily injury or death;
    2. The fear must be real or honestly believed to be real at the time; and
    3. Based upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct, the fear must be founded upon reasonable grounds.
  3. It is an offense for a person to knowingly shine or aim a light, laser, horn, or other mechanism towards the head of a law enforcement officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician, or other emergency service personnel while the individual is in the performance of the individual's official duties with intent to cause bodily injury.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor, and includes a mandatory fine of five thousand dollars ($5,000) and a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty (30) days incarceration. The defendant shall not be eligible for release from confinement until the defendant has served the entire thirty-day mandatory minimum sentence.

Acts 1999, ch. 146, § 1; 2009, ch. 387, §§ 1, 2; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 24.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3, added (c); substituted “subsection (a)” for “this section” in (d)(1); and added (d)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-16-516. Traffic offense citation quotas — Performance standards.

  1. A public official or public employee shall not establish or maintain, formally or informally, a plan to evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a law enforcement officer solely by the issuance of a predetermined or specified number of any type or combination of types of traffic citations.
  2. A public official or public employee shall not require or suggest to a law enforcement officer that the law enforcement officer is required or expected to issue a predetermined or specified number of any type or combination of types of traffic citations within a specified period.
  3. Nothing in this section prohibits a municipal corporation, a political subdivision, or any agency of this state from establishing performance standards for law enforcement officers that include issuance of traffic citations but do not require issuance of a predetermined or specified number or any type or combination of types of citations as the sole means of meeting the performance standards.
  4. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor, subject to fine only.
  5. As used in this section:
    1. “Public employee” means any person holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer;
    2. “Public employer” means:
      1. The state of Tennessee; or
      2. A county, city, town, municipality, or any other political subdivision of the state;
    3. “Public official” means a person elected to any office or entity of state or local government; and
    4. “Traffic offense” means an offense under title 55.

Acts 2010, ch. 1000, § 1; 2020, ch. 801, § 1.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, in (a) and (b), substituted “A public official or public employee shall not” for “A political subdivision or any agency of this state may not”; in (c), substituted “prohibits” for “shall prohibit” and “the performance standards” for “such performance standards”; added present (d); redesignated former (d) as (e); and rewrote former (d), which read, “(d) As used in this section: “(1) ‘Conviction’ means the rendition of an order by a court imposing a punishment of incarceration or a fine; and “(2) ‘Traffic offense’ means an offense under title 55.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 801, § 2. October 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Part 6
Obstruction of Justice

39-16-601. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Complaining witness” means a person who signs a criminal complaint;
  2. “Custody” means under arrest by a law enforcement officer or under restraint by a public servant pursuant to an order of a court;
  3. “Escape” means unauthorized departure from custody or failure to return to custody following temporary leave for a specific purpose or limited period, but does not include a violation of conditions of probation or parole; and
  4. “Penal institution” includes any institution or facility used to house or detain a person:
    1. Convicted of a crime;
    2. Adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court;
    3. Who is in direct or indirect custody after a lawful arrest; or
    4. When such institution or facility is a court-operated long-term residential substance abuse facility.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1996, ch. 1079, § 125; 2010, ch. 1124, § 3.

Cross-References. Escape from penal institution unlawful, § 39-16-605.

Law Reviews.

“Official” Explanation: Defining “Official Capacity” and Related “Color of Office” Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law (Steven J. Mulroy), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 587 (2008).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Escape.

The unauthorized or intentional departure from a work crew by an inmate assigned to that work crew as a result of his confinement in a jail or workhouse constitutes an escape. State v. Culp, 891 S.W.2d 232, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Community corrections does not qualify as a penal institution for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-16-605, and a violation of the conditions of a community corrections sentence is not included in the criminal offense of escape from a penal institution. Bentley v. State, 938 S.W.2d 706, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), overruled in part, State v. West, 19 S.W.3d 753, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. 2000).

Where defendant discovered the disappearance of a five-year-old victim who was swimming at a lake and discouraged immediate contact with authorities so that her fugitive son could avoid police, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of facilitating escape under T.C.A. § 39-16-601(3); defendant's son left the scene with another individual and remained on escape status for over six months. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).

Escape is a continuing offense under T.C.A. § 39-16-601(3). State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).

In a remanded case in which defendant had received a 151-month sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) based in part on the district court's determination that his prior conviction for escape, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-16-605, was a predicate offense for career offender status under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a), in light of the Chambers decision and the Ford decision, the district court was not satisfied that defendant's conviction for escape was a conviction for a violent felony and, thus, it would not be treated as a predicate offense for career offender status. United States v. Carr, 659 F. Supp. 2d 962, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80432 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 3, 2009).

39-16-602. Resisting stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search — Prevention or obstruction of service of legal writ or process.

  1. It is an offense for a person to intentionally prevent or obstruct anyone known to the person to be a law enforcement officer, or anyone acting in a law enforcement officer's presence and at the officer's direction, from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search of any person, including the defendant, by using force against the law enforcement officer or another.
  2. Except as provided in § 39-11-611, it is no defense to prosecution under this section that the stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search was unlawful.
  3. It is an offense for a person to intentionally prevent or obstruct an officer of the state or any other person known to be a civil process server in serving, or attempting to serve or execute, any legal writ or process.
  4. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor unless the defendant uses a deadly weapon to resist the stop, frisk, halt, arrest, search or process server, in which event the violation is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1991, ch. 307, § 1; 1999, ch. 178, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is similar to prior code §§ 39-5-502, 39-5-50439-5-506. Subsection (b) makes it clear that the offender cannot defend by proving that the law enforcement activity was unlawful. This rejects traditional authority, Poteete v. State, 68 Tenn. 261 (1878), but is consistent with the modern trend. Unlawful law enforcement activities should be remedied in court, see, e.g., § 39-16-403. Subsection (c) makes it illegal to intentionally obstruct a process server in the performance of his or her duties.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Indictment without prosecutor, § 40-13-104.

Penalties for Class A and B misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Law of Arrest (Rollin M. Perkins and Edward C. Rand), 2 Vand. L. Rev. 509 (1949).

Attorney General Opinions. An individual who intentionally but passively refuses to obey a law enforcement officer's reasonable, lawful command does not commit the offense of resisting arrest because force is a necessary element of the offense, OAG 00-147 (9/26/00).

Corporate criminal responsibility under T.C.A. § 39-16-602(c).  OAG 10-23, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 18 (3/1/10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence held insufficient to show that the defendant used force in preventing or obstructing his arrest. State v. Corder, 854 S.W.2d 653, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 918 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Evidence was insufficient to support conviction where defendant's attempt to flee could not be said to have been accomplished by force where he did not touch or exert force on the officer seeking to detain him or on any bystanders to facilitate his flight. United States v. Akins, 995 F. Supp. 797, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2054 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction where defendant became very angry and physically got between the officer to prevent him from arresting another individual. State v. Russell, 10 S.W.3d 270, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 1999).

Defendant, a juvenile, acted in a contentious and disruptive manner before the court, in violation of T.C.A. § 16-1-102(1), failed to follow the court's order to sit in the area benches, and resisted arrest when the court ordered that defendant be taken to a holding cell; because the court had the right and the responsibility to punish that conduct, there was no need to address defendant's constitutional concerns regarding T.C.A. § 39-16-602(b) and the jury's decision to find defendant guilty of assault and resisting arrest was proper. State v. Roberts, 106 S.W.3d 658, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for resisting arrest where a deputy testified that defendant attempted to kick the window out of the sergeant's patrol car, he was able to get his hands in front of him, causing the officers to have to handcuff him again, and the deputy testified that when they attempted to do this defendant began pulling away from them, yelling and screaming, and being disorderly and uncooperative. State v. Applegate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 428 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of resisting official detention because the new charge of felony murder was considered a new arrest, he was taken into custody at the jail and was subjected to new booking procedures, and by refusing to provide a fingerprint he resisted the arrest for the new charges. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

Defendant's kicking the police dog, which was not a law enforcement officer, was not sufficient to support defendant's conviction for preventing or instructing an arrest. State v. Burgess, 532 S.W.3d 372, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 382 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions for preventing or obstructing service of process, as T.C.A. § 39-16-602(c), was not intended to criminalize merely evading or avoiding civil process servers, as defendant did when he remained inside a private residence and chose not to engage with the deputies, who had others means of effective service of process available to them. State v. Burgess, 532 S.W.3d 372, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 382 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2017).

Evidence that defendant would not answer the officer who responded to a domestic dispute where defendant was alleged to have a knife and began to resist when the officer tried to put a second handcuff on him was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for resisting arrest. State v. Rodriguez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of resisting arrest because defendant ignored officers'  orders to come out from underneath a vehicle and had to be dragged out; defendant then refused to place his arms behind his back so that he could be handcuffed; and defendant struggled with the arresting officers before an investigator was able to place handcuffs on him. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for resisting arrest because the jury reasonably could have concluded that defendant intentionally prevented a police officer from effecting a stop, search, and subsequent arrest by using force against the officer. Defendant attempted to drive away as an officer approached defendant's illegally parked car at night in the location of a possible burglary, an altercation occurred when the officer pulled defendant out of the car, and defendant refused to obey commands to stop until subdued. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2019).

2. Defense of Excesive Force.

In this 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 action, as an officer's excessive use of force was a defense to a charge of resisting arrest under Tennessee law, appellant's resisting arrest conviction barred his excessive force claim because he did not raise excessive force as a defense. Parvin v. Campbell, 641 Fed. Appx. 446, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 322.

An instruction on self-defense was warranted because there was some evidence from which the jury could have determined that defendant's use of force was only for protection against police officers who were using more force than was necessary to place defendant under arrest. Defendant testified that defendant was sitting in a car at night when someone with a blinding light from a flashlight approached, began hitting the window, pulled defendant out, and began hitting defendant as defendant attempted to comply with the officer's demands. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2019).

3. Sentencing.

Case was remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting that defendant's resisting arrest conviction was merged into his aggravated assault conviction because during the sentencing hearing, the trial court and the parties mistakenly believed that the resisting arrest conviction was a Class A misdemeanor; the indictment did not allege that defendant used a deadly weapon to resist the arrest, which would have elevated the offense to a Class A misdemeanor. State v. Clouse, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017).

4. Arrest.

In an action charging defendant with resisting arrest, the definition of “arrest” given in the jury instructions, which stated that an “arrest” included putting hands on a person, but also required a person be subject to the control of the person making the arrest, was consistent with the Tennessee Supreme Court's definition in a constitutional context and did not mislead the jury. State v. Rodriguez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2018).

39-16-603. Evading arrest.

    1. Except as provided in subsection (b), it is unlawful for any person to intentionally conceal themselves or flee by any means of locomotion from anyone the person knows to be a law enforcement officer if the person:
      1. Knows the officer is attempting to arrest the person; or
      2. Has been arrested.
    2. It is a defense to prosecution under this subsection (a) that the attempted arrest was unlawful.
    3. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. It is unlawful for any person, while operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, alley or highway in this state, to intentionally flee or attempt to elude any law enforcement officer, after having received any signal from the officer to bring the vehicle to a stop.
    2. It is a defense to prosecution under this subsection (b) that the attempted arrest was unlawful.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(3)(B), a violation of this subsection (b) is a Class E felony and shall be punished by confinement for not less than thirty (30) days.
      2. If the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders, pursuing law enforcement officers, or other third parties, a violation of this subsection (b) is a Class D felony and shall be punished by confinement for not less than sixty (60) days.
    3. In addition to the penalty prescribed in this subsection (b), the court shall order the suspension of the driver license of the person for a period of not less than six (6) months nor more than two (2) years. If the license is already suspended, at the time the order is issued, the suspension shall begin on the date the existing suspension ends. The court shall also confiscate the license being suspended and forward it to the department of safety along with a report of the license suspension. If the court is unable to take physical possession of the license, the court shall nevertheless forward the report to the department. The report shall include the complete name, address, birth date, eye color, sex, and driver license number, if known, of the person whose license has been suspended, and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension period. If the person is the holder of a license from another state, the court shall not confiscate the license but shall notify the department, which shall notify the appropriate licensing officials in the other state. The court shall, however, suspend the person's nonresident driving privileges for the appropriate length of time.
  1. In addition to the penalties prescribed in this section, the court shall order a person who commits evading arrest and, in doing so, recklessly damages government property, including, but not limited to, a law enforcement officer's uniform or motor vehicle, to pay restitution to the appropriate government agency for the value of any property damaged.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1995, ch. 467, § 1; 2016, ch. 633, §§ 1, 2; 2020, ch. 584, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1995, ch. 467, § 3 provided that the amendment by that act applies to all violations occurring after July 1, 1995.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment added (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 584, § 2. July 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. “Innocent bystanders or other third parties,” as used in T.C.A. § 39-16-603(b)(3), means people present other than the driver evading arrest and the law enforcement officer attempting to arrest the driver; the phrase does not exclude persons who share criminal responsibility with the operator of the vehicle or passengers in the fleeing vehicle, OAG 00-140 (9/7/00).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Attempting to Arrest.

In order for an officer to arrest someone, he or she must be in a position to take physical custody of that someone at that time, not at some undetermined time in the future; and fleeing from an officer necessarily involves the concept of fleeing from the presence of an officer. State v. Lewis, 978 S.W.2d 558, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1105 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

2. Double Jeopardy.

Appellate court erred by holding that defendant's convictions of evading arrest, T.C.A. § 39-16-603(b), and reckless endangerment, T.C.A. § 39-13-103, violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy in the Fifth Amendment and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10 because the crimes did not constitute the same offense nor was one a lesser included offense of the other for the purpose of the Blockburger  test. Reckless endangerment did not require the State to prove any of the elements of evading arrest, reckless endangerment simply required proof of imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to another person, evading arrest did not require the use of a deadly weapon as reckless endangerment did, and the State did not need to prove that the danger was to a person who was an innocent bystander or third party in order to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of reckless endangerment. State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

For purposes of double jeopardy, the elements of misdemeanor evading arrest and felony evading arrest are different as misdemeanor evading arrest specifically provides that the accused has to know that the officer is attempting an arrest while felony evading arrest merely requires a signal to stop; and felony evading arrest requires a specific method of evading, by use of a motor vehicle, and addresses the creation of a risk of death or injury to third parties, resulting in an increase of punishment. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

Defendant's felony evading arrest in the car and misdemeanor evading arrest on foot did not violate double jeopardy as they were not part of the same act or transaction as the crash was an intervening force, and defendant formed an additional intent to flee from officers after the crash. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

3. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Black, 924 S.W.2d 912, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Mar. 4, 1996).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction under T.C.A. § 39-16-603(a)(1)(A) where defendant was close enough to have heard the police officer instructing another officer to arrest him, and the defendant immediately fled on foot. State v. Russell, 10 S.W.3d 270, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 1999).

Where the evidence showed that defendant fled from police, disregarded traffic signals, and passed other vehicles he created a risk of death or injury to drivers and pedestrians in his proximity; therefore, there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for Class D felony (now Class E felony) evading arrest under T.C.A. § 39-16-603(b)(3). State v. Turner, 193 S.W.3d 522, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of evading arrest because after an officer activated his blue lights defendant saw the lights but did not pull over. State v. Nelson, 275 S.W.3d 851, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of evading arrest because it showed that, in his efforts to evade a deputy, defendant passed two other vehicles on blind curves and drove at speeds of 80 to 90 miles per hour on stretches of road with a 45 mile per hour speed limit while being pursued by the deputy with his emergency lights flashing and siren blaring. State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

Testimony that defendant tried to run an officer's vehicle into incoming traffic after the officer activated his blue lights and siren supported defendant's conviction for evading arrest under T.C.A. § 39-16-603(b). State v. Houston, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. May 8, 2013), cert. denied, Houston v. Tennessee, 189 L. Ed. 2d 747, 134 S. Ct. 2704, — U.S. —, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3967 (U.S. 2014).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for evading arrest, as defendant ignored repeated commands by law enforcement, leading officers on a foot chase, and then physically resisted being taken into custody; defendant continued to resist even after being physically detained. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 492 S.W.3d 224, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's evading arrest conviction; the officer identified himself and told defendant to drop the gun twice, yet defendant ran both times. State v. Willis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2016).

State established reckless endangerment and evading arrest by showing that defendant led police on a seven-mile, high-speed chase which put police officers'  and other motorists'  lives in imminent danger, plus defendant intentionally failed to stop when officers activated lights and sirens, which placed the officers and other motorists in danger; the jury viewed three dash-cam videos of the high-speed chase, showing defendant weaving through vehicles and crossing into oncoming lanes of traffic, and he reached speeds of up to 117 miles per hour. State v. McCommon, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's evading arrest convictions because it showed that the deputy attempted to arrest the driver of the vehicle who he identified as defendant, defendant engaged the deputy in a high-speed chase and ignored the deputy's signal to pull over, and the deputy saw defendant exit the vehicle and flee on foot. State v. Marlin, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 307 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for evading arrest because police officers testified that during a confrontation with defendant's sibling about the failure to wear a helmet while driving a motorcycle, defendant approached the officers and started causing a disturbance. When backup officers arrived, defendant ran away, the officers gave chase, and defendant, encountering a dead end, turned, raised defendant's fists, and tried to fight the officers, who were able to apprehend defendant. State v. Bonds, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for eluding after being signaled by an officer to stop because (1) the signal did not have to be given while the vehicle was being operated, and (2) the evidence showed defendant intentionally fled after defendant knew police signaled defendant to stop, as, after an officer approached defendant and so instructed defendant, defendant drove away. State v. Olivier, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

Evidence that the officer turned on his lights and sirens to effectuate a traffic stop before defendant provided false identification and then ran supported defendant's conviction for evading arrest. State v. Gray, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony evading arrest in a car and misdemeanor evading arrest on foot because defendant stole the victim's car; an officer turned on his blue lights to signal for defendant to stop; instead of stopping, defendant accelerated, ran a stop sign and a stop light, and crashed into another car in the middle of an intersection; once the car crashed, defendant ran on foot and was pursued by several officers; and two of the officers who witnessed the wreck were 100% certain that defendant was the driver of the car. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

Evidence that defendant took off running after seeing an investigator following him and then yelling for him to stop and the investigator was the police was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for evading arrest. State v. Gill, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of evading arrest because it showed that he led the police on a 25 to 30 minute chase, stopping only when traffic blocked him from continuing, police officers activated their sirens and blue lights while following him, and officers broadcast a command on a PA system for him to stop, but he did not yield to their authority. Defendant had three children in his car throughout the pursuit, and several police officers and vehicles were involved in the attempt to apprehend him. State v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony evading arrest because two police vehicles, with their blue lights activated, boxed in defendant's vehicle to prevent it from leaving the scene; several officers, wearing raid vests clearly marked as law enforcement, gave orders for the occupants of the vehicle to place their hands where they could be seen and that a passenger was under arrest; defendant placed the vehicle into reverse, rammed into an officer's vehicle, and sped off down several heavily-trafficked streets; and defendant's near collision with a silver car showed a risk to innocent bystanders. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

4. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence could not support conviction where an officer without probable cause for arrest was merely in pursuit of an individual who fled the scene, since the officer could not have been attempting an arrest of the individual, and therefore the individual was not evading arrest. State v. Holbrooks, 983 S.W.2d 697, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

5. Sentence.

Defendant had fair warning that the state intended to seek enhanced punishment for the crime of felony evading arrest, accomplishing the purposes of T.C.A. § 40-35-202(a), where both indictments charged evading arrest from the same officer, on the same date, by the same defendant, under the same statutory code provision, T.C.A. § 39-16-603. State v. Livingston, 197 S.W.3d 710, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. 2006).

Fines the trial court imposed for defendant's felony theft and evading arrest convictions were not excessive because they were permitted by the sentencing statutes; the trial court considered the presentence report when making its sentencing determinations, and defendant had an extensive criminal history and low potential for rehabilitation. State v. Crenshaw, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the maximum available sentence for defendant's convictions of evading arrest and operating a motor vehicle as a habitual traffic offender because his presentence report showed that he had numerous arrests, convictions, and failed attempts at probation, the trial court found that no mitigating factors and three enhancement factors applied, and it found two criteria for imposing consecutive sentences, as defendant was on probation and out on bail when he committed the instant offenses. State v. Marlin, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 307 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant to three years for felony evading arrest and 11 months and 29 days for his two aggravated assault convictions, to run consecutively; defendant had an extensive criminal history, the trial court considered all appropriate principles, and the record supported the enhancement factors under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1), (8), (10), (13)(B), as he had no hesitation to commit a crime when the risk to human life was high, he failed to comply with conditions of sentence, and he was on parole when he committed the offense. State v. Stringer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2018).

Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to the maximum sentence of six years for robbery, four years for felony evading arrest, and 11 months and 29 days for misdemeanor evading arrest because he had multiple arrests in his two years as an adult; he possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense; he previously failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community; he was released on bail or pretrial release when he committed the crime; and the offense of felony evading arrest involved more than one victim as the proof showed defendant crashed into a car containing multiple people. State v. Derring, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019).

Trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to seven years'  confinement for felony theft of property because it was within the range provided by this section. State v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2019).

6. Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

Defendant's prior conviction for evading arrest in a motor vehicle in violation of T.C.A. § 39-16-603(b)(1) was a crime of violence as defined in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and § 4B1.2(a) because the decision to flee carried with it the requisite potential risk to qualify as a crime of violence, even if the resulting chase did not escalate so far as to create the actual risk of death or injury that would have made it a Class D felony (now Class E felony) under Tennessee law. Thus, his base-offense level was properly set at 20. United States v. Rogers,  594 F.3d 517, 2010 FED App. 27P, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2537 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2010).

Conviction under Tennessee law for Class E felony evading arrest, Tenn. Ann. Code § 39-16-603(b)(1), is a crime of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. United States v. Doyle, 678 F.3d 429,  2012 FED App. 118P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9128 (6th Cir. May 4, 2012).

Having fully considered the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in another case, nothing caused the appellate court to reconsider its holding that Class E felony evading arrest under Tennessee law, Tenn. Ann. Code § 39-16-603(b)(1), was a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); the decision to flee carried with it the requisite potential risk, even if the resulting chase did not escalate so far as to create the actual risk of death or injury that would make it a Class D felony under Tennessee law. United States v. Doyle, 678 F.3d 429,  2012 FED App. 118P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9128 (6th Cir. May 4, 2012).

7. Constitutionality.

Tennessee statute which declared that evading arrest with a motor vehicle was a Class E felony unless the flight or attempt to elude created a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties, in which case it was a Class D felony, was not void for vagueness, as the statute clearly required gauging the riskiness of conduct in which an individual defendant engaged on a particular occasion. Russell v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2016).

8. Jury Instruction.

Trial court erred in convicting defendant of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle because the trial court's jury instructions, inter alia, misled the jury as to the applicable law inasmuch as the statute at issue required that the flight occur while defendant was operating a vehicle, the jury instructions did not require a finding that the flight occurred while defendant was operating a motor vehicle, and there was no basis for the claim that the indictment encompassed misdemeanor evading arrest as a separate crime where defendant conceded that misdemeanor evading arrest was not a lesser-included offense of felony evading arrest. State v. Mayo, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016).

9. Risk of Death Or Injury to Third Party.

Because there was evidence that defendant's evasion of arrest created a risk of death or injury to a third party, an officer who approached the reported location of the stolen vehicle to provide assistance if required, the Class D felony conviction for evading arrest was proper. State v. Perkins, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 831 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016).

10. Weapons Offenses.

Evidence supported defendant's convictions of being a felon in possession of a firearm and a handgun given that he had a prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and evading arrest, both felonies, defendant admitted living in the house and residing in the bedroom where the gun was found, and the gun was loaded and stored in an unlocked gun case where it was easily accessible to him. State v. Ford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2017).

39-16-604. Compounding of offenses.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to solicit, accept or agree to accept any benefit in consideration of refraining from reporting to a law enforcement officer the commission or suspected commission of an offense.
  2. It is unlawful for a complaining witness to solicit, accept or agree to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discontinuing or delaying the prosecution of another for an offense.
  3. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the benefit was solicited or accepted by the victim and did not exceed an amount reasonably believed by the victim to be due as restitution or indemnification for loss caused by the offense.
    1. A violation of this section with respect to an offense classified as a misdemeanor is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of this section with respect to an offense classified as a felony is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 12.

Cross-References. Grading attempts, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-16-605. Escape.

  1. It is an offense for any lawfully confined person arrested for, charged with, or found guilty of a civil or criminal offense to escape from a penal institution, as defined in § 39-16-601.
    1. A person commits the offense of escape who is in the lawful custody of a law enforcement officer and knowingly escapes the officer's custody.
    2. As used in subdivision (b)(1), “lawful custody” means a person has been taken, seized or detained by a law enforcement officer either by handcuffing, restraining or any other method by which a reasonable person would believe places the person in custody and that otherwise deprives the person's freedom of action in a significant way.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) is:
      1. A Class A misdemeanor if the person was being held for a misdemeanor or civil offense; and
      2. A Class E felony if the person was being held for a felony.
    2. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  2. Any sentence received for a violation of this section shall be ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence being served or sentence received for the charge for which the person was being held at the time of the escape.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 15; 2007, ch. 46, §§ 1, 2; 2009, ch. 241, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section, similar to prior code § 39-5-702, punishes escape from a penal institution. “Escape,” defined in § 39-16-601(3), includes both unauthorized departure and failure to return. A “penal institution” is defined broadly in § 39-16-601(4) to include situations where the offender escapes from custody after arrest or conviction.

The punishment differs according to the gravity of the offense for which the escapee was held.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal conspiracy, § 39-12-103.

Escape, penal institution defined, § 39-16-601.

Failure to return as evidence of escape, § 41-21-514.

Inmates as witnesses against each other, § 41-21-406.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Requirement of culpable mental state, § 39-11-301.

Warrant authorized to retake prisoner sentenced to penitentiary who has absconded while on work release program or violated furlough agreement, § 41-1-117.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 32.174.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, §  47; 11 Tenn. Juris., Escape, §§ 2, 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

By its plain language, T.C.A. § 39-16-605 applies to the escape of an out-of-state prisoner from a private prison facility in Tennessee. State v. Lankford, 51 S.W.3d 212, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), cert. denied, McKeon v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 1134, 122 S. Ct. 1078, 151 L. Ed. 2d 979, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 741 (2002).

Until defendant got his earlier escape conviction under T.C.A. § 39-16-605 overturned or removed from his record, prior sixth circuit precedent compelled the conclusion that defendant's conviction was for a violent felony; thus the district court did not err when it sentenced defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act. United States v. Goodman, 519 F.3d 310, 2008 FED App. 112P, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5635 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2008).

2. Relationship With Other Laws.

In a remanded case in which defendant had received a 151-month sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) based in part on the district court's determination that his prior conviction for escape, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-16-605, was a predicate offense for career offender status under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a), in light of the Chambers decision and the Ford decision, the district court was not satisfied that defendant's conviction for escape was a conviction for a violent felony and, thus, it would not be treated as a predicate offense for career offender status. United States v. Carr, 659 F. Supp. 2d 962, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80432 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 3, 2009).

3. Elements of Offense.

The unauthorized or intentional departure from a work crew by an inmate assigned to that work crew as a result of his confinement in a jail or workhouse constitutes an escape. State v. Culp, 891 S.W.2d 232, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Defendant who was convicted on federal drug charges and held in a Tennessee county jail while awaiting sentencing on the federal charges, and who escaped from the county jail, was a person convicted of an offense who escaped from a penal institution and was subject to the jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts. State v. Holmes, 995 S.W.2d 135, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1179 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Defendant's flight from the rear of a police car did not constitute escape from a penal institution. State v. Walls, 62 S.W.3d 119, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. 2001).

4. Intent.

T.C.A. § 39-11-301, defining a culpable mental state, applied to a prosecution for escape because the escape statute makes no reference to a requisite mental state and, although consideration of defendant's general state of mind was a relevant consideration, it was not limited to the issue of whether he intentionally departed from custody. State v. Anderson, 894 S.W.2d 320, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Defendant's claim that his leaving prison constituted only a “breach of trust” under rules and regulations of the department of correction was erroneous because such rules are not relevant to what constitutes the statutory offense of escape. State v. Anderson, 894 S.W.2d 320, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

5. Community Corrections.

Community corrections does not qualify as a penal institution for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-16-605, and a violation of the conditions of a community corrections sentence is not included in the criminal offense of escape from a penal institution. Bentley v. State, 938 S.W.2d 706, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), overruled in part, State v. West, 19 S.W.3d 753, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. 2000).

6. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Where defendant discovered the disappearance of a five-year-old victim who was swimming at a lake and discouraged immediate contact with authorities so that her fugitive son could avoid police, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of facilitating escape under T.C.A. § 39-16-605(a); defendant's son left the scene with another individual and remained on escape status for over six months. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).

7. Consecutive Sentence.

In a habeas corpus proceeding based upon defendant's contention that his concurrent sentence for escape and the underlying crimes was illegal and therefore resulted in a void judgment, although the judgment on defendant's escape conviction stated that the sentence was to be served concurrently with his sentences for the underlying crimes, the judgment was silent as to whether defendant committed the escape while being held for the other charges, and therefore no illegality of the sentence was evident on the face of the judgment; because the escape judgment was facially valid and defendant failed to support his factual assertions with pertinent documents from the record of the underlying proceedings, summary dismissal was proper. Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. 2007).

Where the trial court ordered defendant to serve his sentence for escape concurrently to his sentences for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated arson, in direct contravention of T.C.A. § 39-16-605(c) (now § 39-16-605(d)) and Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(B), he made a threshold showing that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief; the trial court erred by dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Summers v. Fortner, 267 S.W.3d 1, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 117 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2008).

Trial court ordered the sentence for misdemeanor escape to run consecutively under T.C.A. § 40-35-115 to count one but concurrently to counts two and three; the case was remanded for correction of the judgment sheets to reflect that the sentence for escape had to be served consecutively to the sentences for counts two and three under T.C.A. § 39-16-605(d). State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

8. Sentence.

Trial court's sentences for three years for Class D felony theft, two years for Class E felony reckless endangerment, and three months for Class A misdemeanor escape were entitled to a presumption of reasonableness because they were within the appropriate range under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-105, 39-13-103, 39-16-605, 40-35-111, 40-35-112; no error was found. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 982 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

39-16-606. Report of escape.

  1. Whenever a person convicted of a felony escapes from the custody of a penal institution, the appropriate warden, departmental official or law enforcement official responsible for the custody of the person shall immediately report the escape to the following persons:
    1. Commissioner of correction;
    2. Commissioner of safety;
    3. Director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation;
    4. The district attorney general of the judicial district in which the escape occurred;
    5. The district attorney general of the judicial district in which the escapee was convicted, who shall make a reasonable effort to notify the victim when the conviction was for a crime of violence;
    6. The sheriff of the county in which the escape occurred, and the sheriffs in the adjoining counties;
    7. The sheriff of the county or chief of police in any county having a metropolitan form of government where the escapee was convicted;
    8. The police department of any municipality, city or town, near the location of the escape; and
    9. All trial judges involved in the case.
  2. The report to the officials in subsection (a) shall include the facts of the escape, the time when it occurred and the circumstances under which it occurred, together with the particular description of the escapee, the escapee's age, size, complexion, race, color of hair and eyes, and from what county committed, for what offense, and when.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Escape, penal institution defined, § 39-16-601.

Escape from private prison or facility, § 41-24-116.

39-16-607. Permitting or facilitating escape.

  1. An official or employee of any penal institution that is responsible for maintaining persons in custody commits an offense who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly permits or facilitates the escape of a person in custody.
  2. It is unlawful for any person to intentionally or knowingly permit or facilitate the escape of a person in custody.
  3. Permitting or facilitating escape is a Class E felony unless:
    1. The person in custody was charged with or convicted of a felony;
    2. The person used or threatened to use a deadly weapon to effect the escape; or
    3. The offense under subsection (a) was committed intentionally or knowingly, in which event permitting or facilitating escape is a Class C felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1996, ch. 637, § 1.

Cross-References. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another, § 39-11-402.

Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony, § 39-11-403.

Custody, escape, penal institution defined, § 39-16-601.

Escape en route to or from court to testify, § 41-21-310.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalties for Class C and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Compounding Offenses, § 3; 11 Tenn. Juris., Escape, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Book Review, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Tennessee, 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (1988).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Where defendant discovered the disappearance of the five-year-old victim who was swimming at the lake and discouraged immediate contact with authorities so that her fugitive son could avoid police, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of facilitating escape in violation of T.C.A. § 39-16-607; defendant's son left the scene with another individual and remained on escape status for over six months. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).

Because escape is a continuing offense, a person who intentionally aids a person to avoid recapture, and who he knows has escaped from lawful custody, may properly be charged with the offense of assisting escape. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).

39-16-608. Implements for escape.

  1. It is unlawful for any person, with intent to facilitate escape, to introduce into a penal institution, or provide an inmate with, anything that may be useful for the inmate's escape.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class D felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another, § 39-11-402.

Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony, § 39-11-403.

Escape, penal institution defined, § 39-16-601.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

39-16-609. Failure to appear.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly fail to appear as directed by a lawful authority if the person:
    1. Has been lawfully issued a criminal summons pursuant to § 40-6-215;
    2. Has been lawfully commanded to appear for booking and processing pursuant to a criminal summons issued in accordance with § 40-6-215;
    3. Has been lawfully issued a citation in lieu of arrest under § 40-7-118;
    4. Has been lawfully released from custody, with or without bail, on condition of subsequent appearance at an official proceeding or penal institution at a specified time or place; or
    5. Knowingly goes into hiding to avoid prosecution or court appearance.
  2. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that:
    1. The appearance is required by a probation and parole officer as an incident of probation or parole supervision; or
    2. The person had a reasonable excuse for failure to appear at the specified time and place.
  3. Nothing in this section shall apply to witnesses.
  4. Failure to appear is a Class A misdemeanor.
  5. Any sentence received for a violation of this section must be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence received for the offense for which the defendant failed to appear.
  6. [Deleted by 2019 amendment.]

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 709, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 16; 1997, ch. 317, § 1; 1998, ch. 1049, § 15; 2004, ch. 727, § 1; 2019, ch. 486, § 4.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section provides an offense for persons who knowingly fail to appear at court or other official proceedings or penal institutions when directed to appear by a lawful authority. It is broader than prior code § 39-5-720, which only reached “bail jumping” or the failure to appear if released without bail.

Subsection (b) clarifies that the offense does not cover the failure to make a supervisory meeting with a probation or parole officer, or any other appearance for which there was a reasonable excuse.

Punishment for this offense depends on whether the crime for which the offender failed to appear is a misdemeanor or a felony. The court may order the sentence to be served consecutively to any sentence received for the offense for which the person failed to appear.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote former (d)–(f), which read: “(d) If the occasion for which the defendant's appearance is required is a misdemeanor or is a violation of subdivision (a)(2), failure to appear is a Class A misdemeanor.“(e) If the occasion for which the defendant's appearance is required is a Class A misdemeanor or a felony, failure to appear is a Class E felony.“(f) Any sentence received for a violation of this section may be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence received for the offense for which the defendant failed to appear.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 486, § 15. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 4.6.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Bail Bond System — The Search for a Better Answer (William G. Haemmel), 3 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 39 (1972-1973).

Attorney General Opinions. Procedure where failure to appear in municipal court with general sessions jurisdiction charged, OAG 99-096 (4/27/99).

Standing of bonding company to commence failure to appear action.  OAG 12-83, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 82 (8/23/12).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section 39-16-609 was not unconstitutionally vague on the ground that it did not define “failure to appear,” “appearance,” or “lawful authority” because those were familiar terms capable of ready understanding by a person of ordinary intelligence and the statute did not prohibit conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence had to guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. State v. Chick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

2. Evidence Sufficient.

Trial court did not err by finding that defendant was voluntarily absent from his hearing on his motion for a new trial because he was not in court, he did not attend his hearing on the relevant date, and he made no attempt in the court below and made no attempt on appeal to advance any theory under which his absence could have been deemed involuntary. State v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2012), cert. denied, Adams v. Tennessee, 184 L. Ed. 2d 146, 133 S. Ct. 269, 568 U.S. 880, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 6401 (U.S. 2012).

Evidence that defendant was arrested, informed of the date and time he was to appear in court, and failed to appear, and none of the defenses listed in this section applied was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for failure to appear. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for failure to appear because a rationale jury could find that defendant knowingly failed to appear at an official proceeding; defendant testified about his absence from court, and by its verdict, the jury concluded that his reason for not appearing was not reasonable. State v. Mathis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2019).

3. Evidence Insufficient.

Trial court erred in convicting defendant of failure to appear for a preliminary hearing because the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly failed to appear for his court date where a deputy court clerk was unable to testify whether defendant had been explicitly told to appear in court on a certain date, the State did not produce any other witnesses or document regarding when or if defendant was told to appear, and no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the information contained in the forfeiture order or the attachment. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2017).

4. Sentencing.

Trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences because defendant was subject to consecutive sentences, either pursuant to the trial court's discretionary authority under T.C.A. § 39-16-609(f) or T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2). State v. Holt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 811 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2017).

Defendant's six-year sentence, to be served at 60 percent release eligibility, for failure to appear did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because it was the only sentence available given the offense defendant's criminal record. The presentence report reflected some 45 prior conviction dating back 25 years and defendant was released on bond at the time she committed the instant offense. State v. Chick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

5. Evidence.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant's prior convictions because it complied with the requirements of the rule, and the evidence regarding defendant's mens rea for the offense of failure to appear was not so overwhelming as to make the convictions “needless”; the trial court found, on the record, that the material issue warranting admission of the convictions was proving the required mens rea based upon defendant's prior court experience. State v. Mathis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2019).

39-16-610. Radar jamming devices.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Radar jamming device” means any active or passive device, instrument, mechanism, or equipment that is designed or intended to interfere with, disrupt, or scramble the radar or laser that is used by law enforcement agencies and officers to measure the speed of motor vehicles;
    2. “Radar jamming device” includes, but is not limited to, devices commonly referred to as “jammers” or “scramblers”; and
    3. “Radar jamming device” does not include equipment that is legal under FCC regulations, such as a citizens' band radio, ham radio, or any other similar electronic equipment.
  2. It is an offense for any person to knowingly possess or sell a radar jamming device.
  3. It is an offense for any person to knowingly operate a motor vehicle with a radar jamming device in the motor vehicle.
  4. It is an offense for a person to knowingly use a radar jamming device for the purpose of interfering with the radar signals or lasers used by law enforcement personnel to measure the speed of a motor vehicle on a highway.
  5. Any radar jamming device that is used in violation of this section is subject to seizure by any law enforcement officer and may be confiscated and destroyed by order of the court in which a violation of this section is charged.
  6. This section shall not apply to law enforcement officers acting in their official capacity.
    1. A violation of subsection (b) or (c) is a Class C misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of subsection (d) is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 2006, ch. 853, § 1.

Cross-References. Payment of citations for persons who purchase devices for detection of or interference with devices used to measure the speed of motor vehicles, § 39-17-113.

Penalties for Class B and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Part 7
Perjury

39-16-701. Definitions for perjury offenses.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Material” means the statement, irrespective of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, could have affected the course or outcome of the official proceeding;
  2. “Oath” means a solemn and formal undertaking to tell the truth and includes an equivalent affirmation permitted by law as a substitute for an oath administered by a person authorized by law to take statements under oath;
  3. “Official proceeding” means any type of administrative, executive, judicial, or legislative proceeding that is conducted before a public servant authorized by law to take statements under oath in that proceeding; and
  4. “Statement” means any representation of fact.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Materiality of Statement.

The state sufficiently established the materiality of the conflicting statements given by the defendant under oath before trial and at trial regarding the identity of the perpetrator of a burglary where the state had no other evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrator. State v. Cutshaw, 967 S.W.2d 332, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1237 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

39-16-702. Perjury.

  1. A person commits an offense who, with intent to deceive:
    1. Makes a false statement, under oath;
    2. Makes a statement, under oath, that confirms the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath;
    3. Makes a false statement, not under oath, but on an official document required or authorized by law to be made under oath and stating on its face that a false statement is subject to the penalties of perjury; or
    4. Makes a false statement, not under oath, but in a declaration stating on its face that it is made under penalty of perjury.
    1. Perjury is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. Perjury committed on an application for a handgun carry permit under § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366 is a Class E felony. Each application for a handgun carry permit shall clearly state in bold face type directly above the signature line that an applicant who, with intent to deceive, makes any false statement on the application is guilty of the felony offense of perjury.
    3. Perjury committed on a sexual offender or violent sexual offender TBI registration form under title 40, chapter 39, part 2, is a Class E felony. Each TBI registration form shall clearly state in bold face type directly above the signature line that an applicant who, with the intent to deceive, makes any false statement on the application is guilty of the felony offense of perjury.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 468, § 1; 2004, ch. 921, § 2; 2011, ch. 211, § 1; 2019, ch. 479, § 15.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section punishes a person who makes or confirms a false statement under oath or, on rare occasions, not under oath but on an official document indicating that a false statement is subject to penalty for perjury.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 921, § 4 provided that all sexual offenders who were, prior to August 1, 2004, subject to the provisions of former title 40, chapter 39, part 1, shall, on and after August 1, 2004, be subject to the provisions of title 40, chapter 39, part 2, created by that act.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, inserted “or § 39-17-1366” in the first sentence of (b)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Clerk, false statement in revenue report, § 9-2-111.

County board of equalization, false swearing before, § 67-5-1404.

Disfranchisement on conviction, § 40-20-112.

Expense account for state and county officers, false oath, § 8-26-111.

Gift tax, false return as perjury, § 67-8-110.

Heirship affidavits, false swearing, § 30-2-712.

Judge of general sessions court, false statement in revenue report, § 9-2-111.

Legislative committee, perjury before, § 3-3-120.

National guard, false oath to statement in enlistment contract, § 58-1-222.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Penitentiary officer or employee violating oath, § 41-1-103.

Privilege tax on production of special nuclear material, perjured return, § 67-4-1107.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in the text of and appendix to Rule 24 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Perjury, §§ 2, 3.

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. § 39-16-704 does not apply to perjury, even though simple perjury has been held to be a lesser included offense of aggravated perjury, OAG 02-120 (10/28/02).

A jury may still convict a defendant of simple perjury, even if it is persuaded that the defendant has made an effective retraction, OAG 02-120 (10/28/02).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence.

Because under T.C.A. § 39-16-707 the prosecutor was not required to prove which of the two statements made by defendant during his prior murder trial was false, the state was relieved of any election requirement, and no enhanced unanimity instruction was warranted; therefore, the appellate court erred by reversing defendant's perjury conviction. State v. Buford, 216 S.W.3d 323, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. 2007).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of perjury because defendant was clearly not where she said she was at the time of a shooting where she stated that she was in a bar area with the shooters at the time of the shooting and that she heard the gunshot within seconds of leaving the bar to deliver drinks while a surveillance video shows that defendant left the bar area several minutes before the shooting, that she was in the pool room at the time of the shooting, and that she could not have heard the gunshot within seconds of leaving the bar, defendant never offered an explanation for the discrepancies between her testimony and the video, and never claimed that she had made a mistake. State v. Reid, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's perjury conviction because defendant petitioned for an order of protection against another person, and, in the sworn petition and in defendant's trial testimony, defendant indicated that on a particular date defendant saw the person in a light blue SUV make threatening gestures toward defendant. However, the other person testified that the person no longer owned a light blue Lexus SUV by that date and provided documentation verifying that person's flight and presence in another state on that date. State v. Burton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2017).

Without the admission of the bills of sale or temporary tags, which were improperly admitted, the proof showed that defendant reported as required; without any proof to show that the actual information on the form was false or that defendant had the intent to deceive, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for perjury, and there was no proof that he failed to report a change in information or that he falsified any information on the form, and thus his convictions were vacated. State v. Hicks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2018).

39-16-703. Aggravated perjury.

  1. A person commits an offense who, with intent to deceive:
    1. Commits perjury as defined in § 39-16-702;
    2. The false statement is made during or in connection with an official proceeding; and
    3. The false statement is material.
  2. It is no defense that the person mistakenly believed the statement to be immaterial.
  3. Aggravated perjury is a Class D felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section enhances the penalty for perjury where the false statement is made in an official proceeding.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Materiality of Statement.

The state sufficiently established the materiality of the conflicting statements given by the defendant under oath before trial and at trial regarding the identity of the perpetrator of a burglary where the state had no other evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrator. State v. Cutshaw, 967 S.W.2d 332, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1237 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

2. Evidence.

Proof that defendant told a “half-truth” was not legally sufficient to support a conviction for making a false representation of fact. State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 996 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Because under T.C.A. § 39-16-707 the prosecutor was not required to prove which of the two statements made by defendant during his prior murder trial was false, the state was relieved of any election requirement, and no enhanced unanimity instruction was warranted; therefore, the appellate court erred by reversing defendant's perjury conviction. State v. Buford, 216 S.W.3d 323, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. 2007).

39-16-704. Retraction.

It is a defense to prosecution for aggravated perjury that the person retracted the false statement before completion of the testimony at the official proceeding during which the aggravated perjury was committed.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The retraction defense extends only to aggravated perjury.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Inconsistent statements, § 39-16-707.

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. § 39-16-704 does not apply to perjury, even though simple perjury has been held to be a lesser included offense of aggravated perjury, OAG 02-120 (10/28/02).

A jury may still convict a defendant of simple perjury, even if it is persuaded that the defendant has made an effective retraction, OAG 02-120 (10/28/02).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statement Made Prior to Trial.

The retraction defense applies where the aggravated perjury and the retraction occur in the same official proceeding and not where the defendant claims that his testimony at trial was a retraction of previous false statements he had made under oath. State v. Cutshaw, 967 S.W.2d 332, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1237 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

39-16-705. Subornation of perjury.

  1. A person commits an offense who, with the intent to deceive, induces another to make a false statement constituting perjury or aggravated perjury.
    1. Subornation of perjury is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. Subornation of aggravated perjury is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 9.

Cross-References. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another, § 39-11-402.

Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony, § 39-11-403.

Disfranchisement on conviction, § 40-20-112.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-16-706. Irregularity in oath.

It is no defense to prosecution for perjury or aggravated perjury that:

  1. The oath was administered or taken in an irregular manner, or that there was some irregularity in the appointment or qualification of the person who administered the oath; or
  2. The document was not sworn to if the document contained a recital that it was made under oath, the defendant knew or should have known of the recital when the defendant signed the document, and the document contained the signed jurat of a public servant or notary public authorized to administer oaths.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-16-707. Inconsistent statements.

Except as provided in § 39-16-704, a charge of perjury or aggravated perjury that alleges the person charged has made two (2) or more statements under oath, any two (2) of which cannot both be true, need not allege which statement is false if both statements were made within the period of the statute of limitations. At trial, the prosecution need not prove which statement is false.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 30.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

If a person makes two or more inconsistent statements under oath, the state need not prove which statement is false in order to support a charge of perjury or aggravated perjury. However, if a person makes a false statement under oath and then retracts the false statement pursuant to § 39-16-704, although these statements are “inconsistent” under this section, the defense of retraction is still available and the person cannot be prosecuted for aggravated perjury.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Because under T.C.A. § 39-16-707 the prosecutor was not required to prove which of the two statements made by defendant during his prior murder trial was false, the state was relieved of any election requirement, and no enhanced unanimity instruction was warranted; therefore, the appellate court erred by reversing defendant's perjury conviction. State v. Buford, 216 S.W.3d 323, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. 2007).

39-16-507. Coercion or persuasion of witness.

Chapter 17
Offenses Against Public Health, Safety and Welfare

Part 1
Miscellaneous

39-17-101. Handling snakes so as to endanger life prohibited.

  1. It is an offense for a person to display, exhibit, handle, or use a poisonous or dangerous snake or reptile in a manner that endangers the life or health of any person.
  2. An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Survey of Tennessee Constitutional Law in 1976-77, II. Freedom of Religion (Kenneth L. Penegar), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 126 (1979).

39-17-102. Unlawful disposal of raw sewage — Continued violation — Enforcement.

  1. It is an offense for a person to unlawfully dispose of water carrying human waste, household or business waste, or to pipe or transmit raw sewage or the effluent from any septic tank or other system of any type, into or on public or private property.
  2. Each day of continued violation after conviction constitutes a separate offense.
  3. It is the duty of the local health officer to enforce the terms of this section, but this shall not be a duty exclusive only to local health officers.
  4. An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-103. Abandonment of certain airtight containers.

  1. It is an offense for a person to place or permit to remain outside any dwelling, building, or other structure, or within any warehouse or storage room or any unoccupied or abandoned dwelling, building or other structure, under any circumstances as to be accessible to children, any icebox, refrigerator, or other airtight or semi-airtight container that has a capacity of one and one-half (1½) cubic feet or more and an opening of fifty (50) square inches or more and that has a door or lid equipped with a latch or other fastening device capable of securing the door or lid shut.
  2. An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-104. Safety devices on refrigerators required.

  1. All new iceboxes or refrigerators that have a capacity of one and one-half (1½) cubic feet or more, and an opening of fifty (50) square inches or more, and that have a door or lid equipped with a latch or other fastening device capable of securing the door or lid shut, sold or offered for sale in this state shall be equipped with a safety device that will enable the door or lid to be opened easily from the inside as a means of escape. Failure to abide by this provision is an offense.
  2. An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-105. Charge for use of public toilet facility prohibited.

  1. It is an offense for a person maintaining toilet facilities available to the public to impose a charge for the use of the facility.
  2. Each toilet facility maintained in violation of this section constitutes a separate offense.
  3. An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-106. Gifts of adulterated candy or food.

  1. It is an offense for any person with the intent to harm another knowingly to offer, give or entice another to take or accept any treat, candy, gift, or food that is poisonous or harmful to the health or welfare of the recipient or other person.
  2. An offense under this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Selected Tennessee Legislation of 1983 (N.L. Resener, J.A. Whitson, K.J. Miller), 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 785 (1983).

39-17-107. Adulteration of food, liquids, or pharmaceuticals.

  1. It is an offense for a person to adulterate any food product or liquid that is manufactured, marketed, grown, or produced for human consumption or any pharmaceutical product that is designed, marketed, or prescribed for the diagnosis or treatment of a disease or medical condition by placing in, mixing with, or adding to the product or liquid, any object, liquid, powder or other substance with the intent to cause bodily injury, serious bodily injury or death to a user of the product or liquid.
    1. A violation of this section where the person intends to cause bodily injury is a Class C felony.
    2. A violation of this section where the person intends to cause serious bodily injury or death is a Class B felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Penalties for Class B and C felonies, § 40-35-111.

39-17-108. Tampering with construction signs and barricades — Travel on closed roads — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Barricade” means a barrier for obstructing the passage of motor vehicle traffic;
    2. “Detour sign” means any sign placed across or on a public road of the state, by the state, the county or municipal authorities or by their contractors, indicating that the road is closed or partially closed, which sign also indicates the direction of an alternate route to be followed to give access to certain points;
    3. “Fence” means a barrier to prevent the intrusion of motor vehicle traffic;
    4. “Officially closed” means a highway or road that has been officially closed by a governmental unit, the department of transportation, a city or a county; and
    5. “Warning sign” means a sign indicating construction work in the area.
  2. A person commits an offense who intentionally:
    1. Destroys, knocks down, removes, defaces, or alters any lighting flasher letters or figures on a detour or warning sign set upon a highway or road of this state;
    2. Knocks down, removes, rearranges, destroys, defaces or alters any letters or figures on a barricade or fence erected on any highway or road of this state;
    3. Drives around or through any barricade or fence on any officially closed highway or road of this state;
    4. Drives around a detour sign or barricade or fence; or
    5. Ignores or disregards a warning sign before the road has been officially opened to public traffic by the department, or in appropriate cases by the county or municipal officer responsible for constructing or maintaining such roads.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
  4. This section shall have no application to:
    1. Law enforcement officers in the performance of their duties;
    2. Employees of the Tennessee department of transportation;
    3. Contractors performing work on the highways;
    4. Federal authorities when engaged in inspection of surveys, repairs, maintenance, or construction on or alongside the highways or within the right-of-way;
    5. Individuals domiciled or making their livelihood within the affected areas; or
    6. Any person or group of persons that shall be authorized by the commissioner, or appropriate county or municipal officer.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Outdoor advertising on certain interstate highways prohibited, § 54-21-115.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.114.

39-17-109. Airport and aircraft security.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Air operations area” means a portion of an airport designed and used for the landing, taking off, or surface maneuvering of airplanes; and
    2. “Sterile area” means an area to which access is controlled by the inspection of persons and property in accordance with an approved security program.
  2. It is an offense for a person to knowingly trespass or unlawfully enter upon an aircraft, air carrier, foreign air carrier or air operations area or sterile area of an airport serving the general public, if the trespass or entry is in violation of or contrary to security requirements established by federal regulation.
  3. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  4. If any person violates subsection (b) with the intent to commit an act in the aircraft, air carrier, foreign air carrier or air operations area or sterile area that is punishable as a felony under federal or state law, and the person is convicted of the felony, a violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting prosecution and conviction under any other criminal statute.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2007, ch. 509, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-110. Attachment of signs to barriers constructed or owned by a governmental entity.

  1. It is an offense to tie, attach or otherwise place any sign, sheet, board, poster, banner, advertisement, or other similar item on any fence or barrier that borders an interstate highway if the fence or barrier was constructed or is owned by a governmental entity.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1995, ch. 423, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-111. Alteration of warning, guard or other safety device from any machine, tool, or other implement.

    1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly and intentionally remove, disconnect, alter or cause to have removed, disconnected or altered a warning, guard or other safety device from any machine, tool or other implement and as a result of that action another person suffers bodily injury or death. For purposes of this section, “machine, tool or other implement” does not include:
      1. Any item of equipment or device being used for agricultural, forestry purposes, or lawn and garden care purposes; or
      2. Any item being used for home improvements or maintenance by a person not engaged in commercial activities.
    2. It is not an offense to knowingly and intentionally remove, disconnect, alter or cause to have removed, disconnected or altered a warning, guard or other safety device under subdivision (a)(1) if the warning, guard or other safety device is removed, disconnected or altered:
      1. With the sole and intended purpose of improving safety in accordance with accepted industry safety standards; or
      2. When a machine, tool or other implement is redesigned to manufacture a product or products substantially different than it was originally designed, and the warning, guard or other safety device is replaced with a warning, guard or other safety device with equal or improved effectiveness relative to accepted industry safety standards.
  1. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor, punishable only by fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).
  2. Evidence of a criminal conviction under this section shall not be admissible in a subsequent action against the employer filed by the employee involving a workplace injury or death.
  3. Neither a conviction nor a failure to obtain a conviction under this section shall preclude any other action authorized by law with respect to conduct in controversy under subsection (a).

Acts 1998, ch. 1054, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-112. False academic degrees.

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly issue, sell or manufacture a false academic degree. As used in this subsection (a), “person” includes any individual, corporation, firm, company, partnership or association.
  2. It is an offense for an individual to knowingly use or claim to have a false academic degree to obtain:
    1. Employment;
    2. A promotion in employment; or
    3. Admission to a college, university or other institution of higher learning.
  3. As used in this section, “false academic degree” shall mean any degree issued that meets one of the following criteria:
    1. Issued without requiring any student academic work;
    2. Issued based solely on the student's life experience or portfolio without requiring any post secondary work submitted to and evaluated by faculty with appropriate academic degrees from an institution that is:
      1. Accredited by a regional accrediting agency or other accrediting agency recognized by the United States department of education; and
      2. Authorized to operate in Tennessee pursuant to title 49, chapter 7, part 20, relative to the authorization of post secondary institutions, or is exempted from authorization by § 49-7-2004; or
    3. Issued using more than twenty-five percent (25%) of required credits based on the student's life experience or portfolio.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an otherwise properly accredited and authorized institution from issuing honorary degrees recognizing distinguished individuals for service to the state, an institution or community.
  5. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  6. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 2004, ch. 652, § 1.

Cross-References. Falsifying of educational and academic records, § 39-14-136.

Penalties for Class A and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

39-17-113. Payment of citations for persons who purchase devices for detection of or interference with devices used to measure the speed of motor vehicles.

  1. It is an offense to offer to pay or to pay a motor vehicle traffic citation of any person who purchased any device or mechanism, passive or active, to detect or purposefully interfere with or diminish the measurement capabilities of any radar, laser, or other device or mechanism employed by law enforcement personnel to measure the speed of motor vehicles for law enforcement purposes.
  2. This section shall apply only to persons and firms that sell or lease devices or mechanisms that detect or purposefully interfere with or diminish the measurement capabilities of any radar, laser, or other device or mechanism.
  3. A violation of this section shall be a Class B misdemeanor punishable by a fine only of up to five hundred dollars ($500). Each day a violation occurs constitutes a separate offense.

Acts 2006, ch. 730, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-114. Transportation of illegal aliens.

  1. It is an offense for any person for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain to transport or cause to be transported into the state an individual who the person knows or should have known has illegally entered or remained in the United States, as determined by the bureau of immigration and customs enforcement of the United States department of homeland security.
    1. This section shall not apply to common carriers.
    2. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the individuals were being transported for religious purposes.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor punishable only by a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each person illegally transported.
  3. Any moneys received from a violation of this section shall go to the arresting agency or agencies.

Acts 2007, ch. 242, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-115. Knowingly manufacturing, providing, transferring or submitting false identification for the purposes of obtaining or maintaining employment.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Employment” means any work engaged in for compensation in money or other valuable consideration and for which a person paying the compensation for the work performed would be required to file a W-2 wage and tax statement with the federal internal revenue service;
    2. “False identification” means a document of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purposes of identification of individuals that would identify the individual to be a lawful resident alien, an individual authorized to be employed by the federal Immigration and Naturalization Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.), or the United States attorney general or that would identify the individual to be a United States citizen that:
      1. Is not issued by or under the authority of a governmental entity or was issued under the authority of a governmental entity but was subsequently altered for purposes of deceit; and
      2. Appears to be issued by or under the authority of a governmental entity; and
    3. “Person” means an individual, corporation, partnership, association or any other legal entity.
  2. It is an offense for a person to knowingly manufacture, provide, transfer or submit to any other person false identification for the purposes of obtaining or maintaining employment.
  3. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor. Each false identification document used in violation of subsection (b) shall constitute a separate offense.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit prosecution under any other law.
  5. Upon conviction of a violation of subsection (b), if it is determined that any person in connection with a violation of this section is not lawfully present in the United States, pursuant to the federal Immigration and Naturalization Act the court shall notify the United States department of homeland security.

Acts 2009, ch. 155, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-116. Unlawful to draw property transfer documents without interest in property.

    1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly cause to be prepared, sign, or file records of any property transfer document when the transferor, grantor or person applying for registration knows or should know by an examination of the public records, that the transferor or grantor has no legal nor equitable interest to convey, or when there is no reasonable basis for assumption that the transferor or grantor has any interest in the property.
    2. As used in this subsection (a), “person” includes any individual, corporation, firm, company, partnership, or association.
  1. Upon a final conviction for an offense pursuant to this section, any court having or exercising circuit court jurisdiction may order the filing of an order of said court declaring the offending transfer document or documents to be void and of no legal effect and removing any cloud on the title that may have arisen because of said documents.
  2. This section shall not be applicable to any licensed attorney who, in good faith, prepares such a transfer document in the course of representation of a client.
  3. A violation of subsection (a) shall be a Class E felony.

Acts 2011, ch. 399, § 1; 2013, ch. 413, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-117. Unlawful to draw a lien against real or personal property without legal basis.

    1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly prepare, sign, or file any lien or other document with the intent to encumber any real or personal property when such person has no reasonable basis or any legal cause to place such lien or encumbrance on such real or personal property.
    2. As used in this subsection (a), “person” includes any individual or entity.
  1. Upon conviction for an offense pursuant to this section, any court having or exercising circuit court jurisdiction may order the removal from any record the lien or document evidencing an encumbrance, and order that the document be void and of no legal effect, and, if so ordered, the court shall cause the removal of any cloud on a title that may have arisen because of the document.
  2. This section shall not apply to:
    1. A licensed attorney who prepares a document in the course of representation of a client;
    2. A financial institution regulated by the Tennessee department of financial institutions, the federal reserve board, the office of the comptroller of the currency, the farm credit administration, or the national credit union administration, qualified commercial financing entity, as defined in § 67-4-2004, or an employee or agent of any of those entities, who prepares, signs or files a lien or other document in the ordinary course of business;
    3. A title insurance company or agent who prepares, signs, or files a lien or other document in the ordinary course of business; or
    4. A real estate licensee operating in compliance with the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of 1973, compiled in title 62, chapter 13.
  3. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class E felony.

Acts 2012, ch. 1015, § 1; 2013, ch. 413, § 2.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Part 2
[Reserved]

Part 3
Disorderly Conduct and Riots

39-17-301. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Desecrate” means defacing, damaging, polluting or otherwise physically mistreating in a way that the person knows or should know will outrage the sensibilities of an ordinary individual likely to observe or discover the person's action;
  2. “Participates” includes:
    1. Joining a group of three (3) or more persons who riot;
    2. Aiding and abetting a riot; or
    3. Refusing any lawful order of correctional personnel or other law enforcement officers during the course of a riot;
  3. “Riot” means a disturbance in a public place or penal institution as defined in § 39-16-601 involving an assemblage of three (3) or more persons whether or not participating in any otherwise lawful activity, which, by tumultuous and violent conduct, creates grave danger of substantial damage to property or serious bodily injury to persons or substantially obstructs law enforcement or other governmental function; and
  4. “Transportation facility” means any conveyance or place used for or in connection with public passenger transportation by air, railroad, motor vehicle or any other method. It includes, but is not limited to, aircraft, watercraft, railroad cars, buses, and air, boat, railroad and bus terminals and stations.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 29; 1999, ch. 350, § 1; 2014, ch. 982, § 3; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, §§ 9, 10.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2014, ch. 982, § 5 provided that the act shall apply only to all offenses occurring on or after July 1, 2014.

For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 substituted “Joining” for “Assembling with or joining” in (2)(A); and deleted “Being present,” at the beginning of (2)(B).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Aggravated riot, § 39-17-303.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1970 — A Critical Survey (Joseph G. Cook), 38 Tenn. L. Rev. 182 (1971).

Less Than Picture Perfect: The Legal Relationship Between Photographers' Rights And Law Enforcement, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 105 (2010).

39-17-302. Riot.

  1. A person commits an offense who knowingly participates in a riot.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor. In any sentence imposed for a violation of this section, the court shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty (30) days of incarceration and an order of restitution for any property damage or loss incurred as a result of the offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 added the second sentence in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Forfeiture of right to student loan or financial assistance for participation in riot, § 49-4-601.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1971 — A Critical Survey (Joseph G. Cook), 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 247 (1972).

39-17-303. Aggravated riot.

  1. A person commits an offense who:
    1. Knowingly participates in a riot; and
    2. As a result of the riot a person other than one (1) of the participants suffers bodily injury or substantial property damage occurs.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class E felony. In any sentence imposed for a violation of this section, the court shall include a mandatory minimum sentence of forty-five (45) days of incarceration. In any sentence imposed for a violation of this section, the court shall include an order of restitution for any injury, property damage, or loss incurred as a result of the offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 35; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 added the second and third sentences in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-304. Inciting to riot.

  1. A person commits an offense who incites or urges three (3) or more persons to create or engage in a riot.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor. In any sentence imposed for a violation of this section, the court shall include an order of restitution for any property damage or loss incurred as a result of the offense.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 13.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section punishes those who incite or urge others to create or engage in a riot, defined in § 39-17-301. It reaches the same conduct proscribed by former § 39-6-322. It is a Class A misdemeanor.

If harm results from the riot, the inciter could be liable for aggravated riot under § 39-17-303, since a person who solicits, directs, or aids another to commit an offense is liable for that offense. See § 39-11-402.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 added the second sentence in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another, § 39-11-402.

Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony, § 39-11-403.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under T.C.A. § 39-17-304(a). State v. Russell, 10 S.W.3d 270, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 1999).

39-17-305. Disorderly conduct.

  1. A person commits an offense who, in a public place and with intent to cause public annoyance or alarm:
    1. Engages in fighting or in violent or threatening behavior;
    2. Refuses to obey an official order to disperse issued to maintain public safety in dangerous proximity to a fire, hazard or other emergency; or
    3. Creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose.
  2. A person also violates this section who makes unreasonable noise that prevents others from carrying on lawful activities.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The prior law contained no general disorderly conduct statute, though conduct of this nature was prohibited in various sections throughout the former code. This section consolidates these provisions into a modern statute.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. False reports, § 39-16-502.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Police powers of capitol security guards, § 4-8-104.

Law Reviews.

The Proposed Criminal Code; Disorderly Conduct and Related Offenses, 40 Tenn. L. Rev. 725 (1973).

Attorney General Opinions. Public annoyance or alarm under this section, OAG 99-197 (10/6/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Threatening Behavior.

Where defendant directed profane and insulting language toward a police officer who was ticketing his car and, at the same time, physically positioned himself between the officer and the car, clenching his fist at his side and pointing one finger at the officer, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendant engaged in “threatening behavior” in violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-305. State v. Creasy, 885 S.W.2d 829, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Defendant, a juvenile, made statements to a complainant that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, could have been found to be threatening behavior by a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt; and the statements were not mere epithets or insult, as they were threatening in nature and supported a finding of threatening behavior because the complainant felt apprehensive and took defendant's statements as threats. State v. Roberts, 106 S.W.3d 658, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2002).

Defendant's aggressive conduct and his loud and rude behavior violated the terms of the disorderly conduct statute, T.C.A. § 39-17-305, and therefore, his conduct was not protected by his right to free speech. There was proof, direct and circumstantial, of each and every element of the crime of disorderly conduct, and while words and conduct expressive of an idea might qualify as protected “speech,” the threatening behavior demonstrated by defendant did not fall within either category. State v. Mitchell, 339 S.W.3d 629, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Mar. 31, 2011).

2. Unreasonable Noise.

Defendant's conviction under T.C.A. § 39-17-305(b) was reversible error, where, although the defendant was arguing loudly outside his residence after midnight and may have made an unreasonable noise, there was no proof that others heard the noise and were prevented from carrying on lawful activities. State v. Wilson, 990 S.W.2d 726, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1168 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's disorderly conduct conviction because defendant was not amenable to stopping at the checkpoint, when one officer blocked his path, defendant stepped toward another officer and loudly questioned the propriety of the precautions established for the event. When directed to remove the flag from its pole, defendant, “ranted” and “raved,” “loudly taunting the officers to get the attention of other public rally attendees, getting into their faces.” State v. Mitchell, 339 S.W.3d 629, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Mar. 31, 2011).

39-17-306. Disrupting meeting or procession.

  1. A person commits an offense if, with the intent to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, procession, or gathering, the person substantially obstructs or interferes with the meeting, procession, or gathering by physical action or verbal utterance.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 14.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 substituted “Class A” for “Class B” in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Aggravated criminal trespass, § 39-14-406.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Vandalism, § 39-14-408.

Law Reviews.

Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language (John W. Wade), 4 Vand. L. Rev. 63 (1951).

Attorney General Opinions. The capitol police have general authority to make arrests in and around the State Capitol and other state buildings. They do not need any additional authorization or approval to exercise that arrest authority on the second floor of the Capitol. As state law enforcement officers, the capitol police have authority to make arrests in or around the State Capitol regardless of whether the General Assembly is in session. No relevant statutory provision or applicable rule or regulation distinguishes between the periods during which the legislature is in session and out of session. On the other hand, sergeants-at-arms are legislative officials subject to the control of their respective legislative houses. They do not have any freestanding statutory authority to make arrests absent authorization by their respective houses. To the extent the House or the Senate authorize their respective sergeants-at-arms to make arrests, each individual house may determine whether that authority applies only during session or applies when the legislature is out of session as well. OAG 20-09, 2020 Tenn. AG LEXIS 30 (5/11/2020).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. § 39-17-306 is valid under the First Amendment as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation of expression. State v. Ervin, 40 S.W.3d 508, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, Ervin v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 842, 122 S. Ct. 100, 151 L. Ed. 2d 60, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5886 (2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2001).

To effectuate T.C.A. § 39-17-306 within constitutional limits, T.C.A. § 39-17-306 is interpreted to require that the defendant substantially obstruct the conduct of a lawful meeting with the specific intent of bringing the meeting to an early termination or effectively impairing the conduct of the assemblage. State v. Ervin, 40 S.W.3d 508, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, Ervin v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 842, 122 S. Ct. 100, 151 L. Ed. 2d 60, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5886 (2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2001).

2. Level of Disruption.

The level of disruption at an outdoor political gathering is not what would be reasonably expected at a memorial service for slain police officers; therefore, where defendant used a battery powered bullhorn to yell “Stop killer cops,” while he stood directly behind honored families of slain police officers, thereby confusing and drowning out the master of ceremonies, the intentional activities of the defendant substantially obstructed the conduct of the meeting by effectively impairing the ability of citizens gathered for a solemn memorial service to freely exercise their right of peaceful assembly. State v. Ervin, 40 S.W.3d 508, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, Ervin v. Tennessee, 534 U.S. 842, 122 S. Ct. 100, 151 L. Ed. 2d 60, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5886 (2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2001).

39-17-307. Obstructing highway or other passageway.

  1. A person commits an offense who, without legal privilege, intentionally, knowingly or recklessly:
    1. Obstructs a highway, street, sidewalk, railway, waterway, elevator, aisle, or hallway to which the public, or a substantial portion of the public, has access; or any other place used for the passage of persons, vehicles or conveyances, whether the obstruction arises from the person's acts alone or from the person's acts and the acts of others; or
    2. Disobeys a reasonable request or order to move issued by a person known to be a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, or a person with authority to control the use of the premises to:
      1. Prevent obstruction of a highway or passageway; or
      2. Maintain public safety by dispersing those gathered in dangerous proximity to a fire, riot or other hazard.
  2. For purposes of this section, “obstruct” means to render impassable or to render passage unreasonably inconvenient or potentially injurious to persons or property.
    1. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of subdivision (a)(2) is a Class C misdemeanor.
    3. Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(1), a violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class E felony if the obstruction prevents an emergency vehicle from accessing a highway or street, the obstruction prevents a first responder from responding to an emergency, or if the obstruction prevents access to an emergency exit. For purposes of this subdivision (c)(3):
      1. “Emergency vehicle” means any vehicle of a governmental department or public service corporation when responding to an emergency, any vehicle of a police or fire department, and any ambulance;
      2. “Emergency exit” means a doorway in a building or facility used for egress to the outdoors only when there is an immediate threat to the health or safety of an individual; and
      3. “First responder” has the same definition as used in § 39-13-116(d).
    1. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section, which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
      1. Solicitation and collection of charitable donations at a highway or street intersection were undertaken by members of an organization that has received a determination of exemption from the internal revenue service under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) or (4);
      2. The members of the organization undertook reasonable and prudent precautions to prevent both disruption of traffic flow and injury to person or property; and
      3. The solicitation and collection at the specific time and place and the specific precautions were proposed in advance to, and received the prior written approval of, the administrative head of the local law enforcement agency in whose jurisdiction the intersection is located.
    2. No liability for any accident or other occurrence that arises from solicitations shall attach to the sheriff or government involved in issuing the permit, but shall be borne solely by the organization obtaining the permit.
    3. This subsection (d) shall not be construed to supersede or affect any ordinance relative to collecting donations at public intersections in effect on July 1, 1993.
    4. Any municipality by ordinance may prohibit roadblocks within its corporate limits notwithstanding this subsection (d).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1993, ch. 148, §§ 1-5; 2015, ch. 138, § 1; 2017, ch. 121, § 1; 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 15.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning a  uniform framework of laws that will protect the rights of all Tennesseans to peacefully demonstrate, see Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3.

2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed after August 20, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by ch. 3 rewrote (c), which read: “(c)(1) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.“(2) Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(1), an offense under subdivision (a)(1) is a Class B misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of two hundred dollars ($200) if, at the time of the violation, the person obstructs an emergency vehicle from accessing the highway or street, or highway's or street's right-of-way. As used in this subdivision (c)(2), ‘emergency vehicle’ means any vehicle of a governmental department or public service corporation when responding to an emergency, any vehicle of a police or fire department, and any ambulance.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2020 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 26. August 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1971 — A Critical Survey (Joseph G. Cook), 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 247 (1971).

Attorney General Opinions. If the amendments to T.C.A. § 39-17-307 proposed in H.B. 1286, 109th Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2015) [not enacted], were enacted, T.C.A.. § 39-17-307 would not be unconstitutionally vague in violation of article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and/or the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  OAG 15-46, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 46 (5/27/15).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Obstruction of Roads.

Where defendant's car was stopped on a two-lane road and the officer testified that the defendant was not blocking any traffic, the trial court found that the defendant was not obstructing a street within the definition of T.C.A. § 39-17-307(b); therefore, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 181 (Tenn. 2006).

Police officer could not have had probable cause to stop defendant's car based on a violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-307, as defendant was parked in one lane of a two-lane street and the officer's testimony demonstrated that the officer could have gotten around defendant's car. United States v. Hughes, 606 F.3d 311, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 10802, 2010 FED App. 153P (6th Cir. May 27, 2010).

2. Investigative Stop.

Evidence of defendant's intoxication was admissible at defendant's trial for driving under the influence because a police officer's warrantless detention of defendant and defendant's vehicle was valid as it was supported by reasonable suspicion that defendant was obstructing a roadway. The officer testified that defendant's vehicle was stopped in the middle of the roadway in the early morning hours, the engine was running, the vehicle's lights were on, a door was open, and somebody other than defendant was standing up outside of the car. State v. Christopher, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2016).

39-17-308. Harassment.

  1. A person commits an offense who intentionally:
    1. Communicates a threat to another person, and the person communicating the threat:
      1. Intends the communication to be a threat of harm to the victim; and
      2. A reasonable person would perceive the communication to be a threat of harm;
    2. Communicates with another person without lawful purpose, anonymously or otherwise, with the intent that the frequency or means of the communication annoys, offends, alarms, or frightens the recipient and, by this action, annoys, offends, alarms, or frightens the recipient;
    3. Communicates to another person, with intent to harass that person, that a relative or other person has been injured or killed when the communication is known to be false; or
    4. Communicates with another person or transmits or displays an image without legitimate purpose with the intent that the image is viewed by the victim by any method described in subdivision (a)(1) and the person:
      1. Maliciously intends the communication to be a threat of harm to the victim; and
      2. A reasonable person would perceive the communication to be a threat of harm.
    1. A person convicted of a criminal offense commits an offense if, while incarcerated, on pretrial diversion, probation, community correction or parole, the person intentionally communicates in person with the victim of the person's crime if the communication is:
      1. Anonymous or threatening or made in an offensively repetitious manner or at hours known to be inconvenient to the victim;
      2. Made for no legitimate purpose; and
      3. Made knowing that it will alarm or annoy the victim.
    2. If the victim of the person's offense died as the result of the offense, this subsection (b) shall apply to the deceased victim's next-of-kin.
    1. Except as provided in subsection (d), a violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony.
  2. A violation by a minor of subdivision (a)(4) is a delinquent act and shall be punishable only by up to thirty (30) hours of community service, without compensation, for charitable or governmental agencies as determined by the court.
  3. As used in this section:
    1. “Communicate” means contacting a person in writing or print or by telephone, wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, photooptical, or electronic means, and includes text messages, facsimile transmissions, electronic mail, instant messages, and messages, images, video, sound recordings, or intelligence of any nature sent through or posted on social networks, social media, or websites;
    2. “Electronic communications service” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system;
    3. “Image” includes, but is not limited to, a visual depiction, video clip or photograph of another person;
    4. “Log files” mean computer-generated lists that contain various types of information regarding the activities of a computer, including, but not limited to, time of access to certain records, processes running on a computer or the usage of certain computer resources; and
    5. “Social network” means any online community of people who share interests and activities, or who are interested in exploring the interests and activities of others, and which provides ways for users to interact.
    1. The offense described in this section shall not apply to an entity providing an electronic communications service to the public acting in the normal course of providing that service.
    2. The service providers described in this subsection (f) shall not be required to maintain any record not otherwise kept in the ordinary course of that service provider's business; provided, however, that if any electronic communications service provider operates a website that offers a social network service and the electronic communications service provider provides services to consumers in this state, any log files and images or communications that have been sent, posted, or displayed on the social network service's website and maintained by the electronic communications service provider shall be disclosed to any governmental entity responsible for enforcing this section only if the governmental entity:
      1. Obtains a warrant issued using this state's warrant procedures by a court of competent jurisdiction;
      2. Obtains a court order for the disclosure under subdivision (f)(4); or
      3. Has the consent of the person who sent, posted, or displayed any log files and images or communications on the social network service's website maintained by the electronic communications service provider.
    3. No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of an electronic communications service, its officers, employees, agents, or other specified persons for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order or warrant.
    4. A court order for disclosure under subdivision (f)(2)(B) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of an electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. A court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of this state. A court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify the order, if the information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with the order otherwise would cause an undue burden on the provider.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1998, ch. 1035, §§ 1, 2; 2001, ch. 26, § 1; 2008, ch. 973, § 1; 2009, ch. 347, § 1; 2011, ch. 362, §§ 1-4; 2012, ch. 992, § 1; 2016, ch. 884, §§ 1-5.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section penalizes harassing or threatening telephone calls or written communications. Prior law was similar but dealt only with telephone calls.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Civil action for malicious harassment, title 4, ch. 21, part 7.

Instruction on the prevention of hate crimes and sexual offenses, § 49-7-137.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. § 39-17-308 is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Lakatos, 900 S.W.2d 699, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

T.C.A. § 39-17-308 regulates conduct and not speech, and it is not unconstitutionally overbroad. State v. Lakatos, 900 S.W.2d 699, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

2. Elements of Offense.

Before an accused can be convicted of harassment, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant: (1) Placed one or more telephone calls anonymously, at an inconvenient hour, or in an offensively repetitious manner; (2) The caller does not have a legitimate purpose for communicating with the victim; and (3) The action of the accused knowingly annoys or alarms the victim. State v. Smith, 891 S.W.2d 922, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Allowing proof of numerous incidents of telephone harassment and stalking did not compromise constitutional right to unanimous jury verdict since both offenses require proof of continuous course of conduct. State v. Hoxie, 963 S.W.2d 737, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. 1998).

3. Evidence.

Defendant's conduct violated T.C.A. § 39-17-308 where he made telephone calls to several women, fraudulently identified himself as an employee of a hospital, and conducted a fraudulent sex survey with no apparent motive other than self-gratification. State v. Lakatos, 900 S.W.2d 699, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

39-17-309. Civil rights intimidation.

  1. The general assembly finds and declares that it is the right of every person regardless of race, color, ancestry, religion or national origin, to be secure and protected from fear, intimidation, harassment and bodily injury caused by the activities of groups and individuals. It is not the intent of this section to interfere with the exercise of rights protected by the constitution of the United States. The general assembly recognizes the constitutional right of every citizen to harbor and express beliefs on any subject whatsoever and to associate with others who share similar beliefs. The general assembly further finds that the advocacy of unlawful acts by groups or individuals against other persons or groups for the purpose of inciting and provoking damage to property and bodily injury or death to persons is not constitutionally protected, poses a threat to public order and safety, and should be subject to criminal sanctions.
  2. A person commits the offense of intimidating others from exercising civil rights who:
    1. Injures or threatens to injure or coerces another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee;
    2. Injures or threatens to injure or coerces another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee;
    3. Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee; or
    4. Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee.
  3. It is an offense for a person to wear a mask or disguise with the intent to violate subsection (b).
  4. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class D felony. A violation of subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  5. The penalties provided in this section for intimidating others from exercising civil rights do not preclude victims from seeking any other remedies, criminal or civil, otherwise available under law.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 984, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section protects the people in their exercise of the rights and privileges provided by the federal and Tennessee constitutions and laws.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Civil action for malicious harassment, title 4, ch. 21, part 7.

Criminal responsibility for conduct of another, § 39-11-402.

Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony, § 39-11-403.

Instruction to raise awareness and prevent hate crimes and sexual offenses, § 49-7-137.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application and Scope.

Evidence that defendants assembled before home of citizen and attempted to induce him to quit his job through use of angry language, threats and intimidation was sufficient to sustain convictions under former law. Essary v. State, 210 Tenn. 220, 357 S.W.2d 342, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 427 (1962).

T.C.A. § 39-17-309 provides the framework for a claim for civil malicious harassment under T.C.A. § 4-21-701. Carr v. Robertson County, 29 S.W.3d 466, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. 2000).

It was error to enjoin a citizen under the Tennessee Violence in the Workplace Act (Act) because (1) there was no clear and convincing evidence that the citizen engaged in at least two acts of stalking or that the citizen engaged in intimidation, and (2) a trial court could not issue an injunction “separate and apart” from the Act, since a permanent injunction was available as a remedy only if an applicant prevailed on the merits of a claim. City of Leb. ex rel. Craighead v. Dodson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

2. Age Discrimination.

A claim by plaintiff employee alleging age discrimination and retaliation, even assuming that defendant employer's alleged treatment of plaintiff was intended to intimidate her because she exercised her statutory rights, did not state a cause of action since T.C.A. § 39-17-309 does not mention age in its declaration of rights, and defendant's conduct did not amount to injury, a threat of injury or coercion within the meaning thereof. Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 937, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19740 (W.D. Tenn. 1994).

3. Implied Cause of Action.

For a case discussing an implied cause of action, see Bowden Bldg. Corp. v. Tennessee Real Estate Comm'n, 15 S.W.3d 434, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

39-17-310. Public intoxication.

  1. A person commits the offense of public intoxication who appears in a public place under the influence of a controlled substance, controlled substance analogue or any other intoxicating substance to the degree that:
    1. The offender may be endangered;
    2. There is endangerment to other persons or property; or
    3. The offender unreasonably annoys people in the vicinity.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2012, ch. 848, § 16.

Cross-References. Alcohol abuse prevention, title 33, ch. 10, part 4.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Restriction of prosecutions for intoxication, § 33-10-203.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 10 Tenn. Juris., Drunkenness, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Duty to Arrest Violator.

Statutes pertaining to drunk driving and public intoxication, do not, in conjunction with statutes authorizing warrantless arrests, give rise to a “special-duty” of care where a plaintiff alleges that a police officer failed to arrest or detain an alleged drunk driver. Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. 1995).

2. Unreasonably Annoy.

Defendant's conviction for public intoxication was reversible error, where, although the defendant was arguing loudly outside his residence after midnight, there was no proof that he actually annoyed anyone else in the vicinity. State v. Wilson, 990 S.W.2d 726, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1168 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

3. Insufficient Evidence.

Where the videotape of defendant's interaction with police officers revealed that defendant said he had two beers, it was not sufficient to support a finding of public intoxication, where the tapes contradicted the claim that defendant swayed and was unsteady on his feet or that his speech was slurred. State v. Farrar, 355 S.W.3d 582, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. Oct. 18, 2011).

39-17-311. Desecration of venerated object.

  1. A person commits an offense who intentionally desecrates:
    1. A place of worship or burial; or
    2. A state or national flag.
    1. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class E felony.
    2. A violation of subdivision (a)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2017, ch. 432, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section consolidates a number of prior statutes.

Compiler's Notes. Two United States Supreme Court decisions were handed down concerning the burning of the American flag, which may have implications concerning this code section. See Texas v. Gregory Lee Johnson, 401 U.S. 397, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989), and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 110 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1990).

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Liability for damage to cemetery, power to arrest, § 46-2-102.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Trespass or injury to cemetery property, § 46-2-102.

Vandalism, § 39-14-408.

Violation of graves indictable without prosecutor, § 40-13-104.

Law Reviews.

The Flag Defilement Statutes Defiled (Richard Barrett), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 396 (1975).

Attorney General Opinions. Commercial use of the state flag, OAG 95-083 (8/15/95).

Effect of Texas v. Johnson upon state flag law, OAG 89-138 (11/21/89).

39-17-312. Abuse of corpse.

  1. A person commits an offense who, without legal privilege, knowingly:
    1. Physically mistreats a corpse in a manner offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinary person;
    2. Disinters a corpse that has been buried or otherwise interred; or
    3. Disposes of a corpse in a manner known to be in violation of law.
  2. A person commits an offense who, without legal authority or privilege, knowingly offers to sell, sells, offers to purchase or purchases previously buried human skeletal remains. Any remains seized in violation of this subsection (b) shall be confiscated and subject to disposition as provided for in §§ 11-6-104 and 11-6-119.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2006, ch. 896, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section consolidates and simplifies former code sections.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Alleging grave-robbing, § 40-13-220.

Identification of grave in indictment, § 40-13-220.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Recipients of dead bodies to be notified of communicable diseases and AIDS, § 68-5-102.

Vandalism, § 39-14-408.

Violation of graves indictable without prosecutor, § 40-13-104.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 5 Tenn. Juris., Cemeteries, § 10; 9 Tenn. Juris., Dead Bodies, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's abuse of a corpse conviction because a doctor concluded that defendant never suffered from a severe mental disease or defect. Moreover, the evidence established that defendant went to methodical lengths to conceal the victim's death and dismemberment, telling her family that she left with a friend and forging a Christmas card to her sister. State v. Climer, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2011), modified, 400 S.W.3d 537, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Evidence supported defendant's abuse of a corpse conviction because defendant solicited the victim for sex, the victim was shot by defendant's rifle, the victim's nude body was dumped in a garbage can and trash was placed on top of the victim, it appeared as though the victim was positioned in an effort to create an inference that the victim was trash, defendant's fingerprint was on a box in the trash, defendant solicited a jailhouse informant to murder witnesses, and defendant alleged that individuals who had alibis were the perpetrators. State v. Mendenhall, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020).

2. Double Jeopardy.

Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V, and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 10 barred defendant's retrial on first-degree premeditated murder after the conviction was reversed by the appellate court for insufficient evidence, the appellate court reduced the conviction to second-degree murder, the State did not appeal, and the state's highest court reversed the second-degree murder and abuse of a corpse convictions; defendant could be tried again for second-degree murder and abuse of a corpse. State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

3. Sentencing.

Defendant did not challenge the notice to seek enhanced punishment and, in fact, stipulated the accuracy of his prior convictions; the notice to seek enhanced punishment was not materially misleading as to his false report and abuse of corpse convictions. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2015), aff'd, 519 S.W.3d 1, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 1, 2017), cert. denied, Hawkins v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 288, 138 S. Ct. 388, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6432 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2017).

Criteria are stated in the alternative and therefore only one need exist to support the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing; because the trial court provided reasons on the record establishing two of the statutory grounds, extensive criminal history and dangerous offender, the decision was afforded a presumption of reasonableness, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant's sentences for false report and abuse of corpse to run consecutively. State v. Hawkins, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2015), aff'd, 519 S.W.3d 1, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. May 1, 2017), cert. denied, Hawkins v. Tennessee, 199 L. Ed. 2d 288, 138 S. Ct. 388, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6432 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2017).

Factors weighed in favor of a granting defendant judicial diversion under T.C.A. § 40-35-313(a) in connection with her conviction of abuse of a corpse under T.C.A. § 39-17-312(a)(1); she had a miscarriage, there was no evidence that she caused the death of her infant, and defendant believed the infant was dead when she put it in the dumpster, plus the trial court's conducting independent research into facts outside the case was improper and nothing suggested that the defendant's actions significantly exceeded those required to satisfy the elements of the offense. State v. Lacy, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017).

39-17-313. Aggressive panhandling.

  1. A person commits aggressive panhandling who solicits a donation of money or goods in the following manner:
    1. By intentionally touching the person being solicited without the person's consent;
    2. By intentionally obstructing the path of the person, or of the vehicle of the person, being solicited;
    3. By following a person who is walking away from the person soliciting the donation, unless that person has indicated that the person wishes to make a donation; or
    4. By making any statement, gesture, or other communication that would cause a reasonable person to feel fear of personal harm for refusing a solicitation of a donation.
    1. A first violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.
    2. A second or subsequent violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor punishable by fine or a term of imprisonment not to exceed ninety (90) days, or both.

Acts 2015, ch. 137, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-17-313 (Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1), concerning intimidation, was repealed by Acts 1990, ch. 984, § 2.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B and C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-314. Civil disorder.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Civil disorder” means any public disturbance involving acts of violence by an assemblage of two (2) or more persons which acts cause an immediate danger of or result in damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual;
    2. “Governmental military force” means the:
      1. National guard as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(9);
      2. Organized militia of any state or territory of the United States, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, not included within the definition of “national guard”; and
      3. Armed forces of the United States; and
    3. “Law enforcement agency” means a governmental unit of one (1) or more persons employed full time or part time by the state or federal government, or political subdivision of the state or federal government, for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime and enforcing laws or local ordinances and the employees of which are authorized to make arrests for crimes while acting within the scope of their authority.
  2. A person commits an offense who assembles with one (1) or more persons for the purpose of training or instructing in the use of, or practicing with, any technique or means capable of causing property damage, bodily injury or death with the intent to employ such training, instruction or practice in the commission of a civil disorder.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class D felony.
    1. Nothing contained in this section makes unlawful any act protected by the constitution of Tennessee, or any act of a law enforcement officer that is performed in the lawful performance of the officer's official duties.
    2. Nothing contained in this section makes unlawful:
      1. Any activity of a governmental military force, the Tennessee wildlife resources agency, the department of correction or any law enforcement agency;
      2. Any activity intended to teach or practice self-defense or self-defense techniques, such as karate clubs or self-defense clinics, and similar lawful activity;
      3. Any facility, program or lawful activity related to firearms instruction and training intended to teach the safe handling and use of firearms; or
      4. Any other lawful sports or activities related to the individual recreational use or possession of firearms, including, but not limited to, hunting activities, target shooting, self-defense, firearms collection or any organized activity, including, but not limited to, any hunting club, rifle club, rifle range or shooting range that does not include a conspiracy as defined under the laws of this state, or the knowledge of or the intent to cause or further a civil disorder.
  4. Nothing contained in this section makes unlawful any practice or drill of an organization whose purpose is the reenactment of battles for historic purposes or of ceremonial organizations of a military nature.

Acts 1990, ch. 971, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section protects the people in their exercise of the rights and privileges provided by the federal and Tennessee constitutions and laws.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another, § 40-11-402.

Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony, § 40-11-403.

Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, § 39-12-107.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-315. Stalking, aggravated stalking, and especially aggravated stalking.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of two (2) or more separate, noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose, including, but not limited to, acts in which the defendant directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to a person, or interferes with a person's property;
    2. “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily, require medical or other professional treatment or counseling;
    3. “Harassment” means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress. Harassment does not include constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose;
    4. “Stalking” means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested;
    5. “Unconsented contact” means any contact with another person that is initiated or continued without that person's consent, or in disregard of that person's expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued. Unconsented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following:
      1. Following or appearing within the sight of that person;
      2. Approaching or confronting that person in a public place or on private property;
      3. Appearing at that person's workplace or residence;
      4. Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by that person;
      5. Contacting that person by telephone;
      6. Sending to that person mail or any electronic communications, including, but not limited to, electronic mail, text messages, or any other type of electronic message sent using the internet, websites, or a social media platform; or
      7. Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by that person; and
    6. “Victim” means an individual who is the target of a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment.
    1. A person commits an offense who intentionally engages in stalking.
    2. Stalking is a Class A misdemeanor.
    3. Stalking is a Class E felony if the defendant, at the time of the offense, was required to or was registered with the Tennessee bureau of investigation as a sexual offender, violent sexual offender or violent juvenile sexual offender, as defined in § 40-39-202.
    1. A person commits aggravated stalking who commits the offense of stalking as prohibited by subsection (b), and:
      1. In the course and furtherance of stalking, displays a deadly weapon;
      2. The victim of the offense was less than eighteen (18) years of age at any time during the person's course of conduct, and the person is five (5) or more years older than the victim;
      3. Has previously been convicted of stalking within seven (7) years of the instant offense;
      4. Makes a credible threat to the victim, the victim's child, sibling, spouse, parent or dependents with the intent to place any such person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury; or
      5. At the time of the offense, was prohibited from making contact with the victim under a restraining order or injunction for protection, an order of protection, or any other court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the victim or the victim's property, and the person knowingly violates the injunction, order or court-imposed prohibition.
    2. Aggravated stalking is a Class E felony.
    1. A person commits especially aggravated stalking who:
      1. Commits the offense of stalking or aggravated stalking, and has previously been convicted of stalking or aggravated stalking involving the same victim of the instant offense;
      2. Commits the offense of aggravated stalking, and intentionally or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to the victim of the offense or to the victim's child, sibling, spouse, parent or dependent; or
      3. Commits the offense of stalking or aggravated stalking, the person is eighteen (18) years of age or older, and the victim of the offense was less than twelve (12) years of age at any time during the person's course of conduct.
    2. Especially aggravated stalking is a Class C felony.
  2. Notwithstanding any other law, if the court grants probation to a person convicted of stalking, aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking, the court may keep the person on probation for a period not to exceed the maximum punishment for the appropriate classification of offense. Regardless of whether a term of probation is ordered, the court may, in addition to any other punishment otherwise authorized by law, order the defendant to do the following:
    1. Refrain from stalking any individual during the term of probation;
    2. Refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense or the victim's child, sibling, spouse, parent or dependent;
    3. Be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric, psychological, or social counseling, and, if determined appropriate by the court, to receive psychiatric, psychological or social counseling at the defendant's own expense;
    4. If, as the result of such treatment or otherwise, the defendant is required to take medication, order that the defendant submit to drug testing or some other method by which the court can monitor whether the defendant is taking the required medication; and
    5. Submit to the use of an electronic tracking device, with the cost of the device and monitoring the defendant's whereabouts, to be paid by the defendant.
  3. In a prosecution for a violation of this section, evidence that the defendant continued to engage in a course of conduct involving repeated unconsented contact with the victim after having been requested by the victim to discontinue the conduct or a different form of unconsented contact, and to refrain from any further unconsented contact with the victim, is prima facie evidence that the continuation of the course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
    1. If a person is convicted of aggravated or especially aggravated stalking, or another felony offense arising out of a charge based on this section, the court may order an independent professional mental health assessment of the defendant's need for mental health treatment. The court may waive the assessment, if an adequate assessment was conducted prior to the conviction.
    2. If the assessment indicates that the defendant is in need of and amenable to mental health treatment, the court may include in the sentence a requirement that the offender undergo treatment, and that the drug intake of the defendant be monitored in the manner best suited to the particular situation. Monitoring may include periodic determinations as to whether the defendant is ingesting any illegal controlled substances or controlled substance analogues, as well as determinations as to whether the defendant is complying with any required or recommended course of treatment that includes the taking of medications.
    3. The court shall order the offender to pay the costs of assessment under this subsection (g), unless the offender is indigent under § 40-14-202.
  4. Any person who reasonably believes they are a victim of an offense under this section, regardless of whether the alleged perpetrator has been arrested, charged or convicted of a stalking-related offense, shall be entitled to seek and obtain an order of protection in the same manner, and under the same circumstances, as is provided for victims of domestic abuse by title 36, chapter 3, part 6.
  5. When a person is charged and arrested for the offense of stalking, aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking, the arresting law enforcement officer shall inform the victim that the person arrested may be eligible to post bail for the offense and to be released until the date of trial for the offense.
  6. If a law enforcement officer or district attorney general believes that the life of a possible victim of stalking is in immediate danger, unless and until sufficient evidence can be processed linking a particular person to the offense, the district attorney general may petition the judge of a court of record having criminal jurisdiction in that district to enter an order expediting the processing of any evidence in a particular stalking case. If, after hearing the petition, the court is of the opinion that the life of the victim may be in immediate danger if the alleged perpetrator is not apprehended, the court may enter such an order, directed to the Tennessee bureau of investigation, or any other agency or laboratory that may be in the process of analyzing evidence for that particular investigation.
    1. For purposes of determining if a course of conduct amounting to stalking is a single offense or multiple offenses, the occurrence of any of the following events breaks the continuous course of conduct, with respect to the same victim, that constitutes the offense:
      1. The defendant is arrested and charged with stalking, aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking;
      2. The defendant is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have violated an order of protection issued to prohibit the defendant from engaging in the conduct of stalking; or
      3. The defendant is convicted of the offense of stalking, aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking.
    2. If a continuing course of conduct amounting to stalking engaged in by a defendant against the same victim is broken by any of the events set out in subdivision (k)(1), any such conduct that occurs after that event commences a new and separate offense.
  7. Stalking may be prosecuted pursuant to § 39-11-103(d).

Acts 1992, ch. 795, § 1; 1993, ch. 435, § 1; 1995, ch. 378, § 1; 2005, ch. 482, § 1; 2012, ch. 848, § 17; 2012, ch. 1076, § 2; 2016, ch. 969, §§ 1-3; 2018, ch. 975, § 1.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (d)(1)(C).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 975, § 2. May 21, 2018.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalties for Class C and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Violation of protection order, notice to protected party, § 36-3-612.

Law Reviews.

The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 991 (1993).

Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment to Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Elements of Offense.

Allowing proof of numerous incidents of telephone harassment and stalking did not compromise constitutional right to unanimous jury verdict since both offenses require proof of continuous course of conduct. State v. Hoxie, 963 S.W.2d 737, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. 1998).

Appellate court vacated a district court's decision that modified the special condition for defendant's supervised release, which required defendant to participate in a sexual offender treatment program and evaluation; the court found that the sex-offender treatment condition was not reasonably related to either the instant offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm or defendant's criminal history, which included a stalking conviction under T.C.A. § 39-17-315(a)(1). United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 2006 FED App. 359P, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23677 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2006).

Trial court properly granted a girlfriend an order of protection against her boyfriend based on a finding of stalking and the girlfriend was entitled to an award of her reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the boyfriend's appeal where the boyfriend appeared at her house with a gift, sent emails and flowers with a note, and tried to enter her house after she told him to leave her alone. Walker v. Pawlik, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's stalking conviction because defendant caused the victim, who was the parent of defendant's child, significant mental distress as defendant called and texted the victim, placed signs stating that the victim was a “deadbeat” at the victim's place of work and home, and followed the victim on one occasion after the victim left work. State v. Flowers, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015), rev'd, 512 S.W.3d 161, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 981 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

It was error to enjoin a citizen under the Tennessee Violence in the Workplace Act (Act) because (1) there was no clear and convincing evidence that the citizen engaged in at least two acts of stalking or that the citizen engaged in intimidation, and (2) a trial court could not issue an injunction “separate and apart” from the Act, since a permanent injunction was available as a remedy only if an applicant prevailed on the merits of a claim. City of Leb. ex rel. Craighead v. Dodson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

2. Double Jeopardy.

Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from being punished for multiple counts of stalking for actions, although separate, that constitute only one offense of stalking. State v. Vigil, 65 S.W.3d 26, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 801 (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2001).

3. Evidence.

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for stalking because the evidence failed to establish that the victim experienced significant mental suffering or emotional distress, or that the victim subjectively and actually felt terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested when the victim posted disparaging signs about the victim on the victim's private property and on the property of the victim's employer, followed the victim on one occasion in a vehicle, and sent insulting text messages to the victim. State v. Flowers, 512 S.W.3d 161, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 981 (Tenn. Dec. 30, 2016).

Although the evidence showed that defendant terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, or harassed the victim, there was insufficient evidence that defendant had received the ex parte protection order and knew he was violating such an order, and thus, did not support a conviction for aggravated stalking, but only stalking. State v. Stephens, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2016), rev'd, 521 S.W.3d 718, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. June 16, 2017).

Defendant's appearance in the employee parking lot of plaintiff's employer was an act of unconsented contact even though defendant did not have direct contact with plaintiff on that occasion Purifoy v. Mafa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Defendant's Facebook rants to plaintiff fell within the definition of “unconsented contact” in form of electronic communication to plaintiff that were initiated without her consent and continued in disregard of her expressed desire that the contract be discontinued, and thus, supported the trial court's finding of stalking and grant of an order of protection. Purifoy v. Mafa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Plaintiff experienced “emotional distress” as required by the definition of “harassment,” as it related to stalking, as she felt defendant had become obsessed with her and was scared, a video he made made repeated references to her appearance, and his presence in the employee parking lot of her place of employment caused her to become alarmed and afraid. Purifoy v. Mafa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Evidence that defendant had unconsented contact with the victim when she growled at her, followed the victim to her car after a meeting, glared at the victim from the driveway, used her car to inch up in front of the victim's home and take pictures of the victim, blocked the victim's driveway with her car, and mocked the victim's incontinence was sufficient to support defendant's stalking conviction. State v. Goldberg, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2019).

39-17-316. Noise control at sport shooting ranges.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Local unit of government” means a county, municipality, metropolitan government, or other entity of local government;
    2. “Person” means an individual, proprietorship, partnership, corporation, club, or other legal entity; and
    3. “Sport shooting range” or “range” means an area designed and operated for the use of rifles, shotguns, pistols, silhouettes, skeet, trap, black powder, archery, or any other shooting activity.
    1. A person who operates or uses a sport shooting range is not subject to civil or criminal liability for noise or noise pollution, nuisance or any other claim not involving physical injury to another human, resulting from the operation or use of the sport shooting range as a sport shooting range if the sport shooting range is in compliance with any applicable noise control laws, resolutions, ordinances or regulations issued by a unit of local government, that applied to the range at the time that the range began operation.
    2. A person or entity that operates or uses a sport shooting range is not subject to an action for nuisance, abatement, or any other type of action or proceeding which would have the effect of limiting, reducing, eliminating or enjoining the use or operation of the sport shooting range as a sport shooting range if the sport shooting range is in compliance with any applicable noise control laws, resolutions, ordinances or regulations issued by a unit of local government, that applied to the range and its operation at the time that the range began operation.
    3. A person who subsequently acquires title to or who owns real property adversely affected by the use of property with a sport shooting range shall not maintain any action against the owner of the range to restrain, enjoin, or impede the use of the range except to the extent allowed by this section.
    4. Rules or regulations adopted by any state department or agency for limiting levels of noise in terms of decibel level that may occur in the outdoor atmosphere shall not apply to a sport shooting range exempted from liability under this section.
    5. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, nothing in this section shall be construed to limit civil liability for compensatory damage arising from physical injury to another human, physical injury to tangible personal property, or physical injury to fixtures or structures placed on real property.
  2. To the extent that any sport shooting range has been issued permission, whether by special exception, variance, or otherwise, by any entity having zoning or zoning appeal authority to operate as a range, the right to operate as a range shall not be amended, restricted, or terminated due to a change of circumstances regarding the use of adjacent or surrounding properties. Further, with respect to any sport shooting range that is open to the public and was in continuous operation for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding December 16, 2008, the right to operate as a shooting range shall not be amended, restricted or terminated due to any land use planning or zoning applicable to the shooting range's location if:
    1. The shooting positions operate no closer than:
      1. One hundred fifty feet (150') from any adjoining boundary line or county road that extends from the southeast corner to the southwest corner;
      2. One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining boundary line that extends from the southwest corner to the northwest corner;
      3. One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining boundary line that extends from the northwest corner to the northeast corner;
      4. One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining boundary line or county road that extends from the northeast corner to the southeast corner; and
      5. One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining residential property boundary line, notwithstanding subdivisions (c)(1)(A)-(D); and
    2. Any vegetation between the appropriate distance requirement described in subdivision (c)(1) and the adjoining boundary line or county road remains undisturbed.
  3. With respect to any range that is open to the public and that begins operation after July 1, 2004, and for which there are no local zoning resolutions, ordinances or regulations affecting its establishment as a sport shooting range as of the date it began operation, the range shall not be protected by the exemptions from nuisance actions contained herein until one (1) year after the date the sport shooting range begins operation.

Acts 1995, ch. 308, §§ 1, 2; 2004, ch. 694, § 1; 2009, ch. 227, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 227, § 2 provided that the act, which amended § 39-17-316(c), shall apply to any existing or future enforcement actions by a governmental entity, including any pending actions for which the time for final appeals has not expired and for which a final order or judgment has not been entered by the court.

Acts 1995, ch. 308, § 3 provided that this section does not affect rights or duties that matured liabilities or penalties that were incurred, or proceedings begun before July 1, 1995.

Cross-References. Law enforcement shooting ranges, § 38-8-116.

Attorney General Opinions. Application of zoning to sport shooting ranges under T.C.A. § 39-17-316(c).  OAG 10-50, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 50 (4/14/10).

39-17-317. Disorderly conduct at funerals.

  1. A person commits the offense of interfering with a funeral or burial, funeral home viewing of a deceased person, funeral procession, or funeral or memorial service for a deceased person, if the person acts to obstruct or interfere with such commemorative service by making any utterance, gesture, or display in a manner offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinary person. Picketing, protesting, or demonstrating at a funeral or memorial service shall be deemed offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinary person.
  2. This section shall only apply to acts within five hundred feet (500') of a funeral or burial, funeral home viewing of a deceased person, funeral procession, or funeral or memorial service for a deceased person.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 2006, ch. 543, § 1; 2011, ch. 373, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-318. Unlawful exposure.

  1. A person commits unlawful exposure who, with the intent to cause emotional distress, distributes an image of the intimate part or parts of another identifiable person if:
    1. The image was photographed or recorded under circumstances where the parties agreed or understood that the image would remain private; and
    2. The person depicted in the image suffers emotional distress.
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “Emotional distress” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-17-315; and
    2. “Intimate part” means any portion of the primary genital area, buttock, or any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola that is either uncovered or visible through less than fully opaque clothing.
  3. Nothing in this section precludes punishment under any other section of law providing for greater punishment.
  4. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 2016, ch. 872, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Part 4
Drugs

39-17-401. Tennessee Drug Control Act.

  1. This part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4 shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1989.”
  2. Except as otherwise expressly permitted by state law, the state preempts the entire field of determining the appropriate sanction for conduct involving a drug or other substance that is classified by this part or title 53, chapter 11, as a Class A or B misdemeanor or a Class A, B, C, D, or E felony. No county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan form of government has the authority by ordinance, resolution, regulation, or other local law to enact or adopt a sanction for conduct involving a drug or other substance if the sanction for that conduct is established by this part or title 53, chapter 11, as a criminal offense other than a Class C misdemeanor. Any ordinance, resolution, regulation, or other local law enacted or adopted prior to April 12, 2017, regulating drugs and other substances that is inconsistent with this part and title 53, chapter 11, is superseded and repealed. Any policy, guideline, or practice of any agency, department, or employee of a county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan form of government that regulates or permits the enforcement of conduct covered by this subsection (b) in a manner inconsistent with state law is void.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2017, ch. 124, § 1.

Cross-References. Confiscation of property due to illegal drug-related activities, title 53, ch. 11, part 2.

Controlled substance monitoring, title 53, ch. 10, part 3.

Disposition of proceeds, § 53-11-204.

Drug crimes, fines and forfeitures, § 39-17-420.

Enforcement powers of department of safety, § 65-15-106.

Goods subject to forfeiture, § 53-11-451.

Lodging establishments, conduct of guests, title 68, ch. 14, part 6.

Real property subject to forfeiture, § 53-11-452.

School drug testing, student assistance program; counseling, § 49-6-4213.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 291 (2013).

Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (2000).

Forfeitures Under the Tennessee Drug Control Act (Lewis L. Laska), 16 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 431 (1986).

Joint Authority? The Case For State-Based Marijuana Regulation, 8 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 44 (2012).

On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421 (2009).

States Are Making Their Own Decisions Regarding Whether Marijuana Should Be Illegal: How Should The Federal Government React?, 9 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 233 (2013).

The Need For Prescription Drug Buy-Back Programs, 6 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 103 (2010).

Urine Trouble! Extending Constitutionality to Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students in Extracurricular Activities, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 387 (2000).

Attorney General Opinions. Fines imposed for simple possession under the Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1989, OAG 91-82 (9/4/91).

39-17-402. Definitions for this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4.

As used in this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Administer” means the direct application of a controlled substance, whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means, to the body of a patient or research subject by:
    1. A practitioner or by the practitioner's authorized agent in the practitioner's presence; or
    2. The patient or research subject at the direction and in the presence of the practitioner;
  2. “Agent” means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser. “Agent” does not include a common or contract carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of the carrier or warehouseman;
  3. “Bureau” means the United States drug enforcement administration, United States department of justice, or its successor agency, except when used as the Tennessee bureau of investigation;
  4. “Controlled substance” means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through VII of §§ 39-17-403 – 39-17-416;
  5. “Counterfeit substance” means a controlled substance which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, number or device, or any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer, distributor or dispenser other than the person who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the substance;
  6. “Deliver” or “delivery” means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship;
  7. “Dispense” means to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the prescribing, administering, packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for that delivery;
  8. “Dispenser” means a practitioner who dispenses;
  9. “Distribute” means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance;
  10. “Distributor” means a person who distributes;
  11. “Drug” means:
    1. Substances recognized as drugs in the United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homeopaths Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them;
    2. Substances intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or animal;
    3. Substances, other than food, intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or animal; and
    4. Substances intended for use as a component of any article specified in subdivision (11)(A), (B) or (C). “Drug” does not include devices or their components, parts, or accessories;
  12. “Drug paraphernalia” means all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body, a controlled substance as defined in subdivision (4). “Drug paraphernalia” includes, but is not limited to:
    1. Isomerization devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in increasing the potency of any species of plant that is a controlled substance;
    2. Testing equipment used, intended for use, or designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness or purity of controlled substances; and
    3. Objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing marijuana, marijuana concentrates, marijuana oil, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human body, such as:
      1. Metal, acrylic, glass, stone, or plastic pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls;
      2. Water pipes;
      3. Carburetion tubes and devices;
      4. Smoking and carburetion masks;
      5. Chamber pipes;
      6. Carburetor pipes;
      7. Electric pipes;
      8. Chillums;
      9. Bongs; and
      10. Ice pipes or chillers;
  13. “Immediate methamphetamine precursor” means ephedrine, pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers or salts of isomers, or any drug or other product that contains a detectable quantity of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers or salts of isomers;
  14. “Immediate precursor” means a substance that the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, has found to be and by rule designates as being the principal compound commonly used or produced primarily for use, and that is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit manufacture;
  15. “Manufacture” means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container, except that “manufacture” does not include the preparation or compounding of a controlled substance by an individual for the individual's own use or the preparation, compounding, packaging, or labeling of a controlled substance by:
    1. A practitioner as an incident to administering or dispensing a controlled substance in the course of professional practice; or
    2. A practitioner, or an authorized agent under the practitioner's supervision, for the purpose of, or as an incident to, research, teaching or chemical analysis and not for sale;
    1. “Marijuana” means all parts of the plant cannabis, whether growing or not; the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, including concentrates and oils, its seeds or resin;
    2. “Marijuana” does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted from the mature stalks, fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seeds of the plant which are incapable of germination;
    3. “Marijuana” also does not include hemp, as defined in § 43-27-101;
    4. The term “marijuana” does not include a cannabidiol product approved as a prescription medication by the United States food and drug administration;
    5. The term “marijuana” does not include cannabis oil containing the substance cannabidiol, with less than six tenths of one percent (0.6%) of tetrahydrocannabinol, including the necessary seeds and plants, when manufactured, processed, transferred, dispensed, or possessed by a four-year public or private institution of higher education certified by the drug enforcement administration located in the state as part of a clinical research study on the treatment of intractable seizures, cancer, or other diseases; and
    6. The term “marijuana” does not include oil containing the substance cannabidiol, with less than nine-tenths of one percent (0.9%) of tetrahydrocannabinol, if:
      1. The bottle containing the oil is labeled by the manufacturer as containing cannabidiol in an amount less than nine-tenths of one percent (0.9%) of tetrahydrocannabinol; and
      2. The person in possession of the oil retains:
  1. Proof of the legal order or recommendation from the issuing state; and
  2. Proof that the person or the person's immediate family member has been diagnosed with intractable seizures or epilepsy by a medical doctor or doctor of osteopathic medicine who is licensed to practice medicine in the state of Tennessee;

“Narcotic drug” means any of the following, whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:

Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium or opiate;

Any salt, compound, isomer, derivative, or preparation thereof that is chemically equivalent or identical with any of the substances referred to in subdivision (17)(A), but not including the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium;

Opium poppy and poppy straw; and

Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, isomer, derivative, or preparation thereof that is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, but not including decocainized coca leaves or extractions of coca leaves that do not contain cocaine or ecgonine;

“Opiate” means any substance having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability. “Opiate” does not include, unless specifically designated as controlled under § 39-17-403, the dextrorotatory isomer of 3-methozy-methyl-morphinan and its salts (dextromethorphan). “Opiate” does not include its racemic and levorotatory forms;

“Opium poppy” means the plant of the species papaver somniferum 1 , except its seeds;

“Person” means an individual, corporation, governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association or any other legal entity;

“Pharmacist” means a licensed pharmacist as defined by the laws of this state, and where the context so requires, the owner of a store or other place of business where controlled substances are compounded or dispensed by a licensed pharmacist; but nothing in this part or title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4 shall be construed as conferring on a person who is not registered or licensed as a pharmacist any authority, right or privilege that is not granted to that person by the pharmacy laws of this state;

“Poppy straw” means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium poppy after mowing;

“Practitioner” means:

A physician, dentist, optometrist, veterinarian, scientific investigator or other person licensed, registered or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in this state; or

A pharmacy, hospital or other institution licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in this state;

“Production” includes the manufacturing, planting, cultivating, growing or harvesting of a controlled substance;

“State,” when applied to a part of the United States, includes any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession thereof, and any area subject to the legal authority of the United States;

“Ultimate user” means a person who lawfully possesses a controlled substance for the person's own use or for the use of a member of the person's household or for the administering to an animal owned by the person or by a member of the person's household; and

“Wholesaler” means a person who supplies a controlled substance that the person has not produced or prepared, on official written orders, but not on prescriptions.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1993, ch. 295, § 8; 2005, ch. 18, § 9; 2010, ch. 1100, § 65; 2012, ch. 575, § 2; 2012, ch. 848, § 97; 2014, ch. 916, § 1; 2014 ch. 936, § 1; 2015, ch. 352, § 1; 2016, ch. 873, §§ 1, 2; 2017, ch. 120, § 1; 2018, ch. 1041, § 1; 2019, ch. 87, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is a restatement of prior § 39-6-402. No changes were made in the substantive language.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 1 provided that the act may be cited as the “Meth-Free Tennessee Act of 2005”.

Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

For the preamble to the act concerning growing of industrial hemp, please refer to Acts 2014, ch. 916.

Acts 2014, ch. 936, § 2 provided that any physician conducting a clinical research study on the treatment of intractable seizures at a facility described in § 39-17-402(16)(A) shall report the results of such study, including in- formation on the number of patients involved, the parameters of the study and the outcomes of each patient, to the commissioner of health, the speaker of the house of representatives and the speaker of the senate by January 15, 2018.

Acts 2014, ch. 936, § 3 provided that on July 1, 2018, the provision of Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 39-17-402, amended by Section 1 shall be revived with its language as it was in effect on April 9, 2014; provided, that such revival shall not repeal or delete any amendment to Section 39-17-402 by Public Chapter 916 of the Acts of 2014 [Senate Bill 2495/House Bill 2445].

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (E) and (F) in the definition of “marijuana”.

The 2019 amendment substituted “hemp” for “industrial hemp” and substituted “§ 43-27-101” for “§ 43-26-102” in (C) of the definition of “Marijuana”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1041, § 2. July 1, 2018 at 12:01 a.m.

Acts 2019, ch. 87, § 13. April 4, 2019.

Cross-References. Factors determining whether object is drug paraphernalia, § 39-17-424.

Law Reviews.

Reefer Madness: How Tennessee Can Provide Cannabis Oil Patients Protection from Workplace Discrimination, 47 U. Mem. L. Rev. 935 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Drug Paraphernalia.

A trial court should admit the types of evidence listed in T.C.A. § 39-17-424 to demonstrate that the object at issue is classifiable as drug paraphernalia as defined in T.C.A. § 39-17-402, but the court may do so only to the extent that the proffered evidence otherwise meets all of the requirements for admissibility under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2001).

The only conceivable circumstance in which evidence of prior crimes would have any probative value on whether an object is properly classified as “drug paraphernalia” is to show that the object at issue is capable of being used as drug paraphernalia, as evidenced by the defendant's convictions for uses of the same or similar objects for illicit purposes. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2001).

2. Delivery.

Despite that defendant was blind, evidence showed that he orchestrated drug transfers which, at a minimum, constituted constructive delivery. State v. Thornton, 10 S.W.3d 229, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1045 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2000).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school, rather than a casual exchange, because, despite the small amount of drugs and money involved in each transaction, it could not have been said that these transactions were without design. Defendant twice arranged to meet with a confidential informant outside of their usual social gatherings; moreover, he also set the price and the amount of the controlled substance and instructed her on how to consume the mushrooms at a later time. State v. Peters, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for delivery of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine because a confidential informant recorded a meeting in defendant's car, defendant in the recording referenced a baggie containing “0.7” rather than “0.5” and said, “Here you go,” the informant dropped the drugs the informant received inside the car, defendant fled when police officers arrived and defendant wrecked defendant's car, and police officers located in the car methamphetamine and the cash that was given to the informant. State v. Pollard, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 937 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

3. Manufacture.

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 53-11-410(a), it is defendant's burden to prove the exception that he manufactured the drug for his own use, as stated in T.C.A. § 39-17-402(14) (now (15)). While defendant testified that he had only manufactured methamphetamine for his own personal use, the jury obviously chose not to believe him. State v. Magness, 165 S.W.3d 300, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).

4. Evidence Sufficient.

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's drug and conspiracy convictions because (1) a jury could infer from evidence that a portion of the substance defendant sold was cocaine that the entire substance was cocaine, and (2) the evidence showed defendant's implied understanding with a co-defendant. State v. Murchison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for conspiracy to sell more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and conspiracy to deliver more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school where it showed that he personally sold cocaine to the confidential informant on several occasions, he communicated with his co-defendant about selling cocaine to the informant, he was present for a buy between the co-defendant and the informant at a carwash, he discussed the co-defendant's drug prices with the informant, and acted as a drug courier between the co-defendant and the informant. State v. Graham, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant because a rational juror could have found that he knowingly sold and delivered more than .5 grams of cocaine to a confidential informant; the informant called defendant arranged to purchase some drugs from him and gave him pre-marked $ 20 bills in exchange for the drugs, which tested positive for more than .5 grams of cocaine, and during a traffic stop, defendant had the same amount of money in the same denominations as the informant gave him. State v. Blackman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine because the officers found tubing, acetone, glass jars, and coffee filters, all of which were used in the manufacturing process, residue on one of the jars field-tested positive for methamphetamine, and the officers found multiple items of paraphernalia in the room that were associated with the use of methamphetamine. State v. Madewell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of morphine with the intent to sell or deliver because it showed that both the rifle and the drink can containing 0.5 grams of morphine were found within five to seven feet from where an officer saw defendant prior to his arrest, the can was cut to form a bowl to heat the morphine and inject the drugs intravenously, and the officer believed there was a significant amount of morphine that defendant was going to distribute to the three individuals who were in the home prior to the arrest. State v. Alexander, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to sell or deliver a controlled substance because it showed that a confidential informant (CI) purchased oxycodone and heroin from defendant on two occasions, defendant was seen on two separate occasions getting into the CI's car and going to another man's house to purchase heroin for the CI, the drugs provided by the CI were tested and determined to be oxycodone and heroin, and the testimony at trial revealed that on two separate occasions defendant purchased heroin from another man to sell to the CI. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2020).

39-17-403. Power to schedule dangerous drugs — Federal determination — Exclusions — Revision and publication of schedules.

  1. The commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall administer this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4, and may add substances to or delete or reschedule all substances enumerated in the schedules in this part, pursuant to the procedures of the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services upon the agreement of the commissioner of health. In making a determination regarding a substance, the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall consider the following:
    1. The actual or relative potential for abuse;
    2. The scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known;
    3. The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance;
    4. The history and current pattern of abuse;
    5. The scope, duration and significance of abuse;
    6. The risk to the public health;
    7. The potential of the substance to produce psychic or physiological dependence liability; and
    8. Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under this section.
  2. After considering the factors enumerated in subsection (a), the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall make findings with respect thereto and issue a rule controlling the substance if the findings show the substance has a potential for abuse.
  3. If the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, designates a substance as an immediate precursor, substances that are precursors of the controlled precursor shall not be subject to control solely because they are precursors of the controlled precursor.
  4. If any substance is designated, rescheduled, or deleted as a controlled substance under federal law and notice thereof is given to the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, the commissioner, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall similarly control the substance under this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4 after the expiration of thirty (30) days from publication in the Federal Register of a final order designating a substance as a controlled substance or rescheduling or deleting a substance, unless within that thirty-day period, the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, objects to inclusion, rescheduling or deletion. In that case, the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall publish the reasons for objection and afford all interested parties an opportunity to be heard. At the conclusion of the hearing, the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall publish a decision, which shall be final unless altered by statute. Upon publication of objection to inclusion, rescheduling, or deletion under this part, and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4 by the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, control under this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4 is stayed until a decision in the matter is published.
  5. Authority to control under this section does not extend to distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages or tobacco as those terms are defined or used elsewhere in this code.
  6. The commissioner shall exclude the following from a schedule:
    1. Hemp, as defined in § 43-27-101; and
    2. Any nonnarcotic substance if, under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, compiled in 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., and the laws of this state, the substance may be lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription.
  7. The commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, in cooperation with the board of pharmacy, and in consultation with the director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation, shall revise and republish the schedules annually.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2010, ch. 1100, § 65; 2012, ch. 575, § 2; 2018, ch. 1040, § 1; 2019, ch. 87, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, in (g), inserted “, and in consultation with the director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation,”.

The 2019 amendment, in (f), divided the former subsection into the present introductory language and (f)(2) by adding “the following from a schedule:” at the end of the present introductory language; added (f)(1); and, in present (f)(2),  substituted  “if, under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, compiled in 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.,” for “from a schedule if the substance may, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.),” and inserted “the substance may”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1040, § 13. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 87, § 13. April 4, 2019.

39-17-404. Name of drug.

  1. The controlled substances listed or to be listed in the schedules in this part are included by whatever official, common, usual, chemical, or trade name designated.
  2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the following are excluded from all schedules:
    1. Non-narcotic substances excluded under 21 CFR 1308.22, as amended;
    2. Chemical preparations exempted under 21 CFR 1308.24, as amended;
    3. Veterinary anabolic steroid implant products excluded under 21 CFR 1308.26, as amended;
    4. Prescription products exempted under 21 CFR 1308.32, as amended;
    5. Anabolic steroid products exempted under 21 CFR 1308.34, as amended; and
    6. Certain cannabis plant material, and products made from such material, that contain tetrahydrocannabinols and that are exempted under 21 CFR 1308.35, as amended.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2018, ch. 1040, § 2.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1040, § 13. July 1, 2018.

39-17-405. Criteria for Schedule I.

The commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall place a substance in Schedule I upon finding that the substance has:

  1. High potential for abuse; and
  2. No accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2010, ch. 1100, § 65; 2012, ch. 575, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

39-17-406. Controlled substances in Schedule I.

  1. Schedule I consists of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Opiates, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the specific chemical designation; provided, that for the purposes of subdivision (b)(48)(B)(xv), 3-Methylfentanyl, only, “isomer” includes the optical and geometric isomers:
    1. Acetylmethadol;
    2. Allylprodine;
    3. Alphacetylmethadol (except levo-alphacetylmethadol, also known as levo-alpha-acetylmethadol; levomethadyl acetate; or LAAM);
    4. Alphameprodine;
    5. Alphamethadol;
    6. Benzethidine;
    7. Betacetylmethadol;
    8. Betameprodine;
    9. Betamethadol;
    10. Betaprodine;
    11. Clonitazene;
    12. Dextromoramide;
    13. Diampromide;
    14. Diethylthiambutene;
    15. Difenoxin;
    16. Dimenoxadol;
    17. Dimepheptanol;
    18. Dimethylthiambutene;
    19. Dioxaphetyl butyrate;
    20. Dipipanone;
    21. Ethylmethylthiambutene;
    22. Etonitazene;
    23. Etoxeridine;
    24. Furethidine;
    25. Hydroxypethidine;
    26. Ketobemidone;
    27. Levomoramide;
    28. Levophenacylmorphan;
    29. Morpheridine;
    30. MPPP (1-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine);
    31. Noracymethadol;
    32. Norlevorphanol;
    33. Normethadone;
    34. Norpipanone;
    35. PEPAP (1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-phenyl-4-acetoxypiperidine);
    36. Phenadoxone;
    37. Phenampromide;
    38. Phenomorphan;
    39. Phenoperidine;
    40. Piritramide;
    41. Proheptazine;
    42. Properidine;
    43. Propiram;
    44. Racemoramide;
    45. Tilidine;
    46. Trimeperidine;
    47. U-47700; or
    48. Fentanyl derivatives and analogues:
      1. Unless specifically excepted, listed in another schedule, or contained within a pharmaceutical product approved by the United States food and drug administration, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation, including its salts, isomers, esters, or ethers, and salts of isomers, esters, or ethers, whenever the existence of such salts is possible within any of the following specific chemical designations containing a 4-anilidopiperidine structure:
        1. With or without substitution at the carbonyl of the aniline moiety with alkyl, alkenyl, carboalkoxy, cycloalkyl, methoxyalkyl, cyanoalkyl, or aryl groups, or furanyl, dihydrofuranyl, benzyl moiety, or rings containing heteroatoms sulfur, oxygen, or nitrogen;
        2. With or without substitution at the piperidine amino moiety with a phenethyl, benzyl, alkylaryl (including heteroaromatics), alkyltetrazolyl ring, or an alkyl or carbomethoxy group, whether or not further substituted in the ring or group;
        3. With or without substitution or addition to the piperdine ring to any extent with one or more methyl, carbomethoxy, methoxy, methoxymethyl, aryl, allyl, or ester groups;
        4. With or without substitution of one or more hydrogen atoms for halogens, or methyl, alkyl, or methoxy groups, in the aromatic ring of the anilide moiety;
        5. With or without substitution at the alpha or beta position of the piperidine ring with alkyl, hydroxyl, or methoxy groups;
        6. With or without substitution of the benzene ring of the anilide moiety for an aromatic heterocycle; or
        7. With or without substitution of the piperidine ring for a pyrrolidine ring, perhydroazepine ring, or azepine ring; and
      2. The application of subdivision (b)(48)(A) includes, but is not limited to, any of the following:
        1. Acetylfentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylacetamide);
        2. Acetyl-alpha-methylfentanyl (N-[1-(1-methyl-2-phenethyl)-4-piperidnyl]-N-phenyl-acetamide);
        3. Acryl fentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylacrylamide);
        4. Alpha-methylfentanyl (N-[1-(alpha-methyl-beta-phenyl)ethyl-4-piperidyl]propionanilide; 1-(1-methyl-2-phenylethyl)-4-(N-propanilido)piperidine);
        5. Alpha-methylthiofentanyl (N-[1-methyl-2-(2-thienyl)ethyl-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);
        6. Benzodioxolefentanyl;
        7. Beta-hydroxyfentanyl (N-[1-(2-hydroxy-2-phenethyl)-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);
        8. Beta-hydroxythiofentanyl (N-[1-[2-hydroxy-2-(thiophen-2-yl)ethyl]piperidin-4-yl]-N-phenylpropionamide); N-[1-[2-hydroxy-2-(2-thienyl)ethyl]-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);
        9. Beta-hydroxy-3-methylfentanyl (N-[1-(2-hydroxy-2-phenethyl)-3-methyl-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);
        10. Butyrylfentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylbutyramide; N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylbutanamide);
        11. Cyclopentyl fentanyl;
        12. Isobutyryl fentanyl;
        13. Furanyl fentanyl;
        14. Lofentanil;
        15. 3-Methylfentanyl (N-[3-methyl-1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);
        16. 3-Methylthiofentanyl (N-[3-methyl-1-(2-thienyl)ethyl-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);
        17. Ocfentanil;
        18. Ohmefentanyl;
        19. Para-fluorofentanyl (N-(4-fluorophenyl)-N-[1-(2-phenethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide);
        20. Para-fluoroisobutyryl fentanyl (N-(4-fluorophenyl)-N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)isobutyramide; 4-fluoroisobutyryl fentanyl;
        21. Pentanoyl fentanyl;
        22. Thiofentanyl; or
        23. Valeryl fentanyl.
  3. Opium derivatives, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any of the following opium derivatives, its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. Acetorphine;
    2. Acetyldihydrocodeine;
    3. Benzylmorphine;
    4. Codeine methylbromide;
    5. Codeine-N-Oxide;
    6. Cyprenorphine;
    7. Desomorphine;
    8. Dihydromorphine;
    9. Drotebanol;
    10. Etorphine (except hydrochloride salt);
    11. Heroin;
    12. Hydromorphinol;
    13. Methyldesorphine;
    14. Methyldihydromorphine;
    15. Morphine methylbromide;
    16. Morphine methylsulfonate;
    17. Morphine-N-Oxide;
    18. Myrophine;
    19. Nicocodeine;
    20. Nicomorphine;
    21. Normorphine;
    22. Pholcodine; or
    23. Thebacon.
  4. Hallucinogenic substances, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, or that contains any of its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specified chemical designation; provided, that for purposes of this subsection (d) only, “isomer” includes the optical, positional, and geometric isomers:
    1. Alpha-ethyltryptamine

      Other names: etryptamine; Monase; [alpha]-ethyl-1H-indole-3-ethanamine; 3-(2-aminobutyl) indole; [alpha]-ET; and AET; ET; Trip;

    2. Alpha-methyltryptamine

      Other name: AMT;

    3. 4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine

      Other names: 4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxy-[alpha]-methylphenethylamine; 4-bromo-2,5-DMA;

    4. 4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine

      Other names: 2-(4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)-1-aminoethane; alpha-desmethyl DOB; 2C-B; Nexus;

    5. 2-(4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)-N-(2-methoxybenzyl)ethanamine

      Other names: 25B-NBOMe; 2C-B-NBOMe; 25B; Cimbi-36;

    6. Bufotenine

      Other names: 3-([beta]-Dimethylaminoethyl)-5-hydroxyindole; 3-(2 dimethylaminoethyl)-5-indolol; N,N-dimethylserotonin; 5-hydroxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine; mappine;

    7. 2-(4-Chloro-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)-N-(2-methoxybenzyl)ethanamine

      Other names: 25C-NBOMe; 2C-C-NBOMe; 25C; Cimbi-82;

    8. Diethyltryptamine

      Other names: N,N-Diethyltryptamine; DET;

    9. 2,5-Dimethoxyamphetamine

      Other names: 2,5-Dimethoxy-[alpha]-methylphenethylamine; 2,5-DMA;

    10. 2,5-Dimethoxy-4-ethylamphetamine

      Other name: DOET;

    11. 2,5 Dimethoxy-4-(n)-propylthiophenethylamine

      Other name: 2C-T-7;

    12. Dimethyltryptamine

      Other name: DMT;

    13. Ethylamine analogue of phencyclidine

      Other names: N-Ethyl-1-phenylcyclohexylamine; (1-phenylcyclohexyl)ethylamine; N-(1-phenylcyclohexyl)ethylamine; cyclohexamine; PCE;

    14. Ibogaine

      Other names: 7-Ethyl-6,6[beta],7,8,9,10,12,13-octahydro-2-methoxy-6,9-methano-5H-pyrido [1',2':1,2]azepino[5,4-b]indole; Tabenanthe iboga;

    15. 2-(4-iodo-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)-N-(2-methoxybenzyl)ethanamine

      Other names: 25I-NBOMe; 2C-I-NBOMe; 25I; Cimbi-5;

    16. Lysergic acid diethylamide

      Other name: LSD;

    17. Mescaline

      Other name: Constituent of “Peyote” cacti;

    18. 4-Methoxyamphetamine

      Other names: 4-methoxy-[alpha]-methylphenethylamine; paramethoxyamphetamine; PMA;

    19. 5-Methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine;
    20. 5-Methoxy-N,N-diisopropyltryptamine

      Other name: 5-MeO-DIPT;

    21. 5-methoxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine

      Other names: 5-methoxy-3-[2-(dimethylamino)ethyl]indole; 5-MeO-DMT;

    22. 4-Methyl-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine

      Other names: 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-[alpha]-methylphenethylamine; DOM; STP;

    23. 3,4-Methylenedioxyamphetamine;
    24. 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine

      Other name: MDMA;

    25. 3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-ethylamphetamine

      Other names: N-ethyl-alpha-methyl 3,4(methylenedioxy) phenethylamine; N-ethyl MDA; MDE; MDEA;

    26. 3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-methylcathinone

      Other name: Methylone;

    27. N-Ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;
    28. N-Hydroxy-3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine

      Other names: N-hydroxy-alpha-methyl-3,4(methylenedioxy)phenethylamine; N-hydroxy MDA;

    29. N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;
    30. Parahexyl

      Other names: 3-Hexyl-1-hydroxy-7,8,9,10-tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-6H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran; Synhexyl;

    31. Peyote

      Meaning all parts of the plant presently classified botanically as Lophophora williamsii Lamaire, whether growing or not, the seeds thereof, any extract from any part of such plant, and every compound, manufacture, salts, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant or its seeds or extracts (Interprets 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Schedule l(c)(12));

    32. Psilocybin (constituent of magic mushrooms);
    33. Psilocyn (constituent of magic mushrooms);
    34. Pyrrolidine analogue of phencyclidine (1-(1-phenylcyclohexyl)-pyrrolidine)

      Other names: PCPy; PHP;

    35. 1-[1-(2-Thienyl)cyclohexyl]pyrrolidine

      Other name: TCPy;

    36. 4-Methylmethcathinone

      Other names: mephedrone; methpadrone; 4-MMC;

    37. 3,4-Methylenedioxypyrovalerone

      Other name: MDPV;

    38. 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-ethylphenyl)ethanamine (2C-E);
    39. 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-methylphenyl)ethanamine (2C-D);
    40. 2-(4-Chloro-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C-C);
    41. 2-(4-Iodo-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C-I);
    42. 2-[4-Ethylthio-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl]ethanamine (2C-T-2);
    43. 2-[4-(Isopropylthio)-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl]ethanamine (2C-T-4);
    44. 2-(2,5-Dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C-H);
    45. 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-nitro-phenyl)ethanamine (2C-N);
    46. 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-(n)-propylphenyl)ethanamine (2C-P);
    47. Thiophene analogue of phencyclidine

      Other names: 1-[1-(2-thienyl)cyclohexyl]piperidine; 2-thienylanalog of phencyclidine; TPCP; TCP;

    48. 3,4,5-Trimethoxyamphetamine;
    49. (1-Pentyl-1H-indol-3-yl)(2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropyl)methanone

      Other names: UR-144; 1-pentyl-3-(2,2,3,3 tetramethylcyclopropoyl)indole; or

    50. [1-(5-Fluoro-pentyl)-1H-indol-3-yl](2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropyl) methanone

      Other names: 5-fluoro-UR-144; 5-F-UR-144; XLR-11 1-(5-fluoro-pentyl)-3- (2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropoyl)indole.

  5. Depressants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specified chemical designation:
    1. Etizolam

      Other names: Etilaam, Etizola, Sedekopan, Pasaden, Depas;

    2. Gamma-hydroxybutyric acid

      Other names: GHB; gamma-hydroxybutyrate; 4-hydroxybutyrate; 4-hydroxybutanoic acid; sodium oxybate; sodium oxybutyrate;

    3. Mecloqualone; or
    4. Methaqualone.
  6. Stimulants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers:
    1. Alpha-pyrrolidinobutiophenone

      Other names: [alpha]-PBP; 1-phenyl-2-(pyrrolidin-1-yl)butan-1-one;

    2. Alpha-pyrrolidinopentiophenone

      Other names: [alpha]-PVP; [alpha]-pyrrolidinovalerophenone; 1-phenyl-2-(pyrrolidin-1-yl)pentan-1-one;

    3. Aminorex

      Other names: aminoxophen; 2-amino-5-phenyl-2-oxazoline; or 4,5-dihydro-5-phenyl-2-oxazolamine;

    4. Butylone

      Other names: bk-MBDB; 1-(1,3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-(methylamino)butan-1-one;

    5. Cathinone

      Other names: 2-amino-1-phenyl-1-propanone; alpha-aminopropiophenone; 2-aminopropiophenone; norphedrone; constituent of catha edulis or “Khat” plant;

    6. 3-Fluoro-N-methylcathinone

      Other names: 3-FMC; 1-(3-fluorophenyl)-2-(methylamino)propan-1-one;

    7. 4-Fluoro-N-methylcathinone

      Other names: 4-FMC; flephedrone; 1-(4-fluorophenyl)-2-(methylamino)propan-1-one;

    8. Fenethylline;
    9. Methcathinone

      Other names: 2-(methylamino)-propiophenone; alpha-(methylamino) propiophenone; 2-(methylamino)-1-phenylpropan-1-one; alpha-N-methylaminopropiophenone; monomethylpropion; ephedrone; N-methylcathinone; methylcathinone; AL-464; AL-422; AL-463; and UR1432;

    10. (+/-)cis-4-Methylaminorex (cis isomer)

      Other name: (+/-)cis-4,5 dihydro-4-methyl-5-phenyl-2-oxazolamine;

    11. 4-Methyl-N-ethylcathinone

      Other names: 4-MEC; 2-(ethylamino)-1-(4-methylphenyl)propan-1-one;

    12. 4-Methyl-alpha-pyrrolidinopropiophenone

      Other names: 4-MePPP; MePPP; 4-methyl-[alpha]-pyrrolidinopropiophenone; 1-(4-methylphenyl)-2-(pyrrolidin-1-yl)-propan-1-one;

    13. Naphyrone

      Other names: naphthylpyrovalerone; 1-(naphthalen-2-yl)-2-(pyrrolidin-1-yl)pentan-1-one;

    14. N-Benzylpiperazine

      Other names: BZP; 1-benzylpiperazine;

    15. N-Ethylamphetamine;
    16. N,N-Dimethylamphetamine

      Other names: N,N-alpha-trimethyl-benzeneethanamine; N,N-alpha-trimethylphenethylamine;

    17. Pentedrone

      Other names: [alpha]-methylaminovalerophenone; 2-(methylamino)-1-phenylpentan-1-one; or

    18. Pentylone

      Other names: bk-MBDP; 1-(1,3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-(methylamino)pentan-1-one.

  7. Cannabimimetic agents, unless specifically exempted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances, or that contains their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. 5-(1,1-Dimethylheptyl)-2-[(1R,3S)-3-hydroxycyclohexyl]-phenol (CP-47,497);
    2. 5-(1,1-Dimethyloctyl)-2-[(1R,3S)-3-hydroxycyclohexyl]-phenol (cannabicyclohexanol or CP-47,497 C8-homolog);
    3. 1-Pentyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-018 and AM678);
    4. 1-Butyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-073);
    5. 1-Hexyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-019);
    6. 1-[2-(4-Morpholinyl)ethyl]-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-200);
    7. 1-Pentyl-3-(2-methoxyphenylacetyl)indole (JWH-250);
    8. 1-Pentyl-3-[1-(4-methoxynaphthoyl)]indole (JWH-081);
    9. 1-Pentyl-3-(4-methyl-1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-122);
    10. 1-Pentyl-3-(4-chloro-1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-398);
    11. (1-(5-Fluoropentyl)-1H-indazol-3-yl)(naphthalen-1-yl)methanone (THJ-2201);
    12. 1-(5-Fluoropentyl)-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (AM2201);
    13. 1-(5-Fluoropentyl)-3-(2-iodobenzoyl)indole (AM694);
    14. 1-Pentyl-3-[(4-methoxy)-benzoyl]indole (SR-19 and RCS-4);
    15. 1-Cyclohexylethyl-3-(2-methoxyphenylacetyl)indole (SR-18 and RCS-8);
    16. 1-Pentyl-3-(2-chlorophenylacetyl)indole (JWH-203);
    17. Methyl 2-(1-(cyclohexylmethyl)-1h-indole-3-carboxamido)-3,3-dimethylbutanoate

      Other names: MDMB-CHMICA, MMB-CHMINACA;

    18. Methyl 2-(1-(4-fluorobenzyl)-1h-indazole-3-carboxamido)-3,3-dimethylbutanoate

      Other name: MDMB-FUBINACA;

    19. Methyl 2-(1-(5-fluoropentyl)-1h-indazole-3-carboxamido)-3-methylbutanoate

      Other name: 5F-AMB;

    20. Methyl 2-(1-(5-fluoropentyl)-1h-indazole-3-carboxamido)-3,3-dimethylbutanoate

      Other names: 5F-ADB, 5F-MDMB-PINACA;

    21. N-(1-adamantyl)-1-pentyl-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide

      Other names: APINACA; AKB48;

    22. N-(adamantan-1-yl)-1-(5-fluoropentyl)-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide

      Other names: 5F-APINACA, 5F-AKB48;

    23. N-(1-amino-3-methyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-(4-fluorobenzyl)-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide

      Other name: AB-FUBINACA;

    24. N-(1-amino-3-methyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1(cyclohexylmethyl)-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide

      Other name: AB-CHMINACA;

    25. N-(1-amino-3,3-dimethyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-(4-fluorobenzyl)1H-indazole-3-carboxamide

      Other name: ADB-FUBINACA;

    26. N-(1-amino-3,3-dimethyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-pentyl-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide

      Other name: ADB-PINACA;

    27. N-(1-amino-3-methyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-pentyl-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide

      Other name: AB-PINACA;

    28. Quinolin-8-yl 1-(5-fluoropentyl)-1H-indole-3-carboxylate

      Other names: 5-fluoro-PB-22; 5F-PB-22; or

    29. Quinolin-8-yl 1-pentyl-1H-indole-3-carboxylate

      Other names: PB-22; QUPIC.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 107, § 1; 1997, ch. 149, § 1; 2007, ch. 298, §§ 1-4; 2012, ch. 812, § 1; 2014, ch. 735, § 2; 2015, ch. 302, § 1; 2018, ch. 1040, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

No changes were made in the substantive language of this section; however, the chemical names for the drugs were updated to conform to the most recent list used by the [department of mental health and substance abuse services].

Compiler's Note. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote the section which read:“(a) Schedule I consists of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.“(b) Opiates, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the specific chemical designation; provided, that for the purposes of subdivision (b)(34), 3-Methylfentanyl, only, “isomer” includes the optical and geometric isomers:“(1) Acetyl-alpha-methylfentanyl (N-[1-(1-methyl-2-phenethyl)-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylacetamide);“(2) Acetylmethadol;“(3) Allylprodine;“(4) Alphacetylmethadol (except levo-alphacetylmethadol, also known as levo-alpha-acetylmethadol; levomethadyl acetate; or LAAM);“(5) Alphameprodine;“(6) Alphamethadol;“(7) Alpha-methylfentanyl (N-[1-(alpha-methyl-beta-phenyl) ethyl-4-piperidyl] propionanilide); 1-(1-methyl-2-phenylethyl)-4-(N-propanilido) piperidine;“(8) Alpha-methylthiofentanyl (N-[1-methyl-2-(2-thienyl) ethyl-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);“(9) Benzethidine;“(10) Betacetylmethadol;“(11) Beta-hydroxyfentanyl (N-[1-(2-hydroxy-2-phenethyl)-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);“(12) Beta-hydroxy-3-methylfentanyl“Other name: N-[1-(2-hydroxy-2-phenethyl)-3-methyl-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide;“(13) Betameprodine;“(14) Betamethadol;“(15) Betaprodine;“(16) Clonitazene;“(17) Dextromoramide;“(18) Diampromide;“(19) Diethylthiambutene;“(20) Difenoxin;“(21) Dimenoxadol;“(22) Dimepheptanol;“(23) Dimethylthiambutene;“(24) Dioxaphetyl butyrate;“(25) Dipipanone;“(26) Ethylmethylthiambutene;“(27) Etonitazene;“(28) Etoxeridine;“(29) Furethidine;“(30) Hydroxypethidine;“(31) Ketobemidone;“(32) Levomoramide;“(33) Levophenacylmorphan;“(34) 3-Methylfentanyl (N-[3-methyl-1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);“(35) 3-Methylthiofentanyl (N-[3-methyl-1-(2-thienyl)ethyl-4-piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);“(36) Morpheridine;“(37) MPPP (1-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine);“(38) Noracymethadol;“(39) Norlevorphanol;“(40) Normethadone;“(41) Norpipanone;“(42) Para-fluorofentanyl (N-(4-fluorophenyl)-N-[1-(2-phenethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide);“(43) PEPAP (1-(2-phenethyl)-4-phenyl-4-acetoxypiperidine);“(44) Phenadoxone;“(45) Phenampromide;“(46) Phenomorphan;“(47) Phenoperidine;“(48) Piritramide;“(49) Proheptazine;“(50) Properidine;“(51) Propiram;“(52) Racemoramide;“(53) Thiofentanyl (N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-thienyl)ethyl-4-piperidinyl]-propanamide);“(54) Tilidine; or“(55) Trimeperidine.“(c) Opium derivatives, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any of the following opium derivatives, its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:“(1) Acetorphine;“(2) Acetyldihydrocodeine;“(3) Benzylmorphine;“(4) Codeine methylbromide;“(5) Codeine-N-Oxide;“(6) Cyprenorphine;“(7) Desomorphine;“(8) Dihydromorphine;“(9) Drotebanol;“(10) Etorphine (except hydrochloride salt);“(11) Heroin;“(12) Hydromorphinol;“(13) Methyldesorphine;“(14) Methyldihydromorphine;“(15) Morphine methylbromide;“(16) Morphine methylsulfonate;“(17) Morphine-N-Oxide;“(18) Myrophine;“(19) Nicocodeine;“(20) Nicomorphine;“(21) Normorphine;“(22) Pholcodine; or“(23) Thebacon.“(d) Hallucinogenic substances, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, or that contains any of its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specified chemical designation; provided, that for purposes of this subsection (d) only, “isomer” includes the optical, positional, and geometric isomers:“(1) Alpha-ethyltryptamine“Other names: etryptamine; Monase; [alpha]-ethyl-1H-indole-3-ethanamine; 3-(2- aminobutyl) indole; [alpha]-ET; and AET; ET; Trip;“(2) Alpha-methyltryptamine“Other name: AMT;“(3) 4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine“Other names: 4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxy-[alpha]-methylphenethylamine; 4-bromo-2,5-DMA;“(4) 4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine“Other names: 2-(4-bromo-2, 5-dimethoxyphenyl)-1-aminoethane; alpha-desmethyl DOB; 2C-B; Nexus;“(5) 2-(4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)-N-(2-methoxybenzyl)ethanamine“Other names: 25B-NBOMe; 2C-B-NBOMe; 25B; Cimbi-36;“(6) Bufotenine“Other names: 3-([beta]-Dimethylaminoethyl)-5-hydroxyindole; 3-(2-dimethylaminoethyl) 5-indolol; N,N-dimethylserotonin; 5-hydroxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine; mappine;“(7) 2-(4-Chloro-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)-N-(2-methoxybenzyl)ethanamine“Other names: 25C-NBOMe; 2C-C-NBOMe; 25C; Cimbi-82;“(8) Diethyltryptamine“Other names: N,N-Diethyltryptamine; DET;“(9) 2,5-Dimethoxyamphetamine“Other names: 2,5-Dimethoxy-[alpha]-methylphenethylamine; 2,5-DMA;“(10) 2,5-Dimethoxy-4-ethylamphetamine“Other name: DOET;“(11) 2,5-Dimethoxy-4-(n)-propylthiophenethylamine“Other name: 2C-T-7;“(12) Dimethyltryptamine“Other name: DMT;“(13) Ethylamine analog of phencyclidine“Other names: N-Ethyl-1-phenylcyclohexylamine; (1-phenylcyclohexyl) ethylamine; N-(1-phenylcyclohexyl) ethylamine; cyclohexamine; PCE;“(14) Ibogaine“Other names: 7-Ethyl-6,6[beta],7,8,9,10,12,13-octahydro-2-methoxy-6,9-methano-5H-pyrido [1', 2':1, 2] azepino [5,4-b] indole; Tabernanthe iboga;“(15) 2-(4-Iodo-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)-N-(2-methoxybenzyl)ethanamine“Other names: 25I-NBOMe; 2C-I-NBOMe; 25I; Cimbi-5;“(16) Lysergic acid diethylamide“Other name: LSD;“(17) Mescaline“Other name: Constituent of ‘Peyote’ cacti;“(18) 4-Methoxyamphetamine“Other names: 4-Methoxy-[alpha]-methylphenethylamine; paramethoxyamphetamine; PMA;“(19) 5-Methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy-amphetamine;“(20) 5-Methoxy-N,N-diisopropyltryptamine“Other name: 5-MeO-DIPT;“(21) 5-Methoxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine“Other names: 5-methoxy-3-[2-(dimethylamino)ethyl]indole; 5-MeO-DMT;“(22) 4-Methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine“Other names: 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-[alpha]-methylphenethylamine; DOM; STP;“(23) 3,4-Methylenedioxy amphetamine;“(24) 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine“Other name: MDMA;“(25) 3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-ethylamphetamine“Other names: N-ethyl-alpha-methyl-3,4(methylenedioxy)phenethylamine; N-ethyl MDA; MDE; MDEA;“(26) 3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-methylcathinone“Other name: Methylone;“(27) N-Ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;“(28) N-Hydroxy-3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine“Other names: N-hydroxy-alpha-methyl-3,4(methylenedioxy)phenethylamine; N-hydroxy MDA;“(29) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;“(30) Parahexyl“Other names: 3-Hexyl-1-hydroxy-7,8,9,10-tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-6H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran; Synhexyl;“(31) Peyote“Meaning all parts of the plant presently classified botanically as Lophophora williamsii Lemaire, whether growing or not, the seeds thereof, any extract from any part of such plant, and every compound, manufacture, salts, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds, or extracts (Interprets 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Schedule I(c)(12));“(32) Psilocybin (constituent of magic mushrooms);“(33) Psilocyn (constituent of magic mushrooms);“(34) Pyrrolidine analog of phencyclidine (1-(1-phenylcyclohexyl)-pyrrolidine)“Other names: PCPy; PHP;“(35) 1-[1-(2-Thienyl)cyclohexyl]pyrrolidine“Other name: TCPy;“(36) 4-Methylmethcathinone“Other names: Mephedrone; Methpadrone; 4-MMC;“(37) 3,4-Methylenedioxypyrovalerone“Other name: MDPV;“(38) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-ethylphenyl)ethanamine (2C-E);“(39) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-methylphenyl)ethanamine (2C-D);“(40) 2-(4-Chloro-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C-C);“(41) 2-(4-Iodo-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C-I);“(42) 2-[4-(Ethylthio)-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl]ethanamine (2C-T-2);“(43) 2-[4-(Isopropylthio)-2,5-dimethoxyphenyl]ethanamine (2C-T-4);“(44) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C-H);“(45) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-nitro-phenyl)ethanamine (2C-N);“(46) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-(n)-propylphenyl)ethanamine (2C-P);“(47) Thiophene analog of phencyclidine“Other names: 1-[1-(2-thienyl)-cyclohexyl]-piperidine; 2-thienyl analog of phencyclidine; TPCP; TCP;“(48) 3, 4, 5-Trimethoxy amphetamine;“(49) (1-pentyl-1H-indol-3-yl)(2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropyl)methanone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: UR-144; 1-pentyl-3-(2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropoyl)indole;“(50) [1-(5-Fluoro-pentyl)-1H-indol-3-yl](2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropyl)methanone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: 5-fluoro-UR-144; 5-F-UR-144; XLR-11; 1-(5-fluoro-pentyl)-3-(2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropoyl)indole; or“(51) N-(1-adamantyl)-1-pentyl-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: APINACA; AKB-48;“(52) 25H-NBOMe, being any compound structurally derived from 2-(2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)-N-(2-methoxybenzyl) ethanamine structure with substitution in either phenyl ring to any extent.“(e) Depressants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specified chemical designation:“(1) Gamma-hydroxybutyric acid“Other names: GHB; gamma-hydroxybutyrate; 4-hydroxybutyrate; 4-hydroxybutanoic acid; sodium oxybate; sodium oxybutyrate;“(2) Mecloqualone; or“(3) Methaqualone.“(f) Stimulants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers:“(1) Alpha-pyrrolidinobutiophenone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: [alpha]-PBP; 1-phenyl-2-(pyrrolidin-1-yl)butan-1-one;“(2) Alpha-pyrrolidinopentiophenone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: [alpha]-PVP; [alpha]-pyrrolidinovalerophenone; 1-phenyl-2-(pyrrolidin-1-yl)pentan-1-one;“(3) Aminorex“Other names: aminoxaphen; 2-amino-5-phenyl-2-oxazoline; or 4,5-dihydro-5-phenyl-2-oxazolamine;“(4) Butylone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: bk-MBDB; 1-(1,3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-(methylamino)butan-1-one;“(5) Cathinone“Other names: 2-amino-1-phenyl-1-propanone; alpha-aminopropiophenone; 2-aminopropiophenone; norephedrone; constituent of catha edulis or “Khat” plant;“(6) 3-Fluoro-N-methylcathinone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: 3-FMC; 1-(3-fluorophenyl)-2-(methylamino)propan-1-one;“(7) 4-Fluoro-N-methylcathinone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: 4-FMC; flephedrone; 1-(4-fluorophenyl)-2-(methylamino)propan-1-one;“(8) Fenethylline;“(9) Methcathinone, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers“Other names: 2-(methylamino)-propiophenone; alpha-(methylamino) propiophenone; 2-(methylamino)-1-phenylpropan-1-one; alpha-N-methylaminopropiophenone; monomethylpropion; ephedrone; N-methylcathinone; methylcathinone; AL-464; AL-422; AL-463; and UR1432;“(10) (1)cis-4-methylaminorex (cis isomer)“Other name: (1)cis-4,5-dihydro-4-methyl-5-phenyl-2-oxazolamine;“(11) 4-Methyl-N-ethylcathinone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: 4-MEC; 2-(ethylamino)-1-(4-methylphenyl)propan-1-one;“(12) 4-Methyl-alpha-pyrrolidinopropiophenone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: 4-MePPP; MePPP; 4-methyl-[alpha]-pyrrolidinopropiophenone; 1-(4-methylphenyl)-2-(pyrrolidin-1-yl)-propan-1-one;“(13) Naphyrone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: naphthylpyrovalerone; 1-(naphthalen-2-yl)-2-(pyrrolidin-1-yl)pentan-1-one;“(14) N-Benzylpiperazine“Other names: BZP; 1-benzylpiperazine;“(15) N-Ethylamphetamine;“(16) N,N-Dimethylamphetamine“Other names: N,N-alpha-trimethyl-benzeneethanamine; N,N-alpha-trimethylphenethylamine;“(17) Pentedrone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: [alpha]-methylaminovalerophenone; 2-(methylamino)-1-phenylpentan-1-one; or“(18) Pentylone, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: bk-MBDP; 1-(1,3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-(methylamino)pentan-1-one.“(g) Cannabimimetic agents, unless specifically exempted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances, or that contains their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:“(1) 5-(1,1-Dimethylheptyl)-2-[(1R,3S)-3-hydroxycyclohexyl]-phenol (CP-47,497);“(2) 5-(1,1-Dimethyloctyl)-2-[(1R,3S)-3-hydroxycyclohexyl]-phenol (cannabicyclohexanol or CP-47,497 C8-homolog);“(3) 1-Pentyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-018 and AM678);“(4) 1-Butyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-073);“(5) 1-Hexyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-019);“(6) 1-[2-(4-Morpholinyl)ethyl]-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-200);“(7) 1-Pentyl-3-(2-methoxyphenylacetyl)indole (JWH-250);“(8) 1-Pentyl-3-[1-(4-methoxynaphthoyl)]indole (JWH-081);“(10) 1-Pentyl-3-(4-chloro-1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-398);“(11) 1-(5-Fluoropentyl)-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (AM2201);“(12) 1-(5-Fluoropentyl)-3-(2-iodobenzoyl)indole (AM694);“(13) 1-Pentyl-3-[(4-methoxy)-benzoyl]indole (SR-19 and RCS-4);“(14) 1-Cyclohexylethyl-3-(2-methoxyphenylacetyl)indole 7008 (SR-18 and RCS-8);“(15) 1-Pentyl-3-(2-chlorophenylacetyl)indole (JWH-203);“(16) N-(1-amino-3-methyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-(4-fluorobenzyl)-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other name: AB-FUBINACA;“(17) N-(1-amino-3,3-dimethyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-pentyl-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other name: ADB-PINACA;“(18) Quinolin-8-yl 1-(5-fluoropentyl)-1H-indole-3-carboxylate, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: 5-fluoro-PB-22; 5F-PB-22; or“(19) Quinolin-8-yl 1-pentyl-1H-indole-3-carboxylate, its optical, positional, and geometric isomers, salts, and salts of isomers“Other names: PB-22; QUPIC.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1040, § 13. July 1, 2018.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability of Tennessee law to synthetic forms of LSD and cocaine.  OAG 11-28, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 30 (3/24/11).

39-17-407. Criteria for Schedule II.

The commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall place a substance in Schedule II upon finding that:

  1. The substance has high potential for abuse;
  2. The substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, or currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions; and
  3. The abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychic or physical dependence.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2010, ch. 1100, § 65; 2012, ch. 575, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

39-17-408. Controlled substances in Schedule II.

  1. Schedule II consists of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Substances, vegetable origin or chemical synthesis, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any of the following substances whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:
    1. Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium or opiate excluding apomorphine, dextrorphan, thebaine-derived butorphanol, nalmefene, nalbuphine, naloxone, and naltrexone, and their respective salts, but including the following:
      1. Codeine;
      2. Dihydroetorphine;
      3. Ethylmorphine;
      4. Etorphine hydrochloride;
      5. Granulated opium;
      6. Hydrocodone;
      7. Hydromorphone;
      8. Metopon;
      9. Morphine;
      10. Opium extracts;
      11. Opium fluid;
      12. Oripavine;
      13. Oxycodone;
      14. Oxymorphone;
      15. Powdered opium;
      16. Raw opium;
      17. Thebaine; or
      18. Tincture of opium;
    2. Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof that is chemically equivalent or identical with any of the substances referred to in subdivision (b)(1), except that these substances shall not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium;
    3. Opium poppy and poppy straw;
    4. Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves (including cocaine and ecgonine and their salts, isomers, derivatives, and salts of isomers and derivatives), and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof that is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, except that the substances shall not include decocainized coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which extractions do not contain cocaine or ecgonine; or
    5. Concentrate of poppy straw (the crude extract of poppy straw in either liquid, solid, or powder form that contains the phenanthrene alkaloids of the opium poppy).
  3. Opiates, unless specifically excepted or unless in another schedule, means any of the following opiates, including its isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers whenever the existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the specific chemical designation, dextrorphan and levopropoxyphene excepted:
    1. Alfentanil;
    2. Alphaprodine;
    3. Anileridine;
    4. Bezitramide;
    5. Carfentanil;
    6. Dextropropoxyphene (bulk, non-dosage forms);
    7. Dihydrocodeine;
    8. Diphenoxylate;
    9. Fentanyl;
    10. lsomethadone;
    11. Levo-alphacetylmethadol

      Other names: levo-alpha-acetylmethadol; levomethadyl acetate; LAAM;

    12. Levomethorphan;
    13. Levorphanol;
    14. Metazocine;
    15. Methadone;
    16. Methadone-Intermediate; 4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4,4-diphenyl butane;
    17. Moramide-lntermediate; diphenylpropane-carboxylic acid; 2-methyl-3-morpholino-1,1-Pethidine (meperidine);
    18. Pethidine (meperidine);
    19. Pethidine-Intermediate-A; 4-cyano-1-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine;
    20. Pethidine-Intermediate-B; ethyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylate;
    21. Pethidine-Intermediate-C; 1-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid;
    22. Phenazocine;
    23. Piminodine;
    24. Racemethorphan;
    25. Racemorphan;
    26. Remifentanil;
    27. Sufentanil;
    28. Tapentadol; or
    29. Thiafentanil.
  4. Stimulants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system:
    1. Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its optical isomers;
    2. Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers;
    3. Phenmetrazine and its salts;
    4. Methylphenidate; or
    5. Lisdexamfetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers.
  5. Depressants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. Amobarbital;
    2. Glutethimide;
    3. Pentobarbital;
    4. Phencyclidine; or
    5. Secobarbital.
  6. Hallucinogenic substances:
    1. Nabilone

      Other names: (1)-trans-3-(1,1-dimethylheptyl)-6,6a,7,8,10,10a-hexahydro-1- hydroxy-6,6-dimethyl-9H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran-9-one; or

    2. Dronabinol in oral solution in drug product approved for marketing by United States food and drug administration

      Other names: [(-)-delta-9-trans tetrahydrocannabinol], Syndros.

  7. Immediate precursors, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances:
    1. Immediate precursor to amphetamine and methamphetamine:
      1. Phenylacetone

        Other names: phenyl-2-propanone; P2P; benzyl methyl ketone; methyl benzyl ketone;

    2. Immediate precursors to phencyclidine (PCP):
      1. 1-phenylcyclohexylamine; or
      2. 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile (PCC); or
    3. Immediate precursor to fentanyl:
      1. 4-anilino-N-phenethyl-4-piperidine (ANPP).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2000, ch. 884, § 1; 2007, ch. 298, §§ 5-7; 2012, ch. 812, § 2; 2015, ch. 302, § 2; 2018, ch. 1040, §§ 4-6.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

No changes were made in the substantive language in this section; however, the chemical names for the drugs were updated to conform to the most recent list used by the department of mental health and mental retardation [mental health and developmental disabilities].

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote (c)(17) which read: “Moramide-Intermediate; 2-methyl-3-morpholino-1,1-diphenylpropane-carboxylic acid”; added (c)(29); added (f)(2); and, in (g)(2)(A), added “or” following the semicolon at the end.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1040, § 13. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Prescription of Schedule II stimulants for weight control prohibited, § 53-10-109.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability of Tennessee law to synthetic forms of LSD and cocaine.  OAG 11-28, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 30 (3/24/11).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to show that the substance in defendant's possession was methamphetamine as a witness testified that he saw defendant in possession of methamphetamine, that he was familiar with the drug, having injected it once before, and that the purpose of the group traveling to the place where the victim's body was found was to “get high” on methamphetamine. State v. Pack, 421 S.W.3d 629, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for conspiracy to sell more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and conspiracy to deliver more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school where it showed that he personally sold cocaine to the confidential informant on several occasions, he communicated with his co-defendant about selling cocaine to the informant, he was present for a buy between the co-defendant and the informant at a carwash, he discussed the co-defendant's drug prices with the informant, and acted as a drug courier between the co-defendant and the informant. State v. Graham, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

There was evidence from which a jury could find defendant guilty of conspiracy to sell and deliver a Schedule II controlled substance because defendant and his co-conspirator acted in concert to sell cocaine to a confidential informant (CI); defendant knowingly solicited, negotiated, and arranged for the drug sale, and he provided directions, access to the co-conspirator and was the person designated to literally hand the drugs over to the CI. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction because the evidence showed (1) defendant possessed cocaine, and (2) defendant distributed cocaine. State v. Gossett, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant because a rational juror could have found that he knowingly sold and delivered more than .5 grams of cocaine to a confidential informant; the informant called defendant arranged to purchase some drugs from him and gave him pre-marked $ 20 bills in exchange for the drugs, which tested positive for more than .5 grams of cocaine, and during a traffic stop, defendant had the same amount of money in the same denominations as the informant gave him. State v. Blackman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of one count of sale and one count of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, morphine, as it was within the jury's purview to reject defendant's theory of casual exchange because defendant established the price of the morphine tablets, by offering the tablets for a discount; he sold the drugs to an individual that defendant had only met a few times previously; and the individual did not have an established relationship with defendant. State v. Shelton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Jan. 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to have found defendant guilty of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine because defendant gave cocaine to a confidential informant in exchange for money; by finding defendant guilty, the jury implicitly resolved any conflicts between the testimonies of the detectives and between the undercover operations report and the indictment information and discovery. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine because he knowingly sold less than 0.5 grams of cocaine to a confidential informant; the informant indicated to defendant that he desired to purchase cocaine and gave defendant sixty dollars, and defendant eventually gave the informant a substance later determined to be cocaine. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for simple possession of cocaine, where defendant admitted to agents that there was cocaine in a motel room and agents found 0.45 grams of cocaine packaged the way defendant described inside the motel room. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver and possession of illegal drug paraphernalia because it showed that he was found inside a residence where .32 grams of crack cocaine and a crack pipe were present, he was found in a bathroom with a digital scale commonly used for weighing drugs, and he later admitted to selling crack cocaine as a means of making money and to keeping a third of an ounce of cocaine with him at all times. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2019).

3. Restoration of Right to Bear Arms.

Circuit court properly declined to restore defendant's right to bear arms because it was an offense for a convicted drug felon to possess a firearm, a convicted drug felon was prohibited from being granted a permit, and defendant's conviction involved the attempted sale of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. Fisher v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 821 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017).

39-17-409. Criteria for Schedule III.

The commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall place a substance in Schedule III upon finding that:

  1. The substance has a potential for abuse less than the substances listed in Schedules I and II;
  2. The substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and
  3. Abuse of the substance may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2010, ch. 1100, § 65; 2012, ch. 575, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

39-17-410. Controlled substances in Schedule III.

  1. Schedule III consists of the drugs and other substances by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Stimulants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers (whether optical, positional, or geometric), and salts of such isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. Those compounds, mixtures, or preparations in dosage unit form containing any stimulant substances listed in Schedule II, which compounds, mixtures, or preparations were listed on August 25, 1971, as excepted compounds under 21 CFR 1308.32, and any other drug of the quantitative composition shown in that list for those drugs or that is the same except that it contains a lesser quantity of controlled substances;
    2. Benzphetamine;
    3. Clorphentermine;
    4. Clortermine; or
    5. Phendimetrazine.
  3. Depressants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on the central nervous system:
    1. Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing:
      1. Amobarbital;
      2. Secobarbital;
      3. Pentobarbital;

        or any salt thereof and one (1) or more other active medicinal ingredients that are not listed in any schedule;

    2. Any suppository dosage form containing:
      1. Amobarbital;
      2. Secobarbital;
      3. Pentobarbital;

        or any salt of these drugs and approved by the federal food and drug administration for marketing only as a suppository;

    3. Any substance that contains any quantity of a derivative of barbituric acid or any salt thereof. Examples include the following drugs:
      1. Aprobarbital;
      2. Butabarbital (secbutabarbital);
      3. Butalbital;
      4. Butobarbital (butethal);
      5. Talbutal;
      6. Thiamylal;
      7. Thiopental; or
      8. Vinbarbital;
    4. Chlorhexadol;
    5. Embutramide;
    6. Gamma hydroxybutyric acid preparations. Any drug product containing gamma hydroxybutyric acid, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, for which an application is approved under § 505 of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.);
    7. Ketamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers

      Other name: (1)-2-(2-chlorophenyl)-2-(methylamino)-cyclohexanone;

    8. Lysergic acid;
    9. Lysergic acid amide;
    10. Methyprylon;
    11. Perampanel, and its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers;
    12. Sulfondiethylmethane;
    13. Sulfonethylmethane;
    14. Sulfonmethane; or
    15. Tiletamine and zolazepam or any salt of tiletamine or zolazepam:
      1. Other name for a tiletamine-zolazepam combination product: Telazol(R);
      2. Other name for tiletamine: 2-(ethylamino)-2-(2-thienyl)-cyclohexanone; and
      3. Other names for zolazepam: 4-(2-fluorophenyl)-6,8-dihydro-1,3,8-trimethylpyrazolo[3,4-e],[1,4]-diazepin-7(1H)-one; flupyrazapon.
  4. Nalorphine.
  5. Narcotic drugs, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means:
    1. Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the following narcotic drugs, or their salts calculated as the free anhydrous base or alkaloid, in limited quantities as set forth below:
      1. Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters or not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with an equal or greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium;
      2. Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters or not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one (1) or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
      3. Not more than 1.8 grams of dihydrocodeine per 100 milliliters or not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one (1) or more active non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
      4. Not more than 300 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100 milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with one (1) or more active non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
      5. Not more than 500 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams or not more than 25 milligrams per dosage unit, with one (1) or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts; or
      6. Not more than 50 milligrams of morphine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams, with one (1) or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
    2. Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the following narcotic drug or its salts:
      1. Buprenorphine.
  6. Anabolic steroids, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, esters, and ethers:
    1. Anabolic steroids:
      1. 3[alpha],17[beta]-dihydroxy-5a-androstane;
      2. 17[alpha]-methyl-3[alpha],17[beta]-dihydroxy-5a-androstane;
      3. 17[alpha]-methyl-3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxy-5a-androstane;
      4. 17[alpha]-methyl-3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxyandrost-4-ene;
      5. 17[alpha]-methyl-[delta]1-dihydrotestosterone(17[beta]-hydroxy-17[alpha]-methyl-5[alpha]-androst-1-en-3-one

        Other Names: 17-[alpha]-methyl-1-testosterone;

      6. 17[alpha]-methyl-4-hydroxynandrolone(17[alpha]-methyl-4-hydroxy-17[beta]-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
      7. 1-Androstenediol (3[alpha],17[beta]-dihydroxy-5[alpha]-androst-1-ene);
      8. 1-Androstenediol (3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxy-5[alpha]-androst-1-ene);
      9. 4-Androstenediol (3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxy-androst-4-ene);
      10. 5-Androstenediol (3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxy-androst-5-ene);
      11. 1-Androstenedione (5[alpha]-androst-1-en-3,17-dione);
      12. 4-Androstenedione (androst-4-en-3,17-dione);
      13. 5-Androstenedione (androst-5-en-3,17-dione);
      14. 3[Beta],17[beta]-dihydroxy-5a-androstane;
      15. 13[Beta]-ethyl-17[beta]-hydroxygon-4-en-3-one;
      16. Androstanedione (5[alpha]-androstan-3,17-dione);
      17. Bolasterone (7[alpha],17[alpha]-dimethyl-17[beta]-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
      18. Boldenone (17[beta]-hydroxyandrost-1,4-diene-3-one);
      19. Boldione (androsta-1,4-diene-3,17-dione);
      20. Calusterone (7[beta],17[alpha]-dimethyl-17[beta]-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
      21. Clostebol (4-chloro-17[beta]-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one)

        Other Name: 4-Chlorotestosterone;

      22. Dehydrochloromethyltestosterone (4-chloro-17[beta]-hydroxy-17[alpha]-methylandrost-1,4-dien-3-one);
      23. [Delta]1-dihydrotestosterone (17[beta]-hydroxy-5[alpha]-androst-1-en-3-one)

        Other name: 1-testosterone;

      24. Desoxymethyltestosterone (17[alpha]-methyl-5[alpha]-androst-2-en-17[beta]-ol)

        Other name: madol;

      25. 4-Dihydrotestosterone (17[beta]-hydroxyandrostan-3-one);
      26. Drostanolone (17[beta]-hydroxy-2[alpha]-methyl-5[alpha]-androstan-3-one);
      27. Ethylestrenol (17[alpha]-ethyl-17[beta]-hydroxyestr-4-ene);
      28. Fluoxymesterone (9-fluoro-17[alpha]-methyl-11[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
      29. Formebolone (2-formyl-17[alpha]-methyl-11[alpha],17[beta]-dihydroxyandrost-1,4-dien-3-one);
      30. Furazabol (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxyandrostano[2,3-c]-furazan);
      31. 4-Hydroxy-19-nortestosterone (4,17[beta]-dihydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
      32. 4-Hydroxytestosterone (4,17[beta]-dihydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
      33. Mestanolone (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxy-5[alpha]-androstan-3-one);
      34. Mesterolone (1[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxy-5[alpha]-androstan-3-one);
      35. Methandienone (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxyandrost-1,4-diene-3-one);
      36. Methandranone;
      37. Methandriol (17[alpha]-methyl-3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxyandrost-5-ene);
      38. Methandrostenolone;
      39. Methasterone (2[alpha],17[alpha]-dimethyl-5[alpha]-androstan-17[beta]-ol-3-one);
      40. Methenolone (1-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxy-5[alpha]-androst-1-en-3-one);
      41. Methyldienolone (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxyestra-4,9(10)-dien-3-one);
      42. Methyltestosterone (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
      43. Methyltrienolone (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxyestra-4,9,11-trien-3-one);
      44. Mibolerone (7[alpha],17[alpha]-dimethyl-17[beta]-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
      45. Nandrolone (17[beta]-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
      46. 19-Nor-4,9(10)-androstadienedione (estra-4,9(10)-diene-3,17-dione);
      47. 19-Nor-4-androstenediol (3[alpha],17[beta]-dihydroxyestr-4-ene);
      48. 19-Nor-4-androstenediol (3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxyestr-4-ene);
      49. 19-Nor-5-androstenediol (3[alpha],17[beta]-dihydroxyestr-5-ene);
      50. 19-Nor-5-androstenediol (3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxyestr-5-ene);
      51. 19-Nor-4-androstenedione (estr-4-en-3,17-dione);
      52. 19-Nor-5-androstenedione (estr-5-en-3,17-dione);
      53. Norbolethone (13[beta],17[alpha]-diethyl-17[beta]-hydroxygon-4-en-3-one);
      54. Norclostebol (4-chloro-17[beta]-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
      55. Norethandrolone (17[alpha]-ethyl-17[beta]-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
      56. Normethandrolone (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
      57. Oxandrolone (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxy-2-oxa-5[alpha]-androstan-3-one);
      58. Oxymesterone (17[alpha]-methyl-4,17[beta]-dihydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
      59. Oxymetholone (17[alpha]-methyl-2-hydroxymethylene-17[beta]-hydroxy-[5[alpha]]-androstan-3-one);
      60. Prostanozol (17[beta]-hydroxy-5[alpha]-androstano[3,2-c]pryazole);
      61. Stanolone (17[beta]-hydroxy-5alpha-androstan-3-one);
      62. Stanozolol (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxy-[5[alpha]]-androst-2-eno[3,2-c]-pyrazole);
      63. Stenbolone (17[beta]-hydroxy-2-methyl-[5[alpha]]-androst-1-en-3-one);
      64. Testolactone (13-hydroxy-3-oxo-13,17-secoandrosta-1,4-dien-17-oic acid lactone);
      65. Testosterone (17[beta]-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
      66. Tetrahydrogestrinone (13[beta],17[alpha]-diethyl-17[beta]-hydroxygon-4,9,11-trien-3-one); or
      67. Trenbolone (17[beta]-hydroxyestr-4,9,11-trien-3-one).
    2. Any salt, ester, or ether of a drug or substance described in this subsection (f), except such term does not include an anabolic steroid that is expressly intended for administration through implants to cattle or other nonhuman species and that has been approved by the United States secretary of health and human services for such administration. If any person prescribes, dispenses, or distributes such steroid for human use, the person shall be considered to have prescribed, dispensed, or distributed an anabolic steroid within the meaning of this subsection (f); or
    3. Anabolic steroids with a combination of estrogens intended for administration to hormone deficient women are exempt from this rule unless such steroids are prescribed, dispensed, or distributed to women who are not hormone deficient.
  7. Hallucinogenic substances:
    1. Dronabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil and encapsulated in a soft gelatin capsule in a United States food and drug administration approved product

      Other names: (6aR-trans)-6a,7,8,10a-tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-3-pentyl-6-H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-ol or (-)-delta-9-(trans)-tetrahydrocannabinol.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1992, ch. 700, § 3; 1996, ch. 694, §§ 1, 2; 2000, ch. 755, § 2; 2000, ch. 884, § 2; 2007, ch. 298, §§ 8-10; 2012, ch. 812, § 3; 2015, ch. 302, § 3; 2018, ch. 1040, § 7.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The chemical names for the drugs in this section were updated to conform to the most recent list used by the department of mental health and mental retardation [mental health and developmental disabilities]. The 1992 amendment moved steroids from Schedule VIII to this section.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote (f)(1)(A) which read: “(A) 3[Alpha],17[beta]-dihydroxy-5a-androstane”; deleted former (f)(1)(B) which read: “(B) 5[Alpha]-androstan-3,17-dione;” rewrote former (f)(1)(C) through (f)(1)(G) which read:“(C) 17[Alpha]-methyl-3[alpha],17[beta]-dihydroxy-5a-androstane;“(D) 17[Alpha]-methyl-3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxy-5a-androstane;“(E) 17[Alpha]-methyl-3[beta],17[beta]-dihydroxyandrost-4-ene;“(F) 17[Alpha]-methyl-delta1-dihydrotestosterone (17[beta]-hydroxy-17[alpha]-methyl-5[alpha]-androst-1-en-3-one) (a.k.a. “17-[alpha]-methyl-1-testosterone”);“(G) 17[Alpha]-methyl-4-hydroxynandrolone (17[alpha]-methyl-4-hydroxy-17[beta]-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);” and redesignated them as (f)(1)(B) through (f)(1)(F), respectively; redesignated former (f)(1)(H) through (f)(1)(P) as (f)(1)(G) through (f)(1)(O); added present (f)(1)(P); deleted former (f)(1)(U) which read: “Chlorotestosterone”; redesignated former (f)(1)(V) as present (f)(1)(U) and added “Other name: 4-Chlorotestosterone” therein; redesignated former (f)(1)(W) and (f)(1)(X) as present (f)(1)(V) and (f)(1)(W), respectively; in present (f)(1)(W), added “Other name: 1-testosterone”; redesignated former (f)(1)(Z) through (f)(1)(FF) as present (f)(1)(Y) through (f)(1)(EE); rewrote present (f)(1)(EE) which read: “(FF) 4-hydroxy-19-nortestosterone (4,17[beta]-dihydroxy-estr-4-en-3-one)”; rewrote present (f)(1)(FF) which read: “(GG) 4-hydroxytestosterone (4,17[beta]-dihydroxy-androst-4-en-3-one)”;redesignated former (f)(1)(HH) through (f)(1)(FFF) as present (f)(1)(GG) through (f)(1)(EEE); rewrote present (f)(1)(EEE) which read: “Oxandrolone (17[alpha]-methyl-17[beta]-hydroxy-2-oxa-[5[alpha]]-androstan-3-one)”; redesignated former (f)(1)(GGG) through (f)(1)(LLL) as present (f)(1)(FFF) through (f)(1)(KKK); rewrote present (f)(1)(HHH) which read: “(III) Prostanozol (17[beta]-hydroxy-5[alpha]-androstano[3,2-c]pyrazole)” rewrote present (f)(1)(III) which read: “(JJJ) Stanolone”; rewrote present (KKK) which read: “(LLL) Stenbolone (17[beta]-hydroxy-2-methyl-[5alpha]-androst-1-en-3-one)”; and redesignated former (f)(1)(MMM) through (f)(1)(PPP) as present (f)(1)(LLL) through (f)(1)(OOO).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1040, § 13. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Anabolic steroids, prohibited activities, § 39-17-430.

39-17-411. Criteria for Schedule IV.

The commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall place a substance in Schedule IV upon finding that:

  1. The substance has a low potential for abuse relative to substances in Schedule III;
  2. The substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and
  3. Abuse of the substance may lead to limited physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to the substances in Schedule III.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2010, ch. 1100, § 65; 2012, ch. 575, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

39-17-412. Controlled substances in Schedule IV.

  1. Schedule IV consists of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Narcotic drugs, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the following narcotic drugs, or their salts calculated as the free anhydrous base or alkaloid, in limited quantities as set forth below:
    1. Not more than 1 milligram of difenoxin and not less than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit; or
    2. Dextropropoxyphene (alpha-(+)-4-dimethylamino-1,2-diphenyl-3-methyl-2-propionoxybutane).
  3. Depressants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. Alfaxalone;
    2. Alprazolam;
    3. Barbital;
    4. Bromazepam;
    5. Camazepam;
    6. Carisoprodol

      Other name: Soma(R);

    7. Chloral betaine;
    8. Chloral hydrate;
    9. Chlordiazepoxide;
    10. Clobazam;
    11. Clonazepam;
    12. Clorazepate;
    13. Clotiazepam;
    14. Cloxazolam;
    15. Delorazepam;
    16. Diazepam;
    17. Dichloralphenazone;
    18. Estazolam;
    19. Eszopiclone;
    20. Ethchlorvynol;
    21. Ethinamate;
    22. Ethyl loflazepate;
    23. Fludiazepam;
    24. Flunitrazepam;
    25. Flurazepam;
    26. Fospropofol;
    27. Halazepam;
    28. Haloxazolam;
    29. Ketazolam;
    30. Loprazolam;
    31. Lorazepam;
    32. Lormetazepam;
    33. Mebutamate;
    34. Medazepam;
    35. Meprobamate;
    36. Methohexital;
    37. Methylphenobarbital (mephobarbital);
    38. Midazolam;
    39. Nimetazepam;
    40. Nitrazepam;
    41. Nordiazepam;
    42. Oxazepam;
    43. Oxazolam;
    44. Paraldehyde;
    45. Petrichloral;
    46. Phenobarbital;
    47. Pinazepam;
    48. Prazepam;
    49. Quazepam;
    50. Suvorexant;
    51. Temazepam;
    52. Tetrazepam;
    53. Tramadol

      Other names: Ultram(R) and Ultracet(R);

    54. Triazolam;
    55. Zaleplon;
    56. Zolpidem; or
    57. Zopiclone.
  4. Fenfluramine means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, isomers (whether optical, positional, or geometric), and salts of isomers, whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible:
    1. Fenfluramine; or
    2. Dexfenfluramine.
  5. Lorcaserin means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, isomers, and salts of such isomers, whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible:
    1. Lorcaserin.
  6. Stimulants, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers:
    1. Cathine ((+)-norpseudoephedrine);
    2. Diethylpropion;
    3. Fencamfamin;
    4. Fenproporex;
    5. Mazindol;
    6. Mefenorex;
    7. Modafinil;
    8. Pemoline (including organometallic complexes and chelates thereof);
    9. Phentermine;
    10. Pipradol;
    11. Sibutramine; or
    12. SPA ((-)-1-dimethylamino-1,2-diphenylethane).
  7. Other substances. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts:
    1. Pentazocine;
    2. Butorphanol (including its optical isomers); or
    3. Eluxadoline (5-[[[(2S)-2-amino-3-[4-aminocarbonyl)-2,6-dimethylphenyl]-1-oxopropyl][(1S)-1-(4-phenyl-1H-imidazol-2-yl)ethyl]amino]methyl]-2-methoxybenzoic acid) (including its optical isomers) and its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 107, § 2; 1997, ch. 236, § 1; 1997, ch. 445, § 1; 1998, ch. 868, § 1; 2000, ch. 755, § 1; 2007, ch. 298, §§ 11-13; 2012, ch. 812, § 4; 2015, ch. 302, § 4; 2018, ch. 1040, § 8.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

No changes were made in the substantive language in this section; however, the chemical names for the drugs were updated to conform to the most recent list used by the department of mental health and mental retardation.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added “or” at the end of (g)(2); and added (g)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1040, § 13. July 1, 2018.

39-17-413. Criteria for Schedule V.

The commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, shall place a substance in Schedule V upon finding that:

  1. The substance has low potential for abuse relative to the controlled substances listed in Schedule IV;
  2. The substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and
  3. The substance has limited physical dependence or psychological dependence liability relative to the controlled substances listed in Schedule IV.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2010, ch. 1100, § 65; 2012, ch. 575, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

39-17-414. Controlled substances in Schedule V.

  1. Schedule V consists of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Narcotic drugs containing non-narcotic active medicinal ingredients. Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the following narcotic drugs, or their salts calculated as the free anhydrous base or alkaloid, in limited quantities as set forth below, which shall include one (1) or more non-narcotic active medicinal ingredients in sufficient proportion to confer upon the compound, mixture, or preparation valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by narcotic drugs alone:
    1. Not more than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams;
    2. Not more than 100 milligrams of dihydrocodeine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams;
    3. Not more than 100 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams;
    4. Not more than 2.5 milligrams of diphenoxylate and not less than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit;
    5. Not more than 100 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams; or
    6. Not more than 0.5 milligrams of difenoxin and not less than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit.
  3. Stimulants, unless specifically exempted or excluded, or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers:
    1. Pyrovalerone.
  4. Depressants, unless specifically exempted or excluded or unless listed in another schedule, means any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts:
    1. Brivaracetam ((2S)-2-[(4R)-2-oxo-4-propylpyrrolidin-1-yl] butanamide);
    2. Ezogabine [N-[2-amino-4-(4-fluorobenzylamino)-phenyl]-carbamic acid ethyl ester];
    3. Gabapentin [1-(aminomethyl)cyclohexaneacetic acid];
    4. Lacosamide [(R)-2-acetoamido-N-benzyl-3-methoxy-propionamide]; or
    5. Pregabalin [(S)-3-(aminomethyl)-5-methylhexonoic acid].

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2007, ch. 298, §§ 14, 15; 2012, ch. 812, § 5; 2015, ch. 302, § 5; 2018, ch. 1040, § 9.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

No changes were made in the substantive language in this section; however, the chemical names for the drugs were updated to conform to the most recent list used by the department of mental health and mental retardation [mental health and developmental disabilities].

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added present (d)(1) and redesignated former (d)(1) as present (d)(2); added present (d)(3) and redesignated former (d)(2) and (d)(3) as present (d)(4) and (d)(5), respectively.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1040, § 13. July 1, 2018.

39-17-415. Criteria and controlled substances for Schedule VI.

  1. There is established a Schedule VI for the classification of substances which the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services, upon the agreement of the commissioner of health, upon considering the factors set forth in § 39-17-403, decides should not be included in Schedules I through V. The controlled substances included in Schedule VI are:
    1. Marijuana;
    2. Tetrahydrocannabinols; and
    3. Synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp.  and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure and pharmacological activity, such as the following:
      1. 1 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and its optical isomers;
      2. 6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and its optical isomers; or
      3. 3, 4 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and its optical isomers.
  2. Since nomenclature of these substances is not internationally standardized, compounds of these structures, regardless of numerical designation of atomic positions are covered.
  3. This section does not categorize hemp, as defined in § 43-27-101, as a controlled substance.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2010, ch. 1100, § 65; 2012, ch. 575, § 2; 2014, ch. 916, § 2; 2016, ch. 728, § 2; 2019, ch. 87, § 3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

No changes were made in the substantive language in this section; however, the chemical names for the drugs were updated to conform to the most recent list used by the department of mental health and developmental disabilities.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

For the preamble to the act concerning growing of industrial hemp, please refer to Acts 2014, ch. 916.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote (c), which read: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to categorize industrial hemp, as defined in § 43-26-102, as a controlled substance; provided, however, that industrial hemp shall be categorized as a controlled substance in circumstances where such classification is required by § 43-26-103(c).”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 87, § 13. April 4, 2019.

Cross-References. Licensing of hemp growers, § 43-26-103.

Law Reviews.

Dignity, And Danger: Human Dignity As A Constitutional Constraint To Limit Overcriminalization, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 291 (2013).

Joint Authority? The Case For State-Based Marijuana Regulation, 8 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 44 (2012).

On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421 (2009).

States Are Making Their Own Decisions Regarding Whether Marijuana Should Be Illegal: How Should The Federal Government React?, 9 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 233 (2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Marijuana.

Marijuana, including the seeds thereof, is a controlled substance; the transportation thereof subjects the vehicle used to forfeiture. Hill v. Lawson, 851 S.W.2d 822, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of third offense possession of a controlled substance where it showed that the captain, upon stopping defendant's vehicle for a traffic violation, detected the smell of marijuana inside the vehicle, when the captain asked defendant if he was in possession of marijuana he answered in the affirmative and gave the captain a small cigarette butt, and testing of the cigarette butt revealed that it contained marijuana. State v. Marsh, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of simple possession of marijuana because the deputy testified that when he approached the vehicle driven by defendant, he smelled burnt marijuana; after asking defendant if he had marijuana, defendant spit a bag containing a green plant-like substance onto the ground in his presence; and a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation testified that the bag contained just over one gram of marijuana. State v. Linsey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 729 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2016).

Sufficient evidence demonstrated defendant's guilt of possessing a firearm with intent to go armed during commission of a dangerous felony because (1) the possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver was a serious felony, and (2) a loaded gun found near a large amount of marijuana, plastic bags, scales, and ammunition let a jury infer the gun was possessed with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Watkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of marijuana with intent to sell because he possessed over 345 grams of marijuana; the jury could rationally conclude that defendant constructively possessed the marijuana as it was found in plain view on the front floorboard of the vehicle defendant had been driving, which was registered to defendant's mother and which also contained defendant's wallet and mail; and there was other circumstantial evidence of defendant's intent to sell or deliver the drug as plastic sandwich bags and a digital scale were found in the vehicle, both of which were commonly used to weigh and package drugs for sale, and $500 in cash was found on defendant's person when he was taken to the jail. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

2. Sentencing.

In a case where defendant pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of theft of property, one count of vandalism over $500, one count of vandalism under $500, and possession of marijuana, the trial court did not err in denying alternative sentencing to defendant because, although he was young, and he accepted responsibility for his actions, the trial court found that defendant continued to commit similar crimes to those for which he was arrested and subsequently released on bond; and that confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offenses, and to protect society from defendant and his criminal activities. State v. Cunningham, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2014).

39-17-416. Controlled substances in Schedule VII.

  1. There is established a Schedule VII for the classification of substances that should not be included in Schedules I through VI.
  2. The controlled substance included in Schedule VII is Butyl nitrite and any isomer of Butyl nitrite.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1044, § 1; 1992, ch. 700, §§ 1, 2.

39-17-417. Criminal offenses and penalties.

  1. It is an offense for a defendant to knowingly:
    1. Manufacture a controlled substance;
    2. Deliver a controlled substance;
    3. Sell a controlled substance; or
    4. Possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell the controlled substance.
  2. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to a Schedule I controlled substance is a Class B felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
  3. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to:
    1. Cocaine or methamphetamine is a Class B felony if the amount involved is point five (0.5) grams or more of any substance containing cocaine or methamphetamine and, in addition, may be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); and
      1. Any other Schedule II controlled substance, including cocaine or methamphetamine in an amount of less than point five (0.5) grams, is a Class C felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); provided, that if the offense involves less than point five (0.5) grams of a controlled substance containing cocaine or methamphetamine but the defendant carried or employed a deadly weapon as defined in § 39-11-106, during commission of the offense or the offense resulted in death or bodily injury to another person, the offense is a Class B felony.
      2. As a part of any sentence imposed for a violation of subdivision (a)(1) involving a controlled substance listed in § 39-17-408(d)(2), the court shall require the defendant to make restitution to any governmental entity for the costs reasonably incurred in cleaning the area in which the offense occurred and in rendering the area safe for human use.
      3. In addition to the requirement that restitution be made to the governmental entity pursuant to subdivision (c)(2)(B), the court shall also require that restitution be made to any private property owner, either real or personal, whose property is destroyed or suffers damage as a result of the offense. In the case of property that was rented or leased, damages may also include the loss of any revenue that occurred because the property was uninhabitable or a crime scene. The type and amount of restitution permitted pursuant to this subdivision (c)(2)(C) shall be determined by the court using the procedure set out in § 40-35-304.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to a Schedule III controlled substance is a Class D felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
      1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a person charged for the first time with delivering an anabolic steroid or possessing an anabolic steroid with the intent to manufacture, deliver or sell the steroid shall be eligible for pretrial diversion pursuant to title 40, chapter 15, and probation pursuant to title 40, chapter 28 and § 40-35-313.
      2. The inference permitted by the first sentence of § 39-17-419 does not apply to a person charged under subdivision (a)(4) with possession of an anabolic steroid with intent to sell or deliver the steroid. Unless the state can prove that an actual sale or delivery occurred, the person may only be convicted of simple possession and punished as provided in § 39-17-418.
  4. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to:
    1. Flunitrazepam is a Class C felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); and
    2. Any other Schedule IV controlled substance is a Class D felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
  5. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to a Schedule V controlled substance is a Class E felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
    1. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to a Schedule VI controlled substance classified as marijuana containing not less than one-half (½) ounce (14.175 grams) nor more than ten pounds (10 lbs.) (4535 grams) of marijuana, or a Schedule VI controlled substance defined as a non-leafy, resinous material containing tetrahydrocannabinol (hashish), containing not more than two pounds (2 lbs.) (905 grams) of hashish is a Class E felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
    2. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to a Schedule VI controlled substance classified as marijuana and containing not less than ten pounds (10 lbs.), one gram (4536 grams) of marijuana nor more than seventy pounds (70 lbs.) (31,696 grams) of marijuana, or a Schedule VI controlled substance defined as a non-leafy, resinous material containing tetrahydrocannabinol (hashish) and containing not less than two pounds (2 lbs.), one gram (906 grams) nor more than four pounds (4 lbs.) (1810 grams) of hashish, or a Schedule VI controlled substance classified as marijuana consisting of not less than ten (10) marijuana plants nor more than nineteen (19) marijuana plants, regardless of weight, is a Class D felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
    3. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to a Schedule VI controlled substance defined as a non-leafy, resinous material containing tetrahydrocannabinol (hashish) and containing not less than four pounds (4 lbs.), one gram (1811 grams) nor more than eight pounds (8 lbs.) (3620 grams) of hashish, or a Schedule VI controlled substance classified as marijuana consisting of not less than twenty (20) marijuana plants nor more than ninety-nine (99) marijuana plants, regardless of weight, is a Class C felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
  6. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to a Schedule VII controlled substance is a Class E felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  7. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to the following amounts of a controlled substance, or conspiracy to violate subsection (a) with respect to such amounts, is a Class B felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000):
    1. Fifteen (15) grams or more of any substance containing heroin;
    2. Fifteen (15) grams or more of any substance containing morphine;
    3. Five (5) grams or more of any substance containing hydromorphone;
    4. Five (5) grams or more of any substance containing lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD);
    5. Twenty-six (26) grams or more of any substance containing cocaine;
    6. Five (5) grams or more of any substance containing a combination of pentazocine and tripelennamine or joint possession of pentazocine and tripelennamine;
    7. Thirty (30) grams or more of any substance containing phencyclidine;
    8. One hundred (100) grams or more of any substance containing a derivative of barbituric acid or any of the salts of a derivative of barbituric acid;
    9. Fifty (50) grams or more of any substance containing phenmetrazine;
    10. Twenty-six (26) grams or more of any substance containing amphetamine or methamphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine or methamphetamine;
    11. One thousand (1,000) grams or more of any substance containing peyote;
    12. Fifteen (15) grams or more of any substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, remifentanil, alfentanil, thiafentanil, or any fentanyl derivative or analogue under § 39-17-406(b)(48);
    13. Two hundred (200) grams or more of any substance containing a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II not listed in subdivisions (i)(1)-(12); or
    14. Not less than seventy pounds (70 lbs.) (31,697 grams) nor more than three hundred pounds (300 lbs.) (136,050 grams) of any substance containing marijuana, or a Schedule VI controlled substance defined as a non-leafy, resinous material containing tetrahydrocannabinol (hashish) and containing not less than eight pounds (8 lbs.), one gram (3621 grams) nor more than fifteen pounds (15 lbs.) (6,792 grams) of any substance containing hashish, or not less than one hundred (100) marijuana plants nor more than four hundred ninety-nine (499) marijuana plants, regardless of weight.
  8. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to the following amounts of a controlled substance, or conspiracy to violate subsection (a) with respect to such amounts is a Class A felony and, in addition, may be fined not more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000):
    1. One hundred fifty (150) grams or more of any substance containing heroin;
    2. One hundred fifty (150) grams or more of any substance containing morphine;
    3. Fifty (50) grams or more of any substance containing hydromorphone;
    4. Fifty (50) grams or more of any substance containing lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD);
    5. Three hundred (300) grams or more of any substance containing cocaine;
    6. Fifty (50) grams or more of any substance containing a combination of pentazocine and tripelennamine or joint possession of pentazocine and tripelennamine;
    7. Three hundred (300) grams or more of any substance containing phencyclidine;
    8. One thousand (1,000) grams or more of any substance containing a derivative of barbituric acid or any of the salts of a derivative of barbituric acid;
    9. Five hundred (500) grams or more of any substance containing phenmetrazine;
    10. Three hundred (300) grams or more of any substance containing amphetamine or methamphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine or methamphetamine;
    11. Ten thousand (10,000) grams or more of any substance containing peyote;
    12. One hundred fifty (150) grams or more of any substance containing fentanyl, carfentanil, remifentanil, alfentanil, thiafentanil, or any fentanyl derivative or analogue under § 39-17-406(b)(48);
    13. Two thousand (2,000) grams or more of any substance containing a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II not listed in subdivisions (i)(1)-(12); or
    14. Three hundred pounds (300 lbs.) (136,050 grams) or more of any substance containing marijuana, or a Schedule VI controlled substance defined as a non-leafy, resinous material containing tetrahydrocannabinol (hashish) and containing not less than fifteen pounds (15 lbs.), one gram (6,793 grams) of any substance containing hashish, or five hundred (500) or more marijuana plants, regardless of weight.
  9. A violation of this section or a conspiracy to violate this section where the recipient or the intended recipient of the controlled substance is under eighteen (18) years of age shall be punished one (1) classification higher than provided in subsections (b)-(i).
    1. If the district attorney general believes that a defendant should be sentenced as a habitual drug offender, the district attorney general shall file notice of the defendant's record of prior convictions for violations specified in this subsection (l ) in conformity with § 40-35-202.
    2. The trial court, upon the request of the district attorney general, shall enter injunctions, restraining orders, directions or prohibitions, or take other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, liens on real property, security interests in personal property, for the purpose of collecting any fine imposed pursuant to this entire section.
    3. Any person found guilty of a violation of this section that constitutes a Class A or Class B felony or attempts to commit a Class A or Class B violation of this section or conspiracy to commit a Class A or Class B violation of this section and who has at least three (3) prior Class A or Class B felony convictions or any combination thereof under this section or § 39-6-417 [repealed] or under the laws of any other state or jurisdiction, which if committed in this state would have constituted a Class A or Class B felony violation under this section or § 39-6-417 [repealed]; provided, that the prior convictions were for violations committed at different times and on separate occasions at least twenty-four (24) hours apart, shall be found to be an habitual drug offender and shall be sentenced to one range of punishment higher than the range of punishment otherwise provided for in § 40-35-105, and, in addition, shall be fined not more than two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000).
  10. The offense described in subdivision (a)(1) with respect to any substance defined in § 39-17-408(d)(2) shall include the preparation or compounding of a controlled substance by an individual for the individual's own use.
    1. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) with respect to any amount of methamphetamine shall be punished by confinement for not less than one hundred eighty (180) days, and the person shall serve at least one hundred percent (100%) of the one hundred eighty (180) day minimum.
      1. The one hundred eighty (180) day minimum sentence required by subdivision (n)(1) shall not be construed to prohibit a person sentenced pursuant to this subsection (n) from participating in a drug or recovery court that is certified by the department of mental health and substance abuse services.
      2. Any person participating in such a court may receive sentence credit for up to the full one hundred eighty (180) day minimum required by subdivision (n)(1).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 991, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, § 30; 1992, ch. 700, §§ 4, 5; 1992, ch. 878, § 4; 1994, ch. 703, § 1; 1996, ch. 928, §§ 1-3; 1997, ch. 107, § 3; 1998, ch. 1079, §§ 1, 3, 4, 6, 7; 2003, ch. 331, § 1; 2004, ch. 845, §§ 1-3; 2005, ch. 18, § 15; 2005, ch. 322, § 1; 2012, ch. 852, § 1; 2014, ch. 970, § 1; 2019, ch. 201, §§ 1-3.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

The commission wished to make it clear that each of these acts was a separate offense and therefore listed the manufacture, delivery, sale or possession with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell each as a separate subsection. Subsections (b)-(h) classify the schedules of drugs. Schedule I is a Class B felony. Schedule II is a Class C offense, except cocaine is punished as a Class B felony if the amount of drug is .5 grams or more, if a weapon is involved, or if death or bodily injury occurs. Schedules III and IV are Class D offenses, and Schedules V, VI and VII are Class E offenses. Each of the fines under this subsection is increased with the exception of Schedule VII which was decreased to a $1,000 fine.

Subsection (i) restates the language of the Class X drug offenses and makes conspiracy, manufacture, delivery, sale or possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell or conspiracy to do any of those offenses a Class B offense. The minimum amount of substance containing cocaine necessary for this subsection to apply was changed from 30 grams to 26 grams.

Subsection (j) is a new section to Tennessee law. The commission felt there should be provisions made for the “mega drug” offenses. Each of these amounts listed is ten times the amount of the old Class X offenses. These offenses are punished as Class A felonies.

Compiler's Notes. Section 39-6-417, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 1 provided that the act may be cited as the “Meth-Free Tennessee Act of 2005”.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2014, ch. 904, which enacted § 39-17-434, provided that any reference in Tennessee Code Annotated that provides a penalty, forfeiture, punishment, fine, disability or other adverse effect for a violation of § 39-17-417 or § 39-17-418, shall be considered to apply to a conviction under § 39-17-434 if the violation involves methamphetamine.

Amendment Notes. The 2019 amendment added current (i)(12); redesignated former (i)(12) and (13) as current (i)(13) and (14); added current (j)(12); redesignated former (j)(12) and (13) as current (j)(13) and (14); and substituted “listed in subdivisions (i)(1)-(12)” for “listed in subdivisions (i)(1)-(11)” at the end of current (i)(13) and current (j)(13).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 201, § 4.  April 25, 2019.

Cross-References. Application for consent to petition to convene investigative grand jury, § 40-12-201.

Commitment to department of children's services, § 37-1-137.

Drug abuse resistance education, title 49, ch. 1, part 4.

Drug interdiction programs, financial incentives for counties, title 38, ch. 11, part 2.

Drugs on grounds of county institution where prisoners are quartered as felony, § 39-16-201.

Eligibility of certain drug offenders for special alternative incarceration unit, § 40-20-207.

Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Introduction or possession of weapons, explosives, intoxicants or drugs into a penal institution where prisoners are quartered, § 39-16-201.

Manufacture, delivery, sale or possession of methamphetamines, § 39-17-434.

Penalties for Class A, B, C, D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Procedure for confiscation of property in cases of seizure of narcotic drugs or marijuana, § 53-11-201.

Procedure for seizing contraband in cases of seizure of tobacco products, § 67-4-1021.

Procedure for seizing contraband property in cases of seizure of alcoholic beverages, § 57-9-202.

Racketeer-influenced and corrupt organizations, title 39, ch. 12, part 2.

School drug testing, student assistance program, counseling, § 49-6-4213.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 7.7, 16.21, 27.121, 27.194, 28.63, 28.114, 30.66, 31.51, 32.20, 32.64, 32.192.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 43; 10 Tenn. Juris., Drugs and Druggists, § 5.

Law Reviews.

Confusing Views: Open View, Plain View, and Open Fields Doctrines in Tennessee, 14 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 337 (1984).

Constitutional Law — Fourth Amendment — Using an Informant as the Basis of a Search of Seizure — State v. Simpson, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 531 (1999).

Criminal Procedure—Tennessee v. Carter: The Strict Requirement of Notice Under Tennessee's Recidivist Sentencing Statutes (David Demar Ayliffe) 35 U. Mem. L. Rev. 145 (2004).

Dignity, And Danger: Human Dignity As A Constitutional Constraint To Limit Overcriminalization, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 291 (2013).

Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (2000).

Joint Authority? The Case For State-Based Marijuana Regulation, 8 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 44 (2012).

On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421 (2009).

States Are Making Their Own Decisions Regarding Whether Marijuana Should Be Illegal: How Should The Federal Government React?, 9 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 233 (2013).

The Need For Prescription Drug Buy-Back Programs, 6 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 103 (2010).

Attorney General Opinions. Registration requirements and sentencing for methamphetamine offenses. OAG 14-104, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 107 (12/3/14).

The proposed Tennessee Clinical Cannabis Authorization and Research Act would immunize pharmacists acting in good faith from adverse administrative actions and civil liability under state law. And, although the Cannabis Act does not immunize pharmacists from state criminal liability and does not—and could not—immunize pharmacists from adverse administrative and criminal consequences under federal law, pharmacists acting in good faith pursuant to the state medical cannabis program are highly unlikely to face criminal prosecution or adverse administrative action by federal officials. OAG 20-11, 2020 Tenn. AG LEXIS 28 (6/5/2020).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The drug related activity proscribed by T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a) and for which the Drug-Free School Zone Act enhances applicable criminal penalties does not enjoy First Amendment or other constitutional protections. State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

2. Construction.

The term “defendant” as used in T.C.A. § 39-17-417 includes all persons, not persons who are already defendants in another proceeding. State v. Patton, 898 S.W.2d 732, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Mar. 6, 1995).

The common law “procuring agent defense” has been statutorily abolished. State v. Porter, 2 S.W.3d 190, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. 1999).

With the passage of the Criminal Reform Act of 1989, the legislature made procuring or delivering a controlled substance the same crime as selling a controlled substance. State v. Porter, 2 S.W.3d 190, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. 1999).

The amount of cocaine sold by a defendant is an essential element of the Class B felony of selling cocaine under T.C.A. § 39-17-417. State v. Walker, 29 S.W.3d 885, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1059 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

3. Application.

Defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective in setting out the range of punishment for the offense charged, when the conspiracy to which defendant pled guilty, delivery of over 300 pounds of marijuana, continued beyond the effective date of the statute designating the offense as a Class A felony, and defendant could properly be convicted of a Class A felony without violating the ex post facto provisions of U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, Tenn. Const. art. I, § 11, and T.C.A. § 39-11-112. Agee v. State, 111 S.W.3d 571, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Apr. 28, 2003).

4. Relationship With Federal Law.

In a case in which defendant appealed his 180-month sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he unsuccessfully argued that the district court erroneously classified him as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because his 1990 conviction for sale of a controlled substance, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-417, was not a violent felony or a serious drug offense. His assertions that the district court should have considered the amount of cocaine listed in the arrest report and that the government should be estopped from contending otherwise were off the mark; all that mattered was whether, at the time of his conviction, the maximum sentence for the conviction was at least ten years of imprisonment, and it was. United States v. Landon, 449 Fed. Appx. 500, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24293, 2011 FED App. 814N (6th Cir.).

Inmate's claim that his conviction under T.C.A. § 39-17-417 for possession with intent to distribute cocaine no longer qualified as a predicate offense under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 195 L. Ed. 2d 604, 2016 U.S. Lexis 4060 (2016), failed as a violation of § 39-17-417 was a categorical controlled substance offense and Mathis only applied in the modified categorical context; the inmate's conviction under § 39-17-417, coupled with his unchallenged Tennessee conviction for evading arrest, meant he was properly designated a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1. Franklin v. United States, — F.3d —, — FED App. —, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 36893 (6th Cir. May 11, 2018).

In sentencing defendant for being a felon in possession of ammunition, a four-point enhancement was properly applied to defendant's base offense level because the federal district court did not clearly err when it determined that defendant possessed drugs in his house and on his person for resale—a felony drug-trafficking offense—and correctly determined that mere presence of ammunition in close proximity to the drugs facilitated, or had potential to facilitate, that offense. United States v. Posley, 2017 FED App. 515N (6th Cir.), — F.3d —, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17245 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2017).

Defendant was properly sentenced as a career offender because his prior Tennessee conviction for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver under T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(4) counted as a sentence-enhancing controlled-substance offense under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(b); possession with intent to deliver was a completed crime, not an attempted one beyond the guidelines'  reach. United States v. Garth,  — F.3d —, 2020 FED App. 212P, 2020 FED App. 0212P (6th Cir.), 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 21786 (6th Cir. July 14, 2020).

5. Control or Possession.

Convictions for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia were not supported by defendants' mere presence in an apartment where drugs and paraphernalia were found or their mere association with the person who was inferentially the owner of the drugs and paraphernalia. State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Before a person can be found to constructively possess a drug, it must appear that the person has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over the drug either directly or through others; in other words, constructive possession is the ability to reduce an object to actual possession. State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. 2001).

Although a defendant's mere presence at a place where controlled substances are found will not support an inference of possession, a person in possession of the premises where controlled substances are found may also be presumed to possess the controlled substances themselves. State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. 2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that defendant had constructive possession of cocaine, a firearm, and ammunition because the verdict reflected that the jury credited the proof that defendant lived at the home where the crack cocaine, firearm, and ammunition were found; officers found defendant's driver's license on a bedside table and a box of baggies containing crack cocaine in the master bedroom closet, and they saw both male and female clothing in the closet. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Evidence regarding defendant's relationship with the motel room that housed controlled substances was sufficient to establish that he was in possession of marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia because the drugs were scattered over the bed and bedside table so that an occupant of the room could not have escaped knowledge of their presence; the drugs were discovered immediately after defendant emerged from the room, and the room was otherwise unoccupied. State v. Green, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Defendant was in constructive possession of the controlled substances and drug paraphernalia found inside the vehicle, as he was the driver and only occupant of the vehicle and investigators detected an odor of marijuana and discovered a bag of marijuana in plain view; although defendant argued that because the vehicle was registered to another person and no investigator observed him place the narcotics in the vehicle, the State failed to establish possession, the court disagreed. State v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2019).

6. Facilitation.

Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a jury instruction on facilitation as a lesser-included offense of sale and delivery of a Schedule I controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school; there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant merely facilitated the drug sales because he set the price for the drugs, acquired the drugs, accepted payment for the drugs, and delivered the drugs. Bryant v. State, 460 S.W.3d 513, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2015), overruled in part, Moore v. State, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for facilitation of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school because defendant was in close proximity to the duffel bags containing cocaine, defendant admitted ownership of one of the bags, defendant's student identification was found in one of the bags, and defendant knowingly provided substantial assistance to another individual and that individual's drug operation by possessing and safeguarding the drugs. State v. Gibson, 506 S.W.3d 450, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

7. Defect in Indictment.

Entry of defendant's guilty plea constituted waiver of defendant's right to raise defect in the indictment due to failure to specify the amount of controlled substance possessed. State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. 1999).

Because indictments charging defendant with the delivery of cocaine referenced the appropriate section, defendant was provided sufficient notice of the required mental state to commit the offense; therefore, the indictments were legally sufficient. State v. Wilson, 31 S.W.3d 189, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. 2000).

As defendant's indictment charged defendant with possessing cocaine with the intent to sell, the necessary mental state could be inferred from the conduct alleged; therefore, the indictment was valid. State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. June 30, 2003).

Defendant's indictment for possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana did not include a charge for two offenses, sale and delivery, in a single count, thereby depriving defendant of a unanimous verdict because possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver was a single, independent offense so that it was properly charged in a single count. State v. Matthews, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Because defendant was erroneously charged with two separate and distinct offenses in the same indictment, as he was indicted for two counts of sale or delivery of cocaine, one count under 0.5 grams and one count more than 0.5 grams, the court held that plain error existed and defendant's convictions were reversed. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017).

Habeas corpus court properly dismissed petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus because petitioner failed to show that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment since he had sufficient notice of the charges to defend at trial; the indictment cited the relevant drug statute and tracked the language of the drug-free school zone enhancement verbatim, and the language enabled petitioner to know the accusation to which an answer was required. Washington v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2018).

Habeas court properly denied petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus because despite the minor defect in the indictment, the indictment satisfied the minimum requirements; Borner v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 21, 2018).

8. Search and Seizure.

Deputies' warrantless entry into defendants' residence was unlawful because the deputies created the exigent circumstances by approaching the residence and alerting defendants to their presence. However, the unlawful entry and detention did not taint the evidence seized pursuant to the subsequent search warrant, because one deputy's observations as he approached defendants' residence and stood at the front door (the smell of anhydrous ammonia associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine and the sound of persons running), were not unlawful with respect to an expectation of privacy; further, the affidavit supporting the issuance of the warrant was supported by probable cause because the confidential informant's hearsay information (that defendants were manufacturing methamphetamine), was corroborated by the independent observations of the deputies. State v. Carter, 160 S.W.3d 526, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 224 (Tenn. 2005), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 365 (Tenn. Apr. 18, 2005), cert. denied, Carter v. Tennessee , 547 U.S. 1081, 126 S. Ct. 1797, 164 L. Ed. 2d 536, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 3098 (2006).

Affidavit provided the following facts: (1) upon receiving an anonymous tip that someone was manufacturing methamphetamine at the defendants' residence, one deputy smelled ether coming from the area of defendants' residence; (2) as the deputy approached defendants' residence, he smelled both ether and anhydrous ammonia coming from inside of the residence; (3) the deputy also heard people running inside of the residence; and (4) based upon his prior experience, the deputy associated his observations with the operation of a methamphetamine laboratory. Those facts in combination provided more than sufficient independent police corroboration to compensate for deficiencies in meeting the two-prong test under State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 432, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. 1989); therefore, the information provided in the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. State v. Carter, 160 S.W.3d 526, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 224 (Tenn. 2005), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 365 (Tenn. Apr. 18, 2005), cert. denied, Carter v. Tennessee , 547 U.S. 1081, 126 S. Ct. 1797, 164 L. Ed. 2d 536, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 3098 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for selling and conspiring to sell cocaine in violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-417(b) were improper because he was not under arrest at the time of the search of his person and therefore, the warrantless search was invalid. State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Jan. 21, 2011).

Officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for the felony offense of possessing with intent to deliver or sell heroin where at the moment that the officer put defendant in handcuffs, he knew the driver had stated that defendant put heroin in her pants, defendant was acting nervously, defendant's actions were inconsistent with his statement that he did not have identification, and defendant had a large amount of cash in his pocket. United States v. Jackson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165010 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 24, 2014), aff'd, — F.3d — , 663 Fed. Appx. 426, 2016 FED App. 569N, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18545 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2016).

Where defendant showed the police that defendant had marijuana inside defendant's home and the police obtained a search warrant, suppression was not warranted, because there was an outright certainty, not just a “fair probability,” that the house contained illegal drugs, and it did not matter whether the police suspected that defendant possessed marijuana, dealt marijuana, or committed some other crime; the contents of the warrant affidavit were not stale. United States v. Church, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8982, 2016 FED App. 120P (6th Cir.), 823 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2016).

In a case where defendant pled guilty to aggravated statutory rape, her motion to suppress was properly denied because an investigator's affidavit stated that individuals who dealt in controlled substances often possessed photographs and/or videotapes of themselves; during the search for methamphetamine, once the officers seized evidence of drug sales and deliveries, the search warrant encompassed the seizure of an electronic storage device that contained two separate videos of what appeared to be an underage male having sex with defendant; and the warrant established a sufficient nexus between the items sought to be seized and defendant's alleged violations of the Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1989 and the Money Laundering Act. State v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 966 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

9. Double Jeopardy.

Trial court violated the protection against double jeopardy in failing to merge defendant's convictions for possession with intent to sell and possession with intent to deliver. State v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

There is no language in subsection (a)(4) or (c)(1) indicating the legislature intended to create more than one unit of prosecution for possession of cocaine based on its form, and subsection (c)(1) seems to ensure that if cocaine is combined with any other substance, the total weight can be considered to determine the class of the offense; therefore, there is no clear intent to create separate units of prosecution for the possession of powder cocaine and the possession of cocaine base. State v. Brandon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2016).

Defendant's multiple convictions for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine base violated the principles of double jeopardy because there was clear intent on the part of the legislature to create separate units of prosecution for the possession of powder cocaine and the possession of cocaine base; therefore, defendant's convictions were merged. State v. Brandon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2016).

Because the legislature did not intend to allow for multiple units of prosecution for a single sale of cocaine that occurred in overlapping drug-free zones, defendant's convictions in counts three and four violated double jeopardy; however, because the remedy for such improper dual convictions was merger, and the trial court merged all four of the possessing cocaine with intent to sell or deliver convictions in defendant's case, defendant was not entitled to relief. State v. Armstrong, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1024 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied as his convictions did not violate double jeopardy, and his counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that argument because defendant's conviction for attempted possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver required a finding that he attempted to possess the cocaine with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell it; and a factual finding of intent to manufacture, deliver or sell was completely absent from the crime of aggravated robbery, which required proof that the theft of the drug was accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon. Howard v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

10. Evidence.

When the state sought to prove the sale of a controlled substance to the informant, who was the only agent of the state participating in the transactions, it was not entitled to keep her identity privileged. State v. Brown, 823 S.W.2d 576, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 753 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

To convict a defendant for possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, the state is required to prove the existence of three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the defendant possessed a controlled substance; (2) That the substance contained 0.5 grams of cocaine or more; and (3) That the defendant possessed the substance with the intent deliver or sell it. State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. 2001).

In his drug trial, the trial court did not err by allowing the state to introduce 17 firearms, photographs of multiple firearms, and ammunition into evidence at trial because the evidence concerning the weapons found defendant's residence was relevant to support his convictions for possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver more than 10 pounds but less than 70 pounds of marijuana, and manufacturing 20 or more marijuana plants, T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(4). Further, even if the evidence was admitted in error, the error was harmless because of the overwhelming evidence against defendant. State v. Hayes, 337 S.W.3d 235, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2011).

In a trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or deliver heroin, in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-12-103 and 39-17-417, the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing testimony establishing the street value of the drugs seized from the vehicle driven by defendant because the value of the drugs was relevant to establish defendant's intent to sell or deliver. State v. Martinez, 372 S.W.3d 598, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 27, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012).

11. —Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Defendant's argument that because he is blind, he necessarily required the assistance and cooperation of another person to sell or deliver cocaine, and that therefore, a conviction for conspiracy would constitute double jeopardy, failed because the offenses of delivering or selling cocaine and the offense of conspiracy to deliver or sell cocaine contain different elements. State v. Thornton, 10 S.W.3d 229, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1045 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2000).

The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine where defendant and the defendant's cousin made their living selling drugs, and lived together in a residence, the purpose of which was to sell drugs. State v. Bigsby, 40 S.W.3d 87, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

Trial court did not err in charging a jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver where the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support conviction for facilitation of possession of marijuana; when the vehicle defendant was in was initially stopped by the police, one or more of the occupants had been recently smoking marijuana due to the strong odor and it was defendant (not his friend) who was in physical control of the marijuana due to his proximity to the brown paper bag. State v. Nash, 104 S.W.3d 495, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of manufacturing more than 100 grams of methamphetamine, though defendant argued that the state failed to prove the element of manufacture because there was no evidence introduced at trial that would prove the manufacture of the methamphetamine was not for the defendant's own use; however, pursuant to T.C.A. § 53-11-410(a), it was defendant's burden to prove the exception that he manufactured the drug for his own use, as stated in T.C.A. § 39-17-402(14) (now (15)), and while defendant testified that he had only manufactured methamphetamine for his own personal use, the jury obviously chose not to believe him. State v. Magness, 165 S.W.3d 300, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for the sale of drugs within one thousand feet of a school where witnesses identified defendant as the perpetrator of the offenses, defendant's features were clearly visible on a videotape before and after the transaction, and a city employee testified that the location of the transaction was approximately four hundred eighty feet from a school. State v. Lindsey, 208 S.W.3d 432, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2006), dismissed, Lindsey v. Parker, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102475 (E.D. Tenn. July 23, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for the sale of cocaine because an officer testified as to his buying cocaine from a man he later identified as defendant, another officer monitored the transaction through audio equipment, although he did not see the person from whom the other officer bought the cocaine, and the cocaine sample weighed .4 grams. State v. Biggs, 211 S.W.3d 744, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1129 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendants'  convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone because all defendants met at a parking lot beforehand and each either participated in the delivery of marijuana to a carwash or placed himself in position to assist in the drug transaction. State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. 2007), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to sell because: (1) Defendant took off on foot and got into a scuffle with a police officer; (2) After defendant was arrested, the officer located a blue container filled with .5 grams of cocaine near the area where the scuffle took place; (3) Defendant claimed that the cocaine was for his personal use; (4) The officer testified that the amount discovered was not consistent with personal use; (5) No drug paraphernalia was found; and (6) Defendant was spotted in a location known for illegal drug sales. State v. Nelson, 275 S.W.3d 851, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2008).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of 26 to 299 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, under T.C.A. § 39-17-417(i)(5), but not for the Class A felony for which defendant was convicted where: (1) The cocaine found in co-defendant one's truck was within arm's reach of defendant's seat; (2) An officer saw him throw a small portion of the cocaine into the back seat; (3) Defendant made statements to co-defendant two from which it could be inferred that he had general knowledge of the drug trade; and (4) There was insufficient evidence to show that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine found in co-defendant one's home under T.C.A. § 39-17-419, which had been aggregated with the cocaine found in the truck to convict him of a Class A felony. State v. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d 529, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with the intent to sell because defendant was driving his vehicle, in which almost four ounces of marijuana were found; defendant used his vehicle to transport marijuana, expecting compensation, and was aware of the presence and location of the drugs inside the car. State v. Rutherford, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1061 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 3, 2013), overruled, State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2014).

Evidence that a high volume of foot traffic was seen going to and from the house, defendant was the only person in the house when the agents searched it, defendant had a large amount of cash and a cellular phone on him when searched, a box of clear plastic sandwich bags like those often used to package narcotics was found in the front room of the house, and cocaine was found in the attic was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver it. State v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. June 24, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's drug and conspiracy convictions because (1) a jury could infer from evidence that a portion of the substance defendant sold was cocaine that the entire substance was cocaine, and (2) the evidence showed defendant's implied understanding with a co-defendant. State v. Murchison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for conspiracy to sell more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and conspiracy to deliver more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school where it showed that he personally sold cocaine to the confidential informant on several occasions, he communicated with his co-defendant about selling cocaine to the informant, he was present for a buy between the co-defendant and the informant at a carwash, he discussed the co-defendant's drug prices with the informant, and acted as a drug courier between the co-defendant and the informant. State v. Graham, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient that defendant sold .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone within a 1,000 of a park to a confidential informant on three occasions because (1) the informant arranged to purchase cocaine from defendant; (2) before each transaction, the police searched the informant and the informant's vehicle for contraband and found none; (3) the police supplied the informant with recording equipment and money to purchase the cocaine; (4) the transactions were recorded; and (5) the lab tests were positive for cocaine. State v. Pillow, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of three counts of sale of cocaine over .5 gram within a drug-free zone where the informant testified he purchased cocaine from defendant during controlled buys on three occasions, a detective identified defendant on each of the video recordings, an agent testified that each of the three substances purchased from defendant contained cocaine and testified that they all weighed over .5 gram, and the detective and a witness testified that the drug transactions occurred within 1,000 feet of a licensed, operating daycare. State v. Waire, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 257 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2016).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine base because officers discovered defendant alone in a hotel room with the drugs and cash; the director of the drug task force testified that the amount of drugs found, along with the large amount of cash, was indicative of someone selling drugs rather than just using drugs State v. Brandon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of selling dihydrocodeinone because the jury heard the impeaching evidence regarding the character of the purchaser for untruthfulness and, in spite of that evidence, chose to accredit his testimony that defendant sold him dihydrocodeinone; the first officer testified that he saw what he believed was a hand-to-hand drug transaction; the second officer testified that he saw money being exchanged between defendant and the purchaser; defendant lied to the first officer about her relationship with the purchaser; the first officer found an empty pill bottle when he searched defendant; and the first officer testified that the purchaser was cooperative with him and produced four dihydrocodeinone pills. State v. Crews, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 2, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for casual exchange of methamphetamine because the evidence proved that defendant agreed to sell methamphetamine to a paid confidential informant (CI); met with the CI, who was wired, and accepted photocopied drug buy money and pills from the CI; later handed the methamphetamine to the CI's then fiancee; and had the drug buy money when arrested soon after delivering the methamphetamine. State v. Dickerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free school zone where an employee of the Metropolitan Planning Department testified that the location where defendant exchanged money with the undercover officer took place was within 1,000 feet of a school, defendant gave the detective the drugs when the undercover vehicle was one block away from the gas station. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for sale and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within a drug-free zone, given that defendant gave cocaine to an offer in exchange for money, and the transaction took place within 1,000 feet of a preschool and another school. State v. Stripling, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of 150 grams or more of heroin with the intent to sell or distribute where it showed that a package containing heroin was addressed to a fictitious person, when a detective posing as a delivery person approached the residence on the package defendant ran toward him from the other side of the duplex, defendant told the detective that it was his house, he followed the detective to the truck to retrieve the package, and he was arrested after receiving it. State v. Gonzalez-Fonesca, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of the sale and delivery of marijuana where the informant and the agent testified they went to meet with defendant to purchase marijuana, the agent paid defendant $380, the transaction was recorded, officers later discovered one of the marked bills the agent used in defendant's possession, they discovered the remaining cash in the home of defendant's supplier, and an agent weighed and tested the substance defendant sold and determined it was marijuana. State v. Fredrickson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 740 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Informant's testimony that he gave defendant $100 and defendant gave him a small plastic bag containing cocaine, an officer's statement that the informant gave him a small bag of cocaine after meeting defendant, an agent's statement that the substance in the bag contained 2.13 grams of cocaine base, and an officer's statement that the distance between the fence of the school and the location of the transaction was 441 feet supported defendant's conviction for sale of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. State v. Lindsey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2016).

Evidence that an officer gave a confidential informant (CI) cash to buy three grams of heroin, the officer monitored the controlled buy, which was captured on audio and video recording, the CI provided the officer with a substance identified as 2.97 grams of heroin, and defendant was arrested with the money provided to the CI was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for selling and delivering heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia. State v. Scruggs, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2017).

Evidence that the confidential informant called defendant to arrange the purchase of crack cocaine from codefendant, defendant selected her own residence as the location for the transaction, defendant was present for the entire transaction, and a detective measure the distance from defendant's home to school as being 647 feet was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for facilitation to deliver cocaine within a school zone. State v. Pinegar, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2016), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 386 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for the sale of cocaine in a drug-free school zone because a confidential informant (CI), at an officer's behest, arranged to purchase cocaine from defendant on three separate occasions and an audio or video recording of each transaction was made and played for the jury. On each occasion, the officer searched the CI, provided the CI with recording equipment and money, and accompanied the CI to the apartment where the transactions occurred almost directly across the street from a school. State v. Maples, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for conspiracy to possess over 300 pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell it. Some of the marijuana, which defendant admitted belonged to him, had already been packaged into baggies in a manner that would facilitate resale, and between $20,000 to $22,000 cash was discovered next to this marijuana. State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).

Defendant was properly convicted of selling cocaine .5 grams or more of cocaine within a drug free school zone because a confidential informant (CI) twice purchased cocaine from defendant, the parties stipulated that the substance the CI purchased was cocaine and that the residence was located within 1,000 feet of a private elementary school and a childcare agency, authorities executing a search warrant discovered, inter alia, a large amount of cocaine in various stages of production and packaging, digital scales, and other items used in the production and packaging of crack cocaine, and marked bills from the controlled buys. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2017).

There was evidence from which a jury could find defendant guilty of conspiracy to sell and deliver a Schedule II controlled substance because defendant and his co-conspirator acted in concert to sell cocaine to a confidential informant (CI); defendant knowingly solicited, negotiated, and arranged for the drug sale, and he provided directions, access to the co-conspirator and was the person designated to literally hand the drugs over to the CI. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of over one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver because defendant and codefendant were discovered lying in a ditch on the side of a rural road adjacent to a prison from which defendant had been released two weeks earlier, just after midnight, at or near a known hot-spot for smuggling illegal contraband into the prison. Moreover, two large duffel bags containing cell phones, cell phone charges, tobacco, and marijuana were found one to two feet from defendant. State v. Matthews, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2017).

Evidence that defendant handed .76 grams of crack cocaine to the confidential informant and, in exchange, received money, and that the transaction occurred within 1,000 feet of a school was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. State v. Dunn, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

Evidence that 16 grams of powder cocaine were found in defendant's residence, and plastic baggies, digital scales, and Pyrex measuring cups that tested positive for cocaine residue were found in the residence, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for attempt to commit the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver. State v. Byars, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2017), overruled in part, State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction because the evidence showed (1) defendant possessed cocaine, and (2) defendant distributed cocaine. State v. Gossett, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

Defendant's claim that the evidence merely established a casual exchange under T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a), as opposed to a sale or delivery failed, as there was no evidence he gave the drugs to the individual out of friendship, the deals were made solely for monetary gain, and the amount of drugs, price, and meeting places were clearly established before each transaction. State v. Click, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017), overruled, State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2018).

Sufficient evidence demonstrated defendant's guilt of possessing a firearm with intent to go armed during commission of a dangerous felony because (1) the possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver was a serious felony, and (2) a loaded gun found near a large amount of marijuana, plastic bags, scales, and ammunition let a jury infer the gun was possessed with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Watkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver or sell the substance because a police officer, during a search incident to arrest, discovered a pack of cigarettes containing over .5 grams of crack cocaine in the pocket of defendant's pants. Police officers testified that, based on their training and experience, defendant's possession of the cocaine was inconsistent with the usual practices of an ordinary drug user and more consistent with the practices of a drug dealer. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Apr. 18, 2018), overruled in part, State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of participation in a controlled drug buy of heroin and cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school because a detective engaged in a text message conversation with a cell phone ending in 4949 wherein he sought to purchase heroin and cocaine; after setting up the controlled drug buy, the holder of the 4949 number instructed the detective to call him when he arrived at the apartment complex, and then directed him to a specific apartment; defendant opened the door and gave him a package of heroin and cocaine in exchange for $130; detective captured defendant's face on video during the transaction; and the jury found that defendant was the author of the text messages and, thus, the seller of the drugs. State v. Lane, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for the sale or delivery of a controlled substance because it showed that a confidential informant (CI) conducted controlled drug purchases, after each exchange the CI turned over drugs to the officer which were later determined to be crack cocaine, video recordings and still images from both purchases were shown to the jury, and the jury heard testimony that both purchases occurred within 1,000 feet of two public parks. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver or to sell it because defendant was the sole occupant of a vehicle, in which a backpack containing marijuana and a pistol were found on the front passenger-side floorboard and were easily accessible from the driver's seat when the police stopped defendant. In addition, the vehicle matched the description given by a confidential informant, and it appeared at the same location and time officers expected a drug sale to occur. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant because a rational juror could have found that he knowingly sold and delivered more than .5 grams of cocaine to a confidential informant; the informant called defendant arranged to purchase some drugs from him and gave him pre-marked $ 20 bills in exchange for the drugs, which tested positive for more than .5 grams of cocaine, and during a traffic stop, defendant had the same amount of money in the same denominations as the informant gave him. State v. Blackman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of one count of sale and one count of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, morphine, as it was within the jury's purview to reject defendant's theory of casual exchange because defendant established the price of the morphine tablets, by offering the tablets for a discount; he sold the drugs to an individual that defendant had only met a few times previously; and the individual did not have an established relationship with defendant. State v. Shelton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Jan. 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient that defendant constructively possessed cocaine found behind the backseat of a police car after a police sergeant transported defendant and the driver of the car in which defendant was a passenger to a police station. During the traffic stop defendant was arrested after a police officer discovered dihydrocodeinone tablets that defendant had secreted in the crotch of defendant's pants and defendant's hands were handcuffed in front of defendant's body, while the driver's hands were handcuffed behind defendant's back. State v. Bynum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver because a confidential informant recorded a meeting in defendant's car, defendant in the recording referenced a baggie containing “0.7” rather than “0.5” and said, “Here you go,” the informant dropped the drugs the informant received inside the car, defendant fled when police officers arrived and wrecked the car, and officers located in the car methamphetamine and the cash that was given to the informant. State v. Pollard, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 937 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied because, although counsel's advice to plead guilty constituted deficient performance, as by pleading guilty to aggravated burglary, defendant acknowledged that he intended to possess cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver it, and that he actually possessed the cocaine, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance as he did not show a reasonable probability that the jury would have entertained reasonable doubt regarding the drug charge had he not acknowledged guilt of the aggravated burglary charge because he entered an apartment that appeared to function solely as a cocaine dispensary with co-defendant, who had cocaine, a gun, and two sets of scales. McCathern v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, McCathern v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2018).

Evidence that a confidential informant met a seller in a parking lot, the seller called defendant, 20 minutes later defendant arrived and had an interaction with the seller, thereafter the informant had the cocaine and defendant had the photocopied money, was sufficient to support an inference that defendant knowingly sold the cocaine to the informant via the seller for purposes of a conviction for the sale of cocaine. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 997 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possessing cocaine with intent to sell or deliver because the officers saw defendant conduct a hand-to-hand drug transaction; the officers found $237 dollars, but no drug paraphernalia, on defendant's person; and an expert in narcotics testified that drug sellers often hid cocaine in their mouths and that he would not expect to find drug paraphernalia on a drug seller. State v. Armstrong, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1024 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of selling heroin in a drug-free zone and possession of heroin with intent to sell in a drug-free zone because the confidential informant (CI) placed the prerecorded buy money on a coffee table in an apartment; codefendant took the money and went into another room with defendant; defendant then left the apartment; codefendant handed the heroin to the CI; when defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter, he was in possession of a twenty dollar bill and a ten dollar bill with serial numbers that matched those of bills given to the CI by police; codefendant's apartment was within 1000 feet of a city park; and the vehicle that defendant was riding in passed within 1000 feet of an elementary school. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions of facilitation to possess with intent to sell marijuana and marijuana wax, given that several packages had been sent to her address from Colorado, and several packages bearing her name were sent back, such that the jury could have inferred that the return packages were payment by the defendant to a supplier, establishing knowledge and intent. State v. Hart, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver because defendant admitted that the over 100 grams of marijuana and the scales found during a traffic stop belonged to defendant and the police officers found scales, baggies, a loaded gun, and ammunition in the vicinity of the narcotics and defendant. State v. Clay, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2018).

Circumstantial evidence connecting defendant to the cocaine and a handgun, including the discovery of both under a car at a location identified in a phone call defendant placed from jail, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (Tenn. July 19, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for delivery of less than fifteen grams of a Schedule I controlled substance because a witness testified that defendant sold the witness heroin after the witness called defendant and arranged a meeting, and phone records corroborated this testimony. Police officers testified that they observed an apparent transaction between defendant and the witness in a parked car, subsequently found the heroin on the witness, and were able to identify defendant from the license plate number on defendant's car. State v. Merritt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 260 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to have found defendant guilty of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine because defendant gave cocaine to a confidential informant in exchange for money; by finding defendant guilty, the jury implicitly resolved any conflicts between the testimonies of the detectives and between the undercover operations report and the indictment information and discovery. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, one of which was within a school zone, because a corporal and an agent met with the confidential informant (CI) and the CI's wife, searched them and their vehicle, and, upon finding no contraband, supplied them with a recording device and cash to purchase drugs from defendant; the second transaction occurred within 1,000 feet of an elementary school zone; on each occasion, the CI gave defendant money in exchange for crack cocaine in an amount greater than .5 grams; and, following each transaction, the CI and his wife immediately met the officers, relinquished the cocaine, returned the recording device, and submitted to another search. State v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver because an officer found baggies containing what was later identified as methamphetamine after stopping defendant and a driver; because defendant was seated in the front passenger seat in close proximity to the contraband, it was reasonable to infer that he could have exercised dominion and control over the bags containing methamphetamine. State v. Madden, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine because he knowingly sold less than 0.5 grams of cocaine to a confidential informant; the informant indicated to defendant that he desired to purchase cocaine and gave defendant sixty dollars, and defendant eventually gave the informant a substance later determined to be cocaine. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Evidence that defendant's house contained two sets of scales, marijuana that was compressed in a brick, cocaine in baggies, large amounts of cash, an electronic money counter, and multiple guns was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession with intent to sell marijuana and cocaine. State v. Tuttle, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 671 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for sale of drugs within 1,000 feet of a public elementary school because, on two separate occasions, defendant arranged for the confidential informant to come to his residence, a home located 800 feet from a public elementary school, to sell her drugs; the state presented video footage and still images from the footage of defendant during both controlled buys; the March 27 recording of the controlled buy showed defendant on the screen; and a mens rea was not required for the statute dealing with the sale of drugs within 1,000 feet of a public elementary school as it was an enhancement statute and not a separate offense. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2018).

Evidence showed that a confidential informant gave defendant $100 in exchange for 1.05 grams of cocaine contained in a plastic bag, and that this exchange took place within 1,000 feet of a school. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant was guilty of the sale or delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2018).

Defendant's convictions of selling cocaine were supported by sufficient evidence; while a witness gave conflicting testimony, all persons were presumed competent to be a witness and defense counsel never challenged her competency, plus the jury saw recordings of the arranged drug buys, and there was no error. State v. Primm, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a drug free zone because his two meetings with the informant, occurring about 20 minutes apart, constituted a single transaction, at least a portion of the sale occurred in a parking lot that was 164 feet away from a park that was a drug free zone, and a single plastic baggie containing 1.25 grams of cocaine was submitted to the TBI. State v. Marks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2018).

Evidence that defendant possessed about two ounces of marijuana which was not indicative of personal use, digital scales which were commonly used to weigh narcotics for packaging for sale, and small plastic bags which were indicative of narcotics sales was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession with the intent to sell or to deliver marijuana. State v. Evans, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine because defendant aided codefendant by allowing defendant's house to be used as the location for a drug venture and defendant intended to benefit from providing this aid by receiving drugs, rather than cash, for defendant's personal use. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2019).

Evidence that a confidential informant made two controlled buys from defendant was sufficient to support defendant's convictions despite the informant's prior criminal history, which the jury weighed before accrediting her testimony. State v. Montgomery, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2019).

Evidence that a confidential informant and defendant engaged in a transaction where the informant paid defendant $100 in exchange for methamphetamine was sufficient to prove that defendant engaged in the sale of methamphetamine and that he delivered it to her. State v. Marsh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2019).

Defendant's conviction for possession with intent to sell or deliver was supported by evidence that the amounts of cocaine and marijuana were not consistent with personal use, and the officers also found a firearm, scales, and plastic baggies in the vehicle. State v. Gill, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to infer that defendant possessed crack cocaine with intent to sell because defendant admitted ownership of an amount of cocaine that was not associated with personal use, the cocaine was consistent with the form which crack cocaine took during manufacture before it was broken into smaller pieces for sale, no instrument used to ingest cocaine was found, and defendant had no employment and initially offered to be drug-tested to show that defendant had not used drugs before later claiming the cocaine was for personal use. State v. Kelly, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession with intent to sell alprazolam because a trooper observed a baggy containing pills in the floorboard of defendant's truck, and defendant had no prescription for the pills. State v. Barnett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts convicting defendant of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia because the testimony established that the amount of drugs that he possessed was more than law enforcement officers typically encountered when the drugs were for personal use; an officer testified that the marijuana appeared to be packaged for sale rather than personal use because it was split up into smaller amounts. State v. Green, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of morphine with the intent to sell or deliver because it showed that both the rifle and the drink can containing 0.5 grams of morphine were found within five to seven feet from where an officer saw defendant prior to his arrest, the can was cut to form a bowl to heat the morphine and inject the drugs intravenously, and the officer believed there was a significant amount of morphine that defendant was going to distribute to the three individuals who were in the home prior to the arrest. State v. Alexander, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2019).

Independent corroborative evidence was sufficient to connect defendant with the commission of the offense of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine; defendant gave a telephone number to a witness as his own number and spoke to the witness from that number, plus the witness said the telephone number was only associated with defendant, an officer was aware that the number belonged to defendant, and the witness exchanged text messages with defendant and spoke to him over the phone about the drug transaction. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 313 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of marijuana with intent to sell because he possessed over 345 grams of marijuana; the jury could rationally conclude that defendant constructively possessed the marijuana as it was found in plain view on the front floorboard of the vehicle defendant had been driving, which was registered to defendant's mother and which also contained defendant's wallet and mail; and there was other circumstantial evidence of defendant's intent to sell or deliver the drug as plastic sandwich bags and a digital scale were found in the vehicle, both of which were commonly used to weigh and package drugs for sale, and $500 in cash was found on defendant's person when he was taken to the jail. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions of sale and delivery of a controlled substance; an acquaintance of defendant agreed to work as a confidential informant for the police, and under their supervision, she arranged three controlled drug buys with defendant, and by way of its verdict, the jury found that defendant was the person who met the informant on all three occasions and sold her cocaine. State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver and possession of illegal drug paraphernalia because it showed that he was found inside a residence where .32 grams of crack cocaine and a crack pipe were present, he was found in a bathroom with a digital scale commonly used for weighing drugs, and he later admitted to selling crack cocaine as a means of making money and to keeping a third of an ounce of cocaine with him at all times. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver; defendant was a regular overnight guest at the home and was present when the cocaine, which he constructively possessed, was seized, and a rational juror could have found that he provided substantial assistance to co-defendant by using a measuring cup that tested positive for trace amounts of cocaine in attempting to manufacture cocaine for sale or delivery. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of knowingly possessing a controlled substance with intent to sell and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because the evidence established that defendant constructively possessed the drugs and gun, as officers who responded to the scene testified there were men's clothing and shoes laying around the room, the beds were disheveled and there was a lot of baggage in the room, and there was no evidence of items belonging to a women in the room. State v. Brandon, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to sell and to deliver because drug enforcement officers testified that the amount of drugs found on defendant during a traffic stop and the manner in which they were packaged indicated that they were intended for resale rather than personal use. Therefore, from the evidence, a rational jury could have inferred that defendant possessed the drugs with intent to sell or deliver them rather than for defendant's own personal use. State v. Carero, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's drug convictions because each of the co-conspirators testified that defendant was in charge of a network that trafficked controlled substances from Detroit to Knoxville, recorded phone calls and text messages corroborated that defendant was in charge of the drug network, the controlled buys took place within drug-free zones, defendant answered the same phone number used by a coconspirator to set up the controlled buys, multiple people testified that defendant delivered heroin and opiate pills to members of the conspiracy, and officers seized drugs at locations where defendant was known to frequent. State v. Winbush, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for resale because the evidence was sufficient that defendant had actual possession of a cylinder of methamphetamine before a police officer initiated a traffic stop, that defendant directed defendant's paramour to conceal it in the paramour's vagina, and that defendant intended to re-obtain actual possession if the police failed to discover the drugs. Defendant had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the methamphetamine. State v. Ledet, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 224 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2020).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions of possession with intent to sell methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, as constructive possession was shown; the drugs and drug paraphernalia were located inside defendant's home and he shouted a warning when he saw the officer at the door, suggesting he knew drugs were in the house. Furthermore, the amount of drugs found was far in excess of the amount typically possessed and a witness testified that the drug paraphernalia was present in the home. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Trial court properly sentenced defendants to 21 and/or 25 years of incarceration after a jury convicted them of conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell heroin within 1000 feet of a drug-free school zone because the trial court made an explicit finding that a conspiracy existed—the first defendant packaged heroin for resale into small heat-sealed Ziploc baggies while the second defendant was present, and the second and third defendants resold the heroin to others—it would be extremely impractical and inefficient to hold a pretrial hearing due to the number of defendants and witnesses, the trial court could admit the co-conspirators'  statements before determining that a conspiracy existed. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of the sale of a Schedule II drug and conspiracy because an officer testified that he saw defendant pass the bottle of the purported drug to the accomplice, which the accomplice then gave to the officer, and when defendant and the accomplice were subsequently pulled over following the transaction, defendant had $150 on him, the exact amount the officer paid for the drug, but the accomplice had no money on him. State v. Savely, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to sell over 300 grams of methamphetamine because it showed that he supplied methamphetamine to the co-conspirator at the direction of another co-conspirator, the weight of the methamphetamine involved was over 300 grams, defendant knew that the methamphetamine was delivered to Tennessee by the first co-conspirator, the first co-conspirator delivered the methamphetamine to a third co-conspirator in the county, and defendant supplied the methamphetamine on more than one occasion. State v. Castillo, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2020).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for selling or delivering cocaine, including evidence that the video recording shows defendant got into the confidential informant's (CI) car, that the CI asked for a “fifty” and handed defendant money, that the CI and defendant drove a short distance, and that defendant got out of the car and returned with a substance wrapped in a napkin. After defendant left the car, the CI drove to another location and gave the substance to an agent, and the field test revealed that the substance was cocaine. State v. Vasser, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and heroin because, during a foot chase he discarded a bag containing large amounts of heroin, powder cocaine, and crack cocaine; the house from which defendant fled was littered with indicia of drug manufacture and sales; and defendant, who had no job and no other source of income, had $740 in cash at the time of his arrest. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for possession of heroin with the intent to sell and possession with the intent to deliver 0.5 gram or more of cocaine because defendant admitted to purchasing the cocaine and heroin before defendant handed the drugs to the driver of a vehicle in a traffic stop for the driver to hide the drugs. Defendant stated that the cocaine was purchased for a third party, and, based upon the amount of cocaine seized, the jury was permitted to infer that the cocaine was possessed for purpose of selling or delivery. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2020).

Evidence that methamphetamine was found in defendant's shoe, which was locked in a locker after being removed from defendant during booking, supported defendant's conviction for possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of methamphetamine. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to sell or deliver a controlled substance because it showed that a confidential informant (CI) purchased oxycodone and heroin from defendant on two occasions, defendant was seen on two separate occasions getting into the CI's car and going to another man's house to purchase heroin for the CI, the drugs provided by the CI were tested and determined to be oxycodone and heroin, and the testimony at trial revealed that on two separate occasions defendant purchased heroin from another man to sell to the CI. State v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for sale of amphetamine because a confidential informant's testimony and a video recording of the controlled buy proved the sale of the controlled substance by defendant to the informant. Furthermore, after the transaction, the informant gave a police officer the capsules that the informant purchased, which forensic testing established contained amphetamine. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 691 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had physical control over the methamphetamine and an intent to exercise control over it because a false-bottom can containing a substantial amount of methamphetamine was found wedged beneath the passenger seat in his vehicle and he was carrying a large amount of cash on his person. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 27, 2020).

12. —Insufficient.

Insufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession with intent to sell the cocaine found in co-defendant's residence under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 and 39-17-419 where: (1) Defendant's voice was identified in the background during the conversation with a confidential informant that established the drug buy; (2) Defendant was seen leaving the home with co-defendants before the takedown; (3) Some cocaine and items of drug paraphernalia were found in plain view in the home; and (4) It could be inferred that defendant had knowledge of some of the contraband in the home, but not that he had constructive possession of the contraband found in the home. State v. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d 529, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions because the State failed to present any proof that he actually or constructively possessed the drugs or gun in the motel room, as the police did not find any contraband on defendant and fingerprint analysis was not conducted on any of the items seized. The State did not present any proof as to who had rented the room or possessed a key, how long defendant had been in the room, how long he intended to stay in the room, or whether any of the bags or clothing in the room belonged to him. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 gram of cocaine when, during a traffic stop after defendant was observed speeding while driving a rental car, a police detective discovered a bag containing cocaine in the waistband of codefendant, the passenger in the car. However, none of the evidence directly connected defendant with the cocaine or created an inference that defendant had the knowledge and ability to exercise dominion and control over the cocaine. State v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2020).

13. Jury Instructions.

The trial court was obligated to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt the element relating to the amount of cocaine defendant sold. State v. Walker, 29 S.W.3d 885, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1059 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

14. Sentencing.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the maximum sentence within his sentencing range because it properly considered the applicable enhancement factors when determining the length of his sentence, and defendant received a sentence within the appropriate range; the trial court outlined defendant's history of failing to comply with conditions related to his release back into the community, including the crimes that he committed while on bond and probation. State v. Brandon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2016).

Defendant's sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because, based on his status as a career offender, he was properly sentenced to the mandatory maximum sentence of 30 years in prison State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017).

Trial court erred when classifying defendant's attempt to deliver conviction as a Class B felony and requiring 100 percent service of the minimum sentence. State v. Pinegar, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 386 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Trial court properly denied an alternative sentence based on defendant's criminal history and probation violations, and his five-year sentences for three counts of possessing cocaine with intent to sell were within the statutory range under T.C.A. § 39-17-417(c)(2)(A), 40-35-112(a)(3); the trial court carefully considered the evidence, enhancement and mitigating factors under T.C.A. §§ 40-35-113, 40-35-114, and the purposes and principles of sentencing under T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210, 40-35-102, 40-35-103, and no abuse of discretion was found. State v. Cogshell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2017).

Defendant's 15-year sentence for one count of sale and one count of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, morphine, was not excessive because the sentence was within the statutorily-applicable range; besides defendant's five prior felony convictions that established his range, defendant had convictions for contempt, simple possession, assault, domestic assault, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, under-age drinking, and vandalism; defendant had nine violations of orders of protection; and defendant had previously failed to comply with the conditions of his release into society. State v. Shelton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Jan. 17, 2018).

Trial court did not err in ordering that defendant serve his 15-year sentence for one count of sale and one count of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, morphine, in confinement because the interests of society would be protected from possible future criminal conduct if defendant were incarcerated, and confinement was suited to provide an effective deterrence; defendant was not statutorily eligible for probation or community corrections under the special needs provision; and defendant was not eligible for community corrections as he had a past pattern of behavior indicating violence and he had demonstrated a pattern of committing violent offenses. State v. Shelton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Jan. 17, 2018).

Defendant was not entitled to relief regarding his sentences of eight and sixteen years for delivery of cocaine under T.C.A. § 39-17-417; the enhancement factor in T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1) was supported by the record, given defendant's three previous cocaine-related and other convictions, the sentences were within the appropriate range under T.C.A. § 40-35-112(b)(2), (b)(3), and the trial court properly applied the purposes and principles of sentencing for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, 40-35-103. State v. Whisnet, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because defendant failed to state a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence; the sentences imposed were authorized and did not directly contravene an applicable statute because defendant was sentenced to fifteen years as a career offender on each of the two Class C felonies. State v. Sanders, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 122 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. June 6, 2018).

Trial court, after revoking defendant's community corrections sentence, did not abuse its discretion in resentencing defendant to a within range sentence for possession of cocaine and ordering defendant to serve the sentence in confinement because defendant had been arrested for and pleaded guilty to simple possession and evading arrest and defendant had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior and an extensive history of failing to comply with court-ordered drug treatment programs and of absconding from supervision. State v. Franklin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Trial court erred in finding that it did not have the authority to order defendant to serve his sentences for the drug convictions on probation because the possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony statute limited the trial court's discretion to grant probation only for convictions resulting from the possession of a firearm and did not limit the trial court's discretion to grant probation for the underlying dangerous felonies; thus, defendant, who was sentenced to three years each for the drug convictions, was eligible for probation for those convictions. State v. Lindsey, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to serve her total effective sentence of two years in confinement because she had been convicted under the Drug-Free School Zone Act and was ineligible for community corrections. State v. Barrett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying community corrections on the grounds that defendant had been convicted under the Drug-Free School Zone (DFSZ) Act because it properly applied precedent to defendant's case; previous panels of the court of appeals concluded that a defendant convicted of violating the DFSZ Act had to serve the sentence in confinement. State v. Barrett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2019).

Because defendant's sentences for sale of a Schedule III controlled substance within a drug-free zone, delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance within a drug-free zone, and maintaining a dwelling where a controlled substance was kept or sold were within the appropriate range, the trial court's sentencing determinations were entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Barrett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to serve his total effective sentence of two years in confinement because defendant was not eligible for community corrections as he was convicted under the Drug-Free School Zone Act; defendants dealing drugs in school zones who were sentenced to the minimum term in their sentencing range would serve 100% of their sentences; and defendant received concurrent sentences of two years for each conviction of sale of a Schedule III controlled substance within a drug-free zone, delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance within a drug-free zone, and maintaining a dwelling where a controlled substance was kept or sold, which were the minimum sentences for those offenses. State v. Diggs, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2019).

Defendant was properly sentenced for sale of a controlled substance as a Range III, persistent offender; defendant's attempted aggravated robbery charge necessarily contained an element of bodily injury or threatened bodily injury, and because this conviction contained bodily harm or threatened bodily harm, it was an exception to the 24-merger rule and would not merge with the aggravated burglary conviction. State v. Adcock, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2019).

Trial court did not err in ordering his sentence for sale of a controlled substance to run consecutively with his sentence from another county; the trial court found two factors that might be used to impose consecutive sentences, including defendant's extensive criminal activity and that the offense was committed while on probation, and there were supported by the record State v. Adcock, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2019).

Defendant's maximum 30-year sentence for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver was upheld on appeal; he was a career offender, the sentence was in range, and the trial court considered several enhancement and mitigating factors and followed the purposes of the Sentencing Act. State v. Parks, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 740 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Defendant's history of criminal activity was extensive, spanned more than 20 years, and included 10 felony convictions, half of which related to the possession or sale of drugs; thus, the consecutive sentences of 20 years and 11 months, 29 days respectively, for possession with intent to sell methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, were proper. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

15. Judicial Diversion.

Defendant was a qualified defendant for judicial diversion purposes as, contrary to the State's contention, the judicial diversion statute did not conflict with T.C.A. § 39-17-432, of which defendant was convicted. It was within the legislature's discretion to determine which offenses it deemed ineligible for diversion, and it had not deemed the offense of possession of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school zone ineligible. State v. Dycus, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2013), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 973 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 456 S.W.3d 918, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2015).

There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's denial of judicial diversion for defendant's conviction of facilitation to possess with intent to sell marijuana and marijuana wax, as her facilitation of the transfer of drugs, given her role in the community as a drug and alcohol counselor, outweighed the factors favoring the grant of judicial diversion. State v. Hart, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2018).

16. Weapons Offenses.

Evidence supported defendant's convictions of being a felon in possession of a firearm and a handgun given that he had a prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and evading arrest, both felonies, defendant admitted living in the house and residing in the bedroom where the gun was found, and the gun was loaded and stored in an unlocked gun case where it was easily accessible to him. State v. Ford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2017).

39-17-418. Simple possession or casual exchange.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly possess or casually exchange a controlled substance, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of professional practice.
  2. It is an offense for a person to distribute a small amount of marijuana not in excess of one-half (½) ounce (14.175 grams).
    1. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), a violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
      1. A violation of subsection (a) with respect to any amount of methamphetamine shall be punished by confinement for not less than thirty (30) days, and the person shall serve at least one hundred percent (100%) of the thirty (30) day minimum.
        1. The thirty (30) day minimum sentence required by subdivision (c)(2)(A) shall not be construed to prohibit a person sentenced pursuant to this subsection (c) from participating in a drug or recovery court that is certified by the department of mental health and substance abuse services.
        2. Any person participating in such a court may receive sentence credit for up to the full thirty (30) day minimum required by subdivision (c)(2)(A).
  3. A violation of subsections (a) or (b), where there is casual exchange to a minor from an adult who is at least two (2) years the minor's senior, and who knows that the person is a minor, is punished as a felony as provided in § 39-17-417.
  4. A violation under this section is a Class E felony where the person has two (2) or more prior convictions under this section and the current violation involves a Schedule I controlled substance classified as heroin.
    1. In addition to the other penalties provided in this section, any person convicted of violating this section for possession of a controlled substance may be required to attend a drug offender school, if available, or may be required to perform community service work at a drug or alcohol rehabilitation or treatment center.
    2. Any person required to attend a drug offender school pursuant to this subsection (f) shall also be required to pay a fee for attending the school. If the court determines that the person, by reason of indigency, cannot afford to pay a fee to attend the school, the court shall waive the fee and the person shall attend the school without charge. The amount of fee shall be established by the local governmental authority operating the school, but the fee shall not exceed the fee charged for attending an alcohol safety DUI school program if such a program is available in the jurisdiction. All fees collected pursuant to this subsection (f) shall be used by the governmental authority responsible for administering the school for operation of the school.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 992, § 3; 1993, ch. 456, §§ 1, 2; 2014, ch. 970, § 2; 2016, ch. 876, § 12.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section creates an enhanced penalty for third and subsequent offenses.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2014, ch. 904, which enacted § 39-17-434, provided that any reference in Tennessee Code Annotated that provides a penalty, forfeiture, punishment, fine, disability or other adverse effect for a violation of § 39-17-417 or § 39-17-418, shall be considered to apply to a conviction under § 39-17-434 if the violation involves methamphetamine.

Cross-References. Manufacture, delivery, sale or possession of methamphetamines, § 39-17-434.

Penalties for driving while intoxicated, §§ 55-10-402, 55-10-403.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Vehicle forfeiture for violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-418, OAG 93-46 (5/13/93).

Imposition of penalties for simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance.  OAG 12-33, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33 (3/9/12).

Registration requirements and sentencing for methamphetamine offenses. OAG 14-104, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 107 (12/3/14).

The conflict-preemption principles that are well established in Tennessee’s jurisprudence prevent a municipality from enacting and enforcing an ordinance that allows a police officer to issue a municipal citation that carries a civil penalty of fifty dollars or community service for the offense of possession of one-half ounce or less of marijuana. Such an ordinance conflicts with the provisions of the Drug Control Act and with the prosecutorial discretion and responsibilities of the district attorneys general in enforcing the Act. OAG 16-40, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 40 (11/16/2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

The misdemeanor “casual exchange” law applies solely to controlled substances; defendant was charged with sale or distribution of a counterfeit substance, he was not entitled to a charge relative to casual exchange. State v. Carey, 914 S.W.2d 93, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

2. “Casual Exchange.”

A casual exchange contemplates a spontaneous passing of a small amount of drugs, for instance, at a party, where money may or may not be involved. State v. Copeland, 983 S.W.2d 703, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1337 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

3. Probable Cause.

Officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for the felony offense of possessing with intent to deliver or sell heroin where at the moment that the officer put defendant in handcuffs, he knew the driver had stated that defendant put heroin in her pants, defendant was acting nervously, defendant's actions were inconsistent with his statement that he did not have identification, and defendant had a large amount of cash in his pocket. United States v. Jackson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165010 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 24, 2014), aff'd, — F.3d — , 663 Fed. Appx. 426, 2016 FED App. 569N, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18545 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2016).

Where officers found cocaine in a defendant's vehicle during a traffic stop, suppression was not warranted, because the officers were justified in continuing their investigation since the defendant's wife's admission that the wife had paid a relative to obtain prescription drugs was more than sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; the officers also had probable cause to search the vehicle. United States v. Collazo, 818 F.3d 247, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5757, 2016 FED App. 75P (6th Cir.).

Where defendant showed the police that defendant had marijuana inside defendant's home and the police obtained a search warrant, suppression was not warranted, because there was an outright certainty, not just a “fair probability,” that the house contained illegal drugs, and it did not matter whether the police suspected that defendant possessed marijuana, dealt marijuana, or committed some other crime; the contents of the warrant affidavit were not stale. United States v. Church, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8982, 2016 FED App. 120P (6th Cir.), 823 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2016).

Probable cause sufficiently supported a search warrant for a residence where police officers encountered defendant because (1) no lapse of time rendered the officers'  observation of marijuana in plain view at that location stale, as the officers sought the warrant on the same day as the observation, (2) defendant admitted possessing marijuana to the officers when defendant stated defendant had smoked marijuana earlier in the day and still possessed the remnants of that use, and (3) possessing any amount of marijuana was a crime. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 790 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

4. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence of drug paraphernalia, including spoons, a butane torch, plastic baggies, along with defendant's admission that he had used illicit drugs, was sufficient to convict defendant of simple possession of Darvocet tablets found in his car. Although defendant invoked the “valid prescription” exception, T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a), by stating that the drugs belonged to his wife's cousin, the jury was free to disbelieve the cousin. State v. Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d 64, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. June 18, 2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of third offense possession of a controlled substance where it showed that the captain, upon stopping defendant's vehicle for a traffic violation, detected the smell of marijuana inside the vehicle, when the captain asked defendant if he was in possession of marijuana he answered in the affirmative and gave the captain a small cigarette butt, and testing of the cigarette butt revealed that it contained marijuana. State v. Marsh, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for casual exchange of marijuana because the evidence proved that defendant met with a paid confidential informant (CI), agreed to sell the CI marijuana, accepted money which the police had photocopied from the CI in a meeting that the police recorded, and later drove by the CI's house and dropped off the marijuana. State v. Dickerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia because when officers searched defendant they found digital scales, and when the officers began placing defendant under arrest a small bag of marijuana fell from his pants leg; a rational jury also could have concluded that defendant's possession of digital scales was proof of his possessing the scales with the intent to use them as drug paraphernalia. State v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2016).

Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence demonstrated that the defendant, at a minimum, attempted to possess the diazepam and alprazolam tablets, and there was no evidence at trial that the defendant possessed a valid prescription for these controlled substances. Rather, the undisputed evidence established that the pills were found in close proximity to the gun the defendant admittedly threw prior to his arrest thereby support his conviction for possession of the drugs. State v. Abujaber, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of simple possession of marijuana because the deputy testified that when he approached the vehicle driven by defendant, he smelled burnt marijuana; after asking defendant if he had marijuana, defendant spit a bag containing a green plant-like substance onto the ground in his presence; and a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation testified that the bag contained just over one gram of marijuana. State v. Linsey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 729 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of possession of marijuana under T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a); the jury heard the proof and clearly resolved the issue of credibility in the State's favor, which could not be reconsidered on appeal, and any inconsistencies in the verdicts, one finding defendant guilty of possession of marijuana and one acquitting him of possessing contraband in a penal facility, did not affect the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction. State v. Hester, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 978 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of simple possession of marijuana because an officer discovered a green, plant-like material in defendant's car; the officer conducted a field test of the material, and the field test indicated that the substance, which weighed less than a gram, contained THC, the active ingredient in marijuana; and the substance was admitted into evidence and submitted to the jury for examination. State v. Lozano, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had constructive possession of methamphetamine and marijuana because moments after the agent knocked at the door and was greeted by the occupant of the residence agents at the back of the house heard the flushing of the toilet and hurried movements, the occupant and defendant were the only people in the house leaving defendant as the person in possession of the drugs that were being flushed, numerous agents testified to locating scales in plain sight, agents located defendant's clothes and debit card in the house, and $2,100 was found on defendant's person. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2019).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's constructive possession of marijuana conviction; while he was not a permanent resident at the home, he often spent the night there, his paystubs and auto insurance card were located there, and he was also present in the same room at the same time the investigators found the marijuana blunt. State v. Champion, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2020).

5. Evidence Insufficient.

Reversal of defendant's conviction for simple possession of marijuana was appropriate because the appellate court found that the marijuana found in defendant's back pocket was to be suppressed as it was discovered in a search incident to an arrest for public intoxication, when the appellate court determined that the arrest was made without probable cause, and the marijuana was the sole evidence supporting the conviction. State v. Pippen, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2016).

Defendant's claim that the evidence merely established a casual exchange, as opposed to a sale or delivery under T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(2) and (3) failed, as there was no evidence he gave the drugs to the individual out of friendship, the deals were made solely for monetary gain, and the amount of drugs, price, and meeting places were clearly established before each transaction. State v. Click, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017), overruled, State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions because the State failed to present any proof that he actually or constructively possessed the drugs or gun in the motel room, as the police did not find any contraband on defendant and fingerprint analysis was not conducted on any of the items seized. The State did not present any proof as to who had rented the room or possessed a key, how long defendant had been in the room, how long he intended to stay in the room, or whether any of the bags or clothing in the room belonged to him. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

6. Sentence.

Sentencing enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6) for possessing a weapon in connection with drug possession in violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-418 was improperly applied to defendant, who was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), because defendant was not trafficking in drugs, the street value of the drugs defendant possessed was negligible, and the gun was not used to protect the drugs. United States v. Shields, 664 F.3d 1040, 2011 FED App. 324P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25986 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 2011).

Defendant was not entitled to relief under the rule; he was convicted of casual exchange of a controlled substance, which carried a maximum sentence of 11 months and 29 days, and his sentence of the same, with 15 days' incarceration and the remainder on supervised probation, was within the statutory range, plus the trial court considered the principles of sentencing, including that absent jail time, it took away from any deterrence factors. State v. Evans, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2016), overruled, State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive, within range sentences of eight years, four years, and 11 months, 29 days for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, unlawful possession of a handgun, and merged drug convictions, for an effective sentence of 12 years, 11 months, and 29 days; defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive, plus his actions indicated a lack of potential for rehabilitation. State v. Ford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2017).

In a case where defendant was convicted of, among other things, simple possession of a controlled substance as a Class E felony, defendant did not qualify for enhancement of punishment for his simple possession conviction based on his prior convictions based on the amendment to this statute because defendant was charged in the indictment with simple possession of marijuana; defendant was not subject to enhanced punishment for the conviction as a Class E felony as the current violation did not involve heroin; the amendment resulted in a lesser penalty; and the trial court erred in declining to apply the amendment, and in sentencing defendant to simple possession of a controlled substance as a Class E felony. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2017).

Trial court incorrectly sentenced defendant for possession of marijuana as a Class E felony instead of a Class A misdemeanor; although defendant was charged and tried under prior law, T.C.A. § 39-17-418(e) had been amended by the time of his sentencing hearing and resulted in a lesser penalty, for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-11-112, and therefore, the imposition of a Class E sentence had to be reversed. State v. Hester, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 978 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2017).

7. Consent to Search.

Defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-17-418(c) and 39-17-425(c)(2) were appropriate because the warrantless search of his residence was proper since he consented to the search and the consent was not the product of the previous illegal search of his person. State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Jan. 21, 2011).

Where crack cocaine was found hidden in defendant's rectum when officers took defendant to an emergency room and a doctor performed a digital rectal examination, suppression was warranted because the doctor had to be treated as a government agent, and the unconsented paralysis, intubation, and rectal examination amounted to an unreasonable search. United States v. Booker, 728 F.3d 535, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17716, 2013 FED App. 251P (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2013).

39-17-419. Inferences.

It may be inferred from the amount of a controlled substance or substances possessed by an offender, along with other relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the controlled substance or substances were possessed with the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing. It may be inferred from circumstances indicating a casual exchange among individuals of a small amount of a controlled substance or substances that the controlled substance or substances so exchanged were possessed not with the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing in violation of § 39-17-417(a). The inferences shall be transmitted to the jury by the trial judge's charge, and the jury will consider the inferences along with the nature of the substance possessed when affixing the penalty.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to sell because: (1) Defendant took off on foot and got into a scuffle with a police officer; (2) After defendant was arrested, the officer located a blue container filled with .5 grams of cocaine near the area where the scuffle took place; (3) Defendant claimed that the cocaine was for his personal use; (4) The officer testified that the amount discovered was not consistent with personal use; (5) No drug paraphernalia was found; and (6) Defendant was spotted in a location known for illegal drug sales. State v. Nelson, 275 S.W.3d 851, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2008).

Where evidence clearly established that defendant conspired with one person for the delivery of more than 300 grams of cocaine and that defendant conspired with another person to possess more than 300 grams of cocaine, the jury was free to infer from the large amount of illegal drugs involved that defendant possessed the drugs with the intent to deliver them. State v. Elliot, 366 S.W.3d 139, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of 26 to 299 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, under T.C.A. § 39-17-417(i)(5), but not for the Class A felony for which defendant was convicted where: (1) The cocaine found in co-defendant one's truck was within arm's reach of defendant's seat; (2) An officer saw him throw a small portion of the cocaine into the back seat; (3) Defendant made statements to co-defendant two from which it could be inferred that he had general knowledge of the drug trade; and (4) There was insufficient evidence to show that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine found in co-defendant one's home under T.C.A. § 39-17-419, which had been aggregated with the cocaine found in the truck to convict him of a Class A felony. State v. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d 529, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of 150 grams or more of heroin with the intent to sell or distribute where it showed that a package containing heroin was addressed to a fictitious person, when a detective posing as a delivery person approached the residence on the package defendant ran toward him from the other side of the duplex, defendant told the detective that it was his house, he followed the detective to the truck to retrieve the package, and he was arrested after receiving it. State v. Gonzalez-Fonesca, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction because the evidence showed (1) defendant possessed cocaine, and (2) defendant distributed cocaine. State v. Gossett, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

Sufficient evidence demonstrated defendant's guilt of possessing a firearm with intent to go armed during commission of a dangerous felony because (1) the possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver was a serious felony, and (2) a loaded gun found near a large amount of marijuana, plastic bags, scales, and ammunition let a jury infer the gun was possessed with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Watkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and delivery of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine because a confidential informant recorded a meeting in defendant's car, defendant referenced a baggie containing “0.7” rather than “0.5” and said, “Here you go,” the informant dropped the purchased drugs in the car, defendant wrecked the car when fleeing, and officers located in the car packaged methamphetamine and the cash that was given to the informant. State v. Pollard, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 937 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and/or deliver because it showed that during a search, the officers found that defendant had crack cocaine bagged in three of four different bags and defendant admitted to selling drugs and carrying a gun. State v. Duncan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver because defendant admitted that the over 100 grams of marijuana and the scales found during a traffic stop belonged to defendant and the police officers found scales, baggies, a loaded gun, and ammunition in the vicinity of the narcotics and defendant. State v. Clay, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver because an officer found baggies containing what was later identified as methamphetamine after stopping defendant and a driver; because defendant was seated in the front passenger seat in close proximity to the contraband, it was reasonable to infer that he could have exercised dominion and control over the bags containing methamphetamine. State v. Madden, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone because a rational juror could find defendant knew a package delivered to defendant's address in a drug-free zone contained methamphetamine which defendant and defendant's associates intended to sell. State v. Cole, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 824 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine because deputies found tools and ingredients indicative of methamphetamine manufacture within 35 to 40 feet of defendant's house while conducting a search of defendant's property, the shake bottle lab was fresh, and defendant, as the property lessor, was responsible for the property's upkeep. State v. Delosh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to infer that defendant possessed crack cocaine with intent to sell because defendant admitted ownership of an amount of cocaine that was not associated with personal use, the cocaine was consistent with the form which crack cocaine took during manufacture before it was broken into smaller pieces for sale, no instrument used to ingest cocaine was found, and defendant had no employment and initially offered to be drug-tested to show that defendant had not used drugs before later claiming the cocaine was for personal use. State v. Kelly, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts convicting defendant of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia because the testimony established that the amount of drugs that he possessed was more than law enforcement officers typically encountered when the drugs were for personal use; an officer testified that the marijuana appeared to be packaged for sale rather than personal use because it was split up into smaller amounts. State v. Green, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of morphine with the intent to sell or deliver because it showed that both the rifle and the drink can containing 0.5 grams of morphine were found within five to seven feet from where an officer saw defendant prior to his arrest, the can was cut to form a bowl to heat the morphine and inject the drugs intravenously, and the officer believed there was a significant amount of morphine that defendant was going to distribute to the three individuals who were in the home prior to the arrest. State v. Alexander, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of marijuana with intent to sell because he possessed over 345 grams of marijuana; the jury could rationally conclude that defendant constructively possessed the marijuana as it was found in plain view on the front floorboard of the vehicle defendant had been driving, which was registered to defendant's mother and which also contained defendant's wallet and mail; and there was other circumstantial evidence of defendant's intent to sell or deliver the drug as plastic sandwich bags and a digital scale were found in the vehicle, both of which were commonly used to weigh and package drugs for sale, and $500 in cash was found on defendant's person when he was taken to the jail. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to sell and to deliver because drug enforcement officers testified that the amount of drugs found on defendant during a traffic stop and the manner in which they were packaged indicated that they were intended for resale rather than personal use. Therefore, from the evidence, a rational jury could have inferred that defendant possessed the drugs with intent to sell or deliver them rather than for defendant's own personal use. State v. Carero, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2020).

2. Evidence Insufficient.

Insufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession with intent to sell the cocaine found in co-defendant's residence under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 and 39-17-419 where: (1) Defendant's voice was identified in the background during the conversation with a confidential informant that established the drug buy; (2) Defendant was seen leaving the home with co-defendants before the takedown; (3) Some cocaine and items of drug paraphernalia were found in plain view in the home; and (4) It could be inferred that defendant had knowledge of some of the contraband in the home, but not that he had constructive possession of the contraband found in the home. State v. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d 529, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

3. Constructive Possession.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver or to sell it because defendant was the sole occupant of a vehicle, in which a backpack containing marijuana and a pistol were found on the front passenger-side floorboard and were easily accessible from the driver's seat when the police stopped defendant. In addition, the vehicle matched the description given by a confidential informant, and it appeared at the same location and time officers expected a drug sale to occur. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that defendant had constructive possession of cocaine, a firearm, and ammunition because the verdict reflected that the jury credited the proof that defendant lived at the home where the crack cocaine, firearm, and ammunition were found; officers found defendant's driver's license on a bedside table and a box of baggies containing crack cocaine in the master bedroom closet, and they saw both male and female clothing in the closet. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had constructive possession of methamphetamine and marijuana because moments after the agent knocked at the door and was greeted by the occupant of the residence agents at the back of the house heard the flushing of the toilet and hurried movements, the occupant and defendant were the only people in the house leaving defendant as the person in possession of the drugs that were being flushed, numerous agents testified to locating scales in plain sight, agents located defendant's clothes and debit card in the house, and $2,100 was found on defendant's person. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2019).

4. Jury Instructions.

Trial court did not err by not instructing the jury on casual exchange because the evidence did not show an actual exchange of a small amount of a controlled substance. Tenn. v. Bates, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 868 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

5. Inference.

Based upon the amount of cocaine seized during a traffic stop, the jury was permitted to infer that the cocaine was possessed for purpose of selling or delivery. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2020).

39-17-420. Fines and forfeitures.

    1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) and in subsection (d), all fines and forfeitures of appearance bonds received because of a violation of any provision of this part and that are specifically set forth in this part, and the proceeds of goods seized and forfeited under § 53-11-451 and disposed of according to law, shall be accounted for in a special revenue fund of the jurisdiction that initiated the arrest, or in a special reserve fund of the university employing the campus police officers if the arrest was initiated by campus police officers as defined in § 49-7-118 or in the special revenue fund of the department of correction if the arrest was initiated by the internal affairs director or an internal affairs special agent of the department of correction. All financial activities related to funds received under this part shall be accounted for in this fund. Cash transactions related to undercover investigative operations of county or municipal drug enforcement programs shall be administered in compliance with procedures established by the comptroller of the treasury. Moneys in the special revenue fund may be used only for the following purposes:
      1. Local drug enforcement program;
      2. Local drug education program;
      3. Local drug treatment program; and
      4. Nonrecurring general law enforcement expenditures.
    2. The chief law enforcement officer and the mayor of a municipality, or other chief executive officer of a metropolitan government, shall recommend a budget for the special revenue fund, to be approved by the legislative body of the municipality according to law. The chief law enforcement officer of a county shall recommend a budget for the special revenue fund, to be approved by the legislative body of the county according to law. The board of regents of the state university and community college system and the board of trustees for the University of Tennessee each shall approve a budget for the special revenue fund for funds from seizures by campus police officers as defined in § 49-7-118 in the respective systems. The commissioner of correction shall approve a budget for the special revenue fund for funds from seizures by the internal affairs director or an internal affairs special agent of the department of correction. Expenditures from the special revenue fund are subject to the availability of funds and budgetary appropriations for the expenditure. Any purchase made with moneys from the fund shall be made in accordance with all existing purchasing laws applicable to the particular county or municipality or university or department of correction. All fines and forfeitures resulting from cases and actions of the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall be paid to the state treasurer, to be used only as appropriated by the general assembly. If goods are seized by a combination of the Tennessee bureau of investigation and county or municipal law enforcement personnel, the court ordering their disposal shall determine the allocation of proceeds upon disposition of the goods. In all other cases, fines and forfeitures and goods and their proceeds shall be disposed of as otherwise provided by law.
    3. In counties having a metropolitan form of government and a population in excess of five hundred thousand (500,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, all fines and forfeitures of appearance bonds received from the violation of this part and that are specifically set forth in this part shall be paid to the county trustee or city recorder of the jurisdiction which initiated the arrest and shall be used exclusively in the local drug enforcement program or local drug education program. All requests for disbursement from the funds maintained by the county trustee or city recorder shall be by written request signed by the appropriate chief law enforcement officer of the county or municipality and the district attorney general. All purchases made from proceeds derived from any forfeiture of any interest in real property or proceeds derived pursuant to this part that are for use in the drug enforcement program or drug education program of either a county or a municipality shall be made in accordance with existing purchasing statutes, including private acts, which establish purchasing provisions or requirements for the county or municipality. All fines and forfeitures resulting from cases and actions of the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall be paid to the state treasurer, to be used only as appropriated by the general assembly. Fines and forfeitures received as a result of the application of other provisions of the law shall be disposed of as otherwise provided.
  1. In counties having a metropolitan form of government and a population in excess of five hundred thousand (500,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the proceeds of goods seized and forfeited under § 53-11-451 and disposed of according to law shall inure to the benefit of the county or city whose law enforcement personnel seized the goods, if the goods were seized by county or city law enforcement personnel, for the use of the county or city drug enforcement program or drug education program, as appropriate. All purchases made from proceeds derived from any forfeiture of any interest in real property or proceeds derived pursuant to this part that are for use in the drug enforcement program or local drug education program of either a county or a municipality shall be made in accordance with existing purchasing statutes, including private acts, which establish purchasing provisions or requirements for such county or municipality. All fines and forfeitures resulting from cases and actions of the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall be paid to the state treasurer, to be used only as appropriated by the general assembly. If the goods are seized by a combination of the Tennessee bureau of investigation, county and city law enforcement personnel, the court ordering disposal of the goods shall determine the allocation of proceeds upon disposition of the goods. In all other cases, the goods and the proceeds from the goods shall be disposed of as otherwise provided by law.
  2. All fines and forfeitures of appearance bonds received from the violation of this part and that are specifically set forth in this part, the proceeds of goods seized and forfeited under § 53-11-451 and disposed of according to law that arise from the activities of a judicial district drug task force shall be paid to an expendable trust fund maintained by the county mayor in a county designated by the district attorney general and shall be used exclusively in a drug enforcement or drug education program of the district as directed by the board of directors of the judicial district drug task force. All requests for disbursement from the expendable trust fund maintained by the county mayor for confidential purposes shall be by written request signed by the drug task force director and the district attorney general.
  3. In addition to all other fines, fees, costs and punishments now prescribed by law, in counties having a population of not less than eighty-seven thousand nine hundred (87,900) nor more than eighty-eight thousand (88,000), or a population greater than seven hundred thousand (700,000), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, a drug testing fee of twenty dollars ($20.00) shall be assessed upon conviction of a violation of this part whenever a drug analysis is performed by a publicly funded forensic laboratory or other forensic laboratory maintained in or operated by those counties. This fee shall be collected by the clerks of the various courts of those counties and forwarded to the appropriate county trustees on a monthly basis and designated for the exclusive use of the publicly funded forensic laboratory of those counties.
  4. The comptroller of the treasury and the department of finance and administration, in consultation with the Tennessee bureau of investigation, the Tennessee sheriffs' association and the Tennessee association of chiefs of police shall develop procedures and guidelines for handling cash transactions related to undercover investigative operations of county or municipal drug enforcement programs. The procedures and guidelines shall be applicable to the disbursement of proceeds from the drug enforcement program that are acquired on and after January 1, 1991, or an earlier date as may be adopted.
  5. Notwithstanding subsection (a) or § 53-11-415 to the contrary, effective July 1, 1994, any county or municipality, or, in any county having a metropolitan form of government and a population in excess of five hundred thousand (500,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, any law enforcement agency that receives proceeds from fines, forfeitures, seizures or confiscations pursuant to this part or title 53, chapter 11, may set aside a sum from the proceeds to purchase supplies and other items for the operation and promotion of the DARE program, created by title 49, chapter 1, part 4, or any other drug abuse prevention program conducted in the school system or systems within the county or municipality or served by the law enforcement agency. The local school board shall approve the program before the program may become eligible to receive funds under this subsection (f). Supplies and items that may be purchased with the proceeds include, but are not limited to, workbooks, T-shirts, caps and medallions.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (g)(2), notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, in order to comply with state and federal fingerprinting requirements such as those in former 42 U.S.C. § 14071, effective July 1, 1997, twenty percent (20%) of the funds a sheriff or municipal police department receives pursuant to this section shall be set aside and earmarked for the purchase, installation, and maintenance of and line charges for an electronic fingerprint imaging system that is compatible with the federal bureau of investigation's integrated automated fingerprint identification system. Prior to the purchase of the equipment, the sheriff or municipal police department shall obtain certification from the Tennessee bureau of investigation that the equipment is compatible with the Tennessee bureau of investigation's and federal bureau of investigation's integrated automated fingerprint identification system. Once the electronic fingerprint imaging system has been purchased, a sheriff or municipal police department may continue to set aside up to twenty percent (20%) of the funds received pursuant to this section to pay for the maintenance of and line charges for the electronic fingerprint imaging system. Instead of purchasing the fingerprinting equipment, a local law enforcement agency may enter into an agreement with another law enforcement agency that possesses the equipment for the use of the equipment. The agreement may provide that the local law enforcement agency may use the fingerprinting equipment for identifying persons arrested by that agency in exchange for paying an agreed upon portion of the cost and maintenance of the fingerprinting equipment. If no agreement exists, it shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to obtain fingerprints and answer for the failure to do so.
    2. This subsection (g) does not apply in any county having a metropolitan form of government and a population in excess of five hundred thousand (500,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census.
  6. In addition to all other fines, fees, costs and punishments now prescribed by law, including those imposed pursuant to subsection (d), a drug testing fee in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) shall be assessed upon a conviction of or upon the granting of pretrial diversion under § 40-15-105 or judicial diversion under § 40-35-313 for a violation of any part of the Tennessee Drug Control Act, compiled in this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4.
    1. This fee shall be collected by the clerks of the various courts of the counties and forwarded to the state treasurer on a monthly basis for deposit in the state general fund, to be used only as appropriated by the general assembly.
    2. Any moneys in the TBI drug chemistry unit drug testing fund as of June 30, 2018, shall revert to the general fund on such date, to be used only as appropriated by the general assembly.
  7. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
  8. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, any drug testing fee of twenty dollars ($20.00) and any other fees that were assessed and collected in any county of the ninth judicial district before such fees were repealed in 2007 shall be designated for use by the ninth judicial district drug task force.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 968, §§ 1, 2; 1994, ch. 607, § 1; 1994, ch. 923, § 1; 1995, ch. 305, § 102; 1997, ch. 56, §§ 1-4, 7, 8; 1998, ch. 1020, § 1; 2003, ch. 90, § 2; 2006, ch. 998, § 1; 2007, ch. 106, § 6; 2007, ch. 374, § 1; 2008, ch. 1201, § 1; 2009, ch. 511, § 1; 2010, ch. 941, § 1; 2010, ch. 1004, § 1; 2010, ch. 1040, § 5; 2011, ch. 78, § 1; 2018, ch. 1044, §§ 1, 2.

Code Commission Notes.

In the first sentences of subdivision (a)(3), subsection (b), and subsection (c), the language “except as provided in former subsection (d)” was deleted as obsolete by the code commission in 2014, as  former subsection (d), concerning fines and forfeitures of appearance bonds resulting from actions under the Project Canaan Act of 1980, was deleted as obsolete by the code commission in 2006.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1990, ch. 968, § 3 provided that the amendment by that act shall apply to any purchase made on or after April 30, 1990.

Acts 2003, ch. 90, § 2, directed the code commission to change all references from “county executive” to “county mayor” and to include all such changes in supplements and replacement volumes for the Tennessee Code Annotated.

For tables of population of Tennessee municipalities and for U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Former 42 U.S.C. § 14071 was repealed by § 129(a) of Act July 27, 2006, P.L. 109-248, effective July 27, 2009, which enacted another section that requires fingerprinting relative to sexual offenders, 42 U.S.C. § 16914.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment redesignated former (i) as (i)(1) and added (i)(2); in present (i)(1), substituted “for deposit in the state general fund, to be used only as appropriated by the general assembly” for “for deposit in the TBI drug chemistry unit drug testing fund, created in subsection (j), and designated for exclusive use by the Tennessee bureau of investigation for the purposes set out in subsection (j)” at the end; and deleted former (j) which read: “(j)  There is created a fund within the state treasury, to be known as the TBI drug chemistry unit drug testing fund.“(1)  Moneys shall be deposited into the fund pursuant to subsection (i), and as may be otherwise provided by law, and shall be invested pursuant to § 9-4-603. Moneys in the fund shall not revert to the general fund of the state, but shall remain available for appropriation to the Tennessee bureau of investigation, as determined by the general assembly. “(2)  Moneys in the TBI drug chemistry unit drug testing fund and available federal funds, to the extent permitted by federal law and regulation, shall be used to fund a forensic scientist position in each of the three (3) bureau crime laboratories, to employ forensic scientists to fill the positions and to purchase, maintain and upgrade the equipment and supplies necessary to carry out, in a timely manner, the increased number of requests for determinations of weight and analysis of submitted substances. To the extent that additional funds are available, the funds shall be used to employ personnel, purchase equipment and supplies, pay for the education, training and scientific development of employees, or for any other purpose so as to further allow the bureau to operate in a more efficient and expeditious manner.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1044, § 5. May 21, 2018.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Confiscation of property due to illegal drug-related activities, title 53, ch. 11, part 2.

Disposition of proceeds, § 53-11-204.

Drug interdiction programs, financial incentives for counties, title 38, ch. 11, part 2.

Goods subject to forfeiture, § 53-11-451.

Mandatory minimum fines, § 39-17-428.

Procedure for confiscation of property in cases of seizure of narcotic drugs or marijuana, § 53-11-201.

Procedure for seizing contraband in cases of seizure of tobacco products, § 67-4-1021.

Procedure for seizing contraband property in cases of seizure of alcoholic beverages, § 57-9-202.

Real property subject to forfeiture, § 53-11-452.

Attorney General Opinions. Distribution of fines from drug arrests, DUI's and other criminal offenses, OAG 91-85 (10/28/91).

Use of drug fines for drug education programs, OAG 92-45 (5/28/92).

Allocation of drug fines and forfeitures, OAG 93-63 (11/9/93).

Drug forfeiture funds used only to fund county or city drug education or law enforcement programs, OAG 97-037 (4/2/97).

Use of drug forfeiture proceeds to fund private drug education programs, OAG 97-125 (9/02/97).

Use of drug fines, forfeitures of appearance bonds and the proceeds of property forfeitures to fund salaries of persons employed by county and municipal law enforcement agencies, OAG 99-202 (10/6/99).

If no cooperative agreement exists between a particular county and municipality for the use of electronic fingerprinting equipment purchased by the county, the county is not required to process fingerprints from persons arrested by the municipality and may leave the responsibility for fingerprinting to the municipality as the arresting agency, OAG 01-088 (5/24/01).

Member agencies of the Tennessee Association of Police Chiefs may use one percent of the funds received from drug forfeitures to pay the expenses of outside speakers and trainers participating in a continuous training program for the benefit of all municipal law enforcement agencies, provided such expenditures are not for supplementing salaries of public employees or law enforcement officers or for long-term obligations that recur, including salaries, OAG 02-130 (12/02/02).

Acts 2010, ch. 1004, which increases the fees assessed for drug testing in certain cases, applies statewide.  OAG 10-103, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 105 (10/4/10).

Use of proceeds from the sale of property forfeited for violations of the Drug Control Act.  OAG 11-62, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 64 (8/25/11).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Forfeitures.

Marijuana, including the seeds thereof, is a controlled substance; the transportation thereof subjects the vehicle used to forfeiture. Hill v. Lawson, 851 S.W.2d 822, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

2. Indispensable Party.

In civil rights action challenging the state's forfeiture of a vehicle for alleged use to transport marijuana seeds, the city which effected the initial seizure of the vehicle was an indispensable party. Hill v. Tennessee, 868 F. Supp. 221, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16871 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).

3. Constitutionality.

Court of criminal appeals rejected as meritless defendant's claim that T.C.A. § 39-17-420(h)-(j) was unconstitutional. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2018).

39-17-421. Substitution of drugs in filling prescriptions prohibited.

  1. Except as provided in title 53, chapter 10, part 2, it shall be unlawful for any pharmacist, or any pharmacy technician or pharmacy intern under the supervision of a pharmacist who dispenses prescriptions, drugs, and medicines, to substitute any drug or device different from the one ordered, or deviate in any manner from the requirements of an order or prescription, without the approval of the prescriber, as defined in § 63-10-204.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2005, ch. 434, § 1.

Cross-References. Adulterated drugs or devices, § 53-10-106.

Affordable Drug Act, title 53, ch. 10, part 2.

Medical Assistance Act, title 71, ch. 5, part 1.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Pharmaceutical Connection Program, title 71, ch. 5, part 5.

Prescription Drug Programs, title 71, ch. 2, part 5.

Prescription requirements, § 53-11-308.

Substitution of generic drugs, §  53-10-204.

Volunteer Rx discount drug program, title 56, ch. 57.

39-17-422. Inhaling, selling, giving or possessing glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, gases for unlawful purposes.

  1. No person shall, for the purpose of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, elation, dizziness, excitement, stupefaction, paralysis, or the dulling of the brain or nervous system, or disturbing or distorting of the audio or visual processes, intentionally smell or inhale the fumes from any glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes; provided, that nothing in this section shall be interpreted as applying to the inhalation of any anesthesia for medical or dental purposes, or to the use of nitrous oxide to implement the distribution of beverages or other foodstuffs for commercial purposes.
  2. No person shall, for the purpose of violating subsection (a), use, or possess for the purpose of so using, any glue containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes.
  3. No person shall sell, or offer to sell, or deliver or give away, to any person any tube or other container of glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or any other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes, if the person has reasonable cause to suspect that the product sold or offered for sale, or delivered or given away, will be used for the purpose set forth in subsection (a).
  4. As used in this section, “glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes” means and includes any glue, cement, paint, gasoline, aerosol, or any other substance of whatever kind containing one (1) or more of the following chemical compounds: acetone, an acetate, benzene, butyl alcohol, ethyl alcohol, ethylene dichloride, isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone, nitrous oxide, pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, toluene or any group of polyhalogenated hydrocarbons containing fluorine and chlorine.
  5. Nothing contained in this section shall be considered applicable to the sale of a hobby or model kit containing as a part of the kit a tube or other container of glue, nor shall this section be considered applicable to the sale of a tube or other container of glue immediately in conjunction with the sale of a hobby or model kit requiring the use of approximately the quantity of glue for the assembly of a model. Nothing contained in this section shall be applicable to the transfer of a tube or other container of glue from a parent to the parent's own child, or from a guardian to the guardian's own ward.
    1. A violation of subsection (a), (b) or (d) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of subsection (c) is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 154, §§ 1, 2.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-423. Counterfeit controlled substances.

  1. It is an offense for a person to:
    1. Sell;
    2. Deliver; or
    3. Distribute a substance that is represented to be a controlled substance and which is substantially similar in color, shape, size, and markings or lack thereof, to a Schedule I, II, III or IV controlled substance as classified in §§ 39-17-406 — 39-17-412, in order that the substance may be sold as a controlled substance.
  2. It is an offense for a person to manufacture for sale or exchange any substance with the intent that the substance substantially imitate in color, shape, size, and markings or lack of markings, the physical appearance of a Schedule I, II, III or IV controlled substance, as classified in §§ 39-17-406 — 39-17-412, in order that the substance may be sold as a controlled substance.
  3. A violation of subsection (a) or (b) is a Class E felony.
  4. It is an offense for a person to be the recipient of a sale or exchange of a substance set forth in this section. A violation of this subsection (d) is a Class A misdemeanor. In addition to the penalties set forth in this section, the court may impose a mandatory drug rehabilitation program.
  5. This section shall not apply to:
    1. Any person who manufactures or sells a substance for use as a placebo by a licensed physician, dentist, pharmacist or registered nurse acting under the direction of a physician, dentist, or pharmacist;
    2. A licensed physician, dentist, pharmacist or registered nurse who sells, dispenses, administers or otherwise distributes a placebo to a patient of the physician or dentist for purposes of the medical care or treatment of the patient;
    3. A noncontrolled substance that was introduced into commerce prior to the introduction into commerce of the controlled substance that it is alleged to imitate;
    4. A substance that may be legally purchased at a drug or grocery store without a prescription; provided, that the substance is not represented by the seller to be a controlled substance; and
    5. A substance that is packaged and labeled in accordance with appropriate rules and regulations of the United States food and drug administration shall create a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer or wholesaler of the substance is exempted from this section.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability of Tennessee law to synthetic forms of LSD and cocaine.  OAG 11-28, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 30 (3/24/11).

39-17-424. Determination whether object is drug paraphernalia.

In determining whether a particular object is drug paraphernalia as defined by § 39-17-402, the court or other authority making that determination shall, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, consider the following:

  1. Statements by the owner or anyone in control of the object concerning its use;
  2. Prior convictions, if any, of the owner or of anyone in control of the object for violation of any state or federal law relating to controlled substances or controlled substance analogues;
  3. The existence of any residue of controlled substances or controlled substance analogues on the object;
  4. Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use;
  5. Descriptive materials accompanying the object that explain or depict its use;
  6. The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
  7. The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the community; and
  8. Expert testimony concerning its use.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2012, ch. 848, § 18.

Cross-References. Drug paraphernalia defined, § 39-17-402.

Law Reviews.

Paine on Procedure: Separation of powers and the “Mallard” decision (Donald F. Paine), 37 No. 12 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2001).

Attorney General Opinions. Sign stating “for tobacco use only” above a display case of items often used in connection with illegal drugs is a factor relevant to determining the store owner's intent, OAG 05-085 (5/23/05).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

A trial court should admit the types of evidence listed in T.C.A. § 39-17-424 to demonstrate that the object at issue is classifiable as “drug paraphernalia,” but the court may do so only to the extent that the proffered evidence otherwise meets all of the requirements for admissibility under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2001).

Because the legislature did not intend for the factors in T.C.A. § 39-17-424 to be absolute or preemptive, and because the legislature did not intend to remove the discretion of the trial judge to determine the logical or legal relevance of such evidence, T.C.A. § 39-17-424 supplements the Rules of Evidence and should be permitted to operate to the fullest extent allowed by the Rules. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2001).

2. Application.

There is an inherent conflict in any application of T.C.A. § 39-17-424(2) and trial courts are well advised to carefully consider this conflict when deciding whether to admit evidence of the defendant's prior convictions for the purposes outlined in T.C.A. § 39-17-424. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2001).

The only conceivable circumstance in which evidence of prior crimes would have any probative value on whether an object is properly classified as “drug paraphernalia” is to show that the object at issue is capable of being used as drug paraphernalia, as evidenced by the defendant's convictions for uses of the same or similar objects for illicit purposes. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2001).

3. Instructions to Jury.

Although T.C.A. § 39-17-424 allowed evidence to show that a glass pipe may be objectively classifiable as drug paraphernalia, the court erred in instructing the jury to consider prior convictions as evidence of the defendant's “knowledge” of the object's use; the defendant's knowledge of an object's use is irrelevant as far as T.C.A. § 39-17-424 is concerned. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2001).

39-17-425. Unlawful drug paraphernalia uses and activities.

    1. Except when used or possessed with the intent to use by a person authorized by this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4 to dispense, prescribe, manufacture or possess a controlled substance, it is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance or controlled substance analogue in violation of this part.
    2. Any person who violates this subsection (a) commits a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. Except when delivered, possessed with the intent to deliver, or manufactured with the intent to deliver by a person authorized by this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4 to dispense, prescribe, manufacture or possess a controlled substance, it is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance or controlled substance analogue in violation of this part.
    2. Any person who violates subdivision (b)(1) commits a Class E felony.
    3. Except when delivered by a person authorized by this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4 to dispense, prescribe, manufacture or possess a controlled substance, any person eighteen (18) years of age or over who violates this subsection (b) by delivering drug paraphernalia to a person under eighteen (18) years of age who is at least three (3) years younger than that person commits a Class E felony.
    1. It is unlawful for any person to place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication, any advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia.
    2. Any person who violates subdivision (c)(1) commits a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2012, ch. 848, § 19.

Cross-References. Forfeiture of drug paraphernalia, § 53-11-451.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Mandatory minimum fines for use of drug paraphernalia, OAG 96-095 (7/29/96).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Elements.

To convict a defendant of possession of drug paraphernalia with unlawful intent, the state is required to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the defendant possessed an object; (2) That the object possessed was classifiable as drug paraphernalia; and (3) That the defendant intended to use that object for at least one of the illicit purposes enumerated in the statute. State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. 2001).

2. Consent to Search.

Defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia in violation of T.C.A. §§ 39-17-418(c) and 39-17-425(c)(2) were appropriate because the warrantless search of his residence was proper since he consented to the search and the consent was not the product of the previous illegal search of his person. State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Jan. 21, 2011).

3. Probable Cause.

Where police officer saw defendant enter and leave a house where he believed cocaine was being sold, and he approached her while she was standing in the middle of a public street and observed a crack pipe protruding from her pocket, he had probable cause to arrest her for possession of drug paraphernalia, and to detain and search her. State v. Moore, 949 S.W.2d 704, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), overruled, State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. 1999).

4. Burden of Proof.

Under T.C.A. § 39-17-425, the state had the burden of proving three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the defendant possessed an object; (2) That the object possessed was classifiable as drug paraphernalia; and (3) That the defendant intended to use that object for at least one of the illicit purposes enumerated in T.C.A. § 39-17-425. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2001).

5. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia because when officers searched defendant they found digital scales, and when the officers began placing defendant under arrest a small bag of marijuana fell from his pants leg; a rational jury also could have concluded that defendant's possession of digital scales was proof of his possessing the scales with the intent to use them as drug paraphernalia. State v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2016).

Evidence that an officer gave a confidential informant (CI) cash to buy three grams of heroin, the officer monitored the controlled buy, which was captured on audio and video recording, the CI provided the officer with a substance identified as 2.97 grams of heroin, and defendant was arrested with the money provided to the CI was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for selling and delivering heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia. State v. Scruggs, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver because defendant admitted that the over 100 grams of marijuana and the scales found during a traffic stop belonged to defendant and the police officers found scales, baggies, a loaded gun, and ammunition in the vicinity of the narcotics and defendant. State v. Clay, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2018).

Clear plastic sandwich baggie was drug paraphernalia and, thus, defendant's possession of the baggie supported his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. State v. King, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2018).

Evidence defendant used scales in the living room to weigh the drugs he sold to the confidential informant and had constructive possession of the pipes found in co-defendant's bedroom supported his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. State v. Marsh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2019).

Defendant's possession of plastic baggies and scales supported his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. State v. Gill, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts convicting defendant of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia because the testimony established that the amount of drugs that he possessed was more than law enforcement officers typically encountered when the drugs were for personal use; an officer testified that the marijuana appeared to be packaged for sale rather than personal use because it was split up into smaller amounts. State v. Green, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Evidence regarding defendant's relationship with the motel room that housed controlled substances was sufficient to establish that he was in possession of marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia because the drugs were scattered over the bed and bedside table so that an occupant of the room could not have escaped knowledge of their presence; the drugs were discovered immediately after defendant emerged from the room, and the room was otherwise unoccupied. State v. Green, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver and possession of illegal drug paraphernalia because it showed that he was found inside a residence where .32 grams of crack cocaine and a crack pipe were present, he was found in a bathroom with a digital scale commonly used for weighing drugs, and he later admitted to selling crack cocaine as a means of making money and to keeping a third of an ounce of cocaine with him at all times. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2019).

6. Evidence Insufficient.

Insufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of the drug paraphernalia under T.C.A. § 39-17-425 found in co-defendant's residence where: (1) Defendant's voice was identified in the background during the conversation with a confidential informant that established the drug buy; (2) Defendant was seen leaving the home with co-defendants before the takedown; (3) Some cocaine and items of drug paraphernalia were found in plain view in the home; and (4) It could be inferred that defendant had knowledge of some of the contraband in the home, but not that he had constructive possession of the contraband found in the home. State v. Robinson, 400 S.W.3d 529, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2013).

7. Sentencing.

Trial court properly sentenced defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of nine years'  imprisonment because there was no dispute that defendant was a Range II, multiple offender, with a sentencing range of 4-12 years, the sentence was within the statutory range and presumed reasonable, the record showed the trial court noted only that the location of the offense, a funeral, had “some bearing” on the vulnerability of the victim, and the trial court properly applied several other enhancement factors, including defendant's extensive criminal history, the fact that previous efforts at rehabilitation had failed, and the fact that defendant committed the offense while on parole. State v. Henson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019).

39-17-426. Delivery, sale or possession of jimsonweed.

  1. It is an offense for a person to deliver, sell or possess the seed of the gentiana lutea  plant, also known as jimsonweed, on the premises or grounds of any school, grades kindergarten through twelve (K-12).
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-427. Exception.

It is an exception to this part if the person lawfully possessed the controlled substance as otherwise authorized by this part and title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-17-428. Mandatory minimum fines — Allocation of proceeds.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part to the contrary, any person convicted of violating any provision of this part shall be fined no less than the amount set out in the schedule in subsection (b). The fines set out in the schedule shall be the minimum mandatory fine for each type of offense and offender and shall not be construed to be a separate fine or in addition to the fines currently authorized by law for the offense committed. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the court from imposing a fine in excess of the minimum set out in such schedule; provided, that the amount is authorized by law.
  2. In determining the minimum fine to impose upon any person convicted of violating any provision of this part, the court shall first determine whether the person was convicted of a misdemeanor or felony violation of this part and then shall determine if the person has any previous convictions for violations of this part. Having determined the category of offense and offender, the judge shall impose a minimum mandatory fine based upon the following:
    1. First conviction for a misdemeanor drug offense involving a Schedule VI controlled substance classified as marijuana or hashish  $250
    2. Second conviction for a misdemeanor drug offense involving a Schedule VI controlled substance classified as marijuana or hashish  500
    3. Third or subsequent conviction for a misdemeanor drug offense  1,000
    4. First conviction for a misdemeanor drug offense involving a scheduled controlled substance other than Schedule VI  750
    5. Second conviction for a misdemeanor drug offense involving a scheduled controlled substance other than Schedule VI  850
    6. Third or subsequent conviction for a misdemeanor drug offense, where the current offense involves a Schedule I controlled substance classified as heroin, enhanced as a felony under § 39-17-418(e)  1,000
    7. First conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia under § 39-17-425(a)(1)  150
    8. Second or subsequent conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia under § 39-17-425(a)(1) and conviction for all other misdemeanor drug offenses  250
    9. First conviction for all felony drug offenses involving a scheduled controlled substance  2,000
    10. Second conviction for all felony drug offenses involving a scheduled controlled substance  3,000
    11. Third or subsequent conviction for all felony drug offenses involving a scheduled controlled substance  5,000
    12. First conviction for all other felony drug offenses including § 39-17-423(a) and (b) and § 39-17-425(b)(1)  1,000
    13. Second or subsequent conviction for all other felony drug offenses including § 39-17-423(a) and (b) and § 39-17-425(b)(1)  1,500
    14. First conviction for an offense under § 39-17-431(m) 1,000.
    15. Second or subsequent conviction for an offense under § 39-17-431(m) 2,000.
    1. Fifty percent (50%) of any fine collected pursuant to subsection (b) shall be allocated in the manner set out in § 39-17-420. The remaining fifty percent (50%) shall be paid to the general fund of the governing body of the law enforcement agency responsible for the investigation and arrest which resulted in the drug conviction; provided, that if a drug task force is responsible for the investigation and arrest, the amount above the minimum fine shall be paid to the general fund of the governing body of one (1) or more counties and cities within the judicial district as directed by the court. Notwithstanding § 39-17-420(a)(1) or any other law to the contrary, a portion of any fine collected pursuant to subsection (b) may be expended to fund programs and services for infants and children who are afflicted by HIV or AIDS.
    2. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the use of proceeds from fines imposed pursuant to this section for the purpose of drug education.
    1. Unless the judge, using the applicable criteria set out in § 40-14-202(c), determines that a person convicted of violating this section is indigent, or that payment of the minimum fine would result in a severe economic hardship, or such fine would otherwise not be in the interests of justice, the minimum fines imposed by this section shall be mandatory and shall not be reduced, suspended, waived or otherwise released by the court. No plea agreement shall be accepted by a court if the agreement attempts to reduce or suspend all or any portion of the mandatory fines imposed by this section unless the judge determines that one (1) of the conditions set out in the first sentence of this subdivision (d)(1) exists.
    2. If the judge of a court of general sessions determines that it is necessary to reduce, suspend, waive or otherwise release the minimum fines imposed by this section, the judge shall assess the fine, and write on the warrant the amount of the fine, the fact that it is reduced, suspended, waived or released and the reasons for the reduction, suspension, waiver or release. If done by the judge of a court of record, the judge shall assess the fine and make a specific finding of fact on the record relative to the reduction, suspension, waiver or release and the reasons for the reduction, suspension, waiver or release.

Acts 1990, ch. 1036, § 1; 1994, ch. 923, § 2; 1998, ch. 1079, § 5; 1999, ch. 503, § 1; 2000, ch. 881, § 1; 2011, ch. 292, § 3; 2016, ch. 876, § 13.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 292, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “I Hate Meth Act.”

Cross-References. Accountability for disposition of fines and forfeitures, § 39-17-429.

Fines and forfeitures, § 39-17-420.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability, OAG 91-82 (9/4/91).

Use of drug fines for drug education programs, OAG 92-45 (5/28/92).

Allocation of drug fines and forfeitures, OAG 93-63 (11/9/93).

Mandatory minimum fines for use of drug paraphernalia, OAG 96-095 (7/29/96).

Acts 2000, ch. 881, which amended T.C.A. § 39-17-428(c), did not modify the manner of allocating drug fines in cases brought by judicial district drug task forces; it only changed the manner of allocating drug fines in cases brought by a single law enforcement agency, OAG 00-171 (11/3/00).

The judicial district drug task force does not receive all of the fines imposed in cases brought by judicial district task forces; instead, an amount equal to the mandatory minimum fine is allocated to the special fund administered by the drug task force and the balance is allocated to the general fund or funds of one or more of the counties or cities within the judicial district, as directed by the court, OAG 00-171 (11/3/00).

The conflict-preemption principles that are well established in Tennessee’s jurisprudence prevent a municipality from enacting and enforcing an ordinance that allows a police officer to issue a municipal citation that carries a civil penalty of fifty dollars or community service for the offense of possession of one-half ounce or less of marijuana. Such an ordinance conflicts with the provisions of the Drug Control Act and with the prosecutorial discretion and responsibilities of the district attorneys general in enforcing the Act. OAG 16-40, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 40 (11/16/2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Conviction Required.

The mandatory minimum fine provisions are triggered only by a conviction and, thus, defendant could not be required to pay a fine as a condition to a memorandum of understanding for pretrial diversion. State v. Alberd, 908 S.W.2d 414, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

39-17-429. Accountability for disposition of fines and forfeitures.

  1. The sheriff's department shall be accountable to the county legislative body and the municipal law enforcement department shall be accountable to the municipal legislative body for the proper disposition of the proceeds of goods seized and forfeited under § 53-11-451, and for the fines imposed by § 39-17-428.
  2. An annual audited report of the funds shall be submitted by the sheriff or the proper official of the municipal law enforcement department to the respective local legislative body. In those years when the office of the comptroller of the treasury conducts an audit, if any, the audit shall satisfy this requirement. If no audit is conducted by the office of the comptroller of the treasury, then an audit shall be performed by a certified public accountant to satisfy this requirement.

Acts 1990, ch. 1036, § 3.

39-17-430. Anabolic steroids — Prohibited activities.

  1. It is unlawful for a practitioner to prescribe, order, distribute, supply or sell an anabolic steroid for:
    1. Enhancing performance in an exercise, sport or game without medical necessity; or
    2. Hormonal manipulation intended to increase muscle mass, strength or weight without medical necessity.
    1. It is unlawful for any person who is not a practitioner or lawful manufacturer of anabolic steroids to:
      1. Knowingly or intentionally manufacture or deliver an anabolic steroid, pure or adulterated; or
      2. Possess, with intent to manufacture or deliver, an anabolic steroid.
    2. As used in this subsection (b), “practitioner” means a physician, dentist or veterinarian.
  2. A person who knowingly violates this section shall be punished as provided in § 39-17-417(d) for a violation of a Schedule III controlled substance.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1044, § 1; T.C.A., § 39-17-416 (c), (d); Acts 1992, ch. 700, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1990, ch. 1044, § 1(a) provided that the act, which amended (a) and (b) among other provisions, shall be known and may be cited as the “Young Athletes Anti-Drug Act.”

Cross-References. Anabolic steroids enumerated, § 39-17-410.

39-17-431. Immediate methamphetamine precursor — Prohibitions.

  1. Except as provided in this section, any product that contains any immediate methamphetamine precursor may be dispensed only by a licensed pharmacy.
    1. A product or category of products that contains any immediate methamphetamine precursor shall be exempt from the requirements of this section if the ingredients are not in a form that can be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
    2. The board of pharmacy, in consultation with the Tennessee bureau of investigation (TBI), shall determine whether a product or category of products that contain any immediate methamphetamine precursor is not in a form that can be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. In making such a determination, the board shall solicit the written opinion of the bureau and work with the bureau to develop procedures that consider, among other factors:
      1. The ease with which the product can be converted to methamphetamine, including the presence or absence of a “molecular lock” completely preventing a product's use in methamphetamine manufacture;
      2. The ease with which pseudoephedrine can be extracted from a product and whether it forms a salt, emulsion, or other form; and
      3. Any other pertinent data that can be used to determine the risk of a product being viable in the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine.
    3. The board of pharmacy shall maintain a public list of the exempted products or categories of products. Any person may request that a product or category of products be included on the exemption list.
    1. A pharmacy shall not sell products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine base, or their salts, isomers or salts of isomers to the same person in an amount more than:
      1. Five and seventy-six hundredths (5.76) grams in any period of thirty (30) consecutive days; or
      2. Twenty-eight and eight tenths (28.8) grams in any one-year period.
    2. A person shall not purchase products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine base, or their salts, isomers or salts of isomers in an amount more than:
      1. Five and seventy-six hundredths (5.76) grams in any period of thirty (30) consecutive days; or
      2. Twenty-eight and eight tenths (28.8) grams in any one-year period.
    3. The limits in this subsection (c) shall apply whether one (1) form of identification required in subsection (d) is used to make the purchase or if two (2) or more forms of identification required in subsection (d) are used to purchase the products. The limits contained in this subsection (c) shall apply to the amount of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine base, or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers contained in a product. The prohibitions contained in this subsection (c) shall not apply to a person who obtains the product or products pursuant to a valid prescription issued by a licensed healthcare practitioner authorized to prescribe by the laws of the state.
    4. This subsection (c) also shall apply to pharmacist-generated prescription orders of the product pursuant to § 63-10-206. The provision of the patient education and counseling as a part of the practice of pharmacy shall be required when any product is issued under this subsection (c).
    5. There shall be no protocol or procedure mandated by any individual or corporate entity that interferes with the pharmacist's professional duty to counsel and evaluate the patient's appropriate pharmaceutical needs and the exercise of the pharmacist's professional judgment as to whether it is appropriate to dispense medication as set forth in subsection (d) or otherwise.
  2. The pharmacist or pharmacy intern under the supervision of the pharmacist shall require any person purchasing an over-the-counter product containing pseudoephedrine or ephedrine to present valid government issued photo identification at the point of sale. The pharmacist or pharmacy intern shall counsel with the person seeking to purchase the product as to the reasons for needing the product and may decline the sale if the pharmacist or pharmacy intern believes the sale is not for a legitimate medical purpose. The pharmacist, pharmacy technician, or pharmacy intern shall maintain an electronic record of the sale under this subsection (d) and the record may be maintained in the form of a pharmacist prescription order as provided by § 63-10-206(c). The electronic record shall include the name and address of purchaser; name and quantity of product purchased; date and time purchased; purchaser identification type and number, such as driver license state and number; and the identity, such as name, initials or identification code, of the dispensing pharmacist or pharmacy intern. If a system is not able to record the identification type and number, the pharmacist, pharmacy technician, or pharmacy intern shall write the identification type and number on the prescription order. The electronic record shall also be maintained in a manner that allows for the determination of the equivalent number of packages purchased and total quantity of base ephedrine or pseudoephedrine purchased.
    1. By January 1, 2012, each pharmacy in this state shall have in place and operational all equipment necessary to access and use the National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx) administered by the National Association of Drug Diversion Investigators (NADDI). The NPLEx system shall be available for access and use free of charge to the pharmacies and this state.
    2. Beginning January 1, 2012, before completing a sale of an over-the-counter product containing pseudoephedrine or ephedrine not otherwise excluded from the record keeping requirement, a pharmacy shall electronically submit the required information to NPLEx administered by NADDI. On learning of a data entry error in which a transaction was submitted to NPLEx when it should not have been, the pharmacy shall submit a data entry error correction to NPLEx to remedy the error and prevent an inappropriate stop sale alert from being generated for a person who may seek to purchase an over-the-counter product containing pseudoephedrine or ephedrine. Except as provided in subsection (j), the seller shall not complete the sale if the system generates a stop sale alert.
    3. Absent negligence, wantonness, recklessness, or deliberate misconduct, any pharmacy utilizing the electronic sales tracking system in accordance with this subsection (e) shall not be civilly liable as a result of any act or omission in carrying out the duties required by this subsection (e) and shall be immune from liability to any third party unless the retailer has violated this subsection (e) in relation to a claim brought for such violation. This subsection (e) shall not apply to a person who obtains the product or products pursuant to a valid prescription.
    4. The data entered into, stored and maintained by the NPLEx may only be used by law enforcement officials, healthcare professionals and pharmacists and only for controlling the sale of methamphetamine precursors.
    5. If, for any reason, the NPLEx administered by NADDI is no longer the system used in this state to track the sale of methamphetamine precursors, whether because the system no longer functions, is no longer in existence, is no longer offered to the state without cost, or is otherwise no longer available, each pharmacy shall switch to and commence using the Tennessee Methamphetamine Information System (TMIS), as soon as the equipment necessary to access and use the system is made available at no charge to the pharmacy. TMIS shall be available for access and use free of charge to the pharmacies.
  3. If a pharmacy selling an over-the-counter product containing pseudoephedrine or ephedrine experiences mechanical or electronic failure of the tracking system and is unable to comply with the electronic sales tracking requirement, the pharmacy or retail establishment shall maintain a written log until such time as the pharmacy or retail establishment is able to comply with the electronic sales tracking requirement.
  4. A pharmacy selling an over-the-counter product containing pseudoephedrine or ephedrine may seek an exemption from submitting transactions to the electronic sales tracking system in writing to the board of pharmacy stating the reasons therefore. The board of pharmacy may grant an exemption for good cause shown, but in no event shall such exemption exceed one hundred eighty (180) days. Any pharmacy or retail establishment that receives an exemption shall maintain a hardcopy logbook and must still require the purchaser to provide the information required under this section before completion of any sale. The logbook shall be maintained as a record of each sale for inspection by any law enforcement officer or inspector of the board of pharmacy during normal business hours.
  5. Nonexempt products containing an immediate methamphetamine precursor shall be maintained behind-the-counter of the pharmacy or in a locked case within view of and within twenty-five feet (25') of the counter.
  6. All data that is collected from Tennessee pharmacies and stored in the NPLEx will be downloaded and exported by electronic means to TMIS at least every twenty-four (24) hours. This export of data will be in a version in compliance with the National Information Exchange Standard and agreed to by both the TBI and NADDI. The export will be executed without a charge to TMIS or any agency of this state. Any and all data exported to, obtained by, gathered by, transmitted to and/or stored by TMIS or its designee, once received from NADDI, is the property of this state. TMIS has the authority to control, administer, and disseminate, at its discretion, this transaction data for the purpose of enforcing federal and state laws. In addition to the exporting of data to TMIS, real time access to NPLEx information through the NPLEx online portal shall be provided to law enforcement in the state free of charge.
    1. NPLEx shall generate a stop sale alert, if completion of a sale would result in the seller or purchaser violating the quantity limits set forth in this section. The system shall contain an override function that may be used by a dispenser of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine who has a reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm if the sale is not completed. Each instance in which the override function is utilized shall be logged by the system.
    2. In instances when a data entry correction has been submitted to the NPLEx concerning a purchaser in accord with subdivision (e)(2), the NPLEx shall not generate a stop sale alert in cases where the quantity limit is exceeded due to the data entry error for which the correction was submitted.
  7. A violation of subsections (a)-(j) is a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by fine only. If the person in violation is a licensed pharmacy or pharmacist, the violation shall be reported to the board of pharmacy for review and appropriate action. If a product is dispensed in violation of subsection (a), the owner or operator of the wholesale or retail establishment dispensing the product shall be in violation of subsection (a).
    1. The TBI, in cooperation with NADDI which administers NPLEx, shall devise a method to electronically notify NADDI at least every seven (7) days of any person placed on the methamphetamine registry pursuant to § 39-17-436(b). The notification shall include the first, middle and last names of the person, the person’s date of birth and the person’s driver license number or any other state or federal identification number. NPLEx shall be designed to generate a stop-sale alert for any purchaser whose name has been submitted to the registry. Such person shall be prohibited from purchasing nonexempt products at the point-of-sale using NPLEx.
    2. The bureau shall also notify NADDI when a person is removed from the methamphetamine registry pursuant to § 39-17-436(e). When notified, the person shall be removed from NPLEx and is permitted to purchase nonexempt products.
      1. Any person who sells or delivers a nonexempt substance to a person known to be on the methamphetamine registry commits a Class A misdemeanor.
      2. Any person who purchases or attempts to purchase a nonexempt substance while such person is on the methamphetamine registry commits a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. It is an offense for a person not authorized to do so to knowingly engage in any of the following conduct with respect to a nonexempt product containing an immediate methamphetamine precursor and required to be maintained behind-the-counter of the pharmacy as specified in subsection (h):
      1. Attempt to sell the product knowing that it will be used to produce methamphetamine, or with reckless disregard of its intended use;
      2. Attempt to purchase the product with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine or deliver the product to another person whom they know intends to manufacture methamphetamine, or with reckless disregard of the other person's intent;
      3. Purchase the product at different times or locations for the purpose of circumventing the maximum allowable quantity of the product that may lawfully be purchased during a thirty-day or one-year period; or
      4. Use a false identification to purchase the product for the purpose of circumventing the maximum allowable quantity of the product that may lawfully be purchased during a thirty-day or one-year period.
    2. A violation of this subsection (m) shall be a Class A misdemeanor. All proceeds from fines imposed pursuant to this subsection (m) shall be used by the jurisdiction making the arrest for methamphetamine clean-up activities in that jurisdiction.
  8. This section shall supersede any local laws or ordinances currently regulating sales of products containing any immediate methamphetamine precursor.
  9. For the purposes of this section, “pharmacy” means only a pharmacy operating under title 63, chapter 10, which sells any immediate methamphetamine precursor at retail to the public.
  10. No person under eighteen (18) years of age may purchase a product that contains any immediate methamphetamine precursor, except pursuant to a valid prescription issued by a licensed healthcare practitioner authorized to prescribe by the law of the state or a pharmacist generated prescription issued pursuant to § 63-10-206.

Acts 1995, ch. 123, § 1; 2005, ch. 18, § 2; 2011, ch. 292, § 2; 2012, ch. 764, §§ 1, 2; 2012, ch. 911, §§ 2, 3; 2013, ch. 236, § 61; 2014, ch. 828, §§ 1, 2; 2014, ch. 906, §§ 1-3; 2015, ch. 59, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Former subsection (o) of this section, concerning a study of methamphetamine use in the state that was to be completed by January 1, 2013, was deleted as obsolete by authority of the code commission.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 1 provided that the act may be cited as the “Meth-Free Tennessee Act of 2005”.

Acts 2011, ch. 292, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “I Hate Meth Act.”

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Application of prohibition against dispensing ephedrine, OAG 96-084 (6/5/96).

The legal duty of pharmacies to allow inspection of methamphetamine precursor registries, OAG 05-174 (12/12/05).

Regulation of distribution of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine by local governments.  OAG 13-99, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 102 (12/6/13).

The state may require that all products containing pseudoephedrine be sold only with a valid prescription from a Tennessee licensed health-care professional, even though pseudoephedrine is not contained on the DEA’s list of scheduled narcotics.  OAG 13-108, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 110 (12/20/13).

39-17-432. Drug-Free School Zone — Enhanced criminal penalties for violations within zone.

  1. It is the intent of this section to create drug-free zones for the purpose of providing vulnerable persons in this state an environment in which they can learn, play and enjoy themselves without the distractions and dangers that are incident to the occurrence of illegal drug activities. The enhanced sentences authorized by this section for drug offenses occurring in a drug-free zone are necessary to serve as a deterrent to such unacceptable conduct.
    1. A violation of § 39-17-417, or a conspiracy to violate the section, may be punished one (1) classification higher than is provided in § 39-17-417(b)-(i) if the violation or the conspiracy to violate the section occurs:
      1. On the grounds or facilities of any school; or
      2. Within five hundred feet (500') of or within the area bounded by a divided federal highway, whichever is less, the real property that comprises a public or private elementary school, middle school, secondary school, preschool, child care agency, public library, recreational center, or park.
    2. In addition to any other penalty imposed by this section, a person convicted of violating this subsection (b) may also be subject to the following:
      1. Upon conviction of a Class E felony, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000);
      2. Upon conviction of a Class D felony, a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000);
      3. Upon conviction of a Class C felony, a fine of not more than forty thousand dollars ($40,000);
      4. Upon conviction of a Class B felony, a fine of not more than sixty thousand dollars ($60,000); and
      5. Upon conviction of a Class A felony, a fine of not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
    3. A person convicted of violating this subsection (b), who is within the prohibited zone of a preschool, childcare center, public library, recreational center or park shall not be subject to additional incarceration as a result of this subsection (b) but may be subject to the additional fines imposed by this section.
    1. Notwithstanding any other law or the sentence imposed by the court to the contrary, a defendant sentenced for a violation of subsection (b) may be required to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant's appropriate range of sentence.
    2. There is a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not required to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant's appropriate range of sentence. The rebuttable presumption is overcome if the court finds that the defendant's conduct exposed vulnerable persons to the distractions and dangers that are incident to the occurrence of illegal drug activity.
    3. If the defendant is required to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant's appropriate range of sentence, any sentence reduction credits the defendant may be eligible for or earn must not operate to permit or allow the release of the defendant prior to full service of the minimum sentence.
  2. Notwithstanding the sentence imposed by the court, title 40, chapter 35, part 5, relative to release eligibility status and parole does not apply to or authorize the release of a defendant sentenced for a violation of subsection (b), and required under subsection (c) to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant's appropriate range of sentence, prior to service of the entire minimum sentence for the defendant's appropriate range of sentence.
  3. Nothing in title 41, chapter 1, part 5, shall give either the governor or the board of parole the authority to release or cause the release of a defendant sentenced for a violation of subsection (b), and required under subsection (c) to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant's appropriate range of sentence, prior to service of the entire minimum sentence for the defendant's appropriate range of sentence.
  4. This section does not prohibit the judge from sentencing a defendant, who violated subsection (b) and is required under subsection (c) to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant's appropriate range of sentence, to any authorized term of incarceration in excess of the minimum sentence for the defendant's appropriate range of sentence.
  5. The sentence of a defendant who, as the result of a single act, violates both subsection (b) and § 39-14-417(k), may be enhanced under both subsection (b) and § 39-17-417(k) for each act. The state may seek enhancement of the defendant's sentence under subsection (b), § 39-17-417(k), or both, and shall provide notice of the election pursuant to § 40-35-202.

Acts 1995, ch. 515, § 1; 1998, ch. 1049, § 16; 2005, ch. 295, §§ 1-4; 2020, ch. 803, §§ 1-9.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2012, ch. 727, § 1 amended § 4-3-104, which concerns name changes of departments and divisions, to provide that references to the board of probation and parole, formerly referred to in this section, are deemed references to the board of parole.

Acts 2020, ch. 803, § 12 provided that the act, which amended this section, applies to offenses committed on or after September 1, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, in the second sentence of (a), substituted “sentences authorized” for “and mandatory minimum sentences required”; rewrote (b)(1), which read: “(1) A violation of § 39-17-417, or a conspiracy to violate the section, that occurs on the grounds or facilities of any school or within one thousand feet (1,000') of the real property that comprises a public or private elementary school, middle school, secondary school, preschool, child care agency, or public library, recreational center or park shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is provided in § 39-17-417(b)-(i) for such violation.”; in the introductory language of (b)(2), substituted “may also be” for “shall also be”; in (b)(3), substituted “but may be subject to” for “but shall be subject to”; in (c), redesignated the former first sentence as (c)(1) and substituted “may” for “shall” therein, added (c)(2), and rewrote the former last sentence as (c)(3), which read: “Any sentence reduction credits the defendant may be eligible for or earn shall not operate to permit or allow the release of the defendant prior to full service of the minimum sentence.”; in (d), substituted “does” for “, shall” ; in (d) and (e), inserted “and  required under subsection (c) to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant’s appropriate range of sentence”, and inserted similar language in (f); also in (f), substituted “This section does not prohibit” for “Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting”;  and rewrote (g) which read: “The sentence of a defendant who, as the result of a single act, violates both subsection (b) and § 39-17-417(k), may only be enhanced one (1) time under those sections for each act. The state must elect under which section it intends to seek enhancement of the defendant's sentence and shall provide notice of the election pursuant to § 40-35-202.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 803, § 12. September 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A, B, C, D, and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Interpretation of 2005 amendments to the Drug-Free School Zone Act, OAG 07-059 (4/26/07).

Proposed legislation that would reduce the drug-free school zones from 1000 feet to 500 feet in counties having a population of 300,000 or more is likely to be deemed constitutional if the population bracket differences relate to a matter in respect of which a difference in population could furnish a rational basis for diversity of laws. OAG 19-05, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 5 (4/5/2019).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. § 39-17-432 does not violate due process, equal protection or constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Jenkins, 15 S.W.3d 914, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1082 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

The drug related activity proscribed by T.C.A. § 39-17-421 and for which the Drug-Free School Zone Act enhances applicable criminal penalties does not enjoy First Amendment or other constitutional protections. State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

2. Construction.

The legislature's intent to enact an enhancement statute is unmistakable both from the plain language of the Drug-Free School Zone Act and from the act's legislative history. State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

In accordance with the Drug-Free School Zone Act, and in accordance with defendant's career offender status, the defendant's sentence of 60 years’ incarceration for possession of .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

3. Notice.

Even if the defendant's conduct had met the requirements necessary to invoke T.C.A. § 39-17-432, the defendant would not have been given proper notice that the defendant was being charged because the indictment did not include any reference to the drug sale occurring near or within 1,000 feet of the school or whether the school was an elementary, middle, or secondary school as required by the Drug-Free School Zone Act. State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 2001).

4. Seriousness of Offense.

The mere existence of the Drug-Free School Zone Act, without more, cannot elevate the nature of an offense to one requiring incarceration; thus, where there was no indication that the school was visible from the location of the drug transaction and there was no evidence that students were in the vicinity, were being solicited by drug dealers, were aware of the drug transaction, or were in any way involved, the facts failed to meet the standard necessary to apply T.C.A. § 40-35-103(B) requiring that the offense, as committed, must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree. State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. 2001).

5. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for the sale of drugs within one thousand feet of a school where witnesses identified defendant as the perpetrator of the offenses, defendant's features were clearly visible on a videotape before and after the transaction, and a city employee testified that the location of the transaction was approximately four hundred eighty feet from a school. State v. Lindsey, 208 S.W.3d 432, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2006), dismissed, Lindsey v. Parker, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102475 (E.D. Tenn. July 23, 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendants' convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone because all defendants met at a parking lot beforehand and each either participated in the delivery of marijuana to a carwash or placed himself in position to assist in the drug transaction. State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. 2007), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. 2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support the school zone enhancement of defendant's convictions because this section applied for any travel within a school zone, even travel on an interstate. State v. Lockhart, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 726 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2015), cert. denied, Lockhart v. Tennessee, 136 S. Ct. 2471, 195 L. Ed. 2d 809, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3909 (U.S. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient that defendant sold .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone within a 1,000 of a park to a confidential informant on three occasions because (1) the informant arranged to purchase cocaine from defendant; (2) before each transaction, the police searched the informant and the informant's vehicle for contraband and found none; (3) the police supplied the informant with recording equipment and money to purchase the cocaine; (4) the transactions were recorded; and (5) the lab tests were positive for cocaine. State v. Pillow, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of three counts of sale of cocaine over .5 gram within a drug-free zone where the informant testified he purchased cocaine from defendant during controlled buys on three occasions, a detective identified defendant on each of the video recordings, an agent testified that each of the three substances purchased from defendant contained cocaine and testified that they all weighed over .5 gram, and the detective and a witness testified that the drug transactions occurred within 1,000 feet of a licensed, operating daycare. State v. Waire, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 257 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2016).

Police officer's testimony that both locations where drug transactions occurred were within 1,000 feet of a football field that was owned by a city and leased by a youth football league established that defendant's offense could not be enhanced above the Class C felony classification for deliver of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine due to the offense's commission within a drug-free zone. State v. Dickerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free school zone where an employee of the Metropolitan Planning Department testified that the location where defendant exchanged money with the undercover officer took place was within 1,000 feet of a school, defendant gave the detective the drgus when the undercover vehicle was one block away from the gas station. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for sale and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within a drug-free zone, given that defendant gave cocaine to an offer in exchange for money, and the transaction took place within 1,000 feet of a preschool and another school. State v. Stripling, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2016).

Informant's testimony that he gave defendant $100 and defendant gave him a small plastic bag containing cocaine, an officer's statement that the informant gave him a small bag of cocaine after meeting defendant, an agent's statement that the substance in the bag contained 2.13 grams of cocaine base, and an officer's statement that the distance between the fence of the school and the location of the transaction was 441 feet supported defendant's conviction for sale of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. State v. Lindsey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for the sale of cocaine in a drug-free school zone because a confidential informant (CI), at an officer's behest, arranged to purchase cocaine from defendant on three separate occasions and an audio or video recording of each transaction was made and played for the jury. On each occasion, the officer searched the CI, provided the CI with recording equipment and money, and accompanied the CI to the apartment where the transactions occurred almost directly across the street from a school. State v. Maples, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2016).

Evidence that defendant handed .76 grams of crack cocaine to the confidential informant and, in exchange, received money, and that the transaction occurred within 1,000 feet of a school was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. State v. Dunn, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. May 18, 2017).

Evidence showed that defendant passed within 1000 feet of a preschool while in possession of cocaine because an officer confirmed that the route taken by defendant's car passed in front of a preschool, while an office manager and administrative technician for a geographic information systems company confirmed that a computer model calculated the location indicated by the officer to be within 1000 feet of the preschool. Whether defendant was aware that defendant was committing the drug offense while in proximity to the preschool was immaterial. State v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Apr. 18, 2018), overruled in part, State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of participation in a controlled drug buy of heroin and cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school because a detective engaged in a text message conversation with the cell phone ending in 4949 wherein he sought to purchase heroin and cocaine; after setting up the controlled drug buy, the holder of the 4949 number directed the detective to a specific apartment; defendant opened the door and gave him a package of heroin and cocaine in exchange for $130; and it was undisputed that defendant sold the drugs with 1,000 feet of a school for children in the sixth through twelfth grades. State v. Lane, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2017).

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied because, although counsel's advice to plead guilty constituted deficient performance, as by pleading guilty to aggravated burglary, defendant acknowledged that he intended to possess cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver it, and that he actually possessed the cocaine, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance as he did not show a reasonable probability that the jury would have entertained reasonable doubt regarding the drug charge had he not acknowledged guilt of the aggravated burglary charge because he entered an apartment that appeared to function solely as a cocaine dispensary with co-defendant, who had cocaine, a gun, and two sets of scales. McCathern v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, McCathern v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2018).

Evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for .5 grams or more of methamphetamine within a drug-free zone. The proof adduced at trial revealed that defendant sold .94 grams of methamphetamine to a confidential informant and that the transaction occurred within 1,000 feet of a city park. State v. Hinson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of selling heroin in a drug-free zone and possession of heroin with intent to sell in a drug-free zone because the confidential informant (CI) placed the prerecorded buy money on a coffee table in an apartment; codefendant took the money and went into another room with defendant; defendant then left the apartment; codefendant handed the heroin to the CI; when defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter, he was in possession of a twenty dollar bill and a ten dollar bill with serial numbers that matched those of bills given to the CI by police; codefendant's apartment was within 1000 feet of a city park; and the vehicle that defendant was riding in passed within 1000 feet of an elementary school. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that defendant had constructive possession of cocaine, a firearm, and ammunition because the verdict reflected that the jury credited the proof that defendant lived at the home where the crack cocaine, firearm, and ammunition were found; officers found defendant's driver's license on a bedside table and a box of baggies containing crack cocaine in the master bedroom closet, and they saw both male and female clothing in the closet. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, one of which was within a school zone, because a corporal and an agent met with the confidential informant (CI) and the CI's wife, searched them and their vehicle, and, upon finding no contraband, supplied them with a recording device and cash to purchase drugs from defendant; the second transaction occurred within 1,000 feet of an elementary school zone; on each occasion, the CI gave defendant money in exchange for crack cocaine in an amount greater than .5 grams; and, following each transaction, the CI and his wife immediately met the officers, relinquished the cocaine, returned the recording device, and submitted to another search. State v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for sale of drugs within 1,000 feet of a public elementary school because, on two separate occasions, defendant arranged for the confidential informant to come to his residence, a home located 800 feet from a public elementary school, to sell her drugs; the state presented video footage and still images from the footage of defendant during both controlled buys; the March 27 recording of the controlled buy showed defendant on the screen; and a mens rea was not required for the statute dealing with the sale of drugs within 1,000 feet of a public elementary school as it was an enhancement statute and not a separate offense. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a drug free zone because his two meetings with the informant, occurring about 20 minutes apart, constituted a single transaction, at least a portion of the sale occurred in a parking lot that was 164 feet away from a park that was a drug free zone, and a single plastic baggie containing 1.25 grams of cocaine was submitted to the TBI. State v. Marks, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of delivering methamphetamine in a drug-free zone because it showed that defendant delivered methamphetamine to an inmate while she was on a medical furlough, the inmate testified that she arranged to meet defendant outside of a pharmacy to obtain methamphetamine, after meeting defendant she tried to smuggle methamphetamine into jail, and an agent testified that he had measured the distance between the pharmacy and the park and found it to be 660 feet. State v. Garrard, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Trial court properly sentenced defendants to 21 and/or 25 years of incarceration after a jury convicted them of conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell heroin within 1000 feet of a drug-free school zone because the trial court made an explicit finding that a conspiracy existed—the first defendant packaged heroin for resale into small heat-sealed Ziploc baggies while the second defendant was present, and the second and third defendants resold the heroin to others—it would be extremely impractical and inefficient to hold a pretrial hearing due to the number of defendants and witnesses, the trial court could admit the co-conspirators'  statements before determining that a conspiracy existed. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2020).

6. Sentencing.

In defendant's sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school case, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to the presumptive sentence of thirty-two years and six months for each conviction where defendant responded voluntarily to the confidential informant's request to purchase drugs and chose the location for the transaction. The sales occurred within a forty-eight hour time span, and defendant had a prior criminal record of selling drugs. State v. Lindsey, 208 S.W.3d 432, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2006), dismissed, Lindsey v. Parker, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102475 (E.D. Tenn. July 23, 2013).

Defendant was not entitled to habeas corpus relief under T.C.A. § 29-21-101 because he failed to show that his plea-bargained sentence requiring him to serve 22 years pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-17-432 with no possibility of early release on parole was not within the trial court's jurisdiction to impose, or that he was on an expired sentence. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. May 7, 2010), cert. denied, Davis v. Tennessee, 562 U.S. 985, 131 S. Ct. 423, 178 L. Ed. 2d 330, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 8233 (U.S. 2010).

Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant under the Drug-Free School Zone Act as a Range II offender; the broad intent of the Act is that a defendant convicted of the facilitation of an offense proscribed by the Act is to be sentenced according to its requirements. State v. Gibson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 506 S.W.3d 450, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Trial court did not err in merging each count of delivering cocaine within a drug-free zone into its corresponding count of selling cocaine and in sentencing defendant to three, concurrent sentences of five and one-half years because the trial court thought defendant's prior criminal history and behavior, which included his prior convictions and his years of cocaine use, justified enhancing his sentences from three years, the minimum punishment in the range, to five and one-half years, just six months shy of the maximum punishment in the range; and the trial court's statements showed that it was concerned about defendant's claim that he was not a drug dealer despite his selling drugs to a confidential informant on three separate occasions. State v. Dixon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for reduction of sentence because defendant's eight-year sentences were the minimum punishments in the range for the Class B felony offenses to which he pleaded guilty; because defendant was statutorily required to serve those sentences, the interests of justice did not warrant a reduction. State v. Deadrick, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Defendant was not entitled to relief because the trial court was statutorily required to order that defendant serve at least the minimum sentence of three years on defendant's conviction for delivery of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, within 1000 feet of a drug free zone. State v. Dickerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2016).

Trial court improperly sentenced defendant to 60 years imprisonment because it erred by ordering him to serve the additional incarceration of a Class A felony that this section specifically prohibited. State v. Garrard, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to serve her total effective sentence of two years in confinement because she had been convicted under the Drug-Free School Zone Act and was ineligible for community corrections. State v. Barrett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2019).

Because defendant's sentences for sale of a Schedule III controlled substance within a drug-free zone, delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance within a drug-free zone, and maintaining a dwelling where a controlled substance was kept or sold were within the appropriate range, the trial court's sentencing determinations were entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Barrett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying community corrections on the grounds that defendant had been convicted under the Drug-Free School Zone (DFSZ) Act because it properly applied precedent to defendant's case; previous panels of the court of appeals concluded that a defendant convicted of violating the DFSZ Act had to serve the sentence in confinement. State v. Barrett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to serve his total effective sentence of two years in confinement because defendant was not eligible for community corrections as he was convicted under the Drug-Free School Zone Act; defendants dealing drugs in school zones who were sentenced to the minimum term in their sentencing range would serve 100% of their sentences; and defendant received concurrent sentences of two years for each conviction of sale of a Schedule III controlled substance within a drug-free zone, delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance within a drug-free zone, and maintaining a dwelling where a controlled substance was kept or sold, which were the minimum sentences for those offenses. State v. Diggs, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2019).

Trial court erred in granting defendants'  motions to dismiss the drug-free zone enhancement alleged in their presentments because the determination of whether the greenway was a public park as contemplated by the Drug-Free School Zone Act was a question of fact to be decided by the finder of fact; nothing indicated the legislature intended to limit the Act to public parks of only certain dimensions. State v. Langley, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 14, 2020).

7. Judicial Diversion.

Defendant was a qualified defendant for judicial diversion purposes as, contrary to the State's contention, the judicial diversion statute did not conflict with T.C.A. § 39-17-432, of which defendant was convicted. It was within the legislature's discretion to determine which offenses it deemed ineligible for diversion, and it had not deemed the offense of possession of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school zone ineligible. State v. Dycus, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2013), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 973 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 456 S.W.3d 918, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2015).

In judicial diversion cases, no judgment of conviction is entered, and a sentence is imposed only in the instance that the defendant fails to successfully complete the period of probation pursuant to the grant of judicial diversion; therefore, the plain meaning of the mandatory minimum service requirement of the Drug-Free School Zone Act, applicable only to those who have been “sentenced” under the Act, does not preclude the possibility of judicial diversion. State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2015).

Mandatory minimum service requirement of the Drug-Free School Zone Act does not render offenses under that Act ineligible for judicial diversion. State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2015).

Trial court properly denied defendant's request to be placed on judicial diversion because defendant repeatedly continued to commit marijuana-related offenses while she had pending charges at various stages in the criminal process; defendant's convictions were more than isolated instances of criminal behavior, but rather, they constituted a pattern of drug activity taking place over the course of a significant period of time and in spite of multiple arrests. State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2015).

8. Facilitation.

Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a jury instruction on facilitation as a lesser-included offense of sale and delivery of a Schedule I controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school; there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant merely facilitated the drug sales because he set the price for the drugs, acquired the drugs, accepted payment for the drugs, and delivered the drugs. Bryant v. State, 460 S.W.3d 513, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2015), overruled in part, Moore v. State, 485 S.W.3d 411, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict because a reasonable jury could have determined that defendant facilitated the possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in a drug-free school zone; two bags of cocaine were found by officers in a bag close to where defendant had been sitting, and he acknowledged that one of the bags was his. State v. Gibson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 506 S.W.3d 450, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Because the Tennessee Drug-Free School Zone Act, T.C.A. § 39-17-432, did not apply to a conviction for facilitation, the trial court erred by increasing defendant's felony classification to a Class B felony and by requiring service of the entire minimum sentence upon defendant's conviction for facilitation of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. State v. Gibson, 506 S.W.3d 450, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Trial court erred in increasing defendant's facilitation convictions under the Drug-Free School Zone Act because the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the Act did not apply to convictions of facilitation. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2017).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's petition for sentencing relief because the allegation put forth by defendant did not render his sentences illegal, defendant failed to present a colorable claim, defendant filed his motion well beyond the one year statute of limitations, and the Drug-Free School Zone Act did not apply to facilitation, did not fall within the statutory purview of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, and did not apply to facilitation or trigger due process protections. Osborne v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2020).

9. Jury Instructions.

Including the preamble to the Drug-Free School Zone Act in the instructions was not prejudicial because an element of each offense for which defendant was convicted included that the delivery and sale of the controlled substances occurred within 1,000 feet of a school; it was undisputed at trial that defendant sold the detective heroin and cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school for children in the sixth through twelfth grades; and the appellate court had previously held that the trial court's instruction properly summarized the Drug-Free School Zone Act. State v. Lane, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2017).

Trial court did not err by not instructing the jury that the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine was a lesser-included offense of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone because the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine was not a lesser-included offense of the sale of the same amount in a drug-free zone, because the drug-free zone statute sets forth a sentencing enhancement for certain drug offenses. State v. Jordan, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

10. Indictment.

Habeas corpus court properly dismissed petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus because petitioner failed to show that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment since he had sufficient notice of the charges to defend at trial; the indictment cited the relevant drug statute and tracked the language of the drug-free school zone enhancement verbatim, and the language enabled petitioner to know the accusation to which an answer was required. Washington v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2018).

39-17-433. Promotion of methamphetamine manufacture.

  1. It is an offense for a person to promote methamphetamine manufacture. A person promotes methamphetamine manufacture who:
    1. Sells, purchases, acquires, or delivers any chemical, drug, ingredient, or apparatus that can be used to produce methamphetamine, knowing that it will be used to produce methamphetamine, or with reckless disregard of its intended use;
    2. Purchases or possesses more than nine (9) grams of an immediate methamphetamine precursor with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine or deliver the precursor to another person whom they know intends to manufacture methamphetamine, or with reckless disregard of the person's intent; or
    3. Permits a person to use any structure or real property that the defendant owns or has control of, knowing that the person intends to use the structure to manufacture methamphetamine, or with reckless disregard of the person's intent.
  2. Expert testimony of a qualified law enforcement officer shall be admissible to establish that a particular chemical, drug, ingredient, or apparatus can be used to produce methamphetamine. For purposes of this testimony, a rebuttable presumption is created that any commercially sold product contains or contained the product that it is represented to contain on its packaging or labels.
  3. Possession of more than fifteen (15) grams of an immediate methamphetamine precursor shall be prima facie evidence of intent to violate this section. This subsection (c) shall not apply to the following persons or entities that lawfully possess drug products in the course of legitimate business activities:
    1. A pharmacy or pharmacist licensed by the board of pharmacy;
    2. A wholesale drug distributor, or its agents, licensed by the board of pharmacy;
    3. A manufacturer of drug products, or its agents, licensed by the board of pharmacy; and
    4. A licensed health care professional possessing the drug products in the course of carrying out the health care provider's profession.
  4. For purposes of this section, “structure” means any house, apartment building, shop, barn, warehouse, building, vessel, railroad car, cargo container, motor vehicle, housecar, trailer, trailer coach, camper, mine, floating home, watercraft, or any other structure capable of holding a clandestine laboratory.
    1. If the chemical, drug, ingredient, or apparatus to produce methamphetamine is purchased in violation of subdivision (a)(1) in more than one (1) county, venue for purposes of prosecution under this section is proper in any county in which such an item was purchased.
    2. If immediate methamphetamine precursors are purchased in violation of subdivision (a)(2) in more than one (1) county, venue for purposes of prosecution under this section is proper in any county in which a precursor was purchased.
  5. A violation of this section is a Class D felony.

Acts 1999, ch. 446, § 1; 2005, ch. 18, § 11; 2011, ch. 292, § 4; 2011, ch. 309, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 1 provided that the act may be cited as the “Meth-Free Tennessee Act of 2005.”

Acts 2011, ch. 292, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “I Hate Meth Act.”

Cross-References. Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence that an active methamphetamine lab was found in the house that consisted of a cook bottle containing a clear liquid that was tested and determined to contain methamphetamine and that several items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were found in the house was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions for promotion of methamphetamine manufacturing and initiation of methamphetamine manufacturing. State v. Welch, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 771 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture because a deputy saw defendant throw something into a ditch; when the deputy searched the ditch a few minutes later, he located a plastic bag filled with crushed ephedrine; the bag itself was relatively dry while all of the other items in the area were soaked from the recent rain; and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant acquired the ephedrine, crushed it, and placed it in the bag before throwing it in the ditch, and that the crushed ephedrine would be used to make methamphetamine. State v. McCullough, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine because the officers found tubing, acetone, glass jars, and coffee filters, all of which were used in the manufacturing process, residue on one of the jars field-tested positive for methamphetamine, and the officers found multiple items of paraphernalia in the room that were associated with the use of methamphetamine. State v. Madewell, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine because deputies found tools and ingredients indicative of methamphetamine manufacture within 35 to 40 feet of defendant's house while conducting a search of defendant's property, the shake bottle lab was fresh, and defendant, as the property lessor, was responsible for the property's upkeep. State v. Delosh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2019).

2. Evidence Insufficient.

State was required, under T.C.A. § 39-17-433 and T.C.A. § 43-11-303 at the time of defendant's commission of the crime, to prove the chemical composition of anhydrous ammonia beyond a reasonable doubt, and because no chemical test was performed to determine the composition of the substance found, the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction. State v. Marise, 197 S.W.3d 762, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. 2006).

39-17-434. Manufacture, delivery, sale or possession of methamphetamines.

  1. It is an offense for a defendant to knowingly:
    1. Manufacture methamphetamine;
    2. Deliver methamphetamine;
    3. Sell methamphetamine; or
    4. Possess methamphetamine with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell methamphetamine.
  2. It is an offense for a person to knowingly possess or casually exchange methamphetamine.
  3. If the violation is for methamphetamine, the defendant shall be charged, indicted, prosecuted and convicted under this section rather than §§ 39-17-417 or 39-17-418.
  4. Any reference in Tennessee Code Annotated that provides a penalty, forfeiture, punishment, fine, disability or other adverse effect for a violation of §§ 39-17-417 or 39-17-418, shall be considered to apply to a conviction under this section if the violation involves methamphetamine.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) shall be punished as provided in § 39-17-417.
    2. A violation of subsection (b) shall be punished as provided in § 39-17-418.

Acts 2014, ch. 904, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 39-17-434 (Acts 2004, ch. 845, § 4), concerning possession of a substance with intent to manufacture a controlled substance or with intent to convey the substance to another, was repealed by Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 12, effective March 30, 2005.

Cross-References. Criminal offenses and penalties, § 39-17-417.

Drug offender registry, § 39-17-436.

Simple possession or casual exchange, § 39-17-418.

Attorney General Opinions. Registration requirements and sentencing for methamphetamine offenses. OAG 14-104, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 107 (12/3/14).

Registration requirements and sentencing for methamphetamine offenses. OAG 14-104, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 107 (12/3/14).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for .5 grams or more of methamphetamine within a drug-free zone. The proof adduced at trial revealed that defendant sold .94 grams of methamphetamine to a confidential informant and that the transaction occurred within 1,000 feet of a city park. State v. Hinson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver because an officer found baggies containing what was later identified as methamphetamine after stopping defendant and a driver; because defendant was seated in the front passenger seat in close proximity to the contraband, it was reasonable to infer that he could have exercised dominion and control over the bags containing methamphetamine. State v. Madden, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2018).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, the court of criminal appeals concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of over 0.5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell. The jury could have inferred from defendant's response (“he wasn't doing nothing big”) when asked if he was selling drugs that this was an acknowledgement that he sold drugs. State v. Hunley, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had constructive possession of methamphetamine and marijuana because moments after the agent knocked at the door and was greeted by the occupant of the residence agents at the back of the house heard the flushing of the toilet and hurried movements, the occupant and defendant were the only people in the house leaving defendant as the person in possession of the drugs that were being flushed, numerous agents testified to locating scales in plain sight, agents located defendant's clothes and debit card in the house, and $2,100 was found on defendant's person. State v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of methamphetamine with intent to resell and intent to deliver because defendant dropped a clear plastic container onto the ground; inside the container were plastic baggies containing methamphetamine ice; a narcotics officer testified that, through his training and experience, breaking a large quantity of a drug into smaller quantities was for the purpose of distributing and selling the drug; and defendant told an investigator that he had to sell drugs to make ends meet. State v. Chavez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to sell over 300 grams of methamphetamine because it showed that he supplied methamphetamine to the co-conspirator at the direction of another co-conspirator, the weight of the methamphetamine involved was over 300 grams, defendant knew that the methamphetamine was delivered to Tennessee by the first co-conspirator, the first co-conspirator delivered the methamphetamine to a third co-conspirator in the county, and defendant supplied the methamphetamine on more than one occasion. State v. Castillo, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2020).

After a jury convicted defendant of two counts of delivery of methamphetamine weighing more than .5 grams, the trial court properly imposed enhanced sentences of 25 years for each conviction, based on defendant's extensive history of drug convictions, to be served concurrently because, on two separate dates, a confidential informant (CI) arranged to meet defendant to purchase methamphetamine from him, the CI's testimony about the sale of the methamphetamine and defendant's involvement was direct evidence of his guilt, and were supported by the audio and video recordings of the transactions. State v. Gray, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 679 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 2020).

2. Clerical Error.

Case was remanded for entry of a corrected judgment due to a clerical error because the judgment indicated that defendant was found guilty of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, however, the judgment incorrectly listed T.C.A. § 37-17-455; in an amended indictment, the document was corrected and cited the correct statute, T.C.A. § 39-17-434. State v. Madden, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2018).

3. Sentence.

Defendant's effective sentence of 12-years for possession of methamphetamine with intent to resell and intent to deliver, a Class B felony, was not excessive because the trial court was clearly troubled by the his prior criminal history and failure to abide by the terms of his prior probation sentences. State v. Chavez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2019).

39-17-435. Initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly initiate a process intended to result in the manufacture of any amount of methamphetamine.
  2. It shall not be a defense to a violation of this section that the chemical reaction is not complete, that no methamphetamine was actually created, or that the process would not actually create methamphetamine if completed.
  3. For purposes of this section, “initiates” means to begin the extraction of an immediate methamphetamine precursor from a commercial product, to begin the active modification of a commercial product for use in methamphetamine creation, or to heat or combine any substance or substances that can be used in methamphetamine creation.
  4. Expert testimony of a qualified law enforcement officer shall be admissible for the proposition that a particular process can be used to manufacture methamphetamine. For purposes of this testimony, a rebuttable presumption is created that any commercially sold product contains or contained the product that it is represented to contain on its packaging or labels.
  5. A person may not be prosecuted for a violation of this section and of manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of § 39-17-417 based upon the same set of facts.
  6. A violation of this section is a Class B felony.

Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 10.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 1 provided that the act may be cited as the “Meth-Free Tennessee Act of 2005.”

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

There was insufficient evidence to show that defendant furnished substantial assistance in initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine because the evidence related to methamphetamine production was discovered in a shed located, and there was no evidence defendant ever entered the shed or that he was present at the owner's house when the lab was active; the only evidence presented purportedly linking defendant to the methamphetamine lab was that he was involved with the owner. State v. Hammack, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine where the opened cold compression pack containing small amounts of ammonium nitrate was found in a plastic bag inside the vehicle, defendant had possession of the vehicle for four days prior to the discovery of the plastic bag, he admitted to using methamphetamine in the 24 to 48 hours prior to the bag's discovery, and he said the items in the vehicle belonged to him. State v. Dunn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2016).

Defendant's conviction of initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine was supported by the evidence, given that the accomplice testified that she allowed defendant to make methamphetamine in her home in exchange for drugs, and the evidence that defendant purchased pseudoephedrine provided corroboration to the accomplice's testimony; furthermore, by living in the house and admitting to using methamphetamine, defendant was deemed to have constructively possessed the items in the house used to make the methamphetamine. State v. Strickland, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 716 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence that an active methamphetamine lab was found in the house that consisted of a cook bottle containing a clear liquid that was tested and determined to contain methamphetamine and that several items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were found in the house was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions for promotion of methamphetamine manufacturing and initiation of methamphetamine manufacturing. State v. Welch, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 771 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for facilitation of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine because defendant lived in the camper under which an active methamphetamine laboratory was found, purchased an excessive number of cold tablets containing the essential ingredient for the manufacture of methamphetamine, and claimed in his own testimony that he bought the tablets for the owner of the property where defendant's camper was located to use to cook the methamphetamine that defendant craved. State v. Fletcher, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for initiating a process to manufacture methamphetamine; one witness testified that defendant crushed the pseudoephedrine pills, thereby initiating the methamphetamine cook, the jury reviewed defendant's written statement wherein he admitted that the active, one-pot methamphetamine lab was his, and the jury weighed defendant's testimony, that the witness initiated the methamphetamine cook, in relation to the other evidence presented at trial and reconciled the evidence in favor of the State, which was not reweighed on appeal. State v. Grayson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Evidence found in defendant's bedroom and an adjoining bathroom, including a bottle with methamphetamine residue inside of it, ammonium nitrate, a pill grinder, lithium batteries, muriatic acid, coffee filters, a cold pack, needle-nose pliers with burn marks on the ends, and two drink bottles filled with a liquid defendant acknowledged was fuel was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine. State v. Phillips, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture because a deputy saw defendant throw something into a ditch; when the deputy searched the ditch a few minutes later, he located a plastic bag filled with crushed ephedrine; the bag itself was relatively dry while all of the other items in the area were soaked from the recent rain; and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant acquired the ephedrine, crushed it, and placed it in the bag before throwing it in the ditch, and that the crushed ephedrine would be used to make methamphetamine. State v. McCullough, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine (meth) because the bottle contained an active meth lab; a deputy with the meth task force explained that the bottle contained the components to make meth and that the “pulsing” of the bottle indicated the process was ongoing; the deputy stated that the bottle had to be “burped” fairly frequently to prevent dangerous pressure from building in the bottle, and that the bottle had to be shaken to combine the components and encourage the cooking process to continue; and, although defendant was not involved in the beginning of the manufacturing process, the word “initiates” was not so narrowly defined. State v. Mathis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2018).

2. Instructions.

Trial court instructed the jury with language that mirrored the statute defining the offense for which defendant was on trial, initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and he was not entitled to relief on this ground. State v. Strickland, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 716 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

3. Sentence.

In a case in which defendant was convicted of initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, the trial court correctly sentenced defendant because he was not considered a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing, and he was ineligible for probation as he received a sentence of 11 years; and denial of a community corrections sentence was appropriate as defendant had been released on probation in the past and had failed to comply with the terms of release, and defendant's rehabilitation potential was poor and he was highly likely to reoffend. State v. Mathis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2018).

By pleading guilty to two initiation offenses, defendant acknowledged that he knowingly initiated a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine; because defendant had a violent felony conviction and two serious drug offense convictions, the district court did not err in sentencing him as an armed career criminal under the ACCA. United States v. Myers,  2019 FED App. 0112 (6th Cir.), — F.3d —, 2019 FED App. 112p, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 16560 (6th Cir. June 3, 2019).

39-17-436. Drug offender registry.

  1. There is created within the Tennessee bureau of investigation a registry of persons convicted of a violation of any of the following offenses:
    1. Section 39-17-418 involving any substance listed in § 39-17-408(d)(2);
    2. Section 39-17-431;
    3. Any felony offense prohibited by this part; or
    4. Conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or solicitation to commit any of the offenses listed in subdivisions (a)(1)-(3).
  2. This registry shall be maintained by the Tennessee bureau of investigation based upon information supplied to the bureau by the clerks pursuant to subsection (c) and the registry shall be made available for public inquiry on the internet.
  3. The registry shall consist of the person's name, date of birth, offense or offenses requiring the person's inclusion on the registry, the conviction date and county of those offenses. If available after reasonable inquiry, the clerk shall provide the bureau of investigation with the person's driver license number and issuing state, or any other state or federal identification number, and such other identifying data as the bureau determines is necessary to properly identify the convicted person and exclude innocent persons. However, the registry available for public inquiry shall not include the person's social security number, driver license number, or any other state or federal identification number.
  4. The court clerks shall forward a copy of the judgment and date of birth of all persons who are convicted of a violation of the offenses described in subsection (a) to the Tennessee bureau of investigation. The information shall be forwarded to the bureau within forty-five (45) days of the date of judgment.
  5. The Tennessee bureau of investigation shall remove from the registry the name and other identifying information of persons who are convicted of a violation of the offenses described in subsection (a) ten (10) years after the date of the most recent conviction.
  6. Any person convicted of an offense or offenses for which placement on the drug offender registry is required pursuant to subsection (a) shall be prohibited from purchasing a nonexempt product containing any immediate methamphetamine precursor for the entire period such person is required to be on the registry.

Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 13; 2012, ch. 911, § 1; 2014, ch. 732, §§ 1-3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 1 provided that the act may be cited as the “Meth-Free Tennessee Act of 2005.”

Acts 2014, ch. 904, which enacted § 39-17-434, provided that any reference in Tennessee Code Annotated that provides a penalty, forfeiture, punishment, fine, disability or other adverse effect for a violation of § 39-17-417 or § 39-17-418, shall be considered to apply to a conviction under § 39-17-434 if the violation involves methamphetamine.

Cross-References. Manufacture, delivery, sale or possession of methamphetamines, § 39-17-434.

Law Reviews.

Crime & Punishment: Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Advice Regarding Plea Offers (Wade V. Davies), 49 Tenn. B.J. 28 (2013).

Attorney General Opinions. Registration requirements and sentencing for methamphetamine offenses. OAG 14-104, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 107 (12/3/14).

39-17-437. Falsification of the results of a drug test — Synthetic urine prohibited.

    1. It is an offense for a person to intentionally use, or possess with the intent to use, any substance or device designed to falsify the results of a drug test of that person.
    2. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(3), it is an offense for a person to sell synthetic urine.
    3. It is not an offense for a person to sell synthetic urine to an individual for bona fide educational, medical or scientific purposes. Any person selling synthetic urine for such purposes shall maintain documentation as to the educational, medical or scientific purpose for each individual sale of such urine for a period not less than five (5) years.
  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Drug test” means a lawfully administered test designed to detect the presence of a controlled substance or a controlled substance analogue; and
    2. “Synthetic urine” means any product or substance which is designed to falsify the results of a drug test for a human being.
    1. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. A violation of subdivision (a)(2) is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 14; 2010, ch. 873, § 1; 2012, ch. 848, § 20.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 18, § 1 provided that the act may be cited as the “Meth-Free Tennessee Act of 2005”.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

39-17-438. Production, manufacture, distribution or possession of salvia divinorum A.

    1. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, it is an offense to knowingly produce, manufacture, distribute, possess, or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or distribute the active chemical ingredient in the hallucinogenic plant salvia divinorum or the following synthetic cannabinoids, including any of their isomers, esters, or salts:
      1. (6a,10a)-9-(hydroxymethyl)-6,6-dimethyl-3-(2methyloctan-2-yl)-6a,7,10,10a-tetrahydrobenzo[c]chromen-1-ol; including, but not limited to, HU 210 or HU 211;
      2. Naphthoylindoles being any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl) indole with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to JWH-015; JWH-210; AM-1220; or MAM-2201;
      3. Naphthylmethylindoles being any compound structurally derived from a 1-H-indole-3-yl-(1-naphthyl)methane structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to, JWH-175; JWH-184; or JWH-199;
      4. Naphthoylpyrroles, being any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl) pyrrole with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the pyrrole ring whether or not further substituted in the pyrrole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to, JWH-307;
      5. Naphthylmethylindenes, being any compound structurally derived from 1-(1-naphthylmethyl) indene with substitution at the 3-position of the indene ring whether or not further substituted in the indene ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to, JWH-176;
      6. Phenylacetylindoles, being any compound structurally derived from 3-phenylacetylindole with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the phenyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to, JWH-167; JWH-201; JWH-251; or JWH-302;
      7. Cyclohexylphenols, being any compound structurally derived from 2-(3-hydroxycyclohexyl) phenol with substitution at the 5-position of the phenolic ring whether or not further substituted in the cyclohexyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to, the dimethylhexyl or dimethylnonyl homologues of CP 47,497;
      8. Tetrahydro derivatives of cannabinol and 3-alkyl homologues of cannabinol or of its tetrahydro derivatives, except where contained in cannabis or cannabis resin;
      9. Benzoylindoles, being any compound containing a 3-(benzoyl) indole structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted in the phenyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to, Pravadoline (WIN 48,098); AM-1241; or AM-2233;
      10. WIN-55; 212-2 or 2,3-Dihydro-5-methyl-3-(4-Morpholinylmethyl)pyrrolo[1,2,3-de]-1,4-benzoxazin-6-yl]-1-napthalenylmethanone;
      11. Cyclopropanoylindoles, being any compound structurally derived from a 3-(cyclopropylmethanoyl) indole structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted in the cyclopropyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to, A-796,260;
      12. Adamantoylindoles, being any compound structurally derived from a 3-(1-adamantoyl)indole structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted in the adamantyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to, AM-1248 or AB-001;
      13. Adamantoylindolecarboxamides, being any compound structurally derived from an N-adamantyl-1-indole-3-carboxamide with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted in the adamantyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to, STS-135; 2NE1;
      14. Adamantylindazolecarboxamides, being any compound structurally derived from an N-adamantyl-1-indazole-3-carboxamide with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indazole ring, whether or not further substituted in the indazole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted in the adamantyl ring to any extent;
      15. Naphthoylnaphthalene, being any compound structurally derived from naphthalene-1-yl-(naphthalene-1-yl) methanone with substitutions on either of the naphthalene rings to any extent; including, but not limited to, CB-13;
      16. Quinolinylindolecarboxylate, being any compound structurally derived from indole-3carboxylic acid-1H-quinolinyl ester structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl; haloalkyl; alkenyl; cycloalkylmethyl; cycloalkylethyl; 1-(N-methyl-2-piperidinyl)methyl; or 2-(4-morpholinyl) ethyl group, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the quinolinyl ring to any extent;
      17. (1-Aminocarbonyl)propylindazolecarboxamides, being any compound structurally derived from 3-[(1-aminocarbonyl)-1-propyl] indazole carboxamide structure with substitution at either nitrogen atom of the indazole ring by alkyl; haloalkyl; alkenyl; cycloalkylmethyl; cycloalkylethyl; 1-(N-methyl-2-piperidinyl) methyl; or 2-(4-morphonlinyl) ethyl group, whether or not further substituted in the indazole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the propyl chain to any extent; including, but not limited to, AB-PINACA.
      18. Naphthoylindazoles, being any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl) indazole structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indazole ring, whether or not further substituted in the indazole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent; including, but not limited to THJ-2201;
      19. Methylindazolecarboxamidobutanoate, being any compound structurally derived from methyl-2-(indazole-3-carboxamido) butanoate structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indazole ring whether or not further substituted in the indazole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the butanyl or methyl chain around the ester to any extent; including, but not limited to AMB and fluoro-AMB; and
      20. Naphthalenylindolecarboxylates, being any compound structurally derived from a naphthalen-1-yl 1 H-indole-3-carboxylate structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl, haloalkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl, 1-(N-methyl-2- piperidinyl) methyl, or 2-(4-morpholinyl) ethyl group, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthalene ring to any extent; including, but not limited to NM-2201.
    2. Subdivision (a)(1) concerning synthetic cannabinoids shall not apply to drugs or substances lawfully prescribed or to drugs or substances that have been approved or approved for study by the federal food and drug administration.
  1. This section shall not apply to the possession, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of the hallucinogenic plant strictly for aesthetic, landscaping, or decorative purposes.
  2. This section shall not apply to any dosage form that is legally obtainable from a retail establishment without a prescription and is recognized by the federal food and drug administration as a homeopathic drug.
    1. A first violation of this section is a Class D felony.
    2. A second or subsequent violation of this section is a Class C felony.
    3. If the violation of this section involved the delivery, dispensing, or sale of a controlled substance analogue to a minor, the person shall be punished one (1) classification higher than the punishment provided by this subsection (d) for delivering, dispensing, or selling to an adult.

Acts 2006, ch. 700, § 1; 2010, ch. 922, § 1; 2011, ch. 274, § 1; 2012, ch. 848, § 21; 2012, ch. 854, § 1; 2013, ch. 161, § 1; 2014, ch. 735, § 1; 2015, ch. 302, § 6; 2015, ch. 401, §§  1–3.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability of Tennessee law to synthetic forms of LSD and cocaine.  OAG 11-28, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 30 (3/24/11).

Cross-References. Penalties for Class C and D felonies, § 40-35-111.

39-17-439. Alcohol and drug addiction treatment fee.

  1. In addition to all other fines, fees, costs and punishments now prescribed by law, an alcohol and drug addiction treatment fee of one hundred dollars ($100) shall be assessed for each conviction for a violation under this part.
  2. All proceeds collected pursuant to subsection (a) shall be transmitted to the commissioner of mental health and substance abuse services for deposit in the alcohol and drug addiction treatment fund administered by the department.
    1. All state funding to implement § 40-35-303(d)(11) shall be paid only from the alcohol and drug addiction treatment fund.
    2. Funds expended pursuant to § 40-35-303(d)(11) shall not exceed the funds generated by this section, and, if necessary, treatment offered pursuant to § 40-35-303(d)(11) shall not be available if the treatment would result in expenditures in excess of the amount so generated.

Acts 2007, ch. 311, § 2; 2009, ch. 186, § 4; 2010, ch. 1100, § 65; 2012, ch. 575, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. For an Order transferring the bureau of alcohol and drug abuse services from the department of health to the department of mental health and developmental disabilities, except for functions related to the licensing of alcohol and drug abuse counselors, see Executive Order No. 44 (February 23, 2007).

Acts 2007, ch. 311, § 3 provided that the act shall apply to any conviction for conduct occurring on or after July 1, 2007.

Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

39-17-440. Sale of product containing dextromethorphan to person under 18 years of age — Exception — Proof of age — Violation.

  1. It is unlawful for:
    1. Any commercial entity, or the entity's employee or representative acting on behalf of the entity, to knowingly sell a product containing dextromethorphan to a person that the employee or representative knows or has reason to know is less than eighteen (18) years of age and is not an emancipated minor, as defined in § 39-11-106. However, no employee, representative, or person acting on behalf of a commercial entity shall be in violation of this section, or be subject to an adverse employment action for a violation of this section, unless the employee, representative, or person has completed an employer-provided course of instruction that is specifically designed to enable the employee, representative, or person to identify products containing dextromethorphan and distinguish those products from similar products that do not contain dextromethorphan; or
    2. Any person who is less than eighteen (18) years of age and who is not an emancipated minor, as defined in § 39-11-106, to purchase a product the person knows or should know contains any quantity of dextromethorphan with the intent to use the product in a manner inconsistent with the recommended dosage and manner of use indicated on the container.
    1. This section requires an entity, employee, or representative to manually obtain and verify proof of age or emancipation pursuant to subsection (c) as a condition of sale. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require additional compliance requirements, including placement of products in a specific place within a store, other restrictions on consumers' direct access to products, or the maintenance of transaction records.
    2. This section shall not apply to a product containing dextromethorphan that is sold pursuant to a valid prescription, including a pharmacist-generated prescription issued pursuant to § 63-10-206.
  2. Before completing a retail sale of a product containing dextromethorphan, the seller shall require the purchaser to present:
    1. Valid government-issued photo identification proving that the purchaser is at least eighteen (18) years of age, unless from the purchaser's outward appearance the seller would reasonably believe the purchaser to be thirty (30) years of age or older; or
    2. Proof of emancipation, if the purchaser is less than eighteen (18) years of age but is an emancipated minor.
  3. A violation of subsection (a) is punishable by a civil penalty of not more than one hundred dollars ($100) for a first violation and five hundred dollars ($500) for a second or subsequent violation.
  4. This section shall not apply to a product containing dextromethorphan that is:
    1. Delivered or dispensed at a facility licensed under title 68, chapter 11, part 2, or title 33, chapter 2, part 4; or
    2. Delivered or dispensed by a licensed healthcare practitioner to an inmate at a jail or correctional facility.
  5. This section shall preempt any local ordinance regulating the retail sale of products containing dextromethorphan enacted by a local governmental entity of this state. Products containing dextromethorphan shall not be subject to further regulation by a local governmental entity.

Acts 2015, ch. 82, §§ 1, 2.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 82, § 3. January 1, 2016.

39-17-441 — 39-17-451. [Reserved.]

    1. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, it is an offense to knowingly produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, offer for sale, or possess any capsule, pill, or other product composed of or containing any amount of any compound, other than bupropion, that is structurally derived from 2-amino-1-phenyl-1-propanone by modification in any of the following ways:
      1. Substitution in the phenyl ring to any extent with alkyl; alkoxy; alkylenedioxy; haloalkyl; or halide substituents, whether or not further substituted in the phenyl ring by one (1) or more other univalent substituents;
      2. Substitution at the 3-position with an alkyl substituent; or
      3. Substitution at the nitrogen atom with alkyl or dialkyl groups, or by inclusion of the nitrogen atom in a cyclic structure.
    2. Compounds recognized under subdivision (a)(1) include, but are not limited to:
      1. 4-Methoxymethcathinone (Methedrone);
      2. 3-Methoxymethcathinone (HMMC);
      3. 4-Methyl-alpha-pyrrolidinobutyrophenone (MPBP);
      4. 4-Ethylmethcathinone (4-EMC);
      5. 3,4-Dimethylmethcathinone (3,4-DMMC);
      6. [beta]-Keto-Ethylbenzodioxolylbutanamine (Eutylone);
      7. 3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-ethylcathinone (Ethylone);
      8. Mitragynine and hydroxymitragynine;
      9. Desoxypipradol;
      10. URB 754; and
      11. URB602.
      1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly:
        1. Sell, or offer for sale, Kratom unless labeled and in its natural form;
        2. Distribute, sell, or offer for sale, Kratom to a person under the age of twenty-one (21) years; or
        3. Purchase or possess Kratom if under the age of twenty-one (21) years.
      2. For purposes of this subdivision (a)(3):
        1. “Labeled” means a label containing the manufacturer's information and a warning that includes, at a minimum, “Warning: Do not use if you are pregnant or nursing. It is illegal to possess Kratom if under 21 years of age. Consult your healthcare professional before using. Do not combine with alcohol or medication. Consult a doctor prior to usage if you have any heart disease, liver disorder, high blood pressure, or medical condition or take medication.”; and
        2. “Natural form” means dried, cut, and sifted Kratom leaf or raw Kratom leaf powder.
  1. Subsection (a) shall not apply to drugs or substances lawfully prescribed or to drugs or substances that have been approved by the federal food and drug administration.
  2. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 2011, ch. 169, § 1; 2012, ch. 838, § 1; 2013, ch. 161, §§ 5, 6; 2015, ch. 302, § 7; 2018, ch. 1040, § 10.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (a)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1040, § 13. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Possession of the Kratom plant in its natural botanical form should not subject a person to potential criminal prosecution under Tennessee law. The Kratom plant in its natural botanical form is not a prohibited controlled substance under Tennessee law. OAG 17-55, 2017 Tenn. AG LEXIS 54 (12/20/2017).

39-17-453. Imitation controlled substances.

  1. It is an offense to knowingly manufacture, deliver, sell, or possess with the intent to sell, deliver or manufacture an imitation controlled substance.
  2. No person shall, for the purpose of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, elation, dizziness, excitement, stupefaction, paralysis, or the dulling of the brain or nervous system, or disturbing or distorting of the audio or visual processes, intentionally smell, inhale, inject, ingest or consume in any manner whatsoever an imitation controlled substance.
  3. No person shall, for the purpose of violating subsection (b), use, or possess for the purpose of so using, an imitation controlled substance.
  4. For purposes of this section:
      1. “Imitation controlled substance” means a pill, capsule, tablet, or substance in any form whatsoever if it:
        1. Is not a controlled substance enumerated in this part;
        2. Is subject to abuse;  (iii)  Purports, by express or implied representations, to act like a controlled substance that is a stimulant or depressant of the central nervous system; and  (iv)  Is not commonly used or recognized for use in that particular formulation for any purpose other than as a stimulant or depressant of the central nervous system; or(B)  (i)  The chemical structure of the substance is a derivative or analogue of the chemical structure of a controlled substance; and
    1. “Imitation controlled substance” does not include a pill, capsule, tablet, or substance in any form whatsoever if it is marketed or promoted, or sold as permitted by the United States food and drug administration.
    1. In determining whether a pill, capsule, tablet, or substance in any other form whatsoever, is an imitation controlled substance, there shall be considered, in addition to all other relevant factors, comparisons with accepted methods of marketing for legitimate nonprescription drugs for medicinal purposes rather than for drug abuse or any similar nonmedicinal use, including consideration of the packaging of the drug and its appearance in overall finished dosage form, promotional materials or representations, oral or written, concerning the drug, and the methods of distribution of the drug and where and how it is sold to the public.
    2. In determining whether any person intends to manufacture, sell, give or distribute an imitation controlled substance, it may be inferred from, in addition to all other relevant evidence, whether any distribution or attempted distribution of such pill, capsule, tablet or substance in any other form whatsoever included an exchange of or a demand for money or other property as consideration, and, if so, whether the amount of such consideration was substantially greater than the reasonable value of such pill, capsule, tablet or substance in any other form whatsoever, considering the actual chemical composition of such pill, capsule, tablet or substance in any other form whatsoever and, where applicable, the price at which over-the-counter substances of like chemical composition sell. Such inference shall be transmitted to the jury by the trial judge's charge.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class E felony. In addition to any period of incarceration imposed, there shall be imposed a fine of not less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
    2. A violation of subsection (b) or (c) is a Class A misdemeanor. In addition to any period of incarceration imposed, there shall be imposed a fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) and not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).
  5. The building and premises of any business in or upon which a violation of this section is committed by an employee, agent or owner of such business is declared to be a public nuisance and shall be subject to abatement as provided in title 29, chapter 3.

The substance is not commonly used or recognized for use in that particular formulation for any purpose other than as a stimulant or depressant of the central nervous system.

Acts 2012, ch. 843, § 1; 2013, ch. 433, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

A Problem of Design: Proposed Changes to Controlled Substance Analogue Statutes — Modifying Tennessee's Approach, 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 395 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of possession of an imitation controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver because the white powder found in the back of defendant's vehicle was determined not to be cocaine, but the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation could not conclusively determine what it actually was; and there was no evidence that the chemical structure of the substance was a derivative or analogue of a controlled substance. State v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2019).

39-17-454. Controlled substance analogues.

    1. As used in this section, “controlled substance analogue” means a capsule, pill, powder, product or other substance, however constituted, that has the stimulant, depressant or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance; and
      1. Has a chemical structure which is a derivative or structural analogue of the chemical structure of a controlled substance; provided, that as used in this subdivision (a)(1), “analogue” means the structure of the tested item differs in no more than two (2) atoms, one (1) functional group, or one (1) double bond, from the structure of a controlled substance; or
      2. Is prohibited by § 39-17-452.
    2. “Controlled substance analogue” does not include:
      1. A controlled substance;
      2. Any substance for which there is an approved use or new drug application by the federal food and drug administration;
      3. Any compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any controlled substance that is not for administration to a human being or animal, and that is packaged in such form or concentration, or with adulterants or denaturants, so that as packaged it does not present any significant potential for abuse; or
      4. Any substance to which an investigational exemption applies under § 505 of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 355), but only to the extent that conduct with respect to the substance is pursuant to such exemption.
    1. In determining whether a substance is a controlled substance analogue, the following factors shall be considered, along with any other relevant factors:
      1. The difference between the price at which the substance is sold and the price at which the substance it is purported to be or advertised as is normally sold;
      2. Its diversion from legitimate channels, and its clandestine importation, manufacture, or distribution;
      3. The defendant's prior convictions, if any, for a violation of any state or federal statute prohibiting controlled substances or controlled substance analogues; and
      4. Comparisons with accepted methods of marketing a legitimate nonprescription drug for medicinal purposes rather than for the purpose of drug abuse or any similar nonmedical use, including:
        1. The packaging of the substance and its appearance in overall finished dosage form;
        2. Oral or written statements or representations concerning the substance;
        3. The methods by which the substance is distributed; and
        4. The manner in which the substance is sold to the public.
    2. In determining whether a substance is a controlled substance analogue, the following scientific or pharmacological factors may be considered, along with any other relevant factors:
      1. Its actual or relative potential for abuse;
      2. Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known;
      3. The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance;
      4. The history of the substance and its current pattern of abuse;
      5. The scope, duration and significance of abuse;
      6. What, if any, risk there is to the public health;
      7. Its psychic or physiological dependence liability; and
      8. Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under this chapter.
  1. It is an offense to knowingly manufacture, deliver, dispense or sell a controlled substance analogue or to possess a controlled substance analogue with the intent to manufacture, deliver, dispense or sell such substance.
  2. It is an offense to knowingly possess or casually exchange a small amount of a controlled substance analogue not in excess of one (1) gram.
  3. It may be inferred from the amount of controlled substance analogue possessed by an offender, along with other relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the controlled substance analogue was possessed with the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing in violation of subsection (c). It may be inferred from circumstances indicating a casual exchange among individuals of a controlled substance analogue that the controlled substance analogue so exchanged was possessed not with the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing in violation of subsection (c). The inferences shall be transmitted to the jury by the trial judge's charge, and the jury will consider the inferences along with the nature of the substance possessed when affixing the penalty.
    1. It is an offense for a person to represent, orally or in writing, advertise, infer or intend that a controlled substance analogue has the stimulant, depressant or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance; and
      1. Has a chemical structure which is a derivative or structural analogue of the chemical structure of a controlled substance; provided, that as used in this subdivision (f)(1), “analogue” means the structure of the tested item differs in no more than two (2) atoms, one (1) functional group, or one (1) double bond, from the structure of a controlled substance; or
      2. Is prohibited by § 39-17-452.
    2. It is not a defense to prosecution under this subsection (f) that the controlled substance analogue:
      1. Is not a derivative of a controlled substance;
      2. Does not have a chemical structure which is a derivative or analogue, as defined in subdivision (f)(1)(A), of the chemical structure of a controlled substance;
      3. Does not have a stimulant, depressant, hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance; or
      4. Is not listed in § 39-17-452.
    1. A first violation of subsection (c) is a Class D felony.
    2. A second or subsequent violation of subsection (c) is a Class C felony.
    3. If the violation of subsection (c) involved the delivery, dispensing or sale of a controlled substance analogue to a minor, the person shall be punished one (1) classification higher than the punishment provided by this subsection (g) for delivering, dispensing or selling to an adult.
    4. A violation of subsection (d) or (f) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. Nothing in this section shall preclude a violation of § 39-17-453, involving an imitation controlled substance, or § 39-17-452 from being prosecuted and punished as a violation of this section if the substance in question meets the definition of an analogue controlled substance under subsection (a).
    2. Nothing in this section shall preclude a violation of this section involving a controlled substance analogue from being prosecuted and punished under § 39-17-452 or § 39-17-453 if the controlled substance analogue in question also meets the definitions found in such sections.
    3. If the chemical analysis of a controlled substance analogue determines that it also contains a hazardous substance as defined by § 68-131-102, nothing in this section shall preclude a violation of this section from also being prosecuted and punished under title 68, chapter 131, part 1.
  4. Any disability, disqualification, forfeiture, suspension, revocation, prohibition, tax or other adverse consequence provided by law that may result from a conviction for an offense involving a controlled substance shall also apply if the conviction involves a controlled substance analogue in violation of subsection (c).
  5. The building and premises of any business in or upon which a violation of subsection (c) or (f) is committed by an employee, agent or owner of such business is declared to be a public nuisance and shall be subject to abatement as provided in title 29, chapter 3.

Acts 2012, ch. 848, § 96; 2013, ch. 161, §§ 2-4, 7.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class C and D felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

A Problem of Design: Proposed Changes to Controlled Substance Analogue Statutes — Modifying Tennessee's Approach, 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 395 (2014).

39-17-455. Manufacture of marijuana concentrate by process which includes use of inherently hazardous substance — Use of premises.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Inherently hazardous substance” means any liquid chemical, compressed gas, or commercial product that has a flash point at or lower than thirty-eight degrees Celsius (38° C) or one hundred degrees Fahrenheit (100° F), including butane, propane, and diethyl ether; and
    2. “Inherently hazardous substance” does not include all forms of alcohol and ethanol.
  2. It is an offense for a person to knowingly manufacture marijuana concentrate by a process which includes use of an inherently hazardous substance.
  3. It is an offense for any person who owns, manages, operates, or otherwise controls the use of any premises to knowingly allow marijuana concentrate to be manufactured on the premises by a process which includes use of an inherently hazardous substance.
    1. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony.
    2. A violation of subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 2016, ch. 1014, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Clerical Error.

Case was remanded for entry of a corrected judgment due to a clerical error because the judgment indicated that defendant was found guilty of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, however, the judgment incorrectly listed T.C.A. § 37-17-455; in an amended indictment, the document was corrected and cited the correct statute, T.C.A. § 39-17-434. State v. Madden, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2018).

Part 5
Gambling

39-17-501. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. Gambling is contrary to the public policy of this state and means risking anything of value for a profit whose return is to any degree contingent on chance, or any games of chance associated with casinos, including, but not limited to, slot machines, roulette wheels and the like. For the purposes of this chapter gambling does not include:
    1. A lawful business transaction;
    2. Annual events operated for the benefit of nonprofit organizations that are authorized pursuant to a two-thirds (2/3) approval of the general assembly, so long as such events are not prohibited by the state constitution;
    3. A state lottery of the type in operation in Georgia, Kentucky, and Virginia in 2000 and authorized by amendment to the Constitution of Tennessee, if the lottery is approved by the general assembly;
    4. A fantasy sports contest as defined in § 47-18-1602 and conducted in accordance with the Fantasy Sports Act, compiled in title 47, chapter 18, part 16;
    5. Lawfully accepting or placing a wager on a sporting event in accordance with the Tennessee Sports Gaming Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 51, part 3; or
    6. A low-level sports entertainment pool;
  2. “Gambling bet” means anything of value risked in gambling;
  3. “Gambling device or record” means anything designed for use in gambling, intended for use in gambling, or used for gambling;
  4. “Lawful business transaction,” as used in subdivision (1), includes any futures or commodities trading;
  5. “Lottery” means the selling of anything of value for chances on a prize or stake;
  6. “Low-level sports entertainment pool” or “pool” means a type of pari-mutuel betting:
    1. In which a participant:
      1. Pays money for participation in a pool; and
      2. Makes selections based on the participant's predictions of either the outcome of a series of athletic contests of the same sport or the statistics of individual athletes selected by the participant to assemble an imaginary team of athletes;
    2. That does not involve laying odds; and
    3. That has the following characteristics:
      1. The total or cumulative entry fee paid by an individual participant is no more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00);
      2. The total pool is no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000); and
      3. The pool is managed by an individual and not by any type of business entity; and
  7. “Profit” means anything of value in addition to the gambling bet.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 945, § 1; 2001, ch. 439, § 1; 2007, ch. 349, § 1; 2009, ch. 267, § 1; 2015, ch. 134, § 23; 2016, ch. 978, § 2; 2019, ch. 126, §§ 2, 3; 2019, ch. 507, § 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section contains the definitions for gambling offenses. The definitions are intentionally broader than those found in prior law. The commission intends to include any scheme by which value is risked upon a chance for greater value as a “gambling” offense. The definition of “gambling” includes lotteries, chain or pyramid clubs, numbers, pinball, poker or any as yet unnamed scheme where value is risked for profit. The definition of “lawful business transaction”, however, makes it clear that futures and commodities trading is not included in gambling. This is a change from prior code § 39-6-627, which prohibited such trading under certain circumstances as gambling.

Compiler's Notes. Section 501(c)(3), referred to in this section, is codified as 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2019, ch. 126, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “March Madness and Fantasy Football Freedom Act.”

Acts 2019, ch. 507, § 7 provided that the act take effect July 1, 2019, the public welfare requiring it.  The act was returned without the governor's signature and became effective under the provisions of Tenn. Const., art. III, § 18.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by ch. 126 added (1)(F); and added the definition of “‘low-level sports entertainment pool’ or ‘pool’”.

The 2019 amendment by ch. 507 added (1)(E).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 126, § 4. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 507, July 1, 2019; provided that, for purposes of promulgating rules and carrying out any administrative duties necessary to effectuate the provisions and intent of this act, the act took effect on May 25, 2019.  See Compiler’s Notes.

Cross-References. Application for consent to petition to convene investigative grand jury, § 40-12-201.

Disposal of confiscated gambling devices, § 38-6-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 13 Tenn. Juris., Gaming, Gambling and Gambling Contracts, §§ 2-4, 8, 9; 18 Tenn. Juris., Lotteries, § 3.

Law Reviews.

Book Review, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Tennessee, 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (1988).

Dignity, And Danger: Human Dignity As A Constitutional Constraint To Limit Overcriminalization, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 291 (2013).

Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 291 (2013).

Attorney General Opinions. Lottery tickets as gambling devices, OAG 93-16 (2/22/93).

Legality of redesigned gaming machines in mock casino, OAG 94-129 (11/2/94).

Constitutional and statutory limits on casino gambling, OAG 94-139 (11/23/94).

Effect of deletion of lottery prohibition in constitution, OAG 95-039 (4/18/95).

Gambling device construed to include gambling software, OAG 98-0173 (8/28/98).

Prohibitions on intranet gambling, OAG 98-0173 (8/28/98).

Advertisements promoting lawful, out-of-state casino gambling, OAG 99-030 (2/18/99).

Fishing tournaments where fees paid for chance to win cash or prizes, OAG 99-084 (4/5/99).

Legality of machines vending purported “collector cards” simultaneous with an opportunity to win cash by playing a video game, OAG 99-146 (7/30/99).

Legality of fund-raising bingo activities awarding winners cash prizes funded by payments from participants, OAG 99-191 (9/28/99).

A so-called “redemption machine,” which upon payment of a fee allows a person an opportunity to play to potentially win coupons redeemable on-premises for merchandise perceived as having a greater value than the cost to play the machine, is an illegal “lottery” prohibited by the Tennessee constitution and the gambling laws, OAG 02-054 (4/30/02).

A machine that upon payment of a fee dispenses a short term prepaid telephone or “psychic reading” card connected to a scratch-off type card, which, in turn, provides the opportunity to instantly win cash or other prizes, is an illegal gambling device, OAG 02-089 (8/21/02).

“Reverse raffle” and “auction” involving paying money to win a prize is a prohibited lottery unless part of an annual event approved by the general assembly, OAG 03-049 (4/22/03).

Legality of lottery pool, OAG 04-042 (3/12/04).

Legality of leasing equipment for and conducting poker tournaments, OAG 06-046 (3/10/06).

It is not lawful to conduct a lottery-ticket pool in which Tennessee lottery ticket holders pool their tickets and share in any prizes awarded on winning tickets; such a pool constitutes “gambling” and does not fall within any exceptions provided in T.C.A. §  39-17-501(1). OAG 14-58, 2014 Tenn. AG Lexis 60 (5/23/14).

It is not permissible to conduct dog-racing activities under the Racing Control Act of 1987, T.C.A. §§ 4-36-101 to 402.  As with horse racing, betting on dog racing is illegal.  The Racing Control Act did not authorize betting on dog racing.  When the racing commission ceased to exist, so too did betting on horse racing.  Legislation would be required to reestablish the State Racing Commission. OAG 14-91, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 92 (9/30/14).

Fantasy sports contests constitute illegal gambling under Tennessee law. OAG 16-13, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 13 (4/5/2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The Tennessee gambling statutes are not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant, who placed video poker and slot machines in businesses and collected one half of the profits generated from their use. United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1999 FED App. 59P, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2516 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8656 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 872, 120 S. Ct. 175, 145 L. Ed. 2d 148, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5820 (1999).

T.C.A. § 39-17-501(1) and former (3), defining gambling and a gambling device, were not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant who possessed video slot machines where: (1) Defendant engaged in conduct clearly proscribed by the statute; (2) The definition was sufficiently clear to provide notice that a slot machine was a gambling device; (3) Defendant's speculations about possible arbitrary enforcement of the statute did not render it unconstitutional; and (4) It was not overbroad, since gambling was not constitutionally protected conduct. State v. Burkhart, 58 S.W.3d 694, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Burkhart v. Tennessee, 535 U.S. 930, 122 S. Ct. 1303, 152 L. Ed. 2d 214, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1590 (2002).

2. Exemption from Money Laundering Act.

Legislative history of the Money Laundering Act indicated that the gambling laws, T.C.A. § 39-17-501 et seq., were exempted from the definition of “specified unlawful activity” in T.C.A. §§ 39-14-903(b)(1) and 39-14-902(5)(A) and (B) (now §  39-14-902(6)(A) and (B)), because a majority of the members of the Tennessee house of representatives did not feel that the money laundering statute should be applied to gambling acts which might be considered minor offenses and because (by implication) the act was designed to enable law enforcement to combat money laundering in other offenses considered to be more serious by the legislative body; thus, the legislative history supported the constitutionality of the money laundering statutes, T.C.A. §§ 39-14-90139-14-903, by establishing that the reasonableness of the classification was at least fairly debatable and, therefore, the money laundering statutes did not violate the equal protection divisions of the Tennessee Constitution, Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 8 and art. I, § 8. State v. Price, 124 S.W.3d 135, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. 2003).

39-17-502. Gambling — Defenses.

  1. A person commits an offense who knowingly engages in gambling.
  2. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section, which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that a person reasonably and in good faith relied upon the representations of a gambling promoter that a gambling activity was lawful because it was an authorized annual event pursuant to title 3, chapter 17. It is not an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that a person engaged in a gambling activity that was not an authorized type of lottery game pursuant to title 3, chapter 17.
  3. The offense of gambling is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2004, ch. 476, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. Betting on election — Penalty, § 2-19-129.

Fantasy Sports Act, title 47, ch. 18, part 16.

Gambling contracts void, § 29-19-101.

Horse racing, title 4, ch. 36.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Prosecution for gaming to be commenced within six months, § 40-2-102.

Prosecutor not required for indictment, § 40-13-104.

Recovery of gambling losses, § 28-3-106.

Suspension, removal and discharge from office, § 39-16-406.

Winner may not recover, § 29-19-102.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 13 Tenn. Juris., Gaming, Gambling and Gambling Contracts, §§ 3, 4, 10.

Law Reviews.

Jail Fees and Court Costs for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: An Examination of the Tennessee Procedure, 35 Tenn. L. Rev. 74 (1968).

Attorney General Opinions. Fund raising by “rubber duck races” at which valuable prizes are offered, OAG 97-025 (3/19/97).

Prohibitions on intranet gambling, OAG 98-0173 (8/28/98).

Advertisements promoting lawful, out-of-state casino gambling, OAG 99-030 (2/18/99).

Fishing tournaments where fees paid for chance to win cash or prizes, OAG 99-084 (4/5/99).

Fantasy sports contests constitute illegal gambling under Tennessee law. OAG 16-13, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 13 (4/5/2016).

39-17-503. Gambling promotion.

  1. A person commits an offense who knowingly induces or aids another to engage in gambling, and:
    1. Intends to derive or derives an economic benefit other than personal winnings from the gambling; or
    2. Participates in the gambling and has, other than by virtue of skill or luck, a lesser risk of losing or greater chance of winning than one (1) or more of the other participants.
  2. The offense of gambling promotion is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another, § 39-11-402.

Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony, § 39-11-403.

Horse racing, title 4, ch. 36.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 13 Tenn. Juris., Gaming, Gambling and Gambling Contracts, §§ 9, 10.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure (William D. Warren), 6 Vand. L. Rev. 1179 (1953).

Attorney General Opinions. Legality of out-of-state lottery ticket purchasing service, OAG 96-031 (3/5/96).

Fund raising by “rubber duck races” at which valuable prizes are offered, OAG 97-025 (3/19/97).

“Gambling device” construed to include gambling software, OAG 98-0173 (8/28/98).

Advertisements promoting lawful, out-of-state casino gambling, OAG 99-030 (2/18/99).

Fishing tournaments where fees paid for chance to win cash or prizes, OAG 99-084 (4/5/99).

Statute of limitations for gambling promotion, OAG 99-127 (6/29/99).

A so-called “redemption machine,” which upon payment of a fee allows a person an opportunity to play to potentially win coupons redeemable on-premises for merchandise perceived as having a greater value than the cost to play the machine, is an illegal “lottery” prohibited by the Tennessee constitution and the gambling laws, OAG 02-054 (4/30/02).

Fantasy sports contests constitute illegal gambling under Tennessee law. OAG 16-13, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 13 (4/5/2016).

39-17-504. Aggravated gambling promotion.

  1. A person commits an offense who knowingly invests in, finances, owns, controls, supervises, manages or participates in a gambling enterprise.
  2. For purposes of this section, “gambling enterprise” means two (2) or more persons regularly engaged in gambling promotion as defined in § 39-17-503.
  3. The offense of aggravated gambling promotion is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Abatement of gambling premises as nuisances, § 29-3-101.

Criminal responsibility for conduct of another, § 39-11-402.

Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony, § 39-11-403.

Horse racing, title 4, ch. 36.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 13 Tenn. Juris., Gaming, Gambling and Gambling Contracts, § 10.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure — 1963 Tennessee Survey (Robert E. Kendrick), 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1977 (1964).

Attorney General Opinions. Fishing tournaments where fees paid for chance to win cash or prizes, OAG 99-084 (4/5/99).

Statute of limitations of aggravated gambling promotion, OAG 99-127 (6/29/99).

A so-called “redemption machine,” which upon payment of a fee allows a person an opportunity to play to potentially win coupons redeemable on-premises for merchandise perceived as having a greater value than the cost to play the machine, is an illegal “lottery” prohibited by the Tennessee constitution and the gambling laws, OAG 02-054 (4/30/02).

39-17-505. Possession of gambling device or record — Forfeiture.

    1. A person commits an offense who knowingly owns, manufactures, possesses, buys, sells, rents, leases, stores, repairs, transports, prints, or makes any gambling device or record.
    2. It is not an offense for a person to own or possess in this state a lottery ticket originating from a state in which a lottery is lawful, if the ticket is not owned or possessed for the purpose of resale.
    3. It is not an offense for a person to knowingly own, manufacture, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record if the device or record is owned, manufactured, possessed, bought, sold, rented, leased, stored, repaired, transported, printed or made pursuant to title 4, chapter 51, part 1 and part 6 of this chapter.
    4. It is not an offense for a person to knowingly own, manufacture, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record if the device or record is for the purpose of conducting an annual event pursuant to title 3, chapter 17, and part 6 of this chapter.
      1. It shall not be an offense for a manufacturer of gambling devices to knowingly own, manufacture, assemble, design, possess, buy, sell, rent, lease, store, repair, transport, print or make any gambling device or record solely intended for gambling outside of this state and in compliance with the laws of the United States. The requirement that the manufacturing, selling or leasing of gambling devices be intended solely for gambling outside of the state shall not restrict uses of the gambling devices by the manufacturer that are ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business, including, but not limited to, using the gambling devices for research and development, employee training, compliance program initiatives, testing and quality assurance processes, showroom display, leasing or purchasing or selling of gambling devices or parts or equipment, storage or warehousing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, maintenance or refurbishing of gambling devices or parts or equipment, and safekeeping of gambling devices or parts or equipment for future litigation. Also considered ancillary or accessorial to the manufacturing, selling or leasing process or business shall be the use or operation of computers, computer servers, and similar electronic devices, hardware and software, and all gambling records, data or information owned, maintained or stored thereupon, or produced, generated, created, printed, transported or transmitted therefrom, whether paper, electronic or otherwise, in conjunction with legal gambling and in compliance with the laws of the United States. Ancillary or accessorial uses shall not include use of the gambling devices or records that would allow persons physically present in this state to place gambling bets. This subdivision (a)(5) shall not apply unless the manufacturer meets or exceeds federal government requirements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and any regulations promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq., and provides the secretary of state with a copy of the request for registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1173, together with copies of each gambling license or permit issued by any regulatory authority, including but not limited to any state, country, federally recognized tribe or United States territory, and pays a ten-thousand-dollar fee prior to January 1 of that year. Additionally, the manufacturer shall provide the secretary of state with proof of annual registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1173 with the office of the United States attorney general within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereof.
      2. The fee imposed by subdivision (a)(5)(A) shall not apply to nonprofit corporations licensed by the department of mental health and substance abuse services and certified by the department of human services to provide vocational rehabilitation job training programs that otherwise qualify for the exemption under subdivision (a)(5)(A).
    1. Any gambling device or record is contraband and shall be subject to seizure, confiscation and forfeiture in accordance with the forfeiture provisions, compiled in chapter 11, part 7 of this title.
    2. After a gambling device or record has been forfeited to the state pursuant to chapter 11, part 7 of this title, the court hearing the criminal charges resulting in the forfeiture shall order the destruction of the device or record. If the district attorney general or law enforcement agency does not believe that a gambling device or record should be destroyed in a particular case, the district attorney general shall petition the court for an alternate disposition of the record or device. If the court finds that the proposed alternate disposition reasonably ensures that the device will not be used in an unlawful manner in this state, the court may grant the petition and order the disposition of the device or record in accordance with the petition.
  1. Possession of a gambling device or record is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1993, ch. 265, § 1; 1994, ch. 856, § 1; 2003, ch. 297, § 5; 2004, ch. 476, § 4; 2009, ch. 267, § 2; 2011, ch. 459, § 1; 2012, ch. 575, § 1; 2012, ch. 840, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section combines the provisions of prior code §§ 39-6-602 and 39-6-615. Prior code § 39-6-615 prohibited possession of a gambling device but did not include a culpable mental state. Former code § 39-6-602(d) prohibited the other interests listed in gambling devices. Gambling records were not directly prohibited under prior law, although communication of the records was prohibited under former code §§ 39-6-602(c) and 39-6-603.

In 1994, subsection (a) was amended to exempt from prosecution a person who possesses or owns an out-of-state lottery ticket, if the person did not possess or own the ticket for the purpose of resale.

Subsection (b) was amended in 1993 to allow the district attorney general to petition the court for disposition other than destruction of the record or device. The court may grant the petition if it finds the disposition reasonably ensures that the device will not be used illegally in this state.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Abatement of gaming devices as nuisances, § 29-3-101.

Alleging gambling, § 40-13-217.

Disposal of confiscated gambling devices, § 38-6-111.

Law enforcement efforts, § 39-15-413.

Lotteries, Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 5.

Lotteries, chain letters and pyramid clubs, § 39-17-506.

Lottery not gambling, § 8-47-127.

Lottery sales, title 39, ch. 17, part 6.

Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

State lottery proceeds, title 49, ch. 4, part 9.

Sufficiency of indictment, § 40-13-217.

Tennessee Education Lottery Implementation Law, title 4, ch. 51.

Tennessee Lottery Funds for Education Projects Loan Act of 2003, title 4, ch. 31, part 10.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 13 Tenn. Juris., Gaming, Gambling and Gambling Contracts, §§ 3, 9-11; 18 Tenn. Juris., Lotteries, §§ 3, 4.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law — Mint Vending Machines as Gambling Device, 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 401 (1943).

Attorney General Opinions. Lottery ticket vending machines, manufacture and export, OAG 94-029 (3/10/94).

Prohibitions on intranet gambling, OAG 98-0173 (8/28/98).

“Gambling device” construed to include gambling software, OAG 98-0173 (8/28/98).

A so-called “redemption machine,” which upon payment of a fee allows a person an opportunity to play to potentially win coupons redeemable on-premises for merchandise perceived as having a greater value than the cost to play the machine, is an illegal “lottery” prohibited by the Tennessee constitution and the gambling laws, OAG 02-054 (4/30/02).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Slot Machines.

The statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant, who possessed video slot machines, where: (1) The machines were clearly included in the definition of gambling devices, so defendant was on notice about engaging in a prohibited activity; (2) Any speculation about arbitrary enforcement of the statute did not render it unconstitutional; and (3) Possessing a gambling device was not constitutionally protected conduct, so the statute was not overbroad. State v. Burkhart, 58 S.W.3d 694, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, Burkhart v. Tennessee, 535 U.S. 930, 122 S. Ct. 1303, 152 L. Ed. 2d 214, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1590 (2002).

39-17-506. Lotteries, chain letters and pyramid clubs.

  1. A person commits an offense who knowingly makes or aids in the making of any lottery. For the purposes of this section, “makes or aids in the making of any lottery” does not include:
    1. Ownership or possession in this state of a lottery ticket originating from another state in which a lottery is lawful, if the ticket is not owned or possessed for the purpose of resale; provided, however, that nothing in this subdivision (a)(1) shall be construed as preventing the sale of lottery tickets or shares under the authority of the Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation; or the sale of tickets, shares, chances or similar records for an annual event pursuant to title 3, chapter 17, and part 6 of this chapter;
    2. The Tennessee Education Lottery operated pursuant to title 4, chapter 51, part 1; or
    3. An annual event operated pursuant to title 3, chapter 17, and part 6 of this chapter.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “makes or aids in the making of any lottery” includes the organization of, membership in, or solicitation of persons for membership in any chain letter club, pyramid club, or other group organized under any plan whereby anything of value to be given by a member of the club or group is to be given to any other member of the club or group, which plan includes any provision for the increase in membership through a chain process of new members securing other new members and thereby advancing themselves in the group to a position where the members in turn receive things of value from other members.
  3. An offense under this section is:
    1. A Class C misdemeanor if the aggregate amount of money involved in the lottery, chain letter, or pyramid club is fifty dollars ($50.00) or less;
    2. A Class B misdemeanor if the aggregate amount of money involved in the lottery, chain letter, or pyramid club is more than fifty dollars ($50.00) but less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250);
    3. A Class A misdemeanor if the aggregate amount of money involved in the lottery, chain letter, or pyramid club is two hundred fifty dollars ($250) or more but less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000); or
    4. A Class E felony if the amount of money involved in the lottery, chain letter, or pyramid club is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1994, ch. 856, § 2; 2003, ch. 297, §§ 6, 7; 2004, ch. 476, §§ 5, 6.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section combines prior code §§ 39-6-624 and 39-6-625. Although such activities are prohibited as gambling, the commission included a special section to make the offense clear. Because of the special circumstances involved in these schemes, the penalty is based on the aggregate amount of money involved.

In 1994, subsection (a) was amended to exempt from prosecution a person who possesses or owns an out-of-state lottery ticket, if the person did not possess or own the ticket for the purpose of resale.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Law enforcement efforts, § 39-15-413.

Lotteries, Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 5.

Lottery not gambling, § 8-47-127.

Lottery sales, title 39, ch. 17, part 6.

Penalties for Class A, B and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Possession of gambling device or record, forfeiture, § 39-17-505.

State lottery proceeds, title 49, ch. 4, part 9.

Tennessee Education Lottery Implementation Law, title 4, ch. 51.

Tennessee Lottery Funds for Education Projects Loan Act of 2003, title 4, ch. 31, part 10.

Violations indictable without prosecutor, § 40-13-104.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 18 Tenn. Juris., Lotteries, §§ 3, 4.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1970 — A Critical Survey (Joseph G. Cook), 38 Tenn. L. Rev. 182 (1971).

Attorney General Opinions. Lottery tickets as gambling devices, OAG 93-16 (2/22/93).

Fund raising by “rubber duck races” at which valuable prizes are offered, OAG 97-025 (3/19/97).

Constitutionality of ban on billboard advertisements promoting lotteries, OAG 99-039 (2/24/99).

Unless and until the legislature enacts legislation implementing a state lottery, which would include authorization for the sale of lottery tickets statewide, a local government may enact an ordinance prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets within its jurisdiction, OAG 03-004 (1/17/03).

“Reverse raffle” and “auction” involving paying money to win a prize is a prohibited lottery unless part of an annual event approved by the general assembly, OAG 03-049 (4/22/03).

Poker tournaments charging an admission fee to play “Texas Hold'Em” for a chance to win a prize are not legal in Tennessee, OAG 05-159 (10/14/05).

39-17-507. Customer referral rebates unlawful.

  1. With respect to a consumer sale, consumer credit sale or consumer lease, the seller or lessor may not give or offer to give a rebate or discount or otherwise pay or offer to pay value to a buyer or lessee as an inducement for a sale or lease in consideration of the buyer or lessee referring or giving to the seller or lessor the names of prospective customers or lessees, or otherwise aiding the seller or lessor in making a sale or lease to another person, if the earning of the rebate, discount, commission or other value is contingent upon the occurrence of an event subsequent to the time the buyer or lessee agrees to buy or lease.
  2. If a buyer or lessee is induced by a violation of this section to enter into a consumer sale, consumer credit sale or consumer lease, then the transaction is declared to be a lottery and the agreement is unenforceable by the seller or lessor, and the buyer or lessee, at the buyer's or lessee's option, may rescind the agreement or retain the goods delivered and the benefits of any services performed, without any obligation to pay for them.
  3. Any person offering to sell or lease goods or services in violation of this section commits a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is a recodification of prior code § 39-6-626. Although this activity is prohibited by the gambling and lottery statutes, the commission retained this special section to protect consumers.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-508. Premiums at fairs.

It is lawful and not in violation of this part for a person, upon complying with the rules of public fairs, to enter and contend for any and all premiums as may be offered at such fairs.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section retains the exception for premiums at fairs found in prior code § 39-6-629. These premiums are listed in § 43-21-106.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Solicitation of charitable funds, title 48, ch. 101, part 5.

Tax exemption for religious, educational, and charitable institutions inapplicable to purchase of bingo materials, supplies, equipment or cards, § 67-6-322.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 28.114, 28.112.

39-17-509. Preemption.

The general assembly, by enacting this part, intends to preempt any other regulation of the area covered by this part. No governmental subdivision or agency may enact or enforce a law that regulates or makes any conduct in the area covered by this part an offense, a violation, or the subject of a criminal or civil penalty or sanction of any kind.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section specifically prohibits the enactment and enforcement of local laws in the area of gambling. The comprehensive prohibition against gambling in this part eliminates the need for local law on this subject. This section makes it clear the state intends to preempt the area of gambling.

Compiler's Notes. Pursuant to the style typically used throughout the Tennessee Code Annotated, the two sentences of this section would have been designated as (a) and (b); however, at the request of the sentencing commission, the two sentences have been left as one paragraph.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Part 6
Lottery Sales

39-17-601. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Annual event” means an event:
    1. Authorized by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members elected to each house of the general assembly;
    2. Operated for the benefit of a nonprofit organization located in Tennessee;
    3. Conducted with a single type of lottery game, as defined in § 3-17-102;
    4. Conducted on an event date, as defined in § 3-17-102; and
    5. Conducted at a location within a county where the organization maintains a physical presence;
  2. “Corporation” means the Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation or its successor;
  3. “Proof of age” means a driver license or other generally accepted means of identification that describes the individual as eighteen (18) years of age or older, contains a photograph or other likeness of the individual, and appears on its face to be valid;
  4. “State lottery game” means any game of chance approved and operated pursuant to title 4, chapter 51, part 1, including, but not limited to, instant tickets, online games, and games using mechanical or electronic devices;
  5. “State lottery retailer” means:
    1. A person who sells state lottery tickets or shares on behalf of the corporation pursuant to a contract or an employee or agent of the person; or
    2. The corporation or an employee or agent of the corporation; and
  6. “State lottery ticket or share” means a lottery ticket or share issued by, or under the authority of, the corporation for evidence of participation in a state lottery game.

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8; 2004, ch. 476, § 7; 2015, ch. 134, § 24.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. Law enforcement efforts, § 39-15-413.

Lotteries, Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 5.

Lotteries, chain letters and pyramid clubs, § 39-17-506.

Lottery not gambling, § 8-47-127.

Possession of gambling device or record, forfeiture, § 39-17-505.

State lottery proceeds, title 49, ch. 4, part 9.

Tennessee Education Lottery Implementation Law, title 4, ch. 51.

Tennessee Lottery Funds for Education Projects Loan Act of 2003, title 4, ch. 31, part 10.

39-17-602. Sales to persons under 18 years of age.

  1. It is an offense for any person, including a state lottery retailer, to sell a state lottery ticket or share to any person under eighteen (18) years of age.
  2. It is an offense for a state lottery retailer to allow a person under eighteen (18) years of age to purchase a state lottery ticket or share from an electronic or mechanical device.
  3. It is an offense for a state lottery retailer to allow a person under eighteen (18) years of age to play any state lottery game.
  4. It is an offense for a state lottery retailer to redeem a state lottery ticket or share for any person under eighteen (18) years of age.
  5. A person's first violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor. A person's second or subsequent violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
  6. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section, which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that the state lottery retailer reasonably and in good faith relied upon a representation of proof of age in making, or allowing, the sale or redemption.

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class A or B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-603. Delinquent acts.

  1. It is a delinquent act for a person under eighteen (18) years of age to purchase, or attempt to purchase, a state lottery ticket or share.
  2. It is a delinquent act for a person under eighteen (18) years of age to redeem, or attempt to redeem, a state lottery ticket or share.
  3. A violation of this section is punishable by a fine not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00) or, in the discretion of the court, community service work not less than twenty (20) hours nor more than fifty (50) hours.
  4. This section shall not be construed as prohibiting any person under eighteen (18) years of age from handling or transporting state lottery tickets or shares as a part of and in the course of the person's employment; provided, however, that the person is under the supervision of another employee who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age.

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8.

Cross-References. Delinquent act defined, § 37-1-102.

Juvenile court proceedings, title 37, ch. 1.

39-17-604. Illegal sales — Exceptions.

  1. It is an offense for a person, other than a state lottery retailer, to sell a state lottery ticket or share.
  2. It is an offense for a person to sell a state lottery ticket or share at a price other than face value.
  3. It is an offense for a state lottery retailer to sell a state lottery ticket or share at a location other than the location listed on the retailer's certificate of authorization.
  4. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
  5. It is an exception to the application of this section that:
    1. A state lottery retailer, with written preauthorization from the chief executive officer of the corporation, sold state lottery tickets or shares at a price other than the price established by the corporation; and
    2. A state lottery retailer, with written preauthorization from the chief executive officer of the corporation, sold state lottery tickets or shares at a temporary location.
  6. This section shall not be construed as preventing the corporation from giving or selling state lottery tickets or shares at any price or at any location.

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-605. Failure to display certificate of authorization.

  1. It is an offense for a state lottery retailer to fail to display a certificate of authorization pursuant to § 4-51-115(d) at each location where the retailer sells state lottery tickets or shares.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-606. Signage.

  1. Each state lottery retailer shall display, in a prominent place at the location where the retailer sells lottery tickets or shares, a sign, at least seventeen inches (17") high and twenty-two inches (22") wide, stating:

    ATTENTION: STATE LAW STRICTLY PROHIBITS THE SALE OF LOTTERY TICKETS TO PERSONS UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS; PROOF OF AGE MAY BE REQUIRED FOR PURCHASE.

    ATENCION: POR LEY DEL ESTADO DE TENNESSEE ES ESTRICTAMENTE PROHIBIDO VENDER BOLETAS DE LOTERIA A PERSONAS MENORES DE DIECIOCHO AQOS; PRUEBA DE EDAD PUEDE SER REQUERIDA PARA COMPRARLAS.

  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-607. Fraud.

  1. It is an offense for any person to falsely make, alter, forge, pass or counterfeit a state lottery ticket with the intent to defraud.
  2. It is an offense for any person to knowingly influence, or attempt to influence, the winning of a prize through the use of coercion, fraud, deception, or tampering with lottery equipment or materials.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class D felony; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
    2. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class C felony; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class C and D felonies, § 40-35-111.

39-17-608. False statements in applications or records.

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly:
    1. Make a material false statement in any application to the corporation for a license or proposal to conduct lottery activities; or
    2. Make a material false entry in any book or record which is compiled for the corporation, maintained for the corporation, or submitted to the corporation.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class D felony; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or the dollar amount of the false entry or statement, whichever is greater.

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8.

Cross-References. Issuing false financial statement, § 39-14-120.

Offenses involving financial accounting of an annual event, § 39-17-655.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-609. Federal exemption.

All terminals, tickets, shares, and other devices imported, transported, or distributed under the authority of the Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation are exempt from the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1172.

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8.

Compiler's Notes. 15 U.S.C. § 1172, referred to in this section, concerns the transportation of gambling devices being unlawful and the authority of the federal trade commission.

39-17-610. Preemption.

The general assembly, by enacting this part, intends to preempt any other regulation of the area covered by this part and the Tennessee Education Lottery Implementation Law, compiled in title 4, chapter 51. No political subdivision or agency may enact or enforce a law, ordinance, resolution, or regulation that regulates or prohibits any conduct in the area covered by this part and title 4, chapter 51.

Acts 2003, ch. 297, § 8.

39-17-611 — 39-17-650. [Reserved.]

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly sell annual event tickets, shares, chances or similar records for a period longer than the period authorized pursuant to § 3-17-103(d)(3).
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be one thousand dollars ($1,000) per day in excess of the authorized period.

Acts 2004, ch. 476, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-652. Offense of conducting more than one annual event.

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly conduct more than one (1) annual event for the benefit of the same nonprofit organization within the twelve-month period beginning July 1 following the application deadline and ending the next June 30.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) per event in excess of the authorized annual event.

Acts 2004, ch. 476, § 9; 2015, ch. 134, § 25.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-653. Offense of conducting annual event at an unauthorized location or on unauthorized date.

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly conduct an annual event at a location other than the location, or locations, listed in a nonprofit organization's annual event application pursuant to § 3-17-104(e)(4).
  2. It is an offense for any person to knowingly conduct an annual event on a date not authorized pursuant to title 3, chapter 17.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

Acts 2004, ch. 476, § 9; 2015, ch. 134, § 26.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-654. Offense of engaging in gambling promotion under the pretense of conducting an annual event — Offense of managing, conducting or operating an annual event.

    1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly engage in gambling promotion under the pretense of conducting an annual event.
    2. A violation of this subsection (a) is a Class E felony; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be the greater of:
      1. Fifty thousand dollars ($50,000); or
      2. The amount of gross proceeds derived from the gambling activity.
    1. It is an offense for any person authorized to conduct an annual event to knowingly employ, contract with, or otherwise utilize the services of any person, management company or consultant to manage, conduct or operate an annual event.
    2. A violation of this subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
    1. It is an offense for any person not authorized pursuant to title 3, chapter 17, to knowingly manage, conduct or operate an annual event for a nonprofit organization.
    2. A violation of this subsection (c) is a Class D felony; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be the greater of:
      1. Fifty thousand dollars ($50,000); or
      2. The amount of the consideration obtained for the management, conducting or operation of the annual event.

Acts 2004, ch. 476, § 9; 2015, ch. 134, § 27.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-655. Offenses involving financial accounting of an annual event.

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly:
    1. Fail to file a financial accounting for an annual event as required pursuant to § 3-17-106;
    2. Fail to timely file a financial accounting for an annual event as required pursuant to § 3-17-106;
    3. Make a material false statement in any application, affidavit or statement made to the secretary of state in an application for an annual event; or
    4. Make a material false entry or statement in a financial accounting that is compiled for an annual event or that is submitted to the secretary of state for an annual event.
    1. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class B misdemeanor; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be the greater of:
      1. Twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000); or
      2. The amount of gross proceeds derived from the annual event.
    2. A violation of subdivision (a)(2) is a Class C misdemeanor; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be the lesser of:
      1. Five thousand dollars ($5,000); or
      2. The amount of gross proceeds derived from the annual event.
    3. A violation of subdivision (a)(3) is a Class A misdemeanor; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
    4. A violation of subdivision (a)(4) is a Class A misdemeanor; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be the greater of:
      1. Fifty thousand dollars ($50,000); or
      2. The dollar amount of the false entry or statement.

Acts 2004, ch. 476, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. False statements in application or records, § 39-17-608.

Issuing of false financial statement, § 39-14-120.

Penalties for Class A, B and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

39-17-656. Offense of falsely making, altering, forging, passing or counterfeiting a ticket, share, chance or similar record for an annual event.

  1. It is an offense for any person to falsely make, alter, forge, pass or counterfeit a ticket, share, chance or similar record for an annual event with the intent to defraud.
  2. It is an offense for any person to knowingly influence, or attempt to influence, the winning of a prize through the use of coercion, fraud, deception, or tampering with an annual event's equipment or materials.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).
    2. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).

Acts 2004, ch. 476, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-657. Offense of offering cost of services, records or devices on a contingency basis.

  1. It is an offense for any person to knowingly sell or lease, or offer for sale or lease, facilities, locations, advertising services, printing services, telephone services, gambling records or gambling devices based on a percentage of the proceeds of an annual event or by any other contingency agreement based on the proceeds of an annual event or at a price greater than fair market value.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class E felony; provided, however, that the maximum fine shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).

Acts 2004, ch. 476, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-658. Exemption from federal law prohibiting transportation of gambling devices.

All tickets, shares, chances or similar records and other devices imported, transported, or distributed for an annual event operated pursuant to title 3, chapter 17 are exempt from the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1172.

Acts 2004, ch. 476, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

39-17-659. Legislative intent to preempt other regulations.

The general assembly, by enacting §§ 39-17-65139-17-658, intends to preempt any other regulation of the area covered by §§ 39-17-65139-17-658 and title 3, chapter 17. No political subdivision or agency may enact or enforce a law, ordinance, resolution, or regulation that regulates or prohibits any conduct in the area covered by §§ 39-17-651 — 39-17-658 and title 3, chapter 17.

Acts 2004, ch. 476, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 350, § 13 provided that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Part 7
Intoxicating Liquors

39-17-701. Application of part.

This part shall not apply to acts that are lawful under § 26-5-107 or title 57.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Allegations concerning liquor law, § 40-13-219.

Violations indictable without prosecutor, § 40-13-104.

39-17-702. Unlawful sale of alcoholic beverages.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to sell wine, beer, ale, or any other beverage or mixed drink containing alcohol in any establishment unless the establishment is operating in compliance with all laws governing the sale of alcoholic beverages in the establishments.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Cosmetologists, application of alcoholic beverage regulations to, OAG 96-089 (7/24/96).

39-17-703. Receiving, possessing, and transporting alcoholic beverages.

  1. No person, unless authorized to do so under title 57, shall receive, possess or transport with the intent to redistribute or resell in this state any intoxicating liquor that has not had all taxes attributable to the intoxicating liquor paid.
  2. It shall be inferred that any receipt, possession, or transportation of more than five (5) gallons of intoxicating liquors that is not accompanied by a receipt or documentation from an entity holding a license issued under § 57-3-203, § 57-3-204, § 57-3-207 or § 57-3-218 is for the purpose of resale or distribution.
  3. No person, unless authorized to do so pursuant to title 57, shall receive, possess, or transport an intoxicating liquor with the intent to deliver the intoxicating liquor to customers resulting in a fee or service charge.
  4. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2009, ch. 434, §§ 1, 2; 2011, ch. 451, § 3; 2016, ch. 1045, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section prohibits receipt, possession or transportation of alcoholic beverages for redistribution without proper state revenue stamps. Subsection (b) provides an inference of intent to resell or distribute where more than five gallons of unstamped alcoholic beverages are possessed, received or transported.

Subsection (b) deviates from prior law which allowed an inference for resale where the quantity is seven gallons or more. The commission made the change to provide consistency with other provisions in the proposed code which allow transporting of less than five gallons of alcoholic beverages which have proper revenue stamps.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Allegations concerning intoxicating liquor, § 40-13-219.

Local option law, title 57, ch. 3.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 3, 6, 11, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 28.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law — Illegal Search and Seizure, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 577 (1962).

39-17-704. Transportation of alcoholic beverages by common carriers.

  1. It is unlawful for any common carrier or other person or organization to transport into this state or to transport from one (1) location to another within this state any intoxicating beverages for the purpose of resale unless licensed to do so.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section prohibits the transportation of alcoholic beverages for resale into the state or from one location to another within the state without a license. The proposal deviates from prior law by removing the enhanced punishment provisions for quantity and subsequent offenses.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Allegations concerning intoxicating liquor, § 40-13-219.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 3, 4, 15-17, 20, 21.

39-17-705. Exceptions.

Nothing in § 39-17-703 shall make it unlawful for:

  1. Any priest or minister of any religious denomination or sect to receive and possess wines for sacramental purposes, or for any common or other carrier to ship or transport wine for sacramental purposes to any priest or minister of any religious denomination or sect;
  2. Druggists to receive and possess alcohol and other intoxicating liquors and preparations as may be sold by druggists for the special purposes and in the manner as provided by law, for manufacturers of medicines that conform to the provisions of the law applicable to pure food and pure drugs, or for bona fide hospitals, and for manufacturers of perfumery and toilet articles and manufacturers of flavoring extracts, to receive and possess alcohol for use of bona fide patients of the hospitals, or in the manufacturing of medicines or flavoring extracts, or perfumery or toilet articles, or for any common or other carrier to ship or transport liquor, or alcohol for such purposes to druggists or hospitals, or manufacturers of medicines, or flavoring extracts or perfumery or toilet articles;
  3. Any person engaged in the manufacture of thermostatic devices or temperature regulators to import alcohol into this state for use in the manufacture and charging of the devices and regulators;
  4. Bona fide educational institutions to receive and possess alcohol for scientific and therapeutic purposes, or for any common or other carrier to ship or transport alcohol for those purposes to bona fide educational institutions; or
  5. Any person to transport intoxicating liquor not in excess of the quantity permitted by 19 U.S.C. § 1202, notwithstanding that the liquor may be transported without the proper revenue affixed thereto, if the liquor was purchased outside the United States and brought into the state through an airport designated as a point of origin and destination for international passengers and cargo.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is essentially a restatement of prior law. It provides an exception to the application of § 39-17-703 for certain specific purposes. The exemption for personal use of less than five gallons with the proper revenue stamp was deleted since § 39-17-703 does not apply to personal use, but only to resale and redistribution.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

The reference to subsection (5) to 19 U.S.C. § 1202, Item 813.30, which is part of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, is no longer current. The Harmonized Tariff Schedule is maintained and published periodically by the United States International Trade Commission and is available at http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts.

Cross-References. Allegations concerning intoxicating liquor, § 40-13-219.

Restrictions on importing or transporting alcoholic beverages, § 57-3-402.

39-17-706. Manufacture of alcoholic beverages.

  1. It is unlawful for any person, company, or other entity to manufacture intoxicating beverages unless authorized by law to do so; provided, that this section shall not be construed to prohibit the manufacture of alcohol for use as a fuel to power motor-driven vehicles and machinery or for heating purposes or of not less than one hundred eighty-eight (188) proof for chemical, pharmaceutical, medical, and bacteriological purposes.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Criminal attempt, § 39-12-101.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1969 — A Critical Survey (Joseph G. Cook), 37 Tenn. L. Rev. 433 (1970).

39-17-707. Possession of still.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to have possession or control of any still or other apparatus, or part of any still or other apparatus, used or intended to be used for the purpose of manufacturing intoxicating liquor as prohibited by law.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-708. Home manufacture of wine or beer excepted.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of this part, a private individual in the person's own home may manufacture and possess wine or beer in an amount not in excess of that amount annually permitted as of January 1, 1997, by federal statutes and regulations relative to household manufacture and consumption; provided, that the wine or beer is for personal consumption by members and guests of the household. Such wine or beer may also be transported by the person, member or guest without being in violation of this part; provided, that the amount being transported at any one (1) time shall not exceed five (5) gallons, except as provided in § 57-5-111.
  2. It shall be inferred that transportation of more than five (5) gallons is for the purpose of resale or redistribution.
  3. For purposes of this section, “beer” means the undistilled and unfortified product, of any name or description, of the normal alcoholic fermentation of malt or other ingredients except grapes.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997, ch. 140, §§ 1-3; 2015, ch. 69, § 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section continues the allowance of home manufacture of wine as previously provided in former law. The amount of wine allowed to be transported has been raised to five gallons, consistent with the allowance in § 39-17-703. Subsection (b) adds an inference that transportation of more than five gallons is for resale.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Viticulture, title 43, ch. 30.

39-17-709 — 39-17-712. [Reserved.]

  1. It is unlawful for any person, unless authorized by law to do so, to have or keep in stock, in any warehouse or place of business or other place, any intoxicating liquors, including wine, ale or beer, intended for present or future sale as a beverage, either wholesale or retail, and whether intended to be sold for delivery at the place of sale or to be shipped or otherwise transported for delivery at another place.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section prohibits the storage of alcoholic beverages by persons not legally authorized to do so. Subsection (a) is a restatement of prior law.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure — 1964 Tennessee Survey (Graham Parkes and Robert E. Kendrick), 18 Vand. L. Rev. 1131 (1965).

39-17-714. Disposal of alcoholic beverages.

Upon the conviction of any person for a violation of § 39-17-713, the sheriff or other officer shall be directed as a part of the judgment of the court to destroy or otherwise dispose of all alcoholic beverages according to law.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Disposition of seized liquor, § 57-9-107 et seq.

39-17-715. Consuming alcoholic beverages on school premises.

  1. It is unlawful to consume or possess any alcoholic beverage on the school plant or grounds of any public school in this state having any of the grades kindergarten through twelve (K-12).
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section prohibits consumption or possession of alcoholic beverages on public school grounds. The provisions deviate from prior law by deleting the provisions regarding throwing empty beer cans or liquor bottles on the grounds. The commission believes the Litter Control Laws, title 39, ch. 14, part 5, sufficiently prohibit that behavior.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

The Proposed Criminal Code: Disorderly Conduct and Related Offenses, 40 Tenn. L. Rev. 725 (1973).

Part 8
[Reserved]

Part 9
Obscenity

39-17-901. Part definitions.

The following definitions apply in this part, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Actual or constructive knowledge” means that a person is deemed to have constructive knowledge of the contents of material who has knowledge of facts that would put a reasonable and prudent person on notice as to the suspect nature of the material;
  2. “Community” means the judicial district, as defined in § 16-2-506, in which a violation is alleged to have occurred;
  3. “Distribute” means to transfer possession of, whether with or without consideration;
  4. “Excess violence” means the depiction of acts of violence in such a graphic or bloody manner as to exceed common limits of custom and candor, or in such a manner that it is apparent that the predominant appeal of the material is portrayal of violence for violence's sake;
  5. “Final judgment” or “conviction” means all direct appeals have been exhausted including an application for appeal or for certiorari to the Tennessee or United States supreme court;
  6. “Harmful to minors” means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual excitement, sexual conduct, excess violence or sadomasochistic abuse when the matter or performance:
    1. Would be found by the average person applying contemporary community standards to appeal predominantly to the prurient, shameful or morbid interests of minors;
    2. Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable for minors; and
    3. Taken as whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific values for minors;
  7. “Matter” means any book, magazine, newspaper or other printed or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette or other pictorial representation, or any statue, figure, device, theatrical production or electrical reproduction, or any other article, equipment, machine or material that is obscene as defined by this part;
  8. “Minor” means any person who has not reached eighteen (18) years of age and is not emancipated;
  9. “Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state;
  10. “Obscene” means:
    1. The average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
    2. The average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct; and
    3. The work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value;
  11. “Patently offensive” means that which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters;
  12. “Prurient interest” means a shameful or morbid interest in sex;
  13. “Sadomasochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture or physical restraint by or upon a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of either person;
  14. “Sexual conduct” means:
    1. Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. A sexual act is simulated when it depicts explicit sexual activity that gives the appearance of ultimate sexual acts, anal, oral or genital. “Ultimate sexual acts” means sexual intercourse, anal or otherwise, fellatio, cunnilingus or sodomy; or
    2. Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals; and
  15. “Sexual excitement” means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1092, §§ 1-3.

Cross-References. Children, obscenity law relating to, §§ 39-17-911, 39-17-914.

Obscene or patently offensive bumper stickers, etc., prohibited, § 55-8-187.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6A Tenn. Juris., Constitutional Law, § 58; 20 Tenn. Juris., Nuisances, § 4; 20 Tenn. Juris., Obscenity, §§ 1-3.

Law Reviews.

Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 291 (2013).

State Restrictions on Violent Expression: The Impropriety of Extending an Obscenity Analysis, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 473 (1993).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of local standard, OAG 90-02 (1/8/90).

Constitutionality of inclusion of sadomasochistic abuse in definition of sexual conduct, OAG 90-02 (1/8/90).

Constitutionality of tax on sale or rental of adult videos, 98-067 (3/18/98).

Constitutionality of requiring public library policies prohibiting minors' access to harmful material, OAG 99-108 (5/10/99).

39-17-902. Producing, importing, preparing, distributing, processing or appearing in obscene material or exhibition — Distribution to or employment of minors.

  1. It is unlawful to knowingly produce, send or cause to be sent, or bring or cause to be brought, into this state for sale, distribution, exhibition or display, or in this state to prepare for distribution, publish, print, exhibit, distribute, or offer to distribute, or to possess with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute any obscene matter, or to do any of the aforementioned with any matter found legally obscene that violates the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2257. It is unlawful to direct, present or produce any obscene theatrical production, peep show or live performance, and every person who participates in that part of the production which renders the production or performance obscene is guilty of the offense.
  2. It is unlawful for any person to hire, employ or use a minor to do or assist in doing any of the acts described in subsection (a) with knowledge that the person is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, or while in possession of the facts that the person should reasonably know that the person is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age. However, this section shall not apply to those acts that are prohibited by §§ 39-17-1003 — 39-17-1005.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor, and, in addition, any corporation or business entity that violates this section shall be fined an amount not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
    2. A second or subsequent violation of subsection (a) is a Class E felony; provided, that the second or subsequent violation occurs after a conviction has been obtained for the previous violation; provided further, that the range of fines authorized for a first violation by a corporation or business entity shall also be applicable for second or subsequent violations by the corporation or entity.
  3. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony, and, in addition, a violator shall be fined an amount not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
  4. It is an exception to this section that the obscene material is possessed by a person having scientific, educational, governmental or other similar justification.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1092, § 4; 1991, ch. 469, § 1; 1996, ch. 1070, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section is similar to prior code § 39-6-1104. Subsection (b) is limited to the use of minors in the sale or distribution of obscene materials, as compared with title 39, ch. 17, part 10, where minors are used in the production of the materials. Subsection (e) is similar to prior code § 39-6-1117, and exempts possession of obscene materials pursuant to subsection (a) by persons having scientific, educational, governmental or other similar justification.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Application for consent to petition to convene investigative grand jury, § 40-12-201.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Sexual exploitation of children, title 39, ch. 17, part 10.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6A Tenn. Juris., Constitutional Law, §§ 73, 78; 20 Tenn. Juris., Obscenity, §§ 1, 2.

Law Reviews.

1985 Tennessee Survey: Selected Developments in Tennessee Law, 53 Tenn. L. Rev. 307 (1986).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of penalties, OAG 90-02 (1/8/90).

Constitutionality of excluding public libraries from exemption for possession of certain obscene materials, OAG 99-108 (5/10/99).

Constitutionality of legislation restricting sale or trafficking of pornographic, x-rated materials in particular county, OAG 03-056 (5/01/03).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Possession.

Although there was sufficient evidence from which to infer defendant's possession of obscene matter, the fact that the defendant possessed the material did not per se establish that he knowingly did so. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

2. Actual Knowledge.

Because of the legislature's clear and unambiguous choice of the word “knowingly” in T.C.A. § 39-17-902(a), a conviction for distribution of obscene matter may be sustained only if there is sufficient proof of record of actual knowledge of the proscribed conduct. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

3. Police Report.

Plaintiff attached to his complaint as an exhibit the police report concerning the investigation pursuant to the statute, and the trial court did not err by considering the reference in the report to the statute, as the report was a part of the complaint for purposes of the motion to dismiss. Pagliara v. Moses, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2020).

39-17-903. Seizure of obscene materials — Warrant — Disposition of seized materials.

  1. Upon a showing of probable cause that the obscenity laws of this state are being violated, any judge or magistrate shall be empowered to issue a search warrant in accordance with the general law pertaining to searches and seizures in this state. The warrant shall authorize or designate a law enforcement officer to enter upon the premises where alleged violations of the obscenity laws are being carried on and take into custody one (1) example of each piece of matter which is obscene. Return on the search shall be in the manner prescribed generally for searches and seizures in this state, except that matter that is seized shall be retained by the district attorney general to be used as evidence in any legal proceeding in which the matter is in issue or involved.
  2. When a search and seizure takes place in accordance with this section, any person aggrieved by the search and seizure, or claiming ownership of the matter seized, may file a motion in writing with the court of record in the jurisdiction in which the search and seizure took place, contesting the legality of the search and seizure or the fact of the obscenity of the matter seized. The court shall set a hearing within one (1) day after the request therefor, or at such time as the requesting party might agree. In the event the court finds that the search and seizure was illegal or if the court or any other court of competent jurisdiction shall determine that the matter is not obscene, the matter shall be forthwith returned to the person and to the place from which it was taken.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 18.5, 18.8, 18.100, 18.128.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Obscenity, § 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court Systems — Prosecution, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 477 (1978).

39-17-904. Destruction of material upon conviction.

Upon the conviction of the accused, the court may, when the conviction becomes final, order any matter of advertisement, in respect whereof the accused stands convicted, and that remains in the possession or under the control of the district attorney general or any law enforcement agency to be destroyed, and the court may cause to be destroyed any such material in its possession or under its control.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

39-17-905. Temporary restraining orders and injunctions — Trial — Judgment — Review.

  1. The circuit, chancery, or criminal courts of this state and the chancellors and judges of those courts shall have full power, authority, and jurisdiction, upon application by sworn detailed petition filed by the district attorney general within their respective jurisdictions, to issue any and all proper temporary restraining orders, temporary and permanent injunctions, and any other writs and processes appropriate to carry out and enforce §§ 39-17-901 — 39-17-908. However, this section shall not be construed to authorize the issue of ex parte temporary injunctions preventing further regularly scheduled exhibition of motion picture films by commercial theaters, such injunction to issue only upon at least one (1) day's notice, but the court may immediately forbid the removing, destroying, deleting, splicing, amending or otherwise altering the matter alleged to be obscene.
  2. The person to be enjoined shall be entitled to trial of the issues within two (2) days after joinder of issue, and a decision shall be rendered by the court within two (2) days of the conclusion of the trial. In order to facilitate the introduction of evidence at any hearing as provided in this section, the court is empowered to order defendants named in any proceeding set out in this section to produce one (1) copy of the matter alleged to be obscene, along with necessary viewing equipment, in open court at the time of the hearing or at any other time agreed upon by the parties and the court. In proceedings under this section, there shall be no right to trial by jury. If the defendant in any suit for injunction filed under the terms of this section shall fail to answer or otherwise join issue within twenty (20) days after the filing of a petition for injunction, the court, on motion of the district attorney general, shall enter a general denial for the defendant, and set a date for hearing on the questions raised in the petition for injunction within ten (10) days following the entry of the denial entered by the court, and the court shall render its decision within two (2) days after the conclusion of that hearing.
  3. In the event that a final order or judgment of injunction is entered against the person sought to be enjoined, the final order or judgment shall contain a provision directing the person to surrender to the clerk of the court of the county in which the proceedings were brought any of the obscene matter in the person's possession, and the clerk shall be directed to hold the matter in the clerk's possession to be used as evidence in any criminal proceedings in which the matter is in issue, but if no indictment is returned concerning the matter within six (6) months of the entry of final order, the clerk shall destroy the matter.
  4. Any party, including the district attorney general, shall be entitled to an appeal from an adverse decision of the court. The granting of an appeal shall have the effect of staying or suspending any order to destroy but not an order to seize the matter, nor shall the granting of an appeal suspend any permanent injunction granted by the trial court.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Appellate Procedure and the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (William J. Harbison), 6 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 291 (1976).

39-17-906. Remedies supplementary.

  1. The remedies and procedures set out in §§ 39-17-901 — 39-17-908 are supplementary to each other and no remedy shall be construed as excluding or prohibiting the use of any other remedy.
  2. Except as expressly provided in this part, §§ 39-17-901 — 39-17-908 shall not be construed as repealing any provisions of any other statute, but shall be supplementary thereto and cumulative thereto.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1979 — A Critical Survey, II. Offenses (Joseph G. Cook), 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 3 (1981).

39-17-907. Restrictions on showings.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to exhibit for public consumption, whether or not the exhibition is for compensation, any motion picture, film, movie, or videotape that depicts sexual conduct as defined in § 39-17-901, unless the exhibition is within a theater auditorium or other enclosed area that effectively removes the exhibition from the view of members of the public who are not voluntarily engaged in viewing the motion picture, film, movie, or videotape.
  2. No minor under eighteen (18) years of age may be admitted to a movie theatre if the movie has been found to be “harmful to minors” pursuant to § 39-17-901. It is a deceptive practice under title 47, chapter 18, part 1, to advertise or promote a motion picture as having a rating other than the rating that has been assigned to it.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2013, ch. 459, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

Under prior law, theaters were obligated to comply with this provision but there was no criminal penalty specified by statute. This section creates such a penalty.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Display for sale or rental of material harmful to minors, § 39-17-914.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Registration of adult-oriented establishments, title 7, ch. 51, part 11.

Sale, loan or exhibition of material to minors, § 39-17-911.

Law Reviews.

Film Is a Four Letter Word (Richard A. Lord), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 41 (1975).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of criminal statute regarding admission of minors to movies.  OAG 13-93, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 96 (11/25/13).

The provisions of T.C.A. § 39-17-907(b), prior to its amendment by Acts 2013, ch. 459, are unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. The provisions of T.C.A. § 39-17-907(b) as amended by Acts 2013, Chapter 459 are facially constitutionally defensible.  OAG 13-101, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 106 (12/6/13).

39-17-908. Enforcement — Initiation of criminal actions — Civil proceedings.

  1. Criminal action shall commence only on criminal indictment or the issuance of a warrant by a judge of any court of record; provided, that the commencement of any criminal action shall be made only with the prior knowledge and written approval of the district attorney general or any assistant district attorney general.
  2. Sections 39-17-901 — 39-17-908 may be enforced by either criminal actions or by actions for injunctive relief, or both, and the actions may be commenced simultaneously and proceed independently of each other.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Persons whose compensation is contingent upon issuance or nonissuance are prohibited from issuing search warrant, an arrest warrant or mittimus, § 40-5-106.

39-17-909. Offense of providing location for minors to engage in public indecency.

  1. It is an offense for a person eighteen (18) years of age or older to knowingly promote or organize a gathering of two (2) or more minors in a public place, as defined in § 39-13-511, with the intent to provide a location for said minors to engage in public indecency as defined in § 39-13-511.
  2. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  3. Any personal property used in the commission of a violation of this section is, upon conviction, subject to judicial forfeiture as provided in title 39, chapter 11, part 7.
  4. Nothing in this section shall deprive a court of any authority to suspend or cancel a license, declare the establishment a nuisance or impose costs and other monetary obligations if specifically authorized by law.
  5. For purposes of this section “public area on the property of that business or retail establishment” means a public place as defined in § 39-13-511.

Acts 2012, ch. 1091, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-910. Unlawful possession, sale, distribution, or transportation of child-like sex doll.

  1. It is an offense for a person to knowingly possess a child-like sex doll.
  2. It is an offense for a person to knowingly sell or distribute a child-like sex doll.
  3. It is an offense for a person to knowingly transport a child-like sex doll into this state or within this state with the intent to sell or distribute the child-like sex doll.
  4. As used in this section, “child-like sex doll” means an obscene anatomically correct doll, mannequin, or robot that is intended for sexual stimulation or gratification and that has the features of, or has features that resemble those of, a minor.
  5. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  6. A violation of subsection (b) or (c) is a Class E felony, and in addition, notwithstanding § 40-35-111, a violator shall be fined an amount not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). Any fine must be paid to the clerk of the court imposing the sentence, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fine to the general fund. All fines so credited to the general fund pursuant to this subsection (f) are subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the exclusive purposes of funding child advocacy centers, court-appointed special advocates, and sexual assault centers.

Acts 2019, ch. 360, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 360, 2 provided that the act, which added this section, shall apply to violations occurring on or after July 1, 2019.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 360, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-911. Sale, loan or exhibition of material to minors.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly sell or loan for monetary consideration or otherwise exhibit or make available to a minor:
    1. Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, video game, computer software game, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body, that depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and that is harmful to minors; or
    2. Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter, however reproduced, or sound recording, which contains any matter enumerated in subdivision (a)(1), or that contains explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and that is harmful to minors.
  2. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly exhibit to a minor for monetary consideration, or to knowingly sell to a minor an admission ticket or pass or otherwise admit a minor to premises whereon there is exhibited a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
  4. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the minor to whom the material or show was made available or exhibited was, at the time, accompanied by the person's parent or legal guardian, or by an adult with the written permission of the parent or legal guardian.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2000, ch. 763, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Registration of adult-oriented establishments, title 7, ch. 51, part 11.

Restrictions on showings, § 39-17-907.

Sexual exploitation of children, title 39, ch. 17, part 10.

Law Reviews.

State Restrictions on Violent Expression: The Impropriety of Extending an Obscenity Analysis, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 473 (1993).

Attorney General Opinions. Violations of § 39-17-911, OAG 00-030 (2/22/00).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Although the term “excess violence” is unconstitutionally vague, because it fails to provide adequate notice of criminal conduct, T.C.A. § 39-17-911 as a whole survives under the applicable doctrine of elision. Davis-Kidd Booksellers v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. 1993).

2. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for exhibiting obscene material to a minor because the proof fully supported the jury's finding that defendant knew the victim was a minor at the time he sent nude photographs; defendant never confirmed that the victim was at least eighteen years old before sending the pictures. State v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

39-17-912, 39-17-913. [Reserved.]

  1. It is unlawful for a person to display for sale or rental a visual depiction, including a videocassette tape or film, video game, computer software game, or a written representation, including a book, magazine or pamphlet, that contains material harmful to minors anywhere minors are lawfully admitted.
  2. The state has the burden of proving that the material is displayed. Material is not considered displayed under this section if:
    1. The material is:
      1. Placed in “binder racks” that cover the lower two thirds (2/3) of the material and the viewable one third (1/3) is not harmful to minors;
      2. Located at a height of not less than five and one-half feet (5½') from the floor; and
      3. Reasonable steps are taken to prevent minors from perusing the material;
    2. The material is sealed, and, if it contains material on its cover that is harmful to minors, it must also be opaquely wrapped;
    3. The material is placed out of sight underneath the counter; or
    4. The material is located so that the material is not open to view by minors and is located in an area restricted to adults;
    5. Unless its cover contains material which is harmful to minors, a video cassette tape or film is not considered displayed if it is in a form that cannot be viewed without electrical or mechanical equipment and the equipment is not being used to produce a visual depiction; or
    6. In a situation if the minor is accompanied by the minor's parent or guardian, unless the area is restricted to adults as provided for in subdivision (b)(4).
  3. A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor for each day the person is in violation of this section.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1092, § 5; 2000, ch. 763, § 2.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Registration of adult-oriented establishments, title 7, ch. 51, part 11.

Restrictions on showings, § 39-17-907.

Sexual exploitation of children, title 39, ch. 17, part 10.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Nuisances, § 4; 20 Tenn. Juris., Obscenity, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine — Older Minors' and Adults' Access Rights to Constitutionally Protected Material, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 353 (1995).

State Restrictions on Violent Expression: The Impropriety of Extending an Obscenity Analysis, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 473 (1993).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of incorporation of Motion Picture Association of America's rating system into code, OAG 90-02 (1/8/90).

Constitutionality of tax on sale or rental of adult videos, 98-067 (3/18/98).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. § 39-17-914 is readily susceptible to a narrowing construction which makes it only applicable to those materials which lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for a reasonable 17-year-old minor and is therefore not facially unconstitutional under the federal or state constitutions on the grounds of overbreadth. Davis-Kidd Booksellers v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. 1993).

Since all adult bookstores restricted admission to adults, as defined in T.C.A. § 7-51-1102(1) and as restricted in T.C.A. § 39-17-914, restricted access was a reliable indicator of adult materials and was a rational way to identify those likely to produce the adverse secondary effects the Tennessee Adult-Oriented Establishment Registration Act of 1998 targeted; plaintiff bookstore was properly denied a preliminary injunction on an equal protection challenge against defendant county. East Brooks Books, Inc. v. Shelby County, 588 F.3d 360, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25806, 2009 FED App. 407P (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009).

39-17-915 — 39-17-917. [Reserved.]

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Compensation” means payment, loan, advance, contribution, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value;
    2. “Erogenous area” means the pubic area, penis, scrotum, vulva, vagina, perineum, anus or breast;
    3. “Massage” means the art of body massage, by hand or with a mechanical or vibratory device, for the purpose of massaging, reducing, or contouring the body, and may include the use of oil rubs, heat lamps, hot and cold packs, tub, shower or cabinet baths. The procedures involved include, but are not limited to, touching, stroking, kneading, friction, vibration, percussion and medical gymnastics; and
    4. “Masseur” or “masseuse” means a person engaged in the activities set forth in subdivision (a)(3).
  2. It is unlawful for a masseur or masseuse to expose the masseur's or masseuse's erogenous area for compensation or to touch with any part of the masseur's or masseuse's body, or fondle in any manner or massage an erogenous area for compensation. This section shall not apply to any person authorized by the laws of this state to practice any branch of medicine, surgery, osteopathy, chiropractic or chiropody, any person holding a drugless practitioner's certificate or any person licensed as a physical therapist, while such person is acting within the scope of the license.
  3. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Adult-oriented establishment registration, title 7, ch. 51, part 11.

Massage Licensure Act, title 63, ch. 18.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-919. Injunctions.

  1. If the district attorney general is of the opinion that § 39-17-911 or § 39-17-914 is being violated, the district attorney general may file a petition in a circuit, chancery or criminal court of that district relating the opinion, and request the court to issue a temporary restraining order or a temporary injunction enjoining the person named in the petition from removing the material in question from the jurisdiction of the court pending an adversary hearing on the petition.
  2. If a temporary restraining order or, after notice, a temporary injunction is so issued, the person enjoined shall answer within the time set by the court, which time shall be set by the court at not more than sixty (60) days.
  3. The adversary hearing on the petition shall be held within two (2) days after the joinder of issues.
  4. At the conclusion of the hearing, or within two (2) days thereafter, the court will determine whether or not the material in question is in violation of § 39-17-911 or § 39-17-914.
    1. On a finding of a violation, the court shall grant a temporary injunction or continue its injunction in full force and effect for a period not to exceed forty-five (45) days or until an indictment on the matter has been submitted to the grand jury.
    2. If forty-five (45) days elapse and the grand jury has taken no action, the injunction terminates.
    3. The injunction also terminates on the grand jury returning a no true bill.
  5. On the return of a true bill of indictment, the court shall order the material in question delivered into the hands of the court clerk or district attorney general, there to be held as evidence in the case.

Acts 1990, ch. 1092, § 10.

39-17-920. Issuance of process.

No process, except as otherwise provided, shall be issued for the violation of § 39-17-911 or § 39-17-914, unless it is issued upon the application of the district attorney general of the district.

Acts 1990, ch. 1092, § 10.

Part 10
Sexual Exploitation of Children

39-17-1001. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1990.”

Acts 1990, ch. 1092, § 7.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This part punishes persons involved in child pornography. Statutes concerning obscene materials and adult pornography made available to minors are found in part 9 of this chapter.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Law Reviews.

Abolishing Child Sex Trafficking on the Internet: Imposing Criminal Culpability on Digital Facilitators, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1097 (2013).

Filling the Gap: Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation to Address the Problem of Pimping, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 961  (2015).

For Their Own Good? Exploring Legislative Responses to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children and the Illinois Safe Children Act, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1361 (2012).

“Let’s Talk About Sexting, Baby”: A Mens Rea-Centered Approach to the Sexting Issue in Tennessee, 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1139 (2012).

Pimps Down: A Prosecutorial Perspective on Domestic Sex Trafficking,, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1013 (2013).

Prosecuting Demand as a Crime of Human Trafficking: The Eighth Circuit Decision in United States v. Jungers, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 917 (2013).

Sexting, Statutes, and Saved by the Bell: Introducing a Lesser Juvenile Charge with an “Aggravating Factors”, 77 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

Taking Prevention Seriously: Developing a Comprehensive Response to Child Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation, 43 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1 (2010).

39-17-1002. Part definitions.

The following definitions apply in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Community” means the judicial district, as defined by § 16-2-506, in which a violation is alleged to have occurred;
  2. “Material” means:
    1. Any picture, drawing, photograph, undeveloped film or film negative, motion picture film, videocassette tape or other pictorial representation;
    2. Any statue, figure, theatrical production or electrical reproduction;
    3. Any image stored on a computer hard drive, a computer disk of any type, or any other medium designed to store information for later retrieval;
    4. Any image transmitted to a computer or other electronic media or video screen, by telephone line, cable, satellite transmission, or other method that is capable of further transmission, manipulation, storage or accessing, even if not stored or saved at the time of transmission; or
    5. Any computer image, or computer-generated image, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means;
  3. “Minor” means any person who has not reached eighteen (18) years of age;
  4. “Patently offensive” means that which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters;
  5. “Performance” means any play, motion picture, photograph, dance, or other visual representation that can be exhibited before an audience of one (1) or more persons;
  6. “Promote” means to finance, produce, direct, manufacture, issue, publish, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do those things;
  7. “Prurient interest” means a shameful or morbid interest in sex; and
  8. “Sexual activity” means any of the following acts:
    1. Vaginal, anal or oral intercourse, whether done with another person or an animal;
    2. Masturbation, whether done alone or with another human or an animal;
    3. Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, physical contact with or touching of a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or breasts in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or sexual abuse;
    4. Sadomasochistic abuse, including flagellation, torture, physical restraint, domination or subordination by or upon a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of any person;
    5. The insertion of any part of a person's body or of any object into another person's anus or vagina, except when done as part of a recognized medical procedure by a licensed professional;
    6. Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, conduct, representations, depictions or descriptions of excretory functions; or
    7. Lascivious exhibition of the female breast or the genitals, buttocks, anus or pubic or rectal area of any person.

Acts 1990, ch. 1092, § 7; 1995, ch. 216, § 1; 1999, ch. 343, §§ 1-4; 2001, ch. 147, § 1; 2005, ch. 496, § 1; 2017, ch. 249, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Clear Error or De Novo - State v. Whited: Did the Court Inadvertently Introduce a New Appellate Standard of Review in Tennessee in Its Opinion in a Child Pornography Case?, 48 U. Mem. L. Rev. 719 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

In consolidated appeals from defendants'  sexual exploitation of a minor charges and convictions, the supreme court held that the term “material,” as it appeared in T.C.A. § 39-17-1002, was not unconstitutionally overbroad because, in order to constitute a criminal act under T.C.A. § 39-17-1003, possession had to include a minor engaged in sexual activity; because the statue required proof that the materials depicted actual minors, it was not subject to the Miller  test. State v. Pickett, 211 S.W.3d 696, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. 2007), cert. denied, Harwood v. Tennessee, 169 L. Ed. 2d 305, 128 S. Ct. 436, 552 U.S. 973, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 11604 (2007).

2. Sexual Activity.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because it showed that, had the victim not found the camera defendant placed in her bedroom, it would have recorded her bare breasts, pubic area, and buttocks while she dressed after showering. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2017).

Evidence sufficiently established defendant's conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor because defendant directed the victims to make a video after showing them a pornographic video, and defendant provided the the victims with the means to make a video; the victims'  self-described acts of removing all of their clothing, dancing in front of the camera, jumping on the bed, grabbing their breasts, and using a lamp as a stripper pole could be construed as “unnatural” and “overtly sexual.” State v. Melton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. May 15, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because the evidence showed at most that when he hid a video camera in the minor victim's bedroom aimed to record the area where she normally changed clothes, defendant intended to produce material that would include images of the victim engaged in everyday activities ordinarily performed in the nude, which were deemed insufficient in the Whited case to constitute a “lascivious exhibition.” State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Jan. 7, 2019).

In advising defendant about a guilty plea to especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, trial counsel was not ineffective because, based on counsel's understanding of the case law, he determined that the videos orchestrated and produced by defendant were likely to be found to be lascivious; and, following a review of some of the videos, the appellate court agreed with the post-conviction court that counsel's assessment of the State's case was reasonable. Jones v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of solicitation of a minor because, given defendant's direct request for a photograph of the victim's breasts, and the victim's role in the photography, the evidence showed that defendant attempted to induce the victim to produce a lascivious exhibition of her breasts. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because the image sent by the victim to defendant was a close-up photograph of the nine-year-old victim's privates; the victim was coached to take the photograph by defendant; and the photograph was overtly sexual. State v. Holbrooks, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2020).

3. Material.

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of sexual exploitation of a minor for knowingly possessing less than fifty sexual images of minors because at least fifty-eight to sixty pornographic images depicting children were found on defendant's laptop computer, defendant confirmed defendant's exclusive ownership of the computer and defendant's Microsoft SkyDrive account on which a pornographic image was uploaded, and defendant's computer showed that defendant used search terms to find child pornography. State v. Burt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

39-17-1003. Offense of sexual exploitation of a minor.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess material that includes a minor engaged in:
    1. Sexual activity; or
    2. Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.
  2. A person possessing material that violates subsection (a) may be charged in a separate count for each individual image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation. Where the number of materials possessed is greater than fifty (50), the person may be charged in a single count to enhance the class of offense under subsection (d).
  3. In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly possessed the material, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.
  4. A violation of this section is a Class D felony; however, if the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials, that are possessed is more than fifty (50), then the offense shall be a Class C felony. If the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials, exceeds one hundred (100), the offense shall be a Class B felony.
  5. In a prosecution under this section, the state is not required to prove the actual identity or age of the minor.
  6. It shall not be a defense to a violation of this section that a minor victim of the offense consented to the conduct that constituted the offense.

Acts 1990, ch. 1092, § 7; 2005, ch. 496, § 2; 2013, ch. 350, § 2.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class B, C, and D felonies, § 40-35-111.

Sexual offender registration and monitoring, title 40, ch. 39.

Law Reviews.

Let's Talk About Sexting, Baby: A Mens Rea-Centered Approach to the Sexting Issue in Tennessee (Emily Long), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1139 (2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

In consolidated appeals from defendants'  sexual exploitation of a minor charges and convictions, the supreme court held that earlier provisions of T.C.A. § 39-17-1003(b), a permissive inference, was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague as the inference did not alter the requirement that the image be of a minor, and the possession contemplated by the statute had to be knowing; thus, a person who inadvertently stumbled upon child pornography would not be guilty of a crime under the terms of the statute. State v. Pickett, 211 S.W.3d 696, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. 2007), cert. denied, Harwood v. Tennessee, 169 L. Ed. 2d 305, 128 S. Ct. 436, 552 U.S. 973, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 11604 (2007).

2. Evidence Sufficient.

Images found in unallocated space on defendant's computer were sufficient to support defendant's convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor, as the evidence showed that the images had to have been manually downloaded and defendant's search history evinced that he knowingly sought out child pornography. State v. Aguilar, 437 S.W.3d 889, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1101 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 436 (Tenn. May 16, 2014).

Evidence supported the jury's finding that defendant knowingly possessed the materials during the dates charged in the indictment where it established that the detective discovered on defendant's computer 61 videos and more than 4,000 images depicting children engaged in sexual activity. The sheer number of images and videos, as well as the detective's testimony that all of the files came from frostwire application and instant messenger indicated that download activity was intentional and not accidental. State v. Doria, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 307 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2016).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor because (1) defendant's paramour notified a sheriff's office of finding child pornography images on defendant's laptop; (2) defendant provided a statement to a detective wherein defendant acknowledged having looked for child porn on the internet; (3) the detective found that searches were conducted on defendant's laptop and that the subject images were viewed on the laptop and then deleted; and (4) the jury viewed each of the images. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 949 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of sexual exploitation of a minor as a jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant knowingly possessed child pornography because defendant had a laptop in his residence that contained several hundred images of child pornography and approximately 50 videos depicting child pornography; when asked by the police whether he looked at child pornography, defendant initially was evasive in his answer, and later, in a recorded interview, defendant told an officer that his computer contained child pornography images; and defendant told investigators that he had bought the computer himself. State v. Ragan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2017).

Evidence sufficiently established defendant's conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor because defendant directed the victims to make a video after showing them a pornographic video, and defendant provided the victims with the means to make a video; the victims'  self-described acts of removing all of their clothing, dancing in front of the camera, jumping on the bed, grabbing their breasts, and using a lamp as a stripper pole could be construed as “unnatural” and “overtly sexual.” State v. Melton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. May 15, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of sexual exploitation of a minor for knowingly possessing less than fifty sexual images of minors because at least fifty-eight to sixty pornographic images depicting children were found on defendant's laptop computer, defendant confirmed defendant's exclusive ownership of the computer and defendant's Microsoft SkyDrive account on which a pornographic image was uploaded, and defendant's computer showed that defendant used search terms to find child pornography. State v. Burt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor and aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because, inter alia, he admitted to having child pornography on his phone, many of the children depicted in the 3000 images and 23 videos were infants and toddlers and the trial court properly considered the evidence and statutory factors. State v. Norton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2019).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted sexual exploitation of a minor because the mere fact that defendant previously took a photograph that was awfully close to the victim's private parts was not enough to say that such a photograph would have been lascivious exhibition of the victim's genitals and defendant's using food items to lure the victim into engaging in sexual activity did not constitute a substantial step toward sexual exploitation because defendant's entire course of action did not corroborate the intent to commit such an offense. State v. Glatz, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2020).

3. Sentence.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentencing where it considered the offenses for which defendant was being sentenced as evidence of his extensive criminal activity where he had no criminal history outside of his convictions for which he was being sentenced and he was convicted of 39 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. State v. Doria, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 307 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing partially consecutive sentences for an effective sentence of 106 years in connection with defendant's plea of guilty to 59 counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor; the trial court discussed all aggravating circumstances, including the abuse of trust, the long period of time the offenses went undetected, and the scope of the abuse, plus defendant made unrepentant and flippant statements blaming the victim for his sexual abuse against her. State v. Perry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 2016).

4. Multiple Counts.

Defendant's convictions under this section did not violate double jeopardy because they were permitted by statute, as by amending this section the legislature intended to permit multiple aggregation of offenses. State v. Doria, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 307 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2016).

5. Relevant Evidence.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the State to use a visual presentation prepared by a detective during his direct examination because evidence of the creation of false user profiles was relevant to establish defendant's identity as the person who downloaded images of minors engaged in sexual activity and evidence of the chat files were relevant to establish that defendant was searching for illegal material, contrary to his statement to an investigator that he downloaded the images by accident. State v. Doria, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 307 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2016).

Trial court did not err by permitting the State to cross-examine defendant regarding his purported interest in pornography because the probative value of the testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; the trial court conducted more than one thorough and thoughtful bench conference, with an eye toward the potential prejudicial impact of the testimony, and strictly limited the State's ability to question defendant about any specific pornographic material. State v. Melton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. May 15, 2018).

Trial court properly admitted testimony of defendant's internet search history because the search terms, “young amateur sex” and “nude teen sex,” were suggestive of someone interested in finding sexually explicit images of minors, was relevant and probative to the issue of defendant's intent and knowledge, and was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Norton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2019).

6. Joinder of Offenses.

It was error to dismiss an indictment because counts of sexual exploitation of a minor were not based on the same conduct and did arise from the same episode as the offenses for which defendant was tried, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault; there was no proof images shown to the victim were the images that led to the indictment for sexual exploitation, and there was no overlap in the evidence necessary to prove the other offenses and sexual exploitation. State v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

39-17-1004. Offense of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor.

    1. It is unlawful for a person to knowingly promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material, or possess with the intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material, that includes a minor engaged in:
      1. Sexual activity; or
      2. Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.
    2. A person who violates subdivision (a)(1) may be charged in a separate count for each individual image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation. Where the number of materials involved in a violation under subdivision (a)(1) is greater than twenty-five (25), the person may be charged in a single count to enhance the class of offense under subdivision (a)(4).
    3. In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed the material for these purposes, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.
    4. A violation of this section is a Class C felony; however, if the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials that are promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed, with intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange, is more than twenty-five (25), then the offense shall be a Class B felony.
    1. It is unlawful for a person to knowingly promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material that is obscene, as defined in § 39-17-901, or possess material that is obscene, with the intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange the material, which includes a minor engaged in:
      1. Sexual activity; or
      2. Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.
    2. A person who violates subdivision (b)(1) may be charged in a separate count for each individual image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation. Where the number of materials involved in a violation under subdivision (b)(1) is greater than twenty-five (25), the person may be charged in a single count to enhance the class of offense under subdivision (b)(4).
    3. In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed the material for these purposes, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.
    4. A violation of this section is a Class C felony; however, if the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials, that are promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed, with intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange, is more than twenty-five (25), then the offense shall be a Class B felony.
  1. In a prosecution under this section, the state is not required to prove the actual identity or age of the minor.
  2. A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the person promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed, with intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material within this state.
  3. It shall not be a defense to a violation of subsection (a) that the minor victim of the offense consented to the conduct that constituted the offense.

Acts 1990, ch. 1092, § 7; 2005, ch. 496, § 3; 2013, ch. 350, § 3.

Cross-References. Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Penalties for Class B and C felonies, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); defendant made the victim perform sexual acts while he took photos and videos of her, the victim testified about these acts, and a witness testified that defendant showed him one of the videos, such that a jury could have inferred that defendant possessed photos and video of the victim with the intent to publish or exhibit them. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because his actions in downloading the peer-to-peer file sharing network on his computer, storing child pornography in his shared folder, and allowing others to download child pornography from it met the definition of distribution. State v. Bohannon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2018).

Defendant was properly convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor and aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because, inter alia, he admitted to having child pornography on his phone, many of the children depicted in the 3000 images and 23 videos were infants and toddlers and the trial court properly considered the evidence and statutory factors. State v. Norton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2019).

2. Sentencing.

Record supported the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms under T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(5) for rape of a child, aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, 39-13-503(a)(2), 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); defendant was convicted for two or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Offenses involved a victim and were committed to gratify defendant's desire for pleasure, he abused a position of trust, and the victim was vulnerable, for purposes of the enhancement factors under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(4), (7), (14); the record supported the mid-range sentence of 20 for rape of a child under T.C.A. § 39-15-522, the minimum sentences of five and eight years, respectively, for aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1). State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Record supported the maximum sentence within range for rape of a child under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, 39-13-503(a)(2), plus aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); the trial court considered all the relevant principles associated with sentencing under T.C.A. § 40-35-103, when imposing the sentences in this case. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

3. Relevant Evidence.

Trial court properly admitted testimony of defendant's internet search history because the search terms, “young amateur sex” and “nude teen sex,” were suggestive of someone interested in finding sexually explicit images of minors, was relevant and probative to the issue of defendant's intent and knowledge, and was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Norton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2019).

39-17-1005. Offense of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor.

  1. It is unlawful for a person to knowingly promote, employ, use, assist, transport or permit a minor to participate in the performance of, or in the production of, acts or material that includes the minor engaging in:
    1. Sexual activity; or
    2. Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.
  2. A person violating subsection (a) may be charged in a separate count for each individual performance, image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation.
  3. In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly promoted, employed, used, assisted, transported or permitted a minor to participate in the performance of or in the production of acts or material for these purposes, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.
  4. A violation of this section is a Class B felony. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting prosecution for any other sexual offense under this chapter, nor shall a joint conviction under this section and any other related sexual offense, even if arising out of the same conduct, be construed as limiting any applicable punishment, including consecutive sentencing under § 40-35-115, or the enhancement of sentence under § 40-35-114.
  5. In a prosecution under this section, the state is not required to prove the actual identity or age of the minor.
  6. A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the person promoted, employed, assisted, transported or permitted a minor to engage in the performance of, or production of, acts or material within this state.
  7. It shall not be a defense to a violation of subsection (a) that the minor victim of the offense consented to the conduct that constituted the offense.

Acts 1990, ch. 1092, § 7; 2005, ch. 496, § 4; 2013, ch. 350, § 4.

Cross-References. Immediate revocation of bail for certain offenses, § 40-11-113.

Penalty for Class B felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Clear Error or De Novo - State v. Whited: Did the Court Inadvertently Introduce a New Appellate Standard of Review in Tennessee in Its Opinion in a Child Pornography Case?, 48 U. Mem. L. Rev. 719 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Indictment.

Defendant was wrongfully convicted of a violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-1005 under an indictment that did not allege the element of production of material, but alleged instead that defendant transported a minor to participate in sexual or simulated sexual activity, specifically masturbation. VanArsdall v. State, 919 S.W.2d 626, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

2. Elements.

T.C.A. § 39-17-1005 imposes liability only upon those who promote, employ, use, assist, transport or permit participation by a minor in the performance or production of proscribed material. VanArsdall v. State, 919 S.W.2d 626, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

3. Evidence.

Evidence that defendant positioned the camera in the bathroom to capture videos of the victim's breasts and genitalia, placed the camera in the bedroom so that the buttocks and breasts of the victims were in the center of the screen when victims stood in the center of the room, and retrieved the camera just after the victims left the rooms supported defendant's convictions for especially aggravated exploitation of a minor and attempted especially aggravated exploitation of a minor. State v. Whited, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 324 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2015), modified, 506 S.W.3d 416, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Nov. 7, 2016), overruled in part, State v. Grisham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017).

Convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor had to be reversed because the videos defendant secretly took of his daughter and her friend, while depicting the daughter and the friend in the nude, did not include a minor engaging in a lascivious exhibition but rather in everyday activities such as showering and changing clothes. State v. Whited, 506 S.W.3d 416, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Nov. 7, 2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of a mother because there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother committed severe child abuse; the mother took photographs of the child's genitals and sent them to a known sex offender, who had discussed with her his sexual interest in the child, and her actions constituted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and severe child abuse. In re G.L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 993 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because it showed that, had the victim not found the camera defendant placed in her bedroom, it would have recorded her bare breasts, pubic area, and buttocks while she dressed after showering. State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2017).

While the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, the record, showing defendant's placement of the phone in the bathroom so as to record his stepdaughter, was sufficient to support an attempt conviction. State v. Grisham, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); defendant made the victim perform sexual acts while he took photos and videos of her, the victim testified about these acts, and a witness testified that defendant showed him one of the videos, such that a jury could have inferred that defendant possessed photos and video of the victim with the intent to publish or exhibit them. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Each of defendant's convictions of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor was based on forty photographs depicting the victim engaged in digital-vaginal penetration, penile-vaginal penetration, oral sex/fellatio, and other sexually explicit photographs of the victim. Although the photographs did not show defendant's face, there were other identifiable characteristics of defendant including his wedding ring, fingers, distinctive moles on his penis, a watch, pajamas and a bedspread and mini-fridge from defendant's bedroom. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because the evidence showed at most that when he hid a video camera in the minor victim's bedroom aimed to record the area where she normally changed clothes, defendant intended to produce material that would include images of the victim engaged in everyday activities ordinarily performed in the nude, which were deemed insufficient in the Whited case to constitute a “lascivious exhibition.” State v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Jan. 7, 2019).

In advising defendant about a guilty plea to especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, trial counsel was not ineffective because, based on counsel's understanding of the case law, he determined that the videos orchestrated and produced by defendant were likely to be found to be lascivious; and, following a review of some of the videos, the appellate court agreed with the post-conviction court that counsel's assessment of the State's case was reasonable. Jones v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of solicitation of a minor because, given defendant's direct request for a photograph of the victim's breasts, and the victim's role in the photography, the evidence showed that defendant attempted to induce the victim to produce a lascivious exhibition of her breasts. State v. Mason, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor because the image sent by the victim to defendant was a close-up photograph of the nine-year-old victim's privates; the victim was coached to take the photograph by defendant; and the photograph was overtly sexual. State v. Holbrooks, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2020).

4. Multiple Counts.

Convictions for multiple counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation, criminal exposure to HIV, and aggravated statutory rape for various sex crimes were upheld, because defendant penetrated multiple orifices of the victim, including the victim's anus and mouth, and each act defendant performed was capable of producing its own fear, humiliation, pain, and damage to the victim. State v. Hogg, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 448 S.W.3d 877, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

As to defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, each of the 11 clips from defendant's video camera was a “unit of prosecution,” as each contained graphic images of a child participating in sexual acts or posing in simulated sexual positions. State v. Hogg, 448 S.W.3d 877, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

5. Sentencing.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing partially consecutive sentences for an effective sentence of 106 years in connection with defendant's plea of guilty to 59 counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor; the trial court discussed all aggravating circumstances, including the abuse of trust, the long period of time the offenses went undetected, and the scope of the abuse, plus defendant made unrepentant and flippant statements blaming the victim for his sexual abuse against her. State v. Perry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 2016).

Offenses involved a victim and were committed to gratify defendant's desire for pleasure, he abused a position of trust, and the victim was vulnerable, for purposes of the enhancement factors under T.C.A. § 40-35-114(4), (7), (14); the record supported the mid-range sentence of 20 for rape of a child under T.C.A. § 39-15-522, the minimum sentences of five and eight years, respectively, for aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1). State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Record supported the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms under T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(5) for rape of a child, aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, 39-13-503(a)(2), 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); defendant was convicted for two or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

Record supported the maximum sentence within range for rape of a child under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, 39-13-503(a)(2), plus aggravated and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction under T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1004(a)(1), 39-17-1005(a)(1); the trial court considered all the relevant principles associated with sentencing under T.C.A. § 40-35-103, when imposing the sentences in this case. State v. Smartt, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2018).

6. Consecutive Sentences.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences, which were authorized by T.C.A. § 39-17-1005(d). State v. Hogg, 448 S.W.3d 877, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014).

7. Double Jeopardy.

Although the especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor convictions required the State to establish that defendant persuaded or encouraged the victim to take sexually explicit photographs of herself, no such proof was required for the sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means conviction. The offenses contain different elements, and therefore, convictions for both offenses did not violate principles of double jeopardy. State v. Jernigan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017).

39-17-1006. Injunctions.

If the district attorney general is of the opinion that §§ 39-17-1001—39-17-1005 are being violated, the district attorney general may file a petition in a circuit, chancery or criminal court of that district relating the opinion, and request the court to issue a temporary restraining order or a temporary injunction enjoining the person named in the petition from removing the material in question from the jurisdiction of the court pending an adversary hearing on the petition. If a temporary restraining order or, after notice, a temporary injunction is so issued, the person enjoined shall answer within the time set by the court, which time shall be set by the court at not more than sixty (60) days. The adversary hearing on the petition shall be held within two (2) days after the joinder of issues. At the conclusion of the hearing, or within two (2) days thereafter, the court will determine whether or not the material in question is in violation of §§ 39-17-100139-17-1005. On a finding of a violation, the court shall grant a temporary injunction or continue its injunction in full force and effect for a period not to exceed forty-five (45) days or until an indictment on the matter has been submitted to the grand jury. If forty-five (45) days elapse and the grand jury has taken no action, the injunction terminates. The injunction also terminates on the grand jury returning a no true bill. On the return of a true bill of indictment, the court shall order the material in question delivered into the hands of the court clerk or district attorney general, there to be held as evidence in the case.

Acts 1990, ch. 1092, § 7.

39-17-1007. Issuance of process.

No process, except as otherwise provided, shall be issued for the violation of §§ 39-17-100339-17-1005 unless it is issued upon the application of the district attorney general of the district.

Acts 1990, ch. 1092, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Signing Indictments.

Defendant's contention that the search warrant was void on the ground that it was not signed by the District Attorney General pursuant to this section was rejected, despite the fact that this section did not contain language specifically approving the delegation of authority by the District Attorneys General to the Assistant District Attorneys General, because the District Attorney General possessed the authority to delegate his duties under T.C.A. § 8-7-103(7). State v. Doria, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 307 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2016).

2. “Process” Did Not Include Search Warrant.

In a case in which “process” had to be issued upon the application of the district attorney general of the district, defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied because the legislature intended the issuance of “process” in this statute to refer to the Tennessee Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act's injunction and forfeiture provisions, and, thus, “process” did not include a search warrant; and, if “process” included search warrants, the “except as otherwise provided” language of this statute would allow law enforcement to apply for a search warrant otherwise because law enforcement officers were authorized to request a search warrant under the rules of criminal procedure. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 3, 2017).

3. Construction.

“Process” referred to in T.C.A. § 39-17-1007 does not include search warrants. To the extent that State v. Davis,  2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 941 and State v. Doria,  2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 307, hold otherwise, they are overruled. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. May 22, 2019).

T.C.A. § 39-17-1007 does not require search warrants to be applied for by the office of the district attorney general. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. May 22, 2019).

39-17-1008. Forfeiture of any conveyance or real or personal property used in commission of an offense under this part.

  1. Any conveyance or real or personal property used in the commission of an offense under this part is subject to forfeiture under title 40, chapter 33, part 2.
  2. Notwithstanding § 40-33-211, the proceeds from all forfeitures made pursuant to this section shall be transmitted to the general fund, where there is established a general fund reserve to be allocated through the general appropriations act, which shall be known as the child abuse fund. Moneys from the fund shall be expended to fund activities authorized by the child abuse fund as set out in § 39-13-530. Any revenues deposited in this reserve shall remain in the reserve until expended for purposes consistent with this section, and shall not revert to the general fund at the end of the fiscal year. Any excess revenues or interest earned by the revenues shall not revert at the end of the fiscal year, but shall remain available for appropriation in subsequent fiscal years. Any appropriation from the reserve shall not revert to the general fund at the end of the fiscal year, but shall remain available for expenditure in subsequent fiscal years.

Acts 2006, ch. 960, § 2.

Part 11
Public Events

39-17-1101. Prize fighting, sparring and other brutal sports unlawful — Exception.

  1. It is an offense for any person or persons to engage in what is known as prize fighting or boxing with or without gloves, or in other brutal sport or exhibition, whereby bruising, maiming, or other serious bodily injury may result to the boxers or participants unless regulated pursuant to title 68, chapter 115.
  2. This section shall not be construed to apply to football, baseball, basketball, hockey, soccer, lacrosse or similar activities, nor to any professional contest of unarmed combat regulated pursuant to title 68, chapter 115.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit or declare unlawful any activity authorized by other provisions of this code when carried out in accordance with the other provisions, or to render any participants of the same liable to the penalties of subsection (d).
  4. All persons engaging in the sports or contests designated in this section either as principals, aids, seconds, or backers, commit a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 2008, ch. 1149, § 1; T.C.A. § 39-17-1102.

Cross-References. Boxing, sparring, and wrestling, title 68, ch. 115.

Disorderly conduct and riots, title 39, ch. 17, part 3.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1102. Definitions for sports bribery.

As used in § 39-17-1103, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Sports contest” means any professional or amateur sport, athletic game, contest, or race involving machines, persons or animals, viewed by the public, or for which admission is charged;
  2. “Sports official” means any person who acts or expects to act in a sports contest as an umpire, referee or judge, or otherwise to officiate at a sports contest; and
  3. “Sports participant” means any person who participates or expects to participate in a sports contest as a player, contestant or member of a team, or as a coach, manager, trainer or other person directly associated with a player, contest or team.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; T.C.A. § 39-17-1103.

39-17-1103. Sports bribery.

  1. A person commits the crime of sports bribery who:
    1. Confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon a sports participant with intent to influence the participant not to give the participant's best efforts in a sports contest;
    2. Confers, or offers or agrees to confer any benefit upon a sports official in return for an agreement from the official to perform the official's duties improperly;
    3. Being a sports participant, solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that the participant will thereby be influenced not to give the participant's best efforts in a sports contest; or
    4. Being a sports official, solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that the official will perform the official's duties improperly.
  2. Sports bribery is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1;  T.C.A. § 39-17-1104.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1104. Interference with operations of ticket seller.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “ticket seller” means a person who has executed a written agreement with the management of any venue for a sporting event, theater, musical performance, or public entertainment or amusement of any kind, to sell tickets to such an event over the internet.
  2. It is an offense for any person to knowingly sell, give, transfer, use, distribute or possess with the intent to sell, give or distribute software that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of interfering with the operations of any ticket seller that sells, over the internet, tickets of admission to a sporting event, theater, musical performance, or place of public entertainment or amusement of any kind by circumventing any security measures on the ticket seller's website, circumventing any access control systems of the ticket seller's website, or circumventing any controls or measures that are instituted by the ticket seller on its website to ensure an equitable ticket buying process.
    1. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor, punishable by fine only of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or any profits made or tickets acquired in the course of the violation of this section, whichever amount is greater.
    2. Each acquisition, sale, or offer in violation of this section constitutes a separate offense.

Acts 2008, ch. 731, § 1;  T.C.A. § 39-17-1105.

Cross-Reference. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Part 12
[Reserved]

Part 13
Weapons

39-17-1301. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Adjudication as a mental defective or adjudicated as a mental defective” means:
    1. A determination by a court in this state that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, mental illness, incompetency, condition or disease:
      1. Is a danger to such person or to others; or
      2. Lacks the ability to contract or manage such person's own affairs due to mental defect;
    2. A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal proceeding; or
    3. A finding that a person is incompetent to stand trial or is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to Article 50a and 76b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §§ 850a and 876b respectively);
  2. “Club” means any instrument that is specially designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury or death by striking a person with the instrument;
  3. “Crime of violence” includes any degree of murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated rape, rape, rape of a child, especially aggravated rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, burglary, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, trafficking for commercial sex act, especially aggravated sexual exploitation, felony child abuse, and aggravated child abuse;
    1. “Explosive weapon” means any explosive, incendiary or poisonous gas:
      1. Bomb;
      2. Grenade;
      3. Rocket;
      4. Mine; or
      5. Shell, missile or projectile that is designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury, death or substantial property damage;
    2. “Explosive weapon” also means:
      1. Any breakable container which contains a flammable liquid with a flashpoint of one hundred fifty degrees Fahrenheit (150° F) or less and has a wick or similar device capable of being ignited, other than a device which is commercially manufactured primarily for purposes of illumination; or
      2. Any sealed device containing dry ice or other chemically reactive substances for the purposes of causing an explosion by a chemical reaction;
  4. “Hoax device” means any device that reasonably appears to be or is purported to be an explosive or incendiary device and is intended to cause alarm or reaction of any type by an official of a public safety agency or a volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies;
  5. “Immediate vicinity” refers to the area within the person's immediate control within which the person has ready access to the ammunition;
  6. “Judicial commitment to a mental institution” means a judicially ordered involuntary admission to a private or state hospital or treatment resource in proceedings conducted pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7;
  7. “Knife” means any bladed hand instrument that is capable of inflicting serious bodily injury or death by cutting or stabbing a person with the instrument;
  8. “Knuckles” means any instrument that consists of finger rings or guards made of a hard substance and that is designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury or death by striking a person with a fist enclosed in the knuckles;
  9. “Machine gun” means any firearm that is capable of shooting more than two (2) shots automatically, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger;
  10. “Mental institution” means a mental health facility, mental hospital, sanitarium, psychiatric facility and any other facility that provides diagnoses by a licensed professional of an intellectual disability or mental illness, including, but not limited to, a psychiatric ward in a general hospital;
  11. “Restricted firearm ammunition” means any cartridge containing a bullet coated with a plastic substance with other than a lead or lead alloy core or a jacketed bullet with other than a lead or lead alloy core or a cartridge of which the bullet itself is wholly composed of a metal or metal alloy other than lead. “Restricted firearm ammunition” does not include shotgun shells or solid plastic bullets;
  12. “Rifle” means any firearm designed, made or adapted to be fired from the shoulder and to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed metallic cartridge to fire a projectile through a rifled bore by a single function of the trigger;
  13. “Short barrel” means a barrel length of less than sixteen inches (16") for a rifle and eighteen inches (18") for a shotgun, or an overall firearm length of less than twenty-six inches (26");
  14. “Shotgun” means any firearm designed, made or adapted to be fired from the shoulder and to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun shell to fire through a smooth-bore barrel either a number of ball shot or a single projectile by a single function of the trigger;
  15. “Switchblade knife” means any knife that has a blade which opens automatically by:
    1. Hand pressure applied to a button or other device in the handle; or
    2. Operation of gravity or inertia; and
  16. “Unloaded” means the rifle, shotgun or handgun does not have ammunition in the chamber, cylinder, clip or magazine, and no clip or magazine is in the immediate vicinity of the weapon.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 1; 2001, ch. 375, §§ 1, 2; 2009, ch. 578, § 8; 2010, ch. 734, § 1; 2017, ch. 339, § 2; 2018, ch. 903, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act regarding changing the term “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability”, please refer to Acts 2010, ch. 734.

Acts 2010, ch. 734, § 1 provided that the Tennessee code commission is directed to change all references to “mental retardation”, wherever such references appear in titles 33, 39 and 41, to “intellectual disability”, as supplements are issued and volumes are replaced.

Acts 2010, ch. 734, § 7 provided that for purposes of each provision amended by the act, a reference to intellectual disability shall be considered to refer to mental retardation, as defined by that provision on the day before the date of enactment of the act.

Acts 2010, ch. 734, § 8 provided that nothing in the act shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of the act.

Acts 2017, ch. 339, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Hearing Protection Act.”

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, rewrote the definition of “crime of violence” which read: “‘Crime of violence’ includes any degree of murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated rape, rape, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, burglary, aggravated assault or aggravated kidnapping;”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 903, § 7. July 1, 2018.

Law Reviews.

Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey of Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 177 (1999).

Attorney General Opinions. Use of exploding targets. OAG 15-12, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 12 (2/5/15).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Prior Offense.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon because he unlawfully possessed a firearm during the incident that formed the basis for the convictions; any inquiry into the underlying facts of the prior offense was not relevant because defendant acknowledged his prior attempted aggravated kidnapping conviction, and a copy of the judgment was received as an exhibit. State v. Tweedy, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2019).

Trial court properly determined that aggravated assault accomplished by reckless conduct was a crime of violence, admitted a recording of defendant's 9-1-1 call, and his previous manslaughter conviction after he shot at a vehicle that was occupied by three people because the 9-1-1 recording was relevant to show how the case originated, the officers discovered that defendant possessed a .45-caliber handgun and that he was a convicted felon during their investigation of the call, the trial court provided proper curative instructions to the jury regarding defendant's previous conviction. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

39-17-1302. Prohibited weapons.

  1. A person commits an offense who intentionally or knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, repairs or sells:
    1. An explosive or an explosive weapon;
    2. A device principally designed, made or adapted for delivering or shooting an explosive weapon;
    3. A machine gun;
    4. A short-barrel rifle or shotgun;
    5. Hoax device;
    6. Knuckles; or
    7. Any other implement for infliction of serious bodily injury or death that has no common lawful purpose.
  2. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the person's conduct:
    1. Was incident to the performance of official duty and pursuant to military regulations in the army, navy, air force, coast guard or marine service of the United States or the Tennessee national guard, or was incident to the performance of official duty in a governmental law enforcement agency or a penal institution;
    2. Was incident to engaging in a lawful commercial or business transaction with an organization identified in subdivision (b)(1);
    3. Was incident to using an explosive or an explosive weapon in a manner reasonably related to a lawful industrial or commercial enterprise;
    4. Was incident to using the weapon in a manner reasonably related to a lawful dramatic performance or scientific research;
    5. Was incident to displaying the weapon in a public museum or exhibition; or
    6. Was licensed by the state of Tennessee as a manufacturer, importer or dealer in weapons; provided, that the manufacture, import, purchase, possession, sale or disposition of weapons is authorized and incident to carrying on the business for which licensed and is for scientific or research purposes or sale or disposition to an organization designated in subdivision (b)(1).
  3. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the person must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
    1. The person's conduct was relative to dealing with the weapon solely as a curio, ornament or keepsake, and if the weapon is a type described in subdivisions (a)(1)-(4), that it was in a nonfunctioning condition and could not readily be made operable; or
    2. The possession was brief and occurred as a consequence of having found the weapon or taken it from an aggressor.
  4. It is an exception to the application of subsection (a) that the person acquiring or possessing a weapon described in subdivisions (a)(3) or (a)(4) is in full compliance with the requirements of the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. §§  5841-5862).
  5. Subsection (a) shall not apply to the possession, manufacture, transportation, repair, or sale of an explosive if:
    1. The person in question is eighteen (18) years of age or older; and
    2. The possession, manufacture, transport, repair, or sale was incident to creating or using an exploding target for lawful sporting activity, as solely intended by the commercial manufacturer.
    1. An offense under subdivision (a)(1) is a Class B felony.
    2. An offense under subdivisions (a)(2)-(4) is a Class E felony.
    3. An offense under subdivision (a)(5) is a Class C felony.
    4. An offense under subdivisions (a)(6)-(7) is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, §§ 2, 11; 2001, ch. 375, §§ 3, 4; 2002, ch. 849, § 5; 2006, ch. 798, § 1; 2014, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2; 2015, ch. 85, §§ 1, 2; 2015, ch. 397, §  1; 2017, ch. 339, §§ 3-6.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section concerns weapons which have little or no lawful purpose. Subsection (b) establishes the defenses for law enforcement and military purposes as well as industrial, scientific and artistic purposes and other limited circumstances of lawful registration. Subsection (c) establishes affirmative defenses, with the burden of persuasion on the defendant because the facts necessary to establish the defenses are in most instances known exclusively to the defendant.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2017, ch. 339, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Hearing Protection Act.”

Cross-References. Penalties for Class B, C and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 13 Tenn. Juris., Explosions and Explosives, § 2; 25 Tenn. Juris., Weapons, §§ 3, 7.

Attorney General Opinions. Use of exploding targets. OAG 15-12, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 12 (2/5/15).

T.C.A.§ 39-17-1311(a) prohibits possession of those weapons listed in T.C.A. § 39-17-1302(a) and prohibits possession of other types of weapons on recreational property owned or operated by state, county, or municipal governments at any time the person’s conduct does not strictly conform to the requirements of T.C.A. § 39-17-1311(b)(1).  T.C.A. § 39-11-1311(b)(1)(H) authorizes holders of valid handgun carry permits to possess a handgun in the places specifically identified in the subsection.  The statute is silent regarding the possession of rifles or shotguns in those places.  Thus, T.C.A. § 39-17-1311(b)(1)(H) permits the holder of a valid handgun carry permit to possess only handguns in the areas, places, and facilities that are specifically described therein.   Under T.C.A. § 39-17-1311(b)(1)(J), civilians with or without a valid handgun carry permit may possess handguns, rifles, and shotguns on the grounds of a public park, playground, civic center, or other building facility, area or property owned, used, or operated by any state, county, or municipal government for recreational purposes, but only while the civilian is engaged in one of the specific activities set forth in that subsection and only as long as the civilian’s conduct strictly conforms to the statutorily circumscribed activity.  In enacting T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1311 and 39-17-1314, the legislature has preempted the entire field of regulation of the possession and use of firearms, including the possession and use of firearms in public parks, playgrounds, civic centers, buildings, facilities, areas, and other  facilities and property owned by any state, county, or municipal government, or instrumentality thereof for recreational purposes.  Thus, counties and municipalities may not prohibit or otherwise regulate possession or use of firearms in or on those properties in any manner that conflicts with state law.  OAG 18-04, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 4 (1/31/2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sentence.

A sentence of six months in the county jail imposed for carrying a prohibited weapon was proper. State v. Loden, 920 S.W.2d 261, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Where defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), defendant's sentence was properly not enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act because a prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun did not amount to a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). United States v. Amos, 501 F.3d 524, 2007 FED App. 302P, 2007 FED App. 302P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18833 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 2007).

2. Defense.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because a trooper recovered a firearm and a baggy containing marijuana and pills from defendant's person during a search of his vehicle; even if subsection (c) applied, it operated as an affirmative defense, and because defendant did not plead that section prior to trial, it would be waived. State v. Barnett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2019).

39-17-1303. Unlawful sale, loan or gift of firearm.

  1. A person commits an offense who:
    1. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly sells, loans or makes a gift of a firearm to a minor;
    2. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly sells a firearm or ammunition for a firearm to a person who is intoxicated; or
    3. Intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence violates § 39-17-1316.
  2. It is a defense to prosecution under subdivision (a)(1) that:
    1. A firearm was loaned or given to a minor for the purposes of hunting, trapping, fishing, camping, sport shooting or any other lawful sporting activity; and
    2. The person is not required to obtain a license under § 39-17-1316.
  3. For purposes of this section, “intoxicated” means substantial impairment of mental or physical capacity resulting from introduction of any substance into the body.
  4. An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 3; 2014, ch. 647, § 3.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1304. Restrictions on firearm ammunition.

  1. It is an offense for any person to possess, use or attempt to use restricted firearm ammunition while committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence. A violation of this section constitutes a separate and distinct felony.
  2. It is an offense for any person or corporation to manufacture, sell, offer for sale, display for sale or use in this state any ammunition cartridge, metallic or otherwise, containing a bullet with a hollow-nose cavity that is filled with an explosive material and designed to detonate upon impact; provided, that this section shall not apply to any state or federal military unit or personnel for use in the performance of its duties.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) by possession of restricted firearm ammunition is a Class E felony.
    2. A violation of subsection (a) by use or attempted use of restricted firearm ammunition is a Class D felony.
    3. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class D and E felonies, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1305. [Reserved.]

  1. No person shall intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carry on or about the person while inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress any weapon prohibited by § 39-17-1302(a), for the purpose of going armed; provided, that if the weapon carried is a firearm, the person is in violation of this section regardless of whether the weapon is carried for the purpose of going armed.
  2. Any person violating subsection (a) commits a Class E felony.
  3. Subsection (a) shall not apply to any person who:
    1. Is in the actual discharge of official duties as a law enforcement officer, or is employed in the army, air force, navy, coast guard or marine service of the United States or any member of the Tennessee national guard in the line of duty and pursuant to military regulations, or is in the actual discharge of official duties as a guard employed by a penal institution, or as a bailiff, marshal or other court officer who has responsibility for protecting persons or property or providing security;
    2. Has been directed by a court to bring the firearm for purposes of providing evidence;
    3. Is in the actual discharge of official duties as a judge, and:
      1. Is authorized to carry a handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351;
      2. Keeps the handgun concealed at all times when in the discharge of such duties; and
      3. Is vested with judicial powers under § 16-1-101;
    4. Is in the actual discharge of official duties as an elected official of any county or municipality, and:
      1. Is authorized to carry a handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351; and
      2. Is not in the room in which judicial proceedings are in progress; or
    5. Is in the actual discharge of official duties as the county attorney of any county in this state, and:
      1. Is authorized to carry a handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351; and
      2. Is not in the room in which judicial proceedings are in progress.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 5; 2000, ch. 988, § 2; 2011, ch. 469, § 1; 2014, ch. 663, § 1; 2017, ch. 467, § 5; 2018, ch. 880, § 1; 2020, ch. 681, §§ 1, 2.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (c)(4).

The 2020 amendment, redesignated former (c)(4)(A) as the present introductory language of (c)(4) and substituted “an elected official of any county or municipality,” for “a county commissioner”; redesignated former (c)(4)(A)(i) as present (c)(4)(A); redesignated former (c)(4)(A)(ii) as present (c)(4)(B) and deleted “Is in a building in which county  commission meetings are held, but” from the beginning; deleted former (c)(4)(B) which read: “As used in this subdivision (c)(4), ‘county commissioner' means a member of a local legislative body known as a board of county commissioners and does not include a member of the legislative body of a metropolitan government.”; and added (c)(5).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 880, § 2. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2020, ch. 681, § 3. July 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of off duty officer to carry weapon on specific sites, OAG 99-024 (2/16/99).

There is no requirement for posting notices that carrying handguns onto premises where judicial proceedings are being conducted is prohibited, OAG 07-148 (10/22/07).

Appointment of court officer authorized to carry weapon in courtrooms; required training, qualifications, etc.  OAG 10-77, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 83 (6/1/10).

The statutory prohibition against carrying a handgun “inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress” would not apply during a time when no judicial proceedings are being carried out in the building.  Whether it is an offense for a person who has a handgun permit to carry a handgun in a building in which judicial proceedings are in progress if that person has no notice that judicial proceedings are taking place in the building depends on the specific facts and circumstances in each case because an offense occurs only if the person carrying a handgun in a building in which judicial proceedings are in progress acts “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.”  If a building is a gun-free zone because “judicial proceedings are in progress,” employees or government officials who work in or are assigned to the building and who are eligible to carry a handgun may be subject to criminal prosecution if they possess the firearm in the building at the time that judicial proceedings are in progress unless they come squarely within one of the statutory exceptions. OAG 19-07, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 10 (6/18/2019).

The phrase “judicial proceedings are in progress” refers broadly to any court proceeding that is currently underway or being carried out.  Depending on the specific facts and circumstances in any given case, “judicial proceedings” are not limited to formal courtroom proceedings but may include proceedings that are carried out in a judge’s chambers or elsewhere in a building, whether in person with litigants or attorneys or by conference call or other electronic means. T.C.A § 39-17-1306 does not contain a notice-posting requirement to indicate to the public that firearms are or may be prohibited during specific times. OAG 19-07, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 10 (6/18/2019).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Firearm.

The reference to “firearm” in the second portion of T.C.A. § 39-17-1306(a) refers to all firearms, and not only to those firearms specifically enumerated in T.C.A. § 39-17-1302(a). State v. Williams, 854 S.W.2d 904, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

2. Instructions.

The trial court did not err in not instructing the jury to consider the lesser included offense of carrying arms with the intent to go armed, a misdemeanor under T.C.A. § 39-17-1307, where defendant was charged with carrying a weapon during a judicial proceeding under T.C.A. § 39-17-1306. State v. Williams, 854 S.W.2d 904, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

3. Sufficient Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for carrying weapons during a judicial proceeding. State v. Williams, 854 S.W.2d 904, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

39-17-1307. Unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon.

    1. A person commits an offense who carries, with the intent to go armed, a firearm or a club.
      1. The first violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class C misdemeanor, and, in addition to possible imprisonment as provided by law, may be punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500).
      2. A second or subsequent violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class B misdemeanor.
      3. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor if the person's carrying of a handgun occurred at a place open to the public where one (1) or more persons were present.
    1. A person commits an offense who unlawfully possesses a firearm, as defined in § 39-11-106, and:
      1. Has been convicted of a felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, or a felony involving use of a deadly weapon; or
      2. Has been convicted of a felony drug offense.
    2. An offense under subdivision (b)(1)(A) is a Class B felony.
    3. An offense under subdivision (b)(1)(B) is a Class C felony.
    1. A person commits an offense who possesses a handgun and has been convicted of a felony unless:
      1. The person has been pardoned for the offense;
      2. The felony conviction has been expunged; or
      3. The person's civil rights have been restored pursuant to title 40, chapter 29, and the restoration order does not specifically prohibit the person from possessing firearms.
    2. An offense under subdivision (c)(1) is a Class E felony.
    1. A person commits an offense who possesses a deadly weapon other than a firearm with the intent to employ it during the commission of, attempt to commit, or escape from a dangerous offense as defined in § 39-17-1324.
    2. A person commits an offense who possesses any deadly weapon with the intent to employ it during the commission of, attempt to commit, or escape from any offense not defined as a dangerous offense by § 39-17-1324.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (d)(3)(B), a violation of this subsection (d) is a Class E felony.
      2. A violation of this subsection (d) is a Class E felony with a maximum fine of six thousand dollars ($6,000), if the deadly weapon is a switchblade knife.
    1. It is an exception to the application of subsection (a) that a person is carrying or possessing a firearm, loaded firearm, or firearm ammunition in a motor vehicle or boat if the person:
      1. Is not prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or purchasing a firearm by § 39-17-1316; and
      2. Is in lawful possession of the motor vehicle or boat.
      1. As used in this subsection (e):
        1. “Boat” means any watercraft, other than a seaplane on the water, designed and used primarily for navigation or transportation on the water; and
        2. “Motor vehicle” has the same meaning as defined in § 55-1-103.
      2. This subsection (e) shall not apply to a motor vehicle or boat that is:
        1. Owned or leased by a governmental or private entity that has adopted a written policy prohibiting firearms, loaded firearms, or firearm ammunition not required for employment within the motor vehicle or boat; and
        2. Provided by such entity to an employee for use during the course of employment.
    1. A person commits an offense who possesses a firearm, as defined in § 39-11-106(a), and:
      1. Has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921, and is still subject to the disabilities of such a conviction;
      2. Is, at the time of the possession, subject to an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); or
      3. Is prohibited from possessing a firearm under any other state or federal law.
    2. If the person is licensed as a federal firearms dealer or a responsible party under a federal firearms license, the determination of whether such an individual possesses firearms that constitute the business inventory under the federal license shall be determined based upon the applicable federal statutes or the rules, regulations and official letters, rulings and publications of the bureau of alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives.
    3. For purposes of this section, a person does not possess a firearm, including, but not limited to, firearms registered under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq.), if the firearm is in a safe or similar container that is securely locked and to which the respondent does not have the combination, keys or other means of normal access.
    4. A violation of subdivision (f)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor and each violation constitutes a separate offense.
    5. If a violation of subdivision (f)(1) also constitutes a violation of § 36-3-625(h) or § 39-13-113(h), the respondent may be charged and convicted under any or all such sections.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 6; 2007, ch. 412, § 1; 2007, ch. 594, § 3; 2008, ch. 1166, § 1; 2008, ch. 1176, § 1; 2009, ch. 431, § 1; 2009, ch. 455, § 6; 2010, ch. 793, § 1; 2012, ch. 726, § 1; 2014, ch. 647, §§ 4, 5; 2014, ch. 870, § 1; 2017, ch. 202, § 1; 2017, ch. 475, § 1; 2018, ch. 903, §§ 2, 4.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section prohibits a person from carrying a weapon with the intent to go armed. It also prohibits mere possession of a handgun by certain convicted felons and mere possession of a deadly weapon by one who intends to use it to commit an offense. Defenses to this section are found in § 39-17-1308. Punishment for these offenses is based on the seriousness of the offense and the potential for harm to others.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2017, ch. 475, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to any person committing an applicable offense on or after July 1, 2017.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, rewrote (b)(1)(A) which read: “Has been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon; or”; redesignated former (c) as the present introductory language of (c) by adding “unless:”; and added (c)(1)(A) through (c)(1)(C).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 903, § 7. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Aggravated assault, § 39-13-102.

Certain security guards prohibited from carrying firearms, § 62-35-134.

Penalties for Class A, B and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Penalties for Class C, Class D and Class E felonies, § 40-35-111.

Right to bear arms may be regulated by general assembly to prevent crime, Tenn. Const., art. I, § 26.

Robbery with deadly weapon, § 39-13-402.

Violations indictable without prosecutor, § 40-13-104.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 11.2, 16.118, 16.120, 28.114, 32.174.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Citizenship, § 2; 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 49 ; 25 Tenn. Juris., Weapons, §§ 3, 5-7.

Law Reviews.

Book Review, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Tennessee, 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (1988).

Criminal Procedure—Tennessee v. Carter: The Strict Requirement of Notice Under Tennessee's Recidivist Sentencing Statutes (David Demar Ayliffe) 35 U. Mem. L. Rev. 145 (2004).

Stick to Your Guns: Restoration of Tennessee's “Firearm Rights” (David L. Raybin), 39 No. 3 Tenn. B.J. 17 (2003).

Weapons in the Workplace: The Effect of Tennessee's Concealed Weapons Statute on Employer Liability, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 281 (1997).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality § 26, OAG 96-080 (4/25/96).

Statutory nature of self-defense, OAG 96-079 (4/24/96).

Enforcement of statutory requirements for constables, OAG 99-025 (2/16/99).

Bounty hunters may carry firearms in Tennessee, but only to the same extent as may private citizens, OAG 03-018 (2/19/03).

A permit fee that defrays expenses incident to regulating the exercise of a constitutional right does not per se infringe that right. Fines for unlawful weapon possession do not burden the constitutional right to keep and bear arms but instead penalize violations of a legitimate regulatory measure.  OAG 12-90, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 97 (9/24/12).

Searches and arrests on school property.  OAG 14-21, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 22 (2/24/14).

Licenses to hunt and possession of firearms and effect of conviction of certain felonies and other offenses.  OAG 15-33, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33  (4/10/15).

Once a person has obtained a complete restoration of firearms and other citizenship rights, that individual may lawfully possess or purchase any firearm that may be lawfully possessed or purchased by any other private citizen. Tennessee law is sufficiently clear to provide convicted felons with fair warning regarding applicable prohibitions on the possession of antique or black powder firearms. OAG 15-75, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 76 (11/9/2015).

Public Chapter 279, which became effective May 2, 2019, exempted “antique firearm[s]” from the definition of “firearm” in T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(11). As a result of the passage of Public Chapter 279, the prohibitions in T.C.A. § 39-11-1307 on the possession of firearms and handguns by individuals convicted of felonies and certain misdemeanors no longer apply to antique firearms. OAG 19-19, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 56 (10/9/2019).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Although the term “carries” is not defined in the Tennessee Code, it is capable of ready understanding by a person of ordinary intelligence; consequently, T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

2. Legislative Intent.

The legislature intended that a person who has been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon cannot possess a handgun, even where citizenship rights have been restored pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-29-101 et seq.; therefore, a defendant who was previously convicted of such a felony can subsequently be convicted for the unlawful possession of a weapon pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A). State v. Johnson, 79 S.W.3d 522, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. 2002).

3. Handgun Carry Permit.

Circuit court properly declined to restore defendant's right to bear arms because it was an offense for a convicted drug felon to possess a firearm, a convicted drug felon was prohibited from being granted a permit, and defendant's conviction involved the attempted sale of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. Fisher v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 821 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017).

4. Lesser Included Offenses.

The trial court did not err in not instructing the jury to consider the lesser included offense of carrying arms with the intent to go armed, a misdemeanor under T.C.A. § 39-17-1307, where defendant was charged with carrying a weapon during a judicial proceeding under T.C.A. § 39-17-1306. State v. Williams, 854 S.W.2d 904, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Tenn. Const., art. I, § 10, prohibiting double jeopardy, barred defendant's conviction for possessing a weapon intended for use in the commission of an offense because the offense was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. 1996), overruled, State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012), overruled, State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2012), overruled, State v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2012), overruled, State v. Brawner, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2012), overruled, State v. Buford, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2012), overruled, State v. Readus, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2012), overruled, State v. Alston, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2013), overruled, State v. Hollins, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), overruled, State v. Ralph, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1125 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2013), overruled, Garrett v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2014), overruled, State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2014), overruled in part, State v. Isabell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2014), overruled, State v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2014), overruled, State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2015), overruled, State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. June 25, 2015), overruled in part, State v. Itzol-Deleon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2016), overruled, State v. Freitas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2016), overruled, State v. Jernigan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017), overruled in part, State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017), overruled, Johnson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2017), overruled, State v. Steelman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

Defendant was indicted for a drug felony, but pled guilty to a reduced charge of attempt to commit a felony. There was no proof that defendant pled guilty to any crime other than attempt to possess a Schedule II substance for purposes of resale, and the record contained only speculation that defendant might have, or could have pled to a different offense; thus, defendant was not entitled to have his right to keep and bear arms restored. State v. Ferguson, 106 S.W.3d 665, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. May 19, 2003).

5. Multiple Offenses.

Offenses of second degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in a felony are separate and distinct, and merger of convictions would not be appropriate. Dixon v. State, 934 S.W.2d 69, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

6. Defenses.

Trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of duress under T.C.A. § 39-11-504 did not constitute plain error under former Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (now Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b)), and therefore his conviction of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon in violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) was reinstated, even though the evidence, including defendant's testimony, may have been sufficient to warrant such an instruction, because duress was never discussed as a theory of the defense and defendant expressly declined a jury instruction on self-defense, a defense closely related to duress. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Apr. 26, 2007).

In a prosecution of defendant for being a felon in possession of a handgun, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for an instruction on the defense of necessity. Nothing in the record indicated defendant's action of possessing the gun in any way delayed or hindered the subsequent violence, and the trial court was correct in finding the evidence produced at trial did not fairly raise the defense of necessity as to defendant's actions. State v. Cole-Pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2018).

7. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of defendant who was in possession of a handgun and who had previously been convicted of aggravated assault and malicious shooting. State v. Black, 924 S.W.2d 912, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Mar. 4, 1996).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant possessed marijuana, cocaine, and handguns where evidence clearly established that defendant conspired with one person for the delivery of more than 300 grams of cocaine and that defendant conspired with another person to possess more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. Defendant's presence alone in an apartment at the time officers entered and defendant's knowledge of the key to a lock box established defendant's ability to reduce the marijuana, cocaine, and handguns found to defendant's actual possession at any moment. State v. Elliot, 366 S.W.3d 139, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010).

Facts were sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree premeditated murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and aggravated assault because the victim identified defendant soon after the shooting and again in court, and the jury heard the evidence and was able to gauge the victim's credibility. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon because, without a prior disagreement or provocation, defendant drew a gun while the victim's back was turned, pointed it at the victim, and shot him when he attempted to escape, the shooting was a substantial step toward killing the victim, firing the gun was an intentional act, the victim believed that defendant intended to rob him, defendant did not attempt to render aid to the victim, left the scene, and hid in his mother's attic, and the parties stipulated that defendant had two prior felony convictions involving violence and/or drugs. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016).

Evidence that defendant, a convicted felon, acted at least recklessly by driving a vehicle that he knew had a firearm inside while his license was suspended and simultaneously denied knowledge and provided explanations for how the gun came to be there and why it would have his fingerprints on it was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. State v. Holman, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm where he did not dispute that he had a prior felony conviction for a drug offense and police found him hiding in an attic in someone else's home with a gun matching the description of the gun used in the robbery. State v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions of being a felon in possession of a firearm and a handgun given that he had a prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and evading arrest, both felonies, defendant admitted living in the house and residing in the bedroom where the gun was found, and the gun was loaded and stored in an unlocked gun case where it was easily accessible to him. State v. Ford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon because it showed that the gun was found in the motel room where defendant was living under the couch where he had been sleeping, the officer testified that defendant told him where the gun was, and the co-defendant did not claim ownership of the gun until she testified at trial. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2017).

In defendant's case, the underlying felony was first degree murder, which was clearly a violent felony for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A), and thus facilitation of first degree murder for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-11-403(a), was likewise a violent felony and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's unlawful possession of a firearm conviction under T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A), given that the firearm was found in the truck he was driving, the gun was directed toward him and within his reach, and he changed his story as to the owner of the gun; it was established that he had the ability to exercise control over the firearm and thus was in constructive possession of it. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon because it showed that the victim was unarmed and seated in his car when defendant approached and fired at least five shots at him, two witnesses testified that the victim identified defendant as the shooter at the scene, defendant concealed his identity during his commission of the offenses, and he admitted he had been convicted of a felony drug offense at the time the offenses in the instant case were committed. State v. Bailey, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 808 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery, two counts of felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of convicted felon in possession of handgun because the victim identified defendant as the person who robbed him at the crime scene, when he gave a statement to the sergeant, and in the courtroom at trial; the victim testified that he had no difficulty seeing defendant and that he recognized defendant's voice; the victim testified that defendant pointed a pistol at him during the robbery; and the parties stipulated to the underlying prior felonies necessary to support the three weapon counts. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 888 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed because defendant placed a loaded handgun into a cooler and then placed the cooler on the front seat of his vehicle, and defendant acknowledged that he carried the weapon for the purpose of defending himself. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of being a felon in possession of a handgun because he possessed a gun during the robbery; the parties stipulated that defendant had a prior conviction for aggravated assault; and the stipulation was read to the jury. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 988 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm because witnesses testified that defendant approached and attempted to speak to the victim moments before the victim was shot, the driver of the car in which defendant was riding testified that defendant shot the victim, a forensic scientist testified that the bullet that was retrieved from the victim's heart was fired from defendant's pistol, and an inmate testified that defendant spoke about the shooting when they were incarcerated. State v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that defendant had constructive possession of cocaine, a firearm, and ammunition because the verdict reflected that the jury credited the proof that defendant lived at the home where the crack cocaine, firearm, and ammunition were found; officers found defendant's driver's license on a bedside table and a box of baggies containing crack cocaine in the master bedroom closet, and they saw both male and female clothing in the closet. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Circumstantial evidence connecting defendant to the cocaine and a handgun, including the discovery of both under a car at a location identified in a phone call defendant placed from jail, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (Tenn. July 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to convict defendant under the theory of criminal responsibility for burglary and theft beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant's confession to a detective corroborated the accomplice's testimony; defendant confessed that at some point after the burglary he had possession of the stolen handgun, and the accomplice's testimony established that he knowingly obtained or exercised control over the stolen items when he assisted her in the burglary. State v. Mooneyhan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2018).

Victim's testimony that defendant entered his residence with a gun and employed the gun during the burglary and robbery was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm duing the commission of an aggravated assault. State v. Gray, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; both victims testified that they believed the gun defendant used was real and the jury was able to determine their credibility at trial. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2018).

Proof adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain appellant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and being a felon in possession of a weapon, where multiple witnesses identified appellant as the shooter and an autopsy revealed the victim died as a result of the gunshot wound. Regarding the felon in possession of a charge, appellant stipulated that at the time of the offenses, he had been convicted of five felonies involving the use or attempted use of violence and knew it was illegal for him to own, possess or handle a firearm. State v. Harper, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and being a felon in possession of a firearm because the victim testified that the weapon defendant threatened her with was a chrome revolver with a brown handle that he kept at her house and the state introduced a certified copy of defendant's prior felony drug conviction into evidence. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2019).

Complainant's testimony that defendant possessed an actual handgun with a clip in it was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, as the complainant was familiar with different types of guns and, while her version of the event evolved over time, her insistence that defendant possessed an actual handgun did not. State v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of a gun by a prior felon because defendant's corroborated statement showed defendant's actual and constructive possession of a gun and defendant's prior felony conviction. State v. Reynolds, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon because he unlawfully possessed a firearm during the incident that formed the basis for the convictions; the victim's testimony, credited by the jury, was that defendant possessed a gun during the altercation in which the victim was injured. State v. Tweedy, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon because he unlawfully possessed a firearm during the incident that formed the basis for the convictions; any inquiry into the underlying facts of the prior offense was not relevant because defendant acknowledged his prior attempted aggravated kidnapping conviction, and a copy of the judgment was received as an exhibit. State v. Tweedy, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because it was stipulated that he had four prior convictions involving the use or attempted use of violence and that he had been instructed by the criminal court not to possess or handle firearms. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant possessed at least one gun during the shooting in spite of his felon status. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a felony drug offense because it showed that defendant possessed a firearm during the robberies and homicides and that he had a prior felony conviction of a drug offense. State v. Mitchell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2019).

Evidence that defendant was seen in close proximity to the victims moments before he entered the back seat of one victim's car just before they were found shot in the cemetery and several inmates testified they heard defendant and/or codefendant admit to murdering and robbing the victims after luring them to the cemetery was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. State v. Alston, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Evidence that defendant was in the vicinity, possessed a handgun, and planned to rob the victim and stipulated to having a felony drug conviction supported convictions for murder in the perpetration of theft and of robbery, criminal attempt of especially aggravated robbery, and felon in possession of a firearm. State v. Olivo, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of one count attempted possession of a weapon by a convicted felon because defendant mistakenly called a detective and asked him if was interested in purchasing a shotgun; the detective recognized defendant's voice and knew that he was a convicted felon; the detective went to a specified location at a specified time where he saw a vehicle that defendant was known to drive; when approached and questioned by the detective, defendant admitted that the shotgun was in the trunk of the vehicle; and, despite the testimony of defendant's girlfriend that the shotgun belonged to her, the jury chose to determine the facts sufficient to support a conviction for attempt. State v. Moose, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of second degree murder and unlawful possession of a handgun because the surveillance video showed defendant near the sidewalk outside the club when he started shooting the victim, there were no witnesses that testified the victim made any threats, verbal or otherwise, toward defendant, and the surveillance video did not show the victim in the possession of a weapon, and the only weapon found near the scene was the handgun which contained defendant's DNA. State v. Patterson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2020).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of especially aggravated robbery and possession of a firearm while having a prior felony conviction involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon and denied his motion to bifurcate the trial because the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity and the stipulation entered into by the parties did not describe the prior felony convictions as involving force, violence, or a deadly weapon, the trial court's jury instructions on the firearm charge were consistent with the language in the stipulation, and the trial court instructed the jury that the fact that defendant had a prior criminal conviction did not impair his presumption of innocence. State v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim testified to being robbed by masked and armed men in the victim's home, a police officer saw an individual matching the description of one of the assailants, a police dog tracked the individual to where defendant came out from behind a shed and said, “I give up,” a gun was found in a nearby trash can, the victim identified defendant in a show-up identification, and defendant made incriminating statements during recorded telephone calls while in jail. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2020).

7.5. Evidence Insufficient.

Because the State failed to present any evidence from which the jury could have concluded that defendant's reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon conviction was a felony conviction for a crime of violence, an essential element for defendant to be convicted of a violation of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, his conviction has to be reversed. State v. Dean, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

8. Jury Instructions.

In a case in which defendant was convicted of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, because the evidence showed that defendant employed his firearm, defendant did not establish that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony affected a substantial right. State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity during defendant's trial for being a felon in possession of a handgun because it was fairly raised by the evidence, as it showed that defendant became involved in a physical altercation with two men inside a convenience store, a gun from the jacket of one of the men, the two men grappled with defendant for the gun but defendant reached it first, a jury could have inferred that defendant reasonably believed that obtaining the gun was immediately necessary for him to avoid imminent harm, and defendant's girlfriend was shot with another gun very shortly thereafter. State v. Cole-pugh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Oct. 25, 2019).

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that defendant had no duty to retreat because it found that defendant was acting unlawfully by carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed and the Perrier decision was not limited to convicted felons in possession of a firearm. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

9. Sentencing.

In a case in which the State appealed the dismissal of an indictment count charging defendant with possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, the court of criminal appeals, which reinstated the count, concluded that defendant's prior conviction for possession of cocaine in Indiana was a “felony drug offense” under T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B). Regardless of whether defendant was sentenced in Indiana for a Class D felony or a Class A misdemeanor, defendant could have received a punishment of imprisonment for one year or more. State v. Smith, 495 S.W.3d 271, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive, within range sentences of eight years, four years, and 11 months, 29 days for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, unlawful possession of a handgun, and merged drug convictions, for an effective sentence of 12 years, 11 months, and 29 days; defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive, plus his actions indicated a lack of potential for rehabilitation. State v. Ford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant as a multiple offender to 10 years in the Department of Correction at 35% instead of alternative sentencing after he pleaded guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm with a prior violent felony because the record showed that the trial court considered the relevant sentencing principles and applied them to the facts of the case and defendant had shown many times that he was unable to successfully complete a sentence involving probation or other forms of release into the community. State v. Ford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

Trial court properly sentenced defendant under T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 to a term of incarceration; while the trial court did not make specific findings regarding the determinations set forth in T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C), the record supported the imposition of a sentence of confinement because as a Range II, multiple offender under T.C.A. § 40-35-106(6)(A), he was not considered a favorable candidate for an alternative sentence, he had prior felony convictions, and confinement was necessary to protect society. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

As a Range II, multiple offender convicted of a Class C felony, unlawful possession of a firearm under T.C.A. § 39-17-1307, the applicable sentencing range was six to ten years under T.C.A. § 40-35-112(b)(3), and the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence; the trial court considered the principles of sentencing for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210, 40-35-103, the nature of the offense, and enhancing and mitigating factors, such that there was no abuse of discretion. State v. Theus, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Trial court erred in sentencing defendant for possession of a firearm by one previously convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, when the verdict rendered by the jury was for convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. State v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 988 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2017).

10. Severance.

Trial court did not err when it failed to sever the unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felony from the remaining counts in the indictment because, after the trial court denied defendant's bifurcation request, defendant agreed to stipulate that he was a convicted felon as described in the statute. State v. Richardson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2018).

Trial court did not err by declining the sever the homicide charges from the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge because the offenses were subject to mandatory joinder as they arose from the same conduct and defendant chose to stipulate to his criminal record which mitigated any prejudicial effect that substantive evidence of his convictions would have had. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2019).

11. Evidence.

Trial court did not err by allowing the state to introduce evidence of defendant's prior felony conviction because the state had to prove that he possessed a firearm and had a previous conviction for a felony drug offense in order to convict him of being a felon in possession of a firearm, defendant refused to stipulate to his status as a felon, and therefore the probative value of the prior conviction outweighed the prejudicial effect. State v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2019).

39-17-1308. Defenses to unlawful possession or carrying of a weapon.

  1. It is a defense to the application of § 39-17-1307 if the possession or carrying was:
    1. Of an unloaded rifle, shotgun or handgun not concealed on or about the person and the ammunition for the weapon was not in the immediate vicinity of the person or weapon;
    2. By a person authorized to possess or carry a firearm pursuant to § 39-17-1315, § 39-17-1351, or § 39-17-1366;
    3. At the person's:
      1. Place of residence;
      2. Place of business; or
      3. Premises;
    4. Incident to lawful hunting, trapping, fishing, camping, sport shooting or other lawful activity;
    5. By a person possessing a rifle or shotgun while engaged in the lawful protection of livestock from predatory animals;
    6. By a Tennessee valley authority officer who holds a valid commission from the commissioner of safety pursuant to this part while the officer is in the performance of the officer's official duties;
    7. By a state, county or municipal judge or any federal judge or any federal or county magistrate;
    8. By a person possessing a club or baton who holds a valid state security guard/officer registration card as a private security guard/officer, issued by the commissioner, and who also has certification that the officer has had training in the use of club or baton that is valid and issued by a person certified to give training in the use of clubs or batons;
    9. By any person possessing a club or baton who holds a certificate that the person has had training in the use of a club or baton for self-defense that is valid and issued by a certified person authorized to give training in the use of clubs or batons, and is not prohibited from purchasing a firearm under any local, state or federal laws;
    10. By any out-of-state, full-time, commissioned law enforcement officer who holds a valid commission card from the appropriate out-of-state law enforcement agency and a photo identification; provided, that if no valid commission card and photo identification are retained, then it shall be unlawful for that officer to carry firearms in this state and this section shall not apply. The defense provided by this subdivision (a)(10) shall only be applicable if the state where the out-of-state officer is employed has entered into a reciprocity agreement with this state that allows a full-time, commissioned law enforcement officer in Tennessee to lawfully carry or possess a weapon in the other state; or
    11. By a person authorized to carry a handgun pursuant to § 36-3-626 or § 39-17-1365.
  2. The defenses described in this section are not available to persons described in § 39-17-1307(b)(1).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 7; 1993, ch. 200, § 1; 1996, ch. 1009, §§ 20, 21; 1997, ch. 476, § 3; 1999, ch. 295, § 1; 2003, ch. 144, § 2; 2017, ch. 468, § 2; 2019, ch. 479, § 2.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section establishes defenses for certain persons in the scope of their employment and for other lawful behavior such as hunting or in certain locations. Subdivision (a)(1) provides a defense if the firearm was not concealed or loaded and if the ammunition was not in the immediate vicinity of the person or the weapon. Subdivision (a)(2) provides a defense if the person has a written directive or permit to carry a handgun. Subsection (b) makes these defenses unavailable to certain convicted felons.

Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 4 provided that, for the purpose of initiating the process of implementing the requirements of the act, including any programming changes, the act took effect on May 26, 2017. For the purpose of implementing the requirements of the act, the act shall take effect thirty (30) days after the date upon which the commissioner of safety provides written notification to the secretary of state and the executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission that the department of safety's “A-list” driver license program is capable of implementing the new requirements of the act or on January 1, 2018, whichever is earlier. The executive secretary did not receive the notice therefore the provision became effective January 1, 2018.

Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 4 provided further that the commissioner shall cause the notification to be published on the website of the department contemporaneously with delivery to the secretary of state and executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, substituted “§ 39-17-1315, § 39-17-1351, or § 39-17-1366” for “§ 39-17-1315 or § 39-17-1351” in (a)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability as defense to prosecution limited, OAG 98-0151 (8/12/98).

A permit fee that defrays expenses incident to regulating the exercise of a constitutional right does not per se infringe that right. Fines for unlawful weapon possession do not burden the constitutional right to keep and bear arms but instead penalize violations of a legitimate regulatory measure.  OAG 12-90, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 97 (9/24/12).

Licenses to hunt and possession of firearms and effect of conviction of certain felonies and other offenses.  OAG 15-33, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33  (4/10/15).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Possession of a handgun in a residence is not an available defense to one who has been convicted of a prior violent felony where a defendant's citizenship rights have been restored pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-29-101State v. Johnson, 79 S.W.3d 522, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. 2002).

Where a deputy's seizure of a handgun from an auto was proper under the exigent circumstances of the seizure, the gun became contraband and subject to permanent seizure when the deputy found that the gun was loaded. United States v. Bishop, 338 F.3d 623, 2003 FED App. 264P, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15419 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1206, 124 S. Ct. 1479, 158 L. Ed. 2d 129, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1473 (2004).

39-17-1309. Carrying weapons on school property.

  1. As used in this section, “weapon of like kind” includes razors and razor blades, except those used solely for personal shaving, and any sharp pointed or edged instrument, except unaltered nail files and clips and tools used solely for preparation of food, instruction and maintenance.
    1. It is an offense for any person to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, with the intent to go armed, any firearm, explosive, explosive weapon, bowie knife, hawk bill knife, ice pick, dagger, slingshot, leaded cane, switchblade knife, blackjack, knuckles or any other weapon of like kind, not used solely for instructional or school-sanctioned ceremonial purposes, in any public or private school building or bus, on any public or private school campus, grounds, recreation area, athletic field or any other property owned, operated, or while in use by any board of education, school, college or university board of trustees, regents or directors for the administration of any public or private educational institution.
    2. A violation of this subsection (b) is a Class E felony.
      1. It is an offense for any person to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any firearm, not used solely for instructional or school-sanctioned ceremonial purposes, in any public or private school building or bus, on any public or private school campus, grounds, recreation area, athletic field or any other property owned, operated, or while in use by any board of education, school, college or university board of trustees, regents or directors for the administration of any public or private educational institution.
      2. It is not an offense under this subsection (c) for a nonstudent adult to possess a firearm, if the firearm is contained within a private vehicle operated by the adult and is not handled by the adult, or by any other person acting with the expressed or implied consent of the adult, while the vehicle is on school property.
    1. A violation of this subsection (c) is a Class B misdemeanor.
    1. Each chief administrator of a public or private school shall display in prominent locations about the school a sign, at least six inches (6") high and fourteen inches (14") wide, stating:

      FELONY. STATE LAW PRESCRIBES A MAXIMUM PENALTY OF SIX (6) YEARS IMPRISONMENT AND A FINE NOT TO EXCEED THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($3,000) FOR CARRYING WEAPONS ON SCHOOL PROPERTY.

    2. As used in this subsection (d), “prominent locations about a school” includes, but is not limited to, sports arenas, gymnasiums, stadiums and cafeterias.
  2. Subsections (b) and (c) do not apply to the following persons:
    1. Persons employed in the army, air force, navy, coast guard or marine service of the United States or any member of the Tennessee national guard when in discharge of their official duties and acting under orders requiring them to carry arms or weapons;
    2. Civil officers of the United States in the discharge of their official duties;
    3. Officers and soldiers of the militia and the national guard when called into actual service;
    4. Officers of the state, or of any county, city or town, charged with the enforcement of the laws of the state, when in the discharge of their official duties;
    5. Any pupils who are members of the reserve officers training corps or pupils enrolled in a course of instruction or members of a club or team, and who are required to carry arms or weapons in the discharge of their official class or team duties;
    6. Any private police employed by the administration or board of trustees of any public or private institution of higher education in the discharge of their duties;
    7. Any registered security guard/officer who meets the requirements of title 62, chapter 35, and who is discharging the officer's official duties;
      1. Persons possessing a handgun, who are authorized to carry the handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351, while within or on a public park, natural area, historic park, nature trail, campground, forest, greenway, waterway, or other similar public place;
      2. Subdivision (e)(8)(A) shall not apply if the enhanced handgun carry permit holder:
        1. Possessed a handgun on property described in subdivision (e)(8)(A) that is owned or operated by a board of education, school, college, or university board of trustees, regents, or directors unless the permit holder's possession is otherwise excepted by this subsection (e); or
        2. Possessed a handgun in the immediate vicinity of property that was, at the time of possession, in use by any board of education, school, college or university board of trustees, regents, or directors for the administration of any public or private educational institution for the purpose of conducting an athletic event or other school-related activity on an athletic field, permanent or temporary, including but not limited to, a football or soccer field, tennis court, basketball court, track, running trail, Frisbee field, or any similar multi-use field; and
        3. Knew or should have known that:
          1. An athletic event or school-related activity described in subdivision (e)(8)(B)(ii) was taking place on the property at the time of the possession; or
          2. The property on which the possession occurred was owned or operated by a school entity described in subdivision (e)(8)(B)(ii); or
        4. Failed to take reasonable steps to leave the area of the athletic field or school-related activity or the property after being informed or becoming aware of:
          1. Its use for athletic or school-related purposes; or
          2. That it was, at the time of the possession, owned or operated by a school entity described in (e)(8)(B)(ii);
    8. Persons permitted to carry a handgun on the property of private K-12 schools by § 49-50-803, and persons permitted to carry a handgun on the property of private for-profit or nonprofit institutions of higher education pursuant to § 49-7-161; provided, that this subdivision (e)(9) shall apply only:
      1. To the school or institution where the person is located, when that school or institution has adopted a handgun carry policy pursuant to § 49-50-803 or § 49-7-161;
      2. While the person is on the property or grounds covered by the private school or institution's policy; and
      3. When the person is otherwise in compliance with the policy adopted by the private school or institution;
    9. Persons carrying a handgun pursuant to § 49-6-809, § 49-6-815, or § 49-6-816; provided, that this subdivision (e)(10) shall apply only within and on the grounds of the school for which the person is authorized;
      1. Employees authorized to carry a handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351 on property owned, operated, or controlled by the public institution of higher education at which the employee is employed;
        1. Any authorized employee who elects to carry a handgun pursuant to this subdivision (e)(11) shall provide written notification to the law enforcement agency or agencies with jurisdiction over the property owned, operated, or controlled by the public institution of higher education that employs the employee;
        2. The employee's name and any other information that might identify the employee as a person who has elected to carry a handgun pursuant to this subdivision (e)(11) shall be confidential, not open for public inspection, and shall not be disclosed by any law enforcement agency with which an employee registers; except that the employee's name and other information may be disclosed to an administrative officer of the institution who is responsible for school facility security; provided, however, that the administrative officer is not the employee's immediate supervisor or a supervisor responsible for evaluation of the employee. An administrative officer to whom such information is disclosed shall not disclose the information to another person. Identifying information about the employee collected pursuant to this subdivision (e)(11) shall not be disclosed to any person or entity other than another law enforcement agency and only for law enforcement purposes; and
        3. Law enforcement agencies are authorized to develop and implement:
          1. Policies and procedures designed to implement the notification and confidentiality requirements of this subdivision (e)(11)(B); and
          2. A voluntary course or courses of special or supplemental firearm training to be offered to the employees electing to carry a handgun pursuant to this subdivision (e)(11). Firearm safety shall be a component of any firearm course;
      2. Unless carrying a handgun is a requirement of the employee's job description, the carrying of a handgun pursuant to this subdivision (e)(11) is a personal choice of the employee and not a requirement of the employer. Consequently, an employee who carries a handgun on property owned, operated, or controlled by the public institution of higher education at which the employee is employed is not:
        1. Acting in the course of or scope of their employment when carrying or using the handgun;
        2. Entitled to workers' compensation benefits under § 9-8-307(a)(1)(K) for injuries arising from the carrying or use of a handgun;
        3. Immune from personal liability with respect to use or carrying of a handgun under § 9-8-307(h);
        4. Permitted to carry a handgun openly, or in any other manner in which the handgun is visible to ordinary observation; or
        5. Permitted to carry a handgun at the following times and at the following locations:
          1. Stadiums, gymnasiums, and auditoriums when school-sponsored events are in progress;
          2. In meetings regarding disciplinary matters;
          3. In meetings regarding tenure issues;
          4. A hospital, or an office where medical or mental health services are the primary services provided; and
          5. Any location where a provision of state or federal law, except the posting provisions of § 39-17-1359, prohibits the carrying of a handgun on that property;
      3. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a public institution of higher education shall be absolutely immune from claims for monetary damages arising solely from or related to an employee's use of, or failure to use, a handgun; provided the employee is employed by the institution against whom the claim is filed and the employee elects to carry the handgun pursuant to this subdivision (e)(11). Nothing in this section shall expand the existing conditions under which sovereign immunity is waived pursuant to § 9-8-307; and
      4. As used in subdivisions (e)(11)-(13):
        1. “Employee” includes all faculty, staff, and other persons who are employed on a full-time basis by a public institution of higher education; and
        2. “Employee” does not include a person who is enrolled as a student at a public institution of higher education, regardless of whether the person is also an employee;
      1. Any employee of the University of Tennessee institute of agriculture or a college or department of agriculture at a campus in the University of Tennessee system when in the discharge of the employee's official duties and with prior authorization from the chancellor of the University of Tennessee institute of agriculture; or
      2. Any employee of the University of Tennessee institute of agriculture or a college or department of agriculture at a campus in the University of Tennessee system, and any member of the employee's household, living in a residence owned, used, or operated by the University of Tennessee, if the employee has prior authorization from the chancellor of the University of Tennessee institute of agriculture and the employee and household members are permitted to possess firearms in their residence under Tennessee and federal law; and
      1. Any employee of the university's college or department of agriculture when in the discharge of the employee's official duties and with prior authorization from the president of a university in the board of regents system;
      2. Any employee of the university's college or department of agriculture, and any member of the employee's household, living in a residence owned, used, or operated by the university, if the employee has prior authorization from the president of a university in the board of regents system and the employee and household members are permitted to possess firearms in their residence under Tennessee and federal law; or
      3. Any employee, with prior authorization of the president of a university in the board of regents system, who is engaged in wildlife biology or ecology research and education for the purpose of capture or collection of specimens.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 8; 1991, ch. 510, §§ 1-3; 1996, ch. 1009, § 24; 2015, ch. 250, §§ 3, 4; 2016, ch. 698, § 3; 2016, ch. 1049, § 2; 2016, ch. 1061, § 1; 2018, ch. 1008, § 2; 2019, ch. 479, § 6.

Compiler's Notes.  Acts 2015, ch. 250, § 6 provided that any department of state government may, but is not required to, change, remove, or replace signs as a result of Sections 1 [which amended § 39-17-1311] or 4 of the act [which added (e)(8) to this section]  prior to the time the signs are regularly scheduled to be changed, replaced, or removed or are required to be changed, replaced, or removed by any other law or due to destruction or theft; provided, that the general assembly may specifically provide funds for the purpose of removing or replacing signs in a general appropriations act.

For Preamble to act concerning armed officers on school premises, please refer to Acts 2018, ch. 1008.

Acts 2018, ch. 1008, § 1 provided that the act shall be known and may be cited as the “School Safety Act of 2018.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1008, § 4 provided that the state board of education is authorized to promulgate rules to effectuate the purposes of this act. All rules must be promulgated in accordance with title 4, chapter 5.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment substituted “§ 49-6-809, § 49-6-815, or § 49-6-816” for “§ 49-6-815 or § 49-6-816” in (e)(10).

The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, inserted “enhanced handgun carry” preceding “permit holder” in (e)(8)(B).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1008, § 5. May 21, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

School Security Act, title 49, ch. 6, part 42.

Law Reviews.

Weapons in the Workplace: The Effect of Tennessee's Concealed Weapons Statute on Employer Liability, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 281 (1997).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality § 26, OAG 96-080 (4/25/96).

Authority of off duty officer to carry weapon on specific sites, OAG 99-024 (2/16/99).

Off-Duty law enforcement officer carrying weapon to county school board meeting.  OAG 10-111, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 117 (11/3/10).

Possession of firearms and firearm ammunition on school property; construction of T.C.A.§§  39-17-1313  and 39-17-1309.  OAG 13-15, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 14 (2/22/13).

Searches and arrests on school property.  OAG 14-21, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 22 (2/24/14).

Possession of firearms on athletic fields used by schools. OAG 14-88, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 88 (9/18/14).

Applicability of T.C.A.. § 39-17-1309 to Religious Institutions and Home Schooling.  OAG 15-67, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 68 (9/18/15).

To the extent T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1309 and 39-17-1313 (2013) are in conflict, the provisions of 39-17-1313 (2013) take precedence over the conflicting provisions of § 39-17-1309. After the 2014 amendments to T.C.A. § 39-17-1313, T.C.A. § 39-17-1313 still takes priority over prohibitions on gun storage in T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1309, 39-17-1311, and 39-17-1359. The phrase “or while in use by,” in the context of T.C.A. § 39-17-1309 as a whole, applies even when students or school personnel are not present on the property. Thus, gun possession would be prohibited on property used to store equipment or supplies by an educational institution specified in the statute. OAG 16-29, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 29 (7/27/2016).

The practice of dentistry is a “medical service” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 39-17-1309(e)(11)(C)(v)(d). OAG 17-02, 2017 Tenn.  AG LEXIS 2 (1/9/2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence sufficient.

Evidence defendant conspired with another to rob the victim, acted with the intent to rob the victim through the use of a deadly weapon, and was in possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed on a college campus supported his convictions for aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm on a college campus. State v. Spicer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2016).

39-17-1310. Affirmative defense to carrying weapons on school property.

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under § 39-17-1309(a)-(d) that the person's behavior was in strict compliance with the requirements of one (1) of the following classifications:

  1. A person hunting during the lawful hunting season on lands owned by any public or private educational institution and designated as open to hunting by the administrator of the educational institution;
  2. A person possessing unloaded hunting weapons while transversing the grounds of any public or private educational institution for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting with the intent to hunt on the public or private lands unless the lands of the educational institution are posted prohibiting entry;
  3. A person possessing guns or knives when conducting or attending “gun and knife shows” and the program has been approved by the administrator of the educational institution; or
  4. A person entering the property for the sole purpose of delivering or picking up passengers and who does not remove, utilize or allow to be removed or utilized any weapon from the vehicle.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1991, ch. 510, § 4.

39-17-1311. Carrying weapons on public parks, playgrounds, civic centers and other public recreational buildings and grounds.

  1. It is an offense for any person to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, with the intent to go armed, any weapon prohibited by § 39-17-1302(a), not used solely for instructional, display or sanctioned ceremonial purposes, in or on the grounds of any public park, playground, civic center or other building facility, area or property owned, used or operated by any municipal, county or state government, or instrumentality thereof, for recreational purposes.
    1. Subsection (a) shall not apply to the following persons:
      1. Persons employed in the army, air force, navy, coast guard or marine service of the United States or any member of the Tennessee national guard when in discharge of their official duties and acting under orders requiring them to carry arms or weapons;
      2. Civil officers of the United States in the discharge of their official duties;
      3. Officers and soldiers of the militia and the national guard when called into actual service;
      4. Officers of the state, or of any county, city or town, charged with the enforcement of the laws of the state, in the discharge of their official duties;
      5. Any pupils who are members of the reserve officers training corps or pupils enrolled in a course of instruction or members of a club or team, and who are required to carry arms or weapons in the discharge of their official class or team duties;
      6. Any private police employed by the municipality, county, state or instrumentality thereof in the discharge of their duties;
      7. A registered security guard/officer, who meets the requirements of title 62, chapter 35, while in the performance of the officer's duties;
        1. Persons possessing a handgun, who are authorized to carry the handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366, while within or on a public park, natural area, historic park, nature trail, campground, forest, greenway, waterway, or other similar public place that is owned or operated by the state, a county, a municipality, or instrumentality of the state, a county, or municipality;
        2. Subdivision (b)(1)(H)(i) shall not apply if the permit holder:
          1. Possessed a handgun in the immediate vicinity of property that was, at the time of possession, in use by any board of education, school, college or university board of trustees, regents, or directors for the administration of any public or private educational institution for the purpose of conducting an athletic event or other school-related activity on an athletic field, permanent or temporary, including but not limited to, a football or soccer field, tennis court, basketball court, track, running trail, Frisbee field, or similar multi-use field; and
          2. Knew or should have known the athletic activity or school-related activity described in subdivision (b)(1)(H)(ii)(a ) was taking place on the property; or
          3. Failed to take reasonable steps to leave the area of the athletic event or school-related activity after being informed of or becoming aware of its use;
        3. For purposes of subdivision (b)(1)(H)(ii)(a ) and (c ), property described in subdivision (b)(1)(H)(i) is “in use” only when one (1) or more students are physically present on the property for an activity a reasonable person knows or should know is an athletic event, or other school event or school-related activity. Property listed in subdivision (b)(1)(H)(i) is not in use solely because equipment, materials, supplies, or other property owned or used by a school is stored, maintained, or permitted to remain on the property;
      8. Persons possessing a handgun, who are authorized to carry the handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366, while within or on property designated by the federal government as a national park, forest, preserve, historic park, military park, trail or recreation area, to the extent permitted by federal law; and
      9. Also, only to the extent a person strictly conforms the person's behavior to the requirements of one (1) of the following classifications:
        1. A person hunting during the lawful hunting season on lands owned by any municipality, county, state or instrumentality thereof and designated as open to hunting by law or by the appropriate official;
        2. A person possessing unloaded hunting weapons while traversing the grounds of any public recreational building or property for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting with the intent to hunt on the public or private lands unless the public recreational building or property is posted prohibiting entry;
        3. A person possessing guns or knives when conducting or attending “gun and knife shows” when the program has been approved by the administrator of the recreational building or property;
        4. A person entering the property for the sole purpose of delivering or picking up passengers and who does not remove any weapon from the vehicle or utilize it in any manner; or
        5. A person who possesses or carries a firearm for the purpose of sport or target shooting and sport or target shooting is permitted in the park or recreational area.
    2. At any time the person's behavior no longer strictly conforms to one (1) of the classifications  in subdivision (b)(1), the person shall be subject to subsection (a).
  2. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  3. For the purposes of this section, a “greenway” means an open-space area following a natural or man-made linear feature designed to be used for recreation, transportation, conservation, and to link services and facilities. A greenway is a paved, gravel-covered, woodchip covered, or wood-covered path that connects one greenway entrance with another greenway entrance. In the event a greenway traverses a park that is owned or operated by a county, municipality or instrumentality thereof, the greenway shall be considered a portion of that park unless designated otherwise by the local legislative body. Except as provided in this part, the definition of a greenway in this section shall not be applicable to any other provision of law.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 9; 1993, ch. 480, §§ 1-3; 1996, ch. 1009, § 23; 2009, ch. 428, §§ 1, 2; 2010, ch. 1006, § 1; 2015, ch. 250, §§ 1, 2, 5; 2017, ch. 341, § 1; 2019, ch. 479, § 7.

Compiler's Notes.  Acts 2015, ch. 250, § 6 provided that any department of state government may, but is not required to, change, remove, or replace signs as a result of Sections 1 [which amended (b)(1)(H) of this section] or 4 of the act [which amended  § 39-17-1309]  prior to the time the signs are regularly scheduled to be changed, replaced, or removed or are required to be changed, replaced, or removed by any other law or due to destruction or theft; provided, that the general assembly may specifically provide funds for the purpose of removing or replacing signs in a general appropriations act.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, inserted “or § 39-17-1366” twice in (b)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Weapons in the Workplace: The Effect of Tennessee's Concealed Weapons Statute on Employer Liability, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 281 (1997).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality § 26, OAG 96-080 (4/25/96).

Authority of off duty officer to carry weapon on specific sites, OAG 99-024 (2/16/99).

Possession of firearms on athletic fields used by schools. OAG 14-88, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 88 (9/18/14).

Possession of Firearms in Public Parks Owned by Counties and Municipalities.  OAG 15-63, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 63  (7/29/15).

To the extent T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1309 and 39-17-1313 (2013) are in conflict, the provisions of 39-17-1313 (2013) take precedence over the conflicting provisions of § 39-17-1309. After the 2014 amendments to T.C.A. § 39-17-1313, T.C.A. § 39-17-1313 still takes priority over prohibitions on gun storage in T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1309, 39-17-1311, and 39-17-1359. The phrase “or while in use by,” in the context of T.C.A. § 39-17-1309 as a whole, applies even when students or school personnel are not present on the property. Thus, gun possession would be prohibited on property used to store equipment or supplies by an educational institution specified in the statute. OAG 16-29, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 29 (7/27/2016).

T.C.A.§ 39-17-1311(a) prohibits possession of those weapons listed in T.C.A. § 39-17-1302(a) and prohibits possession of other types of weapons on recreational property owned or operated by state, county, or municipal governments at any time the person’s conduct does not strictly conform to the requirements of T.C.A. § 39-17-1311(b)(1).  T.C.A. § 39-11-1311(b)(1)(H) authorizes holders of valid handgun carry permits to possess a handgun in the places specifically identified in the subsection.  The statute is silent regarding the possession of rifles or shotguns in those places.  Thus, T.C.A. § 39-17-1311(b)(1)(H) permits the holder of a valid handgun carry permit to possess only handguns in the areas, places, and facilities that are specifically described therein.   Under T.C.A. § 39-17-1311(b)(1)(J), civilians with or without a valid handgun carry permit may possess handguns, rifles, and shotguns on the grounds of a public park, playground, civic center, or other building facility, area or property owned, used, or operated by any state, county, or municipal government for recreational purposes, but only while the civilian is engaged in one of the specific activities set forth in that subsection and only as long as the civilian’s conduct strictly conforms to the statutorily circumscribed activity.  In enacting T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1311 and 39-17-1314, the legislature has preempted the entire field of regulation of the possession and use of firearms, including the possession and use of firearms in public parks, playgrounds, civic centers, buildings, facilities, areas, and other  facilities and property owned by any state, county, or municipal government, or instrumentality thereof for recreational purposes.  Thus, counties and municipalities may not prohibit or otherwise regulate possession or use of firearms in or on those properties in any manner that conflicts with state law.  OAG 18-04, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 4 (1/31/2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Right to Bear Arms.

Where a detainee openly carried a Draco AK-47 pistol at a state park and was detained and disarmed, a park ranger was entitled to qualified immunity as to the detainee's Second Amendment claim because no court had held that the Second Amendment encompassed a right to bear arms within state parks. Embody v. Ward, 695 F.3d 577, 2012 FED App. 293P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18399 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2012).

2. Search and Seizure.

Where a detainee openly carried a Draco AK-47 pistol at a state park and was detained and disarmed, the detainee's Fourth Amendment claim failed because: (1) The AK-47, carried openly and fully loaded through a state park, gave the park ranger ample reason for suspicion that the detainee possessed an illegal firearm since the barrel was a half-inch shy of the legal limit, and, when coupled with a thirty-round ammunition clip, it reasonably could look more like a rifle than a handgun; and (2) The officers stopped the detainee only as long as it took to investigate the legitimacy of the weapon and bring a supervisor to the park. Embody v. Ward, 695 F.3d 577, 2012 FED App. 293P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18399 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2012).

39-17-1312. Inaction by persons eighteen (18) years of age or older, including parents or guardians, knowing a minor or student illegally possesses a firearm.

  1. It is an offense if a person eighteen (18) years of age or older, including a parent or other legal guardian, knows that a minor or student is in illegal possession of a firearm in or upon the premises of a public or private school, in or on the school's athletic stadium or other facility or building where school sponsored athletic events are conducted, or public park, playground or civic center, and the person, parent or guardian fails to prevent the possession or fails to report it to the appropriate school or law enforcement officials.
  2. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1992, ch. 907, § 1; 1999, ch. 309, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1313. Transporting and storing a firearm or firearm ammunition in permit holder's motor vehicle.

  1. Notwithstanding any provision of law or any ordinance or resolution adopted by the governing body of a city, county or metropolitan government, including any ordinance or resolution enacted before April 8, 1986, that prohibits or regulates the possession, transportation or storage of a firearm or firearm ammunition by an enhanced handgun carry permit holder or concealed handgun carry permit holder, the holder of a valid enhanced handgun carry permit or concealed handgun carry permit recognized in Tennessee may, unless expressly prohibited by federal law, transport and store a firearm or firearm ammunition in the permit holder's motor vehicle, as defined in § 55-1-103, while on or utilizing any public or private parking area if:
    1. The permit holder's motor vehicle is parked in a location where it is permitted to be; and
    2. The firearm or ammunition being transported or stored in the motor vehicle:
      1. Is kept from ordinary observation if the permit holder is in the motor vehicle; or
      2. Is kept from ordinary observation and locked within the trunk, glove box, or interior of the person's motor vehicle or a container securely affixed to such motor vehicle if the permit holder is not in the motor vehicle.
  2. No business entity, public or private employer, or the owner, manager, or legal possessor of the property shall be held liable in any civil action for damages, injuries or death resulting from or arising out of another's actions involving a firearm or ammunition transported or stored by the holder of a valid handgun carry permit in the permit holder's motor vehicle unless the business entity, public or private employer, or the owner, manager, or legal possessor of the property commits an offense involving the use of the stored firearm or ammunition or intentionally solicits or procures the conduct resulting in the damage, injury or death. Nor shall a business entity, public or private employer, or the owner, manager, or legal possessor of the property be responsible for the theft of a firearm or ammunition stored by the holder of a valid handgun carry permit in the permit holder's motor vehicle.
  3. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Motor vehicle” means any motor vehicle as defined in § 55-1-103, which is in the lawful possession of the permit holder, but does not include any motor vehicle which is owned or leased by a governmental or business entity and that is provided by such entity to an employee for use during the course of employment if the entity has adopted a written policy prohibiting firearms or ammunition not required for employment within the entity's motor vehicles; and
      1. “Parking area” means any property provided by a business entity, public or private employer, or the owner, manager, or legal possessor of the property for the purpose of permitting its invitees, customers, clients or employees to park privately owned motor vehicles; and
      2. “Parking area” does not include the grounds or property of an owner-occupied, single-family detached residence, or a tenant-occupied single-family detached residence.
  4. An enhanced handgun carry permit holder or concealed handgun carry permit holder transporting, storing or both transporting and storing a firearm or firearm ammunition in accordance with this section does not violate this section if the firearm or firearm ammunition is observed by another person or security device during the ordinary course of the enhanced handgun carry permit holder or concealed handgun carry permit holder securing the firearm or firearm ammunition from observation in or on a motor vehicle.

Acts 2013, ch. 16, § 1; 2014, ch. 498, § 1; 2014, ch. 505, §§ 1-6; 2014, ch. 768, § 1; 2019, ch. 479, §§ 8, 9.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning handgun carry permits, please refer to Acts 2013, ch. 16.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, in (a), substituted “valid enhanced handgun carry permit or concealed handgun carry permit” for “valid handgun carry permit”; and substituted “enhanced handgun carry permit holder or concealed handgun carry permit holder” for “handgun carry permit holder” in (a) and twice in (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Law Reviews.

Guns in Trunks: An Erosion of Tennessee's Employment-At-Will Rule?, 49 Tenn. B.J. 17 (2013).

Attorney General Opinions. Possession of firearms and firearm ammunition on school property; construction of T.C.A.§§  39-17-1313  and 39-17-1309.  OAG 13-15, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 14 (2/22/13).

Employee’s possession of firearms and firearm ammunition on employer property.  OAG 13-41, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 42 (5/28/13).

Constitutionality of firearms-in-parking-lots statute on vagueness grounds. OAG 14-87, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 90 (9/18/14).

To the extent T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1309 and 39-17-1313 (2013) are in conflict, the provisions of 39-17-1313 (2013) take precedence over the conflicting provisions of § 39-17-1309. After the 2014 amendments to T.C.A. § 39-17-1313, T.C.A. § 39-17-1313 still takes priority over prohibitions on gun storage in T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1309, 39-17-1311, and 39-17-1359. The phrase “or while in use by,” in the context of T.C.A. § 39-17-1309 as a whole, applies even when students or school personnel are not present on the property. Thus, gun possession would be prohibited on property used to store equipment or supplies by an educational institution specified in the statute. OAG 16-29, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 29 (7/27/2016).

39-17-1314. Preemption of local regulation of firearms, ammunition, and knives — Actions against firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer — Party adversely affected by local regulation.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by state law or as specifically provided in subsection (b), the general assembly preempts the whole field of the regulation of firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof including, but not limited to, the use, purchase, transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, possession, carrying, sale, acquisition, gift, devise, licensing, registration, storage, and transportation thereof, to the exclusion of all county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government law, ordinances, resolutions, enactments or regulation. No county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government nor any local agency, department, or official shall occupy any part of the field regulation of firearms, ammunition or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof.
  2. A city, county, town, municipality or metropolitan government is expressly authorized to regulate by ordinance, resolution, policy, rule or other enactment the following:
    1. The carrying of firearms by employees or independent contractors of the city, county, town municipality or metropolitan government when acting in the course and scope of their employment or contract, except as otherwise provided in § 39-17-1313;
    2. The discharge of firearms within the boundaries of the applicable city, county, town, municipality or metropolitan government, except when and where the discharge of a firearm is expressly authorized or permitted by state law;
    3. The location of a sport shooting range, except as otherwise provided in §§ 39-17-316 and 13-3-412. To the extent that a city, county, town, municipality, or metropolitan government has or enforces any regulation of privately owned or operated sport shooting ranges, the city, county, town, municipality, or metropolitan government shall not impose greater restrictions or requirements on privately owned or operated ranges than are applicable to any range located within the same unit of local government and owned or operated by a government entity. A party may challenge any regulation of a sport shooting range that violates this subdivision (b)(3) in the manner described in subsection (g); and
    4. The enforcement of any state or federal law pertaining to firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof.
  3. The general assembly declares that the lawful design, marketing, manufacture and sale of firearms and ammunition to the public are not unreasonably dangerous activities and do not constitute a nuisance per se.
    1. The authority to bring suit and right to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association or dealer by or on behalf of any state entity, county, municipality or metropolitan government for damages, abatement or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public shall be reserved exclusively to the state.
    2. Nothing in this subsection (d) shall be construed to prohibit a county, municipality, or metropolitan government from bringing an action against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or ammunition purchased by such county, municipality, or metropolitan government.
    3. Nothing in this subsection (d) shall preclude an individual from bringing a cause of action for breach of a written contract, breach of an express warranty, or for injuries resulting from defects in the materials or workmanship in the manufacture of the firearm.
  4. Subsections (c) and (d) shall not apply in any litigation brought by an individual against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association or dealer.
  5. It is the intent of the general assembly that this part is preemptive with respect to the transfer, ownership, possession or transportation of knives and no city, county, or metropolitan government shall occupy any part of the field of regulation of the transfer, ownership, possession or transportation of knives.
    1. Notwithstanding title 29, chapter 20, a party who is adversely affected by an ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced by a county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government or any local agency, department, or official that violates this section may file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction against the county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government for:
      1. Declaratory and injunctive relief; and
      2. Damages, as provided in subsection (i).
    2. This subsection (g) shall apply to any ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is adopted or enforced on or after July 1, 2017.
  6. As used in subsection (g), a party is “adversely affected” if:
    1. The party is an individual who:
      1. Lawfully resides within the United States;
      2. May legally possess a firearm under Tennessee law; and
      3. Is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is the subject of an action filed under subsection (g). An individual is or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment if the individual is or was physically present within the boundaries of the political subdivision for any reason; or
    2. The party is a membership organization that:
      1. Includes two (2) or more individuals described in subdivision (h)(1); and
      2. Is dedicated in whole or in part to protecting the rights of persons who possess, own, or use firearms for competitive, sporting, defensive, or other lawful purposes.
  7. A prevailing plaintiff in an action under subsection (g) is entitled to recover from the county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government the following:
    1. The greater of:
      1. Actual damages, including consequential damages, attributable to the ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment; or
      2. Three (3) times the plaintiff's attorney's fees;
    2. Court costs, including fees; and
    3. Reasonable attorney's fees; provided, that attorney's fees shall not be awarded under this subdivision (i)(3) if the plaintiff recovers under subdivision (i)(1)(B).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1999, ch. 293, §§ 1, 2; 2009, ch. 428, § 3; 2013, ch. 418, § 1; 2014, ch. 822, § 1; 2017, ch. 467, § 1; 2019, ch. 223, § 1.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section retains the legislative enactment which followed the decision of the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, Ill. 1982, 695 F.2d 261, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863, 104 S. Ct. 194, 78 L. Ed. 2d 170.

Compiler's Notes. The provisions of subsections (b)-(d) shall apply to any action brought on or after May 26, 1999.

Acts 2013, ch. 418, § 2 provided that the act, which added subsection (e), shall apply to all applicable provisions of law in conflict with the act.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Pursuant to Article III, Section 18 of the Constitution of Tennessee, Acts 2014, ch. 822 took effect on April 28, 2014.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the last two sentences in (b)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 223, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Attorney General Opinions. Analysis of §§ 39-17-1314 through 39-17-1316, OAG 95-118 (11/28/95).

Individual's right to recover from firearms and ammunition manufacturers, OAG 99-072 (3/22/99).

Possession of firearms on publicly owned property, OAG 04-020 (2/09/04).

Local government prohibition of the discharge of firearms.  OAG 13-66, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 70 (8/23/13).

T.C.A. § 39-17-1314 regulates firearms and ammunition.  A local zoning ordinance prohibiting all manufacturing in a residential area regulates land use.  The state law and the local ordinance regulate different subjects and therefore operate independently of one another.  As long as the zoning ordinance is not otherwise discriminatory in its application and enforcement and does not indirectly engage in regulation that is forbidden under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314, the ordinance will be enforceable.   However, the firearms statute could prohibit enforcement of a local ordinance that is merely an indirect way of regulating firearms or ammunition sellers and manufacturers.  OAG 17-26, 2017 Tenn. AG LEXIS 25 (4/11/2017).

T.C.A.§ 39-17-1311(a) prohibits possession of those weapons listed in T.C.A. § 39-17-1302(a) and prohibits possession of other types of weapons on recreational property owned or operated by state, county, or municipal governments at any time the person’s conduct does not strictly conform to the requirements of T.C.A. § 39-17-1311(b)(1).  T.C.A. § 39-11-1311(b)(1)(H) authorizes holders of valid handgun carry permits to possess a handgun in the places specifically identified in the subsection.  The statute is silent regarding the possession of rifles or shotguns in those places.  Thus, T.C.A. § 39-17-1311(b)(1)(H) permits the holder of a valid handgun carry permit to possess only handguns in the areas, places, and facilities that are specifically described therein.   Under T.C.A. § 39-17-1311(b)(1)(J), civilians with or without a valid handgun carry permit may possess handguns, rifles, and shotguns on the grounds of a public park, playground, civic center, or other building facility, area or property owned, used, or operated by any state, county, or municipal government for recreational purposes, but only while the civilian is engaged in one of the specific activities set forth in that subsection and only as long as the civilian’s conduct strictly conforms to the statutorily circumscribed activity.  In enacting T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1311 and 39-17-1314, the legislature has preempted the entire field of regulation of the possession and use of firearms, including the possession and use of firearms in public parks, playgrounds, civic centers, buildings, facilities, areas, and other  facilities and property owned by any state, county, or municipal government, or instrumentality thereof for recreational purposes.  Thus, counties and municipalities may not prohibit or otherwise regulate possession or use of firearms in or on those properties in any manner that conflicts with state law.  OAG 18-04, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 4 (1/31/2018).

39-17-1315. Written directive and permit to carry handguns.

      1. The following persons may carry handguns at all times pursuant to a written directive by the executive supervisor of the organization to which the person is or was attached or employed, regardless of the person's regular duty hours or assignments:
        1. Any law enforcement officer, police officer, bonded and sworn deputy sheriff, director, commissioner, county magistrate or retired law enforcement officer who is bonded and who, at the time of receiving the written directive, has successfully completed and, except for a law enforcement officer who has retired in good standing as certified by the chief law enforcement officer of the organization from which the officer retired, continues to successfully complete on an annual basis a firearm training program of at least eight (8) hours duration;
        2. Any director or full-time employee of the Tennessee emergency management agency in the performance of the director's or employee's duty;
        3. Any duly authorized representative or full-time employee of the department of correction who has been specifically designated by the commissioner of the department to execute warrants issued pursuant to § 40-28-121 or § 40-35-311 or to perform such other duties as specifically designated by the commissioner; or
        4. Any other officer or person authorized to carry handguns by this, or any other law of this state.
      2. A copy of the written directive shall be retained as a portion of the records of the particular law enforcement agency that shall issue the directive. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(1) shall prevent federal officers from carrying firearms as prescribed by federal law.
      1. Any duly elected and sworn constable in any county having a population of not less than eleven thousand one hundred (11,100) nor more than eleven thousand two hundred (11,200), according to the 1970 federal census or any subsequent federal census, and being a county in which constables retain law enforcement powers and duties under §§ 8-10-108, 40-6-210, 55-8-152, 57-5-202 and 57-9-101, are authorized to and may carry handguns at all times and may equip their vehicles with blue and red lights and sirens. The sheriff of such county shall issue a written directive or permit authorizing the constables to carry a handgun; provided, that each constable has completed the same eight-hour annual firearm training program as is required by this subsection (a).
      2. The county commission may, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote, require the constable to have in effect a liability policy or a corporate surety bond in an amount of not less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
    1. An individual, corporation or business entity is authorized to prohibit the possession of weapons by employees otherwise authorized by this subsection (b) on premises owned, operated or managed by the individual, corporation or business entity. Notice of the prohibition shall be posted or otherwise noticed to all affected employees.
    2. An individual, corporation, business entity or governmental entity or agent thereof is authorized to prohibit possession of weapons by any person otherwise authorized by this subsection (b), at meetings conducted by, or on premises owned, operated, managed or under control of the individual, corporation, business entity or governmental entity. Notice of the prohibition shall be posted or announced.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1029, § 10; 1993, ch. 471, §§ 2, 4; 1994, ch. 943, §§ 2-9, 11-13; 1995, ch. 434, § 1; 1996, ch. 905, § 1; 1999, ch. 498, § 1; 2003, ch. 144, § 1; 2007, ch. 318, § 1; 2007, ch. 586, § 3; 2012, ch. 727, § 8.

Sentencing Commission Comments.

This section establishes a significant change in Tennessee law with respect to handguns. In 1994, this section was substantially rewritten.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1993, ch. 471, § 4 provided that the amendment by that act shall have no effect unless it is approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the legislative body of any county to which it may apply, and that its approval or nonapproval shall be proclaimed by the presiding officer of such legislative body and certified to the secretary of state.

For the preamble to the act concerning transfers of certain functions relating to probation and parole services and the community correction grant program from the board of probation and parole to the department of correction, please refer to Acts 2012, ch. 727.

Acts 2012, ch. 727, § 63 provided that the implementation of the act, which amended subdivision (a)(1), shall be fully accomplished on or before January 1, 2013.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation.

Cross-References. Certain security guards prohibited from carrying firearms, § 62-35-134.

Department of safety, retired member, retention of weapon and badge, § 4-7-110.

Private protective services, title 62, ch. 35.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 28.114.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 25 Tenn. Juris., Weapons, §§ 5, 6.

Law Reviews.

Guns in Trunks: An Erosion of Tennessee's Employment-At-Will Rule?, 49 Tenn. B.J. 17 (2013).

“Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws (Clayton E. Cramer and David V. Kopel), 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 679 (1995).

Weapons in the Workplace: The Effect of Tennessee's Concealed Weapons Statute on Employer Liability, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 281 (1997).

Attorney General Opinions. Powers and duties of constables in Clay County, OAG 92-18 (2/28/92).

Authority of Morgan County constables to carry guns, OAG 93-62 (10/20/93).

Firearms for constables without law enforcement powers, OAG 94-112 (10/6/94).

Limits on sheriff's authority as to handgun permits, OAG 95-025 (3/28/95).

Authority of off duty officer to carry weapon on specific sites, OAG 99-024 (2/16/99).

Constables carrying firearms.  OAG 13-110, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 115 (12/27/13).

County employees carrying handguns while on duty, OAG 14-56, 2014 Tenn. AG Lexis 14-59 (5/19/14)

39-17-1316. Sales of dangerous weapons — Certification of purchaser — Exceptions — Licensing of dealers — Definitions.

    1. Any person appropriately licensed by the federal government may stock and sell firearms to persons desiring firearms; however, sales to persons who have been convicted of the offense of stalking, as prohibited by § 39-17-315, who are addicted to alcohol, who are ineligible to receive firearms under 18 U.S.C. §  922, or who have been judicially committed to a mental institution pursuant to title 33 or adjudicated as a mental defective are prohibited. For purposes of this subdivision (a)(1), the offense of violation of a protective order as prohibited by § 39-13-113 shall be considered a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 921.
    2. The provisions of this subsection (a) prohibiting the sale of a firearm to a person convicted of a felony shall not apply if:
      1. The person was pardoned for the offense;
      2. The conviction has been expunged or set aside; or
      3. The person's civil rights have been restored pursuant to title 40, chapter 29; and
      4. The person is not prohibited from possessing a firearm by § 39-17-1307.
    1. As used in this section, “firearm” has the meaning as defined in § 39-11-106, including handguns, long guns, and all other weapons that meet the definition except “antique firearms” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921.
    2. As used in this section, “gun dealer” means a person engaged in the business, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921, of selling, leasing, or otherwise transferring a firearm, whether the person is a retail dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise.
  1. Except with respect to transactions between persons licensed as dealers under 18 U.S.C. § 923, a gun dealer shall comply with the following before a firearm is delivered to a purchaser:
    1. The purchaser shall present to the dealer current identification meeting the requirements of subsection (f);
    2. The gun dealer shall complete a firearms transaction record as required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-929, and obtain the signature of the purchaser on the record;
    3. The gun dealer shall request by means designated by the bureau that the Tennessee bureau of investigation conduct a criminal history record check on the purchaser and shall provide the following information to the bureau:
      1. The federal firearms license number of the gun dealer;
      2. The business name of the gun dealer;
      3. The place of transfer;
      4. The name of the person making the transfer;
      5. The make, model, caliber and manufacturer's number of the firearm being transferred;
      6. The name, gender, race, and date of birth of the purchaser;
      7. The social security number of the purchaser, if one has been assigned; and
      8. The type, issuer and identification number of the identification presented by the purchaser; and
    4. The gun dealer shall receive a unique approval number for the transfer from the bureau and record the approval number on the firearms transaction record.
  2. Upon receipt of a request of the gun dealer for a criminal history record check, the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall immediately, during the gun dealer's telephone call or by return call:
    1. Determine, from criminal records and other information available to it, whether the purchaser is disqualified under subdivision (a)(1) from completing the purchase; and
    2. Notify the dealer when a purchaser is disqualified from completing the transfer or provide the dealer with a unique approval number indicating that the purchaser is qualified to complete the transfer.
    1. The Tennessee bureau of investigation may charge a reasonable fee, not to exceed ten dollars ($10.00), for conducting background checks and other costs incurred under this section, and shall be empowered to bill gun dealers for checks run.
    2. Funds collected by the Tennessee bureau of investigation pursuant to this section shall be deposited in a continuing deferred interest-bearing revenue fund that is created in the state treasury. This fund will not revert to the general fund on June 30 of any year. This fund shall be used to offset the costs associated with conducting background checks. By February 1 of each year the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall report to the judiciary committee of the senate and the judiciary committee of the house of representatives the amount of money collected pursuant to this section in excess of the costs associated with conducting background checks as required by this section. The excess money shall be appropriated by the general assembly to the Tennessee bureau of investigation for other law enforcement related purposes as it deems appropriate and necessary.
    1. Identification required of the purchaser under subsection (c) shall include one (1) piece of current, valid identification bearing a photograph and the date of birth of the purchaser that:
      1. Is issued under the authority of the United States government, a state, a political subdivision of a state, a foreign government, a political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental organization or an international quasi-governmental organization; and
      2. Is intended to be used for identification of an individual or is commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of an individual.
    2. If the identification presented by the purchaser under subdivision (f)(1)(A) does not include the current address of the purchaser, the purchaser shall present a second piece of current identification that contains the current address of the purchaser.
  3. The Tennessee bureau of investigation may require that the dealer verify the identification of the purchaser if that identity is in question by sending the thumbprints of the purchaser to the bureau.
  4. The Tennessee bureau of investigation shall establish a telephone number that shall be operational seven (7) days a week between the hours of eight o'clock a.m. and ten o'clock p.m. Central Standard Time (8:00 a.m. – 10:00 p.m. (CST)), except Christmas Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Independence Day, for the purpose of responding to inquiries from dealers for a criminal history record check under this section.
  5. No public employee, official or agency shall be held criminally or civilly liable for performing the investigations required by this section; provided the employee, official or agency acts in good faith and without malice.
  6. Upon the determination that receipt of a firearm by a particular individual would not violate this section, and after the issuance of a unique identifying number for the transaction, the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall destroy all records (except the unique identifying number and the date that it was assigned) associating a particular individual with a particular purchase of firearms.
  7. A law enforcement agency may inspect the records of a gun dealer relating to transfers of firearms in the course of a reasonable inquiry during a criminal investigation or under the authority of a properly authorized subpoena or search warrant.
    1. The following transactions or transfers are exempt from the criminal history record check requirement of subdivision (c)(3):
      1. Transactions between licensed:
        1. Importers;
        2. Manufacturers;
        3. Dealers; and
        4. Collectors who meet the requirements of subsection (b) and certify prior to the transaction the legal and licensed status of both parties;
      2. Transactions or transfers between a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer and a bona fide law enforcement agency or the agency's personnel. However, all other requirements of subsection (c) are applicable to a transaction or transfer under this subdivision (l )(1)(B); and
      3. Transactions by a gun dealer, as defined in subdivision (b)(2), making occasional sales, exchanges, or transfers of firearms that comprise all or part of the gun dealer's personal collection of firearms.
    2. The burden of proving the legality of any transaction or transfer under this subsection (l ) is upon the transferor.
  8. The director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation is authorized to make and issue all rules and regulations necessary to carry out this section.
  9. In addition to the other grounds for denial, the bureau shall deny the transfer of a firearm if the background check reveals information indicating that the purchaser has been charged with a crime for which the purchaser, if convicted, would be prohibited under state or federal law from purchasing, receiving, or possessing a firearm; and, either there has been no final disposition of the case, or the final disposition is not noted.
  10. Upon receipt of the criminal history challenge form indicating a purchaser's request for review of the denial, the bureau shall proceed with efforts to obtain the final disposition information. The purchaser may attempt to assist the bureau in obtaining the final disposition information. If neither the purchaser nor the bureau is able to obtain the final disposition information within fifteen (15) calendar days of the bureau's receipt of the criminal history challenge form, the bureau shall immediately notify the federal firearms licensee that the transaction that was initially denied is now a “conditional proceed.” A “conditional proceed” means that the federal firearms licensee may lawfully transfer the firearm to the purchaser.
  11. In any case in which the transfer has been denied pursuant to subsection (n), the inability of the bureau to obtain the final disposition of a case shall not constitute the basis for the continued denial of the transfer as long as the bureau receives written notice, signed and verified by the clerk of the court or the clerk's designee, that indicates that no final disposition information is available. Upon receipt of the letter by the bureau, the bureau shall immediately reverse the denial.
    1. It is an offense for a person to purchase or attempt to purchase a firearm knowing that the person is prohibited by state or federal law from owning, possessing or purchasing a firearm.
    2. It is an offense to sell or offer to sell a firearm to a person knowing that the person is prohibited by state or federal law from owning, possessing or purchasing a firearm.
    3. It is an offense to transfer a firearm to a person knowing that the person:
      1. Has been judicially committed to a mental institution or adjudicated as a mental defective unless the person's right to possess firearms has been restored pursuant to title 16; or
      2. Is receiving inpatient treatment, pursuant to title 33, at a treatment resource, as defined in § 33-1-101, other than a hospital.
    4. A violation of this subsection (q) is a Class A misdemeanor.
  12. The criminal history records check required by this section shall not apply to an occasional sale of a used or second-hand firearm by a person who is not engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 and 923.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1993, ch. 372, § 1; 1994, ch. 1001, §§ 1-6; 1995, ch. 371, § 1; 1996, ch. 1075, §§ 1, 2; 1998, ch. 1071, § 1; 2001, ch. 396, § 1; 2005, ch. 482, § 8; 2006, ch. 920, § 4; 2009, ch. 102, §§ 1, 2; 2009, ch. 195, § 2; 2009, ch. 578, § 9; 2013, ch. 236, § 36; 2017, ch. 185, §§ 1, 2; 2019, ch. 345, § 53; 2019, ch. 432, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 102, § 3 provided that the act, which amended subsection (c) and deleted former subsection (l ), shall apply to all firearms transactions occurring on or after July 1, 2009.

Acts 2009, ch. 195, § 1 provided that the act, which added § 39-17-1316(r) (now (q)), shall be known and may be cited as the “Coach Willard Ross Act of 2009.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by ch. 345 substituted “judiciary” for “criminal justice” preceding “committee of the house” in the fourth sentence of (e)(2).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 432 added (q)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 432, § 2. May 21, 2019.

Cross-References. Furnishing firearms or other harmful articles to patients or residents of mental institutions prohibited, § 33-3-904.

Penalties for Class A misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 25 Tenn. Juris., Weapons, §§ 3, 5.

Law Reviews.

Balancing Public Safety with the Rights of the Mentally Ill: The Benefit of a Behavioral Approach in Reducing Gun Violence in Tennessee, 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 671 (2015).

Attorney General Opinions. Although the Tennessee bureau of investigation can request an individual to provide social security number in an application for approval of a firearm purchase under certain conditions, the bureau may not deny approval of a firearm purchase solely upon the individual's refusal to supply a social security number, OAG 01-023 (2/14/01).

Tennessee has no specific provision of law governing the occasional sale of firearms, and since Tennessee law provides that federal licensing requirements apply to persons in this state, the federal law provision exempting occasional sales of firearms from licensing requirements applies. In Tennessee, persons who are not engaged in the business of dealing in firearms under federal law are not required to obtain a background check before making an occasional sale or transfer of a firearm pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-17-1316(c)(2).  OAG 16-44, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 44 (12/14/2016).

39-17-1317. Confiscation and disposition of confiscated weapons.

    1. Any weapon that is possessed, used, or sold in violation of the law shall be confiscated by a law enforcement officer and declared to be contraband by a court of record exercising criminal jurisdiction.
      1. The sheriff or chief of police for the jurisdiction where the weapon was confiscated may petition the court for permission to dispose of the weapon in accordance with this section.
      2. If the weapon was confiscated by a judicial district drug task force, then the director of the task force where the weapon was confiscated may petition the court for disposal of the weapon in accordance with this section.
      3. If the weapon was confiscated by the department of safety, then the commissioner of safety may petition the court for disposal of the weapon in accordance with this section.
      4. If the weapon was confiscated by the Tennessee bureau of investigation, then the director may petition the court for disposal of the weapon in accordance with this section.
  1. Any weapon declared contraband, secured by a law enforcement officer or agency after being abandoned, voluntarily surrendered to a law enforcement officer or agency, or obtained by a law enforcement agency, including through a buyback program, shall be, pursuant to a written order of the court:
    1. Sold in a public sale;
    2. Used for legitimate law enforcement purposes, at the discretion of the court; or
    3. Relinquished in accordance with subsection (i).
  2. If the weapon was confiscated, or obtained after being abandoned and secured, after being voluntarily surrendered, or through a buyback program, by a local law enforcement agency or a judicial district drug task force and if the court orders the weapon to be sold, then:
    1. It shall be sold at a public auction not later than six (6) months from the date of the court order. The sale shall be conducted by the sheriff of the county or the chief of police of the municipality in which it was seized or obtained;
    2. The proceeds from the sale shall be deposited in the county or municipal general fund and allocated solely for law enforcement purposes;
    3. The sale shall be advertised:
      1. In a daily or weekly newspaper circulated within the county. The advertisement shall run for not less than three (3) editions and not less than thirty (30) days prior to the sale; or
      2. By posting the sale on a website maintained by the state or a political subdivision of the state not less than thirty (30) days prior to the sale; and
    4. If required by federal or state law, then the sale can be conducted under contract with a licensed firearm dealer, whose commission shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the gross sales price. However, the dealer shall not hold any elective or appointed position within the federal, state, or local government in this state during any stage of the sales contract.
  3. If the weapon was confiscated, or obtained after being abandoned and secured, after being voluntarily surrendered, or through a buyback program, by the department of safety or the Tennessee bureau of investigation and if the court orders it to be sold, then it shall be turned over to the department of general services, which shall sell the weapon and dispose of the proceeds of the sale in the same manner as it currently does for other confiscated weapons.
  4. If the court orders the weapon to be retained and used for legitimate law enforcement purposes, then:
    1. Title to the weapon shall be placed in the law enforcement agency or judicial district drug task force retaining the weapon; and
    2. When the weapon is no longer needed for legitimate law enforcement purposes, it shall be sold in accordance with this section.
  5. If the weapon is sold, then the commissioner of safety or the director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation, the sheriff, chief of police, or director of the judicial district drug task force shall file an affidavit with the court issuing the sale order. The affidavit shall:
    1. Be filed within thirty (30) days after the sale;
    2. Identify the weapon, including any serial number, and shall state the time, date, and circumstances of the sale; and
    3. List the name and address of the purchaser and the price paid for the weapon.
  6. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section:
    1. A weapon that may be evidence in an official proceeding shall be retained or otherwise preserved in accordance with the rules or practices regulating the preservation of evidence. The weapon shall be sold or retained for legitimate law enforcement purposes not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one hundred eighty (180) days after the last legal proceeding involving the weapon; provided, that the requirements of subdivision (g)(2) have been met; and
    2. A law enforcement agency possessing a weapon declared contraband, retained as evidence in an official proceeding, secured after being abandoned, or surrendered by someone other than the owner shall use best efforts to determine whether the weapon has been lost by or stolen or borrowed from an innocent owner, and if so, the agency shall return the weapon to the owner, if ascertainable, unless that person is ineligible to possess, receive, or purchase such weapon under state or federal law.
    1. Except in accordance with this section, no weapon seized by law enforcement officials or judicial district drug task force members shall be used for law enforcement purposes, sold, or destroyed.
    2. No weapon seized by law enforcement officials or judicial district drug task force members shall be used for any personal use.
  7. Notwithstanding this section, if the chief of police, sheriff, director of the judicial district drug task force, commissioner of safety, or director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation, depending upon who confiscated or obtained the weapon, certifies to the court that a weapon is inoperable or unsafe, then the court shall order the weapon:
    1. Destroyed or recycled; or
    2. Transferred to a museum or historical society that displays such items to the public and is lawfully eligible to receive the weapon.
  8. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor.
  9. Nothing in this section shall authorize the purchase of any weapon, the possession of which is otherwise prohibited by law.
    1. The commissioner of safety, the director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation, the executive director of the Tennessee alcoholic beverage commission, the executive head of any local law enforcement agency, or the director of a judicial district drug task force may petition the criminal court or the court in the official's county having criminal jurisdiction for permission to exchange firearms that have previously been properly titled, as specified by this section, to the law enforcement agency or the drug task force for other firearms, ammunition, or body armor suitable for use by the law enforcement agency or drug task force.
    2. The exchange of firearms for the specified items used for legitimate law enforcement purposes is permitted only between the department of safety, the director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation, the executive director of the Tennessee alcoholic beverage commission, a local law enforcement agency, a judicial district drug task force, and a licensed and qualified law enforcement firearms dealer.
    3. No firearm obtained by a law enforcement agency through a buyback program shall be eligible to be exchanged under this subsection (l ).

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1991, ch. 111, §§ 1-6; 1992, ch. 734, §§ 1-5; 2006, ch. 798, § 2; 2009, ch. 116, § 1; 2010, ch. 629, §§ 1-11; 2011, ch. 159, § 1; 2015, ch. 408, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2015, ch. 408, § 2 provided that all provisions requiring the sale or destruction of weapons shall only apply to weapons obtained on or after July 1, 2015.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judges, § 13; 25 Tenn. Juris., Weapons, §§ 2, 7.

Attorney General Opinions. A judge does not have discretion pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-17-1317(a) to return a rifle used to violate the hunting laws, OAG 07-026 (3/9/07).

39-17-1318. New serial numbers for confiscated firearms.

  1. If any firearm confiscated and adjudicated as contraband pursuant to this part or any other law could be sold at public auction or retained by a law enforcement agency for law enforcement as provided in § 39-17-1317, but for the fact that the serial number of the firearm has been defaced or destroyed, the commissioner of safety or the sheriff or chief of police, as appropriate, of the county in which the firearm was confiscated may send the firearm to the director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation. The director shall assign the firearm a new serial number, permanently affix the number to the firearm, record the number in the bureau's computer system, and send the firearm back to the commissioner of safety, the sheriff or chief of police for disposition in accordance with this part.
  2. If any firearm assigned a new serial number pursuant to subsection (a) is later sold at public auction, ten percent (10%) of the proceeds of the sale shall be returned to the general fund of the state to defray the costs incurred by the director in administering this section.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1991, ch. 111, §§ 7, 8.

39-17-1319. Handgun possession prohibited — Exceptions.

  1. As used in this section and § 39-17-1320, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Handgun” means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm of any description, loaded or unloaded, from which any shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged, the length of the barrel of which, not including any revolving, detachable, or magazine breech, does not exceed twelve inches (12"); and
    2. “Juvenile” means any person less than eighteen (18) years of age.
  2. Except as provided in this section, it is an offense for a juvenile to knowingly possess a handgun.
    1. Illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile is a delinquent act and, in addition to any other disposition authorized by law, the juvenile may be required to perform not more than one hundred (100) hours of community service work to be specified by the judge, and the juvenile's driving privileges shall be suspended for a period of one (1) year in accordance with the procedure set out in title 55, chapter 10, part 7.
    2. A second or subsequent violation of this section is a delinquent act and, in addition to any other disposition authorized by law, the juvenile may be required to perform not less than one hundred (100) nor more than two hundred (200) hours of community service work to be specified by the judge, and the juvenile's driving privileges shall be suspended for a period of two (2) years in accordance with the procedure set out in title 55, chapter 10, part 7.
    3. Any handgun illegally possessed in violation of this section shall be confiscated and disposed of in accordance with § 39-17-1317.
    1. It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the juvenile is:
      1. In attendance at a hunter's safety course or a firearms safety course;
      2. Engaging in practice in the use of a firearm or target shooting at an established range authorized by the governing body of the jurisdiction in which such range is located or any other area where the discharge of a firearm is not prohibited;
      3. Engaging in an organized competition involving the use of a firearm, or participating in or practicing for a performance by an organized group which is exempt from federal income taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)), as amended, and which uses firearms as part of the performance;
      4. Hunting or trapping pursuant to a valid license issued to the juvenile pursuant to title 70;
      5. Accompanied by the juvenile's parent or guardian and is being instructed by the adult or guardian in the use of the handgun possessed by the juvenile;
      6. On real property which is under the control of an adult and has the permission of that adult and the juvenile's parent or legal guardian to possess a handgun;
      7. Traveling to or from any activity described in subdivision (d)(1) with an unloaded gun; or
      8. At the juvenile's residence and with the permission of the juvenile's parent or legal guardian, possesses a handgun and is justified in using physical force or deadly force.
    2. For purposes of subdivision (d)(1)(G), a handgun is “unloaded” if:
      1. There is not a cartridge in the chamber of the handgun;
      2. There is not a cartridge in the cylinder of the handgun if the handgun is a revolver; or
      3. The handgun, and the ammunition for the handgun, are not carried on the person of a juvenile or are not in such close proximity to the juvenile that the juvenile could readily gain access to the handgun and the ammunition and load the handgun.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part to the contrary, this section shall govern a juvenile who possesses a handgun.

Acts 1994, ch. 802, § 1.

Cross-References. Delinquent act defined, § 37-1-102.

Juvenile court proceedings, title 37, ch. 1.

39-17-1320. Providing handguns to juveniles — Penalties.

  1. It is an offense for a person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly to provide a handgun with or without remuneration to any person that the person providing the handgun knows or has reason to believe is a juvenile in violation of § 39-17-1319.
  2. It is an offense for a parent or guardian intentionally, knowingly or recklessly to provide a handgun to a juvenile or permit a juvenile to possess a handgun, if the parent or guardian knows of a substantial risk that the juvenile will use a handgun to commit a felony.
  3. Unlawfully providing or permitting a juvenile to possess a handgun in violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor and in violation of subsection (b) is a Class D felony.

Acts 1994, ch. 802, § 1.

Cross-References. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another, § 39-11-402.

Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony, § 39-11-403.

Parties to offenses, § 39-11-401.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class D felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1321. Possession of handgun while under influence — Penalty.

  1. Notwithstanding whether a person has a permit issued pursuant to § 39-17-1315 or § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366, it is an offense for a person to possess a handgun while under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substance or controlled substance analogue.
  2. It is an offense for a person to possess a firearm if the person is both:
    1. Within the confines of an establishment open to the public where liquor, wine or other alcoholic beverages, as defined in § 57-3-101(a), or beer, as defined in § 57-6-102, are served for consumption on the premises; and
    2. Consuming any alcoholic beverage listed in subdivision (b)(1).
    1. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. In addition to the punishment authorized by subdivision (c)(1), if the violation is of subsection (a), occurs in an establishment described in subdivision (b)(1), and the person has a handgun permit issued pursuant to § 39-17-1351 or §  39-17-1366, such permit shall be suspended in accordance with § 39-17-1352 for a period of three (3) years.

Acts 1994, ch. 943, § 10; 1997, ch. 476, § 4; 2010, ch. 1009, § 2; 2012, ch. 848, § 22; 2019, ch. 479, § 16.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1009 was repassed over the governor's veto on June 4, 2010.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, inserted “or § 39-17-1366” in (a) and (c)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Defense to prosecution under § 39-17-1308 not applicable, OAG 98-0151 (8/12/98).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Inevitable Discovery.

Inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply where: (1) defendant was subjected to an improper stop and frisk; (2) a revolver was found on defendant's person; and (3) the officers did not become aware of defendant's intoxication, which would have made defendant's carrying of the gun unlawful under T.C.A. § 39-17-1321(a), until after the frisk. State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. May 31, 2012).

39-17-1322. Defenses.

  1. A person shall not be charged with or convicted of a violation under this part if the person possessed, displayed or employed a handgun in justifiable self-defense or in justifiable defense of another during the commission of a crime in which that person or the other person defended was a victim.
  2. A person who discharges a firearm within the geographical limits of a municipality shall not be deemed to have violated any ordinance in effect or be subject to any citation or fine the municipality may impose for discharging a firearm within the limits of the municipality if it is determined that when the firearm was discharged the person was acting in justifiable self-defense, defense of property, defense of another, or to prevent a criminal offense from occurring.

Acts 1994, ch. 943, § 1; 2018, ch. 599, § 1.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 599, § 2. March 23, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Instructions.

Trial court did not improperly advised defendant that if he testified that he had acted in self-defense, the jury would be instructed that he was engaged in unlawful activity by being a felon in possession of a firearm because, at the time of the trial, being a felon in possession of a firearm could constitute unlawful activity for purposes of the self-defense statute. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that defendant had no duty to retreat because it found that defendant was acting unlawfully by carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed and the Perrier decision was not limited to convicted felons in possession of a firearm. State v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2020).

2. Self-defense.

Because the jury found that defendant did not employ the handgun in justifiable self-defense pursuant to this section, it was able to consider his commission of the employment of a firearm offense in determining whether he was engaged in unlawful activity pursuant to the self-defense statute. The defeat of a weapons charge pursuant to this section meant that the jury could not consider the conduct that was the subject of the weapons charge in determining whether defendant was engaged in unlawful activity for purposes of T.C.A. § 39-11-611. State v. Perrier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016), aff'd, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

For purposes of self-defense, the duty to retreat does not mean that a person cannot defend herself or himself as a defendant may still defend himself even to the point of using deadly force, and may be acquitted of a weapons offense if a jury finds that his self-defense was justifiable; those provisions are not mutually exclusive. State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree murder conviction and to reject his claim of self-defense because it showed that he was angry with the victim for taking his gun, defendant forced his way into the apartment and shot the victim several times, defendant testified that the victim fell after the first gunshot, and defendant's gun was still in the victim's waistband after the shooting. State v. Hill-Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2017), appeal denied, State v. Hill-Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

3. Self-Defense Rejected.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because defendant and a codefendant in the car which defendant was driving exchanged gunfire with codefendants in another car. Several eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from defendant's car, while the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of a youth on a sidewalk that was stopped by codefendants in the other car. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

39-17-1323. Commission of certain offenses while wearing a body vest.

  1. A person commits an offense who knowingly wears a body vest, when acting either alone or with one (1) or more other persons, while committing:
    1. Any felony whose statutory elements involve the use or threat of violence to a human being;
    2. Any burglary, car-jacking, theft of a motor vehicle, or arson; or
    3. Any felony offense involving a controlled substance or controlled substance analogue.
  2. For purposes of this section, a “body vest” means a bullet-resistant soft armor providing, as a minimum standard, the level of protection known as threat level I which shall mean at least seven (7) layers of bullet-resistant material providing protection from three (3) shots of one hundred fifty-eight-grain lead ammunition fired from a .38 caliber handgun at a velocity of eight hundred fifty feet (850') per second.
  3. The unlawful wearing of a body vest is a Class E felony.
  4. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the possession of a body vest for lawful purposes.
  5. Any sentence imposed under this section shall run consecutively to any other sentence imposed for the conviction of the underlying offense.

Acts 1997, ch. 321, § 1; 2012, ch. 848, § 23.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1324. Offense of possessing firearm or antique firearm during commission or attempt to commit dangerous felony.

  1. It is an offense to possess a firearm or antique firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.
  2. It is an offense to employ a firearm or antique firearm during the:
    1. Commission of a dangerous felony;
    2. Attempt to commit a dangerous felony;
    3. Flight or escape from the commission of a dangerous felony; or
    4. Flight or escape from the attempt to commit a dangerous felony.
  3. A person may not be charged with a violation of subsection (a) or (b) if possessing or employing a firearm or antique firearm is an essential element of the underlying dangerous felony as charged. In cases where possession or employing a firearm or antique firearm are elements of the charged offense, the state may elect to prosecute under a lesser offense wherein possession or employing a firearm or antique firearm is not an element of the offense.
  4. A violation of subsection (a) or (b) is a specific and separate offense, which shall be pled in a separate count of the indictment or presentment and tried before the same jury and at the same time as the dangerous felony. The jury shall determine the innocence or guilt of the defendant unless the defendant and the state waive the jury.
    1. A sentence imposed for a violation of subsection (a) or (b) shall be served consecutive to any other sentence the person is serving at the time of the offense or is sentenced to serve for conviction of the underlying dangerous felony.
    2. A person sentenced for a violation of subsection (a) or (b) shall not be eligible for pretrial diversion pursuant to title 40, chapter 15, judicial diversion pursuant to § 40-35-313, probation pursuant to § 40-35-303, community correction pursuant to title 40, chapter 36, participation in a drug court program or any other program whereby the person is permitted supervised or unsupervised release into the community prior to service of the entire mandatory minimum sentence imposed less allowable sentence credits earned and retained as provided in § 40-35-501(j).
  5. In a trial for a violation of subsection (a) or (b), where the state is also seeking to have the person sentenced under subdivision (g)(2) or (h)(2), the trier of fact shall first determine whether the person possessed or employed a firearm or antique firearm. If the trier of fact finds in the affirmative, proof of a qualifying prior felony conviction pursuant to this section shall then be presented to the trier of fact.
    1. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class D felony, punishable by a mandatory minimum three-year sentence to the department of correction.
    2. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class D felony, punishable by a mandatory minimum five-year sentence to the department of correction, if the defendant, at the time of the offense, had a prior felony conviction.
    1. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class C felony, punishable by a mandatory minimum six-year sentence to the department of correction.
    2. A violation of subsection (b) is a Class C felony, punishable by a mandatory minimum ten-year sentence to the department of correction, if the defendant, at the time of the offense, had a prior felony conviction.
  6. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Dangerous felony” means:
      1. Attempt to commit first degree murder, as defined in §§ 39-12-101 and 39-13-202;
      2. Attempt to commit second degree murder, as defined in §§ 39-13-210 and 39-12-101;
      3. Voluntary manslaughter, as defined in § 39-13-211;
      4. Carjacking, as defined in § 39-13-404;
      5. Especially aggravated kidnapping, as defined in § 39-13-305;
      6. Aggravated kidnapping, as defined in § 39-13-304;
      7. Especially aggravated burglary, as defined in § 39-14-404;
      8. Aggravated burglary, as defined in § 39-14-403;
      9. Especially aggravated stalking, as defined in § 39-17-315(d);
      10. Aggravated stalking, as defined in § 39-17-315(c);
      11. Initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine, as defined in § 39-17-435;
      12. A felony involving the sale, manufacture, distribution or possession with intent to sell, manufacture or distribute a controlled substance or controlled substance analogue defined in part 4 of this chapter; or
      13. Any attempt, as defined in § 39-12-101, to commit a dangerous felony;
      1. “Prior conviction” means that the person serves and is released or discharged from, or is serving, a separate period of incarceration or supervision for the commission of a dangerous felony prior to or at the time of committing a dangerous felony on or after January 1, 2008;
      2. “Prior conviction” includes convictions under the laws of any other state, government or country that, if committed in this state, would constitute a dangerous felony. If a felony offense in a jurisdiction other than Tennessee is not identified as a dangerous felony in this state, it shall be considered a prior conviction if the elements of the felony are the same as the elements for a dangerous felony; and
    2. “Separate period of incarceration or supervision” includes a sentence to any of the sentencing alternatives set out in § 40-35-104(c)(3)-(9). A dangerous felony shall be considered as having been committed after a separate period of incarceration or supervision if the dangerous felony is committed while the person was:
      1. On probation, parole or community correction supervision for a dangerous felony;
      2. Incarcerated for a dangerous felony;
      3. Assigned to a program whereby the person enjoys the privilege of supervised release into the community, including, but not limited to, work release, educational release, restitution release or medical furlough for a dangerous felony; or
      4. On escape status from any correctional institution when incarcerated for a dangerous felony.
  7. Any person convicted under this section who has a prior conviction under this section shall be sentenced to incarceration with the department of correction for not less than fifteen (15) years. A person sentenced under this subsection (j) shall serve one hundred percent (100%) of the sentence imposed.

Acts 2007, ch. 594, § 1; 2009, ch. 583, § 1; 2012, ch. 848, § 24; 2012, ch. 950, § 1; 2019, ch. 279, § 4.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “or antique firearm” throughout.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 279, § 5. May 2, 2019.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class C and D felonies, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Dangerous Felony.

Petitioner's counsel was ineffective for advising defendant to plead guilty to employing a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony under this section because petitioner's underlying felonies of aggravated robbery were not qualified prior felonies, as they were not listed within the statutory definition of dangerous felonies. Bowman v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 530 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Defendant's conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of an aggravated robbery was reversed and that count was remanded for a new trial on the offense of employing a firearm during the commission of an aggravated burglary, because aggravated robbery was not statutorily permissible as a predicate dangerous felony under this section. State v. Richardson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2018).

Defendant's sentences were improperly enhanced to a ten-year mandated minimum sentence because none of his prior felony convictions listed in the presentment were dangerous felonies. State v. Stumbo, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2018).

Petitioner waived his double jeopardy claim by entering his guilty plea in count two to possession of a firearm, but in any event, he was not entitled to relief because a directed verdict on count two, which was contingent on the jury's guilty verdict in count one, first degree murder, did not preclude him from being retried on count two; the directed verdict was entered because count one was not an enumerated dangerous felony, and when the verdict on count one was set aside, petitioner returned to the position he held post-indictment. Evans v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 769 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 15, 2018).

2. Sufficiency of Indictment.

Although an indictment did not name the underlying predicate felony for purposes of this statute, there was no possibility of confusion or lack of notice because there was only one dangerous felony that could serve as the underlying predicate felony; defendant needed to only look back to the carjacking count of the indictment, the only “dangerous felony” count in the indictment and only other charge against him, and would have notice of the predicate felony relied on for the firearm charge. State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2015), aff'd, 505 S.W.3d 492, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2016).

Count of the indictment charging defendant with employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony was not void for failing to name the underlying predicate felony where the record made it clear that the attempted second degree murder offense, which was the only dangerous felony with which defendant was charged, served as the predicate felony. State v. Perrier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2016), aff'd, 536 S.W.3d 388, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2017).

Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing defendant's conviction and dismissing the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because the fact that the indictment did not say which of the two possible predicate felonies would be used to prove the “dangerous felony” element of the firearm offense did not mean that it fell below the minimum required to meet the constitutional and statutory mandates of apprising defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and enabling him to adequately prepare a defense to the charge. State v. Duncan, 505 S.W.3d 480, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2016).

Indictment was sufficient, even though it failed to name the underlying felony for the charge that defendant employed a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, because he knew that the possible underlying dangerous felonies were to be tried in the same trial as the firearm charge and therefore was not surprised. State v. Dobson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 927 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2017).

Count charging defendant with employing a firearm during the commission of dangerous felony was defective because it failed to provide him with adequate notice of the charged offense, as the State did not indict defendant, independent of the employing a firearm charge, for any enumerated dangerous felony. Neither of the remaining charges in the indictment, first degree murder and false report, could have provided defendant adequate notice of the dangerous felony upon which the State would rely to obtain a conviction for the firearm charge because neither of the charges were enumerated felonies. State v. Ayers, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 928 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2016).

Defendant was indicted for multiple counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated burglary, and although the count charging him with employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony did not state the underlying felony, he knew that the possible underlying felonies were to be tried in the same trial as the firearm charge, and was even informed before trial that the firearm count referred to the aggravated burglary charge; defendant was not surprised at having to make a defense against the possible underlying felonies. State v. Sherrod, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 607 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

3. Alternate Theories of Guilt.

In a prosecution for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, the state was entitled to pursue alternate theories that defendant was guilty as a principal or as an aider and abettor, and doing so did not implicate the doctrines of judicial estoppel or equitable estoppel. State v. Fayne, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2013), aff'd, 451 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2014).

4. Lesser Included Offenses.

Possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony qualifies as a lesser included offense of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Fayne, 451 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2014).

5. Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony did not violate this statute or the prohibitions against double jeopardy because that a firearm was the means of accomplishing the force or intimidation for the carjacking did not transform the use of the firearm into an essential element of the carjacking. State v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2015), aff'd, 505 S.W.3d 492, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2016).

Defendant claimed that a conviction for both employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the predicate felony violated the principles of double jeopardy, but it was clear that the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments, and defendant was not entitled to relief. State v. Pirtle, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

There is no clear intent that this employing or possessing statute be construed as allowing separate firearm convictions for each felony committed in a single transaction; there is only one unit of prosecution for possession with intent to go armed or employing a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony where multiple felonies are committed as part of a single transaction, and the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments functions to prevent prosecutors from exceeding the legislatively authorized punishment. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Defendant's multiple convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violated double jeopardy; the single offending act was the employment of a handgun during the shooting event, regardless of the number of firearms used by the various individuals, the number bullets fired by defendant, or the number of predicate felonies arising out of that single transaction, and the appropriate unit of prosecution was a single conviction for the felonious conduct during one transaction, regardless of whether the conviction was garnered under a theory of criminal responsibility or as a principal actor. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Defendant's convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony did not violate double jeopardy or T.C.A. 39-17-1324(c), as the State relied on force by intimidation not by use of a weapon. State v. Martin, 505 S.W.3d 492, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2016).

Defendant's convictions for attempted second degree murder and employment of a firearm during that offense did not violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy and could stand. State v. Sample, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2017).

Defendant's multiple convictions for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, based on convictions for the attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter involving multiple victims when defendant fired a single weapon in a shooting incident, did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

6. Evidence.

Successor judge, who heard only defendant's motion for a new trial after his appointment under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1), could not properly act as a thirteenth juror in this case because credibility was an overriding issue. The validity of defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony depended upon the credibility determinations by the jury and ultimately the judge, acting as a thirteenth juror; other than the victims'  own statements, no one provided any independent knowledge of what was taken from the victims, that it was taken at gunpoint, or that defendant entered the residence forcibly. State v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 262 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2013), rev'd, 453 S.W.3d 889, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2015).

7. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, as his accomplice testified they participated in an aggravated burglary, the victim testified the gunman was much taller than he was, and defendant was much taller than both the victim and accomplice. State v. Fayne, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2013), aff'd, 451 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2014).

Even if the evidence did not establish that defendant was the gunman, under T.C.A. § 39-11-402(2), the jury could have properly found him responsible for his accomplice's employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (aggravated burglary) because the evidence established that defendant aided the accomplice in committing the burglary. State v. Fayne, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2013), aff'd, 451 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2014).

Facts were sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction because the jury specifically found that defendant was guilty and that the specific dangerous felony was attempted first degree murder, despite having convicted him of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of attempted first degree murder; thus, the verdicts are seemingly inconsistent; nonetheless, inconsistent verdicts were allowed. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

An investigator's testimony that he recovered a photograph from defendant's cellular telephone in which there was cash next to a handgun, and that a handgun was found in a bedroom defendant shared with his sister, supported a finding that defendant constructively possessed the handgun. State v. Kincaid, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2016).

Evidence that the victim and defendants were all members of a street gang, that one defendant possessed a handgun, that defendants beat the victim until he was unconscious, and that the victim was in a medically-induced coma for nine weeks and needed physically therapy to walk and talk again was sufficient to support defendants'  convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because defendant and one of the victims had a dispute over money; on the day of the incident, defendant sped through traffic to cut off the vehicle carrying the two victims; defendant waved a handgun and exited his vehicle, demanding money; defendant took money given to him by one of the victims; he then shot the decedent four times, several times while the victim was already down, shot the other victim once, and fired at least nine rounds; and defendant then discarded his handgun, fled the scene, and hid inside of a truck. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon because, without a prior disagreement or provocation, defendant drew a gun while the victim's back was turned, pointed it at the victim, and shot him when he attempted to escape, the shooting was a substantial step toward killing the victim, firing the gun was an intentional act, the victim believed that defendant intended to rob him, defendant did not attempt to render aid to the victim, left the scene, and hid in his mother's attic, and the parties stipulated that defendant had two prior felony convictions involving violence and/or drugs. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that attempted second degree murder was a natural and probable consequence of an intended aggravated robbery. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission of attempted second degree murder under the theory of criminal responsibility. State v. Henderson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2016).

Evidence that defendant got out of the car to commit the aggravated assaults, chose to get up off the ground and return fire, and he and his accomplice fired numerous shots allowed the jury to reject the self-defense claim and convict him of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during attempt to commit a dangerous felony. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because defendant shot the unarmed victim three times and fled the scene when the victim raised his hands after approaching defendant regarding a recent break-in and theft at the victim's home where defendant was in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner and he intended to go armed when he shot the victim. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Despite the acquittal on the attempted first degree murder charge, the State presented evidence from which a trier of fact could have found that defendants, by shooting eight times each into a nearby vehicle containing six people, committed attempted murder, and that they employed a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; thus, the evidence supported the attempted second degree murder conviction. State v. Pirtle, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Eyewitnesses testified that the first shots came from the defendant's car, the forensic evidence established that the victim was likely hit by a bullet that came from defendant's car, and the jury chose not to credit defendant's theory of self-defense or defense of others, which was not second-guessed on appeal; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and the corresponding counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Because the evidence supported defendant's attempted murder conviction and he used a firearm to commit the offense, the evidence was sufficient to support his employing a firearm during a dangerous felony conviction. State v. Vinson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony. Although the gun used to shoot the victim was not recovered and no bullets were introduced into evidence, the presence of gunshot wounds on the victim's legs, the cartridge casings, and the testimony of the victim and the responding police officers that the victim had been shot was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have concluded that defendant employed a firearm to commit the dangerous felony of attempted second degree murder. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2016).

Evidence supported convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, and the employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous offense, as defendant admitted helping plan the robbery, driving the assailants to the victim's home, and that he expected to be compensated, and the jury determined the offenses against the victim's friend were a natural and probable consequence of attempting to rob the murder victim at gunpoint. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 714 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2017).

Defendant's attempted murder and firearms convictions were supported by evidence that at least 15 shots were filed at the victims'  home, immediately prior to the shooting someone claiming to be defendant called an individual an asked her to get in touch with the male victim and then defendant asked the victim if he had any “beef” with defendant moments before shots were fired, and the casings recovered from the scene matched cartridge casings found in a vehicle where defendant was a passenger. State v. Lagrone, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 751 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because it was clear that the bedroom the handguns were found in belonged to defendant, he had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the handguns, and the handguns were loaded and within the immediate proximity of the contraband. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017).

Evidence that two defendants shot firearms during the commission of attempted first degree murder, and that first defendant stipulated to a prior felony conviction at the time of the shooting supported their convictions for employing a firearm during a felony, and by a convicted felon as to first defendant. State v. Burgess, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Sufficient evidence demonstrated defendant's guilt of possessing a firearm with intent to go armed during commission of a dangerous felony because (1) the possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver was a serious felony, and (2) a loaded gun found near a large amount of marijuana, plastic bags, scales, and ammunition let a jury infer the gun was possessed with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Watkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because he committed an aggravated burglary by entering the victim's home brandishing a weapon with the intent to steal items from her home; and aggravated burglary constituted a dangerous felony under this statute. State v. Bertrand, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle, in which a backpack containing marijuana and a pistol were found on the front passenger-side floorboard in plain sight when the police stopped defendant. In addition, the vehicle matched the description given by a confidential informant, and it appeared at the same location and time the officers expected a drug sale to take place. State v. Collins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's identity as the shooter because the victim knew defendant, the victim testified regarding his unique haircut and gait, the jury was presented with video of the shooter as well as video of defendant filmed with the same equipment at the same location under similar circumstances, the shooter's appearance was consistent with defendant's in physique, movement, and general hairstyle, both had a similarly shaped tattoo in the same location, the shooter and defendant appeared to be wearing the same shoes, and the victim testified that he was certain the shooter depicted on film was defendant. State v. Myles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 787 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence that defendant and his co-defendant approached the victim in the driveway of his parent's home, pointed a gun at his head and ordered him to the ground, they drove away in the victim's car, they were apprehended a short distance from the victim's wrecked car, and defendant matched the victim's description of the perpetrator was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, carjacking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Perkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 892 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

There was ample evidence defendant used a firearm during the attempted first degree murder, as the victim testified that defendant shot at him. State v. Linzy, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 786 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for multiple counts of employing a firearm during attempted first degree murder because witnesses testified that defendant chased seven unarmed victims, without provocation, fired at least eleven gunshots at the victims, and one of the victims died as the result of a gunshot wound to the victim's neck, which was fired at the victim in relatively close proximity. Defendant then rejoined defendant's friends and discussed the events of the night, including the fact that defendant fired shots. State v. Sims, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2017).

Defendant's argument that he could not form the requisite specific intent to commit the offenses due to his alleged intoxication was rejected by the jury, and thus, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated burglary, burglary of a vehicle, two counts of theft, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Goss, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that defendant had constructive possession of cocaine, a firearm, and ammunition because the verdict reflected that the jury credited the proof that defendant lived at the home where the crack cocaine, firearm, and ammunition were found; officers found defendant's driver's license on a bedside table and a box of baggies containing crack cocaine in the master bedroom closet, and they saw both male and female clothing in the closet. State v. Reed, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim identified defendant, officers recovered the victim's scarf from the apartment where defendant was staying and recovered a gun and a cellular phone which the victim recognized as similar to the ones possessed by defendant during the attack, and DNA consistent with the victim's DNA was found on swabs taken from defendant. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because a loaded handgun was found during a traffic stop under the passenger seat of the car in which defendant was sitting in close proximity to a jar of marijuana and defendant's feet. The fact that the gun was loaded and within the close immediate proximity of the contraband established defendant's intent to go armed and demonstrated a nexus between the firearm and the drugs. State v. Clay, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim identified defendant as the perpetrator in both a photographic line-up following the offenses and at trial; the victim stated that she recognized defendant as the perpetrator by his eyes, and she identified a photograph of the gun that defendant possessed during the attack. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

Circumstantial evidence connecting defendant to the cocaine and a handgun, including the discovery of both under a car at a location identified in a phone call defendant placed from jail, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. State v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (Tenn. July 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary of the victim while employing a firearm because the victim testified he woke up bound on his couch with a handgun pointed to the back of his head as men raided his apartment; the men stole the victim's 12-gauge shotgun, AK-47, .22 long rifle, computers, tablets, and his wallet; defendant's ex-girlfriend testified that she saw defendant in her apartment with a shotgun, a ski mask, a duffle bag carrying a handgun, and a check with the victim's name on it; and, upon searching the ex-girlfriend's apartment, officers found the victim's shotgun and ammunition, his military ID, and his small computer, and they also found a handgun and a ski mask. State v. Loyde, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence that defendant entered the victim's residence through a window, shot the victim, and later gave a written statement admitting to breaking and entering into the residence and shooting the victim supported defendant's convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Stitts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because two witnesses testified that defendant and the intended victim were arguing immediately before the shooting, a witness saw defendant walk out of his home with a gun and shoot at the intended victim, the witness then saw the victim fall to the ground after the shot was fired, and two witnesses testified that before the shooting defendant told them to get out of the way because he was about to shoot the intended victim. State v. Williamson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2018).

Evidence that defendant and his accomplice fired at least 12 shots at the victims was sufficient to show that defendant intentionally shot the victims with the knowledge that shooting them was reasonably certain to kill them and thus, supported defendant's convictions for attempted second-degree murder and unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. State v. Orozco, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2018).

Defendant's admission that he rented the motel room, he owned and possessed the pistol, and that he was selling marijuana and methamphetamine was sufficient to prove that defendant possessed the pistol with intent to go armed during the commission of the marijuana offense, a dangerous felony. State v. Mahaffey, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2018).

Victim's testimony that defendant entered his residence with a gun and employed the gun during the burglary and robbery was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for employing a firearm during aggravated burglary. State v. Gray, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2018).

Defendant entered the victims'  apartment armed with a handgun and pointed the gun at the victims while demanding money, and thus the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated burglary. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Since defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, an enumerated dangerous felony, and defendant testified to carrying the firearm found on his person for protection, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm with intent to go armed. State v. Evans, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because the evidence was sufficient for the underlying felony of possession with intent to sell and deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine—as defendant allowed defendant's house to be used as the location for a drug venture—and defendant admitted that a revolver found under a couch of defendant's house belonged to defendant. State v. Moore, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2019).

Because the evidence reflected defendant used a firearm in an attempted first degree murder, it supported his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Russell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Since there was sufficient evidence that defendant possessed a firearm while committing possession of cocaine and marijuana with an intent to sell or deliver, a dangerous felony, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Gill, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as to the first victim because it showed that they had two separate altercations prior to the shooting, during the fight defendant pulled a gun from his boot and aimed it at the victim, and when he fired the gun through the wall it missed the victim and hit the second victim. State v. Jenkins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony because a trooper recovered a firearm and a baggy containing marijuana and pills from defendant's person during a search of his vehicle. State v. Barnett, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because it showed that defendant found the victim hiding in a closet, he put a gun to the victim's head and pulled the trigger as she begged for her life, the gun jammed, and defendant, unable to get the gun to fire, left the house. State v. Burrow, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because it showed that a loaded rifle sat within feet of defendant prior to arrest. While the subsequent investigation revealed the rifle belonged to defendant's father, nothing in the record disputed the jury's finding that defendant possessed the gun as he prepared to distribute morphine to the three individuals in his home. State v. Alexander, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony because it showed that both defendants showed up at the home armed with guns and shot at the house with the intent to kill the people inside and the uncontroverted testimony at trial named the people who were in the home at the time the shots were fired. State v. Avant, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019).

All three defendants were involved in the events that led up to and included the victim's murder, and there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that an accomplice's testimony was corroborated and to sustain the convictions for each defendant for first degree murder, conspiracy, attempt, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment; they all met to discuss killing someone in retaliation for the murder of one defendant's sister earlier that day, and witnesses identified them. State v. Clayton, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of knowingly possessing a controlled substance with intent to sell and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because the evidence established that defendant constructively possessed the drugs and gun, as officers who responded to the scene testified there were men's clothing and shoes laying around the room, the beds were disheveled and there was a lot of baggage in the room, and there was no evidence of items belonging to a women in the room. State v. Brandon, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Because the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's attempted second degree murder conviction and showed he used a firearm to commit the offense, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction. State v. Wilkins, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

That the handgun found under defendant's mattress belonged to him, that he had the ability to exercise dominion and control over it, and that it was within the immediate proximity of the contraband established defendant's intent to go armed and demonstrated a nexus between the firearm and the drugs. State v. Perez, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2020).

Defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder and other offenses because witnesses testified that the victim was the primary aggressor failed because a reasonable juror could have found that defendant's self-defense claim was not well-founded given the victim's testimony that he had not drawn his gun when defendant opened fire and that defendant turned and walked toward the victim when the victim came outside, engaging further rather than continuing to walk away. State v. Cole, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because the victim's identification of defendant in a photographic lineup and at trial was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator, and the jury could consider defendant's accomplice's testimony because it was sufficiently corroborated by the victim's testimony. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions because it showed that a co-defendant and defendant made a plan to “hit a lick” on Hispanic people, obtained a working magazine for the malfunctioning handgun, armed themselves, and asked another co-defendant to drive them around town to identify vulnerable targets. After choosing a house, the co-defendant and defendant walked back to the house, fired two shots into the air, and ordered the victims onto the ground, one of the men took a victim's wallet, and when they were surprised by the victims inside the house opening the door, the co-defendant and defendant opened fire, striking the house and four people present. State v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020).

Testimony that defendant drove the vehicle from which two weapons fired multiple gunshots and evidence that three victims were shot and one died from her wounds permitted the jury to infer defendant knew that firing a gun at the home which he knew to be filled with people could have resulted in any of their deaths and thus supported defendant's convictions for second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and possession of a firearm during the attempt. State v. Parham, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 15, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator because the victim testified to being robbed by masked and armed men in the victim's home, a police officer saw an individual matching the description of one of the assailants, a police dog tracked the individual to where defendant came out from behind a shed and said, “I give up,” a gun was found in a nearby trash can, the victim identified defendant in a show-up identification, and defendant made incriminating statements during recorded telephone calls while in jail. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support second and third defendants'  convictions for aggravated robbery, theft, conspiracy, aggravated burglary, and firearms offenses, as it showed that first defendant devised a plan to conduct a home invasion and steal stuff, he enlisted others, including second and third defendants, to carry o ut the plan, and the group carried out the plan, which included the use of masks, gloves, and a gun to take the items from the victim's home. State v. Morales, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2020).

8. Evidence Insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support one of defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because the doctrine of transferred intent was inapplicable to the conviction. Therefore, the corresponding count of employing a firearm during the commission of the dangerous felony likewise could not stand. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Because the evidence established that second defendant possessed a firearm but did not employe it, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. State v. Burgess, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. May 22, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions because the State failed to present any proof that he actually or constructively possessed the drugs or gun in the motel room, as the police did not find any contraband on defendant and fingerprint analysis was not conducted on any of the items seized. The State did not present any proof as to who had rented the room or possessed a key, how long defendant had been in the room, how long he intended to stay in the room, or whether any of the bags or clothing in the room belonged to him. State v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

9. Jury Instructions.

Defendant waived his right to an instruction on any lesser included offenses, including possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, because he failed to specifically request such an instruction at trial as required by this section, and it did not amount to plain error. State v. Fayne, 451 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2014).

Trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the definition of “possession” because the instruction as provided fully and fairly set forth the applicable law. State v. Fayne, 451 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2014).

Trial court erroneously instructed the jury that especially aggravated kidnapping with a deadly weapon could serve as a predicate felony for a firearms charge because the underlying statute prohibited a conviction for possession or employment of a firearm in conjunction with especially aggravated kidnapping with a deadly weapon where the weapon was a firearm. State v. Duncan, 505 S.W.3d 480, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2016).

Defendant failed to establish that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesser-included offense of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony affected a substantial right, as the proof at trial was uncontroverted that the perpetrator employed his gun during the carjacking, so defendant, who relied on a theory of misidentification, was not entitled to plain error relief. State v. Martin, 505 S.W.3d 492, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2016).

Trial court did not err by instructing the jury that in order to find defendant guilty of employment a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony it had to find him guilty of aggravated burglary because the proof at trial showed that the deadly weapon used to commit the especially aggravated kidnappings was a firearm and therefore this section prohibited especially aggravated kidnapping from serving as the underlying felony. State v. Dobson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 927 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2017).

Trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury that defendant could be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm if he acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly because this section contained only one possible mental state, that defendant possessed the firearms intentionally. State v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2017).

Jury instruction on possessing a firearm with intent to go armed during commission of a dangerous felony was plain error because (1) the record showed what occurred at trial, (2) the instruction breached an unequivocal rule of law by stating defendant could be guilty for acting knowingly or recklessly, when the mens rea was intentionally, (3) defendant's substantial right was adversely affected by lessening the State's burden of proof, violating defendant's rights to a fair trial and a jury trial, (4) defendant did not tactically waive the issue, and (5) it was necessary to consider the error to do substantial justice, as the error likely changed the trial's outcome. State v. Watkins, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2017).

Even though the completed offense of voluntary manslaughter was defined as a dangerous felony under T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(i)(1)(C), the trial court specified attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter, and without knowing that the completed offense of voluntary manslaughter in count one was a statutorily enumerated dangerous felony, it was reasonable that the jury considered only the attempted voluntary manslaughter in count two as the underlying felony; counsel was not deficient and petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 40-30-103, 40-30-110(f). Summers v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2017).

10. Sentencing.

Case was remanded for correction of a clerical error because the trial court should have indicated the 100 percent release eligibility. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences of 25 years for second degree murder, and seven years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, but the trial court erred in not imposing the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as defendant had two prior felony convictions - one for aggravated assault and one for possession of marijuana with intent to sell. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Defendant's consecutive sentences were not an abuse of discretion, as both defendants were on probation at the time of the shooting, both defendants fell into the dangerous offender category, and the proper findings were made. State v. Pirtle, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016).

Consecutive sentencing was mandatory for defendant's employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony -- attempted voluntary manslaughter. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Correction of judgment was ordered to reflect defendant's release eligibility as one hundred percent because in the judgment for the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a box reading “Persistent 45 percent” was marked under release eligibility, but although defendant was properly determined to be a Range III, persistent offender, his release eligibility was governed by the statute. State v. Vonner, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2017).

Trial court erred in finding that it did not have the authority to order defendant to serve his sentences for the drug convictions on probation because the possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony statute limited the trial court's discretion to grant probation only for convictions resulting from the possession of a firearm and did not limit the trial court's discretion to grant probation for the underlying dangerous felonies; thus, defendant, who was sentenced to three years each for the drug convictions, was eligible for probation for those convictions. State v. Lindsey, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentencing and a total effective sentence of life plus 24 years for first degree felony and premeditated murder, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm; defendant committed six distinct violations of the law and the trial court properly applied the dangerous offender category after making the necessary findings, which included in part his long history of being a drug dealer and being affiliated with a gang. State v. Austin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2018).

Defendant's sentence was not an abuse of discretion because (1) defendant's firearm offense sentence was statutorily set, (2) the aggravating factor for particularly great injury was properly applied to defendant's aggravated assault sentence based on the victim's written statement describing specific, objective examples of the long-lasting and significant effects defendant's conduct had and continued to have on the victim, (3) the sentence was within the range defendant faced as a Range I offender, and (4) defendant did not state what mitigating factors defendant believed the court should have applied. State v. Blackmon, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 435 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2019).

Remand as to defendant's sentence for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony was necessary because defendant did not have any prior felonies and thus, by statute he should have received a mandatory minimum six-year sentence, not 10 years as imposed by the trial court. State v. Wren, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2019).

11. Bifurcated Sentencing.

Trial court properly ordered that defendant serve 15 years but could not order that he serve a minimum 10-year sentence at 100% under this section because no bifurcated hearing or jury determination regarding his prior felony convictions occurred and nothing indicated that defendant personally waived his right to have a jury determine the existence of prior convictions. Defendant had to serve his 15-year sentence at 45%, the release eligibility for a persistent offender. State v. Dobson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 927 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2017).

Reversal of defendant's sentence for a firearm conviction and remand for a new sentencing hearing on the conviction was appropriate because the trial court erred in imposing a five-year sentence as the mandatory minimum sentence for the conviction for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony in that the State of Tennessee never sought a bifurcated hearing and a jury determination regarding a prior felony conviction. Defendant was subject to only a mandatory minimum sentence of three years. State v. Peterson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2018).

12. Conviction Reversed.

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony because the State failed to prove the underlying dangerous felony; the evidence was not sufficient to establish that defendant initiated the process to manufacture methamphetamine or facilitated in the initiation of the manufacturing process. State v. Hammack, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2016).

13. Sentence Affirmed.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant because it properly sentenced him to a length of ten years pursuant to subsection (h)(2). State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant because it properly aligned his sentence consecutively to a sentence for a prior case under subsection (e). State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant because properly considered the criteria for imposing consecutive sentences and determined that the aggregate sentence length was reasonably related to the offenses for which defendant was convicted; the trial court determined that running all sentences consecutively would be excessive and determined that only the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony sentence would be served consecutively. State v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Length of defendant's sentences for second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction were appropriate because the sentences were within the applicable ranges; and the trial court identified several enhancing factors on the record as defendant had one prior felony and one prior misdemeanor drug conviction in addition to a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault, and he was on probation at the time of the current offense and previously had a sentence of probation revoked. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Defendant's consecutive sentences for second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction were appropriate because the sentence for employment of a firearm was statutorily required to be consecutive to the sentence for the accompanying dangerous felony conviction; as for the other two convictions, defendant was a dangerous offender as his behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high; and the extended confinement was necessary to protect society from defendant's behavior and was reasonably related to the underlying offenses. State v. Tate, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Trial court adequately considered the proper factors and therewas no abuse of discretion by the trial court in imposing partial consecutive sentencing, which was mandatory in this case; although only one firearm conviction remained, consecutive sentencing of that count was not discretionary. State v. Harbison, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2018).

Consecutive sentencing was appropriate because the sentence for the employment of a firearm had to run consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony of aggravated burglary, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the aggravated robbery sentence should also run consecutively to the other two sentences as defendant had attempted to rob her at gunpoint on the same day, before he robbed the victim; and the presentence report included facts that recounted defendant's involvement in two other armed robberies that same week, one of which was the robbery of an elderly woman. State v. Bertrand, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

Twenty-five-year sentence defendant received for attempted first degree murder was not excessive because a 10-year sentence for the firearms offense and consecutive sentencing for the two conviction offenses of attempted first-degree murder were required. State v. Ward, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. July 18, 2019).

Defendant did not show consecutive sentencing was in error because (1) consecutive sentencing was mandatory for a firearm charge and attempted first degree murder, (2) defendant did not contest a finding of being a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high, and (3) the evidence presumably sufficed when defendant did not include the presentence report in the appellate record. State v. Chambers, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019).

14. Language In Charging Instrument.

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the indictment against defendant for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony because defendant knew from the indictment that two possible underlying dangerous felonies–especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary–were to be tried in the same trial as the firearm charge, so that defendant was not surprised at having to make a defense against either felony. Perry v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

39-17-1325. Immunity for failure to adopt policy that prohibits weapons on premises.

  1. A person, business, or other entity that owns, controls, or manages property and has the authority to prohibit weapons on that property by posting, pursuant to § 39-17-1359, shall be immune from civil liability with respect to any claim based on such person's, business's, or other entity's failure to adopt a policy that prohibits weapons on the property by posting pursuant to § 39-17-1359.
  2. Immunity under subsection (a) does not apply to a person, business, or other entity whose conduct or failure to act is the result of gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

Acts 2016, ch. 947, § 1.

39-17-1326 — 39-17-1349. [Reserved.]

  1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, any law enforcement officer may carry firearms at all times and in all places within Tennessee, on-duty or off-duty, regardless of the officer's regular duty hours or assignments, except as provided by subsection (c), federal law, lawful orders of court or the written directives of the executive supervisor of the employing agency.
  2. The authority conferred by this section is expressly intended to and shall supersede restrictions placed upon law enforcement officers' authority to carry firearms by other sections within this part.
  3. The authority conferred by this section shall not extend to a law enforcement officer:
    1. Who is not engaged in the actual discharge of official duties as a law enforcement officer and carries a firearm onto school grounds or inside a school building during regular school hours unless the officer immediately informs the principal that the officer will be present on school grounds or inside the school building and in possession of a firearm. If the principal is unavailable, the notice may be given to an appropriate administrative staff person in the principal's office;
    2. Who is consuming beer or an alcoholic beverage or who is under the influence of beer, an alcoholic beverage, or a controlled substance or controlled substance analogue; or
    3. Who is not engaged in the actual discharge of official duties as a law enforcement officer while attending a judicial proceeding.
    1. For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” means a person who is a full-time employee of the state in a position authorized by the laws of this state to carry a firearm and to make arrests for violations of some or all of the laws of this state, or a full-time police officer who has been certified by the peace officer standards and training commission, or a commissioned reserve deputy sheriff as authorized in writing by the sheriff, or a commissioned reserve or auxiliary police officer as authorized in writing by the chief of police, or a sheriff who has been certified by the peace officer standards and training commission, or a deputy sheriff employed by a county as a court officer or corrections officer as authorized in writing by the sheriff.
    2. For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” also means an inmate relations coordinator who is employed by the department of correction and has completed the probationary period established for an inmate relations coordinator, a correctional officer who is employed by the department of correction and has completed the probationary period established for a correctional officer, a person employed by the department of correction as a warden, deputy warden, associate warden, correctional administrator, assistant or deputy commissioner, or commissioner who has successfully completed any probationary period if required for those positions and who has successfully completed firearms training in accordance with department of correction standards, which standards shall include, at a minimum, forty (40) hours initial training and eight (8) hours annual in-service training in firearms qualification administered by an instructor with certification from the Tennessee Correction Academy's firearms instructor program or from a police firearms instructor training program conducted or sanctioned by the federal bureau of investigation or the National Rifle Association.
    3. For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” also means a duly elected and sworn constable in a county where constables retain law enforcement powers and duties under § 8-10-108; provided, that the constable receives, at a minimum, forty (40) hours initial training, within one (1) year of election, and eight (8) hours annual in-service training in firearms qualification administered by a certified law enforcement firearms instructor.
      1. For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” also means a person who has successfully completed firearms training in accordance with POST certification, which shall include, at a minimum, forty (40) hours initial training and eight (8) hours annual in-service training in firearms qualification administered by a POST-certified firearms training program and is:
        1. An elected district attorney general;
        2. A full-time assistant district attorney general who has been authorized pursuant to subdivision (d)(4)(B);
        3. The executive director or deputy director of the district attorneys general conference; or
        4. A full-time, pro-tem prosecutor employed by the district attorneys general conference.
      2. Each elected district attorney general, at such district attorney general's discretion, is authorized to determine if any assistant district attorney general in the district attorney general's office or judicial district is authorized to carry a firearm pursuant to this section.
      3. The district attorneys general conference shall develop a uniform identification system clearly identifying that a person described in subdivision (d)(4)(A) is qualified under this section to carry a firearm at all times. Persons authorized by this subdivision (d)(4) to carry a firearm under this section shall carry this identification at all times the person is carrying a firearm.
  4. In counties having a population of not less than thirty thousand two hundred (30,200) nor more than thirty thousand four hundred seventy-five (30,475) or not less than one hundred eighteen thousand four hundred (118,400) nor more than one hundred eighteen thousand seven hundred (118,700), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the authority conferred by this section shall only apply to law enforcement officers who are law enforcement officers for those counties or law enforcement officers for municipalities located therein.
    1. The secretary of state shall, in consultation with the commissioner of correction, design and issue to each requesting inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer who is employed by the department of correction and has completed the probationary period established for an inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer, a state identification card certifying that the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is authorized to carry a firearm pursuant to this section.
    2. Any inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer desiring an identification card shall notify the secretary of state and shall provide the inmate relations coordinator's or correctional officer's full name and residential address. Upon receipt of the request, the secretary of state shall notify the commissioner of correction of the request. The commissioner of correction shall verify to the secretary of state whether the requesting inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is employed by the department of correction and has completed the appropriate probationary period and shall so certify in a letter to be maintained by the secretary.
    3. If the secretary of state receives certification that a requesting inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is employed by the department and has completed the appropriate probationary period, the secretary shall issue the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer an identification card so certifying. The card shall be valid for as long as the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer remains in the employment of the department of correction.
    4. An inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer issued a card pursuant to this subsection (f) shall carry the card at all times the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is carrying a firearm. The card shall be sufficient proof that the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is authorized to carry a firearm pursuant to this section.
    5. If an inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer who is employed by the department and has completed the appropriate probationary period resigns, is terminated, or is otherwise no longer employed by the department, the commissioner shall, within ten (10) days, so notify the secretary of state. Upon receiving the notice, the secretary of state shall revoke the identification card and send a letter of revocation to the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer at the coordinator's or officer's last known address.
      1. A person who is no longer an inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer employed by the department of correction but who still has an identification card issued by the secretary of state shall have ten (10) days from receipt of the letter of revocation from the secretary of state to return the card to the secretary.
      2. It is a Class C misdemeanor punishable by fine only of fifty dollars ($50.00) for a person to knowingly fail to return an identification card as required by subdivision (f)(6)(A).
  5. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a community corrections officer who holds a valid Tennessee handgun carry permit may carry a handgun at all times and in all places in Tennessee while in the course of employment and engaged in the actual discharge of official duties, except as provided by subsection (c), federal law, or lawful orders of court. This subsection applies to community corrections officers employed in counties having a population, according to the 2010 federal census or any subsequent federal census of:

    not less than nor more than 32,200  32,300 22,600  22,675 6,800  6,900 56,800  56,900 51,400  51,500 19,100  19,150

    Click to view table.

Acts 2000, ch. 988, § 1; 2001, ch. 175, § 1; 2002, ch. 682, § 1; 2009, ch. 605, § 1; 2010, ch. 631, §§ 1, 2; 2010, ch. 895, § 1; 2012, ch. 603, § 2; 2012, ch. 848, § 25; 2016, ch. 641, § 1; 2016, ch. 746, § 1; 2017, ch. 447, § 1; 2018, ch. 828, § 1; 2019, ch. 92, § 1; 2020, ch. 599, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (g).

The 2019 amendment, in (d)(2), substituted “who is employed by the department of correction and has completed the probationary period established for an inmate relations coordinator, a correctional officer who is employed by the department of correction and has completed the probationary period established for a correctional officer,” for “employed by the department of correction, or a vested correctional officer employed by the department of correction,” and inserted  “any probationary period if required for those positions and who has successfully completed”.

The 2020 amendment, in (f)(1), deleted “vested and” preceding “employed” and inserted “and has completed the probationary period established for an inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer”; in the last sentence of (f)(2) and the first sentence of (f)(3), deleted “vested and” preceding “employed” and inserted “and has completed the appropriate probationary period”; deleted “vested and” preceding “in the employment” in the second sentence of (f)(3); in the first sentence of (f)(5), substituted “an inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer who is employed by the department and has completed the appropriate probationary period” for “a vested inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer”; and substituted “an inmate relations coordinator” for “a vested inmate relations coordinator” in (f)(6)(A).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 828, § 2. April 27, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 92, § 2. March 28, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 599, § 2. March 20, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalties for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. A “vested correctional officer,” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 39-17-1350(d), is someone who is employed to perform correctional work and certain security functions at a state penal institution involving the custody, transport, and rehabilitation of inmates, who has taken the required oath, and who has completed the required academy training and who is vested with law enforcement authority pursuant to T.C.A. § 4-3-609, OAG 01-126 (8/7/01).

T.C.A. § 39-17-1350(d) does not authorize any department of correction security personnel other than correctional officers who have five or more years of service as correctional officers with the department of correction to carry firearms while off duty, OAG 02-035 (3/15/02).

Off-Duty law enforcement officer carrying weapon to county school board meeting.  OAG 10-111, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 117 (11/3/10).

Constables carrying firearms.  OAG 13-110, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 115 (12/27/13).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-17-1350, “any law enforcement officer may carry firearms at all times and in all places within Tennessee, on-duty or off-duty. . . .”  A full-time police officer who has been certified by the police officer standards and training commission and a commissioned reserve deputy sheriff who has received written authorization from the sheriff are among those defined as “law enforcement officers” under the statute. Their authority to carry a firearm on public or private property within Tennessee is limited only by the enumerated exceptions in the statute itself. A posting prohibiting firearms on the property is not one of those exceptions. Unless one of the exceptions in the statute applies, law enforcement officers may carry firearms onto public or private property in Tennessee, even if there is a posted prohibition. T.C.A. § 39-17-1359 describes the circumstances and manner in which one who owns, operates, manages, or controls property may prohibit weapons on the property. That statute does not apply to law enforcement officers carrying firearms and may not be used to prohibit them from carrying firearms onto public or private property in Tennessee. In addition, T.C.A. § 39-17-1359 describes the precise manner in which prohibitions against weapons must be posted. Even if the statute did apply to law enforcement officers, verbal notice that firearms are prohibited on the property would not satisfy the statutory posting requirements. OAG 18-22, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 21 (5/24/2018).

To comply with T.C.A. § 39-17-1350(f), the Secretary of State may issue identification cards only to otherwise qualified inmate relations coordinators and correctional officers who are vested, not to those who have merely “completed the probationary period.” “Vested” and “completed the probationary period” are not the same; they refer to different events and different employee status and they entail different time periods. Inmate relations coordinators and correctional officers who otherwise have qualified to carry firearms off-duty under T.C.A. § 39-17-1350 and who have completed the probationary period but who are not vested may carry firearms off-duty without having been issued an identification card under T.C.A. § 39-17-1350(f) because the identification card is proof that the holder is authorized to carry a firearm, but it is not a necessary prerequisite to being authorized to carry a firearm off-duty. OAG 19-16, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 59 (9/17/2019).

In 2002, the Attorney General opined that the term “vested” refers to the employee's being vested in the state retirement system, which generally occurs only after five years or more of employment, and 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 92, § 1 does not alter the Attorney General's interpretation of “vested.” OAG 19-16, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 59 (9/17/2019).

39-17-1351. Enhanced handgun carry permit.

  1. The citizens of this state have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense; but the general assembly has the power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (r), any resident of Tennessee who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident, as defined by § 55-50-102, may apply to the department of safety for an enhanced handgun carry permit. If the applicant is not prohibited from possessing a firearm in this state pursuant to § 39-17-1307(b), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), or any other state or federal law, and the applicant otherwise meets all of the requirements of this section, the department shall issue a permit to the applicant; provided:
    1. The applicant is at least twenty-one (21) years of age; or
    2. The applicant is at least eighteen (18) years of age; and
        1. Is an honorably discharged or retired veteran of the United States armed forces; and
        2. Includes with the application a certified copy of the applicant's certificate of release or discharge from active duty, department of defense form 214 (DD 214);
        1. Is an honorably discharged member of the army national guard, the army reserve, the navy reserve, the marine corps reserve, the air national guard, the air force reserve, or the coast guard reserve, who has successfully completed a basic training program; and
        2. Includes with the application a certified copy of the applicant's honorable discharge certificate, department of defense form 256 (DD 256), or report of separation and record of service, NGB form 22, that indicates an honorable discharge characterization; or
        1. Is a member of the United States armed forces on active duty status or is a current member of the army national guard, the army reserve, the navy reserve, the marine corps reserve, the air national guard, the air force reserve, or the coast guard reserve, who has successfully completed a basic training program; and
        2. Includes with the application a military identification card or such other document as the commissioner designates as sufficient proof that the applicant is an active duty member of the military or a current member of the national guard or United States military reserve, who has successfully completed a basic training program.
  3. The application for a permit shall be on a standard form developed by the department. The application shall clearly state in bold face type directly above the signature line that an applicant who, with intent to deceive, makes any false statement on the application commits the felony offense of perjury pursuant to § 39-16-702. The following are eligibility requirements for obtaining an enhanced handgun carry permit and the application shall require the applicant to disclose and confirm compliance with, under oath, the following information concerning the applicant and the eligibility requirements:
    1. Full legal name and any aliases;
    2. Addresses for the last five (5) years;
    3. Date of birth;
    4. Social security number;
    5. Physical description (height, weight, race, sex, hair color and eye color);
    6. That the applicant has not been convicted of a criminal offense that is designated as a felony, or that is one of the disqualifying misdemeanors set out in subdivisions (c)(11), (c)(16), or (c)(18), with the exception of any federal or state offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade or other similar offenses relating to the regulations of business practices;
    7. That the applicant is not currently under indictment or information for any criminal offense that is designated as a felony, or that is one of the disqualifying misdemeanors set out in subdivisions (c)(11), (c)(16), or (c)(18), with the exception of any federal or state offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade or other similar offenses relating to the regulations of business practices;
    8. That the applicant is not currently subject to any order of protection and, if so, the applicant shall provide a copy of the order;
    9. That the applicant is not a fugitive from justice;
    10. That the applicant is not an unlawful user of or addicted to alcohol, any controlled substance or controlled substance analogue, and the applicant has not been either:
      1. A patient in a rehabilitation program pursuant to a court order or hospitalized for alcohol, controlled substance or controlled substance analogue abuse or addiction pursuant to a court order within ten (10) years from the date of application; or
      2. A voluntary patient in a rehabilitation program or voluntarily hospitalized for alcohol, controlled substance or controlled substance analogue abuse or addiction within three (3) years from the date of application;
    11. That the applicant has not been convicted of the offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant in this or any other state two (2) or more times within ten (10) years from the date of the application and that none of the convictions has occurred within five (5) years from the date of application or renewal;
    12. That the applicant has not been adjudicated as a mental defective, has not been judicially committed to or hospitalized in a mental institution pursuant to title 33, has not had a court appoint a conservator for the applicant by reason of a mental defect, has not been judicially determined to be disabled by reason of mental illness, developmental disability or other mental incapacity, and has not, within seven (7) years from the date of application, been found by a court to pose an immediate substantial likelihood of serious harm, as defined in title 33, chapter 6, part 5, because of mental illness;
    13. That the applicant is not an alien and is not illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
    14. That the applicant has not been discharged from the armed forces under dishonorable conditions;
    15. That the applicant has not renounced the applicant's United States citizenship;
    16. That the applicant has not been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921;
    17. That the applicant is not receiving social security disability benefits by reason of alcohol dependence, drug dependence or mental disability; and
    18. That the applicant has not been convicted of the offense of stalking.
    1. In addition to the information required under subsection (c), the applicant shall be required to provide two (2) full sets of classifiable fingerprints at the time the application is filed with the department. The applicant's fingerprints may be taken by the department at the time the application is submitted or the applicant may have the fingerprints taken at any sheriff's office and submit the fingerprints to the department along with the application and other supporting documents. The sheriff may charge a fee not to exceed five dollars ($5.00) for taking the applicant's fingerprints. At the time an applicant's fingerprints are taken either by the department or a sheriff's office, the applicant shall be required to present a photo identification. If the person requesting fingerprinting is not the same person as the person whose picture appears on the photo identification, the department or sheriff shall refuse to take the fingerprints. The department shall also be required to photograph the applicant in a manner that is suitable for use on the permit.
    2. An applicant shall also be required to present a photo identification to the department at the time of filing the application. If the name on the photo identification, name on the application and name on the fingerprint card, if taken by a sheriff, are not the same, the department shall refuse to accept the application. If the person whose picture appears on the photo identification is not the same as the applicant, the department shall refuse to accept the application.
  4. The department shall also require an applicant to submit proof of the successful completion of a department approved handgun safety course within one (1) year of the date of application. Any form created by the department to show proof of the successful completion of a department approved handgun safety course shall not require the applicant to provide the applicant's social security number. Any instructor of a department approved handgun safety course shall not withhold proof of the successful completion of the course solely on the fact the applicant did not disclose the applicant's social security number. The course shall include both classroom hours and firing range hours; provided, that an applicant shall not be required to comply with the firing range requirements if the applicant submits proof to the department that the applicant has successfully passed small arms qualification training or combat pistol training in any branch of the United States armed forces. Beginning September 1, 2010, and thereafter, a component of the classroom portion of all department-approved handgun safety courses shall be instruction on alcohol and drugs, the effects of those substances on a person’s reflexes, judgment and ability to safely handle a firearm, and §  39-17-1321. An applicant shall not be required to comply with the firing range and classroom hours requirements of this subsection (e) if the applicant submits proof to the department that within five (5) years from the date the application for an enhanced handgun carry permit is filed the applicant has:
    1. Been certified by the peace officer standards and training commission;
    2. Successfully completed training at the law enforcement training academy;
    3. Successfully completed the firearms training course required for armed security guard/officer registration, pursuant to § 62-35-118(b);
    4. Successfully completed all handgun training of not less than four (4) hours as required by any branch of the military; provided, however, that an applicant who seeks waiver of the training course pursuant to this subdivision (e)(4) may have completed the military handgun training at any time prior to submission of proof; or
    5. Successfully completed Tennessee department of correction firearms qualification.
  5. The department shall make applications for permits available for distribution at any location where the department conducts driver license examinations.
    1. Upon receipt of a permit application, the department shall:
      1. Forward two (2) full sets of fingerprints of the applicant to the Tennessee bureau of investigation; and
      2. Send a copy of the application to the sheriff of the county in which the applicant resides.
    2. Within thirty (30) days of receiving an application, the sheriff shall provide the department with any information concerning the truthfulness of the applicant's answers to the eligibility requirements of subsection (c) that is within the knowledge of the sheriff.
  6. Upon receipt of the fingerprints from the department, the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall:
    1. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the fingerprints, conduct computer searches to determine the applicant's eligibility for a permit under subsection (c) as are available to the bureau based solely upon the applicant's name, date of birth and social security number and send the results of the searches to the department;
    2. Conduct a criminal history record check based upon one (1) set of the fingerprints received and send the results to the department; and
    3. Send one (1) set of the fingerprints received from the department to the federal bureau of investigation, request a federal criminal history record check based upon the fingerprints, as long as the service is available, and send the results of the check to the department.
  7. The department shall deny a permit application if it determines from information contained in the criminal history record checks conducted by the Tennessee and federal bureaus of investigation pursuant to subsection (h), from information received from the clerks of court regarding individuals adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution pursuant to title 33, or from other information that comes to the attention of the department, that the applicant does not meet the eligibility requirements of this section. The department shall not be required to confirm the applicant's eligibility for a permit beyond the information received from the Tennessee and federal bureaus of investigation, the clerks of court and the sheriffs, if any.
  8. The department shall not deny a permit application if:
    1. The existence of any arrest or other records concerning the applicant for any indictment, charge or warrant have been judicially or administratively expunged;
    2. An applicant's conviction has been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction;
    3. The applicant, who was rendered infamous or deprived of the rights of citizenship by judgment of any state or federal court, has had the applicant's full rights of citizenship duly restored pursuant to procedures set forth within title 40, chapter 29, or other federal or state law; provided, however, that this subdivision (j)(3) shall not apply to any person who has been convicted of a felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, a felony drug offense, or a felony offense involving use of a deadly weapon; or
    4. The applicant, who was adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution, as defined in § 39-17-1301, has had the applicant's firearm disability removed by an order of the court pursuant to title 16, and either a copy of that order has been provided to the department by the TBI or a certified copy of that court order has been provided to the department by the applicant.
  9. If the department denies an application, the department shall notify the applicant in writing within ten (10) days of the denial. The written notice shall state the specific factual basis for the denial. It shall include a copy of any reports, records or inquiries reviewed or relied upon by the department.
  10. The department shall issue a permit to an applicant not prohibited from obtaining a permit under this section no later than ninety (90) days after the date the department receives the application. A permit issued prior to the department's receipt of the Tennessee and federal bureaus of investigation's criminal history record checks based upon the applicant's fingerprints shall be subject to immediate revocation if either record check reveals that the applicant is not eligible for a permit pursuant to this section.
  11. A permit holder shall not be required to complete a handgun safety course to maintain or renew an enhanced handgun carry permit. No permit holder shall be required to complete any additional handgun safety course after obtaining an enhanced handgun carry permit. No person shall be required to complete any additional handgun safety course if the person applies for a renewal of an enhanced handgun carry permit within eight (8) years from the date of expiration.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (n)(2) and subsection (x), a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be good for eight (8) years and shall entitle the permit holder to carry any handgun or handguns that the permit holder legally owns or possesses. The permit holder shall have the permit in the holder's immediate possession at all times when carrying a handgun and shall display the permit on demand of a law enforcement officer.
    2. A Tennessee permit issued pursuant to this section to a person who is in or who enters into the United States armed forces shall continue in effect for so long as the person's service continues and the person is stationed outside this state, notwithstanding the fact that the person may be temporarily in this state on furlough, leave, or delay en route, and for a period not to exceed sixty (60) days following the date on which the person is honorably discharged or separated from service or returns to this state on reassignment to a duty station in this state, unless the permit is sooner suspended, cancelled or revoked for cause as provided by law. The permit is valid only when in the immediate possession of the permit holder and the permit holder has in the holder's immediate possession the holder's discharge or separation papers, if the permit holder has been discharged or separated from the service.
    3. After the initial issuance of an enhanced handgun carry permit, the department shall conduct a name-based criminal history record check every four (4) years or upon receipt of an application.
    1. The permit shall be issued on a wallet-sized laminated card of the same approximate size as is used by this state for driver licenses and shall contain only the following information concerning the permit holder:
      1. The permit holder's name, address and date of birth;
      2. A description of the permit holder by sex, height, weight and eye color;
      3. A color photograph of the permit holder; and
      4. The permit number, issuance date, and expiration date.
    2. The following language must be printed on the back of the card: This permit is valid beyond the expiration date if the permit holder can provide documentation of the holder's active military status and duty station outside Tennessee.
    1. Except as provided in subsection (x), the department shall charge an application and processing fee of one hundred dollars ($100). The fee shall cover all aspects of processing the application and issuing a permit. In addition to any other portion of the permit application fee that goes to the Tennessee bureau of investigation, fifteen dollars ($15.00) of the fee shall go to the bureau for the sole purpose of updating and maintaining its fingerprint criminal history data base. On an annual basis, the comptroller of the treasury shall audit the bureau to ensure that the extra fifteen dollars ($15.00) received from each handgun permit application fee is being used exclusively for the purpose set forth in this subsection (p). By February 1 of each year the bureau shall provide documentation to the judiciary committee of the senate and the judiciary committee of the house of representatives that the extra fifteen dollars ($15.00) is being used exclusively for the intended purposes. The documentation shall state in detail how the money earmarked for fingerprint data base updating and maintenance was spent, the number and job descriptions of any employees hired and the type and purpose of any equipment purchased. Any person, who has been honorably discharged from any branch of the United States armed forces or who is on active duty in any branch of the armed forces or who is currently serving in the national guard or armed forces reserve, and who makes initial application for an enhanced handgun carry permit shall be required to pay only that portion of the initial application fee that is necessary to conduct the required criminal history record checks.
    2. The provisions of subdivision (p)(1) increasing each permit application fee by fifteen dollars ($15.00) for the purpose of fingerprint data base updating and maintenance shall not take effect if the general appropriation act provides a specific appropriation in the amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), to defray the expenses contemplated in subdivision (p)(1). If the appropriation is not included in the general appropriations act, the fifteen dollar ($15.00) permit fee increase imposed by subdivision (p)(1) shall take effect on July 1, 1997, the public welfare requiring it.
    3. Beginning July 1, 2008, fifteen dollars ($15.00) of the fee established in subdivision (p)(1) shall be submitted to the sheriff of the county where the applicant resides for the purpose of verifying the truthfulness of the applicant's answers as provided in subdivision (g)(1).
    1. Prior to the expiration of a permit, a permit holder may apply to the department for the renewal of the permit by submitting, under oath, a renewal application with a renewal fee of fifty dollars ($50.00). The renewal application shall be on a standard form developed by the department of safety and shall require the applicant to disclose, under oath, the information concerning the applicant as set forth in subsection (c), and shall require the applicant to certify that the applicant still satisfies all the eligibility requirements of this section for the issuance of a permit. In the event the permit expires prior to the department's approval or issuance of notice of denial regarding the renewal application, the permit holder shall be entitled to continue to use the expired permit; provided, however, that the permit holder shall also be required to prove by displaying a receipt for the renewal application fee that the renewal application was delivered to the department prior to the expiration date of the permit. The department is authorized to contract with a local government agency for the provision of any service related to the renewal of enhanced handgun carry permits, subject to applicable contracting statutes and regulations. An agency contracting with the department is authorized to charge an additional fee of four dollars ($4.00) for each renewal application, which shall be retained by the agency for administrative costs.
      1. A person may renew that person's enhanced handgun carry permit beginning six (6) months prior to the expiration date on the face of the card, and, if the permit is not expired, the person shall only be required to comply with the renewal provisions of subdivision (q)(1).
      2. Any person who applies for renewal of that person's enhanced handgun carry permit after the expiration date on the face of the card shall only be required to comply with the renewal provisions of subdivision (q)(1) unless the permit has been expired for more than eight (8) years.
      3. Any person who applies for renewal of an enhanced handgun carry permit when the permit has been expired for more than eight (8) years, shall, for all purposes, be considered a new applicant.
    2. If a person whose enhanced handgun carry permit remained valid pursuant to subdivision (n)(2) because the person was in the United States armed forces applies for a renewal of the permit within eight (8) years of the expiration of the sixty (60) day period following discharge, separation, or return to this state on reassignment to a duty station in this state as provided in subdivision (n)(2), the person shall only be required to comply with the renewal provisions of subdivision (q)(1). If the renewal application is filed eight (8) years or more from expiration of the sixty (60) day period following the date of honorable discharge, separation, or return to this state on reassignment to a duty station in this state, the person shall, for all purposes, be considered a new applicant.
    1. A facially valid handgun permit, firearms permit, weapons permit or license issued by another state shall be valid in this state according to its terms and shall be treated as if it is a handgun permit issued by this state; provided, however, this subsection (r) shall not be construed to authorize the holder of any out-of-state permit or license to carry, in this state, any firearm or weapon other than a handgun.
    2. For a person to lawfully carry a handgun in this state based upon a permit or license issued in another state, the person must be in possession of the permit or license at all times the person carries a handgun in this state.
      1. The commissioner of safety shall enter into written reciprocity agreements with other states that require the execution of the agreements. The commissioner of safety shall prepare and publicly publish a current list of states honoring permits issued by the state of Tennessee and shall make the list available to anyone upon request. The commissioner of safety shall also prepare and publicly publish a current list of states who, after inquiry by the commissioner, refuse to enter into a reciprocity agreement with this state or honor enhanced handgun carry permits issued by this state. To the extent that any state may impose conditions in the reciprocity agreements, the commissioner of safety shall publish those conditions as part of the list. If another state imposes conditions on Tennessee permit holders in a reciprocity agreement, the conditions shall also become a part of the agreement and apply to the other state's permit holders when they carry a handgun in this state.
      2. If a person with a handgun permit from another state decides to become a resident of Tennessee, the person must obtain a Tennessee handgun permit within six (6) months of establishing residency in Tennessee. The permit may be issued based on the person having a permit from another state provided the other state has substantially similar permit eligibility requirements as this state. However, if during the six-month period the person applies for a handgun permit in this state and the application is denied, the person shall not be allowed to carry a handgun in this state based upon the other state's permit.
        1. If a person who is a resident of and handgun permit holder in another state is employed in this state on a regular basis and desires to carry a handgun in this state, the person shall have six (6) months from the last day of the sixth month of regular employment in this state to obtain a Tennessee enhanced handgun carry permit. The permit may be issued based on the person having a permit from another state provided the other state has substantially similar permit eligibility requirements as this state. However, if during the six-month period the person applies for a handgun permit in this state and the application is denied, the person shall not be allowed to carry a handgun in this state based upon the other state's permit.
        2. This subdivision (r)(3)(C) shall not apply if the state of residence of the person employed in Tennessee has entered into a handgun permit reciprocity agreement with this state pursuant to this subsection (r).
        3. As used in this subdivision (r)(3)(C), “employed in this state on a regular basis” means a person has been gainfully employed in this state for at least thirty (30) hours a week for six (6) consecutive months not counting any absence from employment caused by the employee's use of sick leave, annual leave, administrative leave or compensatory time.
    1. The department shall make available, on request and payment of a reasonable fee to cover the costs of copying, a statistical report that includes the number of permits issued, denied, revoked, or suspended by the department during the preceding month, listed by age, gender and zip code of the applicant or permit holder and the reason for any permit revocation or suspension. The report shall also include the cost of the program, the revenues derived from fees, the number of violations of the enhanced handgun carry permit law, and the average time for issuance of an enhanced handgun carry permit. By January 1 of each year, a copy of the statistical reports for the preceding calendar year shall be provided to each member of the general assembly.
      1. The department shall maintain statistics related to responses by law enforcement agencies to incidents in which a person who has a permit to carry a handgun under this section is arrested and booked for any offense.
      2. The department by rule promulgated pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, shall adopt procedures for state and local law enforcement officials to report the information required by subdivision (s)(2)(A) to the department.
  12. Any law enforcement officer of this state or of any county or municipality may, within the realm of the officer's lawful jurisdiction and when the officer is acting in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties, disarm a permit holder at any time when the officer reasonably believes it is necessary for the protection of the permit holder, officer or other individual or individuals. The officer shall return the handgun to the permit holder before discharging the permit holder from the scene when the officer has determined that the permit holder is not a threat to the officer, to the permit holder, or other individual or individuals; provided, that the permit holder has not violated any provision of this section and provided the permit holder has not committed any other violation that results in the arrest of the permit holder.
  13. Substantial compliance with the requirements of this section shall provide the department and any political subdivision thereof with immunity from civil liability alleging liability for issuance of the permit.
  14. Any permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed a “license” within the meaning of title 36, chapter 5, part 7, dealing with the enforcement of child support obligations through license denial and revocation.
    1. Notwithstanding any other law or rule to the contrary, neither the department nor an instructor or employee of a department approved handgun safety course is authorized to require any applicant for an enhanced handgun carry permit to furnish or reveal identifying information concerning any handgun the applicant owns, possesses or uses during the safety course in order to apply for or be issued the permit.
    2. For purposes of subdivision (w)(1), “identifying information concerning any handgun” includes, but is not limited to, the serial number, model number, make of gun or manufacturer, type of gun, such as revolver or semi-automatic, caliber or whether the applicant owns the handgun used for the safety course.
    1. Any resident of Tennessee who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident, as defined by § 55-50-102, who has reached twenty-one (21) years of age, may apply to the department of safety for a lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit. If the applicant is not prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm in this state pursuant to § 39-17-1316 or § 39-17-1307(b), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), or any other state or federal law, and the applicant otherwise meets all of the requirements of this section, the department shall issue a permit to the applicant. The lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit shall entitle the permit holder to carry any handgun or handguns the permit holder legally owns or possesses and shall entitle the permit holder to any privilege granted to enhanced handgun carry permit holders. The requirements imposed on enhanced handgun carry permit holders by this section shall also apply to lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit holders.
    2. The department shall charge an application and processing fee for a lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit equal to the application and processing fee charged under subsection (p) plus a lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit fee of two hundred dollars ($200); provided, however, that a permit holder who is applying for the renewal of an enhanced handgun carry permit under subsection (q) may instead obtain a lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit by submitting to the department a fee of two hundred dollars ($200). The application process shall otherwise be the same as the application process for an enhanced handgun carry permit as set out in this section. Any funds from the fees paid pursuant to this subdivision (x)(2) that are not used for processing applications and issuing permits shall be retained by the department to fund any necessary system modifications required to create a lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit and monitor the eligibility of lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit holders as required by subdivision (x)(3).
    3. A lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit shall not expire and shall continue to be valid for the life of the permit holder unless the permit holder no longer meets the requirements of this section. A lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit shall not be subject to renewal; provided, however, that every five (5) years after issuance of the lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit, the department shall conduct a criminal history record check in the same manner as required for enhanced handgun carry permit renewals. Upon discovery that a lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit holder no longer satisfies the requirements of this section, the department shall suspend or revoke the permit pursuant to § 39-17-1352.
      1. If the lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit holder's permit is suspended or revoked, the permit holder shall deliver, in person or by mail, the permit to the department within thirty (30) days of the suspension or revocation.
      2. If the department does not receive the lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit holder's suspended or revoked permit within thirty (30) days of the suspension or revocation, the department shall send notice to the permit holder that:
        1. The permit holder has thirty (30) days from the date of the notice to deliver the permit, in person or by mail, to the department; and
        2. If the permit holder fails to deliver the suspended or revoked permit to the department within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice, the department will suspend the permit holder's driver license.
      3. If the department does not receive the lifetime enhanced handgun carry permit holder's suspended or revoked permit within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice provided by the department, the department shall suspend the permit holder's driver license in the same manner as provided in § 55-50-502.
    4. The total fee required by subdivision (x)(2) shall be waived if the applicant:
      1. Is a retired federal, state, or local law enforcement officer, as defined in § 39-11-106;
      2. Served for at least ten (10) years prior to retirement and was POST-certified, or had equivalent training, on the date the officer retired;
      3. Was in good standing at the time of leaving the law enforcement agency, as certified by the chief law enforcement officer or designee of the organization that employed the applicant; and
      4. Is a resident of this state on the date of the application.
  15. An applicant shall not be required to comply with the firing range requirements of this section if the applicant:
    1. Is an active duty service member or honorably discharged or retired veteran of the United States armed forces;
    2. Has a military occupational specialty, special qualification identifier, skill identifier, specialty code, or rating that identifies a service qualification in military police, special operations, or special forces; and
    3. Presents to the department a certified copy of the applicant's certificate of release or discharge from active duty, department of defense form 214 (DD 214), or other official documentation that provides proof of the service criteria required under this subsection (y).

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 3; 1997, ch. 476, § 1; 2000, ch. 947, § 8C; 2001, ch. 218, § 1; 2002, ch. 601, § 1; 2003, ch. 300, §§ 1, 2; 2003, ch. 349, §§ 1, 2; 2004, ch. 483, §§ 1, 2; 2004, ch. 776, § 1; 2005, ch. 343, § 1; 2005, ch. 423, § 1; 2008, ch. 1174, § 1; 2009, ch. 101, § 1; 2009, ch. 433, § 1; 2009, ch. 578, §§ 10, 11; 2010, ch. 1009, § 4; 2012, ch. 848, §§ 26, 27; 2013, ch. 236, § 35; 2013, ch. 270, § 1; 2014, ch. 866, §§ 1, 2; 2015, ch. 281, §§ 1-3; 2015, ch. 459, § 5; 2016, ch. 736, §§ 1-8; 2016, ch. 875, § 1; 2016, ch. 903, § 1; 2016, ch. 925, § 1; 2016, ch. 1037, § 1; 2017, ch. 159, § 1; 2017, ch. 247, § 1; 2018, ch. 690, § 1; 2018, ch. 865, § 1; 2018, ch. 903, §§ 3, 5; 2019, ch. 109, § 1; 2019, ch. 345, § 54; 2019, ch. 367, § 1; 2019, ch. 396, § 1; 2019, ch. 479, §§ 3, 4; 2020, ch. 804, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Former subsection (v), concerning enhanced handgun carry permit applications filed prior to July 13, 1997, was deleted as obsolete by the code commission in 2006.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 483, § 3 provided that the act shall apply to all handgun carry permits in effect or issued on or after April 8, 2004.

Acts 2010, ch. 1009 was repassed over the governor’s veto on June 4, 2010.

Acts 2014, ch. 866, § 3 provided that for the purpose of initiating the process of implementing the staggered handgun permit renewal dates to meet the requirements of (n)(3), this act shall take effect upon becoming a law [May 1, 2014], the public welfare requiring it. For the purpose of implementing the staggered dates in accordance with (n)(3), this act shall take effect thirty (30) days after the date upon which the commissioner of safety provides written notification to the secretary of state and the executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission that the department of safety’s “A-list” driver license program is capable of implementing staggered dates in accordance with (n)(3) or on January 1, 2016, whichever is earlier, the public welfare requiring it. The commissioner shall cause such notification to be published on the website of the department contemporaneously with delivery to the secretary of state and executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission. The last sentence of (p) shall take effect January 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.

Pursuant to Acts 2014, ch. 866, 3, the commissioner of safety gave notification on March 18,  2015, that the department of safety’s  A-list driver license program is capable of implementing staggered dates in accordance with (n)(3); thus, subdivision (n)(3) became effective April 17, 2015.

Acts 2016, ch. 736, § 9 provided that for the purpose of promulgating rules, forms, and procedures and making necessary provisions for the implementation of the act, the act took effect April 7, 2016,  the public welfare requiring it. For all other purposes, the act shall take effect thirty (30) days after the date upon which the commissioner of safety provides written notification to the secretary of state and the executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission that the department of safety's “A-list” driver license program is capable of implementing this act or it shall take effect on January 1, 2017, whichever is earlier, the public welfare requiring it. The commissioner shall cause such notification to be published on the web site of the department contemporaneously with delivery to the secretary of state and executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission. This provision became effective January 1, 2017.

Acts 2019, ch. 367, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section by adding subdivision (o)(2), shall take effect thirty (30) days after the date upon which the commissioner of safety provides written notification to the secretary of state and the executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission that the department of safety's “A-list” driver license program is capable of implementing this act, or it shall take effect on January 1, 2020, whichever is earlier.  The commissioner shall cause such notification to be published on the website of the department contemporaneously with delivery to the secretary of state and executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment by ch. 690 inserted “or designee” in (x)(5)(C); and rewrote (x)(5)(D) which read: “Was a resident of this state on the date of the officer's retirement and is a resident on the date of the application.”

The 2018 amendment by ch. 865, effective January 1, 2019, added (e)(5).

The 2018 amendment by ch. 903, added present (b)(2)(B)(i), (b)(2)(B)(ii), and (b)(2)(C)(i); redesignated the existing language in (b)(2)(A) as (b)(2)(A)(i) and (b)(2)(A)(ii); in present (b)(2)(A)(i), deleted “or is a member of the United States armed forces on active duty status” following “forces”; in the present introductory language of (b)(2)(A)(ii), deleted “or” at the end; redesignated former (b)(2)(B)ii) as (b)(2)(C)(ii); in present (b)(2)(C)(ii), added “or a current member of the national guard or United States military reserve, who has successfully completed a basic training program.”; and, at the end of (j)(3), substituted “a felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, a felony drug offense, or a felony offense involving use of a deadly weapon; or” for “burglary, any felony offense involving violence or use of a firearm or any felony drug offense involving a Schedule I, II, III, IV or V controlled substance or a controlled substance analogue. If the applicant has been convicted of a felony drug offense involving a Schedule VI controlled substance, this subdivision (j)(3) shall not apply if the offense occurred within ten (10) years of the date of application or renewal; or”.

The 2019 amendment by ch. 109 added the last two sentences in (q)(1).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 345 substituted “judiciary” for “criminal justice” preceding “committee of the house” in (p)(1).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 367 added (o)(2).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 396 in (x)(5) substituted “shall be waived” for “shall be one hundred dollars ($100)”, in (x)(5)(A) substituted “former” for “retired”; in (x)(5)(B) substituted “leaving the law enforcement agency” for “retirement”, substituted “officer left the law enforcement agency” for “retired”; and rewrote (x)(5)(C) which read: “Retired in good standing, as certified by he chief law enforcement officer or designee of the organization from which the applicant; and;”.

The 2019 amendment by ch. 479, effective January 1, 2020, substituted “enhanced handgun carry permits” for “handgun carry permits” in the third sentence of (r)(3)(A); and substituted “enhanced handgun carry permit” for “handgun carry permit” throughout the section.

The 2020 amendment, in (x)(5)(A), substituted “retired” for “former”; and in (x)(5)(B), substituted “retirement” for “leaving the law enforcement agency” and “retired” for “left the law enforcement agency”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 690, § 2. April 9, 2018.

Acts 2018, ch. 865,  § 2. January 1, 2019.

Acts 2018, ch. 903, § 7. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 109, § 2. July 1,  2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 367, § 2. January 1, 2020, see Compiler's Notes.

Acts 2019, ch. 396, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Acts 2020, ch. 804, § 2. July 15, 2020.

Cross-References. Controlled substances, title 39, ch. 17, part 4.

Escape defined, § 39-11-602.

Reporting requirement satisfied by notice to general assembly members of publication of report, § 3-1-114.

Stalking defined, § 39-17-315.

Law Reviews.

Another Can of Crawford Worms: Certificates of Nonexistence of Public Record and the Confrontation Clause (Keith Hollingshead-Cook), 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1793 (2010).

Weapons in the Workplace: The Effect of Tennessee’s Concealed Weapons Statute on Employer Liability, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 281 (1997).

Attorney General Opinions. Felons obtaining handgun carry permit after restoration of rights, OAG 97-169 (12/22/97).

Requirements for constables carrying firearms, OAG 99-025 (2/16/99).

Bradley County constable — handgun carry permit; county abolishing position, OAG 99-159 (8/19/99).

Ability of an armed security guard to carry a weapon on breaks and during off-duty hours, OAG 99-189 (9/22/99).

Effect of juvenile delinquency adjudications upon ability to obtain handgun carrying permit, OAG 00-008 (1/18/00).

Actions of court officers, OAG 00-009 (1/19/00).

Requirement of handgun safety class for individuals whose handgun carrying permit has expired, OAG 00-038 (3/7/00).

A bounty hunter cannot carry weapons in Tennessee without a permit from Tennessee or another state, OAG 01-20 (2/7/01).

The department of safety can refuse to issue a permit to carry a concealed handgun to a person who refuses to disclose the person's social security number on the application, but otherwise meets the qualifications set forth in T.C.A. § 39-17-1351, OAG 02-003 (1/2/02).

Federal law prohibits the department of safety from printing a handgun permit holder's social security number on the face of a permit if the person to whom the permit has been issued objects to the disclosure of such information on the face of the permit, OAG 02-003 (1/2/02).

T.C.A. § 39-17-1351(d) does not authorize the off duty carrying of firearms by correctional officers who are vested with limited law enforcement authority under T.C.A. § 4-3-609 or by all officers who are vested in the Tennessee consolidated retirement system; the statute authorizes only correctional officers who have five or more years of service as correctional officers with the department of correction to carry firearms while off duty, OAG 02-035 (3/15/02).

If a felon not sentenced to the penitentiary was convicted on and after July 1, 1986, but before July 1, 1996, he or she must obtain a “certificate of restoration” under T.C.A. § 40-29-105(b)(3); however, the “full restoration of rights” provided for under that section does not restore the right to possess a handgun to persons convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly weapon. To the extent that OAG 97-169 could be read to suggest that otherwise eligible penitentiary-sentenced inmates have their full rights of citizenship restored for handgun purposes by issuance of a certificate of restoration, it is hereby withdrawn, OAG 02-119 (10/24/02).

A pre-1998 form titled “Restoration of Voting Rights” is sufficient for issuance of handgun carry permit to non-penitentiary-sentenced felons convicted between 1986 and 1996 if executed by the proper authority at the time it was the officially prescribed form, OAG 02-119 (10/24/02).

An otherwise eligible felon convicted during the 1986-1996 period and sentenced to the penitentiary must obtain restoration of his or her “citizenship rights” by court order according to the procedures outlined in T.C.A. §§ 40-29-101 and 40-29-102 before obtaining a handgun permit, OAG 02-119 (10/24/02).

The term “committed to or hospitalized in a mental institution,” as used in subdivision (c)(12) of this section applies only to situations where a person has been admitted to a hospital or other institution after it has been determined that he or she suffers from a mental illness or other defect, OAG 03-118 (9/23/03).

The seven year period in subdivision (c)(12) of this section applies only to those persons who have been diagnosed as suffering from a mental illness or other defects and have been found by a court of competent jurisdiction to pose an immediate threat to themselves or others as a result of such illness, OAG 03-118 (9/23/03).

A handgun carry permit holder may be arrested for carrying a handgun openly if he or she is using the handgun to commit a crime, or is otherwise engaged in criminal activity while carrying the handgun, OAG 05-154 (10/11/05).

A handgun carry permit holder is not required to carry the handgun in a concealed manner, OAG 05-154 (10/11/05).

Discharges under dishonorable conditions for the purpose of denying a handgun carry permit, OAG 06-109 (7/5/06).

Holders of handgun carry permits are prohibited by T.C.A.§ 39-17-1306 from carrying their handguns into any room where judicial proceedings are being conducted, OAG 07-148 (10/22/07).

The holders of handgun carry permits are prohibited by T.C.A. § 39-17-1311 from carrying handguns into public parks, playgrounds, civic centers, or other buildings, facilities, areas or other properties, OAG 07-148 (10/22/07).

A property owner has the right to regulate the manner in which the holder of a handgun carry permit may possess or carry his or her handgun on the owner's property, OAG 07-148 (10/22/07).

The holder of a handgun carry permit can be prosecuted for criminal trespass if the owner of property has not posted a sign that satisfies the requirements of T.C.A. § 39-17-1359 but has ordered the permit holder to leave the property because he or she is armed, or for any other lawful reason, OAG 07-148 (10/22/07).

Carrying of firearms into rooms where judicial proceedings are in progress; establishment of security committee for determining security needs of courtrooms; security training of court officers.  OAG 12-32, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 32 (3/9/12).

A permit fee that defrays expenses incident to regulating the exercise of a constitutional right does not per se infringe that right. Fines for unlawful weapon possession do not burden the constitutional right to keep and bear arms but instead penalize violations of a legitimate regulatory measure.  OAG 12-90, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 97 (9/24/12).

Constables carrying firearms.  OAG 13-110, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 115 (12/27/13).

Out-of-state handgun permits held by Tennessee residents.  OAG 14-60, 2014 Tenn. AG Lexis 62  (6/11/14).

Use of alcohol or controlled substances and handgun carry permits. OAG 14-86, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 89 (9/18/14).

Licenses to hunt and possession of firearms and effect of conviction of certain felonies and other offenses.  OAG 15-33, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33  (4/10/15).

Once a person has obtained a complete restoration of firearms and other citizenship rights, that individual may lawfully possess or purchase any firearm that may be lawfully possessed or purchased by any other private citizen. Tennessee law is sufficiently clear to provide convicted felons with fair warning regarding applicable prohibitions on the possession of antique or black powder firearms. OAG 15-75, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 76 (11/9/2015).

The statutory prohibition against carrying a handgun “inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress” would not apply during a time when no judicial proceedings are being carried out in the building.  Whether it is an offense for a person who has a handgun permit to carry a handgun in a building in which judicial proceedings are in progress if that person has no notice that judicial proceedings are taking place in the building depends on the specific facts and circumstances in each case because an offense occurs only if the person carrying a handgun in a building in which judicial proceedings are in progress acts “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.”  If a building is a gun-free zone because “judicial proceedings are in progress,” employees or government officials who work in or are assigned to the building and who are eligible to carry a handgun may be subject to criminal prosecution if they possess the firearm in the building at the time that judicial proceedings are in progress unless they come squarely within one of the statutory exceptions. OAG 19-07, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 10 (6/18/2019).

The phrase “judicial proceedings are in progress” refers broadly to any court proceeding that is currently underway or being carried out.  Depending on the specific facts and circumstances in any given case, “judicial proceedings” are not limited to formal courtroom proceedings but may include proceedings that are carried out in a judge’s chambers or elsewhere in a building, whether in person with litigants or attorneys or by conference call or other electronic means. T.C.A § 39-17-1306 does not contain a notice-posting requirement to indicate to the public that firearms are or may be prohibited during specific times. OAG 19-07, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 10 (6/18/2019).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Where a deputy's seizure of a handgun from an auto was proper under the exigent circumstances of the seizure, the gun became contraband and subject to permanent seizure when the deputy found that the gun was loaded. United States v. Bishop, 338 F.3d 623, 2003 FED App. 264P, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15419 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1206, 124 S. Ct. 1479, 158 L. Ed. 2d 129, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1473 (2004).

2. Rights.

Defendant was indicted for a drug felony, but pled guilty to a reduced charge of attempt to commit a felony. There was no proof that defendant pled guilty to any crime other than attempt to possess a Schedule II substance for purposes of resale, and the record contained only speculation that defendant might have, or could have pled to a different offense; thus, defendant was not entitled to have his right to keep and bear arms restored. State v. Ferguson, 106 S.W.3d 665, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. May 19, 2003).

3. Eligibility.

Circuit court properly declined to restore defendant's right to bear arms because it was an offense for a convicted drug felon to possess a firearm, a convicted drug felon was prohibited from being granted a permit, and defendant's conviction involved the attempted sale of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. Fisher v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 821 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017).

39-17-1352. Suspension or revocation of license.

  1. The department shall suspend or revoke a handgun permit upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the permit holder:
    1. Is prohibited from purchasing a handgun under applicable state or federal law;
    2. Has not accurately disclosed any material information required by § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366;
    3. Poses a material likelihood of risk of harm to the public;
    4. Has been arrested for a felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon, or a felony drug offense;
    5. Has been convicted of a felony;
    6. Has violated any other provision of §§ 39-17-1351 – 39-17-1360 or § 39-17-1366;
    7. Has at any time committed an act or omission or engaged in a pattern of conduct that would render the permit holder ineligible to apply for or obtain a permit under the eligibility requirements of § 39-17-1351 or §  39-17-1366;
    8. Has been convicted of domestic assault as defined in § 39-13-111, or any other misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and is still subject to the disabilities of such a conviction;
    9. Is subject to a current order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); or
    10. Has been judicially committed to a mental institution pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or title 33, chapter 7 or has been adjudicated as a mental defective.
    1. It is an offense for a permit holder to knowingly fail or refuse to surrender to the department a suspended or revoked handgun permit within ten (10) days from the date appearing on the notice of suspension or revocation sent to such permit holder by the department.
    2. A violation of this subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. Upon the suspension or revocation of a permit, the department shall send notice of the suspension or revocation to the permit holder and the appropriate local law enforcement officers. The notice shall state the following:
      1. That the permit has been immediately suspended or revoked;
      2. That the permit holder must surrender the permit to the department within ten (10) days of the date appearing on the notice;
      3. That it is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one (1) year in jail for the permit holder to knowingly fail or refuse to surrender the permit to the department within the ten-day period;
      4. That if the permit holder does not surrender the suspended or revoked permit within the ten-day period, a law enforcement officer will be directed to take possession of the permit; and
      5. That the permit holder has thirty (30) days from the date appearing on the notice of suspension or revocation to request a hearing on the suspension or revocation.
    2. If the permit holder fails to surrender the suspended or revoked permit as required by this section, the department shall issue authorization to the appropriate local law enforcement officials to take possession of the suspended or revoked permit and send it to the department.
  2. The applicant shall have a right to petition the general sessions court of the applicant's county of residence for judicial review of departmental denial, suspension or revocation of a permit. At the review by the general sessions court, the department shall be represented by the district attorney general.
    1. If a permit holder is arrested and charged with burglary, a felony drug offense or a felony offense involving violence or the use of a firearm, then the court first having jurisdiction over the permit holder with respect to the felony charge shall inquire as to whether the person has been issued a Tennessee handgun carry permit, order the permit holder to surrender the permit and send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit. The department shall suspend the permit pending a final disposition on the felony charge against the permit holder.
    2. If a permit holder is arrested and charged with any felony offense other than an offense subject to subdivision (e)(1), then the court first having jurisdiction over the permit holder with respect to the felony charge shall inquire as to whether the person has been issued a Tennessee handgun carry permit, order the permit holder to surrender the permit and send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit, unless the permit holder petitions the court for a hearing on the surrender. If the permit holder does petition the court, the court shall determine whether the permit holder will present a material risk of physical harm to the public if released and allowed to retain the permit. If the court determines that the permit holder will present a material risk of physical harm to the public, it shall condition any release of the permit holder, whether on bond or otherwise, upon the permit holder's surrender of the permit to the court. Upon surrender of the permit, the court shall send the permit to the department with a copy of the court's order that required the surrender of the permit and the department shall suspend the permit pending a final disposition of the felony charges against the permit holder.
    3. If the permit holder is acquitted on the charge or charges, the permit shall be restored to the holder and the temporary prohibition against the carrying of a handgun shall be lifted.
    4. If the permit holder is convicted of the charge or charges, the permit shall be revoked by the court and the revocation shall be noted in the judgment and minutes of the court. The court shall send the surrendered permit to the department.
    5. If the permit holder is placed on pretrial diversion or judicial diversion, the permit holder's privilege to lawfully carry a handgun shall be suspended for the length of time the permit holder is subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The court shall send the surrendered permit to the department.
    1. If a permit holder is convicted of a Class A misdemeanor offense, the permit holder shall surrender the permit to the court having jurisdiction of the case for transmission to the department.
    2. The permit holder shall not be permitted to lawfully carry a handgun or exercise the privileges conferred by the permit for the term of the sentence imposed by the court for the offense or offenses for which the permit holder was convicted.
  3. In order to reinstate a permit suspended pursuant to subsection (e) or (f), the permit holder shall pay a reinstatement fee of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) with one half (½) of the fee payable to the department of safety and one half (½) payable to the court that suspended the permit.
    1. Prior to the reinstatement of the permit, the permit holder shall have paid in full all fines, court costs and restitution, if any, required by the sentencing court.
    2. Failure to complete any terms of probation imposed by the court shall be a bar to reinstatement of the permit.
    3. Prior to reissuance of the permit, the department shall verify that the permit holder has complied with all reinstatement requirements of this subsection (g).

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 4; 1997, ch. 476, § 2; 2009, ch. 455, § 7; 2009, ch. 578, § 12; 2018, ch. 903, § 6; 2019, ch. 479, §§ 17, 18.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, substituted “crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon” for “involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly weapon”  in (a)(4).

The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, in (a), inserted “or § 39-17-1366”  in (a)(2), (a)(6) and (a)(7).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 903, § 7. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. The mandatory provisions of T.C.A. § 39-17-1352(e)(1) and (2) apply to general sessions courts when they have first jurisdiction over the permit holder, but do not apply to judicial commissioners at the time they set bonds in felony cases, OAG 00-183 (12/12/00).

A law enforcement officer may not seize a handgun carry permit from an individual when that individual is arrested or charged with a crime, OAG 05-154 (10/11/05).

39-17-1353. Review of revocation or suspension.

  1. Any person who has received a notice of suspension or revocation may make a written request for a review of the department's determination by the department at a hearing. The request shall be made on a form available from the department. If the person's permit has not been previously surrendered, it must be surrendered at the time the request for a hearing is made. A request for a hearing does not stay the permit suspension or revocation.
  2. Within thirty (30) days from the date the request for a hearing is filed, the department shall establish a hearing date and set the case on a docket. Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the hearing to be conducted within such thirty-day period. The hearing shall be held at a place designated by the department. The department shall provide written notice of the time and place of the hearing to the party requesting the hearing at least ten (10) days prior to the scheduled hearing, unless the party agrees to waive this requirement.
  3. The presiding hearing officer shall be the commissioner or an authorized representative designated by the commissioner. The presiding hearing officer shall have the authority to:
    1. Administer oaths and affirmations;
    2. Examine witnesses and take testimony;
    3. Receive relevant evidence;
    4. Issue subpoenas, take depositions, or cause depositions to interrogatories to be taken;
    5. Regulate the course and conduct of the hearing; and
    6. Make a final ruling on the issue.
  4. The sole issue at the hearing shall be whether by a preponderance of the evidence the person has violated any provision of §§ 39-17-1351 – 39-17-1360 or § 39-17-1366. If the presiding hearing officer finds the affirmative of this issue, the suspension or revocation order shall be sustained. If the presiding hearing officer finds the negative of this issue, the suspension or revocation order shall be rescinded.
  5. The hearing shall be recorded. The decision of the presiding hearing officer shall be rendered in writing, and a copy will be provided to the person who requested the hearing.
  6. If the person who requested the hearing fails to appear without just cause, the right to a hearing shall be waived, and the department's earlier determination shall be final.
  7. Witnesses under subpoena shall be entitled to the same fees as are now or may hereafter be provided for witnesses in civil actions in the circuit court and, unless otherwise provided by law or by action of the agency, the party requesting the subpoenas shall bear the cost of paying fees to the witnesses subpoenaed.

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 5; 2019, ch. 479, § 19.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, inserted “or § 39-17-1366” in (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

39-17-1354. Judicial review of department determination.

  1. Within thirty (30) days of the issuance of the final determination of the department following a hearing under § 39-17-1353, a person aggrieved by the determination shall have the right to file a petition in the chancery court of the county of the person's residence for judicial review. The filing of a petition for judicial review shall not stay the revocation order.
  2. The review shall be on the record, without taking additional testimony. If the court finds that the department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, the court may reverse the department's determination.

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 6.

39-17-1355. Applicability of Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.

The Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, applies to the extent it is consistent with the proceedings under §§ 39-17-1353 and 39-17-1354 relating to administrative hearing and judicial review.

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 7.

39-17-1356. Duplicate permits.

The department shall issue a duplicate permit to a permit holder upon the payment by the permit holder of a fee of five dollars ($5.00).

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 8.

39-17-1357. Notice of address change.

  1. Within sixty (60) days of any change in a permit holder's principal place of residence, the permit holder shall notify the department in writing of the permit holder's new address.
  2. On or after January 1, 2015, the department shall provide a method for permit holders to notify the department electronically on the department's website.

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 9; 2014, ch. 816, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Pursuant to Article III, Section 18 of the Constitution of Tennessee, Acts 2014, ch. 816 took effect on April 28, 2014.

Acts 2014, ch. 816, § 2 provided that the commissioner is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of this act, which added subsection (b). All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

39-17-1358. Retention of records — Violations.

  1. The sheriff or chief law enforcement officer may retain applications and files related to the approval or denial of any application submitted from October 1, 1994, to October 1, 1996, if the applications and files are relevant to any pending litigation. After the pending litigation is concluded, the applications and files shall be destroyed.
  2. Except as otherwise specifically provided in §§ 39-17-1351 and 39-17-1352, a violation of §§ 39-17-1351 – 39-17-1360 or § 39-17-1366 is a Class B misdemeanor punishable only by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500).
  3. Any party aggrieved under the terms of §§ 39-17-1351 – 39-17-1360 or § 39-17-1366 by the denial, suspension or revocation of a permit, or otherwise, may file a writ of mandamus, as provided by law. The action shall also allow the recovery of any actual damages sustained by the party. The aggrieved party, if prevailing in action, shall also be entitled to recover those costs and attorney's fees reasonably incurred or relating to the action.
  4. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to alter, reduce or eliminate any personal civil or criminal liability that an applicant may have for the intentional or negligent use of a firearm.

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 10; 1997, ch. 476, § 5; 2019, ch. 479, § 20.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, inserted “or § 39-17-1366” in (b) and the first sentence of (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1359. Prohibition at certain meetings — Posted notice — Handgun carry permit holder.

    1. Except as provided in § 39-17-1313, an individual, corporation, business entity, or local, state, or federal government entity or agent thereof is authorized to:
      1. Prohibit the possession of weapons by any person who is at a meeting conducted by, or on property owned, operated, or managed or under the control of the individual, corporation, business entity, or government entity; or
      2. Restrict the possession of weapons by any person who is at a meeting conducted by, or on property owned, operated, or managed or under the control of the individual, corporation, business entity, or government entity by allowing a handgun to be carried in a concealed manner only by persons authorized to carry a handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366.
    2. The prohibition in subdivision (a)(1) shall apply to any person who is authorized to carry a firearm by authority of § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366.
    1. Notice of the prohibition or restriction permitted by subsection (a) shall be accomplished by displaying the notice described in subdivision (b)(3) in prominent locations, including all entrances primarily used by persons entering the property, building, or portion of the property or building where weapon possession is prohibited or restricted. The notice shall be plainly visible to the average person entering the building, property, or portion of the building or property, posted.
    2. The notice required by this section shall be in English, but a duplicate notice may also be posted in any language used by patrons, customers, or persons who frequent the place where weapon possession is prohibited or restricted.
      1. A sign shall be used as the method of posting.
        1. A sign prohibiting possession in accordance with subdivision (a)(1)(A) shall include the phrase “NO FIREARMS ALLOWED”, and the phrase shall measure at least one inch (1") high and eight inches (8") wide. The sign shall also include the phrase “As authorized by T.C.A. § 39-17-1359”.
        2. The sign shall include a pictorial representation of the phrase “NO FIREARMS ALLOWED” that shall include a circle with a diagonal line through the circle and an image of a firearm inside the circle under the diagonal line. The entire pictorial representation shall be at least four inches (4") high and four inches (4") wide. The diagonal line shall be at a forty-five degree (45°) angle from the upper left to the lower right side of the circle.
        1. A sign restricting possession in accordance with subdivision (a)(1)(B) shall include the phrase “CONCEALED FIREARMS BY PERMIT ONLY”, and the phrase shall measure at least one inch (1") high and eight inches (8") wide. The sign shall also include the phrase “As authorized by T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1351, 39-17-1359, and 39-17-1366”.
        2. The sign shall include a pictorial representation of the phrase “CONCEALED FIREARMS BY PERMIT ONLY” that shall include a circle with a diagonal line through the circle and an image of a firearm inside the circle. The entire pictorial representation shall be at least four inches (4") high and four inches (4") wide. The diagonal line shall be at a forty five degree (45°) angle from the upper left to the lower right side of the circle.
    3. An individual, corporation, business entity, or government entity that, as of January 1, 2018, used signs to provide notice of the prohibition permitted by subsection (a) shall have until January 1, 2019, to replace existing signs with signs that meet the requirements of subdivision (b)(3).
    1. It is an offense to possess a weapon in a building or on property that is properly posted in accordance with this section.
    2. Possession of a weapon on posted property in violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor punishable by fine only of five hundred dollars ($500).
  1. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter, reduce or eliminate any civil or criminal liability that a property owner or manager may have for injuries arising on their property.
  2. This section shall not apply to title 70 regarding wildlife laws, rules and regulations.
  3. Except as provided in subsection (g), this section shall not apply to the grounds of any public park, natural area, historic park, nature trail, campground, forest, greenway, waterway or other similar public place that is owned or operated by the state, a county, a municipality or instrumentality thereof. The carrying of firearms in those areas shall be governed by § 39-17-1311.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (g)(2), nothing in this section shall authorize an entity of local government or a permittee thereof to enact or enforce a prohibition or restriction on the possession of a handgun by an enhanced handgun carry permit holder or concealed handgun carry permit holder on property owned or administered by the entity unless the following are provided at each public entrance to the property:
      1. Metal detection devices;
      2. At least one (1) law enforcement or private security officer who has been adequately trained to conduct inspections of persons entering the property by use of metal detection devices; and
      3. That each person who enters the property through the public entrance when the property is open to the public and any bag, package, and other container carried by the person is inspected by a law enforcement or private security officer described in subdivision (g)(1)(B) or an authorized representative with the authority to deny entry to the property.
    2. Subdivision (g)(1) does not apply to:
      1. Facilities that are licensed under title 33, 37, or 68;
      2. Property on which firearms are prohibited by § 39-17-1309 or § 39-17-1311(b)(1)(H)(ii);
      3. Property on which firearms are prohibited by § 39-17-1306 at all times regardless of whether judicial proceedings are in progress;
      4. Buildings that contain a law enforcement agency, as defined in § 39-13-519;
      5. Libraries; or
      6. Facilities that are licensed by the department of human services, under title 71, chapter 3, part 5, and administer a Head Start program.

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 11; 2000, ch. 929, § 1; 2009, ch. 428, § 4; 2010, ch. 1009, § 3; 2013, ch. 16, § 2; 2016, ch. 638, § 1; 2017, ch. 467, §§ 3, 4; 2018, ch. 823, §§ 1-4; 2019, ch. 479, §§ 10-12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1009 was repassed over the governor's veto on June 4, 2010.

For the Preamble to the act concerning handgun carry permits, please refer to Acts 2013, ch. 16.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment redesignated former (a)(1) as the present introductory language of (a)(1) and (a)(1)(A); added “or” at the end of present (a)(1)(A); added (a)(1)(B); inserted “or restriction” and “or restricted” in (b)(1); added “or restricted” at the end of (b)(2); redesignated the former second sentence in (b)(3)(A) as present (b)(3)(A)(i) and substituted “A sign prohibiting possession in accordance with subdivision (a)(1)(A)” for “The sign”; redesignated former (b)(3)(B) as present (b)(3)(B)(ii); added (b)(3)(C); and, in (b)(4), substituted “January 1, 2018” for “January 1, 2015”  and “January 1, 2019” for “January 1, 2018”.

The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, inserted “or § 39-17-1366” twice in (a); substituted “§§ 39-17-1351, 39-17-1359, and 39-17-1366” for “§§ 39-17-1351 and 39-17-1359” in (b); and substituted “an enhanced handgun carry permit holder or concealed handgun carry permit holder” for “a handgun carry permit holder” in (g)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 823, § 5. April 24, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Guns in Trunks: An Erosion of Tennessee's Employment-At-Will Rule?, 49 Tenn. B.J. 17 (2013).

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. § 39-17-1359 allows local, state, federal, or private entities to limit the ability of persons other than law enforcement personnel, including those who have a permit to carry a handgun, to carry weapons on certain property, if the appropriate notices are provided, OAG 00-161 (10/17/00).

Posting notices that handguns are not permitted in private buildings, OAG 07-043 (4/9/07).

Carrying of firearms into rooms where judicial proceedings are in progress; establishment of security committee for determining security needs of courtrooms; security training of court officers.  OAG 12-32, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 32 (3/9/12).

To the extent T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1309 and 39-17-1313 (2013) are in conflict, the provisions of 39-17-1313 (2013) take precedence over the conflicting provisions of § 39-17-1309. After the 2014 amendments to T.C.A. § 39-17-1313, T.C.A. § 39-17-1313 still takes priority over prohibitions on gun storage in T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1309, 39-17-1311, and 39-17-1359. The phrase “or while in use by,” in the context of T.C.A. § 39-17-1309 as a whole, applies even when students or school personnel are not present on the property. Thus, gun possession would be prohibited on property used to store equipment or supplies by an educational institution specified in the statute. OAG 16-29, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 29 (7/27/2016).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-17-1350, “any law enforcement officer may carry firearms at all times and in all places within Tennessee, on-duty or off-duty. . . .”  A full-time police officer who has been certified by the police officer standards and training commission and a commissioned reserve deputy sheriff who has received written authorization from the sheriff are among those defined as “law enforcement officers” under the statute. Their authority to carry a firearm on public or private property within Tennessee is limited only by the enumerated exceptions in the statute itself. A posting prohibiting firearms on the property is not one of those exceptions.  Unless one of the exceptions in the statute applies, law enforcement officers may carry firearms onto public or private property in Tennessee, even if there is a posted prohibition. T.C.A. § 39-17-1359 describes the circumstances and manner in which one who owns, operates, manages, or controls property may prohibit weapons on the property. That statute does not apply to law enforcement officers carrying firearms and may not be used to prohibit them from carrying firearms onto public or private property in Tennessee.  In addition, T.C.A. § 39-17-1359 describes the precise manner in which prohibitions against weapons must be posted. Even if the statute did apply to law enforcement officers, verbal notice that firearms are prohibited on the property would not satisfy the statutory posting requirements. OAG 18-22, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 21 (5/24/2018).

39-17-1360. Rules and regulations.

The department of safety is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, to implement §§ 39-17-135139-17-1360 or § 39-17-1366.

Acts 1996, ch. 905, § 12; 2019, ch. 479, § 21.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, inserted “or § 1366” following “§§ 39-17-5139-17-1360”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

39-17-1361. Chief law enforcement officer's certification for transfer or making of firearm.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Certification” means the participation and assent of the chief law enforcement officer necessary under federal law for the approval of the application to transfer or make a firearm;
    2. “Chief law enforcement officer” or “officer” means any official, or the official's designee, that the federal bureau of alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives, or any successor agency, identifies by regulation or otherwise as eligible to provide any required certification for the making or transfer of a firearm; and
    3. “Firearm” has the same meaning as provided in the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)).
  2. When a chief law enforcement officer's certification is required by federal law or regulation for the transfer or making of a firearm, the officer shall, within fifteen (15) days of receipt of a request for certification, provide such certification if the applicant is not prohibited by law from receiving or possessing the firearm, including pursuant to § 39-17-1316, and is not the subject of a proceeding that could result in the applicant being prohibited by law from receiving or possessing the firearm. If the officer is unable to make a certification as required by this section, the officer shall provide the applicant a written notification of the denial and the reason for this determination.
  3. An officer shall not be required by this section to make any certification the officer knows to be untrue, but the officer may not refuse to provide certification based on a generalized objection to private persons or entities making, possessing, or receiving firearms or any certain type of firearm the possession of which is not prohibited by law.
  4. An officer and the officer's employees who act in good faith are immune from civil liability arising from any act or omission in making a certification as required by this section.
  5. An applicant whose request for certification is denied may appeal the officer's decision to the circuit court or chancery court that is located in the jurisdiction in which the applicant resides or maintains its address of record. The court shall review the officer's decision to deny the certification de novo. If the court finds that the applicant is not prohibited by law from receiving or possessing the firearm and is not the subject of a proceeding that could result in such prohibition and that no substantial evidence supports the officer's determination that the officer cannot truthfully make the certification, the court shall order the officer to issue the certification.
  6. In making the determination required by subsection (b), an officer may conduct a criminal background check and may require of the applicant only the information that is necessary to identify the applicant for that purpose or to determine the disposition of an arrest or proceeding relevant to the applicant's eligibility to lawfully possess or receive a firearm. An officer may not require access to or inspection of any private residential premises as a condition of granting an application under this section.

Acts 2003, ch. 275, § 1; 2015, ch. 234, § 1.

39-17-1362. Imitation firearm — Defined — Offense to display in threatening manner in public place.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Imitation firearm” means an object or device substantially similar in coloration and overall appearance to a firearm, as defined in § 39-11-106(a), as to lead a reasonable person to perceive that the object or device is a firearm; and
    2. “Public place” means a place to which the public or a group of persons has access and includes, but is not limited to, highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, places of business, playgrounds, and hallways, lobbies and other portions of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence. An act is deemed to occur in a public place if it produces its proscribed consequences in a public place, even if the person engaging in the prohibited conduct is not in a public place.
  2. A person commits an offense who intentionally displays in a threatening manner an imitation firearm in a public place in a way that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to themselves or another.
  3. It is a defense to a violation of subsection (b) if the imitation firearm is displayed in connection with, or as a part of, any justifiable defense as set forth in chapter 11, part 6 of this title.
  4. A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit prosecution under any other law.

Acts 2008, ch. 1173, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1363. Offense of owning, possessing, or having custody or control of a potentially vicious dog or a vicious dog.

  1. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Potentially vicious dog” means a dog that may reasonably be assumed to pose a threat to public safety as demonstrated by any of the following behaviors:
      1. When unprovoked and off the property of the owner or keeper of the dog, inflicts a bite causing bodily injury, as defined in § 39-11-106, to a person or domestic animal; or
      2. When unprovoked and off the property of the owner or keeper of the dog, on two (2) or more separate occasions, chases, menaces or approaches a person or domestic animal in an aggressive manner or apparent attitude of attack;
    2. “Vicious dog” means any dog that without provocation and off the property of the owner or keeper of the dog, has attacked a person causing death or serious bodily injury, as defined by § 39-11-106, to such person; and
    3. “Violent felony” means:
      1. Any felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly weapon;
      2. A violation of § 39-17-417, § 39-17-433 or § 39-17-435; or
      3. A violation of § 39-14-203(a)(1)-(3), § 39-14-205, § 39-14-212 or § 39-14-214.
  2. It is an offense for any person convicted of a violent felony to knowingly own, possess, have custody or control of a potentially vicious dog or a vicious dog for a period of ten (10) years after such person has been released from custody following completion of sentence or is no longer under active probation, community correction or parole supervision for such violent felony, whichever date is later.
  3. It is an offense for any person convicted of a violent felony to own, possess, or have custody or control of a dog that:
    1. Is not micro chipped for permanent identification; and
    2. Is not spayed or neutered and is older than twelve (12) weeks of age.
  4. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under subsection (c), which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that the dog in question is microchipped and neutered or spayed, or that the dog in question was microchipped and neutered or spayed within thirty (30) days of the defendant being charged with a violation of this section.
    2. Medical records from, or a certificate by, a person who is licensed by the person's state of residence as a doctor of veterinary medicine, whose license is in good standing and who has personally examined, inserted a microchip in, or operated upon the dog, indicating that the dog in question has been microchipped or spayed or neutered, shall be sufficient evidence that the dog in question has been microchipped or spayed or neutered.
    3. If the dog in question is microchipped by a different doctor than the doctor who spayed or neutered the dog, medical records or a certificate indicating that both procedures have been performed are required for purposes of this defense.
  5. This section shall only apply if a person's conviction for a violent felony occurs on or after July 1, 2010.

Acts 2010, ch. 949, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1364. Purchase and shipment of antique firearms and certain edged weapons.

Notwithstanding § 39-17-1307, or any other law, it is lawful in this state for a person to purchase, and have shipped directly to such person's residence, the following:

  1. A black powder weapon; provided, that it meets the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 921;
  2. A knife, even if the blade is in excess of four inches (4"); or
  3. A sword or bayonet, whether for ornamental, ceremonial, historical, theatrical or collecting purposes, or otherwise.

Acts 2012, ch. 608, § 1; 2014, ch. 647, § 6.

Attorney General Opinions. Once a person has obtained a complete restoration of firearms and other citizenship rights, that individual may lawfully possess or purchase any firearm that may be lawfully possessed or purchased by any other private citizen. Tennessee law is sufficiently clear to provide convicted felons with fair warning regarding applicable prohibitions on the possession of antique or black powder firearms. OAG 15-75, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 76 (11/9/2015).

39-17-1365. Application for temporary handgun carry permit by person granted order of protection — Issuance of permit.

  1. A person who petitions the court and is granted an order of protection, ex parte or otherwise, pursuant to title 36, chapter 3, part 6, may apply for a temporary handgun carry permit from the department of safety within twenty-one (21) calendar days after that order of protection is granted.
  2. To be eligible to receive a temporary handgun carry permit, the person must:
    1. Apply in person to the department of safety on a temporary handgun carry permit application developed by the department;
    2. Include a certified copy of the order of protection with the application;
    3. Provide proof of the person's identity and Tennessee residency by presenting:
      1. A driver license or photo identification issued by the state of Tennessee; or
      2. Other proof satisfactory to the department showing the person's identity and residency; and
    4. Meet the qualifications for the issuance of a handgun carry permit under § 39-17-1351(c).
  3. The department of safety shall conduct a name-based criminal history check in the same manner as set forth in § 39-17-1351(n)(3) upon receiving an application for a temporary handgun carry permit under this section.
  4. If an applicant meets all the requirements of this section, the department of safety shall issue a temporary handgun carry permit to the applicant that shall be valid for sixty (60) calendar days from the date of issuance.
  5. A person issued a temporary handgun carry permit under this section shall carry that permit and a copy of the protective order at all times when carrying a handgun pursuant to this section.
  6. A temporary handgun carry permit issued under this section shall only be valid in Tennessee and shall not be considered as satisfying the requirements of reciprocity with any other state firearm carry provisions.
  7. A temporary handgun carry permit issued under this section may be issued as a letter to the applicant and may be issued without the applicant's photograph.
  8. The issuance of a temporary handgun carry permit under this section does not relieve a person from complying with all requirements of § 39-17-1351 in order to be issued a handgun carry permit pursuant to that section.
  9. A temporary handgun carry permit issued under this section is subject to §§ 39-17-1352 - 39-17-1359.

Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 4 provided that, for the purpose of initiating the process of implementing the requirements of the act, including any programming changes, the act took effect on May 26, 2017. For the purpose of implementing the requirements of the act, the act shall take effect thirty (30) days after the date upon which the commissioner of safety provides written notification to the secretary of state and the executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission that the department of safety's “A-list” driver license program is capable of implementing the new requirements of the act or on January 1, 2018, whichever is earlier. The executive secretary did not receive the notice therefore the provision became effective January 1, 2018.

Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 4 provided further that the commissioner shall cause the notification to be published on the website of the department contemporaneously with delivery to the secretary of state and executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 4. Contingent [See Compiler’s Notes.].

39-17-1366. Concealed handgun carry permit.

  1. Any resident of this state who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident, as defined by § 55-50-102, may apply to the department for a concealed handgun carry permit. If the applicant is not prohibited from possessing a firearm in this state pursuant to § 39-17-1307(b), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), or any other state or federal law, and the applicant otherwise meets all of the requirements of this section, the department shall issue a permit to the applicant.
  2. To be eligible to receive a concealed handgun carry permit, the person must:
    1. Apply in person to the department on a concealed handgun carry permit application developed by the department;
    2. Provide proof of the person's identity and state residency by presenting:
      1. A driver license or photo identification issued by this state; or
      2. Other proof satisfactory to the department showing the person's identity and residency;
    3. Meet the qualifications for the issuance of an enhanced handgun carry permit under § 39-17-1351(b) and (c) and provide the department with two (2) sets of fingerprints in the manner required in § 39-17-1351(d);
      1. Provide proof the person has demonstrated competence with a handgun; provided, that any safety or training course or class must have been completed no more than one (1) year prior to the application for the concealed handgun carry permit. The person may demonstrate such competence by one (1) of the following, but a person is not required to submit to any additional demonstration of competence:
        1. Completing any hunter education or hunter safety course approved by the Tennessee wildlife resources agency or a similar agency of another state;
        2. Completing any firearms safety or training course administered by an organization specializing in firearms training and safety;
        3. Completing any firearms safety or training course or class available to the general public offered by a law enforcement agency, junior college, college, private or public institution or organization, or firearms training school utilizing instructors certified by an organization specializing in firearms training and safety or the department;
        4. Completing any law enforcement firearms safety or training course or class offered for security guards, investigators, special deputies, or any division or subdivision of law enforcement or security enforcement;
        5. Presenting evidence of equivalent experience with a firearm through current military service or proof of an honorable discharge from any branch of the armed services;
        6. Obtaining or previously having held a license to carry a firearm in this state, unless such license has been revoked for cause;
        7. Completing any firearms training or safety course or class, including an electronic, video, or online course, that:
          1. Is conducted by a firearms instructor who is certified by the state or an organization specializing in firearms training and safety; and
          2. Meets the qualifications established by the department pursuant to subsection (l );
        8. Completing any governmental law enforcement agency firearms training course and qualifying to carry a firearm in the course of normal police duties; or
        9. Completing any other firearms training that the department deems adequate; and
      2. Proof of competence under this subdivision (b)(4) is evidenced by a photocopy of a certificate of completion of any of the courses or classes described in subdivision (b)(4)(A); an affidavit from the instructor, school, club, organization, or group that conducted or taught such course or class attesting to the completion of the course or class by the applicant; or a copy of any document that shows completion of the course or class or required experience;
    4. Pay an application and processing fee of sixty-five dollars ($65.00) to the department; and
    5. Provide a signed printed copy of the form provided by the department, pursuant to subdivision (k)(4), stating that the applicant has read and understands the current state law on carrying handguns.
    1. Upon receipt of a concealed handgun carry permit application, the department shall:
      1. Forward two (2) full sets of fingerprints of the applicant to the Tennessee bureau of investigation; and
      2. Send a copy of the application to the sheriff of the county in which the applicant resides.
    2. Within thirty (30) days of receiving an application, the sheriff shall provide the department with any information concerning the truthfulness of the applicant's answers to the eligibility requirements of § 39-17-1351(c) that is within the knowledge of the sheriff.
    3. Upon receipt of the fingerprints from the department, the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall conduct searches and record checks in the same manner required in § 39-17-1351(h) and send the results to the department.
  3. If an applicant meets all the requirements of this section, the department shall issue the applicant a concealed handgun carry permit that entitles the permit holder to carry any handgun that the permit holder legally owns or possesses in a concealed manner. The concealed handgun permit is valid for eight (8) years from the date of issuance.
  4. A person issued a concealed handgun carry permit under this section shall carry the permit at all times when carrying a handgun pursuant to this section and shall display the permit on demand of a law enforcement officer.
  5. The permit shall be issued on a wallet-sized laminated card of the same approximate size as is used by this state for driver licenses and contain only the following information concerning the permit holder:
    1. The permit holder's name, address, and date of birth;
    2. A description of the permit holder by sex, height, weight, and eye color;
    3. A color photograph of the permit holder; and
    4. The permit number, issuance date, and expiration date.
  6. The issuance of a concealed handgun carry permit under this section does not relieve a person from complying with all requirements of § 39-17-1351 in order to be issued an enhanced handgun carry permit pursuant to that section.
  7. A concealed handgun carry permit issued under this section shall authorize the permit holder to carry or possess a handgun as authorized by § 39-17-1313.
  8. A concealed handgun carry permit issued under this section is subject to the same restrictions and requirements found in §§ 39-17-1352 – 39-17-1359.
    1. Prior to the expiration of a concealed handgun carry permit, a permit holder may apply to the department for the renewal of the permit by submitting, under oath, a renewal application. The renewal application must be on a standard form developed by the department; must require the applicant to disclose, under oath, the information concerning the applicant as set forth in subsection (b); and must require the applicant to certify that the applicant still satisfies all the eligibility requirements of this section for the issuance of a concealed handgun carry permit. In the event the permit holder's current concealed handgun carry permit expires prior to the department's approval or issuance of notice of denial regarding a pending renewal application, the permit holder is entitled to continue to use the expired permit until the department issues an approval or denial of the renewal application.
    2. A person may renew that person's concealed handgun carry permit beginning six (6) months prior to the expiration date on the face of the permit.
  9. The department shall maintain the following material on the department's website:
    1. Current state law on carrying handguns;
    2. An explanation of the different handgun carry permits available;
    3. A list of various providers that conduct department-approved training courses or classes, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(A); and
    4. A printable form to be signed by the applicant pursuant to subdivision (b)(6).
  10. The department shall determine that a firearms training or safety course or class meets the requirement of subdivision (b)(4)(A)(vii) if the course or class curriculum does the following:
    1. Conveys the basic knowledge and skills necessary for safe handling and storage of firearms and ammunition and includes firearm safety rules, handgun uses, features, basic skills and techniques, safe cleaning, transportation, and storage methods;
    2. Conveys the current state law on carrying handguns;
    3. Is not less than ninety (90) minutes in length;
    4. Includes a test or quiz that confirms competency of the course or class curriculum; and
    5. Provides a printable certificate of course or class completion.
  11. Any law enforcement officer of this state or of any county or municipality may, within the officer's lawful jurisdiction and when the officer is acting in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties, disarm a permit holder at any time when the officer reasonably believes it is necessary for the protection of the permit holder, officer, or another individual. The officer shall return the handgun to the permit holder before discharging the permit holder from the scene when the officer has determined that the permit holder is not a threat to the officer, the permit holder, or another individual; provided, that the permit holder has not violated this section or committed any other violation that results in the arrest of the permit holder.
  12. As used in this section, “department” means the department of safety.

Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 5.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 479, § 22. January 1, 2020.

Part 14
Metals Recycling

39-17-1401. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Metals recycling facility” means any business that is predominantly engaged in performing the process by which scrap, used or obsolete ferrous or nonferrous metals are converted into raw materials consisting of proper grades and having an existing or potential economic value;
  2. “Motor vehicle” means any vehicle which is self-propelled;
  3. “PCB-containing capacitor” means a capacitor that contains polychlorinated biphenyls and is regulated under the federal Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.);
  4. “Person” means an individual, corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship or other business entity; and
  5. “Scrap vehicle” means any motor vehicle that has been crushed, flattened or dismantled or that has been otherwise damaged to the extent that it cannot be economically repaired.

Acts 1994, ch. 798, § 2.

39-17-1402. Conveyance of dangerous materials to metals recycling facilities.

  1. A person may not sell, convey or otherwise transfer to a metals recycling facility any of the following items without first obtaining from the metals recycling facility a signed written acknowledgment that the item has been sold, conveyed or transferred to the facility:
    1. Lead-acid battery;
    2. Fuel tank;
    3. PCB-containing capacitor;
    4. Chlorofluorocarbon refrigerant; or
    5. Unspent air bag.
  2. This section applies whether an item is included with a load of scrap or is contained or enclosed in a motor vehicle, scrap vehicle, appliance or other item of scrap.

Acts 1994, ch. 798, § 3.

39-17-1403. Posting of requisite notice.

A metals recycling facility shall post in a conspicuous location a notice that is readily visible to all persons selling materials to the facility. The notice shall be no smaller than twenty-four inches (24") horizontally by eighteen inches (18") vertically and must contain the following language:

TENNESSEE LAW PROHIBITS THE SALE, TRANSFER OR CONVEYANCE OF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO THIS FACILITY WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING OUR SIGNED WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT WE WILL ACCEPT THE ITEM:

LEAD-ACID BATTERIES;

FUEL TANKS;

PCB-CONTAINING CAPACITORS;

CHLOROFLUOROCARBON REFRIGERANTS; AND

UNSPENT AIR BAGS.

A VIOLATION OF THIS LAW IS A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR.

Acts 1994, ch. 798, § 4.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1404. Penalty for violations.

A person who violates this part commits a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1994, ch. 798, § 5.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Part 15
Prevention of Youth Access to Tobacco, Smoking Hemp, and Vapor Products Act

39-17-1501. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Prevention of Youth Access to Tobacco, Smoking Hemp, and Vapor Products Act.”

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 1; 2011, ch. 501, § 1; 2015, ch. 353, § 1; 2019, ch. 303, § 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “Smoking Hemp,”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Attorney General Opinions. Implementation of amendments to Prevention of Youth Access to Tobacco Act of 1994, OAG 99-200 (9/29/99).

39-17-1502. Purpose and intent. [Effective until January 1, 2021 See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

  1. The purpose of this part is to reduce the access of persons under eighteen (18) years of age to tobacco products by strengthening existing prohibitions against the sale and distribution of tobacco products and prohibiting the purchase or receipt of tobacco products by such persons, limiting the sale of tobacco products through vending machines, restricting the distribution of tobacco product samples, prohibiting the sale of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products other than in unopened packages, and random, unannounced inspections of locations where tobacco products are sold or distributed, providing for the report required to be submitted to the United States department of health and human services pursuant to Section 1926 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 300x-26), and ensuring uniform regulations with respect to tobacco products within this state.
  2. The purpose of this part is also to prohibit the sale or distribution of vapor products to, or purchase of vapor products on behalf of, persons under eighteen (18) years of age.
  3. The purpose of this part is also to prohibit the sale or distribution of smoking hemp products to, or purchase of smoking hemp products on behalf of, persons under eighteen (18) years of age.
  4. It is the intent of the general assembly that this part be equitably enforced so as to ensure the eligibility for and receipt of any federal funds or grants that this state now receives or may receive relating to this part.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 2; 2011, ch. 501, § 2; 2015, ch. 353, § 2; 2019, ch. 303, § 3.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

39-17-1502. Purpose and intent. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

  1. The purpose of this part is to reduce the access of persons under twenty-one (21) years of age to tobacco products by strengthening existing prohibitions against the sale and distribution of tobacco products and prohibiting the purchase or receipt of tobacco products by such persons, limiting the sale of tobacco products through vending machines, restricting the distribution of tobacco product samples, prohibiting the sale of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products other than in unopened packages, and random, unannounced inspections of locations where tobacco products are sold or distributed, providing for the report required to be submitted to the United States department of health and human services pursuant to Section 1926 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 300x-26), and ensuring uniform regulations with respect to tobacco products within this state.
  2. The purpose of this part is also to prohibit the sale or distribution of vapor products to, or purchase of vapor products on behalf of, persons under twenty-one (21) years of age.
  3. The purpose of this part is also to prohibit the sale or distribution of smoking hemp products to, or purchase of smoking hemp products on behalf of, persons under twenty-one (21) years of age.
  4. It is the intent of the general assembly that this part be equitably enforced so as to ensure the eligibility for and receipt of any federal funds or grants that this state now receives or may receive relating to this part.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 2; 2011, ch. 501, § 2; 2015, ch. 353, § 2; 2019, ch. 303, § 3; 2020, ch. 732, § 9.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (c).

The 2020 amendment. effective January 1, 2021, substituted “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age” throughout the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1503. Part definitions. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Beedies” or “bidis” means a product containing tobacco that is wrapped in temburni leaf (dispyros melanoxylon ) or tendu leaf (diospyros exculpra ), or any other product that is offered to, or purchased by, consumers as beedies or bidis. For purposes of this chapter, beedies or bidis shall be considered a tobacco product;
  2. “Commissioner” means the commissioner of agriculture or the commissioner's duly authorized representative;
  3. “Department” means the department of agriculture;
  4. “Hemp” means the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof, and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of not more than three tenths of one percent (0.3 %) on a dry weight basis;
  5. “Person” means any individual, firm, fiduciary, partnership, corporation, trust, or association;
  6. “Proof of age” means a driver license or other generally accepted means of identification that describes the individual as eighteen (18) years of age or older, contains a photograph or other likeness of the individual, and appears on its face to be valid. Except in the case of distribution by mail, the distributor shall obtain a statement from the addressee that the addressee is eighteen (18) years of age or older;
  7. “Public place” means any public street, sidewalk or park, or any area open to the general public in any publicly owned or operated building;
  8. “Sample” means a tobacco product distributed to members of the general public at no cost for the purpose of promoting the product;
  9. “Sampling” means the distribution of samples to members of the general public in a public place;
  10. “Smoking hemp” means hemp that is offered for sale to the public with the intention that it is consumed by smoking and that does not meet the definition of a vapor product;
  11. “Tobacco product” means any product that contains tobacco and is intended for human consumption, including, but not limited to, cigars, cigarettes and bidis; and
  12. “Vapor product”:
    1. Means any noncombustible product containing nicotine or any other substance that employs a mechanical heating element, battery, electronic circuit, or other mechanism, regardless of shape or size, that can be used to produce or emit a visible or non-visible vapor;
    2. Includes any electronic cigarette, electronic cigar, electronic cigarillo, electronic pipe, or similar product, and any vapor cartridge, any substance used to refill a vapor cartridge, or other container of a solution containing nicotine or any other substance that is intended to be used with or in an electronic cigarette, electronic cigar, electronic cigarillo, electronic pipe, or similar product; and
    3. Does not include any product regulated under Chapter V of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 351 et seq.).

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 3; 1995, ch. 470, § 1; 1999, ch. 354, § 3; 2002, ch. 511, §§ 1, 2; 2011, ch. 501, § 3; 2015, ch. 353, § 3; 2019, ch. 144, § 1; 2019, ch. 303, § 4.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by ch. 144, in the definition of “vapor product”, substituted  “a visible or non-visible vapor” for “vapor” at the end of (A), and inserted “, any substance used to refill a vapor cartridge,” in (B).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 303 added the definitions for “hemp” and “smoking hemp”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 144, § 4. April 17,  2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

39-17-1503. Part definitions. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Beedies” or “bidis” means a product containing tobacco that is wrapped in temburni leaf (dispyros melanoxylon ) or tendu leaf (diospyros exculpra ), or any other product that is offered to, or purchased by, consumers as beedies or bidis. For purposes of this chapter, beedies or bidis shall be considered a tobacco product;
  2. “Commissioner” means the commissioner of agriculture or the commissioner's duly authorized representative;
  3. “Department” means the department of agriculture;
  4. “Hemp” means the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof, and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of not more than three tenths of one percent (0.3 %) on a dry weight basis;
  5. “Person” means any individual, firm, fiduciary, partnership, corporation, trust, or association;
  6. “Proof of age” means a driver license or other generally accepted means of identification that describes the individual as twenty-one (21) years of age or older, contains a photograph or other likeness of the individual, and appears on its face to be valid. Except in the case of distribution by mail, the distributor shall obtain a statement from the addressee that the addressee is twenty-one (21) years of age or older;
  7. “Public place” means any public street, sidewalk or park, or any area open to the general public in any publicly owned or operated building;
  8. “Sample” means a tobacco product distributed to members of the general public at no cost for the purpose of promoting the product;
  9. “Sampling” means the distribution of samples to members of the general public in a public place;
  10. “Smoking hemp” means hemp that is offered for sale to the public with the intention that it is consumed by smoking and that does not meet the definition of a vapor product;
  11. “Tobacco product” means any product that contains tobacco and is intended for human consumption, including, but not limited to, cigars, cigarettes and bidis; and
  12. “Vapor product”:
    1. Means any noncombustible product containing nicotine or any other substance that employs a mechanical heating element, battery, electronic circuit, or other mechanism, regardless of shape or size, that can be used to produce or emit a visible or non-visible vapor;
    2. Includes any electronic cigarette, electronic cigar, electronic cigarillo, electronic pipe, or similar product, and any vapor cartridge, any substance used to refill a vapor cartridge, or other container of a solution containing nicotine or any other substance that is intended to be used with or in an electronic cigarette, electronic cigar, electronic cigarillo, electronic pipe, or similar product; and
    3. Does not include any product regulated under Chapter V of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 351 et seq.).

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 3; 1995, ch. 470, § 1; 1999, ch. 354, § 3; 2002, ch. 511, §§ 1, 2; 2011, ch. 501, § 3; 2015, ch. 353, § 3; 2019, ch. 144, § 1; 2019, ch. 303, § 4; 2020, ch. 732, § 9.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by ch. 144, in the definition of “vapor product”, substituted  “a visible or non-visible vapor” for “vapor” at the end of (A), and inserted “, any substance used to refill a vapor cartridge,” in (B).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 303 added the definitions for “hemp” and “smoking hemp”.

The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, substituted “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age” twice in (6).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 144, § 4. April 17,  2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1504. Sale or distribution to minors unlawful — Proof of age requirement. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

  1. It is unlawful for any person to sell or distribute any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product to another person who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age or to purchase a tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product on behalf of such person under eighteen (18) years of age.
  2. It is unlawful for any person to persuade, entice, send or assist a person who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age to purchase, acquire, receive or attempt to purchase, acquire or receive a tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product. This section and § 39-17-1505 shall not be deemed to preclude law enforcement efforts involving the use of individuals under eighteen (18) years of age if the minor's parent or legal guardian has consented to this action.
  3. No person shall distribute tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product samples in or on any public street, sidewalk, or park.
  4. A person engaged in the sale or distribution of tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products shall demand proof of age from a prospective purchaser or recipient if an ordinary person would conclude on the basis of appearance that the prospective purchaser or recipient may be under twenty-seven (27) years of age. In the case of distribution by mail, the distributor of tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products shall obtain from the addressee an affirmative statement that the person is eighteen (18) years of age or older, and shall inform the recipient that the person is strictly prohibited from distributing any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product, as defined by this part, to any person under eighteen (18) years of age.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 4; 1995, ch. 470, §§ 2, 3; 1999, ch. 354, §§ 1, 2, 4; 2011, ch. 501, § 4; 2013, ch. 319, § 2; 2015, ch. 353, §§ 4-6; 2019, ch. 303, §§ 5, 6.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product” for “tobacco or vapor product”  and “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products” for “tobacco or vapor products” throughout the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Civil penalty for violation of section, § 39-17-1509.

Criminal penalty for violation of section, § 39-17-1510.

Attorney General Opinions. Department of agriculture enforcement agent as law enforcement officer, OAG 99-016 (2/2/99).

Procedures for use of minors in tobacco sales sting operations, OAG 99-016 (2/2/99).

39-17-1504. Sale or distribution to underage persons unlawful — Proof of age requirement. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

  1. It is unlawful for any person to sell or distribute any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product to another person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age or to purchase a tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product on behalf of such person under twenty-one (21) years of age.
  2. It is unlawful for any person to persuade, entice, send or assist a person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age to purchase, acquire, receive or attempt to purchase, acquire or receive a tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product. This section and § 39-17-1505 do not preclude law enforcement efforts involving:
    1. The use of a minor if the minor's parent or legal guardian has consented to this action; or
    2. The use of an individual under twenty-one (21) years of age who is not a minor if the individual has consented to this action.
  3. No person shall distribute tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product samples in or on any public street, sidewalk, or park.
  4. A person engaged in the sale or distribution of tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products shall demand proof of age from a prospective purchaser or recipient if an ordinary person would conclude on the basis of appearance that the prospective purchaser or recipient may be under thirty (30) years of age. In the case of distribution by mail, the distributor of tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products shall obtain from the addressee an affirmative statement that the person is twenty-one (21) years of age or older, and shall inform the recipient that the person is strictly prohibited from distributing any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product, as defined by this part, to any person under  twenty-one (21) years of age.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 4; 1995, ch. 470, §§ 2, 3; 1999, ch. 354, §§ 1, 2, 4; 2011, ch. 501, § 4; 2013, ch. 319, § 2; 2015, ch. 353, §§ 4-6; 2019, ch. 303, §§ 5, 6; 2020, ch. 732, §§ 9-11.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product” for “tobacco or vapor product”  and “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products” for “tobacco or vapor products” throughout the section.

The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, substituted “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age” throughout the section; in (b), rewrote the provisions  following the first sentence, which read:  “This section and § 39-17-1505 shall not be deemed to preclude law enforcement efforts involving the use of individuals under eighteen (18) years of age if the minor's parent or legal guardian has consented to this action.”; and substituted “thirty (30) years of age” for “twenty-seven (27) years of age in the first sentence of (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1505. Prohibited purchases or possession by minors — Penalties. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

  1. It is unlawful for a person who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age to possess either a tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product, to purchase or accept receipt of either product, or to present or offer to any person any purported proof of age that is false, fraudulent, or not actually that person's own for the purpose of purchasing or receiving any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product.
  2. Any person who violates this section may be issued a citation by a law enforcement officer who has evidence of the violation. Regardless of whether a citation is issued, the product shall be seized as contraband by the law enforcement officer.
  3. A violation of this section is a civil offense, for which the juvenile court may, in its discretion, impose a civil penalty of not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00), which may be charged against a parent, guardian, or custodian, but not a minor. The juvenile court may, in its discretion, also impose community service work not to exceed fifty (50) hours or successful completion of a prescribed teen court program for a second or subsequent violation within a one-year period.
  4. A minor who is cooperating with law enforcement officers in an operation designed to test the compliance of other persons with this part shall not be subject to sanctions under this section.
  5. As used in this section, “law enforcement officer” means an officer, employee or agent of government who is authorized by law to investigate the commission or suspected commission of violations of Tennessee law.
  6. It is not unlawful for a person under eighteen (18) years of age to handle or transport:
    1. Tobacco, tobacco products, smoking hemp, or vapor products as a part of and in the course of the person's employment; provided, that the person is under the supervision of another employee who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age; or
    2. Tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products as part of an educational project that has been developed by the person for entry and display at an agricultural fair or other agricultural competition or event.
  7. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a person under eighteen (18) years of age from handling or transporting tobacco or hemp as part of and in the course of the person's involvement in any aspect of the agricultural production or storage of tobacco or hemp, the sale of raw tobacco or hemp at market or the transportation of raw tobacco or hemp to a processing facility.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 5; 1999, ch. 354, §§ 5-7; 2001, ch. 341, § 11; 2015, ch. 353, §§ 7-10; 2018, ch. 1052, § 54; 2019, ch. 303, §§ 7-9.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 1052, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1052, § 55 provided that it is the intent of the general assembly that improvements to the juvenile justice system and expansion of community-based resources for justice-involved children be prioritized, including, but not limited to, evidence-based programs, informal adjustment, diversion, home placement supervision, statewide data collection, early intervention programs and services for children and families, and mental health services, especially in any county underserved with such programs and services.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote (b) which read: “Any person who violates this section shall be issued a citation by a law enforcement officer or school principal who has evidence of the violation. The citation shall require the person to appear in the juvenile court for the county in which the violation is alleged to have occurred. At the time of issuance of the citation, the product shall be seized as contraband by the law enforcement officer or school principal.”; and, in (c), in the first sentence, substituted “a civil offense, for which the juvenile court may, in its discretion, impose a” for “a civil offense, the penalty for which is a” and added “, which may be charged against a parent, guardian, or custodian, but not a minor” at the end, and deleted the former second sentence which read: “Upon its determination that the person has violated this section, the juvenile court shall determine the amount of the civil penalty and shall order the destruction of the product.”.

The 2019 amendment, in (a), substituted “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product” for “tobacco or vapor product” twice; in (f), inserted “smoking hemp,” twice; and in (g), inserted “or hemp” following “tobacco” three times.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1052, § 58. July 1, 2018; provided, that for purposes of rulemaking, the act took effect May 21, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Using a false identification, § 39-16-303.

Attorney General Opinions. Department of agriculture enforcement agent as law enforcement officer, OAG 99-016 (2/2/99).

Procedures for use of minors in tobacco sales sting operations, OAG 99-016 (2/2/99).

Implementation of amendments to Prevention of Youth Access to Tobacco Act of 1994, OAG 99-200 (9/29/99).

Authority of school principals to issue citations under § 39-17-1505, OAG 99-215 (10/27/99).

The disciplinary action a principal may take against an under-age student found in possession of tobacco products is not limited to a civil citation; the civil citation is in addition to other penalties, such as suspension, or other disciplinary measures that may be taken under a principal's general supervisory authority, OAG 00-110 (6/20/00).

39-17-1505. Prohibited purchases or possession by underage persons — Penalties. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

  1. It is unlawful for a person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age of age to possess either a tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product, to purchase or accept receipt of either product, or to present or offer to any person any purported proof of age that is false, fraudulent, or not actually that person's own for the purpose of purchasing or receiving any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product.
  2. Any person who violates this section may be issued a citation by a law enforcement officer who has evidence of the violation. Regardless of whether a citation is issued, the product shall be seized as contraband by the law enforcement officer.
  3. A violation of this section is a civil offense, for which the general sessions or juvenile court may, in its discretion, impose a civil penalty of not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00), which may be charged against a person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age but less than twenty-one (21) years of age, or, in the case of a minor, against a parent, guardian, or custodian. The general sessions or juvenile court may, in its discretion, also impose community service work not to exceed fifty (50) hours or successful completion of a prescribed court program for a second or subsequent violation within a one-year period.
  4. A person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age and who is cooperating with law enforcement officers in an operation designed to test the compliance of other persons with this part is not subject to sanctions under this section.
  5. As used in this section, “law enforcement officer” means an officer, employee or agent of government who is authorized by law to investigate the commission or suspected commission of violations of Tennessee law.
  6. It is not unlawful for a person under twenty-one (21) years of age to handle or transport:
    1. Tobacco, tobacco products, smoking hemp, or vapor products as a part of and in the course of the person's employment; provided, that the person is under the supervision of another employee who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age; or
    2. Tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products as part of an educational project that has been developed by the person for entry and display at an agricultural fair or other agricultural competition or event.
  7. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a person under twenty-one (21) years of age from handling or transporting tobacco or hemp as part of and in the course of the person's involvement in any aspect of the agricultural production or storage of tobacco or hemp, the sale of raw tobacco or hemp at market or the transportation of raw tobacco or hemp to a processing facility.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 5; 1999, ch. 354, §§ 5-7; 2001, ch. 341, § 11; 2015, ch. 353, §§ 7-10; 2018, ch. 1052, § 54; 2019, ch. 303, §§ 7-9; 2020, ch. 732, §§ 9, 12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 1052, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018.”

Acts 2018, ch. 1052, § 55 provided that it is the intent of the general assembly that improvements to the juvenile justice system and expansion of community-based resources for justice-involved children be prioritized, including, but not limited to, evidence-based programs, informal adjustment, diversion, home placement supervision, statewide data collection, early intervention programs and services for children and families, and mental health services, especially in any county underserved with such programs and services.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote (b) which read: “Any person who violates this section shall be issued a citation by a law enforcement officer or school principal who has evidence of the violation. The citation shall require the person to appear in the juvenile court for the county in which the violation is alleged to have occurred. At the time of issuance of the citation, the product shall be seized as contraband by the law enforcement officer or school principal.”; and, in (c), in the first sentence, substituted “a civil offense, for which the juvenile court may, in its discretion, impose a” for “a civil offense, the penalty for which is a” and added “, which may be charged against a parent, guardian, or custodian, but not a minor” at the end, and deleted the former second sentence which read: “Upon its determination that the person has violated this section, the juvenile court shall determine the amount of the civil penalty and shall order the destruction of the product.”.

The 2019 amendment, in (a), substituted “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product” for “tobacco or vapor product” twice; in (f), inserted “smoking hemp,” twice; and in (g), inserted “or hemp” following “tobacco” three times.

The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, substituted “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age” throughout (a), (f), and (g); in (c), inserted “general sessions or” twice and in the first sentence, inserted “person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age but less than twenty-one (21) years of age, or, in the case of a minor, against a”, deleted “, but not a minor.” from the end of the first sentence following “or custodian” and in the second sentence, deleted “teen” following “of a prescribed”; and in (d), substituted “A person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age and” for “A minor” and substituted “is not” for “shall not be”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1506. Required postings. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

  1. Every person who sells tobacco products at retail shall post conspicuously and keep so posted at the place of business a sign, no smaller than ninety-three and one-half (93½) square inches, to ensure that it is likely to be read at each point of sale, stating the following:

    STATE LAW STRICTLY PROHIBITS THE SALE

    OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS OR SMOKING PARAPHERNALIA

    TO PERSONS UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS

    PROOF OF AGE MAY BE REQUIRED

  2. Unless another notice is required by federal law, the notice required by this section and the notice required by § 39-15-411 shall be the only notice regarding tobacco products required to be posted or maintained in any store that sells tobacco products at retail.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 6; 1999, ch. 354, § 8.

Cross-References. Civil penalties for violation of this section, § 39-17-1509.

Criminal penalties for violation of this section, § 39-17-1510.

39-17-1506. Required postings. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

  1. Every person who sells tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products at retail shall post conspicuously and keep so posted at the place of business a sign, no smaller than ninety-three and one-half (93 ½) square inches, to ensure that it is likely to be read at each point of sale, stating the following:

    STATE LAW STRICTLY PROHIBITS THE SALE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS, VAPOR PRODUCTS, OR SMOKING PARAPHERNALIA TO PERSONS UNDER THE AGE OF TWENTY-ONE (21) YEARS

    PROOF OF AGE MAY BE REQUIRED

  2. Unless another notice is required by federal law, the notice required by this section and the notice required by § 39-15-411 shall be the only notice regarding tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products required to be posted or maintained in any store that sells tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products at retail.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 6; 1999, ch. 354, § 8; 2020, ch. 732, §§ 13, 14.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, in (a), inserted “, smoking hemp, or vapor” in the first paragraph and in the second paragraph, inserted “, VAPOR PRODUCTS,” and substituted “TWENTY-ONE (21) YEARS” for “EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS”; and substituted "tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products" for “tobacco products” twice in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1507. Vending machine sales. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

  1. It is unlawful for any person to sell tobacco or smoking hemp products through a vending machine unless the vending machine is located in any of the following locations:
    1. In areas of factories, businesses, offices, or other places that are not open to the public;
    2. In places that are open to the public but to which persons under eighteen (18) years of age are denied access;
    3. In places where alcoholic beverages are sold for consumption on the premises, but only if the vending machine is under the continuous supervision of the owner or lessee of the premises or an employee of the owner or lessee of the premises, and is inaccessible to the public when the establishment is closed; and
    4. In other places, but only if the machine is under the continuous supervision of the owner or lessee of the premises or an employee of the owner or lessee of the premises, or the machine can be operated only by the use of a token purchased from the owner or lessee of the premises or an employee of the owner or lessee of the premises prior to each purchase, and is inaccessible to the public when the establishment is closed.
  2. In any place where supervision of a vending machine, or operation by token is required by this section, the person responsible for that supervision or the sale of the token shall demand proof of age from a prospective purchaser if an ordinary person would conclude on the basis of appearance that the prospective purchaser may be under twenty-seven (27) years of age.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 7; 1999, ch. 354, §§ 9, 10; 2019, ch. 303, § 10.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “or smoking hemp” in (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Civil penalties for violation of section, § 39-17-1509.

Criminal penalties for violation of section, § 39-17-1510.

39-17-1507. Vending machine sales. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

  1. It is unlawful for any person to sell tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products through a vending machine unless the vending machine is located in any of the following locations:
    1. In areas of factories, businesses, offices, or other places that are not open to the public;
    2. In places that are open to the public but to which persons under twenty-one (21) years of age are denied access;
    3. In places where alcoholic beverages are sold for consumption on the premises, but only if the vending machine is under the continuous supervision of the owner or lessee of the premises or an employee of the owner or lessee of the premises, and is inaccessible to the public when the establishment is closed; and
    4. In other places, but only if the machine is under the continuous supervision of the owner or lessee of the premises or an employee of the owner or lessee of the premises, or the machine can be operated only by the use of a token purchased from the owner or lessee of the premises or an employee of the owner or lessee of the premises prior to each purchase, and is inaccessible to the public when the establishment is closed.
  2. In any place where supervision of a vending machine, or operation by token is required by this section, the person responsible for that supervision or the sale of the token shall demand proof of age from a prospective purchaser if an ordinary person would conclude on the basis of appearance that the prospective purchaser may be under thirty (30) years of age.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 7; 1999, ch. 354, §§ 9, 10; 2019, ch. 303, § 10; 2020, ch. 732, §§ 9, 15, 16.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “or smoking hemp” in (a).

The 2020 amendment effective January 1, 2021, substituted “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor” for “tobacco or smoking hemp” in the introductory language of (a); substituted “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age” in (a)(2); and substituted “thirty (30) years of age” for “twenty-seven (27) year of age” in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1508. Required packaging.

It is unlawful for any person to sell cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products except in the original, sealed package in which they were placed by the manufacturer that bears the health warning required by federal law.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 8; 1999, ch. 354, § 11.

Cross-References. Civil penalties for violation of section, § 39-17-1509.

Criminal penalties for violation of section, § 39-17-1510.

39-17-1509. Enforcement — Inspections — Reporting — Civil penalties. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

  1. The department shall enforce this part in a manner that may reasonably be expected to reduce the extent to which tobacco or smoking hemp products are sold or distributed to persons under eighteen (18) years of age, and shall conduct random, unannounced inspections at locations where tobacco or smoking hemp products are sold or distributed to ensure compliance with this part.
  2. A person who violates § 39-17-1504, § 39-17-1506, § 39-17-1507 or § 39-17-1508 shall receive only a warning letter for the person's first violation and shall not receive a civil penalty for the person's first violation. A person who violates § 39-17-1504, § 39-17-1506, § 39-17-1507 or § 39-17-1508 is subject to a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for the person's second violation, not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for the person's third violation and not more than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) for the person's fourth or subsequent violation. For purposes of determining whether a violation is the person's first, second, third, fourth or subsequent violation, the commissioner shall count only those violations that occurred within the previous five (5) years. A civil penalty shall be assessed in the following manner:
    1. The commissioner shall issue the assessment of civil penalty against any person responsible for the violation;
    2. Any person against whom an assessment has been issued may secure a review of the assessment by filing with the commissioner a written petition setting forth the person's reasons for objection to the assessment and asking for a hearing before the commissioner;
    3. Any hearing before the commissioner shall be conducted in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 3. An appeal from the final order of the commissioner may be taken by the person to whom the assessment was issued, and the appeal proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the judicial review provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, codified in §§ 4-5-322 and 4-5-323; and
    4. If a petition for review is not filed within thirty (30) days after the date the person received the assessment, the person shall be deemed to have consented to the assessment, and it shall become final. Whenever an assessment has become final, the commissioner may apply to the chancery court of Davidson County for a judgment in the amount of the assessment and seek execution on the judgment. The chancery court of Davidson County shall treat a person's failure to file a petition for review of an assessment as a confession of judgment in the amount of the assessment.
  3. A person who demanded, was shown, and reasonably relied upon proof of age is not liable for a civil penalty for a violation of § 39-17-1504 or § 39-17-1507. In the case of distribution of any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product by mail, a person who obtained a statement from the addressee that the addressee is at least eighteen (18) years of age is not liable for a civil penalty so long as that distributor of the tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product informed the addressee that § 39-17-1504 prohibits the distribution of tobacco, smoking hemp, and vapor products to a person under eighteen (18) years of age.
  4. When assessing a civil penalty, the commissioner is authorized to assess the penalty against any person or persons determined by the commissioner to be responsible, in whole or in part, for contributing to or causing the violation to occur, including, but not limited to, the owner, manager or employee of a store at which any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product is sold at retail, the owner, manager or employee of an establishment in which a vending machine selling tobacco or smoking hemp products is located, and a company or any of its employees engaged in the business of sampling.
    1. The owner or manager of a store that sells tobacco and smoking hemp products at retail shall provide training to the store's employees concerning the provisions of this part. As a part of this training, each employee shall, prior to selling tobacco and smoking hemp products at retail, sign a statement containing substantially the following words:

      I understand that state law prohibits the sale of tobacco and smoking hemp products to persons under eighteen (18) years of age and that state law requires me to obtain proof of age from a prospective purchaser of tobacco and smoking hemp products who, based on appearance, might be as old as twenty-six (26) years of age. I promise to obey this law, and I understand that monetary or criminal penalties may be imposed on me if I violate this law.

    2. If the commissioner assesses a penalty against the store owner or manager, the owner or manager may present to the commissioner a copy of the statement described in subdivision (e)(1) that was signed by the employee who made the sale to a minor, along with a sworn statement by the owner or manager that the employee had signed the statement prior to the sale to the minor, and the name and address of the employee who made the sale. If the owner or manager does not know which employee made the sale to the minor, the owner or manager may present to the commissioner copies of the statements described in subdivision (e)(1) that were signed by all employees working at the store on the day the sale was made, along with a sworn statement that these employees had signed those statements prior to the sale to the minor.
    3. When the store owner or manager presents to the commissioner the statements described in subdivision (e)(2):
      1. If the violation is the second violation determined to have occurred at that store, the penalty against the store owner or manager shall be eliminated; or
      2. If the violation is the third or subsequent violation determined to have occurred at that store, the commissioner shall consider that evidence and any other evidence with respect to the amount of the penalty against the owner or manager.
  5. The department shall prepare annually for submission by the governor to the secretary of the United States department of health and human services the report required by Section 1926 of subpart I of Part B of Title XIX of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 300x-26). The department shall prepare for submission to the general assembly and the public an annual report describing in detail the department's enforcement efforts under this part.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 10; 1999, ch. 354, § 12; 2015, ch. 353, §§ 11, 12; 2019, ch. 303, §§ 11-16.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (c) and (d), substituted “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product” for “tobacco or vapor product” throughout and made a related change in (c); in (d), inserted “or smoking hemp”; and in (e), inserted “and smoking hemp”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Attorney General Opinions. Department of agriculture enforcement agent as law enforcement officer, OAG 99-016 (2/2/99).

39-17-1509. Enforcement — Inspections — Reporting — Civil penalties. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

  1. The department shall enforce this part in a manner that may reasonably be expected to reduce the extent to which tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products are sold or distributed to persons under twenty-one (21) years of age, and shall conduct random, unannounced inspections at locations where tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products are sold or distributed to ensure compliance with this part.
  2. A person who violates § 39-17-1504, § 39-17-1506, § 39-17-1507 or § 39-17-1508 shall receive only a warning letter for the person's first violation and shall not receive a civil penalty for the person's first violation. A person who violates § 39-17-1504, § 39-17-1506, § 39-17-1507 or § 39-17-1508 is subject to a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for the person's second violation, not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for the person's third violation and not more than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) for the person's fourth or subsequent violation. For purposes of determining whether a violation is the person's first, second, third, fourth or subsequent violation, the commissioner shall count only those violations that occurred within the previous five (5) years. A civil penalty shall be assessed in the following manner:
    1. The commissioner shall issue the assessment of civil penalty against any person responsible for the violation;
    2. Any person against whom an assessment has been issued may secure a review of the assessment by filing with the commissioner a written petition setting forth the person's reasons for objection to the assessment and asking for a hearing before the commissioner;
    3. Any hearing before the commissioner shall be conducted in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 3. An appeal from the final order of the commissioner may be taken by the person to whom the assessment was issued, and the appeal proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the judicial review provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, codified in §§ 4-5-322 and 4-5-323; and
    4. If a petition for review is not filed within thirty (30) days after the date the person received the assessment, the person shall be deemed to have consented to the assessment, and it shall become final. Whenever an assessment has become final, the commissioner may apply to the chancery court of Davidson County for a judgment in the amount of the assessment and seek execution on the judgment. The chancery court of Davidson County shall treat a person's failure to file a petition for review of an assessment as a confession of judgment in the amount of the assessment.
  3. A person who demanded, was shown, and reasonably relied upon proof of age is not liable for a civil penalty for a violation of § 39-17-1504 or § 39-17-1507. In the case of distribution of any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product by mail, a person who obtained a statement from the addressee that the addressee is at least twenty-one (21) years of age is not liable for a civil penalty so long as that distributor of the tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product informed the addressee that § 39-17-1504 prohibits the distribution of tobacco, smoking hemp, and vapor products to a person under twenty-one (21) years of age.
  4. When assessing a civil penalty, the commissioner is authorized to assess the penalty against any person or persons determined by the commissioner to be responsible, in whole or in part, for contributing to or causing the violation to occur, including, but not limited to, the owner, manager or employee of a store at which any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product is sold at retail, the owner, manager or employee of an establishment in which a vending machine selling tobacco or tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products is located, and a company or any of its employees engaged in the business of sampling.
    1. The owner or manager of a store that sells tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products at retail shall provide training to the store's employees concerning the provisions of this part. As a part of this training, each employee shall, prior to selling tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products at retail, sign a statement containing substantially the following words:

      I understand that state law prohibits the sale of tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products to persons under twenty-one (21) years of age and that state law requires me to obtain proof of age from a prospective purchaser of tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products who, based on appearance, might be as old as twenty-nine (29) years of age. I promise to obey this law, and I understand that monetary or criminal penalties may be imposed on me if I violate this law.

    2. If the commissioner assesses a penalty against the store owner or manager, the owner or manager may present to the commissioner a copy of the statement described in subdivision (e)(1) that was signed by the employee who made the sale to a minor, along with a sworn statement by the owner or manager that the employee had signed the statement prior to the sale to the minor, and the name and address of the employee who made the sale. If the owner or manager does not know which employee made the sale to the minor, the owner or manager may present to the commissioner copies of the statements described in subdivision (e)(1) that were signed by all employees working at the store on the day the sale was made, along with a sworn statement that these employees had signed those statements prior to the sale to the minor.
    3. When the store owner or manager presents to the commissioner the statements described in subdivision (e)(2):
      1. If the violation is the second violation determined to have occurred at that store, the penalty against the store owner or manager shall be eliminated; or
      2. If the violation is the third or subsequent violation determined to have occurred at that store, the commissioner shall consider that evidence and any other evidence with respect to the amount of the penalty against the owner or manager.
  5. The department shall prepare annually for submission by the governor to the secretary of the United States department of health and human services the report required by Section 1926 of subpart I of Part B of Title XIX of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 300x-26). The department shall prepare for submission to the general assembly and the public an annual report describing in detail the department's enforcement efforts under this part.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, § 10; 1999, ch. 354, § 12; 2015, ch. 353, §§ 11, 12; 2019, ch. 303, §§ 11-16; 2020, ch. 732, §§ 9, 17-20.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (c) and (d), substituted “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor product” for “tobacco or vapor product” throughout and made a related change in (c); in (d), inserted “or smoking hemp”; and in (e), inserted “and smoking hemp”.

The 2020 amendment , effective January 1, 2021, substituted “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age” throughout the section; substituted “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products” for “tobacco or smoking hemp products” twice in (a) and once near the end of (d); substituted “tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products” for “tobacco and smoking hemp products” throughout (e)(1); and substituted  “twenty-nine (29) years of age” for “twenty-six (26) years of age” in (e)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 303, § 17. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1510. Criminal penalties.

A person who violates § 39-17-1504, § 39-17-1506, § 39-17-1507, or § 39-17-1508 commits a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1999, ch. 354, § 13.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

39-17-1511. Maintenance of smoking paraphernalia in area inaccessible to customers. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

  1. For the purpose of this section:
    1. “Counter” means the point of purchase at a retail establishment;
    2. “Retail establishment” means a place of business open to the general public for the sale of goods or services; and
    3. “Smoking paraphernalia” means:
      1. A cigarette holder;
      2. A smoking pipe made of metal, wood, acrylic, glass, stone, or plastic with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads or punctured metal bowls;
      3. A water pipe; or
      4. Rose and pen combinations; and
    4. “Smoking paraphernalia” does not include a smoking pipe or smoking device when sold at retail, if the smoking pipe or smoking device is primarily made of briar, meerschaum, clay or corn cob.
  2. All smoking paraphernalia shall be maintained behind the counter of a retail establishment in an area inaccessible to a customer or in a locked display case that makes the products unavailable to a customer without the assistance of an employee.
    1. A violation of this section is punishable as provided in § 39-17-1509.
    2. If smoking paraphernalia is sold in violation of this section by an employee, the owner or operator of the retail establishment where the employee sold the products shall be in violation of this section.

Acts 2013, ch. 194, § 1.

39-17-1511. Maintenance of smoking paraphernalia in area inaccessible to customers. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

  1. For the purpose of this section:
    1. “Counter” means the point of purchase at a retail establishment;
    2. “Retail establishment” means a place of business open to the general public for the sale of goods or services; and
    3. “Smoking paraphernalia” means:
      1. A cigarette holder;
      2. A smoking pipe made of metal, wood, acrylic, glass, stone, or plastic with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads or punctured metal bowls;
      3. A water pipe;
      4. Rose and pen combinations; or
      5. Vapor products; and
    4. “Smoking paraphernalia” does not include a smoking pipe or smoking device when sold at retail, if the smoking pipe or smoking device is primarily made of briar, meerschaum, clay or corn cob.
  2. All smoking paraphernalia shall be maintained behind the counter of a retail establishment in an area inaccessible to a customer or in a locked display case that makes the products unavailable to a customer without the assistance of an employee.
    1. A violation of this section is punishable as provided in § 39-17-1509.
    2. If smoking paraphernalia is sold in violation of this section by an employee, the owner or operator of the retail establishment where the employee sold the products shall be in violation of this section.

Acts 2013, ch. 194, § 1; 2020, ch. 732, § 21.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, added (a)(3)(E).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1512. Liquid nicotine containers to satisfy federal child-resistant effectiveness standards.

  1. As used in this section, “liquid nicotine container”:
    1. Means a bottle or other container that contains liquid nicotine or any other substance containing nicotine, where the liquid or other substance is sold, marketed, or intended for use in a vapor product; and
    2. Does not include a liquid or other substance containing nicotine in a cartridge that is sold, marketed, or intended for use in a vapor product; provided, that such cartridge is prefilled and sealed by the manufacturer, and not intended to be opened by the consumer.
  2. Unless specifically preempted by federal law, a liquid nicotine container used in conjunction with a vapor product that is sold at retail in this state shall satisfy the child-resistant effectiveness standards under 16 CFR 1700.15(b)(1) when tested in accordance with the requirements of 16 CFR 1700.20.

Acts 2015, ch. 353, § 13.

39-17-1513. Department of agriculture encouraged to study effects of sale and distribution of vapor products to persons under 18. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

The department of agriculture is urged to study the effects of the sale and distribution of vapor products to persons under eighteen (18) years of age and is encouraged to make recommendations to the legislature with regard to reducing such sale and distribution.

Acts 2015, ch. 353, § 14.

39-17-1513. Department of agriculture encouraged to study effects of sale and distribution of vapor products to persons under 21. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

The department of agriculture is urged to study the effects of the sale and distribution of vapor products to persons under twenty-one (21) years of age and is encouraged to make recommendations to the legislature with regard to reducing such sale and distribution.

Acts 2015, ch. 353, § 14; 2020, ch. 732, § 9.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, substituted “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1514 — 39-17-1550. [Reserved.]

  1. The general assembly intends by this part and other provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated to occupy and preempt the entire field of legislation concerning the regulation of tobacco products. Any law or regulation of tobacco products enacted or promulgated after March 15, 1994, by any agency or political subdivision of the state or any agency thereof is void; provided, that cities, counties and counties having a metropolitan form of government may regulate the use of tobacco products in buildings owned or leased by the political subdivisions; and provided further, that airport authorities created pursuant to title 42; utility districts created pursuant to title 7; and special school districts may regulate the use of tobacco products in buildings owned or leased by the entities. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, individual owners or operators of retail establishments located within an enclosed shopping mall shall retain the right to determine the policy on the use of tobacco products within the person's establishment.
    1. Notwithstanding subsection (a) or any other provision of this title, a municipality, a county or a county having a metropolitan form of government is authorized by local ordinance or resolution to prohibit smoking on the grounds of a hospital or in the public areas immediately outside of a hospital building and its entrances, including public sidewalks.
    2. Any regulation or ordinance that is passed or adopted by a local government pursuant to the authority granted by this subsection (b) may prohibit smoking by a distance of up to fifty feet (50') from a hospital's entrance unless the application of a fifty-foot limit would place hospital patients in a potentially unsafe condition. In which case the fifty-foot limit shall be extended to such distance as is necessary to ensure patient safety as determined by the local government's legislative body in consultation with representatives of any hospitals that are subject to the regulation or ordinance.
    1. Notwithstanding subsection (a) or any other provision of this title, a local government is authorized by ordinance to prohibit smoking on the grounds of a swimming pool owned or operated by such local government or an outdoor amphitheater with a seating capacity of at least six thousand (6,000) owned or operated by such local government.
    2. Subdivision (c)(1) shall only apply to:
      1. Municipalities located in a county having a population of not less than one hundred fifty-six thousand eight hundred (156,800) nor more than one hundred fifty-six thousand nine hundred (156,900), according to the 2010 federal census or any subsequent federal census; or
      2. Any county having a metropolitan form of government with a population of more than five hundred thousand (500,000), according to the 2010 federal census or any subsequent federal census.
    1. Notwithstanding subsection (a) or any other provision of this title, a local government is authorized by ordinance to prohibit smoking on the grounds of an urban park center, as described in § 57-4-102.
    2. Subdivision (d)(1) shall only apply to municipalities located in a county having a population of not less than seventy-two thousand three hundred (72,300) nor more than seventy-two thousand four hundred (72,400), according to the 2010 federal census or any subsequent federal census.
    1. Notwithstanding subsection (a) or any other provision of this title, a local government may prohibit smoking on the grounds of a playground by adopting a resolution or ordinance approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the legislative body of the local government.
    2. As used in this subsection (e):
      1. “Playground” means an indoor or outdoor facility that is intended for recreation of children and owned by the local government; and
      2. “Smoking” means the burning of a tobacco product, hemp product, or any other drug or substance. “Smoking” does not include the use of a vapor product.

Acts 1994, ch. 872, §§ 9, 12; 2011, ch. 296, § 1; 2016, ch. 847, § 1; 2017, ch. 188, § 1; 2020, ch. 529, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For tables of population of Tennessee municipalities, and for U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Acts 2020, ch. 529, §  2 provided that the act shall take effect on July 1, 2019.  However, since an act cannot take effect prior to becoming law, the act took effect pursuant to Article II, Sec. 20 of the Constitution of Tennessee, 40 days after the bill became law. Thus, the effective date of the act is April 19, 2020.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment added (e).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 529, § 2. April 19, 2020. [See Compiler's Notes.]

Attorney General Opinions. A municipality is not authorized to enact an ordinance that would ban smoking in restaurants located in buildings not owned or leased by the municipality, OAG 01-053 (4/9/01).

A city or county is not authorized to enact an ordinance that would prohibit smoking in parks owned or leased by them, OAG 07-152 (11/14/07).

Part 16
Children's Act for Clean Indoor Air

39-17-1601. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Children's Act for Clean Indoor Air.”

Acts 1995, ch. 455, § 1.

Attorney General Opinions. Where T.C.A. § 4-4-121 and the Children's Clean Air Act, T.C.A. § 39-17-1601 et seq., conflict, the latter act governs, OAG 02-111 (10/07/02).

The federal Pro-Children Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 6081 et seq., which prohibits persons from smoking in any indoor facility where children receive routine or regular health, day care, education or library services, if these services are funded by the federal government, or through state or local governments, by federal grant, loan, loan guarantee, or contract, prevails over state law to the extent that state law conflicts with the federal act, OAG 02-111 (10/07/02).

39-17-1602. Purpose.

It is the intention of the general assembly that this part reduce the extent to which children are exposed to environmental tobacco smoke in facilities where children's services are provided.

Acts 1995, ch. 455, § 2.

Attorney General Opinions. Accomplishment of purpose of Act, OAG 97-140 (10/14/97).

39-17-1603. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Children” means individuals who have not attained eighteen (18) years of age;
  2. “Community center” means any center operated by any city or county government that is used for children's activities;
  3. “Day care center” means any place, operated by a person, society, agency, corporation, institution or religious organization, or any other group wherein are received thirteen (13) or more children for group care for less than twenty-four (24) hours per day without transfer of custody;
  4. “Designated smoking area” means an enclosed indoor area or an outdoor area in which smoking is permitted pursuant to this part. If indoors, the smoking area shall be clearly demarcated and separate from any area in which smoking is not permitted, and shall not include more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the area of the building. The indoor smoking area shall be a fully enclosed area;
  5. “Group care home” means a home operated by any person, society, agency, corporation, or institution or any group which receives seven (7) or more children for full-time care outside their own homes in facilities owned or rented and operated by the organization;
  6. “Museum” means those indoor museums and art galleries owned or operated by the state or any political subdivision of the state, and those museums, historical societies, and art galleries owned and operated by not-for-profit corporations;
  7. “Residential treatment facility” means a residential treatment facility licensed under title 33, chapter 2, part 4;
  8. “School grounds” means any building, structure, and surrounding outdoor grounds contained within a public or private preschool, nursery school, kindergarten, elementary or secondary school's legally defined property boundaries as registered in a county register's office, and any publicly owned or leased vehicle used to transport children to or from school or any officially sanctioned or organized school event;
  9. “Smoking” means the burning of a lighted cigarette, cigar, pipe or any other substance containing tobacco;
  10. “Vapor product” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-17-1503;
  11. “Youth development center” means a center established under title 37, chapter 5, part 2, for the detention, treatment, rehabilitation and education of children found to be delinquent; and
  12. “Zoo” means any indoor area open to the public for the purpose of viewing animals.

Acts 1995, ch. 455, § 3; 2000, ch. 947, § 8L; 2019, ch. 144, § 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the definition of “vapor product”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 144, § 4. April 17,  2019.

39-17-1604. Places where smoking and use of vapor products is prohibited.

Smoking or the use of vapor products is not permitted, and no person shall smoke or use vapor products, in the following places:

  1. Child care centers; provided, that the prohibition of this section does not apply to child care services provided in a private home. Adult staff members may be permitted to smoke or use vapor products in designated areas to which children are not allowed access. However, the child care center shall give written notification to the parent or legal guardian upon enrollment if the child care center has an indoor area designated for smoking or the use of vapor products;
  2. Any room or area in a community center while the room or area is being used for children's activities;
  3. Group care homes. Adults may smoke or use vapor products in any fully enclosed adult staff residential quarters contained within a group care home, but not in the presence of children who reside as clients in the group care home;
  4. Healthcare facilities, excluding nursing home facilities. Adult staff members may be permitted to smoke or use vapor products in designated areas to which children are not allowed access, and adults may be permitted to smoke or use vapor products outside the facility;
  5. Museums, except when used after normal operating hours for private functions not attended by children. Adult staff members may be permitted to smoke or use vapor products while at work in designated smoking areas to which children are not allowed access;
  6. All public and private kindergartens and elementary and secondary schools. Adult staff members may be permitted to smoke or use vapor products outdoors but not within one hundred feet (100') of any entrance to any building. Adults may also smoke or use vapor products in any fully enclosed adult staff residential quarters but not in the presence of children attending the school;
  7. Residential treatment facilities for children and youth. Adult staff members may be permitted to smoke or use vapor products in designated areas to which children are not allowed access;
  8. Youth development centers and facilities. Adult staff members may be permitted to smoke or use vapor products in designated areas to which children are not allowed access;
  9. Zoos. Adult staff members may be permitted to smoke or use vapor products in designated areas to which children are not allowed access; and
  10. School grounds, including any public seating areas, such as bleachers used for sporting events, or public restrooms.

Acts 1995, ch. 455, § 4; 2000, ch. 981, § 62; 2019, ch. 144, § 3.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted the instances of “or the use of vapor products” and “or use vapor products” throughout; substituted “in designated areas” for “in designated smoking areas” throughout; in (1), substituted “apply to child care services” for “apply to the services” in the first sentence, and rewrote the last sentence which read: “However, written notification shall be given to the parent or legal guardian upon enrollment if the child care center has an indoor designated smoking area;”; substituted “Healthcare facilities” for “Health care facilities” at the beginning of (4); substituted both commas for parentheses in the first sentence of (5); in (6), substituted “kindergartens  and elementary” for “kindergartens, elementary” and substituted “not within one hundred feet (100')” for “not within fifty feet (50')”; and rewrote (10) which read: “School grounds; provided, that after regular school hours, adults are allowed to smoke on the property surrounding the institution, but not blocking any entrance to any building. The property shall not include any public seating areas, including, but not limited to, bleachers used for sporting events, or public restrooms.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 144, § 4. April 17,  2019.

Cross-References. Penalty for violation of this section, § 39-17-1606.

39-17-1605. “No smoking” signs — Posting notice.

  1. “No Smoking” signs, or the international “No Smoking” symbol, which consists of a pictorial representation of a burning cigarette enclosed in a circle with a bar across it, shall be prominently posted and properly maintained on each main building entrance where smoking is regulated by this part. The “No Smoking” signs or “No Smoking” symbols shall be prominently displayed throughout the building to ensure that the public is aware of the restriction.
  2. The following notice shall be prominently posted, including at each ticket booth, for elementary or secondary school sporting events:

    “Smoking is prohibited by law in seating areas and in restrooms.”

Acts 1995, ch. 455, § 5.

Cross-References. Penalty for violation of this section, § 39-17-1606.

39-17-1606. Penalty — Enforcement.

  1. An institution violating this part or failing to take reasonable measures to enforce this part commits a Class B misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500).
  2. Any law enforcement officer may issue a citation regarding a violation of this part.

Acts 1995, ch. 455, § 6.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Class A misdemeanor penalty not applicable to individuals, OAG 97-140 (10/14/97).

Part 17
Child Curfew

39-17-1701. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Child Curfew Act of 1995.”

Acts 1995, ch. 314, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews: Constitutional Standards & the Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 653 (2000).

39-17-1702. Curfew established — Exceptions — Duties of apprehending authority.

  1. It is unlawful for any minor between seventeen (17) and eighteen (18) years of age to remain in or upon any public street, highway, park, vacant lot, establishment or other public place within the county during the following time frames:
    1. Monday through Thursday between the hours of eleven o'clock p.m. (11:00 p.m.) to six o'clock a.m. (6:00 a.m.); and
    2. Friday through Sunday between the hours of twelve o'clock (12:00) midnight to six o'clock a.m. (6:00 a.m.).
  2. It is unlawful for any minor sixteen (16) years of age and under to remain in or upon any public street, highway, park, vacant lot, establishment or other public place within the county during the following time frames:
    1. Monday through Thursday between the hours of ten o'clock p.m. (10:00 p.m.) to six o'clock a.m. (6:00 a.m.); and
    2. Friday through Sunday between the hours of eleven o'clock p.m. (11:00 p.m.) to six o'clock a.m. (6:00 a.m.).
  3. It is unlawful for a parent or guardian of a minor to knowingly permit or by inefficient control to allow the minor to be or remain upon any street or establishment under circumstances not constituting an exception to, or otherwise beyond the scope of subsections (a) and (b). The term “knowingly” includes knowledge that a parent or guardian should reasonably be expected to have concerning the whereabouts of a minor in that parent's legal custody. The term “knowingly” is intended to continue to keep neglectful or careless parents up to a reasonable community standard of parental responsibility through an objective test. It is not a defense that a parent was completely indifferent to the activities or conduct or whereabouts of the minor child.
    1. The following are valid exceptions to the operation of the curfew:
      1. At any time, if a minor is accompanied by the minor's parent or guardian;
      2. When accompanied by an adult authorized by a parent or guardian of the minor to take the parent or guardian's place in accompanying the minor for a designated period of time and purpose within a specified area;
      3. Until the hour of twelve-thirty a.m. (12:30 a.m.), if the minor is on an errand as directed by the minor's parent;
      4. While engaged in a lawful employment activity, or while going directly to or returning directly from the minor's home and place of lawful employment. This exception shall also apply if the minor is in a public place during the curfew hours in the course of the minor's lawful employment. To come within this exception, the minor must be carrying written evidence of employment that is issued by the employer;
      5. Until the hour of twelve-thirty a.m. (12:30 a.m.) if the minor is on the property of or the sidewalk directly adjacent to the place where the minor resides or the place immediately adjacent to the place where the minor resides, if the owner of the adjacent building does not communicate an objection to the minor and the law enforcement officer;
      6. When returning home by a direct route from (and within thirty (30) minutes of the termination of) a school activity or an activity of a religious or other voluntary association, or a place of public entertainment, such as a movie, play or sporting event. This exception does not apply beyond one o'clock a.m. (1:00 a.m.).
      7. In the case of reasonable necessity, but only after the minor's parent has communicated to law enforcement personnel the facts establishing the reasonable necessity relating to specified streets at a designated time for a described purpose including place or origin and destination. A copy of the communication, or the record of the communication, an appropriate notation of the time it was received and of the names and addresses of the parent or guardian and minor constitute evidence of qualification under this exception;
      8. When exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution, such as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech and the right of assembly. A minor shall show evidence of the good faith of the exercise and provide notice to the city officials by first delivering to the appropriate law enforcement authority a written communication, signed by the minor, with the minor's home address and telephone number, addressed to the mayor of the county specifying when, where and in what manner the minor will be on the streets at night during hours when the curfew is still otherwise applicable to the minor in the exercise of a First Amendment right specified in the communication; and
      9. When a minor is, with parental consent, in a motor vehicle engaged in good faith interstate travel.
    2. Each of the exceptions  contained in subdivision (d)(1), and the limitations are severable.
  4. When any child is in violation of this section, the apprehending officer shall act in one (1) of the following ways:
    1. In the case of a first violation, and if in the opinion of the officer the action would be effective, take the child to the child's home and warn and counsel the parents or guardians;
    2. Take the minor into custody and transport the minor to a designated curfew center;
    3. Issue a summons to the child or parents or guardians to appear at the juvenile court; or
    4. Bring the child into the custody of the juvenile court for disposition.
    1. A minor violating this section shall commit an unruly act disposition of which shall be governed pursuant to title 37.
    2. Any parent, guardian, or other person having the care, custody and control of a minor violating this section commits a Class C misdemeanor and shall be fined no more than fifty dollars ($50.00) for each offense. Each violation of this section shall constitute a separate offense.

Acts 1995, ch. 314, § 2; 2015, ch. 319, §§ 1, 2.

Cross-References. Circumstances under which parent or guardian liable, § 37-10-103.

Delinquent act defined, § 37-1-102.

Juvenile court proceedings, title 37, ch. 1.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Provisions of this section inapplicable to a municipality that has a more stringent curfew ordinance, § 39-17-1703.

39-17-1703. Applicability upon adoption of part.

  1. This part shall apply upon the adoption of a resolution or ordinance by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the appropriate legislative body of any:
    1. County having a population of not less than eight hundred ninety-seven thousand four hundred (897,400) nor more than eight hundred ninety-seven thousand five hundred (897,500), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census;
    2. County having a population of not less than twenty-eight thousand one hundred (28,100) nor more than twenty-eight thousand two hundred (28,200), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census; or
    3. Municipality in any county referenced in subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2).
  2. Section 39-17-1702 shall not apply to a municipality that has a more stringent curfew ordinance.

Acts 1995, ch. 314, § 3; 1999, ch. 31, § 1; 2002, ch. 507, § 1; 2007, ch. 67, § 1; 2007, ch. 586, § 4.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2007, ch. 586, § 4 purported to amend this section, effective June 28, 2007, with provisions that are identical to those by Acts 2007, ch. 67, § 1, effective April 30, 2007, and was not given effect.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

39-17-1704. Authorization to adopt municipal curfew.

The county legislative body of any county having a population of not less than three hundred eighty-two thousand (382,000) nor more than three hundred eighty-two thousand one hundred (382,100), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, is authorized to adopt by a two-thirds (2/3) vote a curfew identical to that which a municipality located within that county has previously adopted by ordinance.

Acts 2002, ch. 507, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Part 18
Non-Smoker Protection Act

39-17-1801. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Non-Smoker Protection Act.”

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1.

39-17-1802. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Acceptable form of identification” means:
    1. A state-issued driver license;
    2. A state-issued identification card;
    3. A valid passport; or
    4. A valid military identification;
  2. “Age-restricted venue” means a legal establishment that affirmatively restricts access to its buildings or facilities at all times to persons who are twenty-one (21) years of age or older by requiring each person who attempts to gain entry to those buildings or facilities to submit for inspection an acceptable form of identification for the express purpose of determining if the person is twenty-one (21) years of age or older;
  3. “Employee” means a person who is employed by an employer in consideration for direct or indirect monetary wages or profit and a person who volunteers that person's services for a nonprofit entity;
  4. “Employer” means a person, business, partnership, association, corporation, including a municipal corporation, educational institution, trust, or nonprofit entity that employs the services of one (1) or more individual persons;
  5. “Enclosed area” means all space between a floor and ceiling that is enclosed on all sides by solid walls or windows, exclusive of doorways, that extend from the floor to the ceiling;
  6. “Health care facility” means an office or institution providing care or treatment of diseases, whether physical, mental, or emotional, or other medical, physiological, or psychological conditions. “Health care facility” includes all waiting rooms, hallways, private rooms, semiprivate rooms, and wards within health care facilities;
  7. “Person” means an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation or any other organization or group of persons;
  8. “Place of employment” means an enclosed area under the control of a public or private employer that employees normally frequent during the course of employment, including, but not limited to, work areas, private offices, employee lounges, restrooms, conference rooms, meeting rooms, classrooms, employee cafeterias, hallways, and vehicles. A private residence is not a place of employment unless it is used as a child care, adult day care, or health care facility;
  9. “Place of worship” means any enclosed area that is:
    1. Approved, or qualified to be approved, by the state board of equalization for property tax exemption pursuant to § 67-5-212, based on ownership and use of the enclosed area by a religious institution; and
    2. Utilized on a regular basis by such religious institution as the site of congregational services, rites or activities communally undertaken for the purpose of worship;
    1. “Private club” means any club or organization that does not permit the general public access to its facilities or activities. Access is denied to anyone who does not agree or adhere to the rules of membership. In order to be considered a private club or organization for purposes of this part, the club or organization shall adhere to all of the following criteria:
      1. Have a permanent mechanism to carefully screen applicants for membership on subjective rather than objective factors;
      2. Limit access and use of facilities, services and activities of the organization to members and guests of the members;
      3. Be controlled by its membership and operate solely for the benefit and pleasure of its members; and
      4. Advertise exclusively and only to its members, excluding membership drives;
    2. “Private club” also means any institution or organization that has received a determination of exemption from the internal revenue service under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(19);
  10. “Public place” means an enclosed area to which the public is invited, including, but not limited to, banks, educational facilities, health care facilities, hotel and motel lobbies, laundromats, public transportation facilities, reception areas, restaurants, retail food production and marketing establishments, recreational facilities, retail service establishments, retail stores, shopping malls, sports arenas, theaters, places of employment and waiting rooms;
  11. “Restaurant” means an eating establishment, including, but not limited to, coffee shops, cafeterias, sandwich stands, and private and public school cafeterias, that gives, or offers for sale, food to the public, guests, or employees, as well as kitchens and catering facilities in which food is prepared on the premises for serving elsewhere. “Restaurant” includes a bar area within the restaurant;
  12. “Retail tobacco store” means a retail store that derives its largest category of sales from tobacco products and accessories;
  13. “Service line” means an indoor line in which one (1) or more persons are waiting for or receiving service of any kind, whether or not the service involves the exchange of money;
  14. “Shopping mall” means an enclosed public walkway or hall area that serves to connect retail or professional establishments;
  15. “Smoking” means inhaling, exhaling, burning, or carrying any lighted cigar, cigarette, pipe, or other lighted tobacco product in any manner or in any form; and
  16. “Sports arena” means sports pavilions, stadiums, gymnasiums, health spas, boxing arenas, swimming pools, roller and ice rinks, bowling alleys, and other similar places where members of the general public assemble to engage in physical exercise, participate in athletic competition, or witness sports or other events.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1; 2008, ch. 897, § 2.

39-17-1803. Places where smoking is prohibited.

  1. Smoking is prohibited in all enclosed public places within this state, including, but not limited to, the following places:
    1. Aquariums, galleries, libraries, and museums;
    2. Areas available to and customarily used by the general public in businesses and nonprofit entities patronized by the public, including, but not limited to, banks, laundromats, factories, professional offices, and retail service establishments;
    3. Child care and adult day care facilities;
    4. Convention facilities;
    5. Educational facilities, both public and private, except as provided by § 49-7-135;
    6. Elevators;
    7. Health care facilities;
    8. Hotels and motels;
    9. Lobbies, hallways, and other common areas in apartment buildings, condominiums, trailer parks, retirement facilities, nursing homes, and other multiple-unit residential facilities;
    10. Polling places;
    11. Public and private transportation facilities, including trains, buses, taxicabs and airports under the authority of state or local governments, and ticket, boarding, and waiting areas of public transit depots;
    12. Restaurants;
    13. Restrooms, lobbies, reception areas, hallways, and other common-use areas;
    14. Retail stores;
    15. Rooms, chambers, places of meeting or public assembly, including school buildings, under the control of an agency, board, commission, committee or council of this state or a political subdivision of the state, to the extent the place is subject to the jurisdiction of the state;
    16. Service lines;
    17. Shopping malls;
    18. Sports arenas, including enclosed public places in outdoor arenas; and
    19. Theaters and other facilities primarily used for exhibiting motion pictures, stage dramas, lectures, musical recitals, or other similar performances.
  2. This prohibition on smoking shall be communicated to all existing employees and to all prospective employees upon their application of employment.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1; 2017, ch. 161, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Because the Non-Smoker Protection Act (NSPA) limitation on smoking in enclosed public areas is rationally related to limiting citizens'  exposure to harmful second-hand smoke, the NSPA does not violate the constitutional equal protection clause. Burnette v. Bredesen, 566 F. Supp. 2d 738, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52322 (E.D. Tenn. July 7, 2008).

2. Standing.

Smoker lacked standing to challenge the Non-Smoker Protection Act (NSPA) because he had not shown an injury in fact because even if the NSPA discriminated against him, he still had to demonstrate the discrimination has injured him; further, his alleged injury was not concrete and imminent, but rather his fear of penalty was shared by all citizens, and constituted a generalized grievance. Burnette v. Bredesen, 566 F. Supp. 2d 738, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52322 (E.D. Tenn. July 7, 2008).

39-17-1804. Exempted areas. [Effective until January 1, 2021. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

Notwithstanding any other provision of this part to the contrary, the following areas shall be exempt from § 39-17-1803:

  1. Age-restricted venues;
  2. Hotel and motel rooms that are rented to guests and are designated as smoking rooms; provided, that no more than twenty-five percent (25%) of rooms rented to guests in a hotel or motel may be so designated. All smoking rooms on the same floor shall be contiguous and smoke from these rooms shall not infiltrate into areas where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part;
  3. All premises of any manufacturer, importer, or wholesaler of tobacco products, all premises of any tobacco leaf dealer or processor, and all tobacco storage facilities;
    1. Nonenclosed areas of public places, including:
      1. Open air patios, porches or decks;
      2. Any area enclosed by garage type doors on one (1) or more sides when all those doors are completely open; and
      3. Any area enclosed by tents or awnings with removable sides or vents when all those sides or vents are completely removed or open;
    2. Smoke from those nonenclosed areas shall not infiltrate into areas where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part;
  4. Nursing homes and long-term care facilities licensed pursuant to title 68, chapter 11; provided, that this exemption shall only apply to residents of those facilities and that resident smoking practices shall be governed by the policies and procedures established by those facilities. Smoke from such areas shall not infiltrate into areas where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part;
  5. Private businesses with three (3) or fewer employees where, in the discretion of the business owner, smoking may be allowed in an enclosed room not accessible to the general public. Smoke from that room shall not infiltrate into areas where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part;
  6. Private clubs; provided, that this exemption shall not apply to any entity that is established solely for the purpose of avoiding compliance with this part;
  7. Private homes, private residences and private motor vehicles, unless those homes, residences and motor vehicles are being used for child care or day care or unless the private vehicle is being used for the public transportation of children or as part of health care or day care transportation;
  8. Retail tobacco stores that prohibit minors on their premises; and
  9. Commercial vehicles when the vehicle is occupied solely by the operator.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1.

39-17-1804. Exempted areas. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until January 1, 2021.]

Notwithstanding any other provision of this part to the contrary, the following areas shall be exempt from § 39-17-1803:

  1. Age-restricted venues;
  2. Hotel and motel rooms that are rented to guests and are designated as smoking rooms; provided, that no more than twenty-five percent (25%) of rooms rented to guests in a hotel or motel may be so designated. All smoking rooms on the same floor shall be contiguous and smoke from these rooms shall not infiltrate into areas where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part;
  3. All premises of any manufacturer, importer, or wholesaler of tobacco products, all premises of any tobacco leaf dealer or processor, and all tobacco storage facilities;
    1. Nonenclosed areas of public places, including:
      1. Open air patios, porches or decks;
      2. Any area enclosed by garage type doors on one (1) or more sides when all those doors are completely open; and
      3. Any area enclosed by tents or awnings with removable sides or vents when all those sides or vents are completely removed or open;
    2. Smoke from those nonenclosed areas shall not infiltrate into areas where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part;
  4. Nursing homes and long-term care facilities licensed pursuant to title 68, chapter 11; provided, that this exemption shall only apply to residents of those facilities and that resident smoking practices shall be governed by the policies and procedures established by those facilities. Smoke from such areas shall not infiltrate into areas where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part;
  5. Private businesses with three (3) or fewer employees where, in the discretion of the business owner, smoking may be allowed in an enclosed room not accessible to the general public. Smoke from that room shall not infiltrate into areas where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part;
  6. Private clubs; provided, that this exemption shall not apply to any entity that is established solely for the purpose of avoiding compliance with this part;
  7. Private homes, private residences and private motor vehicles, unless those homes, residences and motor vehicles are being used for child care or day care or unless the private vehicle is being used for the public transportation of children or as part of health care or day care transportation;
  8. Retail tobacco stores that prohibit persons under twenty-one (21) years of age on their premises; and
  9. Commercial vehicles when the vehicle is occupied solely by the operator.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1; 2020, ch. 732, § 22.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, substituted “persons under twenty-one (21) years of age” for “minors” in (9).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

39-17-1805. Posting of nonsmoking areas.

  1. “No Smoking” signs or the international “No Smoking” symbol, consisting of a pictorial representation of a burning cigarette enclosed in a red circle with a red bar across it, shall be clearly and conspicuously posted at every entrance to every public place and place of employment where smoking is prohibited by this part by the owner, operator, manager, or other person in control of that place.
  2. This section shall not apply to a place of worship.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1; 2008, ch. 897, § 1.

39-17-1806. Enforcement — Notice — Complaints — Inspections — Informing violators.

  1. This part shall be enforced by the department of health in those enclosed public places otherwise regulated by the department. This part shall be enforced by the department of labor and workforce development in those enclosed public places otherwise regulated by the department. If neither department otherwise regulates an enclosed public place where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part, the department of labor and workforce development shall enforce this part. The commissioner of health or the commissioner of labor and workforce development may apply for injunctive relief to enforce this part in any court of competent jurisdiction.
  2. Notice of the provisions of this part shall be given to all applicants for a business license pursuant to title 67, chapter 4, part 7.
  3. Any person who desires to register a complaint under this part may initiate the complaint with the department of health or the department of labor and workforce development, or both.
  4. The department of health and the department of labor and workforce development shall, while an establishment is undergoing otherwise mandated inspections, inspect for compliance with this part.
  5. An owner, manager, operator, or employee of an establishment regulated by this part shall inform persons violating this part of the appropriate provisions of this part.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1.

39-17-1807. Penalties.

  1. A person who knowingly smokes in an area where smoking is prohibited by this part shall be subject only to a civil penalty of fifty dollars ($50.00).
  2. A person who owns, manages, operates or otherwise controls any public place where smoking is prohibited pursuant to this part and who knowingly fails to comply with any provision of this part shall be subject to the following:
    1. For a first violation in any twelve-month period, a written warning from the department of health or department of labor and workforce development, as appropriate;
    2. For a second violation in any twelve-month period, a civil penalty of one hundred dollars ($100); and
    3. For a third or subsequent violation in any twelve-month period, a civil penalty of five hundred dollars ($500).
  3. Each day on which a knowing violation of this part occurs shall be considered a separate and distinct violation.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1.

39-17-1808. Continuing program to explain and clarify.

The department of health and the department of labor and workforce development shall engage in a continuing program to explain and clarify the purposes and requirements of this part to all persons affected by this part.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1.

39-17-1809. Local operating procedures.

The commissioner of health and the commissioner of labor and workforce development shall annually request other governmental and educational agencies to establish local operating procedures in cooperation and compliance with this part.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1.

39-17-1810. Construction with other laws.

This part shall not be construed to permit smoking where it is otherwise restricted by other applicable laws.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 1.

39-17-1811. Rules and regulations.

  1. The department of health, in consultation with the department of labor and workforce development, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate this part.
  2. The department of labor and workforce development, in consultation with the department of health, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate this part.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 2.

39-17-1812. Liberal construction.

This part shall be liberally construed so as to further its purposes.

Acts 2007, ch. 410, § 3.

39-17-452. Synthetic derivatives or analogues of methcathinone.

39-17-651. Offense of selling annual event tickets, shares, chances or similar records for period longer than authorized.

39-17-713. Storage of liquor for sale.

39-17-914. Display for sale or rental of material harmful to minors.

39-17-918. Massage or exposure of erogenous areas.

39-17-1306. Carrying weapons during judicial proceedings.

39-17-1350. Law enforcement officers permitted to carry firearms — Exceptions — Restrictions — Identification card for corrections officers.

39-17-1551. Purpose of part — Exemptions — Authority to prohibit smoking.