Chapter 1
Code Commission

1-1-101. Composition of commission — Vacancies.

  1. There is created a Tennessee code commission of five (5) members composed of the chief justice of the supreme court, the attorney general and reporter, a director of the office of legal services for the general assembly, and two (2) other members appointed by the chief justice.
  2. In the event of a vacancy for any cause in the appointed membership, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the chief justice.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 16; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-101; Acts 2016, ch. 603, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. The Tennessee code commission, created by this section, terminates June 30, 2025. See §§ 4-29-112, 4-29-246.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment substituted “a” for “the” preceding “director” in (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 603, § 4. March 17, 2016.

Cross-References. Reproduction, publication and sale of T.C.A. to be pursuant to this chapter, § 3-10-108.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191 (1978).

1-1-102. Chair — Executive secretary.

  1. The chief justice shall serve as chair of the commission.
  2. The revisor of statutes within the office of legal services for the general assembly shall serve as executive secretary of the commission.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 6; 1977, ch. 89, § 17; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-102; Acts 2016, ch. 603, § 2.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment substituted “The revisor of statutes within” for “The director of the office of” in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 603, § 4. March 17, 2016.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191 (1978).

1-1-103. Staff services for commission.

The office of legal services for the general assembly shall provide all staff services for the commission.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 2; 1977, ch. 89, § 18; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-103.

1-1-104. Successor to 1953 commission.

The Tennessee code commission, created by § 1-1-101, shall be the immediate successor to the commission created by Chapter 80 of the Public Acts of 1953.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 7; 1977, ch. 89, § 19; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-104.

Compiler's Notes. Section 1 of Public Acts of 1953, ch. 80, referred to in this section, reads:

“There is created a Tennessee code commission of five members composed of a chief justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the attorney general and reporter and three other members. The commission as originally constituted shall be composed of the following members: A. B. Neil, chief justice of the Supreme Court, Roy H. Beeler, attorney-general and reporter, Sam L. Felts, Sr., Alfred P. Adams, Sr., and Harry Phillips. Whoever shall occupy the positions of chief justice and attorney general and reporter shall be members of such commission, in event of a vacancy for any cause among the other three members, the same shall be filled at appointment by the chief justice.”

1-1-105. Publication of Tennessee Code Annotated.

  1. The Tennessee code commission is hereby authorized and directed to formulate and supervise the execution of plans for the compilation, arrangement, classification, annotation, editing, indexing, printing, binding, publication, sale, distribution and the performance of all other acts necessary for the publication of an official compilation of the statutes, codes and session laws of the state of Tennessee of a public and general nature, now existing and to be enacted in the future, including an electronically searchable database of such code, which official compilation shall be known as “Tennessee Code Annotated.”
  2. “Publication,” as used in this chapter, includes the necessary actions by whatever means and in whatever form for development of a Tennessee Code database.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-105; Acts 1984, ch. 660, §§ 1, 2.

Cross-References. Free distribution law inapplicable, § 12-6-102.

Preparation of additional indices, § 1-1-115.

Publication of court rules, § 16-3-405.

Reproduction, publication and sale of T.C.A. to be pursuant to this chapter, § 3-10-108.

Attorney General Opinions. Unconstitutional enactment not cured by codification or recaptioning, OAG 98-023 (1/23/98).

Unconstitutional enactment (Acts 1997, ch. 98) not eligible for codification, OAG 98-023 (1/23/98).

1-1-106. Powers of commission — Contracts.

  1. The Tennessee code commission has full power and authority on behalf of the state of Tennessee to perform all acts and to negotiate and enter into all contracts necessary for and expedient to the successful production and publication of a revised compilation of the statutory laws of Tennessee, including the power and authority to enter into contracts with a law book publisher for the editing, compiling, annotating, indexing, printing, binding, publication, sale and distribution of the revised compilation and the performance and execution of all other publication plans formulated by the commission.
  2. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to render invalid or impair the obligations of any contract previously entered into by the commission for the purposes set forth in this section or with a suitable contractor for an electronically searchable database of such code.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 2; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-106; Acts 1984, ch. 660, § 3.

1-1-107. Specifications in contract — Price of supplements and replacement volumes.

  1. Any contract with a law book publisher for the purposes referred to in §§ 1-1-105 and 1-1-106 shall prescribe the specifications for the publication of the revised compilation, including the size of type to be used in the text of the statutes and the annotations, the grade and weight of the paper to be used, the size of the volumes, appropriate provisions for the insertion of pocket supplements and the publication of replacement volumes, the price at which Tennessee Code Annotated shall be sold in Tennessee when originally published, and such other provisions as are necessary for the full performance of the publication plans formulated by the commission.
  2. The price at which pocket supplements and replacement volumes are to be sold from time to time in Tennessee shall be controlled by the commission in such contracts as it may, from time to time, in its discretion execute.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-107.

Cross-References. Price of supplements and replacement volumes, § 1-1-113.

1-1-108. Substantive changes in text prohibited — Changes authorized — Effect of error in enrollment.

  1. In preparing the manuscript of the revised compilation (including pocket supplements and replacement volumes) for publication and distribution, the commission shall not alter the sense, meaning or effect of any act of the general assembly, but shall copy the exact language of the text of the statutes, codes and session laws of a public and general nature of the state of Tennessee, except that the commission is authorized to rearrange, regroup and renumber the titles, chapters, sections and parts of sections of the statutes, codes and code supplements and to change reference numbers to agree with any renumbered chapter or section; to change the wording of and prepare new section headings and symbols; to substitute the proper section or chapter reference where the terms “this act” or “the preceding section” or similar expressions are used in the statutes; to correct manifest misspelling and typographical errors and to change capitalization and spelling for the purpose of uniformity; to change references to governmental agencies, departments and officers when part or all of the powers, rights and/or duties of such agencies, departments or officers have, by an act of the general assembly, been transferred to other agencies, departments or officers; to omit enacting clauses, repealing clauses, severability clauses, conditional clauses, preambles, captions and statements declaring legislative intent; and to make other stylistic, nonsubstantive changes if such changes are consistent with style guidelines that have been approved by the commission and submitted to the judiciary committee of the senate and the judiciary committee of the house of representatives. Where the application or effect of a statute, by its terms, depends on the time when the act creating the statute took effect, the commission may substitute the actual effective date for the various forms of expression which mean that date — such as “when this act (or chapter, or section) takes effect,” or “after (or before) the effective date of this act (or chapter, or section).” No such change shall be deemed an alteration of or departure from the enrolled statute.
    1. When the commission is advised by certificate of the secretary of state that a bill which is signed by the governor, or passed over the governor's veto, or otherwise becomes a public act, differs, by reason of an error in the enrolling process or otherwise from such bill as passed on third reading by both houses of the general assembly, the commission will not compile the public act for codification, but will have a compiler's note inserted in the manuscript of Tennessee Code Annotated, which compiler's note shall set forth the facts revealed by the certificate received from the secretary of state in reference to such error.
    2. Nothing in this subsection (b) shall affect the powers granted the commission under subsection (a).

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 4; 1968, ch. 442, § 1; 1970, ch. 378, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-108; Acts 2011, ch. 48, §§ 1, 2; 2013, ch. 236, § 34; 2019, ch. 345, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “judiciary” for “civil justice” preceding “committee of the house” in (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Cross-References. Reproduction, publication and sale of T.C.A. to be pursuant to this chapter, § 3-10-108.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 566.

Law Reviews.

Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Tennessee, 43 Tenn. L. Rev. 663 (1976).

Attorney General Opinions. Re-engrossment of bills, OAG 95-093 (9/1/95).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Defects in Enactment.

Mere act of codification of statutes for publication in the code does not cure defects in the passage but the enactment of the codified statutes into the code by the general assembly does cure such defects. Keaton v. State, 212 Tenn. 690, 372 S.W.2d 163, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 459 (1963).

The court rejected the contention that, under this section, if the act is void because the body is broader than the caption, then codification cannot cure the defect. Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 13, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

2. Surplusage.

Where the compiler added parenthetical reference to sections of the United States Code (U.S.C.) following the reference to the federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, but the original act passed by the general assembly and signed by the governor contained no reference to any U.S.C. sections, the court held that such parenthetical references were mere surplusage and could in no way alter the sense or meaning of the act. Moore v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 512 S.W.2d 564, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. 1974).

1-1-109. Seal and certificate.

The commission has the authority to design and adopt an appropriate certificate and distinctive seal on behalf of the state, a copy of which shall be included in each copy of each volume and pocket supplement of “Tennessee Code Annotated.”

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-109.

1-1-110. Examination and certification of published volumes.

  1. When the commission finds that the manuscript of the revised compilation hereby authorized or any volume or pocket supplement thereof as printed, edited, annotated, indexed and bound by the law book publisher pursuant to contract conforms to the commission's publication plans and meets and satisfies the requirements of this chapter and also the requirements of the publication contract entered into pursuant to the terms of this chapter, the commission shall prepare an appropriate written certificate of approval for each volume and pocket supplement, and the commission, acting through its executive secretary or other authorized officer, shall certify in writing that the commission has approved the manuscript of the compilation and that the text of each section of the statutes printed or appearing in such volume or pocket supplement has been compared with the original section appearing in the published copies of the public acts, and that, with the exception of changes in form permitted by § 1-1-108, the sections in the printed compilation are correctly and accurately copied.
  2. One (1) copy of each edition of each volume and pocket supplement so approved, together with the original certificate of approval by the commission, shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state.
  3. All other printed copies of each edition of each volume and pocket supplement shall contain a printed copy of the commission's certificate of approval.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 5; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-110.

Cross-References. Reproduction, publication and sale of T.C.A. to be pursuant to this chapter, § 3-10-108.

1-1-111. Official status — Prima facie evidence of law — Citation.

  1. Upon appropriate certification of approval by the commission filed with the secretary of state as provided in § 1-1-110, the compilation in each volume and supplement so certified shall be in force.
  2. The text of the statutes, codes and code supplements (but not the annotations, footnotes and other editorial matter) appearing in the printed copies of the compilation, containing a copy of the commission's certificate of approval, shall constitute prima facie evidence of the statutory law of this state and be received, recognized, referred to and used in all courts, agencies, departments, offices of and proceedings in the state as the official compilation of the statutory law, and may be cited as Tennessee Code Annotated or by the abbreviation “T.C.A.”

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 5; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-111.

Cross-References. References in statutes to T.C.A., § 1-2-101.

1-1-112. Uncertified compilations not recognized.

No compilation or codification of the statutes of Tennessee not bearing a copy of the certificate of approval of the code commission as provided in § 1-1-110 shall be recognized as an official compilation of the statutory law of Tennessee.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 5; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-112.

Cross-References. Reproduction, publication and sale of T.C.A. to be pursuant to this chapter, § 3-10-108.

1-1-113. Expenses — Costs of publication — Price.

  1. The commission shall be authorized to expend such funds as may be appropriated by the general assembly for the purpose of this chapter. Such expenditures shall be made upon certification by the chief justice to the proper fiscal officers.
  2. The commission shall not be authorized to subsidize the publication of the code out of public funds, but shall require that the cost of publication be borne by the publisher, and the publisher shall be required to depend for compensation upon the proceeds of the sale of the publication.
  3. In contracting for the price at which the Tennessee Code Annotated and its pocket supplements and replacement volumes shall be sold in Tennessee, the commission is directed to keep the price at the lowest figure which in its discretion is consistent with high editorial and publishing quality.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 8; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-113.

Cross-References. Price of supplements and replacement volumes, § 1-1-107.

1-1-114. Recommendations for statutory changes.

The commission may prepare and submit to succeeding sessions of the general assembly its recommendations for the revision in substance and form or the repeal or amendment of certain statutes or any portion thereof, and submit bills for the accomplishment of such proposed revision, repeal or amendment.

Acts 1953, ch. 80, § 4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-114.

Cross-References. Regulatory agencies not collecting fees sufficient to pay operating costs, § 4-29-121.

1-1-115. Preparation of additional indices.

The commission may prepare or cause to be prepared indices to the laws of Tennessee, in addition to such indices as are prepared in accordance with § 1-1-105, and in preparing such indices has the powers authorized by this chapter.

Acts 1982, ch. 649, § 1.

1-1-116. Changing references from “tax assessor” to “assessor of property.”

The code commission is directed to change all references to tax assessor in title 6, chapter 22, part 1; § 6-51-204; title 6, chapter 55, part 6; title 7, chapter 32, part 1; § 7-64-102; § 25-3-118; § 43-34-104; title 67; and title 69, chapter 6, part 1, wherever such references appear, to assessor of property as such sections are amended or volumes are replaced.

Acts 2008, ch. 971, § 1.

Chapter 2
Enactment of Code

1-2-101. Designation of code.

  1. This compilation of the laws of the state is to be designated as the “Tennessee Code” and the annotated edition of the code provided for by chapter 1 of this title shall be designated as “Tennessee Code Annotated”. Citations to the Tennessee Code Annotated may incorporate the abbreviations “Tenn. Code Ann.” or “T.C.A.”
  2. As used in acts and resolutions of the general assembly, “Tennessee Code”, “Tennessee Code Annotated”, “Tenn. Code Ann.” or “T.C.A.” shall, unless a contrary intention is manifest, be construed to refer to this enactment of the Tennessee Code, amendments and revisions of the Tennessee Code, and additions and supplements to the Tennessee Code.

Code 1858, § 40; Shan., § 57; Code 1932, § 1; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-201; Acts 2008, ch. 637, § 1.

Cross-References. Definition of “Code,” § 1-3-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Common Law, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The adoption of the 1858 code was more than a mere revision of preexisting statutes of the state; it was a legislative act. Whitworth v. Hager, 124 Tenn. 355, 140 S.W. 205, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1910).

2. Constitutionality.

The Code of 1932 was constitutionally enacted. The title of the codification act related to a single and unified subject of codification of the statutes, collecting and compiling the statutes in a logical and concise form, and expressing the jural sense of the state. The act was also passed according to the provision of Tenn. Const., art. II, § 18 regulating the passage of statutes. Chumbley v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 166 Tenn. 35, 60 S.W.2d 164, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1933).

3. Amendment of Code.

Any act amending this code may recite either the caption, or the title of the code as given by this section. State v. Runnells, 92 Tenn. 320, 21 S.W. 665, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1893).

4. Construction of Code.

The code must be taken as our statute and its different parts which relate to the same subject matter must be construed with reference to each other. McMinnville & M. R. Co. v. Huggins, 47 Tenn. 217, 1869 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1869) (concurring opinion).

When the same terms used in the code appear in the constitution of the state, they must be taken to have the same meaning as in the constitution, unless the context, or other parts of the code, show that they are used in a different sense. McMinnville & M. R. Co. v. Huggins, 47 Tenn. 217, 1869 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1869) (concurring opinion).

5. Relation of Code to Subsequent Statutes.

Provisions made applicable to the whole code apply not only to the code, but also to statutes subsequently enacted where such provisions are properly applicable to such statutes, and in the absence of a contrary purpose expressed in the statutes themselves. Wiley v. State, 43 Tenn. 362, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1866); Cowan v. Murch, 97 Tenn. 590, 37 S.W. 393, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 186, 34 L.R.A. 538, (1896); Wallace v. Goodlett, 104 Tenn. 670, 58 S.W. 343, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1900); Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 257, 64 S.W. 193, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1901); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 71, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1015 (1907).

1-2-102. Preservation of enrolled draft.

The enrolled draft of the official Tennessee Code shall, upon the approval of this statute by the governor, be deposited in the office of the secretary of state, and shall be carefully preserved by that officer as the official code of this state, adopted and declared to be such.

Code 1932, § 27; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-202.

Code Commission Notes.

Chapter 6 of the Public Acts of 1955, which enacted the Tennessee Code Annotated, was approved by the governor on February 2, 1955.

1-2-103. Effective date of code.

All the provisions of the following titles, chapters and sections shall be in force on and after January 1, 1956.

Code 1932, § 26; C. Supp. 1950, § 26.1; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-203.

1-2-104. Repeal of public and general laws — Conflict with 1955 Acts.

  1. All public and general acts passed prior to the 1955 session of the general assembly, and all such acts the subjects of which are revised in this code, except those named in § 1-2-105, subject to the limitations and with the exceptions herein expressed, are repealed.
  2. In case of any conflict between chapter 70 of the Public Acts of 1953 or the acts of the 1955 session of the general assembly and this code, the former shall be controlling, and this regardless of respective dates of passage or approval.

Code 1858, § 41; Shan., § 58; Code 1932, § 2; C. Supp. 1950, § 2.1; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-204.

Cross-References. Effect of repeal, §§ 1-2-1071-2-113, 1-3-101.

Laws not repealed, § 1-2-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Common Law, §§ 2, 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Scope of Repeal.

By a section of this character, all public and general acts passed prior to the session at which the code was enacted, and not reproduced or compiled therein, are expressly repealed. Lewis v. State, 40 Tenn. 127, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1859); Swan v. Swan, 40 Tenn. 163, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (1859); Furman, Green & Co. v. Nichol, 43 Tenn. 432, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1866), rev'd, 75 U.S. 44, 19 L. Ed. 370, 1868 U.S. LEXIS 1082 (1869), criticized, Briefs & Arguments v. Bank of Tenn., 64 Tenn. 123, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 125 (1875); Lindsley v. James, 43 Tenn. 477, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1866); State v. Smith, 50 Tenn. 465, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1872); Bledsoe v. Stokes, 60 Tenn. 312, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (1873); Kelly v. Jackson, 2 Shan. 198 (1877); Clay v. Justices of Hawkins County, 73 Tenn. 137, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1880); State v. Miller, 79 Tenn. 620, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1883); Sharp v. Vanwinkle, 80 Tenn. 15, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1883); Puckett v. Springfield, 97 Tenn. 264, 37 S.W. 2, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 138 (1896); Padgett v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 97 Tenn. 690, 37 S.W. 698, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 196 (1896); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 113, 64 L.R.A. 458 (1904); Smith v. North Memphis Sav. Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S.W. 392, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1905); Whitworth v. Hager, 124 Tenn. 355, 140 S.W. 205, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1910); Moss v. State, 131 Tenn. 94, 173 S.W. 859, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 90, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1915D361 (1914).

Statutes which abrogated the common law, and were not carried into the code, were expressly repealed and the principle of the common law thereby restored to full force. State v. Smith, 50 Tenn. 465, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1872).

The principles and rules of law which may have originally grown out of the provisions of ancient English statutes, and have been adopted as rules of property and settled principles of law, are not annulled by this section. State v. Miller, 79 Tenn. 620, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1883).

All prior public and general statutes not embraced or reproduced in the code were in effect repealed by this section, whether such statutes were English statutes theretofore in force in this state, or statutes enacted in this state, or brought into it from North Carolina. State v. Miller, 79 Tenn. 620, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1883); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 113, 64 L.R.A. 458 (1904); Smith v. North Memphis Sav. Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S.W. 392, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1905); Moss v. State, 131 Tenn. 94, 173 S.W. 859, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 90, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1915D361 (1914); Burger v. Parker, 154 Tenn. 279, 290 S.W. 22, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 124 (1926).

Provisions of the Code of 1858 which were not brought forward into the Code of 1932 were repealed by § 2 of the Code of 1932. State use of Moore v. Tutt, 175 Tenn. 412, 135 S.W.2d 449, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1940); Cambria Coal Co. v. Teaster, 179 Tenn. 472, 167 S.W.2d 343, 1942 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1943); Dearing v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 182 Tenn. 302, 186 S.W.2d 329, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 222 (1945).

This section worked a repeal of ch. 48 of the Public Acts of 1919 authorizing the use of old forms of acknowledgment. Pennington v. Webb-Hammock Coal Co., 182 Tenn. 33, 184 S.W.2d 47, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (1944).

2. Examination of Original Statutes.

The original statutes from which sections of the code were compiled may be considered to ascertain the meaning of statutes. Burgner v. Burgner, 58 Tenn. 729, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 326 (1872); White's Creek Turnpike Co. v. Davidson County, 82 Tenn. 73, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1884), superseded by statute as stated in, Jenkins v. Loudon County, 736 S.W.2d 603, 1987 Tenn. LEXIS 1084 (Tenn. 1987); Balch v. Johnson, 106 Tenn. 249, 61 S.W. 289, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (1901).

The language of the caption of an act of the general assembly may be examined after the body of that act has been carried into the code, to assist the court in its interpretation of the act. Hutchison v. Montgomery, 172 Tenn. 375, 112 S.W.2d 827, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1938).

This section does not preclude reference to the original act where the codifiers clearly express an intention to embody in the code and so reenact acts of the legislature which were in force and effect at the time of the adoption of the code. Roberts v. Cahill Forge & Foundry Co., 181 Tenn. 688, 184 S.W.2d 29, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 292 (1944).

3. Defects in Original Enactment.

Contention that § 6-55-501 was unconstitutional in that the legislature did not have authority to enact the original statute, Acts 1937 (3rd Ex. Sess.), ch. 18, under the governor's proclamation calling for the extra session, was without merit in view of this section and the fact that the efficacy of such section was due solely to its enactment as part of Tennessee Code Annotated. Memphis v. Yellow Cab, Inc., 201 Tenn. 71, 296 S.W.2d 864, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (1956).

4. Statutes Reenacted Without Change.

Error in charge of court in prosecution for rape in referring to sections of the 1932 code rather than to sections of Tennessee Code Annotated was a technical error of no materiality where the sections of the 1932 code and of the Tennessee Code Annotated were identical. Tines v. State, 203 Tenn. 612, 315 S.W.2d 111, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 226 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889, 79 S. Ct. 134, 3 L. Ed. 2d 117, 1958 U.S. LEXIS 243 (Nov. 10, 1958).

5. Change of Law by Code.

In construing the code it will be presumed, in doubtful cases, that it was not intended to change, but only to revise the old statutes. Bates v. Sullivan, 40 Tenn. 632, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 187 (1859); Tennessee Hosp. v. Fuqua, 69 Tenn. 608, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (1878); In re Wills of Miller, 70 Tenn. 54, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 188 (1878); State v. McConnell, 71 Tenn. 332, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1879); Farmer v. Farmer, 78 Tenn. 309, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 182 (1882); Arrowsmith v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 57 F. 165, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2756 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1893); Balch v. Johnson, 106 Tenn. 249, 61 S.W. 289, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (1901); Sheafer v. Mitchell, 109 Tenn. 181, 71 S.W. 86, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 68 (1902); Smith v. North Memphis Sav. Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S.W. 392, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1905).

All sections of the code will be construed together in order to determine whether code provisions changed the prior existing law, since repeal by implication is not favored by the courts. Furman v. Nichol, 75 U.S. 44, 19 L. Ed. 370, 1868 U.S. LEXIS 1082 (1869).

Where the code is clear the presumption that the code was not intended to change but only to compile old statutes has no application or force. Padgett v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 97 Tenn. 690, 37 S.W. 698, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 196 (1896); Brien v. Robinson, 102 Tenn. 157, 52 S.W. 802, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1899).

6. Statutes Originating with Code.

It is wholly immaterial whether a statute found in the code had any existence prior to that time. The code was an enactment itself and all its provisions are the law of the state. Brien v. Robinson, 102 Tenn. 157, 52 S.W. 802, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1899).

1-2-105. Laws not repealed.

The following are not to be deemed repealed by the enactment of this code, or the failure to incorporate the statutes or provisions of statutes as a part of this code, unless repealed by necessary implication:

  1. Local, special or private acts, or general or public acts of a temporary nature. “Local act” means one applicable to one (1) or more, but not all, subdivisions or parts of the state;
  2. Provisions in general laws excepting particular localities or subdivisions from their operation;
  3. Acts amendatory of general laws excepting such localities or political subdivisions of the state specifically from their operation;
  4. Acts ceding territory and jurisdiction to the general government;
  5. Acts fixing state or county boundaries;
  6. Acts establishing or regulating special and local courts;
  7. Acts fixing the times of holding courts, or providing for judges or chancellors holding any such, by special act;
  8. Acts, which are not incorporated in this code, establishing, aiding or regulating state or state-aided parks, reservations or memorials;
  9. Acts appropriating money or authorizing the issuance of bonds, or providing sinking funds, for special purposes;
  10. Acts authorizing the construction of public buildings or works;
  11. Acts authorizing officials to convey or mortgage property of the state, including grants of easements;
  12. Curative or validating acts, or provisions in acts, though relating to a general law;
  13. Acts of incorporation passed before the Constitution of 1870 became effective;
  14. Acts incorporating grand lodges of fraternal orders, or societies, and creating or regulating charitable bodies, such as the Ladies' Hermitage Association;
  15. Acts relating to turnpikes and turnpike corporations;
  16. Provisions in general acts saving rights accrued or status fixed under previous acts or laws;
  17. Occupant, entry and other land laws; and
  18. Any act to provide for the revenue of the state and the counties and municipalities thereof, except as may be incorporated in this code.

Code 1932, § 3; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-205.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Grand Jury, § 3.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure — 1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 1131 (1959).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Local Laws.

Public Acts 1913 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 49, providing for a commission form of government for cities and towns not operating under the commission form of government on November 1, 1913, was a local act and was not repealed by the failure of compilers to include such act in the Code of 1932. Smith v. Lawrenceburg, 167 Tenn. 447, 71 S.W.2d 214, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1934).

2. Repeals by Necessary Implication.

Memphis ordinance purporting to levy tax on operation of taxicabs on its streets which was directly in conflict with § 6-55-501 was inoperative not merely by virtue of the “necessary implication” provision of this section as applied to the private act authorizing such ordinance but was inoperative as well by the express language of § 6-55-502 declaring such ordinances inoperative and of no effect. Memphis v. Yellow Cab, Inc., 201 Tenn. 71, 296 S.W.2d 864, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (1956).

Section 22-1-101, prescribing the basic qualifications of jurors, affected citizens in their private capacity rather than the county in its governmental capacity, so that Private Acts 1911, ch. 115, permitting only men to serve on the grand jury in Chester County, was repealed by necessary implication in absence of good reason why women should not serve in that county in accordance with the general law. Pierce v. State, 204 Tenn. 14, 315 S.W.2d 271, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 240 (1958).

1-2-106. Special provisions preserved.

None of the provisions of §§ 4, 5, 6, 6a, 6b, or 16 of chapter 165 of the Public Acts of 1937, nor of the second paragraph of § 15 of that chapter, nor of chapter 11 of the Public Acts of the Second Extraordinary Session of 1931, nor of chapter 103 of the Public Acts of 1933, nor of §§ 1 to 18, inclusive, 20 to 33, inclusive, 35, or 37 to 41, inclusive, of chapter 70 of the Public Acts of 1953, nor of the first sentence of § 19 of that chapter, shall be deemed repealed by the enactment of this code, or the incorporation of or failure to incorporate these chapters or sections or any part thereof in this code, unless repealed by necessary implication.

C. Supp. 1950, § 3.1; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-206.

Compiler's Notes. Sections 6a and 6b of Acts 1937, ch. 165, referred to in this section, were added by Acts 1939, ch. 188 and Acts 1945, ch. 155, respectively.

1-2-107. Effect on statutes of limitations.

Such repeal, as to any statute of limitations, under which the bar of a right of action or remedy is complete at the time the repeal takes effect, shall not be deemed a removal of such bar.

Code 1932, § 7; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-207.

Law Reviews.

Statute of Limitations, 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 1046 (1954).

1-2-108. Effect on criminal offenses.

No offense committed, and no penalty or forfeiture incurred, under any act hereby repealed, and before January 1, 1956, shall be affected by the repeal; except that when a punishment, penalty, or forfeiture is mitigated by the provisions herein contained, such provisions may be applied to the judgment pronounced after December 31, 1955.

Code 1858, § 45; Shan., § 59a3; Code 1932, § 8; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-208.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Amount of Punishment.

A crime committed by a slave, the punishment of which was fixed by law at the time of its commission, could not, after his freedom was declared, be punished with any heavier or more degrading punishment. Such an interpretation of the law would be in direct violation of this section. Brothers v. State, 42 Tenn. 201, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1865).

1-2-109. Prosecutions for offenses and penalties.

No suit or prosecution, pending on January 1, 1956, for an offense committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be conformed to the provisions of this code as far as applicable.

Code 1858, § 46; Shan., § 59a4; Code 1932, § 9; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-209.

1-2-110. Continuation in effect of existing laws.

The existing acts continue in force until January 1, 1956.

Code 1858, § 43; Shan., § 59a1; Code 1932, § 4; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-210.

1-2-111. Actions commenced — Rights accrued.

No action or proceeding commenced before January 1, 1956, and no right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code, but such proceedings may be conformed to the requirements of the code as far as applicable.

Code 1858, § 44; Shan., § 59a2; Code 1932, § 5; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-211.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Previously Accrued Rights.

No right which had previously accrued was affected by the provisions of the Code of 1858. Anderson v. Bedford, 44 Tenn. 464, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1867).

The personal property exemption statute in effect at the time of the creation of an obligation prior to the effective date of the Code of 1932, and not the provisions of the Code of 1932 which were in effect at the time of an execution, determined what personalty of the debtor was exempt. Hair v. Ramsey, 165 Tenn. 149, 53 S.W.2d 381, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1932).

1-2-112. Litigation pending on effective date.

Although a notice, recognizance, or process has been given, taken, or issued before January 1, 1956, it may, nevertheless, be taken or returnable to a day after such date, in like manner as if this code had been in effect before the notice, recognizance, or process was given, taken or issued. Nothing in this code shall operate to discontinue any cause or matter, civil or criminal, which shall be pending and undetermined in any court on December 31, 1955; but every such cause and matter shall be proceeded in, tried and determined in such court.

Code 1932, § 6; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-212.

1-2-113. Limitations applicable.

Causes of action accruing before January 1, 1956, shall not be affected by any different limitations provided in the code, but shall be subject to existing limitations. If the limitation is uncertain, the longest time prescribed for the commencement of an action in any form for such cause shall be allowed.

Code 1858, § 47; Shan., § 59a5; mod. Code 1932, § 10; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-213.

Law Reviews.

Procedure in Contesting Life Insurance Policies (Aubrey F. Folts), 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 780 (1939).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Actions Accrued Prior to Code.

Where a cause of action accrued before the adoption of the code, the limitations prescribed by the code do not apply, and the law as to the limitation of the action remains as it existed at the adoption of the code. Anderson v. Bedford, 44 Tenn. 464, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1867); Keeble v. Tompkins, 61 Tenn. 473, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 211 (1873); Mason v. Spurlock, 63 Tenn. 554, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 304 (1874); Stephens v. Martin, 85 Tenn. 278, 2 S.W. 206, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1886).

2. Actions Accrued After Adoption of Code.

Where cause of action did not accrue until after enactment of code the limitation provision of the code applied. Courtney v. Dyer, 2 Shan. 360 (1877).

1-2-114. Reenactment of supplemental and replacement volume material into code.

  1. Reenactment of the Acts of the 2020 Sessions of the General Assembly.
    1. This compilation of laws together with the supplemental reenactments set out in subdivision (b)(1) shall be deemed amendatory.
    2. This compilation shall be deemed a reenactment of the general acts of a permanent nature enacted at the 2020 regular and extraordinary sessions of the general assembly to the extent codified by the codification act. The sections so reenacted shall be construed as continuations of the previous laws so reenacted, and pending litigation, criminal prosecutions and statutes of limitations shall not be affected by such reenactments.
    3. Each section of this reenactment bearing the same number as a section appearing in the Tennessee Code as enacted in 1955 or in supplemental reenactments of the code is deemed to be in substitution for such section. Statutory references in any title, chapter, or section of the Tennessee Code shall be deemed to be references to the applicable provisions of law, and any change or rearrangements in numbering, division, or placement of the actual title, chapter, or section referred to shall not affect the validity of such references. Where only a portion of a section appears in this reenactment, such portion is deemed to be either in substitution of the same portion appearing in the Tennessee Code or supplemental reenactment or an addition to such section. Where section numbers of the Tennessee Code or supplemental reenactments are followed by “Repealed” or “Superseded”, they are deemed repealed unless limiting or restricting language follows the word “Repealed” or “Superseded”, in which latter event such repeal or supersession shall be limited or restricted in accordance with such language. Where section numbers of the Tennessee Code or supplemental reenactments are followed by “Unconstitutional” or are noted as having been found unconstitutional, this is reflective of a definitive court decision on the constitutionality of that section. Clauses, preambles, captions, statements of legislative intent, severability or reverse-severability clauses omitted from codification pursuant to § 1-1-108, remain valid in construing legislative intent of the codified portions of the act notwithstanding that the omitted portions of the act were not codified.
    4. All public acts of a general and permanent nature passed at the 2020 sessions of the general assembly, to the extent codified in the code, are repealed except those laws excepted by § 1-2-105 of the Tennessee Code.
    5. The enrolled draft of this reenactment shall, upon approval of this statute by the governor, be deposited in the office of the secretary of state, and shall be carefully preserved by that officer as an official reenactment of supplemental material to the Tennessee Code.
    6. All provisions of the Tennessee Code as enacted by chapter 6 of the Public Acts of 1955 and the supplemental reenactments set out in subdivision (b)(1) referring generally to such code, including the provisions of chapter 3 of this title, shall be likewise applicable to the sections of this reenactment and to prior supplemental reenactments.
    7. In case of any conflict between the acts of the 2021 session of the general assembly, or any extraordinary session occurring after the 2020 regular session of the general assembly, and this reenactment, the former shall be controlling regardless of the respective dates of passage or approval.
    8. All references and amendments in the acts of the 2021 session of the general assembly to code sections included in this reenactment shall be deemed to be references or amendments to provisions of law as stated in this reenactment.
  2. Reenactment of the Acts of the 1955 Through 2020 Sessions of the General Assembly.
      1. The supplemental material enacted by chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1959, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1961, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1963, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1965, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1967, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1969, chapter 354 of the Public Acts of 1970, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1971, chapter 441 of the Public Acts of 1972, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1973, chapter 414 of the Public Acts of 1974, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1975, chapter 382 of the Public Acts of 1976, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1977, chapter 496 of the Public Acts of 1978, chapters 1 and 145 of the Public Acts of 1979, chapter 444 of the Public Acts of 1980, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1981, chapter 543 of the Public Acts of 1982, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1983, chapter 483 of the Public Acts of 1984, chapter 2 of the Public Acts of 1985, chapters 523 and 786 of the Public Acts of 1986, chapter 4 of the Public Acts of 1987, chapter 458 of the Public Acts of 1988, chapter 5 of the Public Acts of 1989, chapter 668 of the Public Acts of 1990, chapter 28 of the Public Acts of 1991, chapter 528 of the Public Acts of 1992, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1993, chapter 543 of the Public Acts of 1994, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1995, chapter 554 of the Public Acts of 1996, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1997, chapter 574 of the Public Acts of 1998, chapter 235 of the Public Acts of 1999, chapter 574 of the Public Acts of 2000, chapter 52 of the Public Acts of 2001, chapter 491 of the Public Acts of 2002, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 2003, chapter 437 of the Public Acts of 2004, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 2005, chapter 507 of the Public Acts of 2006, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 2007, chapter 607 of the Public Acts of 2008, chapter 2 of the Public Acts of 2009, chapter 624 of the Public Acts of 2010, chapter 41 of the Public Acts of 2011, chapter 582 of the Public Acts of 2012, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 2013,  chapter 530 of the Public Acts of 2014, chapter 27 of the Public Acts of 2015, chapter 569 of the Public Acts of 2016, chapter 30 of the Public Acts of 2017, chapter 536 of the Public Acts of 2018, chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 2019 and chapter 518 of the Public Acts of 2020 shall be deemed amendatory of, supplemental to and become part of the Tennessee Code enacted as chapter 6 of the Public Acts of 1955.
      2. The supplemental material reenacted by chapters 450 and 802 of the Public Acts of 1980, by chapters 5 through 13 of the Public Acts of 1981, by chapters 2, 3, 6, and 7 of the Public Acts of 1983, by chapters 487 and 488 of the Public Acts of 1984, by chapters 4 through 6 of the Public Acts of 1985, by chapters 1 through 3 of the Public Acts of 2006, and chapters 1 through 4 of the Public Acts of 2010 shall be deemed amendatory of, supplemental to and become part of the Tennessee Code enacted as chapter 6 of the Public Acts of 1955.
      3. The material contained in replacement volumes 9A (1983 edition), 12A (1983 edition), 6 (1984 edition), 2 (1985 edition), 2A (1985 edition), 2B (1985 edition), 11 (1986 edition), 3A (1987 edition), 12A (1987 edition), 12B (1987 edition), 8 (1987 edition), 8B (1988 edition), 3 (1988 edition), 10 (1988 edition), 10A (1989 edition), 10B (1989 edition), 12 (1989 edition), 9 (1990 edition), 10C (1990 edition), 11 (1990 edition), 7A (1990 edition), 6A (1991 edition), 7 (1991 edition), 2A (1991 edition), 9A (1991 edition), 12A (1992 edition), 3A (1992 edition), 2B (1992 edition), 8A (1992 edition), 11A (1993 edition), 10 (1993 edition), 3 (1993 edition), 8 (1993 edition), 4 (1994 edition), 10A (1994 edition), 2 (1994 edition), 12 (1994 edition), 8B (1995 edition), 12B (1995 edition), 6A (1996 edition), 8A (1996 edition), 9 (1996 edition), 12A (1996 edition), 7 (1997 edition), 7A (1997 edition), 10C (1997 edition), 11 (1997 edition), 2A (1998 edition), 2B (1998 edition), 10 (1998 edition), 12 (1998 edition), 3A (1999 edition), 3B (1999 edition), 9A (1999 edition), 4A (2000 edition), 5 (2000 edition), 8 (2000 edition), 10A (2000 edition), 6 (2001 edition), 6A (2001 edition), 8A (2001 edition), 8B (2001 edition), 12A (2001 edition), 3 (2002 edition), 8C (2002 edition), 9 (2002 edition), 10B (2002 edition), 2 (2003 edition), 7 (2003 edition), 7A (2003 edition), 12 (2003 edition), 10 (2004 edition), 11 (2004 edition), 11A (2004 edition), 12B (2004 edition), 2A (2005 edition), 2B (2005 edition), 6A (2005 edition) 9A (2005 edition), 7 (2006 edition), 7A (2006 edition), 7B (2006 edition), 12 (2006 edition), 12A (2006 edition), 1 (2007 edition), 1A (2007 edition), 6 (2007 edition), 8 (2007 edition), 8A (2007 edition), 9A (2008 edition), 9B (2008 edition), 9C (2008 edition), 10 (2008 edition), 10A (2008 edition), 4 (2009 edition), 9 (2009 edition), 10C (2009 edition), 13 (2009 edition), 6A (2010 edition), 7 (2010 edition), 7B (2010 edition), 11 (2010 edition), 2A (2011 edition) 2B (2011 edition), 3 (2011 edition), 3B (2011 edition), 12 (2011 edition), 12A (2011 edition), 3A (2012 edition), 5 (2012 edition), 7A (2012 edition), 8D (2012 edition), 9C (2012 edition), 12B (2012 edition), 8C (2013 edition), 9 (2013 edition), 10B (2013 edition), 11B (2013 edition), 11C (2013 edition), 12 (2013 edition) 12A (2013 edition), 2 (2014 edition), 6A (2014 edition), 6B (2014 edition), 7 (2014 edition), 7B (2014 edition), 9A (2014 edition), 2A (2015 edition), 2B (2015 edition), 2C (2015 edition), 6 (2015 edition), 11A (2015 edition), 3 (2016 edition), 9 (2016 edition), 9A (2016 edition), 10 (2016 edition), 10A (2016 edition), 1A (2017 edition), 4A (2017 edition), 6A (2017 edition), 9D (2017 edition), 11 (2017 edition), 7 (2018 edition), 7A (2018 edition), 7B (2018 edition), 10B (2018 edition), 11C (2018 edition), 3B (2019 edition), 7C (2019 edition), 8D (2019 edition), 10C (2019 edition), 12B (2019 edition), 3A (2020 edition), 8A (2020 edition), 9 (2020 edition), 9A (2020 edition), and 9D (2020 edition), shall be deemed amendatory of, supplemental to and become part of the Tennessee Code enacted as chapter 6 of the Public Acts of 1955, as though such material were specifically reenacted in its entirety.
    1. The supplemental reenactments set out in subdivision (b)(1) shall be deemed reenactments of the general acts of a permanent nature enacted at the sessions of the general assembly held in the years 1955 through 2020 which were codified therein. The sections so reenacted shall be construed as continuations of the previous laws so reenacted, and pending litigation, criminal prosecutions and statutes of limitations shall not be affected by such reenactments.
    2. Each section of the supplemental reenactments bearing the same number as a section appearing in the Tennessee Code as enacted in 1955 or in prior supplemental reenactments of the code is deemed to be in substitution for such section. Where only a portion of a section appears, such portion is deemed to be either in substitution of the same portion appearing in the Tennessee Code or prior supplemental reenactments or an addition to such section. Where section numbers of the Tennessee Code or supplemental reenactments are followed by “Repealed” or “Superseded”, they are deemed repealed unless limiting or restricting language follows the word “Repealed” or “Superseded”, in which latter event such repeal or supersession shall be limited or restricted in accordance with such language. Where section numbers of the Tennessee Code or supplemental reenactments are followed by “Unconstitutional” or are noted as having been found unconstitutional, this is reflective of a definitive court decision on the constitutionality of that section. Clauses, preambles, captions, statements of legislative intent, severability or reverse-severability clauses omitted from codification pursuant to § 1-1-108, remain valid in construing legislative intent of the codified portions of the act notwithstanding that the omitted portions of the act were not codified.
    3. All public acts of a general and permanent nature, to the extent codified in this act and the supplemental reenactments set out in subdivision (b)(1), which were passed prior to the 2020 session of the general assembly and after the 1953 session are repealed, except chapters 6 and 121 of the Public Acts of 1955, all of the supplemental reenactments set out in subdivision (b)(1), and those laws excepted by § 1-2-105 of the Tennessee Code.
    4. The enrolled draft of each supplemental reenactment shall, upon approval of the statute by the governor, be deposited in the office of the secretary of state, and shall be carefully preserved by that officer as an official enactment of supplemental material to the Tennessee Code.
    5. Title 47 of the Tennessee Code as enacted by chapter 6 of the Public Acts of 1955, as amended and supplemented by chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1961 and chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1963, is repealed in its entirety except as provided in § 47-1-110 [repealed]; provided, that the sections appearing in title 47, chapters 11-15 in the reenactment by chapter 1 of the Public Acts of 1965 shall be construed as continuations of the similar sections appearing in the former title 47, and pending litigation, criminal prosecutions and statutes of limitation shall not be affected by such repeal and reenactment.
    6. In case any act or portion of an act codified and reenacted as provided in subdivision (b)(1) is thereafter deleted from this code for reasons other than repeal, supersession, or unconstitutionality, the original act or portion of an act so removed from the code shall be revived and continued in the same force and effect it had as a separate act prior to codification, notwithstanding any action occurring under subsection (a).
    7. Legislative intent or effect which is dependent on the proposed placement of an act in the Tennessee Code shall not be affected by the actual codification of such material, and the general repealer contained in subdivision (a)(4) shall not affect such presumed intent.

T.C.A., § 1-214; Acts 1980, ch. 444, §§ 1, 2; 1981, ch. 1, §§ 1, 2; 1982, ch. 543, § 1; 1983, ch. 1, § 1; 1984, ch. 483, § 1; 1985, ch. 2, § 1; 1986, ch. 523, § 1; 1986, ch. 786, § 1; 1987, ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 458, § 1; 1989, ch. 5, § 1; 1990, ch. 668, § 1; 1991, ch. 28, § 1; 1992, ch. 528, § 1; 1993, ch. 1, § 1; 1994, ch. 543, § 1; 1995, ch. 1, § 1; 1996, ch. 554, § 1; 1997, ch. 1, § 1; 1998, ch. 574, § 1; 1999, ch. 235, § 1; 2000, ch. 574, § 1; 2001, ch. 52, § 1; 2002, ch. 491, § 1; 2003, ch. 1, § 1; 2004, ch. 437, § 1; 2005, ch. 1, § 1; 2006, ch. 507, § 1; 2007, ch. 1, § 1; 2008, ch. 607, § 1; 2009, ch. 2, § 1; 2010, ch. 624, § 1; 2011, ch. 41, § 1; 2012, ch. 582, § 1; 2013, ch. 1, § 1; 2014, ch. 530, § 1; 2015, ch. 27, § 1; 2016, ch. 569, § 1; 2017, ch. 30, § 1; 2018, ch. 536, § 1; 2019, ch. 1, § 1; 2020, ch. 518, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. This section was amended by Acts 1995, ch. 1, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 1994 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 1996, ch. 554, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 1995 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 1997, ch. 1, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 1996 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 1998, ch. 574, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 1997 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 1999, ch. 235, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 1998 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2000, ch. 534, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 1999 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2001, ch. 52, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2000 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2002, ch. 491, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2001 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2003, ch. 1, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2002 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2004, ch. 437, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2003 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2005, ch. 1, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2004 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2006, ch. 507, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2005 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2007, ch. 1, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2006 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2008, ch. 607, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2007 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2009, ch. 2, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2008 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2010, ch. 624, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2009 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2011, ch. 41, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2010 regular and extraordinary legislative sessions.

This section was amended by Acts 2012, ch. 582, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2011 regular and extraordinary legislative sessions.

This section was amended by Acts 2013, ch. 1, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2012 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2014, ch. 530, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2013 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2015, ch. 27, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2014 regular legislative session.

This section was amended by Acts 2016, ch. 569, which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2015 regular legislative session.

Former § 47-1-110 referred to in subdivision (b)(6) was repealed by Acts 2008, ch. 930, § 1, effective July 1, 2008, which enacted a revised chapter 1 to Title 47. The former section pertained to the continued validity of transactions entered into prior to midnight on June 30, 1964, when Acts 1963, ch. 81 became effective.

This section was amended by Acts 2017, ch. 30 which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2016 regular and extraordinary legislative sessions.

This section was amended by Acts 2018, ch. 536 which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2017 regular session.

This section was amended by Acts 2019, ch. 1 which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2018 regular session.

This section was amended by Acts 2020, ch. 518 which reenacted as part of the Tennessee Code those public laws enacted by the 2019 regular session.

This section is set out in this Advance Code Service to include references to the 2020 Second Extraordinary Session.

Effective Dates. Acts 2014, ch. 530, § 2. February 19, 2014.

Acts 2015, ch. 27, § 2. March 27, 2015.

Acts 2016, ch. 569, § 2. March 2, 2016.

Acts 2017, ch. 30, § 2. March 29, 2017.

Acts 2018, ch. 536, § 2. March 7, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 1, § 2. February 20, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 518, § 2. March 6, 2020.

Attorney General Opinions. Effect of 1998 Codification Act on prior 1998 acts that amend provisions of the T.C.A. codified by the 1998 Codification Act, OAG 98-015 (1/12/98).

Chapter 3
Construction of Statutes

1-3-101. Repeals not retroactive.

The repeal of a statute does not affect any right which accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, nor any proceeding commenced, under or by virtue of the statute repealed.

Code 1858, § 49; Shan., § 61; Code 1932, § 12; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-301.

Cross-References. Repeal or amendment of criminal statutes, § 39-11-112.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 13; 23 Tenn. Juris., Statutes, § 51.

Law Reviews.

Constitutional Law — 1961 Tennessee Survey (James C. Kirby, Jr.), 14 Vand. L. Rev. 1171 (1961).

“Putting Legislative History to a Vote,” see 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1529 (2000).

“The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers,” see 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457 (2000).

“Timing and Delegation: A Reply,” see 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1543 (2000).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose of Statute.

It was the intention of the legislature, in adopting this section, to provide against the rule of common law that when suit has been commenced the repeal of a statute does away with the right of suit. Wallace v. Goodlett, 104 Tenn. 670, 58 S.W. 343, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1900).

2. Statutes Covered.

The provision applies to statutes enacted or repealed subsequent to the adoption of the Code as well as to the sections of the Code which may have been repealed. Shelby Co. v. Mississippi & T. R. Co., 84 Tenn. 401, 1 S.W. 32, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1886); Wallace v. Goodlett, 104 Tenn. 670, 58 S.W. 343, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1900); Gass v. State, 130 Tenn. 581, 172 S.W. 305, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1914).

3. Provisions Not Covered.

Municipal ordinances are not statutes within the meaning of this section. Mayor, etc. of Rutherford v. Swink, 96 Tenn. 564, 35 S.W. 554, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1896).

4. Effect of Repeal.

5. —In General.

The repeal of a statute does not affect accrued rights, imposed duties, incurred penalties, nor pending proceedings. Wallace v. Goodlett, 104 Tenn. 670, 58 S.W. 343, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1900); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 71, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1015 (1907); Nashville R. & L. Co. v. Norvell, 122 Tenn. 613, 124 S.W. 613, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1910).

Since by this section the repeal of a statute did not affect any right which accrued or proceeding which was commenced under a repealed statute, an act which repealed one section and amended another was not applicable to suits brought against a railroad that arose out of an accident that occurred before the enactment of the act but were commenced after the act went into effect. Southern R. Co. v. Miller, 285 F.2d 202, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3074, 85 A.L.R.2d 842 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1960).

Statutes are given a prospective application and will not be construed to apply retroactively without a clear expression of that intent. Woods v. TRW, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 274, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 671 (Tenn. 1977).

6. —Accrued Rights.

Where work was performed for city and after work was done the method by which payment was to be made was declared unconstitutional and as a result the legislature authorized the city to levy a tax to pay for such work, contractor who obtained judgment for work performed and instituted mandamus proceedings to obtain the levy to satisfy the judgment was not deprived of his remedy when act authorizing the levy was repealed before levy actually was made. Memphis v. United States, 97 U.S. 293, 24 L. Ed. 920, 1877 U.S. LEXIS 1776 (1878).

Change in statutory method of collecting taxes does not deprive official of fees actually earned at the time. Sherrill v. Thomason, 145 Tenn. 499, 238 S.W. 876, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1922).

Where Public Acts 1919, ch. 90, effective in April, 1919, repealed provisions of code giving right of jury trial to either party in chancery cases, a jury trial in chancery case held in August, 1919, was proper where the proceedings were instituted in January, 1919. Johnston v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 146 Tenn. 135, 240 S.W. 429, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1921).

Where a right or benefit is conferred upon a person by statute such benefit or right is not lost by its repeal. Hutton v. State, 175 Tenn. 44, 131 S.W.2d 11, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (1939).

Where Public Acts 1937, ch. 154 permitted a person committed to the county jail or workhouse for nonpayment of fine or costs to be discharged on oath of insolvency, a prisoner to whom such right accrued during the time such statute was in effect was entitled to such relief even though the act was repealed without any saving clause prior to the time he would have been entitled to a release. Hutton v. State, 175 Tenn. 44, 131 S.W.2d 11, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (1939).

7. —Pending Proceedings.

A conviction may be had upon an indictment or presentment for an offense that was unlawful at the time of the finding, although the statute upon which the proceeding is based is repealed, without any saving clause, before conviction. Richardson v. State, 43 Tenn. 122, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1866); Hill v. State, 73 Tenn. 725, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (Dec. 1880); Gass v. State, 130 Tenn. 581, 172 S.W. 305, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1914); Hutton v. State, 175 Tenn. 44, 131 S.W.2d 11, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (1939).

8. —Tax Laws.

The repeal of a statute levying a tax will not affect the liability of a person against whom the tax has accrued. State v. Nashville Sav. Bank, 84 Tenn. 111, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1885); Shelby Co. v. Mississippi & T. R. Co., 84 Tenn. 401, 1 S.W. 32, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1886).

Under this section, assessments made prior to the repeal of the law authorizing such assessments are unaffected by such repealing law. Shelby Co. v. Mississippi & T. R. Co., 84 Tenn. 401, 1 S.W. 32, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1886).

Proceeding for back assessment of taxes, commenced under a statute, is not affected by its subsequent repeal. Nashville R. & L. Co. v. Norvell, 122 Tenn. 613, 124 S.W. 613, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1910).

A statute prohibiting the back assessment or reassessment of property which has been assessed, as applied to suits already commenced, is not affected by this section, because the statute is not a repealing statute. State ex rel. Woolen v. Pearson, 137 Tenn. 253, 192 S.W. 164, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (1917).

9. —Penalties.

This section did not apply where the section providing the penalty for first-degree murder was amended changing the method of inflicting the death penalty, as it was the purpose of the legislature that the death penalty should be inflicted by electrocution rather than hanging in all cases where the sentence of death was pronounced after the amendment was effective, regardless of whether the crime was committed before or after the passage of the act. Shipp v. State, 130 Tenn. 491, 172 S.W. 317, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1914).

A penalty never vests but continues to be executory. The repeal of a penalty statute is not within the saving of this section, and a penalty could not be enforced after repeal. O. H. May Co. v. Anderson, 156 Tenn. 216, 300 S.W. 12, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 105 (1927).

Where a subsequent penal statute changes a punishment, the former mode is thereby repealed. Stinson v. State, 208 Tenn. 159, 344 S.W.2d 369, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (1961), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Gray, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 1994).

Repeal of a penal statute operates as a pardon of all offenses committed before such repeal unless the right to prosecute is saved by a provision in the repealing act or by separate legislation. Stinson v. State, 208 Tenn. 159, 344 S.W.2d 369, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (1961), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Gray, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 1994).

10. —Decisions Under Common Law.

The change of a law by statute between the trial and appeal does not change the rights of the parties. Gaines v. Catron, 20 Tenn. 514, 1840 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1840); Garnett v. Stockton, 26 Tenn. 84, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1846).

Subsequent legislation curing defective probate and registration cannot affect rights under a decree thereon previously rendered. Garnett v. Stockton, 26 Tenn. 84, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1846).

Prior to the adoption of § 49 of the Code of 1858, it was held not only that punishment must be according to the law existing when the offense was committed, but also that such law must be valid and subsisting at the trial. State v. Davidson, 42 Tenn. 184, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1865); Wharton v. State, 45 Tenn. 1, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1867); Keith v. State, 45 Tenn. 35, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (1867); Boyd v. State, 47 Tenn. 69, 1869 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1869).

11. —Criminal Proceedings.

Where conviction of defendant was held to be void in unappealed habeas corpus proceeding and indictment of defendant under robbery statute as it read prior to amendment was quashed, subsequent attempted indictment of defendant under former existing law was void where such indictment was subsequent to date of amending statute which increased penalty for robbery and amendment did not save right to prosecute under original statute. Stinson v. State, 208 Tenn. 159, 344 S.W.2d 369, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (1961), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Gray, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 1994).

1-3-102. Computation of time.

The time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, and then it shall also be excluded.

Code 1858, § 48; Shan., § 60; Code 1932, § 11; Acts 1965, ch. 203, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-302.

Compiler's Notes. This section may be superseded in part by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 45 and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.01.

Cross-References. Computation of time for election purposes, § 2-1-115.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 78, 773.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 51; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 73; 23 Tenn. Juris., Time, § 1.

Law Reviews.

1985 Tennessee Survey: Selected Developments in Tennessee Law, 53 Tenn. L. Rev. 337 (1986).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application of Statute.

The provisions of this section apply when the computation of time begins on the happening of some event or the performance of some act, and the performance of some act within a given length of time thereafter is indispensable in order that some right may be saved or that some liability may be avoided. They have no application to the computation of the time of service and return of process. Dickinson v. Lee, 42 Tenn. 615, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 3 (1866).

The provisions of this section have no application to acts required to be done by private contract where the time for performance is stipulated. Shankle v. Home Ins. Co., 175 Tenn. 228, 133 S.W.2d 489, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1939).

This section applies to acts provided by law to be done, and does not apply to a situation involving the last day of the grace period of an insurance policy falling on Sunday. Simpkins v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 31 Tenn. App. 306, 215 S.W.2d 1, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

This section is a statutory enactment of the common-law rule. Needham v. Moore, 200 Tenn. 445, 292 S.W.2d 720, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 428, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (1956).

This section merely provides a method for the computation of time “within which any act provided by law is to be done.” It does not purport to change the common-law method of age computation. State v. Alley, 594 S.W.2d 381, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. 1980).

T.C.A. § 1-3-102 is applicable to private contracts. Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17718 (W.D. Tenn. 1985).

T.C.A. §§ 1-3-102 and 56-7-1102 et seq. did not apply to extend insured's right to accept continuous coverage under insurance policy where the policy had lapsed for nonpayment of premium and the insurer had extended an offer to renew coverage upon certain conditions being met. Robinson v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 857 S.W.2d 559, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

2. Bill of Exceptions.

While this section does not embrace an order giving time “until” a certain date to perform an act, an order of the court giving “until” a specified day to file a bill of exceptions included that day. Blaylock v. State, 108 Tenn. 185, 65 S.W. 398, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (1901).

Where a motion for a new trial was overruled and 60 days granted for the filing of a bill of exceptions and the 60 days expired on Sunday a bill of exceptions duly filed and approved by the trial judge on the 61st day was in time. Taylor v. State, 180 Tenn. 62, 171 S.W.2d 403 (1943).

Where the defendant immediately following a final decree on September 24, 1942, was allowed 30 days in which to file his bill of exceptions, which time was later extended an additional 30 days, the bill of exception filed on November 24, 1942 came too late in that it was filed 61 days after the final decree. Fletcher v. Russell, 27 Tenn. App. 44, 177 S.W.2d 854, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943), overruled in part on other grounds, J. C. Bradford & Co. v. Martin Constr. Co., 576 S.W.2d 586, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. 1979).

3. Appeal.

Where, by excluding the day on which the appeal was granted and including the first day of the next term, only five days intervened between the appeal and the convening of the criminal court, the appeal would run to the next succeeding term of the criminal court, in view of § 27-4-103. Luke v. State, 171 Tenn. 76, 100 S.W.2d 656, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1937).

The provisions of this section apply in computing the 10-day period provided by § 27-5-108 for appeals from decisions of general sessions courts, and Sunday is excluded only if it is the last day. Biggs v. Memphis Loan & Thrift Co., 215 Tenn. 294, 385 S.W.2d 118, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (1964).

Fact that § 15-1-101 declares Saturdays to be half-holidays on which public offices may be closed did not require that Saturdays be counted as half days in computing the 10-day period for appeal from decisions of general sessions courts provided by § 27-5-108. Biggs v. Memphis Loan & Thrift Co., 215 Tenn. 294, 385 S.W.2d 118, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (1964).

Circuit court erred in dismissing an appeal of a legal malpractice action merely because appellant entered the wrong docket number on her notice of appeal and appeal bond; the appeal was otherwise timely filed. Johnson v. Ragsdale, 158 S.W.3d 426, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Jan. 24, 2005).

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.01 did not apply to the computation of time of an appeal from a general sessions court because the Tennessee rules of civil procedure did not apply to the action of general sessions courts; the issue of computation was controlled by the general law. State v. Smith, 278 S.W.3d 325, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2008).

4. Elections.

Where district attorney general died on July 4 and the next biennial election was held August 4, such election was “more than 30 days after the happening of the vacancy.” Hanover v. Boyd, 173 Tenn. 426, 121 S.W.2d 120, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1938).

An election law governed so that nominating petition of candidate for statewide election had to be filed at least 60 days before election even though such day fell on Sunday and general provisions of this section would not operate to permit such petition to be filed the following Monday. Koella v. State, 218 Tenn. 629, 405 S.W.2d 184, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 594 (1966).

5. Statute of Limitations.

Under a statute barring debts against the estates of decedents, unless suit is brought within two years from the qualification of the personal representative a suit brought on the first day of September, 1853, is in time, where the administrator was legally appointed and qualified on the first day of September, 1851. Elder v. Bradley, 34 Tenn. 247, 1854 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (1854).

A suit upon a judgment rendered on the 20th day of November, 1883, is not barred by the 10 years' statute of limitations, if it is commenced on the 20th day of November, 1893. Cowan v. Donaldson, 95 Tenn. 322, 32 S.W. 457, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1895).

Because the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, T.C.A. § 29-20-101 et seq., has no specific provision directing how to compute the days for the 12-month statute of limitations, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.01 and T.C.A. § 1-3-102 may be applied to define the statutory period. Sanders v. Traver, 109 S.W.3d 282, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. 2003).

6. —Grace Periods.

A life insurance policy's 31-day grace period which ends on a Sunday is extended to the next business day. Flowers v. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co., 713 S.W.2d 69, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 765 (Tenn. 1986).

Since T.C.A. § 56-7-2307 requires that life insurance policies contain a grace period of one month, the days of that grace period should be counted as provided by T.C.A. § 1-3-102. Flowers v. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co., 713 S.W.2d 69, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 765 (Tenn. 1986).

The payment of a premium under a grace period provision of a life insurance policy is an act provided by law. Flowers v. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co., 713 S.W.2d 69, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 765 (Tenn. 1986).

7. Redemption.

Where land sold for debt is redeemable “at any time within two years after such sale,” the computation of the time shall be made by excluding the day of sale. Jones v. Planters' Bank, 24 Tenn. 619, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1845); Rothwell v. Gettys, 30 Tenn. 135, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1850).

8. Contracts.

While this statute relates only to acts provided by law to be done, it is in accord with sound principles to say that the rule prescribed is a sound one to be observed in the interpretation of contracts, where no different meaning is given by the instrument, or where no different intention is manifest from the contract. Cowan v. Donaldson, 95 Tenn. 322, 32 S.W. 457, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1895); Allen v. Effler, 144 Tenn. 685, 235 S.W. 67, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1921); Allen v. Reed, 147 Tenn. 612, 250 S.W. 546, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1922).

Whether the day on which a contract is executed is to be included or excluded, under the provision for performance within a specified number of days “from” the day of execution of the contract is to be determined according to the tenor of the instrument and the intent of the parties. Allen v. Effler, 144 Tenn. 685, 235 S.W. 67, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1921).

Under a contract giving persons an option to buy land “at any time within 18 days from the date hereof,” the date on which the contract was executed is to be excluded. Allen v. Effler, 144 Tenn. 685, 235 S.W. 67, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1921).

The same rule as provided by this section for computation of time as to acts required by law has been applied by the courts to private contracts. Dobson & Johnson, Inc. v. Waldron, 47 Tenn. App. 121, 336 S.W.2d 313, 1960 Tenn. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960).

9. Deed of Trust.

In computing the time of notice required in a deed of trust, the first day of publication of the notice should be excluded, and the last day included. Pope v. Craft, 1 Tenn. App. 356, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

10. Fractions of Day.

The general rule is that the law knows no fractions of a day. Allen v. Effler, 144 Tenn. 685, 235 S.W. 67, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1921).

11. Petition for Rehearing.

Where opinion of supreme court was filed on June 6 and petition for rehearing was filed on June 16, such petition was filed within 10 days. Eslinger v. Miller Bros. Co., 203 Tenn. 688, 315 S.W.2d 261, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (1958).

12. Computation of Age.

The conventional or prevailing attitude and belief evidenced by birthday commemorations and celebrations to the contrary notwithstanding, legally one attains any given age one day before his birthday. State v. Alley, 594 S.W.2d 381, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. 1980).

1-3-103. Conflicts within code.

If provisions of different titles or chapters of the code appear to contravene each other, the provisions of each title or chapter shall prevail as to all matters and questions growing out of the subject matter of that title or chapter.

Code 1932, § 13; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-303.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 16.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure — 1962 Tennessee Survey (Robert E. Kendrick), 16 Vand. L. Rev. 712 (1963).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Conflict of General and Specific Provisions.

Where there are two provisions, one of which is special and particular and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general and if standing alone would include the same matter and conflict with the special act or provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general. State v. Safley, 172 Tenn. 385, 112 S.W.2d 831, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1938); State v. Nelson, 577 S.W.2d 465, 1978 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

A special statute or a special provision of a particular statute controls a general provision in another statute or a general provision in the same statute. Strader v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 411, 403 S.W.2d 765, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (1966).

Wrongful death settlement proceeds were subject to a hospital lien because it had been held that T.C.A. § 20-5-106(a), exempting such proceeds from creditors'  claims, did not bar such attachment. Blackburn v. McGee, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. June 20, 2014).

2. Conflicting Acts Embodied in Code.

Where the code embodies two acts with conflicting provisions without material change, it must be held that the code embodied these acts as they have been previously construed. Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Himmelstein, 165 Tenn. 102, 53 S.W.2d 378, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1932).

Because patients'  complaint against pharmacies stated a cause of action pursuant to the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (THCLA), the provisions of that statute prevailed as to all matters and questions growing out of the subject matter of that title or chapter; as such, the seller shield defense contained within the Tennessee Products Liability Act was applicable only to product liability actions and could not be used as a defense to the patients'  THCLA claims. Heaton v. Mathes, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2020).

3. Conflicts in Particular Cases.

4. —Appeals.

Specific provisions of statute requiring motion for new trial upon appeal from revocation of suspended sentence or parole governed over the general provision that no motion for new trial is necessary in nonjury cases. Green v. State, 207 Tenn. 461, 340 S.W.2d 916, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (1960).

5. —Elections.

Alleged offense in taking ballot box, lock and registration book from custody and control of election officials with pistol during election was punishable under statute relating to breaking up election with force and violence rather than as armed robbery. Mowery v. State, 209 Tenn. 250, 352 S.W.2d 435, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (1961).

6. —Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals.

Where two acts of the general assembly included in the code contained conflicting provisions, providing for an appeal from a judgment disbarring an attorney to the supreme court and providing for appeal in such case to the court of appeals, the latter, governing jurisdiction as between those two courts, governed under this section. Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Himmelstein, 165 Tenn. 102, 53 S.W.2d 378, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1932).

Supreme court did not have jurisdiction to review certiorari proceeding in chancery court arising out of decision of a commission though § 27-9-112 as it then stood providing for appeal direct to supreme court since section contradicted § 16-4-108 governing jurisdiction of court of appeals, hence this section governing conflicts applied, and since subject matter of § 16-4-108 was jurisdiction of court of appeals, and subject matter of § 27-9-112 dealt generally with right of appeal in certain certiorari cases the court of appeals had jurisdiction. Woodroof v. Nashville, 183 Tenn. 483, 192 S.W.2d 1013, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (1946).

7. —Lien Lis Pendens.

In bill to subject property provisions of § 26-4-104 relating to lien lis pendens contained in chapter dealing with bills to subject property, governed over general provisions relating to lis pendens contained in § 20-3-101. Cannon Mills, Inc. v. Spivey, 208 Tenn. 419, 346 S.W.2d 266, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (1961).

8. —School Building Bonds.

The specific provisions of § 49-3-1002 providing that bonds for school buildings may be issued by resolution of a majority of the members of the county legislative body in regular session prevailed over the general provisions of a statute requiring a majority vote of the qualified voters in the county in issuance of county bonds and constituted an exception to such provision. State v. Safley, 172 Tenn. 385, 112 S.W.2d 831, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1938).

9. —Surety Companies.

Under this section, special provisions of § 56-15-112 dealing with venue of actions against surety companies prevailed over general provisions of a statute dealing with venue of tort actions in which parties are residents of different counties. Keefe v. Atkins, 199 Tenn. 183, 285 S.W.2d 338, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 444 (1955).

10. —Workers' Compensation Law.

Section 50-6-222 giving compensation claims the same preference as is allowed by law for any unpaid wages for labor, and subordinating compensation claims to rights and interest secured by a registered mortgage which is valid as to general creditors, controls as to compensation claims over title 66, ch. 13 relating to liens of employees for labor. Pennington v. Webb-Hammock Coal Co., 182 Tenn. 33, 184 S.W.2d 47, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (1944).

Under this section, effect must be given to the exception in § 50-6-222 relating to priority of employees' claims under Workers' Compensation Law rather than conflicting provisions relating to unpaid wages for labor. McKee v. Dever Bros., 39 Tenn. App. 411, 284 S.W.2d 305, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

Section 50-6-225 relating specifically to workers' compensation cases governed in appeals in such cases rather than former statutory provisions relating to appeals generally. Strader v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 411, 403 S.W.2d 765, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 578 (1966).

Collateral References.

Inclusion or exclusion of first and last days in computing the time for performance of an act or event which must take place a certain number of days before a known future date. 98 A.L.R.2d 1331.

1-3-104. Tense — Gender — Number of words.

  1. Words used in this code in the past or present tense include the future, and the future tense includes the present.
  2. Words importing the masculine gender include the feminine and neuter, except when the contrary intention is manifest.
  3. Singular includes the plural and the plural the singular, except when the contrary intention is manifest.

Code 1858, § 50; Shan., § 62; mod. Code 1932, § 14; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-304.

Cross-References. English deemed official and legal language, § 4-1-404.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 23 Tenn. Juris., Statutes, § 23.

Attorney General Opinions. Senate Bill 1085/House Bill 1111, 110th Gen. Assem. (2017), which would codify one of the most basic canons of statutory construction, the “ordinary-meaning canon,” could be construed as a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine embodied in the Tennessee Constitution.  In construing certain statutes with gender-limiting words, a court would likely apply the very specific gender-inclusive requirements of T.C.A. § 1-3-104(b) rather than the very general “ordinary meaning” requirements of the proposed legislation.   OAG 17-29, 2017 Tenn.AG LEXIS 28 (4/13/2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Gender.

The variance between an indictment for stealing a horse and proof of the stealing of a gelding is fatal, where the statute creating the offense uses both terms. Turley v. State, 22 Tenn. 323, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (1842).

By the well settled rules of interpretation, words importing the masculine gender include the feminine. This rule is embodied in this section. Ex parte Brien, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 33 (1874); Balch v. Johnson, 106 Tenn. 249, 61 S.W. 289, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (1901).

The word “widow,” as used in the statute, allowing damages for a wrongful death, includes both the feminine and masculine gender, so that the surviving husband, as “widower” is entitled to the damages recoverable for the wrongful death of his wife. Trafford v. Adams Express Co., 76 Tenn. 96, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (1881); Railway Co. v. Lilly, 90 Tenn. 563, 18 S.W. 243, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (1891).

Under the provision of this section that “words importing the masculine gender include the feminine and neuter,” and under former § 9568 of the 1932 Code (repealed), a married woman could join her husband in the adoption of a child. Balch v. Johnson, 106 Tenn. 249, 61 S.W. 289, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (1901).

Where Acts 1823, ch. 28, dealt with the right of a child born to a father after he had made a will was reenacted in Code of 1858 but word “father” was changed to “testator” the word “testator” included a testatrix. King v. King, 166 Tenn. 115, 59 S.W.2d 510, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1933).

Statute providing that action for injuries resulting in death is not extinguished but passes to widow, children or next of kin in that order applies whether the deceased injured party be male or female. Sneed v. Henderson, 211 Tenn. 572, 366 S.W.2d 758, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (1963).

Since this section provides that words importing the masculine gender include the feminine and no proof that women have been systematically excluded from the office of grand jury foreman was offered, a statute referring to the “foreman” of a jury does not create a classification based on sex in violation of the sixth amendment. McMath v. State, 544 S.W.2d 902, 1976 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).

2. Number.

The provision of this section that the singular includes the plural applied to individuals and employing units under the Unemployment Compensation Act. Royal Jewelers Co. v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 254, 205 S.W.2d 963, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 328 (1947).

3. Applicability.

Substituting “comparable feminine terms” for the words like “man” or “father,” as the non-biological parent proposed, goes beyond allowing words written in one gender be construed, where necessary, to apply to the other, and exceeds the purpose of the parentage statute; no rights or relationships are created by the parentage statutes, only a procedure by which the father is able to establish parentage and as such, recourse to T.C.A. § 1-3-104(b) for other purposes is not warranted. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

1-3-105. Definition of terms used in code.

  1. As used in this code, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Age of majority” means eighteen (18) years of age or older; except that when purchasing, consuming or possessing alcoholic beverages, wine or beer as those terms are defined in title 57, “age of majority” means twenty-one (21) years of age. This subdivision (1) shall not be construed as prohibiting any person eighteen (18) years of age or older from selling, transporting, possessing or dispensing alcoholic beverages, wine or beer in the course of employment;
      1. “Agriculture” means:
        1. The land, buildings and machinery used in the commercial production of farm products and nursery stock;
        2. The activity carried on in connection with the commercial production of farm products and nursery stock;
        3. Recreational and educational activities on land used for the commercial production of farm products and nursery stock; and
        4. Entertainment activities conducted in conjunction with, but secondary to, commercial production of farm products and nursery stock, when such activities occur on land used for the commercial production of farm products and nursery stock;
      2. As used in this definition of agriculture, the term “farm products” means forage and sod crops; grains and feed crops; dairy and dairy products; poultry and poultry products; livestock, including breeding and grazing; fruits; vegetables; flowers; seeds; grasses; forestry products; fish and other aquatic animals used for food; bees; equine; and all other plants and animals that produce food, feed, fiber or fur;
      3. As used in this definition of agriculture, the term “nursery stock” means all trees, shrubs, or other plants, or parts of such trees, shrubs or other plants, grown or kept for, or capable of, propagation, distribution or sale on a commercial basis;
    2. “Code” includes the Tennessee Code and all amendments and revisions to the code and all additions and supplements to the code;
    3. “Collector” includes any person entrusted with the collection of public revenue;
    4. “Constable,” or other word used for an executive or ministerial officer, includes any person performing the duties of such officer, either generally or in special cases;
    5. “Coroner,” or other word used for an executive or ministerial officer, includes any person performing the duties of such officer, either generally or in special cases;
    6. “County executive” means and includes “county mayor” unless the context clearly indicates otherwise;
    7. “County mayor” means and includes “county executive” unless the context clearly indicates otherwise;
    8. “Executor” includes an administrator, where the subject matter applies to an administrator;
    9. “Federal census,” “federal census of population,” or references to the federal decennial census, are deemed to be references to the federal decennial censuses of population as defined in § 1-3-116, and contained in the “Tables” volume of this code, Volume 13, or its replacement volume;
    10. “Funeral and burial expenses” includes, but is not limited to, the cost of preparing the body for burial or other disposition, the funeral service, any funeral merchandise, flowers, honoraria, acknowledgment cards, postage, transporting the body to the place of burial or disposition, the burial space, crypt, mausoleum or other final resting place, the opening and closing thereof and any marker;
    11. “Highway” includes public bridges and may be held equivalent to the words “county way,” “county road” or “state road”;
    12. “Insane” includes all persons of unsound mind;
    13. “Lands” includes lands, tenements and hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interests therein, equitable as well as legal;
    14. “Livestock” means all equine as well as animals that are being raised primarily for use as food or fiber for human utilization or consumption including, but not limited to, cattle, sheep, swine, goats, and poultry;
    15. “Minor” means any person who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age; except that where used in title 57 with respect to purchasing, consuming or possessing alcoholic beverages, wine or beer, “minor” means any person who has not attained twenty-one (21) years of age. This subdivision (16) shall not be construed as prohibiting any person eighteen (18) years of age or older from selling, transporting, possessing or dispensing alcoholic beverages, wine or beer in the course of employment;
    16. “Month” means a calendar month;
    17. “Oath” includes affirmation;
    18. “Person” includes a corporation, firm, company or association;
    19. “Personal property” includes money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt;
    20. “Personal representative,” when applied to those who represent a decedent, includes executors and administrators, unless the context implies heirs and distributees;
    21. “Probate court” means the court having jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of decedents;
    22. “Property” includes both personal and real property;
    23. “Real estate” and “real property” include lands, tenements and hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interests therein, equitable as well as legal;
    24. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in a perceivable form;
    25. “Representative,” when applied to those who represent a decedent, includes executors and administrators, unless the context implies heirs and distributees;
    26. “Road” includes public bridges and may be held equivalent to the words “county way,” “county road” or “state road”;
    27. “Savings and loan association” includes a building and loan association, a federal or state savings and loan association, a federal savings bank, and any other financial institution, the accounts of which are insured by the federal savings and loan insurance corporation (FSLIC) or any successor of such corporation;
    28. “Sheriff,” or other word used for an executive or ministerial officer, includes any person performing the duties of such officer, either generally or in special cases;
    29. “Signature” or “signed” includes a mark, the name being written near the mark and witnessed, or any other symbol or methodology executed or adopted by a party with intention to authenticate a writing or record, regardless of being witnessed;
    30. “State,” when applied to the different parts of the United States, includes the District of Columbia and the several territories of the United States;
    31. “Subscription” includes a mark, the name being written near the mark and witnessed;
    32. “Tennessean” denotes a permanent resident of the state, and such spelling is the recognized spelling of the word;
    33. “Tennessee-based business enterprise” means a sole proprietorship, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability corporation, limited partnership or any other business entity having any:
      1. Place of business permanently located within this state;
      2. Employees permanently assigned to work stations or areas located within this state; or
      3. Tangible assets permanently located within this state;
    34. “United States” includes the District of Columbia and the several territories of the United States;
    35. “Writing” or “written” includes printing, typewriting, engraving, lithography, and any other mode of representing words and letters; and
    36. “Year” means a calendar year, unless otherwise expressed; but “year,” in reference to any appropriation from the state treasury, means fiscal year, unless otherwise expressed or implied.
  2. As used in this code, undefined words shall be given their natural and ordinary meaning, without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language, except when a contrary intention is clearly manifest.

Code 1858, §§ 50-52, 54-57, 59; Shan., §§ 62-64, 65-68, 70; Code 1932, §§ 14-16, 18-21, 23-25; C. Supp. 1950, § 27.2; modified; Acts 1969, ch. 76, § 1; 1972, ch. 612, § 1; 1972, ch. 740, § 2; 1979, ch. 413, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-305; Acts 1983, ch. 304, § 1; 1984, ch. 705, § 1; 1984, ch. 1006, § 1; 1985, ch. 134, § 1; 1985, ch. 140, § 2; 1990, ch. 655, § 1; 1992, ch. 951, § 1; 1997, ch. 272, § 1; 2001, ch. 215, § 1; 2003, ch. 90, § 2; 2005, ch. 19, § 1; 2011, ch. 47, § 1; 2014, ch. 568, § 1; 2014, ch. 581, § 1; 2017, ch. 302, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. The federal savings and loan insurance corporation, referred to in (28), was abolished, effective February 1, 1992. See the Historical and Statutory Notes under 12 U.S.C. § 1437.

Acts 2003, ch. 90, § 2, directed the code commission to change all references from “county executive” to “county mayor” and to include all such changes in supplements and replacement volumes for the Tennessee Code Annotated.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

Amendments. The 2014 amendment  by ch. 568 added the definition of “livestock”.

The 2014 amendment  by ch. 581 added (A)(iv) in the definition of “agriculture”.

The 2017 amendment added (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2014, ch. 568, § 6. March 21, 2014.

Acts 2014, ch. 581, § 5. March 28, 2014.

Acts 2017, ch. 302, § 2. May 5, 2017.

Cross-References. Alcoholic beverage limitations on persons under 21, § 1-3-113.

Definition of agriculture, § 43-1-113.

Entities included within definition of savings and loan association, § 45-3-104.

“Minor” defined for purposes of municipal motion picture regulatory boards, § 6-54-404.

Penalty for sale of alcoholic beverages to minor, §§ 57-4-203, 57-5-303.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 44.

Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 16, 151, 193, 418, 453, 611.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Animals, §§ 3, 4; 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, § 4; 5 Tenn. Juris., Bridges, § 3; 7 Tenn. Juris., Corporations, § 101; 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 2; 16 Tenn Juris., Interest, § 10; 18 Tenn. Juris., Mechanics' Liens, § 8; 18 Tenn. Juris., Minors, § 2; 22 Tenn. Juris., Signatures, § 1; 23 Tenn. Juris., Time, § 1; 25 Tenn. Juris., Wills, §§  11, 117.

Law Reviews.

Probate—Taylor v. Holt: The Tennessee Court of Appeals Allows a Computer Generated Signature to Validate a Testamentary Will, (Chad Michael Ross), 35 U. Mem. L. Rev. 603 (2005).

Selection and Removal of Fiduciaries (Robert L. McMurray), 26 No. 3, Tenn. B.J. 22 (1990).

Attorney General Opinions. Senate Bill 1085/House Bill 1111, 110th Gen. Assem. (2017), which would codify one of the most basic canons of statutory construction, the “ordinary-meaning canon,” could be construed as a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine embodied in the Tennessee Constitution.  In construing certain statutes with gender-limiting words, a court would likely apply the very specific gender-inclusive requirements of T.C.A. § 1-3-104(b) rather than the very general “ordinary meaning” requirements of the proposed legislation.   OAG 17-29, 2017 Tenn.AG LEXIS 28 (4/13/2017).

The definition for “agriculture” at T.C.A. §§ 1-3-105(2)(A) and 43-1-113(b)(1) is applicable to the word “agriculture” as used in the definition of “Farm Property” in T.C.A. § 67-5-501(3).  OAG 17-30, 2017 Tenn. AG LEXIS 29 (4/17/2017).

The definition of “agriculture” in T.C. A. §§ 1-3-105(a)(2)(A) and 43-1-113(b)(1) applies  in determining the meaning of “agricultural” as used in T.C.A. § 5-1-118(b), T.C.A. § 5-1-122, and T.C.A. § 13-7-114. AG LEXIS 35 (7/26/2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application of Definitions.

The code definitions were not intended to be limited to the words as used by the code, but extend to the words whenever used in subsequent statutes. Wiley v. State, 43 Tenn. 362, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1866); Cowan v. Murch, 97 Tenn. 590, 37 S.W. 393, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 186, 34 L.R.A. 538, (1896); Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 257, 64 S.W. 193, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1901); State v. Erwin, 139 Tenn. 341, 200 S.W. 973, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (1917); Dunn v. Archer, 150 Tenn. 440, 265 S.W. 678, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1924).

These definitions are not applicable to common-law terms not embraced in the statutory system. Lewis v. Glass, 92 Tenn. 147, 20 S.W. 571, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1892).

The definitions apply not only to the statutes in the code as enacted, but to all amendments thereof, which include all statutes passed since its enactment, in the absence of a contrary intention or purpose expressed in the statutes themselves. Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 71, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1015 (1907).

Owners and operators of a farm, who operated a pumpkin patch and corn maze and conducted concerts on their property, were protected from the application of the local zoning laws by the Tennessee Right-to-Farm Act, T.C.A. § 43-26-101 et seq., because their farm activities were sufficient to meet the definition of agritourism. Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012), rev'd, 411 S.W.3d 405, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2013).

While the statutory definitions of “agriculture” include recreational and educational activities, they do not include entertainment activities; therefore, entertainment activities occurring on a farm are not an agricultural use that exempts the related land, buildings, or other structures from local zoning regulation. Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, 411 S.W.3d 405, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2013).

Music concerts a neighbor hosted on his farm could not claim the benefit of the exemption contained in T.C.A. § 13-7-114 from compliance with a county's zoning resolution because they did not fall within the rubric of “agriculture”; without the exemption, a homeowner's evidence established that the neighbor violated both the county zoning resolution and the order of the county board of zoning appeals limiting the concerts to one per year. Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, 411 S.W.3d 405, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2013).

2. Collectors.

Under a law making the state comptroller (now comptroller of the treasury) a collector of the state taxes due from railroads and conferring general powers upon him in the premises, he was authorized to assess omitted railroads for taxes. State v. Railroad, 96 Tenn. 385, 34 S.W. 1023, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1895); Railroad v. Williams, 101 Tenn. 146, 46 S.W. 448, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1898).

The remedies against the delinquent revenue collectors provided in the statutes may be used against county trustees entrusted with the collection of public revenue. McHenderson v. Anderson County, 105 Tenn. 591, 59 S.W. 1016, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (1900).

3. Executors and Administrators.

An administrator de bonis non is embraced and described in our statutes by the general description of administrator, whether by such statutes powers are given, or duties imposed. Schackelford v. Runyan, 26 Tenn. 141, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1846); Coleman v. Raynor, 43 Tenn. 25, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1866); Minor v. Webb, 48 Tenn. 395, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1870); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 80 Tenn. 393, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 187 (1883).

An act of the general assembly passed after the adoption of the code, empowering a bank to act as executor, includes power to act as administrator. This section applies to later enactments. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Wright, 58 S.W. 755, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 50 (1900).

4. Highways and Roads.

Public bridges are included within the general words “roads and highways,” and may be held to be equivalent to the words “county roads.” Ledbetter v. Clarksville & R. Turnpike Co., 110 Tenn. 92, 73 S.W. 117, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1903), overruled in part, Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. 1976), overruled in part on other grounds, Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. 1976); Cannon County v. McConnell, 152 Tenn. 555, 280 S.W. 24, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1926); Boshears v. Foster, 154 Tenn. 494, 290 S.W. 387, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 148 (1926).

5. Month.

A lunar month is not intended. Cook v. Shute, 3 Tenn. 67, 1 Cooke 67, 1812 Tenn. LEXIS 21(1812).

The period of 30 days, within which time the execution issued by a justice of the peace is required by statute to be returned, does not mean a calendar month, and is not equivalent thereto, except when such month happens to contain 30 days. Cowan v. Sloan, 95 Tenn. 424, 32 S.W. 388, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1895).

6. Person.

The word “person” includes a corporation, but the word as here used means a private corporation and not a public or municipal corporation. Memphis v. Laski, 56 Tenn. 511, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1872); Adams v. City of Memphis, 3 Shan. 392 (1875); Parsons v. McGavock, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 581 (1875); Daly v. State, 81 Tenn. 228, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1884); Turcott v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 101 Tenn. 102, 45 S.W. 1067, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 37, 70 Am. St. Rep. 661, 40 L.R.A. 768 (1898); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 71, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1015 (1907).

While the word “person” includes a “corporation,” within the purview of the statute that excludes absence from the state in computing the time for the running of the statute of limitations, a foreign corporation that has never complied with our statutes for its domestication, but has continually, for the period requisite for the running of the statute, operated its business within the state, maintaining an office, with officers and agents subject, under our statutes, to service of process that binds it, is entitled to plead and rely upon the statute of limitations to the same extent as a domestic corporation. Turcott v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 101 Tenn. 102, 45 S.W. 1067, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 37, 70 Am. St. Rep. 661, 40 L.R.A. 768 (1898); Boro v. Hidell, 122 Tenn. 80, 120 S.W. 961, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 4, 135 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1909).

Corporations are not included in the words “a person or persons” used in a statute the indictment provisions of which show a contrary intention. Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 71, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1015 (1907).

Because collateral estoppel did not apply, the circuit court did not commit any error in hearing and deciding on the merits a company's action against a former wife for money she had taken from the company and which the divorce court had determined was a debt she owed to the company; the company, which had been jointly owned by the former husband and the wife, was not a party to the divorce case, and it was an entity separate and apart from the husband and was its own legal person. Neas Welding & Steel Fabricating, Inc. v. Neas, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

7. Personal Property.

Dogs, having owners, are personal property. Wheatley v. Harris, 36 Tenn. 468, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1857); State v. Brown, 68 Tenn. 53, 1876 Tenn. LEXIS 17, 40 Am. Rep. 81 (1876); Phillips v. Lewis, 3 Shan. 230 (1877); Citizens' Rapid Transit Co. v. Dew, 100 Tenn. 317, 45 S.W. 790, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 120, 66 Am. St. Rep. 754, 40 L.R.A. 518 (1897).

“Personal property” includes “money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt.” Duke v. Hall, 68 Tenn. 282, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1878), overruled in part, Lancaster v. State, 91 Tenn. 267, 18 S.W. 777, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1891), overruled, Roach v. Woodall, 91 Tenn. 206, 18 S.W. 407, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 95, 30 Am. St. Rep. 883 (1891).

Defendant's conviction of aggravated arson under T.C.A. §§ 39-14-302(a)(2) and 39-14-303(a)(1) was supported by sufficient evidence where defendant set fire not only to the victim's person but also to the victim's clothing, which was personal property under T.C.A. § 1-3-105. State v. Brawner, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2012).

8. Property.

The right to litigate in the courts is a common right, and a species of incorporeal property. Harrison, Pepper & Co. v. Willis, 54 Tenn. 35, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 413, 19 Am. Rep. 604 (1871); Maxwell v. State, 55 Tenn. 565, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 3 (1875).

The word “property” includes both personal and real property, and all rights and interests, therein, equitable as well as legal. Wooldridge v. Page, 68 Tenn. 325, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1878); Alexander v. Miller's Heirs, 54 Tenn. 65, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 417 (1871); Hooberry v. Harding, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 677 (1878).

9. Real Property and Lands.

A right to or interest in land is precisely the same thing as land and the course of descent of the one and the other is regulated by the same law. Alexander v. Miller's Heirs, 54 Tenn. 65, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 417 (1871).

Fences, apple trees, timber and forest trees, and corn in the field are part of the realty. Nashville, C. & S. L. R.R. Co. v. Weaks, 81 Tenn. 148, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1884).

An interest in realty, purely contingent, is not by this section made leviable. Nichols v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535, 73 S.W. 107, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1903).

The terms “real estate,” “real property,” and “lands,” as defined in this section, expressly include every species of realty which a railroad company may own. State ex rel. Stewart v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 139 Tenn. 406, 201 S.W. 738, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1917).

Regulation of the use of land includes regulation of the use to which buildings on the land may be put. Spencer-Sturla Co. v. Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 290 S.W. 608, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1927).

10. —Leasehold Estates.

A leasehold estate or an estate for a term of years is subject to the mechanic's lien, because it is “land.” Alley & Bush v. Lanier, 41 Tenn. 540, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (1860), overruled in part, Prowell v. Fowlkes, 64 Tenn. 649, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 148 (1875); Kay v. Smith, 57 Tenn. 41, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 392 (1872); Burr v. Graves, 72 Tenn. 552, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1880); H.E. Daniel & Co. v. Weaver, 73 Tenn. 392, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1880); Truxall v. Williams, 83 Tenn. 427, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1885); Steger v. Arctic Refrigerating Co., 89 Tenn. 453, 14 S.W. 1087, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 70, 11 L.R.A. 580 (Tenn. Dec. 1890); Lewis v. Glass, 92 Tenn. 147, 20 S.W. 571, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1892).

A leasehold estate in land is real estate. Kelley v. Shultz, 59 Tenn. 218, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1873); Steers v. Daniel, 4 F. 587, 1880 U.S. App. LEXIS 2631 (W.D. Tenn. 1880), aff'd, 110 U.S. 264, 4 S. Ct. 94, 28 L. Ed. 141, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1689 (1884); Lewis v. Glass, 92 Tenn. 147, 20 S.W. 571, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1892); Matthews v. Crofford, 129 Tenn. 541, 167 S.W. 695, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (1914); Growers Warehousing Corp. v. W. E. Sawyer Tobacco Co., 5 Tenn. App. 619, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927); American R. E. Co. v. Chattanooga, 10 Tenn. App. 63, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

A statute which protects the interest of a husband in real estate of the wife from his creditors protects a like interest in the wife's leasehold. Burr v. Graves, 72 Tenn. 552, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1880).

This section does not change the common-law rule that curtesy does not attach to the wife's leasehold. Lewis v. Glass, 92 Tenn. 147, 20 S.W. 571, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1892).

A lease of an upper story of a building is not personalty, but is an interest in real estate, and contracts therefor are governed by the law relating to real estate. Mason v. Nashville, 155 Tenn. 256, 291 S.W. 1074, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1927).

11. Sheriff.

A deputy sheriff is not included in § 25-3-101 giving remedy by motion against “any sheriff, coroner, or constable, or other executive officer, to whom an execution is directed and by him received,” for certain defaults as to same. An execution is never directed to the deputy sheriff, but to the sheriff. Robertson v. Lessan & Dougan, 47 Tenn. 159, 1869 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1869); State ex rel. Little v. Slagle, 115 Tenn. 336, 89 S.W. 326, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1905).

12. Signature.

A person whose name is written by another, and who makes his mark thereto, may be a good attesting witness to a will. Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. 92, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 68 (1846); Rose v. Allen, 41 Tenn. 23, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1860); Tate v. Lawrence, 58 Tenn. 503, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 294 (1872); Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 18 S.W. 280, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 92, 30 Am. St. Rep. 875 (1892).

A mark, with name written near it and witnessed, constitutes a “signature” or “subscription.” A party may bind himself by making his mark or signing his initials with the intent thereby to be bound. Brown v. McClanahan, 68 Tenn. 347, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1878).

The name of a witness written by another, without the witness touching the pen or making his mark, is not sufficient. McFarland v. Bush, 94 Tenn. 538, 29 S.W. 899, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 66, 45 Am. St. Rep. 760, 27 L.R.A. 662 (1894).

13. Year.

The definition of “year” means that a year shall be 12 calendar months, regardless of the time of commencement. It does not mean that the year must commence with the month of January, for it may commence at any time. McClellan v. Memphis & C. R.R. Co., 79 Tenn. 336, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1883).

In computing interest a year is not to be treated as 360 days, or 12 periods of 30 days each. Dowler v. Georgia Enterprises, Inc., 162 Tenn. 59, 34 S.W.2d 445, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1931).

Collateral References.

Mistake or lack of information as to victim's age as defense to statutory rape. 46 A.L.R.5th 499.

Statute protecting minors in a specified age range from rape or other sexual activity as applicable to defendant minor within protected age group. 18 A.L.R.5th 856.

Statutory change of age of majority as affecting pre-existing status or rights. 75 A.L.R.3d 228.

What 12-month period constitutes “year” or “calendar year” as used in public enactment, contract, or other written instrument. 5 A.L.R.3d 584.

1-3-106. Words of joint authority.

All words giving a joint authority to three (3) or more persons or officers, give such authority to a majority of such persons or officers, unless it is otherwise declared.

Code 1858, § 58; Shan., § 69; Code 1932, § 22; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-306.

Law Reviews.

An Examination of The Tennessee Law of Administrative Procedure (George Street Boone), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 339 (1947).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application of Section.

This section should be considered not only in respect to the code but in respect to all subsequent statutes so as to build up a uniform and harmonious system. Cowan v. Murch, 97 Tenn. 590, 37 S.W. 393, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 186, 34 L.R.A. 538, (1896); Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 257, 64 S.W. 193, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1901).

2. Boards and Agencies.

Where statute creating state board of equalization provided that majority of board constituted a quorum for transaction of business the action of the board was not illegal merely because of presence of a substitute for and in lieu of state treasurer. Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 257, 64 S.W. 193, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1901).

Under a statute creating a board of jury commissioners, the action of a majority of the board is valid. Turner v. State, 111 Tenn. 593, 69 S.W. 774, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1902).

3. Courts.

Determination by court of chancery appeals was valid though only two consulted and concurred in regard to case due to absence of third member where case was argued before entire bench. Cowan v. Murch, 97 Tenn. 590, 37 S.W. 393, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 186, 34 L.R.A. 538, (1896).

4. Quorum Under Common Law.

Under the common law, a majority of a board, such as a county board of education, constituted a quorum. Collins v. Janey, 147 Tenn. 477, 249 S.W. 801, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1922).

1-3-107. Use of numerals.

The Roman numerals and Arabic figures are to be taken as part of the English language, and are always sufficient to express dates and amounts, unless otherwise imperatively directed by law.

Code 1858, § 53; Shan., § 64a; Code 1932, § 17; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-307.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Variance Between Words and Figures.

Where there is a discrepancy between the amount expressed in words and in figures, the writing is not necessarily rendered void for uncertainty, for either the words will prevail, or the words and figures will be read together, and any defect in either corrected by the other. It will only be after all efforts to produce a harmonious result have failed, that the writing will be held void for uncertainty. If the figures are complete, and the words are incomplete and show an omission, the inference is unavoidable that there was a clerical misprision by omission, and the amount in words will be corrected by the amount expressed in figures, and the omission supplied. Warder v. Millard, 76 Tenn. 581, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1881); Weaver v. Davidson County, 104 Tenn. 315, 59 S.W. 1105, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1899).

2. Meaningless Use of Degree Sign.

The usual degree sign, when used with or between figures, thus “12° 93,” if altogether unmeaning in its ordinary sense, will be read as a decimal point in notation, if this is entirely consistent and appropriate. Brown v. Hamlett, 76 Tenn. 732, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1882).

3. Decisions Under Common Law.

It is not a tenable objection to an indictment that in caption dates are expressed in figures. State v. Hunter, 7 Tenn. 165, 1823 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1823); Barnes v. State, 13 Tenn. 186, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1833).

1-3-108. Code as continuation of existing law.

For the purposes of construction, the provisions of this code insofar as they are substantially the same as existing law relating to the same subject matter shall be construed as continuations of and substitutes for the previously existing law repealed by § 1-2-104. It is not the purpose of this code to change the effect of any such existing law.

T.C.A., § 1-308.

Compiler's Notes. This section first appeared in the code as enacted by chapter 6 of the Public Acts of 1955.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 151.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Automobiles, § 26.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Defects in Original Enactment.

This section did not change the fact that efficacy of § 6-55-501 was due solely to its enactment as part of Tennessee Code Annotated, and contention that such section was unconstitutional in that the legislature did not have authority to enact the original statute, Acts 1937 (3rd Ex. Sess..), ch. 18, under the governor's proclamation calling for the extra session was without merit. Memphis v. Yellow Cab, Inc., 201 Tenn. 71, 296 S.W.2d 864, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (1956).

1-3-109. Section headings and histories.

Headings to sections in this code and the references at the end of such sections giving the source or history of the respective sections shall not be construed as part of the law.

T.C.A., § 1-309.

Compiler's Notes. This section first appeared in the code as enacted by Acts 1955, ch. 6.

Law Reviews.

Uncovering Legislative History Sources in Tennessee (Steven R. Thorpe), 31 No. 3 Tenn. B.J. 19 (1995).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Title or Heading.

Although supreme court disagreed with contention of appellant that § 6-55-501 was misentitled, the accuracy or inaccuracy of such contention was immaterial in view of the provisions of this section. Memphis v. Yellow Cab, Inc., 201 Tenn. 71, 296 S.W.2d 864, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (1956).

The term “alimony” would be construed as meaning support for wife only and not child support even though § 36-5-101 had been entitled “Alimony for Support of Wife and Children” since the time of Shannon's Code. Livingston v. Livingston, 58 Tenn. App. 271, 429 S.W.2d 452, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

1-3-110. Severability of code.

It is hereby declared that the sections, clauses, sentences and parts of the Tennessee Code are severable, are not matters of mutual essential inducement, and any of them shall be exscinded if the code would otherwise be unconstitutional or ineffective. If any one (1) or more sections, clauses, sentences or parts shall for any reason be questioned in any court, and shall be adjudged unconstitutional or invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remaining provisions thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the specific provision or provisions so held unconstitutional or invalid, and the inapplicability or invalidity of any section, clause, sentence or part in any one (1) or more instances shall not be taken to affect or prejudice in any way its applicability or validity in any other instance.

C. Supp. 1950, § 27.3; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 1-310.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 16.65.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1970 — A Critical Survey (Joseph G. Cook), 38 Tenn. L. Rev. 182 (1971).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The fact that one provision of a statute is unconstitutional does not affect the validity of other independent provisions. State v. Murray, 480 S.W.2d 355, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (Tenn. 1972).

Where to ascertain the rights of a party it was only necessary to decide whether a portion of a statute could be elided if unconstitutional and actual decision of constitutionality was unnecessary, actual decision on constitutionality is pretermitted. State v. Murray, 480 S.W.2d 355, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (Tenn. 1972).

The severability clause is a mere aid to interpretation and does not alter the force of the rationale that compels a decision of unconstitutionality. Leech v. American Booksellers Asso., 582 S.W.2d 738, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. 1979).

2. Whole Act Void.

Where the unconstitutional provision could not be elided without creating an incomplete statute, the whole act was void. Frost v. Chattanooga, 488 S.W.2d 370, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. 1972).

Where the sections that define the criminal offense that is the subject of an entire law and the section that identifies and classifies those who are subject and exempt from criminal penalties are void, there is a criminal law with no legally cognizable offense and no identifiable parties to charge; thus, the entire law is void. Leech v. American Booksellers Asso., 582 S.W.2d 738, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. 1979).

3. Application.

Even if an issue existed with the constitutionality under the Class Legislation Clause, Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 8, of T.C.A. § 2-5-151 due to the existence of the later-enacted § 2-5-151(l ), the remedy under T.C.A. § 1-3-110 would be to elide the offending provision, subsection (l ). Littlefield v. Hamilton County Election Comm'n, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 628 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2012).

1-3-111. Certified mail.

Certified mail may be used instead of registered mail whenever the law requires a notice to be given by registered mail.

Acts 1957, ch. 38, § 1; T.C.A., § 1-311.

1-3-112. “Legal blindness” and “total blindness” — Definition.

  1. In all statutes, rules and regulations enacted and/or promulgated by the state, its departments, agencies and institutions, wherein the term “total blindness,” that is, unable to distinguish between light and dark, is used or referred to, hereinafter, the term “legal blindness” meaning a person having not more than 20/200 with correcting glasses but with a limitation in the field of vision such that the widest diameter of the visual field subtends an angle no greater than twenty degrees (20°) shall be used.
  2. Such blindness shall be certified by a duly licensed ophthalmologist, and/or optometrist.
  3. In statutes enacted and/or rules and regulations promulgated prior to and in effect on March 17, 1961, the use of the term “total blindness” shall be construed to mean “legal blindness.”

Acts 1961, ch. 278, § 1; T.C.A., § 1-312.

1-3-113. Eighteen-year-olds — Legal responsibility — Alcoholic beverage restrictions on persons under twenty-one (21) years of age. [Effective until December 30, 2020. See version effective on January 1, 2021.]

  1. Notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, any person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older shall have the same rights, duties, and responsibilities as a person who is twenty-one (21) years of age, except as provided in subsection (b) relative to the rights to purchase, possess, transport, and consume alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer as those terms are defined in title 57.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), it is unlawful for any person under twenty-one (21) years of age to purchase, possess, transport or consume alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer, with the following exceptions:
    1. Any person eighteen (18) years of age or older may transport, possess, sell, or dispense alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer in the course of such person's employment; and
    2. The provisions of § 39-17-705(1) shall not be affected by any provision of subsection (b), it being the intent of the general assembly that such provisions remain lawful and in full force and effect. Any such priest or minister may utilize and administer alcohol or wine at a communion service, bat mitzvah, bar mitzvah, or other similar religious service or ceremony, in accordance with the practices of such denomination or sect.

Acts 1971, ch. 162, § 3; 1979, ch. 413, § 2; T.C.A., § 1-313; Acts 1984, ch. 1006, §§ 2, 9, 13-16; 1985, ch. 375, §§ 1-4; 1987, ch. 95, § 1; 1996, ch. 675, § 1.

Cross-References. Age of majority for alcoholic beverage and legal purposes, § 1-3-105.

Alcoholic beverage definitions, §§ 57-2-101, 57-3-101.

Juvenile alcohol abuse, title 68, ch. 24, part 4.

Lodging establishments, conduct of guests, title 68, ch. 14, part 6.

Minimum age for fire protection sprinkler system certification and licensing, § 62-32-107.

Removal of disability of minor veterans and spouses for receipt of benefits, § 58-3-103.

Sale of alcoholic beverages to minors, §§ 57-4-203, 57-5-301.

Support of child over 18 in high school, § 34-1-102.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 16.56.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, §§ 3, 34; 18 Tenn. Juris., Minors, § 2; 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, § 18.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1971 — A Critical Survey (Joseph G. Cook), 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 247 (1972).

Attorney General Opinions. No driver's license suspension for underage consumers of alcohol, OAG 94-137 (11/21/94).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The Legal Responsibility Act of 1971 is not unconstitutional as being retrospective. Arnold v. Davis, 503 S.W.2d 100, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. 1973).

2. Construction with Other Statutes.

Upon a finding that a child is delinquent, has committed any act designated a crime by § 37-1-103, the court has the discretion to “retain jurisdiction and control … until he or she shall have reached the age of twenty-one (21) years,” notwithstanding the Legal Responsibility Act of 1971 lowering the age of minority to age 18. State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 596 S.W.2d 779, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. 1980).

3. Federal Laws.

The enactment of this statute by Tennessee did not prevent a federal court from sentencing a juvenile under the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042) to custody until the age of 21. United States v. Minor, 455 F.2d 937, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11068 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 975, 92 S. Ct. 2426, 32 L. Ed. 2d 675, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 2408 (1972).

4. Limitations of Actions.

The Legal Responsibility Act of 1971 is not a statute of limitations although its effect shortens the time minors have to commence actions. Arnold v. Davis, 503 S.W.2d 100, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. 1973).

5. Legal Capacity of Minors.

A six-year-old child, as a matter of law, has no capacity to enter into an agreement of joint venture involving the hauling of livestock in a trailer being pulled by a pickup truck owned by his alleged coadventurer. Bennett v. Sanders, 685 S.W.2d 1, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2994 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

6. Duty to Support.

By lowering the age of majority from 21 to 18 years of age the general assembly completely emancipated such persons from the control of the parents and relieved the parents of their attendant legal duty of support. Garey v. Garey, 482 S.W.2d 133, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. 1972).

Father's legal obligation to maintain, support, and educate his two sons terminated as of May 11, 1971, for son over the age of 18 years old and on the date of the eighteenth birthday of the younger son. Weinstein v. Heimberg, 490 S.W.2d 692, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

Where divorce decree provided for child support by father “until each child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age or is otherwise emancipated” passage of this section relieved father of obligation to make support payments for 18-year-old child. Garey v. Garey, 482 S.W.2d 133, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. 1972).

Where divorce decree provided for child support by father until children were completed education or reached age 22 and would be reduced if child permanently left custody of mother, father was liable to support 18-year-old daughter who had not left custody of mother regardless of this section. Jones v. Jones, 503 S.W.2d 924, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

Separation agreement between husband and wife providing that husband pay support for the children until they reached the age of 21 was within the husband's legal obligations and therefore lost its contractual nature when approved by the court and could be enforced only so long as he had a legal duty to support his children. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 526 S.W.2d 463, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. 1975).

The statute by lowering the age of majority to 18 cut short support obligations. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 526 S.W.2d 463, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. 1975).

Absent a specific contractual undertaking going further, the parental duty to support the child terminates when the child reaches 18 years of age, the age of majority. In re Deatherage, 55 B.R. 268, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 4905 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).

A parent has no legal duty to support a child who has attained majority. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 797 S.W.2d 897, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Oct. 22, 1990).

Under Tennessee state law, standing alone, there is no statutory duty to support a child after the age of majority and any duty to provide post-majority support is purely contractual in nature. Binder v. Prager (In re Prager), 181 B.R. 917, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995).

7. Emancipation.

Emancipation may occur by operation of law and the enactment of T.C.A. § 1-3-113(a) completely emancipated those over 18 years of age from the control of their parents. Morris v. State, 21 S.W.3d 196, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, Morris v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 910, 121 S. Ct. 258, 148 L. Ed. 2d 187, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6400 (2000).

8. Jury Selection.

There was no basis for contention that persons 18, 19, and 20 years old, who were extended the elective franchise on May 11, 1971, were systematically excluded from grand jury where the jury list from which the defendant's grand jury was empaneled was selected, compiled and placed in the jury box long before that date. Shadden v. State, 488 S.W.2d 54, 1972 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 313 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972), cert. denied, Shadden v. Tennessee, 411 U.S. 909, 93 S. Ct. 1538, 36 L. Ed. 2d 199, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 2958 (1973).

Collateral References.

Burden of proof of defendant's age, in prosecution where attainment of particular age is statutory requisite of guilt. 49 A.L.R.3d 526.

Statutory change of age of majority as affecting pre-existing status or rights. 75 A.L.R.3d 228.

Validity and construction of covenant restricting occupancy of premises to person over or under specified age. 68 A.L.R.3d 1239, 526 P.2d 747, 1974 Ariz. App. LEXIS 453.

1-3-113. Eighteen-year-olds — Legal responsibility — Tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products and alcoholic beverage restrictions on persons under twenty-one (21) years of age. [Effective on January 1, 2021. See version effective until December 30, 2020.]

  1. Notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, any person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older shall have the same rights, duties, and responsibilities as a person who is twenty-one (21) years of age, except as provided in subsection (b) relative to the rights to purchase, possess, transport, and consume any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products as those terms are defined in title 39 or alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer as those terms are defined in title 57.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (a), it is unlawful for any person under twenty-one (21) years of age to purchase, possess, transport or consume tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products, alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer, with the following exceptions:
    1. Any person eighteen (18) years of age or older may transport, possess, sell, or dispense tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products, alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer in the course of such person's employment; and
    2. The provisions of § 39-17-705(1) shall not be affected by any provision of subsection (b), it being the intent of the general assembly that such provisions remain lawful and in full force and effect. Any such priest or minister may utilize and administer alcohol or wine at a communion service, bat mitzvah, bar mitzvah, or other similar religious service or ceremony, in accordance with the practices of such denomination or sect.

Acts 1971, ch. 162, § 3; 1979, ch. 413, § 2; T.C.A., § 1-313; Acts 1984, ch. 1006, §§ 2, 9, 13-16; 1985, ch. 375, §§ 1-4; 1987, ch. 95, § 1; 1996, ch. 675, § 1; 2020, ch. 732, §§ 1, 2.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment inserted "any tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products as those terms are defined in title 39 or” in (a); and substituted "tobacco, smoking hemp, or vapor products, alcoholic beverages" for “alcoholic beverages” in (b) and (b)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 732, § 25. January 1, 2021.

1-3-114. Eighteen-year-olds — Professional responsibility.

Notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, any person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older shall not be prohibited from entering into any profession or from performing any services on the basis of such person's minority.

Acts 1971, ch. 161, § 3; T.C.A., § 1-314.

Collateral References.

Statutory change of age of majority as affecting pre-existing status or rights. 75 A.L.R.3d 228.

Validity and construction of covenant restricting occupancy of premises to person over or under specified age. 68 A.L.R.3d 1239, 526 P.2d 747, 1974 Ariz. App. LEXIS 453.

1-3-115. Effect of law reducing age limit.

The provisions of chapter 612 of the Public Acts of 1972, reducing the age limitations from twenty-one (21) years of age to eighteen (18) years of age in §§ 23-1-102 [repealed], 23-1-107, 34-1-106 [repealed], 34-2-201 [repealed], 34-3-412 [repealed], 35-7-102 [repealed], 36-1-102, 36-1-105 and 57-4-203 and the definition of “minor” in § 1-3-105 shall not be considered as repealing or otherwise limiting the provisions of §§ 1-3-113 and 1-3-114.

Acts 1972, ch. 612, § 10; T.C.A., § 1-315.

Compiler's Notes. Section 23-1-102, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1981, ch. 238, § 1.

Sections 34-1-106, 34-2-201 and 34-3-412 were repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 794, §§ 33 and 40, effective January 1, 1993. Acts 1992, ch. 794, § 7 enacted a new § 34-1-106; however, the section referred to above was repealed.

Former § 35-7-102, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 664, § 2.

The age limitation of 18 years in § 57-4-203, referred to in this section, has subsequently been increased to 21 years.

Collateral References.

Burden of proof of defendant's age, in prosecution where attainment of particular age is statutory requisite of guilt. 49 A.L.R.3d 526.

Statutory change of age of majority as affecting pre-existing status or rights. 75 A.L.R.3d 228.

Validity and construction of covenant restricting occupancy of premises to person over or under specified age. 68 A.L.R.3d 1239, 526 P.2d 747, 1974 Ariz. App. LEXIS 453.

1-3-116. Population figures.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b), references in this code to the federal censuses of population or brackets based on such censuses shall be deemed references to or based on the population figures contained in Volume 13 of this code, or its replacement volume which are reproduced from publications of the United States bureau of the census as specified below, and shall not be affected by revisions, corrections, or alterations to such population figures by the United States bureau of the census subsequent to the publication of these publications:
    1. Census of 1900 and Census of 1910: Bureau of the census. Thirteenth Census of the United States. Taken in the Year 1910. Volume 1. Population. General Report and Analysis, pp. 118, 119;
    2. Census of 1920 and Census of 1930: Bureau of the census. Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930. Volume 1. Population. Distribution of Inhabitants, pp. 1033, 1034;
    3. Census of 1940 and Census of 1950: Bureau of the census. A Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the United States. Census of Population: 1950. Volume 1. Number of Inhabitants, pp. 42-10, 42-11;
    4. Census of 1960 and Census of 1970: U.S. bureau of the census. U.S. Census of Population: 1970. Number of Inhabitants. Final Report of PC(1)-A44 Tennessee, pp. 44-15, 44-16;
    5. Census of 1980: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Tennessee, PHC80-V-44. April 1, 1980;
    6. Census of 1990: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1990 Census of Population: Tennessee, 1990 CP-1-44;
    7. Census of 2000: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000 Census of Population and Housing: Tennessee, 2000 PHC-1-44; and
    8. Census of 2010: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2010 Census of Population and Housing: Tennessee, 2010 CPH-1-44.
  2. Subsection (a) does not apply to the provisions of title 3, chapter 1, relative to legislative reapportionment; § 8-24-101, relative to the classification of counties for the purpose of determining the compensation of county officers and clerks of court; §§ 16-15-204 [repealed] and 16-15-5001, relative to the classification of counties for the purpose of determining the compensation of judges; to any provision of the code in which a population figure may be adjusted by a local or state conducted supplemental census; or to any instance where an intent contrary to this section is evidenced.

Acts 1985, ch. 134, § 2; 1989, ch. 107, § 1; 2018, ch. 581, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-204, referred to in this section, was repealed in 1993.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment substituted “2000 PHC-1-44” for “2000 CPC-1-44” in (a)(7); and added (a)(8).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 581, § 4. March 16, 2018.

1-3-117. Korean War.

  1. All references in Tennessee Code Annotated to “Korean Conflict” are hereby amended to read “Korean War.”
  2. All references to “Korean Conflict” included within the official publications, communications, memoranda, letters, public records, legal documents and all other official records of the State of Tennessee shall be deemed to read “Korean War” on April 13, 2000.

Acts 2000, ch. 656, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 656, § 2, directed the code commission to change all references from “Korean Conflict” to “Korean War” and to include all such changes in the 2000 supplements and replacement volumes for Tennessee Code Annotated. Section 3 of the act provided that all other departments and agencies shall implement the provisions of the act no later than January 1, 2001.

Cross-References. Special license plates for honorably discharged veterans, § 55-4-253.

1-3-118. Recognition of high school diplomas from church-related schools and home schools.

  1. Notwithstanding any rule, regulation or other law to the contrary, a high school diploma awarded by a school as defined by § 49-50-801 or § 49-6-3050 in recognition of completion of secondary educational requirements shall be considered by all departments, agencies, commissions or other such entities of state and local government as having all the rights and privileges of a high school diploma awarded by a public school system.
  2. This section shall not apply to state lottery proceeds as provided in title 49, chapter 4, part 9.

Acts 2009, ch. 329, § 1.

1-3-119. Express language required to create or confer a private right of action.

  1. In order for legislation enacted by the general assembly to create or confer a private right of action, the legislation must contain express language creating or conferring the right.
  2. In the absence of the express language required by subsection (a), no court of this state, licensing board or administrative agency shall construe or interpret a statute to impliedly create or confer a private right of action except as otherwise provided in this section.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed in any way to impair the ability of a court to:
    1. Recognize a private right of action that was recognized before July 1, 2012, by the courts of this state as arising under a statute, unless the statute is amended after July 1, 2012, to expressly bar the private right of action;
    2. Create or confer a private right of action in the absence of a controlling statute on each cause of action contained in the complaint if such action is based on the common law;
    3. Utilize the doctrine of negligence per se; or
    4. Recognize a private right of action commenced by a state or local governmental entity to collect any fees owed for a governmental service or to recover such fees from a party that is obligated to bill and collect fees owed others for a governmental service.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed in any way to impair the ability of a state or local regulatory or licensing agency to enforce rules pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, if such rules were duly enacted through the rulemaking authority granted to any such agency by statute.

Acts 2012, ch. 759, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2012, ch. 759, § 2 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to all actions that accrue on or after July 1, 2012.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Private Cause of Action Not Implied.

Employee had no private right of action under the Tennessee Tip Statute because, while the employee was an intended beneficiary, (1) the statute did not expressly provide such a right, and (2) no such right was implied, as the doctrine of legislative inaction did not apply to show legislative acquiescence in a judicial decision implying the right, since that decision was inconsistent with subsequent jurisprudence on implication of a private right of action, as the decision reflected a willingness to imply a private remedy so long as doing so was not inconsistent with either the purpose of the statute or any criminal or administrative remedies expressly provided therein, but courts had retreated from that approach in favor of one presuming a legislature would expressly provide for a private remedy if it intended there to be one. Hardy v. Tournament Players Club at Southwind, Inc., 513 S.W.3d 427, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. May 25, 2016).

2. Constitutionality.

Dismissal of hospital patients'  cause of action against a hospital and its services provider was appropriate because the Tennessee statute creating or conferring private rights of action did not violate the Open Court Clause of the Tennessee Constitution, as-applied to hospital patients, and there was no recognized statutory cause of action for the hospital patients under the statute, nor common law cause of action for the hospital patients against the hospital and its services provider. Fowler v. Morristown-Hamblen Hosp. Ass'n, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2019).

1-3-120. Newspapers of general circulation that publish public notices required to post notice in its entirety on web site for same price.

  1. Beginning April 1, 2014, in all cases where a public notice or legal notice is required to be published in a newspaper of general circulation, the newspaper shall for the same price post the complete notice:
    1. On the newspaper's web site, where it shall be published contemporaneously with the notice's first print publication and will remain on the web site for at least as long as the notice appears in the newspaper; and
    2. On a statewide web site established and maintained as a joint venture of the majority of Tennessee newspapers as a repository for such notices and will remain on the repository web site for at least as long as it appears in the newspaper. Any newspaper of general circulation that meets the criteria of this subsection (a) shall have access to the statewide web site at no charge.
  2. Any such notice shall be published online in its entirety, including maps and other exhibits, and shall include the date on which it was first printed in the newspaper.
  3. An error in a notice placed on the newspaper web site or statewide web site, or temporary web site outages or service interruptions prohibiting the posting or display of such notice shall be considered harmless error and proper legal notice requirements shall be considered met if the notice published in the newspaper is correct.
  4. Each newspaper of general circulation publishing public notices shall include on its web site home page a link to its public notice section and shall include on its public notice home page a link to the statewide public notice web site.
  5. Any notice published on a web site pursuant to subdivisions (a)(1) and (2) shall be accessible to the public at no charge.

Acts 2013, ch. 124, § 1.

1-3-121. Cause of action under chapter.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a cause of action shall exist under this chapter for any affected person who seeks declaratory or injunctive relief in any action brought regarding the legality or constitutionality of a governmental action. A cause of action shall not exist under this chapter to seek damages.

Acts 2018, ch. 621, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 621, § 2. April 2, 2018.

1-3-122. References to committees of general assembly that no longer exist.

References in this code to committees of the general assembly that no longer exist due to rule change of either the senate or house of representatives are deemed to be references to the committee that has jurisdiction of the subject matter pursuant to the rules of the appropriate chamber.

Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 2.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.