History of title. —

Section 1, ch. 188, Laws 1977, revised this title, substituting §§ 1-1-101 to 1-39-102 for §§ 1-1 to 1-1066, W.S. 1957. The original Code of Civil Procedure was enacted as Laws 1886, ch. 60, and consisted of 809 sections. This title, as revised, is based on the original code and many laws which, although not enacted as part of the Civil Code, also relate to civil procedure. For disposition of acts, see the Table of Disposition of Acts. Attention is called to the fact that many provisions of the original Civil Code, and many laws inserted therein in prior compilations, were superseded by the Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted by the supreme court effective December 1, 1957. See Rule 86, W.R.C.P.

Inasmuch as there is no chapter 16 in the 1977 revision of title 1 by § 1, ch. 188, Laws 1977, the chapters following chapter 15 have been renumbered so as to maintain proper numerical sequence and internal references in the statutes have been changed accordingly throughout the title.

Section 2, ch. 188, Laws 1977, reads: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming Legislature during the same session which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict herewith.”

Law reviews. —

For article, “Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 159 (1985).

Library References.

Family Law and Practice § 3.02 (Matthew Bender).

Chapter 1 General Provisions as to Civil Actions

Law reviews. —

For comments, “Wyoming Tort Reform and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: A Second Opinion,” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 593 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

20 Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment and Setoff § 1 et seq.; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 1 et seq.; 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants §§ 150 to 224; 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes §§ 27, 95, 96.

Nature of termination of civil action required to satisfy element of favorable termination to support action for malicious prosecution, 30 ALR4th 572.

Assignability of proceeds of claim for personal injury or death, 33 ALR4th 82.

Assignability of claim for legal malpractice, 40 ALR4th 684.

What constitutes “suit” triggering insurer's duty to defend environmental claims — state cases, 48 ALR5th 355.

Medical-malpractice countersuits, 61 ALR5th 307.

1A C.J.S. Actions §§ 1 to 45.

§ 1-1-101. Provisions to be liberally construed.

The Code of Civil Procedure [this title] and all proceedings under it shall be liberally construed to promote its object and assist the parties in obtaining justice. The rule of common law that statutes in derogation thereof must be strictly construed has no application to the Code of Civil Procedure, but this shall not be so construed as to require a liberal construction of provisions affecting personal liberty, relating to amercement or of a penal nature.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 2338; R.S. 1899, § 2727; C.S. 1910, § 4263; C.S. 1920, § 5532; R.S. 1931, § 89-102; C.S. 1945, § 3-102; W.S. 1957, § 1-2; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

In general. —

Under this section the Code of Civil Procedure will be liberally construed to promote its object and assist parties in obtaining justice, the common law rule that statutes in derogation thereof must be strictly construed being inapplicable. Allen v. Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Petition to set aside fraudulent conveyance should be construed liberally in order to promote the objects of the Code of Civil Procedure and to assist the parties in obtaining justice. Glover v. Berger, 75 Wyo. 191, 294 P.2d 793, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1956).

Likewise, petition for money had and received on an oral contract for the sale of realty breached by the vendor should be construed liberally in order to promote justice. Smith v. Gorsuch, 36 Wyo. 430, 256 P. 664, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1927).

And occupying claimant's statute should be construed in its entirety and liberally in order to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice. Walther v. Steward, 54 Wyo. 160, 88 P.2d 475, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1939).

Sufficiency of evidence to support finding could be reviewed under an assignment of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain “judgment.” Schiller v. Blyth & Fargo Co., 15 Wyo. 304, 88 P. 648, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1907).

Practice of other states not controlling. —

Courts of this state are not controlled by principles of practice established in other jurisdictions, unless they are more reasonable and consonant with other rules of our procedure, either judicially established or prescribed by statute. Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 P. 255, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1925).

Quoted in

Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 287 (Wyo. 1981); Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1991).

§ 1-1-102. Minors as parties to actions.

Every person over fourteen (14) years of age and under the age of majority, when subject to no disability other than being a minor, may sue or be sued. When plaintiff he shall sue by a next friend selected by him before suit is commenced. The next friend is liable for the cost chargeable to the plaintiff. When the minor is sued he shall appear by guardian nominated by him and appointed by the court before further proceedings are had in the case, but judgment shall be against the minor defendant only. In either case, if plaintiff or defendant neglects or refuses to nominate a next friend or guardian, the court shall appoint a next friend or guardian, who shall file his consent in writing, with the court.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 9; R.S. 1887, § 3423; R.S. 1899, § 4332; C.S. 1910, § 5194; C.S. 1920, § 6470; R.S. 1931, § 62-303; C.S. 1945, § 14-203; W.S. 1957, § 1-509; Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision reserving rights of minors in judgments or orders, see § 1-16-101 .

As to right of minor to obtain declaration of rights under Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, see § 1-37-105 .

As to appointment of guardians generally, see §§ 3-2-101 to 3-2-112 .

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Quoted in

Kordus v. Montes, 2014 WY 146, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Nov. 14, 2014).

Cited in

Cheeseman v. Fenton, 13 Wyo. 436, 80 P. 823, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1905).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Minors as subject to constructive or substituted service of process under statutes providing for such service on nonresident motorist, 53 ALR2d 1164.

Recognition of foreign guardian as next friend or guardian ad litem, 94 ALR2d 162.

Who is minor's next of kin for guardianship purposes, 63 ALR3d 813.

Child's right of action for loss of support, training, parental attention, or the like, against a third person negligently injuring parent, 11 ALR4th 549.

Sexual child abuser's civil liability to child's parent, 54 ALR4th 93.

Parent's right to recover for loss of consortium in connection with injury to child, 54 ALR4th 112.

§ 1-1-103. Power of deputies.

A duty enjoined by statute upon a ministerial officer or an act permitted to be done by him may be performed by his lawful deputy.

History. Laws 1880, ch. 60, § 3; R.S. 1887, § 2339; R.S. 1899, § 3421; C.S. 1910, § 4264; C.S. 1920, § 5533; R.S. 1931, § 89-103; C.S. 1945, § 3-103; W.S. 1957, § 1-3; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to deputies of state officers, see § 9-1-101 .

As to deputies of county officers, see §§ 18-3-111 , 18-3-112 .

§ 1-1-104. Sureties; justification.

A court or an officer authorized by law to approve a surety may require such person to testify orally or in writing touching his sufficiency, but this in itself shall not exonerate the officer in an action for taking insufficient surety.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 6; R.S. 1887, § 2342; R.S. 1899, § 3424; C.S. 1910, § 4267; C.S. 1920, § 5536; R.S. 1931, § 89-106; C.S. 1945, § 3-105; W.S. 1957, § 1-4; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to rights and remedies of sureties, surety bonds and surety companies, see title 38.

§ 1-1-105. Sureties; qualifications.

Sureties shall be residents of this state, worth in the aggregate double the sum to be secured, beyond the amount of their debts, and have property liable to execution in this state equal to the sum to be secured. Every person acting as surety for another shall file with the court his affidavit showing that he meets the requirements set forth herein.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 7; R.S. 1899, § 3425; C.S. 1910, § 4268; C.S. 1920, § 5537; R.S. 1931, § 89-107; C.S. 1945, § 3-106; W.S. 1957, § 1-5; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to qualifications of sureties with reference to county officers, see § 18-3-102 .

Cited in

Snake River Land Co. v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 57 Wyo. 425, 120 P.2d 601, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (1942).

§ 1-1-106. Compensation of cross demands.

When cross demands exist between persons under circumstances that if one brought an action against the other, a counterclaim or setoff could be set up, neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by assignment by the other, or by his death, but the two (2) demands will be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 128; R.S. 1887, § 2464; R.S. 1899, § 3551; C.S. 1910, § 4397; C.S. 1920, § 5667; R.S. 1931, § 89-1022; C.S. 1945, § 3-1316; W.S. 1957, § 1-6; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Assignment improper.—

Appellants’ assignment of the judgments to themselves as tenants in the entirety was improper because it would deprive individual appellees, holders of a cross demand, of the benefit of their claim by making the judgments held by appellants exempt from execution. Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Constr., LLC, 2020 WY 125, 473 P.3d 279, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 2020).

“Compensated” defined. —

This section represents a principle of natural justice, “compensated” therein meaning, as in the civil law, extinguished or satisfied. Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder, 55 Wyo. 109, 97 P.2d 311, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1939).

Presentation in probate unnecessary. —

Under this section counterclaim may be set up even if not presented to executor or administrator. Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder, 55 Wyo. 109, 97 P.2d 311, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1939).

Setoff not permitted. —

This section does not authorize a setoff by the maker of a note where the holder is suing the maker on a note transferred to the holder by the federal deposit insurance corporation (FDIC) after the maker's bank went into receivership and the maker seeks to offset this claim with a payment made on a separate note issued to a separate bank also in receivership to the FDIC. Gose v. Hess, 822 P.2d 846, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1991).

Setoff permitted.—

Appellants asserted that part of the statute that prohibited partial assignment of judgments, but corporate appellees’ partial assignments of their judgment against appellants did not deprive appellants of the benefit of their judgments against individual appellees, as appellants still received value for their judgments by having the amount appellants owed reduced. The partial assignments were valid. Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Constr., LLC, 2020 WY 125, 473 P.3d 279, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 2020).

§ 1-1-107. Furnishing of transcripts.

Upon request and receipt of the lawful fees required, judges of judicial tribunals and the clerks of every court of record, shall furnish to any person an authenticated transcript of proceedings containing the judgment or final order in their court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 787; R.S. 1887, § 3135; R.S. 1899, § 4255; C.S. 1910, § 5115; C.S. 1920, § 6377; R.S. 1931, § 89-4809; C.S. 1945, § 3-5309; W.S. 1957, § 1-7; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2009, ch. 168, § 201.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, deleted “justices of the peace and” preceding “judges of” and deleted “other” preceding “judicial.”

§ 1-1-108. Voluntary partial payment of liability claims.

No voluntary partial payment of a claim based on alleged liability for injury or property damage shall be construed as an admission of fault or liability, or as a waiver or release of claim by the person receiving payment. Such payment is not admissible as evidence in any action for the purpose of determining the amount of any judgment, with respect to the parties to the occurrence from which the claim arose. Upon settlement of the claim, the parties may make any agreement they desire in respect to all voluntary partial payments. After entry of judgment, any such payment shall be treated as a credit and deducted from the amount of the judgment. If after partial voluntary payments are made it is determined by final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction that the payor is liable for an amount less than the voluntary payments already made, the payor has no right of action for the recovery of amounts by which the voluntary payments exceed the final judgment. No voluntary partial payments shall be construed to reduce the amount of damages which may be pleaded and proved in a court proceeding between the parties.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 140, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-7.1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

No credit for payments made by another. —

This section does not provide for a credit to a party, upon a judgment for payments made by another in settlement of the claim of an injured person. The clear legislative intent is that the voluntary payments accrue only to the benefit or detriment of the payor of the voluntary payments. The statute makes no mention of third parties who pay nothing as being either benefitted or harmed by the party paying and the injured party. Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1993).

Applied in

Amerigas Propane, Inc. v. Bing, 875 P.2d 1276, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1994).

Law reviews. —

For discussion of Rule 409, F.R.E., which excludes offers to pay or payments of an injured party's medical expenses when offered to prove negligence by the alleged tortfeasor, see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 601 (1977).

§ 1-1-109. Comparative fault.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Actor” means a person or other entity,  including the claimant, whose fault is determined to be a proximate  cause of the death, injury or damage, whether or not the actor is  a party to the litigation;
    2. “Claimant” means a natural person, including  the personal representative of a deceased person, or any legal entity,  including corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships  or unincorporated associations, and includes a third party plaintiff  and a counterclaiming defendant;
    3. “Defendant” means a party to the litigation  against whom a claim for damages is asserted, and includes third party  defendants. Where there is a counterclaim, the claimant against whom  the counterclaim is asserted is also a defendant;
    4. “Fault” includes acts or omissions, determined  to be a proximate cause of death or injury to person or property,  that are in any measure negligent, or that subject an actor to strict  tort or strict products liability, and includes breach of warranty,  assumption of risk and misuse or alteration of a product;
    5. “Injury to person or property,” in addition  to bodily injury, includes, without limitation, loss of enjoyment  of life, emotional distress, pain and suffering, disfigurement, physical  or mental disability, loss of earnings or income, damage to reputation,  loss of consortium, loss of profits and all other such claims and  causes of action arising out of the fault of an actor;
    6. “Wrongful death” means that cause of action  authorized by Wyoming statute to recover money damages when the death  of a person is caused by the fault of an actor such as would have  entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages  if death had not ensued.
  2. Contributory fault shall not bar a recovery  in an action by any claimant or the claimant’s legal representative  to recover damages for wrongful death or injury to person or property,  if the contributory fault of the claimant is not more than fifty percent  (50%) of the total fault of all actors. Any damages allowed shall  be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the  claimant.
  3. Whether or not the claimant is free of  fault, the court shall:
    1. If a jury trial:
      1. Direct the jury to determine the total  amount of damages sustained by the claimant without regard to the  percentage of fault attributed to the claimant, and the percentage  of fault attributable to each actor; and
      2. Inform the jury of the consequences of  its determination of the percentage of fault.
    2. If a trial before the court without jury,  make special findings of fact, determining the total amount of damages  sustained by the claimant without regard to the percentage of fault  attributed to the claimant, and the percentage of fault attributable  to each actor.
  4. The court shall reduce the amount of damages  determined under subsection (c) of this section in proportion to the  percentage of fault attributed to the claimant and enter judgment  against each defendant in the amount determined under subsection (e)  of this section.
  5. Each defendant is liable only to the extent  of that defendant’s proportion of the total fault determined under  paragraph (c)(i) or (ii) of this section.

History. Laws 1973, ch. 28, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-7.2; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1986, ch. 24, § 1; 1994, ch. 98, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

Many of the following annotations are taken from cases decided prior to the 1986 amendment of this section and the repeal of §§ 1-1-110 through 1-1-113.

Negligence on part of fraud victim. —

It seems clear the legislature sought to ensure negligent defendants would not be held accountable for the intentional acts of another, and the Wyoming Supreme Court is not persuaded the legislature intended negligence on the part of a fraud victim to be compared with the intentional acts of the perpetrator so as to reduce the perpetrator's liability based upon any percentage of fault apportioned to the victim. Erdelyi v. Lott, 2014 WY 48, 326 P.3d 165, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2014).

Absent clear statutory language showing the legislature intended the negligence of a fraud victim to be compared to the conduct of the perpetrator, thereby potentially reducing the latter's liability for his intentionally wrongful acts, the court declines to hold that the statute is a proper matter for a jury instruction in a fraud case. Erdelyi v. Lott, 2014 WY 48, 326 P.3d 165, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2014).

District court erred in instructing on comparative fault and negligence so as to allow the jury to compare the stockbroker's willful act with any negligence of the client in this constructive fraud case, and the district court further erred in providing a verdict form requiring the jury to compare the stockbroker's constructive fraud and any negligence of the client. Erdelyi v. Lott, 2014 WY 48, 326 P.3d 165, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2014).

If a jury finds that a claimant knew or could have discovered the fraud more than four years before filing the action, the perpetrator of the fraud is relieved from any liability, and thus any negligence of the claimant in not discovering and timely pursuing a fraud claim is addressed in the statute, and there is no need for a separate instruction allowing a jury to compare a claimant's negligence or comparative fault with the willful act of the perpetrator in a fraud case; on remand, the jury was not to be instructed on comparative fault as between the client and the stockbroker. Erdelyi v. Lott, 2014 WY 48, 326 P.3d 165, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2014).

Law applied prior to June 11, 1986. —

The supreme court continued the law of Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 287 (Wyo. 1981) and Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 521 (Wyo. 1985) during the period before the 1986 amendment to this section and repeal of §§ 1-1-110 through 1-1-113 took effect (June 11, 1986). Burton v. Fisher Controls Co., 723 P.2d 1214, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 596 (Wyo. 1986).

Contractual remedies not precluded. —

The provisions of this statute relating to contribution among joint tortfeasors does not inhibit the contractual remedies. Remedies for breach of contract and breach of express and implied warranty which arise under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code may still be asserted. Centric Corp. v. Drake Bldg. Corp., 726 P.2d 1047, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 628 (Wyo. 1986) (decided under former § 1-1-110 ).

Although plaintiff negligent, warranty action not precluded. —

This section does not require that recovery in a warranty action be precluded where the jury finds that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Sheldon v. Unit Rig & Equipment Co., 797 F.2d 883, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27470 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1090, 107 S. Ct. 1300, 94 L. Ed. 2d 156, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 734 (U.S. 1987).

Section not applicable to warranty, strict liability. —

The supreme court will not, in response to certified questions from a federal district court, engage in comprehensive judicial legislating in order to extend the application of this section from its express and intended arena of negligence into warranty and strict liability proceedings by either statutory interpretation or common-law extension. Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, 806 P.2d 834, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1991).

The decision in Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1991) makes it clear that a reduction of damages in proportion to plaintiff's fault is not appropriate in non-negligence causes of action based on strict liability. Zierke v. Agri-Systems, 992 F.2d 276, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 10185 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1993).

Subsection (d) should not be read in isolation to apply comparative fault to actions other than negligence but should be read in the context of the entire section to forbid its application altogether to actions premised on theories of strict liability or breach of warranty. Schneider Nat'l v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1992).

Inapplicable to contract and fiduciary breach claims. —

This section does not bar plaintiff's recovery in a legal malpractice action based on claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, even though the jury apportioned fault in the following manner: plaintiff, 35%; defendant, 35%; and a third party, 30%. Furthermore, neither this comparative negligence statute nor any other principle of Wyoming law requires that the plaintiff's recovery be reduced by his percentage of fault. Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1993), limited, Long-Russell v. Hampe, 2002 WY 16, 39 P.3d 1015, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 2002), overruled in part, Dockter v. Lozano, 2020 WY 119, 472 P.3d 362, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2020).

Inapplicable to contract claim not involving personal injury or property damage. —

Comparative fault under this section was inapplicable in a breach of contract action brought by a city against a contractor based on failure to provide motors that conformed to specifications. Strong Constr., Inc. v. City of Torrington, 2011 WY 82, 255 P.3d 903, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (Wyo. 2011).

Absolute defense of contributory negligence was abolished when legislature adopted comparative negligence statute. Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1995).

Purpose of comparative negligence. —

The doctrine of comparative negligence is designed to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence bar. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1981).

Comparative fault applied. —

Evidence was sufficient to support the finding by the jury of total damages of $150,000, and where the jury attributed 45% of the fault to plaintiff for her injuries, pursuant to the comparative fault statute, defendant's liability was reduced to 55% of the $ 150,000. Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1997).

Judgment dismissing negligence action because under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(b) the plaintiff was more than 50 percent at fault was affirmed, and trial court properly allowed defendant to amend its admissions under W.R.C.P. 36. If the errant admission had been allowed to stand, it would have essentially decided the breach-of-duty element of the action. Permitting the parties to present evidence on the fault issue advanced the search for the truth and promoted a correct legal ruling. Hodges v. Lewis & Lewis, Inc., 2005 WY 134, 121 P.3d 138, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2005).

In a slip and fall case, court did not err in an instruction that defendants were all responsible for their own percentage of fault, because the jury determined plaintiff's fault to be sixty-five percent, and as long as his fault was greater than fifty percent, he was not entitled to recovery. Parrish v. Groathouse Constr., Inc., 2006 WY 33, 130 P.3d 502, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2006).

In a passenger's personal injury suit against a driver, it was not error to admit evidence of the passenger's comparative fault or to instruct the jury on comparative fault because a jury could reasonably find the passenger at fault for not determining how drunk the driver was before asking the driver for a ride, since the passenger knew the driver had likely been drinking alcohol. Wise v. Ludlow, 2015 WY 43, 346 P.3d 1, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 2015), reh'g denied, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. Apr. 7, 2015).

This section applies only in cases where plaintiff is contributorily negligent. Palmeno v. Cashen, 627 P.2d 163, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 327 (Wyo. 1981).

Where the court ruled that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the plaintiff that would justify the plaintiff's inclusion on the verdict form as an actor as to whom negligence could be attributed, there was no error in its failure to give an instruction pursuant to this section. Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1990), overruled, Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2004).

Evidence of seat belt usage. —

Court found no inconsistency in the application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1402(f), which prohibits the introduction of evidence of seat belt nonuse, in light of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 ; the legislature had the right to limit the application of comparative fault principles to negligence actions arising out of automobile accidents involving unbelted occupants. Huff v. Shumate, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27781 (D. Wyo. 2004).

Learned intermediary doctrine. —

In a prescription drug user's product liability suit against the drug manufacturer, the court determined that the Wyoming comparative fault statute has no effect on the application of the learned intermediary doctrine. Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26105 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2003).

Section inapplicable to contractual recovery for legal malpractice. —

Wyoming's comparative negligence statute did not bar plaintiff's recovery in a legal malpractice action based on claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, nor did it require that plaintiff's recovery be reduced by his percentage of fault. Jackson State Bank v. King, 992 F.2d 256, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 9116 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1993).

As this section is based on the comparative negligence statute of Wisconsin, the construction given the Wisconsin statute by the highest court of that state at the time the Wyoming legislature enacted the statute is also presumed to have been adopted. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 287 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 627 P.2d 163, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 341 (Wyo. 1981), overruled in part, ABC Builders v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 365 (Wyo. 1981).

But subsection (a) and § 1-1-114 cannot stand together. —

There is enough of a conflict between § 1-1-114 and subsection (a) of this section that the two cannot stand together. Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 315 (Wyo. 1977).

Thus, subsection (a) is amended. —

The Wyoming legislature, in enacting § 1-1-114 , clearly intended for its provisions to apply to comparative negligence actions and amended subsection (a) to the extent that in such actions the jury shall be informed by the trial court on the effect of its percentage findings, as those findings affect the outcome of the case, and particularly the damage issue. Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 315 (Wyo. 1977).

The legislature, by its enactment of § 1-1-114 , manifested a clear intendment for its provisions to apply without exception to all personal injury actions, including those cases brought by “any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property.” Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 315 (Wyo. 1977).

Emotional distress damages. —

Subsection (a) does not evidence an intent by the legislature to permit emotional distress damages in connection with an injury to property. Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 1997).

Section distinguished from “pure” form of comparative negligence statute. —

This section is a “not as great as” form of comparative negligence statute (similar to an “equal to or greater than” form), as distinguished from the “pure” form, under which the plaintiff may recover part of his damages if defendant's negligence is established regardless of the percentage of his own contributory negligence, such percentage being used only to determine the amount by which plaintiff's damages are reduced. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1979).

Effect of equal fault. —

Under this section a defendant who caused 50% of a loss pays nothing, and a plaintiff who was responsible for just 50% of his own damage recovers nothing. Jones v. Sheridan County Sch. Dist., 731 P.2d 29, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 383 (Wyo. 1987).

Effect of willful, wanton misconduct by defendant. —

This section does not mandate reduction of damages on the basis of comparative negligence of the plaintiff if defendant's misconduct is willful and wanton. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1979); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1981).

Willful conduct. —

Pursuant to the statute, willful conduct must be compared with negligence. Board of County Comm'rs v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 2000).

In an action arising from an automobile accident which occurred when a fleeing suspect crashed into the plaintiffs' vehicle just after it cleared a roadblock set up to stop the fleeing suspect, the court erred in not including the fleeing suspect on the verdict form as an actor whose conduct would be compared by the jury in allocating fault. Board of County Comm'rs v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 2000).

Under case law, a joint tortfeasor who acts willfully is properly included as an actor on a verdict form in a negligence case so that the jury can compare the defendant's negligence and the non-party actor's willful conduct and apportion liability. Erdelyi v. Lott, 2014 WY 48, 326 P.3d 165, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2014).

Trial court errs in reducing damages for the intentional tort of outrageous conduct on the basis of comparative negligence. Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 29178 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1983).

Ordinary negligence of both parties compared before addressing culpable negligence. —

When an action involves both ordinary negligence of the plaintiff and defendant and culpable negligence of the defendant, the jury must apportion the ordinary negligence of the parties before addressing the defendant's culpable negligence. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1981).

Assumption of risk is form of contributory negligence in Wyoming. Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 458 (Wyo. 1979).

There is no distinction between the doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1981).

Assumption of risk not absolute defense. —

Assumption of risk, as a form of contributory negligence, is not an absolute defense to a negligence action but is a basis for apportionment of fault. Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 472 (Wyo. 1979); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1981); Walters v. Grand Teton Crest Outfitters, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1442, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15892 (D. Wyo. 1992).

In examining finding of assumption of risk there must be found substantial evidence from which a jury could find the existence of a risk or danger to one entering the site of the injury and from which it could find that a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would not take the risk or subject himself to the danger. Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 472 (Wyo. 1979).

Last clear chance doctrine unnecessary. —

The apportionment of damages under this section makes unnecessary the doctrine of last clear chance. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1979).

Mere use of an obviously dangerous product does not constitute negligence, as a matter of law; in order for contributory negligence to be found, there must be evidence that care commensurate with the risks involved was not used. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1983).

Negligence of all participants to be considered. —

In a comparative negligence case, the jury must consider the negligence of not only the parties but also of all the participants in the transaction which produced the injuries sued upon. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 287 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 627 P.2d 163, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 341 (Wyo. 1981), overruled in part, ABC Builders v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 365 (Wyo. 1981).

Multiple plaintiffs or claims. —

Particular care should be taken when multiple plaintiffs or claims are present, so that only the negligence that proximately causes any particular injury is considered by the jury when apportioning fault as to that injury. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 287 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 627 P.2d 163, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 341 (Wyo. 1981), overruled in part, ABC Builders v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 365 (Wyo. 1981).

In cases involving multiple defendants, plaintiff's negligence is compared with that of each individual defendant. If the plaintiff's negligence is greater than an individual defendant's negligence, there can be no recovery from that defendant. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 287 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 627 P.2d 163, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 341 (Wyo. 1981), overruled in part, ABC Builders v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 365 (Wyo. 1981).

In a negligence action against multiple defendants, the plaintiff's percentage of fault, as ascertained by the jury, had to be converted to a dollar figure and subtracted from the verdict. The trial court then had to further reduce the verdict by the total dollar amount of all settlements as revealed in the settling instruments of all the settling tortfeasors. As there remained nonsettling tortfeasors, each of whose percentage of fault, as ascertained by the jury, exceeded that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was allowed to proceed against all of these tortfeasors, jointly and severally, for the full amount of the judgment. Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 521 (Wyo. 1985).

Loss-of-consortium award to wife reduced by percentage of fault attributed to husband. —

The common-law rule that a wife was not entitled to damages for loss of consortium had its genesis in a social, economic and political climate entirely foreign to Wyoming in 1986. Hence, a woman will no longer be denied a cause of action for loss of consortium. However, the trial court should reduce any award to the wife by the percentage of fault attributed to her husband, as a cause of action for loss of consortium is a derivative action, and the causal negligence of the injured spouse limits recovery of the claiming spouse under this section. Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 513 (Wyo. 1986).

When subsection (b) applicable. —

The request and the finding under subsection (c) are to be made only in connection with actions to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property. Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 458 (Wyo. 1979).

Determination of damages and negligence required in jury trial. —

The language in subsection (c)(ii) following “special findings of fact” was not intended to apply to paragraph (ii) only, but to apply equally to paragraphs (i) and (ii). Thus in a jury trial, as in a trial before the court without a jury, there must be a determination of the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 287 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 627 P.2d 163, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 341 (Wyo. 1981), overruled in part, ABC Builders v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 365 (Wyo. 1981); Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 647 P.2d 58, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 348 (Wyo. 1982).

Error to give unsupported instruction. —

It is prejudicial error to give instructions on contributory negligence if the defense of such negligence is not supported by substantial evidence. The same rule would apply with respect to the negligence of a plaintiff in a comparative negligence context. Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Wyo. 1978).

But negligence usually question for jury. —

Ordinarily, the question of negligence in a collision involving leading and following vehicles is a question of fact for the jury, but the exception to that rule is recognized when the evidence is undisputed and subject to but one reasonable inference, or is legally insufficient to raise a question of fact for the jury. Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Wyo. 1978).

Duty to make the comparison of negligence as required by this section is for the fact finder if the evidence can result in a difference of opinion. Cline v. Sawyer, 618 P.2d 144, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 314 (Wyo. 1980).

The factual resolution of the degrees of negligence and contributory negligence belongs to the province of the jury, not the court. Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 21320 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1982).

Settlements disclosure not required. —

This section does not require the disclosure of settlements to satisfy the jury's understanding of the consequences of attributing fault under state comparative negligence law. Wardell v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1992).

The phrase “consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault” in subsection (c)(i)(B) does not encompass informing the jury of the fact and amount of settlement with other entities no longer parties to the litigation. This statutory language requires only that the jury be told that if the plaintiff's percentage of negligence is more than 50%, the plaintiff will not recover, and that a defendant who is liable will only pay in proportion to his percentage of fault. Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1993).

Nor disclosure of immunity of decedent's employer. —

In a wrongful death action against an electric company, arising out of an electrocution of a highway worker, an instruction describing Wyoming's comparative fault scheme and alerting the jury that if it found the decedent over 50% at fault then the plaintiff would recover nothing, was adequate for compliance with subsection (c)(i)(B); there was no plain error in failing to inform the jury that the decedent's employer (the highway department) was immune from suit. Furman v. Rural Elec. Co., 869 P.2d 136, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1994).

Jury should be advised which actors have “available pockets.” —

In view of subsection (b), it would seem that either through the verdict form or the statement of the issues the jury should be advised as to who among the actors had “available pockets” and who was included only for determination of the computation of responsibility. Burton v. Fisher Controls Co., 723 P.2d 1214, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 596 (Wyo. 1986).

But mistaken reference to actor as “defendant” in verdict form not prejudicially confusing. —

In action for damages resulting from an accident, the use of “defendant” rather than “actor” in the verdict form to refer to parties who had settled or who otherwise were not actual litigants during the trial did not cause prejudicial confusion. Burton v. Fisher Controls Co., 723 P.2d 1214, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 596 (Wyo. 1986).

Defendant in default may assert failure of evidence. —

In hearing to determine damages following defendant's default, defendant could properly assert that no damages were caused by collision between his vehicle and plaintiff's; even though defaulted defendant was charged with one hundred percent of the fault, no recovery could be had if no damages were caused by his fault. Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 186 (Wyo. 1998).

Defendant in default must be permitted to address issue of relative fault. —

The issue of fault, as distinguished from liability, is no longer separable from the issue of damages; the two are intertwined to the extent that one cannot defend on the issue of damages without being permitted to participate with respect to the issue of fault. The defendant in default must be permitted to participate in proceedings which address the issue of relative fault because it is a significant factor in any damage award. McGarvin-Moberly Constr. Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1995).

Because, by our comparative negligence statute, the question of fault is inextricably intertwined with the amount of damages that may be awarded against any defendant, a defendant who makes an appearance after entry of default, but before default judgment could participate fully in the discovery process and on issues concerning proximate cause and damages. McGarvin-Moberly Constr. Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1995).

Summary judgment is poor device for deciding questions of comparative negligence. What is contemplated by the comparative negligence statute is that the totality of the causal negligence present in the case will be examined to determine the contribution each party has made to that whole. It is the “respective contributions to the result” which determine who is most negligent, and by how much. Connett v. Fremont County Sch. Dist., 581 P.2d 1097, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 1978).

Recreation Safety Act limits provider's duty. —

The Recreation Safety Act, §§ 1-1-121 to 1-1-123 , is intended to limit the duty which a provider owes to a participant, and is not affected by the adoption of this section. Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1995).

Law concerning duty to remove or warn of obvious or known danger unchanged. —

Since the law of this state is to the effect that there is no duty to remove or warn of an obvious danger or one that is known to the person injured, no change was accomplished in that law by the adoption of comparative negligence. Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 321 (Wyo. 1982).

“Known and obvious danger” rule did not negate city's duty to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition and in reasonably good repair, but the obvious danger of the streets resulting from accumulations of loose gravel after resurfacing could be considered by the trier of fact to determine the plaintiff's percentage of negligence. O'Donnell v. Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 462 (Wyo. 1985) (but see Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 321 (Wyo. 1982), annotated above).

Liability resulting from accumulation of ice, snow. —

Absent the legislature's express intention to abrogate the natural accumulation and obvious-danger rules, the rules survive the adoption of comparative negligence. Therefore, the rule remains that an owner or occupier of premises will not be liable for injuries resulting from a slip and fall on a natural accumulation of ice and snow. Eiselein v. K-Mart, 868 P.2d 893, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1994).

An owner or occupier of premises owes a duty to prevent injuries resulting from an unnatural accumulation of ice which will be found if the owner or occupier creates an accumulation of water in a manner substantially different in volume or course than would naturally have occurred. Eiselein v. K-Mart, 868 P.2d 893, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1994).

Even the most ably constructed and carefully maintained parking lot will probably contain minor indentions in which naturally occurring water can accumulate and freeze. Naturally occurring water which naturally concentrates in such a lot is still considered a natural accumulation, for which the owner or occupier is not liable. Eiselein v. K-Mart, 868 P.2d 893, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1994).

Presumption against retrospective effect. —

There appears no language in this section to indicate it should apply retrospectively, and indeed, there exists a violent presumption that it will not. Fraley v. Worthington, 64 F.R.D. 726, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6180 (D. Wyo. 1974) (decided under former § 1-1-110 (right to contribution among tort feasors)).

Applicability of percentage-of-fault provisions. —

Subsection (d) (liability for percent of fault) does not apply to those causes of action accruing before June 11, 1986. Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux & Assocs., 773 P.2d 153, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1989).

Subsections (b) through (d) come into play only if the case is tried by a jury or to the court and a party requests, or the court on its own makes, a determination of the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. Melehes v. Wilson, 774 P.2d 573, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1989), reh'g denied, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. June 12, 1989).

Under 1986 version of statute, district court erred in requiring defendant to pay 100 percent of plaintiffs' damages, where plaintiffs were found to be free from negligence and defendant was determined to be only 50 percent at fault. Anderson Highway Signs & Supply, Inc. v. Close, 6 P.3d 123, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2000).

Indemnity available on strict liability and breach of warranty grounds. —

This section, in the absence of an express contract of indemnity, provides negligent actors a right of indemnity against another actor who was liable for the third party's injuries on strict liability or breach of warranty grounds. Schneider Nat'l v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1992).

New trial required. —

Erroneous instruction regarding comparative fault principles as applied to claims based on strict liability and breach of warranty, along with misleading closing remarks regarding apportionment, required a new trial where after the verdict was returned, certain questions regarding the applicability of this section were certified to the Wyoming supreme court. Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 973 F.2d 869, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19548 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1992).

Right of contribution is dependent upon existence of statute and involves joint tortfeasors. Northern Utils. Div. of K N Energy v. Evansville, 822 P.2d 829, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1991) (decided under prior law).

Judgment entered without credit from settling defendants. —

A nonsettling defendant, found to be 100% at fault, was not entitled to credit the amount the plaintiff received from settling defendants against the judgment he had to pay. Credit need not be given, because the amount of judgment for which each defendant is liable is always limited by the percentage of fault assigned to that defendant. Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1993).

Where the jury found that defendant was ninety percent at fault, if defendant were given credit for co-defendant's settlement, she would not be required to satisfy her full responsibility to the plaintiffs, and that result would not be consistent with this section or with the court's decision in Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1993).Rudy v. Bossard, 997 P.2d 480, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2000).

Contractor/subcontractor claims. —

In an action against a contractor for injuries to employees of its subcontractor arising from an accident during work on a construction project, the contractor had a viable contractual indemnity claim against the subcontractor which was not barred by application of the comparative fault statute. Diamond Surface v. Cleveland, 963 P.2d 996, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1998).

Legislature may change approach. —

While it is true that the legislature, in enacting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 , generally espoused the comparative negligence approach for negligence actions, that is not to say that the legislature is precluded from subsequently limiting, or even rejecting altogether, the application of comparative negligence in negligence actions arising out of particular circumstances. Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp., 2003 WY 77, 71 P.3d 717, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. July 24, 2003).

Applied in

Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 300 (Wyo. 1983); Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 526 (Wyo. 1985); Cities Serv. Co. v. Northern Prod. Co., 705 P.2d 321, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 543 (Wyo. 1985); Stroup v. Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 205 (Wyo. 1999).

Quoted in

Martinez v. Union P. R. Co., 714 F.2d 1028, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 24763 (10th Cir. 1983); Harmon v. Town of Afton, 745 P.2d 889, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 543 (Wyo. 1987); Glenn v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2011 WY 126, 262 P.3d 177, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Sept. 9, 2011).

Stated in

Lake v. D & L Langley Trucking, Inc., 2010 WY 75, 233 P.3d 589, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (June 9, 2010).

Cited in

Sanders v. Pitner, 508 P.2d 602, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1973); Hendrickson v. Heinze, 541 P.2d 1133, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1975); Venes v. Heck, 642 F.2d 380, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19846 (10th Cir. 1981); Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 547 (Wyo. 1986); Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745 P.2d 883, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 541 (Wyo. 1987); Radosevich v. Board of County Comm'rs, 776 P.2d 747, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1989); Seaton v. State Highway Comm'n, Dist. No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 236 (Wyo. 1989); Horowitz v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 992 F.2d 279, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 10201 (10th Cir. 1993); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Colley, 871 P.2d 191, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1994); Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11925 (10th Cir. 2000); Beavis v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 2001 WY 32, 20 P.3d 508, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 2001); Beckwith v. Weber, 2012 WY 62, — P.3d —, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Apr. 25, 2012); Carson v. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 WY 42, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Mar 31, 2014).

Law reviews. —

See comment, “Comparative Negligence in Wyoming,” VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 597 (1973).

See article, “Comparative Negligence Problems with the Special Verdict: Informing the Jury of the Legal Effects of Their Answers,” X Land & Water L. Rev. 199 (1975).

For article, “The Wyoming Uninsured Motorist Act: A Regulatory Reconciliation of Mandated Coverages with the Standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement,” see XI Land & Water L. Rev. 213 (1976).

For comment, “Landowner Liability Under the Wyoming Recreational Use Statute,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 649 (1980).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — Constitutionality of Wyoming's Co-employee Immunity Statute under Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution.Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 355 (1983).

For case note, “Torts — Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule. Primary or Secondary Assumption of Risk? Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 321 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 373 (1983).

For article, “Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability — A Marriage of Necessity,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1983).

For comment, “Comparative Negligence Practice in Wyoming,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 713 (1983).

For case note, “Torts — The Obvious Danger Rule — A Qualified Adoption of Secondary Assumption of Risk Analysis. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 462 (Wyo. 1985),” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 251 (1986).

For case note, “Torts — Should a Plaintiff's Intervening Act Be An Absolute Defense Under Comparative Negligence? Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 517 (Wyo. 1985),” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 591 (1986).

For case note, “Torts — Wyoming Finds an Appropriate Case to Adopt Strict Products Liability. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 511 (Wyo. 1986),” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 223 (1987).

For article, “Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability — The Marriage Revisited,” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 455 (1987).

For article, “Lender Liability in Wyoming,” see XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. 707 (1991).

For casenote, “Res Ipsa Loquitur — The Wyoming Supreme Court Relaxes the Elements a Plaintiff Needs to Establish Before Invoking the Doctrine. Goedert v. Newcastle Equipment Co., 802 P.2d 157, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1990),” see XXVII Land & Water L. Rev. 207 (1992).

For comment, “The Availability of Indemnity in Tort Actions Involving the Wyoming Comparative Negligence Statute—Multiple Parties Cause Multiple Problems,” see XXIX Land & Water L. Rev. 253 (1994).

For article, “Wyoming's New Comparative Fault Statute,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 509 (1996)

For casenote, “Torts-I may be liable but it's not my fault!: The Wyoming Supreme Court rules that defaulting defendants can now challenge fault. McGarvin-Moberly Constr. Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1995),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1996)

For article, “The Law of Indemnity in Wyoming: Unravelling the Confusion,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 811 (1996).

For article, “Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act: An Update, see XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. 249 (1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Application of last clear chance doctrine in comparative negligence case, 59 ALR2d 1261.

Comparative negligence rule where misconduct of 3 or more persons is involved, 8 ALR3d 722.

Comment note on the doctrine of comparative negligence and its relation to the doctrine of contributory negligence, 32 ALR3d 463.

Retrospective application of state statute substituting rule of comparative negligence for that of contributory negligence, 37 ALR3d 1438.

Contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors on basis of relative fault, 53 ALR3d 184.

Modern development of comparative negligence doctrine having applicability to negligence actions generally, 78 ALR3d 339.

Judicial adoption of comparative negligence doctrine as applicable retrospectively, 78 ALR3d 421.

Choice of law as to application of comparative negligence doctrine, 86 ALR3d 1206.

Liability of one negligently causing fire for injuries sustained by person other than firefighter, 91 ALR3d 1202.

Automobile occupant's failure to use seat belts as contributory negligence, 92 ALR3d 9.

Liability for injuries in connection with revolving door on nonresidential premises, 93 ALR3d 132.

Nonuse of automobile seat belts as evidence of comparative negligence, 95 ALR3d 239.

Evidence of automobile passenger's blood-alcohol level as admissible in support of defense that passenger was contributorily negligent or assumed risk of automobile accident, 5 ALR4th 1194.

Applicability of comparative negligence doctrine to actions based on strict liability in tort, 9 ALR4th 633.

Effect of adoption of comparative negligence rules on assumption of risk, 16 ALR4th 700.

Effect of plaintiff's comparative negligence in reducing punitive damages recoverable, 27 ALR4th 318.

Liability of operator of grocery store to invitee slipping on spilled liquid or semiliquid substance, 24 ALR4th 696.

Modern trends as to contributory negligence of children, 32 ALR4th 56.

Patient's failure to reveal medical history to physician as contributory negligence or assumption of risk in defense of malpractice action, 33 ALR4th 790.

Tennis club's liability for tennis player's injuries, 52 ALR4th 1253.

Liability to one struck by golf ball, 53 ALR4th 282.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning electrical generation and transmission equipment, 55 ALR4th 1010.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning lawnmowers, 55 ALR4th 1062.

Tort liability for window washer's injury or death, 69 ALR4th 207.

Comparative fault: calculation of net recovery by applying percentage of plaintiff's fault before or after subtracting amount of settlement by less than all joint tortfeasors, 71 ALR4th 1108.

Right of tortfeasor initially causing injury to recover indemnity or contribution from medical attendant aggravating injury or causing new injury in course of treatment, 72 ALR4th 231.

Products liability: contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense in negligence action based on failure to provide safety device for product causing injury, 75 ALR4th 443.

Products liability: contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense in action for strict liability or breach of warranty based on failure to provide safety device for product causing injury, 75 ALR4th 538.

Rescue doctrine: applicability and application of comparative negligence principles, 75 ALR4th 875.

Modern status of rule imputing motor vehicle driver's negligence to passenger on joint venture theory, 3 ALR5th 1.

Comparative Negligence: Judgment allocating fault in action against less than all potential defendants as precluding subsequent action against parties not sued in original action, 4 ALR5th 753.

Joint and several liability of physicians whose independent negligence in treatment of patient causes indivisible injury, 9 ALR5th 746.

Sufficiency of evidence to raise last clear chance doctrine in cases of automobile collision with pedestrian or bicyclist—modern cases, 9 ALR5th 826.

Applicability of comparative negligence principles to intentional torts, 18 ALR5th 525.

Applicability of comparative negligence doctrine to actions based on negligent misrepresentation, 22 ALR5th 464.

Liability for injuries to, or death of, water-skiers, 34 ALR5th 77.

Products liability: defective motor vehicle air bag systems, 39 ALR5th 267.

Recovery for emotional distress based on fear of contracting HIV or AIDS, 59 ALR5th 535.

Comparative negligence of driver as defense to enhanced injury, crashworthiness, or second collision claim, 69 ALR5th 625.

Liability of owner, operator, or other parties, for personal injuries allegedly resulting from snow or ice on premises of parking lot, 74 ALR5th 49.

Comparative negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of risk in action against owner of store, office, or similar place of business by invitee falling on tracked-in water or snow, 83 ALR5th 589.

Contributory negligence or comparative negligence based on failure of patient to follow instructions as defense in action against physician or surgeon for medical malpractice, 84 ALR5th 619.

Products liability: Liability of manufacturer, supplier, or seller of passenger or freight elevator, hoist, or elevator component for injury or damage resulting from alleged defect in elevator or component, 117 ALR5th 267.

Applicability of maritime law rule of comparative negligence to strict products liability cases brought in admiralty, 74 ALR Fed 316.

§§ 1-1-110 through 1-1-113. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1986, ch. 24, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to liability of each defendant for proportional amount of damages, see § 1-1-109 .

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1973, ch. 67, § 1 and Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1, related to contributions among joint tortfeasors, and releases or covenants not to sue.

§ 1-1-114. Pleading of damages.

In all cases the court shall inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict.

History. Laws 1976, ch. 10, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-7.7; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2009, ch. 168, § 101.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, deleted the former first and second sentences which related to dollar amounts for damages.

The former first two sentences of this section are unconstitutional in that they prescribe the content of pleadings, a procedural function, thereby infringing upon the constitutional and inherent power of the supreme court to make rules. White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 341 (Wyo. 1984) (decided under prior law).

Wyoming legislature intended for provisions of this section to apply to incidents occurring only on or after May 28, 1976, its effective date. Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 315 (Wyo. 1977) (decided under prior law).

Mere reading of language in this section evinces clear and definite meaning. Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 315 (Wyo. 1977) (decided under prior law); Buttrey Food Stores Div. v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 323 (Wyo. 1980) (decided under prior law).

Use of phrase, “In all cases,” in this section, permitting advice to the jury concerning the effect of the percentage findings in its verdict under the comparative negligence statute, conveys a clear and commonly understood meaning which can be applied in a fashion consistent with the other provisions of the statute. The phrase relates to a class of civil actions which are characterized as personal injury or wrongful death and refers without exception to all cases which fall into this class. Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 315 (Wyo. 1977) (decided under prior law).

The legislature, by its enactment of this section, manifested a clear intendment for its provisions to apply without exception to all personal injury actions, including those cases brought by “any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property.” Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 315 (Wyo. 1977) (decided under prior law).

There is enough conflict between this section and § 1-1-109 that the two cannot stand together. Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 315 (Wyo. 1977) (decided under prior law).

Thus § 1-1-109 is amended. —

The Wyoming legislature, in enacting this section, clearly intended for its provisions to apply to comparative negligence actions and amended § 1-1-109 to the extent that in such actions the jury shall be informed by the trial court on the effect of its percentage findings, as those findings affect the outcome of the case, and particularly the damage issue. Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 315 (Wyo. 1977) (decided under prior law).

Quoted in

Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1977).

Cited in

Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1993).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability — A Marriage of Necessity,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1983).

For article, “Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 159 (1985).

For article, “Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability — The Marriage Revisited,” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 455 (1987).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect of anticipated inflation on damages for future losses — modern cases, 21 ALR4th 21.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for noneconomic loss caused by personal injury or death of parent, 61 ALR4th 251.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for noneconomic loss caused by personal injury or death of spouse, 61 ALR4th 309.

Plaintiff's rights to punitive or multiple damages when cause of action renders both available, 2 ALR5th 449.

Wrongful death damages for loss of expectancy of inheritance from decedent, 42 ALR5th 465.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for injuries to trunk or torso, or internal injuries, 48 ALR5th 129.

Valuing damages in personal injury actions awarded for gratuitously rendered nursing and medical care, 49 ALR5th 685.

§ 1-1-115. Civil liability for unpaid checks.

  1. Any person who issues a check which is  not paid because the check has been dishonored for any reason has  thirty (30) days following the date of a written demand mailed to  the drawer of the check by United States postal service certificate  of mailing at the address shown on the check or his last known address  or personally served pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,  to pay to the holder of the check the amount of the check and a collection  fee not to exceed thirty dollars ($30.00). The demand shall state  that the drawer is required to pay the value of the check and the  collection fee demanded and shall state the collection fee provided  for in this section.
  2. Any person who fails to pay the amount  of the check and the collection fee as set forth in subsection (a)  of this section within thirty (30) days following the date of a written  demand, mailed to or served on the drawer in accordance with subsection  (a) of this section, is liable to the holder of the check for three  (3) times the amount of the check, but in no case less than one hundred  dollars ($100.00), a collection fee of thirty dollars ($30.00), and  court costs.
  3. In extraordinary cases, including cases  in which the court determines that the party who wrote the check has  raised dilatory or bad faith defenses, the court may award the prevailing  party reasonable attorney fees.
  4. Nothing in this section shall prevent  the criminal prosecution of the person who issues the check. However,  any payment made by the defendant to a victim pursuant to an order  for restitution entered in a criminal case pursuant to W.S. 7-9-101 through 7-9-112 or 6-3-704(b), shall be set off against any judgment in favor of the  victim in a civil action brought under this section arising out of  the same facts or event.
  5. A cause of action under this section may  be brought in small claims court, if the amount of the demand does  not exceed the jurisdiction of that court, or in any other appropriate  court.
  6. As used in this section, “check,” “drawee,”  “drawer” and “issue” have the same meaning as defined in W.S. 6-3-701 .

History. Laws 1984, ch. 28, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1997, ch. 201, § 1; 1999, ch. 53, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to criminal penalties for check fraud, see § 6-3-701 et seq.

Cited in

Mt. Rushmore Broad., Inc. v. Statewide Collections, 2002 WY 39, 42 P.3d 478, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2002); Dave v. Valdez, 2012 WY 59, 275 P.3d 485, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Apr. 13, 2012).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Collecting Debt in Wyoming: The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as a Trap for the Unwary,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 731 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and application of provision of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act relating to validation of debts (15 U.S.C. § 1692g), 150 ALR Fed 101.

§ 1-1-116. Civil liability for theft of services.

  1. Notwithstanding any criminal penalties which may apply, an owner or operator of a franchised or otherwise duly licensed provider of services may bring a civil action to enjoin or restrain any violation of W.S. 6-3-402 when the violation involves theft of services and may in the same action seek damages from the person violating W.S. 6-3-402 .
  2. In order to maintain an action for injunctive  relief under this section, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to  show actual damages or the threat of actual damages.
  3. As used in this section, “services” has the same meaning as specified in W.S. 6-3-401(a)(v).

History. Laws 1985, ch. 149, § 1; 2020, ch. 90, § 1.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a) substituted “violation of W.S. 6-3-402 when the violation involves theft of services” for “violation of W.S. 6-3-408 ” and “violating W.S. 6-3-402 ” for “violating W.S. 6-3-408 ”; and in (c) substituted “W.S. 6-3-401(a)(v)” for “W.S. 6-3-408” and made a stylistic change.

§ 1-1-117. Affidavits of noninvolvement.

  1. In any action, whether in tort, contract  or otherwise, in which the plaintiff seeks damages, a party may, in  lieu of answering or otherwise pleading, file an affidavit certifying  that he was not directly or indirectly involved in the occurrence  or occurrences alleged in the action. If an affidavit is filed, the  court shall order the dismissal of the claim against the certifying  party, except as provided for in subsection (b) of this section. The  affidavit shall be filed within the time required for filing an answer,  if no answer is filed; and, in any event, at least twenty (20) days  prior to trial. Any order of dismissal based on the affidavit shall  not be entered within ten (10) days after the affidavit is filed.
  2. Any party may oppose the dismissal or  move to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the certifying  party, provided he can show that the certifying party was directly  or indirectly involved in the occurrence or occurrences alleged in  the action. After the filing of an affidavit under this section, the  party opposing the dismissal may have discovery with respect to the  involvement or noninvolvement of the party filing the affidavit, provided  the discovery is completed within sixty (60) days of the filing of  the affidavit.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 5, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1986, ch. 48, § 1, also enacted a § 1-1-117 . See § 1-1-118 and notes thereto.

Dismissal. —

When plaintiff was rear-ended by a drunk, eighteen-year-old driver, she recovered compensatory damages in an action against the driver and was made whole; thus, her second suit against the driver's parents and uncle was barred. The district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the uncle from the case after he filed an affidavit of non-involvement under this section. Fuentes v. Jednat, 2010 WY 40, 229 P.3d 949, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2010).

Applied in

Chasson v. Community Action of Laramie County, Inc., 768 P.2d 572, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1989).

§ 1-1-118. Amateur rodeos; liability for injuries; consent to participate.

  1. No public school or nonprofit organization  sponsoring an amateur rodeo is liable for injuries suffered by a contestant  as a result of his voluntary participation in a rodeo event except  for injuries caused by the willful, wanton or reckless act of the  sponsoring organization or its employees.
  2. A minor shall be deemed to be a voluntary  participant for purposes of this section if he has signed a written  consent to participate in the rodeo event and the consent is also  signed by one (1) of the minor’s parents or by his legal guardian.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 48, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-1-117 .

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1986, ch. 48, § 1, enacted this section as § 1-1-117 , but since a previous act (Laws 1986, ch. 5, § 1) had already enacted a § 1-1-117 , this section has been redesignated as § 1-1-118 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity, construction and effect of provision releasing school from liability for injuries to students caused by interscholastic and other extracurricular activities, 85 ALR4th 344.

§ 1-1-119. Release or covenant not to sue.

When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one (1) of two (2) or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 137, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

Former § 1-1-113 related to the same subject matter as this section, before being repealed in 1986. See, also, § 1-1-109 and notes thereto.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Release of one joint tortfeasor as discharging liability of others under uniform contribution among tortfeasors act and other statutes expressly governing effect of release, 6 ALR5th 883.

Validity and effect of “Mary Carter” or similar agreement setting maximum liability of one cotortfeasor and providing for reduction or extinguishment thereof relative to recovery against nonagreeing cotortfeasor, 22 ALR5th 483.

§ 1-1-120. Persons rendering emergency assistance exempt from civil liability.

  1. Any person licensed as a physician and  surgeon under the laws of the state of Wyoming, or any other person,  who in good faith renders emergency care or assistance without compensation  at the place of an emergency or accident, is not liable for any civil  damages for acts or omissions in good faith.
  2. Persons or organizations operating volunteer  ambulances or rescue vehicles supported by public or private funds,  staffed by unpaid volunteers, and which make no charge, or charge  an incidental service or user fee, for services rendered during medical  emergencies, and the unpaid volunteers who staff ambulances and rescue  vehicles are not liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions  in good faith in furnishing emergency medical services. This immunity  does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross negligence  or willful or wanton misconduct. For purposes of this section, “unpaid  volunteers” means persons who either receive incidental remuneration  on a per call basis or receive no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)  annually for volunteer ambulance and rescue activities. The immunity  provided by this subsection shall extend to a physician while serving  in his capacity as medical director of any ambulance service, to hospitals  and hospital employees for activities directly related to providing  clinical training as part of an emergency medical service class approved  by the department of health, and to students while participating in  emergency medical services training approved by the department of  health. If an unpaid volunteer’s, medical director’s, hospital’s or  trainee’s acts or omissions are subject to the provisions of the Wyoming  Governmental Claims Act, immunity under this section is waived to  the extent of the maximum liability provided under W.S. 1-39-118 .
  3. Any person who provides assistance or  advice without compensation other than reimbursement of out-of-pocket  expenses in mitigating or attempting to mitigate the effects of an  actual or threatened discharge of hazardous materials, or in preventing,  cleaning up or disposing of or in attempting to prevent, clean up  or dispose of any discharge of hazardous materials, is not liable  for any civil damages for acts or omissions in good faith in providing  the assistance or advice. This immunity does not apply to acts or  omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.  As used in this subsection:
    1. “Discharge” includes leakage, seepage  or other release;
    2. “Hazardous materials” includes all materials  and substances which are now or hereafter designated or defined as  hazardous by any state or federal law or by the regulations of any  state or federal government agency.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 42, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 33-343.1; Laws 1977, ch. 135, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 33-26-143; Rev. W.S. 1977, § 1-1-119 ; Laws 1987, ch. 79, § 2; ch. 229, § 1; 2003, ch. 113, § 1; 2005, ch. 112, § 1.

Cross references. —

For the Wyoming Emergency Medical Services Act, see chapter 36 of title 33.

The 2005 amendment in (b), inserted the fourth sentence, and in the last sentence added “medical director's, hospital's or trainee's” after “If an unpaid volunteer’s.”

Laws 2005, ch. 112, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 24, 2005.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1987, ch. 79, § 2, effective May 22, 1987, renumbered former § 33-26-143 as § 1-1-119 , effective May 22, 1987. Since Laws 1987, ch. 137, § 1, also added a § 1-1-119 , this section has been renumbered as § 1-1-120 .

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. —

See §§ 1-39-101 , 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Care or assistance must be rendered “without compensation.” —

It will be noted the legislature has here recognized the right of a doctor or other person to have immunity when he renders emergency care or assistance in good faith, only if it is rendered “without compensation.” Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of Am. v. Yepsen, 469 P.2d 409, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1970).

Quoted in

Ellsworth Bros. v. Crook, 406 P.2d 520, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1965).

Cited in

Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1979).

Law reviews. —

For case note on Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America v. Yepsen, 469 P.2d 409, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1970), see VII Land & Water L. Rev. 717 (1972).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction of “good Samaritan” statute excusing from civil liability one rendering care in emergency, 39 ALR3d 222.

Liability of otherwise uninvolved person for harm resulting from refusal to telephone, or to allow another to telephone, for emergency or police help, 37 ALR4th 1196.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported, 68 ALR4th 14.

Construction and application of “good samaritan” statutes, 68 ALR4th 294.

Rescue doctrine: liability of one who negligently causes motor vehicle accident for injuries to person subsequently attempting to rescue persons or property, 73 ALR4th 737.

Application of “firemen's rule” to bar recovery by emergency medical personnel injured in responding to, or at scene of, emergency, 89 ALR4th 1079.

Duty of retail establishment, or its employees, to assist patron choking on food, 2 ALR5th 966.

Infliction of emotional distress: toxic exposure, 6 ALR5th 162.

Modern status of sudden emergency doctrine, 10 ALR5th 680.

Common-law strict liability in tort of prior landowner or lessee to subsequent owner for contamination of land with hazardous waste resulting from prior owner's or lessee's abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity, 13 ALR5th 600.

Liability for negligence of ambulance attendants, emergency medical technicians and the like, rendering emergency medical care outside hospital, 16 ALR5th 605.

Valuing damages in personal injury actions awarded for gratuitously rendered nursing and medical care, 49 ALR5th 685.

What constitutes “hazardous waste” subject to regulation under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act USCS §§ 6901 et seq.)?, 135 ALR Fed 197.

§ 1-1-121. Recreation Safety Act; short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the “Recreation Safety Act”.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 228, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1989, ch. 262, § 1, also enacted a § 1-1-121 , but it was renumbered as § 1-1-124 .

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “[t]his act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-1-122(a)(vi).

Nature of risk. —

Whether the risk of being thrown was an inherent risk of riding a mule, in light of proffered evidence that the mule in question was likely to throw a rider, was a question of fact. Walters v. Grand Teton Crest Outfitters, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1442, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15892 (D. Wyo. 1992).

Duty to provide instruction. —

Once a skier asked a resort employee how to exit the advanced terrain park area without “taking” any of the features, the resort had a duty to provide her with appropriate instructions, which might have included a specific warning to beware of the drop into the half-pipe at the end of the catwalk that provided an exit out of the terrain park area, and the trial court erred when it found that the risk of falling into the half-pipe was an inherent risk of the skier's alpine skiing and that therefore the resort did not owe her a duty under the Recreation Safety Act. Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 392 F.3d 1145, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25807 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2004).

Application to ski lifts. —

In answer to two certified questions, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act (RSA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-121 et seq., does not apply to a cause of action based upon the design or manufacture of sport or recreational equipment or products or safety equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or recreational opportunity. That exemption does not exclude the operation of a ski lift by a recreational provider from the protections of the RSA. Muller v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort, 2006 WY 100, 139 P.3d 1162, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2006).

Inherent risk. —

Wyoming Recreational Safety Act (RSA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-121 et seq., is, in part, a products liability statute that is unambiguous on its face and the RSA does not necessarily exclude a ski lift from its protections. The inherent risks of skiing are not limited only to the act of skiing, and an injury suffered while boarding a ski lift (with skis stowed on the exterior of the lift) may be an inherent risk of skiing. Muller v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort, 2006 WY 100, 139 P.3d 1162, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2006).

Finding that the horse rider's injuries were the result of an inherent risk of horseback riding as defined by the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-121 to 1-1-123 , was proper because the legislature defined the term “inherent risk” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i)and the district court did not err in declining to further define the legislature's language. The district court properly instructed the jury and provided an appropriate form of special verdict for the jury's use. Beckwith v. Weber, 2012 WY 62, 277 P.3d 713, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2012).

Cited in

Peterson v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 989 P.2d 113, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 1-1-122. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Inherent risk” with regard to any sport  or recreational opportunity means those dangers or conditions which  are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport  or recreational opportunity;
    2. “Provider” means any person or governmental entity which for profit or otherwise, offers or conducts a sport or recreational opportunity or regulates an interscholastic sport or recreational opportunity. This act does not apply to a cause of action based upon the design or manufacture of sport or recreational equipment or products or safety equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or recreational opportunity;
    3. “Sport or recreational opportunity” means commonly understood sporting activities including baseball, softball, football, soccer, basketball, swimming, hockey, wrestling, cheerleading, rodeo, dude ranching, nordic or alpine skiing and other alpine sports, snowboarding, mountain climbing, outdoor education programs, river floating, hunting, fishing, backcountry trips, horseback riding and any other equine activity, snowmobiling and similar recreational opportunities and includes the use of private lands for vehicle parking and land access related to the sport or recreational opportunity. “Sport or recreational opportunity” does not include skiing in a ski area as defined by the Ski Safety Act;
    4. “Equine activity” means:
      1. Equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances  or parades that involve any or all breeds of equines;
      2. Any of the equine disciplines;
      3. Equine training or teaching activities,  or both;
      4. Boarding equines;
      5. Riding, inspecting or evaluating an equine  belonging to another, whether or not the owner has received some monetary  consideration or other thing of value for the use of the equine or  is permitting a prospective purchaser of the equine to ride, inspect  or evaluate the equine;
      6. Rides, trips, hunts or other equine activities  of any type however informal or impromptu;
      7. Day use rental riding, riding associated  with a dude ranch or riding associated with outfitted pack trips;  and
      8. Placing or replacing horseshoes on an  equine.
    5. Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 78, § 2.
    6. “This act” means W.S. 1-1-121 through 1-1-123 .

History. Laws 1989, ch. 228, § 1; 1993, ch. 162, § 1; 1996, ch. 78, §§ 1, 2; 2009, ch. 47, § 1; 2011, ch. 91, § 1; 2015, ch. 178, § 1; 2017, ch. 192, § 2.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added “and includes the use of private lands for vehicle parking and land access related to the sport or recreational opportunity” in (a)(iii).

The 2011 amendment, in (a)(iii), substituted “and other alpine sports, snowboarding, mountain climbing, outdoor education programs” for “mountain climbing.”.

Laws 2011, ch. 91, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2011.

The 2017 amendment , effective July 1, 2017, added the last sentence of (a)(iii) and made a related change.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

“Inherent risk.” —

River rafting operator failed to produce any admissible evidence that bumping heads with another passenger was an inherent risk in river rafting, and therefore operator was not entitled to summary judgment under Recreation Safety Act. Madsen v. Wyoming River Trips, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77 (D. Wyo. 1999).

What an “inherent risk” means in any given set of circumstances is a variable that the Wyoming Legislature included in the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act (RSA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-121 et seq., by design. Muller v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort, 2006 WY 100, 139 P.3d 1162, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2006).

Finding that the horse rider's injuries were the result of an inherent risk of horseback riding as defined by the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-121 to 1-1-123 , was proper because the legislature defined the term “inherent risk” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i)and the district court did not err in declining to further define the legislature's language. The district court properly instructed the jury and provided an appropriate form of special verdict for the jury's use. Beckwith v. Weber, 2012 WY 62, 277 P.3d 713, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2012).

Wyoming Recreation Safety Act (WRSA)-- which does not exempt or identify specific inherent risks--did not conflict with the types of risks or injuries listed in a release signed by the plaintiff when she rented ski equipment; the release at issue did not incorporate by reference the WRSA. Cunningham v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 673 Fed. Appx. 841, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22608 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2270, 198 L. Ed. 2d 714, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3994 (U.S. 2017).

If a motion for summary judgment is filed, a trial court must scrutinize the facts brought forward by the parties with great care, and if the court can say that, given that evidence, this is an “inherent risk” of a recreational activity under this section and the guidance of Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-44-103 (3.5), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-15-10, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52 with regards to skiing and reasonable minds cannot differ about that, then summary judgment is appropriate. If the risk is an inherent one, then the provider has no duty to eliminate, alter, or control it; however, if reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not the risk was one inherent to the recreational activity, then summary judgment is not appropriate and the answer to the question must be assigned to the jury (or other fact finder). Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp. v. Rohrman, 2006 WY 156, 150 P.3d 167, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 2006).

Equine activity injuries. —

Although the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act's definition of an equine activity extends to injuries received while evaluating the horse in contemplation of a sale, it plainly does not extend to a breach of warranty action arising from the sale. Keller v. Merrick, 955 P.2d 876, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1998).

Company that provided guided horseback rides in a wilderness area of a national park was entitled to summary judgment on a negligence claim by the estate of a horseback rider because any risks associated with spooked, runaway horses, including the rider’s fall from the horse, were inherent in the activity of horseback riding, and, pursuant to the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, the company owed no duty to protect the rider from the inherent risks of horseback riding. Dullmaier v. Xanterra Parks & Resorts, 883 F.3d 1278, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 4792 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2018).

Wyoming Recreation Safety Act does not establish public policy creating a public duty for equine providers. Street v. Darwin Ranch, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17646 (D. Wyo. 1999).

Slipping saddle due to loose cinch was an inherent risk of horseback riding under Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, and therefore horse provider had no duty to protect customers against it. Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11925 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2000).

Because horseback riding is considered a sport or recreational opportunity under this section, a provider was not required to eliminate, alter, or control the inherent risks associated with horseback riding, and any person who chose to take part in the provider's horseback riding services assumed all inherent risks which were associated with that activity. As a result, a rider could not sue the provider for negligence if the damage, injury or death alleged in her complaint was the result of an inherent risk of horseback riding. Kovnat v. Xanterra Parks & Resorts, 770 F.3d 949, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 20140 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2014).

Application to Ski Lifts. —

Wyoming Recreational Safety Act (RSA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-121 et seq., is, in part, a products liability statute that is unambiguous on its face and the RSA does not necessarily exclude a ski lift from its protections. The inherent risks of skiing are not limited only to the act of skiing, and an injury suffered while boarding a ski lift (with skis stowed on the exterior of the lift) may be an inherent risk of skiing. Muller v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort, 2006 WY 100, 139 P.3d 1162, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2006).

Application to golf. —

Genuine questions of material fact existed as to whether the operator of a golf course increased the risk that a spectator would be struck by a golf ball, beyond the risk inherent in the sport, when the course's agent instructed a player to tee off when golfers and spectators were on and around the green and the player expressed concern that he could hit the group ahead of him. Creel v. L & L, 2012 WY 124, 287 P.3d 729, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 2012).

Quoted in

Carden v. Kelly, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20055 (D. Wyo. 2001); Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 392 F.3d 1145, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25807 (2004); Halvorson v. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2015 WY 18, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Feb. 4, 2015).

Stated in

Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

Estate of Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7946 (D. Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act: An Update,” see XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. 249 (1998).

§ 1-1-123. Assumption of risk.

  1. Any person who takes part in any sport  or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport  or recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown,  and is legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death  to himself or other persons or property that results from the inherent  risks in that sport or recreational opportunity.
  2. A provider of any sport or recreational  opportunity is not required to eliminate, alter or control the inherent  risks within the particular sport or recreational opportunity.
  3. Actions based upon negligence of the provider  wherein the damage, injury or death is not the result of an inherent  risk of the sport or recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant  to W.S. 1-1-109 .
  4. The assumption of risk provisions in subsections  (a) through (c) of this section apply irrespective of the age of the  person assuming the risk.
  5. This act shall not apply to skiing in a ski area as defined by the Ski Safety Act.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 228, § 1; 1996, ch. 78, § 1; 2011, ch. 91, § 1; 2017, ch. 192, § 2.

The 2011 amendment, added (d).

Laws 2011, ch. 91, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2011.

The 2017 amendment , effective July 1, 2017, added (e).

Scope. —

This act bars recovery for “inherent risks” only, not for all risks. Walters v. Grand Teton Crest Outfitters, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1442, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15892 (D. Wyo. 1992).

Summary judgment. —

If a motion for summary judgment is filed, a trial court must scrutinize the facts brought forward by the parties with great care, and if the court can say that, given that evidence, this is an “inherent risk” of a recreational activity under this section and the guidance of Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-44-103 (3.5), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-15-10, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52 with regards to skiing and reasonable minds cannot differ about that, then summary judgment is appropriate. If the risk is an inherent one, then the provider has no duty to eliminate, alter, or control it; however, if reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not the risk was one inherent to the recreational activity, then summary judgment is not appropriate and the answer to the question must be assigned to the jury (or other fact finder). Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp. v. Rohrman, 2006 WY 156, 150 P.3d 167, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 2006).

In reviewing summary judgment granted for a ski resort on the basis of the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, the court defined the risk at the level of specificity supported by the record, and asked: Whether encountering boulders, and gaps between them, in changing snow conditions in an off-piste area of a ski resort was an “inherent risk” of alpine skiing? Roberts v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 884 F.3d 967, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5552 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2018).

Action against a ski resort was properly decided on the basis of summary judgment because boulders and the gaps of widely varying dimensions between them—at times exposed to the elements and at others lightly covered by fresh snow—were an inherent risk of skiing an off-piste run. The provider did nothing to exacerbate the inherent risk posed by the hazard. Roberts v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 884 F.3d 967, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5552 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2018).

District court properly granted summary judgment in favor of a horseback riding services provider with respect to a rider's claim that her fall and resulting injuries were the result of her saddle cinch being too loose because, when the cinching of a saddle can be too tight or too loose, and the cinching is not done with scientific precision, it is inherent in the sport that the provider at times will cinch too loosely or too tightly. Kovnat v. Xanterra Parks & Resorts, 770 F.3d 949, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 20140 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2014).

Equine activity injuries. —

Although the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act's definition of an equine activity extends to injuries received while evaluating the horse in contemplation of a sale, it plainly does not extend to a breach of warranty action arising from the sale. Keller v. Merrick, 955 P.2d 876, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1998).

Slipping saddle due to loose cinch was an inherent risk of horseback riding under Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, and therefore horse provider had no duty to protect customers against it. Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11925 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2000).

In an action to recover for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while on a day trip trail horseback ride in a national forest with the defendants, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment where (1) the plaintiff was a very inexperienced rider and was injured when her horse stumbled, fell, and rolled over her, and (2) the plaintiff presented an affidavit from a master riding instructor who opined that the defendants' failure to properly educate the plaintiff on how to handle the horse, their failure to match the plaintiff to the horse, combined with taking the plaintiff up a steep rocky slope with no marked trail created a risk of the horse slipping and falling that was not inherent in day trip trail horseback riding. Carden v. Kelly, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20055 (D. Wyo. 2001).

Ski lifts. —

In answer to two certified questions, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act (RSA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-121 et seq., does not apply to a cause of action based upon the design or manufacture of sport or recreational equipment or products or safety equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or recreational opportunity. That exemption does not exclude the operation of a ski lift by a recreational provider from the protections of the RSA. Muller v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort, 2006 WY 100, 139 P.3d 1162, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2006).

Preemption by federal law not shown. —

In an action to recover for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while on a day trip trail horseback ride in a national forest with the defendants, the court found that the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act (§§ 1-1-121 through 1-1-123 ) was not preempted by Forest Service regulations and the defendants' special-use permit. Carden v. Kelly, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20055 (D. Wyo. 2001).

River rafting. —

River rafting operator failed to produce any admissible evidence that bumping heads with another passenger was an inherent risk in river rafting, and therefore operator was not entitled to summary judgment under Recreation Safety Act. Madsen v. Wyoming River Trips, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77 (D. Wyo. 1999).

Wyoming Recreation Safety Act does not establish public policy creating a public duty for equine providers. Street v. Darwin Ranch, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17646 (D. Wyo. 1999).

Snowboarding injuries. —

Under the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, there were no issues of material fact about the duty in a snowboarding fatality case when the question was whether the loss of control by an experienced 16 year old snowboarder, familiar with a man-made tabletop jump, was an inherent risk when the jump was altered the night before the accident, tested the morning of the accident, used throughout the day, and located in a specially designed roped-off terrain park containing other man-made jumps and warning signs on national forest land. Estate of Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7946 (D. Wyo. 2002).

Once a skier asked a resort employee how to exit the advanced terrain park area without “taking” any of the features, the resort had a duty to provide her with appropriate instructions, which might have included a specific warning to beware of the drop into the half-pipe at the end of the catwalk that provided an exit out of the terrain park area, and the trial court erred when it found that the risk of falling into the half-pipe was an inherent risk of the skier's alpine skiing and that therefore the resort did not owe her a duty under the Recreation Safety Act. Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 392 F.3d 1145, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25807 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2004).

Provisions not affected by comparative negligence statute. —

The Recreation Safety Act, § 1-1-121 to this section, is intended to limit the duty which a provider owes to a participant, and is not affected by the adoption of the comparative negligence statute, § 1-1-109 .Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1995).

Inherent risk. —

Finding that the horse rider's injuries were the result of an inherent risk of horseback riding as defined by the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-121 to 1-1-123 , was proper because the legislature defined the term “inherent risk” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i)and the district court did not err in declining to further define the legislature's language. The district court properly instructed the jury and provided an appropriate form of special verdict for the jury's use. Beckwith v. Weber, 2012 WY 62, 277 P.3d 713, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2012).

In an action against a ski resort, conclusory expert testimony was not itself enough to preclude summary judgment under the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act. The expert’s testimony contained no analysis about the inherent risk of encountering covered boulders on off-piste trails, or whether this hazard was an inherent risk of a trail littered with trees and other natural obstacles. Roberts v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 884 F.3d 967, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5552 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2018).

Jury decides whether risk inherent to sport. —

Whether a particular risk is inherent to a sport or recreational opportunity, when genuine issues of material fact exist, is properly presented to the jury. Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1995).

Application to golf. —

Genuine questions of material fact existed as to whether the operator of a golf course increased the risk that a spectator would be struck by a golf ball, beyond the risk inherent in the sport, when the course's agent instructed a player to tee off when golfers and spectators were on and around the green and the player expressed concern that he could hit the group ahead of him. Creel v. L & L, 2012 WY 124, 287 P.3d 729, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 2012).

Quoted in

Halvorson v. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2015 WY 18, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Feb. 4, 2015).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act: An Update,” see XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. 249 (1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability for injuries to, or death of, water-skiers, 34 ALR5th 77.

§ 1-1-123.1. Ski Safety Act; short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the “Ski Safety Act.”

History. Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2017.

§ 1-1-123.2. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Freestyle terrain” includes terrain parks and terrain features such as jumps, rails, half pipes and other constructed and natural features found in terrain parks;
    2. “Inherent risk” with regard to skiing in a ski area means those dangers or conditions which are part of the sport of skiing, including:
      1. Changing weather conditions;
      2. Falling or surface snow conditions, whether natural or man-made, as they exist or change;
      3. Surface or subsurface conditions including bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, cliffs, extreme terrain, trees or other natural objects;
      4. Collisions or impacts with natural objects such as the objects specified in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph including encounters with wildlife;
      5. Impact with ski lift towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, water pipes or other man-made structures and their components subject to W.S. 1-1-123 .3(k);
      6. Variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of ski trail or feature design, or snowmaking or grooming operations such as roads, freestyle terrain, jumps and catwalks or other terrain modifications; and
      7. Collisions with other skiers.
    3. “Ski area” means the ski trails and other places within the boundary of a ski area under the control of a ski area operator and administered as a single enterprise within the state;
    4. “Ski area operator” means a person having the responsibility for the operations of a ski area and the owners, partners and members, managers, employees, agents, volunteers, board members, representatives, affiliates and assigns of the person. “Ski area operator” includes an agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof;
    5. “Ski area vehicle” means a vehicle used in the operation and maintenance of a ski area which is owned by or under the direction and control of the ski area operator such as a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, snow grooming vehicle, sled and other similar vehicle;
    6. “Ski lift” means a chairlift, gondola, tramway, cable car or other aerial lift and any rope tow, conveyor, t-bar, j-bar, handle tow or other surface lift used by a ski area operator to transport skiers;
    7. “Ski trail” means a trail, slope, run, freestyle terrain, competition terrain, tree skiing area, tubing park area or other area at or near a ski area designated by the ski area operator to be used by skiers for the purpose of skiing;
    8. “Skier” means a person who is using a ski area for the purpose of skiing;
    9. “Skiing” includes sliding downhill or jumping on snow or ice on skis or a toboggan, sled, tube, snowbike, snowboard or other device;
    10. “This act” means W.S. 1-1-123 .1 through 1-1-123.5.

History. Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2017.

§ 1-1-123.3. Duties of ski area operators; signs for trails; notices to skiers; duties of skiers.

  1. A ski area operator shall post and maintain a sign visible to skiers at or near the beginning of a trail that depicts and explains the degree of difficulty of the trail relative to each individual ski area.
  2. A ski area operator shall post and maintain a sign at or near the loading area of a ski lift that states the relative degree of difficulty of the trails serviced by the lift.
  3. A ski area operator shall print a warning notice on all ski lift tickets and season passes and shall post and maintain a warning sign at or near the ski area’s ticket sales building that is no smaller than six (6) square feet in size and states the following:

    WARNING. Under Wyoming law, a skier assumes the inherent risks of skiing and is legally responsible for damage, injury or death to person or property that results from the inherent risks of skiing.

  4. A ski area operator shall post and maintain a warning sign at the ski area’s ticket sales building that is no smaller than six (6) square feet in size and that notifies the skier of the duties imposed on the skier by this act and the limitations on liability provided in this act.
  5. A ski area operator shall:
    1. Mark or identify on trail maps the ski area boundaries;
    2. Post a sign notifying the public if a trail or portion thereof is closed at the identified entrance of the trail or portion thereof. A trail without an identified entrance may be closed with ropes or fences.
  6. A ski area operator shall have no duty arising out of the operator’s status as a ski area operator to a skier skiing beyond a ski area boundary marked or identified as required by subsection (e) of this section or skiing in an area posted as closed or otherwise fenced or roped off in accordance with subsection (e) of this section.
  7. A ski area operator shall post signs in the ski area or on trail maps warning skiers of encounters with ski area vehicles.
  8. A ski area operator shall equip ski area vehicles with a light and a fluorescent flag mounted at least five (5) feet above the bottom of the vehicle’s tracks visible at any time the vehicle is moving on or in the vicinity of a ski trail.
  9. A ski area operator shall annually inspect, operate and maintain ski lifts in accordance with the most current version of the American National Standards Institute B-77.1 aerial tramway standards. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a ski lift shall not be deemed a common carrier.
  10. A ski area operator shall mark hydrants, water pipes and all other man-made structures on slopes and trails which are not visible to skiers under conditions of ordinary visibility from a distance of one hundred (100) feet and shall cover the structures with a shock-absorbent material typically used by ski area operators for the purpose. Any type of marker shall be sufficient under this subsection including but not limited to wooden poles, flags or signs if the marker is visible from a distance of one hundred (100) feet and if the marker itself does not constitute a serious hazard to skiers. As used in this subsection “man-made structures” shall not include variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations, including but not limited to roads, catwalks and other terrain modifications.
  11. A skier shall have the responsibility to observe all posted information and other signs and warnings posted in accordance with this act and shall be presumed to have seen and understood all signs, warnings and other information posted in accordance with this act.

History. Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2017.

§ 1-1-123.4. Assumption of risks; limitations on actions.

  1. A skier expressly accepts and assumes the inherent risks of skiing and is legally responsible for damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results from the inherent risks in skiing.
  2. A skier may not make any claim against or recover from any ski area operator for injury resulting from any inherent risk of skiing.
  3. A skier is not precluded under this act from suing another skier for any damage, injury or death to person or property that results from the other skiers’ acts or omissions. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the risk of collision with other skiers is not an inherent risk nor a risk assumed by a skier in an action by a skier against another skier.

History. Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2017.

§ 1-1-123.5. Negligence; civil actions.

  1. A violation by any person or ski area operator of any provision of this act shall, to the extent the violation causes damage, injury or death to person or property, constitute evidence of negligence on the part of the person or ski area operator violating this act.
  2. Actions based upon negligence of a person or ski area operator wherein the damage, injury or death is not the result of an inherent risk of skiing shall be preserved pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109 .

History. Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2017, ch. 192, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2017.

§ 1-1-124. Pretrial screening.

  1. The supreme court may promulgate rules  to provide a screening procedure to expedite the prelitigation resolution  of claims arising from any alleged act, error or omission in the rendering  of licensed or certified professional or health care services.
  2. The screening procedure authorized by  this section shall be designed to reduce the burden of malpractice  cases on the state judicial system and to encourage the prompt resolution  of nonmeritorious claims. The expedited procedure may include the  creation of professional review panels to review claims and to determine:
    1. Whether there is substantial evidence  that the acts complained of occurred, constituted malpractice and  resulted in injury to the claimant; and
    2. A recommended award if requested by the  parties.
  3. The supreme court shall annually report  to the joint judiciary interim committee the costs of operating the  expedited screening procedure and shall submit a recommendation for  the proration and assessment of costs among the professions subject  to the pretrial screening procedure.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 262, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-1-121 ; 2008, ch. 44, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to professional review panel, see § 9-2-1801 et seq. and notes thereto.

The 2008 amendment, substituted “joint judiciary interim committee” for “legislature” in (c).

Laws 2008, ch. 44, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 5, 2008.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1989, ch. 228, § 1, and ch. 262, § 1, both enacted a § 1-1-121 ; the section enacted by ch. 262, § 1, was therefore changed to § 1-1-124 .

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2008, ch. 44, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Stated in

State ex rel. Wyo. Ass'n of Consulting Eng'rs & Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1990).

§ 1-1-125. Immunity for volunteers; volunteer firefighters; search and rescue.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Compensation” does not include actual  and necessary expenses that are incurred by a volunteer in connection with the services that the volunteer performs for a nonprofit organization and that are reimbursed to the volunteer or otherwise paid nor does  it include any incidental personal privileges received by volunteers  for their services;
    2. “Nonprofit organization” means those nonprofit  organizations exempt from federal income tax pursuant to section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code;
    3. “Volunteer” means:
      1. An officer, director, trustee or other  person who performs services for a nonprofit organization but does  not receive compensation, either directly or indirectly, for those  services;
      2. A volunteer firefighter who performs  services for a volunteer fire department under W.S. 35-9-616(a)(ix) whether or not the firefighter receives compensation or a pension;
      3. An individual engaged in search and rescue operations  under a county sheriff’s coordination pursuant to W.S. 18-3-609(a)(iii) or supervision pursuant to W.S. 19-16-101 whether or not the individual receives compensation.
  2. Except as  provided in subsection (c) of this section, a volunteer who provides  services or performs duties on behalf of a nonprofit organization, a volunteer fire department or a sheriff  as part of a search and rescue operation is personally  immune from civil liability for any act or omission resulting in damage  or injury if at the time of the act or omission:
    1. The person  was acting within the scope of his duties as a volunteer for the nonprofit  organization, volunteer fire department or a sheriff as part of a search and rescue operation; and
    2. The act or omission did not constitute  willful or wanton misconduct or gross negligence.
  3. This section does not grant immunity to  any person causing damage as a result of the negligent operation of  a motor vehicle.
  4. In any suit  against a nonprofit organization, a volunteer fire  department or a sheriff as part of a search  and rescue operation for civil damages based upon the  negligent act or omission of a volunteer, proof of the act or omission  shall be sufficient to establish the responsibility of the organization, department or sheriff under  the doctrine of respondeat superior, notwithstanding the immunity  granted to the volunteer with respect to any act or omission included under subsection (b) of this section.

History. Laws 1992, ch. 32, § 1; 1997, ch. 155, § 1; 2017, ch. 113, § 1; ch. 172, § 1.

The 2017 amendments. — The first 2017 amendment, by ch. 113, § 1, redesignated former (a)(iii) as (a)(iii) through (a)(iii)(B); in (a)(iii)(B), substituted “ W.S. 35-9-601 -(h)” for “35-9-616(a)(ix)” and “the firefighter” for “he”; added (a)(iii)(C); in (b) and (b)(i), added “or a sheriff as part of a search and rescue operation”; in (d), added “or a sheriff as part of a search and rescue operation”, substituted “department or sheriff under the doctrine” for “department under the doctrine”; and made related changes.

Laws 2017, ch. 113, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Art. 4, § 8, Wy. Const. Approved Mar. 2, 2017.

The second 2017 amendment, by ch. 172, § 1, effective July 1, 2017, near the end substituted “35-9-616(a)(ix)” for “35-9-601(h).”

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

Internal Revenue Code. —

Section 501(c) of the federal Internal Revenue Code, referred to in subsection (a)(ii), appears as 26 U.S.C. § 501(c).

Prospective application. —

Laws 1992, ch. 32, § 2, provides: “The provisions of this act shall apply only to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1992.”

§ 1-1-126. Civil liability for stalking.

  1. A person who is the victim of stalking  as defined by W.S. 6-2-506 may maintain a civil action against an individual who  engages in a course of conduct that is prohibited under W.S. 6-2-506 for damages incurred by the victim as a result of that  conduct. The aggrieved party may also seek and be awarded exemplary  damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action.
  2. A civil action may be maintained under  this section whether or not the individual who is alleged to have  engaged in a course of conduct prohibited under W.S. 6-2-506 has been charged or convicted under W.S. 6-2-506 for the alleged crime.
  3. Neither the pendency nor the termination  of a civil action under this section shall prevent the criminal prosecution  of a person who violates W.S. 6-2-506 .

History. Laws 1993, ch. 92, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

As to the enactment of another § 1-1-126 by Laws 1993, ch. 61, § 1, see § 1-1-127 and notes thereto.

Evidence sufficient to establish stalking. —

In an action by the owner of a funeral home against the county coroner and the owner of another funeral home alleging a protected property interest in a rotation policy established by the coroner, the evidence was sufficient to support a jury verdict on the cross-claim of the defendant funeral home owner for stalking where (1) the plaintiff told the defendant that he would ruin him financially and in terms of his reputation, (2) after the defendant opened his funeral home, the plaintiff followed him around the community at least once a month, (3) the defendant, who also operated an ambulance service, testified that the plaintiff often drove to the scene of an ambulance call and watched him, and (4) the jury saw a remarkably complex diagram created by the plaintiff with the defendant's name in the middle surrounded by the names of 14 other members of the community. Veile v. Martinson, 258 F.3d 1180, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17097 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2001).

Cited in

Hoblyn v. Johnson, 2002 WY 152, 55 P.3d 1219, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 2002); Dave v. Valdez, 2012 WY 59, 275 P.3d 485, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Apr. 13, 2012).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Utilizing the Tools: Successfully Implementing the Stalking Statutes,” see XXXV Land & Water L. Rev. 521 (2000).

§ 1-1-127. Civil liability for shoplifting.

  1. A person over ten (10) years of age who violates W.S. 6-3-402 with regard to property offered for sale by a wholesale or retail store is civilly liable to the merchant of the property in an amount consisting of:
    1. Return of the property in original condition  or actual damages equal to the full marked or listed price of the  property; plus
    2. A civil liability of twice the amount  of the full marked or listed price of the property but not less than  fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00);  plus
    3. Reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.
  2. If an unemancipated minor violates W.S. 6-3-402 with regard to property offered for sale by a wholesale or retail store, the parents or guardian of the child shall be civilly liable as provided by subsection (a) of this section, provided liability under this subsection shall not apply to foster parents, to parents whose parental custody and control of the child have been terminated by court order prior to the violation or to any governmental or private agency that has been appointed guardian for the minor child pursuant to court order or action of the department of family services. Civil liability under this subsection is not subject to the limitation on liability provided by W.S. 14-2-203 or any other law that limits the liability of parents for damages caused by an unemancipated minor.
  3. A conviction or a plea of guilty to a violation of W.S. 6-3-402 with regard to property offered for sale by a wholesale or retail store is not a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil suit under this section.
  4. An action to recover damages and any civil  liability under this section may be brought in small claims court  if the total amount of the demand for damages and any civil liability  does not exceed the jurisdiction of that court, or in any other appropriate  court.
  5. In order to recover damages and any civil  liability under this act, the merchant of the property shall also  notify law enforcement officials.

History. Laws 1993, ch. 61, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-1-126 ; 2020, ch. 90, § 1.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in the introductory language of (a), (b), and (c) substituted “W.S. 6-3-402 with regard to property offered for sale by a wholesale or retail store” for “W.S. 6-3-404(a) or (b).”

Editor's notes. —

This section was enacted as § 1-1-126 but, since another § 1-1-126 had been enacted by Laws 1993, ch. 92, § 1, this section has been redesignated as § 1-1-127 .

Measure of damages. —

Amount of restitution order under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(b) related to larceny conviction was inappropriate because the actual pecuniary damages suffered by the store under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iii) was the sale price of the clothes taken, not the full retail value, as that was the fair market value on the date of the loss; the store was entitled to the damages it could recover in a civil action under this section. Solis v. State, 2010 WY 165, 245 P.3d 323, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Wyo. 2010).

§ 1-1-128. Civil liability for theft of identity.

  1. A person who is the victim of theft of  identity as defined by W.S. 6-3-901 may maintain a civil action to enjoin or restrain any  violation of W.S. 6-3-901 and may in the same action seek damages from the person  violating W.S. 6-3-901. In order to maintain an action for injunctive relief  under this section, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show  actual damages or the threat of actual damages. A prevailing party  in an action under this section may recover court costs and reasonable  attorney fees.
  2. A conviction or plea of guilty is not  a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action under this section.
  3. A cause of action for theft of identity  is not deemed to have accrued until the wrongdoer is discovered.
  4. Nothing in this section shall prevent  the criminal prosecution of a person for theft of identity. However,  any payment made by the defendant to a victim pursuant to an order  for restitution entered in a criminal case pursuant to W.S. 6-3-901 and 7-9-101 through 7-9-115 , shall be set off against any judgment in favor of the  victim in a civil action brought under this section arising out of  the same facts or event.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 175, § 1.

Cited in

Dave v. Valdez, 2012 WY 59, 275 P.3d 485, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Apr. 13, 2012).

§ 1-1-129. Immunity from liability for volunteer health care professionals; insurance required of nonprofit health care facility.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Health care professional” means any of  the following who provide medical or dental diagnosis, care or treatment:
      1. Physicians, osteopaths and physician assistants  licensed to practice as provided in title 33, chapter 26 of the Wyoming  statutes;
      2. All nurses licensed to practice as provided  in title 33, chapter 21 of the Wyoming statutes;
      3. Pharmacists licensed to practice as provided  in title 33, chapter 24 of the Wyoming statutes;
      4. Dentists and dental hygienists licensed  to practice as provided in title 33, chapter 15 of the Wyoming statutes;  and
      5. Optometrists licensed to practice as provided  in title 33, chapter 23 of the Wyoming statutes.
    2. “Low income uninsured person” means a  person who meets all of the following requirements:
      1. The person’s income is not greater than  two hundred percent (200%) of the current poverty line as defined  by federal law, as amended;
      2. The person currently is not receiving  medical, disability or other assistance under any federal or state  government health care program; and
      3. Either of the following applies:
        1. The person is not a policyholder, certificate  holder, insured, contract holder, subscriber, enrollee, member, beneficiary  or other covered individual under a health insurance or health care  policy, contract or plan; or
        2. The person is a policyholder, certificate  holder, insured, contract holder, subscriber, enrollee, member, beneficiary  or other covered individual under a health insurance or health care  policy, contract or plan, but the insurer, policy, contract or plan  denies coverage or is the subject of insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings  in any jurisdiction.
    3. “Nonprofit health care facility” means  a charitable nonprofit corporation or association organized and operated  under title 17, chapters 19 or 22 of the Wyoming statutes, or any  charitable organization not organized and not operated for profit,  that exclusively provides health care services to low income uninsured  persons, except that “health care facility” does not include a hospital,  including a swing bed hospital, facility or center defined under W.S. 35-2-901 or any other medical facility that is operated for profit;
    4. “Operation” means an invasive procedure  that involves cutting or otherwise infiltrating human tissue by mechanical  means, including surgery, laser surgery, ionizing radiation, therapeutic  ultrasound or the removal of intraocular foreign bodies. “Operation”  does not include the administration of medication by injection, unless  the injection is administered in conjunction with a procedure infiltrating  human tissue by mechanical means other than the administration of  medicine by injection;
    5. “Tort action” means a civil action for  damages for injury, death or loss to person or property other than  a civil action for damages for a breach of contract or another agreement  between persons or government entities;
    6. “Volunteer” means an individual who provides  any medical, dental or other health care related diagnosis, care or  treatment without the expectation of receiving, and without receipt  of, any compensation or other form of remuneration from a low income  uninsured person, another person on behalf of a low income uninsured  person, any health care facility or any other person or government  entity.
  2. Subject to subsection (d) of this section,  a health care professional who is a volunteer and complies with subsection  (c) of this section is not liable in damages to any person or government  entity in a tort or other civil action, including an action on a medical,  dental or other health-related claim for injury, death or loss to  person or property that allegedly arises from an action or omission  of the volunteer in the provision at a nonprofit health care facility  to a low income uninsured person of medical, dental or other health-related  diagnosis, care or treatment, including the provision of samples of  medicine and other medical or dental products, unless the action or  omission constitutes willful or wanton misconduct.
  3. To qualify for immunity under subsection  (b) of this section, a volunteer health care professional shall do  all of the following prior to the initial diagnosis, care or treatment:
    1. Inform the person of the provisions of  this section either personally or by means of a writing so stating  provided by the nonprofit health care facility and signed by the person,  or by another individual on behalf of, and in the presence of, the  person; and
    2. Obtain the informed consent of the person  and a written waiver, signed by the person, or by another individual  on behalf of, and in the presence of, the person.
  4. Except as provided in this subsection,  the immunities provided by subsection (b) of this section are not  available to a volunteer health care professional, if at the time  of an alleged injury, death or loss to person or property, the volunteer  health care professional involved was performing an operation or delivering  a baby. This subsection does not apply to a volunteer health care  professional who provides diagnosis, care or treatment or performs  an operation or delivers a baby when necessary to preserve the life  of a person in a medical emergency.
  5. In order for the immunity under subsection  (b) of this section to apply and before the rendering of any services  by the volunteer health care professional at the nonprofit health  care facility, there must be a written agreement between the volunteer  health care professional and the facility pursuant to which the volunteer  health care professional will provide medical, dental or health care  related diagnosis, care or treatment under the control of the facility  to patients of the facility.
  6. A nonprofit health care facility entering  into a written agreement under subsection (e) of this section shall  maintain liability coverage of not less than one million dollars ($1,000,000.00)  per occurrence, except that no such coverage shall be required to  be maintained by the facility if such coverage is maintained by all  volunteer health care professionals rendering services at the facility.  A nonprofit health care facility shall be liable for the negligent  acts of a volunteer health care professional providing diagnosis,  care or treatment at the facility only in the circumstances and to  the extent the facility is required to maintain liability coverage  under this subsection.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 100, § 1; 2004, ch. 90, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, inserted “volunteer” preceding “health care professional” throughout; and in (f) added the exception at the end of the first sentence and the condition at the end of the second sentence.

Laws 2004, ch. 90, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 5, 2004.

§ 1-1-130. Actions against health care providers; admissibility of evidence.

  1. In any civil action or arbitration brought  by an alleged victim of an unanticipated outcome of medical care against  a health care provider, any and all statements, affirmations, gestures  or conduct expressing apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence,  compassion or a general sense of benevolence that are made by a health  care provider or an employee of a health care provider to the alleged  victim, or to a relative or representative of the alleged victim,  and that relate to the discomfort, pain, suffering, injury or death  of the alleged victim as the result of the unanticipated outcome of  medical care, are inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability  or as evidence of an admission against interest.
  2. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Health care provider” means a person  who is licensed, certified or otherwise authorized or permitted by  the laws of this state to administer health care in the ordinary course  of business or practice of a profession;
    2. “Relative” means a spouse, parent, grandparent,  stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half brother,  half sister or parent of a spouse, and includes those relationships  established by adoption;
    3. “Representative” means a legal guardian,  attorney, person designated to make decisions on behalf of a patient  under a medical power of attorney or any person recognized in law  or custom as a patient’s agent;
    4. “Unanticipated outcome” means the result  of a medical treatment or procedure that differs from an expected  result.

History. Laws 2004, Sp. Sess., ch. 1, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2004, Sp. Sess., ch. 1, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved July 17, 2004.

§ 1-1-131. Short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the “Successor Corporation Asbestos-Related Liability Fairness Act.”

History. Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

§ 1-1-132. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Asbestos claim” means any claim, wherever  or whenever made, for damages, losses, indemnification, contribution  or other relief arising out of, based on or in any way related to  asbestos, including:
      1. The health effects of exposure to asbestos,  including a claim for personal injury or death, mental or emotional  injury, risk of disease or other injury, or the costs of medical monitoring  or surveillance;
      2. Any claim made by or on behalf of any  person exposed to asbestos, or a representative, spouse, parent, child  or other relative of the person; and
      3. Any claim for damage or loss caused by  the installation, presence or removal of asbestos.
    2. “Corporation” means a corporation for  profit, including a domestic corporation organized under the laws  of this state or a foreign corporation organized under laws other  than the laws of this state;
    3. “Successor” means a corporation that assumes  or incurs or has assumed or incurred successor asbestos-related liabilities  that is a successor and became a successor before May 13, 1968, or  is any of that successor corporation’s successors;
    4. “Successor asbestos-related liabilities”  means any liability, whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted,  absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated  or due or to become due, which is related to asbestos claims and was  assumed or incurred by a corporation as a result of or in connection  with a merger or consolidation or the plan of merger or consolidation  related to the merger or consolidation with or into another corporation,  or that is related in any way to asbestos claims based on the exercise  of control or the ownership of stock of the corporation before the  merger or consolidation. The term includes liabilities that, after  the time of the merger or consolidation for which the fair market  value of total gross assets is determined under W.S. 1-1-135 , were or are paid or otherwise discharged, or committed  to be paid or otherwise discharged, by or on behalf of the corporation  or by a successor of the corporation or by or on behalf of a transferor,  in connection with settlements, judgments or other discharges in this  state or another jurisdiction;
    5. “Transferor” means a corporation from  which successor asbestos-related liabilities are or were assumed or  incurred.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Effective date. —

Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

§ 1-1-133. Applicability.

  1. The limitations in W.S. 1-1-134 shall apply to any successor corporation.
  2. The limitations of W.S. 1-1-134 shall not apply to:
    1. Workers’ compensation benefits paid by  or on behalf of an employer to an employee under the provisions of  Wyoming statutes, title 27, chapter 14 or a comparable workers’ compensation  law of another jurisdiction;
    2. Any claim against a corporation that does  not constitute a successor asbestos-related liability;
    3. Any obligation under the National Labor  Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 151, et seq., as amended, or under any collective bargaining  agreement;
    4. A successor that, after a merger or consolidation,  continued in the business of mining asbestos or in the business of  selling or distributing asbestos fibers or in the business of manufacturing,  distributing, removing or installing asbestos-containing products;  or
    5. Any claim against a corporation that was  filed in a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the effective  date of this act.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

§ 1-1-134. Limitations on successor asbestos-related liabilities.

  1. Except as further limited in subsection  (b) of this section, the cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities  of a successor corporation are limited to the fair market value of  the total gross assets of the transferor determined as of the time  of the merger or consolidation. The successor corporation shall not  have responsibility for successor asbestos-related liabilities in  excess of this limitation.
  2. If the transferor had assumed or incurred  successor asbestos-related liabilities in connection with a prior  merger or consolidation with a prior transferor, then the fair market  value of the total assets of the prior transferor determined as of  the time of the earlier merger or consolidation shall be substituted  for the limitation set forth in subsection (a) of this section for  purposes of determining the limitation of liability of a successor  corporation.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

§ 1-1-135. Establishing fair market value of total assets.

  1. A successor corporation may establish  the fair market value of total gross assets for the purpose of the  limitations under W.S. 1-1-134 through any method reasonable under the circumstances,  including:
    1. By reference to the going concern value  of the assets or to the purchase price attributable to or paid for  the assets in an arms-length transaction; or
    2. In the absence of other readily available  information from which the fair market value can be determined, by  reference to the value of the assets recorded on a balance sheet.
  2. Total gross assets include intangible  assets.
  3. To the extent total gross assets include  any liability insurance that was issued to the transferor whose assets  are being valued for purposes of this section the applicability, terms,  conditions and limits of such insurance shall not be affected by this  section, nor shall this section otherwise affect the rights and obligations  of an insurer, transferor or successor under any insurance contract  or any related agreements, including, without limitation, preenactment  settlements resolving coverage-related disputes, and the rights of  an insurer to seek payment for applicable deductibles, retrospective  premiums or self-insured retentions or to seek contribution from a  successor for uninsured or self-insured periods or periods where insurance  is uncollectible or otherwise unavailable. Without limiting the foregoing,  to the extent total gross assets include any such liability insurance,  a settlement of a dispute concerning any such liability insurance  coverage entered into by a transferor or successor with the insurers  of the transferor before July 1, 2011 shall be determinative of the  total coverage of such liability insurance to be included in the calculation  of the transferor’s total gross assets.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

§ 1-1-136. Adjustment.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (b)  through (d) of this section, the fair market value of total gross  assets at the time of the merger or consolidation shall increase annually  at a rate equal to the sum of:
    1. The prime rate as listed in the first  edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year  since the merger or consolidation, unless the prime rate is not published  in that edition of the Wall Street Journal, in which case any reasonable  determination of the prime rate on the first day of the year may be  used; and
    2. One percent (1%).
  2. The rate found in subsection (a) of this  section shall not be compounded.
  3. The adjustment of the fair market value  of total gross assets shall continue as provided in subsection (a)  of this section until the date the adjusted value is first exceeded  by the cumulative amounts of successor asbestos-related liabilities  paid or committed to be paid by or on behalf of the successor corporation  or a predecessor or by or on behalf of a transferor after the time  of the merger or consolidation for which the fair market value of  total gross assets is determined.
  4. No adjustment of the fair market value  of total gross assets shall be applied to any liability insurance  that may be included in the definition of total gross assets by W.S. 1-1-135(c).

History. Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

§ 1-1-137. Scope of act.

  1. The courts of this state shall construe  the provisions of this act liberally with regard to successors.
  2. This act shall apply to all asbestos claims  filed against a successor on or after July 1, 2011.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2011, ch. 117, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

§ 1-1-138. Donation of emergency responder equipment; exemption from civil and criminal liability; definitions; relation to other law.

  1. Any person who donates surplus emergency  response equipment to any emergency responder shall not be liable  for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal  proceeding resulting from the nature, age, condition or packaging  of such equipment; except that this exemption shall not apply to the  grossly negligent, willful, wanton or reckless acts of donors.
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “Emergency responder” means as provided  in W.S. 35-9-152(a)(i);
    2. “Emergency response equipment” means all  equipment designed for or typically used in the course of performing  the duties required of an emergency responder.
  3. Should any grant of immunity, exception or imposition of liability within the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 , conflict with any provision of this section, the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act shall prevail.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 65, § 1; 2017, ch. 41, § 1.

The 2017 amendment , effective July 1, 2017, in the middle of (c), substituted “1-38-120” for “1-39-121.”

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2011, Chapters 65 and 117 both enacted W.S. 1-1-131 . This section, as enacted by Laws 2011, Chapter 65, has been redesignated as W.S. 1-1-138 at the direction of the legislative service office.

Effective date. —

Laws 2011, ch. 65, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 22, 2011.

§ 1-1-139. Civil liability for female genital mutilation.

  1. A person who is the victim of female genital mutilation as defined by W.S. 6-1-104(a)(xvii) may maintain a civil action against an individual who engages in conduct that is prohibited under W.S. 6-2-502(a)(v) for damages incurred by the victim as a result of that conduct. The victim may also be awarded exemplary damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, costs of the action and any other appropriate relief. A victim of female genital mutilation may bring a civil action under this section at any time within ten (10) years of:
    1. The procedure being performed; or
    2. The victim’s eighteenth birthday.
  2. A civil action may be maintained under this section whether or not the individual who is alleged to have engaged in conduct prohibited under W.S. 6-2-502(a)(v) has been charged or convicted under W.S. 6-2-502(a)(v) for the alleged crime.
  3. Neither the pendency nor the termination of a civil action under this section shall prevent the criminal prosecution of a person who violates W.S. 6-2-502(a)(v).

History. Laws 2020, ch. 105, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2020, ch. 105, § 4, makes the act effective July 1, 2020.

§ 1-1-140. Public utility exemption from civil liability; catastrophes caused by an act of God.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a public utility is not liable for damages to real or personal property or damages for claims resulting from economic losses in any civil action against the public utility for a catastrophe caused by an act of God.
  2. Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to damages if a negligent, willful, wanton or reckless act of the public utility was a proximate cause of the catastrophe.
  3. As used in this section:
    1. “Economic losses” includes damages caused by a failure to provide an adequate supply of gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection or disposal, heating and ground transportation;
    2. “Municipality” means as defined in W.S. 37-1-101(a)(iii);
    3. “Public utility” means as defined in W.S. 37-1-101(a)(vi), excluding the state or a municipality.
  4. Should any grant of immunity, exception or imposition of liability within the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 , conflict with any provision of this section, the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act shall prevail.

History. Laws 2020, ch. 77, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2020, ch. 77, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2020.

Editor’s notes. —

Laws 2020, ch. 77, § 2, provides: “It is intended by this act to codify the common law existing in this state as of July 1, 2020, as it relates to the liability of a public utility for damages to real or personal property or damages for claims resulting from economic losses in a civil action against a public utility for a catastrophe caused by an act of God.”

§ 1-1-141. COVID-19 exposure and illness; assumption of the risk.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Claimant” means any person or estate of a person seeking recovery of damages in a COVID-19 liability claim;
    2. “COVID-19” means severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and any mutation or viral fragments thereof or any disease or condition caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) that was the subject of the public health emergency declared by the governor under W.S. 35-4-115(a)(i) on March 13, 2020;
    3. “COVID-19 liability claim” means a cause of action for:
      1. The transmission, infection, exposure or potential exposure of COVID-19 to a claimant:
        1. At any health care facility or on any person’s or entity’s premises that resulted in injury to or death of the claimant; or
        2. Caused by the actions of any health care provider or other person that resulted in injury to or death of the claimant.
      2. Acts or omissions by a health care facility or provider in arranging for or providing health care services or medical care to the claimant that resulted in injury to or death of the claimant, or where the response to COVID-19 reasonably interfered with the arranging for or the providing of health care services or medical care for the claimant; or
      3. Manufacturing, labeling, donating or distributing personal protective equipment or sanitizer that is directly related to the provision of personal protective equipment or sanitizer to the claimant by any person or entity during the public health emergency declared under COVID-19 that departs from the normal manufacturing, labeling, donating or distributing of personal protective equipment by an entity and that proximately causes injury to or the death of the claimant.
    4. “Personal protective equipment” means equipment worn to minimize exposure to hazards that cause injury or illness, including gloves, masks, face shields, safety glasses, shoes, earplugs, muffs, respirators, coveralls, vests and full body suits;
    5. “Sanitizer” means any substance generally used to decrease infectious agents including viruses on the body, objects or other spaces that receive human contact.
  2. Subject to subsection (c) of this section, in any action involving a COVID-19 liability claim against a person or entity, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the claimant accepted and assumed the risk of catching COVID-19 if the claimant entered the premises of another person or entity.
  3. The assumption of risk specified in subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict the immunity available in W.S. 35-4-114(d) or any other immunity available under law.

History. Laws 2021, ch. 118, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 118, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved April 6, 2021.

Chapter 2 Oaths

Cross references. —

As to oath of office, see art. 6, §§ 20 and 21, Wyo. Const.

As to perjury generally, see § 6-5-301 .

As to disobeying subpoena, refusing to take oath or to answer questions, see § 6-5-306 .

For provision requiring witnesses to be sworn before grand jury, see § 7-5-205 .

As to oath of jury in criminal cases generally, see § 7-11-107 .

For provision that the manner of procuring and examining witnesses in criminal cases shall be as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, see § 7-11-403 .

As to acknowledgment of instruments by members of armed forces before commissioned officers, see § 19-11-202 .

As to form of oath required to register to vote, see § 22-3-103 .

As to notary public, see title 32.

For Wyoming Uniform Law on Notarial Acts, see § 34-26-101 et seq.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

58 Am. Jur. 2d Oath and Affirmation § 1 et seq.

Validity of governmental requirement of oath of allegiance or loyalty, 18 ALR2d 268.

67 C.J.S. Oaths and Affirmations §§ 1 to 13.

§ 1-2-101. Form.

A person may be sworn by any form he deems binding on his conscience.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 4; R.S. 1887, § 2340; R.S. 1899, § 3422; C.S. 1910, § 4265; C.S. 1920, § 5534; R.S. 1931, § 89-104; C.S. 1945, § 3-2801; W.S. 1957, § 1-8; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-2-102. Officers authorized to administer.

  1. The following officers are authorized to administer oaths:
    1. Justices of the Wyoming supreme court;
    2. Judges of the Wyoming district courts;
    3. Judge of the United States district court for the district of Wyoming;
    4. Clerks of the Wyoming supreme court, Wyoming district courts and Wyoming circuit courts;
    5. Clerk of the United States district court for the district of Wyoming;
    6. Commissioners and magistrates appointed by authority of the laws of the United States or of Wyoming;
    7. Repealed by Laws 2011, ch. 113, § 3.
    8. County clerks;
    9. County treasurers;
    10. Clerks of school districts in Wyoming;
    11. Clerks of any incorporated city or town in Wyoming;
    12. County commissioners within their respective counties;
    13. Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 168, § 202.
    14. Judges of the Wyoming circuit courts;
    15. Notarial officers.
  2. Except for notarial officers, officers listed in this section are authorized to administer oaths, but are not authorized to perform other notarial acts as defined in W.S. 32-3-102(a)(xviii), unless specified otherwise in W.S. 32-3-105(a).

History. Laws 1890-91, ch. 2, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4295; Laws 1905, ch. 23, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 5156; C.S. 1920, § 6432; R.S. 1931, § 89-1501; C.S. 1945, § 3-2802; Laws 1953, ch. 29, § 1; 1955, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-9; Laws 1969, ch. 13, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1991, ch. 99, § 1; 2008, ch. 20, § 2; 2009, ch. 168, § 202; 2011, ch. 113, §§ 2, 3; 2012, ch. 98, § 1; 2021, ch. 27, § 2.

Cross references. —

For provision that master commissioner or special master has the same power to administer oaths as the sheriff, see § 1-17-323 .

As to authority of state auditor and state treasurer to administer oaths, see § 9-1-401 .

For authority of members of Wyoming aeronautics commission to administer oaths and affirmations, see § 10-3-301 .

For authority of commissioned officers to administer oath required on enlistment in national guard, see § 19-9-302 .

As to administering oath to trustees of a school district, see § 21-3-106 .

For authority of trustees of school districts to administer oaths, see § 21-3-122 .

For authority of secretary of board of trustees of the University of Wyoming to administer oaths, see § 21-17-206 .

As to authority of election judges to administer oaths, see § 22-15-105 .

As to authority of officers, employees, agents or selling agents authorized by state game and fish commission to sell and issue licenses and permits to administer oaths, see § 23-1-701 .

For authority of employees of highway department to administer oaths to each other and to witnesses, see § 24-3-116 .

For authority of insurance commissioner to administer oaths or affirmations, see §§ 26-2-116 to 26-2-118 , 26-2-122 , 26-2-123 .

As to power of commissioner of labor and statistics to administer oaths, see § 27-2-109 .

For power of members of employment service commission and their authorized representatives to administer oaths, see § 27-3-602 .

For authority of inspector of mines to administer oaths, see § 30-2-212 .

For authority of members and secretary of Wyoming oil and gas conservation commission to administer oaths, see §§ 30-5-103 and 30-5-112 .

For authority of state board of architects to administer oaths, see § 33-4-104 .

As to persons authorized to administer oaths to new attorneys, see § 33-5-112 .

For authority of board of chiropractors to administer oaths, see § 33-10-104 .

For authority of state board of embalming to administer oaths, see § 33-16-304 .

As to authority of members of board of examiners and optometry to administer oaths, see § 33-23-105 .

For authority of engineering and surveying board to administer oaths, see § 33-29-119.

For authority of state director of public health to administer oaths, see § 35-1-240 .

As to authority of members of board of land commissioners to administer oaths, see § 36-2-102 .

For authority of commissioner of land to administer oaths, see §§ 36-3-107 and 36-7-404 .

For authority of members of public service commission to administer oaths, see §§ 37-2-206 .

For authority of members of board of control to administer oaths, see § 41-4-211 .

For authority of superintendent of water division to administer oaths, see § 41-4-306 .

For provision that depositions may be taken before an officer authorized to administer oaths, see Rule 28, W.R.C.P.

For Wyoming Uniform Law on Notarial Acts, see § 34-26-101 et seq.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, added (b).

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, deleted (a)(xiii) which read: “Justices of the peace within their respective counties.”

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, repealed former (a)(vii), which read: “Notaries public”; added (a)(xv); and in (b), inserted “Except for notarial officers,” and deleted “32-1-105(c) or” preceding “34-26-103(a).”

The 2012 amendment, substituted “circuit” for “county” in (a)(iv) and (a)(xiv).

Laws 2012, ch. 98 § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 15, 2012.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, in (b), substituted "32-3-102(a)(xviii)" for "34-26-101(b)(iii)" and "32-3-105(a)" for "34-26-103(a)."

Editor's notes. —

This section as originally enacted provided, in addition, for the administration of oaths by the clerk and the judge of the United States circuit court including the state of Wyoming. United States circuit courts have been abolished and their powers and duties transferred to district courts.

Failure to follow statutory provisions exactly. —

In proceeding to condemn land for highway where appraisers were not sworn by themselves and instead by county clerk, failure to follow provisions of statute exactly would be mere irregularity not subject to collateral attack. Miller v. Hagie, 59 Wyo. 383, 140 P.2d 746, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1943).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Disqualification of official empowered to administer oath when he is attorney for person taking oath, 21 ALR3d 483.

§ 1-2-103. Affirmation in lieu of oath; manner of administering.

Persons conscientiously opposed to swearing or to taking any oath may affirm, and are subject to the penalties of perjury as in the case of swearing an oath. Whenever any person is required to take an oath in any court, or before any person or officer authorized by law to administer oaths, it is lawful for the court, officer or person administering the same, to administer it in the following manner: the person taking the oath or swearing shall, with his or her right hand uplifted, swear or take the oath, concluding with the words “so help me God”.

History. Laws 1890-91, ch. 2, § 2; R.S. 1899, § 4296; C.S. 1910, § 5157; C.S. 1920, § 6433; R.S. 1931, § 89-1502; C.S. 1945, § 3-2803; W.S. 1957, § 1-10; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to penalties for perjury, see § 6-5-301 .

Perjury charge supported by proof oath administered by clerk of court. —

Under this section and § 5-7-101 , declaring that, in the performance of his duties, the clerk of court shall be under the direction of the court, and providing for the administering of oaths, an averment in an information charging perjury that the accused was in due form of law sworn by the court, having competent authority to administer to him the oath of a witness before the court, is supported by the proof that the oath was administered to him by the clerk. Fletcher v. State, 20 Wyo. 284, 123 P. 80, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1912).

§ 1-2-104. Certification of documents.

  1. A matter required or authorized to be  supported, evidenced, established or proven by the sworn statement,  declaration, verification, certificate, oath or affidavit, in writing  of the person making it, other than a deposition, an acknowledgment,  an oath of office or an oath required to be taken before a specified  official other than a notary public, may be supported, evidenced,  established or proven by the person certifying in writing “under penalty  of false swearing” that the matter is true. The certification shall  state the date and place of execution and the following:

    “I certify under penalty of false swearing that the foregoing is true”.

  2. A person who knowingly makes a false certification  under subsection (a) of this section is guilty of false swearing in  violation of W.S. 6-5-303(c).

History. Laws 2007, ch. 199, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2007, ch. 199, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2007.

Quoted in

Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Jul 16, 2014).

Chapter 3 Limitation of Actions

Cross references. —

As to limitation on bringing proceedings to vacate or modify a judgment or order, see § 1-16-408 .

As to limitation for bringing action to revive a judgment, see § 1-16-503 .

For provision that recovery of damages in connection with issuance of writ of mandamus bars other actions, see § 1-30-113 .

As to limitation of action for damages sustained by an official whose office was usurped, see § 1-31-116 .

As to limitation upon time of bringing action of quo warranto against corporations or officers, see § 1-31-127 .

As to limitation upon time to bring action for damages caused by misconduct of officers resulting in forfeiture of corporate charter, see § 1-31-128 .

As to time for bringing suit against receiver on rejected claim, see § 1-33-110 .

As to limitation of action for wrongful death, see § 1-38-102 .

For provision making probate conclusive, see § 2-6-306 .

As to claims against estates, see § 2-7-701 et seq.

As to specified claims against state, see § 9-1-404 .

As to actions involving retirement board, see § 9-3-411 .

For limitation of claims against state for slaughter of diseased animals, see § 11-19-106 .

As to limitation of actions in connection with assessments for local improvements in cities and towns, see § 15-6-426 .

As to time for contesting rules on grounds of noncompliance with Administrative Procedure Act, see § 16-3-103 .

As to limitations for claims for damages in connection with establishment, alteration or vacation of proposed county highways, see § 24-3-112 .

As to prohibition of provision in life insurance policy limiting time within which an action at law or in equity may be commenced to less than three years after the cause of action shall accrue, see § 26-16-119 .

For limitations on filing of claims for worker's compensation, see § 27-14-503 .

As to limitation of actions with reference to mechanics' and builders' liens, see § 29-2-109 .

As to limitation of actions with reference to liens of threshermen, hay bailers and miners, see § 29-5-106 .

As to limitation of action on surety bonds of collection agencies, see § 33-11-109 .

As to limitation of actions to recover penalty from railroads for failure to burn fireguards, see § 37-9-302 .

As to limitation of actions with reference to recovery of additional penalties against public utilities, see § 37-12-212 .

As to limitation on actions to recover real property sold for taxes, see § 39-13-108 .

As to limitation of actions with reference to illegal tax levy, see § 39-13-109 .

As to limitation of actions to collect refunds of overpayment under use tax, see § 39-16-109 .

For limitation of actions alleging violations for multilevel and pyramid distributorship act, see § 40-3-123 .

For limitation of action alleging violation of consumer protection act, see § 40-12-109 .

As to limitation of actions to determine rights of joint users or claimants in connection with irrigation and drainage districts, see § 41-6-305 .

As to limitation of actions contesting organization of or assessments of irrigation and drainage districts, see §§ 41-6-401 and 41-6-402 .

As to when action commences, see Rule 3, W.R.C.P.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Civil RICO After Sedima: An Exercise in Restraint,” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 153 (1987).

For comments, “Wyoming Tort Reform and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: A Second Opinion,” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 593 (1993).

For article, “Collecting Debt in Wyoming: The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as a Trap for the Unwary,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 731 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

9 Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy §§ 547 to 549; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 1 et seq.

Which statute of limitations applies to efforts to compel arbitration of a dispute, 77 ALR4th 1071.

What statute of limitations applies to action to compel arbitration pursuant to § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act (29 USC § 185), 96 ALR Fed 378.

Construction and application of provision of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act relating to validation of debts (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692g), 150 ALR Fed 101.

54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 1 et seq.

§ 1-3-101. Applicability of provisions.

This chapter shall not apply in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust, nor to an action by a vendee of real property in possession thereof to obtain a conveyance of it.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 27; R.S. 1887, § 2363; R.S. 1899, § 3446; C.S. 1910, § 4289; C.S. 1920, § 5558; R.S. 1931, § 89-401; C.S. 1945, § 3-401; W.S. 1957, § 1-11; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

A resulting trust is not a continuing and subsisting trust. Herndon v. Hege, 528 P.2d 682, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1974).

Hence, the statute of limitations commences to run against enforcement of resulting trust from the time the act occurs which creates the trust. Herndon v. Hege, 528 P.2d 682, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1974).

If a cestui que trust is in possession, or if the trustee continues to acknowledge in some fashion the trust, or if the cestui has no knowledge that the trustee had taken title in his individual name, there are grounds for contending that the statute of limitations would be tolled while those conditions existed. Herndon v. Hege, 528 P.2d 682, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1974).

Applied in

In re Estate of Sullivan, 506 P.2d 813, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1973).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code — Part II,” VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1973).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Possession by mortgagee for limitation period before foreclosure as barring right of redemption, 7 ALR2d 1131.

Estoppel to rely on statute of limitations, 24 ALR2d 1413.

Applicability of statute of limitations to quo warranto proceedings involving corporations, 26 ALR2d 828.

Authority of agent to make payment on behalf of principal, as regards statute of limitations, 31 ALR2d 139.

Promissory estoppel as to statute of limitations, 48 ALR2d 1069.

Raising defense of statute by demurrer, equivalent motion to dismiss or by motion for judgment on pleadings, 61 ALR2d 300.

What statute of limitations governs creditor's action under bulk sales acts against purchaser, 61 ALR2d 935.

Statute of limitations as defense to action or proceeding for alimony or support of child allowed by decree or order of court, 70 ALR2d 1250.

Validity and applicability to existing causes of action not already barred of statute enlarging period of limitation, 79 ALR2d 1080.

Effect on accrual of cause of action against physician, surgeon or dentist for malpractice of patient's ignorance of extent of injuries or of his right to cause of action, 80 ALR2d 368.

General appearance as avoiding otherwise effective bar of statute of limitations, 82 ALR2d 1200.

Claim barred by limitations as within Bulk Sales Law, 85 ALR2d 1211.

Appointment of guardian as affecting running of statute of limitations against infant, 86 ALR2d 965.

Settlement negotiations as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 39 ALR3d 127.

Insurer's failure to pay amount of admitted liability as precluding reliance on statute of limitations, 41 ALR3d 1111.

Agreement of parties as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 43 ALR3d 756.

Promises to settle or perform as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 44 ALR3d 482.

Plaintiff's diligence as affecting his right to have defendant estopped from pleading the statute of limitations, 44 ALR3d 760.

Fiduciary or confidential relationship as affecting estoppel to plead statute of limitations, 45 ALR3d 630.

Delay caused by other litigation as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 45 ALR3d 703.

Tort claim against which period of statute of limitations has run as subject to setoff, counterclaim, cross bill or cross action in tort action arising out of same accident or incident, 72 ALR3d 1065.

Choice of law as to applicable statute of limitations in contract actions, 78 ALR3d 639.

Legal malpractice by permitting statutory time limitation to run against client's claim, 90 ALR3d 293.

Statute of limitations as bar to arbitration under agreement, 94 ALR3d 533.

Post-traumatic syndrome as tolling running of statute of limitations, 12 ALR5th 546.

Statute of limitations in civil actions for damages under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, 156 ALR Fed 361.

§ 1-3-102. When actions may be commenced.

Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action accrues, but where a different limitation is prescribed by statute, that shall govern.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 29; R.S. 1887, § 2365; R.S. 1899, § 3450; C.S. 1910, § 4294; C.S. 1920, § 5563; R.S. 1931, § 89-405; C.S. 1945, § 3-405; W.S. 1957, § 1-12; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Contractually created shorter periods. —

Clearly, contractually created shorter periods are ‘within’ the limitation period. Nuhome Invs., LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, 81 P.3d 940, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 2003).

Ranch's action against corporation for failure to provide services was time-barred. —

Finding that a ranch's action seeking damages resulting from a corporation's failure to provide engineering and surveying services was time-barred was appropriate because, whether Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107 began to run on the date of the act, error or omission, or on the date the cause of action accrued, the lawsuit was untimely. The ranch's cause of action was time barred if not commenced within two years of the act, error or omission giving rise to the cause of action, or if, the two-year time limit started to run upon “accrual” of the cause of action, the ranch's claim was still time barred because the cause of action accrued on or before May 5, 2005. Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assocs., 2009 WY 69, 208 P.3d 57, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 2009).

Quoted in

Badley v. Birchby, 487 P.2d 798, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 238 (Wyo. 1971).

Cited in

National Tailoring Co. v. Scott, 65 Wyo. 64, 196 P.2d 387, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1948); Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, 79 P.3d 500, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 2003).

Law reviews. —

See “Abstractor's Liability in Examination of Title,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 189.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Law requiring service of notice before bringing suit as affecting time from which statute of limitations begins to run, 3 ALR2d 711.

Limitation period as affected by requirement of notice or presentation of claim against governmental body, 3 ALR2d 711.

Bringing in new party after statute of limitations has run, 8 ALR2d 6.

Waiver or tolling of statute of limitations by executor or administrator, 8 ALR2d 660.

Statutory provisions regarding delivery of summons or other process for commencement of action to officer for service as equivalent of service of process for purpose of statute of limitation, 16 ALR2d 1079.

First and last day included or excluded for purposes of statute, 20 ALR2d 1249.

Statute of limitations as bar to arbitration under agreement, 37 ALR2d 1125.

Statement of account as reviving barred items, 51 ALR2d 331.

When statute of limitations starts to run against enforcement of constructive trust, 55 ALR2d 220.

Illness or death of party, counsel or witness as excuse for failure to timely prosecute action, 80 ALR2d 1399.

Appointment of committee for incompetent as affecting running of limitations against him, 86 ALR2d 965.

Timely suit to enforce policy as interrupting limitations against claimant's amended pleading to reform it, or vice versa, 92 ALR2d 168.

Acceptance of past due interest as waiver precluding acceleration which will institute limitations period, 97 ALR2d 997.

Time from which statute begins to run against action for wrongful death, 97 ALR2d 1151.

When statute of limitations or laches commences to run against action to set aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer in fraud of creditors, 100 ALR2d 1094.

Validity of contractual limitation of time for action, 6 ALR3d 1197.

Accrual of cause of action and tolling of limitation period of § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 56), 16 ALR3d 637.

Death before accrual of cause of action of one in whose favor it would have accrued as affecting running of limitation, 28 ALR3d 1141.

Liability in damages for preventing bringing of action before its being barred by statute of limitations, 33 ALR3d 1077.

What constitutes “publication” of libel in order to start running of period of limitations, 42 ALR3d 807.

Promises or attempts by seller to repair goods as tolling statute of limitations for breach of warranty, 68 ALR3d 1277.

Effect of injured employee's proceeding for workmen's compensation benefits on running of statute of limitations governing action for personal injury arising from same incident, 71 ALR3d 849.

Owner's surveying of land as entry thereon tolling running of statute of limitations for purposes of adverse possession, 76 ALR3d 1202.

Imprisonment of party to civil action as tolling statute of limitations, 77 ALR3d 735.

When statute of limitations begins to run as to cause of action for development of latent industrial or occupational disease, 1 ALR4th 117.

What statute of limitations governs damage action against attorney for malpractice, 2 ALR4th 284.

What statute of limitations governs action arising out of transaction consummated by use of credit card, 2 ALR4th 677.

What statute of limitations governs physician's action for wrongful denial of hospital privileges, 3 ALR4th 1214.

When statute of limitations begins to run as to cause of action for nuisance based on air pollution, 19 ALR4th 456.

Time when cause of action accrues for civil action under state antitrust, monopoly or restraint of trade statutes, 90 ALR4th 1102.

Insurer's waiver of defense of statute of limitations, 104 ALR5th 331.

§ 1-3-103. Recovery of real property; generally.

An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments can only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of such action accrues.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 30; R.S. 1887, § 2366; R.S. 1899, § 3451; C.S. 1910, § 4295; C.S. 1920, § 5564; R.S. 1931, § 89-406; C.S. 1945, § 3-501; W.S. 1957, § 1-13; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

I.General Consideration.

Cross references. —

For action to quiet title, see § 1-32-201 .

Section is available in judicial proceedings only as a defense and can never be asserted by a plaintiff as a cause of action in him or as conferring upon him an affirmative right of action. The principle has sometimes been expressed in the figure of speech that the statute is available only as a shield, not as a sword. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 277 F.2d 615, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5155 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1960).

But it is not merely statute of limitations. —

This section relating to time for bringing action to recover real property is not merely statute of limitations, but when adverse possession for statutory period is held, adverse possessor is vested with full, new and distinct title. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Action to recover land held under resulting trust. —

A petition to recover land from defendant, alleging that deed to the land was erroneously taken in defendant's name instead of in the name of plaintiff's ancestor, and that defendant did not disclose that fact or convey the land to plaintiff's ancestor as good faith required, is not an action for relief on the ground of fraud which must be commenced within four years under § 1-3-105 , but action to recover possession of land held under resulting trust which may be begun within 10 years under this section, limiting actions for the recovery of lands, or under § 1-3-109 , relating to actions for relief not before provided for. Cook v. Elmore, 27 Wyo. 163, 192 P. 824, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1920).

When time runs against right to recover public lands. —

Under this section and § 1-3-109 , time does not run against the right to recover public lands until a patent is issued. Wolbol v. Steinhoff, 25 Wyo. 227, 168 P. 251, 1917 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 25 Wyo. 227, 168 P. 251, 1917 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1917).

Laches. —

Where petition to intervene as complainant in federal equity suit was filed more than 14 years after suit was initiated, and more than four years after cause of action would have been barred by limitation under this section, no excusing circumstances being indicated, petition was barred by laches. Clarke v. Boysen (8th Cir. 1922).

Discovery rule. —

In a dispute over real property, when the statute of limitations began to run was a disputed issue of fact because factual disputes remained concerning when the father rejected the children's demands to convey property to the trust, giving them actual notice of the dispute. Factual disputes also remained concerning when the children had reason to know that the father had not conveyed the disputed property to the trust. Redland v. Redland, 2012 WY 148, 288 P.3d 1173, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 2012).

Section cannot be applied to action to foreclose mortgage, since the object of such action is not to recover the land, but to realize the amount of the debt by selling the security. Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 P. 434, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1899).

Right to maintain damage action. —

A plaintiff who had resided on land with family 31 years, had fenced it and had not had his title questioned could, without proving record or paper title, maintain an action for damages to growing crops and trees caused by defendant's destruction of irrigation flume. Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 121 P. 522, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1912).

Reformation of warranty deed not permitted where deed clearly conveys title. —

Inasmuch as a 1933 warranty deed clearly conveyed the land being disputed in a quiet title action with no reservations whatsoever, the court did not permit reformation to express the alleged intent of the party that the property was conveyed to be used solely as an airport, which would have been a clear violation of this section. Samuel Mares Post No. 8 v. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, Am. Legion v. Board of County Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 1040, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 470 (Wyo. 1985).

Applied in

Johnson v. Szumowicz, 63 Wyo. 211, 179 P.2d 1012, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (1947); Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1975); Near v. Casto, 613 P.2d 577, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1980); Bummer v. Collier, 864 P.2d 453, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 1993).

Quoted in

United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 169 F. Supp. 735, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3874 (D. Wyo. 1959); Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1997).

Stated in

Baker v. First Nat'l Bank, 603 P.2d 397, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 488 (Wyo. 1979); Lewis v. State Bd. of Control, 699 P.2d 822, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 483 (Wyo. 1985); Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil Co., 750 P.2d 1321, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 1988); Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, 226 P.3d 889, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Mar. 23, 2010).

Cited in

Broatch v. Boysen, 175 F. 702, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 4192 (8th Cir. 1910); National Tailoring Co. v. Scott, 65 Wyo. 64, 196 P.2d 387, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1948); Riedesel v. Towne, 66 Wyo. 160, 206 P.2d 747, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1949); Horse Creek Royalty Corp. v. Southland Royalty Co., 489 P.2d 214, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1971); Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1981); DeWitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 539 (Wyo. 1986); Helm v. Clark, 2010 WY 168, 244 P.3d 1052, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Dec. 21, 2010); Wyo-Ben, Inc. v. Van Fleet, 2015 WY 146, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Nov. 19, 2015).

Law reviews. —

See note, “The Claim of Right Element in Adverse Possession in Wyoming,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 155.

See comment, “Remedial Title Legislation for Wyoming,” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 561 (1972).

See comment, “Procedural Considerations in the Judicial Determination of Water Disputes,” VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 513 (1974).

For comment, “Outlaws of the Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 79 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of creditor to set aside transfer of property as fraudulent as affected by the fact that his claim is barred by statute of limitations, 14 ALR2d 598.

When statute of limitations or laches commences to run against action to set aside conveyance or transfer in fraud of creditors, 100 ALR2d 1094.

Prescriptive right to maintain gates across easement of way, 52 ALR3d 9.

Owner's surveying of land as entry thereon tolling running of statute of limitations for purposes of adverse possession, 76 ALR3d 1202.

State statute of limitations applicable to inverse condemnation or similar proceedings by landowner to obtain compensation for direct appropriation of land without the institution or conclusion of formal proceedings against specific owner, 26 ALR4th 68.

Presumptions and evidence respecting identification of land on which property taxes were paid to establish adverse possession, 36 ALR4th 843.

Grazing of livestock, gathering of natural crop, or cutting of timber by record owner as defeating exclusiveness or continuity of possession by one claiming title by adverse possession, 39 ALR4th 1148.

Extinguishment by prescription of natural servitude for drainage of surface waters, 42 ALR4th 462.

Sufficiency of showing, in establishing boundary by parol agreement, that boundary was uncertain or in dispute before agreement, 72 ALR4th 132.

II.Adverse Possession.
A.In General.

Adverse possession is based upon running of statute of limitations applicable to the recovery of property, but the party claiming the land must be in continuous possession of the real estate for the statutory period under certain conditions and requisites. Roush v. Roush, 589 P.2d 841, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 353 (Wyo. 1979).

Statements made out of court, particularly if made to the owner of the disputed property or members of the community, can be evidence every bit as objective and relevant as the nonverbal act of erecting a banner of conquest on a neighbor's land; the district court erred when it found that no statements of subjective intent were relevant to either prove or disprove adverse possession. Galiher v. Johnson, 2017 WY 31, 391 P.3d 1101, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2017).

Purpose of adverse possession statute is to establish title good against world where right formerly possessed by others was forfeited by adverse possession, regardless of whether former rights were founded upon mere lien, security deed or upon absolute, unconditional title. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

The prime object in prescribing how adverse possession shall be made manifest, of what elements or requisites it shall be composed, is to advise the real owner that his ownership is in danger, and the law has deemed the time fixed as sufficiently long, so as to give him ample opportunity to protect his right; and if he fails to do so, when thus advised, within the time fixed, he is considered as having acquiesced in the transfer of ownership. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966). See also, City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929).

Date of adverse possessor's title. —

An adverse possessor's title dates from that time when an action to recover the land is barred by the statute of limitations. Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 339 (Wyo. 1983).

Party need not bring quiet title action after adverse title vests. —

A party holding title by adverse possession is not barred by this section because he does not bring a quiet title action within 10 years after his adverse title vests. Sanders v. Lidle, 674 P.2d 1291, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1984).

Once title is vested by adverse possession, subsequent possession need not be adverse up to the time a quiet title action is filed, so long as title is not divested in the meantime. Sanders v. Lidle, 674 P.2d 1291, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1984).

After title is vested by adverse possession it can only be divested by conveyance, descent, or operation of law. Sanders v. Lidle, 674 P.2d 1291, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1984).

Adverse possession initiated against mortgagee. —

Title by adverse possession is, at least in absence of facts to contrary, initiated against mortgagee from time hostile and exclusive possession is taken of property, if adverse possessor has no actual or constructive knowledge of existence of mortgage. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Right to foreclose, and right to acquire title in connection therewith, exists as against the world, including an adverse possessor, during statutory 10-year period after due date of mortgage. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Where adverse possessor held possession 12 years, he obtained title valid against a mortgagee in absence of proof that mortgage indebtedness was extended before he took possession so as to give mortgagee less than statutory 10-year period after due date to foreclose. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Mortgagee cannot, as against adverse possessor, extend time for payment and for foreclosure after adverse possession has started. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Summary Judgment.—

Evidence submitted in support of cross-motions for summary judgment in an adverse possession case, based on the fencing and grazing of livestock on a strip of adjoining property, failed to establish that either party was entitled to summary judgment because the evidence reflected a clear dispute of material fact on the question of the continuous and exclusive use or permissive use of the disputed property. White v. Wheeler, 2017 WY 146, 406 P.3d 1241, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 2017).

Easement by prescription is created by the use of land, provided such use is: (1) adverse, (2) continuous and uninterrupted and (3) for the period of prescription; in order to prevail the claimant must prove all three of these essential elements. Stock v. Roebling, 459 P.2d 780, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1969).

Prescriptive easements are not favored in law. Gregory v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 384 (Wyo. 1981).

Allegation that plaintiff and predecessors “have been” in continuous possession of premises for 10 years prior to commencement of action should be construed as including the time of commencement of action. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Failure to plead specifically held not fatal. —

Failure of party relying on statute relating to adverse possession to plead specifically as against prior mortgagee that foreclosure of mortgage was barred by limitations was not fatal. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 , 136 A.L.R. 770 (1941), rehearing denied, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 113 P.2d 963, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 19 , 136 A.L.R. 770 (1941). See Rule 8(c), W.R.C.P.

Waiver of objection. —

A defendant waives objection to petition that may have been defective because of failure to allege plaintiff's possession at time of commencement of action where he asks for affirmative relief. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (1946). See Rule 12, W.R.C.P.

Answer showing plaintiff in possession. —

A defendant's answer stating that plaintiff keeps defendant out of possession aids plaintiff's petition in establishing that plaintiff was in possession of the property. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Rebuttal of presumption of permission. —

Use of an unimproved road crossing the lands of a neighbor will be presumed to have been with permission. To rebut this presumption, the claimant of a prescriptive easement must demonstrate the manner in which the hostile and adverse nature of his use was brought home to the owner of the adjacent land. A.B. Cattle Co. v. Forgey Ranches, 943 P.2d 1184, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 1997).

Neighbor did not establish a prescriptive easement over a strip of landowners' property based on a former owner's use because there was no evidence to overcome a presumption that such use was not hostile but merely permissive. Kawulok v. Legerski, 2007 WY 133, 165 P.3d 112, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 2007).

Rebuttable presumption favors record title holder. —

There is a presumption in favor of the record title holder which can be rebutted if the adverse possession claimant makes, in the absence of explanatory circumstance to the contrary, a prima facie case of adverse possession, whereupon the burden shifts back to the record title holder who must produce evidence contrary to the presumption by showing that the claimant's possession was permissive. If the title holder can do that, then it becomes a question of weight and credibility to be determined by the trier of fact. Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1995).

Burden is on adverse claimant to prove the right to have ownership of disputed land transferred to himself. Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1979); Gregory v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 384 (Wyo. 1981).

It is necessary for claimant to show by sufficient substantial evidence that the possession was adverse. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966).

But there may be presumption of adverse possession. —

Presumption is that one occupying land for prescriptive period under mistake as to boundary occupies adversely under claim of right, burden of proof being on one claiming contrary. City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929).

Absent a clear showing to the contrary, long continued possession coupled with complete dominion over the property and open and visible acts of ownership, gives rise to the presumption that the possession was adverse. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966).

Doubt whether possession is adverse must be submitted to trier of facts; otherwise, it may be law question on undisputed facts. City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929), See also, Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Property restored to record title holder where adverse claimants without “clean hands.” —

Since holders by adverse possession failed to demonstrate the equities (“clean hands”) which entitled them to prevail in quiet title action, the district court properly treated action as a claim for ejectment and restored the disputed property to the record title holder. Harsha v. Anastos, 693 P.2d 760, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 423 (Wyo. 1985).

B.Elements.

Summary judgment inappropriate.—

Appellees were not entitled to summary judgment on an adverse possession claim based on the neighborly accommodation doctrine where the testimony did not clearly establish a communication or joint activity that demonstrated such an accommodation. Little Med. Creek Ranch, Inc. v. D’Elia, 2019 WY 103, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (October 10, 2019).

Summary judgment was inappropriate on the adverse possession claim based on the fence-out doctrine where the record contained little, if any, evidence regarding who built or decided not to build fences, when, and for what reasons. The significance of any perimeter fencing and the lack of any fencing around the disputed parcels had to be sorted out by a fact-finder at trial. Little Med. Creek Ranch, Inc. v. D’Elia, 2019 WY 103, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (October 10, 2019).

Summary judgment was inappropriate on appellant’s adverse possession claim where the court improperly evaluated the credibility of a witness, and the deposition testimony raised issues of fact as to the appellant’s exclusive possession. Little Med. Creek Ranch, Inc. v. D’Elia, 2019 WY 103, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (October 10, 2019).

Proof required individually for separate tracts. —

Where land claimed was neither contiguous nor was used for the same purpose, the adverse claimant was required to prove his case for each tract individually. Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1995).

Elements stated. —

Adverse possession of real estate is an actual, visible and exclusive appropriation of land, commenced and continued under a claim of right, with the intent to assert such claim against the true owner, and accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as to give him a cause of action. The possession must be hostile and under a claim of right; it must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous. Bryant v. Cadle, 18 Wyo. 64, 104 P. 23, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1909), modified, 18 Wyo. 64, 106 P. 687, 1910 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1910); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929); Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966); Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1979); Farella v. Rumney, 649 P.2d 185, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 364 (Wyo. 1982); Rutar Farms & Livestock v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 388 (Wyo. 1982).

The elements of adverse possession consist of actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of another's real property for the statutory period, which possession is hostile and under claim of right or color of title, with the party claiming title carrying the burden of proof as to each of these elements. Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 369 (Wyo. 1983), See, Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 339 (Wyo. 1983).

Establishment of occupation. —

The dominion and control necessary to establish actual occupation in adverse possession cases is that adapted to the particular land, its condition, locality and appropriate use. Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1979).

When claimant has occupied land under mistaken belief as to true boundary, there must be evidence of an intent to possess to that boundary. Evidence of use and occupancy of a disputed strip up to a fence is sufficient. Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1979).

Grazing as sufficient use. —

Where a tract was only suitable for grazing, the claimant utilized it for that purpose for a period of some forty years and was well known in the community, grazing would constitute a sufficient use of the tract under such circumstances. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966), See also, Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1979); Farella v. Rumney, 649 P.2d 185, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 364 (Wyo. 1982).

Must show continuous claim of right. —

As a key element of adverse possession one is required to show by proof the continuous nature, for the statutory period, of his claim of right. Snell v. Ruppert, 582 P.2d 916, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 225 (Wyo. 1978).

Continuity of possession established by grazing of land. —

Continuity of possession requires more than occasional or sporadic acts of dominion, but different legal standards apply when adverse possession is predicated upon the grazing of lands where the evidence is undisputed that every year defendants' cattle literally grazed within the fenced confines of the disputed acres. This evidence will establish continuity. Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1979).

Adverse possession of easement. —

Because the owner of a servient estate claiming adverse possession in an easement already had the right to possess and use the land so long as that use was not inconsistent with the easement, the owner of a servient estate is required to prove that the use of the servient estate made during the period of adverse possession is sufficiently hostile and inconsistent with the use permitted by the easement. Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1994).

Flight easement created by government declarations of navigability and repeated overflights. —

The mere fact of airplane overflight, without evidence of impact on the surface (i.e., substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the surface), did not create a constitutional claim against either the city or its airport board, which adopted an ordinance providing a height limitation in a noninstrument approach zone to the airport, for the “taking” of property the creation of a flight easement. In addition, the flight easement utilized by airplanes was not created by the passage of the ordinance, but by federal and state declarations of public navigability and by repeated overflights which preceded the home owner's action by considerably more than the 10 years allowed by this section. Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 579 (Wyo. 1985).

Temporary break or interruption, not of unreasonable duration, does not destroy continuity of adverse possession. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

One element to be considered as to whether temporary absence will break continuity of adverse possession is whether or not person claiming to be true owner, or perhaps someone else, enters upon and takes possession of land during such temporary absence. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

There may be an interruption of adverse possession by an action in court or by an entry of former owner without abandonment on part of the claimant. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Lease of land to third person by adjoining landowner was not such ouster as would as matter of law require a holding that continuity of plaintiff's adverse possession was interrupted where such third person disclaimed any rights under the lease on discovery that plaintiff's tenants had leased the land. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Where continuous possession of plaintiff and predecessor in title was marred only by predecessor's absence from premises for five months at which time he deeded land to plaintiff and by fact that land thereafter was vacant four months before plaintiff's tenant moved in, the interruption did not, as matter of law, affect plaintiff's adverse possession. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Straying of cattle onto grazing land being held adversely did not have effect of an ouster requiring court, as matter of law, to hold that there was an interruption of adverse possession. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Successive periods of occupation may be united to make up statutory time. —

Possession for the statutory period need not be continued in the same person to constitute adverse possession; but, where there is privity between persons successively in possession, holding adversely to the true title continuously, the successive periods of occupation may be united to make up the statutory time. Bryant v. Cadle, 18 Wyo. 64, 104 P. 23, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1909), modified, 18 Wyo. 64, 106 P. 687, 1910 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1910).

The doctrine of tacking was engrafted upon the general principles of the law of adverse possession for the purpose of meeting the requirement of “continuous” possession for the statutory period. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966).

Effect of infirmities attaching to predecessors' possession. —

Adverse possession claimants who must tack their possession to that of their predecessors in order to satisfy the statutory period must accept not only their predecessor's period of possession, but any infirmities attaching to it as well. Snell v. Ruppert, 582 P.2d 916, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 225 (Wyo. 1978).

Exclusiveness of possession. —

That adjoining owner's house encroached slightly on strip claimed by defendant did not affect exclusiveness of defendant's possession. City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929).

District court did not err in quieting title in appellees to certain land that had been enclosed with lands owned by appellees and their predecessors since a fence was initially constructed over 50 years ago; appellees proved that their possession was exclusive in spite of the town's use of the property during the winter months because the town was considered appellees' agent, and the fence in question was not one of convenience, given that all parties believed that the fence was the true boundary for at least 40 years. Davis v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, 55 P.3d 1267, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 2002).

Disputed property which had always been included within what appeared to be the owners' property, by a fence built by the neighbors, a tree line, and a distinction in vegetation, were adequate to establish exclusivity; the owners never needed to build a fence, as they had no reason to do so, and their use of the property was consistent with that which would be exercised by one using the land to the exclusion of others. Graybill v. Lampman, 2014 WY 100, 332 P.3d 511, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2014).

Exclusiveness of possession. —

District court did not err in finding that appellees had acquired title to the disputed property by adverse possession where the undisputed evidence established that, they had constructed and maintained a boundary fence encompassing the disputed property, they moved into an existing home and used an existing well that were located on the property for 30 years. Osuch v. Gunnels, 2017 WY 49, 393 P.3d 898, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 2017).

Exclusive possession not proven. —

Where there is uncontradicted testimony that the defendant seeded, tended and harvested hay on reservoir land and that he obtained a well permit, drilled a well and installed a sprinkler system in order to irrigate the hay, but there is no showing that his activities were separate and exclusive uses inconsistent with plaintiff's right under a certificate of appropriation to use the reservoir for storage when water was available, the defendant has failed to prove the essential element of exclusive possession. Joe Johnson Co. v. Landen, 738 P.2d 711, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 463 (Wyo. 1987).

Later conduct indicates party's intent during period of asserted adverse possession. —

A party's conduct after the time he claimed to have acquired title by adverse possession might be said to have little relevance as to whether use of the disputed area was hostile or antagonistic, but such later conduct also indicates his intent during the period of asserted adverse possession. Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d 798, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 523 (Wyo. 1986), overruled in part, Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1991).

Claim of title is sufficient for purpose of initiating adverse possession. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Invalid deed. —

Possession of oil claim under invalidly executed deed conveying entire interest by eight cotenants of the claim was possession under color of title barring rights of an original cotenant 10 years after execution of the deed through operation of this section. Hodgson v. Federal Oil & Dev. Co., 285 F. 546, 1922 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1164 (D. Wyo. 1922), aff'd, 5 F.2d 442, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2677 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1925).

Void tax deed was admissible in action to quiet title in plaintiff on ground of 10 years' adverse possession for purpose of showing that plaintiff's possession has not been that of mere trespasser, but has at all times been under a claim of ownership or claim of title. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

A deed, even void on its face, is a color of title sufficient to constitute a claim of color of title for purposes of adverse possession. Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 339 (Wyo. 1983).

Knowledge of defect of title is not sufficient to destroy adverse nature of possession. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Notice of hostility must be given to landowner so that he will know that his title is in jeopardy and that the running of the 10-year period necessary for adverse possession has started. Rutar Farms & Livestock v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 388 (Wyo. 1982).

Landowner claiming an easement by prescription in an unimproved road crossing lands of his neighbor must establish clearly and unequivocally to his neighbor his intention to make a hostile use of the road adverse to the interests of his neighbor. A.B. Cattle Co. v. Forgey Ranches, 943 P.2d 1184, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 1997).

Fence inclosing land may be sufficient under some circumstances to raise the “flag” of an adverse claimant. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966).

Fence and farming operations put owner on notice. —

The presence of a fence and continuous farming operations on the enclosed land put the real property owner on notice to make inquiry. Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 339 (Wyo. 1983).

Fence of convenience may not establish adverse possession. —

In some circumstances, enclosing land in a fence is sufficient to “raise the flag” of an adverse claimant; however, a fence kept simply for convenience has no effect upon the true boundary between tracts of land and creates a permissive use. Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 196 (Wyo. 1999).

Failure to pay taxes upon a disputed strip is an element to be considered along with other circumstances in a case and would tend to weaken a claim of ownership by adverse possession. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966); Rutar Farms & Livestock v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 388 (Wyo. 1982).

Nonpayment of taxes on adversely possessed land, while a consideration, does not in itself destroy an adverse possession claim. Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 339 (Wyo. 1983).

Abandonment of adverse possession. —

To constitute an abandonment of adverse possession, the act of relinquishment of possession or enjoyment must be accompanied by an intent to part permanently with claim of ownership. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1946).

Permissive possession not adverse. —

If a claimant's possession is shown to be permissive, then he acquires no title by adverse possession. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966).

Where land is vacant, unoccupied and free to public use and travel until circumstances induce owners to enclose it, mere travel across the same without objection from the owners does not enable public to acquire road over it, the use being regarded as permissive rather than adverse. Board of County Comm'rs v. Patrick, 18 Wyo. 130, 104 P. 531, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1909), reh'g denied, 18 Wyo. 130, 107 P. 748, 1910 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1910).

A public roadway cannot be acquired by mere permissive public use. If the private landowner establishes through competent evidence that the public's use is merely permissive, the question of supervision, control or maintenance is irrelevant. If the landowner fails to establish permissive use, he is still entitled to a presumption of permissive use unless the public authority establishes that it has assumed supervision or control of the road or has kept it in repair. Koontz v. Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 558 (Wyo. 1987).

Failure to object not deemed permissive use. —

Failure on the part of the owner to interrupt or object to the public use of the street for the statutorily prescribed period of time cannot be equated to permissive use. Koontz v. Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 558 (Wyo. 1987).

Statutory 10-year period for adverse possession not met. —

Where there was nothing in the record to indicate use prior to 1996 was anything other than permissive, the action was insufficient to establish adverse possession because it failed to satisfy the statutory ten-year period. Lake v. Severson, 993 P.2d 309, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 1999).

Maintenance of road necessary for town's claim. —

A showing of maintenance of a road by a town is necessary to prove a claim of right in the public, which is separate and distinct from the element of continuous public use. Maintenance need not be constant. The extent of maintenance required is only as much as may be necessary to keep the road in substantial repair or to put it in condition for public travel. Koontz v. Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 558 (Wyo. 1987).

Library References.

American Law of Mining, 2nd Edition § 205.07 (Matthew Bender).

§ 1-3-104. Recovery of real property; legal disability.

Any person entitled to bring an action for the recovery of real property who is under any legal disability when the cause of action accrues may bring his action within ten (10) years after the disability is removed.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 31; R.S. 1887, § 2367; R.S. 1899, § 3452; C.S. 1910, § 4296; C.S. 1920, § 5565; R.S. 1931, § 89-407; C.S. 1945, § 3-502; W.S. 1957, § 1-14; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision concerning minors as parties to actions, see § 1-1-102 .

For provision reserving rights of minors in judgments or orders, see § 1-16-101 .

For age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Cited in

Hill v. Mayall, 886 P.2d 1188, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1994); Sullivan v. Bailiff, 867 F. Supp. 992, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16706 (D. Wyo. 1994).

Law reviews. —

See comment, “Remedial Title Legislation for Wyoming,” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 561 (1972).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Tolling of state statute of limitations in favor of one commencing action despite existing disability, 30 ALR4th 1092.

Post-traumatic syndrome as tolling running of statute of limitations, 12 ALR5th 546.

§ 1-3-105. Actions other than recovery of real property.

  1. Civil actions other than for the recovery  of real property can only be brought within the following periods  after the cause of action accrues:
    1. Within ten (10) years, an action upon  a specialty or any contract, agreement or promise in writing;
    2. Within eight (8) years, an action:
      1. Upon a contract not in writing, either  express or implied; or
      2. Upon a liability created by statute other  than a forfeiture or penalty.
    3. Within five (5) years after the debtor  establishes residence in Wyoming, an action on a foreign claim, judgment  or contract, express or implied, contracted or incurred and accrued  before the debtor became a resident of Wyoming;
    4. Within four (4) years, an action for:
      1. Trespass upon real property;
      2. The recovery of personal property or for  taking, detaining or injuring personal property;
      3. An injury to the rights of the plaintiff,  not arising on contract and not herein enumerated; and
      4. For relief on the ground of fraud.
    5. Within one (1) year, an action for:
      1. Libel or slander;
      2. Assault or battery not including sexual  assault;
      3. Malicious prosecution or false imprisonment;  or
      4. Upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture,  except that if a different limitation is prescribed in the statute  by which the remedy is given the action shall be brought within the  period prescribed by the statute.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this  section, a civil action based upon sexual assault as defined by W.S. 6-2-301(a)(v) against a minor may be brought within the later of:
    1. Eight (8) years after the minor’s eighteenth  birthday; or
    2. Three (3) years after the discovery.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 32-36; R.S. 1887, §§ 2368-2372; Laws 1890-91, ch. 72, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3453-3457; C.S. 1910, §§ 4297-4301; Laws 1911, ch. 63, § 1; C.S. 1920, §§ 5566-5570; Laws 1931, ch. 73, §§ 83, 84; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-408 to 89-412; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-503 to 3-507; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-15 to 1-19; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1993, ch. 215, § 1.

I.General Consideration.

Cross references. —

As to saving clause for persons under disabilities, see § 1-3-114 .

As to abatement of cause of action for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, assault or assault and battery by death of either party, see § 1-4-102 .

As to libel, see art. 1, § 20, Wyo. Const. and ch. 29 of this title.

As to limitation on foreclosure of mortgage under power of sale, see § 34-4-102 .

I.General Consideration.

Section deals with “civil actions” only. —

This section makes it plain that it deals with “civil actions” National Tailoring Co. v. Scott, 65 Wyo. 64, 196 P.2d 387, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1948).

Filing a foreign judgment. —

Filing a foreign judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act does not involve a court proceeding and is thus not a civil action within the clear language of this section, and therefore limitation period specified in subsection (a)(iii) of this section does not apply. Hill v. Value Recovery Group, L.P., 964 P.2d 1256, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1998).

Elements of “cause of action.” —

A “cause of action” cannot exist without the concurrence of a right, a duty and a default; or, stated differently, an obligation must exist upon one party in favor of the other, the performance of which is refused. Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1978).

Accrual of cause of action. —

Generally, a cause of action accrues as soon as a right to maintain an action arises — when the plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted the action to successful completion. Gillis v. F & A Enters., 934 P.2d 1253, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1997).

A cause of action accrues only when forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3006 (U.S. 1979), reh'g denied, 590 P.2d 1340, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1979).

An injured person's cause of action against the manufacturer of a product that caused an injury accrues at the time of the injury, not at the time the injured person learns the identity of the manufacturer. Nowotny v. L & B Contract Indus., 933 P.2d 452, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1997).

When a cause of action is created by the reversal of a judgment on appeal, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the written appellate opinion is issued. Gillis v. F & A Enters., 934 P.2d 1253, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1997).

Occurrence of damage begins period. —

The statute of limitations had run with respect to the plaintiff's tort claims, as the occurrence of damage satisfies the requirement that the injured party knew or reasonably should have known of the potential of a wrongful act being the cause. Barlage v. Key Bank, 892 P.2d 124, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1995).

Discovery rule. —

Under doctrine of second compensable injury, if psychic trauma was proximately caused by sexual assault upon a minor, and medical science could not recognize that trauma or its final consequences could not be forecast, period of limitations does not begin to run until the damage is identified. McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1999).

Wyoming is a discovery state, in which statute of limitations is triggered when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of existence of a cause of action. Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee Pshp. Co., 2 P.3d 534, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 2000).

Even though an investor, who withdrew from a business he created with the business's owners, did not assert the tort of conversion when he first filed suit, the business owners knew that he was seeking the return of property. Moreover, the investor did not become aware that he had a claim for conversion until it was decided on appeal that the investor had an equity interest in the business; the investor's claim was not time-barred. Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, 208 P.3d 1296, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2009).

June 6, 2006 was the last date on which plaintiff could legitimately claim that he was unaware that Wyoming no longer had at least some of his property; the deadline for plaintiff to file his complaint was June 5, 2010, and plaintiff did not file until August 22, 2011, over a year late. Deloge v. Homar, 2013 WY 33, 297 P.3d 117, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2013).

In a dispute over real property, when the statute of limitations began to run was a disputed issue of fact because factual disputes remained concerning when the father rejected the children's demands to convey property to the trust, giving them actual notice of the dispute. Factual disputes also remained concerning when the children had reason to know that the father had not conveyed the disputed property to the trust. Redland v. Redland, 2012 WY 148, 288 P.3d 1173, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 2012), reh'g denied, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. Dec. 18, 2012), 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Nov 21, 2012).

In a case relating to the theft and resale of beer, the discovery rule applied to the fraud and conversion statutes of limitation; however, whether the explanations for a delay in discovery were credible and reasonably diligent were questions for the jury. The parties disputed what steps were necessary to determine the cause of the beer losses and to determine who was involved in those losses. Robert L. Kroenlein Trust v. Kirchhefer, 2015 WY 127, 357 P.3d 1118, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2015).

Borrowing Statute.—

When applying a foreign jurisdiction's statute of limitations pursuant to Wyoming's borrowing statute, a Wyoming court should not also consider or apply that foreign jurisdiction's choice of law statutes or case law. Therefore, in a negligence case arising from a vehicle accident in Montana, the Montana three-year statute of limitations applied, but not its choice of law principles. Boutelle v. Boutelle, 2014 WY 147, 337 P.3d 1148, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 2014).

Contractual actions accrue at time of breach. —

The principle applied to contractual actions is that the statute of limitations commences to run when the right or cause of action accrues. This is usually the time of a breach of a contractual agreement rather than the time that actual damages are sustained as a consequence of the breach. Richardson Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, 806 P.2d 790, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1991).

District court must determine arbitrability in light of all contract terms. —

The district court is obligated to determine the question of arbitrability in the light of all the contract terms which form the agreement to arbitrate. Where the parties detailed that the agreement to arbitrate would not extend beyond any applicable statute of limitations, the district court was compelled to ascertain that issue as a part of its determination whether an agreement to arbitrate existed. Pioneer Water & Sewer Dist. v. Civil Eng'g Professionals, 905 P.2d 1245, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1995).

Estoppel to prevent fraud. —

The doctrine of estoppel in pais is applicable in a proper case to prevent a fraudulent or inequitable resort to the statute of limitations. Turner v. Turner, 582 P.2d 600, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 220 (Wyo. 1978).

Equitable estoppel did not preclude a statute of limitations defense because the evidence showed that it was not an insurer's actions that induced an accident victim to delay service of the summons and complaint, but rather an apparent misunderstanding on the part of the victim's counsel as to the period of time within which service had to be accomplished. Inman v. Boykin, 2014 WY 94, 330 P.3d 275, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2014).

Party has reasonable time in which to bring action after estoppel has expired, not exceeding the period of limitation imposed by this section for commencing the action. Turner v. Turner, 582 P.2d 600, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 220 (Wyo. 1978).

In product liability suit against manufacturer of intrauterine device, the statute of limitations began to run when plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that she had suffered an injury and knew or reasonably should have known the cause of that injury, and neither the manner by which she came to know significant facts nor her awareness of her legal rights, were relevant to the running of the statute. Olson v. A.H. Robins Co., 696 P.2d 1294, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 463 (Wyo. 1985).

Plaintiff in product liability suit against manufacturer of intrauterine device could not rely on equitable estoppel to toll statute where there was no contact between her and defendant company. Olson v. A.H. Robins Co., 696 P.2d 1294, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 463 (Wyo. 1985).

Burden of proof of exception or excuse from nonapplication of statute of limitations rests upon the plaintiff, including discovery; while proof of the application of the limitation period is an obligation in allegation and proof of the defendant. Richardson Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, 806 P.2d 790, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1991).

Governmental immunity preclusion arises from governmental interest. —

Governmental immunity preclusion from a defense of statute of limitations requires public interest in the results and not pro forma participation in the proceedings. No matter whether the immune government is a party, the insulation arises only if the real interest is governmental and not by a benefit for private individuals. Richardson Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, 806 P.2d 790, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1991).

Construction of public school building by school district is sovereign activity, and the applicable statutes of limitations cannot be invoked to bar the school district from bringing an action against a contractor or an architect for damages arising out of that construction in order to vindicate public rights. Laramie County Sch. Dist. Number One v. Muir, 808 P.2d 797, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1991).

Statute of limitations for collecting unpaid taxes. —

There is no Wyoming law which restricts the power of the state and its taxing instrumentalities, the counties, from collecting due and unpaid mineral production taxes; the passage of time will not serve to absolve nonpayment of Wyoming ad valorem and severance taxes which, although due for prior periods, went unreported and consequently unpaid. Union Pac. Resources Co. v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1992).

Section 1983 claims. —

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in this state is controlled by this section which governs the limitations period for personal injuries. Sullivan v. Bailiff, 867 F. Supp. 992, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16706 (D. Wyo. 1994).

Prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on allegations that the prisoner was restrained and therefore prevented from accessing food and water during transport; although the claim was untimely, the prisoner was entitled to an opportunity to show that equitable tolling was applicable under Wyoming law. Gee v. Pacheco, 624 F.3d 1304, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21996 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2010).

While plaintiff inmate's Eighth Amendment claim against defendant prison officials was untimely under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105 , it had only been filed two days late, thus dismissal without providing an opportunity for the inmate to better articulate his argument for equitable tolling was error. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25613 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2010).

Service of process—

Where public employee did not serve copies of her personal injury complaint on the state attorney general or the director of the department of employment in the manner required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b) the complaint was barred by the statute of limitation, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105 because service was not perfected until after expiration of the four year statute of limitations. However, the savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 , applied to allow the employee to refile the action. Haney v. Cribbs, 2006 WY 158, 148 P.3d 1118, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 2006).

Relation back of amended complaints. —

Plaintiffs' third amended complaint, which named the manufacturer of a defective product as defendant, but which was filed after the running of the statute of limitations, could not relate back to a prior defective amendment filed within the limitations period naming the manufacturer as defendant; it could relate back only to the original complaint, which did not identify the manufacturer. Nowotny v. L & B Contract Indus., 933 P.2d 452, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1997).

Question of law for court. —

Trial court erred in relegating to jury application of statute of limitations governing sexual assault of minor, without any guidance with respect to law. McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1999).

Applied in

Johnson v. Wold, 475 P.2d 714, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1970); Badley v. Birchby, 487 P.2d 798, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 238 (Wyo. 1971); In re Estate of Sullivan, 506 P.2d 813, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1973); Courtney v. School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 401, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12070 (D. Wyo. 1974); Lafferty v. Nickel, 663 P.2d 168, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1983); Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 25531 (10th Cir. 1985); Richardson v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1990); Johnson v. Griffin, 922 P.2d 860, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1996); VanLente v. University of Wyo. Research Corp., 975 P.2d 594, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1999).

Quoted in

United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 169 F. Supp. 735, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3874 (D. Wyo. 1959); Baker v. First Nat'l Bank, 603 P.2d 397, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 488 (Wyo. 1979); Hulse v. BHJ, Inc., 2003 WY 75, 71 P.3d 262, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 2003); NuHome Invs., LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, 81 P.3d 940, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 2003).

Stated in

Ellis v. Cauhaupe, 71 Wyo. 475, 260 P.2d 309, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (1953); Wyoming Constr. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 275 F.2d 97, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5521 (10th Cir. 1960); Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 2000).

Cited in

Board of Comm'rs v. Stone, 7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (1898); Ingersoll v. Davis, 14 Wyo. 120, 82 P. 867, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (1905); City of Rawlins v. Murphy, 19 Wyo. 238, 115 P. 436, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1911); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Summers, 19 Wyo. 441, 120 P. 185, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (1912); Cook v. Elmore, 27 Wyo. 163, 192 P. 824, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (1920); Houghton Bros. v. Yocum, 40 Wyo. 57, 274 P. 10, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1929); Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (1929); Gray v. Town of Thermopolis, 33 F. Supp. 73, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1104 (D. Wyo. 1936); Wyoming Disct. Corp. v. Lamar, 444 P.2d 620, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 1968); Waters v. Brand, 497 P.2d 875, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 254 (Wyo. 1972); In re Estate of Sullivan, 506 P.2d 813, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1973); Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1973); Awe v. University of Wyo., 534 P.2d 97, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1975); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co., 669 P.2d 505, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1983); DeWitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 539 (Wyo. 1986); Streeter v. Amerequip Corp., 968 F. Supp. 624, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9464 (D. Wyo. 1997); Ryel v. Anderies, 4 P.3d 193, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 2000); Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 2000); Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Followill, 2004 WY 80, 93 P.3d 238, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (2004); Prokop v. Hockhalter, 2006 WY 75, 137 P.3d 131, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (2006); Reynolds v. Moore, 2014 WY 20, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 21 , 2014 WL 547505 (Feb 11, 2014).

Law reviews. —

See “Attorney's Liability in Title Examination,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 177.

See “Abstractor's Liability in Examination of Title,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 184.

See “The Claim of Right Element in Adverse Possession in Wyoming,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 155.

See comment, “Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors,” IX Land & Water L. Rev. 589 (1974).

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For note, “An Interest Analysis Approach to Wyoming's Borrowing Statute,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 717 (1980).

For comment, “Hazardous Waste Cleanup in Wyoming: Legal Tools Available to the Private Citizen,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 395 (1984).

For case note, “Torts — Wyoming Finds An Appropriate Case to Adopt Strict Products Liability. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 511 (Wyo. 1986),” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 223 (1987).

For article, “Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability — The Marriage Revisited,” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 455 (1987).

For article, “The Ungrateful Living: An Estate Planner's Nightmare — The Trial Attorney's Dream,” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 401 (1989).

For article, “Understanding the New Tort of First Party Bad Faith in Wyoming: McCullough v. Golden Rule Insurance Company,” see XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. 225 (1991).

For article, “Lender Liability in Wyoming,” see XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. 707 (1991).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

When limitation period begins to run against employee's cause of action for contracting of disease, 11 ALR2d 277.

Action by passenger against carrier for personal injuries as based on contract or on tort with respect to application of statute of limitation, 20 ALR2d 331.

Statute of limitations governing damage action against warehouseman for loss of or damage to destroyed goods, 23 ALR2d 1466.

What statute of limitations governs action to reform instrument, 36 ALR2d 687.

Nuisance by sewage disposal plant as affected by limitations, 40 ALR2d 1177.

Statute of limitations applicable to action by employer or insurance carrier subrogated to rights of claimant of workmen's compensation as against tortfeasor, 41 ALR2d 1044.

When statute of limitations starts to run against enforcement of resulting trust, 45 ALR2d 382.

Limitation of action as applied to account stated, 51 ALR2d 331.

What constitutes sufficient repudiation of express trust by trustee to cause statute of limitations to run, 54 ALR2d 13.

Time limitations as to claims based on uninsured motorist clause, 28 ALR3d 580.

Commencing of running of limitations against option or right in nature of option exercisable on demand, 35 ALR3d 349.

When is account “mutual” for purposes of rule that limitations run from last item in open, current, and mutual account, 45 ALR3d 446.

Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bastardy proceedings, 59 ALR3d 685.

What statute of limitations applies to action for surplus of proceeds from sale of collateral, 59 ALR3d 1205.

When statute of limitations begins to run against action to recover money paid by mistake, 79 ALR3d 754.

When does statute of limitations begin to run against action for wrongful appropriation of literary property or idea, 79 ALR3d 820.

When statute of limitations begins to run against action for conversion of property by theft, 79 ALR3d 847.

Validity of contractual provision establishing period of limitations longer than that provided by state statute of limitations, 84 ALR3d 1172.

When statute of limitations begins to run on negligent design claim against architect, 90 ALR3d 507.

What statute of limitations governs actions based on strict liability in tort, 91 ALR3d 455.

When does statute of limitations begin to run upon an action by subrogated insurer against third-party tort-feasor, 91 ALR3d 844.

Effect of lack of knowledge of product's defect on running of statute of limitations in products liability claim, 91 ALR3d 991.

What statute of limitations governs damage action against attorney for malpractice, 2 ALR4th 284.

What statute of limitations governs action arising out of transaction consummated by use of credit card, 2 ALR4th 677.

When statute of limitations begins to run in dental malpractice suits, 3 ALR4th 318.

What statute of limitations governs physician's action for wrongful denial of hospital privileges, 3 ALR4th 1214.

Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support, 5 ALR4th 1015.

Statutes of limitation: actions by purchasers or contractees against vendors or contractors involving defects in houses or other buildings caused by soil instability, 12 ALR4th 866.

When statute of limitations begins to run against action based on unwritten promise to pay money where there is no condition or definite time for repayment, 14 ALR4th 1385.

When statute of limitations begins to run as to cause of action for nuisance based on air pollution, 19 ALR4th 456.

When statute of limitations begins to run upon action against attorney for malpractice, 32 ALR4th 260.

Limitation of actions: invasion of right of privacy, 33 ALR4th 479.

Limitation of actions: time of discovery of defamation as determining accrual of action, 35 ALR4th 1002.

When statute of limitations commences to run on automobile no-fault insurance personal injury claim, 36 ALR4th 357.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by spoilage or contamination of beverage, 87 ALR4th 804.

Application of “discovery rule” to postpone running of limitations against action for damages from assault, 88 ALR4th 1063.

Computer sales and leases: time when cause of action for failure of performance accrues, 90 ALR4th 298.

Running of limitations against action for civil damages for sexual abuse of child, 9 ALR5th 321.

Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or property caused by underground flow of contaminants, 11 ALR5th 438.

When statute of limitations commences to run as to cause of action for wrongful discharge, 19 ALR5th 439.

Modern status of the application of “discovery rule” to postpone running of limitations against actions relating to breach of building and construction contracts, 33 ALR5th 1.

Attorney malpractice — Tolling or other exceptions to running of statute of limitations, 87 ALR5th 473.

Laches or other assertion of untimeliness as defense to action under title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.) brought by equal employment opportunity commission, 67 ALR Fed 381.

Limitations of actions applicable to action by trustees of employee benefit plan to enforce delinquent employer contributions under ERISA (29 USC § 1132(a)), 90 ALR Fed 374.

Pre-emption, by Railway Labor Act (45 USC §§ 151 et seq.), of employee's state-law action for infliction of emotional distress, 104 ALR Fed 548.

When does statute of limitations begin to run in action under False Claims Act (31 USCS §§ 3729 -3733), 139 ALR Fed 645.

II.Ten Years.

Provisions applicable to written indemnity. —

Merely because a four-year limitation was applicable as against plaintiff's right of recovery for injuries to real and personal property, application of that same limitation to an action to recover on the written indemnity protecting said property was not required. Under such circumstances, this section would apply. Taylor Ditch Co. v. Carey, 520 P.2d 218, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1974).

And to certificates of indebtedness. —

Suits to recover judgment upon certificates of indebtedness (warrants) issued by county commissioners to attorneys for services are governed by subsection (a)(i) of this section, providing 10-year limitation rather than by subsection (a)(ii) of this section. Board of Comm'rs v. Casper Nat'l Bank, 56 Wyo. 132, 105 P.2d 578, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1940).

Statutory period applicable to federal pension action. —

The ten-year statute of limitations for actions based on written contract was applicable to an action brought under the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act by trustees of a pension plan to recover delinquent contributions. Trustees of Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8635 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1988), overruled in part, NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Div., Inc., 979 F.2d 1384, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28309 (10th Cir. Kan. 1992), overruled in part, NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Div., 979 F.2d 1384, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28310 (10th Cir. Kan. 1992).

Limitation period applicable to faulty construction claim. —

The 10-year statute of limitations applied to bar contractual claims in a complex civil action resulting from the faulty construction of a county library building which, soon after completion, started sinking into the ground and cracking up to the point of near nonhabitability. Richardson Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, 806 P.2d 790, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1991).

And to negotiable instruments. —

The six-year limitation on negotiable instruments found in § 34.1-3-118 could not be applied retroactively to bar a cause of action brought to enforce a note that was signed prior to the enactment of that section; instead, the 10-year statute of limitation found in subsection (a)(i) of this section was applicable. S & S Diversified Servs., L.L.C. v. Arguello, 911 F. Supp. 498, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19764 (D. Wyo. 1995).

And to promissory note delivered to Wyoming. —

Where a promissory note was executed in California and then delivered by mailing to Wyoming, enforcement was controlled by the Wyoming statute of limitations, and the lender then had at least 10 years to file suit from the date of receipt, which completed delivery. Stanbury v. Larsen, 803 P.2d 349, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1990).

But inapplicable to oral contracts. —

An action against an insurance company to recover a premium paid, on the ground that the policy delivered did not conform to the oral contract of insurance made with the soliciting agent, is not an “action on a contract in writing” for the payment of money within subsection (a)(i) of this section, limiting actions on such contracts; rather, the cause of action is oral and is barred in eight years from the time of its accrual by subsection (a)(ii) of this section. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Summers, 19 Wyo. 441, 120 P. 185, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1912).

And contractual power of sale. —

Even though the remedy by court action in mortgage foreclosure proceedings on both the note evidencing the debt and the mortgage securing it are barred by this section, another existing remedy, that of the contractual power of sale, would not be held barred unless the applicable statute relating to it so stated. National Tailoring Co. v. Scott, 65 Wyo. 64, 196 P.2d 387, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1948).

Breach of contract action. —

Where net profits became due and payable in May 2005 under oil and gas leases, plaintiff successors in interest filed suit against defendant oil and gas companies in March 2006; this was less than one year after plaintiffs' claim accrued. Therefore, the district court properly rejected defendants' statute of limitations claim in light of the applicable ten-year time limit for breach of contract actions under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i). Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, 226 P.3d 889, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 2010).

Accrual of cause of action on note. —

A cause of action on a note, and to foreclose a mortgage securing the same, accrues at maturity of the note and must be brought within the period of limitations thereafter. Ingersoll v. Davis, 14 Wyo. 120, 82 P. 867, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1905).

Statute of limitations commences on note when due. —

A “cause of action” is said to accrue to any person when that person first comes to a right to bring an action, so the statute of limitations is never held to have commenced to run upon a note until it has become due, and the duty has devolved upon the party liable to make payment. Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1978).

And cause arises where note payable. —

Since a cause of action does not arise until the note becomes due and a duty devolves upon the maker to render payment, the place where the cause of action arises is the place where the note is payable — regardless of where it had been executed. Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1978).

Cause of action on demand note arises immediately upon its execution and delivery, even though no demand has been made by the payee. Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1978).

Even where undisputed evidence indicates that demand notes were antedated, the stated date on the notes determines the time when they are payable. Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1978).

Ten-year statute of limitations was not tolled in action on promissory note, where the lender knew the borrower's location in California, visited the borrower in California, knew the location of the borrower's residence, knew the borrower's mailing address and knew that the borrower was not avoiding service during this period. Stanbury v. Larsen, 803 P.2d 349, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1990).

Where debt is payable in installments, statute of limitations runs on the whole debt from the date of the first default only when such default has the effect by the terms of the contract or otherwise of maturing the whole debt, and when the default does not mature the whole debt, the statute will run from the date of the default, if at all, only on the installment as to which default has occurred. Clause v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 16 Wyo. 450, 95 P. 54, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1908).

Under trust deed or mortgage securing debt payable in installments with provision that upon default entire debt with interest may at once, at option of legal holder thereof, become due and payable, option is solely for creditor's benefit, and unless he exercises it, statute runs on debt only from time of its maturity as originally fixed. Clause v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 16 Wyo. 450, 95 P. 54, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1908).

A debt payable in installments was secured by a deed of trust stipulating that on the default in any of the payments the whole debt might at the option of the creditor become due at once. Unless the creditor exercised the option, the statute of limitations ran on the debt only from the time of its maturity as originally fixed. Clause v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 16 Wyo. 450, 95 P. 54, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1908).

Effect of payment by comaker. —

Where one of two makers of a joint and several promissory note makes a payment thereon, so doing does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations as to the other maker. Bergman v. Bly, 66 F. 40, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2292 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1895).

Propriety of suing upon original obligation. —

In action on note, it is proper to sue upon original obligation, relying upon a reply, after bar of statute of limitations has been alleged in defendant's answer, avoiding that bar through claim of acknowledgment of indebtedness. Investment & Sec. Co. v. Bunten, 56 Wyo. 77, 103 P.2d 414, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (1940). See Rule 7 and 8, W.R.C.P.

Acknowledgment sufficient to revive debt or claim. —

Letters which make excuses for nonpayment of a note and do not deny the obligation, nor regard indebtedness as nonexistent, are sufficient acknowledgment to revive the debt or claim otherwise barred by limitations. Investment & Sec. Co. v. Bunten, 56 Wyo. 77, 103 P.2d 414, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1940).

Where a purchaser of land agreed to pay part of the price in money and part in stock in a corporation to be subsequently formed, the payment of the money portion of the price, coupled with a written acknowledgment that the plaintiff would get the stock as soon as it was issued, and the further fact that the stock was afterwards issued, started anew the statute limiting the plaintiff's cause of action for the price. Kuhn v. McKay, 7 Wyo. 42, 49 P. 473, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1897). See § 1-3-119 .

Running of statute of limitation in suits charging negligent performance of professional duties. —

See Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1970). See also § 1-3-107 .

Limitations do not run as to express and continuing trusts until repudiation or adverse possession. Tibbals v. Keys, 40 Wyo. 524, 281 P. 190, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1929).

Failure of one having power of disposal of property to make sale thereof during lifetime was not repudiation of trust relation. Tibbals v. Keys, 40 Wyo. 524, 281 P. 190, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1929).

When adverse possession initiated against mortgagee. —

Title by adverse possession is, at least in absence of facts to contrary, initiated against mortgagee from time hostile and exclusive possession is taken of property. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Adverse possession is initiated against a mortgagee at once if adverse possessor has no actual or constructive knowledge of existence of mortgage. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Where mortgage was recorded prior to date adverse possessor initiated possession, adverse possessor had “constructive knowledge” of its existence. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Mortgagee's right to foreclose and right to acquire title in connection therewith must exist as against world, including an adverse possessor, during time granted by statute. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Right to foreclose, and right to acquire title in connection therewith, exists as against the world, including an adverse possessor, during statutory 10-year period after due date of mortgage. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Mortgagee who forecloses by virtue of power of sale has same rights against an adverse possessor as a mortgagee who forecloses by action. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Where adverse possession begins after execution of recorded mortgage, mortgagee may foreclose within 10 years after mortgage becomes due, and making adverse possessor a party, previous adverse possession cannot deprive him of rights and cannot again be initiated against him until he is entitled to foreclosure deed. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Where adverse possessor held possession 12 years he obtained title valid against a mortgagee in absence of proof that mortgage indebtedness was extended before he took possession so as to give mortgagee less than statutory 10-year period after due date to foreclose. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Where record failed to disclose when indebtedness secured by mortgage executed Nov. 30, 1921, was due, supreme court must assume it was due at once or within reasonable time, and at least during 1922. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Mortgagee cannot, as against adverse possessor, extend time for payment and for foreclosure after adverse possession has started. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1941).

Where limitations shown to have run. —

Where petition shows upon its face that cause of action accrued at such time that under the statute of limitations no action can be brought, demurrer (now motion) will lie on ground that petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute cause of action. Cowhick v. Shingle, 5 Wyo. 87, 37 P. 689, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 23 , 25 L.R.A. 608 (1894). See Rule 7, W.R.C.P.

Subsequent disability of no consequence. —

When statute of limitations once begins to run, it is not arrested by any subsequent disability; and that rule was held applicable to the disability of coverture. Bliler v. Boswell, 9 Wyo. 57, 59 P. 798, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 9 Wyo. 57, 59 P. 798, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1900).

Pleading statute of limitations is personal privilege, and while mortgagor in foreclosure action may, if he desires, plead statute, privilege does not pass to subsequent encumbrancers. Wild v. Stephens, 1 Wyo. 366, 1877 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1877).

Failure to plead held not fatal. —

Failure of party relying on statute relating to adverse possession to plead specifically as against prior mortgagee that foreclosure of mortgage was barred by limitations was not fatal. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 18 , 136 A.L.R. 770 (1941), rehearing denied, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 113 P.2d 963, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 19 , 136 A.L.R. 770 (1941). See Rule 8(c), W.R.C.P.

Which state statute applicable. —

As the statute of limitations applies only to the remedy and not to the right, the statute in force in the state in which the action is brought applies. Union Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Maika, 16 Wyo. 141, 92 P. 619, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1907).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes contract in writing within statute of limitations, 3 ALR2d 809.

Check as contract in writing within meaning of statute, 3 ALR2d 809.

Insurance policy as within provisions applicable to contracts in writing, 3 ALR2d 809.

Statute of limitation governing action to recover unearned premium retained by insurer upon cancellation of policy, 29 ALR2d 938.

What statute of limitations concerns action to reform insurance contracts, 36 ALR2d 687.

Applicability of limitation statute to action on bonds of public body or on obligation to collect revenues for their payment, 38 ALR2d 930.

Suspension or removal of bar of statute of limitations as against judgment, 45 ALR2d 967.

When statute of limitations begins to run on contractual obligation to pay for minor's support, 52 ALR2d 1125.

Validity of contractual time period, shorter than statute of limitations, for bringing action, 6 ALR3d 1197.

What statute of limitations governs action for interference with contract or other economic relations, 58 ALR3d 1027.

III.Eight Years.

Constitutionality of amendment. —

The 1891 amendment to subsection (a)(ii) of this section is not in violation of art. 3, § 24 Wyo. Const.Board of Comm'rs v. Stone, 7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1898).

Provisions inapplicable to certificates of indebtedness. —

Suits to recover judgment upon certificates of indebtedness (warrants) issued by county commissioners to attorneys for services are governed by subsection (a)(i) of this section, providing 10-year limitation rather than by subsection (a)(ii) of this section. Board of Comm'rs v. Casper Nat'l Bank, 56 Wyo. 132, 105 P.2d 578, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1940).

Provisions inapplicable to periodic child support payments. —

In the absence of a statute, a decree for periodic payments of child support creates sequential judgments enforceable under the statutory procedures for enforcement of judgments. Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1997).

Provisions Applicable to inverse condemnation actions. —

Statute of limitations applicable to an inverse condemnation action was eight years, as found in Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B), because that statute's language more closely fit an inverse condemnation action. 2013 WY 3, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 2 .

When right of action accrues under continuing contract. —

Where services are rendered under an agreement indefinite as to length of service and the mode or rate of compensation, the contract is a continuing one, and an employee's right of action accrues, and the statutory period of this section begins to run, when, and only when, the services are fully performed or the employment is otherwise terminated. Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 64 Wyo. 455, 197 P.2d 697 (Wyo. 1948).

A claim for wages previously earned under a continuing contract of employment accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, when there was a break in the employment, even though the employee later returned to the same employment. Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 64 Wyo. 455, 197 P.2d 697 (Wyo. 1948).

And under mistaken belief that marriage existed. —

Where a cause of action arises not from any contract but because services were rendered under the mistaken belief that a marriage existed, the case would be analogous to fraud, and the cause of action would not accrue, nor the statutory period of this section run, until the discovery of the mistake, that is, that no marriage existed. Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1948). See § 1-3-106 .

Running of statute of limitation in suits charging negligent performance of professional duties. —

See Banner v. Dayton, 474 P.2d 300, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1970).

Laches. —

Where plaintiff's cause of action as partner in oil claim accrued in 1912, but suit instituted two years thereafter was dismissed for want of prosecution, whereafter he waited until 1921 before bringing another suit, awaiting outcome of other litigation, during which time his partners transferred their interests, his cause of action, if any, was barred by laches. Taylor v. Salt Creek Consol. Oil Co. (8th Cir. 1922).

Statute of limitations was tolled by letter from property owner's attorney to a contractor's attorney which acknowledged a debt clearly identifiable in the contractor's subsequent claim. Longstaff v. Mills, 773 P.2d 149, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1989).

Argument that laches is inapplicable whenever a statute of limitations governs a claim would completely abolish the doctrine of laches because all actions in Wyoming are governed by a statute of limitations, and this would frustrate the goal of securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action; however, the role of laches in breach of contract cases covered by an applicable statute of limitations should be very limited in scope, and in the proper case, the defense of laches should be available to remedy not only the delay but the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the plaintiff's dilatory action. Windsor Energy Group, L.L.C. v. Noble, Energy, Inc., 2014 WY 96, 330 P.3d 285, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2014).

There was no question that the statute of limitations had not expired when companies commenced this breach of contract action for payment of the joint interest bills, but the business asserted that the companies' claims were barred by laches, and the defense applied and was proven.. Windsor Energy Group, L.L.C. v. Noble, Energy, Inc., 2014 WY 96, 330 P.3d 285, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2014).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Limitation period as affected by requirement of notice or presentation of claim against governmental body, 3 ALR2d 711.

Running of statute of limitations against claim for services rendered over extended period under indefinite employment not fixing time of payment, 7 ALR2d 198.

Failure to comply with statute requiring one involved in automobile accident to stop or report as affecting question as to suspension or tolling statute of limitations, 10 ALR2d 564.

What statute of limitations governs cause of action for personal injuries against retailer, manufacturer and the like based on breach of implied warranty, 37 ALR2d 703.

Statute of limitations applicable to action, by way of subrogation or the like, by employer or insurance carrier against third person for injury to employee, 41 ALR2d 1044.

When limitations begin to run against actions on public securities or obligations to be paid out of a special or particular fund, 50 ALR2d 271.

Limitation of actions for annulment of marriage, 52 ALR2d 1163.

What statute of limitations applies to action under dramshop or civil damage act, 55 ALR2d 1286.

Applicability of general statute of limitations to real estate tax lien foreclosure action, 59 ALR2d 1144.

Physician's claim for compensation for medical services or treatment, 99 ALR2d 251.

IV.Five Years.

When period commences to run. —

Five-year period for commencing of action on foreign claim or contract, under this section, does not commence to run until after the cause of action has accrued. Houghton Bros. v. Yocum, 40 Wyo. 57, 274 P. 10, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1929).

V.Four Years.

Action challenging term limit statute not barred. —

Four-year limitation period did not bar declaratory judgment action challenging a term limit law; the legislators' causes of action did not accrue until they were actually faced with the reality of being foreclosed from seeking re-election, and the electors' causes of action did not accrue until they were actually faced with the reality of not being able to vote for their chosen candidates. Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2004).

Annexation challenges. —

Because applying a 10-day time limit to declaratory actions where there is no clear legislative intent to do so thwarts the broad purpose of such actions, aggrieved parties may challenge the validity of an annexation ordinance within the statute of limitations applicable to civil actions under this section. Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, 79 P.3d 500, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 2003).

Applicability. —

Election contest was dismissed because the electors failed to bring the contest within 15 days; the four-year statute of limitations under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) did not apply. Rock v. Lankford, 2013 WY 61, 301 P.3d 1075, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2013).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i) did not preclude the Wyoming Public Service Commission from ordering refunds dating back more than 10 years where the Commission was a governmental entity, and as such, the statute of limitations did not apply. Montana-Dakota Utils., Co. v. Wyo. PSC, 2014 WY 106, 332 P.3d 1160, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2014).

Provisions govern actions for change of street grade. —

An action against a city for damage to property caused by changing the grade of abutting streets is governed by subsection (a)(iv) of this section, requiring actions for injury to rights not arising on contract, and not otherwise provided for, to be brought within four years; and subsection (a)(ii) of this section is not applicable thereto. Rawlins v. Murphy, 19 Wyo. 238, 115 P. 436, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1911).

Likewise, action for personal injuries must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues. Riley v. Union P. R. Co., 182 F.2d 765, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2864 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1950).

And negligence actions. —

Negligence actions are governed by the four-year limitation specified in subsections (a)(iv)(B) and (C) of this section. Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, 927 P.2d 1168, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1996).

And action for damages to land resulting from construction of railroad embankment and reservoir seepage was an “action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff,” “not arising on contract” and within the four year provision of this section. Schoening v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 30 F.2d 803, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2530 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1929).

In landowners' action for damage to their property occurring as the result of long-continued seepage from an irrigation ditch, court's refusal to assume that entire reduction in value of landowners' property due to seepage occurred when seepage began, which date was beyond the statute of limitations, was not erroneous. Taylor Ditch Co. v. Carey, 520 P.2d 218, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1974).

Subsection (a)(iv)(C) governs strict liability claims. It establishes a four-year limitations period which runs from the date of injury. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 511 (Wyo. 1986).

Tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress fits under subsection (a)(iv)(C), which provides for a four year statute of limitations. Gustafson v. Bridger Coal Co., 834 F. Supp. 352, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13281 (D. Wyo. 1993).

Civil sexual assault. —

The statute of limitations for civil sexual assault is four years. McCulloh v. Drake, 2001 WY 56, 24 P.3d 1162, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2001).

Claims brought under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. —

Statute of limitations for claims brought in Wyoming state courts under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 was four years pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), not two years under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-115 ; the inmate's motion to amend his counterclaim and cross-claim under this section to add a § 1983 cause of action was brought within four years and should not have been denied as untimely. Ray v. St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc., 2006 WY 98, 139 P.3d 464, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2006).

Running of statute of limitation in suits charging negligent performance of professional duties. —

See Banner v. Dayton, 474 P.2d 300, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1970).

When period of limitations begins to run. —

A cause of action for conversion or wrongful execution, where the judgments upon which a valid execution sale was conducted were later reversed, did not accrue until the judgments were reversed. Gillis v. F & A Enters., 934 P.2d 1253, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1997).

When a cause of action for personal injury arises, the period of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know the existence of a cause of action. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3006 (U.S. 1979), reh'g denied, 590 P.2d 1340, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1979).

Where an injury, although slight, is sustained in consequence of the wrongful act of another, and the law affords a remedy therefor, the statute of limitations attaches at once; it is not required that all the damages resulting from the act shall have been sustained at that time, and the running of the statute is not postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial damages do not occur until a later date. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3006 (U.S. 1979), reh'g denied, 590 P.2d 1340, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1979); ABC Builders v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 365 (Wyo. 1981).

A negligence action cannot accrue before the damage element has occurred. A cause of action in negligence accrues when the injured party knows or reasonably ought to know that some damage has resulted from the wrongful act. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 511 (Wyo. 1986).

The statute of limitations applicable to an employee's negligence claim against his employer began to run when the employee knew or reasonably should have known that he had suffered an injury and knew or reasonably should have known that the cause of that injury was job-related stress; the statute did not begin to run upon cessation of the employer-employee relationship. Lesh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 624, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12514 (D. Wyo. 1989).

As party asserting statute of limitations against counterclaim for conversion, it was counterclaim defendant's responsibility to demonstrate date of demand and refusal in order to commence running of limitations period. Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee Pshp. Co., 2 P.3d 534, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 2000).

Because Wyoming is a discovery rule state, the statute of limitations is not triggered until such time as the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of the cause of action. Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, 927 P.2d 1168, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1996); Nowotny v. L & B Contract Indus., 933 P.2d 452, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1997).

The discovery rule does not require that the identity of the tortfeasor be known before a cause of action can accrue. Nowotny v. L & B Contract Indus., 933 P.2d 452, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1997).

Trustee's action against lessees involved in a joint venture cattle operation was properly barred by a four-year limitations period of this section, where the trustee signed the documents transferring the remaining cattle and ranch brand to the lessees in 1998, the date of the last acts underlying the trustee's cause of action, and the action was not filed until seven years later. Platt v. Creighton, 2007 WY 18, 150 P.3d 1194, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2007).

Because Wyoming was place of injury, its law applied, and plaintiff husband's negligence and strict products liability claims were timely under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (2011) as they were filed within four years of date of injury. Tolman v. Stryker Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37987 (D. Wyo. 2013).

Defective summons served after statute of limitations had run. —

Where the summons in a negligence action did not comply with Wyo. R. Civ. P. 4(b), in that was not signed by the court clerk or sealed and did not have the complaint attached, and was served after the four-year Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105 statute of limitations had run, dismissal was proper because the summons was void, not just voidable. The defect in the summons was so deficient that any judgment against it was susceptible to collateral attack. Hoke v. Motel 6 Jackson & Accor N. Am., Inc., 2006 WY 38, 131 P.3d 369, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2006).

Relation back of amended complaints. —

The purpose of Wyo. R. Civ. P. 17(d) is to provide a plaintiff with a means to toll the statute of limitations when she does not know the proper designation of the defendant; customer's tort action against a corporation should not have been dismissed because despite the fact that customer's amended complaint, in which she replaced a fictitious defendant with the corporation under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 17(d), was untimely, it could relate back under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3), and the complaint was filed within the four year requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C). Busch v. Horton Automatics, Inc., 2008 WY 140, 196 P.3d 787, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 2008).

Failure to timely serve. —

Since plaintiffs failed to serve their complaint within sixty days of filing it, their diversity action was deemed to have commenced on date of service, which was 106 days beyond statute of limitations period, and their action was therefore barred. Habermehl v. Potter, 153 F.3d 1137, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20746 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1998).

Single act of negligence creates only one cause of action and damage arising years later from that act of negligence does not create a new cause of action. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3006 (U.S. 1979), reh'g denied, 590 P.2d 1340, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1979).

Injury suffered in workplace. —

Even though plaintiff's injury was suffered in the workplace, the four-year limitations period of this section applied to her culpable negligence action against coworkers, rather than § 27-14-503 , the statute of limitations in the Workers' Compensation Act. James v. Montoya, 963 P.2d 993, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1998).

Action to recover damages to houses from water seepage accrues when damage occurs. —

In actions by homeowners for negligence and breach of warranty against a land developer, builders and the county to recover damages to their houses from seepage of water, each homeowner's cause of action accrued on or about the date water seepage was first noticed and damage occurred. Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 280 (Wyo. 1984).

Claim for “conversion” of bank moneys accrues when bank statements sent to customer. —

When bank statements were sent to a customer, he knew or should have known of the alleged “conversion” of moneys from his account by the bank, which deposited the moneys in the accounts of other parties. Since no claim was brought within four years based upon that transaction, the district court properly concluded that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. O'Donnell v. Western Nat'l Bank, 705 P.2d 1242, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 562 (Wyo. 1985).

In action against former husband for recovery of overriding oil and gas royalties which were due to the former wife by virtue of an assignment of the same by the husband, as ordered in a divorce decree, but which were not remitted to her, the husband was guilty of conversion, so, therefore, the four-year limitation period of subsection (a)(iv)(B) was applicable. Because this failure to remit was a recurring tort involving a series of tortious acts, each of which formed the basis of a separate claim, and each of which accrued when the husband, on different occasions throughout the years, received royalties and made no remittances, and the wife discovered, or could have discovered, that she was not receiving her royalty share, the wife could recover for her share of royalties received but not remitted by the husband within four years preceding the filing of her action. As to the rest, i.e., the royalties received but not remitted beyond this four-year period, she was barred. Young v. Young, 709 P.2d 1254, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 628 (Wyo. 1985).

Forgery of will, where discoverable, must be raised in probate proceedings. —

Alleged fraud in the forging and probating of a will could not estop beneficiaries from asserting the bar of the statute of limitation, where there was no claim that anything was done which prevented petitioner from discovering the forgery and raising the question in the probate proceedings. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 557 (Wyo. 1986).

Sufficient evidence to support finding statute of limitations had run. —

See Redland v. Tharp, 498 P.2d 1240, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1972).

When confronted with procedural questions involving a pleading of the statute of limitations, the trial courts must carefully weigh the policy of liberality inherent in the rules of procedure and the sound public policy that anchors those statutes. As tersely stated many years ago, “They [the statutes] stimulate to activity and punish negligence.” Bon v. Lemp, 444 P.2d 333, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1968).

Summary Judgment. —

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the irrigation district and the homeowners' neighbors in the homeowners' action to recover for water damage allegedly caused by irrigation, because before the four-year statute of limitations provided in this section could be applied to bar the homeowners' action, a determination was necessary regarding the source of the water, whether its release was negligent, and if it was a continuous tort occurring each season. Reed v. Cloninger, 2006 WY 37, 131 P.3d 359, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2006).

Defense of statute of limitations is question of law because only one conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the factual picture. Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 265 (Wyo. 1971).

It may be raised by motion for summary judgment. Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 265 (Wyo. 1971).

No error in granting directed verdict. —

Though defendant's motion for directed verdict was based on statute generally, referring to part relating to action for trespass on real property for identification, court did not err in granting motion in view of provision barring action for injury to rights not arising on contract after four years. Schoening v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 30 F.2d 803, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2530 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1929).

Unnecessary for appellate court to inquire whether claims barred by limitations. —

Where the supreme court holds that there was no negligence and no breach of appellee's alleged fiduciary duty to appellants and therefore affirms the trial court, which holding is decisive of the case, the court has no need to inquire into the issue whether or not the appellants' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Zwick v. United Farm Agency, 556 P.2d 508, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 1976).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

When limitation commences to run against right of action for damages for overflow of land caused by artificial construction or obstruction, 5 ALR2d 302.

Fraud as tolling period for bringing action prescribed in statute creating the right of action, 15 ALR2d 519.

Statute of limitations applicable to action for an encroachment, 24 ALR2d 903.

Limitation of actions as to slander of title based on recording of instrument purporting to affect title, 39 ALR2d 840.

When statute of limitations begins to run against action for false imprisonment or false arrest, 49 ALR2d 922.

When statute of limitation starts to run against bailor's action for recovery, or for damages for retention, of property deposited for indefinite time, 57 ALR2d 1044.

When does cause of action accrue, for purposes of statute of limitations, against action based upon encroachment of building or other structure upon land of another, 12 ALR3d 1265.

Statutes of limitation concerning actions of trespass as applicable to actions for injury to property not constituting a common-law trespass, 15 ALR3d 1228.

Fraud, misrepresentation or deception as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 43 ALR3d 429.

Publication of libel for purposes of statute of limitations, 42 ALR3d 807.

Right to amend pending personal injury action by including action for wrongful death after statute of limitations has run against independent death action, 71 ALR3d 933.

§ 1-3-106. When certain causes of action accrue.

A cause of action for the wrongful taking of personal property is not deemed to have accrued until the wrongdoer is discovered. A cause of action on the ground of fraud is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 35; R.S. 1887, § 2371; R.S. 1899, § 3456; C.S. 1910, § 4300; C.S. 1920, § 5569; R.S. 1931, § 49-411; C.S. 1945, § 3-506; W.S. 1957, § 1-18; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Active concealment. —

Client's efforts to obtain information were met with active concealment by the stockbroker and others, and under these circumstances, the evidence did not support dismissal of the case on the basis of the statute of limitations. Erdelyi v. Lott, 2014 WY 48, 326 P.3d 165, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2014).

Negligence. —

If a jury finds that a claimant knew or could have discovered the fraud more than four years before filing the action, the perpetrator of the fraud is relieved from any liability, and thus any negligence of the claimant in not discovering and timely pursuing a fraud claim is addressed in the statute, and there is no need for a separate instruction allowing a jury to compare a claimant's negligence or comparative fault with the willful act of the perpetrator in a fraud case; on remand, the jury was not to be instructed on comparative fault as between the client and the stockbroker. Erdelyi v. Lott, 2014 WY 48, 326 P.3d 165, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2014).

When statute runs in fraud cases. —

The statute begins to run in fraud cases when there is discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud. Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 265 (Wyo. 1971).

Fraud and conversion. —

In a case relating to the theft and resale of beer, the discovery rule applied to the fraud and conversion statutes of limitation; however, whether the explanations for a delay in discovery were credible and reasonably diligent were questions for the jury. The parties disputed what steps were necessary to determine the cause of the beer losses and to determine who was involved in those losses. Robert L. Kroenlein Trust v. Kirchhefer, 2015 WY 127, 357 P.3d 1118, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2015).

Words “until the discovery of the fraud” mean from the time the fraud was known or could have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence. They do not necessarily mean until the party complaining had actual notice of the fraud alleged to have been committed. Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 265 (Wyo. 1971); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 557 (Wyo. 1986).

Actual knowledge of fraud will be inferred if the aggrieved party, by the exercise of due diligence, could have discovered it. Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 265 (Wyo. 1971).

In action against former husband for recovery of overriding oil and gas royalties which were due to the former wife by virtue of an assignment of the same by the husband, as ordered in a divorce decree, but which were not remitted to her, the husband was guilty of conversion, so, therefore, the four-year limitation period of § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) was applicable. Because this failure to remit was a recurring tort involving a series of tortious acts, each of which formed the basis of a separate claim, and each of which accrued when the husband, on different occasions throughout the years, received royalties and made no remittances, and the wife discovered, or could have discovered, that she was not receiving her royalty share, the wife could recover for her share of royalties received but not remitted by the husband within four years preceding the filing of her action. As to the rest, i.e., the royalties received but not remitted beyond this four-year period, she was barred. Young v. Young, 709 P.2d 1254, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 628 (Wyo. 1985).

Action for conversion of road grader. —

A cause of action for conversion did not accrue on the date that the plaintiff first attempted to recover a road grader from the defendant, but on the later date that the defendant lied to the plaintiff and falsely reported that the grader was no longer on his property. Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 2000), reh'g denied, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. Aug. 8, 2000).

Cited in

Richardson Assocs. v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1991).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect of lack of knowledge of product's defect on running of statute of limitations in products liability claim, 91 ALR3d 991.

What statute of limitations governs damage action against attorney for malpractice, 2 ALR4th 284.

What statute of limitations governs physician's action for wrongful denial of hospital privileges, 3 ALR4th 1214.

Insurance agents or brokers as professionals or nonprofessionals for purposes of malpractice statutes of limitations, 121 ALR 5th 365.

Fraudulent concealment, so as to toll statute of limitations, as presenting common question of proof in antitrust class action, 70 ALR Fed 498.

When does state statute of limitations begin to run in civil action for securities fraud under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC § 78j(b)), 71 ALR Fed 257.

Application of fraudulent concealment doctrine to statute of limitations in antitrust case (15 USC § 15b), 72 ALR Fed 430.

When does statute of limitations begin to run in action under False Claims Act (31 USCS §§ 3729 -3733), 139 ALR Fed 645.

What constitutes “inquiry notice” sufficient to commence running of statute of limitations in securities fraud action — Post-Lampf cases, 148 ALR Fed 629.

§ 1-3-107. Act, error or omission in rendering professional or health care services.

  1. A cause of action arising from an act,  error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional  or health care services shall be brought within the greater of the  following times:
    1. Within two (2) years of the date of the  alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action may  be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged  act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged  act, error or omission was:
      1. Not reasonably discoverable within a two  (2) year period; or
      2. The claimant failed to discover the alleged  act, error or omission within the two (2) year period despite the  exercise of due diligence.
    2. For injury to the rights of a minor, by  his eighth birthday or within two (2) years of the date of the alleged  act, error or omission, whichever period is greater, except that a  cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after  discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can  establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:
      1. Not reasonably discoverable within the  two (2) year period; or
      2. That the claimant failed to discover the  alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period despite  the exercise of due diligence.
    3. For injury to the rights of a plaintiff  suffering from a legal disability other than minority, within one  (1) year of the removal of the disability;
    4. If under paragraph (i) or (ii) of this  subsection, the alleged act, error or omission is discovered during  the second year of the two (2) year period from the date of the act,  error or omission, the period for commencing a lawsuit shall be extended  by six (6) months.
  2. This section applies to all persons regardless  of minority or other legal disability.

History. Laws 1976, ch. 18, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-18.1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision concerning minors as parties to actions, see § 1-1-102 . As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Existing causes of action. —

Section 3, ch. 18, Laws 1976, reads: “(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of this act, any action which could have been brought on the effective date of this act may be brought within the shorter of the following periods:

“(i) The period of the statute of limitations that would have applied to the action before the passage of this act; or

“(ii) The period of the statute of limitations specified in this act and applied as if the act, error or omission had occurred on the effective date of this act.”

Section 5, ch. 18, Laws 1976, makes the act effective on May 28, 1976.

Constitutionality—

Statute of limitations for minors violated Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8. The court also held that the exception now contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-114 — “except for an action arising from error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care services” — was constitutionally infirm. Kordus v. Montes, 2014 WY 146, 337 P.3d 1138, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 2014).

Termination of course of treatment and discovery of claim within first year.—

March 16, 2016 was the date on which the doctor last treated the patient and because she discovered her claim on March 29, 2016, at the latest, she discovered it within the first year following termination of treatment and the limitations period thus began running on March 16, 2016; the statute of limitations expired on June 25, 2018 and the patient’s complaint was untimely filed on June 29, 2018. Candelaria v. Karandikar, 2020 WY 140, 475 P.3d 548, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2020).

Time limitations based on year claim discovered.—

If a claim is discovered within the first year following an alleged act, error, or omission, the limitations period for medical malpractice claims is two years from the date of the alleged act, error, or omission; if a claim is discovered in the second year, the limitations period is two years and six months from the date of the alleged act, error, or omission. Candelaria v. Karandikar, 2020 WY 140, 475 P.3d 548, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2020).

Construction.—

For medical malpractice statute of limitations purposes, as to the meaning of the statute’s phrase, “within the greater of the following times,” the more reasonable interpretation is that it refers to the provisions that immediately follow it; in those cases where more than one of the subsections applies, the statute allows application of the one that provides the longer limitations period. Candelaria v. Karandikar, 2020 WY 140, 475 P.3d 548, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2020).

Six-month extension not applicable.—

Patient discovered her claim less than two weeks after her last treatment with the doctor not in the second year as discussed in case law, and therefore the six-month extension of the limitations period did not apply. Candelaria v. Karandikar, 2020 WY 140, 475 P.3d 548, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2020).

Running of statute for attorney malpractice.—

Plaintiff, who sought the return of a $30,000 retainer he paid defendant attorney to defend him against a first degree murder charge, knew or should have known of his alleged cause of action against defendant no later than January 19, 2017. Because plaintiff filed his complaint on May 9, 2019, the two-year professional malpractice statute of limitations barred plaintiff’s complaint. Foltz v. Oblasser, 2020 WY 51, 461 P.3d 417, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2020).

Federal law applicable to labor claim. —

The National Labor Relation Act's six month statute of limitations applies to an employee's claim of breach of duty of fair representation against his union, and not this section's two year limitations period for professional negligence. Winders v. United Transp. Union, 833 F. Supp. 860, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14157 (D. Wyo. 1993).

No exoneration prerequisite for malpractice claim against criminal defense attorney.—

Wyoming Supreme Court declines to create an exception to the discovery rule to adopt an exoneration prerequisite to bringing a legal malpractice claim against a criminal defense attorney, particularly when the professional malpractice statute of limitations makes no distinction between legal malpractice suits arising out of civil and criminal cases. Dockter v. Lozano, 2020 WY 119, 472 P.3d 362, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2020).

Application to realtors. —

A claim against a realtor is a claim for professional negligence, and realtors are licensed professionals who fall within the scope of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a); accordingly, the two-year limitations period of the section applies to all claims against realtors, even those that arose prior to July 1, 2000. Rawlinson v. Greer, 2003 WY 28, 64 P.3d 120, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 2003).

Because a home owner and its occupants learned of water in their crawl space three years before they filed a negligence action against a real estate agency and an associate broker, the matter was time-barred under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a), and the trial court correctly granted the agency and broker summary judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56(c). Rawlinson v. Greer, 2003 WY 28, 64 P.3d 120, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 2003).

Professional negligence claim against real estate broker by non-client buyers asserting negligent misrepresentation was governed by the 2-year statute of limitations in this section. Hulse v. BHJ, Inc., 2003 WY 75, 71 P.3d 262, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 2003).

Real estate buyer's claim that the agent violated his duty of disclosure was moot on appeal because the district court's independent ruling that the statute of limitations had run trumped its first erroneous ruling on the question of duty, the buyer failed to challenge the district court's statute of limitations ruling, and that ruling provided an independent ground for dismissal. Ferrell v. Knighten, 2013 WY 37, 298 P.3d 161, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2013).

Prisoner not under “legal disability”. —

Under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-3-107 (2005), imprisonment is not a “legal disability other than minority” that suspends the running of the statute of limitations, because a convicted felon is not “legally dead” in Wyoming, and both convicted felons and prisoners have the right to file lawsuits. Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, 118 P.3d 429, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2005).

Rule 6(a), W.R.C.P., applicable to computation of time under this section. —

Rule 6(a), W.R.C.P., setting guidelines for computation of time for court purposes, is applicable to the two-year time limit contained in this section; an application of Rule 6(a), W.R.C.P., does not enlarge the time periods provided for in this section but merely creates a uniform rule for determining when the time limit begins to run and when it ends. Olson v. Campbell County Memorial Hosp., 652 P.2d 1365, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 395 (Wyo. 1982).

Termination of course of treatment starts running of limitation period. —

The act, error or omission which starts the running of the statute of limitations against medical malpractice actions is the termination of the course of treatment for the same or related illnesses or injuries. Accordingly, the limitation period established by subsection (a)(i) began to run with respect to a claim against a doctor, for his failure to diagnose and properly treat a pituitary tumor, on the date he last treated the plaintiff. Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 603 (Wyo. 1985).

Plaintiff discovers wrongful “act” when learns that harm resulted from doctor's wrongful conduct. —

A plaintiff discovers an “alleged act, error or omission” within the meaning of subsection (a)(iv) when she learns that her harm resulted from the wrongful conduct of the defendant, not just when she discovers the harm itself. In a medical malpractice action, it did not matter what the plaintiff “suspected” or “should have known.” When she actually discovered the doctor's alleged wrong — his failure to diagnose her tumor, and the fact that he should have diagnosed it, given her symptoms and history — during the second year after its occurrence, she was entitled to rely on subsection (a)(iv). Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 603 (Wyo. 1985).

Attorneys' negligence “reasonably discoverable” within few months of bank failure. —

In a third party action by the directors of a failed bank against the attorneys whose negligence allegedly contributed to the failure, the negligence was reasonably discoverable at the time of the bank closure or within a few months thereafter and the claim, which was brought almost four years from the date the bank closed, was therefore barred by this section. Boller v. Western Law Ass'n, P.C., 828 P.2d 1184, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. Apr. 28, 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 869, 113 S. Ct. 198, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 5361 (U.S. 1992).

Plaintiff discovers wrongful “act” when learns that harm resulted from doctor's wrongful conduct. —

Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 , with respect to the statute of limitations, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 , the date of the act, error, or omission had to be determined before it could be concluded that the patient timely filed a governmental claim against the doctor within the two-year period; date of discovery of employment relationship was crucial. Jost v. Goss, 2010 WY 104, 236 P.3d 994, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2010).

Statute of limitations defense raised by motion to dismiss. —

A statute-of-limitations defense was appropriately raised in a Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim where the answers, counterclaims, cross-claims and initial third-party claims filed by third-party plaintiffs reflected on their faces that the third-party claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Boller v. Western Law Ass'n, P.C., 828 P.2d 1184, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. Apr. 28, 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 869, 113 S. Ct. 198, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 5361 (U.S. 1992).

Plaintiff's claims all arose from acts, errors or omissions in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care services on December 5, 2012, but plaintiff failed to bring those claims within the two year limitations period. Therefore, the district court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Vance v. Wyomed Lab., Inc., 2016 WY 61, 375 P.3d 746, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2016).

Equitable estoppel not established. —

In a legal malpractice case, equitable estoppel, based on the attorney's alleged misleading statements to the client, did not apply to extend the time for filing suit because the client had all the essential facts for his cause of action more than two years before he filed suit. Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, 118 P.3d 429, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2005).

Discovery rule held inapplicable to legal malpractice suit. —

In a legal malpractice case based on a personal representative's attorney's allowing insurance on estate property to lapse, the discovery rule did not apply to extend the time for filing suit. Despite misleading statements the attorney allegedly made to the client, the client had all the essential facts for his cause of action more than two years before he filed suit. Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, 118 P.3d 429, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2005).

In negligence action against surveyors for conducting erroneous land surveys and against the board of county commissioners for filing the surveys, the plaintiffs did not “discover” the tortious act for purposes of the accrual of their cause of action until they received a corrected land surveyor's report. The statute of limitations did not begin to run on an earlier date when the title insurance agent advised them that he would not continue to issue title insurance policies because of the survey discrepancies. Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach & Assocs., 824 P.2d 560, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1992).

Running of statute of limitation in suits charging negligent performance of professional duties. —

See Banner v. Dayton, 474 P.2d 300, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1970).

In legal malpractice action, for purposes of summary judgment motion, even where a factual dispute exists, the statute of limitations issue is still a question of law within the province of the court. Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1996).

The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice cause of action had run where the action was commenced more than two years after defendant knew of had reason to know that he had a cause of action. Connell v. Barrett, 949 P.2d 871, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1997).

Where buyers purchased a home from sellers on June 1, 2006, where the buyers experienced significant flooding that required engineer-designed remediation on the house at a cost of more than $ 25,000, where the buyers filed suit against the sellers and the sellers' real estate agent in September of 2007 alleging fraudulent non-disclosure, and where the buyers filed an amended complaint in August of 2008 to add their real estate agent and broker as defendants, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the buyers' real estate agent and broker because the two-year statute of limitations under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 began to run on the date of the alleged act or omission, which in this case was June 1, 2006, the last day that the real estate agent and broker performed professional services for the buyers under their contract. Further, no exception applied because the buyers had sufficient knowledge about the water problems and the non-disclosure of those problems; as such, any professional negligence by their agent and broker was reasonably discoverable within the statutory two-year period. Adelizzi v. Stratton, 2010 WY 148, 243 P.3d 563, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 2010).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendant emergency room (ER) doctor based on the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. The fact that defendant was out of state was not enough to toll the statute of limitations, given the fact that plaintiff had no intention of bringing legal action against the ER doctor within the limitation period. Adams v. Walton, 2011 WY 58, 248 P.3d 1167, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2011).

In a professional negligence case, the engineering corporation’s motion for summary judgment was improperly granted as the non-profit corporation’s claims against it were not time-barred because genuine issues of material fact existed as to when the non-profit should reasonably have been on notice that it needed to investigate the adequacy of the design, plans, and specifications for the building as questions remained regarding whether the 2006 incident of bird in the attic of the building; the 2007 incident of cracking concrete in the covered parking area, or the 2013 incident of a binding door and plaster cracks in the building should have put the non-profit on notice of the engineering corporation’s alleged negligence. Pioneer Homestead Apts. III v. Sargent Eng'rs, Inc., 2018 WY 80, 421 P.3d 1074, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2018).

Bail bondsman did not establish that his activities fit within the professional duties of bail bondsman, and therefore the trial court erred by applying the two-year statute of limitations which applied to the rendering of professional services to the pedestrian's action. It was not established that taking custody of persons who had been arrested following their release was part of the professional responsibilities of a bail bondsman as nothing in the complaint alleged that a bondsman received raining in such activity or that knowledge of such practices was required for licensure. Irene v. Seneca Ins. Co., 2014 WY 145, 337 P.3d 483, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 2014).

Continuing treatment. —

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a doctor in a malpractice suit, finding that the Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 statute of limitations had run. The final act in the surgeon's continuous course of treatment was the second surgery performed on February 26, 1999, to remove a surgical sponge, not the first surgery to repair the torn rotator cuff, and the suit was brought within two years of the date of the second surgery. Jauregui v. Mem'l Hosp., 2005 WY 59, 111 P.3d 914, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. June 8, 2005), overruled in part, Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 331 P.3d 1174, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2014).

Running of statute for attorney malpractice. —

The statute of limitations for the claim of attorney malpractice began to run when both attorney and client learned that the estate would be subject to the payment of interest on taxes and potential penalties. Murphy v. Housel & Housel, 955 P.2d 880, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1998), reh'g denied, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. Apr. 8, 1998).

Client's legal malpractice suit was properly dismissed as time-barred under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-3-107(a); his imprisonment was not a ‘legal disability other than minority’ under § 1-3-107(a)(iii) so as to extend the statute of limitations, as the statute did not list imprisonment as a disability, and in Wyoming, prisoners had the right to file lawsuits. Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, 118 P.3d 429, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2005).

Continuous representation doctrine. —

The court rejected defendant's contention that the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations because Wyoming has not adopted the continuous representation doctrine. Connell v. Barrett, 949 P.2d 871, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1997).

In a legal malpractice case based on a personal representative's attorney's allowing insurance on estate property to lapse, the continuous representation doctrine did not extend the time for the client to file suit, because that doctrine was absent from Wyoming's legal malpractice statute, and the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to judicially adopt it. Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, 118 P.3d 429, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2005).

Discharge from hospital started running of limitation period. —

Patient's medical malpractice claim was timely under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(i) because he presented his claim just under two years from the date of his discharge; he presented evidence that the hospital treated him for the pain and dysfunction in his shoulder and arm until he was discharged. Nobles v. Mem'l Hosp. of Laramie County, 2013 WY 66, 301 P.3d 517, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2013).

Statute of repose asserted on remand. —

Because a statute of repose and a statute of limitations can be applied to the same facts to bar the same cause of action, they are not truly inconsistent; therefore, a defendant land surveyor could subsequently assert on remand a new statute of limitations (§ 1-3-111(a)) labeled as a statute of repose, after stipulating in the prior adjudication that subsection (a)(i) of this section controlled the case. Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. Dec. 21, 1993).

Construction with wrongful death statute. —

This section and the wrongful death statute (§ 1-38-101 ) must be construed together; thus, where a decedent had failed to bring his claim against a physician and hospital within two-years, he had no viable action at the time of his death and a wrongful death action on behalf of his survivors was barred. Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 1998), reh'g denied, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. Aug. 26, 1998).

Section applies to licensed outfitters. —

Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the plain language of the Wyoming Outfitters and Guides Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-407 , defined guides as “professional,” and that it need not look any further than the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) to conclude that the two-year statute of limitations applied to causes of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed outfitter or professional guide services. Prokop v. Hockhalter, 2006 WY 75, 137 P.3d 131, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 2006).

Where a customer was injured during a hunting expedition, the two-year statute of limitations clearly applied to an outfitting company and one of its members because they were licensed outfitters; the statute of limitations also applied to the other member because the suit against the other member arose from the same act, error, or omission that the customer asserted caused the injuries. Bylin v. Billings, 568 F.3d 1224, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 13557 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 936, 130 S. Ct. 1506, 176 L. Ed. 2d 110, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 1204 (U.S. 2010).

Section applies to licensed outfitters whether claim based in tort or contract. —

Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the 2-year statute of limitations for professionals in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) applied to actions brought against licensed outfitters and professional guides, and if the cause of action against an outfitter or a guide arose from the rendering of licensed or certified professional services, the 2 year statute of limitations in § 1-3-107(a) applied whether the claim against them was pled in tort or contract. Prokop v. Hockhalter, 2006 WY 75, 137 P.3d 131, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 2006).

Action relating to obtaining credit not based on rendering professional or health care services. —

Two-year statute of limitations under this section did not apply because a patient's claim under the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act that a dentist committed unfair and deceptive trade practices by compelling to her obtain a credit card to settle her account was not based on the rendering of professional or health care services. St. John v. Joshua G. Wagner, DDS, PC, 2013 WY 69, 302 P.3d 906, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2013).

Due diligence. —

In a sale of property that did not reserve plaintiffs' mineral interests in the property, although plaintiffs sued the closing agent, its general counsel, and the brokerage firm involved in the transaction more than seven years after the sale, because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiffs exercised due diligence by trusting the representation of the closing agent's employee that the deeds had been changed to reserve plaintiffs' mineral interests in the property had to be evaluated in light of all the facts, summary judgment was improperly granted to the closing agent and its general counsel in light of the employee's representations. Moats v. Prof'l Assistance, LLC, 2014 WY 6, 319 P.3d 892, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2014).

Statute of limitations not extended by third party misrepresentations. —

In a sale of property that did not reserve plaintiffs' mineral interests in the property, where plaintiffs sued the closing agent, its general counsel, and the brokerage firm involved in the transaction more than seven years after the sale, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the brokerage firm as the misrepresentations by the closing agent's employee should not extend the statute of limitations as to the brokerage firm. Moats v. Prof'l Assistance, LLC, 2014 WY 6, 319 P.3d 892, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2014).

Ranch's action against corporation for failure to provide services was time-barred. —

Finding that a ranch's action seeking damages resulting from a corporation's failure to provide engineering and surveying services was time-barred was appropriate because, whether Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107 began to run on the date of the act, error or omission, or on the date the cause of action accrued, the lawsuit was untimely. The ranch's cause of action was time-barred if not commenced within two years of the act, error or omission giving rise to the cause of action, or if, the two-year time limit started to run upon “accrual” of the cause of action, the ranch's claim was still time barred because the cause of action accrued on or before May 5, 2005. Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assocs., 2009 WY 69, 208 P.3d 57, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 2009).

Applied in

Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 426 (Wyo. 1987); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 518 (Wyo. 1987); Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1988); Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1989).

Quoted in

Richardson Assocs. v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1991); Walters v. Grand Teton Crest Outfitters, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1442, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15892 (D. Wyo. 1992); Peters v. W. Park Hosp., 2003 WY 117, 76 P.3d 821, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 2003).

Cited in

Lesh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 624, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12514 (D. Wyo. 1989); Bender v. Phillips, 8 P.3d 1074, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 2000); Rawlinson v. Cheyenne Bd. of Pub. Utils., 2001 WY 6, 17 P.3d 13, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2001); Hoke v. Motel 6 Jackson & Accor N. Am., Inc., 2006 WY 38, 131 P.3d 369, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. Mar. 27, 2006).

Law reviews. —

See note, “The Statute of Limitations in Actions for Undiscovered Malpractice,” 12 Wyo. L.J. 30.

See case note on Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America v. Yepsen, 469 P.2d 409, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1970), VII Land & Water L. Rev. 717 (1972).

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For case note, “Appeal and Error” —The Omnipotent Wyoming Supreme Court: New Allegations and Evidence Will Be Heard for the First Time on Appeal. Boller v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 677 (1993).

For case note, “Should a Wrongful Death Action Expire Before the Decedent Does? A Wrong Turn for Wrongful Death,” see XXXV Land & Water L. Rev. 235 (2000).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

When statute of limitation begins to run upon action against attorney for malpractice, 18 ALR3d 978.

Application of statute of limitations to damage actions against public accountants for negligence in performance of professional services, 26 ALR3d 1438.

When statute of limitations commences to run against malpractice action based on leaving foreign substance in patient's body, 70 ALR3d 7.

Statute of limitations relating to medical malpractice actions as applicable to actions against unlicensed practitioner, 70 ALR3d 114.

When statute of limitations begins to run against malpractice action in connection with sterilization or birth control procedures, 93 ALR3d 218.

When statute of limitations begins to run in dental malpractice suits, 3 ALR4th 318.

What statute of limitations governs physician's action for wrongful denial of hospital privileges, 3 ALR4th 1214.

Statute of limitations applicable to third person's action against psychiatrist, psychologist or other mental health practitioner, based on failure to warn persons against whom patient expressed threats, 41 ALR4th 1078.

Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49 ALR4th 972.

Applicability of “foreign object” exception in medical malpractice statutes of limitations, 50 ALR4th 250.

Statute of limitations in wrongful death action based on medical malpractice, 70 ALR4th 535.

When limitations period begins to run on claim for optometrist's malpractice, 70 ALR4th 600.

Medical malpractice liability of sports medicine care providers for injury to, or death of, athlete, 33 ALR5th 619.

When statute of limitations begins to run upon action against attorney for legal malpractice — deliberate wrongful acts or omissions, 67 ALR5th 587.

Medical malpractice statutes of limitation minority provisions, 71 ALR5th 307.

Surveyor's liability for mistake in, or misrepresentation as to accuracy of, survey of real property, 117 ALR5th 23.

Effect of fraudulent or negligent concealment of patient's cause of action on timeliness of action under medical malpractice statute of repose. 19 A.L.R.6th 475.

§ 1-3-108. Official bonds and statutory undertakings.

An action upon the official bond of an officer, assignee, trustee, executor, administrator or guardian, or upon a bond given in pursuance of a statute can only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrues.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 37; R.S. 1887, § 2373; R.S. 1899, § 3458; C.S. 1910, § 4302; C.S. 1920, § 5571; R.S. 1931, § 89-413; C.S. 1945, § 3-508; W.S. 1957, § 1-20; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Law reviews. —

See “Abstractor's Liability in Examination of Title,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 184.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What period of limitation governs in an action against a public officer and a surety on official bond, 18 ALR2d 1176.

Liability on statutory bond as within statute of limitations prescribing specific limitation period for liabilities created by statute, 32 ALR2d 1240.

What statute of limitations governs action to reform bond, 36 ALR2d 687.

Limitation statute applicable to action on bonds of public body, 38 ALR2d 930.

When statute of limitations begins to run against action on bond of personal representative, 44 ALR2d 807.

§ 1-3-109. Actions not otherwise limited.

An action for relief, not hereinbefore provided for, can only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrues.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 38; R.S. 1887, § 2374; R.S. 1899, § 3459; C.S. 1910, § 4303; C.S. 1920, § 5572; R.S. 1931, § 89-414; C.S. 1945, § 3-509; W.S. 1957, § 1-21; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Applicable in all actions whether formerly denominated at law or in equity. —

Since actions at law and suits in equity are blended and there is in Wyoming but one form of action, called a civil action, the statutes of limitations apply in all actions whether formerly denominated at law or in equity. Town of Glenrock v. Abadie, 71 Wyo. 414, 259 P.2d 766, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (1953). See Rule 2, W.R.C.P.

But section is available in judicial proceedings only as defense and can never be asserted by a plaintiff as a cause of action in him or as conferring upon him an affirmative right of action. The principle has sometimes been expressed in the figure of speech that the statute is available only as a shield, not as a sword. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 277 F.2d 615, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5155 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1960).

When no justiciable controversy. —

There is no justiciable controversy as contemplated by Declaratory Judgment Act where it appears on face of the pleadings that the statute of limitations is applicable thereto. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

Right to reformation of deed barred. —

In an action brought by a town to quiet title to a one-half interest in minerals underlying property conveyed by defendant to the town 30 years before, defendant's cross-petition for reformation of the deed was barred by this section. Town of Glenrock v. Abadie, 71 Wyo. 414, 259 P.2d 766, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 72 Wyo. 111, 262 P.2d 393, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1953).

In an action to quiet title, wherein a cross-petition was filed for reformation of a deed, the fact that the parties and their positions remained the same as they were when the deeds in question were made, and the rights of innocent purchasers for value without notice were not concerned, was no defense to the running of the statute of limitations upon the right of action for reformation of the deed. Town of Glenrock v. Abadie, 72 Wyo. 111, 262 P.2d 393, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1953).

Reformation of warranty deed not permitted where deed clearly conveys title. —

Inasmuch as a 1933 warranty deed clearly conveyed the land being disputed in a quiet title action with no reservations whatsoever, the court did not permit reformation to express the alleged intent of the party that the property was conveyed to be used solely as an airport, which would have been a clear violation of this section. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, Am. Legion v. Board of County Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 1040, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 470 (Wyo. 1985).

Quoted in

United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 169 F. Supp. 735, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3874 (D. Wyo. 1959); Trustees of Wyo. Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8635 (10th Cir. 1988).

Stated in

Wyoming Constr. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 275 F.2d 97, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5521 (10th Cir. 1960); Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, 226 P.3d 889, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Mar. 23, 2010).

Cited in

Wolbol v. Steinhoff, 25 Wyo. 227, 168 P. 251, 1917 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (1917); Cook v. Elmore, 27 Wyo. 163, 192 P. 824, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (1920); Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (1939); Campbell v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (1940); Badley v. Birchby, 487 P.2d 798, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 238 (Wyo. 1971); Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (2004).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What statute of limitations governs physician's action for wrongful denial of hospital privileges, 3 ALR4th 1214.

Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support, 5 ALR4th 1015.

State statute of limitations applicable to inverse condemnation or similar proceedings by landowner to obtain compensation for direct appropriation of land without the institution or conclusion of formal proceedings against specific owner, 26 ALR4th 68.

Limitation of actions: invasion of right of privacy, 33 ALR4th 479.

§ 1-3-110. “Substantial completion” defined.

As used in this act [§§ 1-3-110 through 1-3-113 ] “substantial completion” means the degree of completion at which the owner can utilize the improvement for the purpose for which it was intended.

History. Laws 1973, ch. 82, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-21.1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

“Substantial completion.”

Homeowners' suit alleging defects in a condominium's HVAC system was not barred by the statute of repose because (1) the statute began to run when the condominium and system were substantially completed, as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-110 , which occurred when the condominium and system could be used for their intended purposes, and (2) the condominium and system could not be used for their intended purposes until a certificate of occupancy was issued less than ten years before the homeowners filed suit. Horning v. Penrose Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2014 WY 133, 336 P.3d 151, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 2014).

Cited in

Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1991).

§ 1-3-111. Improvements to real property; generally.

  1. Unless the parties to the contract agree  otherwise, no action to recover damages, whether in tort, contract,  indemnity or otherwise, shall be brought more than ten (10) years  after substantial completion of an improvement to real property, against  any person constructing, altering or repairing the improvement, manufacturing  or furnishing materials incorporated in the improvement, or performing  or furnishing services in the design, planning, surveying, supervision,  observation or management of construction, or administration of construction  contracts for:
    1. Any deficiency in the design, planning,  supervision, construction, surveying, manufacturing or supplying of  materials or observation or management of construction;
    2. Injury to any property arising out of  any deficiency listed in paragraph (i) of this subsection; or
    3. Injury to the person or wrongful death  arising out of any deficiency listed in paragraph (i) of this subsection.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection  (a) of this section, if an injury to property or person or an injury  causing wrongful death occurs during the ninth year after substantial  completion of the improvement to real property, an action to recover  damages for the injury or wrongful death may be brought within one  (1) year after the date on which the injury occurs.
  3. This section shall not be construed to  extend the period for bringing an action allowed by the laws of this  state.

History. Laws 1973, ch. 82, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-21.2; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1981, ch. 166, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to saving clause for persons under disabilities, see § 1-3-114 .

Purpose of section. —

Section 2, ch. 166, Laws 1981, states that the purpose of that act is to allocate the burden of insuring improvements to the possessor after 10 years as it is not in the public interest to impose liability in perpetuity on those providing goods or services necessary for the improvement.

Former subsection (a) violated constitution. —

Subsection (a), as it read prior to the 1981 amendment, violated article 1, §§ 8 and 34 and article 3, § 27, Wyo. Const.Phillips v. ABC Builders, 611 P.2d 821, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 273 (Wyo. 1980).

Section is constitutional and does not violate the open courts, uniform operation of general law, and special and local laws provisions of the Wyoming constitution. Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1991).

Section was intended to apply without regard for discovery in application of its 10-year period. Richardson Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, 806 P.2d 790, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1991).

“Improvement to real property.” —

Given the insufficient factual record regarding the use and permanency of the product at issue, a question of fact existed as to whether the product constituted an “improvement to real property” which would afford the defendant the protection of the statute of repose. Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn, Inc., 952 P.2d 1105, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1998).

“Substantial completion.”

Homeowners' suit alleging defects in a condominium's HVAC system was not barred by the statute of repose because (1) the statute began to run when the condominium and system were substantially completed, as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-110 , which occurred when the condominium and system could be used for their intended purposes, and (2) the condominium and system could not be used for their intended purposes until a certificate of occupancy was issued less than ten years before the homeowners filed suit. Horning v. Penrose Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2014 WY 133, 336 P.3d 151, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 2014).

Section inapplicable for failure to maintain, inspect. —

Where the alleged negligent action of the defendants (failure to discover, disclose and warn) occurred after construction was completed and was not a “deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, construction, surveying, manufacturing or supplying of materials or observation or management of construction,” this section was not applicable to the plaintiff's cause of action for negligent failure to maintain and inspect the property and discover and disclose a dangerous condition which was known or should have been known. Goodrich v. Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1994).

Defense not waived by failure to plead. —

An affirmative defense, specifically the statute of repose found in this section, is not deemed waived by the failure to plead it or by admitting an inconsistent factual allegation. Loftus v. Romsa Constr., 913 P.2d 856, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1996).

Construction of public school building by school district is sovereign activity, and the applicable statutes of limitations cannot be invoked to bar the school district from bringing an action against a contractor or an architect for damages arising out of that construction in order to vindicate public rights. Laramie County Sch. Dist. Number One v. Muir, 808 P.2d 797, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1991).

Statute of repose asserted on remand. —

Because a statute of repose and a statute of limitations can be applied to the same facts to bar the same cause of action, they are not truly inconsistent; therefore, a defendant land surveyor could subsequently assert on remand a new statute of limitations (subsection (a) of this section) labeled as a statute of repose, after stipulating in the prior adjudication that another statute of limitations, § 1-3-107(a)(i) (rendering professional services), controlled the case. Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. Dec. 21, 1993).

Quoted in

NuHome Invs., LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, 81 P.3d 940, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 2003).

Cited in

Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1991); Pioneer Water & Sewer Dist. v. Civil Eng'g Professionals, Inc., 905 P.2d 1245, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1995).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Statute of Limitations for Architects and Builders as Special Legislation, Phillips v. ABC Builders, 611 P.2d 821, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 273 (Wyo. 1980),” see XVI Land & Water L. Rev. 313 (1981).

For case note, “Builder-Vendors' Broadened Liability for Selecting an Unsafe Homesite. Homeowners-Sellers' Duty to Warn. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 365 (Wyo. 1981),” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 467 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper performance of work by private building contractor, 1 ALR3d 914.

Validity and construction of time limitation upon action against architect or engineer, 93 ALR3d 1242.

Statutes of limitation: actions by purchasers or contractees against vendors or contractors involving defects in houses or other buildings caused by soil instability, 12 ALR4th 866.

Validity and construction of statute terminating right of action for product-caused injury at fixed period after manufacture, sale or delivery of product, 30 ALR5th 1.

Modern status of the application of “discovery rule” to postpone running of limitations against actions relating to breach of building and construction contracts, 33 ALR5th 1.

Surveyor's liability for mistake in, or misrepresentation as to accuracy of, survey of real property, 117 ALR5th 23.

What constitutes “improvement to real property” for purposes of statute of repose or statute of limitations, 122 ALR 5th 1.

§ 1-3-112. Improvements to real property; exception as to persons in possession or control.

The limitation prescribed by this act [§§ 1-3-110 through 1-3-113 ] shall not be asserted by way of defense by any person in actual possession or control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time any deficiency in the improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to bring an action.

History. Laws 1973, ch. 82, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-21.3; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Quoted in

Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1991).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes “improvement to real property” for purposes of statute of repose or statute of limitations, 122 ALR 5th 1.

§ 1-3-113. Improvements to real property; extension of limitations precluded.

Nothing in this act [§§ 1-3-110 through 1-3-113 ] shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by law for the bringing of any action.

History. Laws 1973, ch. 82, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-21.4; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes “improvement to real property” for purposes of statute of repose or statute of limitations, 122 ALR 5th 1.

§ 1-3-114. Legal disabilities.

If a person entitled to bring any action except for an action arising from error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care services or for a penalty or forfeiture, is, at the time the cause of action accrues, a minor or subject to any other legal disability, the person may bring the action within three (3) years after the disability is removed or within any other statutory period of limitation, whichever is greater.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 39; R.S. 1887, § 2375; R.S. 1889, § 3460; C.S. 1910, § 4304; C.S. 1920, § 5573; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 85; R.S. 1931, § 89-415; C.S. 1945, § 3-510; W.S. 1957, § 1-22; Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1976, ch. 18, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Minor tolling provision. —

Statute of limitations for minors, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(ii), violated Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8. The court also held that the exception now contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-114 “except for an action arising from error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care services” was constitutionally infirm. Kordus v. Montes, 2014 WY 146, 337 P.3d 1138, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 2014).

Because the limitation period in § 1-38-102(d) is a condition precedent, and not a statute of limitation, the minor tolling provision of this section is not applicable to the wrongful death statute. Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1998).

Law reviews. —

See “Attorney's Liability in Title Examination,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 177.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Proof of unadjudged incompetency which prevents running of statute of limitations, 9 ALR2d 964.

Time of existence of mental incompetency which will prevent or suspend running of statute of limitations, 41 ALR2d 726.

Imprisonment of party to civil action as tolling statute of limitations, 77 ALR3d 735.

Tolling of state statute of limitations in favor of one commencing action despite existing disability, 30 ALR4th 1092.

Tolling of statute of limitations, on account of minority of injured child, as applicable to parent's or guardian's right of action arising out of same injury, 49 ALR4th 216.

Wrongful death: surviving parent's minority as tolling limitation period on suit for child's wrongful death, 54 ALR4th 362.

Local government tort liability: minority as affecting notice of claim requirement, 58 ALR4th 402.

Attorney malpractice — Tolling or other exceptions to running of statute of limitations, 87 ALR5th 473.

Effect of appointment of legal representative for person under mental disability on running of state statute of limitations against such person,111 ALR5th 159.

Effect of appointment of legal representative for minor on running of state statute of limitations against minor, 1 ALR6th 407.

When is person, other than one claiming posttraumatic stress syndrome or memory repression, within coverage of statutory provision tolling running of limitations period on basis of mental disability. 23 A.L.R.6th 697.

§ 1-3-115. Liability created by federal statute.

All actions upon a liability created by a federal statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty, for which no period of limitations is provided in such statute, shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action has accrued.

History. Laws 1943, ch. 77, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-511; W.S. 1957, § 1-23; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Existing causes of action. —

Section 2, ch. 77, Laws 1943, reads: “This act shall not apply to any existing cause of action which accrued more than one year before this act takes effect, provided suit be instituted thereon within one year after this act takes effect.”

Section 3, ch. 77, Laws 1943, makes the act effective from and after passage. Approved February 23, 1943.

Section hostile against federal causes of action. —

Although the two-year limitations period provided in this section is not necessarily hostile to a federal cause of action by virtue of the amount of time provided, a comparison of the amount of time provided for causes of action arising under state law with the amount of time provided for actions arising under federal law demonstrates the statute's hostility against federal causes of action. Trustees of Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8635 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1988), overruled in part, NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Div., Inc., 979 F.2d 1384, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28309 (10th Cir. Kan. 1992), overruled in part, NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Div., 979 F.2d 1384, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28310 (10th Cir. Kan. 1992).

Pursuit of state court remedies does not toll section. —

A plaintiff under 42 USCS § 1983 does not toll the running of this section by pursuing remedies in state courts. Spiegel v. School Dist., 600 F.2d 264, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14003 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1979), overruled in part, Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 24023 (10th Cir. N.M. 1984).

Criminal charges do not toll statute of limitations. —

Where civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 USCS § 1983 arise out of the same incident as criminal charges, the pendency of the criminal charges does not toll the statute of limitations. Lafferty v. Nickel, 663 P.2d 168, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1983), overruled, Ray v. St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc., 2006 WY 98, 139 P.3d 464, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2006).

Section was inapplicable to action brought under the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act by trustees of a pension plan to recover delinquent contributions. Trustees of Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8635 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1988), overruled in part, NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Div., Inc., 979 F.2d 1384, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28309 (10th Cir. Kan. 1992), overruled in part, NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Div., 979 F.2d 1384, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28310 (10th Cir. Kan. 1992).

Section 1983 claims. —

The statute of limitations for 42 USCS § 1983 actions brought in this state is controlled by the personal injury statute of limitations, § 1-3-105 .Sullivan v. Bailiff, 867 F. Supp. 992, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16706 (D. Wyo. 1994).

Statute of limitations for claims brought in Wyoming state courts under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 was four years pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), not two years under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-115 ; the inmate's motion to amend his counterclaim and cross-claim under this section to add a § 1983 cause of action was brought within four years and should not have been denied as untimely. Ray v. St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc., 2006 WY 98, 139 P.3d 464, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2006).

Punitive damages claim not “penalty” action. —

A claim for punitive damages does not transform a civil suit brought under 42 USCS § 1983 into a “penalty” action outside the scope of this section. Spiegel v. School Dist., 600 F.2d 264, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14003 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1979), overruled in part, Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 24023 (10th Cir. N.M. 1984).

When actions for civil rights violations arise. —

Actions giving rise to alleged civil rights violations arise upon unlawful arrest, confinement and prosecution and not upon the reversal of these convictions. Lafferty v. Nickel, 663 P.2d 168, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1983), overruled, Ray v. St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc., 2006 WY 98, 139 P.3d 464, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2006).

Federal cause of action based on termination of employment necessarily accrues when termination becomes final. Spiegel v. School Dist., 600 F.2d 264, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14003 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1979), overruled in part, Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 24023 (10th Cir. N.M. 1984).

Action involving continuous series of actions occurring within statutory time period not barred. —

A federal civil rights action brought by a psychologist was not time-barred by this section, as the defendant, also a psychologist, had embarked on a continuous campaign to destroy the plaintiff's professional standing, involving a series of actions, including contacts with others which occurred, in part at least, within the statutory two-year period. Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 25531 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1985), limited, Pindell v. Wilson-Mckee, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12878 (D. Wyo. 1999).

Cited in

Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1988).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Period of limitations or laches to be applied under 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 187 in action for breach of labor contract or damages from unfair labor practice, 19 ALR3d 1034.

State statute of limitations as affecting federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 29 ALR Fed 710.

What limitation periods apply under 28 U.S.C. § 2415 to government suits, 31 ALR Fed 348.

Time for bringing private civil action for discrimination in housing under §§ 810 and 812 of Fair Housing Act (42 USC §§ 3610 and 3612), 62 ALR Fed 267.

Laches or other assertion of untimeliness as defense to action under title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.) brought by equal employment opportunity commission, 67 ALR Fed 381.

When does state statute of limitations begin to run in civil action for securities fraud under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC § 78j(b)), 71 ALR Fed 257.

Applicable state limitations period in actions under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC § 78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10b-5 (17 CFR § 240.10b-5), 72 ALR Fed 763.

Extensions of time under § 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 USC § 108(a)), 80 ALR Fed 374.

What constitutes “inquiry notice” sufficient to commence running of statute of limitations in securities fraud action — Post-Lampf cases, 148 ALR Fed 629.

§ 1-3-116. Absence from state, abscondence or concealment.

If a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, or has absconded or concealed himself, the period limited for the commencement of the action does not begin to run until he comes into the state or while he is so absconded or concealed. If after the cause of action accrues he departs from the state or absconds or conceals himself, the time of his absence or concealment is not computed as a part of the period within which the action shall be brought.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 42; R.S. 1887, § 2378; R.S. 1899, § 3463; C.S. 1910, § 4307; C.S. 1920, § 5576; R.S. 1931, § 89-418; C.S. 1945, § 3-519; W.S. 1957, § 1-24; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to service of process outside state, see § 5-1-107 .

Construed in pari materia. —

Section 1-39-102 must be read together with this section and § 1-6-301 .Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Defendant must be beyond reach of law for service. —

In order to consider the invocation of this section it must be read to mean and understood to say that the defendant has absconded, concealed himself or departed from the state in such manner so that he is beyond the reaches of the law for purposes of service. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

There can be no reason for a tolling statute except where service is impossible or unusually difficult. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

The need and reason for the tolling statute fails where there is another readily available method of service. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Where there is provision for substituted service section is inapplicable, and the limitation statute means what it says. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Where a provision authorizes service on the nonresident motorist or the resident motorist who has concealed himself or who has absconded, the tolling statute serves no purpose. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

The absence from the state of a defendant in a wrongful death action did not toll the statute of limitations by reason of the applicability of this section where the defendant could have been served at any time through substituted service upon the secretary of state. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Statute of limitations not tolled. —

Defendant's absence from state did not serve to toll statute of limitations, because substituted service of process could have been made upon defendant within state in accordance with § 1-6-301(a). Ryel v. Anderies, 4 P.3d 193, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 2000).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendant emergency room (ER) doctor based on the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. The fact that defendant was out of state was not enough to toll the statute of limitations, given the fact that plaintiff had no intention of bringing legal action against the ER doctor within the limitation period. Adams v. Walton, 2011 WY 58, 248 P.3d 1167, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2011).

Tolling provision not rescinded by long-arm statute. —

After the cause of action for medical malpractice accrued, the defendant departed from the state of Wyoming, and then, as this section plainly states, during his absence, the statute of limitations was tolled. The policy behind the tolling provision in the statute of limitations was not rescinded by the existence of the long-arm statute (§ 5-1-107 ), since only if the plaintiff had known where to find the defendant, which she did not, would the long-arm statute have operated to permit effective service. Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 518 (Wyo. 1987), limited, Adams v. Walton, 2011 WY 58, 248 P.3d 1167, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2011).

Section does not require plaintiff use diligence in determining out-of-state whereabouts of defendant to be served. Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 518 (Wyo. 1987), limited, Adams v. Walton, 2011 WY 58, 248 P.3d 1167, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2011).

Burden of proof. —

Where a petition on a note and to foreclose a mortgage alleged, and the answer denied, that after the execution of the note defendants departed and remained absent from the state and the note as set out in petition showed on its face that it had matured more than the statutory period prior to the commencement of the action, the burden of proving the absence of defendant from the state was on the plaintiff. Ingersoll v. Davis, 14 Wyo. 120, 82 P. 867, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1905).

Burden is on plaintiff to prove absence of defendant or to prove that he had absconded in order to conceal himself. Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23413 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S. Ct. 85, 78 L. Ed. 2d 94, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1117 (U.S. 1983).

Sufficiency of evidence. —

Testimony that defendants, who were husband and wife, left their home in the state and witness subsequently saw them at the “Denver Tramway Company,” where the husband was working, and that they were living there, “a block away from South Broadway,” without further testimony as to the town, city, county or state in which the places mentioned were situated was insufficient to show defendants' absence from the state, within the meaning of this section. Ingersoll v. Davis, 14 Wyo. 120, 82 P. 867, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1905).

Lack of manufacturer identification on defective product. —

The mere fact that the product causing plaintiffs' injury had no mark identifying the manufacturer did not justify tolling the limitations period for plaintiffs' cause of action against the manufacturer under a theory of “concealment,” given that alternative methods of service were available. Nowotny v. L & B Contract Indus., 933 P.2d 452, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1997).

Effect of former adjudication. —

Where petition on cause of action appearing on its face to be barred by limitations is demurred to (now moved against) for that reason and demurrer (now motion) sustained and another suit is thereafter brought on same facts with petition alleging facts showing statute has not run, latter suit cannot be maintained, as judgment upon demurrer (now motion) in first suit, though error, was a former adjudication barring any other suit. Price v. Bonnifield, 2 Wyo. 80, 1879 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1879). See Rule 7, W.R.C.P.

Subsequent disability. —

When statute once begins to run, it is not arrested by any subsequent disability; and that rule was held to apply to the disability of coverture. Bliler v. Boswell, 9 Wyo. 57, 59 P. 798, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 9 Wyo. 57, 59 P. 798, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1900).

Ten-year statute of limitations was not tolled in action on promissory note, where the lender knew the borrower's location in California, visited the borrower in California, knew the location of the borrower's residence, knew the borrower's mailing address and knew that the borrower was not avoiding service during this period. Stanbury v. Larsen, 803 P.2d 349, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1990).

Applied in

Bon v. Lemp, 444 P.2d 333, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1968).

Cited in

Kuhn v. McKay, 7 Wyo. 42, 49 P. 473, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1897); Hammons v. International Playtex, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1114, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261 (D. Wyo. 1988); Habermehl v. Potter, 153 F.3d 1137, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20746 (10th Cir. 1998); Hoke v. Motel 6 Jackson & Accor N. Am., Inc., 2006 WY 38, 131 P.3d 369, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. Mar. 27, 2006).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes concealment which will prevent running of statute of limitations, 1 ALR2d 630.

Provision of statute of limitations excluding period of defendant's absence from the state as applicable to a local cause of action against individual who was a nonresident when the same arose, 17 ALR2d 502.

Tolling of statute of limitations where process is not served before expiration of limitation period as affected by statutes defining commencement of an action or expressly relating to interruption of running of limitations, 27 ALR2d 236.

Absence of judgment debtor from state as suspending or tolling running of period of limitations as to judgment, 27 ALR2d 839.

Tolling of statute of limitations during absence from state as affected by fact that party claiming benefit of limitations remained subject to service during absence or nonresidence, 55 ALR3d 1158.

Posttraumatic syndrome as tolling running of statute of limitations, 12 ALR5th 546.

§ 1-3-117. Effect of foreign law.

If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in this state.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 43; R.S. 1887, § 2379; R.S. 1899, § 3464; C.S. 1910, § 4308; C.S. 1920, § 5577; R.S. 1931, § 89-419; C.S. 1945, § 3-520; W.S. 1957, § 1-25; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Limitations law of jurisdiction in which cause of action arises is law of this state, even though a defendant is properly before a Wyoming court, the place where he may be personally served with process and a remedy found. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3006 (U.S. 1979), reh'g denied, 590 P.2d 1340, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1979).

Whether characterized as substantive or procedural. —

The limitation of action statute of the foreign jurisdiction in which a cause in question arose is applied by the forum court regardless of whether or not the foreign limitation could be characterized as substantive or procedural: thus, in almost all instances, if a plaintiff's cause of action is time-barred in the jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose, it would be barred by the passage of time in the forum court as well. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3006 (U.S. 1979), reh'g denied, 590 P.2d 1340, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1979).

Application of “borrowing” statute. —

In applying a “borrowing” statute, a court must consider not only the borrowed limitation of action statute itself, but also any applicable tolling or other statutes as well as pertinent court cases of that state where the cause of action accrued. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3006 (U.S. 1979), reh'g denied, 590 P.2d 1340, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1979).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-117 (2015) did not provide a basis to apply the Shoshone and Arapahoe Law and Order Code's two-year statute of limitations to a non-Indian plaintiff's action against two tribal members for injuries sustained in an accident that occurred on a state highway within the reservation as the reservation was neither a state nor a country. C'Hair v. Dist. Court of the Ninth Judicial Dist., 2015 WY 116, 357 P.3d 723, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2015).

Accrual of cause of action on mortgage obligation. —

Where a mortgage contains a promise or obligation to pay the indebtedness, and the indebtedness is to be paid in Colorado at a specified time, but it was not then and there paid, the cause of action accrues at that time and at that place. Baker v. First Nat'l Bank, 603 P.2d 397, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 488 (Wyo. 1979).

Accrual of action involving mineral production. —

Although subject matter of contract was mineral production in Wyoming, cause of action arose in Colorado where contract was made and negotiated in Colorado, documents were delivered there, and alleged breach clearly occurred in Colorado; under this section, applicable statute of limitations was therefore that of Colorado. BHP Petroleum (Ams.), Inc. v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 1 P.3d 1253, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 2000).

Application of “borrowing” statute. —

When applying a foreign jurisdiction's statute of limitations pursuant to Wyoming's borrowing statute, a Wyoming court should not also consider or apply that foreign jurisdiction's choice of law statutes or case law. Therefore, in a negligence case arising from a vehicle accident in Montana, the Montana three-year statute of limitations applied, but not its choice of law principles. Boutelle v. Boutelle, 2014 WY 147, 337 P.3d 1148, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 2014).

Quoted in

Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1978); Stanbury v. Larsen, 803 P.2d 349, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1990).

Cited in

Kuhn v. McKay, 7 Wyo. 42, 49 P. 473, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1897); Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1993); Hronek v. Saint Joseph's Children's Home, 866 P.2d 1305, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1994).

Law reviews. —

For note, “An Interest Analysis Approach to Wyoming's Borrowing Statute,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 717 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Conflict of laws as to validity and effect of arbitration provision in contract for purchase or sale of goods, products or services, 95 ALR3d 1145.

Validity and effect of stipulation in contract to effect that it shall be governed by law of particular state which is neither place where contract is made nor place where it is to be performed, 16 ALR4th 967.

Validity, construction and application, in nonstatutory personal injury actions, of state statute providing for borrowing of statute of limitations of another state, 41 ALR4th 1025.

§ 1-3-118. Right to commence new action.

If in an action commenced in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and the time limited for the commencement of the action has expired at the date of the reversal or failure, the plaintiff, or his representatives if he dies and if the cause of action survives, may commence a new action within one (1) year after the date of the failure or reversal. This provision also applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 44; R.S. 1887, § 2380; R.S. 1899, § 3465; C.S. 1910, § 4309; C.S. 1920, § 5578; R.S. 1931, § 89-420; C.S. 1945, § 3-521; W.S. 1957, § 1-26; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to abatement of actions by death, see § 1-4-102 .

Section applies only where first action was commenced in due time. Riley v. Union P. R. Co., 182 F.2d 765, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2864 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1950).

Where public employee did not serve copies of her personal injury complaint on the state attorney general or the director of the department of employment in the manner required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b) the complaint was barred by the statute of limitation, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105 because service was not perfected until after expiration of the four year statute of limitations. However, the savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 , applied to allow the employee to refile the action. Haney v. Cribbs, 2006 WY 158, 148 P.3d 1118, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 2006).

And in Wyoming. —

This section does not apply to actions brought in a state other than Wyoming. Riley v. Union P. R. Co., 182 F.2d 765, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2864 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1950).

Question whether original action sufficiently commenced. —

Where an amended petition showed that the time between the accrual of the cause of action and the filing of such petition exceeded the period of limitations, a demurrer (now motion) to the petition did not raise the question whether the summons issued on filing the original petition was a sufficient commencement of the action to entitle plaintiff to a new action within one year under this section. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Clause, 13 Wyo. 166, 78 P. 708, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (1904). See Rule 7, W.R.C.P.

No application to cases filed under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. —

Where plaintiff's minivan was struck by a county road grader on October 31, 2007, plaintiff's complaint filed against the county on February 20, 2009 was barred by the one-year period of limitations for bringing an action under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act; likewise, plaintiff's second complaint filed against the county on July 27, 2009 was time-barred. The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the savings statute did not apply to actions filed under the WGCA. Hall v. Park County, 2010 WY 124, 238 P.3d 580, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2010).

Inability to complete service. —

This section, the Wyoming savings statute, is designed for situations where the plaintiff files an action in a timely manner and makes a diligent good faith effort to serve the defendant but is unable to complete service within the 60-day time period of Rule 3(b), W.R.C.P., through no fault of his own. Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23413 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S. Ct. 85, 78 L. Ed. 2d 94, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1117 (U.S. 1983).

Improper joinder. —

Where service of process by the coroner was quashed because the sheriff was improperly joined as a party, a new action could be commenced under the provisions of this section within one year thereafter. Clause v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 16 Wyo. 450, 95 P. 54, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1908).

Federal court dismissal. —

This section affords a plaintiff a year from a federal court dismissal to commence a new action in the state court. Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15055 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1995).

The one-year time frame in this section controls over the 30-day tolling period that 28 USCS § 1367(d) provides for dismissed supplemental claims where state law does not grant a longer tolling period. Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15055 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1995).

Dismissal with prejudice as sanction for discovery violations. —

District court did not exceed its authority or violate the Wyoming Constitution's separation of powers provision by dismissing a passenger's second personal injury complaint in response to repeated discovery violations because the procedural rule authorizing the sanction of dismissal with prejudice for discovery violations was clearly within the district court's authority to control the course of litigation. Reynolds v. Bonar, 2013 WY 144, 313 P.3d 501, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2013).

Quoted in

McAteer v. Stewart, 696 P.2d 72, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 456 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Terex Corp. v. Hough, 2002 WY 112, 50 P.3d 317, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2002); Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, 101 P.3d 465, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (2004); Roush v. State, 2014 WY 45, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Apr 8, 2014); Dirks v. Jimenez, 2015 WY 36, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Mar. 6, 2015).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Successive actions as within statutory provision fixing time within which new action may be commenced after nonsuit or judgment not on merits, 54 ALR2d 1229.

Statute permitting new action, after failure of original action timely commenced, as applicable where original action was filed in another state, 55 ALR2d 1038.

Determination of beginning of period allowed by statute for commencement of new action after failure, otherwise than on the merits, of action timely begun, 79 ALR2d 1270.

Voluntary dismissal or nonsuit as within provision of statute extending time for new action in case of dismissal or failure of original action otherwise than upon the merits, 79 ALR2d 1290.

Character or kind of action or proceeding within operation of statute which permits new action after expiration of period of limitation, upon failure of previous action commenced within the period, 79 ALR2d 1309.

Statute permitting new action after failure of original action commenced within period of limitation, as applicable in cases where original action fails for lack of jurisdiction, 6 ALR3d 1043.

Applicability, as affected by change in parties, of statute permitting commencement of new action within specified time after failure of prior action not on merits, 13 ALR3d 848.

Effect of statute permitting new action to be brought within specified period after failure of original action other than on the merits to limit period of limitations, 13 ALR3d 979.

Application to period of limitations fixed by contract of statute permitting new action to be brought within specified time after failure of prior action for cause other than on the merits, 16 ALR3d 452.

§ 1-3-119. Effect of partial payment or new promise in writing.

When payment has been made upon any demand founded on contract or a written acknowledgment thereof, or promise to pay the same has been made and signed by the party to be charged, the time for commencing an action runs from the date of such payment, acknowledgment or promise.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 45; R.S. 1887, § 2381; R.S. 1899, § 3466; C.S. 1910, § 4310; C.S. 1920, § 5579; R.S. 1931, § 89-421; C.S. 1945, § 3-522; W.S. 1957, § 1-27; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Propriety of suing upon original obligation. —

In action on note, it is proper to sue upon original obligation, relying upon a reply, after bar of statute of limitations has been alleged in defendant's answer, avoiding that bar through claim of acknowledgment of indebtedness. Investment & Sec. Co. v. Bunten, 56 Wyo. 77, 103 P.2d 414, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (1940). See Rule 7 and 8, W.R.C.P.

Promise to pay balance implied. —

Part payment takes action on debt out of statute of limitation, since promise to pay balance is implied. Smith v. Smith, 39 Wyo. 107, 270 P. 174, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1928).

Sufficient acknowledgment to revive debt. —

Letters which make excuses for nonpayment of a note and do not deny the obligation, nor regard indebtedness as nonexistent, are sufficient acknowledgment to revive the debt or claim otherwise barred by limitations. Investment & Sec. Co. v. Bunten, 56 Wyo. 77, 103 P.2d 414, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1940).

Statute of limitations was tolled by letter from property owner's attorney to a contractor's attorney which acknowledged a debt clearly identifiable in the contractor's subsequent claim. Longstaff v. Mills, 773 P.2d 149, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1989).

Circumstances of payment considered. —

Circumstances surrounding payments by brother to sister could be considered in determining whether payments were applicable to brother's note, relieving note of bar by limitations. Smith v. Smith, 39 Wyo. 107, 270 P. 174, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1928).

Maker's intentions not shown by endorsements. —

Maker's intentions in making payments are not shown by endorsement of payments on note in determining whether payments took note out of statute of limitations. Smith v. Smith, 39 Wyo. 107, 270 P. 174, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1928).

Effect of payment by comaker. —

A payment on a note by one of two jointly and severally liable thereon, made without the knowledge or consent of the other, does not suspend the running of the statute in favor of the other. Cowhick v. Shingle, 5 Wyo. 87, 37 P. 689, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1894).

Where one of two makers of a joint and several promissory note makes a payment thereon, so doing does not prevent running of the statute of limitations as to the other maker. Bergman v. Bly, 66 F. 40, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2292 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1895).

Proceeds of foreclosure sale not deemed payment. —

The application of proceeds of a mortgage foreclosure sale on the mortgage note is not a payment which arrests the running of limitations within this section. Union Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Maika, 16 Wyo. 141, 92 P. 619, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1907).

Cited in

NuHome Invs., LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, 81 P.3d 940, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 2003).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Moral obligation to pay barred debt as consideration for a new promise, 8 ALR2d 787.

Entry or endorsement by creditor on note, bond or other obligation as evidence of part payment which will toll the statute of limitations, 23 ALR2d 1331.

Acknowledgment or promise to pay judgment as affecting running of statute of limitations, 45 ALR2d 967.

Acknowledgment, new promise or part payment as affecting running of limitations on account stated, 51 ALR2d 331.

Payment by 1 of 2 or more joint or several debtors as suspending or tolling limitations, 74 ALR2d 1287.

Acceptance of past due interest, default in payment of which accelerates maturity of note or mortgage, as suspending the running of limitations, 97 ALR2d 997.

Necessity and sufficiency, in order to toll statute of limitations as to debt, of statement of amount of debt in acknowledgment or new promise to pay, 21 ALR4th 1121.

When statute of limitations commences to run against promise to pay debt “when able,” “when convenient,” or the like, 67 ALR5th 479.

Chapter 4 Abatement and Survival

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival §§ 52 to 109.

1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival §§ 117 to 180.

§ 1-4-101. Causes of action that survive.

In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes of action for mesne profits, injuries to the person, an injury to real or personal estate, or any deceit or fraud also survive. An action may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same, but in actions for personal injury damages, if the person entitled thereto dies recovery is limited to damages for wrongful death.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 28; R.S. 1887, § 2364; R.S. 1899, § 3447; C.S. 1910, § 4290; C.S. 1920, § 5559; R.S. 1931, § 89-402; C.S. 1945, § 3-402; Laws 1947, ch. 124, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-28; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision giving personal representative the right to bring new action when cause of action survives and timely suit failed otherwise than on the merits, see § 1-3-118 .

“Survival” defined. —

In the context of a survival action, “survive” means to continue to live or exist beyond the life, or existence of; to live through; to live on after passing through; to remain alive. Thus, this section cannot apply to harm allegedly done to an estate after death. Connely v. McColloch (In re Estate of Drwenski), 2004 WY 5, 83 P.3d 457, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2004).

Cause of action for personal injuries survives. —

Formerly, cause of action for purely personal injuries, caused by negligence of another, did not survive death of wrongdoer. Tuttle v. Short, 42 Wyo. 1, 288 P. 524, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1930).

By amendment in 1947 the legislature effectively permitted a cause of action for personal injuries to survive. Parsons v. Roussalis, 488 P.2d 1050, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1971).

Before the 1947 amendment to this section, which extended the section to personal injuries and added the proviso as to personal injury damages, it was held that this section did not authorize the personal representative of a person who had died from injuries to recover from the estate of a deceased wrongdoer for pecuniary losses suffered by the family of the injured person. Mull v. Wienbarg, 66 Wyo. 410, 212 P.2d 380, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (1949). See § 1-39-101 .

Causes of action for damages or injury to persons and property survive and are assignable, and consequently can be the subject of a claim for conventional subrogation. Northern Utils. Div. of K N Energy v. Evansville, 822 P.2d 829, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1991).

This section is ambiguous as to the applicability of language in second sentence beginning with “but.” De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

What that language refers to. —

The language in the second sentence beginning with “but” refers to those cases where death results from the injuries complained of. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

The language in the second sentence beginning with “but” does not attach to the words “injuries to the person” under circumstances other than wrongful death actions where the negligence causes the death. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

Cause survives where death due to unconnected illness. —

A cause of action for personal injuries survives under this section where the injured party dies of an illness unconnected with the alleged negligence of a defendant. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

It is not reasonable to relate wrongful death recovery to negligent acts not causing death. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

Where a person is injured by another, if he dies from other causes, an action for personal injury survives; however, if death results from the same injuries, the action may not be maintained by the personal representative for the estate, but may be brought under the wrongful death act for the next of kin. Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 2000).

Where decedent's death is due to wrongful injuries, suit is permitted under either this section or §§ 1-38-101 and 1-38-102 .Parsons v. Roussalis, 488 P.2d 1050, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1971).

But recovery is limited to that stemming from wrongful death. —

pain and suffering of the decedent, according to the words of this section, having no part in establishing damages. Parsons v. Roussalis, 488 P.2d 1050, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1971).

Complete remedy for wrongful death not allowed. —

Wyoming's survival statute with its language in the second sentence beginning with “but” is unique in that it does not allow a complete remedy for wrongful death as in other jurisdictions. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

Both a recovery for the estate and a recovery for the survivors are not available in wrongful death actions because of the language in the second sentence of this section which begins with “but.” De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

Distinctions between survival and wrongful death statutes. —

The prime difference between survival and wrongful death statutes is that the survival statute merely continues a cause of action in existence. The injured party's claim after death is an asset of the estate, while the wrongful death statute creates a new cause of action for the benefit of designated persons who have suffered the loss of a loved one and provider. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977); Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23413 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S. Ct. 85, 78 L. Ed. 2d 94, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1117 (U.S. 1983).

Survival statutes permit the personal representative of the deceased to prosecute any claims for personal injury the deceased would have had but for his death but do not permit recovery for harms suffered by the decedent's family as a result of his death. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

The survival statute protects the creditors of the estate; the Wrongful Death Act does not. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

Quoted in

Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, 50 P.3d 323, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 557 (Wyo. 1986).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Should a Wrongful Death Action Expire Before the Decedent Does? A Wrong Turn for Wrongful Death,” see XXXV Land & Water L. Rev. 235 (2000).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Survival of action for invasion of right of privacy, 14 ALR2d 750, 57 ALR3d 16.

Survival of action based on delay in passing upon application for insurance, 32 ALR2d 487.

Claim for negligently damaging or destroying personal property as surviving tortfeasor's death, 40 ALR2d 533.

Statutory liability for physical injuries inflicted by animal as surviving defendant's death, 40 ALR2d 543.

Death of beneficiary as affecting right of action under death statute, 43 ALR2d 1291.

Survival of obligation of guaranty, 41 ALR2d 1213.

Action or claim for punitive damages as surviving death of person wronged, 63 ALR2d 1327.

Death as terminating coexecutor's, coadministrator's or testamentary cotrustee's liability for defaults or wrongful acts of fiduciary in handling trust or estate, 65 ALR2d 1019.

Survivability of cause of action created by civil rights statute, 88 ALR2d 1153.

Survival of cause of action under Civil Damage Act, 94 ALR2d 1140.

Survivability of action for libel by will, 21 ALR3d 754.

Death of putative father as precluding action for determination of paternity or for support of illegitimate child, 58 ALR3d 188.

Recovery, in action for benefit of decedent's estate in jurisdiction which has both wrongful death and survival statutes, of value of earnings decedent would have made after death, 76 ALR3d 125.

Validity of exception for specific kind of tort action in survival statute, 77 ALR3d 1349.

Products liability: forklift trucks, 95 ALR3d 541.

Judgment in favor of, or adverse to, person injured as barring action for his death, 26 ALR4th 1264.

Claim for punitive damages in tort action as surviving death of tortfeasor or person wronged, 30 ALR4th 707.

Defamation action as surviving plaintiff's death, under statute not specifically covering action, 42 ALR4th 272.

When is death “instantaneous” for purposes of wrongful death or survival action, 75 ALR4th 151.

Right of workers' compensation insurer or employer paying to a workers' compensation fund, on the compensable death of an employee with no dependants, to indemnity or subrogation from proceeds of wrongful death action brought against third-party tortfeasor, 7 ALR5th 969.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive damages awarded in personal injury or death cases, 12 ALR5th 195.

Wrongful death damages for loss of expectancy of inheritance from decedent, 42 ALR5th 465.

Survival of action or cause of action based on violation of antitrust laws, 11 ALR Fed 963.

§ 1-4-102. Abatement of actions by death.

No action or proceeding pending in any court abates by the death of either or both of the parties thereto except as herein provided; an action for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, assault, assault and battery or nuisance shall abate by the death of either party.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 195; R.S. 1887, § 2531; R.S. 1899, § 3622; C.S. 1910, § 4477; C.S. 1920, § 5747; R.S. 1931, § 89-1227; C.S. 1945, § 3-2301; W.S. 1957, § 1-29; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to limitation of actions for libel, slander, assault, battery and malicious prosecution, see § 1-3-105 .

For provision that proceedings on orders of attachment shall not abate if the defendant dies or a defendant corporation loses its charter, see § 1-4-101 .

For provision that cause of action for wrongful death survives the death of the person liable, see § 1-38-101 .

As to criminal nuisances, see § 6-6-201 et seq.

As to substitution of parties when one dies, see Rule 25, W.R.C.P.

The 2004 amendment substituted “battery or nuisance” for “battery, nuisance, or against a justice of the peace for misconduct in office.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Section is expressly limited to pending actions and cannot be construed as referring to actions which have not yet been commenced. Mull v. Wienbarg, 66 Wyo. 410, 212 P.2d 380, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1949).

Time to bring appellate proceedings not suspended. —

Statutes dealing with revivor of actions after death of a party do not suspend running of time limit within which appellate proceedings must be brought to view judgment or final order of trial court. Rowray v. McCarthy, 48 Wyo. 108, 42 P.2d 54, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1935).

Death of appellant after original decision on appeal had been rendered does not require substitution of appellant's heirs and administrator as parties, on respondent's motion for substitution and petition for rehearing, under this section, where former opinion would not be disturbed. Lovejoy v. Lovejoy, 38 Wyo. 358, 267 P. 91, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1928).

Death statutes. —

Sections 1-39-101 and 1-39-102 are not mere survival statutes and recovery may be had though deceased died instantaneously. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1931).

Successor in trust as party. —

By analogy to the practice in the district court under the code, the successor in trust would seem to be a proper party. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Sufficiency of affidavit. —

An affidavit by a third person, who seeks to be substituted as plaintiff in ejectment, which states that during pendency of the action the original plaintiff transferred, by warranty deed, all her interest in the premises to the applicant, and then died, and that the applicant is now the owner of the property, does not state with sufficient clearness a case entitling applicant to substitution, since deed, while absolute in terms, may be in effect only a mortgage, a mere colorable conveyance, void for want of consideration, or procured by duress or fraud. Smith v. Harrington, 3 Wyo. 503, 27 P. 803, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1891); Smith v. City of Cheyenne, 3 Wyo. 513, 27 P. 807, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (1891).

Upon forfeiture of charter of corporation, pending action against it was not abated, but could proceed in the corporate name, as general laws governing revivor of actions are not controlling. Lusk Lumber Co. v. Independent Producers Consol., 43 Wyo. 191, 299 P. 1044, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1931).

Applied in

Parsley v. Wyoming Automotive Co., 395 P.2d 291, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1964).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Medical malpractice action as abating upon death of either party, 50 ALR2d 1445.

Abatement or survival of action for attorney's malpractice or negligence upon death of either party, 65 ALR2d 1211.

Recovery, in action for benefit of decedent's estate in jurisdiction which has both wrongful death and survival statutes, of value of earnings decedent would have made after death, 76 ALR3d 125.

Validity of exception for specific kind of tort action in survival statute, 77 ALR3d 1349.

Libel by newspaper headline, 95 ALR3d 660.

Bells, carillons and the like as nuisance, 95 ALR3d 1268.

Effect of death of beneficiary upon right of action under death statute, 13 ALR4th 1060.

Defamation action as surviving plaintiff's death, under statute not specifically covering action, 42 ALR4th 272.

Abatement of state criminal case by accused's death pending appeal of conviction — modern cases, 80 ALR4th 189.

Chapter 5 Venue

Cross references. —

As to change of venue or judge, see § 1-7-101 .

As to venue of action of quo warranto, see § 1-31-109 .

As to venue of application for arbitration, see § 1-36-118 .

As to venue of probate courts, see §§ 2-2-102 and 2-2-103 .

As to venue of actions for damages against city on liability insurance, see § 15-1-104 .

As to venue in connection with divorce proceedings, see § 20-2-104 .

As to venue of suits against insurers, see § 26-15-134 .

As to worker's compensation claim when employee was injured out of state, see § 27-14-204 .

As to contested cases under Worker's Compensation Act, see § 27-14-601 , et seq.

As to venue of proceedings before public service commission, see § 37-2-216 .

As to action to recover from utility for loss or damage, see § 37-12-208 .

As to pleading improper venue, see Rule 12(b), W.R.C.P.

As to effect of objection of joined party to venue, see Rule19(a), W.R.C.P.

As to effect of dismissal for improper venue, see Rule 41(b), W.R.C.P.

For provision that rules of civil procedure shall not be construed to extend or limit jurisdiction of courts or venue of actions therein, see Rule 82, W.R.C.P.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue §§ 1 to 49.

Venue of suit to enjoin nuisance, 7 ALR2d 481.

Relationship between “residence” and “domicile” under venue statutes, 12 ALR2d 757.

What is an action for damages to personal property within venue statute, 29 ALR2d 1270.

Applicability to annulment actions of statutory residence requirements relating to venue in divorce actions, 32 ALR2d 734.

Venue of action for partnership dissolution, settlement or accounting, 33 ALR2d 914.

Venue of wrongful death action, 36 ALR2d 1146.

Retroactive operation and effect of venue statute, 41 ALR2d 798.

Res judicata effect of judgment dismissing action or otherwise denying relief for lack of jurisdiction or venue, 49 ALR2d 1036.

Venue of divorce action in particular county as dependent on residence or domicile for a specified length of time, 54 ALR2d 898.

Validity of contractual provision limiting place or court in which action may be brought, 56 ALR2d 300.

Proper county for bringing replevin or similar possessory action, 60 ALR2d 487.

Venue of action for cutting, destruction or damage of standing timber or trees, 65 ALR2d 1268.

Venue of action for unauthorized geophysical or seismograph survey, 67 ALR2d 444.

Effect on venue of intervention of other stockholders in derivative action, 69 ALR2d 562.

Validity of contractual provision authorizing venue of action in particular place, court or county, 69 ALR2d 1324.

Venue for libel and slander actions, 70 ALR2d 1340.

Venue of action for rescission or cancellation of contract relating to interests in land, 77 ALR2d 1014.

Venue of contribution or indemnity claim arising from payment of judgment or claim in motor vehicle accident case, 84 ALR2d 994.

Prohibition as appropriate remedy to restrain civil action for lack of venue, 93 ALR2d 882.

Sufficiency of contractual designation of place of performance to fix venue at that place under statute authorizing or requiring such venue, 97 ALR2d 934.

Proper place of suit in action on Miller Act bond, 100 ALR2d 456.

Right of defendant to file cross complaint or otherwise seek relief against codefendant or third person in an action pending in the county or district which would not be the proper venue of an independent action in that regard, 100 ALR2d 693.

Venue of damage action for breach of real estate sales contract, 8 ALR3d 489.

Venue of action for libel in newspapers, 15 ALR3d 1249.

Where is embezzlement committed for purposes of territorial jurisdiction or venue, 80 ALR3d 514.

Validity of contractual provision limiting place or court in which action may be brought, 31 ALR4th 404.

Place where claim or cause of action “arose” under state venue statute, 53 ALR4th 1104.

Forum non conveniens in products liability cases, 76 ALR4th 22.

Place where corporation is doing business for purposes of state venue statute, 42 ALR5th 221.

92A C.J.S. Venue § 1 et seq.

§ 1-5-101. Actions to be brought where real property situated; exceptions.

  1. Actions for the following causes shall  be brought in the county in which the subject of the action is situate,  except as provided in W.S. 1-5-102 and 1-5-103 :
    1. For the recovery of real property, or  of an estate or interest therein;
    2. For the partition of real property;
    3. For the sale of real property under a  mortgage, lien or other encumbrance or charge.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 75; R.S. 1887, § 2411; R.S. 1899, § 3496; C.S. 1910, § 4340; C.S. 1920, § 5609; R.S. 1931, § 89-701; C.S. 1945, § 3-801; W.S. 1957, § 1-30; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

For another provision concerning venue of proceedings to partition land, see § 1-32-102 .

As to venue of proceedings to determine heirship to land, see § 2-9-201 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Locus of injury to land. —

The district court of Wyoming had jurisdiction to restrain another from diverting the water of the stream by means of a ditch constructed in Montana, and by it carrying the water to his land in Wyoming, the locus of the injury to the owners being in Wyoming, where their ditch and lands were situated. Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1903).

Locus of ditch and headgate. —

Where owners of lands in Montana have acquired, by prior appropriation, the right to use for irrigating their lands the water of a stream by means of a ditch and headgate located in Wyoming, the district court of Wyoming had jurisdiction to restrain others from diverting the water by means of ditches located in Wyoming or in Montana for the irrigation of land in Wyoming. Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1903).

Foreclosure against nonresident. —

Foreclosure of city lien against realty for street improvements where correct address of nonresident owner was on file and where city omitted filing affidavit to establish defendant's residence was unknown and could not “with reasonable diligence be ascertained” was void. Elstermeyer v. Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 256, 116 P.2d 231, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1941), reh'g denied, 57 Wyo. 421, 120 P.2d 599, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1942).

Action on mortgage after foreclosure and redemption. —

Since a mortgage foreclosed upon did not survive the foreclosure sale and redemption, there was no real property at issue, and an action to collect the debt after the defendants failed to pay the deficiency was improperly venued in the county where the property was located. First Southwestern Fin. Servs. v. Laird, 882 P.2d 1211, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1994).

Quoted in

Spear v. Nicholson, 882 P.2d 1237, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1994).

Stated in

Zweifel v. State ex rel. Brimmer, 517 P.2d 493, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1974).

Law reviews. —

See comment, “Procedural Considerations in the Judicial Determination of Water Disputes,” 8 Land & Water L. Rev. 513 (1974).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Lien as estate or interest in land within venue statute, 2 ALR2d 1261.

Venue of action to set aside as fraudulent conveyance of real property, 37 ALR2d 568.

§ 1-5-102. Property situate in more than a single county.

When the property is situate in more than one (1) county, the action may be brought in either, but in actions to recover real property, this can only be done when the property is an entire tract.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 76; R.S. 1887, § 2412; R.S. 1899, § 3497; C.S. 1910, § 4341; C.S. 1920, § 5610; R.S. 1931, § 89-702; C.S. 1945, § 3-802; W.S. 1957, § 1-31; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

County where personal service on defendants possible. —

Where action to foreclose a mortgage on two parcels of land some distance apart and lying in two counties was brought in one county, statutory language authorized action to be brought “in Sheridan County, where personal service could be had on both defendants.” Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1937).

§ 1-5-103. Specific performance of sale contract for realty.

An action to compel the specific performance of a contract of sale of real estate may be brought in the county where any of the defendants reside.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 77; R.S. 1887, § 2413; R.S. 1899, § 3498; C.S. 1910, § 4342; C.S. 1920, § 5611; R.S. 1931, § 89-703; C.S. 1945, § 3-803; W.S. 1957, § 1-32; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Enforcement of lease not specific performance. —

It is doubtful if an action primarily to enforce a contract for a lease containing a number of reciprocal stipulations is an action for specific performance of a sale of real estate. Otis Oil & Gas Corp. v. Maier, 74 Wyo. 137, 284 P.2d 653, 1955 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1955).

Where action is brought in county of vendor's residence, though land is located in another county in another judicial district, decree requiring vendor's specific performance of real estate contract operates as conveyance when vendor fails to obey it within statutory time. Cantou v. Walker, 61 Wyo. 56, 154 P.2d 530, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1945).

A decree for specific performance of real estate contract operates as deed without actual execution of conveyance if defendant fails to obey it within time faced by statute, and decree may be recorded in county where land lies. Cantou v. Walker, 61 Wyo. 56, 154 P.2d 530, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1945).

Stated in

In re Estate of Frederick, 599 P.2d 550, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 442 (Wyo. 1979).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Venue of action for specific performance of contract pertaining to real property, 63 ALR2d 456.

§ 1-5-104. Actions to be brought where cause of action arose.

  1. Actions for the following causes shall be brought in the county where the cause or some part thereof arose:
    1. For the recovery of a fine, forfeiture or penalty imposed by a statute. When it is imposed for an offense committed on a river or other water course or a road which is the boundary of the state or of two (2) or more counties, the action may be brought in any county bordering on the river, water course or road, and opposite to the place where the offense was committed;
    2. Against a public officer for an act done by virtue or under color of his office, or for a neglect of his official duty;
    3. On the official bond or undertaking of a public officer.
  2. Actions for small claims proceedings under W.S. 1-21-201 through 1-21-205 may be brought in the county where the cause of action or some part thereof arose.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 78; R.S. 1887, § 2414; R.S. 1899, § 3499; C.S. 1910, § 4343; C.S. 1920, § 5612; R.S. 1931, § 89-704; C.S. 1945, § 3-804; W.S. 1957, § 1-33; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2021, ch. 67, § 1.

The 2021 amendment , effective July 1, 2021, added (b).

Cited in

State ex rel. Wyo. Farm Loan Bd. v. Herschler, 622 P.2d 1378, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 285 (Wyo. 1981).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Venue as to suit for avoidance of release or satisfaction of judgment, 9 ALR2d 553.

Venue of actions or proceedings against public officers, 48 ALR2d 423.

Venue in action for malicious prosecution, 12 ALR4th 1278.

What is the judicial district “in which the claim arose” for venue purposes under 28 USC § 1391(a) and (b), 59 ALR Fed 320.

§ 1-5-105. Actions against domestic corporations.

An action, other than those mentioned in W.S. 1-5-101 through 1-5-103 , against a corporation created under the laws of this state may be brought in the county in which the corporation is situate or has its principal office or place of business. If the corporation is an insurance company the action may be brought in the county wherein the cause of action or some part thereof arose.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 79; R.S. 1887, § 2415; R.S. 1899, § 3500; C.S. 1910, § 4344; C.S. 1920, § 5613; R.S. 1931, § 89-705; C.S. 1945, § 3-805; W.S. 1957, § 1-34; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Action against individual and corporation. —

Under this section, it was held that an action against an individual residing in one county and a domestic corporation having its principal office in another county, for damages in consequence of their joint negligence in conducting log drives on a river, was properly brought in the county of the residence of the individual. Harrison v. Carbon Timber Co., 14 Wyo. 246, 83 P. 215, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1905).

Change of venue. —

Defendant by going to trial waived fact that original pleadings were not sent to Crook County on change of venue from Weston County, since such defect did not deprive court of jurisdiction. J.J. Mayou Mfg. Co. v. Consumers Oil & Ref. Co., 60 Wyo. 75, 146 P.2d 738, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 3 , 151 A.L.R. 1243 (1940). See Rule 12, W.R.C.P.

Cited in

Cameron v. Lockhart, 79 Wyo. 187, 332 P.2d 65, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (1958).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Place where corporation is doing business for purposes of state venue statute, 42 ALR5th 221.

§ 1-5-106. Actions against public carriers and railroad companies.

An action for an injury to person or property upon a liability as a public carrier, or an action against a railroad company, may be brought in any county through or into which the carrier or railroad line passes.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 80; R.S. 1887, § 2416; R.S. 1899, § 3501; C.S. 1910, § 4345; C.S. 1920, § 5614; R.S. 1931, § 89-706; C.S. 1945, § 3-806; W.S. 1957, § 1-35; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cited in

Harrison v. Carbon Timber Co., 14 Wyo. 246, 83 P. 215, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (1905).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Federal Motor Carrier Act requiring designation of process agent as affecting venue, 8 ALR2d 814.

Proper forum and right to maintain action for accident causing death over or in high seas, 66 ALR2d 1002.

§ 1-5-107. Actions against nonresidents and foreign corporations.

An action, other than one (1) of those mentioned in W.S. 1-5-101 through 1-5-104 , against a nonresident of this state or a foreign corporation, whether or not codefendants reside in Wyoming, may be brought in any county where the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resides.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 83; R.S. 1887, § 2419; R.S. 1899, § 3504; C.S. 1910, § 4348; C.S. 1920, § 5617; R.S. 1931, § 89-707; Laws 1945, ch. 56, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-807; W.S. 1957, § 1-36; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 157, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to service of process on nonresident motorist, see § 1-6-301 .

As to foreign corporations generally, see §§ 17-16-1501 to 17-16-1534.

As to jurisdiction and venue over nonresident manufacturers and dealers under Mobile Home Warranty Act, see § 35-18-110 .

Purpose of section. —

In passing this section and § 26-3-121 , the legislature was interested in the furnishing of a local forum for residents of this state and for nonresidents when the cause of action arises in this state. Lohman v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 525 P.2d 1, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 224 (Wyo. 1974).

Where there is nonresident plaintiff and cause of action arises and all contracts have been outside state, this section and § 26-3-121 , absent unjustified judicial enlargement, provide for no jurisdiction in Wyoming courts over nonresidents of the state. Lohman v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 525 P.2d 1, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 224 (Wyo. 1974).

No jurisdiction of property or person. —

Where goods have been seized on attachment, a judgment rendered and sale ordered, a writ of prohibition to prevent such sale will not issue, though the court had no jurisdiction either of the property or of the person, as the office of the writ is to arrest judicial, and not ministerial, proceedings. Dobson v. Westheimer, 5 Wyo. 34, 36 P. 626, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1894).

Where tortious acts were committed. —

The exercise of undue influence upon a decedent by the widow and her son causing him to execute documents concerning property, constituted tortious acts, and venue properly existed where the tort was committed and where the cause of action arose. Spear v. Nicholson, 882 P.2d 1237, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1994).

Venue of general action by state attorney general to enforce the laws of the state may properly be filed in the county where he has his office. Zweifel v. State, 517 P.2d 493, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1974).

Cited in

Harrison v. Carbon Timber Co., 14 Wyo. 246, 83 P. 215, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (1905); Pease Bros. v. American Pipe & Supply Co., 522 P.2d 996, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 1974).

Law reviews. —

See comment, “Procedural Considerations in the Judicial Determination of Water Disputes,” 8 Land & Water L. Rev. 513 (1974).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Venue of action against nonresident motorist served constructively under statute, 38 ALR2d 1198.

Forum non conveniens doctrine in state court as affected by availability of alternative forum, 57 ALR4th 973.

Place where corporation is doing business for purposes of state venue statute, 42 ALR5th 221.

Effect of American citizenship or residency of libelant who has alternate forum abroad on applicability of doctrine of forum non conveniens in admiralty action brought in United States district court, 70 ALR Fed 875.

§ 1-5-108. Actions not otherwise provided for; exception.

Every action not otherwise provided for in this chapter shall be brought in the county in which a defendant resides or may be summoned, except actions against an executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, which may be brought in the county where he was appointed or resides. If the action involves two (2) or more defendants, the action may be brought against all defendants in any county in which one (1) of the defendants resides or may be summoned.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 84; R.S. 1887, § 2420; R.S. 1899, § 3505; C.S. 1910, § 4349; C.S. 1920, § 5618; R.S. 1931, § 89-708; C.S. 1945, § 3-808; W.S. 1957, § 1-37; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 157, § 1; 1985, ch. 180, § 2.

Legal malpractice.—

It was an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to dismiss a legal malpractice action for improper venue because (1) suit was not filed in the county in which a law firm and attorneys resided, had their principal place of business, and were summoned, and (2) the statute could not be read so broadly as to authorize the filing of suit in another county without the attorneys and firm being summoned in that county. Aron v. Willey, 2019 WY 122, 453 P.3d 1031, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2019).

Action against individual and corporation. —

In an action against an individual residing in one county and a corporation having its office in another county, the action was properly brought in the county where the individual resided. Harrison v. Carbon Timber Co., 14 Wyo. 246, 83 P. 215, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1905).

Replevin not local action. —

Under this section, replevin is not a local action, and need not be brought where the goods are detained and the petition need not allege the venue of the detention. 16 Wyo. 161, 92 P. 624.

Applied in

First S.W. Fin. Servs. v. Laird, 882 P.2d 1211, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1994).

Cited in

Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (1903); Harrison v. Carbon Timber Co., 14 Wyo. 246, 83 P. 215, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (1905); Cameron v. Lockhart, 79 Wyo. 187, 332 P.2d 65, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (1958); Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1988).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Place of personal representative's appointment as venue of action against him in his official capacity, 93 ALR2d 1199.

Venue for currency reporting offense under Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (CFTRA) (31 USC § 5311 et seq.), 113 ALR Fed 639.

§ 1-5-109. Actions for personal injuries or wrongful death.

An action for personal injuries or wrongful death may be brought in the county in which the cause of action arose or in the county in which the defendant resides or may be summoned.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 180, § 1.

Chapter 6 Process, Notice and Lis Pendens

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 1 to 347.

Necessity, in service by leaving process at place of abode, etc., of leaving a copy of summons for each party sought to be served, 8 ALR2d 343.

What amounts to doing business in a state within statute providing for service of process in action against nonresident natural person or persons doing business in state, 10 ALR2d 200.

Foreign corporation's purchase within state of goods to be shipped into other state or country as doing business within state for purposes of service of process, 12 ALR2d 1439.

Jurisdiction of suit involving trust as affected by service, 15 ALR2d 610.

Ownership or control by foreign corporation of stock of other corporation as constituting doing business within state under statutes providing for service of process, 18 ALR2d 187.

Use of criminal process as ruse or pretense to obtain service on defendant in civil action, 20 ALR2d 163.

Power of state to subject foreign corporation to jurisdiction of its courts on sole ground that corporation committed tort within state, 25 ALR2d 1202.

Who is an “agent authorized by appointment” to receive service of process within purview of federal rules of civil procedure and similar state rules and statutes, 26 ALR2d 1086.

Immunity from service of process of nonresident witness appearing in other than strictly judicial proceedings, 35 ALR2d 1353.

Omission of signature of issuing officer on civil process or summons as affecting jurisdiction of the person, 37 ALR2d 928.

What constitutes doing business within state by foreign magazine, newspaper or other publishing corporation for purposes other than taxation, 38 ALR2d 747.

Power to grant annulment of marriage against nonresident on constructive service, 43 ALR2d 1086.

Foreign insurance company as subject to service of process in action on policy, 44 ALR2d 416.

Application of doctrine of idem sonans or the like to substitute or constructive service of process, 45 ALR2d 1090.

Immunity from service of process of public officer while attending court in official capacity, 45 ALR2d 1100.

Service of process on person in military service by serving person at civilian abode or residence or by leaving copy there, 46 ALR2d 1239.

Constructive or substituted service upon domiciliary or resident of forum in action to enjoin suit in another state or country for divorce or separation, 54 ALR2d 1240.

Sufficiency of notice to, or service upon, contemnor's attorney in civil contempt proceedings, 60 ALR2d 1244.

Service on dissolved domestic corporation in absence of express statutory direction, 75 ALR2d 1399.

Who may serve writ, summons or notice of garnishment, 75 ALR2d 1437.

State's power to subject nonresident individual other than a motorist to jurisdiction of its courts in action for tort committed within state, 78 ALR2d 397.

Failure to make return as affecting validity of service or court's jurisdiction, 82 ALR2d 668.

Holding directors', officers', stockholders' or sales meetings or conventions in a state by foreign corporation as doing business or otherwise subjecting it to service of process and suit, 84 ALR2d 412.

Immunity from service of process as affected by relationship between subject matters of litigation in which process was issued and litigation which nonresident served was attending, 84 ALR2d 421.

Manner of service of process upon foreign corporation which has withdrawn from state, 86 ALR2d 1000.

Permissible modes of service of notice of eminent domain proceedings, 89 ALR2d 1404.

Sufficiency of designation of court or place of appearance in original civil process, 93 ALR2d 376.

Validity of service of process on nonresident owner of watercraft under state “long-arm” statutes, 99 ALR2d 287.

Mistake or error in middle initial or middle name of party as vitiating or invalidating civil process, summons or the like, 6 ALR3d 1179.

Attorney representing foreign corporation in litigation as its agent for service of process in unconnected actions or proceedings, 9 ALR3d 738.

Jurisdiction on constructive or substituted service in suit for divorce or alimony to reach property within state, 10 ALR3d 212.

Validity, construction and application of statute making a foreign corporation subject to action arising out of contract made within the state, although such corporation was not doing business therein, 27 ALR3d 397.

Civil liability of one making false or fraudulent return of process, 31 ALR3d 1393.

Construction and application of phrase “usual place of abode,” or similar terms in statutes relating to service of process, 32 ALR3d 112.

Validity of service of summons or complaint on Sunday or holiday, 63 ALR3d 423.

Civil liability of judicial officer for abuse of process, 64 ALR3d 1251.

In personam jurisdiction, under long-arm statute, over nonresident physician, dentist, or hospital in medical malpractice action, 25 ALR4th 706.

Abuse of process action based on misuse of discovery or deposition procedures after commencement of civil action without seizure of person or property, 33 ALR4th 650.

54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 1 et seq; 66 C.J.S. Notice §§ 1 to 23; 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 1 to 114.

Article 1. In General

Cross references. —

As to style of process, see art. 5, § 15, Wyo. Const.

As to service of process on foreign corporations, see § 1-5-107 .

For authority of court commissioners to compel attendance of witnesses by process in connection with probate matters, see § 2-2-107 .

As to service of process outside state, see § 5-1-107 .

As to issuance of process by clerks of court, see § 5-7-102 .

As to process powers of circuit court, see § 5-9-133 .

As to service of process on first-class cities, see § 15-3-102 .

As to service of process on counties, see § 18-2-110 .

As to service of subpoena issued by county assessor by sheriff without charge, see § 18-3-204 .

As to service of notice on county commissioner with reference to removal from office, see § 18-3-523 .

As to execution of process by sheriff and deputies, see § 18-3-604 .

As to service of process on sheriff, see § 18-3-605 .

For provision requiring petition to be served with summons in connection with removal of county officer from office, see § 18-3-902 .

As to service of notice of suspension of county officer pending outcome of removal proceedings, see § 18-3-903 .

As to service of process in connection with military courts, see § 19-12-106 .

As to service of process on guardian and county attorney in actions for divorce based on insanity, see § 20-2-105 .

As to service of process on insurance commissioner, see § 26-2-126 .

As to service of process on surplus line insurer, see § 26-11-120 .

As to service of summons in suits by Wyoming oil and gas conservation commission, see § 30-5-111 .

As to service of process on temporary or transient merchants, see § 33-20-207 .

For duty of temporary or transient merchant required to post bond to appoint county clerk as agent for service of process in suit on bonds, see § 33-20-207 .

As to service of notice in connection with hearings by public service commission, see § 37-2-202 .

For authority of public service commission to issue subpoenas, etc., see § 37-2-206 .

As to service of process in connection with actions and proceedings in court arising under laws relative to public utilities and public service commission, see § 37-2-220 .

As to duty of nonresident wholesale dealers in cigarettes to appoint secretary of state as agent for service of process, see § 39-18-106 .

As to service of process in connection with civil actions to collect delinquent use taxes, see § 39-16-108 .

As to service of process in connection with multilevel and pyramid distributorship, see §§ 40-3-109 , 40-3-110 and 40-3-112 .

As to service of process on nonresidents in regard to copyrighted music, see § 40-13-108 .

As to service of process in action to collect delinquent state bonds in connection with irrigation drainage districts, see § 41-6-206 .

As to service of notice with reference to formation of irrigation districts, see § 41-7-204 .

As to process, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

As to service and filing of pleadings and other papers, see Rule 5, W.R.C.P.

For provision allowing additional time after service by mail, see Rule 6(d), W.R.C.P.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

51 Am. Jur. 2d Lis Pendens § 1 et seq.

§ 1-6-101. Endorsement by sheriff required.

The sheriff shall endorse upon every writ or order, the day and hour it was received by him.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 20; R.S. 1887, § 2356; R.S. 1899, § 3439; C.S. 1910, § 4282; C.S. 1920, § 5551; R.S. 1931, § 89-211; C.S. 1945, § 3-902; W.S. 1957, § 1-39; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-6-102. Service of process when sheriff is an interested party.

When the sheriff is a party or is interested in an action, process shall be directed to and executed by a person over the age of eighteen (18) years, not a party to the action, appointed for that purpose by the court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 21; R.S. 1887, § 2367; R.S. 1899, § 3440; C.S. 1910, § 4283; C.S. 1920, § 5552; R.S. 1931, § 89-212; C.S. 1945, § 3-903; W.S. 1957, § 1-40; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1985, ch. 212, § 3; 1993, ch. 1, § 1.

Service by coroner may be quashed if sheriff is not party. —

Where the sheriff is a party to the case, the duty of serving process devolves upon the coroner, though the court may quash such service if it finds that the sheriff was not a party within the meaning of this section. Clause v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 16 Wyo. 450, 95 P. 54, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1908) (decided under former § 7-4-103 ).

Cited in

Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1998); Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (2004).

§ 1-6-103. Appointment to serve particular process or order.

For good cause the court may appoint a person to serve a particular process or order, who has the same power as the sheriff to execute it. The person may be appointed on the motion of the party who obtains the process or order, and the return must be verified by affidavit. He is entitled to the fees allowed the sheriff for similar services.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 22; R.S. 1887, § 2358; R.S. 1899, § 3441; C.S. 1910, § 4284; C.S. 1920, § 5553; R.S. 1931, § 89-213; C.S. 1945, § 3-904; W.S. 1957, § 1-41; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-6-104. Duties of sheriff.

The sheriff shall execute every summons, order or other process, return the same as required by law, and exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties enjoined upon him by statute and by the common law.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 23; R.S. 1887, § 2359; R.S. 1899, § 3442; C.S. 1910, § 4285; C.S. 1920, § 5554; R.S. 1931, § 89-214; C.S. 1945, § 3-905; W.S. 1957, § 1-42; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-6-105. Proceedings when defendants not all served.

  1. When service has been made on one (1)  or more defendants, but not on all, the plaintiff may proceed as follows:
    1. If the action is against defendants jointly  indebted upon contract, he may proceed against the defendants served,  unless the court otherwise directs; or
    2. If the action is against defendants severally  liable, he may without prejudice to his rights against those not served,  proceed against the defendants served.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 105; R.S. 1887, § 2441; R.S. 1899, § 3527; C.S. 1910, § 4373; C.S. 1920, § 5643; R.S. 1931, § 89-824; C.S. 1945, § 3-906; W.S. 1957, § 1-43; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-6-106. Lis pendens; generally.

When a summons has been served or publication made, the action is pending so as to charge third persons with notice of its pendency, and while pending no interest can be acquired by third persons in the subject matter thereof as against the plaintiff’s title.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 106; R.S. 1887, § 2442; R.S. 1899, § 3528; C.S. 1910, § 4374; C.S. 1920, § 5644; R.S. 1931, § 89-825; C.S. 1945, § 3-907; W.S. 1957, § 1-44; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision that filing of petition for organization of power district constitutes lis pendens as to lands described therein, see § 37-7-107 .

As to filing of petition for organization of irrigation districts as a lis pendens against all lands described therein from and after the filing thereof, see § 41-7-209 .

Territorial scope of lis pendens. —

The doctrine of lis pendens has no efficacy outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the action is pending. Ludvik v. James S. Jackson Co., 635 P.2d 1135, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 381 (Wyo. 1981).

Admissions by defendants in answer to former action by plaintiffs to cancel oil and gas lease that it was void was binding on defendants therein and, under this section, were binding on corporation which contracted to develop lands. Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 P. 255, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1925).

Pendency of administration proceedings is not notice to one dealing with the administratrix in regard to land to which she holds the legal title that the estate has an interest in the land. Seibel v. Bath, 5 Wyo. 409, 40 P. 756, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1895).

Priorities. —

Under this section, where mortgage was delivered and recorded pending a suit to enforce an agreement to give a mortgage, the mortgage decreed in favor of plaintiff held to have priority over the mortgage so delivered and recorded. Walter v. Kressman, 25 Wyo. 292, 169 P. 3, 1917 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1917).

Property held by receiver. —

A creditor cannot interfere with the rights of property placed by the court into the hands of a receiver and taken possession of by the latter, and this rule applies even though a claimant's lien is paramount to the right of the receiver. When property has passed into the hands of a receiver, it is not subject to execution. Tibbals v. Graham, 50 Wyo. 277, 61 P.2d 279, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1936), overruled, Texas W. Oil & Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank, 743 P.2d 857, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 514 (Wyo. 1987).

Quoted in

Olson v. Leith, 71 Wyo. 316, 257 P.2d 342, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1953).

Cited in

State ex rel. Spriggs v. District Court, 76 Wyo. 128, 301 P.2d 550, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (1956); Wyo. Bank & Trust v. Haught, 2003 WY 111, 76 P.3d 301, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2003); Grommet v. Newman, 2009 WY 150, 220 P.3d 795, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Dec. 10, 2009).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Duration of operation of lis pendens as dependent upon diligent prosecution of suit, 8 ALR2d 986.

New or successive notice of lis pendens in same or new action after loss or cancellation of original notice, 52 ALR2d 1308.

Notice by judicial proceedings of adverse possession between cotenants, 82 ALR2d 5.

Propriety of filing of lis pendens in action affecting leasehold interest, 67 ALR3d 747.

Lis pendens in suit to compel stock transfer, 48 ALR4th 731.

Lis pendens: grounds for cancellation prior to termination of underlying action, absent claim of delay, 49 ALR4th 242.

Library References.

American Law of Mining, 2nd Edition § 92.03 (Matthew Bender).

§ 1-6-107. Lis pendens; recordation when real property situate in other counties; constructive notice.

After filing an action in a court of competent jurisdiction the subject matter of which is the title to real property located in one (1) or more counties in this state, the plaintiff may file a certified copy of the complaint or a sworn notice of the pendency of the action in the office of the county clerk in the county or counties in which the real property is located. The notice shall contain the names of the parties, the object of the action and a description of the property before it shall operate as constructive notice to third parties in such counties. Notice shall be effective in the county where the action is filed without filing a document with the county clerk of that county. Constructive notice shall be effective as to property in the county in which the complaint is filed as of the date the complaint is filed and shall be effective as to property in any other county as of the date on which the notice is filed in the clerk’s office of that county.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 107; R.S. 1887, § 2443; R.S. 1899, § 3529; C.S. 1910, § 4375; C.S. 1920, § 5645; R.S. 1931, § 89-826; C.S. 1945, § 3-908; W.S. 1957, § 1-45; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1995, ch. 109, § 1.

§ 1-6-108. Lis pendens; notice of pendency of action affecting real property or action between husband and wife.

In an action in a state court or in a United States district court affecting the title or right of possession of real property, or in an action between husband and wife, the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint and the defendant at the time of filing his pleading when affirmative relief is claimed or at any time afterward, may file in the office of the county clerk in which the property is situate a notice of pendency of the action containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense and a description of the property in that county affected thereby as provided by W.S. 1-6-107 . From the time of filing the notice a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer of the property shall have constructive notice of the pendency of the action.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 97-301; C.S. 1945, § 3-909; W.S. 1957, § 1-46; Laws 1965, ch. 125, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1995, ch. 109, § 1.

Territorial scope of lis pendens. —

The doctrine of lis pendens has no efficacy outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the action is pending. Ludvik v. James S. Jackson Co., 635 P.2d 1135, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 381 (Wyo. 1981).

Effect on subsequent conveyances. —

From filing of lis pendens in suit to establish a trust in land in compliance with Wyoming statutes, the land was subjected to result of the suit, and all conveyances thereafter made were dominated by such result. Clarke v. Boysen, 264 F. 492, 1920 U.S. App. LEXIS 1278 (8th Cir. Wyo.), modified, Clarke v. Asmus Boysen Mining Co., 268 F. 535, 1920 U.S. App. LEXIS 2347 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1920).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Lis pendens as applicable to suit for separation or dissolution of marriage, 65 ALR4th 522.

§ 1-6-109. Lis pendens; record of notice.

The county clerk upon the filing of such notice shall record the notice in accordance with W.S. 18-3-402(a)(vi).

History. Laws 1923, ch. 31, § 2; R.S. 1931, § 97-302; C.S. 1945, § 3-910; W.S. 1957, § 1-47; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2019, ch. 3, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted “notice” for “same” and substituted “accordance with W.S. 18-3-402(a)(vi)” for “a book kept for that purpose”.

Cited in

Grommet v. Newman, 2009 WY 150, 220 P.3d 795, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Dec. 10, 2009).

§ 1-6-110. Transmission of process by telecommunications.

Any summons, writ or order in any civil proceeding, and all other papers requiring service may be transmitted by any form of telecommunication for service in any place, and the copy of such writ, order or paper so transmitted may be served or executed by the officer or person to whom it is sent for that purpose and returned by him, if any return be requisite, in the same manner and with the same force and effect as the original thereof might be if delivered to him. The officer or person serving or executing the same has the same authority and is subject to the same liabilities as if the copy were the original. The original, when a writ or order, must also be filed in the court from which it was issued and a certified copy thereof shall be preserved in the telecommunication office from which it is sent. In sending it, either the original or certified copy may be used by the operator for that purpose. Whenever any document to be sent by telecommunication bears a seal, either private or official, it is not necessary for the operator to communicate a description of the seal or any words or device thereon, but the same may be expressed in the telecommunication by the letters “L. S.” or by the word “Seal”.

History. Laws 1901, ch. 25, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 4360; C.S. 1920, § 5629; R.S. 1931, § 89-810; C.S. 1945, § 3-1010; W.S. 1957, § 1-48; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-6-111. Substitution of certified mail for registered mail.

Wherever required by statute, rule of court or otherwise that service be made or notice given by registered mail, such requirement may be satisfied by use of certified mail and proof of mailing.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 73, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-48.1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Request for return receipt not eliminated. —

There is nothing in this section which eliminates the requirement for requesting a return receipt signed by addressee only. Oedekoven v. Oedekoven, 475 P.2d 307, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1970).

Article 2. Publication of Notice

Cross references. —

As to publication of notice of execution sale of goods and chattels, see § 1-17-312 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 1 et seq.

66 C.J.S. Notice §§ 1 to 23.

§ 1-6-201. Manner of publishing generally.

All notices by law directed, authorized or permitted to be made by publication may be published once each week during the period of time for which the notice is required by law to be published. All such weekly publications made in a newspaper issued more than once each week shall be published in the same issue in each succeeding week for the required publication period.

History. Laws 1909, ch. 30, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 4431; C.S. 1920, § 5701; R.S. 1931, § 89-1057; C.S. 1945, § 4-101; W.S. 1957, § 1-49; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision that party against whom judgment or order was rendered based on service by publication may have the judgment or order opened and be allowed to defend within six months following date of entry, see § 1-16-402 .

As to publication of notice of hearing in connection with probate of wills, see § 2-4-206 .

As to publication of notice of merger of banks, see § 13-4-107 .

As to publication of notice to creditors in connection with liquidation of banks, see § 13-4-402 .

As to publication of ordinance, see § 15-1-116 .

As to publication of legal notices in newspapers by county commissioners, see § 18-3-519 .

As to publication of change in precinct boundaries, see § 22-7-102 .

As to publication of notice of bond elections, see § 22-21-104 .

As to publication of notice to bidders concerning contracts for road and bridge construction, see § 24-2-108 .

For provision requiring publication or posting of notice of location of roads or alterations, see § 24-3-110 .

For duty of state treasurer to publish notice of intention to issue and negotiate state highway bonds, see § 24-8-103 .

As to publication of notice of selection of public lands prior to sale or lease thereof, see § 36-3-104 .

As to publication and contents of notice with reference to sale of state lands, see § 36-9-104 .

As to publication of notice for bids in connection with construction work in power districts, see § 37-7-128 .

As to publication of notice with reference to collection of delinquent sales taxes, see § 39-13-108 .

As to publication of notice of proposed changes in boundary of water conservancy district, see §§ 41-3-751 and 41-3-752 .

As to publication of notice in connection with bond elections in water conservancy districts, see § 41-3-755 .

As to publication of notice of elections of district advisory board in underground water districts declared critical areas, see § 41-3-913 .

As to publication of notice of hearing as to adjudication of underground waters in critical areas, see § 41-3-914 .

As to publication of notice of hearing in connection with granting permit for construction of well, see § 41-3-932 .

As to publication of notice of election to change public irrigation and power districts to irrigation districts, see § 41-7-832 .

As to notice of hearings to organize drainage districts, see §§ 41-9-104 and 41-9-105 .

As to publication of notice of hearing on dissolution of drainage district, see § 41-9-605 .

As to service by publication, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Jurisdiction, upon service by publication upon nonresident, of suit for establishment or enforcement of trust in respect of real property within the state, 15 ALR2d 610.

Sufficiency of affidavit as to due diligence in attempting to learn whereabouts of party to litigation for the purpose of obtaining service by publication, 21 ALR2d 929.

Validity of legislation relating to publication of legal notices, 26 ALR2d 655.

Difference between date of affidavit for service by publication and date of filing or of order for publication as affecting validity of service, 46 ALR2d 1364.

Sufficiency of affidavit made by attorney or other person on behalf of plaintiff for the purpose of service by publication, 47 ALR2d 423.

Newspapers within statutes as to publication of notices for resale of repossessed property by conditional vendors, 49 ALR2d 15.

Service on nonresident of notice of proceeding for modification of decree for alimony by publication or other form of constructive service, 62 ALR2d 544.

Service of process by publication in involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, 83 ALR2d 703.

Jurisdiction on service by publication in suit for divorce or alimony to reach property within state, 10 ALR3d 212.

Jurisdiction on constructive or substituted service, in divorce or alimony action, to reach property within state, 10 ALR3d 212.

What constitutes newspaper of “general circulation” within meaning of state statutes requiring publication of official notices and the like in such newspaper, 24 ALR4th 822.

§ 1-6-202. Notice for certain number of days.

Whenever the law requires or permits the publication of a notice for a certain number of days prior to any action, unless otherwise provided by law the publication may be made weekly as provided in W.S. 1-6-201 , and as often as such weekly publication can be made during the period of time for which such publication is required by law to be made, the first publication to be made as many days prior to such action as the law requires.

History. Laws 1909, ch. 30, § 2; C.S. 1910, § 4432; C.S. 1920, § 5702; R.S. 1931, § 89-1058; C.S. 1945, § 4-102; W.S. 1957, § 1-50; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-6-203. Notice for specified number of weeks.

In all cases where under the laws a notice is required or permitted to be published for a specified number of weeks, it is sufficient that the publication be made once each week for the number of issues corresponding to the number of weeks for which such publication is required to be made, provided that not more than twenty (20) days shall intervene between the date of the last publication and the time set for the intended action. In no case shall the notice given for a longer time than required by law be held defective for that reason.

History. Laws 1909, ch. 30, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1910, § 4433; C.S. 1920, § 5703; R.S. 1931, § 89-1059; Laws 1943, ch. 95, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 4-103; W.S. 1957, § 1-51; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-6-204. Publication of real property; descriptions used.

All notices directed, authorized or permitted to be made by publication that require a legal description of real property on the notice shall include the street address for the property used by the United States postal service when available, or the street address used by the county or municipality if available.

History. Laws 1996, ch. 70, § 1.

Article 3. Service on Nonresident Motorists

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 935 to 957.

72 C.J.S. Process §§ 73 to 76; 92A C.J.S. Venue § 92.

§ 1-6-301. Secretary of state deemed attorney for service; continuance of action; costs; record of process; jurisdiction; direction of summons.

  1. The use and operation of a motor vehicle on any street or highway within Wyoming by any person upon whom service of process cannot be made within Wyoming either personally or by service upon a duly appointed resident agent is deemed an appointment of the secretary of state of Wyoming as the operator’s lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal processes in any proceeding against him, or his personal representative if he be deceased, due to damage or injury to person or property resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle on the streets or highways within this state. Such operation constitutes the operator’s agreement that any process served in any action against him or his personal representative has the same legal force and validity as if served upon him or his personal representative personally within this state. Service shall be made by serving a copy of the process upon the secretary of state or by filing such copy in his office, together with payment of a fee of ten dollars ($10.00). Within ten (10) days after the date of service, notice of such service and a copy of the process shall be served upon the defendant or his personal representative either personally or by certified mail addressed to the last known address of the defendant or his personal representative. The plaintiff shall file with the clerk of the court in which the action is brought an affidavit that he has complied with such requirement.
  2. The court in which the action is pending shall order such continuance as necessary to afford the defendant or his personal representative reasonable opportunity to defend the action. The fee of ten dollars ($10.00) paid by the plaintiff to the secretary of state at the time of service of process shall be taxed as costs in the suit.
  3. The secretary of state shall keep a record of all processes served showing the date and hour of service and shall arrange and index the record to make it readily accessible and convenient for inspection. The district court of the county in which the cause of action arose or the district court of the county in which the plaintiff resides shall have jurisdiction over the action. The clerk of the district court in which the action is commenced may issue summons directed to the sheriff of Laramie county, Wyoming for service upon the secretary of state of Wyoming.

History. Laws 1935, ch. 43, § 1; 1945, ch. 11, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 60-1101; Laws 1955, ch. 95, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-52; Laws 1963, ch. 20, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1981, ch. 47, § 4; 2021, ch. 51, § 1.

The 2021 amendment , effective July 1, 2021, substituted "ten dollars ($10.00)" for "three dollars ($3.00)" in (a) and (b).

Construed in pari materia. —

Section 1-39-102 must be read together with § 1-3-116 and this section. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Absence from state of defendant in wrongful death action did not toll statute of limitations, by reason of the applicability of § 1-3-116 , where the defendant could have been served at any time through substituted service upon the secretary of state. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Where this section authorizes service on the nonresident motorist or the resident motorist who has concealed himself or who has absconded, the tolling statute serves no purpose. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Absence from state in personal injury action. —

Motorist's absence from state did not serve to toll statute of limitations for personal injury action against her, because substituted service of process could have been made upon her within state in accordance with subsection (a) of this section. Ryel v. Anderies, 4 P.3d 193, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 2000).

Failure to make attempt to locate the driver for service of process. —

Passenger's use of this section and attempted notice of the suit on the driver did not satisfy the statutory requirement, as the passenger had information of a more recent address, failed to make a reasonable attempt to locate the driver, and thus, failed to make an initial determination of whether substituted service was justified Dirks v. Jimenez, 344 P.3d 262 (Mar. 6, 2015).

Section not restricted to use of public highways or streets. —

Where broad language, such as that in this section, does not restrict its application to the use of public highways or streets, the service has been upheld when the cause of action arose out of the use and operation of a motor vehicle over or upon any road or street “within” the state, including private roads and roads within military reservations. Yellowstone National Park. Zacharias v. Ippen, 337 F.2d 445, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 4113 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1964).

Thus service may be had on nonresident when accident occurred in Yellowstone National Park. —

Under the broad terms of this section, service may be had on a nonresident when the cause of action arose out of an accident on a road within the Yellowstone National Park. Zacharias v. Ippen, 337 F.2d 445, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 4113 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1964).

Applicability to resident defendant.—

Substitute service could be made on a resident motorist who remained in the state but could not be found for personal service; this section reaches “any person” who cannot be personally served within Wyoming. Miller v. Johnson, 639 Fed. Appx. 558, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6069 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2016).

Notice to defendant's insurance company not satisfactory. —

Notice to a defendant motorist's insurance company, standing alone, will not satisfy due diligence. The plaintiff has a duty to exercise due diligence as federal due process requires. The plaintiff cannot expect the insurance company to carry out that duty. Colley v. Dyer, 821 P.2d 565, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 182 (Wyo. 1991).

Address given to investigating authorities reliable. —

Insofar as the “last known address” requirement of this section is concerned, a party may rely upon the address given to investigating authorities. Colley v. Dyer, 821 P.2d 565, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 182 (Wyo. 1991).

Action against nonresident in state court. —

Circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over insurer's suit seeking to recover damages from nonresidents of Wyoming, not exceeding $7,000, arising from alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle because circuit courts' subject matter jurisdiction was governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128 , as the granting in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301(c) of jurisdiction to district court of the county in which a cause of action arose or district court of the county in which plaintiff resided addressed venue rather than subject matter jurisdiction. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kunz, 2008 WY 71, 186 P.3d 378, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 2008).

Action by nonresident against nonresident in federal district court. —

A resident of Indiana did not consent to suit by a resident of Texas in a federal district court in Wyoming solely because of service under the provisions of this section upon the secretary of state. Weber v. Threlkel, 126 F. Supp. 98, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2451 (D. Wyo. 1954).

Quoted in

Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 473 (Wyo. 1986).

Stated in

Cook Ford Sales, Inc. v. Benson, 381 P.2d 68, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1963).

Cited in

Cook Ford Sales, Inc. v. Benson, 392 P.2d 307, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1964).

Law reviews. —

See note, “Venue of Action Against Non-Resident Motorists,” 1 Wyo. L.J. 130.

See “Legislation,” 1 Wyo. L.J. 133.

See “Commission of a Single Tort as Giving Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Corporation,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 313.

See article, “Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute,” 18 Wyo. L.J. 231 (1964).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and application of provisions of Federal Motor Carrier Act requiring designation of agent for service of process, 8 ALR2d 814.

Constitutionality and construction of statute authorizing constructive or substituted service of process on foreign representative of deceased nonresident driver of motor vehicle arising out of accident occurring in state, 18 ALR2d 544.

What is “motor vehicle” or the like within statute providing for constructive or substituted service of process on nonresident motorist, 48 ALR2d 1283.

Who is subject to constructive or substituted service of process under statutes providing for such service on nonresident motorist, 53 ALR2d 1164.

Place or type of motor vehicle accident as affecting applicability of statute providing for constructive or substituted service of process upon nonresident motorist, 73 ALR2d 1351.

Statutory service on nonresident motorists: return receipts, 95 ALR2d 1033.

Validity, construction, and effect of “consent to sue” clauses in uninsured motorist endorsement of automobile insurance policy, 24 ALR4th 1024.

Chapter 7 Change of Venue

Cross references. —

See also Rule 40.1, W.R.C.P.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §§ 517 to 543; 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue §§ 50 to 97.

92A C.J.S. Venue §§ 127 to 316.

§ 1-7-101. Liability for expenses in civil actions.

When a change of venue is directed in a civil action in the district court, the county from which the change of venue is taken shall be liable to pay to the county to which the change is taken the fees paid to the jury trying the case and any of the regular panel not engaged in the trial but held in waiting as an incident thereto, allowance to bailiffs, and all other jury expenses necessarily incurred by such county because of the change of venue. Such expenses shall be audited and allowed by the court to which the action is changed and the court shall certify such allowance to the county clerk of the county from which the change of venue was first taken. The allowance shall be paid by the county from which the change of venue was first taken.

History. Laws 1907, ch. 29, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 5143; C.S. 1920, § 6420; R.S. 1931, § 89-1103; C.S. 1945, § 3-1903; W.S. 1957, § 1-55; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to venue generally, see §§ 1-5-101 to 1-5-109 .

As to fees of jurors, see §§ 1-11-301 to 1-11-304 .

As to disqualification of judge in probate matters, see § 2-2-110 .

For duty of judges of district courts to hold court for each other, see § 5-3-106 .

For provision that no change of venue shall be granted in cases arising before police justice under ordinances of cities of the first class, see § 5-6-201 .

As to disqualification of judge in connection with hearings for the establishment of water conservancy districts, see § 41-3-723 .

Cited in

State ex rel. Poston v. District Court, 39 Wyo. 24, 269 P. 35, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (1928); Cosco v. Lampert, 2010 WY 52, 229 P.3d 962, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Apr. 26, 2010).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect of nonsuit, dismissal or discontinuance of action on prior order changing venue, 11 ALR2d 1407.

Binding effect of order on motion for change of venue, where action is terminated otherwise than on merits and reinstituted, 85 ALR2d 993.

Prohibition as appropriate remedy to review ruling on change of venue in civil case, 93 ALR2d 802.

§ 1-7-102. Venue in criminal cases generally.

  1. Every criminal case shall be tried in  the county in which the indictment or offense charged is found, except  as otherwise provided by law.
  2. When the location of a criminal offense  cannot be established with certainty, venue may be placed in the county  or district where the corpus delicti is found, or in any county or  district in which the victim was transported.

History. Laws 1877, p. 27, § 4; R.S. 1887, § 3403; R.S. 1899, § 4285; C.S. 1910, § 5146; C.S. 1920, § 6422; R.S. 1931, § 89-1105; C.S. 1945, § 3-1905; W.S. 1957, § 1-58; Laws 1977, ch. 58, § 1; ch. 188, § 1.

Venue of prosecution was properly laid

where there was conflicting evidence on where the offense occurred, the location of the offense could not be established with certainty, and therefore the predicate requirement for considering alternative avenues for establishing venue was met. Anderson v. State, 2014 WY 74, 327 P.3d 89, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2014).

Generally. —

Venue in criminal cases can be invoked in either the location where the offense is committed or where the corpus delicti is found. Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2000).

Venue in county where threatening calls received. —

This section and art. 1, § 10, Wyo. Const., granted venue and jurisdiction in the county where the defendant made phone calls, or where the phone calls were received, because the threats took effect in the county where they were received. McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. Feb. 2, 1994).

Change in venue due to pretrial publicity was not warranted. —

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for change of venue due to pretrial publicity about defendant's crimes and a separate investigation in which he was a murder suspect because although there were 12 articles published about defendant none was sensational or inflammatory and the last was published three months before trial, and also because only five of 48 prospective jurors expressed concern about their ability to be impartial in light of the pretrial publicity, none of the five was seated on the jury, and the record did not indicate that it was difficult to seat an impartial jury. Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2003).

In a murder case, a court properly denied defendant's motion for change of venue where the news articles were generally factual in nature, reporting information obtained from court documents and from a potential witness, and they were not sensational, inflammatory, or prejudicial. Defense counsel and the trial court appropriately and properly examined the jury venire, and there was no indication that the pretrial publicity made jury selection difficult or created such prejudice that a change of venue was necessary. Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, 99 P.3d 928, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4397 (U.S. 2005).

In defendant's felony murder case, change of venue was not warranted, where sixty-five jurors were summoned for the trial, and of those, twelve had heard about the case, and each of those jurors was closely examined, and at the close of voir dire, defendant passed the jury for cause and had no objections to the jury selection process. Lemus v. State, 2007 WY 111, 162 P.3d 497, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2007).

Quoted in

Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, 199 P.3d 1052, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Jan. 13, 2009); Poitra v. State, 2012 WY 58, 275 P.3d 478, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Apr. 12, 2012).

Cited in

Sides v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1998); Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 198 (Wyo. 1999).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Wyoming Criminal Code Revisited: Reflections after Fifteen Years,” see XXXIII Land and Water L. Rev. 523 (1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and effect of statutes providing for venue of criminal case in either county, where crime is committed partly in 1 county and partly in another, 30 ALR2d 1265, 73 ALR3d 907.

Venue of criminal charge for child desertion or nonsupport as affected by nonresidence of parent or child, 44 ALR2d 886.

Power or duty of prosecuting attorney to proceed with prosecution after change of venue, 60 ALR2d 864.

Change of venue on ground of disqualification of judge in proceeding to punish contempt against or involving himself or court of which he is a member, 64 ALR2d 600.

Binding effect of order on motion for change of venue, when action is terminated otherwise than on the merits and reinstituted, 85 ALR2d 993.

Venue of criminal prosecution for libel in newspaper, 15 ALR3d 1249.

Pretrial publicity in criminal case as ground for change of venue, 33 ALR3d 17.

Right of accused in misdemeanor prosecution to change of venue on grounds of inability to secure fair trial and the like, 34 ALR3d 804.

Change of venue by state in criminal case, 46 ALR3d 295.

Choice of venue to which transfer is to be had where change is sought because of local prejudice, 50 ALR3d 760.

Power of state trial court in criminal case to change venue on its own motion, 74 ALR4th 1023.

Chapter 8 Time for Trial

Cross references. —

As to assignment of cases for trial generally, see Rule 40, W.R.C.P.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 60 to 90.

88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 39 to 42, 60 to 63, 66 to 69, 71 to 90.

§ 1-8-101. Trial docket.

The clerk shall make a trial docket on which shall appear all cases in which the issues have been joined. The cases shall be set for trial in the order in which they stand on the appearance docket. The clerk shall not place upon the trial docket any case in which nothing remains to be done except to execute an order for the sale of real or personal property, and to distribute the proceeds as directed by the order, but if it becomes necessary, the case may be redocketed upon the application of either party, whereupon it shall stand in all respects as if it had remained on the docket.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 183; R.S. 1887, § 2519; Laws 1895, ch. 39, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 3606; C.S. 1910, § 4455; C.S. 1920, § 5725; R.S. 1931, § 89-1206; C.S. 1945, § 3-2106; W.S. 1957, § 1-64; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2019, ch. 54, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to docket of justice of peace court, see § 1-21-101 .

As to dockets of probate courts, see §§ 2-2-201 and 2-2-202 .

As to dockets of circuit courts generally, see § 5-9-101 et seq.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted "trial docket on which" for "trial docket on the first day of each term, on which" in the first sentence.

Entry by clerk presumed. —

In the absence of anything in the record to the contrary it will be presumed that a cause properly triable at the term in which it was heard was duly entered on the trial docket by the clerk, such being his duty under this section. Syndicate Improvement Co. v. Bradley, 6 Wyo. 171, 43 P. 79, 1896 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1896).

Record entry of judgment in the trial court necessary for appeal could not be shown by entries under the trial docket for use of the trial judge under this section, such docket not being the journal entries, required for entry of judgment. Hahn v. Citizens' State Bank, 25 Wyo. 467, 171 P. 889, 172 P. 705, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1918).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Authority of trial judge to impose costs or other sanctions against attorney who fails to appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial, 29 ALR4th 160.

§ 1-8-102. Order of hearing.

All cases shall be heard in the order in which they stand on the trial docket unless the court otherwise directs. The court may hear a motion at any time and may prescribe by rule the time of hearing motions.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 185; R.S. 1887, § 2521; R.S. 1899, § 3608; C.S. 1910, § 4457; C.S. 1920, § 5727; R.S. 1931, § 89-1208; C.S. 1945, § 3-2108; W.S. 1957, § 1-65; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision that actions for quo warranto shall have precedence over pending civil actions, see § 1-31-130 .

For provision authorizing advancement of case involving validity of Water and Sewer District Law or establishment of water and sewer districts, see § 41-10-146 .

For provision authorizing advancement on calendar of action for declaratory judgment, see Rule 57, W.R.C.P.

Cited in

James v. Lederer-Strauss & Co., 32 Wyo. 377, 233 P. 137, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1925).

§ 1-8-103. Copy of docket for bar.

The clerk shall make a copy of the trial docket for the use of the bar.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 187; R.S. 1887, § 2523; R.S. 1899, § 3614; C.S. 1910, § 4469; C.S. 1920, § 5739; R.S. 1931, § 89-1219; C.S. 1945, § 3-2110; W.S. 1957, § 1-67; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2019, ch. 54, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted “use of the bar” for “use of the bar before the first day of the term.”

Chapter 9 Continuances

Cross references. —

For provision that offer to confess judgment is not cause for continuance, see § 1-10-105 .

As to continuances in the municipal courts of cities of the first class, see § 5-6-209 .

Editor's notes. —

Section 3, ch. 17, Laws 1876, which was last compiled as § 1-70, W.S. 1957, provided for applicability of the act to criminal cases. However, even though ch. 188, Laws 1977, omitted this section from this chapter, notes from criminal cases have been retained in the annotations.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance §§ 1 to 64.

Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of denial of continuance to call nonappearing witness whom adversary has been expected to call, 39 ALR2d 1445.

Party litigant's absence in civil case because of illness of relative or member of family as ground for continuance, 47 ALR2d 1058.

Withdrawal or discharge of counsel in civil case as ground for continuance, 48 ALR2d 1155.

Counsel's absence because of attendance on legislature as ground for continuance, 49 ALR2d 1073.

Amendment of pleading before trial with respect to amount or nature of relief sought as ground for continuance, 56 ALR2d 650.

Continuance of civil case because of illness or death of counsel, 67 ALR2d 497.

Continuance of civil case because of illness or death of party, 68 ALR2d 470.

Hostile sentiment or prejudice as ground for continuance in civil case, 68 ALR2d 540.

Motion for continuance as remedy for infringement of right of accused to communicate with his attorney, 5 ALR3d 1360.

Attorney's misrepresentation to court of his state of health or other personal matter in seeking trial delay as ground for disciplinary action, 61 ALR4th 1216.

17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.

§ 1-9-101. Contents of affidavit showing lack of evidence or absent witness; procedure if evidence admitted.

  1. A motion to postpone the trial of a case  because of the lack of evidence shall be supported by affidavit showing:
    1. The materiality of the evidence expected  to be obtained;
    2. That due diligence has been used to obtain  the evidence; and
    3. Where it is expected the evidence may  be found.
  2. If the postponement is because of an absent  witness, the affidavit shall also state:
    1. Where the witness resides, if known;
    2. The probability of procuring the testimony  within a reasonable time;
    3. That absence of the witness was not procured  by the act or connivance of the party seeking the postponement, nor  by others at his request or with his knowledge or consent;
    4. The facts the witness is expected to prove  and that affiant believes the facts as stated to be true; and
    5. Such facts cannot be proven by any other  witness whose testimony can be as readily procured.
  3. If the adverse party consents that, on  the trial, the facts stated in the affidavit will be taken as true,  if the evidence is written or documentary, or in case of an absent  witness that the witness will testify to the facts stated in the affidavit  as true, the trial shall not be postponed for that cause. The party  against whom the evidence is offered may impeach the evidence of an  absent witness the same as when the witness is present or his deposition  is used.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 17, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 3397; R.S. 1899, § 4279; C.S. 1910, § 5139; C.S. 1920, § 6416; R.S. 1931, § 89-901; C.S. 1945, § 3-2001; W.S. 1957, § 1-68; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Section applies to motions for continuance made before trial. Sims v. State, 530 P.2d 1176, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1975).

Granting of continuance is in discretion of trial court. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Perez, 508 P.2d 595, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1973).

Refusal of continuance on ground of party's absence was discretionary where it was not shown party did not have notice of trial date or could not return in time. Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 Wyo. 89, 275 P. 101, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1929).

As are subsequent continuances. —

Disposition of second or further continuances for absent witnesses or evidence rests in court's discretion; refusal is ordinarily proper. Jegendorf v. Jegendorf, 61 Wyo. 277, 157 P.2d 280, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1945).

Issue regarding continuance raised below. —

Counsel's statement, “If we can't continue the matter until such time as he can be here, then we would rest” was sufficient to raise the question of abuse of discretion for the supreme court's consideration, using the standard of review for motions for continuance. Carlson v. BMW Indus. Serv., 744 P.2d 1383, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 532 (Wyo. 1987).

Basis for judging abuse of discretion on appeal. —

Appellate court must not judge the matter of abuse of discretion in granting a continuance on the basis of showings made on appeal, but on the basis of showings made to the trial court when application for continuance was made. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Perez, 508 P.2d 595, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1973).

Court did not abuse discretion in disallowing second continuance to husband in wife's divorce action to permit taking out-of-state deposition for purpose of rebutting medical testimony where satisfactory reasons appeared. Jegendorf v. Jegendorf, 61 Wyo. 277, 157 P.2d 280, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1945).

Refusal for lack of diligence. —

Under this section a continuance will be refused for lack of due diligence where a subpoena for the absent witnesses has not been asked for. Kearney Stone Works v. McPherson, 5 Wyo. 178, 38 P. 920, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1895).

It was not error to refuse a continuance under this section, applied for on the ground of the absence of a witness residing in another state, where defendant had relied on his promise to attend and made no effort to secure his testimony by deposition or his attendance by legal process. Chapman v. First Nat'l Bank, 26 Wyo. 138, 181 P. 360, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 26 Wyo. 156, 182 P. 91 (Wyo. 1919).

Denying continuance to secure witness is not error where party made no attempt to obtain deposition and presented no affidavit. Hinton v. Saul, 37 Wyo. 78, 259 P. 185, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1927).

Reasonable effort to secure witness' presence required. —

Due diligence, in the context of a missing witness, is not satisfied when a party simply secures agreement from the witness that he will attend trial, but a party must make every reasonable effort to insure that his witness will be present. This can include alternate travel plans or schedules and the use of depositions to preserve important testimony. Carlson v. BMW Indus. Serv., 744 P.2d 1383, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 532 (Wyo. 1987).

In defendant's sexual assault case, the court properly denied his motion for a continuance to allow time to locate a witness because defendant failed to establish that the witness could be located and his testimony procured within a reasonable time, the unavailable testimony lacked materiality, and the potential testimony was simply not compelling. Huckfeldt v. State, 2013 WY 29, 297 P.3d 97, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 2013).

New matter in an amended petition which did not increase defendant's obligation under the facts alleged in the original does not entitle defendant to a continuance. Pullman Co. v. Finley, 20 Wyo. 456, 125 P. 380, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1912).

Right to amend affidavit. —

Under this section, defendant asked for a continuance in order to introduce a witness who would testify that the prosecuting witness had made statements indicating that the prosecution was instituted out of malice and that defendant was not guilty. Defendant's affidavit failed to show the time and place of the statements of the prosecuting witness. Defense had right to amend affidavit in that respect. McNealley v. State, 5 Wyo. 59, 36 P. 824, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1894).

Admission as to testimony of absent witnesses. —

Under this section, defendant's motion for continuance was properly overruled where plaintiff made admission as to the testimony of the absent witnesses. Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1916).

Denying continuance for absent witnesses held not error where prosecuting attorney admitted that witnesses would testify as claimed, if present. State v. Aragon, 41 Wyo. 308, 285 P. 803, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1930).

Absence of attorney not ground. —

The absence of defendant's attorney in an adjoining county, attending court, is no ground for a continuance. Van Horn v. State, 5 Wyo. 501, 40 P. 964, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1895).

Continuance should be granted when parties in another case in another state. —

The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance when the defendants were involved in another case in another state and were unable to attend the trial. Even though the defendants were unable to file affidavits in support of their motion, their presence as parties was completely essential to the proper presentation of their case. If the plaintiffs and court personnel were inconvenienced by the delay, assessing costs may have been more appropriate than denying the defendants the right to defend their action in court. Tomash v. Evans, 704 P.2d 1296, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 530 (Wyo. 1985).

Quoted in

Dreyer v. State, 540 P.2d 541, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1975).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Permissibility of testimony by telephone in state trial, 85 ALR4th 476.

Continuance of case because of illness of expert witness. 18 A.L.R.6th 509.

§ 1-9-102. Continuance for good cause.

Any court, for good cause shown may continue any action at any stage of the proceedings at the cost of the applicant, to be paid as the court shall direct.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 17, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 3398; R.S. 1899, § 4280; C.S. 1910, § 5140; C.S. 1920, § 6417; R.S. 1931, § 89-902; C.S. 1945, § 3-2002; W.S. 1957, § 1-69; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Denial appropriate where moving party is at fault.

District court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a mother’s motions for continuance because the mother’s failure to appear at the hearing she requested was sufficient reason to deny her motion for continuance. Bacus v. Coon, 2020 WY 2, 454 P.3d 945, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2020).

District court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a wife’s motion for a continuance of a divorce trial because the need for the continuance was caused by the wife and the court’s decision was not so arbitrary as to deny the wife due process. When the wife asked for a second continuance, the husband had filed pretrial disclosures and subpoenas to witnesses had issued, nearly ten months had passed from the death of the wife’s first attorney; and more than five months had passed from the withdrawal of the wife’s second attorney. Conzelman v. Conzelman, 2019 WY 123, 453 P.3d 773, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2019).

Granting or denial of motion for continuance is matter for discretion of the trial court. Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 1974).

The granting or refusing of a request for a continuance of a trial of a case is ordinarily a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court under the circumstances of each case. Glover v. Berger, 72 Wyo. 221, 263 P.2d 498, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1953); Armed Forces Coop. Insuring Ass'n v. Department of Ins., 622 P.2d 1318, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 332 (Wyo. 1980), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Abuse of discretion. —

A trial judge who grants a continuance of a case, civil or criminal, set for trial based upon the mere request, whim or convenience of counsel without substantial or legal reason for such continuance is himself guilty of a species of discretionary abuse. Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 1974).

Trial court may not grant continuance based on mere whim, request or the convenience to counsel without a substantial factual or legal reason for doing so. Carlson v. BMW Indus. Serv., 744 P.2d 1383, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 532 (Wyo. 1987).

Continuance should be granted when parties in another case in another state. —

The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance when the defendants were involved in another case in another state and were unable to attend the trial. Even though the defendants were unable to file affidavits in support of their motion, their presence as parties was completely essential to the proper presentation of their case. If the plaintiffs and court personnel were inconvenienced by the delay, assessing costs may have been more appropriate than denying the defendants the right to defend their action in court. Tomash v. Evans, 704 P.2d 1296, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 530 (Wyo. 1985).

But not when alleged “new issues” either perfunctorily raised or previously raised. —

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the husband's motion for a continuance of his divorce action on the alleged grounds that his wife, through her counterclaim filed nine days before trial, injected new issues into the case. The issues raised in the counterclaim — a request for divorce, and a request for alimony and certain property — were either raised perfunctorily or were previously raised in the answer to the complaint. Smith v. Smith, 704 P.2d 1319, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 545 (Wyo. 1985).

Nor when party waits over a month to obtain counsel. —

There was no error in the trial court's denial of a motion for continuance filed by a party who waited over a month after the trial date was set to obtain counsel. Shanor v. Engineering, Inc., 705 P.2d 858, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 556 (Wyo. 1985).

Denial appropriate where moving party is at fault. —

Trial court properly denied a husband's request for a continuance because his counsel's late withdrawal was due to the husband's failure to cooperate and his obstruction of an orderly progression of a divorce action. Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, 78 P.3d 671, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 2003).

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying a father's motion to continue a divorce proceeding because: (1) the matter had already been pending for quite some time; (2) the conflicts in the case were in large part due to the father keeping his son against court order; and (3) the father had been aware that the court date was upcoming and had been granted at least one continuance due to scheduling conflicts. Dunsmore v. Dunsmore, 2007 WY 202, 173 P.3d 389, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 216 (Wyo. 2007).

Court reasonably concluded that continuance was not warranted. With respect to the alleged failure of the opposing party to respond to discovery, the requested discovery was specious, unnecessary, untimely and, in effect, a stalling tactic. Regarding the movant's unavailability to attend trial, the movant had voluntarily accepted out-of-state employment, thereby creating the asserted need for a continuance. Inskeep v. Inskeep, 752 P.2d 434, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1988).

Costs. —

Under this section providing for continuances and costs thereof, trial court's action in taxing one-half of costs and expenses of party appearing ready for trial to party obtaining continuance when latter could have, but did not, notify former so that appearance need not have been made was not disturbed on appeal. Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798, 1955 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1955).

Applied in

United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. 1975); Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

Honan v. Honan, 809 P.2d 783, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1991).

Am Jur 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Continuance of case because of illness of expert witness. 18 A.L.R.6th 509.

Chapter 10 Tender and Offer to Confess Judgment

Cross references. —

As to judgment by confession generally, see §§ 1-16-201 and 1-16-202 .

As to enforcement of judgments generally, see chapter 17 of this title.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §§ 1098 to 1151; 74 Am. Jur. 2d Tender § 1 et seq.

Keeping tender good so as to sustain purchaser's claim for damages in suit for specific performance, 7 ALR2d 1204.

Payment of obligor on note or other instrument containing warrant of attorney to confess judgment as extending time within which power to confess may be exercised, 35 ALR2d 1452.

Successive judgments by confession on cognovit note or similar instrument, 80 ALR2d 1380.

Agent's authority to execute warrant of attorney to confess judgment against principal, 92 ALR2d 952.

Requirements as to signing, sealing and attestation in warrants of attorney to confess judgment, 3 ALR3d 1147.

Constitutionality, construction, application and effect of statute invalidating powers of attorney to confess judgment or contract giving such powers, 40 ALR3d 1158.

Institution of confessed judgment proceedings as ground of action for abuse of process or malicious prosecution, 87 ALR3d 554.

49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 188 to 192.

§ 1-10-101. Tender of money before action.

In an action on contract for the payment of money, if the defendant answers and proves that he tendered payment of the money due before commencement of the action, and pays to the clerk before trial the money so tendered, the plaintiff shall not have judgment for more than the money so tendered and due, without costs, and shall pay the defendant his costs.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 188; R.S. 1887, § 2524; R.S. 1899, § 3615; C.S. 1910, § 4470; C.S. 1920, § 5740; R.S. 1931, § 89-1220; C.S. 1945, § 3-2201; W.S. 1957, § 1-71; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Right to interest. —

Where holder of savings certificates issued by building and loan association was member of association and had received no legal tender of part payments made to other members, but deposit was made in court after holder sued on certificates, latter was entitled to interest from times of payments to others to times of deposit. Radalj v. Union Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 Wyo. 140, 138 P.2d 984, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 59 Wyo. 186, 141 P.2d 856 (Wyo. 1943).

§ 1-10-102. Tender of payment other than money or performance of labor.

If, in an action on a contract for the payment of anything other than money or for the performance of labor, the defendant answers that he did tender payment or performance of the contract at such time and place, and in such things or labor as by the contract he was bound to pay or perform, and the court or jury finds that he did tender as alleged in his pleading, they shall assess the value of the property or labor so tendered, and judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the value found, without interest or costs. If the defendant forthwith performs his contract, or gives to the plaintiff such assurance as the court approves that he will perform within such time as the court directs, judgment shall be rendered for the defendant. If any article so tendered is perishable it shall, from the time of tender, be kept at the risk and expense of the plaintiff, provided the defendant takes reasonable care of the same.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 189; R.S. 1887, § 2525; R.S. 1899, § 3616; C.S. 1910, § 4471; C.S. 1920, § 5741; R.S. 1931, § 89-1221; C.S. 1945, § 3-2202; W.S. 1957, § 1-72; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-10-103. Offer to confess judgment before action brought.

Before an action for recovery of money is brought against any person, he may go into the court of competent jurisdiction in the county of his residence or the county in which the person having the cause of action resides, and offer to confess judgment in favor of the claimant for a specified sum. If the claimant, having such notice as the court deems reasonable that the offer will be made, its amount, and the time and place of making it fails to attend and accept the confession, or if he attends and refuses to accept it and afterwards commences an action upon the cause and fails to recover more than the amount offered to be confessed, with interest from the date of the offer, he shall pay all the costs of the action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 190; R.S. 1887, § 2526; R.S. 1899, § 3617; C.S. 1910, § 4472; C.S. 1920, § 5742; R.S. 1931, § 89-1222; C.S. 1945, § 3-2203; W.S. 1957, § 1-73; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to legal rate of interest, see § 40-14-106(e).

§ 1-10-104. Offer in court to confess for part of claim or causes.

The defendant in an action for the recovery of money may offer in court to confess judgment for part of the amount claimed, or part of the causes involved in the action. If the plaintiff, being present, refuses to accept such confession of judgment in full satisfaction of his demands in the action, or having had such notice as the court deems reasonable that the offer would be made, its amount, and the time of making it, fails to attend, and, on the trial, does not recover more than was offered to be confessed, with interest from the date of the offer, the plaintiff shall pay all costs of the defendant incurred after the offer was made.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 192; R.S. 1887, § 2528; R.S. 1899, § 3619; C.S. 1910, § 4474; C.S. 1920, § 5744; R.S. 1931, § 89-1224; C.S. 1945, § 3-2205; W.S. 1957, § 1-74; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to legal rate of interest, see § 40-14-106(e).

Judgment exceeded matters confessed. —

In an action to establish a permanent easement, judgment entered on a partial confession of judgment in favor of dominant estate owners was void; the judgment went beyond the matters admitted in the servient estate owner's confession of judgment. Huish v. Sulenta, 2002 WY 139, 54 P.3d 748, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 1-10-105. Offer to confess not to affect trial.

An offer to confess judgment is not an admission of the cause of action nor of the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled. It is not a cause of continuance of the action, or a postponement of the trial, and may not be offered or admitted in evidence or mentioned at the trial.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 193; R.S. 1887, § 2529; R.S. 1899, § 3620; C.S. 1910, § 4475; C.S. 1920, § 5745; R.S. 1931, § 89-1225; C.S. 1945, § 3-2206; W.S. 1957, § 1-75; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Theory of case not admitted. —

Where plaintiff pleaded that he loaned money to defendant savings and loan association and defendant pleaded that plaintiff was member of defendant association, association's deposit with clerk in partial satisfaction of plaintiff's claim did not admit correctness of plaintiff's theory of case. Radalj v. Union Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 Wyo. 140, 138 P.2d 984, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 59 Wyo. 186, 141 P.2d 856 (Wyo. 1943).

§ 1-10-106. Applicability of confession of judgment provisions.

The provisions relating to confessions of judgment shall apply so far as practicable to an offer made by the plaintiff, and in the discretion of the court, may be applied to one (1) or more of several causes of action, counterclaims, cross-claims or setoffs, and the court shall make such order as to costs as it deems proper.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 194; R.S. 1887, § 2530; R.S. 1899, § 3621; C.S. 1910, § 4476; C.S. 1920, § 5746; R.S. 1931, § 89-1226; C.S. 1945, § 3-2207; W.S. 1957, § 1-76; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Chapter 11 Trial by Jury

Cross references. —

For provision that trial by jury shall be inviolate, see art. 1, § 9, Wyo. Const.

For provision that cases in police justice courts in cities of the first class shall be tried without juries, see § 5-6-207 .

As to jury trial in circuit courts, see § 5-9-136 .

As to jury trials in criminal cases generally, see §§ 7-11-101 to 7-11-206 .

As to jury inquest into sanity of prisoner, see § 7-11-305 .

As to appointing jury to determine pregnancy of female condemned to death, see § 7-13-912 .

As to trial by jury, see Rules 38 and 39, W.R.C.P.

All statutes relating to jurors must be considered in pari materia. Lofton v. State, 489 P.2d 1169, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 260 (Wyo. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949, 92 S. Ct. 2049, 32 L. Ed. 2d 337, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 2587 (U.S. 1972).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right to jury trial in stockholders' derivative action, 32 ALR4th 1111.

Right to jury trial in action for declaratory relief in state court, 33 ALR4th 146.

Propriety of substituting juror in bifurcated state trial after end of first phase and before second phase is given to jury, 89 ALR4th 423.

89 C.J.S. Trial §§ 1031 to 1034.

Article 1. Qualifications, Selection and Empaneling of Juries

Cross references. —

As to selection of jury at coroner's inquest, see §§ 7-4-201 to 7-4-203 .

For provision that trial juries for criminal actions are formed in the same manner as trial juries in civil actions, see § 7-11-101 .

For duty of county clerks to prepare list of qualified jurors, see § 18-3-402 .

As to examination of jurors, see Rule 47, W.R.C.P.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 96 to 194.

Religious belief as ground for exemption or excuse from jury service, 2 ALR3d 1392.

Validity of enactment requiring juror to be an elector or voter or have qualifications thereof, 78 ALR3d 1147.

Validity of jury selection as affected by accused's absence from conducting of procedures for selection and impaneling of final jury panel for specific case, 33 ALR4th 429.

Age group underrepresentation in grand jury or petit jury venire, 62 ALR4th 859.

Propriety of inquiry on voir dire as to juror's attitude toward, or acquaintance with literature dealing with, amount of damage awards, 63 ALR5th 285.

Purposeful inclusion of Negroes in grand or petit jury as unconstitutional discrimination, 4 ALR Fed 449.

50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 134 to 175.

§ 1-11-101. Qualifications of juror.

  1. A person is qualified to act as a juror  if he is:
    1. An adult citizen of the United States  who has been a resident of the state and of the county ninety (90)  days before being selected and returned pursuant to W.S. 1-11-106 ;
    2. In possession of his natural faculties,  of ordinary intelligence and without mental or physical infirmity  preventing satisfactory jury service;
    3. Possessed of sufficient knowledge of the  English language.
  2. No citizen shall be excluded from service  as a juror on account of race, color, religion, sex, age, national  origin or economic status.
  3. The court shall discharge a person from serving as a juror if the person is not qualified to act as a juror under subsection (a) of this section.

History. Laws 1890, ch. 23, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 3340; Laws 1903, ch. 4, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 978; C.S. 1920, § 1204; R.S. 1931, § 61-201; C.S. 1945, § 12-101; Laws 1949, ch. 61, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-77; Laws 1969, ch. 16, § 1; 1973, ch. 213, § 2; ch. 227, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; 2019, ch. 14, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to equal protection, see art. 1, § 2, Wyo. Const.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in the introductory language in (a), substituted “qualified” for “competent”; in (a)(i), added “pursuant to W.S. 1-11-106 ”; and added (c).

Mental incompetency of juror not shown. —

Trial court did not err by denying defendant a new trial based on a juror's alleged mental incompetency because it could have concluded that defendant's showing fell short of raising any significant concern under this section. Defendant relied on a few jurors' nonspecific comments to the bailiff indicating that they could not understand the point of some of the juror's statements made during their deliberations, his own statements to the bailiff, and the district judge's observations. Moore v. State, 2013 WY 120, 309 P.3d 1242, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2013).

Constitutionality of permitting women to serve as jurors. —

The clause in art. 1, § 9, Wyo. Const., in which the word “men” appeared was not inserted for the purpose of preventing the legislature from changing the statutes in effect in regard to the persons competent for jury service. The legislature was therefore entitled to enact ch. 61, Laws 1949, duly incorporated in this section, which permitted women to serve as petit jurors in criminal and civil cases in the district court. Such act did not violate the constitutional provision. State v. Yazzie, 67 Wyo. 256, 218 P.2d 482, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1950).

Exclusion of women from jury on criminal prosecution of man did not deprive the accused of rights, privileges and immunities accorded him by amend. 14, McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 30 P. 293, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1892).

Residency. —

“Selected and returned,” as used in this section, relates to the preparation of the base jury list, which is the list of qualified jurors; because “selected and returned” is a reference to preparation of the base jury list, the critical date for measuring the duration of a prospective juror's residence in a county is April 1, the date on which the base jury list is certified. In other words, any juror who is a resident of a county for the ninety-day period preceding April 1 meets the residence qualification for service in that county; therefore, even though a juror was no longer a resident of the county, she was still qualified because she was a resident of the county in the 90-day period preceding April 1. Lake v. State, 292 P.3d 174, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2013).

Racial discrimination. —

See Lofton v. State, 489 P.2d 1169, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 260 (Wyo. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949, 92 S. Ct. 2049, 32 L. Ed. 2d 337, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 2587 (U.S. 1972).

Showing of prejudice unnecessary where substantial noncompliance with section. —

Where there was substantial noncompliance with provisions of this section in selecting jury list and panel in trial court, defendant was not required to show prejudice before his motions to quash the jury list, to quash the panel of jurors summoned and for a directed verdict were sustained. State v. Dobbs, 70 Wyo. 26, 244 P.2d 280, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1952).

Cited in

Gunnell v. State, 21 Wyo. 125, 128 P. 512, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1912); Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Sept. 10, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Introduction for Lawyers and Judges,” see XXIX Land & Water L. Rev. 175 (1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching verdict, 15 ALR2d 534.

Validity of enactment requiring juror to be an elector or voter or have qualifications thereof, 78 ALR3d 1147.

Religious belief, affiliation or prejudice of prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or ground for challenge on voir dire, 95 ALR3d 172.

Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on appeal, 38 ALR4th 1170.

Jury: visual impairment as disqualification, 48 ALR4th 1154.

Prejudical effect of juror's inability to comprehend English, 117 ALR5th 1.

§ 1-11-102. Convicted felon disqualified.

A person who has been convicted of any felony is disqualified to act as a juror unless his conviction is reversed or annulled, he receives a pardon or his rights are restored pursuant to W.S. 7-13-105(a).

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 2; R.S. 1899, § 3341; C.S. 1910, § 979; C.S. 1920, § 1205; R.S. 1931, § 61-202; C.S. 1945, § 12-102; W.S. 1957, § 1-78; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1998, ch. 89, § 1; 2003, ch. 132, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision that religion is no disqualification, see art. 1, § 18, Wyo. Const.

For provision that pardon restores eligibility to be a juror, see § 6-10-106 .

Section does not render convicted felon ipso facto incompetent to serve as a juror. Vivion v. Brittain, 510 P.2d 21, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1973).

Objection to qualification of juror waived. —

Where there is nothing in the record to show that any member of the jury was ever asked any question which would elicit from them any answer as to their statutory jury qualifications under this section, any objection to the qualification of a juror because of his previous felony conviction is waived. Vivion v. Brittain, 510 P.2d 21, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1973).

Quoted in

Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 383 (Wyo. 1982).

Cited in

Meldrum v. State, 23 Wyo. 12, 146 P. 596, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1915).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Disqualification or exemption of juror for conviction of, or prosecution for, criminal offense, 75 ALR5th 295.

§ 1-11-103. Persons exempt as juror; duty to discharge.

  1. A person is exempt from jury service if the person is:
    1. A salaried and active member of an organized fire department or an active member of a police department of a city, town or law enforcement agency of the county or state;
    2. An elected public official;
    3. An active duty member of the Wyoming national guard; or
    4. A person exempt under federal law or regulation, including an active duty member of the armed forces when service on a jury would unreasonably interfere with his performance of military duties or adversely affect the readiness of his unit, command or activity pursuant to 32 C.F.R. Part 144.
  2. The court shall discharge a person from serving as a trial juror for the jury term in which he is summoned if it satisfactorily appears that the person is exempt and specifically claims the benefit of the exemption under W.S. 1-11-105 .

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 3; R.S. 1899, § 3342; C.S. 1910, § 980; C.S. 1920, § 1206; R.S. 1931, § 61-203; C.S. 1945, § 12-103; W.S. 1957, § 1-79; Laws 1971, ch. 261, § 79; 1975, ch. 139, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to exemption from jury duty of active members of the National Guard, see § 19-9-401 .

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in (a), substituted “jury service” for “liability to act as juror” and deleted “court finds that the provisions of W.S. 1-11-104 apply or for any other compelling reasons or if a”; added (a)(iii) and (a)(iv), and made related changes; and in (b), added “for the jury term in which he is summoned” and “under W.S. 1-11-105 ,” and deleted “not competent or the person is.”

Constitutionality of excluding women. —

See same catchline in notes under § 1-11-104 .

When presented. —

Cause for exemption must be presented and a favorable ruling by the court given before the right accrues. Meldrum v. State, 23 Wyo. 12, 146 P. 596, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1915).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Police officers or other law enforcement officers as jurors in criminal cases, 72 ALR3d 895.

Former law enforcement officers as qualified jurors in criminal cases, 72 ALR3d 958.

Jury: who is lawyer or attorney disqualified or exempt from service, or subject to challenge for cause, 57 ALR4th 1260.

§ 1-11-104. Causes for excusal.

  1. A juror may not be excused for a trivial cause or for hardship or inconvenience to his business, but only when material injury or destruction to his property or property entrusted to him is threatened, or when his health or the sickness or death of a member of his family requires his absence. A person who has attained the age of seventy-two (72) years may be excused at his request. A person may be excused from jury duty when the care of that person’s young children requires his absence. Any person who has served on a jury during a jury term shall, upon request, be excused from further jury service in that court for the remainder of that jury term and in the discretion of the court may be excused from jury service for the following jury term.
  2. For the purposes of this section:
    1. A person has served on a jury during a jury term when he is summoned to serve and he has been selected as a juror in any court within the judicial district and has taken the oath required under W.S. 1-11-201 ;
    2. A person has not served on a jury during a jury term if he is disqualified for that jury term pursuant to W.S. 1-11-102 or is discharged for that jury term pursuant to W.S. 1-11-103 .

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 4; R.S. 1899, § 3343; C.S. 1910, § 981; C.S. 1920, § 1207; R.S. 1931, § 61-204; C.S. 1945, § 12-104; Laws 1949, ch. 61, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 1-80; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; 1989, ch. 44, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1; 2020, ch. 64, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, designated former undesignated paragraph as present (a); in (a), added “who has attained the age of seventy-two (72) years,” deleted “if he is over seventy-two (72) years of age,” added a period to the end of the second sentence, and added “during a jury term” to the beginning of the fourth sentence; and added (b).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (b)(i) substituted “he has been selected as a juror in any court within the judicial district and has taken the oath required under W.S. 1-11-201 ” for “he has complied with the summons.”

Provision of earlier statute. —

Section 2, ch. 47, Laws 1888, read: “Any person may be excused from serving on a jury, when it shall appear to the court that the interests of such juror, or those of the public, will be materially injured by his attendance.”

Constitutionality of excluding women. —

Exclusion of women from jury on criminal prosecution of a man did not deprive the accused of rights, privileges and immunities accorded him by amend. 14, U.S. Const.McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 30 P. 293, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1892).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Proof as to exclusion of or discrimination against eligible class or race in respect to jury in criminal case, 1 ALR2d 1291.

Exclusion of women from grand or trial jury or jury panel in criminal case as violation of constitutional rights of accused or as ground for reversal of conviction — state cases, 70 ALR5th 587.

§ 1-11-105. Exemption affidavit required; failure to file.

If a person exempt from jury duty is summoned as a juror, he may submit a declaration under penalty of perjury stating his purported grounds for exemption. If the court determines that the declaration sufficiently demonstrates that the person is not required to serve as a juror pursuant to W.S. 1-11-103(a), the court shall discharge the person from serving as a trial juror for the jury term in which he was summoned. A person who is discharged under this section is not required to appear in court. Failure of any person who is exempt to submit a declaration under penalty of perjury is a waiver of his exemption, and he is required to appear upon the day for which the jury is summoned and serve as a juror the same as if he were not entitled to exemption unless otherwise excused by the court.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 5; R.S. 1899, § 3344; C.S. 1910, § 982; C.S. 1920, § 1208; R.S. 1931, § 61-205; C.S. 1945, § 12-105; W.S. 1957, § 1-81; Laws 1971, ch. 261, § 80; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1; 2020, ch. 64, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted “If the court determines that the affidavit sufficiently demonstrates that the person is not required to serve as a juror pursuant to W.S. 1-11-103(a), the court shall discharge the person from serving as a trial juror for the jury term in which he was summoned. A person who is discharged under this section is not required to appear in court.” for “The affidavit must be delivered by the clerk to the judge of the court where the person is summoned, and if sufficient in substance, must be received as evidence of his right to exemption and as an excuse for nonattendance in person. The affidavit must then be filed by the clerk.”

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, substituted “he may submit a declaration under penalty of perjury” for “he may file his affidavit with the clerk of the court for which he is summoned,” “his purported grounds for exemption” for “his office, occupation or employment,” “declaration sufficiently” for “affidavit sufficiently,” and “submit a declaration under penalty of perjury” for “file the affidavit” and added “unless otherwise excused by the court” at the end.

§ 1-11-106. Jury lists; preparation of base jury lists; selecting jury panel; certificate and summons.

  1. The list of persons selected to serve as prospective trial jurors, compiled pursuant to W.S. 1-11-129 , is the base jury list for the district court and the circuit court for the jury term set by each court.
  2. The clerk shall prepare a certificate containing the names constituting the base jury list, and summon them to serve as jurors for the jury term for which they have been selected.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 9; R.S. 1899, § 3348; C.S. 1910, § 987; C.S. 1920, § 1212; R.S. 1931, § 61-209; C.S. 1945, § 12-109; W.S. 1957, § 1-85; Laws 1971, ch. 261, § 81; 1975, ch. 67, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; 1989, ch. 44, § 1; 2000, ch. 24, § 4; 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2010, ch. 34, § 1; 2014, ch. 53, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (a), deleted “and justice of the peace courts” following “the circuit court,” “or justice of the peace” preceding “for their respective courts”; and made related changes.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2010 amendment, in the first sentence of (a), deleted “certified and delivered to the clerk of the district court in accordance with W.S. 18-3-402 or a list of persons” following “serve as trial jurors,” and deleted “under an alternate procedure” preceding “pursuant to W.S. 1-11-129 .”

Laws 2010, ch. 34 § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 4, 2010.

The 2014 amendment , effective July 1, 2014, in (a), deleted the former second and third sentences, which read: “By order of the district judge or circuit judge, for their respective courts, the base jury list may be expanded by including some other source or sources of names in addition to voter lists. After the list is delivered and supplemented when applicable, suitable ballots shall be prepared and deposited in a box known as and plainly marked “jury box number one”; in the next-to-last sentence, substituted “shall select a panel of prospective trial jurors from the base jury list for the county” for “sheriff and county treasurer shall draw from jury box number one a panel of trial jurors, which shall contain such”; in the last sentence, added “The clerk shall select the,” and substituted “prospective jurors” for “names.”

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in (a), substituted “selected” for “qualified,” added “prospective” and substituted “for the jury term set by each” for “from April 1 of the year in which the list is certified and delivered through March 31 of the following year. Upon order of the court, the clerk of the district court shall select a panel of prospective trial jurors from the base jury list for the county. The clerk shall select the number of prospective jurors as specified by the”; in (b), substituted “base jury list,” for “panel of trial jurors” and substituted “serve as jurors for the jury term for which they have been selected” for “appear in court for a trial whenever ordered by the court.”

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2014, ch. 53, section 3, provides: “Notwithstanding W.S. 8 -1-107, the provisions of this act shall apply to all actions pending on the effective date of this act for which a jury has not been empaneled and all actions filed thereafter.”

Residency. —

“Selected and returned,” as used in this section, relates to the preparation of the base jury list, which is the list of qualified jurors; because “selected and returned” is a reference to preparation of the base jury list, the critical date for measuring the duration of a prospective juror's residence in a county is April 1, the date on which the base jury list is certified. In other words, any juror who is a resident of a county for the ninety-day period preceding April 1 meets the residence qualification for service in that county; therefore, even though a juror was no longer a resident of the county, she was still qualified because she was a resident of the county in the 90-day period preceding April 1. Lake v. State, 292 P.3d 174, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2013).

Duty of clerk purely ministerial. —

The duty of the clerk to prepare jury list and place names in the boxes according to this section and § 1-11-109 is purely ministerial, and the clerk should not, on theory that they were disqualified, omit some of the names. Meldrum v. State, 23 Wyo. 12, 146 P. 596, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1915).

Applied in

State v. Dobbs, 70 Wyo. 26, 244 P.2d 280, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (1952); Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 257 (Wyo. 1978).

Cited in

Bloomer v. State, 2009 WY 77, 209 P.3d 574, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (June 12, 2009).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Inclusion or exclusion of first and last days in computing time for jury drawing or furnishing of jury list which must take place a certain number of days before a known future date, 98 ALR2d 1331.

Validity of requirement or practice of selecting prospective jurors exclusively from list of registered voters, 80 ALR3d 869.

§ 1-11-107. [Repealed.]

History: Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 10; R.S. 1899, § 3348; C.S. 1910, § 987; C.S. 1920, § 1212; R.S. 1931, § 61-209; C.S. 1945, § 12-110; W.S. 1957, § 1-86; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 53, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 10, related to depositing new ballots in jury box.

§ 1-11-108. Jury panel in circuit courts; functions, powers and duties of judges thereof.

  1. Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 53, §  2.
  2. In conducting jury trials, judges of the  circuit courts shall exercise and perform the same functions, powers  and duties as are prescribed for both the judge and the clerk of the  district court in W.S. 1-11-101 through 1-11-401 , insofar as practicable.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 138, § 3.

History: Laws 1971, ch. 261, § 82; W.S. 1957, § 1-86.1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 3; 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2014, ch. 53, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, in (a), substituted “circuit courts” for “justice of the peace and county courts”; and, in (b), substituted “circuit courts” for “county courts and justice of peace courts.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, repealed former (a), which read: “The names in jury box number one in the office of the clerk of the district court is the panel of trial jurors in all circuit courts.”

Severability. —

Section 73, ch. 261, Laws 1971, reads: “If any provision or clause of this act or application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this act that can be given effect without invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared severable.”

Repealing clauses. —

Section 76, ch. 261, Laws 1971, reads: “All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed to the extent of such inconsistency.”

§ 1-11-109. Procedure for selecting jury; contents of certificate; summons.

  1. The clerk shall choose the prospective jurors from the base jury list using a random method of selection.
  2. Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 53, §  2.
  3. If any person selected is not qualified to serve as a trial juror, the name of the person shall be stricken from the base jury list from which summoned. If any person selected is exempt from serving as a trial juror under W.S. 1-11-103(a) and the person has claimed the exemption under W.S. 1-11-105 , then the name of the person shall be stricken from the base jury list for the jury term from which summoned.
  4. When the necessary number of jurors has been randomly selected, the clerk shall make and certify a list of the names selected. The certificate shall state:
    1. The date of the court order for the selection;
    2. The date of the selection;
    3. The number of jurors selected;
    4. The names and addresses of the competent  jurors; and
    5. The place where the jurors are required to appear.
  5. The jurors on the certified list shall  be summoned to appear.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 15; R.S. 1899, § 3353; C.S. 1910, § 992; C.S. 1920, § 1217; R.S. 1931, § 61-214; C.S. 1945, § 12-115; W.S. 1957, § 1-91; Laws 1963, ch. 74, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; 2014, ch. 53, §§ 1, 2; 2019, ch. 14, § 1.

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, rewrote (a); repealed former (b) which read: “The name on each ballot drawn shall be entered in the minutes of the court”; in (c), substituted “If any person selected” for “If the name of any person is drawn who,” deleted “the ballot containing the name shall be destroyed, and such fact shall be entered in the minutes of the court”; and in (d), substituted “has been randomly selected” for “has been drawn,” and “selected” for “drawn” or variations throughout.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in (c), substituted “qualified” for “competent,” deleted “and the incompetence shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court,” and added “base” and “from which summoned” in the first sentence, added the second sentence; and in (d)(v), deleted “time and.”

Residency. —

“Selected and returned,” as used in this section, relates to the preparation of the base jury list, which is the list of qualified jurors; because “selected and returned” is a reference to preparation of the base jury list, the critical date for measuring the duration of a prospective juror's residence in a county is April 1, the date on which the base jury list is certified. In other words, any juror who is a resident of a county for the ninety-day period preceding April 1 meets the residence qualification for service in that county; therefore, even though a juror was no longer a resident of the county, she was still qualified because she was a resident of the county in the 90-day period preceding April 1. Lake v. State, 292 P.3d 174, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2013).

Defendant failed to show that the jury selection process warranted the granting of his motion to quash the jury panel. —

Defendant's convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver were proper because the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to quash the jury panel; the motion was based upon the district court clerk's policy of selecting jurors from the master list in alphabetical order, rather than in a random selection process. Defendant failed to show that the method used deprived him of a fair cross section of the community or that any distinctive group was systematically excluded from the panel; however, that method was also not to be used in any future cases. Bloomer v. State, 2009 WY 77, 209 P.3d 574, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 2009).

Cited in

Meldrum v. State, 23 Wyo. 12, 146 P. 596, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1915).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Confusion of name or identity in drawing, summoning, calling or impaneling, juror in civil case, as affecting verdict, 89 ALR2d 1242.

§§ 1-11-110 and 1-11-111. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 138, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1899, ch. 23, §§ 17 and 18, related to disposition of ballots after term, and a jury box for jurors residing within five miles, respectively.

§ 1-11-112. Jurors to appear at time specified.

Each grand juror and petit juror summoned shall appear before the court on the day and at the hour specified by the court, and depart only with permission of the court.

History. Laws 1888, ch. 47, § 14; R.S. 1899, § 3355; C.S. 1910, § 994; C.S. 1920, § 1219; R.S. 1931, § 61-216; C.S. 1945, § 12-117; W.S. 1957, § 1-95; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted “by the court” for “in the summons.”

§ 1-11-113. Completion of jury panel.

  1. The persons summoned by the clerk shall appear in answer to the summons and be examined as to their qualifications. If after all qualified trial jurors have been accepted it appears that there are not enough in attendance, the court shall order the clerk to randomly select the necessary number of names from the base jury list to complete the jury panel, and the clerk shall continue to randomly select names until a sufficient number of jurors are obtained. The persons so selected shall be summoned to appear.
  2. Repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 138, § 3.

History: Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 19; R.S. 1899, § 3358; C.S. 1910, § 997; C.S. 1920, § 1222; R.S. 1931, § 61-219; C.S. 1945, § 12-120; W.S. 1957, § 1-96; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, §§ 2, 3; 2014, ch. 53, § 1.

The 2014 amendment, in (a), substituted “summoned by the clerk” for “drawn from jury box number one and certified as trial jurors” in the first sentence “randomly select” for “draw from jury box number one” or variant and inserted “from the base jury list” in the second sentence; and substituted “selected” for drawn” in the third sentence.

Constitutionality. —

This section does not violate the provisions of Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 10. State v. Bolln, 10 Wyo. 439, 70 P. 1, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1902).

Waiver of irregularity. —

When jury is sworn, accused waives all irregularities in the selection of the panel. Delmont v. State, 15 Wyo. 271, 88 P. 623, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 15 Wyo. 271, 88 P. 623, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1907).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Absence of defendant during taking of steps toward impaneling or selecting jury, 26 ALR2d 762.

Religious belief, affiliation or prejudice of prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or ground for challenge on voir dire, 95 ALR3d 172.

§ 1-11-114. Service of summons; proof of service.

  1. Service of a summons may be made by such  means as the court may order. If service is accomplished through the  sheriff’s office, the sheriff’s costs shall be paid by the county.
  2. If necessary the court may require proof  of service.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 21; R.S. 1899, § 3360; C.S. 1910, § 999; C.S. 1920, § 1224; R.S. 1931, § 61-221; C.S. 1945, § 12-122; W.S. 1957, § 1-98; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; Laws 1983, ch. 138, § 2; 1985, ch. 13, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to proof of service, see Rule 4(m)(2), W.R.C.P.

Motion to quash venire selected by the sheriff on ground of interest of sheriff in the prosecution held properly denied where the affidavit merely avers that the sheriff is interested and would be incompetent to serve as juror on account of his bias and prejudice. Gunnell v. State, 21 Wyo. 125, 128 P. 512, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1912).

Cited in

State v. Bolln, 10 Wyo. 439, 70 P. 1, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (1902).

§ 1-11-115. Failure of juror to attend.

Any juror summoned who willfully and without reasonable excuse fails to attend may be arrested and compelled to attend and is subject to contempt of court.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 22; R.S. 1899, § 3361; C.S. 1910, § 1000; C.S. 1920, § 1225; R.S. 1931, § 61-222; C.S. 1945, § 12-123; W.S. 1957, § 1-99; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1989, ch. 208, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Holding jurors in contempt under state law, 93 ALR5th 493.

§ 1-11-116. Empaneling of jury.

At the opening of court on the day that trial jurors are summoned and notified to appear, the clerk shall call the names of those jurors notified to appear. The court shall hear the jurors who are present, and shall excuse those whom the court finds are exempt, disqualified or have material cause for being excused.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 23; R.S. 1899, § 3362; C.S. 1910, § 1001; C.S. 1920, § 1226; R.S. 1931, § 61-223; C.S. 1945, § 12-124; W.S. 1957, § 1-100; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; 2014, ch. 53, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1.

The 2014 amendment, deleted the former second and third sentences.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, added “and notified” and substituted “jurors notified to appear” for “summoned” in the first sentence and substituted “who are present” for “summoned” in the second sentence.

Cited in

State v. Bolln, 10 Wyo. 439, 70 P. 1, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (1902).

§ 1-11-117. [Repealed.]

History: Laws 1899, ch. 23, §§ 24, 25; R.S. 1899, §§ 3363, 3364; C.S. 1910, §§ 1002, 1003; C.S. 1920, §§ 1227, 1228; R.S. 1931, §§ 61-224, 61-225; C.S. 1945, §§ 12-125, 12-126; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-101, 1-102; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 53, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1899, ch. 23, §§ 24, 25, related to drawing trial jury.

§ 1-11-118. Procedure upon exhaustion of prospective jurors during empaneling.

If at any time during the empaneling of a jury all the names selected for the panel are exhausted, the court shall enter an order directing that such additional number of names as necessary be randomly selected from the base jury list. The court may excuse any jurors so selected if it appears that, because of distance, the delay occasioned by notifying the juror and requiring his presence would unduly prolong empaneling the trial jury. The clerk shall notify the persons selected and not excused to appear in court immediately. The process shall continue from time to time when necessary until a jury is obtained.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 26; R.S. 1899, § 3365; C.S. 1910, § 1004; C.S. 1920, § 1229; R.S. 1931, § 61-226; C.S. 1945, § 12-127; W.S. 1957, § 1-103; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; 2014, ch. 53, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1.

The 2014 amendment, substituted “the names selected for the panel” for “the ballots contained in box number two,” inserted “additional” following “that such”, and substituted “be randomly selected from the base jury list” for “be drawn from box number one” in the first sentence; substituted “so selected” for “so drawn” in the second sentence; substituted “shall summon the persons selected and not excused” for “shall forthwith summon the persons drawn” in the third sentence; and deleted the former fourth sentence.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted “notifying” for “summoning” in the second sentence and “notify” for “summon” in the third sentence.

§ 1-11-119. Number of jurors; fees and mileage.

Trial juries in circuit courts shall be composed of six (6) persons. Trial juries in civil cases and all other proceedings in the district courts except criminal cases shall be composed of six (6) jurors unless one (1) of the parties to the action files a written demand for twelve (12) jurors within the time a demand for jury may be filed, in which event the number of jurors shall be twelve (12). Jurors in all courts shall be allowed the same fees and mileage as jurors in district court.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 168, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-103.1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to mileage of jurors in district court, see § 1-11-302 .

As to amount of fees of jurors in district courts, see § 1-11-303 .

As to number of persons on jury, see art. 1, § 9, Wyo. Const.

For provision allowing parties to stipulate a jury of less than 12 members or to agree to accept a majority verdict, see Rule 48, W.R.C.P.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit courts” for “justice of the peace and county courts.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Quoted in

Vivion v. Brittain, 510 P.2d 21, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1973).

Cited in

KAA v. State, 2001 WY 24, 18 P.3d 1159, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

See comment, “The Wyoming Juvenile Court Act of 1971,” VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 237 (1973).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Statute reducing number of jurors as violative of right to trial by jury, 47 ALR3d 895.

Validity of agreement, by stipulation or waiver in state civil case, to accept verdict by number or proportion of jurors less than that constitutionally permitted, 15 ALR4th 213.

Right to jury trial in action under state civil rights law, 12 ALR5th 508.

§ 1-11-120. Persons sworn to constitute jury; generally.

The first six (6) persons, or other number of persons designated for a jury under W.S. 1-11-119 , who appear as their names are randomly selected and are approved as indifferent between the parties and not discharged or excused shall be sworn and constitute the jury to try the issue.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 27; R.S. 1899, § 3366; C.S. 1910, § 1005; C.S. 1920, § 1230; R.S. 1931, § 61-227; C.S. 1945, § 12-128; W.S. 1957, § 1-104; Laws 1971, ch. 168, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2014, ch. 53, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1.

The 2014 amendment, substituted “are randomly selected” for “are drawn.”

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted "other number of persons designated for a jury under W.S. 1-11-119 ," for "twelve (12) if demanded".

§ 1-11-121. [Repealed.]

History: Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 28; R.S. 1899, § 3367; C.S. 1910, § 1006; C.S. 1920, § 1231; R.S. 1931, § 61-228; C.S. 1945, § 12-129; W.S. 1957, § 1-105; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 53, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 28, related to persons sworn to constitute jury..

§ 1-11-122. Discharge of jurors.

After the jury is discharged the jurors, upon request, shall be excused from jury service for the remainder of the calendar year.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 29; R.S. 1899, § 3368; Laws 1903, ch. 65, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 1007; C.S. 1920, § 1232; R.S. 1931, § 61-229; C.S. 1945, § 12-130; W.S. 1957, § 1-106; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2.

§ 1-11-123. Discharge of jurors; absent or excused jurors.

The name of a juror who is absent when his name is selected, or is set aside, or excused from serving on that trial shall remain on the base jury list.

History: Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 30; R.S. 1899, § 3369; C.S. 1910, § 1008; C.S. 1920, § 1233; R.S. 1931, § 61-230; C.S. 1945, § 12-131; W.S. 1957, § 1-107; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2014, ch. 53, § 1.

The 2014 amendment, deleted “ballot containing the” preceding “name of”; and substituted “selected” for “drawn” and “remain on the base jury list” for “be returned to the box containing the undrawn ballots as soon as the jury is sworn.”

§ 1-11-124. [Repealed.]

History: Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 31; R.S. 1899, § 3370; C.S. 1910, § 1009; C.S. 1920, § 1234; R.S. 1931, § 61-231; C.S. 1945, § 12-132; W.S. 1957, § 1-108; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 53, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 31, related to procedure where additional jury needed.

§ 1-11-125. Procedure when sufficient number of jurors fail to attend.

If a sufficient number of jurors duly selected and notified do not attend to form a jury the court shall direct the clerk to select a sufficient number of names from the base jury list to complete the jury and shall summon the persons selected to attend immediately or at a time fixed by the court. If for any reason a sufficient number of jurors to try the issue is not obtained from the persons notified, the court may make successive orders until a sufficient number is obtained. The court may excuse any juror so selected if it appears that, because of distance, the delay occasioned by summoning the juror and requiring his presence would unduly prolong empaneling the trial jury. Each person so notified, unless excused by the court, shall serve as a juror at the trial. For a neglect or refusal to serve he may be fined in the same manner as a trial juror regularly selected and notified and he is subject to the same exceptions and challenges as any other trial juror.

History: Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 32; R.S. 1899, § 3371; C.S. 1910, § 1010; C.S. 1920, § 1235; R.S. 1931, § 61-232; C.S. 1945, § 12-133; W.S. 1957, § 1-109; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; 2014, ch. 53, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to exemptions from jury duty, see § 1-11-103 .

As to excuses from jury service, see § 1-11-104 .

As to punishment for failure to attend, see § 1-11-115 .

As to challenges for cause, see § 1-11-203 .

The 2014 amendment, substituted “selected” for “drawn” or a variant throughout and “of names from the base jury list” for “of ballots from box number one” in the first sentence.

§ 1-11-126. No objection that jury not original one returned.

It is not a valid objection to a jury that it contains none of the jurors originally returned to the court or is only partially composed of such jurors or that the base jury list was not supplemented as permitted herein.

History. Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 33; R.S. 1899, § 3372; C.S. 1910, § 1011; C.S. 1920, § 1236; R.S. 1931, § 61-233; C.S. 1945, § 12-134; W.S. 1957, § 1-110; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to supplementation of base jury list, see § 1-11-106 .

§ 1-11-127. [Repealed.]

History: Laws 1899, ch. 23, § 38; R.S. 1899, § 3377; C.S. 1910, § 1013; C.S. 1920, § 1238; R.S. 1931, § 61-235; C.S. 1945, § 12-139; Laws 1955, ch. 22, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-111; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 53, § 2.

§ 1-11-128. [Repealed.]

History. Laws 1911, ch. 92, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1920, § 1247; R.S. 1931, § 61-244; C.S. 1945, § 12-144; W.S. 1957, § 1-116; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2010, ch. 34, § 1; Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 53, § 2.

§ 1-11-129. Procedure for maintaining jury lists.

The supreme court shall compile a base jury list for each county. The supreme court shall compile a base jury list for the state as necessary under W.S. 7-5-303 . The base jury lists shall be compiled from voter lists and may also include names from Wyoming driver’s license or Wyoming department of transportation state identification lists. The base jury lists prepared by the supreme court and panels or lists of prospective jurors selected by the clerk of court may be compiled and maintained using any manual, mechanical, electronic or other means calculated to ensure the integrity of the system and a random selection process.

History. Laws 1983, ch. 138, § 1; 2010, ch. 34, § 1; 2014, ch. 53, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1; 2020, ch. 87, § 1.

The 2010 amendment, substituted “set by the court” for “modified by the court.”

Laws 2010, ch. 34 § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 4, 2010.

The 2014 amendment, rewrote the section which formerly read: “The procedures for compiling and maintaining of jury lists, jury ballots and jury boxes, and for drawing jurors, may be set by the court to permit the compilation and maintenance of jury lists and ballots and for the drawing of jurors by any manual, mechanical, electronic or other means calculated to insure the integrity of the system and a random selection process.”

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, added “also” and “or Wyoming department of transportation state identification” in the second sentence.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, substituted “ensure the integrity” for “insure the integrity.”

Defendant failed to show that the jury selection process warranted the granting of his motion to quash the jury panel. —

Defendant's convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver were proper because the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to quash the jury panel; the motion was based upon the district court clerk's policy of selecting jurors from the master list in alphabetical order, rather than in a random selection process. Defendant failed to show that the method used deprived him of a fair cross section of the community or that any distinctive group was systematically excluded from the panel; however, that method was also not to be used in any future cases. Bloomer v. State, 2009 WY 77, 209 P.3d 574, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 2009).

Article 2. Conduct of Trial; Verdict

Cross references. —

As to applicability of civil procedure provisions to conduct of criminal trial, see § 7-11-204 .

As to special verdicts and interrogatories, see Rule 49, W.R.C.P.

As to instructions to jury and exceptions, see Rule 51, W.R.C.P.

Statutory provisions for care and conduct of jury in capital cases are mandatory, and failure to comply substantially with requirements will entitle defendant to new trial, unless it reasonably appears no prejudice resulted. Nicholson v. State, 18 Wyo. 298, 106 P. 929, 1910 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1910).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 220 to 345; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 180 to 257, 1077 to 1692.

50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 269 to 296; 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 91 to 140, 415, 431 to 485, 775 to 777, 779 to 782, 784, 786 to 841, 843, 845 to 902, 908, 909.

§ 1-11-201. Oath of jurors; jury ordered into custody.

As soon as the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors that they will truly try the matter in issue between . . . . . , the plaintiff, and . . . . . , the defendant, and render a true verdict according to the evidence. After the oath has been administered and the jury fully empaneled, the court shall order the jury into the custody of the officer selected by the court. The jurors shall not separate from the custody of the officer until they have been duly discharged, unless by the consent of the parties to the action. The officer shall provide for suitable quarters and food for the jury pending the trial.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 69, § 24; R.S. 1887, § 2552; R.S. 1899, § 3643; C.S. 1910, § 4498; C.S. 1920, § 5768; R.S. 1931, § 89-1305; C.S. 1945, § 3-2402; W.S. 1957, § 1-118; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

See also § 1-11-207 concerning custody of jurors during deliberations.

As to oath of jurors in criminal cases, see § 7-11-107 .

Presumption of compliance. —

In the absence of anything to the contrary of which the court on appeal may properly take notice, it will be presumed that the court complied with its duty under this section to order the jury into the custody of an officer when they are not allowed to separate. Wallace v. Skinner, 15 Wyo. 233, 88 P. 221, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1907).

Where separation of or opportunity to communicate with jury shown. —

When defendant in capital case has shown separation of jury or opportunity for other parties, especially witnesses, to communicate with them, and it appears defendant was prejudiced or when it does not appear he was not prejudiced, new trial should be granted. State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1945).

New trial is properly refused because members of jury which had been ordered to be kept together went home for a short time by permission of a bailiff, it being satisfactorily shown that the separation did not serve as the occasion for the exercise of improper influences and that no one was prejudiced thereby. Cronberg Bros. v. Johnson, 29 Wyo. 11, 208 P. 446, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1922).

Juror's affidavits are admissible in capital case showing that no prejudice resulted from their misconduct, and if presumption of prejudice is thereby overcome, new trial should be denied. State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1945).

Where deputy sheriff commingled with jurors but juror's affidavits showed he did not discuss anything with jurors relating to case, no ground for new trial was shown. State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1945).

But not necessarily considered on appeal. —

Juror's affidavits relating to alleged misconduct and to newspaper accounts of case read by them pending trial, which were not seen by district court, nor part of record on appeal and were not agreed to by state, will not be considered by supreme court. State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1945).

Bailiff's duties. —

While a trial judge erred in allowing an officer who participated in an investigation of defendant to act as bailiff during defendant's trial, the error was harmless because there was absolutely no evidence in the record that the bailiff did anything as bailiff other than the routine, administrative matters the bailiff was charged with performing. Majors v. State, 2011 WY 63, 252 P.3d 435, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2011).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of governmental requirement of oath of allegiance or loyalty as applied to jurors, 18 ALR2d 268.

§ 1-11-202. Peremptory challenges allowed.

In the trial of civil cases in the district courts of this state, each side is allowed three (3) peremptory challenges.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 70, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 2549; C.S. 1945, § 3-2404; W.S. 1957, § 1-120; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to peremptory challenges in criminal cases, see § 7-11-103 .

Allocation of peremptory challenges in multi-party context.

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, it was an abuse of discretion to grant a guardian ad litem (GAL) and a Department of Family Services (Department) separate peremptory challenges because the positions of the GAL and Department were not antagonistic. In re LDB, 2019 WY 127, 454 P.3d 908, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 12 9 (Wyo. 2019); Swenson v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In re: LCH), 2019 WY 13, 434 P.3d 100, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2019).

Prior to alloting peremptory challenges under this section, the trial judge should consider all the relevant circumstances to determine whether a good faith controversy exists among multi-party defendants regarding an issue of fact which the jury will decide. Wardell v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1992).

Objection to allocation of peremptory challenges waived.—

Parent could not attack the jury verdict on the basis of an improper allocation of peremptory challenges because the record failed to reveal which jurors the parent desired to empanel, that the state agency or guardian ad litem excluded. The record also failed to disclose which jurors, if any, the parent would have challenged had the parent been allotted additional peremptory challenges because at no point did the parent’s counsel object to the allocation of peremptory challenges, as counsel instead stated that counsel had no such objections. Harmon v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re DKS), 2020 WY 12, 456 P.3d 918, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2020).

Standard of review applicable to allocation of peremptory challenges among multiple parties is an abuse of discretion standard. Cargill v. Mountain Cement Co., 891 P.2d 57, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1995).

A jury verdict will not be reversed, due to improper allocation of peremptory challenges, unless the challenging party can point to some convincing indication in the record that if a further peremptory challenge had been allowed, the party meant to challenge one or more jurors. Cargill v. Mountain Cement Co., 891 P.2d 57, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1995).

Objection to number of peremptory challenges waived. —

Where two defendants in a civil action were awarded a total of six peremptory challenges and plaintiffs were awarded four, plaintiffs' objection on appeal was not preserved, as plaintiffs did not complain that plaintiffs were given insufficient peremptory challenges at trial and did not make this point at the time the jury was empaneled or take any action at all to put the trial court on notice of plaintiffs' dissatisfaction. Smyth v. Kaufman, 2003 WY 52, 67 P.3d 1161, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2003).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Constitutional Law — The United States Supreme Court on Gender-Based Peremptory Jury Challenges — Constitutionally Correct But Out of Touch With Reality: Litigants Beware! J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 144 S. Ct. 1419 (1994),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 195 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Peremptory challenge after acceptance of juror, 3 ALR2d 499.

Use of peremptory challenge to exclude from jury persons belonging to specific race or class, 4 ALR2d 1200.

Waiver of peremptory challenge or challenges in civil cases other than by acceptance of juror, 56 ALR2d 742.

Effect of allowing excessive number of peremptory challenges, 95 ALR2d 957.

Number of peremptory challenges allowable where there are 2 or more parties on same side, 32 ALR3d 747.

Use of peremptory challenge to exclude from jury persons belonging to a class or race, 79 ALR3d 14.

Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in state criminal case, 94 ALR3d 15.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury-post-Batson state cases, 47 ALR5th 259.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons from criminal jury based on religious affiliation — post-Batson state cases, 63 ALR5th 375.

§ 1-11-203. Challenges for cause; grounds.

  1. Challenges for cause may be taken on one  (1) or more of the following grounds:
    1. A lack of any of the qualifications prescribed  by statute which render a person competent as a juror;
    2. Relationship by consanguinity or affinity  within the third degree to either party;
    3. Standing in the relation of debtor or  creditor, guardian or ward, master or servant, or principal or agent  to either party, or being a partner united in business with either  party, or being security on any bond or obligation for either party;
    4. Having served as a juror or a witness  in a previous trial between the same parties for the same cause of  action, or being then a witness therein;
    5. Interest on the part of the juror in the  event or question involved in the action, but not an interest of the  juror as a member or citizen of a municipal corporation;
    6. Having formed or expressed an unqualified  opinion or belief as to the merits or the main question of the action.  The reading of newspaper accounts of the subject matter before the  court shall not disqualify the juror either for bias or opinion;
    7. The existence of a state of mind in the  juror evincing enmity or bias for either party.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 69, § 26; R.S. 1887, § 2550; R.S. 1899, § 3641; C.S. 1910, § 4496; C.S. 1920, § 5766; R.S. 1931, § 89-1303; C.S. 1945, § 3-2405; W.S. 1957, § 1-121; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to qualifications of jurors, see § 1-11-101 .

As to challenges for cause in criminal cases, see §§ 7-11-104 and 7-11-105 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Involvement in personal injury litigation. —

While it is not a statutory ground for challenge in a personal injury action for cause that a juror or his family has been involved in personal injury litigation, such information may lead to further questions to determine if such involvement has caused the juror to form such an attitude or opinion so as not to be fair and impartial. Vivion v. Brittain, 510 P.2d 21, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1973).

Effect of relationship not specified as disqualification. —

Where there was a relationship of attorney and client between a prospective juror's father, whose business was managed by the juror, and the law firm of an attorney representing the defendant, held under this section, which does not specify such a relationship as a disqualification of a prospective juror, that any bias or prejudice which might be said to result from such a relationship was, at the most, only a rebuttable presumption and that the fairness and impartiality of the juror is a matter of fact to be determined by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion. Krahn v. Pierce, 485 P.2d 1021, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 223 (Wyo. 1971).

Speculative bias will not result in successful challenge if the trial court determines that the prospective juror is able to decide the case solely on the evidence presented and according to the trial court's instructions on the law. Schwenke v. State, 768 P.2d 1031, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1989).

Review. —

Where plaintiffs' attorney passed jury panel for cause, plaintiffs could not establish reversible error from court's denial of their challenges of three veniremen for cause. McGhee v. Rork, 978 P.2d 577, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 1999).

Quoted in

Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1976); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 292 (Wyo. 1984); Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1986); Russell v. State, 851 P.2d 1274, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 1993); Smith v. State, 2008 WY 98, 190 P.3d 522, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Aug. 19, 2008); Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, 199 P.3d 1052, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Jan. 13, 2009).

Cited in

Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407, 329 P.2d 257, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 24 , 72 A.L.R.2d 664 (1958); Wardell v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1992); Ormsby v. Dana Kepner Co. of Wyo., 997 P.2d 465, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2000).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Constitutional Law — The United States Supreme Court on Gender-Based Peremptory Jury Challenges — Constitutionally Correct But Out of Touch With Reality: Litigants Beware! J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 144 S. Ct. 1419 (1994),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 195 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Questions to jury in personal injury or death action as to interest in or connection with indemnity insurance company, 4 ALR2d 761.

Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on voir dire in personal injury or death action as to previous claims or actions for damages by himself or his family, 38 ALR2d 624.

Effect of false or erroneous answer on voir dire as to previous claims or actions against himself or his family, 63 ALR2d 1061.

Professional or business relations between proposed juror and attorney as ground of challenge for cause, 72 ALR2d 673.

Previous knowledge of facts of civil case by juror as disqualification, 73 ALR2d 1312.

Relationship (consanguinity or affinity) of juror to witness in civil case as ground of disqualification, 85 ALR2d 851.

Effect of social or business relationship between proposed juror and nonparty witness on qualification of juror, 11 ALR3d 859.

Claustrophobia or other neurosis of juror as subject of inquiry on voir dire or of disqualification of juror, 20 ALR3d 1420.

Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in state criminal case, 94 ALR3d 15.

Religious belief, affiliation or prejudice of prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or ground for challenge on voir dire, 95 ALR3d 172.

Professional or business relations between proposed juror and attorney as ground for challenge for cause, 52 ALR4th 964.

Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on voir dire regarding previous claims or actions against himself or his family, 66 ALR4th 509.

Prospective juror's connection with insurance company as ground for challenge for cause, 9 ALR5th 102.

Propriety of inquiry on voir dire as to juror's attitude toward, or acquaintance with literature dealing with, amount of damage awards, 63 ALR5th 285.

Examination and challenge of federal case jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexuality, 85 ALR Fed 864.

§ 1-11-204. Challenges for cause; trial.

All challenges for cause shall be tried by the court, and the juror challenged, and any other persons may be examined as witnesses upon the trial of the challenge.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 70, § 3; R.S. 1887, § 2551; R.S. 1899, § 3642; C.S. 1910, § 4497; C.S. 1920, § 5767; R.S. 1931, § 89-1304; C.S. 1945, § 3-2407; W.S. 1957, § 1-123; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to trial of challenges in criminal cases, see § 7-11-104 .

§ 1-11-205. Order of trial.

  1. When the jury has been sworn, the trial  shall proceed in the following order, unless the court for good cause  otherwise directs:
    1. The party who has the burden of the issues  may briefly state his case and the evidence by which he expects to  sustain it;
    2. The adverse party may then briefly state  his defense and the evidence he expects to offer in support of it;
    3. The party who has the burden of the issues  shall first produce his evidence, the adverse party will then produce  his evidence;
    4. The parties will then be confined to rebutting  evidence unless the court permits them to offer evidence in their  original case;
    5. When the evidence is concluded, and either  party desires special instructions to be given to the jury, the instructions  shall be reduced to writing, numbered and signed by the party or his  attorney asking the same, and delivered to the court;
    6. Before argument of the cause is begun,  the court shall give such instructions of the law to the jury as may  be necessary. The instructions shall be in writing, numbered and signed  by the judge;
    7. Where either party asks special instructions  to be given to the jury, the court shall either give such instructions  as requested, give the instructions with modifications, or refuse  to give them. The court shall mark each instruction offered so that  it shall appear which instructions were given in whole or in part,  and which were refused, so that either party may except to the instructions  as given, refused or modified. All instructions given by the court  together with those refused shall be filed as a part of the record.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 213; R.S. 1887, § 2553; R.S. 1899, § 3644; C.S. 1910, § 4499; C.S. 1920, § 5769; R.S. 1931, § 89-1306; C.S. 1945, § 3-2408; W.S. 1957, § 1-124; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to order of trial in criminal cases, see § 7-11-201 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Rebuttal evidence. —

The court has discretion in admitting evidence admissible during a party's case in chief when offered in rebuttal. Davis v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, 802 P.2d 840, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. Jan. 11, 1991).

Duty of court to instruct. —

It is duty of court, under § 7-11-201 , to instruct jury on essential law of the case and of such matters of law without which defendant will not receive fair trial, or without which jury of laymen would be apt to go wrong. Gardner v. State, 27 Wyo. 316, 196 P. 750, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1921).

Jury to receive instructions in court. —

Where after the jury made known its desire to be informed concerning a part of the law arising in the case, the requirement of the statute to “conduct them to the court where information upon the matter of law shall be given” was not followed, nor was the instruction made part of the record as required by subsection (a)(vii) of this section and even though an objection was not made thereto (in fact, there is indication to the contrary, i.e., that it was done with the approval of counsel), there was plain error in the proceedings. Rissler & McMurry v. Snodgrass, 854 P.2d 69, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. July 20, 1993).

Failure to instruct held not prejudicial. —

In prosecution for murder committed during attempted robbery, where no instruction defining robbery was asked for and no exception taken, held, that failure to give such instruction was not prejudicial, especially where there was no lack of proof of attempt to commit robbery. Harris v. State, 34 Wyo. 175, 242 P. 411, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (1926). See Rule 30, W.R.Cr.P.

Instructions become part of record. —

Under this section instructions, when offered in writing, numbered, noted and signed by the judge and returned with the original papers, become a part of the record and need not be embodied in a bill of exceptions to be considered on appeal. Stoner v. Mau, 11 Wyo. 366, 72 P. 193, 73 P. 548, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1903).

Failure of court to number and sign instructions given in a case, as required by this section, was without prejudice, there being no suggestion that any of the instructions which were given escaped, or that others crept into, the record. Keffer v. State, 12 Wyo. 49, 73 P. 556, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1903).

Instruction on contributory negligence. —

In action by employee against employer for personal injuries, with evidence to sustain allegations of the answer that plaintiff knew of the danger, and that it was unnecessary for him to go to the place where it existed and accident occurred, and only instructions on contributory negligence were in regard to plaintiff's going to the place of the accident contrary to the rules of his employer, question of contributory negligence, independent of any rule of the company, should have been submitted to the jury, under proper instructions, though the instruction requested did not state the law accurately. Union Pac. R.R. v. Jarvi, 3 Wyo. 375, 3 Wyo. 376, 23 P. 398, 1890 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1890).

Preserving exceptions. —

It is not necessary to preserve properly exceptions to an instruction to state the specific grounds thereof in a bill of exceptions, the usual practice being to state such grounds when first objecting to proposed instructions, without incorporating them in the record, a continued reliance upon the record objection being usually indicated by merely announcing that the party excepts to the giving of the instructions at the time it is given, the jury being instructed upon the law of the case in civil actions, before proceeding with the arguments of counsel. Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 29 Wyo. 440, 213 P. 941, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1923). See Rule 46 and 75, W.R.C.P.

Duty to state issues to jury. —

This section does not, in specific terms, require court to state issues to the jury, but that duty may no doubt be implied, when necessary, to a fair and intelligent consideration of the cause by the jury from the statutory requirement that “before the argument of the case is begun, the court shall give such instructions upon the law to the jury as may be necessary.” Wallace v. Skinner, 15 Wyo. 233, 88 P. 221, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1907).

Communications of administrative directives to jury. —

The status of communications between the judge and the jury that do not involve instructions on the law can be characterized as administrative directives, and the harmless error doctrine applies to such communications. Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1995).

Clarifying communications with jury held proper. —

Where jurors sent the trial court a note asking, “If we cannot find solid proof of trespass, can we award damages?” and it answered “No” without the parties' counsel being present, plaintiffs were not entitled to new trial because (1) answering the question with a definitive “No” left no room for further confusion or undue emphasis on any particular instructions, (2) the jurors had been properly instructed on the burden of proof, and (3) the question did not indicate that the jury was confused about what “preponderance of the evidence” meant. Beck v. Townsend, 2005 WY 84, 116 P.3d 465, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 2005).

Inconsistent findings. —

Plaintiff was injured while assisting J. and E. in lowering an engine in defendant's shop under the orders of the gang “boss.” The jury found that in consequence of an order given by the “boss,” J. did not assist in removing the last timber from under the engine and that in consequence of his failure so to assist the accident occurred, and to that extent, the “boss” and J. were found negligent. They also found that three men were generally employed to do the work referred to, though two, one being in the pit under the engine, could do the work. Held, that the findings were inconsistent. McBride v. Union Pac. R.R., 3 Wyo. 247, 21 P. 687, 1889 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1889).

The finding that two men were sufficient and that two were furnished does not warrant a judgment for defendant, it being inconsistent with the finding that the accident occurred in consequence of the third man being ordered away, and to strike out the latter and give effect to the former would be making a new verdict. McBride v. Union Pac. R.R., 3 Wyo. 247, 21 P. 687, 1889 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1889).

Directed verdicts. —

A verdict cannot be based upon mere guess or conjecture if intelligent minds may not draw therefrom different conclusions upon the question of negligence, and it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict unless the conflict is positive. Galicich v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 54 Wyo. 123, 87 P.2d 27, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (1939). See Rule 50, W.R.C.P.

Where plaintiff sued for diversion of water from his irrigating ditch and during plaintiff's cross-examination defendant introduced written contract tending to show joint ownership of himself with defendant, and then moved for the direction of a verdict before plaintiff's evidence was all in on the ground that irrigation statute provided a specific remedy to determine the right of joint owners, which was exclusive, it was error to direct the verdict, such action being directly contrary to this section, prescribing the mode of trial, and giving plaintiff the right to introduce evidence in support of his case and also in rebuttal. Mau v. Stoner, 10 Wyo. 125, 67 P. 618, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1902).

Cited in

Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1947); Stringer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 347 P.2d 197, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1959); Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 1989); Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1994); Sutherland v. State, 944 P.2d 1157, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1997).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Prejudicial effect of judge's disclosure to jury, in civil case, of motions or proceedings in chamber, 77 ALR2d 1253.

Suggestion by judge during trial as to advisability of compromise, 6 ALR3d 1457.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in which they are written, 10 ALR3d 501.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of sending written instructions with retiring jury in civil case, 91 ALR3d 336.

Propriety of trial court order limiting time for opening or closing argument in civil case — state cases, 71 ALR4th 130.

Order of closing argument in federal civil trials, 53 ALR Fed 900.

§ 1-11-206. View of property or place by jury.

When the court considers it proper for the jurors to view the property which is the subject of litigation or the place in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an officer to the place which shall be shown to them by a person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jurors are absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 214; R.S. 1887, § 2554; R.S. 1899, § 3645; C.S. 1910, § 4500; C.S. 1920, § 5770; R.S. 1931, § 89-1307; C.S. 1945, § 3-2409; W.S. 1957, § 1-125; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Personal appearance to establish damage. —

When party expects to rely in part on his personal appearance in court for purpose of establishing element of damage, the matter should be brought into the record by some appropriate question. Northwest States Utils. Co. v. Ashton, 51 Wyo. 168, 65 P.2d 235, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 51 Wyo. 166, 69 P.2d 623, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1937).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Prejudicial effect of misconduct by one other than juror during authorized view by jury, 45 ALR2d 1128.

Prejudicial effect of acts of jurors in viewing premises with witnesses, 52 ALR2d 182.

Prejudicial effect of acts of jurors in viewing premises with witnesses, 58 ALR2d 177.

Prejudicial effect of indicating to jury a party's desire for view by jury, 76 ALR2d 766.

Propriety of permitting view by jury, in civil personal injury or death action, as affected by claimed change since accident or incident, 85 ALR2d 512.

Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by jury of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 ALR3d 918.

§ 1-11-207. Decision or deliberation by jury; duty of officer in charge of jury.

When the case is submitted, the jury may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If the jurors retire, they shall be kept together in some convenient place under the charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged by the court. The court may permit them to separate temporarily at night or at their meals. The officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them nor make any himself except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, unless by order of the court. He shall not communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon before their verdict is rendered.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 215; R.S. 1887, § 2555; R.S. 1899, § 3646; C.S. 1910, § 4501; C.S. 1920, § 5771; R.S. 1931, § 89-1308; C.S. 1945, § 3-2410; W.S. 1957, § 1-126; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to duty of officer in charge of jury, see § 1-11-201 .

Where separation of or opportunity to communicate with jury shown. —

When defendant in capital case has shown separation of jury or opportunity for other parties, especially witnesses, to communicate with them, and it appears defendant was prejudiced or when it does not appear he was not prejudiced, new trial should be granted. State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1945).

Where a witness who mingled with the jury was a police officer and also a principal witness for the prosecution, and therefore a part of the prosecution team, and no inquiry was made of the jury members to determine if communications between the witness and themselves were such as to be not prejudicial to the defendant, the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for mistrial on the grounds of jury conduct. Romo v. State, 500 P.2d 678, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1972).

Juror's affidavits are admissible in capital case showing that no prejudice resulted from their misconduct, and if presumption of prejudice is thereby overcome, new trial should be denied. State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1945).

Where deputy sheriff commingled with jurors but juror's affidavits showed he did not discuss anything with jurors relating to case, no ground for new trial was shown. State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1945).

But not necessarily considered on appeal. —

Juror's affidavits relating to alleged misconduct and to newspaper accounts of case read by them pending trial which were not seen by district court, nor part of record on appeal and where not agreed to by state will not be considered by supreme court. State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1945).

Receipt of mail by juror error. —

In a homicide case it was reversible error to allow a juror to receive mail during the trial. State v. Eldredge, 45 Wyo. 488, 21 P.2d 545, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1933).

Bailiff's duties. —

While a trial judge erred in allowing an officer who participated in an investigation of defendant to act as bailiff during defendant's trial, the error was harmless because there was absolutely no evidence in the record that the bailiff did anything as bailiff other than the routine, administrative matters the bailiff was charged with performing. Majors v. State, 2011 WY 63, 252 P.3d 435, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2011).

Deadlocked jury.—

Although the bailiffs should not have told the district court judge how the deadlocked jurors had voted, when the judge had not asked the bailiffs for that information, the district court's knowledge of that vote did not render the court's supplemental instruction urging the jury to continue deliberating unduly coercive. Carter v. State, 2016 WY 36, 369 P.3d 220, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2016).

Applied in

State v. Hambrick, 65 Wyo. 1, 196 P.2d 661, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1948).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Prejudicial effect of court direction or caution to party witness not to discuss case with anyone including his counsel during recess or the like, 46 ALR2d 517.

Right to have reporter's notes read to jury, 50 ALR2d 176.

Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of communication between witnesses and jurors, 52 ALR2d 182.

Propriety and effect of jury in civil case taking depositions to jury room during deliberations, 57 ALR2d 1011.

Presence of alternate juror in jury room, 84 ALR2d 1288.

Tests or experiments in jury room, 95 ALR2d 351.

Discussion, during jury deliberation, of possible insurance coverage as prejudicial misconduct, 47 ALR3d 1299.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of trial court's inquiry as to numerical division of jury, 77 ALR3d 769.

Prejudicial effect of jury's procurement or use of book during deliberations in criminal cases, 35 ALR4th 626.

Communication between court officials or attendants and jurors in criminal trial as ground for mistrial or reversal — post-Parker cases, 35 ALR4th 890.

Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of communications between court officials or attendants and jurors, 31 ALR5th 572.

Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of communications between judges and jurors, 33 ALR5th 205.

Taking and use of trial notes by jury, 36 ALR5th 255.

§ 1-11-208. Admonition to jurors when permitted to separate.

If the jurors are permitted to separate during the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse with nor allow themselves to be addressed by any person on any subject of the trial, and that they are not to form or express an opinion until the cause is finally submitted to them.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 216; R.S. 1887, § 2556; R.S. 1899, § 3647; C.S. 1910, § 4502; C.S. 1920, § 5772; R.S. 1931, § 89-1309; C.S. 1945, § 3-2411; W.S. 1957, § 1-127; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Separation or dispersal of jury after submission of civil case, 77 ALR2d 1086.

§ 1-11-209. Further information after jury's retirement.

After the jurors have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any part of the law arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them to the court where information upon the matter of law shall be given. The court may give its recollection as to the testimony on the points in dispute, in the presence of or after notice to the parties or their counsel.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 217; R.S. 1887, § 2557; R.S. 1899, § 3648; C.S. 1910, § 4503; C.S. 1920, § 5773; R.S. 1931, § 89-1310; C.S. 1945, § 3-2412; W.S. 1957, § 1-128; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Non-testimonial exhibits may be permitted.—

District court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to review during deliberations a clip of a video that was an exhibit with the sound muted of defendant and a police officer walking through the bedroom where the alleged sexual abuse of a minor occurred because the jury requested to view again the lighting and layout of the bedroom, defendant did not object when the video was admitted into evidence and did not request a limiting instruction, and the district court did not impermissibly alter the video by removing the sound. Hicks v. State, 2021 WY 2, 478 P.3d 652, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 2021).

Where exact language in jury note sent to trial judge stated “We cannot reach a verdict …,” those words indicated and expressed disagreement. The court had instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous. Apparently, there was not unanimity or there would have been a verdict of guilty or not guilty returned. A deadlock situation was registered. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

Communications of administrative directives to jury. —

The status of communications between the judge and the jury that do not involve instructions on the law can be characterized as administrative directives, and the harmless error doctrine applies to such communications. Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1995).

Clarifying communications with jury held proper. —

Where jurors sent the trial court a note asking, “If we cannot find solid proof of trespass, can we award damages?” and it answered “No” without the parties' counsel being present, plaintiffs were not entitled to new trial because (1) answering the question with a definitive “No” left no room for further confusion or undue emphasis on any particular instructions, (2) the jurors had been properly instructed on the burden of proof, and (3) the question did not indicate that the jury was confused about what “preponderance of the evidence” meant. Beck v. Townsend, 2005 WY 84, 116 P.3d 465, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 2005).

Supplemental Instruction Appropriate. —

In a case where defendant was charged with attempted second degree sexual abuse of a minor in Count III of the information, after being questioned by the jury regarding what act defendant was accused of attempting to commit in Count III, the district court did not err in providing a supplemental jury instruction consistent with the information that the act alleged in Count III was the attempted touching of the victim's vaginal area. Brown v. State, 2015 WY 4, 340 P.3d 1020, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2015).

Provision for giving jury information as to testimony permissive. —

The part of this section relating to the court giving the jury information as to the testimony in a case is permissive and not mandatory. State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1956).

A judge can refresh the memory of the jurors under this section, but this section is not mandatory. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

And refusal not ground for reversal, save for injustice. —

The court may decline to refresh the collective memory of the jury, and its not doing so is not ground for reversal except in a case where it is clear that an injustice had been done. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

In case of disputes on the part of the jury as to the evidence, it is not error for the judge to allow the recollection of the jury to be refreshed, but he may decline to do so altogether, and his doing so would not be ground for reversing the judgment, except in a case where it was clear that injustice had been done. If he should decline to aid the jury in any way, but leave them to recall the evidence as best they could, this would not be ground for reversing the judgment. State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1956).

Denial by court of request for rereading testimony is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, 731 P.2d 1195, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 391 (Wyo. 1987).

Judicial observation of evidence allowed. —

If the trial judge may refresh the jury's memory, he certainly may make the less nocuous observation that there is evidence. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

Information as to power and authority of parole board denied. —

A request by the jury in a murder case to be advised by the court concerning the law as to the power and authority of the board of pardons and parole (now board of parole) was properly denied by the trial court. State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1956).

Nontestimonial exhibits may be permitted. —

Any decision to permit nontestimonial exhibits to be taken into the jury room is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1989), overruled in part, Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, 177 P.3d 807, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 2008).

Whether audiotape was testimonial exhibit was threshold determination to be made by the trial court. Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1989), overruled in part, Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, 177 P.3d 807, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 2008).

Defendant not prejudiced by absence of counsel. —

Where the state waived any objections to the failure of counsel to object to a supplemental instruction, either before or immediately after it was given, and the trial judge was given an opportunity to rule on the propriety of his instruction, brought to his attention before appeal to the supreme court, so the question was properly raised on appeal, defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of counsel, even if true that defendant was unrepresented at the time the instruction was given to the jury. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

Presence during instruction of jurors. —

Trial judge erred in instructing the jurors in writing without bringing them into open court and defendant was not present; however, the record did not disclose that defendant's presence when the jury was given the supplemental instructions was critical where defendant could exert his psychological influence during all other phases of the trial and the bulk of the evidence was presented by the victim's testimony. Daves v. State, 2011 WY 47, 249 P.3d 250, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 2011).

Jury's unsupervised viewing of witness' videotape improper. —

The court improperly abdicated its limited statutory discretion when it allowed the jury to view an entire testimonial videotape twice during deliberations, where the court did not ask the jurors why they wanted to view the tape, and it did not know which facts the jurors could not agree upon. Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 630 (Wyo. 1986).

And conviction reversed due to possible prejudice. —

The conviction of defendant on second degree sexual assault charges supported only by victim's testimony was reversed due to the possible prejudicial impact of allowing the jury to review a videotape of the three-year-old victim's discussion of the alleged crime with police officers, where such review was unsupervised and occurred during jury deliberations without questioning as to why the jurors wished to review the tape. Taylor v. State, 727 P.2d 274, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 631 (Wyo. 1986).

Abuse of discretion not found. —

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a total review of the court transcripts where the jurors did not indicate they were in disagreement but merely wanted to review all of the testimony. Marquez v. State, 941 P.2d 22, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 1997).

Failure to answer question reversible error. —

Reversible error was committed in a second-degree sexual assault case where a trial judge failed to answer a jury's question regarding several incidents; there was confusion due to an improperly drafted information, elements instruction, and verdict form. Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 149, 170 P.3d 1227, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2007).

Applied in

Britton v. State, 643 P.2d 935, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 332 (Wyo. 1982).

Cited in

Jackson v. State, 624 P.2d 751, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1981); Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Verdict-urging instructions stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 ALR3d 1281.

Verdict-urging instructions commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 ALR3d 845.

Verdict-urging instruction admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 ALR3d 1154.

Prejudicial effect of jury's procurement or use of book during deliberations in criminal cases, 35 ALR4th 626.

§ 1-11-210. Discharge of jury without verdict.

The jury may be discharged by the court on account of the sickness of a juror or any accident or calamity requiring its discharge, or by consent of both parties or after the jurors have been kept together until it appears there is no probability of their agreeing.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 218; R.S. 1887, § 2558; R.S. 1899, § 3649; C.S. 1910, § 4504; C.S. 1920, § 5774; R.S. 1931, § 89-1311; C.S. 1945, § 3-2413; W.S. 1957, § 1-129; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to discharge of jury before verdict in criminal case, see § 7-11-205 .

Where exact language in jury note sent to trial judge stated “We cannot reach a verdict …,” those words indicated and expressed disagreement. The court had instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous. Apparently, there was not unanimity or there would have been a verdict of guilty or not guilty returned. A deadlock situation was registered. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

Judgment of dismissal erroneous. —

After discharge of the jury, the court loses control of the proceedings, except to hold another trial, and judgment of dismissal was erroneous. Jones v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 23 Wyo. 148, 147 P. 508, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1915).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Statute or court rule relating to alternate or additional jurors or substitution of jurors during trial, 84 ALR2d 1288.

Proper procedure upon illness or other disability of civil case juror, 99 ALR2d 684.

§ 1-11-211. Retrial after discharge of jury.

When the jury is discharged after the cause is submitted or during the trial, the cause may be tried again immediately or at a future time as the court directs.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 219; R.S. 1887, § 2559; R.S. 1899, § 3650; C.S. 1910, § 4505; C.S. 1920, § 5775; R.S. 1931, § 89-1312; C.S. 1945, § 3-2414; W.S. 1957, § 1-130; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Section superseded by rule to extent it conflicts. —

This section, insofar as it conflicts with Rule 50(b), W.R.C.P., gives way to the rule. In re Estate of Draper, 374 P.2d 425, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1962).

No authority to render judgment. —

Under this section, where jury failed to agree and was discharged, court had no authority, on motion, to render judgment for defendant on the pleadings and evidence. Pike & Richardson v. Sheridan, 22 Wyo. 312, 139 P. 912, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1914).

Cited in

Jones v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 23 Wyo. 148, 147 P. 508, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1915).

§ 1-11-212. Rendition of verdict.

When the jurors agree upon their verdict, it shall be reduced to writing and signed by the foreman. They shall then be conducted into court, their names called by the clerk and the verdict rendered by the foreman. The clerk shall then read the verdict to the jury and inquire whether it is their verdict.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 220; R.S. 1887, § 2560; R.S. 1899, § 3652; C.S. 1910, § 4507; C.S. 1920, § 5776; R.S. 1931, § 89-1313; C.S. 1945, § 3-2415; W.S. 1957, § 1-131; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to return of verdict in criminal cases, see § 7-11-501 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Receipt of verdict in civil case in absence of trial judge, 20 ALR2d 281.

Haste or shortness of time in which jury reached verdict, 91 ALR2d 1220.

Quotient verdict, 8 ALR3d 335.

§ 1-11-213. Further deliberation; polling jury.

If a jury disagrees, or if when the jury is polled a juror answers in the negative, or if the verdict is defective in substance, the jury shall be sent out again for further deliberation and either party may require the jury to be polled by the clerk or court asking each juror if it is his verdict.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 221; R.S. 1887, § 2561; R.S. 1899, § 3653; C.S. 1910, § 4508; C.S. 1920, § 5777; R.S. 1931, § 89-1314; C.S. 1945, § 3-2416; W.S. 1957, § 1-132; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Purpose of section. —

Procedure under this section is designed for orderly and expeditious conduct of litigation and is particularly directed at minimizing the necessity for additional trials. De Witty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1963).

Verdict “defective in matter of substance” may be corrected by jury itself on further deliberation under this section. De Witty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1963); Energy Transp. Sys. v. Mackey, 650 P.2d 1152, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 380 (Wyo. 1982).

And court may submit additional instructions. —

If necessary, the court may assist the jury in its further deliberation by submitting additional instructions. De Witty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1963); Energy Transp. Sys. v. Mackey, 650 P.2d 1152, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 380 (Wyo. 1982).

Jury should continue deliberations following verdict for special damages only. —

Following a jury verdict for special damages only, i.e., medical expenses, and an objection before the jury was discharged, in a motor vehicle accident case, the trial court erred in not returning the jury to continue their deliberations for the purpose of assessing general damages, i.e., pain and suffering. Smith v. Uhrich, 704 P.2d 698, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 523 (Wyo. 1985).

Effect of failure to object to form of verdict. —

Where no objection was made to the form of verdict given to the jury and no objection seems to have been raised when they returned it, so as to give an opportunity for correction, the objection came too late after the jury was discharged. De Witty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1963); Anderson v. Foothill Indus. Bank, 674 P.2d 232, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1984).

When a verdict is not in proper form and the jury is not required to clarify it, any error in the verdict is waived by the party relying thereon who at the time of its rendition failed to make any request that its informality or uncertainty be corrected. De Witty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1963).

Having in mind the plain purpose of this section, to afford a jury the right to correct its own mistakes, it is not harsh or unreasonable to require a litigant, when an opportunity is afforded during the trial, timely, to bring a matter to the attention of the trial court in order that it might be corrected, and failing in this that he shall not be heard to complain, for to hold otherwise would seem unfair to the jury, to the trial court and to the other litigants, to say nothing of the unnecessary loss of time and expense. De Witty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1963).

Despite the demonstrated reluctance of the jury to accept plaintiff's extensive claims at face value, it was incumbent upon her at least to attempt to see that a verdict in proper form was returned by the jury, and not having done so, the supreme court is not at liberty to grant relief. De Witty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1963).

The defendant's failure to seek to correct any substantive defect in the special verdict when it was returned to the trial court was a waiver of his right to do so and he could not be heard to complain on appeal unless the doctrine of plain error would come to his rescue. Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 526 (Wyo. 1985).

Challenges to irregular or inconsistent verdicts may be waived by the failure to object before the discharge of a jury. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1983).

Although there was no inherent error in telling the jury what the plaintiff's burden of proof was and that it must decide whether the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the alleged assault and battery, and then instructing the jury to assess damages without regard to its findings concerning the fact of the assault and whether or not it proximately caused any injuries, it was impossible to reconcile the jury's findings that there was an assault and battery and that the assault was not a “proximate cause of the injuries” with the testimony of the treating doctors who testified without conflict that the plaintiff in fact received injuries resulting in the necessity to prescribe and purchase medication. Therefore, the verdict of the jury was inconsistent and improper on its face. However, even though the substantial rights of the plaintiff were affected, because of the opportunity to correct the verdict offered by this section, which the plaintiff did not take advantage of, this error was waived. Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 526 (Wyo. 1985).

The failure to raise a matter before the jury is released results in waiver of the right to complain about inconsistencies or irregularities in the verdict. Moreover, because of the opportunity to correct the verdict, the complaining party will be held to have waived the error notwithstanding its degree of irregularity or impropriety. Halliburton Co. v. Claypoole, 868 P.2d 252, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1994).

Where counsel for defendant is not present when verdict is returned, but has absented himself through choice because of his individual convenience and necessity, receiving verdict in his absence and failing to resubmit the verdict to jury is not error. Pure Gas & Chem. Co. v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 234 (Wyo. 1974).

Where exact language in jury note sent to trial judge stated “We cannot reach a verdict …,” those words indicated and expressed disagreement. The court had instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous. Apparently, there was not unanimity or there would have been a verdict of guilty or not guilty returned. A deadlock situation was registered. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

Cited in

Big-O Tires, Inc. v. Santini, 838 P.2d 1169, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1992).

Applied in

Thunder Hawk v. Union Pac. R.R., 891 P.2d 773, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1995).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Polling jury, 71 ALR2d 640.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of trial court's inquiry as to numerical division of jury, 77 ALR3d 769.

Products liability: inconsistency of verdicts on separate theories of negligence, breach of warranty or strict liability, 41 ALR4th 9.

Propriety of reassembling jury to amend, correct, clarify, or otherwise change verdict after discharge or separation at conclusion of civil case, 19 ALR5th 622.

§ 1-11-214. Discharge of jury; correcting defective verdict.

If no disagreement is expressed and neither party requires the jury to be polled, or on polling each juror answers in the affirmative, the verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged. If the verdict is defective in form only, it may be corrected by the court with the assent of the jurors before they are discharged.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 222; R.S. 1887, § 2562; R.S. 1899, § 3654; C.S. 1910, § 4509; C.S. 1920, § 5778; R.S. 1931, § 89-1315; C.S. 1945, § 3-2417; W.S. 1957, § 1-133; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Applied in

Big-O Tires, Inc. v. Santini, 838 P.2d 1169, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1992).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of verdict awarding medical expenses to personal injury plaintiff, but failing to award damages for pain and suffering, 55 ALR4th 186.

Article 3. Jury Fees

Cross references. —

For provision that jurors in all courts shall be allowed the same fees and mileage as jurors in district court, see § 1-11-119 .

For provision that no juror shall receive pay as a witness while serving as a juror, see § 1-14-103 .

For limitation on per diem compensation of jurors, see § 1-14-111 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 94.

50 C.J.S. Juries § 207.

§ 1-11-301. Fees in district court generally.

All persons summoned as jurors in the district courts of this state shall receive the fees hereinafter provided and none other.

History. Laws 1879, ch. 37, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 1206; R.S. 1899, § 3383; C.S. 1910, § 1018; C.S. 1920, § 1243; R.S. 1931, § 61-240; C.S. 1945, § 12-301; W.S. 1957, § 1-134; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to fees of jurors upon change of venue or judge, see § 1-7-101 .

§ 1-11-302. Mileage rate.

Jurors shall receive mileage at the rate set in W.S. 9-3-103 when the distance required to be traveled by the juror from the juror’s place of residence to the place of trial exceeds five (5) miles one (1) way.

History. Laws 1879, ch. 37, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 1207; R.S. 1899, § 3384; C.S. 1910, § 1019; C.S. 1920, § 1244; R.S. 1931, § 61-241; C.S. 1945, § 12-302; W.S. 1957, § 1-135; Laws 1965, ch. 71, § 1; 1975, ch. 141, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2019, ch. 14, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted "Jurors" for "For each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going to and returning from the place of trial they" and added "required to be", "by the juror from the juror's place of residence to the place of trial" and "one (1) way."

Law reviews. —

See case note, “Constitutional Law — An Indigent's Right to a Free Trial Transcript. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 30 L. Ed. 2d 372, 92 S. Ct. 410, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 298 (1971),” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 707 (1972).

§ 1-11-303. Amount of fees.

Jurors shall receive thirty dollars ($30.00) for each full or part day of actual attendance. A juror in attendance for more than five (5) consecutive days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed an additional twenty dollars ($20.00) per day for each day actually in attendance.

History. Laws 1879, ch. 37, § 3; R.S. 1887, § 1208; R.S. 1899, § 3385; C.S. 1910, § 1020; C.S. 1920, § 1245; Laws 1921, ch. 82, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 61-242; Laws 1937, ch. 43, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 12-303; W.S. 1957, § 1-136; Laws 1959, ch. 112, § 1; 1967, ch. 129, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1983, ch. 138, § 2; 2009, ch. 169, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, deleted “Effective July 1, 1984,” preceding “jurors shall receive” in the first sentence.

Law reviews. —

See case note, “Constitutional Law — An Indigent's Right to a Free Trial Transcript. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 30 L. Ed. 2d 372, 92 S. Ct. 410, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 298 (1971),” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 707 (1972).

§ 1-11-304. Certificate issued to jurors.

The clerk of the court shall note the time of the discharge of each juror summoned and issue to the juror a certificate under seal of the court for the amount due him for mileage and juror fees.

History. Laws 1879, ch. 37, § 5; R.S. 1887, § 1209; R.S. 1899, § 3386; C.S. 1910, § 1021; C.S. 1920, § 1246; R.S. 1931, § 61-243; C.S. 1945, § 12-304; W.S. 1957, § 1-137; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Certificates not order for payment. —

Certificates issued by clerk of the court which tried a criminal case on change of venue, reciting that a person named therein attended as a witness and is entitled to a certain sum payable by the county in which the indictment was found, is not an order upon said latter county for payment of said sum. Stoll v. Board of Comm'rs, 6 Wyo. 231, 44 P. 58, 1896 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1896).

Article 4. Jurors' Employment

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

30 C.J.S. Employer - Employee § 79.

§ 1-11-401. Protection of jurors' employment.

  1. No employer shall discharge, threaten  to discharge, intimidate or coerce any employee by reason of the employee’s  jury service, for the attendance or scheduled attendance in connection  with jury service, in any court in the state of Wyoming.
  2. Any employer who violates the provisions  of this section:
    1. May be enjoined from further violations  of this section in order to provide other appropriate relief, including  but not limited to reinstatement; and
    2. Is liable for exemplary damages to the  employee in an amount set by the court, but not to exceed one thousand  dollars ($1,000.00) for each violation as to each employee; and
    3. Is liable for the employee’s reasonable  costs and attorney’s fees, as set by the court, in enforcing his rights  hereunder.
  3. Any individual who is reinstated to a  position of employment in accordance with this section shall be considered  as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of  jury service, shall be reinstated to his position of employment without  loss of seniority and is entitled to participate in insurance or other  benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and  practices relating to employees on furlough or on leave of absence  in effect with the employer at the time the individual entered upon  jury service.
  4. No action by an employee aggrieved hereunder  shall be brought more than six (6) months after the alleged violation.
  5. The court may award a prevailing employer  a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the cost if the court determines  that any action brought by an employee is frivolous, vexatious or  brought in bad faith.

History. Laws 1983, ch. 138, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Jurors as within coverage of workers' compensation acts, 13 ALR5th 444.

Chapter 12 Evidence and Witnesses

Cross references. —

As to granting of continuances because of the absence of evidence, see § 1-9-101 .

As to testimony and witnesses in criminal cases, see § 7-11-401 et seq.

For provision that evidence of conviction for violation of Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways shall not be admissible in civil actions, see § 31-5-1208 .

As to evidence generally, see Rule 43, W.R.C.P.

Editor's notes. —

Sections 1-12-101 , 1-12-106 , 1-12-201 to 1-12-203, 1-12-301 to 1-12-303 , 1-12-401 to 1-12-402 and 1-12-501 to 1-12-502 , which formerly appeared, respectively, as §§ 1-138, 1-143, 1-160 to 1-162, 1-165 to 1-169, 1-170 to 1-173 and 1-174 to 1-177, W.S. 1957, and which were recodified by ch. 188, Laws 1977, as part of chapter 12 in revised title 1, effective January 1, 1978, were superseded by the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. See Rule 1102, W.R.E. Accordingly, the provisions enumerated have been deleted, the remaining sections in chapter 12 have been redesignated in order to maintain proper numerical sequence and internal references in the statutes have been changed to the corrected numbers.

Article 1. Witnesses Generally

Cross references. —

As to witnesses in bribery cases, see art. 3, § 44, Wyo. Const.

For authority of district court commissioner to issue and enforce process for attendance of witnesses, see § 5-3-307 .

As to summoning and enforcing attendance of witnesses in trials before police justices in cities of the first class, see § 5-6-206 .

As to validity and summons of verbal notice to witnesses with reference to date of trial upon continuance, see § 5-6-209 .

As to issuance of subpoenas and compelling attendance of witnesses at coroners' inquest, see § 7-4-203 .

As to applicability of civil procedure provisions to criminal cases, see § 7-11-403 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 1 et seq.

“Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without State in Criminal Cases” generally, 44 ALR2d 732.

Right to cross-examine witness as to his place of residence, 85 ALR3d 541.

Court's witnesses (other than expert) in state criminal prosecution, 16 ALR4th 352.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecution's calling as witness, to extract claim of self-incrimination privilege, one involved in offense charged against accused, 19 ALR4th 368.

Right to impeach witness in criminal case by inquiry or evidence as to witness' criminal activity for which witness was arrested or charged, but not convicted — modern state cases, 28 ALR4th 505.

Permissibility of impeaching credibility of witness by showing verdict of guilty without judgment of sentence thereon, 28 ALR4th 647.

Fact that witness undergoes hypnotic examination as affecting admissibility of testimony in civil case, 31 ALR4th 1239.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of comments by counsel vouching for credibility of witness — state cases, 45 ALR4th 602.

Closed-circuit television witness examination, 61 ALR4th 1155.

Compelling testimony of opponent's expert in state court, 66 ALR4th 213.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or question examining doctor—modern cases, 77 ALR4th 463.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine that party's attorney—modern cases, 78 ALR4th 571.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine witness who was occupant of vehicle involved in accident—modern cases, 78 ALR4th 616.

Adverse presumption or inference based on state's failure to produce or examine law enforcement personnel — modern cases, 81 ALR4th 872.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine transferor, transferee, broker or other person allegedly involved in transaction at issue — modern cases, 81 ALR4th 939.

Propriety of using prior conviction for drug dealing to impeach witness in criminal trial, 37 ALR5th 319.

Right of immune jury witness to obtain access to government affidavits and other supporting materials in order to challenge legality of court-ordered wiretap or electronic surveillance which provided basis for questions asked in grand jury proceedings, 60 ALR Fed 706.

98 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 87, 90 to 92, 122 to 131, 144 to 146, 161, 165 to 175, 191 to 200, 202, 204 to 248.

§ 1-12-101. Privileged communications and acts.

  1. The following persons shall not testify  in certain respects:
    1. An attorney or a physician concerning  a communication made to him by his client or patient in that relation,  or his advice to his client or patient. The attorney or physician  may testify by express consent of the client or patient, and if the  client or patient voluntarily testifies the attorney or physician  may be compelled to testify on the same subject;
    2. A clergyman or priest concerning a confession  made to him in his professional character if enjoined by the church  to which he belongs;
    3. Husband or wife, except as provided in W.S. 1-12-104 ;
    4. A person who assigns his claim or interest  concerning any matter in respect to which he would not be permitted  to testify if a party;
    5. A person who, if a party, would be restricted  in his evidence under W.S. 1-12-102 shall, where the property is sold or transferred by an  executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, heir, devisee or legatee,  be restricted in the same manner in any action or proceeding concerning  the property;
    6. A confidential intermediary, as defined  in W.S. 1-22-201(a)(viii), concerning communications made to him or information  obtained by him during the course of an investigation pursuant to W.S. 1-22-203 , when the public interests, in the judgment of the court,  would suffer by the disclosure.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 249; R.S. 1887, § 2589; R.S. 1899, § 3682; Laws 1909, ch. 145, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 4537; C.S. 1920, § 5806; R.S. 1931, § 89-1703; C.S. 1945, § 3-2602; W.S. 1957, § 1-139; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-102 ; Laws 1991, ch. 125, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to health-care-provider privilege not applying in worker's compensation cases, see § 27-14-610 .

As to privileged communication by a licensed or certified mental health professional, see § 33-38-113 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Privilege waived if not claimed. —

The rule is well established that the physician-patient privilege must be claimed and the evidence objected to or the privilege is waived. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 578 (Wyo. 1986).

There is no physician-patient privilege at common law. In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

Physician cannot testify to communication made to him by his patient even though the patient is not a party to the action in which a disclosure is sought and is not present to object. Peters v. Campbell, 80 Wyo. 492, 345 P.2d 234, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1959).

Confidentiality waiver of patient contested issues. —

This section does not prohibit a treating physician from expressing his expert opinion regarding issues placed into contest by his patient, their confidentiality privilege having been implicitly waived. Wardell v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1992).

Physician-patient and psychologist-client privileges limited by §§ 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 . —

The privileges created between physician-patient and psychologist-client by this section and § 33-27-123 are limited by the subsequent enactment of §§ 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 , which set forth a procedure for ascertaining and correcting child abuse and neglect. In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

Attorney-client privilege in federal court. —

Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that state law supplies the rule of decision on privilege in diversity cases. Frontier Ref. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2032 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1998).

Attorney's advice to opposing party. —

In an action praying for a judgment declaring that a subdivision's restrictive covenant prohibited the on-site use of a trailer for habitation during construction, allowing a partner in the law firm which was representing the plaintiffs in another case involving the subdivision's covenants to testify did not violate subsection (a)(i), as the attorney did not testify about communications from the plaintiffs to his firm or advice from his firm to the plaintiffs. Instead, he testified about his advice to the defendant concerning the covenant's meaning. Samuel v. Zwerin, 868 P.2d 265, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1994).

Testimony of attorney improperly excluded. —

In an action to set aside deeds executed by plaintiff to the defendant where the plaintiff testified that she did not voluntarily execute the deeds and that she did not understand the effect of the deeds, the trial court committed error in excluding the testimony of plaintiff's attorney who offered to testify for defendant, but such error was not reversible error where the excluded testimony was cumulative. Bergren v. Berggren, 77 Wyo. 438, 317 P.2d 1101, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1957).

Privilege does not apply when spouse charges crime against the other. —

Defendant's wife, who was an alleged victim spouse, could be compelled by the state to testify against defendant because the marital privilege did not apply when one spouse was charged with a crime against the other. Rogers v. State, 2008 WY 90, 189 P.3d 265, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2008).

Harmless error.—

Even assuming that a physician’s testimony and a medical record were protected by the physician-patient privilege and that a district court erred in admitting the evidence in a termination of parental rights trial, the error was harmless because there was no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the parent in the absence of the evidence. The jury’s conclusion was unassailable as the additional evidence at trial was more than ample to show that the parent was unfit to have custody and control of the child. In re L-MHB, 2020 WY 1, 454 P.3d 935, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 2020).

Privilege waived. —

When it is remembered that the prohibition against testimony respecting confidential communications is generally more strictly guarded than most other privileges, it is safe to conclude that when a defendant, entitled to the privilege of having his wife's testimony against him excluded, makes charges against his wife, testifies she accused him of having carnal knowledge of their daughter, then told him she had made a mistake, and denies the evidence given by his daughter which involved his wife, his privilege not to have her testify against him is waived, at least insofar as to the matters about which he has given testimony. Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1960).

Attorney billing statements may be privileged. —

There is no blanket rule permitting a party to refuse to produce all of its detailed billing statements. In some instances, however, a billing statement may contain communications between the client and the attorney or legal advice given, bringing it under the definition of privilege in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-101 (2015). Dishman v. First Interstate Bank, 2015 WY 154, 362 P.3d 360, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 2015).

Applied in

Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1991).

Quoted in

Freudenthal v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 2010 WY 80, 233 P.3d 933, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (June 22, 2010).

Stated in

Burk v. Burzynski, 672 P.2d 419, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 385 (Wyo. 1983).

Cited in

Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1995); Ortega v. State, 966 P.2d 961, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1998); Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. #2, 2015 WY 70, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (May 14, 2015).

Law reviews. —

See note, “Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases,” 19 Wyo. L.J. 35 (1964).

See note, “Are the Records of Mental Hospitals Privileged in Mental Incompetency Adjudications?,” 19 Wyo. L.J. 59 (1964).

For discussion of privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 601 (1977).

For case note, “Wyoming's New Missing Witness Rule, Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 569 (1979).

For article, “A Preliminary Review of Wyoming's Revised Civil Commitment Procedures,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 531 (1982).

For article, “The Ungrateful Living: An Estate Planner's Nightmare — The Trial Attorney's Dream,” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 401 (1989).

For case note, “Evidence — Recognition of a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3879 (1996),” see XXXII Land & Water L. Rev. 873 (1997).

For comment, “Protecting Our Children in Custody Cases: The Wyoming Legislature Should Create an Attorney/Guardian Ad Litem Who Represents the Best Interests of the Child and Can Give the Child the Benefit of Limited Confidentiality,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 427 (1999).

For article, “Ethical Considerations When Representing Organizations,” see 3 Wyo. L. Rev. 581 (2003).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of one against whom testimony is offered to invoke privilege of communications between others, 2 ALR2d 645.

Conversation between husband and wife relating to property or business as within rule excluding private communications between them, 4 ALR2d 835.

“Communications” within testimonial privilege of confidential communications between husband and wife as including knowledge derived from observation by 1 spouse of acts of other spouse, 10 ALR2d 1389.

Discovery, in medical malpractice action, of names and medical records of other patients to whom defendant has given treatment similar to that allegedly injuring plaintiff, 66 ALR5th 591.

Construction and effect of statutory provision as to relaxation, in event of action for personal injuries, of rule in respect of communications between physician and patient, 25 ALR2d 1429.

Admissibility of testimony by an attorney as to unperformed compromise agreement, 26 ALR2d 858.

Admissibility, on issue of child's legitimacy or parentage, of confidential communication between husband and wife, 31 ALR2d 989.

Privilege against disclosure of matters arising out of transactions or relationship between accountant and client or attorney acting as accountant, 38 ALR2d 670.

Privileged nature of hospital record relating to intoxication or sobriety of patient, 38 ALR2d 778, 9 ALR Fed 457.

Proof of due execution of lost will as affected by privilege attaching to attorney-client communications, 41 ALR2d 393.

Privilege of communications by or to nurse or attendant, 47 ALR2d 742.

Party's waiver of privilege as to communications with counsel by taking stand and testifying, 51 ALR2d 521.

Admissibility of sound recordings in evidence as affected by privileged nature of communications, 58 ALR2d 1024, 57 ALR3d 746, 58 ALR3d 598.

Right of physician, notwithstanding physician-patient privilege, to give expert testimony based on hypothetical question, 64 ALR2d 1056.

Privilege as to communications to attorney in connection with drawing of will, 66 ALR2d 1302.

Waiver of attorney-client privilege by personal representative or heir of deceased client or by guardian of incompetent, 67 ALR2d 1268.

Person other than client or attorney affected by or included within privilege attaching to communication between client and attorney, 96 ALR2d 125.

Who may waive privilege of confidential communications to physician by persons since deceased, 97 ALR2d 393.

Corporation's right to assert attorney-client privilege, 98 ALR2d 241.

Testimony as to communications or observations as to mental condition of patient treated for other condition, 100 ALR2d 648.

Applicability of attorney-client privilege to communications with respect to contemplated tortious acts, 2 ALR3d 861.

Waiver of privilege as regards 1 physician as a waiver as to other physicians, 5 ALR3d 1244.

Attorney-client privilege as affected by communications between several attorneys, 9 ALR3d 1420.

Disclosure of name, identity, address, occupation or business of client as violation of attorney-client privilege, 16 ALR3d 1047.

Admissibility of physician's testimony as to patient's statements or declarations, other than res gestae, during medical examination, 37 ALR3d 778.

Privilege arising from relationship between psychiatrist or psychologist and patient, 44 ALR3d 24.

Who is “clergyman” or the like entitled to assert privilege attaching to communications to clergymen or spiritual advisers, 49 ALR3d 1205.

Applicability of attorney-client privilege to communications relating to drafting of nontestamentary documents, 55 ALR3d 1322.

Matters to which the privilege covering communications to clergyman or spiritual advisor extend, 71 ALR3d 794.

Physician-patient privilege as applied to physician's testimony concerning wound required to be reported to public authority, 85 ALR3d 1196.

Effect, on competency to testify against spouse or on marital communication privilege, of separation or other marital instability short of absolute divorce, 98 ALR3d 1285.

Spouse's betrayal or connivance as extending marital communications privilege to testimony of third person, 3 ALR4th 1104.

Communication between unmarried couple living together as privileged, 4 ALR4th 422.

Applicability of attorney-client privilege to evidence or testimony in subsequent action between parties originally represented contemporaneously by same attorney, with reference to communication to or from one party, 4 ALR4th 765.

Testimony before or communications to private professional society's judicial commission, ethics committee, or the like, as privileged, 9 ALR4th 807.

Existence of spousal privilege where marriage was entered into for purpose of barring testimony, 13 ALR4th 1305.

Applicability of attorney-client privilege to communications made in presence of or solely to or by third person, 14 ALR4th 594.

Attorney-client privilege as extending to communications relating to contemplated civil fraud, 31 ALR4th 458.

Privilege as to communications between lay representative in judicial or administrative proceedings and client, 31 ALR4th 1226.

Privileged communications between accountant and client, 33 ALR4th 539.

Presence of child at communication between husband and wife as destroying confidentiality of otherwise privileged communication between them, 39 ALR4th 480.

Assignability of claim for legal malpractice, 40 ALR4th 684.

Validity, construction and application of statute limiting physician-patient privilege in judicial proceedings relating to child abuse or neglect, 44 ALR4th 649.

Propriety of governmental eavesdropping on communications between accused and his attorney, 44 ALR4th 841.

Physician's tort liability for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information about patient, 48 ALR4th 668.

Discovery: right to ex parte interview with injured party's treating physician, 50 ALR4th 714.

Insured-insurer communications as privileged, 55 ALR4th 336.

Communications between spouses as to joint participation in crime as within privilege of interspousal communications, 62 ALR4th 1134.

Attorney-client privilege: who is “representative of the client” within state statute or rule privileging communications between an attorney and the representative of the client, 66 ALR4th 1227.

Invasion of privacy by a clergyman, church or religious group, 67 ALR4th 1086.

Crimes against spouse within exception permitting testimony by one spouse against other in criminal prosecution—modern state cases, 74 ALR4th 223.

Competency of one spouse to testify against other in prosecution for offense against third party as affected by fact that offense against spouse was involved in same transaction, 74 ALR4th 277.

Involuntary disclosure or surrender of will prior to testator's death, 75 ALR4th 1144.

Determination of whether a communication is from a corporate client for purposes of the attorney-client privilege—modern cases, 26 ALR5th 628.

What corporate communications are entitled to attorney-client privilege—modern cases, 27 ALR5th 76.

What persons or entities may assert or waive corporation's attorney-client privilege — modern cases, 28 ALR5th 1.

Waiver of evidentiary privilege by inadvertent disclosure — state law, 51 ALR5th 603.

Testimonial privilege for confidential communications between relatives other than husband and wife — state cases, 62 ALR5th 629.

What constitutes “confidential source” within Freedom of Information Act exemption permitting nondisclosure of identity of confidential source and, in specified instances, of confidential information furnished only by confidential source (5 USC § 522(b)(7)(D)), 59 ALR Fed 550.

Psychotherapist-patient privilege under federal common law, 72 ALR Fed 395.

Immunity's sufficiency to meet federal grand jury witness' claim of privilege against adverse spousal testimony, 82 ALR Fed 600.

Attorney's disclosure, in federal proceedings, of identity of client as violating attorney-client privilege, 84 ALR Fed 852.

Academic peer review privilege in federal court, 85 ALR Fed 691.

Communications to clergyman as privileged in federal proceedings, 118 ALR Fed 449.

What are matters “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency” exempted from disclosure under Freedom of Information Act (5 USCS § 552(b)(2)), 141 ALR Fed 531.

Determination and application of correct legal standard in weighing medical opinion of treating source in Social Security disability cases, 149 ALR Fed 1.

Waiver of evidentiary privilege by inadvertent disclosure-federal law, 159 ALR Fed 153.

Views of United States Supreme Court as to attorney-client privilege, 159 ALR Fed 243.

“Communications” within testimonial privilege of confidential communications between husband and wife as including knowledge derived from observation by one spouse of acts of other spouse. 23 A.L.R.6th 1.

Application of attorney-client privilege to electronic documents. 26 A.L.R.6th 287.

§ 1-12-102. When party incapable of testifying.

In an action or suit by or against a person who from any cause is incapable of testifying, or by or against a trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other representative of the person incapable of testifying, no judgment or decree founded on uncorroborated testimony shall be rendered in favor of a party whose interests are adverse to the person incapable of testifying or his trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other representative. In any such action or suit, if the adverse party testifies, all entries, memorandum and declarations by the party incapable of testifying made while he was capable, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received in evidence.

History. Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-103 .

This section embodies “dead man's statute.” Consolidated Constr. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 377 (Wyo. 1981).

Rule 601, W.R.E., does not supersede effect of this section. Consolidated Constr. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 377 (Wyo. 1981).

Summary judgment. —

The requirement of corroboration of evidence against a party incapable of testifying under the statute should not come into play at the summary judgment stage; it is the movant's obligation to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, not to rely on the evidence or lack of evidence of the nonmovant. Drake v. Winkler, 838 P.2d 1177, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1992).

Test in this section is one of corroboration rather than one of competency. Consolidated Constr. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 377 (Wyo. 1981).

To be corroborative, as required under this section, the evidence offered must be such that it would support or tend to support, in some degree at least, some of the material issues of the claim which are testified to by the witness whose evidence is sought to be corroborated. Consolidated Constr. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 377 (Wyo. 1981).

Sources of compliance with corroboration requirement. —

Compliance with the corroboration requirement of this section can occur from any competent witness or any other legal sources such as deeds, records or reports. Consolidated Constr. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 377 (Wyo. 1981).

Testimony of adverse claimant alone is not sufficient to satisfy corroboration requirement of this section. Consolidated Constr. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 377 (Wyo. 1981).

But introduction of profit sheets and testimony of record compilers held corroborative. —

The plaintiff's introduction of profit sheets and testimony of persons in charge of compiling company records is enough, under the requirement of this section, to corroborate plaintiff's claim on an oral agreement made with the deceased. Consolidated Constr. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 377 (Wyo. 1981).

Burden of corroboration is on adverse party who is testifying and not on the deceased's representatives. Consolidated Constr. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 377 (Wyo. 1981).

Proof of oral contract to make will. —

A party who asserted the existence of an oral contract between two other persons to make a will, and who claimed to be a beneficiary thereunder, had the burden of proving it and, although his testimony may have been admissible under this section, it could not support a judgment without corroboration. Sievers v. Barton, 775 P.2d 489, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1989).

Erroneous exclusion of testimony. —

The district court's erroneous conclusion that a personal representative's uncorroborated testimony should be disregarded did not require reversal absent any showing that the court's interpretation of this section prejudiced the personal representative's substantial rights. Estate of Short, 785 P.2d 1167, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1990).

Inherent unfairness. —

It would simply be unfair to permit the use of statements made by the principal shareholder and operating officer of the corporation to be used against the entity and then invoke the dead man's statute to prohibit any contrary statements that were made by that corporate officer. Metz Bev. Co. v. Wyo. Bevs. Inc., 2002 WY 21, 39 P.3d 1051, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2002).

Applied in

McClellan v. Britain, 826 P.2d 245, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1992).

Quoted in

Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

Moncrief v. Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 880 F. Supp. 1495, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381 (D. Wyo. 1995).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Article VI of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence: Witnesses,” see XIII Land & Water L. Rev. 909 (1978).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Application of dead man's statute in proceeding involving account of personal representative, 2 ALR2d 349.

Applicability of dead man's statute to testimony denying transaction or communication between witness and person since deceased, 8 ALR2d 1094.

Statute excluding testimony of person because of death of another as applicable where deceased was coparty with person or persons still living in contract or transaction to which testimony relates, 22 ALR2d 1068.

Introduction of decedent's books of account by his personal representative as rendering the adverse party or interested person a competent witness, 26 ALR2d 1009.

Dead man's statute as applicable to spouse of party disqualified from testifying, 27 ALR2d 538.

Examination and the like of witness incompetent under dead man's statute as waiver of incompetency of other witnesses, 33 ALR2d 1440.

Proof of due execution of lost will by testimony of persons who will benefit from establishment, 41 ALR2d 393.

Propriety of compelling witness to testify, in pretrial proceeding, as to matters which would be prohibited in trial testimony by dead man's statute, 42 ALR2d 578.

What constitutes claim or demand against estate within statute disqualifying witness, 54 ALR2d 1103.

Applicability of dead man's statute to proceedings to determine liability for succession, estate or inheritance tax, 66 ALR2d 714.

Competency of witness in wrongful death action as affected by dead man's statute, 77 ALR2d 676.

Testimony to facts of automobile accident as testimony to a “transaction” or “communication” with a deceased person within dead man's statute, 80 ALR2d 1296.

Competency of interested witness to testify as to handwriting or signature of decedent, 13 ALR3d 404.

Statute excluding testimony of person because of death of another as applied to testimony in respect of lost or destroyed instrument, 18 ALR3d 606.

Taking depositions or serving interrogatories in civil case as waiver of incompetency of witness, 23 ALR3d 389.

Personal representative's loss of rights under dead man's statute by prior institution of discovery proceedings, 35 ALR3d 955.

Applicability to attorneys of statute excluding testimony of party to action or transaction because of death of another, 67 ALR3d 924.

Use of evidence excludible under dead man's statute to defeat or support summary judgment, 67 ALR3d 970.

Dead man's statutes as affected by Rule 601 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and similar state rules, 50 ALR4th 1238.

§ 1-12-103. Compelling testimony of adverse parties in civil and criminal actions.

A party may compel the adverse party to testify orally or by deposition as any other witness, and no person is disqualified as a witness in any action, civil or criminal, because of his interest in the same as a party or otherwise. Every person is a competent witness except as otherwise provided by law, but his interest in the action may be shown to affect the credibility of the witness. Any party of record in a civil action, or any person for whose immediate benefit the action is prosecuted or defended, or his assignor, officer, agent or employee or if a county or city is a party any officer of the county or city, may be examined upon the trial of any action as if under cross-examination at the instance of the adverse party and may be compelled to testify subject to the same rules for examination as any other witness. The party calling for the examination is not concluded thereby and may rebut the evidence given by counter or impeaching testimony.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 251; R.S. 1887, § 2591; R.S. 1899, § 3684; C.S. 1910, § 4539; C.S. 1920, § 5808; Laws 1921, ch. 116, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 89-1705; C.S. 1945, § 3-2604; Laws 1955, ch. 24, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-141; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-104 .

Cross references. —

As to self-incrimination, see art. 1, § 11, Wyo. Const.

True test of right to cross-examine under this section is whether the party called is in fact adverse to the one calling him as a witness. Husted v. French Creek Ranch, 79 Wyo. 307, 333 P.2d 948, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1959).

The test under the provisions of this section as to whether an adverse party may be called for cross-examination is whether the party is actually an adverse party. State Bank v. Bagley Bros., 44 Wyo. 244, 11 P.2d 572, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 44 Wyo. 456, 13 P.2d 564, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1932).

The test of the right to call for cross-examination under this section is whether the person so called is adverse in material and relevant sense to the party calling him. Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1933).

Whether party so called is friendly is question for discretion of trial judge. Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1933).

Necessarily in the administration of the law the trial judge will guide the matter in the exercise of a sound discretion. Husted v. French Creek Ranch, 79 Wyo. 307, 333 P.2d 948, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1959).

Spencer was a codefendant with appellant and the testimony he gave, if at all damaging, was as hurtful to him as it was to the appellant, and it will not be assumed he was unfriendly to himself. Furthermore, the admitted matter pleaded was also testified to by other witnesses and the same is true of all, or practically all, of Spencer's testimony. Even if there remained any doubt about this, the appellant seems to have lost its right to now complain because appellant failed to follow up its objection on that score. Appellant elected to call Spencer on its own account for similar cross-examination, and so had ample opportunity to impeach or discredit him had that been possible. Spencer also testified on direct examination in his own behalf, thus giving appellant further opportunity to subject him to additional searching cross-inquiry. The brief cross-examination attempted by appellant, however, failed to alter Spencer's testimony. The supreme court was not disposed to say in this instance that the trial court's discretion was abused. Husted v. French Creek Ranch, 79 Wyo. 307, 333 P.2d 948, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1959).

When it appears that a party called for cross-examination is friendly in fact to the party calling him the cross-examination should not be permitted. Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1933).

Surviving codefendant. —

A codefendant who admits all the claims of the plaintiff in an action to foreclose a mortgage on deceased partner's homestead, held not an adverse party which the plaintiff might call under this section. State Bank v. Bagley Bros., 44 Wyo. 244, 11 P.2d 572, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 44 Wyo. 456, 13 P.2d 564, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1932).

Adverse and surviving party, when compelled to testify by an executor or administrator, cannot reasonably complain, for, although a party, he can then be examined fully in his own behalf on the subject of his examination in chief. Hay v. Peterson, 6 Wyo. 419, 45 P. 1073, 1896 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1896).

Section permits impeachment as to character of only such witnesses as are hostile in fact. Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1933).

Where defendants were not allowed to call a witness for cross-examination under this section and were limited in cross-examining him when called by plaintiff to clarify his testimony, and they thereafter called him as their own witness, they were not allowed to impeach his testimony. Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1933).

Applied in

Hawkey v. Williams, 72 Wyo. 20, 261 P.2d 48, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (1953); Hawkey v. Williams, 73 Wyo. 463, 281 P.2d 447, 1955 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1955).

Quoted in

Johnston v. Vukelic, 67 Wyo. 1, 213 P.2d 925, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (1950).

Cited in

Megown v. Fuller, 38 Wyo. 211, 266 P. 124, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (1928); Puterman v. Puterman, 66 Wyo. 89, 205 P.2d 815, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (1949); Rogers v. State, 2008 WY 90, 189 P.3d 265, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (July 31, 2008).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Article VI of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence: Witnesses,” see XIII Land & Water L. Rev. 909 (1978).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Attorney as witness for client in civil proceedings — modern state cases, 35 ALR4th 810.

§ 1-12-104. Husband and wife as witnesses in civil and criminal cases.

No husband or wife shall be a witness against the other except in criminal proceedings for a crime committed by one against the other, or in a civil action or proceeding by one against the other. They may in all civil and criminal cases be witnesses for each other the same as though the marital relation did not exist.

History. Laws 1897, ch. 2, § 1; 1899, ch. 81, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 3681; C.S. 1910, § 4536; C.S. 1920, § 5805; R.S. 1931, § 89-1702; C.S. 1945, § 3-2605; W.S. 1957, § 1-142; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-105 .

Cross references. —

For abrogation of any privilege between husband and wife in child abuse cases, see § 14-3-210 .

For provision making privilege of husband and wife inapplicable in an action for desertion of wife or children, see § 20-3-104 .

For provision making husband and wife privilege inapplicable in action under Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, see § 20-4-166 .

Repealing clauses. —

Section 2, ch. 2, Laws 1897, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict with that act.

Origin of section. —

This section was originally a part of § 1-12-101 , relating to privileged communications. Stephens v. Short, 41 Wyo. 324, 285 P. 797, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1930).

Purpose. —

This statute is a codification of a common law privilege and the court looks to the common law history of the privilege in determining its purpose. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

The primary purpose of the confidential marital communication privilege is to foster marital relationships by encouraging confidential communication between spouses and this is the primary purpose the Wyoming legislature intended to further when it enacted this statute. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

The legislature codified the confidential marital communication privilege in this statute and intended to make the confidential marital communication privilege available to either spouse. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

The confidential marital communication privilege is the privilege that ensures that private marital communications will remain private. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

Witness spouse might directly invoke privilege against testifying if called to testify against a party spouse in a criminal case. Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1991).

But wife refusing to testify against husband not made “unavailable witness.” —

A wife's refusal to testify against her husband-defendant when called as a witness by the state in a criminal case did not make her an “unavailable witness” which would have, under Rule 804, W.R.E., justified the admission of the proffered hearsay testimony of another witness, who would have testified as to an earlier statement by the wife. Nothing in the statutes extends a privilege to the spouse when called by the defendant in a criminal case. In order for the defendant to have demonstrated “unavailability” to him, he would have had to call his wife as a witness and, if she then had continued to refuse to testify, the court could have found that she was unavailable and the hearsay testimony possibly would have been admissible. Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1991).

Privilege does not apply to acts that are in no way communicative. —

It is generally accepted that the confidential marital communication privilege extends to communications and not to acts that are in no way communicative. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

Privilege does not apply when spouse charges crime against the other. —

Defendant's wife, who was an alleged victim spouse, could be compelled by the state to testify against defendant because the marital privilege did not apply when one spouse was charged with a crime against the other. Rogers v. State, 2008 WY 90, 189 P.3d 265, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2008).

Privilege not applicable where spouse not witness against spouse. —

Where the evidence in question at trial is not presented by one spouse as a witness against the other, but rather is the product of the defendant himself, then the extension of the privilege to such circumstances clearly exceeds the limits of this doctrine. Nisonger v. State, 581 P.2d 1094, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1978).

Or where child of wife wronged. —

Cases in which there is a wrong against the child of the wife fall within this section's exception applicable to “criminal proceedings for a crime committed by one [spouse] against the other,” because the wrong affecting the wife is different from that suffered by the public in general, and it is not the policy of this state to encourage defendants to silence their spouses in child abuse or child homicide cases. Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1978).

Circumstances of utterance factor in confidentiality. —

Whether a particular statement is a privileged confidential marital communication depends on the nature and character of the communication as well as the circumstances surrounding the utterance. The communication must be delivered during marriage and in confidence. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

Confidentiality of no consequence. —

Under this section and § 1-12-101 , one spouse is rendered incompetent to testify against the other irrespective of such testimony being related to confidential communications. Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1956).

But bar against matters not confidential does not survive termination of marriage. —

The bar against matters not confidential, unlike that against confidential communications, does not continue after the termination of the marriage relationship. Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1956).

Confidential communications between spouses should be protected after the death of either one of the spouses, as well as after termination of the marriage from other cause. But, unless precluded by the express terms of a statute or for some other reason, adverse testimony may be given by a former spouse against the other or against the estate of the other, except as to confidential communications received during coverture. Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1956).

Communications held not confidential. —

A widow could not claim immunity under this section from testifying as to messages relayed by her from plaintiff to her husband, and from her husband to plaintiff, during a phone conversation between her and plaintiff, since such communications could not be considered confidential. Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1956).

Defendant's statement to his wife is robbed of any confidential aspect because it was made in the presence and hearing of a child and the child testified to it. Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1960).

The privilege does not attach when the confidentiality of the communication is destroyed by revealing it in the presence of a third party. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

Privilege not applicable when obvious marital status should no longer endure. —

While the preservation of the marital relation is a matter of primary importance as a matter of public and social policy, when it becomes obvious that the marriage should no longer endure, the injury to the marital status which results from permitting the wife to testify against her husband cannot be greater than is the benefit to society by its insuring that justice be done. Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1960).

Privilege survives death. —

The confidential marital communications privilege survives the death of either spouse. To rule otherwise would thwart the very purpose of the confidential marital communication privilege. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

Exception broader than “cases involving corporal violence.” —

That the legislature intended something more than to declare the common law exception of “cases involving corporal violence,” by this section is made plain by its use of the broader phrase “crimes against the other,” which means nothing more nor less than a “wrong” against the other. Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1960).

“Crime” against other means “wrong” against other. —

Legalistically speaking, a crime is never “committed by one against the other” but rather, against the state, so offenses against an individual are civil wrongs. A “crime” against the other, as used in this section, means nothing more nor less than a “wrong” against the other. Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1960).

Hence, wife permitted to testify when she has suffered a special, particular and personal wrong. —

It is within the purview of this section that the wife be considered a competent witness and be permitted to testify against her husband because she has suffered a special, particular and personal wrong through his rapacious assault upon her child. Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1960).

Invoking the privilege. —

The privilege of spousal immunity may be invoked by the spouse who does not wish to be the instrumentality of condemnation directed at his or her partner. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

When a wife testifies for her husband, she is subject to contradiction and impeachment. Strand v. State, 36 Wyo. 78, 252 P. 1030, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1927).

Test for determining whether communication protected by privilege. —

The supreme court finds the rationale underlying the “intentions test” persuasive and adopts it as the rule in Wyoming. This test treats assertive conduct that is intended to communicate a confidential message from one spouse to another as a confidential marital communication. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

The “intentions test” is a flexible analytical tool that allows a court to avoid erecting barriers to the truth while still protecting conduct that is intended to convey confidential messages between spouses. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

Expectation of confidentiality may not determine protection under privilege. —

Conduct that is undertaken in reliance on the confidence of the marital relationship, i.e., with an expectation of confidentiality, is not necessarily considered a confidential marital communication. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

Prosecution may comment on defendant's failure to call wife as witness. —

Since, under this section, the wife of a defendant is a competent witness for him but not for the prosecution, it is proper for the prosecuting attorney to comment upon defendant's failure to produce her as a witness. State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1956).

Generally, where a witness is equally available to both parties, the failure to call the witness is not the proper subject of comment; however, where the witness is the defendant's spouse and can assert the marital privilege because she is then available to the defendant but not to the government, reference to the defendant's failure to call her is not error. Fortner v. State, 835 P.2d 1155, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1992).

Waiver of objection. —

Defendant executrix waived objection to testimony of plaintiff's husband where she subjected the husband to cross-examination as to matters not gone into upon his direct examination. Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1956); Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1960).

Having chosen to have his wife testify as a witness, defendant is in no position to argue about his “forced” election between waiving the defendant's right to not have his wife testify against him or have the transcript of her previous testimony introduced. Simms v. State, 492 P.2d 516, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886, 93 S. Ct. 104, 34 L. Ed. 2d 142, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 1757 (U.S. 1972).

Only the party spouse may waive privilege. —

Only the party spouse can waive the confidential marital communication privilege with respect to information communicated in confidence to the other spouse. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

The spouse against whom confidential marital communications are offered must waive the confidential marital communication privilege before the witness spouse can testify regarding those confidential marital communications. Once the party spouse has waived the confidential marital communication privilege, the non-party spouse may then elect to invoke or waive the privilege of spousal immunity. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

If the party spouse refuses to waive the confidential marital communication privilege, the witness spouse cannot testify even if he or she waives the spousal immunity privilege. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

Privilege may be waived by signing of consent form authorizing censorship of mail during booking procedure. Nisonger v. State, 581 P.2d 1094, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1978).

The party spouse may voluntarily waive the confidential marital communication privilege. To waive the confidential marital communication privilege, the party spouse must, in some way, destroy the confidentiality of the communication. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1994).

Testimony of spouse over objection not prejudicial error per se. —

No authority exists for the proposition that the mere testifying over objection by the spouse is prejudicial error per se. Pike v. State, 495 P.2d 1188, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 244 (Wyo. 1972).

Where testimony of defendant's wife on direct examination was most meager and added nothing to the evidence before the court, including the admissions of defendant, there was no prejudicial error in receiving her testimony. Pike v. State, 495 P.2d 1188, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 244 (Wyo. 1972).

Testimony harmless where corroborates other witnesses. —

In a civil proceeding by a mother and father against each other, the current wife, who was not a party, should not have been permitted to testify, even though the father and current wife were separated; nevertheless, since the current wife's testimony merely corroborated the testimony of other witnesses, including the father and his son, the admission of the testimony was harmless. Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1995).

In a joint trial of a husband and wife for aggravated robbery, it was not error to permit the wife to testify as follows: (1) she denied having a gun during the encounter with the victim or that she or her husband were engaged in any wrongdoing; and (2) she placed her husband at the scene of the crime, but did so for purposes of showing that her husband rescued her from the victim. Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 449 (Wyo. 1985).

Law reviews. —

See note, “Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases,” 19 Wyo. L.J. 35 (1964).

For discussion of husband-wife testimonial privilege and the Federal Rules of Evidence, see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 601 (1977).

For case note, “Wyoming's New Missing Witness Rule, Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 569 (1979).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Conversations between husband and wife relating to property or business as within rule excluding private communications between them, 4 ALR2d 835.

“Communications” within testimonial privilege of confidential communications between husband and wife as including knowledge derived from observations by one spouse of acts of other, 10 ALR2d 1389.

Crimes against spouse within exception permitting testimony by one spouse against another in criminal prosecution, 11 ALR2d 646.

Effect of divorce or annulment on competency of one former spouse as witness against other in criminal prosecution, 38 ALR2d 570.

Calling or offering accused's spouse as witness for prosecution as prejudicial misconduct, 76 ALR2d 920.

Spouse as competent witness for or against cooffender with other spouse, 90 ALR2d 648.

Crime directed against spouse but taking effect against third person as within exception to rule of incompetency of husband or wife, 36 ALR3d 820.

Competency of husband or wife to testify to nonaccess, 49 ALR3d 212.

Competency of one spouse to testify against other in prosecution for offense against child of both or either, 93 ALR3d 1018.

Effect, on competency to testify against spouse or on marital communication privilege, of separation or other marital instability short of absolute divorce, 98 ALR3d 1285.

Existence of spousal privilege where marriage was entered into for purpose of barring testimony, 13 ALR4th 1305.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's argument commenting on failure of defendant's spouse to testify, 26 ALR4th 9.

Communications between spouses as to joint participation in crime as within privilege of interspousal communications, 62 ALR4th 1134.

Crimes against spouse within exception permitting testimony by one spouse against other in criminal prosecution—modern state cases, 74 ALR4th 223.

Competency of one spouse to testify against other in prosecution for offense against third party as affected by fact that offense against spouse was involved in same transaction, 74 ALR4th 277.

Competency of one spouse to testify against other in prosecution for offense against child of both or either or neither, 119 ALR 5th 275.

Immunity's sufficiency to meet federal grand jury witness' claim of privilege against adverse spousal testimony, 82 ALR Fed 600.

“Communications” within testimonial privilege of confidential communications between husband and wife as including knowledge derived from observation by one spouse of acts of other spouse. 23 A.L.R.6th 1.

§ 1-12-105. Right of witness to demand fees; failure to pay; payments noted.

After the case is called for trial and before a witness is sworn, he may demand his traveling fees and fees for one (1) day’s attendance. If the fees are not paid he is not obliged to testify. At the commencement of the trial each day after the first day he may demand his fees for that day’s attendance and if the fees are not paid he shall not be compelled to remain. The clerk shall note the payment of fees in the witness book.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 259; R.S. 1887, § 2599; R.S. 1899, § 3693; C.S. 1910, § 4548; C.S. 1920, § 5817; R.S. 1931, § 89-1714; C.S. 1945, § 3-2612; W.S. 1957, § 1-144; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-107 .

Cross references. —

As to fees of witnesses subpoenaed by county assessor, see § 18-3-204 .

As to fees for witnesses appearing before public service commission, see § 37-2-208 .

As to witness fees in causes relating to water rights, see § 41-3-328 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right to summon witnesses at public expense under Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without State in Criminal Proceedings, 44 ALR2d 732.

Right of witness detained in custody for future appearance to fees for such detention, 50 ALR2d 1439.

Allowance, as taxable costs, of witness fees and mileage of stockholders, directors, officers and employees of corporate litigant, 57 ALR2d 1243.

Allowance of mileage or witness fees with respect to witnesses who were not called to testify or not permitted to do so when called, 22 ALR3d 675.

§ 1-12-106. Contempt of court by witness.

Disobedience of a subpoena, refusal to be sworn except for refusal to pay fees on demand, or refusal to answer as a witness or to subscribe a deposition when lawfully ordered, may be punished as a contempt of the court or officer who required the attendance or testimony of the witness.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 260; R.S. 1887, § 2600; R.S. 1899, § 3694; C.S. 1910, § 4549; C.S. 1920, § 5818; R.S. 1931, § 89-1715; C.S. 1945, § 3-2613; W.S. 1957, § 1-145; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-108 .

Cross references. —

As to refusal of witness to answer questions in connection with discovery, see Rule 37, W.R.C.P.

Cited in

State ex rel. Romsa v. Grace, 43 Wyo. 454, 5 P.2d 301, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (1931).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Refusal to give self-incriminating evidence before grand jury as contempt, 38 ALR2d 225.

Perjury or false swearing by witness as contempt, 89 ALR2d 1258.

Right, and remedy for enforcement of right, of defendant in criminal case to interview or confer with prospective witness in custody of public institution, 14 ALR3d 652.

Intoxication of witness or attorney as contempt of court, 46 ALR4th 238.

§ 1-12-107. Attachment of witness who disobeys subpoena.

When a witness fails to attend in obedience to a subpoena, the court or officer before whom his attendance is required may issue an attachment to the sheriff of the county commanding him to arrest and bring the person named before the court at a time and place fixed in the attachment, to give his testimony and answer for the contempt. If the attachment is not for immediately bringing the witness before the court or officer, a sum may be fixed in which the witness may give bond with surety for his appearance. The sum shall be endorsed on the back of the attachment. If no sum is fixed and endorsed, it shall be one hundred dollars ($100.00). If the witness was not personally served, the court may order him to show cause why an attachment should not issue against him.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 261; R.S. 1887, § 2601; R.S. 1899, § 3695; C.S. 1910, § 4550; C.S. 1920, § 5819; R.S. 1931, § 89-1716; C.S. 1945, § 3-2614; W.S. 1957, § 1-146; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-109 .

Cross references. —

As to attachment of the person generally, see §§ 1-15-201 to 1-15-212 .

As to attachment for contempt in case of failure of witness to appear or testify before court commissioner in probate matters, see § 2-2-108 .

As to disobeying subpoena, see § 6-5-306 .

Applied in

Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 621 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

State ex rel. Romsa v. Grace, 43 Wyo. 454, 5 P.2d 301, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (1931).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Power to compel expert to testify, 77 ALR2d 1182.

§ 1-12-108. Punishment for contempt by witness.

  1. Punishment for the contempt mentioned  in W.S. 1-12-106 is as follows:
    1. When the witness fails to attend in obedience  to a subpoena, the court or officer may fine him not more than fifty  dollars ($50.00);
    2. In other cases the court or officer may  fine the witness not more than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor less than  five dollars ($5.00), or may imprison him in the county jail until  he submits to be sworn, testifies or gives his deposition.
  2. The fine imposed shall be paid into the  county treasury.
  3. The witness is also liable to the party  injured for any damages occasioned by his failure to attend, his refusal  to be sworn, to testify or give his deposition.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 262; R.S. 1887, § 2602; R.S. 1899, § 3696; C.S. 1910, § 4551; C.S. 1920, § 5820; R.S. 1931, § 89-1717; C.S. 1945, § 3-2615; W.S. 1957, § 1-147; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-110 .

Where order to show cause in contempt proceedings was not styled in name of state, pursuant to art. 5, § 15, Wyo. Const., does not render the commitment void, where defendant voluntarily submitted to the order of the court to show cause, which was personally served on him, and appeared in person and by counsel without questioning the jurisdiction. Ex parte Bergman, 3 Wyo. 396, 26 P. 914, 1890 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1890).

Cited in

State ex rel. Romsa v. Grace, 43 Wyo. 454, 5 P.2d 301, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (1931).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Tort or statutory liability for failure or refusal of witness to give testimony, 61 ALR3d 1297.

§ 1-12-109. Discharge of imprisoned witness.

Upon application of a witness imprisoned by an officer, a judge of the supreme court or district court may discharge him if it appears that his imprisonment is illegal.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 263; R.S. 1887, § 2603; R.S. 1899, § 3697; C.S. 1910, § 4552; C.S. 1920, § 5821; R.S. 1931, § 89-1718; C.S. 1945, § 3-2616; W.S. 1957, § 1-148; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-111 .

§ 1-12-110. Attachment for arrest or order of commitment; execution.

Every attachment for the arrest or order of commitment to prison of a witness by a court or officer must be under the seal of the court or officer, if the officer has an official seal, and must specify particularly the cause of the arrest or commitment. If the commitment is for a refusal to answer a question, the question must be stated in the order and the order of commitment directed to the sheriff of the county where the witness resides or may be found at that time. It shall be executed by committing the witness to the jail of the county and delivering a copy of the order to the jailer.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 264; R.S. 1887, § 2604; R.S. 1899, § 3698; C.S. 1910, § 4553; C.S. 1920, § 5822; R.S. 1931, § 89-1719; C.S. 1945, § 3-2617; W.S. 1957, § 1-149; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-112 .

§ 1-12-111. Procuring testimony of imprisoned witness.

When it is necessary to procure testimony of a person confined in the state penitentiary or any jail or reformatory, in the trial of any issue in an indictment or information, or in any hearing before a grand jury, the court may order a subpoena issued, directed to the warden of the state penitentiary or the superintendent of the jail or reformatory commanding him to bring the witness named in the subpoena before the court. The warden, superintendent or sheriff shall take the witness before the court at the time and place named in the subpoena and hold him until he is discharged by the court. When discharged he shall be returned by the officer to the place of imprisonment from which he was taken. The officer may command such assistance as he deems proper for the safe transportation of the witness. When the witness is in attendance of any court he may be placed for safekeeping in the jail of the county. The county in which the offense was alleged to have been committed shall pay the actual and necessary expenses of producing, keeping and returning the witness.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 265; R.S. 1887, § 2605; R.S. 1899, § 3699; Laws 1905, ch. 6, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 4554; C.S. 1920, § 5823; R.S. 1931, § 89-1720; C.S. 1945, § 3-2618; W.S. 1957, § 1-150; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-113 .

In general. —

Sentence for one felony does not bar prosecution for another, and a convict is not exempt from trial and sentence for another crime committed before or during imprisonment. State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1908).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Issuance by federal court, pursuant to 28 USC § 2241(c)(5), of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum requiring presence of prisoner to testify at civil or criminal trial, 65 ALR Fed 321.

§ 1-12-112. Taking of prisoner's deposition.

While a prisoner’s deposition is being taken he shall remain in the custody of the officer having charge of him. The officer shall afford reasonable facilities for the taking of the deposition.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 266; R.S. 1887, § 2606; R.S. 1899, § 3700; C.S. 1910, § 4555; C.S. 1920, § 5824; R.S. 1931, § 89-1721; C.S. 1945, § 3-2619; W.S. 1957, § 1-151; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-114 .

§ 1-12-113. Immunity of witness obeying subpoena.

A witness may not be served with a summons or sued in a county in which he does not reside while going, returning or attending in obedience to a subpoena.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 267; R.S. 1887, § 2607; R.S. 1899, § 3701; C.S. 1910, § 4556; C.S. 1920, § 5825; R.S. 1931, § 89-1722; C.S. 1945, § 3-2620; W.S. 1957, § 1-152; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-115 .

§ 1-12-114. Oath of witness.

Before testifying the witness shall be sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 268; R.S. 1887, § 2608; R.S. 1899, § 3702; C.S. 1910, § 4557; C.S. 1920, § 5826; R.S. 1931, § 89-1723; C.S. 1945, § 3-2621; W.S. 1957, § 1-153; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-116 .

Cross references. —

As to form of oath, see § 1-2-101 .

As to officers authorized to administer oaths, see § 1-2-102 .

As to affirmation rather than oath, see § 1-2-103 .

§ 1-12-115. Testimony for use in foreign jurisdiction.

Whenever any mandate, writ or commission is issued from any court of record in any foreign jurisdiction, or whenever upon notice or agreement it is required to take the testimony of a witness in this state, the witness may be compelled to appear and testify in the same manner and by the same process as employed for taking testimony in matters pending in the courts of this state.

History. Laws 1927, ch. 47, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 89-1901; C.S. 1945, § 3-2928; W.S. 1957, § 1-158; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-117.

Repealing clauses. —

Section 4, ch. 47, Laws 1927, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict with that act.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Use, in federal criminal prosecution, of deposition of absent witness taken in foreign country, as affected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(b) and (d), requiring presence of accused and that deposition be taken in manner provided in civil actions, 105 ALR Fed 537.

§ 1-12-116. Confidential communications between family violence and sexual assault advocate and victim.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Advocate” or “family violence or sexual  assault advocate” means a person who is employed by or volunteers  services to any family violence and sexual assault program, who is  certified by the program as having undergone at least forty (40) hours  of crisis advocacy training and whose work is directed and supervised  under a family violence and sexual assault program;
    2. “Confidential communication” means information  transmitted in confidence between a victim and an advocate in the  course of that relationship and includes all information received  by, and any report, working paper or document prepared by the advocate  in the course of that relationship;
    3. “Crisis services to victims of family  violence and sexual assault” means emergency and follow-up intervention,  information, referral services and medical, legal and social services  advocacy;
    4. “Family violence and sexual assault program”  means a program whose primary purpose is to offer shelter and crisis  services to victims of family violence and sexual assault through  any community facility or center;
    5. “Shelter” means a place of temporary refuge,  offered on a twenty-four (24) hour, seven (7) day per week basis to  victims and their children;
    6. “Victim” means a person who has been subjected  to sexual assault as defined by W.S. 6-2-301(a)(v), incest as defined by W.S. 6-4-402 or domestic abuse as defined by W.S. 35-21-102(a)(iii).
  2. Except as provided by W.S. 14-3-210 , a person exempted from testifying under the provisions  of W.S. 1-12-116 shall not be examined as a witness in any civil, criminal,  legislative or administrative proceeding concerning the following  communications and information:
    1. An advocate shall not testify concerning  a confidential communication made by a victim in the course of that  relationship, except the advocate:
      1. May testify:
        1. With the express consent of the victim;  or
        2. If the victim voluntarily testifies, provided  the advocate’s testimony shall be limited to the same subject matter.
      2. May be compelled to testify if the victim  is unable to testify due to death or incompetence.
    2. Any employee of a family violence and  sexual assault program who has access to confidential communication  shall not testify except in those circumstances where the advocate  may testify.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 127, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to privileged communication by a licensed or certified mental health professional, see § 33-38-113 .

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Evidence — Recognition of a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3879 (1996),” see XXXII Land & Water L. Rev. 873 (1997).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Constitutionality, with respect to accused's rights to information or confrontation, of statute according confidentiality to sex crime victim's communications to sexual counselor, 43 ALR4th 395.

Validity, construction and application of statute limiting physician-patient privilege in judicial proceedings relating to child abuse or neglect, 44 ALR4th 649.

Article 2. Documentary Evidence Generally

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

32A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 813 to 1053.

§ 1-12-201. Copies of documents filed with interstate commerce or public service commissions.

Printed copies of schedules, classifications and tariffs of rates, fares, charges, rules and regulations and supplements thereto, filed with the interstate commerce commission or the public service commission, which show respectively an interstate commerce commission number and an effective date or a public service commission number and an effective date, may be received in evidence without certification and shall be presumed to be correct copies of the originals on file with the interstate commerce commission or on file with the public service commission.

History. Laws 1955, ch. 211, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-164; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-204.

Cross references. —

For provision that all certificates issued by the secretary of state and all copies of documents filed in his office in accordance with the provisions of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained, see § 17-16-127.

As to copies of county instruments and transcripts of records as evidence, see § 18-3-104 .

As to certificate or record of marriage or a certified copy thereof as presumptive evidence of the fact of marriage, see § 20-1-107 .

As to use of copies of records of state highway commission as evidence, see § 24-2-101 .

As to use of certified copy of surveys constructed by mining companies and filed with secretary of state as evidence, see § 30-1-128 .

As to use of abstract of motor vehicle operating record as evidence in action for damages or criminal proceedings arising out of motor vehicle accidents, see § 31-9-104 .

As to use of report of accident required to be filed under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act as evidence, see § 31-9-209 .

As to force and effect as evidence of conveyances executed prior to 1882, see § 34-1-122 .

As to admissibility of conveyance or the certified record thereof as evidence, see § 34-1-123 .

As to use of federal land office instruments as evidence, see § 34-1-125 .

As to effect of unsealed writings in evidence, see § 34-2-126 .

As to instruments under Comprehensive Curative Act as evidence after validation, see § 34-8-105 .

As to public service commission, see § 37-2-101 .

Article 3. Judicial Notice of Foreign Law

Cross references. —

See also Rule 44.1, W.R.C.P.

Law reviews. —

As to effect of Rule 201, W.R.E. on this article, see XIII Land & Water L. Rev. 581 (1978).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 109.

31A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 18 to 22, 46.

What constitutes “adjudicative facts” within meaning of Rule 201 of Federal Rules of Evidence concerning judicial notice of adjudicative facts, 150 ALR Fed 543.

§ 1-12-301. Proof of laws of foreign jurisdictions.

Printed copies of written law enacted by any other state, territory or foreign government purporting or proved to have been published by the authority thereof, or proved to be commonly admitted as evidence of the existing law in the courts or tribunals of the state, territory or government shall be admitted by the courts and officers of this state on all occasions as prima facie evidence of the law. The unwritten or common law of any other state, territory or foreign government may be proved by parol evidence and the books of reports of cases adjudicated in their courts may also be admitted as prima facie evidence of the law.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 252; R.S. 1887, § 2592; R.S. 1899, § 3686; C.S. 1910, § 4541; C.S. 1920, § 5810; R.S. 1931, § 89-1707; C.S. 1945, § 3-3108; W.S. 1957, § 1-179; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-601 .

Failure to comply with requirements to take judicial notice of foreign law. —

In a custody dispute, a father's claim that the father should have been granted custody or visitation in France, based on a claim that the children were or could become French citizens, failed because (1) the claim was properly considered in the context of the statutory best interest factors, (2) the father did not comply with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-12-301 through 1-12-306 so as to allow the court to take judicial notice of French law, and (3) the father filed no transcript of the trial court's proceedings. Harignordoquy v. Barlow, 2013 WY 149, 313 P.3d 1265, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 817, 135 S. Ct. 66, 190 L. Ed. 2d 33, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 5136 (U.S. 2014).

Applied in

Roberts v. Locke, 2013 WY 73, 304 P.3d 116, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Jun 17, 2013); Roberts v. Locke, 2013 WY 73, 304 P.3d 116, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Jun 17, 2013).

§ 1-12-302. Judicial notice required.

Every court of this state shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States.

History. Laws 1941, ch. 78, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-3109; W.S. 1957, § 1-180; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-602.

Notice that law operative in foreign jurisdiction. —

Under this act courts of Wyoming take judicial notice of common law and statutes of other states, and supreme court judicially notices that Colorado statutes from which it made verbatim excerpts are operative in Colorado. Trepanier v. Standard Mining & Milling Co., 58 Wyo. 29, 123 P.2d 378, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (1942).

But not occurrences in federal bureaus. —

This section does not permit courts to take judicial notice of the occurrences in federal bureaus. Torgeson v. Connelly, 348 P.2d 63, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1959) sub. nom.Markey v. Connelly, 367 P.2d 964, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1962).

Scope more limited than in California. —

A comparison of this section with provisions in California disclosed that the scope of judicial notice as to public records is much more limited in Wyoming than in California. Dame v. Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1959).

Applied in

Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1947).

Quoted in

Bowers v. Getter Trucking Co., 514 P.2d 837, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1973); Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo. 1979).

§ 1-12-303. Manner of obtaining information.

The court may inform itself of foreign laws in such manner as it deems proper, and the court may call upon counsel to aid in obtaining such information.

History. Laws 1941, ch. 78, § 2; C.S. 1945, § 3-3110; W.S. 1957, § 1-181; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-603.

Applied in

Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 400 P.2d 488, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 1965).

Quoted in

Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo. 1979).

§ 1-12-304. Determination of foreign law; reviewability.

The determination of foreign laws shall be made by the court and not by the jury, and is reviewable.

History. Laws 1941, ch. 78, § 3; C.S. 1945, § 3-3111; W.S. 1957, § 1-182; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-604.

Applied in

Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 400 P.2d 488, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 1965).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Raising and determining issue of foreign law under Rule 44.1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 ALR Fed 521.

§ 1-12-305. Reasonable notice to be given adverse party.

Any party may present to the trial court any admissible evidence of foreign laws, but to enable a party to offer evidence of the law in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties in the pleadings or otherwise.

History. Laws 1941, ch. 78, § 4; C.S. 1945, § 3-3112; W.S. 1957, § 1-183; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-605.

§ 1-12-306. Laws of jurisdictions outside United States.

The law of a jurisdiction other than a state, territory or jurisdiction of the United States, is an issue for the court but is not subject to the foregoing provisions concerning judicial notice.

History. Laws 1941, ch. 78, § 5; C.S. 1945, § 3-3113; W.S. 1957, § 1-184; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-606.

Repealing clauses. —

Section 8, ch. 78, Laws 1941, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict with that act.

Law of Nicaragua not judicially noticed. —

This article seems to make it clear Wyoming courts do not take judicial notice of the law of Nicaragua. In re Estate of Sowerwine, 413 P.2d 48, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1966).

Article 4. Captured, Missing or Dead Persons

Cross references. —

As to presumption of death arising from seven years absence, see § 2-7-101 .

Law reviews. —

See “Belief in Death of Absent Consort as a Defense to a Charge of Bigamy,” 10 Wyo. L.J. 158.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

22 Am. Jur. 2d Death §§ 299 to 318.

§ 1-12-401. Written finding of presumed death admissible as evidence.

A written finding of presumed death made by an officer or employee of the United States authorized to make such finding, pursuant to the Federal Missing Persons Act, 37 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., as now or hereafter amended, or a certified copy of the finding, shall be received in any court, office or other place in this state as evidence of the death of the person found to be dead and the date, circumstances and place of his disappearance.

History. Laws 1947, ch. 96, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-186; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-701; 2006, ch. 114, § 1.

The 2006 amendment substituted “ 37 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.” for “56 Stat. 143, 1092, and 58 Stat. 679; 50 U.S.C. App. Supp. 1001-107.”

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes this act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Constitution. Approved March 24, 2006.

Federal Missing Persons Act. —

The Federal Missing Persons Act, referred to in this section, was repealed in 1966. For present provisions, see 37 U.S.C. 551 et seq.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 1-12-402. Official report that person is missing or captured as evidence of person's condition.

An official written report, record or certified copy thereof that a person is missing, missing in action, interned in a neutral country, beleaguered, besieged, captured by an enemy or is dead or alive, made by any officer or employee of the United States authorized by any law of the United States to make the report or copy, shall be received in any court, office or other place in this state as evidence of the condition of that person.

History. Laws 1947, ch. 96, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 1-187; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-702.

§ 1-12-403. Findings and reports and records deemed prima facie valid.

For the purposes of W.S. 1-12-401 and 1-12-402 , any finding, report, record or certified copy purporting to have been signed by an officer or employee of the United States shall be deemed prima facie to have been signed and issued by the officer or employee pursuant to law, and the person signing shall be deemed prima facie to have acted within the scope of his authority. If a copy purports to have been certified by a person authorized by law to certify the same, such certified copy shall be prima facie evidence of his authority.

History. Laws 1947, ch. 96, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 1-188; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-703.

Severability. —

Section 4, ch. 96, Laws 1947, reads: “If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance be held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provision or application of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Article 5. Presumptions

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

31A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 130 to 196.

§ 1-12-501. Survivorship upon simultaneous death.

  1. When two (2) persons perish in the same  calamity and it is not shown who died first and there are no particular  circumstances from which it can be inferred, survivorship is presumed  from the probabilities resulting from the strength, age and sex, according  to the following rules:
    1. If both of those who have perished were  under the age of fifteen (15) years, the older is presumed to have  survived;
    2. If both were of the age of sixty (60)  years or older, the younger is presumed to have survived;
    3. If one is under fifteen (15) years of  age and the other is sixty (60) years of age or older, the former  is presumed to have survived;
    4. If both are fifteen (15) years of age  or older and under sixty (60) years of age, and the sexes are different,  the male is presumed to have survived. If the sexes are the same,  the older will be presumed to have survived;
    5. If one is under the age of fifteen (15)  years or is sixty (60) years of age or older, and the other is between  those ages, the latter is presumed to have survived.

History. Laws 1897, ch. 3, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4865; C.S. 1910, § 5734; C.S. 1920, § 7009; R.S. 1931, § 88-4008; C.S. 1945, § 6-2510; W.S. 1957, § 1-189; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-12-801.

Cross references. —

For Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, see chapter 13 of title 2.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Law reviews. —

See “Legislation,” 1 Wyo. L.J. 126.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Uniform Simultaneous Death Act generally, 39 ALR3d 1332.

Construction of provision as to which of 2 or more parties shall be deemed the survivor in case of death simultaneously, in a common disaster or within a specified period of time, 40 ALR3d 359.

§ 1-12-502. [Renumbered.]

Renumbered by Laws 1979, ch. 142, § 3.

Cross references. —

For present provisions, see § 2-7-101 .

Article 6. Burden of Proof

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

40A Am. Jur. 2d Hospitals and Asylums §§ 27 to 62; 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers §§ 318 to 344.

31A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 120 to 129; 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 118.

§ 1-12-601. Injury by health care providers; burden of proof.

  1. In an action for injury alleging negligence  by a health care provider the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving:
    1. If the defendant is certified by a national  certificating board or association, that the defendant failed to act  in accordance with the standard of care adhered to by that national  board or association; or
    2. If the defendant is not so certified,  that the defendant failed to act in accordance with the standard of  care adhered to by health care providers in good standing performing  similar health care services.
  2. In either paragraph (a)(i) or (ii) of  this section, variations in theory of medical practice or localized  circumstances regarding availability of equipment, facilities or supplies  may be shown to contravene proof offered on the applicable standard  of care.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 45, § 1.

Expert testimony. —

In a medical malpractice case, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to preclude plaintiff's expert's standard of care testimony because the defendant's doctor's infectious disease expert was allowed to give standard of care testimony while plaintiff's was not. Armstrong v. Hrabal, 2004 WY 39, 87 P.3d 1226, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2004), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. May 11, 2004).

In a medical malpractice case, a court did not err by sustaining defendant doctor's objection to testimony from plaintiff's retained emergency medicine expert where plaintiff's counsel made no offer of proof, counsel did not explain to the district court his plan to pursue the standard of care in six sub-categories nor did he make an offer of proof to alert the court to how the proposed testimony would differ from earlier testimony. Further, the record did not suggest that such a plan of attack was apparent from the previous questions. Armstrong v. Hrabal, 2004 WY 39, 87 P.3d 1226, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2004), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. May 11, 2004).

Unpublished decision: In a medical malpractice action arising from a physician's treatment of a patient's abdominal pain, the district court properly allowed the testimony of a general surgeon under Fed. R. Evid. 702 as to the standard of care; the general surgeon did not stray from his area of expertise, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-601 did not suggest a per se rule that only a board-certified specialist such as a gastroenterologist could provide testimony against another board-certified specialist. Poche v. Joubran, 389 Fed. Appx. 768, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15482 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2010).

In a medical malpractice case, an expert's testimony regarding the standard of care was proper because the studies cited by the expert were relevant to rebut plaintiff's claim that the doctor deviated from the standard of care; the testimony was not that the doctor followed the alternative guidelines, but rather that his exercise of clinical judgment was consistent with the guidelines. Miller v. Beyer, 2014 WY 84, 329 P.3d 956, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 2014).

Interpretation. —

This section is clearly not intended to immunize board certified doctors from all liability. Pina v. Christensen, 2009 WY 64, 206 P.3d 1298, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2009).

Instructions to jury. —

In a medical malpractice action, the court correctly gave a standard of care instruction which stated that proper technique for administering an injection is the same for doctors, nurses, and other health care professionals and that the defendant medical assistant's actions were to be measured by such standard. Beavis v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 2001 WY 32, 20 P.3d 508, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 2001), reh'g denied, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. Apr. 17, 2001).

In a medical malpractice suit filed against a board-certified urologist, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that in order for it to find that the doctor was negligent, it had to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he failed to act in accordance with the standard of care adhered to by the American Board of Urology; the instruction was a correct statement of the law as set forth in this section. Pina v. Christensen, 2009 WY 64, 206 P.3d 1298, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2009).

Applied in

May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1993).

Quoted in

Nalder v. West Park Hosp., 254 F.3d 1168, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 12399 (10th Cir. 2001); Garnett v. Coyle, 2001 WY 94, 33 P.3d 114, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For comments, “Wyoming Tort Reform and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: A Second Opinion,” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 593 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Medical malpractice: hospital's liability for injury allegedly caused by failure to have properly qualified staff, 62 ALR4th 692.

Medical practitioner's liability for treatment given child without parent's consent, 67 ALR4th 511.

Malpractice involving hysterectomies and oophorectomies, 86 ALR4th 18.

Gynecological malpractice not involving hysterectomies or oophorectomies, 86 ALR4th 125.

Malpractice: physician's duty, under informed consent doctrine, to obtain patient's consent to treatment in pregnancy or childbirth cases, 89 ALR4th 799.

Liability of physician, nurse, or hospital for failure to contact physician or to keep physician sufficiently informed concerning status of mother during pregnancy, labor and childbirth, 3 ALR5th 123.

Liability of hospital, physician, or other medical personnel for death or injury to mother or child caused by inadequate attendance or monitoring of patient during and after pregnancy, labor, and delivery, 3 ALR5th 146.

Liability of hospital, physician, or other medical personnel for death or injury to mother or child caused by improper choice between, or timing of, vaginal or cesarean delivery, 4 ALR5th 148.

Liability of hospital, physician, or other medical personnel for death or injury to mother or child caused by improper procedures during vaginal delivery, 4 ALR5th 210.

Liability of hospital, physician, or other medical personnel for death or injury to mother or child caused by improper treatment during labor, 6 ALR5th 490.

Liability of hospital, physician, or other medical personnel for death or injury to mother caused by improper postdelivery diagnosis, care, and representations, 6 ALR5th 534.

Liability of hospital, physician, or other medical personnel for death or injury to mother or child caused by improper diagnosis and treatment of mother relating to and during pregnancy, 7 ALR5th 1.

Medical malpractice: physician's admission of negligence as establishing standard of care and breach of that standard, 42 ALR5th 1.

Medical malpractice in connection with diagnosis, care, or treatment of diabetes, 43 ALR5th 87.

Malpractice in diagnosis and treatment of male urinary tract and related organs, 48 ALR5th 575.

Liability of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) for negligence of member physicians, 51 ALR5th 271.

Malpractice in diagnosis or treatment of meningitis, 51 ALR5th 301.

Chapter 13 Reservation of Question to Supreme Court

Cross references. —

As to costs in reserved cases, see Rule 8, Sup. Ct.

As to findings in district court in connection with questions reserved to supreme court, see Rule 52, W.R.C.P.

Provisions construed in pari materia. —

Sections 1-13-101 to 1-13-103 , pertaining to reserved constitutional questions, along with Rule 52(c), W.R.C.P., must be read in pari materia with §§ 1-13-104 to 1-13-107 , pertaining to certified questions. In re Certified Question from United States Dist. Court, 549 P.2d 1310, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1976).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error §§ 967 to 979.

4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 19.

§ 1-13-101. Constitutional questions; generally.

When an important and difficult constitutional question arises in a proceeding pending before the district court on motion of either party or upon his own motion the judge of the district court may cause the question to be reserved and sent to the supreme court for its decision.

History. Laws 1888, ch. 66, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4276; Laws 1903, ch. 72, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 5136; C.S. 1920, § 6398; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 110; R.S. 1931, § 89-5001; C.S. 1945, § 3-5501; W.S. 1957, § 1-191; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Section constitutional. —

This section, authorizing district court to reserve important and difficult questions arising in a cause for decision of the supreme court, is constitutional. State v. Crocker, 5 Wyo. 385, 40 P. 681, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1895).

Rule 52, W.R.C.P., implements this section. Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Prosser, 501 P.2d 1, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1972).

Not mandatory that district judge reserve questions. —

There is nothing in this section or in Rule 52, W.R.C.P., which indicates a mandatory direction to a district judge to reserve important and difficult constitutional questions to the supreme court each time he is requested to do so. Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Prosser, 501 P.2d 1, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1972).

Rather, district court must exercise its sound discretion in determining when a constitutional question is so important and difficult that it ought to be reserved to the supreme court. Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Prosser, 501 P.2d 1, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1972).

Supreme court's jurisdiction to decide questions reserved for its determination is limited to important, difficult constitutional questions arising in actions pending in the district court. State v. Smart, 18 Wyo. 436, 110 P. 715, 1910 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1910).

Only pending constitutional questions may be reserved. —

No question except a constitutional question is authorized to be reserved to the supreme court. White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 77 Wyo. 246, 313 P.2d 484, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1957).

Under this section, only pending constitutional question can be reserved to the supreme court upon order of a district court. State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1908).

Matter referable. —

Under this section, question as to validity of $55,000 worth of Crook county bonds, bearing date May 1, 1891, was sufficiently important and difficult, to authorize its reference to the supreme court. Board of County Comm'rs v. Rollins Inv. Co., 3 Wyo. 470, 27 P. 683, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1891).

And matter not referable. —

This section does not authorize district court to submit question whether plaintiff's petition, to which a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) is interposed, states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Jenkins v. City of Cheyenne, 12 Wyo. 79, 73 P. 758, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (1903). See Rule 7, W.R.C.P.

Statute must appear unconstitutional as to person attacking it. —

It is not sufficient for a party to say that a statute is unconstitutional as to other persons or classes of persons, but it must appear that it is unconstitutional as to person attacking it. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1935).

And specific constitutional provision violated must be pointed out. —

The supreme court will not answer any reserved constitutional questions unless the specific constitutional provision claimed to be violated has been pointed out. White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 77 Wyo. 246, 313 P.2d 484, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1957).

Unless questions specify the constitutional provision alleged to be violated, supreme court is not required to answer said questions. State ex rel. Voiles v. Johnson County High Sch., 43 Wyo. 494, 5 P.2d 255, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1931).

Supreme court is not required to answer reserved questions from district court involving constitutionality of a statute where specific constitutional provision asserted to be violated by it has not been designated. Taxpayers' League of Carbon County v. McPherson, 49 Wyo. 251, 54 P.2d 897, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1936).

Insufficient orders. —

Order of district court certifying that there is a question reviewable under this section, but not stating what such question is, brings up nothing for determination. Corey v. Corey, 3 Wyo. 210, 19 P. 443, 1888 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1888).

An order, made prior to amendatory act, finding that difficult and new questions had arisen in a suit, and ordering that clerk prepare and certify record and questions involved to the supreme court, but failing to state what questions were, was insufficient to bring the case within the proviso of the amendatory act. Smith v. Healy, 12 Wyo. 218, 75 P. 430, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1904).

Question sufficiently presented. —

Though questions reserved for supreme court should be specifically stated by trial court, yet, where question sought to be reserved was clearly stated in stipulation of counsel, this was sufficient to present question for review. Board of Comm'rs v. Rollins, 9 Wyo. 281, 62 P. 351, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1900).

Question must first be presented to district court. —

The supreme court will limit its answers to submitted constitutional questions to questions which have been specifically and fully argued. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1935).

Answers to constitutional questions will be limited to those which have been specifically phrased and fully argued. Miller v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 Wyo. 502, 337 P.2d 262, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1959).

And that court must dispose of all preliminary matters before supreme court asked to determine constitutional problems. —

Constitutional questions submitted to the supreme court must be of such a nature and so vital that there will be nothing more for the district court to determine in order to dispose of the case; in other words, that court must dispose of all preliminary matters, such as questions of statutory construction and factual questions, before the supreme court should be asked to determine constitutional problems in the case. State ex rel. Fawcett v. Board of County Comm'rs, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188, 1954 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1954).

Supreme court is without jurisdiction to consider submitted constitutional questions until all necessary and controlling questions of fact in case are disposed of by trial court. State ex rel. Keefe v. Jones, 62 Wyo. 61, 161 P.2d 135, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1945).

Under rulings of supreme court, said court has no jurisdiction to decide any alleged constitutional questions until all other questions are disposed of in the pending litigation. Roberts v. Rock Springs, 52 Wyo. 89, 68 P.2d 891, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1937).

The supreme court will not consider a reserved constitutional question until there is nothing left for the trial court to do but apply the supreme court's answer to the question or questions and enter judgment consistent with the answer or answers. In re Certified Question from United States Dist. Court, 549 P.2d 1310, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1976).

When the supreme court decides a constitutional question reserved to it, there should be nothing left for the trial court to do but apply it and, depending upon the answer, either proceed at once to sentence and enter a judgment of conviction and sentence, or dismiss the charges. State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1976).

Where information was demurred to (now objected to by motion), first, because facts alleged did not constitute an offense and, second, because statute was unconstitutional, supreme court had no jurisdiction to determine constitutional question on a case reserved in advance of determination of first ground of demurrer (now motion), since, if that ground should be sustained, other would become immaterial. State v. Kelley, 17 Wyo. 335, 98 P. 886, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (1909). See Rule 16, W.R.Cr.P.

The supreme court should not address, and resolve, the constitutional issue in those instances in which the trial court has not disposed of all of the necessary, and controlling, questions of fact and has not set forth its conclusions of law with respect to all questions other than the constitutional question. Rodabaugh v. Ross, 807 P.2d 380, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1991).

Thus trial court must decide meaning and effect of statutes in question. —

The supreme court has no jurisdiction to pass upon a reserved constitutional question until after the trial court has disposed of, and has decided, the meaning and effect of the statutes in question necessarily arising in a case. White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 77 Wyo. 246, 313 P.2d 484, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1957).

Questions of statutory construction and those arising because of incompatibility of statutes, or in course of interpreting effect of their language, raise no constitutional question which may be reserved for supreme court. State ex rel. Lee v. Continental Oil Co., 48 Wyo. 152, 43 P.2d 686, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1935).

In a suit challenging the legality of a bond issue, the petition presented two distinct questions, namely, (1) whether the statute under which the bonds in question were purportedly issued on its face authorized the issuance of the bonds, and (2) if the statute did authorize the issuance of the bonds, then whether the statute was unconstitutional. Where it appeared that the trial court had not decided question (1), the supreme court declined to pass upon question (2), which was reserved to it under this section. White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 77 Wyo. 246, 313 P.2d 484, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1957) (wherein the court stated that the statutory provisions permitting the submission of reserved constitutional questions merely hinders and delays the speedy disposition of cases and should be repealed).

Trial court's certificate is not controlling in determining whether case to resolve reserved constitutional question should be returned to trial court with submitted question unanswered. State ex rel. Keefe v. Jones, 62 Wyo. 61, 161 P.2d 135, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1945).

Examination by supreme court. —

On reserved case, supreme court will examine original papers to determine whether reserved constitutional questions arise in the action and whether determination is necessary to dispose of the case. State ex rel. Keefe v. Jones, 62 Wyo. 61, 161 P.2d 135, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1945).

Supreme court cannot make any order in case in which constitutional questions have been reserved for its consideration. State v. Berry, 36 Wyo. 257, 254 P. 488, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1927).

On reservation of constitutional questions, supreme court cannot order district court to vacate order reserving questions or dismissal of action against defendant. State v. Berry, 36 Wyo. 257, 254 P. 488, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1927).

Tax held unconstitutional. —

In a cause reviewed or determined under this chapter, it was held that a tax to aid a fair association was unconstitutional and void. Board of County Comm'rs v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Wyo. 463, 171 P. 668, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1918).

Applied in

Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962); Galesburg Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1982).

Quoted in

State ex rel. Wyo. Farm Loan Bd. v. Herschler, 622 P.2d 1378, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 285 (Wyo. 1981).

Stated in

Powell v. Daily, 712 P.2d 356, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 448 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

State v. Crocker, 5 Wyo. 385, 40 P. 681, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1895); State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 33 , 13 A.L.R. 1284 (1920); Simpkin v. Rock Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 237 P. 245, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1925); Hanson v. Town of Greybull, 63 Wyo. 467, 183 P.2d 393, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (1947); State v. Yazzie, 67 Wyo. 256, 218 P.2d 482, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (1950); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local v. Kingham, 420 P.2d 254, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1966); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968); Harding v. State, 478 P.2d 64, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1970); County Court Judges Ass'n v. Sidi, 752 P.2d 960 (Wyo. 1988); Allhusen v. State ex rel. Wyo. Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1995), (decided prior to 2001 amendments to the Mental Health Professions Practice Act); RM v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 2004 WY 162, 102 P.3d 868, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (2004).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Constitutional Law — Equal Protection Analysis. Awarding Public Works Contracts: Granting Preference to Resident Bidders. Galesburg Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 393 (1983).

For article, “Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 159 (1985).

§ 1-13-102. Constitutional questions; clerk's duties; rules.

When a question is reserved to the supreme court, the clerk of the district court shall transmit the original papers in the case involving the question to the clerk of the supreme court, who shall place the papers on file. The matter shall then stand for hearing by the supreme court, and the supreme court may make rules of procedure as it deems proper for the speedy hearing of the proceeding.

History. Laws 1888, ch. 66, § 2; R.S. 1899, § 4277; C.S. 1910, § 5137; C.S. 1920, § 6399; R.S. 1931, § 89-5002; C.S. 1945, § 3-5502; W.S. 1957, § 1-192; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Stated in

State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1976).

Cited in

State v. Kelley, 17 Wyo. 335, 98 P. 886, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (1909); Board of County Comm'rs v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Wyo. 463, 171 P. 668, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (1918); State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 33 , 13 A.L.R. 1284 (1920); Simpkin v. Rock Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 237 P. 245, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1925); State v. Berry, 36 Wyo. 257, 254 P. 488, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (1927).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 159 (1985).

§ 1-13-103. Constitutional questions; remand for further proceedings.

Upon hearing the supreme court may remand the case together with the original papers to the district court for further proceedings. The clerk of the supreme court shall certify the order of remand to the clerk of the district court, who shall immediately enter the case upon the journal of the district court, and when entered the order stands as the order of the district court.

History. Laws 1888, ch. 66, § 3; R.S. 1899, § 4278; C.S. 1910, § 5138; C.S. 1920, § 6400; R.S. 1931, § 89-5003; C.S. 1945, § 3-5503; W.S. 1957, § 1-193; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Jurisdiction of district court concluded until mandate from supreme court sent down. —

When a case comes to the supreme court on reserved constitutional questions, the jurisdiction of the district court is concluded for the time being, as in ordinary appeal cases, until the mandate from the supreme court is sent down to the trial court. State ex rel. Fawcett v. Board of County Comm'rs, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188, 1954 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1954).

And judgment entered before supreme court's mandate issues is void. —

When a case comes to the supreme court on reserved constitutional questions and the jurisdiction of the district court is concluded for the time being, a judgment in the case by the district court during that time, and before the supreme court's mandate is issued, is entirely void, since the court has no jurisdiction to act. State ex rel. Fawcett v. Board of County Comm'rs, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188, 1954 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1954).

Stated in

State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1976).

Cited in

Board of County Comm'rs v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Wyo. 463, 171 P. 668, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (1918); State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 33 , 13 A.L.R. 1284 (1920); Simpkin v. Rock Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 237 P. 245, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1925); State v. Berry, 36 Wyo. 257, 254 P. 488, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (1927).

Library references. —

American Law of Mining, 2nd Edition § 205.07 (Matthew Bender).

§ 1-13-104. Questions from federal courts; generally.

W.S. 1-13-104 through 1-13-107 is cited as the “Federal Court State Law Certificate Procedure Act”.

History. Laws 1975, ch. 78, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-193.1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Applied in

Harvey v. GMC, 739 P.2d 763, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 476 (Wyo. 1987); B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1992); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 186 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1992); Oler v. United States, 2001 WY 9, 17 P.3d 27, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Certified Question — Exercising the Power to Answer Federal Court Certification of State Law Questions, In re Certified Question from United States Dist. Court, 549 P.2d 1310, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1976),” see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 337 (1977).

§ 1-13-105. Questions from federal courts; definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Certificate procedure” means the procedure  authorized herein by which a federal court in disposing of a cause  pending before it submits a question of state law to the supreme court  for determination;
    2. “Federal court” means any court of the  United States of America including the supreme court of the United  States, courts of appeal, district courts and any other court created  by act of congress;
    3. “Supreme court” means the supreme court  of Wyoming.

History. Laws 1975, ch. 78, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Applied in

Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 186 (Wyo. 1996).

§ 1-13-106. Questions from federal courts; authority of supreme court.

The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by a federal court when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before the federal court questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the federal court, and as to which it appears to the federal court there is no controlling precedent in the existing decisions of the supreme court.

History. Laws 1975, ch. 78, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

It is not mandatory that supreme court answer certified questions. In re Certified Question from United States Dist. Court, 549 P.2d 1310, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1976).

Court's role in certified question cases does not include fact finding. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., 713 P.2d 766, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 464 (Wyo. 1986).

Applied in

Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 186 (Wyo. 1996).

Quoted in

Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc., 701 P.2d 549, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 486 (Wyo. 1985).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Certified Question — Exercising the Power to Answer Federal Court Certification of State Law Questions, In re Certified Question from United States Dist. Court, 549 P.2d 1310, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1976),” see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 337 (1977).

§ 1-13-107. Questions from federal courts; rules.

The supreme court may adopt rules of practice and procedure to implement or otherwise facilitate utilization of certificate procedure.

History. Laws 1975, ch. 78, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Applied in

Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 186 (Wyo. 1996).

Chapter 14 Fees and Costs and Security Therefor

Cross references. —

As to fees in connection with special appointments to serve process, see § 1-6-103 .

As to fee and costs in connection with service of process on secretary of state as agent for nonresident motorist, see § 1-6-301 .

As to jury costs upon change of venue or judge, see § 1-7-101 .

As to costs in connection with continuances, see § 1-9-102 .

As to costs in connection with tender and offer to confess judgment, see §§ 1-10-101 to 1-10-104 .

As to jury fees, see §§ 1-11-301 to 1-11-304 .

As to costs in connection with attachments, see § 1-15-105 .

As to costs in connection with garnishments, see §§ 1-15-410 to 1-15-414 .

As to fees of district court commissioner, see § 5-3-308 .

As to fees of district court reporter, see § 5-3-410 .

For authority of cities or towns to prescribe by ordinance costs in trials before municipal courts, see § 5-6-108 .

As to filing fees in circuit courts, see § 5-9-135 .

As to costs in trial for removal of county officer, see § 18-3-902 .

As to costs in divorce action for insanity, see § 20-2-105 .

For provision that the court may decree costs and enforce its decree in actions to annul or affirm marriage or for divorce as in other cases, see § 20-2-108 .

As to payment of fees and costs in actions under Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, see § 20-4-163 .

As to costs in worker's compensation cases, see §§ 27-14-105 , 27-14-203 , and 27-14-511 .

As to costs in connection with suits or actions to obtain judgment or enforce lien with reference to irrigation systems constructed under Carey Act, see § 36-7-326 .

As to costs in connection with judgments by court on proposed work of district drainage commissioners, see §§ 41-9-231 to 41-9-233 .

What constitutes proper costs in an action, to be assessed against the losing party, is not very clearly established by either statute or rule. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Vondriska, 547 P.2d 1171, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1976).

This chapter contains several provisions relating to the allowance of costs, but nowhere is there a statutory enumeration of what charges are included. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Vondriska, 547 P.2d 1171, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1976).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Collecting Debt in Wyoming: The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as a Trap for the Unwary,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 731 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 1 et seq.; 31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence §§ 5 to 16; 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses §§ 66 to 72.

Right of party who is attorney and appears for himself to award of attorney's fees against opposing party as element of costs, 78 ALR3d 1119.

Attorney's personal liability for expenses incurred in relation to services for client, 66 ALR4th 256.

Recoverability of cost of computerized legal research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 ALR Fed 168.

20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 98 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 119 to 121, 142, 147 to 160, 162 to 164, 173, 201, 203, 226.

§ 1-14-101. “Folio” defined.

The term folio as used in this act means one hundred (100) words. Four (4) figures shall be counted as one (1) word.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 34; R.S. 1887, § 1224; R.S. 1899, § 4314; C.S. 1910, § 5175; C.S. 1920, § 6451; R.S. 1931, § 89-1617; C.S. 1945, § 3-3717; W.S. 1957, § 1-194; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

The words “this act” refer to ch. 45, Laws 1882, which was a general law concerning fees and compensation of county and precinct officers and which has been largely superseded. However, §§ 23 and 25 to 32, 34 and 35 appear herein as §§ 1-14-101 , 1-14-102 , 1-14-106 to 1-14-108 and 1-14-113 to 1-14-118 .

Applied in

Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 1-14-102. Witness fees; fees for expert witnesses in civil and criminal cases.

  1. Witnesses are entitled to receive the  following minimum fees:
    1. For attending before any court or grand  jury, or before any judge, referee or commissioner, ten dollars ($10.00)  per day, and five dollars ($5.00) for half a day; and
    2. Repealed by Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 2.
    3. Mileage at the rate set in W.S. 9-3-103 for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going  to and returning from place of attendance.
  2. In any civil or criminal case, any party  may call expert witnesses to testify and if the court finds any witness  to be a qualified expert and the expert gives expert testimony which  is admitted as evidence in the case, the expert witness shall be allowed  witness fees of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day or such other  amount as the court allows according to the circumstances of the case.  Expert witness fees may be charged as costs against any party or be  apportioned among some or all parties in the discretion of the court.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 23; R.S. 1887, § 1199; R.S. 1899, § 4298; C.S. 1910, § 5159; C.S. 1920, § 6435; R.S. 1931, § 89-1601; Laws 1935, ch. 41, § 4; C.S. 1945, § 3-3701; W.S. 1957, § 1-195; Laws 1961, ch. 189, § 1; 1963, ch. 170, § 1; 1975, ch. 141, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, §§ 1, 2.

Cross references. —

As to right of witness to demand fees and expenses daily, see § 1-12-105 .

As to allowance of compensation to witnesses in proceedings in aid of execution, see § 1-17-416 .

As to payment of cost for witness not examined before justice of the peace, see § 1-21-103 .

As to fees of witnesses appearing before arbitrators under Uniform Arbitration Act, see § 1-36-109 .

As to fees of witnesses subpoenaed by county assessor, see § 18-3-204 .

As to fees for witnesses appearing before public service commission, see § 37-2-208 .

As to witness fees in causes relating to water rights, see § 41-3-328 .

The 2004 amendment repealed former (a)(ii), which pertained to fees for attending before a justice of the peace, and made a related stylistic change.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Governing Statute.—

Award of costs pursuant to the rule is governed by the district rule and the statute. Weinstein v. Beach, 2014 WY 167, 340 P.3d 1013, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 2014).

No award of costs to nonindigent defendant acquitted of felony. —

A trial court has no authority to grant costs to a nonindigent defendant who has been acquitted of a felony. Bernard v. State, 652 P.2d 982, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1982).

Witness costs are allowed for witnesses who are attending court or deposition sessions under subpoena even though on particular days they may not testify. Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1989).

Fees which include time not spent in court attendance deleted. —

The expert witness fees allowed as costs by the court included time not necessarily spent in court attendance for purposes of testifying and were therefore deleted. Furthermore, such costs should have been supported by evidence of reasonableness. Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 513 (Wyo. 1986).

Expert fees include actual time for testimony. —

Expert witness fees as determined by the court to be reasonable in amount should have included actual time for testimony and should not have included charges of the experts for pretrial conferences or time during the trial session while waiting to actually testify. Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1989).

Expert fees for depositions.—

Defendants sought expert fees in the amount of $ 750.00 for their deposition of plaintiffs' expert, but the rule and statute allow expert fees of only $ 25.00 per day for trial testimony, or fees for actual trial testimony at such higher rate as the court may determine, and neither the rule nor the statute allows for the awarding of expert fees for depositions, and this part of the award was reversed. Graus v. OK Invs., Inc., 2014 WY 166, 342 P.3d 365, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 2014).

Applicability.—

Conclusion that the district rule applies to an offer of judgment award of costs is supported by federal precedent; the rule regarding offers of judgment does not authorize payment of all post-offer costs or expenses, and those costs are not allowable unless authorized by the district rule or the statute. Weinstein v. Beach, 2014 WY 167, 340 P.3d 1013, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 2014).

Proper and improper fees. —

The following award of costs to the prevailing party was proper: witness fees for those days on which the witnesses attended, even if they did not testify on that day. The following award, however, was not proper: (1) service fees upon the parties with whom the successful party had settled; and (2) an expert witness fee for a physician who did not testify. State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 578 (Wyo. 1985).

Witness fees are payable by county in which criminal prosecution is originally instituted, even though there be a change of venue to another county. Stoll v. Board of Comm'rs, 6 Wyo. 231, 44 P. 58, 1896 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1896).

No costs assessed as part of sentence. —

The Code Civil Procedure provides no authority for the assessment of costs as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition of probation. Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 550 (Wyo. 1987).

Discretion of court. —

The phrase “such other amount as the court allows according to the circumstances of the case” gives the court discretion in determining the amount to award. This amount should be limited only to time spent actually testifying and should not include charges for pretrial conferences or time spent during trial while waiting to testify. Coulthard v. Cossairt, 803 P.2d 86, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1990), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Applied in

Harris v. State, 487 P.2d 800, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1971); Buttrey Food Stores Div. v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 323 , 20 A.L.R.4th 419 (Wyo. 1980); Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 1989).

Stated in

Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 553 (Wyo. 1987).

Law reviews. —

See case note, “Constitutional Law — An Indigent's Right to a Free Trial Transcript. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 30 L. Ed. 2d 372, 92 S. Ct. 410, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 298 (1971),” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 707 (1972).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of witness detained in custody for future appearance to fees for such detention, 50 ALR2d 1439.

Allowance, as taxable costs, of witness fees and mileage of stockholders, directors, officers and employees of corporate litigant, 57 ALR2d 1243.

Allowance of mileage or witness fees with respect to witnesses who were not called to testify or not permitted to do so when called, 22 ALR3d 675.

Contingent fee informant testimony in state prosecutions, 57 ALR4th 643.

Compensation of expert witness as costs recoverable in federal civil action by prevailing party against party other than United States, 71 ALR Fed 875.

Taxation of costs associated with videotaped depositions under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Rule 54(d) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 156 ALR Fed 311.

§ 1-14-103. Witness or juror to receive only single fee.

No witness shall receive fees or mileage in more than one (1) case covering the same period of time or the same travel. Each witness shall make affidavit that the fees and mileage claimed have not been claimed or received in any other case. No juror shall receive pay as a witness while serving as a juror.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 23; R.S. 1887, § 1199; R.S. 1899, § 4298; C.S. 1910, § 5159; C.S. 1920, § 6435; R.S. 1931, § 89-1601; Laws 1935, ch. 41, § 4; C.S. 1945, § 3-3701; W.S. 1957, § 1-195; Laws 1961, ch. 189, § 1; 1963, ch. 170, § 1; 1975, ch. 141, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to fees of jurors, see §§ 1-11-303 .

§ 1-14-104. Physician testifying as expert or performing postmortem or autopsy; fees.

Any physician or surgeon shall receive a reasonable fee as determined by the coroner when testifying as an expert before a coroner or other officer for each half day or portion thereof, and when conducting a postmortem examination or autopsy.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 78, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 1200; R.S. 1899, § 4299; C.S. 1910, § 5160; C.S. 1920, § 6436; R.S. 1931, § 89-1602; C.S. 1945, § 3-3702; W.S. 1957, § 1-196; Laws 1965, ch. 74, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1990, ch. 70, § 1.

Applied in

Johnson v. State, 532 P.2d 598, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 1975).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Power of court which appoints or employs expert witnesses to tax their fees as costs, 39 ALR2d 1376.

§ 1-14-105. Physician testifying as expert or performing postmortem or autopsy; postmortem fee certificate; exceptions.

The coroner or other officer who has ordered a postmortem examination shall issue to the physician or surgeon a certificate for the fees provided, which shall be paid by the board of county commissioners by issuing a county warrant on the treasurer of the county in which the services were rendered in the amount of the certificate. W.S. 1-14-104 and 1-14-105 do not apply in the case of any physician regularly employed by the county.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 78, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 1201; R.S. 1899, § 4300; C.S. 1910, § 5161; C.S. 1920, § 6437; R.S. 1931, § 89-1603; C.S. 1945, § 3-3703; W.S. 1957, § 1-197; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Services by county coroner. —

Under this section, the contract of a county employing its coroner to furnish medical aid to its paupers is not void as against public policy, in that the coroner could employ himself to make such examinations, since, under this section, fees would not be allowed in such a case. Baker v. Board of Comm'rs, 9 Wyo. 51, 59 P. 797, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1900).

§ 1-14-106. Payment of fees in criminal cases.

In criminal cases where the fees prescribed are not paid by the defendant or the prosecuting witness, they shall be paid to the party entitled thereto by the public defender’s office, if subpoenaed by a defendant represented by the public defender, otherwise by the county.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 25; R.S. 1887, § 1210; R.S. 1899, § 4301; C.S. 1910, § 5162; C.S. 1920, § 6438; R.S. 1931, § 89-1604; C.S. 1945, § 3-3704; W.S. 1957, § 1-198; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1991, ch. 142, § 1.

No award of costs to nonindigent defendant acquitted of felony. —

A trial court has no authority to grant costs to a nonindigent defendant who has been acquitted of a felony. Bernard v. State, 652 P.2d 982, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1982).

Payment by county where prosecution instituted. —

Witness fees are payable by the county in which a criminal prosecution is originally instituted, even though there be a change of venue to another county. Stoll v. Board of Comm'rs, 6 Wyo. 231, 44 P. 58, 1896 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1896).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Costs as chargeable to defendant in criminal prosecution, 65 ALR2d 854.

Imposition of costs in trial court as affected by death of defendant pending appeal from criminal conviction, 83 ALR2d 864.

Validity and construction of state statute or court rule fixing maximum fees for attorney appointed to represent indigent, 3 ALR4th 576.

§ 1-14-107. Record of attendance and fees of jurors and witnesses.

The clerk of the district court shall keep a record of the attendance and fees of jurors and witnesses at each term of court when claimed during the term and for which the county is liable.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 26; R.S. 1887, § 1211; R.S. 1899, § 4302; C.S. 1910, § 5163; C.S. 1920, § 6439; R.S. 1931, § 89-1605; C.S. 1945, § 3-3705; W.S. 1957, § 1-199; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-14-108. Statement of attendance of jurors and witnesses in criminal cases.

Within ten (10) days after the close of each term of a court of record, the clerk shall return to the county commissioners a statement of the attendance of jurors and witnesses at such term and their mileage as taken by him in all criminal cases for which the county is liable.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 27; R.S. 1887, § 1212; R.S. 1899, § 4303; C.S. 1910, § 5164; C.S. 1920, § 6440; R.S. 1931, § 89-1606; C.S. 1945, § 3-3706; W.S. 1957, § 1-200; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-14-109. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 168, § 207.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1879, ch. 40, § 1, related to names of all witnesses on single subpoena, separate subpoena for defendant's witnesses, and affidavit.

Laws 2009, ch. 168, § 602, makes the act effective July 1, 2009.

§ 1-14-110. Only actual mileage allowed for service; liability for false statement.

If any officer or other person who is allowed mileage for any services rendered receives at the same time more than one (1) writ or process to serve, or authority to render more than one (1) service at the same place, he is only entitled to mileage for the actual number of miles traveled, allowing a full mile from place to place for every person served or every service rendered during the same journey. His return or claim for mileage shall show the actual number of miles necessarily traveled from the place where he received his authority to the place where the actual service was made or rendered. Should any false statement for mileage be proved, then no mileage shall be allowed for any services performed by virtue of the authority, writ or process by which such services were rendered and the maker of the false statement is liable to criminal process.

History. Laws 1879, ch. 40, § 3; R.S. 1887, § 1215; R.S. 1899, § 4305; C.S. 1910, § 5166; C.S. 1920, § 6442; R.S. 1931, § 89-1608; C.S. 1945, § 3-3708; W.S. 1957, § 1-202; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-14-111. Witness or juror entitled to but single day's service for multiple criminal cases and on grand juries.

If a witness or juror is summoned to serve in more than one (1) criminal case in the same court on the same day, the witness or juror is entitled to but one (1) day’s service, which shall be taxed as costs in the first case. The officer swearing the witness or juror shall keep a proper account of the fees in order that not more than one (1) payment is made under such circumstances. This also applies to grand juries and witnesses before grand juries.

History. Laws 1879, ch. 40, § 4; R.S. 1887, § 1217; R.S. 1899, § 4307; C.S. 1910, § 5168; C.S. 1920, § 6444; R.S. 1931, § 89-1610; C.S. 1945, § 3-3709; W.S. 1957, § 1-203; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-14-112. Court officers not allowed witness fees.

An officer whose duty it is to be in constant attendance upon any court and who is sworn as a witness in a case then pending in that court, is not entitled to witness fees in the case.

History. Laws 1879, ch. 40, § 5; R.S. 1887, § 1218; R.S. 1899, § 4308; C.S. 1910, § 5169; C.S. 1920, § 6445; R.S. 1931, § 89-1611; C.S. 1945, § 3-3710; W.S. 1957, § 1-204; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

§ 1-14-113. Officer's fees to be posted; penalty.

Each officer herein named shall post a list of his fees in his office in a conspicuous place. For failure to do so he shall pay three dollars ($3.00) per day for each day of failure, which may be recovered by the county in a civil action.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 28; R.S. 1887, § 1219; R.S. 1899, § 4309; C.S. 1910, § 5170; C.S. 1920, § 6446; R.S. 1931, § 89-1612; C.S. 1945, § 3-3711; W.S. 1957, § 1-205; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to sheriff's fees, see § 18-3-608 .

§ 1-14-114. Officer's return to show his fees.

An officer serving any process or order is not entitled to fees for service unless he returns on the process the amount of his fees and the items thereof.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 29; R.S. 1887, § 1220; R.S. 1899, § 4310; C.S. 1910, § 5171; C.S. 1920, § 6447; R.S. 1931, § 89-1613; C.S. 1945, § 3-3712; W.S. 1957, § 1-206; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to sheriff's fees, see § 18-3-608 .

§ 1-14-115. Right to receive certified bill of costs or fees.

Any person liable for any costs or fees is entitled to receive on demand a certified bill of the same, in which the items of service and the charges therefor are stated.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 30; R.S. 1887, § 1221; R.S. 1899, § 4311; C.S. 1910, § 5172; C.S. 1920, § 6448; R.S. 1931, § 89-1614; C.S. 1945, § 3-3713; W.S. 1957, § 1-207; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to allowance of premiums for bonds as part of costs, see § 38-2-109 .

§ 1-14-116. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 31, read: “Every justice of the peace shall tax the cost of every criminal prosecution or trial before him and certify the cost to the board of county commissioners in all cases in which the county is liable therefor.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-14-117. Disposition of costs collected.

Every sheriff and other officer collecting costs on execution, after retaining the amount of his own fees shall pay the residue of the collected costs to the clerk of the court which issued the execution and take a receipt therefor.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 32; R.S. 1887, § 1223; R.S. 1899, § 4313; C.S. 1910, § 5174; C.S. 1920, § 6450; R.S. 1931, § 89-1616; C.S. 1945, § 3-3715; W.S. 1957, § 1-209; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to collection of fees by bailiff for supreme court and payment into state treasury, see § 5-2-303 .

For duty of the clerk of district court to collect fees in advance and pay to county treasurer monthly, see § 5-3-205 .

As to sheriff's fees, see § 18-3-608 .

The 2004 amendment deleted “or to the justice” following “which issued the execution.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-14-118. Payment of fees and compensation.

All fees provided for by law when due from any party other than the state or the county are payable in advance to the person entitled to them. All fees and compensation due any person from the county are payable once every three (3) months by warrants drawn upon the county treasury in the manner provided by law, unless herein otherwise provided.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 45, § 35; R.S. 1887, § 1225; R.S. 1899, § 4315; C.S. 1910, § 5176; C.S. 1920, § 6452; R.S. 1931, § 89-1618; C.S. 1945, § 3-3718; W.S. 1957, § 1-211; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cited in

State ex rel. Kane v. Dobler, 53 Wyo. 252, 81 P.2d 300, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 17 , 117 A.L.R. 1393 (1938).

§ 1-14-119. Nonresidents and partnerships suing in company name to furnish security; requirements.

If a nonresident of the state or a partnership suing in its company name brings an action, the plaintiff must furnish sufficient security for costs approved by the clerk. A surety’s obligations are complete by his endorsing the summons or complaint. The surety is bound for the payment of all costs adjudged or taxed against the plaintiff in the court in which the action is brought or in any other court to which it may be carried, whether he obtains judgment or not. The nonresident plaintiff may deposit with the clerk of court as security for costs in the case such sum of money as the clerk deems sufficient for the purpose. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the deposit to be increased, that personal security be given or that the nonresident plaintiff pay all costs as fast as they accrue.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 347; R.S. 1887, § 2687; R.S. 1899, § 3781; C.S. 1910, § 4636; Laws 1911, ch. 73, § 1; C.S. 1920, § 5909; R.S. 1931, § 89-2701; C.S. 1945, § 3-3719; W.S. 1957, § 1-212; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Widow who is nonresident may be required to furnish security for costs on her application to have the homestead of her deceased husband set apart for her use. Ullman v. Abbott, 10 Wyo. 97, 67 P. 467, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1902).

Cost bond. —

In view of its language and the statute under which it was given, plaintiff's cost bond was held to have covered judgment for costs in favor of defendant on her cross-petition. Wyoming Cent. Irrigation Co. v. Laporte, 26 Wyo. 522, 188 P. 360, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1920).

Discretion of the court. —

The court may, but is not required to, order security of costs from a nonresident father. KC v. KM (In re IC), 941 P.2d 46, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 1997).

§ 1-14-120. Nonresidents and partnerships suing in company name to furnish security; failure to give security.

If security for costs is not given as required by W.S. 1-14-119 or if the costs are not paid, the court shall at any time before the commencement of the trial, on motion of the defendant and notice to the plaintiff, dismiss the action unless within a reasonable time allowed by the court security is given.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 348; R.S. 1887, § 2688; R.S. 1899, § 3782; C.S. 1910, § 4637; C.S. 1920, § 5910; R.S. 1931, § 89-2702; C.S. 1945, § 3-3720; W.S. 1957, § 1-213; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Discretion of the court. —

The court may, but is not required to, order security of costs from a nonresident father. KC v. KM (In re IC), 941 P.2d 46, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 1997).

§ 1-14-121. Nonresident and partnership suing in company name to furnish security; when plaintiff becomes nonresident of county.

If the plaintiff becomes a nonresident of the county in which the action is brought during its pendency, he may be compelled to give security in the manner stated in W.S. 1-14-119 and 1-14-120 .

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 349; R.S. 1887, § 2689; R.S. 1899, § 3783; C.S. 1910, § 4638; C.S. 1920, § 5911; R.S. 1931, § 89-2703; C.S. 1945, § 3-3721; W.S. 1957, § 1-214; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Law reviews. —

See article, “Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code — Part II,” VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1973).

§ 1-14-122. Additional security upon motion of defendant.

In an action in which security for costs has been given, the defendant may at any time before the commencement of the trial, after reasonable notice to the plaintiff, move the court for additional security. If on the motion the court is satisfied that the surety has moved from this state or the security is not sufficient the action may be dismissed unless in a reasonable time fixed by the court sufficient security is given.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 350; R.S. 1887, § 2690; R.S. 1899, § 3784; C.S. 1910, § 4639; C.S. 1920, § 5912; R.S. 1931, § 89-2704; C.S. 1945, § 3-3722; W.S. 1957, § 1-215; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Law reviews. —

See article, “Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code — Part II,” VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1973).

§ 1-14-123. Judgment against surety for costs; execution.

After final judgment in an action in which security for costs is given, the court may on motion of the defendant or a person having a right to costs, after ten (10) days notice of the motion, render judgment in the name of the movant against the surety, his executors or administrators, for the costs adjudged against the plaintiff. Execution may be issued on the judgment as in other cases for the use and benefit of the person entitled to the costs.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 351; R.S. 1887, § 2691; R.S. 1899, § 3785; C.S. 1910, § 4640; C.S. 1920, § 5913; R.S. 1931, § 89-2705; C.S. 1945, § 3-3723; W.S. 1957, § 1-216; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to rights and remedies of sureties and surety companies generally, see title 38.

As to judgment against surety in connection with appeals to supreme court, see Rule 4.05, W.R.A.P.

§ 1-14-124. Costs allowed for recovery of money or property.

Costs shall be allowed to the plaintiff upon a judgment in his favor in an action for the recovery of money only or for the recovery of specific real or personal property, unless otherwise provided by law.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 355; R.S. 1887, § 2695; R.S. 1899, § 3789; C.S. 1910, § 4644; C.S. 1920, § 5917; R.S. 1931, § 89-2709; C.S. 1945, § 3-3727; W.S. 1957, § 1-220; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to allowance of premiums for bonds as part of costs, see § 38-2-109 .

Costs allowed in counterclaim. —

Plaintiff, recovering a judgment for $120.00, after allowance of a counterclaim, was entitled to costs. Holgate v. Downer, 8 Wyo. 334, 57 P. 918, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1899).

But not in trespass case. —

This section does not entitle plaintiff to recover his costs in action for trespass on oil and gas rights by attempt to drill well. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 P. 862, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 36 Wyo. 166, 255 P. 3, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1927).

Costs “reasonably required for trial preparation” allowed. —

The award of costs, including subpoena, reporter and witness fees for a discovery deposition, was discretionary with the trial court as coming within the criteria of “reasonably required for trial preparation.” Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1989).

Expert fees include actual time for testimony. —

Expert witness fees as determined by the court to be reasonable in amount should have included actual time for testimony and should not have included charges of the experts for pretrial conferences or time during the trial session while waiting to actually testify. Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1989).

Proper and improper costs. —

The following award of costs to the prevailing party was proper: witness fees for those days on which the witnesses attended, even if they did not testify on that day. The following award, however, was not proper: (1) service fees upon the parties with whom the successful party had settled; and (2) an expert witness fee for a physician who did not testify. State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 578 (Wyo. 1985).

Prevailing party. —

Defaulted defendant was regarded as the prevailing party and was entitled to award of costs, since plaintiff did not improve her position by the litigation, but defendant improved his position substantially over the result indicated by the entry of default. Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 186 (Wyo. 1998).

Rejection of more favorable offer of settlement. —

A plaintiff who rejected an offer of settlement that was more favorable than the amount she was eventually awarded by a jury was entitled to recover only those costs she incurred up until the time the offer was made, and the defendant was entitled to recover those costs incurred after the offer was made. Crawford v. Amadio, 932 P.2d 1288, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1997).

Stated in

Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 553 (Wyo. 1987); Morris v. CMS Oil & Gas Co., 2010 WY 37, 227 P.3d 325, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Mar. 25, 2010).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Ethics and the Reasonableness of Contingency Fees: A Survey of State and Federal Law Addressing the Reasonableness of Costs as They Relate to Contingency Fee Arrangements,” see XXIX Land & Water L. Rev. 215 (1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Storage or similar caretaking charges as taxable cost in proceeding to forfeit personal property, 60 ALR2d 813.

Taxable costs and disbursements as including expenses for bonds incident to steps taken in action, 90 ALR2d 448.

Allowance as costs of such items as maps, models, wall charts, photographs and the like, 97 A.L.R.2d 138.

Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud action, 44 ALR4th 776.

§ 1-14-125. When costs not recoverable by plaintiff.

When the judgment is less than one hundred dollars ($100.00), unless the recovery is reduced below that sum by counterclaim or setoff, each party shall pay his own costs. When the damage assessed is under five dollars ($5.00), the plaintiff shall not recover costs in any action for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, assault, assault and battery, false imprisonment or nuisance.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 356; R.S. 1887, § 2696; R.S. 1899, § 3790; C.S. 1910, § 4645; C.S. 1920, § 5918; R.S. 1931, § 89-2710; C.S. 1945, § 3-3728; W.S. 1957, § 1-221; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment deleted “or against a justice of the peace for misconduct in office” at the end of the section and made stylistic changes.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

In general. —

Costs taxable as part of the judgment in favor of the prevailing party are part of the judgment and an incident thereto. Wyoming Cent. Irrigation Co. v. Laporte, 26 Wyo. 522, 188 P. 360, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1920).

Applicability. —

The statute, which speaks to a plaintiff's ability to recover costs, did not apply to the defendants, who successfully defended against the plaintiffs' action. Snyder v. Lovercheck, 2001 WY 64, 27 P.3d 695, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 2001).

Each party to pay own costs. —

Where plaintiff appellant was entitled to nominal damages, judgment will be modified to order each party to pay his own costs, both on trial and on appeal. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 P. 862, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 36 Wyo. 166, 255 P. 3, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1927).

Nominal damages.—

In determining the amount appellee lost because of the vehicles parked on his property, the evidence presented was too remote to sustain the damages awarded by the district court; the case was remanded for the district court to award nominal damages not to exceed $ 100 for the trespass relating to the pickup truck and camper, as the court interprets the statute as the legislature's determination of the maximum amount that can constitute nominal damages, and this was the result case law required in this case. Goforth v. Fifield, 2015 WY 82, 352 P.3d 242, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2015).

Costs to neither party. —

In action for damages for removing cattle from enclosed tract of pasturage belonging in alternate sections to government and defendant, when it appears that no injury was done in the removal, and that land to which they were removed was superior to that enclosed, and plaintiff would not, in any event, be entitled to more than nominal damages, if any, judgment for defendant, with costs to neither party, will not be reversed. Hecht v. Harrison, 5 Wyo. 279, 40 P. 306, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1895).

Applied in

Roberts Constr. Co. v. Vondriska, 547 P.2d 1171, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1976).

Cited in

Holgate v. Downer, 8 Wyo. 334, 57 P. 918, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1899).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Hazardous Waste Cleanup in Wyoming: Legal Tools Available to the Private Citizen,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 395 (1984).

§ 1-14-126. Costs in discretion of court.

  1. In other actions the court may award and  tax costs and apportion them between the parties on the same or adverse  sides as it deems right and equitable. When a civil case is settled  too late for the clerk of court to advise the jury panel that the  jurors should not appear on the date summoned the court may order  that any or all parties reimburse the proper fund for the fees and  mileage paid to the jurors and bailiffs for their appearance.
  2. In civil actions for which an award of  attorney’s fees is authorized, the court in its discretion may award  reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party without requiring  expert testimony. In exercising its discretion the court may consider  the following factors:
    1. The time and labor required, the novelty  and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite  to perform the legal service properly;
    2. The likelihood that the acceptance of  the particular employment precluded other employment by the lawyer;
    3. The fee customarily charged in the locality  for similar legal services;
    4. The amount involved and the results obtained;
    5. The time limitations imposed by the client  or by the circumstances;
    6. The nature and length of the professional  relationship with the client;
    7. The experience, reputation and ability  of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
    8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 358; R.S. 1887, § 2698; R.S. 1899, § 3792; C.S. 1910, § 4647; C.S. 1920, § 5920; R.S. 1931, § 89-2712; C.S. 1945, § 3-3730; W.S. 1957, § 1-223; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1985, ch. 84, § 1; 1992, ch. 39, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to party obligated to pay costs in election contest, see § 22-17-104 .

As to payment of costs of appeal regarding damages in connection with establishment of highways, see § 24-3-121 .

As to payment of costs in hearings and investigations by public service commission, see § 37-2-125 .

As to payment of costs by petitioners upon dismissal of petition in connection with power district, see § 37-7-108 .

As to allowance of premiums for bonds as part of costs, see § 38-2-109 .

Procedure. —

District court did not make a determination on the reasonableness of the client's request for attorney's fees; instead, the record was clear that the district court simply confirmed an agreement between the parties which required the client's ex-husband to make a property distribution to the client to sustain her while she was litigating the divorce. Cotton v. McCulloh, 2005 WY 159, 125 P.3d 252, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 2005).

Appellate fees awarded as prevailing party and under lease. —

In an action to recover rent, a landlord was entitled to appellate attorney's fees under the provisions of the lease contract and pursuant to this provision as prevailing party. Kinstler v. RTB South Greeley, LTD., LLC, 2007 WY 98, 160 P.3d 1125, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2007), reh'g denied, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. July 17, 2007).

Award reasonable. —

Where borrowers, who were foreclosed on by the bank, argued that the award of contractual based attorney fees should have been limited to 15 percent of the amount of the loan but presented no citation to pertinent authority supporting their theory that the ratio of the amount of the award to the amount of the loan was the determinative factor in establishing the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, the district court properly held that the fee requested, an award representing 194 percent of the original loan amount, was founded upon a reasonable hourly rate, and properly held that the time expended by the bank's counsel was well documented and that the time was reasonable and necessary given the defenses raised by the borrowers. Askvig v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2005 WY 138, 121 P.3d 783, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (2005).

In an action concerning a breach of a settlement agreement, an award of attorneys' fees based on the federal lodestar method and this section was upheld as reasonable. The obvious intent of the settlement agreement was to foreclose litigation and to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in any dispute involving the agreement, and the trial court reduced the fees sought by 36 percent. Morrison v. Clay, 2006 WY 161, 149 P.3d 696, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 2006).

When defendant companies sought to develop oil and gas interests, they entered into an agreement with a leaseholder for assignment of leases and for a Net Profits Interest (NPI) in which defendants agreed to pay 5% of the net profits to the leaseholder; in an action to enforce the agreement under the Wyoming Royalty Payment Act (WRPA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-5-301 through 305, plaintiffs established their right to the mineral royalty and were entitled to recover attorney fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-303 . The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding plaintiffs over $ 3.9 million in attorney fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b); the district court accepted plaintiffs' efforts to segregate the non-applicable fees, and the award was reasonable in light to the massive case file and the complexity of the issues. Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, 226 P.3d 889, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 2010).

Based on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b), a former member of an LLC was entitled to attorney's fees of $77,470, which was a reasonable amount for a trial, three evidentiary hearings, and four appeals; pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 1, the court did not remand the action for a determination of fees but made the determination itself based on the unnecessary protraction of the litigation by plaintiff and the LLC. Thorkildsen v. Belden, 2011 WY 26, 247 P.3d 60, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2011).

Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) (2011), the bank's fee application addressed the factors through the attorney's affidavit, and the attached fee statements set forth the fee and cost amounts with sufficient certainty. Broderick v. Wyo. Cent. Fed. Credit Union, 2012 WY 116, 285 P.3d 941, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2012).

Reasonable fees awarded in workers' compensation claim. —

The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) properly awarded attorney fees to a workers' compensation claimant's appointed attorney in the claimants appeal of a denial of benefits. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) does not limit the award of an employee's attorney fees to the “benefits at issue” and there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the determination of the hearing examiner on reasonableness under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b)(i). OAH. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Smith, 2005 WY 137, 121 P.3d 150, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (2005).

Trial of remonstrances under drainage law was action within section, so that on finding that remonstrances against confirmation of report were groundless there was nothing unjust in requiring them to pay costs. In re Bench Canal Drainage Dist., 24 Wyo. 143, 156 P. 610, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1916).

Costs to plaintiff. —

In vendor's suit for cancellation of contract for sale of land, in which purchaser also sought cancellation, court, on finding that defendant was in default, was justified in awarding costs to plaintiff, under this section, on granting relief prayed for. Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 Wyo. 89, 275 P. 101, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1929).

Trial court awarded costs to plaintiff who was found 50 percent at fault for her injuries but award was reduced on appeal because plaintiff conceded that the award was too high. Garnick v. Teton County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2002 WY 18, 39 P.3d 1034, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2002).

Costs to prevailing party. —

Defaulted defendant was regarded as the prevailing party and was entitled to award of costs, since plaintiff did not improve her position by the litigation, but defendant improved his position substantially over the result indicated by the entry of default. Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 186 (Wyo. 1998).

Mandamus proceedings. —

The provision of § 1-31-114 is mandatory and leaves to court no discretion as to taxing costs in mandamus proceedings where judgment must be for defendant. State ex rel. Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170 P. 1, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1918).

No award of costs to nonindigent defendant acquitted of felony. —

A trial court has no authority to grant costs to a nonindigent defendant who has been acquitted of a felony. Bernard v. State, 652 P.2d 982, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1982).

No award to firm with conflict of interest. —

In a dispute regarding a subdivision's protective covenants, a law firm representing the homeowners' association was subject to disqualification under Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a), 1.10(a) because the litigation was substantially related to previous negotiations about the covenants, in which one of the firm's attorneys had represented the owner. Although the district court did not err in denying the disqualification motion as untimely, it should have denied attorney fees as inequitable under this section because the firm had a conflict of interest and had failed to segregate allowable fees from those relating to the disqualification motion. Magin v. Solitude Homeowner's, Inc., 2011 WY 102, 255 P.3d 920, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2011).

Expenditures must be reasonably required. —

The court has discretion in making the award provided the expenditures are reasonably required for trial preparation. Coulthard v. Cossairt, 803 P.2d 86, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1990), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Reasonable necessary deposition expenses reimbursable, but not expense of preparing enlarged exhibits. —

Reasonable necessary deposition expenses made after the making of a settlement offer, such as those made for depositions relied upon by the court in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant, were properly includable in reimbursable costs. However, the expense of preparing enlarged exhibits for trial was not a taxable cost. Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 597 (Wyo. 1985).

Burden of demonstrating reasonableness of fees. —

The party seeking to recover attorney's fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the fees, with reasonableness being determined by the district court through the exercise of its sound discretion. In making that decision, the district court can rely on the itemized list and the directions provided by subsection (b) of this section. Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1997).

Owners did not meet their burden of proof in establishing the reasonableness of their attorney fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) by submitting redacted billing statements along with an offer of in camera review to trial court. Ringolsby v. Johnson, 2008 WY 127, 193 P.3d 1167, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2008).

Deficient record. —

Where the record was deficient as to the factors articulated in subsection (b), the case was remanded for the purpose of presenting the evidence with respect to the factors set forth in subsection (b). In re Awards of Atty. Fees, 920 P.2d 1245, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1996).

Refusal to award costs to either party will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. Rutherford v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 12 Wyo. 299, 75 P. 445, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1904).

Award summarily reversed on appeal with no remand. —

If a party has had an opportunity to present proof of attorney fees to the trial court, and they fail to do so, the award will be summarily reversed on appeal with no remand. Pekas v. Thompson, 903 P.2d 532, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1995).

A remand to allow additional proof on attorney fees will be allowed only in those instances where a party was denied an opportunity to make proof in the proceeding below. Pekas v. Thompson, 903 P.2d 532, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1995).

Award of attorney fees was summarily reversed where party testified as to the amount he had been charged and that he believed the amount was reasonable, but submitted no itemized billing nor offered any evidence upon which the court could evaluate the reasonableness of the fees. Murphy v. Holman, 945 P.2d 1193, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1997).

No prejudgment interest. —

Award of the debtor's attorney fees was not a liquidated claim, and the debtor was therefore not entitled to prejudgment interest on the award, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b). Thorkildsen v. Belden, 2012 WY 8, 269 P.3d 421, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2012).

Applied in

Board of County Comm'rs v. Dunnegan, 884 P.2d 35, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 141 , 48 A.L.R.5th 941 (Wyo. 1994); Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1997); Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Casper, 2014 WY 22, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Feb 19, 2014); Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Casper, 2014 WY 22, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Feb 19, 2014); Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Casper, 2014 WY 22, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Feb 19, 2014).

Quoted in

Rocky Mountain Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 73 Wyo. 11, 269 P.2d 314, 1954 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (1954); Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1989); Dishman v. First Interstate Bank, 2015 WY 154, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Dec. 8, 2015).

Stated in

United States ex rel. FHA v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 450 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Department of Family Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs. v. DDM, 877 P.2d 259, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 1994); Rocha v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1996); Cargile v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 965 P.2d 666, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1998); Gonzales v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 992 P.2d 560, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1999); Bellis v. Kersey, 2010 WY 138, 241 P.3d 818, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Oct. 26, 2010); Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2015 WY 40, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Mar. 19, 2015).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Hazardous Waste Cleanup in Wyoming: Legal Tools Available to the Private Citizen,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 395 (1984).

For comment, “Ethics and the Reasonableness of Contingency Fees: A Survey of State and Federal Law Addressing the Reasonableness of Costs as They Relate to Contingency Fee Arrangements,” see XXIX Land & Water L. Rev. 215 (1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of state or its agency or board for costs in civil action to which it is a party, 72 ALR2d 1379.

Taxation of costs and expenses in proceedings for discovery or inspection, 76 ALR2d 953.

Continuance of civil case as conditioned upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses incurred by other party, 9 ALR4th 1144.

Recoverability from tort-feasor of cost of diagnostic examinations absent proof of actual bodily injury, 46 ALR4th 1151.

Award of attorneys' fees in excess of $75 per hour under Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) provision (28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii)) authorizing higher award—cases involving social security law, 113 ALR Fed 267.

Award of attorneys' fees in excess of $75 per hour under Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) provision (28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii)) authorizing higher awards—cases involving law other than social security law, 119 ALR Fed 1.

Federal district court's power to impose sanctions on non-parties for abusing discovery process, 149 ALR Fed 589.

§ 1-14-127. Recovery of costs when several actions brought on same instrument.

When several actions are brought on one (1) instrument in writing against several parties who might have been joined as defendants in the same action, no costs shall be recovered by the plaintiff in more than one (1) of the actions if the parties proceeded against in the other action were openly within the state at the commencement of the previous action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 359; R.S. 1887, § 2699; R.S. 1899, § 3793; C.S. 1910, § 4648; C.S. 1920, § 5921; R.S. 1931, § 89-2713; C.S. 1945, § 3-3731; W.S. 1957, § 1-224; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Section did not bar recovery of costs. —

See United States ex rel. FHA v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 450 (Wyo. 1985).

§ 1-14-128. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 168, § 102.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 4, § 1, related to baseless pleadings.

Laws 2009, ch. 168, § 602, makes the act effective July 1, 2009.

Chapter 15 Attachment, Replevin and Garnishment

Cross references. —

As to attachment of goods covered by negotiable instruments, see § 34.1-7-602.

Revision of chapter. —

Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3, revised this chapter by repealing and recreating former §§ 1-15-101 through 1-15-407 and 1-34-101 through 1-34-118 as present §§ 1-15-101 through 1-15-425 .Sections 1-15-501 through 1-15-511 were added by Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1.

No detailed explanation of the changes made by Laws 1987, ch. 198, has been attempted, but, where appropriate, annotations to cases decided under former provisions have been placed under comparable sections where it was felt they would be useful. For tables of revised and renumbered sections, see Volume 11 of the Wyoming Statutes Annotated.

Appeal bond distinguished. —

It will be assumed that bond given under the statute relating to appeals as required by the court to stay execution in attachment pending writ of error is not a forthcoming bond under this section, but was conditioned to pay the judgment if affirmed. J. J. Crable & Son v. O'Connor, 21 Wyo. 460, 133 P. 376, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1913), (decided under prior law),.

Law reviews. —

See article, “Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming — Part II,” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 617 (1972).

See case note, “Constitutional Law — Due Process — Replevin — Right to Notice and Hearing Prior to Deprivation of Property. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 42 (1972),” VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 315 (1973).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment § 1 et seq.66 Am. Jur. 2d Replevin § 1 et seq.

Residence of partnership for purposes of statutes authorizing garnishment on ground of nonresidence, 9 ALR2d 471.

What is an action for “debt” within garnishment statute, 12 ALR2d 787.

Remedy of replevin where agent, employed to purchase personal property, buys it for himself, 20 ALR2d 1140.

Taxable costs and disbursements as including expenses for bond, 90 ALR2d 448.

Issue in garnishment as triable to court or to jury, 19 ALR3d 1393.

Garnishment against executor or administrator by creditor of estate, 60 ALR3d 1301.

Recovery of damages for mental anguish, distress, suffering, or the like, in action for wrongful attachment, garnishment, sequestration or execution, 83 ALR3d 598.

Employee retirement pension benefits as exempt from garnishment, attachment, levy, execution or similar proceedings, 93 ALR3d 711.

7 C.J.S. Attachment § 1 et seq.; 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 1 et seq.; 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 1 et seq.

Article 1. In General

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-15-101. Applicability.

  1. This chapter shall apply to and govern:
    1. Attachment, replevin and garnishment proceedings  in all district courts and circuit courts of this state;
    2. Post judgment garnishment in small claims  proceedings as provided by W.S. 1-21-205 .

History. Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (a)(i), substituted “and circuit courts” for “county courts and justice of the peace courts” preceding “of this state.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction.—

District court had subject matter jurisdiction because an airport had no duty to comply with the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 when it was seeking redress for the independent acts of a lessee, which was not a bank or a financial institution. Sky Harbor Air Serv. v. Cheyenne Reg'l Airport Bd., 2016 WY 17, 368 P.3d 264, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 1-15-102. Definitions.

  1. As used in this chapter unless otherwise  defined:
    1. “Attachment” means the procedure by which  a plaintiff obtains a judicial lien on a defendant’s property prior  to judgment;
    2. “Continuing garnishment” means any procedure  for withholding the earnings of a judgment debtor for successive pay  periods for payment of a judgment debt;
    3. “Court” means any district court or circuit  court of this state;
    4. “Defendant” means a person whose property  is being attached, garnished or replevied by a plaintiff and includes  a judgment debtor after entry of judgment;
    5. “Disposable earnings” means that part  of an individual’s earnings remaining after the deduction of all amounts  required by law to be withheld;
    6. “Earnings” or “earnings from personal  services” means compensation paid or payable for personal services,  whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, proceeds  of any pension or retirement benefits or deferred compensation plan  or otherwise;
    7. “Garnishee” means a person other than  a plaintiff or defendant who is in possession of earnings or property  of the defendant and who is subject to garnishment in accordance with  the provisions of this chapter;
    8. “Garnishment” means the procedure by which  a plaintiff on whose behalf a writ of garnishment has been issued  against a defendant reaches tangible or intangible personal property  of the defendant in the possession, control or custody of, or debts  or other monetary obligations owing by, a third person;
    9. “Judgment creditor” means any person who  has recovered a money judgment against a judgment debtor in a court  of competent jurisdiction;
    10. “Judgment debtor” means any person who  has a judgment entered against him in a court of competent jurisdiction;
    11. “Officer” means sheriff;
    12. “Plaintiff” means a person who is attaching,  garnishing or repleving property of a defendant and includes a judgment  creditor after entry of judgment;
    13. “Replevin” means the procedure by which  a plaintiff in a pending action to recover possession of property  obtains redelivery of property claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained;
    14. “Financial institution” means as defined in W.S. 13-1-401(a)(ii).

History. Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 2000, ch. 24, § 4; 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2019, ch. 70, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (a)(iii), deleted “or justice of the peace courts” preceding “of this state,” and made a related change.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, added (a)(xiv).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

As enacted, subsection (a) of this section contained two paragraphs (x) and two paragraphs (xi). The second paragraph (x) has been redesignated as paragraph (xii) and the second paragraph (xi) has been redesignated as paragraph (xiii).

Applicability. —

Laws 2019, ch. 70 § 2, provides: "This act shall apply only to writs of garnishment issued on or after the effective date of this act."

“Disposable earnings.” —

Debtor's claimed exemption of earnings up to a specified percentage failed because the accounts receivable of his business could not be considered “disposable earnings”. In re Welty, 217 B.R. 907, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 92 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1998).

Income from growing wheat on farm fell within “earnings” exemption provisions of of § 1-17-411 , prior to the 1987 amendment thereof. Lingle State Bank v. Podolak, 740 P.2d 392, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 480 (Wyo. 1987).

Business profits and crop receipts not “earnings.” —

Any application of “otherwise” in subsection (a)(vi) is limited to the character of third-party obligations payable for services rendered by the claimant for exemption. Intrinsic to the meaning of this section are the provisions of § 1-15-408 which are related to earnings for personal services periodically payable. Business profits and receipts from crop and livestock simply cannot be logically impressed with the garnishment concept. Coones v. FDIC, 796 P.2d 803, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1990).

Proceeds from sale of cattle not “earnings.” —

Where ranching operations were the judgment debtor's sole source of income and the funds in his bank account which were garnished represented proceeds from the sale of his cattle, the statutory exemption for earnings under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-408 did not apply as the funds were not traceable to a third-party obligation payable periodically within the meaning of § 1-15-102(a)(vi). McManaman v. McManaman, 2002 WY 128, 53 P.3d 103, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2002).

Income tax refunds not “earnings.” —

Debtor's income tax refund, which included earned income credit, did not constitute “earnings” or “disposable earnings” exempt from garnishment. Trudeau v. Royal (In re Trudeau), 237 B.R. 803, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1075 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1999).

Executory waiver of earnings exemption is not permissible as matter of public policy, and a security agreement which purports to deny a debtor and his family a statutory earnings exemption is precisely the type of executory arrangement that is objectionable and contrary to public policy. Lingle State Bank v. Podolak, 740 P.2d 392, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 480 (Wyo. 1987) (decided under § 1-17-411 prior to 1987 amendment).

Cited in

Coones v. FDIC, 848 P.2d 783, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1993); Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 1-15-103. General procedures relating to prejudgment writs of attachment, replevin and garnishment; issuance of writs without notice.

  1. Prejudgment writs of attachment, replevin  and garnishment shall be issued subject to the following conditions  and circumstances:
    1. The writ shall issue only upon written  motion and pursuant to a written order of the court;
    2. The court shall not direct the issuance  of the writ without notice to the adverse party and an opportunity  to be heard unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by  affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable  injury will result to the plaintiff before notice can be served and  a hearing had thereon. A finding by the court that the plaintiff will  suffer irreparable injury shall be made only if the court finds the  existence of either of the following circumstances:
      1. There is present danger that the property  will be immediately disposed of, concealed, or placed beyond the jurisdiction  of the court; or
      2. The value of the property will be impaired  substantially if the issuance of an order of attachment is delayed.
    3. An order granted without notice authorizing  the issuance of a writ shall be endorsed with the date and hour of  issuance and shall be filed in the clerk’s office and entered of record.  The order shall define the injury and state why the injury is irreparable  and why the order was granted without notice. The order, and any writ  issued pursuant thereto, shall expire within a time fixed by the court,  not to exceed ten (10) days after issuance. Within the time fixed,  the court may, after notice and hearing, order the writ continued  in effect or the adverse party may consent that the writ may be extended  for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered  of record;
    4. If the order granting the writ is issued  without notice, a hearing thereon shall be set for the earliest reasonable  time;
    5. At the hearing on the issuance of the  writ or its continuance, the plaintiff shall have the burden of establishing  the facts justifying the issuance and continuance of the writ;
    6. On notice to the plaintiff obtaining the  issuance of the writ without notice, the adverse party may appear  and move dissolution or modification of the writ, and in that event  the court shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expeditiously  as possible;
    7. Any notice required under this section  shall be in a form and served in a manner as will expeditiously give  the adverse party actual notice of the proceeding, all as directed  by the court;
    8. In the event that property has been seized  by the sheriff pursuant to the issuance of a writ without notice,  the property shall be retained by him subject to the order of the  court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 673; R.S. 1887, § 3021; Laws 1890-91, ch. 96, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4146; C.S. 1910, § 5006; C.S. 1920, § 6276; R.S. 1931, § 89-4002; C.S. 1945, § 3-7402; W.S. 1957, § 1-1001; Laws 1973, ch. 173, § 1; ch. 214, §§ 1, 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-21-1103, 1-34-102, 1-34-103; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Creditor may not use replevin prejudgment attachment to secure two remedies. —

Where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), under a security agreement, attempted to exercise its right to possess and sell collateral and under a promissory note attempted to take a judgment on the debt, the FDIC was not allowed to achieve both remedies in a single action using a procedural device, replevin prejudgment attachment. Coones v. FDIC, 848 P.2d 783, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Sufficiency, as to content, of notice of garnishment required to be served upon garnishee, 20 ALR5th 229.

§ 1-15-104. Prejudgment writs; bond required; objection to plaintiff's sureties; hearing on objections; liability of sureties.

  1. No prejudgment writ of attachment, replevin  or garnishment shall issue unless the plaintiff files with the clerk  a surety bond in an amount fixed by the court for the payment of all  costs and damages which may be incurred or suffered by any party as  a result of the wrongful issuance of the writ, not exceeding the sum  specified in the bond.
  2. If the party for whose benefit a bond  under subsection (a) of this section is given is not satisfied with  the amount of the bond or the sufficiency of the sureties, he may,  within five (5) days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays,  after the receipt of a copy of the bond, serve upon the party giving  the bond a notice that the party for whose benefit the bond is given  objects to the amount of the bond or the sufficiency of the sureties.  If the party for whose benefit the bond is given fails to object within  the time allowed he is deemed to have waived all objection to the  amount of bond and the sufficiency of the sureties.
  3. Notice of objections to the amount of  bond and the sufficiency of sureties as provided in subsection (b)  of this section shall be filed in the form of a motion for hearing  on objections to the bond. Upon demand of the objecting party, each  surety shall appear at the hearing of the motion and be subject to  examination as to the surety’s pecuniary responsibility or the validity  of the execution of the bond. Upon hearing, the court shall approve  or reject the bond as filed or require any amended, substitute or  additional bond as the circumstances warrant. If the court rejects  the bond or if the plaintiff fails within the time allowed to file  any amended, substitute or additional bond required by the court,  any property seized under the writ shall be returned to the defendant.
  4. The bond required by this section shall,  in addition to other requirements, provide that each surety is subject  to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk  of the court as the agent of the surety upon whom any papers affecting  the liability of the surety on the bond may be served, and that the  liability of the surety may be enforced on motion and upon notice  as the court may require without the necessity of an independent action.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 108, 111, 126; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 523, 556, 561, 677; R.S. 1887, §§ 2871, 2904, 2909, 3025, 3524, 3527, 3542; Laws 1890-91, ch. 91, §§ 3, 6; R.S. 1899, §§ 3990, 4023, 4028, 4150, 4436, 4438, 4453; C.S. 1910, §§ 4849, 4882, 4887, 5010, 5316, 5299, 5301; C.S. 1920, §§ 6119, 6152, 6157, 6280, 6571, 6573, 6588; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1602, 62-1803, 62-1805, 89-3303, 89-3336, 89-3341, 89-4006; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4706, 3-5003, 3-5041, 3-5306, 14-1203, 14-1205, 14-1402; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-228, 1-261, 1-266, 1-572, 1-695, 1-697, 1-1005; Laws 1973, ch. 173, § 1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-103 , 1-15-310, 1-15-315, 1-21-302, 1-21-1104, 1-21-1106, 1-34-107; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-105. Writs; release of property or discharge of writ; undertaking required; objections to defendant's sureties; liability of sureties.

  1. At any time, either before or after the  execution of a writ of attachment, replevin or garnishment, the defendant  may obtain a release of any property or a discharge of the writ as  follows:
    1. To secure a discharge of the attachment  or garnishment the defendant shall furnish a bond, with sufficient  sureties, in a sum of not less than double the amount claimed by the  plaintiff, but not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) in amount. The  conditions of the bond shall be to the effect that if the plaintiff  recovers judgment, the defendant will pay the judgment together with  interest and all costs assessed against him, not exceeding the sum  specified in the bond;
    2. To secure a release of property seized  under a writ of attachment, replevin or garnishment, the defendant  shall furnish a bond, with sufficient sureties, in a sum not less  than the value of the property to be released, but in no case in an  amount greater than necessary to obtain a discharge of the writ under  paragraph (i) of this subsection. The conditions of the bond shall  be to the effect that if the plaintiff recovers judgment, the defendant  will pay the judgment, together with interest and all costs assessed  against him, not exceeding the sum specified in the bond.
  2. The bond required by subsection (a) of  this section shall be delivered to the sheriff at or before the time  of service of the writ of attachment, replevin or garnishment. If  the release or discharge is sought after the writ has been executed  or the property seized, the defendant shall apply to the court, upon  reasonable notice to the plaintiff, for an order releasing the property  or discharging the writ.
  3. The bond required by subsection (a) of  this section shall be filed with the court, and a copy of the bond  served upon the plaintiff. Within five (5) days, excluding Saturdays,  Sundays and legal holidays, after the plaintiff is served with notice  of the filing of the bond required by subsection (a) of this section  the plaintiff may object to the amount of the bond or the sufficiency  of defendant’s sureties, by serving upon the defendant and filing  with the court a motion for hearing on objection to bond.
  4. Upon demand of the plaintiff, each surety  shall appear at the hearing requested under subsection (c) of this  section, and be subject to examination as to the surety’s pecuniary  responsibility or the validity of the execution of the bond. Upon  hearing, the court shall approve or reject the bond as filed or require  any amended, substitute or additional bond as the circumstances warrant.
  5. Upon a discharge of the writ or release  of the property under this section, all of the property released,  if not sold, and the proceeds of any sale of the property, shall be  delivered to the defendant. The release or discharge by the court  shall not be effective until the time for plaintiff to object to the  amount of the bond or the sufficiency of the defendant’s sureties  has expired.
  6. The bond required by this section shall,  in addition to other requirements, provide that each surety is subject  to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk  of the court as his agent upon whom any papers affecting the liability  of the surety on the bond may be served, and that his liability may  be enforced on motion and upon notice as the court may require without  the necessity of an independent action.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 111, 127, 140, 141; Laws 1884, ch. 52, § 1; 1886, ch. 60, §§ 529, 545, 550, 677, 678, 681; R.S. 1887, §§ 2877, 2893, 2898, 3025, 3026, 3029, 3527, 3543, 3556, 3557; Laws 1890-91, ch. 91, § 6; 1897, ch. 43, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3996, 4012, 4017, 4150, 4151, 4154, 4438, 4454, 4467, 4468; C.S. 1910, §§ 4855, 4871, 4876, 5010, 5011, 5014, 5301, 5317, 5330, 5331; C.S. 1920, §§ 6125, 6141, 6146, 6280, 6281, 6284, 6573, 6589, 6602, 6603; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1603, 62-1616, 62-1617, 62-1805, 89-3309, 89-3325, 89-3330, 89-4006, 89-4007, 89-4010; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5009, 3-5025, 3-5030, 3-7406, 3-7407, 3-7410, 14-1205, 14-1403, 141-1416, 14-1417; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-234, 1-250, 1-255, 1-573, 1-592, 1-593, 1-697, 1-1005, 1-1006, 1-1009; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-109, 1-15-207 , 1-15-304 , 1-21-303, 1-21-322, 1-21-323, 1-21-1106, 1-31-107 , 1-34-108, 1-34-111; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-106. Discharge of improperly issued writs.

The defendant may at any time, upon notice to the plaintiff as the court may require, move the court in which the action is pending, to have a writ of attachment, replevin or garnishment discharged on the ground that it was improperly or irregularly issued. The court shall give the plaintiff reasonable opportunity to correct any defect in the complaint, affidavit, bond, writ or other proceeding so as to show that a legal cause for the writ existed at the time it was issued.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 141 to 143; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 562, 563; R.S. 1887, §§ 2910, 2911, 3357 to 3359; R.S. 1899, §§ 4029, 4030, 4468 to 4470; C.S. 1910, §§ 4888, 4889, 5331 to 5333; C.S. 1920, §§ 6158, 6159, 6603 to 6605; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1617 to 16-1619, 89-3341, 89-3343; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5042, 3-5043, 14-1417 to 14-1419; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-267, 1-268, 1-593 to 1-595; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-316, 1-21-323 to 1-21-325; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-107. Notice of exemptions; right to a hearing; procedures.

  1. Within five (5) days after the court receives  the person’s written request for a hearing, a person whose property  is attached or whose property is in the possession of another person  and is attached or garnished, and against whom no judgment has been  entered, is entitled to a hearing on the attaching party’s right to  the property. The sheriff shall mail to the person a copy of the order  of attachment or writ of garnishment and notice of the right to a  hearing under this section, at the time the order of attachment is  executed or the writ of garnishment is served on the garnishee. The  papers shall be sent by first class United States mail with the postage  prepaid and the envelopes furnished and properly addressed by the  plaintiff.
  2. The notice required by this section shall  inform the person of his right to request a hearing. The notice shall  inform him that certain benefits and property cannot be taken to pay  a debt and shall list the exempted benefits and property set forth  in paragraphs (i) through (x) of this subsection. The notice shall  also include a form for requesting a hearing and instructions that  if the person believes he is entitled to retain or recover the property  because it is exempt, or for any other reason, he should sign the  form requesting a hearing and return or mail the form to the office  of the clerk of court within ten (10) days after the date the notice  was mailed to him. The request for hearing form shall set forth the  following exemptions and provide a place for the person to designate  which exemptions he claims:
    1. Social security benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 407 and supplemental security income;
    2. Veteran’s benefits;
    3. Black lung benefits;
    4. Personal opportunities with employment  responsibilities (POWER) payments;
    5. Federal civil service and state retirement  system benefits as provided in 5 U.S.C. 8346 and W.S. 9-3-426 , 9-3-620 , 9-3-712 and 15-5-313 ;
    6. Worker’s compensation benefits;
    7. Unemployment compensation benefits;
    8. Earnings from personal services as defined  by W.S. 1-15-102(a)(vi);
    9. Homestead, personal articles and articles  used for carrying on a trade or business to the extent provided by W.S. 1-20-101 through 1-20-111 ;
    10. Other exemptions as provided by law.
  3. The notice shall state that there may  be additional exemptions not listed which may be applicable. Failure  by the person to claim an exemption on the request for hearing form  does not preclude him from claiming other exemptions or defenses at  a hearing on the matter. If a person fails to make a written request  for a hearing and claim exemptions pursuant to this section within  ten (10) days after the date the notice was mailed to him, the notice  shall state he may waive or lose his rights under this section.
  4. The sheriff may withhold execution of  the prejudgment writ of attachment or garnishment until the plaintiff  either provides the person’s last known address or a statement that  the plaintiff has no knowledge of the person’s last known address.  The sheriff shall have no duty under this section if the plaintiff  provides a statement that the plaintiff has no knowledge of the defendant’s  address.
  5. In the case of a post judgment writ of  garnishment, procedures for notice and hearing on a claim of exemptions  shall be as provided by W.S. 1-15-501 through 1-15-511 or 1-17-102 .

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 125; R.S. 1887, § 3541; R.S. 1899, § 4452; Laws 1905, ch. 38, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 5315; C.S. 1920, § 6587; R.S. 1931, § 62-1601; C.S. 1945, § 14-1401; W.S. 1957, § 1-571; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-119, 1-21-301 ; Laws 1985, ch. 194, §§ 1, 2; 1986, ch. 62, § 1; 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1997, ch. 196, § 1; 2010, ch. 69, § 301.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in (b)(v), substituted “9-3-620, 9-3-712 and 15-5-313 ” for “and 9-3-620 ,” and made a related change; and in (b)(ix), substituted “through 1-20-111 ” for “through 1-20-109 .”

Applied in

Lingle State Bank v. Podolak, 740 P.2d 392, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 480 (Wyo. 1987).

Cited in

Coones v. FDIC, 848 P.2d 783, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1993).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-15-108. Forms.

Affidavits, notices, writs and other forms for use in attachment, replevin, garnishment and continuing garnishment shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the supreme court of Wyoming.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Article 2. Attachment

Denial of grounds by affidavit casts additional burden on plaintiff. —

An additional burden of proof rests upon plaintiff when the grounds for attachment are positively denied by the defendant in an affidavit in support of a motion to discharge. Smith v. Varel Mfg. Co., 378 P.2d 680, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 1963) (decided under prior law).

He must show circumstances other than voluntary conveyance. —

To sustain an attachment on the ground of transfer with intent to defraud creditors against a motion to discharge there must be a showing of some circumstance other than a mere voluntary transfer, since that alone might be consistent with many facts indicating the transfer to be without the intent to defraud defendant's creditors. Smith v. Varel Mfg. Co., 378 P.2d 680, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 1963) (decided under prior law).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment § 1 et seq.

7 C.J.S. Attachment § 1 et seq.

§ 1-15-201. When attachment may issue; affidavit.

  1. Subject to W.S. 1-15-101 through 1-15-108 and the provisions of this article, at any time after  the filing of the complaint in a civil action for the recovery of  money, the plaintiff may have the property of the defendant not exempt  from execution attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment  that may be recovered.
  2. Before a writ of attachment is issued,  the plaintiff shall file with the court in which the action is pending  an affidavit stating:
    1. That the defendant is indebted to the  plaintiff, specifying the amount of the indebtedness over and above  all legal setoffs and the nature of the indebtedness;
    2. That the attachment is not sought to hinder,  delay or defraud any creditor of the defendant;
    3. That the payment of the indebtedness has  not been secured by any mortgage or lien upon real or personal property  in this state, or, if originally so secured, that the security has,  without any act of the plaintiff or the person to whom the security  was given, become impaired; and
    4. Any one (1) or more of the following grounds  for attachment:
      1. That the defendant is not a resident of  this state;
      2. That the defendant is a foreign corporation,  not qualified to do business in this state;
      3. That the defendant stands in defiance  of an officer, or conceals himself so that process cannot be served  upon him;
      4. That the defendant has assigned, removed,  disposed of or concealed, or is about to assign, remove, dispose of  or conceal, any of his property with intent to defraud his creditors;
      5. That the defendant has departed or is  about to depart from the state to the injury of his creditors;
      6. That the defendant fraudulently or criminally  contracted the debt or incurred the obligation respecting which the  action is brought.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 125, 128; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 521, 522; R.S. 1887, §§ 2869, 2870, 3541, 3544; Laws 1890, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3988, 3989, 4452, 4455; Laws 1905, ch. 38, § 1; C.S. 1910, §§ 4847, 4848, 5315, 5318; C.S. 1920, §§ 6117, 6118, 6587, 6590; Laws 1923, ch. 23, § 1; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1601, 62-1604, 89-3301, 89-3302; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5001, 3-5002, 14-1401, 14-1404; Laws 1955, ch. 77, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-226, 1-227, 1-571, 1-574; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-101 , 1-15-102 , 1-21-301 , 1-21-301 , 1-21-304; Laws 1985, ch. 194, § 2; 1986, ch. 62, § 1; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Statement in words of section initially sufficient. —

The supreme court has held a statement in the words employed by this section to be initially sufficient. Smith v. Varel Mfg. Co., 378 P.2d 680, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 1963).

Attachment affidavit following statutory language so closely as to present equivalent of statutory language is sufficient. Wakefield & Co. v. Bell, 42 Wyo. 355, 294 P. 785, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1930).

To sustain attachment on ground of transfer with intent to defraud creditors against a motion to discharge, the intent to cheat, defraud and delay the plaintiff-creditor must exist as a fact. Smith v. Varel Mfg. Co., 378 P.2d 680, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 1963).

Voluntary conveyance of property by debtor on verge of bankruptcy raises a presumption of an intention to defraud creditors, and unless the presumption is satisfactorily rebutted by the grantors, the conveyance will be ground for an attachment. Smith v. Varel Mfg. Co., 378 P.2d 680, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 1963).

Attachment lies for recovery of unliquidated damages. —

Under this section, authorizing issuance of an attachment in a civil action for recovery of money, an attachment will lie for the recovery of unliquidated damages for unlawful and forcible entry. Collins v. Stanley, 15 Wyo. 282, 88 P. 620, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1907) (decided under prior law).

But not where only part of debt fraudulently contracted. —

Under this section, an attachment will be dissolved when the evidence shows that only part of debt was fraudulently contracted. C.D. Smith Drug Co. v. Casper Drug Co., 5 Wyo. 510, 40 P. 979, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (1895), rehearing denied, 5 Wyo. 520, 42 P. 213 (Wyo. 1895) (decided under prior law).

Support garnishments have priority. —

Support garnishments have priority and where they result in the withholding of 25 percent or more of an employee's disposable earnings, creditor garnishment is impermissible. Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes a fraudulently contracted debt or fraudulently incurred liability or obligation within purview of statute authorizing attachment on such grounds, 39 ALR2d 1265.

Proof of a fraudulently contracted debt or fraudulently incurred liability or obligation within purview of statute authorizing attachment on such grounds, 39 ALR2d 1265.

Joint bank account as subject to attachment, garnishment, or execution by creditor of one joint depositor, 86 ALR5th 527.

§ 1-15-202. Issuance of writ; contents.

  1. If authorized by a written order of the  court pursuant to W.S. 1-15-103(a)(i), the clerk shall issue the writ of attachment upon the  filing by the plaintiff of the bond required by W.S. 1-15-104 .
  2. The plaintiff may have other writs of  attachment issued as often as he may require at any time before judgment,  based upon the original affidavit and bond, if the amount of the bond  is sufficient.
  3. In actions pending in district court or  circuit court several writs may be issued at the same time to the  sheriff of any county.
  4. The writ shall be issued in the name of  the state of Wyoming and shall be directed to the sheriff of any county  in which property of the defendant is located and shall require him  to attach and safely keep all the property of the defendant within  his jurisdiction not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as  may be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s demand, the amount of  which shall be stated in conformity with the complaint.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 127; Laws 1884, ch. 52, § 1; 1886, ch. 60, §§ 524, 525; R.S. 1887, §§ 2872, 2873, 3543; Laws 1895, ch. 4, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3991, 3992, 4454; C.S. 1910, §§ 4850, 4861, 5317; C.S. 1920, §§ 6120, 6121, 6589; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1603, 89-3304, 89-3305; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5004, 3-5005, 14-1403; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-229, 1-230, 1-573; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-104 , 1-15-105 , 1-21-303; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 2000, ch. 24, § 4.

Cross references. —

As to property exempt from execution or attachment generally, see chapter 20 of this title.

As to exemption of interest in prepaid or prearranged funeral contracts, see § 26-32-102 .

For provision that the seal of a notary public shall not be levied upon or sold, see § 32-1-106 .

For provision that funds held in perpetual care with reference to cemeteries shall not be liable to attachment, garnishment or other processes, see § 35-8-103 .

Debtor lacked standing to contend section is unconstitutional because it allows the clerk of court to issue a writ of attachment, where the writ of attachment in her case was issued by the district judge, not the clerk of court. Sturman v. First Nat'l Bank, 729 P.2d 667, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 646 (Wyo. 1986).

Writ of attachment is jurisdictional to obtain jurisdiction of the subject matter. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

Fact writ of attachment was made returnable on same day on which it was issued was not fatal where the garnishee appeared and answered in the case and made no motion to quash the service, thus waiving the defect. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

Writ of prohibition. —

Where goods have been seized on attachment, judgment rendered and goods ordered sold, supreme court will not issue writ of prohibition even though the district court had no jurisdiction. Dobson v. Westheimer, 5 Wyo. 34, 36 P. 626, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1894).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Enforcement of Civil Liability for Non-Support in the State of Wyoming,” see 8 Wyo. L.J. 227 (1954).

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Sufficiency of affidavit respecting intent to defraud as against objection that it is a mere legal conclusion, 8 ALR2d 578.

§ 1-15-203. Manner of executing writ.

  1. If the undertaking provided for in W.S. 1-15-105(a) is not given by the defendant at or before the time the  writ is executed, the sheriff to whom the writ is directed shall execute  the writ without delay in the following manner:
    1. Real property owned in the name of the  defendant shall be attached by filing with the county clerk a copy  of the writ, together with a description of the property attached,  and a notice that it is attached, and by leaving a copy of the writ,  description and notice with an occupant of the property, or if there  is no occupant, by posting the copy of the writ, description and notice  in a conspicuous place on the property attached;
    2. Growing crops, which until severed shall  be deemed personal property not capable of manual delivery, growing  upon real property owned in the name of the defendant shall be attached  by filing with the county clerk a copy of the writ, together with  a description of the growing crops to be attached, and of the real  property upon which the crops are growing, and a notice that the growing  crops are attached in pursuance of the writ, and by leaving a copy  of the writ, description and notice with an occupant of the real property,  or if there is no occupant, by posting the copy of the writ, description  and notice in a conspicuous place on the real property;
    3. Real property or an interest therein belonging  to the defendant and held in the name of any other person, shall be  attached by filing with the county clerk a copy of the writ, together  with a description of the property and a notice that the real property  and any interest of the defendant therein held in the name of the  other person, naming him, are attached, and by leaving with the occupant,  if any, and with the named person or his agent, if known and within  the county, or at the residence of either, if within the county, a  copy of the writ, with a similar description and notice. If there  is no occupant of the property, a copy of the writ, together with  the description and notice, shall be posted in a conspicuous place  upon the property. When filed, the county clerk shall index the attachment  in the names of the defendant and of the person in whose name the  real property is held;
    4. Growing crops, which until severed, shall  be deemed personal property not capable of manual delivery, or any  interest therein belonging to the defendant, and growing upon real  property held in the name of any other person, shall be attached in  the same manner as crops growing upon real property held in the name  of the defendant are attached under paragraph (ii) of this subsection.  The notice of attachment shall state that the crops therein described  or any interest of the defendant therein, held by, or standing upon  the records of the county in the name of such other person, naming  him, are attached pursuant to the writ. In addition, a copy of the  writ, description and notice shall be delivered to such other person,  or his agent, if known and within the county, or left at the residence  of either, if known and within the county. When filed, the county  clerk shall index the attachment in the names of the defendant and  of the person in whose name the real property is held;
    5. Personal property capable of manual delivery  shall be attached by taking it into custody;
    6. Stocks or shares, or interest in stocks  or shares, of any corporation or company shall be attached as provided  by W.S. 1-19-101 through 1-19-108 ;
    7. Personal property not capable of manual  delivery shall be attached by leaving a copy of the writ with the  person having the property in his possession if he can be found, and  by placing a conspicuous notice of levy on the property;
    8. Personal property, other than earnings  from personal services as defined by W.S. 1-15-102(a)(vi), in the possession of another person shall be attached  by service of a writ of garnishment as provided by W.S. 1-15-401 through 1-15-425 ;
    9. If there are several attachments against  the same defendant in different actions, they shall be executed in  the order in which they are received by the sheriff.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 129; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 527, 528, 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2875, 2876, 2878 to 2882, 3545; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3994, 3995, 3997 to 4001, 4456; C.S. 1910, §§ 4853, 4854, 4856 to 4860, 5319; C.S. 1920, §§ 6123, 6124, 6126 to 6130, 6591; Laws 1921, ch. 14, § 1; 1925, ch. 92, § 1; 1931, ch. 73, § 106; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1605, 89-3307, 89-3308, 89-3310 to 89-3314, §§ 3-5007, 3-5008, 3-5010 to 3-5014, 14-1405; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-232, 1-233, 1-235 to 1-239, 1-575; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-107 , 1-15-108 , 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-21-305; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Execution on fraudulently transferred property. —

Ordinarily, a creditor cannot attach property rightfully in custody of his deceased debtor's administrator, but this cannot apply where debtor is living and creditor attaches property fraudulently transferred by debtor to one who died while in possession of the property. Flaks, Inc. v. De Berry, 53 Wyo. 203, 79 P.2d 825, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1938).

Priority in time of service of writ of attachment determines superiority of conflicting attachments or garnishments of the same indebtedness. Great Falls Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 353 F.2d 348, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 3762 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1965).

§ 1-15-204. Third party claims; indemnity to sheriff; application for release.

  1. If the sheriff executing the writ has  actual notice of any third party claim to the personal property to  be levied on or is in doubt as to ownership of the property, or of  encumbrances thereon, or damage to the property held that may result  by reason of its perishable character, he may require the plaintiff  to file with the sheriff a surety bond, indemnifying the sheriff against  any loss or damage by reason of the illegality of any holding or sale  on execution, or by reason of damage to any personal property held  under attachment. Unless a lesser amount is acceptable to the sheriff,  the bond shall be in double the amount of the estimated value of the  property to be seized.
  2. Any person not a party to the action,  who claims ownership or right to possession of property attached,  may, at any time, either before or after judgment, be made a party  on his application for the purpose of removing or discharging the  attachment. The court may grant summary relief as is just, and may  in proper cases try appropriate issues by jury.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 135; Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 558; R.S. 1887, §§ 2906, 3551; R.S. 1899, §§ 4025, 4462; C.S. 1910, §§ 4884, 5325; C.S. 1920, §§ 6154, 6597; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1611, 89-3338; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5038, 14-411; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-263, 1-587; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-312, 1-21-317; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Intervention. —

A claimant to money garnisheed or property attached cannot intervene and be made a party in an action to which the attachment or garnishment is auxiliary. Stanley v. Foote, 9 Wyo. 335, 63 P. 940, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1901) (decided under prior law).

Where intervener claimed an attached automobile and introduced evidence without objection, court had jurisdiction to pass upon questions raised by intervention. Steffy v. Teton Truck Line Co., 44 Wyo. 345, 11 P.2d 1082, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1932) (decided under prior law).

Costs. —

Where petition is dismissed costs may be assessed against party attempting to intervene. Stanley v. Foote, 9 Wyo. 335, 63 P. 940, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1901) (decided under prior law).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Statutory provisions restricting registration of conditional sales contracts in case of residence of other states as affecting priority of lien of conditional vendor over lien of attaching creditor of conditional vendee, 10 ALR2d 764.

Right of garnishee, other than bank holding deposit, to set off claims not due or certain when garnishment is served, 57 ALR2d 700.

Right of successful intervenor or claimant of property to attorney's fees for wrongful attachment, 65 ALR2d 1426.

Right of attachment or judgment creditor, or officer standing in his shoes, to attack older lien or security interest for usury, 70 ALR2d 1409.

Post-Snidach status of banker's right to set off bank's claim against depositor's funds, 65 ALR3d 1284.

§ 1-15-205. Return of sheriff; inventory of property.

The sheriff shall return the writ of attachment to the court within twenty (20) days after its receipt, together with a certificate of his actions endorsed thereon or attached thereto. The certificate shall contain a full inventory of the property attached.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 133, 144; Laws 1879, ch. 48, § 2; 1886, ch. 60, §§ 526, 537; R.S. 1887, §§ 2874, 2885, 3549, 3560; R.S. 1899, §§ 3993, 4004, 4460, 4471; C.S. 1910, §§ 4852, 4863, 5323, 5334; C.S. 1920, §§ 6122, 6133, 6595, 6606; Laws 1927, ch. 76, § 1; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1609, 62-1620, 89-3306, 89-3317; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5006, 3-5017, 14-1409, 14-1421; w.S. 1957, §§ 1-231, 1-242, 1-585, 1-597; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-106 , 1-15-117, 1-21-315, 1-21-327; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Notice of garnishment to be endorsed on original writ. —

Under this section, the fact that notice of garnishment has been given should be endorsed on the original writ of attachment. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

Waiver of nonjurisdictional defects. —

Defects in the sheriff's return were not, under the facts as disclosed by the record, jurisdictional and were waived when the garnishee appeared and answered generally. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

§ 1-15-206. Examination of defendant.

The defendant may be required to appear before the court or a master appointed by the court, to be examined on oath respecting his property. After any examination conducted pursuant to this section, the court or master may order personal property capable of manual delivery to be delivered to the officer, on any terms as are just, having reference to any liens on or claims against the personal property, and may require a memorandum of the amount and description of all other personal property. The court shall make provision for witness fees and mileage as is just.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 132; R.S. 1887, § 3548; R.S. 1899, § 4459; C.S. 1910, § 5322; C.S. 1920, § 6594; R.S. 1931, § 62-1608; C.S. 1945, § 14-1408; W.S. 1957, § 1-578; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-21-308; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

§ 1-15-207. Sale of attached property before judgment.

  1. If any of the property attached is perishable,  the sheriff shall sell it in the manner in which property is sold  on execution. The sheriff shall retain the proceeds and other property  attached by him to answer any judgment that may be recovered in the  action, unless released or discharged, or subjected to execution upon  another judgment recovered previous to issuing the attachment.
  2. When property has been taken by an officer  under a writ of attachment and the court is satisfied that the interest  of the parties to the action will be served by a sale, the court may  order the property sold in the same manner as property sold under  an execution, and the proceeds deposited in the court to be disbursed  pursuant to the judgment in the action. The order shall be made only  upon notice to the adverse party if the party has been personally  served or has entered an appearance in the action.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 134; Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 544; R.S. 1887, §§ 2892, 3550; R.S. 1899, §§ 4011, 4461; C.S. 1910, §§ 4870, 5324; C.S. 1920, §§ 6140, 6596; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1610, 89-3324; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5024, 14-1410; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-249, 1-586; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-206 , 1-21-316; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and effect of provision for execution sale on short notice, or sale in advance of judgment under writ of attachment, where property involved is subject to decay or depreciation, 3 ALR3d 593.

§ 1-15-208. Satisfaction of judgment; deficiency; redelivery of property.

  1. If judgment is recovered by the plaintiff,  the sheriff shall satisfy it out of the attached property which has  not been delivered to the defendant or to a claimant pursuant to W.S. 1-15-105 , or subjected to a prior lien, by paying to the plaintiff  the proceeds of all sales of perishable property sold by the sheriff,  or of any debts or credits collected by the sheriff or as much as  is necessary to satisfy the judgment. If any balance remains due and  an execution has issued on the judgment, the sheriff shall sell under  the execution so much of the property, real or personal, as may be  necessary to satisfy the balance, if enough real or personal property  for that purpose remains in his hands. Notice of the sales shall be  given and the sales shall be conducted as in other cases of sales  on execution.
  2. After selling all the property attached  by the sheriff which remains in his hands, the sheriff shall deduct  his fees and apply the proceeds and any debts or credits collected  by him, to the payment of the judgment. If any balance remains due  on the judgment, the sheriff shall proceed to collect it as upon an  execution in other cases. When the judgment is paid in full, the sheriff  upon reasonable demand, shall deliver to the defendant the attached  property remaining in his hands and any proceeds of the property attached  not applied to the judgment.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 136, 137; Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 555; R.S. 1887, §§ 2903, 3552, 3553; R.S. 1899, §§ 4022, 4463, 4464; C.S. 1910, § 4881, 5326, 5327; C.S. 1920, §§ 6151, 6598, 6599, R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1612, 62-1613, 89-3335; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5035, 14-1412, 14-1413; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-260, 1-588, 1-589; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-309, 1-21-318, 1-21-319; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to levy and sale following execution, see §§ 1-17-310 through 1-17-341 .

As to seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of judgment, see Rule 64, W.R.C.P.

Order of sale of attached property may be made subsequent to entry of final judgment for plaintiff. First Nat'l Bank v. Sorenson, 30 Wyo. 136, 217 P. 948, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1923).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Estoppel of or waiver by parties or participants as to irregularities or defects in sale, 2 A.L.R.2d 6.

§ 1-15-209. Proceedings where defendant prevails.

If the plaintiff does not recover judgment against the defendant, any undertaking received in the action, all the proceeds of sales and money collected by the sheriff and all the property attached remaining in his hands shall be delivered to the defendant, and the attachment shall be discharged and the property released therefrom.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 139; Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 554; R.S. 1887, §§ 2902, 3555; R.S. 1899, §§ 4021, 4466; C.S. 1910, §§ 4880, 5329; C.S. 1920, §§ 6150, 6601; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1615, 89-3334; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5034, 14-1415; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-259, 1-591; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-308, 1-21-321; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-210. Release of attachment upon real property.

If the plaintiff does not recover judgment or an order is made discharging or releasing an attachment upon real property, a certified copy of the judgment or order shall be filed and indexed in the office of the county clerk in which the notice of attachment has been filed.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-211. Attachment before maturity of claim.

A party may commence an action upon an obligation before it is due and have an attachment against the property of the debtor upon any one (1) or more of the grounds set forth in W.S. 1-15-201(b)(iv)(D) through (F). The property attached, or its proceeds, shall be held subject to the judgment to be rendered, but no judgment shall be rendered on the claim until the obligation becomes due.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 564 to 570; R.S. 1887, §§ 2912 to 2918; R.S. 1899, §§ 4031 to 4037; C.S. 1910, §§ 4890 to 4896; C.S. 1920, §§ 6160 to 6166; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3401 to 89-3407; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5101 to 3-5107; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-269 to 1-275; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-401 to 1-15-407 ; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Actions must be done to hinder, delay and defraud creditors. —

In attachment proceedings before debt due under this section, disposal or threatened disposal or removal of property or intended nonresidence of defendant, specified as grounds for attachment, must be done to hinder, delay and defraud creditors, the gist of the matter being the fraudulent intent. Bank of Commerce v. Latham, 8 Wyo. 316, 57 P. 184, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1899).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What amounts to debt within statute providing for attachment before debt is due, 58 ALR2d 1451.

What sort of claim, obligation or liability is within contemplation of statute providing for attachment before debt or liability is due, 58 ALR2d 1451.

§ 1-15-212. Property bound from time of service.

An order of attachment binds the property attached from the time the writ is executed.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 538; R.S. 1887, § 2886; R.S. 1899, § 4005; C.S. 1910, § 4864; C.S. 1920, § 6134; Laws 1927, ch. 30, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 89-3318; C.S. 1945, § 3-5018; W.S. 1957, § 1-243; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-15-118; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

Most of the following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

The issuing court acquires jurisdiction of the debt upon service of writ of attachment on garnishee. Great Falls Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 353 F.2d 348, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 3762 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1965).

And garnishee thereupon becomes liable to garnishor to extent of debt until discharged or any judgment recovered is satisfied. Great Falls Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 353 F.2d 348, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 3762 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1965).

An attachment creates a lien under the provisions of this section. Platte County State Bank v. Frantz, 33 Wyo. 326, 239 P. 531, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1925).

And garnishee becomes liable to plaintiff from time of service of the writ, to the amount of any property or indebtedness belonging to or due to the defendant, and is required to make answer to the writ showing such property or debt. Service of the writ upon the garnishee makes the garnishee liable for such property, and not the return, which the officer is required to make to the court of the action taken by him in the service of the writ. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

A garnishment is virtually a process of attachment, and a garnishee is bound from the time of service. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

It gives the creditor a paramount right, although not necessarily title, to property as a security for his demand. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

Lien rendered complete. —

The filing of suit by lienor, coupled with the subsequent garnishment proceedings, resulting in deposit of the funds, rendered lienor's lien choate in that: (a) the lienor was established; (b) the property subject to the lien had been established and, in fact, seized and placed in the court's custody; and (c) the amount of the lien, excluding fees and interest, had been established by oral judgment. United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

Priority in time of service of writ of attachment determines superiority of conflicting attachments or garnishments of the same indebtedness. Great Falls Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 353 F.2d 348, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 3762 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1965).

Priority of mechanic's lien. —

While it is correct that an attachment writ predicated upon a valid judgment properly served creates a lien, except in cases to set aside fraudulent conveyances, this section exempts such property in the hands of the garnishee as may be by law exempt from execution, and thus, a mechanic's lien has priority. Permian Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 68, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 5581 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1974).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Article 3. Replevin

Editor's notes. —

Most of the following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

In general. —

Whereas in replevin at common law, judgment could only be for return of the property, by statute an undertaking is given as substitute for the property, and is to be charged with the judgment. Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 2 Wyo. 170, 1879 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1879), writ of error dismissed, 105 U.S. 263, 26 L. Ed. 1021, 1881 U.S. LEXIS 2118 (U.S. 1882).

Replevin has not been displaced by Uniform Commercial Code. Brown v. Green, 618 P.2d 140, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1980).

Jurisdiction in replevin action. —

There is no basis for contention that court obtains jurisdiction in replevin action only when replevin writ or order for delivery has been issued. Deschenes v. Beall, 61 Wyo. 39, 154 P.2d 524, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1945).

Writ, defect in. —

Lack of signature on writ of replevin does not make it void, but it may be amended and defect may be waived by appearance in case without first making an objection. Deschenes v. Beall, 61 Wyo. 39, 154 P.2d 524, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1945).

Proof of defendant's title. —

Where court refused to permit defendant to prove his title to the property under the pleadings, but allowed him to amend the answer in order that court might admit such evidence, court did not err. Gregory v. Morris, 1 Wyo. 213, 1875 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1875), aff'd, 96 U.S. 619, 24 L. Ed. 740, 1877 U.S. LEXIS 1706 (U.S. 1878).

Judgment for damages. —

In an action of replevin, it was proper for court to render a judgment for damages without giving the defendant the alternative right to return of property. Montana & W. Oil Co. v. Gibson, 19 Wyo. 1, 113 P. 784, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1911).

Alternative judgments. —

Judgment in replevin suit in alternative for return of property to plaintiff's possession or for money judgment for value of property was improper as to part of the judgment allowing money recovery, in lieu of property; proper judgment being for recovery of the goods with damages under this section. Finance Corp. of Wyoming v. Commercial Credit Co., 41 Wyo. 198, 283 P. 1100, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1930).

Proof of damages. —

It was error to allow plaintiff damages in addition to recovery of property, under this section, where there was no proof submitted of damages. Finance Corp. of Wyoming v. Commercial Credit Co., 41 Wyo. 198, 283 P. 1100, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1930).

Measure of damages. —

The right of a defendant to damages, and the measure and extent of the right, depends on the particular statute authorizing such recovery, and the difference in language between this section and preceding section cannot be held to exclude a defendant from recovery of damages for illegal detention. Hunt v. Thompson, 19 Wyo. 523, 120 P. 181, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1912).

Compensatory damages. —

The principle upon which compensatory damages are assessed is that compensation for injury shall be commensurate with loss, so that under this section, which provides that a defendant in replevin upon a finding in his favor may have such an assessment of damages as is “right and proper,” a successful defendant is authorized to recover damages for wrongful detention where he would not otherwise be fully compensated. Hunt v. Thompson, 19 Wyo. 523, 120 P. 181, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1912).

Actual damages. —

In action for amount due on note secured by mortgage on personal property, for unlawful detention of property, and foreclosure of mortgage, tried on theory that action was in replevin, defendant was entitled to recover actual damages for taking of the property, under this section, if there was no default that gave plaintiff right to possession of the property. Jones v. Parker, 39 Wyo. 423, 273 P. 687, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1929).

Attorneys' fees not generally allowed in replevin. —

Generally, there can be no recovery of attorneys' fees as damages by the prevailing party in replevin, but where there is fraud, malice, oppression or wilful wrong in the bringing of the action there is an exception to the general rule, and attorneys' fees will be allowed. Olds v. Hosford, 354 P.2d 947, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 1960), reh'g denied, 359 P.2d 406, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1961).

But when allowance is proper overall amount should be determined and thereafter apportioned. —

Where the circumstances of the case make the award of attorneys' fees proper, an overall, reasonable attorneys' fee should be first determined, followed by such apportionment of that fee among the several defending interests as is found to be just and equitable under all circumstances. Olds v. Hosford, 354 P.2d 947, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 1960), reh'g denied, 359 P.2d 406, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1961).

And judgment may not be entered for amount larger than that prayed for. —

In no event may a judgment be entered for attorneys' fees in an amount larger than the sums prayed for by the respective defendants. Olds v. Hosford, 354 P.2d 947, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 1960), reh'g denied, 359 P.2d 406, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1961).

Instructions. —

Where court charged, when property claimed is not taken or is returned to defendant by sheriff for want of undertaking, action may proceed as one for damages only and plaintiff shall be entitled to such damages as are right and proper, court may give other, not inconsistent, instructions limiting and fixing amount. Hein v. Marcante, 57 Wyo. 81, 113 P.2d 940, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1941).

Though district court erred in refusing to give instruction requested by defendant to the jury, where in replevin action jury found for defendant, the latter cannot be injured by the refusal, and supreme court will not interfere with the judgment. Alsop v. Hutton, 1 Wyo. 284, 1876 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1876).

Defective verdict. —

Verdict in replevin action was not defective because it failed to find that defendant had right of property or possession. Jones v. Parker, 39 Wyo. 423, 273 P. 687, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1929).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

66 Am. Jur. 2d Replevin § 1 et seq.

77 C.J.S. Replevin § 1 et seq.

§ 1-15-301. Possession of personal property pending action.

Subject to W.S. 1-15-101 through 1-15-108 , after filing the complaint and at any time before judgment, the plaintiff in an action to recover the possession of personal property may claim the delivery of the property to him as provided in this article.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 672, 680; R.S. 1887, § 3020; R.S. 1899, § 4145; C.S. 1910, § 5005; C.S. 1920, § 6275; R.S. 1931, § 89-4001; C.S. 1945, § 3-7401; W.S. 1957, § 1-1000; Laws 1973, ch. 214, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-101 ; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Cited in

Coones v. FDIC, 848 P.2d 783, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1993); Sheridan Com. Park v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1993).

§ 1-15-302. Affidavit.

  1. When delivery is claimed, the plaintiff  shall file with the court an affidavit stating:
    1. A description of the property claimed;
    2. The plaintiff is the owner of the property  or has a special ownership or interest in it, stating the facts in  relation to it, and that he is entitled to the possession of it;
    3. The property is wrongfully detained by  the adverse party;
    4. The alleged cause of the detention of  the property according to the best knowledge, information and belief  of the affiant;
    5. The property has not been taken for a  tax, assessment or fine pursuant to a statute, or seized under an  execution or an attachment against the property of the plaintiff,  or if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from seizure; and
    6. The actual value of the property.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 107; Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 673; R.S. 1887, §§ 3021, 3523; Laws 1890-91, ch. 91, § 2; ch. 96, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 4146, 4435; C.S. 1910, §§ 5006, 5298; C.S. 1920, §§ 6276, 6570; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1802, 89-4002; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-7402, 14-1202; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-694, 1-1001; Laws 1973, ch. 214, § 2; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-21-1102 , 1-34-102; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-15-303. Issuance of writ; undertaking; service.

  1. If authorized by a written order of the  court pursuant to W.S. 1-15-103(a)(i), and upon the filing by plaintiff of the bond required  by W.S. 1-15-104 , the clerk shall issue the writ of replevin.
  2. The writ shall be issued in the name of  the state of Wyoming and shall require the sheriff to take the property  described in the affidavit and retain it in his custody until delivered  as provided in this article. The sheriff shall execute the writ and  without delay serve on the defendant a copy of the affidavit, undertaking  and writ. If personal service cannot be made upon the defendant service  shall be made by depositing a copy of the papers in the United States  mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the defendant at his last known  address.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 108, 109; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 674, 676; R.S. 1887, §§ 3022, 3024, 3524, 3525; Laws 1890-91, ch. 91, §§ 3, 4; R.S. 1899, §§ 4147, 4149, 4436, 4437; C.S. 1910, §§ 5007, 5009, 5299, 5300; C.S. 1920, §§ 6277, 6279, 6571, 6572; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1803, 62-1804, 89-4003, 89-4005; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-7403, 3-7404, 14-1203, 14-1204; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-695, 1-696, 1-1002, 1-1004; Laws 1973, ch. 173, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-21-1104, 1-21-1105, 1-34-104, 1-34-106; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-304. Delivery of property.

Subject to the provisions of W.S. 1-15-103(a)(viii) and 1-15-306 , property seized under a writ of replevin shall be delivered by the sheriff to the plaintiff unless returned to the defendant pursuant to W.S. 1-15-104(c) or 1-15-105 .

History. Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Law reviews. —

See case note, “Constitutional Law — Due Process — Replevin — Right to Notice and Hearing Prior to Deprivation of Property. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 42 (1972),” VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 315 (1973).

§ 1-15-305. Return of sheriff.

The sheriff shall return the writ to the court within twenty (20) days after its receipt, together with a certificate of his actions endorsed thereon or attached thereto.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 675; R.S. 1887, § 3023; R.S. 1899, § 4148; C.S. 1910, § 5008; C.S. 1920, § 6278; R.S. 1931, § 89-4004; C.S. 1945, § 3-7404; W.S. 1957, § 1-1003; Laws 1973, ch. 214, § 2; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-105; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-306. Claim to property by third party.

If property taken under a writ of replevin is claimed by any person other than the defendant, and the claimant serves on the sheriff an affidavit stating the grounds of the claimant’s title or right to possession, the sheriff is not bound to keep the property or deliver it to the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff files with the sheriff a surety bond, indemnifying the sheriff against any loss or damage by reason of the illegality of any holding or delivery or by reason of damage to any personal property held under the writ of replevin. Unless a lesser amount is acceptable to the sheriff, the bond shall be in double the amount of the estimated value of the property seized.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Article 4. Garnishment

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment § 1 et seq.

Garnishee's duty to give debtor notice of garnishment prior to delivery of money without judgment against the garnishee on the debt, 36 ALR4th 824.

38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 1 et seq.

§ 1-15-401. Availability of writ of garnishment.

  1. Subject to W.S. 1-15-101 through 1-15-108 , a plaintiff or judgment creditor may obtain a writ of  garnishment as provided in this article.
  2. A prejudgment writ of garnishment is available  as a means of attachment of tangible or intangible property, other  than earnings from personal services of the defendant, at any time  after the filing of a complaint and before judgment, in cases in which  a writ of attachment is available under W.S. 1-15-201 .
  3. A post judgment writ of garnishment is  available to satisfy a money judgment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; Laws 1901, ch. 95, § 1; C.S. 1910, §§ 4794, 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6064, 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4801, 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-430; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-17-501 ; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

Support garnishments have priority. —

Support garnishments have priority and where they result in the withholding of 25 percent or more of an employee's disposable earnings, creditor garnishments are impermissible. Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Understanding the Tort of Third-Party Bad Faith in Wyoming: Western Casualty & Surety Company v. Fowler Revisited,” see XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. 635 (1991).

§ 1-15-402. Property subject to garnishment.

Any writ of garnishment may be used to levy upon or affect the accrued credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in action, money and other personal property and rights to property of the defendant in the possession of a third person, or under the control or constituting a performance obligation of any third person, whether due or yet to become due at the time of service of the writ of garnishment, which are not exempt from garnishment or execution under any applicable provisions of state or federal law.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Garnishment of funds payable under building and construction contract, 16 ALR5th 548.

Joint bank account as subject to attachment, garnishment, or execution by creditor of one joint depositor, 86 ALR5th 527.

§ 1-15-403. Affidavit for writ of prejudgment garnishment.

  1. Before a writ of prejudgment garnishment  is issued, the plaintiff shall file with the court in which the action  is pending an affidavit stating:
    1. The facts showing that plaintiff’s claim  is one upon which attachment is authorized by W.S. 1-15-201 ;
    2. The grounds and cause for the garnishment;
    3. That the plaintiff has good reason to  believe that the defendant has nonexempt credits, chattels, goods,  effects, debts, choses in action or other personal property or rights  to obligations of performance in the possession or in the control  or otherwise owing from one (1) or more specified third persons that  plaintiff seeks to charge as garnishees or that such third persons  are indebted to the defendant; and
    4. That the property, rights or debts are  not earnings for the personal services of the defendant, or otherwise  exempt from garnishment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-15-404. Issuance of writ of prejudgment garnishment.

If authorized by a written order of the court pursuant to W.S. 1-15-103(a)(i), the clerk shall issue one (1) or more writs of prejudgment garnishment upon the filing by the plaintiff of the bond required by W.S. 1-15-104 .

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-405. Issuance of writ of post judgment garnishment; multiple writs.

  1. After the entry of a judgment requiring  the payment of money, the clerk of the court from which execution  could issue shall, upon application of the plaintiff, issue one (1)  or more writs of post judgment garnishment. The writ may be issued  without the necessity for a bond.
  2. Several writs may be issued at the same  time and the names of as many persons as are sought to be charged  as garnishees may be inserted in the same writ or different writs.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 87; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 475, 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2823, 2878 to 2882, 3508; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3943, 3997 to 4001, 4420; Laws 1901, ch. 95, § 1; C.S. 1910, §§ 4794, 4802, 4856 to 4860, 5283; C.S. 1920, §§ 6064, 6072, 6126 to 6130, 6555; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1305, 89-3109, 89-3117, 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4705, 3-4801, 3-5010 to 3-5014, 14-905; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-414, 1-430, 1-645; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-17-405 , 1-17-501 , 1-21-505 ; Laws 1985, ch. 144, § 2; 1986, ch. 62, § 1; 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

§ 1-15-406. Content of writ of prejudgment or post judgment garnishment; to whom directed.

A writ of prejudgment or post judgment garnishment shall be issued in the name of the state of Wyoming and shall be directed to the person or persons designated in the plaintiff’s affidavit as garnishee. The writ shall advise each person that until further order of the court or until the garnishee has complied with the requirements of W.S. 1-15-407(c), he is attached as garnishee in the action, command him not to pay any debt due or to become due to the defendant which is not exempt from execution and to retain possession and control of all credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in action, money and personal property and rights to property of the defendant not exempt from execution.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 130; Laws 1882, ch. 59, § 1; 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882, 3546; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001, 4457; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860, 5320; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130, 6592; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1606, 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014, 14-1406; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-576; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1993, ch. 110, § 1.

Cited in

Zaloudek v. Zaloudek, 2010 WY 169, 245 P.3d 336, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Dec. 21, 2010).

§ 1-15-407. Answer of garnishee; release of garnishee.

  1. A writ of prejudgment or post judgment  garnishment shall require the garnishee to file with the court a verified  answer within ten (10) days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal  holidays, from the date of service of the writ. The answer of the  garnishee shall state:
    1. Whether the garnishee is indebted to the  defendant, either in property or in money, whether the same is now  due and, if not, when it is to become due;
    2. Whether the garnishee has in his possession,  custody or control any credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses  in action, money or other personal property belonging to the defendant,  or in which the defendant has an interest, and if so, the description  and value of the same;
    3. Whether the garnishee knows of any debts  owing to the defendant or of any credits, chattels, goods, effects,  debts, choses in action, money or other personal property belonging  to the defendant or in which defendant has an interest, whether in  the possession or under the control of the garnishee or another, and  if so, the particulars thereof;
    4. If the defendant is an employee of the  garnishee, the defendant’s job title, position or occupation, the  defendant’s rate and method of compensation, his pay period and the  computation of the amount of the defendant’s accrued disposable earnings  attached by the writ;
    5. Whether the garnishee, pursuant to W.S. 1-15-417 , is retaining or deducting any amount in satisfaction  of a claim the garnishee has against the plaintiff or the defendant,  a designation as to whom the claim relates and the amount retained  or deducted.
  2. The garnishee shall mail a copy of his  answer to the plaintiff and defendant if, at the time he is served  with the writ, the garnishee is furnished with stamped envelopes addressed  to the parties.
  3. The garnishee shall be released from the  writ of garnishment not later than thirty (30) days after service  of the writ on the garnishee, unless sooner released by order of the  court, provided, that the garnishee has first filed with the court  the verified answer required by subsection (a) of this section and  delivered to the court all of the defendant’s credits, chattels, goods,  effects, debts, choses in action, money, personal property and rights  to property not exempt from execution, in the possession of the garnishee  or coming into his possession within thirty (30) days after service  of the writ.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 87, 132; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 475, 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2823, 2878 to 2882, 3508, 3548; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3943, 3997 to 4001, 4420, 4459; Laws 1901, ch. 95, § 1; C.S. 1910, §§ 4794, 4802, 4856 to 4860, 5283, 5322; C.S. 1920, §§ 6064, 6072, 6126 to 6130, 6555, 6594; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1305, 62-1608, 89-3109, 89-3117, 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4705, 3-4801, 3-5010 to 3-5014, 14-905, 14-1408; Laws 1957, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-414, 1-430, 1-578, 1-645; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-17-405 , 1-17-501 , 1-21-308, 1-21-505 ; Laws 1985, ch. 184, § 2; 1986, ch. 62, § 1; 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 42, § 1; 1993, ch. 110, § 1.

§ 1-15-408. Garnishment of earnings for personal services.

  1. A writ of post judgment garnishment attaching earnings for personal services shall attach that portion of the defendant’s accrued and unpaid disposable earnings, specified in subsection (b) of this section. The writ shall direct the garnishee to withhold from the defendant’s accrued disposable earnings the amount attached pursuant to the writ and to pay the exempted amount to the defendant at the time his earnings are normally paid. A defendant’s disposable earnings shall remain exempt to the extent provided in subsection (b) of this section if the earnings were deposited in the defendant’s account with a financial institution within twenty (20) calendar days prior to service of a writ of garnishment against the defendant’s account with the financial institution, on the day of service of the writ or within ten (10) business days after service of the writ. This subsection does not create any obligation on the part of a financial institution to conduct an investigation of the defendant’s account or otherwise make any determination about a judgment creditor’s rights to funds in the account other than the financial institution’s obligation to file with the court and serve on the defendant an answer to the writ of garnishment. A judgment creditor may request that the court issue writs of garnishment to a defendant’s employer and the defendant’s financial institution at the same time; provided, however, that should the judgment creditor successfully garnish earnings as shown on a defendant’s pay advice, then the remaining proceeds from such pay advice deposited into an account with a financial institution shall be entirely exempt from execution, notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section. Earnings for personal services shall be deemed to accrue on the last day of the period in which they were earned or to which they relate. If the writ is served before or on the date the defendant’s earnings accrue and before the same have been paid to the defendant, the writ shall be deemed to have been served at the time the periodic earnings accrue. If more than one (1) writ is served, the writ first served shall have priority. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, an income withholding order for child support obtained pursuant to W.S. 20-6-201 through 20-6-222 shall have priority over any other garnishment.
  2. The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable  earnings of an individual which are subject to garnishment is the  lesser of:
    1. Twenty-five percent (25%) of defendant’s  disposable earnings for that week; or
    2. The amount by which defendant’s aggregate  disposable earnings computed for that week exceeds thirty (30) times  the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards  Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1), in effect at the time the earnings are payable, or,  in case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, any equivalent  multiple thereof prescribed by the administrator of the Wyoming Uniform  Consumer Credit Code in the manner provided by W.S. 40-14-505(b)(iii).
  3. Unless a garnishee is specifically informed  by affidavit of the plaintiff that the defendant has other periodic  earnings from sources other than from the garnishee and the amount  thereof, the garnishee shall treat the defendant’s earnings becoming  due from the garnishee as the defendant’s entire aggregate earnings  for the purpose of computing the sum attached by the garnishment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 483, 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2831, 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; 1897, ch. 11, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3951, 3997 to 4001; Laws 1903, ch. 31, § 1; C.S. 1910, §§ 4810, 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6080, 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3125, 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4713, 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-422; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-17-411 ; Laws 1985, ch. 194, § 2; 1986, ch. 62, § 1; 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 2019, ch. 70, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in (a), added the third, fourth, and fifth sentences.

Editor's note. —

Laws 2019, ch. 70 § 2, provides: "This act shall apply only to writs of garnishment issued on or after the effective date of this act."

Income from growing wheat on farm fell within earnings exemption provisions of § 1-17-411 , prior to the 1987 amendment thereof. Lingle State Bank v. Podolak, 740 P.2d 392, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 480 (Wyo. 1987).

Rancher or farmer cannot claim as exempt 75% of the proceeds derived from the sale of nonpurchase money livestock. Coones v. FDIC, 796 P.2d 803, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1990).

A rancher or farmer cannot claim as exempt 75% of the value of the crops and livestock offspring planted or born after the perfection of a security interest. Coones v. FDIC, 796 P.2d 803, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1990).

Where ranching operations were the judgment debtor's sole source of income and the funds in his bank account which were garnished represented proceeds from the sale of his cattle, the statutory exemption for earnings for personal services did not apply as the funds were not traceable to a third-party obligation payable periodically within the meaning of § 1-15-102(a)(vi). McManaman v. McManaman, 2002 WY 128, 53 P.3d 103, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2002).

Income tax refunds. —

Debtor's income tax refund, which included earned income credit, did not constitute “earnings” or “disposable earnings” exempt from garnishment. Trudeau v. Royal (In re Trudeau), 237 B.R. 803, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1075 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1999).

Unpaid wages or other earnings. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-15-408(a) and 40-14-505(a)(ii) deal with unpaid wages or other earnings; they do not deal with wages or other earnings that have made their way into a debtor's bank account, and the law clearly limits the exception to “accrued and unpaid” earnings. Royal v. Walsh (In re Walsh), 2004 WY 96, 96 P.3d 1, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2004).

Executory waiver of earnings exemption is not permissible as matter of public policy, and a security agreement which purports to deny a debtor and his family a statutory earnings exemption is precisely the type of executory arrangement that is objectionable and contrary to public policy. Lingle State Bank v. Podolak, 740 P.2d 392, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 480 (Wyo. 1987) (decided under § 1-17-411 prior to 1987 amendment).

Exemption of joint account funds requires accounting. —

When the evidence demonstrates that expenses paid from the joint account are to be shared by the depositors, the depositors' burden of establishing the exemption of any portion of the funds from execution clearly demands more than simply proving the deposits. Some accounting in the form of tracing the deposited funds and disbursements must be established. Hancock v. Stockmens Bank & Trust Co., 739 P.2d 760, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 468 (Wyo. 1987).

Support garnishments have priority. —

Support garnishments have priority and where they result in the withholding of 25 percent or more of an employee's disposable earnings, creditor garnishment is impermissible. Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

S & S Diversified Servs. v. Taylor, 897 F. Supp. 549, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12664 (D. Wyo. 1995); In re Welty, 217 B.R. 907, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 92 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 52 ALR5th 221.

§ 1-15-409. Service of writ; return; copy to defendant.

  1. A writ of prejudgment or post judgment  garnishment shall be served on the garnishee in the same manner as  a summons.
  2. Not later than five (5) days after service  is made upon the garnishee the sheriff or other person who served  the writ shall mail a copy of the writ to the defendant. The writ  shall be sent by first class United States mail with the postage prepaid.  The envelope shall be furnished and properly addressed by the plaintiff.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 42, § 1; 2004, ch. 130, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (b), substituted “writ” for “papers,” and “envelope” for “envelopes.”

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-15-410. Release or discharge of garnishment.

At any time, either before or after the service of any writ of garnishment, the defendant may obtain a release or discharge as provided by W.S. 1-15-105 . In the case of a writ of post judgment garnishment, the condition of the bond required by W.S. 1-15-105 (a)(ii) shall be to the effect that if the plaintiff is entitled to execute the writ upon the property seized, the defendant will pay an amount equal to the value of the property, together with interest and all costs assessed against him, not exceeding the sum specified in the bond.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-411. Delivery of property.

  1. Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 42, § 2.
  2. The garnishee may deliver to the officer  serving the writ the property belonging to and the money due to the  defendant as shown by the answer of the garnishee. The officer shall  return the property, money and the writ to the court. The property  shall then be dealt with as ordered by the court. After the property  is delivered, the garnishee shall be relieved from further liability  in the proceedings, unless his answer is successfully controverted  as provided in this article.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 145, 146; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 482, 530 to 534, 547, 548; R.S. 1887, §§ 2830, 2878 to 2882, 2895, 2896, 3561, 3562; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3950, 3997 to 4001, 4014, 4015, 4472, 4473; Laws 1901, ch. 95, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1910, §§ 4795, 4809, 4856 to 4860, 4873, 4874, 5335, 5336; C.S. 1920, §§ 6064, 6065, 6079, 6126 to 6130, 6143, 6144, 6607, 6608; Laws 1927, ch. 94, § 1; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1622, 89-3110, 89-3124, 89-3310 to 89-3314, 89-3327, 89-3328; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4712, 3-4802, 3-5010 to 3-5014, 3-5027, 3-5028, 14-1422, 14-1423; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-252, 1-253, 1-421, 1-430, 1-431, 1-579, 1-580; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-15-301 , 1-15-302 , 1-17-410 , 1-17-501 , 1-17-502, 1-21-309, 1-21-310; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 42, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to the answer of the garnishee, see § 1-15-407 .

Meaning of section when garnishee comes in and admits indebtedness. —

This section means that, when a garnishee comes in and answers that he owes money to the defendant, the court by that very fact obtains jurisdiction over the garnishee and the money garnisheed. The return of the officer in such case becomes immaterial, since evidence of what was done is shown by the appearance and answer of the garnishee. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Garnishee's pleading, answering interrogatories or the like as affecting his right to assert court's lack of jurisdiction, 41 ALR2d 1093.

§ 1-15-412. Reply to answer of garnishee; trial of issues; judgment.

If the garnishee answers, the plaintiff or defendant may, within ten (10) days after the answer of the garnishee is filed with the court, file and serve upon the garnishee and the other party to the action a reply to the garnishee’s answer. Either party may also allege any matters which would charge the garnishee with liability. New matter in a reply is deemed denied. Matters in issue shall be tried to the court and judgment entered as in other civil actions. Costs shall be awarded to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534, 547, 551 to 553; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882, 2895, 2899 to 2901; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001, 4014, 4018 to 4020; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860, 4873, 4877 to 4879; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130, 6143, 6147 to 6149; Laws 1927, ch. 94, § 1; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314, 89-3327, 89-3331 to 89-3333; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014, 3-5027, 3-5031 to 3-5033; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-252, 1-256 to 1-258; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-14-301, 1-15-305 to 1-15-307; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to costs generally, see §§ 1-14-101 to 1-14-127 .

Support garnishments have priority. —

Support garnishments have priority and where they result in the withholding of 25 percent or more of an employee's disposable earnings, creditor garnishment is impermissible. Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” see 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

§ 1-15-413. Judgment on answer of garnishee.

  1. The parties to the principal action who  fail to reply to the answer of the garnishee shall be deemed to have  accepted it as correct. If both parties to the principal action have  accepted the answer, an appropriate judgment shall be entered. If  the answer shows that the garnishment has attached personal property  of any kind in the possession or under the control of the garnishee  which belongs to and is due the defendant, the court shall enter judgment  that the garnishee deliver the personal property to the sheriff. If  the plaintiff has already recovered, or subsequently recovers judgment  against the defendant in the action, the personal property or as much  as may be necessary shall be sold upon execution and the proceeds  applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment, together with the  costs of the action and proceedings. Any surplus of the personal property  or the proceeds thereof shall be returned to the defendant.
  2. If the answer shows that the garnishee  is indebted to the defendant, and if the plaintiff has recovered,  or subsequently recovers judgment against the defendant in the action,  the court shall also enter judgment in favor of the defendant for  the use of the plaintiff against the garnishee. The judgment shall  be the amount attached as shown in the answer but shall not be for  a greater sum than is necessary to satisfy the judgment against the  defendant, together with costs. In no event shall the garnishee be  chargeable with costs except under the provisions of W.S. 1-15-412 and 1-15-414 .

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 148; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534, 550 to 553; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882, 2898 to 2901, 3564; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001, 4017 to 4020, 4475; C.S. 1910, §§ 4855 to 4860, 4876 to 4879, 5339; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130, 6146 to 6149, 6611; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1625, 89-3310 to 89-3314, 89-3330 to 89-3333; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014, 3-5030 to 3-5033, 14-1425; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-255 to 1-258, 1-582; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-15-304 to 1-15-307, 1-21-312; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Meaning of section when garnishee comes in and admits indebtedness. —

This section means that, when a garnishee comes in and answers that he owes money to the defendant, the court by that very fact obtains jurisdiction over the garnishee and the money garnisheed. The return of the officer in such case becomes immaterial, since evidence of what was done is shown by the appearance and answer of the garnishee. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

Cited in

Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 1-15-414. Proceedings on failure of garnishee to answer.

If the garnishee has been duly served with a writ of prejudgment or post judgment garnishment and fails to answer as required by W.S. 1-15-407 , the plaintiff may enter the default of the garnishee and proceed to prove the liability of the garnishee. The garnishee may be ordered to appear before the court or a master appointed by the court and be examined in the same manner as persons are examined under the discovery provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. The court may make provision for witness fees and mileage as is just, provided that if any garnishee has willfully failed to file any required answer, he may be required to pay the costs of any proceeding taken for the purpose of obtaining the information required to be furnished in the answer. Judgment shall be entered upon the evidence to the same effect as if the garnishee had answered. Costs shall be awarded to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 132; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 475, 530 to 534, 551 to 553; R.S. 1887, §§ 2823, 2878 to 2882, 2899 to 2901, 3548; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3943, 3997 to 4001, 4018 to 4020, 4459; C.S. 1910, §§ 4802, 4856 to 4860, 4877 to 4879, 5322; C.S. 1920, §§ 6072, 6126 to 6130, 6147 to 6149, 6594; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1608, 89-3117, 89-3310 to 89-3314, 89-3331 to 89-3333; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4705, 3-5010 to 3-5014, 3-5031 to 3-5033, 14-1408; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-256 to 1-258, 1-414, 1-578; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-15-305 to 1-15-307, 1-17-405 , 1-21-308; Laws 1985, ch. 194, § 2; 1986, ch. 62, § 1; 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to deposition and discovery, see Rules 26 through 37, W.R.C.P.

§ 1-15-415. Judgment discharges garnishee for amount paid.

A garnishee shall be discharged from all claims of all parties in the garnishee action for all goods, effects and credits paid, delivered or accounted for by the garnishee as a result of any judgment against the garnishee.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534, 551 to 553; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882, 2899 to 2901; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 2997 to 4001, 4018 to 4020; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860, 4877 to 4879; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130, 6147 to 6149; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314, 89-3331 to 89-3333; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014, 3-5031 to 3-5033; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-256 to 1-258; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-15-305 to 1-15-307; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Form of judgment against garnishee respecting obligation payable in installments, 7 ALR2d 680.

§ 1-15-416. Intervention or interpleader of third persons.

  1. If it appears that any person not a party  to the action has or claims an interest in any of the garnished property  antedating the garnishment, the court may permit that person to appear  and maintain his rights.
  2. If the answer of the garnishee discloses  that any person other than the defendant claims the indebtedness or  property in his hands, the court may on motion order that the claimant  be interpleaded as a defendant to the garnishee action. Notice in  such form as the court shall direct, together with a copy of the order,  shall be served upon the third-party claimant in the manner required  for the service of a summons. The garnishee may pay or deliver to  the court the indebtedness or property, which shall be a complete  discharge from all liability to any party for the amount paid or property  delivered. The third-party claimant shall be deemed a defendant to  the garnishee action and shall answer within ten (10) days, setting  forth his claim or defense. In case of default, judgment may be rendered  as in other cases of default which shall conclude any claim upon the  part of the third-party claimant.
  3. Any person who intervenes or is interpleaded  as a defendant under this section is bound by the judgment in the  garnishee action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534, 551 to 553; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882, 2899 to 2901; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001, 4018 to 4020; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860, 4877 to 4879; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130, 6147 to 6149; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314, 89-3331 to 89-3333; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014, 3-5031 to 3-5033; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-256 to 1-258; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-15-305 to 1-15-307; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-417. Claims of garnishee against plaintiff or defendant.

A garnishee may retain or deduct out of the property, effects or credits of the defendant in his hands all demands whether or not due against the plaintiff and against the defendant of which he could have availed himself if he had not been served as garnishee. The garnishee is liable for the balance only after all mutual demands between himself and the plaintiff and defendant are settled, not including unliquidated damages for wrongs and injuries. The verdict or findings, if any, and the judgment shall show against which party any claim is allowed, and the amount thereof.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Debtor’s Note Set-Off. —

Because a debtor's note was set-off against her obligation to a limited liability company (LLC) as allowed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-417 , the note was satisfied and a mortgage terminated at the time the LLC answered a creditor's writ of garnishment. As the debtor did not file her petition until after that date, the mortgage was not property of the estate, regardless of the fact that the LLC did not file a cancellation form or discharge as required under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-2-113 and 34-1-130 , and thus, the creditor did not violate the automatic stay by seeking to foreclose on the LLC's property. In re Ford, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 179 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Jan. 16, 2013).

§ 1-15-418. Liability of garnishee on negotiable instruments.

No person shall be liable as garnishee for having drawn, accepted, made or endorsed any negotiable instrument in the hands of the defendant at the time of service of the writ of prejudgment or post judgment garnishment when the negotiable instrument is not due.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-419. When garnishee is mortgagee or pledgee.

When any personal property, choses in action or effects of the defendant in the hands of the garnishee are mortgaged or pledged, or in any way liable for the payment of a debt to the garnishee, the plaintiff may obtain an order from the court authorizing the plaintiff to pay the amount due the garnishee, and requiring the garnishee to deliver the personal property, choses in action and effects, to the officer serving the writ of prejudgment or post judgment garnishment upon payment to the garnishee of the amount due him by the plaintiff.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-420. Where property held to secure performance of other obligation.

  1. The court may order the plaintiff to redeem  personal property, choses in action or effects levied upon under a  writ of prejudgment or post judgment garnishment by performing the  obligation or tendering performance if:
    1. The personal property, choses in action  or effects secure any obligation other than the payment of money;  and
    2. The obligation secured can be performed  by the plaintiff without damage to the interested persons.
  2. Upon performance under subsection (a)  of this section or any tender thereof which is refused, the garnishee  shall deliver the personal property and effects to the officer serving  the writ.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-421. Disposition of property.

  1. All personal property, choses in action  and effects received by the sheriff under W.S. 1-15-419 or 1-15-420 , shall be disposed of in the same manner as if the property,  choses in action and effects had been delivered by the garnishee under  the provisions of W.S. 1-15-411 , provided that the plaintiff shall, out of the proceeds  thereof:
    1. Be first repaid the amount paid by him  to the garnishee for the redemption of the property, choses in action  or effects; or
    2. Be indemnified for any other act or thing  done by him or performed pursuant to the order of the court for the  redemption of the property, choses in action or effects.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-15-422. Effect of discharge of garnishee.

Except as provided by W.S. 1-15-415 , a judgment discharging a garnishee shall be no bar to an action brought against the garnishee by the defendant for or on account of the same demand.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S.1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, 4N1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-423. Execution on judgment against garnishee for debt not due.

When a judgment is rendered against a garnishee with respect to a debt from the garnishee to the defendant and the debt is not yet due, execution shall not issue until the debt has become due.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, 4N1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

§ 1-15-424. Failure to proceed against nonexempt garnished earnings.

If a judgment creditor fails, within sixty (60) days from the filing of the answer of the garnishee, to secure a garnishee judgment and execute on garnished nonexempt earnings held by a garnishee pursuant to a writ of post judgment garnishment, the writ of garnishment which commanded the garnishee to hold the nonexempt portion of the defendant’s earnings shall be released and discharged without further order of the court. In that event the garnishee shall pay to the judgment debtor that portion of his earnings which had been held pursuant to the writ of garnishment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3310 to 89-3314; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

§ 1-15-425. Garnishee bound.

A garnishee served with a writ of prejudgment or post judgment garnishment shall hold for the benefit of the plaintiff all property of the defendant in his possession, and money and credits due from him to the defendant, from the time he is served with the writ until the writ is discharged.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 131; Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 530 to 534, 538; R.S. 1887, §§ 2878 to 2882, 2886, 3547; Laws 1895, ch. 14, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3997 to 4001, 4005, 4458; C.S. 1910, §§ 4856 to 4860, 4864, 5321; C.S. 1920, §§ 6126 to 6130, 6134, 6593; Laws 1927, ch. 30, § 1; R.S. 1931, §§ 62-1607, 89-3310 to 89-3314, 89-3318; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5010 to 3-5014, 3-5018, 14-1407; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-235 to 1-239, 1-243, 1-577; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-15-110 to 1-15-114, 1-15-118, 1-21-307; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

Garnishee becomes liable to plaintiff from time of service of the writ, to the amount of any property or indebtedness belonging to or due to the defendant, and is required to make answer to the writ showing such property or debt. Service of the writ upon the garnishee makes the garnishee liable for such property, and not the return, which the officer is required to make to the court of the action taken by him in the service of the writ. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

A garnishment is virtually a process of attachment, and a garnishee is bound from the time of service. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

It gives the creditor a paramount right, although not necessarily title, to property as a security for his demand. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

The issuing court acquires jurisdiction of the debt upon service of writ of attachment on garnishee. Great Falls Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 353 F.2d 348, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 3762 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1965).

And garnishee thereupon becomes liable to garnishor to extent of debt until discharged or any judgment recovered is satisfied. Great Falls Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 353 F.2d 348, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 3762 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1965).

Lien rendered complete. —

The filing of suit by lienor, coupled with the subsequent garnishment proceedings, resulting in deposit of the funds, rendered lienor's lien choate in that: (a) the lienor was established; (b) the property subject to the lien had been established and, in fact, seized and placed in the court's custody; and (c) the amount of the lien, excluding fees and interest, had been established by oral judgment. United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

Priority in time of service of writ of attachment determines superiority of conflicting attachments or garnishments of the same indebtedness. Great Falls Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 353 F.2d 348, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 3762 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1965).

Cited in

Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Article 5. Continuing Garnishment

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

38 C.J.S. Garnishment §§ 71 to 127.

§ 1-15-501. Definitions.

  1. As used in this article:
    1. “Continuing garnishment” means any procedure  for withholding the earnings of a judgment debtor for successive pay  periods for payment of a judgment debt;
    2. “Court” means any district court or circuit  court of this state;
    3. “Disposable earnings” means that part  of an individual’s earnings remaining after the deduction of all amounts  required by law to be withheld;
    4. “Earnings” means compensation paid or  payable for personal services, including but not limited to wages,  salary, commission, bonus, proceeds of any pension or retirement benefits  or deferred compensation plan. “Earnings” does not include compensation  paid as per diem;
    5. “Garnishee” means a person other than  a judgment creditor or judgment debtor who is in possession of earnings  of the judgment debtor and who is subject to garnishment in accordance  with the provisions of this article;
    6. “Garnishment” means any procedure through  which the property or earnings of an individual in the possession  or control of a garnishee are required to be withheld for payment  of a judgment debt;
    7. “Judgment creditor” means any person who  has recovered a money judgment against a judgment debtor in a court  of competent jurisdiction;
    8. “Judgment debtor” means any person who  has a judgment entered against him in a court of competent jurisdiction.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1; 2000, ch. 24, § 4; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (a)(ii), deleted “or justice of the peace courts” preceding “of this state”; and made stylistic changes.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Child support order treated as garnishment. —

In a case in which the ex-wife applied for a writ of garnishment against the ex-husband’s earnings for amounts owing under the property division ordered by the district court, because the child support order had be treated as a garnishment, the creditor judgment garnishments could be imposed only to the extent support garnishments did not exceed the general 25% limit; however, because the husband’s support garnishment was approximately 42% of his disposable earnings, any additional creditor garnishments were precluded, and the district court erred in enforcing the additional garnishment for the property settlement debt to the wife. Knell v. Knell, 2019 WY 74, 444 P.3d 1262, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2019).

For purposes of calculating the limits on individual garnishments, a child support order equates to a garnishment. Knell v. Knell, 2019 WY 74, 444 P.3d 1262, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2019).

Cited in

Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 1-15-502. Continuing garnishment; creation of lien.

  1. In addition to garnishment proceedings  otherwise available under the laws of this state, in any case in which  a money judgment is obtained in a court of competent jurisdiction  the judgment creditor or his assignees shall be entitled, in accordance  with this article, to have the clerk of the court issue a writ for  continuing garnishment against any garnishee who is an employer of  the judgment debtor. Issuance of a writ of execution is not a prerequisite  to issuance of a writ of continuing garnishment. To the extent that  the earnings are not exempt from garnishment, the garnishment shall  be a lien and continuing levy upon the earnings due or to become due  to the judgment debtor at the time the writ of continuing garnishment  is served on the garnishee.
  2. Subject to the provisions of W.S. 1-15-504 , garnishment pursuant to subsection (a) of this section  shall be a lien and continuing levy against said earnings due until  such time as the employment relationship is terminated, the underlying  judgment is vacated, modified or satisfied in full, the writ is dismissed,  or ninety (90) days have expired since service of the writ, whichever  is sooner. A continuing garnishment may be suspended for a specified  period of time by the judgment creditor upon agreement with the judgment  debtor. The agreement shall be in writing and filed by the judgment  creditor with the clerk of the court in which the judgment was entered  and a copy of the agreement shall be delivered by the judgment creditor  to the garnishee.
  3. Continuing garnishment pursuant to this  article shall apply only to proceedings against the earnings of a  judgment debtor who is a natural person.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

Stated in

Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1993).

§ 1-15-503. Earnings subject to continuing garnishment.

  1. Subject to the provisions of W.S. 1-15-504 , any earnings owed by the garnishee to the judgment debtor  at the time of service of the writ of continuing garnishment upon  the garnishee and all earnings accruing from the garnishee to the  judgment debtor from the date of service up to and including the ninetieth  day thereafter is subject to the process of continuing garnishment.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection  (a) of this section, the exemptions from garnishment shall apply to  continuing garnishments.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect of anti-alienation provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 USCS § 1056(d)) (ERISA) on rights of judgment creditors, 131 ALR Fed 427.

Construction and application of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq.) by United States Supreme Court, 150 ALR Fed 441.

§ 1-15-504. Priority between multiple garnishments.

  1. Only one (1) writ of continuing garnishment  against earnings due the judgment debtor shall be satisfied at one  (1) time. When more than one (1) writ of continuing garnishment has  been issued against earnings due the same judgment debtor, they shall  be satisfied in the order of service on the garnishee. When a writ  of continuing garnishment is served upon a garnishee during the effective  period of a prior writ of continuing garnishment, service of the subsequent  writ shall be deemed effective from the time the liens of all prior  writs have terminated. Except as otherwise provided in this section,  a lien and continuing levy obtained pursuant to this article shall  have priority over any subsequent garnishment lien or wage attachment.  In any civil action, a judgment creditor shall serve no more than  one (1) writ of continuing garnishment upon any one (1) garnishee  for the same judgment debtor during any ninety (90) day period.
  2. Where a continuing garnishment has been  suspended for a specific period of time by agreement of the parties  pursuant to W.S. 1-15-502(b), the suspended continuing garnishment shall have priority  over any writ of garnishment or continuing garnishment served on the  garnishee after the suspension has expired. No suspension shall extend  the running of the ninety (90) day effective period of the writ nor  otherwise affect priorities.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of  this section, an income withholding order for child support obtained  pursuant to W.S. 20-6-201 through 20-6-222 shall have priority over any other continuing garnishment.  If an income withholding order is served during the effective period  of a writ of continuing garnishment, the effective period shall be  tolled and all priorities preserved until the termination of the income  withholding order.
  4. Any writ of garnishment or continuing  garnishment served upon a garnishee while any previous writ of continuing  garnishment is still in effect shall be answered by the garnishee  with a statement that he has been served previously with one (1) or  more writs of continuing garnishment against earnings due the judgment  debtor and specifying the date on which all such liens are expected  to terminate.
  5. Upon the termination of a lien and continuing  levy obtained pursuant to this article, any other writ of garnishment  or continuing garnishment which has been issued or which is issued  subsequently against earnings due the judgment debtor shall have priority  in the order of service on the garnishee. The person who serves a  writ of continuing garnishment on a garnishee shall note the date  and time of the service.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

First come, first serve.—

District court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded a limited liability company’s (LLC) attorneys a portion of a settlement fund because the district court’s adoption of a first come, first serve method for the disbursement of the LLC’s share of the settlement funds was not inequitable under the circumstance; the district court looked to its equitable powers to oversee the distribution of the money the clerk held. Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Constr. LLC, 2019 WY 54, 441 P.3d 841, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2019).

Support garnishments have priority. —

Under Wyoming law an order withholding income for child support has priority over any other garnishment; moreover, creditor judgment garnishments may be imposed only to the extent support garnishments do not exceed the general 25 percent limit, and accordingly, support garnishments are not to be treated as an exemption to be deducted from gross earnings in calculating disposable earnings. Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 52 ALR5th 221.

§ 1-15-505. Service of writ; notice to judgment debtor in continuing garnishment; payment to clerk of court.

  1. The judgment  creditor shall serve two (2) copies of the writ of continuing garnishment  upon the garnishee, one (1) copy of which the garnishee shall deliver  to the judgment debtor as provided in W.S. 1-15-506 . The writ shall be served on the garnishee in the same manner as  a summons under Rule 4(d) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure  or by certified mail sent to the garnishee at the address of its principal  place of business in accordance with Rule 4(r) of  the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. The writ shall include notice  to the judgment debtor of the formula used to calculate:
    1. The amount of exempt earnings owed to  the judgment debtor for a single pay period; and
    2. The amount of nonexempt earnings payable  to the judgment creditor for a single pay period.
  2. The writ shall contain notice to the judgment  debtor of his right to object to the calculation of exempt and nonexempt  earnings and his right to a hearing on his objection.
  3. The writ shall direct the garnishee to  pay over all earnings withheld under this article to the clerk of  the court from which the writ was issued.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1; 1994, ch. 72, § 1; 1997, ch. 92, § 1; 2018, ch. 108, § 1.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in the introductory language of (a), substituted “Rule 4(r)” for Rule 4(l)” following “in accordance with.”

§ 1-15-506. Service of notice upon judgment debtor; answer and tender of payment by garnishee.

  1. The garnishee shall deliver a copy of  the writ of continuing garnishment required by W.S. 1-15-505 , together with the calculation of exempt earnings, to  the judgment debtor at the time the judgment debtor receives earnings  for the first pay period affected by the writ of continuing garnishment.  For all subsequent pay periods affected by the writ, the garnishee  shall deliver a copy of the calculation of the amount of exempt earnings  to the judgment debtor at the time the judgment debtor receives earnings  for that pay period.
  2. Compliance with this section and W.S. 1-15-505 by the judgment creditor shall be deemed to give sufficient  notice to the judgment debtor of the continuing garnishment proceedings  against him, and no further notice shall be required under this article.
  3. The garnishee shall file with the court  a verified answer to the writ of continuing garnishment no later than  ten (10) days following the date the judgment debtor receives earnings  for the first pay period affected by the writ, or forty (40) days  following the date the writ was served upon the garnishee, whichever  is earlier. The answer of the garnishee shall state:
    1. Whether the judgment debtor was employed  by the garnishee on the date the writ was served;
    2. Whether the judgment debtor is paid weekly,  monthly or otherwise;
    3. The dates on which the judgment debtor  will be paid during the ninety (90) day effective period of the writ;
    4. The amount of the judgment debtor’s regular  gross pay and an itemization of deductions regularly withheld from  the judgment debtor’s gross pay by the garnishee; and
    5. Whether any other outstanding writ of  continuing garnishment or income withholding order for child support  relating to the judgment debtor has been served on the garnishee and  if so the date on which each writ or order is expected to terminate.
  4. For each pay period affected by the writ,  the garnishee shall pay any nonexempt earnings and deliver a calculation  of the amount of exempt earnings to the clerk of the court which issued  the writ no less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) days, excluding  Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, following the day the judgment  debtor receives earnings affected by the writ.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

§ 1-15-507. Judgment debtor to file written objection.

  1. If the judgment debtor objects to the  calculation of the amount of exempt earnings, the judgment debtor  shall have five (5) days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays,  from receipt of the calculation of exempt earnings within which to  resolve the issue of the miscalculation by agreement with the garnishee,  during which time the garnishee shall not tender any monies to the  clerk of the court. If the objection is not resolved within five (5)  days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, the garnishee  shall pay the withheld income to the clerk of the court in which the  judgment was entered and the judgment debtor may file a written objection  with the clerk setting forth with reasonable detail the grounds for  the objection. The judgment debtor’s objection shall be filed with  the clerk of court and a copy mailed to the judgment creditor or his  attorney of record within five (5) days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays  and legal holidays, from the date the withheld earnings are received  by the clerk of court. If the objection is not filed within the time  allowed, the clerk of court shall pay the withheld income to the judgment  creditor.
  2. Upon the filing of a written objection,  all further proceedings with relation to the disposition of the earnings  shall be stayed until the matter of the objection is determined.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection  (a) of this section, a judgment debtor failing to make a written objection  may, at any time within ninety (90) days from receipt of a calculation  of exempt earnings, and for good cause shown, move the court in which  the judgment was entered to hear an objection as to any earnings levied  in continuing garnishment, the amount of which the judgment debtor  claims to have been miscalculated.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1; 1988, ch. 42, § 1.

§ 1-15-508. Hearing on objection.

  1. Upon the filing of an objection pursuant  to W.S. 1-15-507(a), the court in which the judgment was entered shall set  a time for the hearing of the objection, which shall be not more than  ten (10) days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, after  filing. The clerk of the court where the objection is filed shall  immediately inform the judgment creditor or his attorney of record  and the judgment debtor or his attorney of record by telephone, by  mail or in person of the date set for the hearing.
  2. The certificate of the clerk of the court  that service of notice of the hearing has been made in the manner  and form stated in subsection (a) of this section, which certificate  has been attached to the court file, shall constitute prima facie  evidence of service, and the certificate of service filed with the  clerk of the court is sufficient return of service.
  3. Upon hearing, the court shall determine  whether the amount of the judgment debtor’s exempt earnings was correctly  calculated by the garnishee and shall enter an order or judgment setting  forth the determination of the court. If the amount of exempt earnings  is found to have been miscalculated, the court shall order the clerk  of the court to remit the amount of over garnished earnings to the  judgment debtor.
  4. If the judgment debtor moves the court  to hear an objection within the time provided by W.S. 1-15-507(c) and the judgment giving rise to the claim has been satisfied  against earnings of the judgment debtor, the court shall determine  whether the amount of the judgment debtor’s earnings paid to the judgment  creditor was correctly calculated and shall issue an order setting  forth the determination of the court. If the amount of earnings is  found to have been miscalculated, the court shall order the judgment  creditor to remit immediately the amount of the over garnished earnings  to the judgment debtor.
  5. Any order or judgment entered by the court  as provided for in subsections (c) and (d) of this section is a final  judgment or order for the purpose of appellate review.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1.

§ 1-15-509. No discharge from employment for any garnishment; general prohibition.

  1. No employer shall discharge an employee  for the reason that a creditor of the employee has subjected or attempted  to subject unpaid earnings of the employee to any continuing garnishment  directed to the employer for the purpose of paying any judgment.
  2. If an employer discharges an employee  in violation of the provisions of this section, the employee may,  within one hundred twenty (120) days, bring a civil action for the  recovery of wages lost as a result of the violation and for an order  requiring the reinstatement of the employee. Damages recoverable shall  be lost wages not to exceed thirty (30) working days, costs and reasonable  attorney fees.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1.

Cited in

Dave v. Valdez, 2012 WY 59, 275 P.3d 485, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Apr. 13, 2012).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Wrongful discharge: employer's liability under state law for discharge of employee based on garnishment order against wages, 41 ALR5th 31.

§ 1-15-510. Forms.

Affidavits, notices, writs and other forms for use in continuing garnishment shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the supreme court of Wyoming.

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1.

§ 1-15-511. Limitation on continuing garnishment.

  1. The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable  earnings of a judgment debtor which are subject to continuing garnishment  under this article is the lesser of:
    1. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the judgment  debtor’s disposable earnings for that week; or
    2. The amount by which the judgment debtor’s  aggregate disposable earnings computed for that week exceeds thirty  (30) times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair  Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1), in effect at the time the earnings are payable, or,  in case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, any equivalent  multiple thereof prescribed by the administrator of the Wyoming Uniform  Consumer Credit Code in the manner provided by W.S. 40-14-505(b)(iii).

History. Laws 1987, ch. 85, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Additional creditor garnishments precluded. —

In a case in which the ex-wife applied for a writ of garnishment against the ex-husband’s earnings for amounts owing under the property division ordered by the district court, because the child support order had be treated as a garnishment, the creditor judgment garnishments could be imposed only to the extent support garnishments did not exceed the general 25% limit; however, because the husband’s support garnishment was approximately 42% of his disposable earnings, any additional creditor garnishments were precluded, and the district court erred in enforcing the additional garnishment for the property settlement debt to the wife. Knell v. Knell, 2019 WY 74, 444 P.3d 1262, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2019).

Child support order treated as garnishment. —

For purposes of calculating the limits on individual garnishments, a child support order equates to a garnishment. Knell v. Knell, 2019 WY 74, 444 P.3d 1262, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2019).

Support garnishments have priority. —

Support garnishments have priority and where they result in the withholding of 25 percent or more of an employee's disposable earnings, creditor garnishment is impermissible. Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

Stated in

Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect of anti-alienation provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 USCS § 1056(d)) (ERISA) on rights of judgment creditors, 131 ALR Fed 427.

Chapter 16 Judgments Generally

Cross references. —

As to judgments in civil actions before justices of the peace, see §§ 1-21-401 to 1-21-403 .

As to judgment with reference to Uniform Arbitration Act, see § 1-36-116 .

As to judgment and enforcement by police justice courts in cities of the first class, see § 5-6-208 .

For provision that judgment against county shall be paid by tax levy, see § 18-2-111 .

As to judgment in connection with removal of county officer, see § 18-3-902 .

As to definition and form of judgment, see Rule 54, W.R.C.P.

As to default judgments, see Rule 55, W.R.C.P.

As to summary judgment, see Rule 56, W.R.C.P.

Editor's notes. —

Inasmuch as there is no chapter 16 in § 1, ch. 188, Laws 1977, which revised title 1, this and the following chapters in this title have been renumbered so as to maintain proper numerical sequence and internal references in the statutes have been changed accordingly throughout the title.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

49 C.J.S. Judgments § 1 et seq.

Article 1. In General

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 1 to 86.

§ 1-16-101. Rights of minors reserved.

It is not necessary to reserve in a judgment or order the right of a minor to show cause why such order or judgment should be set aside after he attains the age of majority, but in any case in which such reservation would have been proper, the minor may show cause against such order or judgment within one (1) year after arriving at the age of majority.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 337; R.S. 1887, § 2677; R.S. 1899, § 3771; C.S. 1910, § 4626; C.S. 1920, § 5899; R.S. 1931, § 89-2607; C.S. 1945, § 3-3607; W.S. 1957, § 1-306; Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-101 .

Cross references. —

For provision concerning minors as parties to actions, see § 1-1-102 .

As to saving clause for actions other than recovery of real property, see § 1-3-114 .

For age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

§ 1-16-102. Interest on judgments.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (b)  and (c) of this section, all decrees and judgments for the payment  of money shall bear interest at ten percent (10%) per year from the  date of rendition until paid.
  2. If the decree or judgment is founded on  a contract and all parties to the contract agreed to interest at a  certain rate, the rate of interest on the decree or judgment shall  correspond to the terms of the contract.
  3. A periodic payment or installment for  child support or maintenance which is unpaid on the date due and which  on or after July 1, 1990, becomes a judgment by operation of law pursuant  to W.S. 14-2-204 shall not bear interest.

History. Laws 1973, ch. 207, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-308.1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-102 ; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2; 1990, ch. 89, § 2; 2003, ch. 93, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to interest rate when not provided by agreement or provision of law, see § 40-14-106(e).

Allowance of interest is not in discretion of court. —

Trial court did not erroneously fail to award postjudgment interest because such interest was available whether stated in a judgment or not. Halling v. Yovanovich, 2017 WY 28, 391 P.3d 611, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2017).

Record insufficient to determine if interest is appropriate.—

Remand on the issue of post-judgment interest was necessary because the record was not adequate to determine whether, when, or how pre- or post-judgment interest should apply. Lew v. Lew, 2019 WY 99, 449 P.3d 683, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2019).

Contracts entered into prior to 1988 amendment. —

This section, as amended in 1988, applies to judgments entered after the 1988 effective date (June 9, 1988), but arising out of obligations incurred before the effective date. The interest is on the judgment, not on the note. Gose v. Hess, 822 P.2d 846, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1991).

Prejudgment interest on arbitration awards against governmental entities is not available. Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. v. Strube Constr. Co., 715 P.2d 540, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1986).

Prejudgment interest is recoverable on liquidated, but not unliquidated, claims; a liquidated claim is one readily computable by simple mathematical computation. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co., 669 P.2d 505, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1983).

There is no common-law right to interest on a judgment, and it is strictly statutory. Pure Gas & Chem. Co. v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 234 (Wyo. 1974).

Allowance of interest is not in discretion of court entering judgment, but it is a grant from the legislature of the state, and no court may refuse to give it effect. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976).

Interest not awarded on contested worker's compensation claim. —

Supreme court rejected the general interest statute as a basis for awarding interest on a contested worker’s compensation claim because the Worker’s Compensation Act did not expressly authorize an award of interest on contested claims; the general interest statute applied to judgments and decrees, not to administrative awards; and workers’ compensation awards were administrative determinations, not judgments. Air Methods v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2018 WY 128, 432 P.3d 476, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2018).

Rate of interest on unpaid judgments in child support case. —

In determining the father's income for child support purposes, simply applying the statutory rate of interest for unpaid judgments to the father's investment portfolio to estimate the father's entire income was not necessarily an accurate means to determine the father's actual income; the interest rate used should be based on some reasonable relationship to the father's actual investment income. Thus, a remand was appropriate so that the trial court could determine whether the 10 percent rate was a reasonable interest rate to estimate the father's investment income. Groenstein v. Groenstein, 2005 WY 6, 104 P.3d 765, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2005).

Because child support arrears did not become a judgment by operation of law under the relevant statute, as the matter was not an action separate from the parties' divorce proceedings, but was initiated by a mother's motion to show cause that was filed in the original divorce action, the mother was not entitled to a 10 percent penalty. However, the delinquent amounts did bear interest by the relevant statute at a rate of 10 percent per year from the date of rendition. Rambo v. Rambo, 2017 WY 32, 391 P.3d 1108, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2017).

Prospective purchasers, upon failure to obtain loan, entitled to interest on earnest money. —

Prospective purchasers of home were entitled to prejudgment interest on the earnest money paid to the prospective sellers at the rate of seven percent per annum from the date of demand, upon the failure of the prospective purchasers to obtain a loan from the veterans' administration, as called for in the sales agreement, and at the judgment rate of 10% per annum thereafter. Holst v. Guynn, 696 P.2d 632, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1985) (decided prior to 1988 amendment).

Divorce case. —

When a Wyoming court enters a divorce decree requiring a party to pay a fixed sum of money and does not set a date for payment different than the date the decree is rendered, the judgment interest statute applies and payment of interest is required; however, when a district court enters a decree and, in the exercise of its discretion to fashion a just and equitable property division, sets a date for payment different than the date the decree is rendered or provides for payment over time, it is not required to impose interest. Therefore, in a divorce case, a district court properly exercised its discretion when it suspended payment of interest as long as a husband made annual payments of at least $15,000 toward the property allocation. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 2015 WY 120, 357 P.3d 1100, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 2015).

District court ordered the father to pay the mother on a date different than the judgment, and as a result, the statute did not apply, and there was no abuse of discretion when the district court did not require the father to pay interest on the equalizing sum awarded to the mother. Williams v. Williams, 2016 WY 21, 368 P.3d 539, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2016).

Date from which interest computed. —

It is error to grant interest from the date of verdict rather than the date judgment was entered. Pure Gas & Chem. Co. v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 234 (Wyo. 1974).

The district court erred in awarding interest on costs from the date of the original award of costs where (1) the award of costs was overturned on appeal, (2) one defendant was awarded significantly lower costs on remand, and (3) two other defendants were awarded the same costs on remand, but on different grounds. Snyder v. Lovercheck, 2001 WY 64, 27 P.3d 695, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 2001).

Offer did not stop accrual of statutory interest. —

District court had discretion to determine manner in which to enforce the judgment, including the discretion to order husband to pay the unsatisfied judgment in cash; husband's offer to convey property by warranty deed did not stop accrual of statutory interest under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-102(a). Burnett v. Steeley, 2008 WY 94, 190 P.3d 132, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 2008).

Tender of judgment to court tolls interest. —

By tendering payment into the district court of the judgment amount as authorized by Rule 67, W.R.C.P., the party against whom judgment was rendered surrendered control of the funds to the court, and the accrual of statutory interest ceased. Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1995).

Defendant's good-faith deposit of the full amount of the judgment against her with the clerk of court, during the pendency of the appeal of the case, was an unconditional offer to perform coupled with the ability to carry out the offer, and was sufficient to stop the accrual of interest. Crawford v. Amadio, 932 P.2d 1288, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1997).

Supersedeas bond did not toll accrual of postjudgment interest. —

Trial court properly held that a supersedeas bond filed by a partner did not toll the accrual of interest on a judgment in favor of an accounting firm and that the firm's recovery was not limited to the bond amount because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-102(a) provided that interest accrued from the date of rendition until paid; Wyo. R. App. P. 4.02(a) indicated that the bond should be conditioned to account for interest and damages for delay. Dorr v. Smith, 2010 WY 120, 238 P.3d 549, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 2010).

Applied in

Mader v. James, 546 P.2d 190, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1976).

Quoted in

Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, 69 P.3d 917, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2003); Jensen v. Milatzo-Jensen, 2014 WY 165, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Dec. 17, 2014).

Cited in

Perry v. Vaught, 624 P.2d 776, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1981); Millheiser v. Wallace, 2001 WY 40, 21 P.3d 752, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 2001); Platt v. Platt, 2014 WY 142, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Nov. 6, 2014).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Date of verdict or date of entry of judgment as beginning interest period on judgment, 1 ALR2d 479.

Date from which interest on judgment starts running, as affected by modification of amount of judgment on appeal, 4 ALR3d 1221.

Insured's right to recover from insurer prejudgment interest on amount of fire loss, 5 ALR4th 126.

Validity and construction of state statute or rule allowing or changing rate of prejudgment interest in tort actions, 40 ALR4th 147.

Retrospective application and effect of state statute or rule allowing interest or changing rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41 ALR4th 694.

Right to prejudgment interest on punitive or multiple damages awards, 9 ALR5th 63.

Divorce and separation: Award of interest on deferred installment payments of marital asset distribution, 10 ALR5th 191.

Allowance of interest on award of attorney's fee under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-5(k)), 77 ALR Fed 272.

§ 1-16-103. Penalty assessed on unpaid judgment by operation of law.

  1. As used in this section “judgment by operation  of law” means a periodic payment or installment for child support  or maintenance which is unpaid on the date due and which has become  a judgment by operation of law pursuant to W.S. 14-2-204 .
  2. Any judgment by operation of law which  is not paid within thirty-two (32) calendar days from the date the  judgment by operation of law arises is subject to an automatic late  payment penalty in an amount equal to ten percent (10%) of the amount  of the judgment by operation of law.
  3. In order to recover penalties assessed  under subsection (b) of this section, the obligee shall file with  the clerk of court a sworn affidavit setting forth the payment history  resulting in assessment of any penalty and a computation of all penalties  claimed to be due and owing. It shall not be the responsibility of  the clerk to compute the amount of the penalties due and owing. If  the obligor disputes the payment history or penalty computation as  stated in the obligee’s sworn affidavit, the obligor shall file with  the clerk of court a written request for a hearing within ten (10)  days after seizure of his property under execution.
  4. This section shall apply only to judgments  by operation of law arising on or after July 1, 1990.

History. Laws 1990, ch. 89, § 1; 2003, ch. 93, § 2.

Interest, but not a penalty incurred on child support arrearages.—

Because child support arrears did not become a judgment by operation of law under the relevant statute, as the matter was not an action separate from the parties' divorce proceedings, but was initiated by a mother's motion to show cause that was filed in the original divorce action, the mother was not entitled to a 10 percent penalty. However, the delinquent amounts did bear interest by the relevant statute at a rate of 10 percent per year from the date of rendition. Rambo v. Rambo, 2017 WY 32, 391 P.3d 1108, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2017).

Article 2. Judgments by Confession

Cross references. —

As to confession of judgment generally, see chapter 10 of this title.

As to confession of judgment in municipal courts of cities of the first class, see § 5-6-208 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §§ 228 to 264.

Successive judgments by confession on cognovit note or similar instrument, 80 ALR2d 1380.

Agent's authority to execute warrant of attorney to confess judgment against principal, 92 ALR2d 952.

Enforceability of warrant of attorney to confess judgment against assignee, guarantor or other party obligating himself for performance of primary contract, 5 ALR3d 426.

Constitutionality, construction, application and effect of statute invalidating powers of attorney to confess judgment or contract giving such powers, 40 ALR3d 1158.

49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 146 to 157.

§ 1-16-201. Right to confess judgment.

A person indebted or against whom a cause of action exists, may personally appear in a court of competent jurisdiction and with the assent of the creditor or person having such cause of action, confess judgment, whereupon judgment shall be entered accordingly.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 328; R.S. 1887, § 2668; R.S. 1899, § 3762; C.S. 1910, § 4617; C.S. 1920, § 5888; R.S. 1931, § 89-2502; C.S. 1945, § 3-3512; W.S. 1957, § 1-309; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-201 .

Intention of legislature is to insure protection of the debtor when judgment is of the consent type. Eggeman v. Western Nat'l Bank, 596 P.2d 318, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 417 (Wyo. 1979).

Judgment exceeded matters confessed. —

In an action to establish a permanent easement, judgment entered on a partial confession of judgment in favor of dominant estate owners was void; the judgment went beyond the matters admitted in the servient estate owner's confession of judgment. Huish v. Sulenta, 2002 WY 139, 54 P.3d 748, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

Grand Island & N.W.R.R. v. Baker, 6 Wyo. 369, 45 P. 494, 1896 Wyo. LEXIS 21 , 34 L.R.A. 835 (1896).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Admissibility of confession or other statement made by defendant as affected by delay in arraignment — modern state cases, 28 ALR4th 1121.

§ 1-16-202. Warrant of attorney to be produced.

An attorney who confesses judgment in any case, at the time of making the confession shall produce the warrant of attorney for making the same to the court. The original or a copy of the warrant shall be filed with the clerk of the court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 331; R.S. 1887, § 2671; R.S. 1899, § 3765; C.S. 1910, § 4620; C.S. 1920, § 5891; R.S. 1931, § 89-2505; C.S. 1945, § 3-3515; W.S. 1957, § 1-312; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-202 .

Intention of legislature is to insure protection of the debtor when judgment is of the consent type. Eggeman v. Western Nat'l Bank, 596 P.2d 318, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 417 (Wyo. 1979).

Cognovit judgment not violative of due process rights. —

A cognovit judgment obtained against a lessee-store owner pursuant to a lease provision which authorized any attorney to appear for and confess judgment against lessee in case of default is not, per se, violative of lessee's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution and article 1, §§ 6 and 8 of the state constitution. Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 618 P.2d 547, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 311 (Wyo. 1980).

Confession under warrant of attorney not contrary to public policy. —

A confession of judgment under a warrant of attorney contained in a promissory note is not contrary to public policy. Westring v. Cheyenne Nat'l Bank, 393 P.2d 119, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1964).

And is as potent as personal confession. —

A confession of judgment under a warrant of attorney is as potent in its operation as a judgment upon personal confession authorizing a debtor, with the consent of the creditor, to appear in a court of competent jurisdiction and to confess judgment. Westring v. Cheyenne Nat'l Bank, 393 P.2d 119, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1964).

Cited in

Grand Island & N.W.R.R. v. Baker, 6 Wyo. 369, 45 P. 494, 1896 Wyo. LEXIS 21 , 34 L.R.A. 835 (1896).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What law governs validity of warrant or power of attorney to confess judgment, 19 ALR2d 544.

Necessity, in order to enter judgment by confession on instrument containing warrant of attorney, that original note or other instrument and original warrant be produced or filed, 68 ALR2d 1156.

Requirements as to signing, sealing and attestation in warrants of attorney to confess judgment, 3 ALR3d 1147.

§ 1-16-203. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 332, related to the execution of the warrant of attorney by a person in custody.

Article 3. Recording and Indexing of Judgments; Release

Cross references. —

As to entry of judgment or order by clerk of court, see Rule 58, W.R.C.P.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §§ 121 to 195.

Necessity of notice of application or intention to correct error in judgment entry, 14 ALR2d 224.

Judgment ambiguous or silent as to amount of recovery as defective for lack of certainty, 55 ALR2d 723.

Mere rendition or formal entry or docketing of judgment as prerequisite to issuance of valid execution thereon, 65 ALR2d 1162.

49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 100 to 133.

§ 1-16-301. Recordation of judgments and orders where real property affected.

  1. When a judgment or order is made determining any matter affecting the title to real property, a certified copy of the judgment or order shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the property is situated.
  2. Repealed by Laws 2019, ch. 24, §  2.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 338; R.S. 1887, § 2678; R.S. 1899, § 3772; C.S. 1910, § 4627; C.S. 1920, § 5900; R.S. 1931, § 89-2608; C.S. 1945, § 3-3608; W.S. 1957, § 1-314; Laws 1963, ch. 58, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-301 ; Laws 1990, ch. 89, § 2; 2001, ch. 70, § 1; 2003, ch. 93, § 2; 2019, ch. 24, § 1; ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

The 2019 amendments. — The first 2019 amendment, by ch. 24, § 1, effective July 1, 2019, in (a), deleted “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, all judgments and orders must be entered in the journal of the court and specify clearly the relief granted or order made in the action” and substituted “situated” for “situate.”

The second 2019 amendment, by ch. 24, § 2, effective July 1, 2019, repealed former (b), which read: “No entry will be made in the journal relating to a judgment by operation of law arising under W.S. 14-2-204 .”

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

Judgment entered as of date rendered. —

Judgment is properly entered on journal as of the date of its rendition, though entry is made later. Hahn v. Citizens' State Bank, 25 Wyo. 467, 171 P. 889, 172 P. 705, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1918).

“Rendition” of judgment distinguished from “entry.” —

Rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law on the facts in controversy, as distinguished from entry, which is the clerical act of spreading the judgment on the record. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

Judgment is rendered and exists as such when it is orally announced from the bench. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

The trial court's findings that the judgment in favor of lienor was rendered on August 9, 1972, and that rendition is the judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law on the facts in controversy, as distinguished from entry, which is the clerical act of the court of spreading the judgment on the record, was not clearly erroneous. United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

Motion for new trial is not part of record unless incorporated in bill of exceptions. Johns v. Adams Bros., 2 Wyo. 194, 1880 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1880); Garbanati v. Board of Comm'rs, 2 Wyo. 257, 1880 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (1880); Perkins v. McDowell, 3 Wyo. 328, 23 P. 71, 1890 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1890); Seibel v. Bath, 5 Wyo. 409, 40 P. 756, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1895); Rubel v. Willey, 5 Wyo. 427, 40 P. 761, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1895); Boulter v. State, 6 Wyo. 66, 42 P. 606, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1895); Freeburgh v. Lamoureux, 12 Wyo. 41, 73 P. 545, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1903).

Bill of exceptions is not merely a statement of exceptions, but includes a statement clearly showing objection, with facts and circumstances on which it is founded, authenticated by trial judge, and brings into record matter which otherwise would not be regularly shown thereby. Middleton v. State, 34 Wyo. 102, 241 P. 715, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 1925).

Clerk's judgment entry not in conformity with verdict. —

Entry in clerk's minutes in journal, in action to remove county commissioner, that court “ordered the removal of defendant from office, the verdict to include costs,” could not be considered as clerk's entry of judgment in conformity with verdict. State v. Scott, 35 Wyo. 108, 247 P. 699, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1926).

Judgment for costs only incomplete. —

Where record shows what purports to be judgment for costs only, but in which amount of such costs is left blank, judgment, not being exact as to costs, will be reversed and case remanded for new trial. Mosher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2 Wyo. 462, 1882 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1882).

Sufficient authentication of record judgment. —

When document is authenticated by clerk of court, under court seal as a full and true copy of the record judgment in that court, it is sufficient authentication for use in any other court in Wyoming. Brophy v. J. M. Brunswick & Balke Co., 2 Wyo. 86, 1879 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1879).

Unsigned judgments. —

Where a judgment creditor sought a declaration that its judgment had priority, the fact that the judgment was unsigned did not necessarily render it void. Although the better practice would be that only signed judgments be entered, where an unsigned judgment is entered, the totality of the circumstances must be evaluated to determine its effectiveness. In re Estate of Hite, 829 P.2d 1173, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. May 26, 1992).

Divorce decree incorporating property lien should be recorded. —

A divorce decree which incorporates a lien on the property of one of the spouses should be recorded in the county clerk's office of the county wherein the property is situated, to serve as notice to the world of the encumbrance. David v. David, 724 P.2d 1141, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 613 (Wyo. 1986).

Personal property lien effectuated by delivered writ. —

Recordation of the judgment effectuates a lien on nonexempt real property, but the same is not true where personal property is involved, as Wyoming subscribes to the common-law rule that delivery of the writ of execution to the sheriff of the appropriate county creates an execution lien on personal property of the debtor. In re Cockreham, 84 B.R. 757, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2789 (D. Wyo. 1988).

Stated in

Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1978); Coones v. FDIC, 848 P.2d 783, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1993).

§ 1-16-302. Record; requirement.

The clerk shall make a complete record of every cause as soon as it is finally determined, unless such record or part thereof is waived.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 339; R.S. 1887, § 2679; R.S. 1899, § 3773; C.S. 1910, § 4628; C.S. 1920, § 5901; R.S. 1931, § 89-2609; C.S. 1945, § 3-3609; W.S. 1957, § 1-315; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-302 .

Cited in

Middleton v. State, 34 Wyo. 102, 241 P. 715, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (1925).

§ 1-16-303. Record; contents.

The record shall contain the complaint, the process, the return, pleadings subsequent thereto and all material acts and proceedings of the court. If the items of an account or the copies of papers attached to the pleadings are voluminous, the court may order the record to be made by abbreviating the same or inserting a pertinent description thereof, or by omitting them entirely. Evidence will not be recorded.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 341; R.S. 1887, § 2681; R.S. 1899, § 3775; C.S. 1910, § 4630; C.S. 1920, § 5903; R.S. 1931, § 89-2611; C.S. 1945, § 3-3611; W.S. 1957, § 1-317; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-303 .

Alleged errors occurring at trial must be called to the attention of the court by motion for a new trial. Boulter v. State, 6 Wyo. 66, 42 P. 606, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1895); Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 P. 924, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1899).

Appellate court, in considering case, is confined to record on appeal, and it may not, by affidavits filed in such court, be shown when judgment was entered, or that it was or was not entered, thereby contradicting or supplementing the record. Hahn v. Citizens' State Bank, 25 Wyo. 467, 171 P. 889, 172 P. 705, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1918).

An agreed statement of facts does not come within the definitions set out in this section and is not part of the record proper. Johnson v. McDonald, 73 Wyo. 263, 278 P.2d 268, 1954 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1954).

If an agreed statement of facts is contained in the judgment, then it is part of the record proper. Johnson v. McDonald, 73 Wyo. 263, 278 P.2d 268, 1954 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1954).

Motion not part of record proper. —

A motion filed in court below and ruling thereon is not part of the record proper under this section, and cannot be reviewed on writ of error unless brought into record by bill of exceptions. Fitzpatrick v. Rogan, 27 Wyo. 388, 197 P. 565, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1921).

Including one for appointment of receiver. —

In absence of bill of exceptions, motion of plaintiff for appointment of a receiver is not properly in the record on writ of error to supreme court, not being part of the record proper, under this section, though among the authenticated original papers in case there is such motion. Fitzpatrick v. Rogan, 27 Wyo. 388, 197 P. 565, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1921).

Overruling order. —

An order overruling a demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to the petition for want of facts was a part of the record and, with the pleadings, was properly presented for review on error without a bill of exceptions. Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P. 43, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1913).

Motion to vacate judgment filed during term at which judgment was rendered was not independent proceeding and, therefore, must be embraced in bill of exceptions on proceedings in error. Sioux City Seed Co. v. Montgomery, 42 Wyo. 170, 291 P. 918, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1930).

Oral motions. —

Wherever a bill of exceptions is necessary to bring a written motion into the record on writ of error, such bill is also necessary to bring in an oral motion for the same purpose. Fitzpatrick v. Rogan, 28 Wyo. 231, 203 P. 245, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1922).

Motion for new trial. —

Writ of error will not be dismissed for want of bill of exceptions on motion for new trial where only questions of law, determinable on facts shown by record, are involved. In re Austin's Estate, 35 Wyo. 176, 246 P. 459, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (1926). See Rule 72 and 75.

Statutes requiring clerk to keep enumerated books has no bearing on question whether execution is part of record proper. Lawer Auto Supply v. Teton Auto Co., 39 Wyo. 14, 269 P. 29, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1928).

Cited in

Johns v. Adams Bros., 2 Wyo. 194, 1880 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (1880); Garbanati v. Board of Comm'rs, 2 Wyo. 257, 1880 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (1880); Perkins v. McDowell, 3 Wyo. 328, 23 P. 71, 1890 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (1890); Rubel v. Willey, 5 Wyo. 427, 40 P. 761, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (1895); Seibel v. Bath, 5 Wyo. 409, 40 P. 756, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (1895); Boulter v. State, 6 Wyo. 66, 42 P. 606, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (1895); Underwood v. David, 9 Wyo. 178, 61 P. 1012, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1900); Freeburgh v. Lamoureux, 12 Wyo. 41, 73 P. 545, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (1903); Middleton v. State, 34 Wyo. 102, 241 P. 715, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (1925); State v. Scott, 35 Wyo. 108, 247 P. 699, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (1926).

§ 1-16-304. Transcription into new volume.

A court by order on the journal, may direct its clerk to transcribe any book in his office into a new volume, and the transcripts made are as valid as the original.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 343; R.S. 1887, § 2683; R.S. 1899, § 3777; C.S. 1910, § 4632; C.S. 1920, § 5905; R.S. 1931, § 89-2613; C.S. 1945, § 3-3613; W.S. 1957, § 1-319; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-304 .

§ 1-16-305. When complete record not required.

  1. W.S. 1-16-302 does not apply:
    1. In criminal prosecutions when the indictment  has been quashed, or when the district attorney has entered a nolle  prosequi on the indictment;
    2. When the action has been dismissed without  prejudice to a future action, as provided in W.S. 1-16-306 ;
    3. In all actions in which, in open court,  at the term at which the final order or judgment is made, both parties  agree that no record shall be made.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 344; R.S. 1887, § 2684; R.S. 1899, § 3778; C.S. 1910, § 4633; C.S. 1920, § 5906; R.S. 1931, § 89-2614; C.S. 1945, § 3-3614; W.S. 1957, § 1-320; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-305 ; Laws 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to dismissal of actions, see Rule 41, W.R.C.P.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-16-306. Record in dismissed action.

When an action has been dismissed without prejudice to a future action, the clerk shall make a complete record of the proceedings upon being paid therefor by the party requesting it.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 345; R.S. 1887, § 2685; R.S. 1899, § 3779; C.S. 1910, § 4634; C.S. 1920, § 5907; R.S. 1931, § 89-2615; C.S. 1945, § 3-3615; W.S. 1957, § 1-321; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-306 .

§ 1-16-307. Index to judgments.

  1. Except as  provided in subsection (b) of this section, the clerk shall keep and make available for public inspection  an index of all civil judgments containing the following information:
    1. The name of  the judgment debtor or, for orders establishing  or modifying a child support obligation, the obligor;
    2. Repealed by Laws 2019, ch. 24, §  2.
    3. The amount  of the original judgment  and the year when it was rendered;
    4. through (vi) Repealed by Laws 2019, ch. 24, §  2.
    5. Whether the notice of satisfaction has been filed  and the date the notice was filed.
  2. No index shall  be made of a judgment by operation of law arising under W.S. 14-2-204 , and no index shall be made of a judgment  by operation of law arising under W.S. 7-9-103(d) until execution is issued upon request of the victim, the division  of victim services or the district attorney pursuant to W.S. 7-9-103(d). Judgments whose access  are restricted by law or court rule shall not be included in the index  required under subsection (a) of this section.
  3. The clerk  shall include in the index required by subsection (a) of this section  all judgments, decrees and orders establishing or modifying a child  support obligation.
    1. through (iii) Repealed by Laws 2019, ch. 24, §  2.
  4. The procedures for compiling and maintaining  the judgment index required by subsection (a) of this section may  be modified by the court to permit the compilation and maintenance  by any manual, mechanical, electronic or other means calculated to  ensure the accuracy of the index.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 346; R.S. 1887, § 2686; R.S. 1899, § 3780; C.S. 1910, § 4635; C.S. 1920, § 5908; R.S. 1931, § 89-2616; C.S. 1945, § 3-3616; W.S. 1957, § 1-322; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-307 ; Laws 1990, ch. 89, § 2; 2001, ch. 70, § 1; 2003, ch. 93, § 2; 2019, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

The 2019 amendments. — The first 2019 amendment, by ch. 24, § 1, effective July 1, 2019, in (a), substituted “and make available for public inspection an index of all civil judgments containing” for “an index, direct and reverse, of all judgments, by the names of parties alphabetically arranged showing in separate columns” and added “information:” after “following”; in (a)(i), added “or, for orders establishing or modifying a child support obligation, the obligor;” after “debtor”; in (a)(iii), added “original” before “judgment” and deleted “and term”; in (a)(vii), substituted “Whether” for “The number and time of issue of,” substituted “notice of” for “execution and satisfaction thereof when” and substituted “filed and the date the notice was filed” for “made”; in (b), added “, and no index shall be made of a judgment by operation of law arising under W.S. 7-9-103(d) until execution is issued upon request of the victim, the division of victim services or the district attorney pursuant to W.S. 7-9-103(d). Judgments whose access are restricted by law or court rule shall not be included in the index required under subsection (a) of this section.”; in (c), added a period after “obligation” and added “, provided the index in such case shall show.”

The second 2019 amendment, by ch 24, § 2, effective July 1, 2019, repealed former (a)(ii), which read: “The name of the judgment debtor”; repealed former (a)(iv) through (a)(vi), which read: ”(iv) The page of the journal on which it is entered; (v) The volume and page of the final record; (vi) The number of the suit”; and repealed (c)(i) through (c)(iii), which read: “(i) The name of the obligor; (ii) The name of the obligee; and (iii) The docket number of the suit.”

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

Statutory requirements of indexing. —

Variation from the statutory requirements for indexing must meet the minimum requirements of the statute unless the legislature authorizes alternative methods for maintaining the index, or the method actually in use (e.g., computer storage) is made readily and plainly available to the public and operates in such a manner as to fully comply with governing statutes. In re Estate of Hite, 829 P.2d 1173, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. May 26, 1992).

The burden of satisfying the information supplying requirements of this section is upon the clerk and not upon the citizenry. In re Estate of Hite, 829 P.2d 1173, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. May 26, 1992).

Cited in

Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, 25 Wyo. 467, 171 P. 889, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1918); State Bd. of Law Exmrs. v. Strahan, 44 Wyo. 156, 8 P.2d 1090, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1932).

§ 1-16-308. Release of satisfied judgment; requirement.

  1. Any action pending or judgment rendered  in the district courts of this state which has been settled or satisfied  shall be released or dismissed in writing upon the face of the docket  or by written release by the attorney of record or the person in whose  favor the judgment was rendered, who shall date and sign the release.  If neither the attorney of record nor the judgment creditor can be  found in the county, the judgment debtor may pay the amount due upon  the judgment to the clerk of court. Upon proper showing to the court  that the judgment has been paid in full, the court shall order the  judgment released and satisfied.
  2. Subsection (a) of this section does not  apply to judgments arising by operation of law under W.S. 14-2-204 .

History. Laws 1915, ch. 114, § 1; C.S. 1920, § 5881; R.S. 1931, § 89-2207; Laws 1945, ch. 61, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-3617; W.S. 1957, § 1-323; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-308 ; Laws 1990, ch. 89, § 2; 2001, ch. 70, § 1; 2003, ch. 93, § 2.

Authority of trial court. —

The trial court had the authority to order a judgment debtor to submit the amount of the judgment debt to the clerk of the court and to order the clerk to enter a satisfaction of judgment. Stilson v. Hodges, 934 P.2d 736, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 1997).

Cited in

Amerigas Propane, Inc. v. Bing, 875 P.2d 1276, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1994).

§ 1-16-309. Release of satisfied judgment; liability for failure.

  1. If the attorney of record or other proper  person fails to release any action pending or judgment rendered within  fifteen (15) days after settlement or satisfaction, the person in  whose favor the judgment was rendered is liable for damages sustained.
  2. Subsection (a) of this section does not  apply to judgments by operation of law arising under W.S. 14-2-204 .

History. Laws 1915, ch. 114, § 2; C.S. 1920, § 5882; R.S. 1931, § 89-2208; C.S. 1945, § 3-3618; W.S. 1957, § 1-324; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-309 ; Laws 1990, ch. 89, § 2; 2003, ch. 93, § 2.

Authority of trial court. —

The trial court had the authority to order a judgment debtor to submit the amount of the judgment debt to the clerk of the court and to order the clerk to enter a satisfaction of judgment. Stilson v. Hodges, 934 P.2d 736, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 1997).

Article 4. Modification or Vacation after Term

Cross references. —

As to vacating satisfaction in connection with sale of wrong property under execution, see § 1-17-333 .

As to motion to vacate or modify injunction, see §§ 1-28-110 and 1-28-111 .

As to court vacating award under Uniform Arbitration Act, see § 1-36-114 .

As to motions to alter or amend judgment, see Rule 59, W.R.C.P.

As to stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment generally, see Rule 62, W.R.C.P.

Article inapplicable to child custody, child support or alimony decrees. —

The general restrictions on a court for modification or vacation of judgments after the term in which such are made do not apply to decrees concerning child custody, child support or alimony, but do apply to decrees concerning property divisions. Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 364 (Wyo. 1981).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §§ 740 to 872; 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 1 et seq.

Vacation or setting aside of judgment as to 1 or more of multiple parties against whom rendered as requiring its vacation as to all, 42 ALR2d 1030.

Power of court to vacate or modify order granting new trial in civil case, 61 ALR2d 642.

Appealability of void judgment or of one granting or denying motion for vacation thereof, 81 ALR2d 537.

Right to jury trial on motion to vacate judgment, 75 ALR3d 894.

Amendment of record of judgment in state civil case to correct judicial errors and omissions, 50 ALR5th 653.

Circumstances in which indefinite stay of proceedings in federal civil case constitutes abuse of discretion or is otherwise unlawful, 150 ALR Fed 577.

49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 228 to 340.

§ 1-16-401. Authority of court; grounds.

  1. A district court may vacate or modify  its own judgment or order after the term at which it was made:
    1. By granting a new trial when the grounds  for a new trial could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered  before, but are discovered after the original motion for a new trial  has been passed upon by the district court;
    2. By a new trial granted in proceedings  against defendants constructively summoned;
    3. For mistake, neglect or omission of the  clerk or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order;
    4. For fraud practiced by the successful  party in obtaining a judgment or order;
    5. For erroneous proceedings against a minor  or person of unsound mind, when the condition of the defendant does  not appear in the record nor the error in the proceedings;
    6. For the death of the parties before judgment  in the action;
    7. For unavoidable casualty or misfortune  preventing the party from prosecuting or defending;
    8. For errors in a judgment shown by a minor  within twelve (12) months after arriving at the age of majority;
    9. For taking judgments upon warrants of  attorney for more than was due the plaintiff, when the defendant was  not summoned or otherwise legally notified of the time and place of  taking the judgment;
    10. When the judgment or order was obtained  in whole or in a material part by false testimony on the part of the  successful party or any witness in his behalf which ordinary prudence  could not have anticipated or guarded against and the guilty party  has been convicted.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 361; R.S. 1887, § 2701; R.S. 1899, § 3795; C.S. 1910, § 4650; C.S. 1920, § 5923; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 93; R.S. 1931, § 89-2301; C.S. 1945, § 3-3801; W.S. 1957, § 1-325; Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 4; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-401 .

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Authority to correct judgments. —

The legislature may authorize courts to correct their judgments after the term at which they were rendered. Midwest Ref. Co. v. George, 44 Wyo. 25, 7 P.2d 213, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1932).

Remedy applicable to interlocutory order. —

Judgment as recorded may be corrected if it does not speak the truth unless limitations or laches bar such relief, and remedy is not limited to judgments only, but applies equally to interlocutory order sustaining demurrer (now motion). Bales v. Brome, 56 Wyo. 111, 105 P.2d 568, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1940).

Nature of proceedings. —

Proceeding to vacate judgment is not a civil action, but special proceedings in action after judgment. Luman v. Hill, 36 Wyo. 48, 252 P. 1019, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 36 Wyo. 427, 256 P. 339, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1927).

No conflict. —

This section does not conflict with Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60 insofar as a party seeks modification of a divorce judgment. Bradley v. Bradley, 2005 WY 107, 118 P.3d 984, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2005).

Correction of error by appeal or modification. —

Where decree establishing water rights was not void on its face and was rendered after jurisdiction of parties and subject matter had been secured, error in award of water to defendant city, if any, could be corrected only by appeal within two years or by proceeding to modify under this section, within three years. Holt v. Cheyenne, 22 Wyo. 212, 137 P. 876, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1914).

District court had jurisdiction to modify divorce decree by ordering defendant to replace value of savings bonds belonging to children, where both parties to divorce agreed that mistake was made in original decree when court ordered defendant to maintain savings bonds which did not then exist. Roseman v. Sackett, 979 P.2d 940, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 1999).

Equitable jurisdiction to relief. —

District courts have equitable jurisdiction to grant relief from judgments in case of fraud, accident and mistake, without statutory authority. Midwest Ref. Co. v. George, 44 Wyo. 25, 7 P.2d 213, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1932).

Subsection (a)(iv) of this section, is merely cumulative and does not restrict power of courts having equitable powers to vacate judgments which have been obtained by fraud or perjury against which the unsuccessful party had no opportunity to defend. Harden v. Card, 17 Wyo. 210, 97 P. 1075, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1908).

District court, as court of equity, had power to annul decree after expiration of term at which it was rendered for fraud or imposition on the court, as provisions of this and other sections in this article are not exclusive. Rock Springs Coal & Mining Co. v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 379, 272 P. 12, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1928).

District courts have jurisdiction over their judgments during term rendered. McGinnis v. Beatty, 28 Wyo. 328, 204 P. 340, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1922).

Motion to vacate made during term. —

The power of the court to vacate a judgment for unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing the party from prosecuting or defending should be exercised at least as liberally when the motion to vacate is made during the term as when it is made after the term, and probably more liberally. Lake v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 373, 63 Wyo. 375, 182 P.2d 824, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1947).

Judgment may be carried over term. —

Court did not err in granting contestee's motion to amend and modify judgment at next term after it was entered, as the motion was filed and notice given before the close of the term, and a judgment may be carried over the term by a motion to vacate or modify it, filed upon notice at the term at which it was rendered. Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 516, 69 P.2d 535, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1937).

Motion properly made at succeeding term. —

Date of rendition of judgment held to be that of entry at term succeeding trial term, so that motion for vacation and judgment notwithstanding verdict was properly made at succeeding term. State v. Scott, 35 Wyo. 108, 247 P. 699, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1926).

And not so made. —

Motion to vacate a judgment not made within three days after the successive term was held ineffective. Boulter v. Cook, 32 Wyo. 461, 234 P. 1101, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 32 Wyo. 461, 236 P. 245, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1925).

Equitable power available to enter nunc pro tunc. —

The district court has power to enter a nunc pro tunc order, which order purports to correct a final decree of settlement of account and distribution in the matter of a decedent's estate, when the order is made some 28 years after entry of the final decree, since there is equitable power without reference to the statutes to grant relief from accident or mistake. In re Estate of Kimball, 583 P.2d 1274, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 232 (Wyo. 1978).

Venue. —

Where time to attack divorce judgment in county wherein judgment was rendered had not expired, action based on husband's alleged fraud through failure to award wife's property settlement or permanent alimony should be brought in county where divorce was obtained. Rush v. Rush, 58 Wyo. 406, 133 P.2d 366, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1943).

Where fraud charged by wife's petition filed in Hot Springs county district court was fraud not only upon wife but upon district court of Natrona county, petition was properly dismissed and wife remitted to her remedy in Natrona county court. Rush v. Rush, 58 Wyo. 406, 133 P.2d 366, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1943).

Diligence required. —

One seeking relief against judgment must show diligence. Kelley v. Eidam, 32 Wyo. 271, 231 P. 678, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 1924).

Procedure for opening. —

Judgment can be opened only on filing of petition and issuance and service of summons, where motion is not based on irregularity. Boulter v. Cook, 32 Wyo. 461, 234 P. 1101, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 32 Wyo. 461, 236 P. 245, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1925).

Summons must issue at commencement of action to vacate or modify a judgment. First Nat'l Bank v. Moorcroft Ranch Co., 5 Wyo. 50, 36 P. 821, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1894).

Jurisdictional defects. —

Plaintiffs having proceeded in trial court to set aside certain orders, such proceedings constituted an appearance which cured alleged jurisdictional defects. Kilpatrick v. Horton, 15 Wyo. 501, 89 P. 1035, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1907).

Insufficient petition dismissed. —

Court may dismiss for insufficiency petition in statutory proceeding to vacate judgment, though no demurrer (now motion to dismiss) is filed. Luman v. Hill, 36 Wyo. 48, 252 P. 1019, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (1927), rehearing denied, 36 Wyo. 427, 256 P. 339, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (1927). See Rule 7, W.R.C.P.

Finding that petition did not state facts sufficient to warrant vacation of judgment is sufficient for the dismissal of the petition. Luman v. Hill, 36 Wyo. 48, 252 P. 1019, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 36 Wyo. 427, 256 P. 339, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1927).

Petition, alleging that fraud was practiced upon defendant by violation of alleged agreement to submit cause upon depositions and assessment schedules and upon an offer of defendant that judgment might be taken against him in certain sum, which did not allege that plaintiff accepted defendant's offer to confess judgment, did not state facts sufficient to warrant vacation of judgment. Luman v. Hill, 36 Wyo. 48, 252 P. 1019, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 36 Wyo. 427, 256 P. 339, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1927).

Motion to reinstate held insufficient. —

Under this section, a motion to reinstate case after dismissal for want of prosecution, considered as a petition, which alleges that by neglect of an attorney for plaintiff his amended petition was not filed within time allowed and that the papers in the case were mislaid for more than two years, without showing any effort to supply loss by copies or otherwise, was insufficient. Parrott v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 20 Wyo. 494, 126 P. 45, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1912).

Motion only considered motion to vacate, not petition. —

A motion designated as motion for new trial, which did not set forth the judgment nor state defense to the action except by reference to an answer tendered before judgment, and on which no summons was issued, could not be considered a petition, since it failed to comply substantially with statutory requirements, but could only be considered motion to vacate the judgment. Mitter v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 28 Wyo. 439, 206 P. 152, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1922), limited, Wyoming Automotive Co. v. Weisflog, 47 Wyo. 32, 30 P.2d 490, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1934).

Cause of action stated. —

In proceeding to vacate a judgment for fraud practiced by successful party, under this section and §§ 1-16-404 and 1-16-405 , petition states good cause of action which alleges that attorney for plaintiff, in collusion with attorney for defendant, fraudulently let judgments go against plaintiff by consent, that judgment of another state, upon which former suit was founded, was fraudulently procured, that court of other state did not have jurisdiction of plaintiff and that prior to that suit judgment creditor had been enjoined by order of another court of same state from collecting notes placed in judgment, except as to his interest therein at time injunction suit was started. Bank of Chadron v. Anderson, 6 Wyo. 518, 48 P. 197, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1897).

Newly-discovered evidence. —

It is a strong case that will warrant a court of review in reversing the judgment of a trial fairly had on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. Hardendorf v. Gafner, 53 Wyo. 427, 84 P.2d 719, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1938).

Reasonable diligence in discovering new evidence, so that it can be properly and timely presented to the court, is necessary, and the burden is upon the appellants to show due diligence. The affidavits must contain more than mere conclusions. Hardendorf v. Gafner, 53 Wyo. 427, 84 P.2d 719, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1938).

Where service was had by publication, parties having no knowledge may apply for and obtain leave to defend at any time within three years. Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo. 1, 215 P. 485, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1923).

Second default judgment against defendant was properly set aside on defendant's motion where it was entered by state court while appeal was pending in state supreme court after rendition of first default judgment and after staying proceedings by giving bond, state district court being then without jurisdiction. Montgomery v. Sioux City Seed Co., 71 F.2d 926, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 3249 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1934).

Term “clerical error” includes not only errors made by clerk in entering judgment, but also those mistakes apparent on the record, whether made by the court or counsel during progress of the case, which cannot reasonably be attributed to exercise of judicial consideration or discretion. In re Pringle's Estate, 51 Wyo. 352, 67 P.2d 204, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1937).

In proceeding to modify a decree, on ground of manifest clerical mistake by the court clerk, affecting certain water rights of the city of Cheyenne over 45 years after its entry, and when it was impossible to ascertain what facts were before the court, such proceedings, which had to be commenced within two years, were barred. Application of Beaver Dam Ditch Co., 54 Wyo. 459, 93 P.2d 934, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1939).

Motion to set aside judgment after term for irregularity in obtaining judgment is proper, but will not be sustained unless court is satisfied that meritorious defense to action exists in favor of moving parties. Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1937).

Power of the court to set aside a judgment after the term under subsection (a)(iii) of this section is not for irregularity in the judgment, but for irregularity in obtaining it. Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1937).

Term “irregularity” must be given a broad enough meaning to cover a case where the court has acted upon an erroneous understanding of the facts. In re Estate of Jansen, 76 Wyo. 430, 305 P.2d 422, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1957).

Applicability to probate matters. —

The provision of this section that the district court may modify its judgment after term for “irregularity” in obtaining a judgment or order is applicable in probate matters. In re Estate of Jansen, 76 Wyo. 430, 305 P.2d 422, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1957).

A final order of a probate court could be set aside after term due to “irregularity” in obtaining the final order where counsel for the estate failed to reveal to the court the fact that the validity of a prior order of the court in the proceeding was pending on appeal in the supreme court. In re Estate of Jansen, 76 Wyo. 430, 305 P.2d 422, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1957).

Wrong findings held not irregularities. —

Wrong findings of fact by trial court in ruling on a defaulting defendant's application for leave to appear and defend are not irregularities for which judgment can be vacated, since an irregularity is not a wrong adjudication, and is to be distinguished from error, but is want of adherence to some prescribed rule or method of proceeding. Mitter v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 28 Wyo. 439, 206 P. 152, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1922), limited, Wyoming Automotive Co. v. Weisflog, 47 Wyo. 32, 30 P.2d 490, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1934).

A wrong decision by district court on questions of fact, which it had power to hear and determine, would not be such an irregularity as would properly fall within subsection (a)(iii) of this section. Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1937).

Special findings on issue of fraud. —

In proceeding to vacate default judgment, refusal to make special findings on issue of fraud was not error where request was not made until order vacating judgment was had. Cottonwood Sheep Co. v. Murphy, 48 Wyo. 250, 44 P.2d 1000, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1935).

Prior death of party. —

Substantial compliance with statute is necessary to authorize vacation of judgment for prior death of party. Clarke v. Shoshoni Lumber Co., 31 Wyo. 205, 224 P. 845, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1924), writ of error dismissed, 276 U.S. 595, 48 S. Ct. 302, 72 L. Ed. 722, 1928 U.S. LEXIS 118 (U.S. 1928).

“Unavoidable casualty” not found. —

That defendant's attorney could not be present at trial on day judgment was rendered because of previous engagements, which kept him in court in another county, did not constitute “unavoidable casualty,” warranting vacation of judgment. Luman v. Hill, 36 Wyo. 48, 252 P. 1019, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 36 Wyo. 427, 256 P. 339, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1927).

Proceeds of homestead. —

Court could determine claim to proceeds of homestead after expiration of term at which sale was confirmed. Altman v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 36 Wyo. 290, 254 P. 691, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1927).

Modification necessarily requires consideration of applicant's defense. Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1965).

Provisions applicable to judgments having some degree of validity. —

Statutes pertaining to the modification and vacation of judgments after term are intended to apply to judgments having some degree of validity. Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1965).

Acts wholly in excess of court's jurisdiction are subject to attack in any way and at any time the aggrieved party may see fit, by proper proceedings. Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1937).

Such as void judgments. —

A judgment which is wholly void is in legal effect a nullity, and there is nothing in this section which purports to, or which could, breathe validity into a judgment which is wholly void on account of being entered in the absence of jurisdiction over the defendant. Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1965).

Consequently, no showing of merits is necessary in support of application to have it vacated. Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1965).

Relief proper. —

In a divorce case, a wife's due process rights under Wyo. Const. art. I, § 6 and the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when a district court entered a default divorce decree based on a supplemental pleading that was not served on the wife; a wife's motion to modify the decree should have been granted because the supplemental affidavit contained claims for relief that were not in the original complaint. Bradley v. Bradley, 2005 WY 107, 118 P.3d 984, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2005).

Writ of prohibition. —

Where the district court had jurisdiction to vacate a judgment, the supreme court will not issue a writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Bank of Chadron v. District Court, 5 Wyo. 227, 39 P. 749, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1895).

Order deemed final. —

An order entered on motion to vacate a judgment under this article is a final order from which appeal lies. Mitter v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 28 Wyo. 439, 206 P. 152, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1922), limited, Wyoming Automotive Co. v. Weisflog, 47 Wyo. 32, 30 P.2d 490, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1934).

Amendment of appeal record. —

After close of term at which judgment was rendered, appeal record can be amended only upon minutes or memoranda in possession of court or judge. State Use of Frederick v. Allen, 42 Wyo. 51, 288 P. 1058, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1930).

Marital property division modifiable where particular debt omitted from original decree. —

The parties to a divorce action stipulated that a particular debt was omitted from the original decree. They also agreed that the district court should make a disposition of the debt. Under such circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion when it modified the judgment containing the division of marital property. Barnett v. Barnett, 704 P.2d 1308, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 534 (Wyo. 1985).

Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., does not limit power of court to entertain independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding as provided in this section and § 1-16-408 or to grant relief to a party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service than by publication, as provided in § 1-16-402 .Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 618 P.2d 547, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 311 (Wyo. 1980).

Applied in

Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 364 (Wyo. 1981); Harshfield v. Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1992).

Quoted in

State v. Bentine, 66 Wyo. 222, 208 P.2d 291, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (1949); Jubie v. Dahlke (In re Estate of Dahlke), 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Feb 25, 2014).

Stated in

Eager v. Derowitsch, 68 Wyo. 251, 232 P.2d 713, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (1951); Henderson v. Sky, 71 Wyo. 250, 256 P.2d 106, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (1953); Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, 652 P.2d 395, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 390 (Wyo. 1982).

Cited in

Hendrickson v. Bradley, 85 F. 508, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2186 (8th Cir. 1898); Kinney v. Owens, 15 Wyo. 387, 89 P. 573, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1907); Kinney v. Owens, 15 Wyo. 394, 89 P. 574, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (1907); Spencer v. Loewenstein, 29 Wyo. 31, 207 P. 1098, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (1922); Clarke v. Shoshoni Lumber Co., 31 Wyo. 205, 224 P. 845, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (1924); In re Estate of Brennan, 433 P.2d 512, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 182 (Wyo. 1967); In re Estate of Sullivan, 506 P.2d 813, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1973); R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1999).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Mechanically Produced Evidence,” 3 Wyo. L.J. 221.

See, “Due Diligence Required for Service by Publication,” 9 Wyo. L.J. 70.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Vacation of judgment based on unauthorized compromise by attorney, 30 ALR2d 944.

Right of successful party to have judgment in his favor vacated or set aside on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect or the like, 40 ALR2d 1127.

Lack of authority of attorney to dismiss or otherwise terminate action as ground for relief from judgment, 56 ALR2d 1290.

Attack, by petition to set aside judgment, on personal service as having been obtained by fraud or trickery, 98 ALR2d 551.

Consent as ground of vacating judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, after expiration of term or time prescribed by statute or rules of court, 3 ALR3d 1191.

Opening default or default judgment claimed to have been obtained because of attorney's mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 ALR3d 1255.

Liability insurer's right to open or set aside or contest matters relating to merits of judgment against insured entered in action in which insurer did not appear or defend, 27 ALR3d 350.

Inattention of juror from sleepiness or other cause as ground for reversal or new trial, 59 ALR5th 1.

Waiver of right to default judgment, 64 ALR5th 163.

§ 1-16-402. Opening judgment or order rendered on service by publication.

A party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without service other than by publication in a newspaper may have the same opened and be allowed to defend within six (6) months after the date of the judgment or order. Before the judgment or order can be opened, the applicant shall give notice to the adverse party of his intended application, file a full answer to the petition, pay all costs if the court requires them to be paid and make it appear to the satisfaction of the court that during the pendency of the action he had no actual notice thereof in time to appear in court and make his defense. Each party may present affidavits.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 362; R.S. 1887, § 2702; R.S. 1899, § 3796; C.S. 1910, § 4651; C.S. 1920, § 5924; R.S. 1931, § 89-2302; C.S. 1945, § 3-3802; Laws 1947, ch. 55, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-326; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-402 .

Cross references. —

As to publication of notice, see §§ 1-6-201 to 1-6-204 .

As to service by publication, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

Proving lack of notice. —

One moving to open default for want of personal service must prove no actual notice in time to defend. Clarke v. Shoshoni Lumber Co., 31 Wyo. 205, 224 P. 845, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1924), writ of error dismissed, 276 U.S. 595, 48 S. Ct. 302, 72 L. Ed. 722, 1928 U.S. LEXIS 118 (U.S. 1928).

Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., does not limit power of court to entertain independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, as provided in §§ 1-16-401 and 1-16-408 , or to grant relief to a party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service than by publication, as provided in this section. Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 618 P.2d 547, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 311 (Wyo. 1980).

Quoted in

Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, 652 P.2d 395, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 390 (Wyo. 1982).

Cited in

Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo. 1, 215 P. 485, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 30 , 29 A.L.R. 1371 (1923); Rock Springs Coal & Mining Co. v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 379, 272 P. 12, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (1928); In re Bergman, 60 Wyo. 355, 151 P.2d 360, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1944); Travis v. Estate of Travis, 79 Wyo. 329, 334 P.2d 508, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1959).

Law reviews. —

See “Administrative Problems Relating to Adoption,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 210.

§ 1-16-403. Bona fide purchasers unaffected.

The title to any property which is the subject of the judgment or order sought to be opened and which in consequence of the judgment or order has passed to a purchaser in good faith, shall not be affected by any proceedings to vacate or modify the judgment, nor shall title to any property sold before judgment under an attachment be affected by the proceedings.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 363; R.S. 1887, § 2703; R.S. 1899, § 3797; C.S. 1910, § 4652; C.S. 1920, § 5925; R.S. 1931, § 89-2303; C.S. 1945, § 3-3803; W.S. 1957, § 1-327; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-403 .

Cited in

Rock Springs Coal & Mining Co. v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 379, 272 P. 12, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (1928).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Execution sale as affected by modification of judgment, 32 ALR3d 1019.

§ 1-16-404. Grounds to vacate tried first.

The court must first try and decide whether to vacate or modify a judgment or order before trying or deciding the validity of the defense or cause of action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 366; R.S. 1887, § 2706; R.S. 1899, § 3800; C.S. 1910, § 4655; C.S. 1920, § 5928; R.S. 1931, § 89-2306; C.S. 1945, § 3-3806; W.S. 1957, § 1-329; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-404.

Meritorious defense to exist. —

Motion to set aside judgment after term for irregularity in obtaining judgment is proper, but will not be sustained unless court is satisfied that meritorious defense to action exists in favor of moving parties. Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1937).

Refusal to make special findings. —

In proceedings to vacate default judgment, refusal to make special findings on issue of fraud was not error where request was not made until order vacating judgment was had. Cottonwood Sheep Co. v. Murphy, 48 Wyo. 250, 44 P.2d 1000, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1935).

Cited in

Bank of Chadron v. Anderson, 6 Wyo. 518, 48 P. 197, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (1897); Kilpatrick v. Horton, 15 Wyo. 501, 89 P. 1035, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (1907); Rock Springs Coal & Mining Co. v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 379, 272 P. 12, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (1928).

§ 1-16-405. Proceedings prior to vacation and upon modification.

A judgment shall not be vacated until it is decided that there is a valid defense to the action in which the judgment was rendered or if the plaintiff seeks its vacation, that there is a valid cause of action. When a judgment is modified, all liens and securities obtained under it shall be preserved to the modified judgment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 367; R.S. 1887, § 2707; R.S. 1899, § 3801; C.S. 1910, § 4656; C.S. 1920, § 5929; R.S. 1931, § 89-2307; C.S. 1945, § 3-3807; W.S. 1957, § 1-330; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-405 .

Section does not limit power of court to control its own judgments during term at which they are rendered. McGinnis v. Beatty, 28 Wyo. 328, 204 P. 340, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1922).

Intention of section is that a judgment should not be opened, if it would be useless to do so. Bales v. Brome, 56 Wyo. 111, 105 P.2d 568, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1940).

Nature of proceeding. —

Proceeding to vacate a judgment is not a civil action, but a special proceeding in an action after judgment, in view of provisions defining a final order. Luman v. Hill, 36 Wyo. 427, 256 P. 339, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1927).

Meritorious defense to exist. —

Motion to set aside judgment after term for irregularity in obtaining judgment is proper, but will not be sustained unless court is satisfied that meritorious defense to action exists in favor of moving parties. Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1937).

But not where judgment void. —

Defendant against whom default judgment on note was entered by district court clerk was entitled to have judgment opened at subsequent term without showing meritorious defense where judgment was void for inclusion of reasonable attorney's fee. Wunnicke v. Leith, 61 Wyo. 191, 157 P.2d 274, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1945).

Justice requires void default judgment on note be reopened at subsequent term, even though it be necessary to show meritorious defense, where petition showed that note had been at least partially paid, so that right of matter might be accurately determined. Wunnicke v. Leith, 61 Wyo. 191, 157 P.2d 274, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1945).

Adjudication to be had on merits. —

Under this section for vacation of judgment, issue must be joined and an adjudication had on the merits of the defense to the action. James v. Lederer-Strauss & Co., 32 Wyo. 377, 233 P. 137, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1925).

Cause of action held stated. —

Plaintiff, after dismissal of action ordered, seeking to correct order sustaining demurrer (now motion to dismiss) on ground of misjoinder of parties, to correspond to facts, is not required to show petition stated cause of action, since court, in refusing to sustain demurrer (now motion to dismiss) on ground that it failed to state cause of action, impliedly held it stated such cause. Bales v. Brome, 56 Wyo. 111, 105 P.2d 568, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1940). See Rule 7, W.R.C.P.

Special findings of fraud. —

In proceedings to vacate default judgment, refusal to make special findings on issue of fraud was not error where request was not made until order vacating judgment was had. Cottonwood Sheep Co. v. Murphy, 48 Wyo. 250, 44 P.2d 1000, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1935).

Cited in

Bank of Chadron v. Anderson, 6 Wyo. 518, 48 P. 197, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (1897); Rock Springs Coal & Mining Co. v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 379, 272 P. 12, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (1928); Kilpatrick v. Horton, 15 Wyo. 501, 89 P. 1035, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (1907).

§ 1-16-406. Injunction; suspension of judgment or order.

The party seeking to vacate or modify a judgment or order may obtain an injunction suspending proceedings on the whole or a part thereof when it appears probable by affidavit or by exhibition of the record that the party is entitled to have the judgment or order vacated or modified.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 368; R.S. 1887, § 2708; R.S. 1899, § 3802; C.S. 1910, § 4657; C.S. 1920, § 5930; R.S. 1931, § 89-2308; C.S. 1945, § 3-3808; W.S. 1957, § 1-331; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-406 .

Cross references. —

As to injunction pending appeal taken from judgment or final order, see Rule 62, W.R.C.P.

Cited in

Rock Springs Coal & Mining Co. v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 379, 272 P. 12, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (1928).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Power of trial court to enjoin enforcement of its judgment as affected by previous affirmance, 85 ALR2d 772.

§ 1-16-407. Injunction; suspension of premature judgment.

If the judgment was rendered before the action stood for trial, the injunction may be granted although no valid defense to the action is shown. The court shall make such orders concerning the executions on the judgment as shall give to the defendant the same rights of delay he would have had if the judgment had been rendered at the proper time.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 369; R.S. 1887, § 2709; R.S. 1899, § 3803; C.S. 1910, § 4658; C.S. 1920, § 5931; R.S. 1931, § 89-2309; C.S. 1945, § 3-3809; W.S. 1957, § 1-332; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-407.

Cited in

Rock Springs Coal & Mining Co. v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 379, 272 P. 12, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (1928).

§ 1-16-408. Limitation on time for proceedings.

Proceedings to vacate or modify a judgment or order, for the causes mentioned in W.S. 1-16-401(a)(iv), (v) and (vii) must be commenced within two (2) years after the judgment was rendered or order made, unless the party entitled thereto is a minor or a person of unsound mind, and in cases of such disability, within two (2) years after the removal thereof. Proceedings for the causes mentioned in W.S. 1-16-401(a)(iii) and (vi) shall be commenced within three (3) years, and in W.S. 1-16-401(a)(ix) within two (2) years, after the defendant has notice of the judgment. Proceedings for the causes mentioned in W.S. 1-16-401(a)(x) may be commenced after the guilty party is convicted, if the conviction is within two (2) years from the rendition of the judgment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 370; R.S. 1887, § 2710; R.S. 1899, § 3804; C.S. 1910, § 4659; C.S. 1920, § 5932; R.S. 1931, § 89-2310; C.S. 1945, § 3-3810; W.S. 1957, § 1-333; Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-408.

Cross references. —

As to limitation of actions generally, see chapter 3 of this title.

Authority to correct judgments. —

Legislature may authorize courts to correct their judgments after the term at which they were rendered. Midwest Ref. Co. v. George, 44 Wyo. 25, 7 P.2d 213, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1932).

Meritorious defense to exist. —

Motion to set aside judgment after term for irregularity in obtaining judgment is proper, but will not be sustained unless court is satisfied that meritorious defense to action exists in favor of moving parties. Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1937).

Right to modify lost. —

If no proceedings are taken within the time specified for correcting a judgment, right to modify is lost. Holt v. Cheyenne, 22 Wyo. 212, 137 P. 876, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1914).

Proceeding barred. —

In proceeding to modify decree, on the ground of a manifest clerical mistake by the clerk of the court, affecting certain water rights of the city of Cheyenne, over 45 years, after its entry, and when it was impossible to ascertain what facts were before the court, such proceeding, which must be commenced within two years, is barred. Application of Beaver Dam Ditch Co., 54 Wyo. 459, 93 P.2d 934, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1939).

Equitable jurisdiction to grant relief. —

District courts have equitable jurisdiction to grant relief from judgments in case of fraud, accident and mistake, without statutory authority. Midwest Ref. Co. v. George, 44 Wyo. 25, 7 P.2d 213, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1932).

Equitable power to enter nunc pro tunc. —

The district court has power to enter a nunc pro tunc order, which order purports to correct a final decree of settlement of account and distribution in the matter of a decedent's estate, when the order is made some 28 years after entry of the final decree since there is equitable power without reference to the statutes to grant relief from accident or mistake. In re Estate of Kimball, 583 P.2d 1274, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 232 (Wyo. 1978).

Vacation not demanded by equity. —

Vacation on motion filed more than eight years after action was commenced was not demanded by impelling equity. Clarke v. Shoshoni Lumber Co., 31 Wyo. 205, 224 P. 845, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1924), writ of error dismissed, 276 U.S. 595, 48 S. Ct. 302, 72 L. Ed. 722, 1928 U.S. LEXIS 118 (U.S. 1928).

Where time to attack divorce judgment in county where granted had not expired, action based on husband's fraud in connection with failure to award property settlement or permanent alimony should be brought in county where divorce judgment was obtained. Rush v. Rush, 58 Wyo. 406, 133 P.2d 366, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1943).

Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., does not limit power of court to entertain independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, as provided in § 1-16-401 and this section, or to grant relief to a party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service than by publication, as provided in § 1-16-402 .Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 618 P.2d 547, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 311 (Wyo. 1980).

Applied in

Roseman v. Sackett, 979 P.2d 940, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 1999).

Cited in

Rock Springs Coal & Mining Co. v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 379, 272 P. 12, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (1928); In re Estate of Sullivan, 506 P.2d 813, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1973).

Stated in

Jubie v. Dahlke (In re Estate of Dahlke), 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Feb 25, 2014).

Law reviews. —

See “Due Diligence Required for Service by Publication,” 9 Wyo. L.J. 70.

§ 1-16-409. Applicability of provisions to supreme court.

The provisions relating to modification or vacation of judgments or orders apply to the supreme court so far as the same are applicable to its judgments or final orders.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 372; R.S. 1887, § 2712; R.S. 1899, § 3806; C.S. 1910, § 4661; C.S. 1920, § 5934; R.S. 1931, § 89-2312; C.S. 1945, § 3-3812; W.S. 1957, § 1-334; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-409.

Where petition in error was dismissed because no judgment was shown in transcript, supreme court will not vacate the order at the second term, though a new transcript was filed showing formal judgment. Gramm v. Fisher, 4 Wyo. 1, 31 P. 767, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1892).

Article 5. Revivor and New Parties

Cross references. —

For provision that dormant judgment ceases to operate as a lien on the estate of the judgment debtor, see § 1-17-307 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §§ 415 to 476.

49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 531 to 549.

§ 1-16-501. Proceeding against parties not summoned and persons whose liability unknown.

When judgment is rendered in this state on a joint instrument, parties to the action who were not summoned and persons whose liability was not known to the plaintiff at the rendition of the judgment may be made parties thereto by action in the same court if they can be summoned. When the judgment is rendered elsewhere, the plaintiff may bring suit upon the instrument against the parties not summoned or persons whose liability was unknown, in any county where any of the parties reside or may be summoned.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 373; R.S. 1887, § 2713; R.S. 1899, § 3807; C.S. 1910, § 4662; C.S. 1920, § 5935; R.S. 1931, § 89-2801; C.S. 1945, § 3-3901; W.S. 1957, § 1-335; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-501 .

Doctrine of merger abolished. —

The doctrine of merger, to the effect that whenever two or more persons are jointly liable and an action is commenced against any less than the whole number the nonjoinder of the others will sustain a plea in abatement (now motion), has been abolished in this state by this section. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

§ 1-16-502. Revivor of dormant judgments; generally.

When a judgment, including judgments rendered by a circuit court, a transcript of which has been filed in the district court for execution, becomes dormant, it may be revived by the allowance of the court of a motion for revival or by a conditional order of the court that the action be revived. If the order of revival is made by consent of the parties, the action shall be revived. If the order is not made by consent, the order shall be served on the adverse party. When either party to the dormant judgment, his agent or attorney, makes affidavit showing that the adverse party is a nonresident of the state and that the judgment remains unsatisfied in whole or in part and the amount owing thereon, service may be made by publication as in other cases. If sufficient cause is not shown to the contrary, the judgment shall stand revived for the amount which the court finds to be due and unsatisfied thereon. The lien of the judgment for the amount due shall be revived and shall operate from the time of the entry of the conditional order or the filing of the motion.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 374; R.S. 1887, § 2714; R.S. 1899, § 3808; C.S. 1910, § 4663; C.S. 1920, § 5936; R.S. 1931, § 89-2802; C.S. 1945, § 3-3902; W.S. 1957, § 1-336; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-502; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2016, ch. 78, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice of the peace.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42,§ 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, substituted “by the allowance of the court of a motion for revival or by a conditional order of the court that the action be revived. If the order of revival is made by consent of the parties, the action shall be revived. If the order is not made by consent, the order shall be served on the adverse party” for “in the same manner as prescribed for reviving actions before judgment or by action” at the end of the first sentence.

Editor's notes. —

The Revisor’s Bill, Laws 2016, ch. 78, § 3, stated: “ Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Constructive service. —

There was no defect in a judgment for revivor where service was constructive instead of personal, since there had been personal service on the judgment debtors in the original action. Hume v. Ricketts, 69 Wyo. 222, 240 P.2d 881, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1952).

Effect of foreign statute of limitations. —

Where Wyoming judgment had been revived under this section, Colorado statute of limitations against actions on foreign judgments began to run from date of revivor of judgment. Kuykendall v. Tod, 219 F. 707, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661 (8th Cir. 1915).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Part payment or promise to pay judgment as affecting time for revival, 45 ALR2d 967.

§ 1-16-503. Revivor of dormant judgments; limitations on time to revive.

  1. No action shall be brought to revive a  judgment after ten (10) years after it becomes dormant, unless the  party entitled to bring the action was:
    1. A minor or subject to any other legal  disability at the time the judgment became dormant, in which case  the action may be brought within fifteen (15) years after the disability  has ceased; or
    2. A party in a child support proceeding,  in which case the action shall be brought within twenty-one (21) years.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 375; R.S. 1887, § 2715; R.S. 1899, § 3809; C.S. 1910, § 4664; C.S. 1920, § 5937; R.S. 1931, § 89-2803; C.S. 1945, § 3-3903; W.S. 1957, § 1-337; Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-503; Laws 2004, ch. 26, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to limitation of actions generally, see chapter 3 of this title.

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, added (a)(ii), making related changes; and in the introductory language in (a) substituted “ten (10) years” for “twenty-one (21) years.”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Child support payments. —

Where a mother did not execute on periodic child support payments within five years of their becoming due, the judgments became dormant, subject to revival within 21 (now 10) years. Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1997).

The doctrine of laches did not apply where a mother revived her claims for child support when she brought a collection action against the father within 21 (now 10) years. Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 2000).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Absence of judgment debtor from state as suspending or tolling running of period of limitations as to judgment, 27 ALR2d 839.

Reviving, renewing or extending judgment by order entered after expiration of statutory limitation period on motion or proceeding commenced within such period, 52 ALR2d 672.

§ 1-16-504. Revivor when parties die after judgment.

If either or both parties die after judgment and before satisfaction thereof, their representatives may be made parties to the judgment in the same manner prescribed for the revival of actions as provided in W.S. 1-16-502 . The judgment may be rendered and execution awarded against the representatives of the deceased parties.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 376; R.S. 1887, § 2716; R.S. 1899, § 3810; C.S. 1910, § 4665; C.S. 1920, § 5938; R.S. 1931, § 89-2804; C.S. 1945, § 3-3904; W.S. 1957, § 1-338; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-504; 2016, ch. 78, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to abatement and survival of causes of action, see chapter 4 of this title.

As to substitution of parties when one dies before judgment, see Rule 25, W.R.C.P.

The 2016 amendment , effective July 1, 2016, substituted “as provided in W.S. 1-16-502 ” for “before judgment” at the end of the first sentence.

Editor's notes. —

The Revisor’s Bill, Laws 2016, ch. 78, § 3, stated: “ Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Death of 1 of 2 judgment creditors who are partners. —

Since, under §§ 17-21-601 and 17-21-801, a surviving partner succeeds to the rights of the deceased partner in trust for the purpose of liquidation, no revivor of judgment is necessary in the case of the death of one of two partners who are judgment creditors. Hume v. Ricketts, 69 Wyo. 222, 240 P.2d 881, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1952).

Where judgment creditors were partners, it was not necessary to bring the action for revivor within a year after the death of one of them, but the surviving partner was able to do so within the limitation of 21 years provided by § 1-16-503 , and without joining the heirs of the deceased partner, although joinder of the heirs was harmless. Hume v. Ricketts, 69 Wyo. 222, 240 P.2d 881, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1952).

§ 1-16-505. Partners made parties to judgment.

The members of a partnership against which a judgment has been rendered in its firm name may by action be made parties to the judgment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 377; R.S. 1887, § 2717; R.S. 1899, § 3811; C.S. 1910, § 4666; C.S. 1920, § 5939; R.S. 1931, § 89-2805; C.S. 1945, § 3-3905; W.S. 1957, § 1-339; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-505.

In general. —

If a partnership is sued as an entity, a judgment in the action reaches the joint property of the partnership, and a plaintiff in such an action may reach the members of the partnership under the provisions of this section. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1951).

Quoted in

Wyoming Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 770 P.2d 215, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 1989).

Law reviews. —

See comment, “Effect of Judgment Against Only One Partner on Partnership Property,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 217.

§ 1-16-506. Sureties made parties to judgment.

Sureties to the bond of an executor, administrator, guardian or trustee may by action be made parties to a judgment thereon against the principal.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 378; R.S. 1887, § 2715; R.S. 1899, § 3812; C.S. 1910, § 4667; C.S. 1920, § 5940; R.S. 1931, § 89-2806; C.S. 1945, § 3-3906; W.S. 1957, § 1-340; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-17-506.

Cross references. —

As to judgment against surety for costs, see § 1-14-123 .

For provision that surety of officer may be made party to judgment in case of amercement, see § 1-24-106 .

As to judgment against plaintiff and his sureties in action of replevin, see § 1-15-105 .

As to rights of surety on paying judgment, see § 38-1-104 .

As to judgment against surety in connection with appeals to supreme court, see Rule 4.05, W.R.A.P.

When liability of administrator becomes fixed, that of surety also attaches, and upon failure of principal to pay money, action can be maintained against surety. In such case, decree of probate court is conclusive upon status of account as respects sureties as well as administrator. Wayman v. Alanko, 351 P.2d 100, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1960).

And surety cannot relitigate matter without such proof as would justify opening any other judgment. —

If the district court sitting in probate had jurisdiction to enter the judgments against defendant guardian, then the rule of res judicata applies in the supreme court with full force and the surety cannot relitigate it without proof of fraud or gross mistake such as would justify opening any other judgment. Wayman v. Alanko, 351 P.2d 100, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1960).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Conclusiveness and effect upon guarantor of default or consent judgment against principal, 59 ALR2d 752.

Article 6. Wyoming Structured Settlement Protection Act

Effective dates. —

Laws 2006, ch. 61, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2006.

§ 1-16-601. Short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the Wyoming Structured Settlement Protection Act.

History. Laws 2006, ch. 61, § 1.

Am Jur 2d and C.J.S. references

Construction and application of state structured settlement protection acts. 27 A.L.R.6th 323.

§ 1-16-602. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Annuity issuer” means an insurer that  has issued a contract to fund periodic payments under a structured  settlement;
    2. “Dependents” include a payee’s spouse  and minor children and all other persons for whom the payee is legally  obligated to provide support, including alimony;
    3. “Discounted present value” means the present  value of future payments determined by discounting the payments to  the present value using the most recently published applicable federal  rate for determining the present value of an annuity, as issued by  the United States Internal Revenue Service;
    4. “Gross advance amount” means the sum payable  to the payee or for the payee’s account as consideration for a transfer  of structured settlement payment rights before any reductions for  transfer expenses or other deductions to be made from such consideration;
    5. “Independent professional advice” means  advice of an attorney, certified public accountant, actuary or other  licensed professional adviser;
    6. “Interested parties” means, with respect  to any structured settlement, the payee, any beneficiary irrevocably  designated under the annuity contract to receive payments following  the payee’s death, the annuity issuer, the structured settlement obligor  and any other party that has continuing rights or obligations under  the structured settlement;
    7. “Net advance amount” means the gross advance  amount less the aggregate amount of the actual and estimated transfer  expenses required to be disclosed under W.S. 1-16-603(e);
    8. “Payee” means an individual who is receiving  tax free payments under a structured settlement and proposes to make  a transfer of payment rights thereunder;
    9. “Periodic payments” includes both recurring  payments and scheduled future lump sum payments;
    10. “Qualified assignment agreement” means  an agreement providing for a qualified assignment within the meaning  of 26 U.S.C. 130;
    11. “Settled claim” means the original tort  claim resolved by a structured settlement;
    12. “Structured settlement” means an arrangement  for periodic payment of damages for personal injuries or sickness  established by settlement agreement or judgment in resolution of a  tort claim;
    13. “Structured settlement agreement” means  the agreement, judgment, stipulation or release embodying the terms  of the structured settlement;
    14. “Structured settlement obligor” means,  with respect to a structured settlement, the party that has a continuing  obligation to make periodic payments to the payee under a structured  settlement agreement or a qualified assignment agreement;
    15. “Structured settlement rights” means rights  to receive periodic payments under a structured settlement, whether  from the structured settlement obligor or the annuity issuer, where:
      1. The payee is domiciled in, or the domicile  or principal place of business of the structured settlement obligor  or the annuity issuer is located in, this state;
      2. The structured settlement agreement was  approved by a court in this state; or
      3. The structured settlement agreement is  expressly governed by the laws of this state.
    16. “Terms of the structured settlement” include,  with respect to a structured settlement agreement, the terms of the  structured settlement agreement, the annuity contract, a qualified  assignment agreement and any order or other approval of any court  that authorized or approved the structured settlement;
    17. “Transfer” means any sale, assignment,  pledge, hypothecation or other alienation or encumbrance of structured  settlement payment rights made by a payee for consideration, provided  that the term “transfer” does not include the creation or perfection  of a security agreement in structured settlement payment rights under  a blanket security agreement entered into with an insured depository  institution, in the absence of any action to redirect the structured  settlement payments to the insured depository institution, or an agent  or successor in interest thereof, or otherwise to enforce the blanket  security interest against the structured settlement payment rights;
    18. “Transfer agreement” means the agreement  providing for a transfer of structured settlement payment rights;
    19. “Transfer expenses” means all expenses  of a transfer that are required under the transfer agreement to be  paid by the payee or deducted from the gross advance amount, including  without limitation, court filing fees, attorneys’ fees, escrow fees,  lien recordation fees, judgment and lien search fees, finders’ fees,  commissions and other payments to a broker or other intermediary.  “Transfer expenses” do not include preexisting obligations of the  payee payable for the payee’s account from the proceeds of a transfer;
    20. “Transferee” means a party acquiring or  proposing to acquire structured settlement payment rights through  a transfer;
    21. “This act” means W.S. 1-16-601 through 1-16-607 .

History. Laws 2006, ch. 61, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-16-603. Required disclosures to payee.

  1. Not less than three (3) days prior to  the date on which a payee signs a transfer agreement, the transferee  shall provide to the payee a separate disclosure statement, in bold  type no smaller than fourteen (14) points, setting forth:
    1. The amounts and due dates of the structured  settlement payments to be transferred;
    2. The aggregate amount of the payments;
    3. The discounted present value of the payments  to be transferred and the amount of the applicable federal rate used  in calculating the discounted present value;
    4. The gross advance amount;
    5. An itemized listing of all applicable  transfer fees, other than attorneys’ fees and related disbursements  payable in connection with the transferee’s application for approval  of the transfer and the transferee’s best estimate of the amount of  any such fees and disbursements;
    6. The net advance amount;
    7. The amount of any penalties or liquidated  damages payable by the payee in the event of any breach of the transfer  agreement by the payee;
    8. A statement that the payee has the right  to cancel the transfer agreement without penalty or further obligation  not later than the third business day after the date the agreement  is signed by the payee.

History. Laws 2006, ch. 61, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-16-604. Approval of transfers of structured settlement payment rights.

  1. No direct or indirect transfer of structured  settlement payment rights shall be effective and no structured settlement  obligor or annuity issuer shall be required to make any payment directly  or indirectly to any transferee of structured settlement payment rights  unless the transfer has been approved in advance in a final court  order based on express findings by the court that:
    1. The transfer is in the best interest of  the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s  dependents;
    2. The payee has been advised in writing  by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding  the transfer and has either received such advice or knowingly waived  such advice in writing; and
    3. The transfer does not contravene any applicable  statute or the order of any court or other government authority.

History. Laws 2006, ch. 61, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-16-605. Effects of transfer of structured settlement payment rights.

  1. Following a transfer of structured settlement  payment rights under this act:
    1. The structured settlement obligor and  the annuity issuer shall, as to all parties except the transferee,  be discharged and released from any and all liability for the transferred  payments;
    2. The transferee shall be liable to the  structured settlement obligor and the annuity issuer:
      1. If the transfer contravenes the terms  of the structured settlement, for any taxes incurred by such parties  as a consequence of the transfer; and
      2. For any other liabilities or costs, including  reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees arising from compliance by such  parties with the order of the court or arising as a consequence of  the transferee’s failure to comply with this act.
    3. Neither the annuity issuer nor the structured  settlement obligor may be required to divide any periodic payment  between the payee and any transferee or assignee or between two (2)  or more transferees or assignees; and
    4. Any further transfer of structured settlement  payment rights by the payee may be made only after compliance with  all requirements of this act.

History. Laws 2006, ch. 61, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-16-602(a)(xxi).

Cited in

Dave v. Valdez, 2012 WY 59, 275 P.3d 485, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Apr. 13, 2012).

§ 1-16-606. Procedure for approval of transfers.

  1. An application under this act for approval  of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall be made  by the transferee and may be brought in the Wyoming district court  that approved the structured settlement payment rights, or the Wyoming  district court in the county where the payee resides without regard  to where the structured settlement payment rights may have accrued.
  2. Not less than twenty (20) days prior to  the scheduled hearing on an application for approval of a transfer  of structured settlement payment rights under W.S. 1-16-604 , the transferee shall file with the court and serve all  interested parties a notice of the proposed transfer and application  for its authorization, including with the notice:
    1. A copy of the transferee’s application  for transfer;
    2. A copy of the transfer agreement;
    3. A copy of the disclosure statement required  under W.S. 1-16-603 ;
    4. A listing of each of the payee’s dependents,  together with each dependent’s age and date of birth;
    5. Notification that any interested party  may support, oppose or otherwise respond to the transferee’s application,  either in person or by counsel, by submitting written comments to  the court or by participating in the hearing; and
    6. Notification of the time and place of  the hearing and notification of the manner in which and the time by  which written responses to the application shall be filed, which time  shall be not less than fifteen (15) days after service of the transferee’s  notice, in order to be considered by the court.

History. Laws 2006, ch. 61, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-16-602(a)(xxi).

§ 1-16-607. General provisions; construction.

  1. The provisions of this act may not be  waived by any payee.
  2. Any transfer agreement entered into on  or after July 1, 2006 by a payee who resides in this state shall provide  that disputes under the transfer agreement, including any claim that  the payee has breached the agreement, shall be determined in and under  the laws of this state. No transfer agreement shall authorize the  transferee or any other party to confess judgment or consent to entry  of judgment against the payee.
  3. No transfer of structured settlement payment  rights shall extend to any payments that are life-contingent unless,  prior to the date on which the payee signs the transfer agreement,  the transferee has established and has agreed to maintain procedures  reasonably satisfactory to the annuity issuer and the structured settlement  obligor for:
    1. Periodically confirming the payee’s survival;  and
    2. Giving the annuity issuer and the structured  settlement obligor prompt written notice in the event of the payee’s  death.
  4. No payee who proposes to make a transfer  of structured settlement payment rights shall incur any penalty, forfeit  any application fee or other payment, or otherwise incur any liability  to the proposed transferee or any assignee based on any failure of  the transfer to satisfy the requirements of this act.
  5. Nothing contained in this act shall be  construed to authorize any transfer of structured settlement payment  rights in contravention of any law or to imply that any transfer under  a transfer agreement entered into prior to July 1, 2006 is valid or  invalid.
  6. Compliance with the requirements of W.S. 1-16-603 and fulfillment of the conditions set forth in W.S. 1-16-604 shall be solely the responsibility of the transferee  in any transfer of structured settlement payment rights, and neither  the structured settlement obligor nor the annuity issuer shall bear  any responsibility for, or any liability arising from, noncompliance  with the requirements of W.S. 1-16-603 or failure to fulfill the conditions set forth in W.S. 1-16-604 .

History. Laws 2006, ch. 61, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-16-602(a)(xxi).

Chapter 17 Enforcement of Judgments

Cross references. —

As to judgments generally, see chapter 16 of this title.

As to relief from judgment, see Rule 60, W.R.C.P.

Property at execution sale to be adequately described. —

In an execution sale, the sheriff has the obligation to meet the requirement that the property to be sold must be adequately described and specifically identified or pointed out to the bidders. Eggeman v. Western Nat'l Bank, 596 P.2d 318, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 417 (Wyo. 1979).

Sheriff subject to amercement. —

In an execution sale the actions of the sheriff are circumscribed by statutes and he is subject to amercement. Eggeman v. Western Nat'l Bank, 596 P.2d 318, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 417 (Wyo. 1979).

Cited in

Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 816 P.2d 808, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1991).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments §§ 61 to 112; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §§ 897 to 914.

Part payment or promise to pay judgment as affecting time for execution, 45 ALR2d 967.

Recovery of damages for mental anguish, distress, suffering, or the like, in action for wrongful attachment, garnishment, sequestration or execution, 83 ALR3d 598.

Judgment of court of foreign country as entitled to enforcement or extra-territorial effect in state court, 13 ALR4th 1109.

Validity, construction and effect of body execution statutes allowing imprisonment based on judgment, debt or the like — modern cases, 79 ALR4th 232.

33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 100 to 136; 50 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 693 to 696.

Article 1. Executions Defined and Classified; Hearing

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-101. Execution defined; issuance; kinds.

  1. An execution is a process of the court  issued by the clerk and directed to the sheriff of the county. Executions  may be issued to the sheriffs of different counties at the same time.
  2. Executions are of two (2) kinds:
    1. Against the property of the judgment debtor,  including orders of sale; and
    2. For the delivery of the possession of  real property in which case the writ shall contain a specific description  of the property and a command to the officer to whom the writ is delivered  to deliver the property to the person entitled to it. The writ may  also require the officer to recover damages for withholding possession  and costs, or costs alone, out of the property of the person who withholds  possession.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 379, 380; R.S. 1887, §§ 2719, 2720; R.S. 1899, §§ 3813, 3814; C.S. 1910, §§ 4668, 4669; C.S. 1920, §§ 5941, 5942; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-2901, 89-2902; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4001, 3-4002; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-341, 1-342; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-101 ; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to execution of judgment against county, see § 18-2-111 .

As to execution generally, see Rule 69, W.R.C.P.

Improper to issue execution to enforce conditional judgment. —

There can be no writ of execution properly issued to enforce a conditional judgment. Where property is sold pursuant to a writ of execution issued on such a nonexistent judgment, the sale is not conducted in conformity with the Code of Civil Procedure, as required by § 1-17-321 , and should not have to be confirmed by the district court. 2-2-H Ranch Co. v. Simmons, 658 P.2d 68, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 281 (Wyo. 1983).

Which clerk shall issue. —

No power exists in clerk of court in which transcript is filed to issue execution, such authority not being expressly conferred, and an execution so issued is void; rather, clerk of the court of the county where the judgment was rendered should issue execution, as authorized by this section. Wyoming Cent. Irrigation Co. v. Laporte, 26 Wyo. 522, 188 P. 360, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1920).

Redemptioner paid for unreceived, unredeemable land. —

Judgment creditors already had title to a parcel of land by virtue of a prior recorded warranty deed and their ownership interest was not affected by their execution against this land. The redemptioner, however, had paid something to redeem this land, as to which he had no right of redemption and to which the court subsequently quieted title in the judgment creditors. Under the circumstances, to refuse to permit the complaint to be amended so that the redemptioner could claim the amount paid for the parcel which he did not receive constituted an abuse of discretion. Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1988), overruled in part, Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1991).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-102. Request for hearing when property seized under execution.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (e) of  this section, a person, other than a corporate entity, against whom  a money judgment has been entered and whose property is seized under  execution is entitled to a hearing within five (5) days, excluding  Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, after the court receives the  person’s written request for a hearing to determine if the property  seized is exempt from execution. The person whose property is seized  shall file a written request for a hearing with the clerk of court  within ten (10) days after seizure of his property.
  2. Except where the judgment is solely against  corporate entities, the court shall attach to every money judgment  a notice containing the following information: “You are informed that since the judgment is entered the prevailing party may proceed to seize your property, funds or wages by execution or garnishment. In that event you may be entitled to the following exemptions:
    1. Social security benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 407 and supplemental security income;
    2. Veteran’s benefits;
    3. Black lung benefits;
    4. Personal opportunities with employment  responsibilities (POWER) payments;
    5. Federal civil service and state retirement  system benefits as provided in 5 U.S.C. 8346 and W.S. 9-3-426 , 9-3-620 , 9-3-712 and 15-5-313 ;
    6. Worker’s compensation benefits;
    7. Unemployment compensation benefits;
    8. A portion of wages as provided in W.S. 1-15-408 , or in the case of consumer credit sales, leases or loans,  as provided by W.S. 40-14-505 ;
    9. Homestead, personal articles and articles  used for carrying on a trade or business to the extent provided by W.S. 1-20-101 through 1-20-111 ;
    10. Other exemptions as provided by law. To assert your right to any of the foregoing exemptions you shall file a written request with the clerk of court within ten (10) days after seizure of your property, funds or wages. If you fail to make a written request for a hearing and claim one (1) or more of the foregoing exemptions within ten (10) days after seizure of your property, funds or wages, you may waive or lose your right to claim the exemptions.”
  3. The notice provided in this section shall  be sent to the last known address of the judgment debtor by the clerk  of court upon the request of any person before any property of the  judgment debtor is seized by execution or garnishment.
  4. A copy of the money judgment together  with the exemption information shall be transmitted by the court by  first class United States mail, with the postage prepaid in envelopes  furnished and properly addressed by the prevailing party.
  5. Notwithstanding any other provision of  this section, a judgment debtor who is served with a writ of continuing  garnishment under W.S. 1-15-506 shall file objections to the continuing garnishment and  receive a hearing on his objections as provided by W.S. 1-15-507 and 1-15-508 .

History. Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 1; 1997, ch. 196, § 1; 2010, ch. 69, §§ 207, 301.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in (b)(v), inserted “9-3-712 and 15-5-313 ” and made related change; substituted “1-20-111” for “1-20-109” in (b)(ix); and deleted “As to any judgment entered prior to June 11, 1986” at the beginning in (c).

Exemption of joint account funds requires accounting. —

When the evidence demonstrates that expenses paid from the joint account are to be shared by the depositors, the depositors' burden of establishing the exemption of any portion of the funds from execution clearly demands more than simply proving the deposits. Some accounting in the form of tracing the deposited funds and disbursements must be established. Hancock v. Stockmens Bank & Trust Co., 739 P.2d 760, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 468 (Wyo. 1987).

Relationship to due process. —

Unpublished decision: To the extent defendant officials exceeded the scope of a writ by shipping the horses at issue to South Carolina, absolute immunity did not apply, and although Wyoming law allowed for a private sale, they were still required to retain possession (actual or constructive) until a court authorized such a sale for good cause after due notice given to the adverse party; nevertheless, there was no constitutional violation stemming from the transfer because the court ultimately held the hearing and ordered the return of all horses not subject to execution (plaintiffs received all the process they were due). Wilcox v. Magill, 468 Fed. Appx. 849, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5284 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2012).

Garnishment not void. —

Although the judgment debtor was not provided with the statutorily required notices under to § 1-17-102(b) when his child support arrearages were reduced to money judgments, the garnishment of the judgment debtor's bank account funds was not void where the district court provided the judgment debtor with notice and an exemption hearing. McManaman v. McManaman, 2002 WY 128, 53 P.3d 103, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2002).

Article 2. Stay of Execution

Cross references. —

As to stay of execution in justice of the peace courts, see §§ 1-21-511 to 1-21-517 .

As to stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment, see Rule 62, W.R.C.P.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments §§ 383 to 408.

Stay of execution on ground of absence in military service, 75 ALR2d 1062.

Circumstances in which indefinite stay of proceedings in federal civil case constitutes abuse of discretion or is otherwise unlawful, 150 ALR Fed 577.

33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 139 to 141.

§ 1-17-201. Right to stay; procedure.

  1. When judgment has been rendered in any  district court against any person for the recovery of money or sale  of property he may have a stay of execution as provided by the Wyoming  Rules of Civil Procedure, except that a supersedeas bond to be furnished  in order to stay the execution of any judgment under this section  or under W.S. 1-17-210 during the entire course of appellate review shall not,  regardless of amount of the judgment, exceed two million dollars ($2,000,000.00)  in any action in which all appellants are either individuals or have  fifty (50) or fewer employees, or twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000.00)  in any other action; provided, however:
    1. That if an appellee proves by a preponderance  of the evidence that an appellant is dissipating assets which may  affect the ultimate payment of all or any portion of the judgment,  the district court, upon motion and hearing, may require the appellant  to post a bond in an amount up to the amount of the judgment; or
    2. That an appellee of a judgment to pay  taxes or liens to the state of Wyoming shall post a bond in an amount  not less than the full amount of the judgment plus interest and costs  of the appeal, unless otherwise ordered, as provided in Rule 4.02(b)  of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 122, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 3815; C.S. 1910, § 4670; C.S. 1920, § 5943; R.S. 1931, § 89-2903; C.S. 1945, § 3-4101; W.S. 1957, § 1-343; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-201; 2007, ch. 208, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to execution, see Rule 69, W.R.C.P.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added the second clause to (a), and added (a)(i) and (a)(ii).

Substantial evidence. —

Where parties went bail on judgments against elevator company, acknowledgment being endorsed upon execution, and upon being compelled to pay judgment, subsequently brought action against party who was alleged to have agreed to hold plaintiffs harmless on bail, and trial court found for plaintiffs that defendant did promise and agree he would protect them against loss, on substantial conflict of evidence, findings were binding on supreme court. Davison v. Nicholson, 37 Wyo. 412, 263 P. 605, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1928).

Cited in

Kirch v. Nicholson, 42 Wyo. 489, 297 P. 398, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (1931).

§ 1-17-202. Notice to sheriff; relinquishment of property.

  1. When the bond is entered after execution  is issued, the clerk shall immediately notify the sheriff and he shall  forthwith return the execution, noting his actions thereon.
  2. All property levied on before the stay  of execution and all written undertakings for the delivery of personal  property to the sheriff shall be relinquished by the officer upon  bond for the stay of execution being entered.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 122, §§ 3, 3820; R.S. 1899, §§ 6, 3817; C.S. 1910, §§ 4672, 4675; C.S. 1920, §§ 5945, 5948; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-2905, 89-2908; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4103, 3-4106; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-345, 1-348; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-202.

§ 1-17-203. Effect of recognizance.

Every recognizance of surety taken as provided shall have the effect of a judgment confessed from the date taken against the person and property of the surety.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 122, § 7; R.S. 1899, § 3821; C.S. 1910, § 4676; C.S. 1920, § 5949; R.S. 1931, § 89-2909; C.S. 1945, § 3-4107; W.S. 1957, § 1-349; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-203.

Cross references. —

As to judgment by confession, see §§ 1-16-201 and 1-16-202 .

Signing of stay bond. —

Where defendant was large stockholder in elevator company, and property of that company was about to be seized and sold by person holding judgment against them and defendant induced plaintiffs to execute stay bond under agreement to protect them, holding harmless and signing of stay bond constituted “confession of judgment” from date thereof under this section, and signing of stay bond constituted valid consideration for promise to hold signers' harmless. Davison v. Nicholson, 37 Wyo. 412, 263 P. 605, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1928).

§ 1-17-204. Execution at expiration of stay.

At the expiration of the stay the clerk shall issue a joint execution against the property of all the judgment debtors and sureties, but the sheriff shall first levy upon the property of the judgment defendant if sufficient property can be found. If not found, he shall without delay levy the execution upon the property of the original judgment debtor subject to the execution which can be found in the county.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 122, § 8; R.S. 1899, § 3822; C.S. 1910, § 4677; C.S. 1920, § 5950; R.S. 1931, § 89-2910; C.S. 1945, § 3-4108; W.S. 1957, § 1-350; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-204.

Cross references. —

As to rights and remedies of sureties upon payment of judgments, see § 38-1-104 .

§ 1-17-205. No stay on “not repleviable” judgments.

A stay of execution shall not be allowed upon any judgment recovered against any person or surety for money received in a fiduciary capacity or for a breach of any official duty. The clerk shall issue executions upon the judgments immediately, returnable in ninety (90) days, endorsed “Not repleviable” and the judgment shall so order.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 122, § 9; R.S. 1899, § 3823; C.S. 1910, § 4678; C.S. 1920, § 5951; R.S. 1931, § 89-2911; C.S. 1945, § 3-4109; W.S. 1957, § 1-351; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-205.

§ 1-17-206. No stay where sureties object; exception.

When a court renders judgment against two (2) or more persons, any of whom are sureties for another in the contract on which the judgment is founded, there shall be no stay of execution on the judgment if the sureties object at the time of rendering the judgment unless the surety for the stay of execution will undertake specially to pay the judgment in case the amount cannot be levied of the principal defendant.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 122, § 10; R.S. 1899, § 3824; C.S. 1910, § 4679; C.S. 1920, § 5952; R.S. 1931, § 89-2912; C.S. 1945, § 3-4110; W.S. 1957, § 1-352; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-206.

§ 1-17-207. Execution upon affidavit of surety; generally.

Any surety for the stay of execution may file with the clerk an affidavit stating that he believes he will be liable for the judgment with interest and costs thereon unless execution issues immediately, and the clerk shall issue execution immediately unless other sufficient surety is entered before the clerk or sheriff as in other cases.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 122, § 11; R.S. 1899, § 3825; C.S. 1910, § 4680; C.S. 1920, § 5953; R.S. 1931, § 89-2913; C.S. 1945, § 3-4111; W.S. 1957, § 1-353; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-207.

§ 1-17-208. Execution upon affidavit of surety; effect of new surety.

If other sufficient surety is entered, it shall have the force of the original surety entered before the filing of the affidavit and shall discharge the original surety.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 122, § 12; R.S. 1899, § 3826; C.S. 1910, § 4681; C.S. 1920, § 5954; R.S. 1931, § 89-2914; C.S. 1945, § 3-4112; W.S. 1957, § 1-354; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-208.

§ 1-17-209. Time of stay excluded for execution.

The time during which any judgment is stayed shall not be included in the period during which the judgment creditor shall cause execution to be issued and levied in order to preserve his lien on the property of the debtor as against other judgment creditors.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 122, § 13; R.S. 1899, § 3827; C.S. 1910, § 4682; C.S. 1920, § 5955; R.S. 1931, § 89-2915; C.S. 1945, § 3-4113; W.S. 1957, § 1-355; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-209.

Bankruptcy stay. —

It is apparent that the automatic stay does not operate to stop a creditor from maintaining or continuing the perfection of its security interest during the pendency of a bankruptcy case; however, under Wyoming law, a creditor must execute on its lien within one year of the date the judgment is rendered to maintain its lien. Execution of a judgment is considered a violation of the automatic stay, and, therefore, the court determined that the one-year period is stayed during the period of the automatic stay for execution of a judgment lien. In re MarMC Transp., Inc., 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3872 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Aug. 23, 2012).

Cross references. —

As to time of execution to preserve judgment lien, see § 1-17-336 .

§ 1-17-210. Stay on appeal.

Execution of a judgment or final order, other than those enumerated in W.S. 1-17-201 , of any judicial tribunal, or the levy or collection of any tax or assessment therein litigated, may be stayed on such terms as may be prescribed by the court in which the appeal is filed.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 795; R.S. 1887, § 3143; R.S. 1899, § 4264; C.S. 1910, § 5124; C.S. 1920, § 6386; R.S. 1931, § 89-4818; C.S. 1945, § 3-5317; W.S. 1957, § 1-356; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-210.

Granting of supersedeas. —

After acquiring jurisdiction, supreme court may grant supersedeas. Farmers' State Bank v. Haun, 29 Wyo. 322, 213 P. 361, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1923).

Cited in

Laughlin v. King, 22 Wyo. 8, 133 P. 1073, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (1913).

Article 3. Lien of Judgment and Enforcement by Execution

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments §§ 113 to 204.

Right of vendee under executory land contract to lien for amount paid on purchase price as against subsequent creditors of purchasers from vendor, 82 ALR3d 1040.

Judgment lien or levy of execution on one joint tenant's share or interest as severing joint tenancy, 51 ALR4th 906.

33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 18 to 55, 123 to 138; 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 454 to 511.

§ 1-17-301. Property subject to execution.

Except for property exempt by law, all property of the judgment debtor, both real and personal or any legal or equitable interest therein including any interest of the judgment debtor in mortgaged property or property being sold under an executory land contract, is subject to execution.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 381; R.S. 1887, § 2721; R.S. 1899, § 3828; C.S. 1910, § 4683; C.S. 1920, § 5956; R.S. 1931, § 89-2916; C.S. 1945, § 39-4201; W.S. 1957, § 1-357; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-301; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to sale and redemption of realty, see chapter 18 of this title.

As to property exempt from execution or attachment, see chapter 20 of this title and cross references thereunder.

As to when proceeds of wrongful death judgment may not be used to pay debts of decedent, see § 1-38-102 .

As to attachment of goods covered by negotiable instruments, see § 34.1-7-602.

After-acquired lands. —

A judgment of the district court constitutes a lien on after-acquired lands of the judgment debtor. Coad v. Cowhick, 9 Wyo. 316, 63 P. 584, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 66 P. 597 (Wyo. 1901).

Beneficial interests. —

An entryman on public land held to have the full beneficial interest which, under this section and § 1-17-302 , was subject to a judgment recovered before issuance of patent. Muir v. Bosey, 23 Wyo. 46, 146 P. 595, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1915).

Execution where lien has expired. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-17-336 does not state that the judgment creditor's rights to execute on the debtor's property expire. Instead, it states that, if there is no execution within a year, the judgment ceases to operate a lien. Thus, even if their lien had expired, the judgment creditors could still execute on the debtor's property and a conveyance of the property by the debtor was fraudulent. Dev-Tech Corp. v. Wilson, Miller, Barton & Peek, Inc., 2004 WY 163, 102 P.3d 880, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 2004).

Although execution was not levied within one year of the filing of foreign judgments, which meant that the judgments were no longer liens under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-17-336 , the property remained available for execution pursuant to this section. Cook v. Swires, 2009 WY 21, 202 P.3d 397, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2009).

Applied in

Bummer v. Collier, 864 P.2d 453, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

Bachmann v. Hurtt, 26 Wyo. 332, 184 P. 709, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1919); Permian Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 68, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 5581 (10th Cir. 1974).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Vendee's interest under executory contract as subject to execution, 1 ALR2d 727.

Property of nongovernmental charity as subject to execution under judgment for damages in tort, 25 ALR2d 29.

Solid mineral royalty as real or personal property for purposes of execution, 68 ALR2d 732.

Interest of spouse in estate by the entirety as subject to execution for individual debt, 75 ALR2d 1172.

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sheriff's sale — modern cases, 5 ALR4th 794.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 52 ALR5th 221.

§ 1-17-302. When lien attaches to property; generally.

The lands and tenements within the county in which judgment is entered are bound for the satisfaction thereof from the day the judgment is filed with the county clerk. Whenever a judgment is required to be filed with the county clerk, it shall be recorded in the real estate records. Goods and chattels of the debtor are bound from the time they are seized in execution.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 382; R.S. 1887, § 2722; R.S. 1899, § 3829; C.S. 1910, § 4684; C.S. 1920, § 5957; R.S. 1931, § 89-2917; C.S. 1945, § 3-4202; W.S. 1957, § 1-358; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-302; Laws 1999, ch. 190, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to judgments by confession generally, see §§ 1-16-201 and 1-16-202 .

Equitable interest not “land and tenement.” —

The statutory phrase “lands and tenements” is not broad enough to encompass the equitable interest of the buyer under a contract for deed. In re Estate of Ventling, 771 P.2d 388, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 1989).

A judgment in and of itself does not necessarily constitute a lien upon any property unless made so by statute. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

“Rendition” of judgment distinguished from “entry.” —

Rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law on the facts in controversy, as distinguished from entry, which is the clerical act of spreading the judgment on the record. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

A writ of attachment creates a lien as of the date of service. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

A garnishment is virtually a process of attachment, and a garnishee is bound from the time of service. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

And it gives the creditor a paramount right, although not necessarily title, to property as a security for his demand. United States v. Hunt, 373 F. Supp. 1079, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9269 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1975).

Action against grantee of deceased judgment debtor. —

Petition in an action against grantee of deceased judgment debtor is an action to enforce a judgment lien. Stephenson v. Lichtenstein, 24 Wyo. 417, 160 P. 1170, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1916).

Bona fide purchaser without notice who buys from fraudulent grantee can hold against fraudulent grantor's creditors. Snyder v. Ryan, 39 Wyo. 266, 270 P. 1072, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1928), reh'g denied, 39 Wyo. 266, 275 P. 127, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1929).

Judgment creditor could not have debtor's conveyances set aside as fraudulent after property passed into hands of innocent purchaser. Snyder v. Ryan, 39 Wyo. 266, 270 P. 1072, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1928), reh'g denied, 39 Wyo. 266, 275 P. 127, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1929).

Disclosure of claim. —

Finding in favor of the judgment lien creditor in the bank's action involving mortgage priority was improper where the record did not support the district court's conclusion that a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed any claim by the creditor to the tracts, but the court remanded to the district court for consideration of the effect of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-17-302 (repealed in part by 1999 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 190, § 1) on the judgment lien creditor's claim. Wyo. Bank & Trust v. Haught, 2003 WY 111, 76 P.3d 301, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2003).

Applied in

United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15543 (10th Cir. 1975).

Quoted in

Wyoming Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 770 P.2d 215, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 1989).

Stated in

Permian Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 68, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 5581 (10th Cir. 1974).

Cited in

Coad v. Cowhick, 9 Wyo. 316, 63 P. 584, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (1901); Muir v. Bosey, 23 Wyo. 46, 146 P. 595, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (1915); Bachmann v. Hurtt, 26 Wyo. 332, 184 P. 709, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1919); In re Estate of Hite, 829 P.2d 1173, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1992); Patel v. Cwcapital Asset Mgmt., Llc, 2010 WY 147, 242 P.3d 1015, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Nov. 16, 2010)..

Law reviews. —

See “Creditors' Rights Under the Recording Statutes,” 4 Wyo. L.J. 73.

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-303. When lien attaches to property; judgment of supreme court.

A judgment of the supreme court for money binds the lands and tenements of the debtor within the county in which the suit originated from the day the judgment is filed with the county clerk. Whenever a judgment is required to be filed with the county clerk, it shall be recorded in the real estate records. Goods and chattels of the debtor are bound from the time they are seized in execution. The lien of a judgment of the district court which is appealed to the supreme court shall not be divested or vacated, but shall continue until the final determination of the action in the supreme court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 383; R.S. 1887, § 2723; R.S. 1899, § 3830; C.S. 1910, § 4685; C.S. 1920, § 5958; R.S. 1931, § 89-2918; C.S. 1945, § 3-4203; W.S. 1957, § 1-359; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-303; Laws 1999, ch. 190, § 1.

§ 1-17-304. Recording lien on real estate in other counties.

The judgment creditor in any judgment rendered by any district court in this state, or in any judgment rendered in a circuit court of this state and filed in the judgment record of the district court, may file a transcript of the judgment record of the district court with the clerk of the district court and the county clerk in any other counties within this state where the judgment debtor owns real estate. The judgment is a lien upon all real estate of the judgment debtor in any county in which the transcript is filed with the clerk of district court and the county clerk from the date of filing with the county clerk. The clerk of the district court of any county in which the transcript is filed shall enter the judgment upon the judgment records of the court in the same manner as judgments are rendered in that court.

History. Laws 1911, ch. 22, § 1; C.S. 1920, § 4614; R.S. 1931, § 89-3011; C.S. 1945, § 3-4204; W.S. 1957, § 1-360; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-304; Laws 1999, ch. 190, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice of the peace court.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Issuing execution. —

The clerk of court where judgment is filed has no power to issue execution, but court of county where judgment was rendered should issue the execution. Wyoming Cent. Irrigation Co. v. Laporte, 26 Wyo. 522, 188 P. 360, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1920).

Quoted in

Barnhart Drilling Co. v. Petroleum Fin., Inc., 807 P.2d 411, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1991).

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-305. Lien of judgments of federal courts.

  1. Judgments and decrees entered in any United  States district court or circuit court held within this state are  a lien against the lands and tenements of the person against whom  the judgment or decree is rendered, situated within the county where  the judgment or decree is entered, from the day the judgment is filed  with the county clerk.
  2. The judgment creditor in any judgment  or decree rendered in any United States district court within this  state may file a transcript of the judgment record in the office of  the clerk of any Wyoming district court and the county clerk in any  counties in the state of Wyoming where the judgment debtor owns real  estate.
  3. The clerk of the district court of any  county in which the transcript is filed shall enter the judgment upon  the judgment records of the court in the same manner as judgments  rendered in that court.
  4. The judgment or decree is a lien upon  all the real estate of the judgment debtor in the county or counties  where the transcript is filed with the clerk of district court and  the county clerk from the date of filing with the county clerk.

History. Laws 1925, ch. 41, §§ 1 to 3; 1929, ch. 10, §§ 1 to 4; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-3012 to 89-3015; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4205 to 3-4208; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-361 to 1-364; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-305; Laws 1999, ch. 190, § 1.

Library references. —

American Law of Mining, 2nd Edition § 92.03 (Matthew Bender).

§ 1-17-306. Lien of judgments of circuit courts.

  1. The party in whose favor a judgment is  rendered by a circuit court if the judgment is not appealed or stayed,  may file with the clerk of the district court and the county clerk  of the county in which the judgment was rendered a transcript thereof,  certifying therein the amount paid thereon, if any. The clerk of court  shall enter the case on the execution docket, together with the amount  of the judgment and the time of filing the transcript with the county  clerk. If within ten (10) days after the judgment was rendered, the  judgment debtor pays the same or gives bond for stay of execution,  the justice shall immediately certify that fact to the clerk of the  district court and the county clerk. The district court clerk shall  enter a memorandum thereof upon the docket. The cost of the transcript,  the filing, recording and the entry on the docket shall be paid by  the party who files and records the transcript and not be taxed to  the other party.
  2. The judgment shall be a lien on the real  estate of the judgment debtor within the county from the day the transcript  is filed with the county clerk provided the transcript has also been  filed previously or that same day with the clerk of district court.
  3. Execution may be issued on the judgment  at any time after filing the transcript as if the judgment had been  rendered in the district court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 384 to 386; R.S. 1887, §§ 2724 to 2726; R.S. 1899, §§ 3831 to 3833; C.S. 1910, §§ 4686 to 4688; C.S. 1920, §§ 5959 to 5961; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-2919 to 89-2921; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4209 to 3-4211; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-365 to 1-367; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-306; Laws 1999, ch. 190, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (a), substituted “circuit court” for “justice of the peace.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-17-307. When judgment becomes dormant.

If execution on a judgment rendered in any court of record in this state or a transcript of which has been filed as provided in W.S. 1-17-306(a) is not issued within five (5) years from date of the judgment or if five (5) years intervene between the date the last execution issued on the judgment and the time of issuing another execution thereon, the judgment is dormant and ceases to operate as a lien on the estate of the judgment debtor.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 387; R.S. 1887, § 2727; R.S. 1899, § 3834; C.S. 1910, § 4689; C.S. 1920, § 5962; R.S. 1931, § 89-2922; C.S. 1945, § 3-4212; W.S. 1957, § 1-368; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-307.

Cross references. —

As to revival of dormant judgments, see §§ 1-16-501 to 1-16-506 .

Waiting period questionable where bankruptcy petition filed. —

There are no irregularities where a creditor waits approximately one and a half years from judgment to seek a writ of execution, but when coupled with the timing of the filing of a bankruptcy petition approximately 68 days after delivery of the writ to the sheriff, this waiting period is questionable. In re Cockreham, 84 B.R. 757, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2789 (D. Wyo. 1988).

False entries. —

An attorney who makes false entries for the purpose of keeping a judgment alive should be suspended from practice. State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Strahan, 44 Wyo. 156, 8 P.2d 1090, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 44 Wyo. 487, 13 P.2d 1083, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1932).

Child support payments. —

Where a mother did not execute on periodic child support payments within five years of their becoming due, the judgments became dormant, subject to revival within 21 years. Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1997).

Cited in

Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 2000).

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-308. Writs of execution; generally.

  1. The writ of execution against the property  of the judgment debtor issuing from any court of record shall command  the officer to whom it is directed that he shall collect the money  specified in the writ from the real and personal property of the debtor.
  2. An execution issued on a judgment rendered  against a partnership by its firm name shall operate only on the partnership  property.
  3. The amount of the debt, damages and costs  for which the judgment is entered shall be endorsed on the execution.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 388; R.S. 1887, § 2728; R.S. 1899, § 3835; C.S. 1910, § 4690; C.S. 1920, § 5963; R.S. 1931, § 89-2923; C.S. 1945, § 3-4213; W.S. 1957, § 1-369; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-308; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2.

Relationship to federal law. —

Unpublished decision: Because defendant officers seized the horses at plaintiffs' ranch pursuant to a facially valid writ of execution, they were absolutely immune from suit; it followed, then, that to the extent the officials were shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity, plaintiffs' conspiracy claim failed. Wilcox v. Magill, 468 Fed. Appx. 849, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5284 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2012).

Execution sales are not for sale of any specified property. Chittim v. Armco Steel Corp., 407 P.2d 1015, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1965).

Rather, such sales are only for recovery of a designated sum of money. Chittim v. Armco Steel Corp., 407 P.2d 1015, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1965).

Hence, there needs to be a reasonable degree of accuracy in designating the sum of money to be recovered for a sale to be considered valid. Chittim v. Armco Steel Corp., 407 P.2d 1015, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1965).

If the money specified in the writ of execution is erroneously stated, it cannot be considered a valid writ for two reasons. In the first place, it is likely to result in the sale of more of the judgment debtor's property than sound judgment would dictate. In the second place, it prevents the judgment debtor from protecting his property by payment of the correct amount for redemption. Any levy and sale under execution, after a lawful tender of the correct amount due, would be illegal. Chittim v. Armco Steel Corp., 407 P.2d 1015, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1965).

Improper to issue execution to enforce conditional judgment. —

There can be no writ of execution properly issued to enforce a conditional judgment. Where property is sold pursuant to a writ of execution issued on such a nonexistent judgment, the sale is not conducted in conformity with the Code of Civil Procedure, as required by § 1-17-321 , and should not have to be confirmed by the district court. 2-2-H Ranch Co. v. Simmons, 658 P.2d 68, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 281 (Wyo. 1983).

Sheriff's commission. —

Under § 18-3-608 , providing that sheriff shall receive commission on money collected on execution or other process, sheriff is entitled to commission where at execution sale the judgment creditor purchases property for less than the judgment debt, although no money actually changes hands, the purchase price being merely credited upon the judgment and execution. Lyman v. Thorn, 24 Wyo. 326, 157 P. 887, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1916).

Applied in

Norman v. Jirdon Agri Chems., Inc. (In re Cockreham), 84 B.R. 757, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2789 (D. Wyo. 1988).

Cited in

Coones v. FDIC, 848 P.2d 783, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1993).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sheriff's sale — modern cases, 5 ALR4th 794.

§ 1-17-309. Writs of execution; preferences.

The officer shall endorse on every writ of execution the time when he received it. When two (2) or more writs of execution against the same debtor are delivered to the officer on the same day, no preference shall be given to either of the writs. If a sufficient sum of money is not made to satisfy all executions, the amount made shall be distributed to the several creditors in proportion to the amount of their respective demands. In all other cases the writ of execution first delivered to the officer shall be first satisfied. This section shall not affect any preferable lien which a judgment on execution issued has on the lands of the judgment debtor.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 389; R.S. 1887, § 2729; R.S. 1899, § 3836; C.S. 1910, § 4691; C.S. 1920, § 5964; R.S. 1931, § 89-2924; C.S. 1945, § 3-4214; W.S. 1957, § 1-370; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-309; Laws 1999, ch. 190, § 1.

Personal property lien effectuated by delivered writ. —

Recordation of the judgment effectuates a lien on nonexempt real property, but the same is not true where personal property is involved, as Wyoming subscribes to the common-law rule that delivery of the writ of execution to the sheriff of the appropriate county creates an execution lien on personal property of the debtor. In re Cockreham, 84 B.R. 757, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2789 (D. Wyo. 1988).

Quoted in

Permian Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 68, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 5581 (10th Cir. 1974).

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

§ 1-17-310. Writs of execution; levy.

The officer to whom a writ of execution is delivered shall proceed immediately to levy the writ upon the real and personal property of the debtor.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 390; R.S. 1887, § 2730; R.S. 1899, § 3837; C.S. 1910, § 4692; C.S. 1920, § 5965; R.S. 1931, § 89-2925; C.S. 1945, § 3-4215; W.S. 1957, § 1-371; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-310; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2.

Relationship to federal law. —

Unpublished decision: Because defendant officers seized the horses at plaintiffs' ranch pursuant to a facially valid writ of execution, they were absolutely immune from suit; it followed, then, that to the extent the officials were shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity, plaintiffs' conspiracy claim failed. Wilcox v. Magill, 468 Fed. Appx. 849, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5284 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2012).

Applied in

2-H Ranch Co. v. Simmons, 658 P.2d 68, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 281 (Wyo. 1983); Norman v. Jirdon Agri Chems., Inc. (In re Cockreham), 84 B.R. 757, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2789 (D. Wyo. 1988).

Quoted in

Permian Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 68, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 5581 (10th Cir. 1974).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-311. Bond for future delivery of property; failure to perform.

When an officer levies an execution upon any goods and chattels which afterwards remain unsold for any reasonable cause, the officer may for his own security, take a bond from the defendant, with security he deems sufficient to the effect that the property shall be delivered to the officer holding the execution for the sale of same at the time and place appointed by the officer, either by notice given in writing to the defendant in execution or by advertisement printed in a newspaper published in the county, naming the day and place of sale. If the defendant fails to deliver the goods and chattels at the time and place mentioned in the notice or to pay to the officer holding the execution the full value of the goods and chattels or the amount of the debt and costs, the bond shall be considered broken and may be proceeded on as in other cases.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 391; R.S. 1887, § 2731; R.S. 1899, § 3838; C.S. 1910, § 4693; C.S. 1920, § 5966; R.S. 1931, § 89-2926; C.S. 1945, § 3-4216; W.S. 1957, § 1-372; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-311.

§ 1-17-312. Notice of execution sale.

Unless a private sale is ordered as provided in W.S. 1-17-314 , the officer who levies execution upon goods and chattels, shall cause public notice to be given of the time and place of sale at least ten (10) days before the day of sale. The notice shall be given by advertisement in a newspaper published in the county or, if no newspaper is published therein, then in a newspaper of general circulation in the county.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 392; R.S. 1887, § 2732; R.S. 1899, § 3839; C.S. 1910, § 4694; C.S. 1920, § 5967; R.S. 1931, § 89-2927; C.S. 1945, § 3-4217; W.S. 1957, § 1-373; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-312.

Cross references. —

As to publication of notice generally, see § 1-6-201 et seq. and Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-313. Alias execution.

When goods and chattels levied upon by execution cannot be sold for want of bidders or want of time, the officer who makes the return shall annex to the execution a true inventory of the goods and chattels remaining unsold. The plaintiff in execution may have another execution issued, directing the sale of the property levied upon, but the goods and chattels shall not be sold unless the time and place of sale is advertised as directed in W.S. 1-17-312 .

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 393; R.S. 1887, § 2723; R.S. 1899, § 3840; C.S. 1910, § 4695; C.S. 1920, § 5968; R.S. 1931, § 89-2928; C.S. 1945, § 3-4218; W.S. 1957, § 1-374; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-313.

§ 1-17-314. Sale to be at public auction; when private sale authorized.

The court from which an execution or order of sale issues, on application of either party with due notice to the adverse party and for good cause, may order the officer holding the process to sell the goods and chattels at private sale for cash, specifying the time during which the sale will continue but not extending beyond the return day of the process. Before a private sale is made, the court shall order the personal property appraised by three (3) disinterested persons or a qualified appraiser and the property shall not be sold for less than two-thirds (2/3) of the appraised value. Except when a private sale is ordered for good cause, all sales of goods and chattels shall be at public auction.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 394; R.S. 1887, § 2734; R.S. 1899, § 3841; C.S. 1910, § 4696; C.S. 1920, § 5969; R.S. 1931, § 89-2929; C.S. 1945, § 3-4219; W.S. 1957, § 1-375; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-314; 2011, ch. 16, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision that purchase by officer making sale or by appraiser is void, see § 1-17-326 .

For provision exempting officer acting under court order from prohibition as to sale of products at less than cost, see § 40-4-107 .

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, inserted “or a qualified appraiser.”

Relationship to federal law. —

Unpublished decision: To the extent defendant officials exceeded the scope of awrit by shipping the horses to South Carolina, absolute immunity did not apply, and although Wyoming law allowed for a private sale, they were still required to retain possession (actual or constructive) until a court authorized such a sale for good cause after due notice given to the adverse party. Wilcox v. Magill, 468 Fed. Appx. 849, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5284 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2012).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes public sale, 4 ALR2d 575.

§ 1-17-315. Additional levy.

When a writ is issued directing the sale of property previously taken in execution, the officer who issues the writ, if requested, shall add thereto a command to the officer to whom the writ is directed that if the unsold property remaining in his hands is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, he shall levy the same upon lands and tenements or goods and chattels of the judgment debtor, as the law permits, sufficient to satisfy the debt.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 395; R.S. 1887, § 2735; R.S. 1899, § 3842; C.S. 1910, § 4697; C.S. 1920, § 5970; R.S. 1931, § 89-2930; C.S. 1945, § 3-4220; W.S. 1957, § 1-376; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-315.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-316. Appraisement of real property required; exception.

  1. The officer who levies execution upon  real property shall designate a qualified appraiser or three (3) disinterested  property owners who are residents of the county where the lands taken  in execution are situate and administer to the appraiser or to the  property owners an oath to view and impartially appraise the value  of the property levied upon or any interest of the judgment debtor.  The appraiser or the property owners shall return to the officer as  soon as possible a signed estimate of the appraised value.
  2. When the officer receives the return,  he shall promptly deposit a copy with the clerk of the court from  which the writ issued and immediately advertise and sell the real  estate or the judgment debtor’s interest as provided by law.
  3. If upon the return it appears that two-thirds  (2/3) of the appraised value of the judgment debtor’s interest in the  real estate levied upon is sufficient to satisfy the execution with  costs, the judgment on which the execution is issued shall not operate  as a lien on the residue of the debtor’s estate to the prejudice of  any other judgment creditor. Except as expressly authorized by law,  no real estate shall be sold for less than two-thirds (2/3) of the appraised  value of the judgment debtor’s interest in the property.
  4. All lands the property of persons indebted  to the state for any debt or taxes, except for loans authorized by  the legislature, shall be sold without appraisal notwithstanding any  other provision of law.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 396 to 398; R.S. 1887, §§ 2736 to 2738; Laws 1897, ch. 26, § 1; R.S. 1899, §§ 3843 to 3845; C.S. 1910, §§ 4698 to 4700; C.S. 1920, §§ 5971 to 5973; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-2931 to 89-2933; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4221 to 3-4223; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-377 to 1-379; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-316; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2.

Cross references. —

For provision that purchase of realty by appraiser is void, see § 1-17-326 .

As to fees of real estate appraisers, see § 1-17-341 .

As to sale and redemption of realty under execution, see chapter 18 of this title.

Sheriff cannot seek reappraisal of property to fit original bid. 2-2-H Ranch Co. v. Simmons, 658 P.2d 68, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 281 (Wyo. 1983).

Qualified appraiser. —

The three dollar fee limit in § 1-17-341 does not apply in cases where the services of a qualified appraiser are required to levy execution upon real property. A reasonable appraiser's fee is appropriate. TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Grieve, 887 P.2d 511, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1994).

Judgment debtor may be charged with the costs of execution. —

While the authority to charge the judgment debtor with the costs of execution in connection with the levy of execution upon real property is somewhat speculative, there is no question that this is the practice in Wyoming. Lutz v. Schmillen, 915 P.2d 599, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Cited in

Lyman v. Thorn, 24 Wyo. 326, 157 P. 887, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1916).

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sheriff's sale — modern cases, 5 ALR4th 794.

Propriety of setting minimum or “upset price” for sale of property at judicial foreclosure, 4 ALR5th 693.

§ 1-17-317. Official property sold without valuation.

The property of any state, county or municipal officer levied on for or on account of any money collected or received by him in his official capacity may be sold without valuation.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 399; R.S. 1887, § 2739; R.S. 1899, § 3846; C.S. 1910, § 4701; C.S. 1920, § 5974; R.S. 1931, § 89-2934; C.S. 1945, § 3-4224; W.S. 1957, § 1-380; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-317.

§ 1-17-318. Return on execution; record.

The sheriff shall endorse his actions on the writ. Immediately upon return of the writ, the clerk shall record at length in the execution docket or other docket provided for the purpose all such endorsements and the record shall be a part of the court record.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 401; R.S. 1887, § 2741; R.S. 1899, § 3848; C.S. 1910, § 4702; C.S. 1920, § 5975; R.S. 1931, § 89-2935; C.S. 1945, § 3-4225; W.S. 1957, § 1-381; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-318.

Return on execution contained in the record held not to require bill of exceptions for consideration in the supreme court on review. Underwood v. David, 9 Wyo. 178, 61 P. 1012, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1900).

Order quashing execution on judgment could not be reviewed, in error proceeding, without bill of exceptions in record. Lawer Auto Supply v. Teton Auto Co., 39 Wyo. 14, 269 P. 29, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1928).

§ 1-17-319. Disposition of nonrealty proceeds.

If the sheriff collects any part of a judgment by virtue of an execution without the sale of real estate, he shall pay the same to the judgment creditor or his attorney. If the execution is fully satisfied, he shall return it within three (3) days after he has collected the money.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 402; R.S. 1887, § 2742; R.S. 1899, § 3849; C.S. 1910, § 4703; C.S. 1920, § 5976; R.S. 1931, § 89-2936; C.S. 1945, § 3-4226; W.S. 1957, § 1-382; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-319.

Applied in

Norman v. Jirdon Agri Chems., Inc. (In re Cockreham), 84 B.R. 757, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2789 (D. Wyo. 1988).

Cited in

Lyman v. Thorn, 24 Wyo. 326, 157 P. 887, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1916).

§ 1-17-320. Failure of realty purchaser to pay.

Upon notice and motion of the officer who makes the sale or of an interested party, the court from which any execution or order of sale issues shall punish as for contempt any purchaser of real property who willfully fails to pay the purchase money.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 403; R.S. 1887, § 2743; R.S. 1899, § 3850; C.S. 1910, § 4704; C.S. 1920, § 5977; R.S. 1931, § 89-2937; C.S. 1945, § 3-4227; W.S. 1957, § 1-383; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-320.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-321. Confirmation of sale of realty and order for deed; disposition of proceeds.

If upon return of any writ of execution for the satisfaction of which lands and tenements have been sold, it is found by the court that the sale was made in all respects in conformity with the code of civil procedure [this title], the clerk shall be directed to make an entry in the journal that the court is satisfied with the legality of the sale and that the officer, upon expiration of the period of redemption, shall make a deed to the purchaser for the lands and tenements. The officer may retain the purchase money until the court examines his proceedings. He shall then pay the money to the persons entitled as the court may order.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 404; R.S. 1887, § 2744; R.S. 1899, § 3851; C.S. 1910, § 4705; C.S. 1920, § 5978; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 94; R.S. 1931, § 89-2938; C.S. 1945, § 3-4228; W.S. 1957, § 1-384; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-321.

Cross references. —

For provision that certificate or deed may be executed by successor in office, see § 1-17-329 .

As to redemption, see §§ 1-18-103 to 1-18-106 .

Jurisdiction after term. —

District court could determine claim to proceeds of homestead after expiration of term at which sale was confirmed. Altman v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 36 Wyo. 290, 254 P. 691, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1927).

Sale to enforce conditional judgment not in conformity with code. —

There can be no writ of execution properly issued to enforce a conditional judgment. Where property is sold pursuant to a writ of execution issued on such a nonexistent judgment, the sale is not conducted in conformity with the Code of Civil Procedure, as required by this section, and should not have to be confirmed by the district court. 2-2-H Ranch Co. v. Simmons, 658 P.2d 68, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 281 (Wyo. 1983).

Objection to confirmation of sale on mortgage foreclosure is properly raised by appearing at time order is entered or by motion to vacate, and objections to sale and confirmation must be seasonable and specific. Grieve v. Huber, 41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1930).

In the confirmation of the sale on mortgage foreclosure, objections to the sale and confirmation must be seasonable and specific. Lutz v. Schmillen, 915 P.2d 599, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Standard of review. —

The standard the Supreme Court applies in its review of execution sales is whether the district court committed an abuse of discretion. Lutz v. Schmillen, 915 P.2d 599, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Hearing required. —

Judgment debtor was denied due process of law when the district court, without the benefit of a hearing, denied the debtor's Objection to Sale of Property. Lutz v. Schmillen, 915 P.2d 599, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Applied in

Norman v. Jirdon Agri Chems., Inc. (In re Cockreham), 84 B.R. 757, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2789 (D. Wyo. 1988).

Cited in

Lyman v. Thorn, 24 Wyo. 326, 157 P. 887, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1916).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Duties, rights and remedies between attorney and client where attorney purchased client's property at or through execution sale, 20 ALR2d 1280.

Time of conversion of real estate sold under and by court order, 66 ALR2d 1266.

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sheriff's sale — modern cases, 5 ALR4th 794.

§ 1-17-322. Conveyance of realty by master commissioner.

A master commissioner, upon order by the court, may convey real property when a party to a proceeding has been ordered to convey the property to another and fails or refuses to obey the order. The master commissioner may also execute a conveyance when specific real property is sold by him under an order or judgment of the court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 405; R.S. 1887, § 2745; R.S. 1899, § 3852; C.S. 1910, § 4706; C.S. 1920, § 5979; R.S. 1931, § 89-2939; C.S. 1945, § 3-4229; W.S. 1957, § 1-385; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-322.

§ 1-17-323. Administering of oaths; sheriff as commissioner; sales by master.

A master commissioner or special master who sells real property has the same power to administer oaths as the sheriff. A sheriff may act as a master commissioner and, upon notice and for reasonable compensation to be paid by the master commissioner out of his fees, may attend and make sale for any commissioner who, by reason of sickness is unable to attend. Sales made by a master shall conform in all respects to the laws regulating sales of lands upon execution.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 406; R.S. 1887, § 2746; R.S. 1899, § 3853; C.S. 1910, § 4707; C.S. 1920, § 5980; R.S. 1931, § 89-2940; C.S. 1945, § 3-4230; W.S. 1957, § 1-386; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-323.

Cross references. —

As to other officers authorized to administer oaths, see § 1-2-102 and note thereunder.

As to sale and redemption of lands upon execution, see chapter 18 of this title.

§ 1-17-324. Effect of deed.

The deed is prima facie evidence of the legality and regularity of the sale and the entire estate and interest of the person whose property the officer sells and conveys shall thereby rest in the purchaser, whether that interest existed at the time the property became liable to satisfy the judgment, or was acquired subsequently.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 408; R.S. 1887, § 2748; R.S. 1899, § 3855; C.S. 1910, § 4709; C.S. 1920, § 5982; R.S. 1931, § 89-2942; C.S. 1945, § 3-4231; W.S. 1957, § 1-387; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-324.

Cross references. —

For another provision concerning effect of deed, see § 1-18-110 .

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-325. Printer's fees for notice.

The officer who makes a levy or holds an order of sale may demand of the plaintiff the fees of the printer for publishing the notice and the officer is not required to make publication until the fees are paid.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 409; R.S. 1887, § 2749; R.S. 1899, § 3856; C.S. 1910, § 4710; C.S. 1920, § 5983; R.S. 1931, § 89-2943; C.S. 1945, § 3-4232; W.S. 1957, § 1-388; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-325.

§ 1-17-326. Where realty sold; certain purchases void.

All sales of lands or tenements under execution or order of sale shall be held at the courthouse in the county in which the lands and tenements are situated, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Purchases of real or personal property by the officer making sale or by an appraiser of the property are void.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 410; R.S. 1887, § 2750; R.S. 1899, § 3857; C.S. 1910, § 4711; C.S. 1920, § 5984; R.S. 1931, § 89-2944; C.S. 1945, § 3-4233; W.S. 1957, § 1-389; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-326.

Cross references. —

See also §§ 1-18-101 and 1-21-603 .

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sheriff's sale — modern cases, 5 ALR4th 794.

§ 1-17-327. Alias executions against realty.

If lands and tenements levied on or ordered sold are not sold upon one (1) execution, other executions may be issued.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 411; R.S. 1887, § 2751; R.S. 1899, § 3858; C.S. 1910, § 4712; C.S. 1920, § 5985; R.S. 1931, § 89-2945; C.S. 1945, § 3-4234; W.S. 1957, § 1-390; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-327.

§ 1-17-328. Separate levies on separate parcels of land.

  1. When two (2) or more executions having  different preferences are to be satisfied by levying upon real estate,  either judgment creditor may require the officer to make a separate  levy for his execution. The officer levying the executions may choose  such part of the debtor’s real property as is sufficient, at two-thirds  (2/3) of the appraised value of the judgment debtor’s interest, to satisfy  the executions.
  2. When two (2) or more executions having  no preference as to each other are to be satisfied by levying upon  real property, either judgment creditor may require the officer to  levy upon separate parcels if the appraisers determine that the property  may be divided without material injury.
  3. If two-thirds (2/3) of the appraised value  of the judgment debtor’s interest in real property is not sufficient  to satisfy all the executions chargeable against it, that part of  the property shall be levied on to satisfy each execution as will  bear the same proportion in value to the whole as the amount due on  the execution bears to the amount of all the executions chargeable  thereon, as near as may be, according to the appraised value of the  judgment debtor’s interest in each separate parcel.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 412; R.S. 1887, § 2752; R.S. 1899, § 3859; C.S. 1910, § 4713; C.S. 1920, § 5986; R.S. 1931, § 89-2946; C.S. 1945, § 3-4235; W.S. 1957, § 1-391; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-328; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to fees of real estate appraisers, see § 1-17-341 .

§ 1-17-329. Certificate or deed by successor officer.

If the term of the officer who makes a sale of any lands and tenements expires, or he is unable from any cause to make a certificate of sale or a deed of conveyance of the property sold, any successor of the officer on receiving a certificate from the court from which execution issued setting forth that sufficient proof has been made that the sale was fairly and legally made, and on tender or proof of payment of the purchase money, may execute to the purchaser or his legal representatives a certificate of sale or a deed of conveyance of the lands and tenements sold. The certificate or deed shall be as valid in law as if the officer who made the sale had executed it.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 413; R.S. 1887, § 2753; R.S. 1899, § 3860; C.S. 1910, § 4714; C.S. 1920, § 5987; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 96; R.S. 1931, § 89-2947; C.S. 1945, § 3-4236; W.S. 1957, § 1-392; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-329.

§ 1-17-330. Disposition of surplus proceeds.

If there remains in the hands of the officer after an execution sale more money than necessary to satisfy the writ of execution with interest and costs, the officer shall pay the balance to the defendant in execution or his legal representatives.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 414; R.S. 1887, § 2754; R.S. 1899, § 3861; C.S. 1910, § 4715; C.S. 1920, § 5988; R.S. 1931, § 89-2948; C.S. 1945, § 3-4237; W.S. 1957, § 1-393; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-330.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-331. Effect of reversal of judgment.

If a judgment in satisfaction of which lands or tenements are sold is thereafter reversed, the reversal shall not affect the title of the purchaser, but the judgment creditor shall make restitution of the money received from the sale with lawful interest from the day of sale.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 415; R.S. 1887, § 2755; R.S. 1899, § 3862; C.S. 1910, § 4716; C.S. 1920, § 5989; R.S. 1931, § 89-2949; C.S. 1945, § 3-4238; W.S. 1957, § 1-394; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-331.

Cross references. —

As to judgment rate of interest, see § 1-16-102 .

As to rate of interest when there is no agreement or provision of law specifying the rate, see § 40-14-106(e).

Assumption of equitable jurisdiction held not warranted on ground that suit was one to quiet title, particularly in absence of any allegation that either party was in possession of the lands or that they were unoccupied, in view of this section. Investors' Guaranty Corp. v. Luikart, 5 F.2d 793, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2757 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1925).

§ 1-17-332. Rights of purchaser where sale invalid.

  1. If the title of the purchaser is invalid  by reason of a procedural defect in the sale of property on execution,  the purchaser is subrogated to the right of the creditor against the  debtor to the extent of the money paid and applied to the debtor’s  benefit, and shall have a lien therefor on the property sold as against  all persons except bona fide purchasers without notice. The creditor  is not required to refund the purchase money by reason of the invalidity  of any such sale.
  2. This section applies to all sales by order  of court, sales by executors, administrators, guardians and assignees  and to all sales for taxes.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 416, 417; R.S. 1887, §§ 2756, 2757; R.S. 1899, §§ 3863, 3864; C.S. 1910, §§ 4717, 4718; C.S. 1920, §§ 5990, 5991; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-2950, 89-2951; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4239, 3-4240; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-395, 1-396; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-332.

Right to reimbursement. —

Though deed from the county, based on its tax deed, was ineffectual as a transfer of title, it gave grantee a right to reimbursement under principles of equity, that have been recognized by statute and discussed by this court. Huber v. Delong, 54 Wyo. 240, 91 P.2d 53, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1939).

Where failure of assessor to make oath to assessment roll invalidated tax sale for the next year, but did not make the taxes illegal nor unjust, it did not relieve former owner seeking to set aside the tax deed from reimbursing the tax deed holder. Huber v. Delong, 54 Wyo. 240, 91 P.2d 53, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1939).

Waiver of claim. —

In an action brought to cancel a tax title or quiet title to land, holder of tax title failing to allege payment of taxes by him, no judgment for amount of the taxes paid will be awarded to him, as he has right to waive his claim and he cannot thereafter maintain an action for the taxes so paid. Brewer v. Folsom Bros. Co., 43 Wyo. 517, 7 P.2d 224, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1932).

Law reviews. —

See “The Tax Sale Purchaser's Lien,” 4 Wyo. L.J. 275.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sheriff's sale — modern cases, 5 ALR4th 794.

§ 1-17-333. Sale of wrong property; vacation of satisfaction.

When a plaintiff in execution, in good faith, has had a levy of execution and sale of property not subject thereto, with the proceeds applied on his judgment, and a recovery therefor has been had against him by the owner of the property, the plaintiff, having paid the amount so recovered, on motion and notice to the judgment defendant, in the court having control of the judgment, may have the satisfaction made from the sale on execution vacated and is entitled to collect the judgment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 418; R.S. 1887, § 2758; R.S. 1899, § 3865; C.S. 1910, § 4719; C.S. 1920, § 5992; R.S. 1931, § 89-2952; C.S. 1945, § 3-4241; W.S. 1957, § 1-397; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-333.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of purchaser at execution sale, upon failure of title, to reimbursement or restitution from judgment creditor, 33 ALR4th 1206.

§ 1-17-334. Sale of wrong property; remedy of levying officer.

When an officer levies execution in good faith, upon property not subject thereto, sells the property and applies the proceeds in satisfaction of the judgment, and a recovery is had against him for its value, upon payment of the recovery and on motion and notice to the execution defendant in the court having control of the judgment, the officer may have the satisfaction of the judgment vacated and execution issued for his use the same as if the levy and sale had not been made.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 419; R.S. 1887, § 2759; R.S. 1899, § 3866; C.S. 1910, § 4720; C.S. 1920, § 5993; R.S. 1931, § 89-2953; C.S. 1945, § 3-4242; W.S. 1957, § 1-398; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-334.

Liability on bond. —

When an execution was vacated after levy, fact that sheriff surrendered the goods without consent of the execution creditor does not release the latter from his indemnity bond. W.F. Main Co. v. Morrow, 8 Wyo. 323, 57 P. 915, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (1899).

Where defendants, as execution creditors, executed an indemnity bond to the sheriff, reciting that execution had been levied, and that if sheriff retained, advertised and sold the goods under the execution, defendants would indemnify him, statement in respect to retention, advertising and sale being mere recital that sheriff would do his duty, and defendants were liable on the bond though execution was vacated and the goods surrendered before advertisement and sale. W.F. Main Co. v. Morrow, 8 Wyo. 323, 57 P. 915, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (1899).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of sheriffs, constables and marshals for defaults and misfeasances of clerks, assistants or deputies, 71 ALR2d 1140.

§ 1-17-335. Sale of wrong property; rights of defendant and surety.

When a defendant in a judgment or his surety mistakenly directs an execution issued on the judgment to be levied on property not liable to execution, and thereby wholly or partially satisfies the judgment, he may be compelled to pay the owner of the property therefor. Thereafter, he shall have the same rights against any codefendant in the judgment and against any cosurety or principal in respect of the debts on which the judgment is founded as though the satisfaction had been made out of the property of the defendant or surety directing the levy.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 420; R.S. 1887, § 2760; R.S. 1899, § 3867; C.S. 1910, § 4721; C.S. 1920, § 5994; R.S. 1931, § 89-2954; C.S. 1945, § 3-4243; W.S. 1957, § 1-399; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-335.

§ 1-17-336. When judgment loses preference; lien to continue for a year.

A judgment on which execution is not levied before the expiration of one (1) year after its rendition shall not operate as a lien on the estate of a debtor. When judgment is rendered in the district or supreme court and a special mandate is awarded to the district court to carry the same into execution, the lien of the judgment creditor shall continue for one (1) year after the mandate is filed with the county clerk. The special mandate shall be entered on the journal of the district court before being filed with the county clerk. In computing the period of one (1) year, the time covered by an appeal of the case, by an injunction against the execution, by a vacancy in the office of sheriff or by the inability of the officer, shall be excluded.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 421; R.S. 1887, § 2761; R.S. 1899, § 3868; C.S. 1910, § 4722; C.S. 1920, § 5995; R.S. 1931, § 89-2955; C.S. 1945, § 3-4244; W.S. 1957, § 1-400; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-336; Laws 1999, ch. 190, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision excluding time during which judgment is stayed, see § 1-17-209 .

Construction. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-17-336 does not state that the judgment creditor's rights to execute on the debtor's property expire. Instead, it states that, if there is no execution within a year, the judgment ceases to operate a lien. Thus, even if their lien had expired, the judgment creditors could still execute on the debtor's property and a conveyance of the property by the debtor was fraudulent. Dev-Tech Corp. v. Wilson, Miller, Barton & Peek, Inc., 2004 WY 163, 102 P.3d 880, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 2004).

Execution where lien has expired. —

Although execution was not levied within one year of the filing of foreign judgments, which meant that the judgments were no longer liens under this section, the property remained available for execution pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-17-301 . Cook v. Swires, 2009 WY 21, 202 P.3d 397, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2009).

Bankruptcy stay. —

It is apparent that the automatic stay does not operate to stop a creditor from maintaining or continuing the perfection of its security interest during the pendency of a bankruptcy case; however, under Wyoming law, a creditor must execute on its lien within one year of the date the judgment is rendered to maintain its lien. Execution of a judgment is considered a violation of the automatic stay, and, therefore, the court determined that the one-year period is stayed during the period of the automatic stay for execution of a judgment lien. In re MarMC Transp., Inc., 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3872 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Aug. 23, 2012).

Cited in

Norman v. Jirdon Agri Chems., Inc. (In re Cockreham), 84 B.R. 757, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2789 (D. Wyo. 1988).

Law reviews. —

See article “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

§ 1-17-337. New appraisement of realty or execution; direction of sale price by court.

When real estate taken on execution is appraised and is twice advertised and offered for sale but remains unsold for lack of bidders, the court from which the execution issued on motion of the plaintiff or defendant shall set aside the appraisement and order a new appraisement to be made, or set aside the levy and appraisement and award a new execution to issue. When the real estate or any part thereof has been three (3) times appraised and thereafter twice advertised and offered for sale, and remains unsold for lack of bidders, the court may direct the amount for which the property shall be sold.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 422; R.S. 1887, § 2762; R.S. 1899, § 3869; C.S. 1910, § 4723; C.S. 1920, § 5996; R.S. 1931, § 89-2956; C.S. 1945, § 3-4245; W.S. 1957, § 1-401; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-337.

Cross references. —

For provision that purchase by officer making sale or by appraiser is void, see § 1-17-326 .

As to fees of real estate appraisers, see § 1-17-341 .

Sheriff cannot seek reappraisal of property to fit original bid. 2-2-H Ranch Co. v. Simmons, 658 P.2d 68, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 281 (Wyo. 1983).

§ 1-17-338. Court order to sell land on time; terms of sale.

When premises are ordered to be sold and having been twice advertised and offered for sale remain unsold for lack of bidders, on motion of the plaintiff or defendant the court from which the order of sale issued shall order a new appraisement, and may also order that the land be sold on time with one-third (1/3) cash in hand, one-third (1/3) in nine (9) months from the day of sale, and the remaining one-third (1/3) in eighteen (18) months from the day of sale. Deferred payments shall draw interest and be secured by a mortgage on the premises.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 423; R.S. 1887, § 2763; R.S. 1899, § 3870; C.S. 1910, § 4724; C.S. 1920, § 5997; R.S. 1931, § 89-2457; C.S. 1945, § 2-4246; W.S. 1957, § 1-402; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-338.

Cross references. —

As to rate of interest on judgments, see § 1-16-102 .

For provision that purchase by officer making sale or by appraiser is void, see § 1-17-326 .

As to fees of real estate appraisers, see § 1-17-341 .

As to rate of interest when there is no agreement or provision of law for a different rate, see § 40-14-106(e).

Sheriff cannot seek reappraisal of property to fit original bid. 2-2-H Ranch Co. v. Simmons, 658 P.2d 68, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 281 (Wyo. 1983).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-339. Return of execution.

The officer to whom a writ of execution is directed shall return the writ to the court within sixty (60) days from the date thereof.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 424; R.S. 1887, § 2764; R.S. 1899, § 3871; C.S. 1910, § 4725; C.S. 1920, § 5998; R.S. 1931, § 89-2958; C.S. 1945, § 3-4247; W.S. 1957, § 1-403; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-339.

Cross references. —

As to return of execution by mail, see § 1-17-342 .

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-340. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 425, related to the entry of judgment against a principal and surety and execution thereof.

§ 1-17-341. Appraiser's fees.

Each person appraising real estate under W.S. 1-17-301 through 1-17-345 shall receive a reasonable fee to be collected on the execution.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 426; R.S. 1887, § 2766; R.S. 1899, § 3873; C.S. 1910, § 4727; C.S. 1920, § 6000; R.S. 1931, § 89-2960; C.S. 1945, § 3-4249; W.S. 1957, § 1-405; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-341; 2009, ch. 168, § 103; 2011, ch. 16, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, inserted “other than qualified appraisers,” following “1-17-345” and added the last sentence.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, substituted “person appraising” for “appraiser of,” and deleted “other than qualified appraisers, shall receive three dollars ($3.00) per day and one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per half day for his services, to be collected on the execution. Qualified appraisers so acting” following “1-17-345.”

Fee limitation unapplicable. —

The three dollar fee limit in this section does not apply in cases where the services of a qualified appraiser are required under § 1-17-316 to levy execution upon real property. A reasonable appraiser's fee is appropriate. TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Grieve, 887 P.2d 511, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1994).

§ 1-17-342. Return of execution to another county by mail.

When execution is issued to the sheriff of another county, and the sheriff, having discharged all the duties required of him by law, returns the execution by mail to the clerk of the court who issued it soon enough to have reached the office where it was issued within the time prescribed by law, he is not liable for any penalty if it does not reach the office in time.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 427; R.S. 1887, § 2767; R.S. 1899, § 3874; C.S. 1910, § 4728; C.S. 1920, § 6001; R.S. 1931, § 89-2961; C.S. 1945, § 3-4250; W.S. 1957, § 1-406; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-342.

Cross references. —

As to time of return of execution, see § 1-17-339 .

As to amercement of officer for failure to make timely return of execution, see § 1-24-101 .

§ 1-17-343. Forwarding of money by mail.

A sheriff shall not forward by mail any money made on execution unless he is specially instructed to do so by the plaintiff, his agent or attorney.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 428; R.S. 1887, § 2768; R.S. 1899, § 3875; C.S. 1910, § 4729; C.S. 1920, § 6002; R.S. 1931, § 89-2962; C.S. 1945, § 3-4251; W.S. 1957, § 1-407; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-343.

§ 1-17-344. Execution docket; entries.

The clerk of the district court shall enter in the execution docket the full names of the parties to the action in which an execution is issued, the number of the action in the appearance docket, the number of the execution, the date of its issue, the amount of the judgment, the costs due each person or officer, the time when the judgment was rendered, the date of the return and the return recorded in full.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 429; R.S. 1887, § 2769; R.S. 1899, § 3876; C.S. 1910, § 4730; C.S. 1920, § 6003; R.S. 1931, § 89-2963; C.S. 1945, § 3-4252; W.S. 1957, § 1-408; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-344.

§ 1-17-345. Execution docket; index.

The clerk shall keep an index to the execution docket showing in separate columns the names of all parties against whom and in whose favor an execution has been issued, the number of the execution and the number of the action upon the appearance docket.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 430; R.S. 1887, § 2770; R.S. 1899, § 3877; C.S. 1910, § 4731; C.S. 1920, § 6004; R.S. 1931, § 89-2964; C.S. 1945, § 3-4253; W.S. 1957, § 1-409; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-345.

Cross references. —

As to recording, indexing and releasing judgments generally, see § 1-16-301 et seq.

Article 4. Proceedings in Aid of Execution

Appointment of receiver. —

Under this article, relative to proceedings in aid of execution, and authorizing appointment of a receiver in such proceedings, mortgagees and lien creditors of a partnership, who were not parties to action against firm resulting in judgment, in aid of execution under which a receiver of the firm property was appointed, cannot, on intervention, complain of the appointment. First Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 12 Wyo. 492, 76 P. 674, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 12 Wyo. 492, 78 P. 1083, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1904).

Improper appointment. —

In proceedings in aid of execution, appointment of receiver to examine claims of lien creditors and mortgagees to the property, and make recommendations to court, is improper, as it is a summary proceeding, and disputes between debtor and third persons cannot be settled. First Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 12 Wyo. 492, 76 P. 674, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 12 Wyo. 492, 78 P. 1083, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1904).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments §§ 643 to 763; 31 Am. Jur. 2d Exemptions §§ 35 to 62.

33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 345 to 406.

§ 1-17-401. Action against equitable assets.

Any equitable interests the judgment debtor has as mortgagor, mortgagee or otherwise, or any interest he has in any joint stock company, money contract, claim or chose in action due or to become due to him, or in any judgment or order, or any money, goods or effects which he has in the possession of any person, which has not been levied upon and sold under execution is subject to the payment of the judgment by action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 464; R.S. 1887, § 2812; R.S. 1899, § 3932; C.S. 1910, § 4786; C.S. 1920, § 6056; R.S. 1931, § 89-3101; C.S. 1945, § 3-4701; W.S. 1957, § 1-410; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-401; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to sale of corporate stock under execution or attachment, see chapter 19 of this title.

As to when proceeds of wrongful death judgment may not be used to pay debts of decedent, see § 1-38-102 .

As to exemption from attachment or garnishment of interest in prepaid or prearranged funeral contracts, see § 26-32-102 .

As to levies on bulk transfers, see § 34.1-9-301.

As to attachment of goods covered by negotiable instruments, see § 34.1-7-602.

As to creditor's legal process, see § 34.1-8-112.

Bare legal title not attachable. —

Where, under a loan participation agreement, the lead institution at no time held more than bare legal title under the note and mortgage, and it acted in that regard in the position of a fiduciary with respect to the savings and loan institution participants since the lead institution held no equitable interest in the note and mortgage, there is nothing for plaintiff to attach, and her action as judgment creditor of the lead institution seeking assignment of a property interest on the mortgage must fail. McVay v. Western Plains Service Corp., 823 F.2d 1395, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 17760 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1987).

Assignment of defendants' chose in action to plaintiff held improper. —

Unpublished decision: After entering judgment for plaintiff, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-17-401 , the district court assigned to plaintiff defendants' interest in a lawsuit they had filed in Florida; this was an abuse of discretion due to the extraordinary difficulty in estimating the value of a chose in action, and the fact that plaintiff had no intention of actually litigating the suit. The court could have subjected the chose to an execution sale, imposed an equitable lien on any proceeds from the suit, or selected an alternative remedy; but simply granting plaintiff direct ownership of defendants' chose was impermissible. Amphibious Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 Fed. Appx. 762, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15234 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2010).

Creditor is not obliged to pursue summary proceedings, but may resort in the first instance to an action in the nature of a creditors' bill. Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 64 P. 225, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1901).

Counterclaims. —

Under statute providing that when cross-demands have existed between two persons, so that if one had brought action the other could have set up counterclaim, neither can be deprived of benefit thereof through assignment by, or death of, the other, but the two demands must be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, and counterclaim may be set up even if not presented to executor or administrator under § 2-6-209 .Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder, 55 Wyo. 109, 97 P.2d 311, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1939).

Applied in

James S. Jackson Co. v. Meyer, 677 P.2d 835, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 266 (Wyo. 1984).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability insurance carried by a charity as subject to appropriation and satisfaction of judgment in tort, 25 ALR2d 29.

Surplus income of trust, and excess of amount required for support and education of beneficiary, as subject of supplementary proceedings, 36 ALR2d 1215.

Rights of creditors of life insured as to options or other benefits available to him during his lifetime, 37 ALR2d 268.

§ 1-17-402. Discovery in aid of execution.

  1. At any time after entry of judgment, the  judgment creditor may obtain discovery by interrogatories, depositions  or otherwise, from any person, including the judgment debtor, in accordance  with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. A person served with notice of discovery  under this section shall hold for the benefit of the judgment creditor  from the time of service all property, money and credits in his hands  belonging to the judgment debtor or due to him.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 472; R.S. 1887, § 2820; R.S. 1899, § 3940; C.S. 1910, § 4799; C.S. 1920, § 6069; R.S. 1931, § 89-3114; C.S. 1945, § 3-4702; W.S. 1957, § 1-411; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-402; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to deposition and discovery, see Rules 26 through 37, W.R.C.P.

Editor's notes. —

All of the following case annotations are taken from cases decided under former §§ 1-17-403 and 1-17-404.

Only judge can order debtor's appearance. —

No person except a judge is authorized to issue an order requiring the debtor to appear and answer concerning his property. Poljanec v. Freed Fin. Co., 440 P.2d 251, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1968).

In county of residence or where found. —

No authority by statute or rule authorizes a district judge to issue an order for the debtor to appear and answer in a county other than the county of his residence or county in which he is found. Poljanec v. Freed Fin. Co., 440 P.2d 251, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1968).

Matters deemed foreign to proceeding. —

Statutory proceeding in aid of execution provides summary method of discovering property subject to execution and applying it thereto when discovered, but taking over of defendant's business, marshaling of liens and settlement of disputed titles are foreign to proceeding. First Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 12 Wyo. 492, 76 P. 674, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 12 Wyo. 492, 78 P. 1083, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1904).

Debtor must be about to leave state or conceal himself. —

This section authorizes a warrant for arrest, but such action is limited to cases where the judgment debtor is about to leave the state or conceal himself. Poljanec v. Freed Fin. Co., 440 P.2d 251, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1968).

Service. —

An order for arrest of defendant in a civil action can only be served in the county where issued. Ahlrep v. Hughes, 18 Wyo. 51, 102 P. 659, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1909).

Cited in

Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 64 P. 225, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1901).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

For article, “Collecting Debt in Wyoming: The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as a Trap for the Unwary,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 731 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and application of provision of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act relating to validation of debts (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692g), 150 ALR Fed 101.

§§ 1-17-403 and 1-17-404. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to discovery in aid of execution, see § 1-17-402 .

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 472 and 473, related to the order for examination of a debtor after execution is returned unsatisfied, and the examination of the debtor before the return of execution and subsequent proceedings, respectively.

§ 1-17-405. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 4.

Cross references. —

For present provisions relating to interrogatories to garnishee, see § 1-15-407 .

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 475, related to an order for examination of persons indebted to the judgment debtor.

§§ 1-17-406 through 1-17-409. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to discovery in aid of execution, see § 1-17-402 .

As to self-incrimination generally, see art. 1, § 11, Wyo. Const.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 476, 477, 480 and 481, related to excuses for not answering questions during examinations, references to a master, examination before a master, and a disobedience of orders, respectively.

§ 1-17-410. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 4.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 482, related to payment to the sheriff by the judgment debtor's debtor.

§ 1-17-411. Order for satisfaction of judgment; request for a hearing.

Following an examination as provided by W.S. 1-17-402 through 1-17-418 , the court may order any property of the judgment debtor not exempt by law, to be applied toward the satisfaction of a judgment. Upon seizure of his property, a judgment debtor may request a hearing pursuant to W.S. 1-17-102 .

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 483; R.S. 1887, § 2831; Laws 1897, ch. 11, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 3951; Laws 1903, ch. 31, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 4810; C.S. 1920, § 6080; R.S. 1931, § 89-3125; C.S. 1945, § 3-4713; W.S. 1957, § 1-422; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-411; Laws 1985, ch. 194, § 2; 1986, ch. 62, § 1; 1987, ch. 198, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to attachment and garnishment generally, see chapter 15 of this title.

As to property exempt from execution or attachment generally, see chapter 20 of this title.

For provision that earnings of inmates on work release program are not subject to garnishment, see § 7-16-308 .

As to exemption of fire department pension and retirement benefits, see § 15-5-209 .

As to exemption of payments for performance of military duty, see § 19-9-401 .

As to exemption of worker's compensation awards, see § 27-14-702 .

For provision that there shall be no garnishment before judgment in consumer credit cases, see § 40-14-504 .

As to limitation on garnishment in consumer credit cases, see § 40-14-505 .

For provision that there shall be no discharge from employment for garnishment in consumer credit cases, see § 40-14-506 .

Discharge of garnishee where amount due exempt. —

Plaintiff garnished defendant's employer and defendant filed affidavit claiming that amount due him was exempt, whereupon garnishee was discharged, but within month plaintiff again had defendant's employer summoned as garnishee and court again found that amount due was exempt and ordered the garnishee discharged, it being held that such order was proper, though defendant had not filed second affidavit. Lafferty v. Sistalla, 11 Wyo. 360, 72 P. 192, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1903).

Matters deemed foreign to proceeding. —

Statutory proceeding in aid of execution provides summary method of discovering property subject to execution and applying it thereto when discovered, but taking over of defendant's business, marshaling of liens and settlement of disputed titles are foreign to proceeding. First Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 12 Wyo. 492, 76 P. 674, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 12 Wyo. 492, 78 P. 1083, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1904).

Quoted in

James S. Jackson Co. v. Meyer, 677 P.2d 835, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 266 (Wyo. 1984).

Cited in

Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 64 P. 225, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1901); Lingle State Bank v. Podolak, 740 P.2d 392, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 480 (Wyo. 1987).

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

See note, “Wage Exemption in Wyoming,” 11 Wyo. L.J. 125.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-412. Appointment of receiver; control of property.

The court may appoint the sheriff of the proper county or other suitable person as receiver of the property of the judgment debtor, and may forbid a transfer or other disposition of or interference with the property of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 484; R.S. 1887, § 2832; R.S. 1899, § 3952; C.S. 1910, § 4811; C.S. 1920, § 6081; R.S. 1931, § 89-3126; C.S. 1945, § 3-4714; W.S. 1957, § 1-423; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-412.

Cross references. —

As to property exempt from execution or attachment generally, see chapter 20 of this title.

As to receivers generally, see chapter 33 of this title.

Judgment creditor may have receiver appointed. —

Judgment creditor may, under certain circumstances, have receiver appointed to take charge of property of judgment debtor for purpose of enabling him to enforce judgment. State ex rel. Avenius v. Tidball, 35 Wyo. 496, 252 P. 499, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1927).

Over debtor corporation. —

Judgment creditor may have receiver appointed over debtor corporation, though it is akin to insolvency proceeding and though it results in dissolution of the corporation. State ex rel. Avenius v. Tidball, 35 Wyo. 496, 252 P. 499, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1927).

Cited in

Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 64 P. 225, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1901).

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-413. Appointment of sheriff or another as receiver.

If the sheriff is appointed receiver, he and his sureties are liable on his official bond as receiver. If another person is appointed, he shall take an oath and bond as in other cases.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 485; R.S. 1887, § 2833; R.S. 1899, § 3953; C.S. 1910, § 4812; C.S. 1920, § 6082; R.S. 1931, § 89-3127; C.S. 1945, § 3-4715; W.S. 1957, § 1-424; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-413.

Cross references. —

As to oath and bond of receiver, see § 1-33-103 .

Matters deemed foreign to proceeding. —

Statutory proceeding in aid of execution provides summary method of discovering property subject to execution and applying it thereto when discovered, but taking over of defendant's business, marshaling of liens and settlement of disputed titles are foreign to proceeding. First Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 12 Wyo. 492, 76 P. 674, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 12 Wyo. 492, 78 P. 1083, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1904).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-414. Sale of judgment debtor's equitable or other interest in realty.

If it appears that the judgment debtor has an interest in real estate in the county in which proceedings are had, as mortgagor, mortgagee or otherwise, and his interest can be ascertained as between himself and any person holding the legal estate or having a lien or interest therein, without controversy, the receiver may be ordered to sell and convey the real estate, or the interest of the debtor. The sale shall be conducted as provided for the sale of real estate upon execution, and before execution of the deed, the proceedings of sale shall be approved by the court in which the judgment was rendered or the transcript filed.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 486; R.S. 1887, § 2834; R.S. 1899, § 3954; C.S. 1910, § 4813; C.S. 1920, § 6083; R.S. 1931, § 89-3128; C.S. 1945, § 3-4716; W.S. 1957, § 1-425; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-414.

Cross references. —

As to sale of real estate upon execution, see §§ 1-17-316 , 1-17-321 to 1-17-332 and chapter 18 of this title.

Receiver may be appointed in mortgage foreclosure without showing person liable for indebtedness was insolvent. Grieve v. Huber, 38 Wyo. 223, 266 P. 128, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1928), reh'g denied, 41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1930).

Entry of judgment in foreclosure action did not defeat right to appoint receiver as respected defendants subsequently served with process. Grieve v. Huber, 38 Wyo. 223, 266 P. 128, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1928), reh'g denied, 41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1930).

Appointment of receiver during period of redemption in foreclosure was not invasion of mortgagor's constitutional rights. Grieve v. Huber, 38 Wyo. 223, 266 P. 128, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1928), reh'g denied, 41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1930).

Stated in

Ruby Drilling Co. v. Title Guar. Co., 750 P.2d 674, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1988).

Cited in

State ex rel. Avenius v. Tidball, 35 Wyo. 496, 252 P. 499, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (1927).

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-415. Filing of orders.

All orders of the court issued pursuant to this article shall be filed with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the judgment is rendered. The clerk shall enter on the execution docket the time of filing the judgment or transcript.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 487; R.S. 1887, § 2836; R.S. 1899, § 3955; C.S. 1910, § 4814; C.S. 1920, § 6084; R.S. 1931, § 89-3129; C.S. 1945, § 3-4717; W.S. 1957, § 1-426; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-415; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 2; 1988, ch. 37, § 2; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to service of summons, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

The 2004 amendment deleted “or in which the transcript of the justice court proceeding is filed” following “which the judgment is rendered.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-17-416. Costs.

The judge shall allow to clerks, sheriffs, referees, receivers and witnesses compensation allowed for like services in other cases, to be taxed as costs and shall enforce the collection thereof from the party or parties liable for payment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 489; R.S. 1887, § 2837; R.S. 1899, § 3956; C.S. 1910, § 4815; C.S. 1920, § 6085; R.S. 1931, § 89-3130; C.S. 1945, § 3-4718; W.S. 1957, § 1-427; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-416.

Cross references. —

As to fees and costs generally, see chapter 14 of this title.

§ 1-17-417. Lien on debtor vendee's interest in personalty; interest defined.

An attaching or judgment creditor of a vendee in a sale, contract or lease wherein the transfer of title or ownership of personal property is contingent upon any condition, has a lien upon the personal property to the extent of the interest of the vendee therein. For the purposes of W.S. 1-17-417 and 1-17-418 , the interest of the vendee is the amount which the personal property will bring at any judicial sale, over and above any sums then unpaid to the vendor in the sale, contract or lease.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 63, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-4719; W.S. 1957, § 1-428; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-417.

Law reviews. —

See “Creditors' Rights Under the Recording Statutes,” 4 Wyo. L.J. 73.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Vendee's interest under executory contract as subject to execution, 1 ALR2d 727.

§ 1-17-418. Lien on debtor vendee's interest in personalty; manner and effect of sale.

When any personal property is attached or levied upon under execution, the judgment creditor shall pay the amount then due the vendor or the assignee of vendor under the sale, contract or lease, and proceed to sell the personal property the same as if title and ownership were in the vendee. If the judgment creditor elects to pay the vendor or assignee of vendor, the bill of sale of the sheriff or person selling under execution shall convey to the purchaser at the execution sale all of the right, title and interest of the vendor to the personal property.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 63, § 2; C.S. 1945, § 3-4720; W.S. 1957, § 1-429; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-418.

Repealing clauses. —

Section 3, ch. 63, Laws 1937, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict with that act.

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Article 5. Garnishment

§§ 1-17-501 through 1-17-505. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 4.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1901, ch. 95, §§ 1 through 3, and Laws 1909, ch. 140, §§ 1 and 2, related to garnishment. For present similar provisions, see §§ 1-15-401 through 1-15-425 .

Article 6. Execution Against the Person; Attachment of Person

§§ 1-17-601 through 1-17-614. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 449, 451 through 457, 459 through 463 and 490, related to execution against, and attachment of, the person.

Article 7. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

In general. —

Under this article, if not under the full faith and credit clause, it must be considered that a judgment nisi entered by a New Jersey superior court, when filed with the district court, justified any action that could be taken by a judgment plaintiff in a case originating in the state of Wyoming. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976).

No distinction between monthly payments and fixed sum. —

There is nothing in the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act that distinguishes between a judgment for alimony and support, to be paid in continuing monthly payments, and a judgment for money only, payable in a definite and fixed sum. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976).

Absent contempt, modification of out-of-state property settlement improper. —

A district court's modification of a California court's order regarding deposit refund moneys involved in a property settlement, when it found that the wife was not in contempt of court and was fully justified in spending those proceeds, was beyond the court's authority. Haltom v. Haltom, 755 P.2d 876, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1988).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 72 ALR2d 1255.

Validity, construction, and application of Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 31 ALR4th 706.

50 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 888 to 906.

§ 1-17-701. Short title.

This act means W.S. 1-17-701 through 1-17-707 and may be cited as the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

History. Laws 1949, ch. 71, § 18; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-460, 1-477.8; Laws 1965, ch. 47, § 8; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-701.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and application of Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 88 ALR5th 545.

§ 1-17-702. “Foreign judgment” defined.

In this act, “foreign judgment” means any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.

History. Laws 1949, ch. 71, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-461, 1-477.1; Laws 1965, ch. 47, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-702.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-17-701 .

Quoted in

Routh v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1998).

§ 1-17-703. Filing of foreign judgment; effect of filing.

In order for a foreign judgment to have the same effect as a judgment of a district court of this state, a copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of Congress or the statutes of this state shall be filed in the office of the clerk of any district court and any county clerk of this state. The clerk of court shall treat the foreign judgment as a judgment of the district court of this state notwithstanding the amount of the judgment or that the action giving rise to the judgment, if initiated in this state, would be within the jurisdiction of a minor court. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment of a district court of this state and may be so enforced or satisfied.

History. Laws 1949, ch. 71, § 3; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-463, 1-477.2; Laws 1965, ch. 47, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-703; Laws 1980, ch. 25, § 1; Laws 1999, ch. 190, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to modification or vacation of judgment after term, see §§ 1-16-401 to 1-16-409 .

As to stay of execution, see §§ 1-17-201 to 1-17-210 .

Parties prohibited from reasserting issues. —

Because the parties would be barred from relitigating the issue in Florida as to whether the pleadings requested the relief which had been granted to the wife and the issue which the husband asserted in the Wyoming action was exactly the same issue which he presented to the Florida courts, and the Florida district court of appeal, which was a court of competent jurisdiction, entered a final judgment on the issue, the Wyoming district court properly gave full faith and credit to the Florida judgment. Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. Sept. 13, 1994).

Copy of actual judgment, not related instrument, needed. —

An Ohio municipal court's “certificate of judgment” does not meet the requirement of this section that a “copy” of the foreign judgment be filed, because the “certificate of judgment” is not identical with the original judgment, which Rule 58, Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, requires to be signed by the judge, but, rather, is a printed form designed to meet Ohio's statutory requirements for the establishment of a lien upon lands of a judgment debtor. Hull v. Buffalo Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 661 P.2d 1049, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 306 (Wyo. 1983).

Limitations period. —

Filing a foreign judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act does not involve a court proceeding and is thus not a civil action within the clear language of § 1-3-105(a)(iii), and therefore limitation period specified in that section does not apply. Hill v. Value Recovery Group, L.P., 964 P.2d 1256, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1998).

Quoted in

Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976); Haltom v. Haltom, 755 P.2d 876, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1988).

§ 1-17-704. Affidavit required; notice of filing; execution.

At the time of filing a foreign judgment, the judgment creditor or his attorney shall file with the clerk of court an affidavit setting forth the name and last known mailing address of the judgment debtor, and the judgment creditor. The clerk shall promptly mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. The notice shall include the name and mailing address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor’s attorney, if any, in this state. The judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the judgment to the judgment debtor and may file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of notice of filing by the clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgment creditor has been filed. An execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign judgment shall not issue until five (5) days after the date the judgment is filed.

History. Laws 1949, ch. 71, §§ 4, 5; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-464, 1-465, 1-477.3; Laws 1965, ch. 47, § 3; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-704.

§ 1-17-705. Stay of enforcement.

If the judgment debtor shows the court that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, and upon proof that the judgment debtor has furnished the security for satisfaction of the judgment required by the law of the state where it was rendered, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or until the stay of execution expires or is vacated. If the judgment debtor shows the court any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of the court of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring the security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this state.

History. Laws 1949, ch. 71, § 9; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-469, 1-477.4; Laws 1965, ch. 47, § 4; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-705.

Cross references. —

As to stay of execution of domestic judgments, see §§ 1-17-201 to 1-17-210 .

Quoted in

Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976).

§ 1-17-706. Fees.

Any person filing a foreign judgment shall pay to the clerk of court the fee for filing instruments in a civil action under W.S. 5-3-206(a)(i). Fees for docketing, transcription or other enforcement proceedings shall be the same as for judgments of the courts of this state.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 47, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 1-477.5; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-706; Laws 1979, ch. 36, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to fees and costs generally, see chapter 14 of this title.

§ 1-17-707. Right of action unimpaired.

The right of a judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce his judgment in the appropriate court in this state instead of proceeding under this act remains unimpaired.

History. Laws 1949, ch. 71, § 16; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-476, 1-477.6; Laws 1965; ch. 47, § 6; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-18-707; Laws 1980, ch. 25, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-17-701 .

Repealing clauses. —

Section 19, ch. 71, Laws 1949, repealed all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with that act.

Stated in

Hull v. Buffalo Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 661 P.2d 1049, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 306 (Wyo. 1983).

Chapter 18 Sale and Redemption of Realty Sold Under Mortgage or Execution

Cross references. —

As to venue in action for sale of real property under mortgage, lien or other encumbrance, see § 1-5-101 .

As to other actions involving realty, see chapter 32 of this title.

As to deeds, mortgages and leases generally, see §§ 34-2-101 to 34-2-130 .

As to deeds of trust and sales thereunder, see §§ 34-3-101 to 34-3-104 .

As to foreclosure of mortgages and power of sale, see §§ 34-4-101 to 34-4-113 .

As to foreclosure of lien on property in connection with water rights under the Carey Act, see §§ 36-7-503 to 36-7-508 .

As to sale and redemption of real estate for taxes, see §§ 39-13-108 and 39-13-109 .

Remedy of mortgagee. —

A mortgagee's only remedy upon mortgage default is foreclosure and public sale, either by power of sale pursuant to § 34-4-101 et seq., or by judicial sale in accordance with this article. Sannerud v. Brantz, 928 P.2d 477, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1996).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments §§ 456 to 603; 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages §§ 512 to 1117.

Validity and enforceability of due-on-sale real-estate mortgage provisions, 61 ALR4th 1070.

33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 211 to 276; 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 490 to 558.

§ 1-18-101. Sale to be at public vendue; hours of sale; notice required; mortgagee, judgment creditor or lienor must be present or waive; penalty.

  1. No lands or tenements shall be sold by  virtue of any execution or decree of foreclosure unless:
    1. The sale is by public vendue between the  hours of 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. of the same day;
    2. The time and place of holding the sale  was previously advertised for four (4) consecutive weeks in a legal  newspaper of general circulation in the county where the lands and  tenements are situate; and
    3. The foreclosing mortgagee, judgment creditor,  other foreclosing lienor or an authorized agent of the foreclosing  party is present at the sale or has previously waived to the sheriff  conducting the sale the right to appear and bid at the sale. The sheriff  conducting the sale shall not be considered to be the authorized agent  of the foreclosing party unless the foreclosing party has given the  sheriff a specified opening bid to be presented by the sheriff on  behalf of the foreclosing party and the sheriff actually presents  the opening bid. Any foreclosure sale conducted without complying  with the terms of this section is void, in which case the mortgage,  power of sale, judgment or other lien which is the subject of the  voided sale is not extinguished or exhausted, but may be properly  foreclosed in a subsequent foreclosure sale in compliance with applicable  law.
  2. The notice shall state the names of the  plaintiff and defendant in the action, and the time and place of sale.  In all notices the lands or tenements to be sold shall be described  with reasonable certainty by appropriate description. The notice shall  state “The property being foreclosed upon may be subject to other  liens and encumbrances that will not be extinguished at the sale and  any prospective purchaser should research the status of title before  submitting a bid.” If any officer sells any lands or tenements by  virtue of any execution or decree, otherwise than as provided, the  officer so offending shall forfeit and pay five hundred dollars ($500.00)  for every offense, to be recovered with costs in any court of record  in this state by the person whose lands were advertised and sold.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 3879; C.S. 1910, § 4733; C.S. 1920, § 6006; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 97; R.S. 1931, § 89-2965; C.S. 1945, § 3-4301; W.S. 1957, § 1-478; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-101 ; Laws 1978, ch. 7, § 1; 2005, ch. 228, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, and applicable to real estate mortgage foreclosures and execution sales commenced on or after that date, added subsection and paragraph designations; in (a)(ii) substituted “a legal newspaper of general circulation” for “the county newspaper”; inserted (a)(iii); in (b) inserted the third sentence and substituted “five hundred dollars ($500.00)” for “fifty dollars ($50.00)”; and made related changes.

Construed in pari materia. —

Sections 1-6-201 and 1-6-203 , being later enactment than this section, not only supplement but also control interpretation of provisions of this section. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Diefenderfer, 57 Wyo. 13, 112 P.2d 563, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1941).

Statute provides protection. —

Wyoming tax sale statutes do not have the protections that the Wyoming foreclosure statutes do. Sherman v. Rose (In re Sherman), 223 B.R. 555, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1127 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998).

Notice of proceedings on confirmation. —

Where notice was given of intended sale, owner could not contend that it did not have notice of proceedings on confirmation which regularly followed under statute, especially where, on motion to vacate sale, it was not claimed that owner had been unavoidably prevented from receiving notice of sale. Grieve v. Huber, 41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1930).

Sufficiency of publication. —

Publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sale weekly for four successive weeks was sufficient though less than 28 days elapsed between time of first publication and date of sale. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Diefenderfer, 57 Wyo. 13, 112 P.2d 563, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1941).

Designation of accounts as proceeds of auction sale as notice to claimant. —

The designation of an account as proceeds of an auction sale, at the very least, put any claimant to the money on notice that the funds were not the unrestricted property of either the person who deposited them or of the person whose name was used to indicate the source from which they came. National Ass'n of Credit Men v. Moss, 349 P.2d 202, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1960).

Cited in

Lyman v. Thorn, 24 Wyo. 326, 157 P. 887, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1916); In re Various Water Rights in Lake De Smet Reservoir, 623 P.2d 764, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1981); Cliff & Co. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1989).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Wyoming Foreclosure Decrees — Personal Judgments and the Right to Jury Trial,” 4 Land & Water L. Rev. 227 (1969).

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

For case note, “Real Estate — The Wyoming Installment Land Contract: A Mortgage in Sheep's Clothing? or What You See Isn't What You Get. Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Belgrade, 816 P.2d 868, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 1991),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 309 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes public sale, 4 ALR2d 575.

Execution and action on note or bond, not resulting in sale of mortgaged property, as precluding foreclosure of real estate mortgage, 37 ALR2d 959.

§ 1-18-102. Certificate of purchase in lieu of deed; contents; recordation of duplicate; admissibility.

When real property is sold by virtue of an execution, order of sale, decree of foreclosure or foreclosure by advertisement and sale, the sheriff or other officer, instead of executing a deed to the premises sold, shall give to the purchaser of the lands a certificate in writing describing the property purchased and the sum paid therefor, or if purchased by the plaintiff in execution or by the mortgagee, the amount of his bid. The certificate shall state that the purchaser is entitled to a deed for the property at the expiration of the period of redemption, unless the property is redeemed prior to that date as provided by law. The sheriff or other officer shall record in the office of the recorder of the county a duplicate of the certificate, signed and acknowledged by him, and the certificate or a certified copy thereof is admissible as evidence of the facts therein contained.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, § 2; R.S. 1899, § 3880; C.S. 1910, § 4734; C.S. 1920, § 6007; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 98; R.S. 1931, § 89-2966; C.S. 1945, § 3-4302; W.S. 1957, § 1-479; Laws 1971, ch. 79, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-102 .

Cross references. —

For provision that successor in office may execute certificate or deed, see § 1-17-329 .

Time of “sale.” —

The property was “sold” and the sale was “complete” on the date of the foreclosure sale. McCarn v. WYHY Fed. Credit Union (In re McCarn), 218 B.R. 154, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 282 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Wyo. 1998).

Difference in language between certificate and section. —

In an action of unlawful detainer brought by purchasers more than six months after a foreclosure sale, where the certificate of sale stated the substance of this section, that is, that at the expiration of the period of redemption provided by statute the sheriff would give to the purchasers a deed conveying to them all title to the premises, the difference in language between the certificate and this section was of doubtful importance and, if it was error, was wholly immaterial in view of § 1-18-104 , which gives the purchaser the right to possession after the expiration of six (now three) months from the sale. Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950).

Effect of redemption on mortgage lien. —

After mortgagors redeemed the property after the mortgagee had foreclosed upon its mortgage, the mortgagors acquired the mortgagee's mortgage interest. At that point, the lien and the title to the property merged, and the mortgage ceased to exist. First Southwestern Fin. Servs. v. Laird, 882 P.2d 1211, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1994).

Redemption period. —

Because property sold by execution was not mortgaged, the redemption period under this section and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-18-103 was three months, regardless of whether the property was agricultural. Cook v. Swires, 2009 WY 21, 202 P.3d 397, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2009).

Quoted in

Federal Land Bank v. Miller, 730 P.2d 122, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 647 (Wyo. 1986); Newman v. American Nat'l Bank, 780 P.2d 336, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

Lyman v. Thorn, 24 Wyo. 326, 157 P. 887, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1916); Christensen v. Oedekoven, 888 P.2d 228, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 1-18-103. Right of redemption; redemption of agricultural real estate; “agricultural real estate” defined.

  1. Except as provided with respect to agricultural real estate, it is lawful for any person, his heirs, executors, administrators, assigns or guarantors whose real property has been sold by virtue of an execution, decree of foreclosure, or foreclosure by advertisement and sale within three (3) months from the date of sale, to redeem the real estate by paying to the purchaser, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, or to the sheriff or other officer who sold the property, for the benefit of the purchaser, the amount of the purchase price or the amount given or bid if purchased by the execution creditor or by the mortgagee under a mortgage, together with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of sale plus the amount of any assessments or taxes and the amount due on any prior lien which the purchaser paid after the purchase, with interest. On payment of this amount the sale and certificate granted are void and the sheriff or other officer shall issue a certificate of redemption.
  2. In the case of any mortgage upon one (1)  or more parcels of real estate any or all of which were agricultural  real estate on the date of execution of the mortgage as stated in  the mortgage, the period within which the owner, his heirs, executors,  administrators, assigns or guarantors may redeem the premises sold  is twelve (12) months from the date of the sale.
  3. The term “agricultural real estate” means any single parcel of land in excess of eighty (80) acres lying outside the exterior boundaries of any incorporated city, town or recorded subdivision or any property that is used substantially for agricultural purposes, which, if combined with other property in the mortgage that is used substantially for agricultural purposes, equals eighty (80) acres or more in aggregate. If the mortgage recites that the real estate involved is agricultural real estate, it is presumed the parties to the mortgage, their heirs, executors, administrators, assigns, guarantors or successors in interest have agreed to and are bound by all the provisions of law relative to the twelve (12) month right of redemption provided in subsection (b) of this section.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, § 3; R.S. 1899, § 3881; C.S. 1910, § 4735; C.S. 1920, § 6008; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 99; R.S. 1931, § 89-2967; C.S. 1945, § 3-4303; W.S. 1957, § 1-480; Laws 1971, ch. 79, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-103 ; Laws 1979, ch. 49, § 1; 1983, ch. 24, § 1; 1986, ch. 16, § 1; 1988, ch. 61, § 1; 2008, ch. 12, § 1; 2009, ch. 62, § 1; 2019, ch. 183, § 1.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, substituted “eighty (80)” for “twenty (20)” in (c).

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (c), inserted “twelve (12) month” preceding “right of redemption” and added “provided in subsection (b) of this section” in the second sentence.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in (a), added “and the sheriff or other officer shall issue a certificate of redemption” to the end of the last sentence; and in (c), added “single” preceding “parcel” and “or any property that is used substantially for agricultural purposes, which, if combined with other property in the mortgage that is used substantially for agricultural purposes, equals eighty (80) acres or more in aggregate” in the first sentence.

Applicability of section. —

This section deals with sales which were valid and from which redemption is sought in due course and does not purport to deal with situation where sale was under a judgment which was a nullity. Elstermeyer v. Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 256, 116 P.2d 231, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1941), reh'g denied, 57 Wyo. 421, 120 P.2d 599, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1942).

Ownership unnecessary. —

Under this section, it is not necessary that defendant in execution be owner of the property at time of redemption to enable him to redeem. Altman v. Schuneman, 39 Wyo. 414, 273 P. 173, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1929).

Character of property determines applicable statutory provisions. —

The character of the property and not its use determines the statutory provisions to be applied in ascertaining the redemption period. Evans v. Stamper, 835 P.2d 1145, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1992).

Avoidance of forfeiture. —

In contrast to the finality and harshness of forfeiture, the mortgagor in a mortgage transaction has a statutory right of redemption pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, which applies to foreclosure sales pursuant to judicial decree, execution, or power of sale. Sannerud v. Brantz, 928 P.2d 477, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1996).

Debtors failed to redeem. —

The debtors had three months to redeem the property from the credit union by paying the amount bid by the credit union at the foreclosure sale, plus interest and other charges. McCarn v. WYHY Fed. Credit Union (In re McCarn), 218 B.R. 154, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 282 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Wyo. 1998).

Right of husband transferring homestead to redeem. —

Husband transferring property in homestead to wife after levy under execution is entitled to redeem, under this section, since as head of the family he has joint possessory right in homestead with the wife. Altman v. Schuneman, 39 Wyo. 414, 273 P. 173, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1929).

Right to redeem tenancy by entireties property. —

In property held as tenants by the entireties neither spouse possesses an independent interest in the property and neither spouse has an interest to which a federal tax lien could attach. Thus, the defaulting taxpayer husband whose tenancy by the entirety property was foreclosed upon had no separate and distinct interest in the right to redeem, but the right to redeem is in the husband and wife, as tenants by the entirety. Talbot v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 969, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5939 (D. Wyo. 1994).

Remedy of mortgagor. —

Mortgagor could prosecute an action to set aside sale and enjoin issuance of certificate of sale and deed instead of bringing a “legal” action. Peterson v. Johnson, 46 Wyo. 473, 28 P.2d 487, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 1934).

No right to have deed declared mortgage. —

Mortgagors not repurchasing property within contract time are not entitled to have deed, made to avoid foreclosure, declared mortgage in action brought just before time expired. Ditto v. Bank of Gillette, 38 Wyo. 120, 264 P. 1013, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1928).

When mortgagor acquires equitable interest of senior mortgagee before it ripens into legal ownership of the property, such interest merges with the mortgagor's legal title, and the senior mortgage ceases to exist. Such is equivalent to a redemption under subsection (a), and liens of junior mortgagees are validated. Newman v. American Nat'l Bank, 780 P.2d 336, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1989).

Redeemer must pay in money or equivalent. —

The phrase “to redeem the real estate by paying to the purchaser … the amount of the purchase price” in the first sentence of subsection (a) means that the redeemer must pay in money or its equivalent. Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 816 P.2d 808, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. Sept. 25, 1991).

Creditor's retention of pledged stock not “payment.” —

A creditor's retention of stock pledged as security on a promissory note, after satisfying a judgment on the note by foreclosing on a ranch which also secured the note, did not constitute “payment” under this section. Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 816 P.2d 808, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. Sept. 25, 1991).

Redemptioner paid for unreceived, unredeemable land. —

Judgment creditors already had title to a parcel of land by virtue of a prior recorded warranty deed and their ownership interest was not affected by their execution against this land. The redemptioner, however, had paid something to redeem this land, as to which he had no right of redemption and to which the court subsequently quieted title in the judgment creditors. Under the circumstances, to refuse to permit the complaint to be amended so that the redemptioner could claim the amount paid for the parcel which he did not receive constituted an abuse of discretion. Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1988), overruled in part, Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1991).

Deficiency judgment allowed. —

Deficiency judgments after foreclosure by advertisement and sale, on deeds of trust or purchase money mortgages, are allowed when the foreclosure and sale was proper and equitable. Fitch v. Buffalo Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 P.2d 1309, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1988).

Effect of redemption on mortgage lien. —

After mortgagors redeemed the property after the mortgagee had foreclosed upon its mortgage, the mortgagors acquired the mortgagee's mortgage interest. At that point, the lien and the title to the property merged, and the mortgage ceased to exist. First Southwestern Fin. Servs. v. Laird, 882 P.2d 1211, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1994).

Effect of redemption on pre-foreclosure quitclaim deed. —

Where father quitclaimed property to three-year old son that was subsequently foreclosed upon by the IRS, monies supplied by the son's uncle to the father for redemption in exchange for father's quitclaim deed to uncle gave the uncle an equitable lien upon the property, but title to the property reverted to the property's presale status and thus to the son. Jessen v. Jessen, 2002 WY 33, 41 P.3d 543, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 2002), reh'g denied, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. Apr. 9, 2002).

Redemption period. —

Because property sold by execution was not mortgaged, the redemption period under this section and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-18-102 was three months, regardless of whether the property was agricultural. Cook v. Swires, 2009 WY 21, 202 P.3d 397, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2009).

Applied in

Gladstone Hotel, Inc. v. Smith, 487 P.2d 329, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 231 (Wyo. 1971); Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1997); McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 2003 WY 2, 60 P.3d 1277, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2003).

Quoted in

Federal Land Bank v. Miller, 730 P.2d 122, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 647 (Wyo. 1986).

Stated in

Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (1950).

Cited in

Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 123 P. 925, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 41 , 40 L.R.A. (n.s.) 785 (1912); Lyman v. Thorn, 24 Wyo. 326, 157 P. 887, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1916); In re Dickinson, 9 F. Supp. 227, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1197 (D. Wyo. 1934); Marple v. Wyoming Prod. Credit Ass'n, 750 P.2d 1315, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1988); Cliff & Co. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1989); Gantz v. Colonial Cent. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. (In re Gantz), 162 B.R. 890, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 316 (D. Wyo. 1994).

Law reviews. —

See note, “Effect of Satisfying a Junior Lien on Statutory Right of Redemption,” 15 Wyo. L.J. 223.

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

For case note, “Real Estate — The Wyoming Installment Land Contract: A Mortgage in Sheep's Clothing? or What You See Isn't What You Get. Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Belgrade, 816 P.2d 868, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 1991),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 309 (1993).

For case note, “Real Property—Intent of the Parties—The Focal Point of Interpreting the Installment Land Contract. McKone v. Guertzgen, 811 P.2d 728, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1991),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 329 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Redemption of client's property sold at execution or judicial sale to attorney, 20 ALR2d 1280.

Sufficiency of tender of payment to effect defaulting vendee's redemption of rights in land purchased, 37 ALR4th 286.

Constitutionality, construction and application of statute as to effect of taking appeal, or staying execution, on right to redeem from execution or judicial sale, 44 ALR4th 1229.

Mortgages: effect on subordinate lien of redemption by owner or assignee from sale under prior lien, 56 ALR4th 703.

§ 1-18-104. Redemption by judgment creditors and others; manner prescribed; subsequent redemptions; possession, rents and profits, common carriers excepted.

  1. If no redemption is made within the redemption  period provided in W.S. 1-18-103 , any judgment creditor of the person whose real estate  has been sold, or any grantee or mortgagee of the real estate or person  holding a lien on the real estate sold is entitled to redeem the same  on or before the thirtieth day after the expiration of the applicable  redemption period provided in W.S. 1-18-103 , by complying with subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
  2. The redemptioner shall pay to the purchaser  or to the officer conducting the sale, either an amount agreed upon  by the purchaser and the redemptioner, or the amount bid with interest  at ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of sale, and the amount  of any assessments or taxes and the amount due on any prior lien which  the purchaser may have paid after the purchase, with interest. If  the purchaser also has a lien prior to that of the redemptioner, the  redemptioner shall also pay the amount of the lien with interest.
  3. The redemptioner must produce for the  purchaser from whom redemption is sought or for the officer who conducted  the sale:
    1. A copy of the judgment under which the  right of redemption is claimed, duly certified by the clerk of the  court in which the judgment was entered, or if redemption is sought  under a mortgage or other lien, a copy of the mortgage or other lien  certified by the clerk of the county; or
    2. A copy of any assignment necessary to  establish the claim; and
    3. An affidavit by himself or his agent showing  the amount actually unpaid and due on the lien.
  4. If the property is redeemed, another redemptioner  may within thirty (30) days from the last redemption again redeem  from the last redemptioner by paying the amount of the last redemption  together with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum from the date  thereof, and the amount of any assessment or taxes which the last  redemptioner may have paid and the amount of any lien held by the  last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property may  again, and as often as any redemptioner desires, be redeemed from  any previous redemption within thirty (30) days from the last redemption.  If no redemption is made within thirty (30) days after the applicable  redemption period provided in W.S. 1-18-103 , the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a sheriff’s  deed to the property, or if so redeemed, whenever thirty (30) days  has elapsed and no other redemption has been made, the last redemptioner  or his assignee is entitled to a sheriff’s deed.
  5. The execution debtor in case of a sale  on execution, and the mortgagor or owner in case of a mortgage foreclosure,  is entitled to possession of the lands sold and to the rents and profits  for a period of three (3) months after the sale unless the property  is agricultural property in which case the entitlement to possession  of the lands sold and to the rents and profits shall be for a period  of twelve (12) months after the sale. At the expiration of three (3)  months from sale of nonagricultural land and twelve (12) months from  sale of agricultural land, the purchaser is entitled to possession  and to the rents and profits of the lands until redemption is made  from him, and each redemptioner until another redemption is made is  likewise entitled to possession and to the rents and profits.
  6. The parties to a mortgage may provide  that the mortgagee is entitled to a receiver or to the rents and profits  upon default, or upon the date of sale or at any time agreed upon.  A court may appoint a receiver or award the rents and profits to the  person entitled thereto for the prevention of waste, or the preservation  of the property, or for any equitable cause.
  7. This section does not apply when real  and personal property of a common carrier is sold in its entirety  at a judicial sale pursuant to an order of court. In such case, property  may be sold without right of redemption unless otherwise directed  by the order of sale.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, § 4; R.S. 1899, § 3882; C.S. 1910, § 4736; C.S. 1920, § 6009; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 100; R.S. 1931, § 89-2968; C.S. 1945, § 3-4304; W.S. 1957, § 1-481; Laws 1961, ch. 181, § 1; 1963, ch. 44, §§ 1, 2; 1971, ch. 79, § 3; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-104 ; 2011, ch. 173, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to contents of deed, see § 1-18-109 .

As to effect of deed, see § 1-18-110 .

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in (b), inserted “either an amount agreed upon by the purchaser and the redemptioner, or”; and in (e), inserted “unless the property is agricultural property in which case the entitlement to possession of the lands sold and to the rents and profits shall be for a period of twelve (12) months after the sale” and “of nonagricultural land and twelve (12) months from sale of agricultural land.”

Only judgment creditor of partnership redeems property. —

When property which is held in a partnership's name is sold at a foreclosure sale, the partnership, not an individual partner, is the “person whose real estate has been sold.” Under the plain language of this section, only a judgment creditor of the partnership can redeem the property. Christensen v. Oedekoven, 888 P.2d 228, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1995).

Rights of mortgagee. —

Although an individual purchases a mortgage because he thinks it will give him a right to be in the building as mortgagee, he has no such right. The mortgage simply creates a lien on the land, and title to the mortgaged property does not pass to him as mortgagee even on default, but passes only on sale by foreclosure. International Distress Signals v. McDowell, 519 P.2d 224, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1974).

Where the mortgage provision, entitling the mortgagee to rents and profits when the right of foreclosure accrued, was not self-executing, the mortgagee's right to receive rents and profits from the mortgaged property prior to taking possession would not accrue until it took some affirmative action to exercise that right. Landen v. Production Credit Ass'n, 737 P.2d 1325, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo. 1987).

Time for issuing sheriff's deed. —

Under this section, creditors may redeem after the expiration of six (now three) months and at any time before the expiration of nine months from the date of the sale (now 30 days after applicable redemption period), and this section contemplates that a sheriff's deed may be issued after the expiration of nine months (now 30 days after applicable redemption period). Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950).

Right of purchaser to maintain action for unlawful detainer. —

Under this section, which provides that the purchaser is entitled to possession after the expiration of six (now three) months from the sale, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale may maintain an action of unlawful detainer after the expiration of the six (now three) months period, and the fact that a sheriff's deed for the premises was prematurely issued and error, if any, in that the language of the certificate of sale differs from the language of § 1-18-102 , are immaterial. Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950).

Action to quiet title. —

A husband bought property for a homestead and he and his wife mortgaged it for purchase money, and upon this mortgage being foreclosed and property sold, they borrowed money from grantor to redeem, giving as security a mortgage wherein the wife alone expressly waived her homestead rights, but property was later again sold at foreclosure sale under this mortgage and a certificate of sale issued, held, that last-mentioned purchaser acquired lien, equal to that of first mortgage and superior to homestead rights of the wife, and wife, not having paid or offered to pay at least amount necessary to satisfy the prior lien could not prevail in suit to quiet her title as against such purchaser. Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 123 P. 925, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 1912).

Character of property determines applicable statutory provisions. —

The character of the property and not its use determines the statutory provisions to be applied in ascertaining the redemption period. Evans v. Stamper, 835 P.2d 1145, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1992).

Applied in

Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1997); McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 2003 WY 2, 60 P.3d 1277, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2003).

Quoted in

Federal Land Bank v. Miller, 730 P.2d 122, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 647 (Wyo. 1986); Newman v. American Nat'l Bank, 780 P.2d 336, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

Lyman v. Thorn, 24 Wyo. 326, 157 P. 887, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1916); In re Wogstad, 14 F. Supp. 72, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1263 (D. Wyo. 1936); Marple v. Wyoming Prod. Credit Ass'n, 750 P.2d 1315, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1988).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What judgment creditor other than execution sale creditor may redeem from execution sale, 58 ALR2d 467.

Mortgages: effect on subordinate lien of redemption by owner or assignee from sale under prior lien, 56 ALR4th 703.

§ 1-18-105. Redemption of whole or portion permitted.

Any person entitled may redeem the whole or any part or portion of lands previously sold upon execution or by foreclosure, but such redemption must be made in the distinct quantities or parcels in which they were sold.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, § 6; R.S. 1899, § 3885; C.S. 1910, § 4739; C.S. 1920, § 6012; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 101; R.S. 1931, § 89-2969; C.S. 1945, § 3-4305; W.S. 1957, § 1-482; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-105 .

§ 1-18-106. Certificate of redemption; recordation; fee.

In all cases of redemption of lands from sale under any judicial process, or by virtue of any mortgage foreclosure, the purchaser or other person from whom the redemption is made shall certify the redemption in writing and record the certificate in the recorder’s office of the proper county as other writings affecting the titles to real estate are filed and recorded. The recording fee shall be paid by the party redeeming.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, § 13; R.S. 1899, § 3890; C.S. 1910, § 4744; C.S. 1920, § 6017; R.S. 1931, § 89-2975; C.S. 1945, § 3-4310; W.S. 1957, § 1-483; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-106 .

§ 1-18-107. Commission of officers.

No commission upon the amount of the redemption money paid shall be allowed to the officer receiving the money, but the usual commission shall be allowed the officer selling the premises, on the excess made over and above the amount of the redemption money and interest.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, § 7; R.S. 1899, § 3886; C.S. 1910, § 4740; C.S. 1920, § 6013; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 102; R.S. 1931, § 89-2970; C.S. 1945, § 3-4306; W.S. 1957, § 1-484; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-107 .

§ 1-18-108. Assignment of certificate of purchase.

Every certificate given by any officer to any purchaser under W.S. 1-18-101 through 1-18-110 , is assignable by endorsement under the hand of the purchaser, his heirs, executor, administrator or assignee. Every person to whom the certificate is assigned is entitled to the same benefits therefrom in every respect that the person named would have been if the certificate had not been assigned, including a deed if the property is not redeemed as provided by law.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, § 8; R.S. 1899, § 3887; C.S. 1910, § 4741; C.S. 1920, § 6014; R.S. 1931, § 89-2971; C.S. 1945, § 3-4307; W.S. 1957, § 1-485; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-108 .

Quoted in

Newman v. American Nat'l Bank, 780 P.2d 336, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 123 P. 925, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 41 , 40 L.R.A. (n.s.) 785 (1912).

§ 1-18-109. Contents of deed; form.

The deed to be executed by the officer to the purchaser under W.S. 1-18-101 through 1-18-110 shall contain a statement of the judgment upon which the lands described were sold, and the date of the execution in the case of an execution sale; a statement of the mortgage, with its date and place of record, the parties thereto, and a statement of the decree in case of foreclosure by suit; or a statement of the time and place of sale in the case of a foreclosure by advertisement and sale. The deed shall also contain a recital showing the issuance of a certificate of purchase and any assignment of the certificate that has been made. The deed shall also contain substantially the following words:

Now, therefore, know all men by this deed, that I, . . . . . , of the county of . . . . . in consideration of the premises, have granted and sold and do hereby convey to . . . . . , his heirs and assigns, the following described tract of land, . . . . . , to have and to hold the described premises with all appurtenances to the said . . . . . , his heirs and assigns forever.

Witness my hand and seal this . . . . . day of . . . . . , A.D. . . . . .

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, §§ 9, 10; R.S. 1899, § 3888; C.S. 1910, § 4742; C.S. 1920, § 6015; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 103; R.S. 1931, § 89-2972; C.S. 1945, § 3-4308; W.S. 1957, § 1-486; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-109.

Cross references. —

For provision that successor in office may execute deed, see § 1-17-329 .

Cited in

Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 123 P. 925, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 41 , 40 L.R.A. (n.s.) 785 (1912).

§ 1-18-110. Effect of deed.

Any deed so executed is prima facie evidence that the provisions of law in relation to sale of real property upon execution, or upon foreclosure, were complied with. The deed conveys to the grantee all the title, estate and interest of defendant in the execution, or the mortgagor or owner, in the lands thereby conveyed, but the deed shall not be construed to contain any covenant upon the part of the officer executing the same.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 95, § 11; R.S. 1899, § 3889; C.S. 1910, § 4743; C.S. 1920, § 6016; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 104; R.S. 1931, § 89-2974; C.S. 1945, § 3-4309; W.S. 1957, § 1-487; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-110.

Cross references. —

For another provision concerning effect of deed, see § 1-17-324 .

Cited in

In re McCarn, 218 B.R. 154, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 282 (10th Cir. 1998).

§ 1-18-111. Sale on foreclosure of mortgage; generally.

  1. When a mortgage is foreclosed a sale of the premises shall be ordered. The decree directing the sale is sufficient warrant for the sheriff or other officer to proceed to advertise and conduct the sale. An order of sale issued by the clerk of court or an appraisement of the real property to be sold is not necessary. When the premises to be sold are in one (1) or more tracts, the court may direct the officer who makes the sale to subdivide and sell the same in parcels, or to sell any one (1) of the tracts as a whole.
  2. Upon the sale of the premises, a purchaser shall have a limited right of entry to ensure the property does not significantly deteriorate during the full redemption period. As used in this subsection, “limited right of entry” means entrance into the premises which is not occupied by a legal inhabitant.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 323; R.S. 1887, § 2663; R.S. 1899, § 3757; C.S. 1910, § 4612; C.S. 1920, § 5883; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 91; R.S. 1931, § 89-2209; C.S. 1945, § 3-3507; W.S. 1957, § 1-488; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-111; 2019, ch. 183, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, designated former undesignated paragraph as present (a); and added (b).

Nature of judgment. —

Whereby contract of sale of land and buyers' deed back to seller, absolute title remained in seller, the latter, foreclosing his lien against the buyers in default, is not entitled to a personal or deficiency judgment. Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1916).

Quoted in

Federal Land Bank v. Miller, 730 P.2d 122, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 647 (Wyo. 1986).

§ 1-18-112. Sale on foreclosure of mortgage; property in more than single county.

When the mortgaged property is situated in more than one (1) county, the court may order the sheriff or other officer of each to make the sale of the property in his county, or may direct one (1) officer to sell the whole. The court shall direct whether publication of the sale shall be made in all the counties or in one (1) county only.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 324; R.S. 1887, § 2664; R.S. 1899, § 3758; C.S. 1910, § 4613; C.S. 1920, § 5884; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 92; R.S. 1931, § 89-2210; C.S. 1945, § 3-3508; W.S. 1957, § 1-489; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-19-112.

Foreclosure as single unit. —

Directing foreclosure sale as single unit of noncontiguous properties in two counties, where mortgages were of same date securing same indebtedness, was not “irregularity in obtaining judgment” for which judgment might be vacated after term. Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1937).

§ 1-18-113. Payment of proceeds.

After any sale of real estate as provided in this chapter, proceeds from the sale shall be paid over by the officer or other person making the sale in accordance with W.S. 34-4-113 .

History. Laws 2005, ch. 228, § 1.

Applicability. —

Laws 2005, ch. 228, § 3, makes the act applicable to real estate mortgage foreclosures and execution sales commenced on or after July 1, 2005.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2005, ch. 228, § 4, makes the act effective July 1, 2005.

§ 1-18-114. Omitted parties; definitions.

  1. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Omitted party” means any person who:
      1. Subsequent to the recording of a mortgage,  deed of trust or other lien instrument pursuant to which a foreclosure  sale has been conducted, has either acquired a record interest in  the property subject to a mortgage foreclosure, deed of trust or execution  sale, or has obtained a valid possessory interest and is in actual  possession of the property; and
      2. Is not included as a party defendant in  a judicial foreclosure action or, if included, is entitled to notice,  but was not served with process, or was not mailed notice of the execution  sale or is not notified pursuant to W.S. 34-4-104 of a mortgage foreclosure sale.
    2. “Interested person” means any holder of  a certificate of purchase or certificate of redemption issued pursuant  to W.S. 1-18-102 and 1-18-106 or any owner of the property by virtue of a sheriff’s  or public trustee’s deed or person claiming through such owner.
  2. The interest of an omitted party in the  property which is the subject of a mortgage foreclosure, execution  or sheriff’s or trustee’s sale may be terminated in a civil action  commenced by any interested person if the omitted party is afforded  rights of redemption upon terms as the district court for the district  in which the property is located may deem just under the circumstances,  which terms shall not, however, be more favorable than the person’s  statutory rights had the person been provided notice of the sale.
  3. For purposes of this section, the mortgage,  judgment or other lien which is the subject of the sale shall not  be extinguished by merger with the title to the property acquired  upon issuance and delivery of the sheriff’s deed until the interest  of any omitted party has been terminated as provided in subsection  (b) of this section or by operation of law.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 228, § 1.

Applicability. —

Laws 2005, ch. 228, § 3, makes the act applicable to real estate mortgage foreclosures and execution sales commenced on or after July 1, 2005.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2005, ch. 228, § 4, makes the act effective July 1, 2005.

§ 1-18-115. Rescission of foreclosure sale.

  1. A judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure  sale may be rescinded in accordance with this section at any time  after the sale but before the sheriff’s deed has been recorded.
  2. If the purchaser at the foreclosure sale  was the foreclosing mortgagee, then the foreclosing mortgagee may  rescind the sale for any reason by executing and recording a notice  of foreclosure sale rescission in the office of the county clerk of  the county where the real estate is located.
  3. If the purchaser at the foreclosure sale  was not the foreclosing mortgagee, then the foreclosing mortgagee  and the certificate holder may agree to rescind the foreclosure sale  for any reason. In order to rescind such a foreclosure sale, the foreclosing  mortgagee shall refund to the certificate holder either an amount  agreed upon by the foreclosing mortgagee and the certificate holder,  or the foreclosure sale bid amount plus ten percent (10%) interest  per annum, calculated daily. In addition, both the foreclosing mortgagee  and the certificate holder shall execute a notice of foreclosure sale  rescission which shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk  of the county where the real estate is located.
  4. If the purchaser at the foreclosure sale  was not the foreclosing mortgagee, and the certificate holder will  not agree to rescind the foreclosure sale, then the foreclosing mortgagee  may still rescind the sale if the statutory requirements for the foreclosure  sale were not fulfilled or if the foreclosure sale did not comply  with applicable federal or state law. In order to rescind such a foreclosure  sale, the foreclosing mortgagee shall refund to the certificate holder  the purchase price, plus ten percent (10%) interest per annum, calculated  daily, and the foreclosing mortgagee shall execute and record a notice  of foreclosure sale rescission in the office of the county clerk of  the county where the real estate is located which shall recite that  the foreclosure sale is being rescinded pursuant to this subsection.  The refund of the certificate holder’s bid amount, plus interest,  shall be the certificate holder’s only remedy notwithstanding any  other provision of law.
  5. Upon recording a notice of foreclosure  sale rescission:
    1. The mortgage and power of sale which are  the subject of the rescinded sale are revived and the mortgage may  be properly foreclosed in a subsequent foreclosure sale in compliance  with applicable law, and all junior liens and rights of junior lienholders  are revived with the same lien priority as if no foreclosure sale  had taken place;
    2. The certificate of sale is rendered null  and void as if no foreclosure sale had taken place; and
    3. The mortgagor’s indebtedness to the foreclosing  mortgagee and all evidence thereof are revived as of the date of the  foreclosure sale and as if no certificate of sale had been issued,  or as otherwise agreed to by the mortgagor and mortgagee.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 173, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2011, ch. 173, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

Chapter 19 Sale of Corporate Stock Under Execution or Attachment

Cross references. —

As to attachment or levy upon securities, see § 34.1-9-203.

Applied in

In re Anselmi, 52 B.R. 479, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 6011 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment §§ 116 to 118.

33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 37.

§ 1-19-101. Right to levy and sale.

Rights and shares of stock in any corporation owned or held by any defendant in execution or attachment, or in trust for such person, may be levied upon under any execution or writ of attachment, and may be sold under any execution in the manner provided.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 80, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 2772; R.S. 1899, § 3893; C.S. 1910, § 4747; C.S. 1920, § 6020; R.S. 1931, § 89-2976; C.S. 1945, § 3-4401; W.S. 1957, § 1-490; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-20-101 .

Pleadings. —

Section 1-19-103 provides that a levy upon the interest of the legal or equitable owner of corporate stock shall be made in a particular way. In action by assignee of a certificate of stock to compel the corporation to make the proper transfer on its books, the answer alleged that, on a certain date, one B. obtained judgment against husband of assignor, “who held said certificate of stock in trust for and to the use of her said husband, and on the 19th day of December, 1887, execution was issued on said judgment, and on the 6th day of February, 1888, the sheriff of Laramie county, Wyoming territory, levied said execution upon said shares of stock as the property of said” husband, and defendant had no notice of assignment to plaintiff, held, that answer was demurrable (now subject to motion), in that it did not allege that judgment debtor was equitable owner of the stock at the date of the levy, nor that sheriff of Laramie county was proper officer to execute writ nor how levy was made. Wyoming Fair Ass'n v. Talbott, 3 Wyo. 244, 21 P. 700, 1889 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1889).

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

§ 1-19-102. Duty to furnish statement of defendant's rights or shares.

When any execution or writ of attachment is issued against the owner of any rights or shares in any corporation or for whom any rights or shares are held by any person other than the defendant, it is the duty of any officer of the corporation, or if there is no officer in the state, then the resident manager or agent, upon the request of the officer having the execution or writ of attachment, to furnish him a certificate under his hand stating the number of rights or shares which the defendant holds, or which are held in trust for defendant, or for his use, in the corporation.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 80, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 2773; R.S. 1899, § 3894; C.S. 1910, § 4748; C.S. 1920, § 6021; R.S. 1931, § 89-2977; C.S. 1945, § 3-4402; W.S. 1957, § 1-491; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-20-102 .

Cited in

Wyoming Fair Ass'n v. Talbott, 3 Wyo. 244, 21 P. 700, 1889 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (1889).

§ 1-19-103. Manner of making levy.

To levy execution or attachment on rights or shares in a corporation, the officer making the levy shall leave a true copy of the writ, with any officer of the corporation and if there is no officer, then with the resident manager or agent thereof, together with the officer’s certificate stating that he levies upon and takes in execution or attachment the rights or shares to satisfy the writ.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 80, § 3; R.S. 1887, § 2774; R.S. 1899, § 3895; C.S. 1910, § 4749; C.S. 1920, § 6022; R.S. 1931, § 89-2978; C.S. 1945, § 3-4403; W.S. 1957, § 1-492; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-20-103 .

Security interest in corporate stock. —

Security interest in corporate stock is perfected, pursuant to this section, where service of a writ of execution is made on the corporation's registered agent because a corporate officer is not present when service is attempted. However, a security interest in corporate stock is not perfected, pursuant to this section, where service of a writ of execution is made on a law partner of the corporation's registered agent. Patel v. CWCapital Asset Mgmt., LLC, 2010 WY 147, 242 P.3d 1015, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 2010).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-19-104. Sale of rights or shares.

Rights or shares in any corporation levied upon by writ of attachment shall be held subject to the judgment rendered in the action in which the writ is issued. Whenever execution is levied upon such rights or shares, they shall be sold as personal property as provided by law, at the front door of the courthouse in the county in which the levy is made.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 80, § 4; R.S. 1887, § 2775; R.S. 1899, § 3896; C.S. 1910, § 4750; C.S. 1920, § 6023; R.S. 1931, § 89-2979; C.S. 1945, § 3-4404; W.S. 1957, § 1-493; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-20-104 .

Cross references. —

As to sale of personal property, see § 1-17-312 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sheriff's sale — modern cases, 5 ALR4th 794.

§ 1-19-105. Certificate of sale; transfer on corporate books.

Every officer who sells any rights or shares of stock in any corporation under an execution shall execute to the purchaser a certificate in writing reciting the sale and payment of the consideration, and conveying to the purchaser the rights and shares. The officer shall also leave with an officer of the corporation or the resident manager or agent, a true copy of the certificate. The person having charge of the books of the corporation shall make entries in the books as necessary to vest the legal and equitable title to the rights or shares in the purchaser.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 80, § 5; R.S. 1887, § 2776; R.S. 1899, § 3897; C.S. 1910, § 4751; C.S. 1920, § 6024; R.S. 1931, § 89-2980; C.S. 1945, § 3-4405; W.S. 1957, § 1-494; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-20-105 .

§ 1-19-106. Rights and privileges of purchasers.

A purchaser of rights or shares in a corporation at a sale made by an officer, upon receiving a certificate of the sale as provided in W.S. 1-19-105 is deemed to be the legal and equitable owner of the rights or shares and is entitled to all dividends and to the same rights and privileges as a shareholder of the corporation as was the defendant in execution, even though the rights and shares of stock may not have been transferred upon the books of the company.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 80, § 6; R.S. 1887, § 2777; R.S. 1899, § 3898; C.S. 1910, § 4752; C.S. 1920, § 6025; R.S. 1931, § 89-2981; C.S. 1945, § 3-4406; W.S. 1957, § 1-495; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-20-106 .

§ 1-19-107. Effect of levy.

Rights and shares of stock in a corporation levied upon as provided by W.S. 1-19-101 through 1-19-107 shall be held and bound from the time of the levy.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 80, § 7; R.S. 1887, § 2778; R.S. 1899, § 3899; C.S. 1910, § 4753; C.S. 1920, § 6026; R.S. 1931, § 89-2982; C.S. 1945, § 3-4407; W.S. 1957, § 1-496; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-20-107 .

Cited in

Patel v. Cwcapital Asset Mgmt., Llc, 2010 WY 147, 242 P.3d 1015, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Nov. 16, 2010).

§ 1-19-108. Liability of shares pledged or used as collateral.

When shares of any corporation are pledged in good faith, or pledged as collateral security for any loan or debt, and the certificate is delivered upon the pledge or debt, the shares are not liable to be taken on execution against the pledgor except for the excess of their value over the sum for which they have been pledged.

History. Laws 1884, ch. 28, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 2779; R.S. 1899, § 3900; C.S. 1910, § 4754; C.S. 1920, § 6027; R.S. 1931, § 89-2983; C.S. 1945, § 3-4408; W.S. 1957, § 1-497; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-20-108 .

Chapter 20 Property Exempt from Execution or Attachment

Cross references. —

As to attachment generally, see chapter 15 of this title.

As to enforcement of judgments generally, see chapter 17 of this title.

As to enforcement of judgments in justice of the peace courts, see §§ 1-21-501 to 1-21-603 .

For provision specifying when proceeds of wrongful death judgment may not be used to pay debts of decedent, see § 1-38-102 .

As to homestead rights in connection with administration of estates, see §§ 2-6-104 to 2-6-109 .

As to earnings of inmates in work release program not being subject to garnishment, see § 7-16-308 .

As to exemption of fire department pension and retirement benefits, see § 15-5-209 .

As to exemption of pay for performance of military duty, see § 19-9-401 .

As to exemption of separate property of one spouse for debts of the other, see § 20-1-201 .

For provision that married person sued alone may claim benefit of all exemptions for heads of families, see § 20-1-202 .

As to exemption of worker's compensation awards, see § 27-14-702 .

As to release or waiver of homestead rights generally, see §§ 34-2-107 and 34-2-121 .

As to exemption of cemetery funds, see § 35-8-103 .

As to restrictions on sale of homestead for delinquent taxes, see § 39-13-108 .

For limitation on garnishment in consumer credit cases, see § 40-14-505 .

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

9A Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy §§ 1298, 1299; 31 Am. Jur. 2d Exemptions §§ 89-197, 199-267, 269-290; 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homestead § 1 et seq.

Retirement or pension proceeds or annuity payments under group insurance as subject to attachment or garnishment, 28 ALR2d 1213.

Endowment policy as life insurance within exemption law, 30 ALR2d 751.

Exemption of proceeds of National Service Life Insurance from claims of creditors, 54 ALR2d 1335.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorney's fees and cost incurred in connection therewith, against homestead exemption, 54 ALR2d 1422.

Wife as head of family within homestead or other property exemption provision, 67 ALR2d 779.

Family allowance from decedent's estate as exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution and foreclosure, 27 ALR3d 863.

Validity, construction, and effect of statutory exemptions of proceeds of workers' compensation awards, 48 ALR5th 473.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 52 ALR5th 221.

Individual retirement accounts as exempt property in bankruptcy, 133 ALR Fed 1.

40 C.J.S. Homesteads § 1 et seq.

§ 1-20-101. Homestead exemption; right and amount.

Every resident of the state is entitled to a homestead not exceeding twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) in value, exempt from execution and attachment arising from any debt, contract or civil obligation entered into or incurred.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 432; R.S. 1887, § 2780; R.S. 1899, § 3901; Laws 1909, ch. 102, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 4755; Laws 1915, ch. 104, § 2; C.S. 1920, § 6028; R.S. 1931, § 89-2984; C.S. 1945, § 3-4501; Laws 1951, ch. 11, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-498; Laws 1975, ch. 60, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-21-101 ; Laws 1983, ch. 41, § 1; 2012, ch. 69, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to elective share, see § 2-5-101 et seq.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00)” for “ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00).”

Waiver requirements include all homestead property, and are not limited to real property. Geist v. Converse County Bank, 79 B.R. 939, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10402 (D. Wyo. 1987).

Purchase money security interests given priority. —

Purchase money security interests in personal property, as well as real property, have priority over a debtor's homestead exemption. Geist v. Converse County Bank, 79 B.R. 939, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10402 (D. Wyo. 1987).

No attachment of nonpurchase-money lien absent waiver. —

A consensual, but nonpurchase money, lien does not attach to the first $10,000 in value of a debtor's homestead unless it is accompanied by an informed, voluntary and specific waiver of the homestead exemption. In re VanGorp, 128 B.R. 579, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 881 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1991).

Amount of homestead exempted from execution. —

Statutes restricting alienation or encumbrance of homestead refer to premises exempt as such from execution, and within operation of such statutes, the homestead cannot consist of more land than will amount in value to $1,500 (now $10,000). Jones v. Losekamp, 19 Wyo. 83, 114 P. 673, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1911).

Occupancy and not title is essential consideration in determining whether the head of a family has a homestead. Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1962).

Occupancy is required. —

The exemption failed under this section where debtor occupied a mobile home on a parcel of land contiguous to the claimed parcels because the debtor must occupy the homestead at the time the bankruptcy case is filed and contiguousness does not equate with occupancy. In re Welty, 217 B.R. 907, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 92 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1998).

It is immaterial in whom legal title is vested as long as the property is the actual home of the family. Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1962).

And immaterial how it becomes vested. —

Since it does not matter in whom the legal title is vested, likewise it does not matter how the legal title becomes vested in the person or persons who may be entitled to receive it. Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1962).

Homestead right can be acquired upon undivided interest in land. Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1962).

Therefore, it will attach to real estate held by entirety and occupied as residence. —

Since it must be regarded as the settled law of Wyoming, under the rule of stare decisis, that a homestead right can be acquired upon an undivided interest in land and that it is immaterial in whom the legal title is vested, it necessarily follows that the right of homestead will attach to real estate held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety and occupied by them as a residence. Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1962).

Loss of right where neither landowner nor family head. —

Under this section, a husband who, with his family, lives on wife's land loses his homestead right therein by permitting his wife and family to separate from him, followed by a divorce in her favor, though he continues to occupy the land, since he is neither owner of the land nor head of a family. In re Arp v. Jacobs, 3 Wyo. 489, 27 P. 800, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1891).

Right of exemption in wife's separate property. —

Under § 20-1-202 , a married woman against whom personal judgment was rendered though judgment was also against her husband, is entitled to homestead exemption in her separate property, on which she lived with her husband though she was not head of a family, and as such entitled to the exemption under this section. Bachmann v. Hurtt, 26 Wyo. 332, 184 P. 709, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1919).

Conveyed property not within bankruptcy estate. —

Denial of a debtor's homestead exemption claim under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522 was affirmed because property that had been conveyed to her husband prior to her bankruptcy filing was not within the debtor's bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C.S. § 541 since Wyo. Const. Art. 19, § 9 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-20-101 do not create a legal or equitable interest in the property sufficient to independently support a bankruptcy exemption, and because neither the debtor nor her husband owned or were entitled to own the claimed homestead property when the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-20-102(a) did not allow a homestead exemption for the property. Hart v. Crawford (In re Hart), 332 B.R. 439, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23595 (D. Wyo. 2005).

Conveyance of homestead property not void as to excess. —

A deed by the owner, without the consent of his or her spouse, conveying property embracing a homestead, but of a value in excess of $4,000 (now $10,000), is not void as to the excess. Stolldorf v. Stolldorf, 384 P.2d 969, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1963).

Transfer of certificate of purchase of homestead property goes only to question as to proper or necessary party to motion by owner for share of proceeds. Altman v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 36 Wyo. 290, 254 P. 691, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1927).

Signature of wife required. —

A mortgage without wife's signature on a partner's homestead for partnership debt and executed by the partnership is void as to the wife. State Bank v. Bagley Bros., 44 Wyo. 244, 11 P.2d 572, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 44 Wyo. 456, 13 P.2d 564, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1932).

Determining claim to proceeds. —

Court could determine claim to proceeds of homestead after expiration of term at which sale was confirmed. Altman v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 36 Wyo. 290, 254 P. 691, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1927).

Applied in

In re Estate of Edelman, 68 Wyo. 30, 228 P.2d 408, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (1951).

Quoted in

In re Johnson, 184 B.R. 141, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 973 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1995); Zubrod v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 329 F.3d 1195, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10711 (10th Cir. 2003).

Stated in

In re Anselmi, 52 B.R. 479, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 6011 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Towne v. Rumsey, 5 Wyo. 11, 35 P. 1025, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1894); Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 123 P. 925, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 41 , 40 L.R.A. (n.s.) 785 (1912); Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo. 1, 215 P. 485, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 30 , 29 A.L.R. 1371 (1923); In re Estate of Hite, 829 P.2d 1173, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1992); In re Welty, 217 B.R. 907, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 92 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1998); Kwiecinski v. Community First Nat'l Bank of Powell, 245 B.R. 672, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 221 (10th Cir. 2000); Zubrod v. Duncan, , 271 B.R. 196, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 4 (10th Cir. 2002); McManaman v. McManaman, 2002 WY 128, 53 P.3d 103, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2002); Duncan v. Zubrod (In re Duncan), 294 B.R. 339, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 594 (10th Cir. 2003).

Law reviews. —

For note on homestead exemption in Wyoming, see 16 Wyo. L.J. 81 (1961).

See note, “Wambeke v. Hopkin — A New Lesson in Wyoming Property Rights,” 18 Wyo. L.J. 34 (1963).

See note, “Should Marital Rights Be Protected by Statute?,” 19 Wyo. L.J. 14 (1964).

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Lien of judgment on excess value of homestead, 41 ALR4th 292.

Forfeiture of homestead based on criminal activity conducted on premises—state cases, 16 ALR5th 855.

§ 1-20-102. Homestead exemption; when operative.

  1. The homestead is only exempt as provided  in W.S. 1-20-101 while occupied as such by the owner or the person entitled  thereto, or his or her family.
  2. When two (2) or more persons jointly own  and occupy the same residence, each shall be entitled to the homestead  exemption.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 433; R.S. 1887, § 2781; R.S. 1899, § 3902; Laws 1909, ch. 102, § 2; C.S. 1910, § 4756; Laws 1915, ch. 104, § 3; C.S. 1920, § 6029; R.S. 1931, § 89-2985; C.S. 1945, § 3-4502; W.S. 1957, § 1-499; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-21-102 ; Laws 1983, ch. 41, § 1.

In general. —

Decedent's homestead is exempt from creditor's claims only while occupied by claimant or his or her family. Dobler v. Clark, 42 Wyo. 160, 292 P. 246, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1925).

Occupied. —

Although the debtors' “farmstead” took up only two acres of the twenty-acre tract, the court was satisfied that they “occupied” the other eighteen within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section, and there is no reason to conclude that they did not “occupy” the remaining sixty acres in the same sense. Kwiecinski v. Community First Nat'l Bank of Powell (In re Kwiecinski), 245 B.R. 672, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 221 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000).

Exemption of unoccupied lands cannot be claimed long after sale of the premises under a mortgage foreclosure, as against grantees. Harney v. Montgomery, 29 Wyo. 362, 213 P. 378, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1923).

Disposition on divorce. —

There being no specific statutory provisions for the disposition of a homestead on divorce, the provisions of § 20-2-114 authorizing court to make just and equitable disposition of the property of parties, control. Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo. 1, 215 P. 485, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1923).

Validity of tax sale. —

Where plaintiff relied on tax deed in an action to quiet title, it was not sufficient to prove validity of the tax sale. Davis v. Minnesota Baptist Convention, 45 Wyo. 148, 16 P.2d 48, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1932).

Exemption held valid. —

Where debtor occupied his townhouse on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed, his claim of a homestead exemption under Wyoming law was valid. In re Johnson, 184 B.R. 141, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 973 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1995).

Ownership interest required. —

The spouse of a Chapter 7 debtor was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption in property in which she resided, but had no ownership interest, on the date on which a bankruptcy case was filed; under Wyoming law, an ownership interest was a prerequisite to a claim of homestead exemption, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-20-102(b). Duncan v. Zubrod (In re Duncan), 294 B.R. 339, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 594 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003).

Denial of a debtor's homestead exemption claim under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522 was affirmed because property that had been conveyed to her husband prior to her bankruptcy filing was not within the debtor's bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C.S. § 541 since Wyo. Const. Art. 19, § 9 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-20-101 do not create a legal or equitable interest in the property sufficient to independently support a bankruptcy exemption, and because neither the debtor nor her husband owned or were entitled to own the claimed homestead property when the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-20-102(a) did not allow a homestead exemption for the property. Hart v. Crawford (In re Hart), 332 B.R. 439, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23595 (D. Wyo. 2005).

Applied in

In re Estate of Edelman, 68 Wyo. 30, 228 P.2d 408, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (1951).

Quoted in

Geist v. Converse County Bank, 79 B.R. 939, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10402 (D. Wyo. 1987); Zubrod v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 329 F.3d 1195, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10711 (10th Cir. 2003).

Cited in

Towne v. Rumsey, 5 Wyo. 11, 35 P. 1025, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1894); Bachmann v. Hurtt, 26 Wyo. 332, 184 P. 709, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1919); Harney v. Montgomery, 29 Wyo. 362, 213 P. 378, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1923); Zubrod v. Duncan, , 271 B.R. 196, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 4 (10th Cir. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Separation agreement as affecting right to homestead, 34 ALR2d 1020, 34 ALR2d 1039.

Estate or interest in real property to which homestead claim may attach, 74 ALR2d 1355.

Divorce as affecting homestead, 84 ALR2d 703.

Validity of contract waiving homestead exemption, 94 ALR2d 967.

§ 1-20-103. Homestead exemption; right of family survivors.

When any person dies seized of a homestead leaving as survivor a widow, husband or minor children, the survivor is entitled to the homestead. If there is no such survivor, the homestead is liable for the debts of the deceased.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 434; R.S. 1887, § 2782; R.S. 1899, § 3903; C.S. 1910, § 4757; C.S. 1920, § 6030; R.S. 1931, § 89-2986; C.S. 1945, § 3-4503; W.S. 1957, § 1-500; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-21-103 .

Right of widow to homestead. —

Dower being abolished, the only substantial interest a wife has in the husband's real estate is the right of homestead. Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo. 1, 215 P. 485, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1923).

This section contemplates that, to be entitled to the homestead, widow must have been a member of the family of deceased at time of his death and an occupant of the homestead. Ullman v. Abbott, 10 Wyo. 97, 67 P. 467, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1902).

Widow as proper party. —

Widow occupying mortgaged premises and claiming them as homestead in her individual, rather than representative, capacity is a proper party defendant in an ejectment action. Delfelder v. Teton Land & Inv. Co., 46 Wyo. 142, 24 P.2d 702, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 46 Wyo. 142, 26 P.2d 153, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1933).

Probate Code does not contemplate homestead different from exemption laws. —

That § 2-7-504 does not contemplate a probate homestead different from the homestead contemplated under the exemption laws is apparent in a couple of ways. First, it is not primarily a “homestead” as such which the statute authorizes to be set over; it is all property of the decedent “exempt from execution,” including the homestead. Second, the value of the homestead referred to in § 2-7-504 is not fixed in the Probate Code; it is fixed in the exemption laws by § 1-20-101 .Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1962).

Hence probate judge looks to exemption laws to determine property set over. —

A probate judge necessarily turns to the exemption laws to find what, if any, property is to be set over pursuant to the provisions of § 2-7-504 and to find the value thereof when money or other property is set over in lieu of exempt property. Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1962).

When land cannot be set apart, law makes other provision for survivors. —

Ordinarily, where in the nature of things land cannot be set apart as a homestead to the survivors, then the law will make provision for them in lieu thereof. Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1962).

Homestead right may be abandoned. Goodson v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 243 P.2d 163, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1952).

Loss of homestead. —

A husband who, with his family lived on wife's land, lost his homestead right therein by permitting his wife and family to separate from him, followed by divorce in her favor, though he continued to occupy the land, since he was neither owner of the land nor head of a family. In re Arp v. Jacobs, 3 Wyo. 489, 27 P. 800, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (1925). See § 1-20-101 .

No loss of right by wife's death. —

One who has acquired homestead does not lose his right to the exemption by death of his wife, even though childless, if he continues to occupy premises as a home. Towne v. Rumsey, 5 Wyo. 11, 35 P. 1025, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1894). See § 1-20-102 .

Funeral and administration expenses. —

District court's order setting apart to widow of decedent real property of estate “free from any and all obligations or debts owing by said estate” is erroneous in view of § 2-7-504 where funeral and administration expenses remain unpaid without other property being available from which to pay it. Dobler v. Clark, 42 Wyo. 160, 292 P. 246, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1925).

Applied in

In re Estate of Edelman, 68 Wyo. 30, 228 P.2d 408, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (1951).

Cited in

Bachmann v. Hurtt, 26 Wyo. 332, 184 P. 709, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1919).

§ 1-20-104. Homestead exemption; composition.

The homestead may consist of a house on a lot or lots or other lands of any number of acres, or a house trailer or other movable home on a lot or lots, whether or not the house trailer or other movable home is equipped with wheels or resting upon immovable support.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 435; R.S. 1887, § 2783; R.S. 1899, § 3904; C.S. 1910, § 4758; Laws 1915, ch. 104, § 4; C.S. 1920, § 6031; Laws 1925, ch. 17, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 89-2987; C.S. 1945, § 3-4504; Laws 1955, ch. 33, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-501; Laws 1963, ch. 163, § 1; 1975, ch. 60, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-21-104; 2012, ch. 69, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “on a lot or lots or other lands” for “and lot or lots in any town or city, or a farm consisting,” inserting “on a lot or lots” and “the house trailer or other movable home is,” and deleted “the value of which does not exceed six thousand dollars ($6,000.00)” at the end.

Occupancy is required. —

The exemption failed under this section where debtor occupied a mobile home on a parcel of land contiguous to the claimed parcels because the debtor must occupy the homestead at the time the bankruptcy case is filed and contiguousness does not equate with occupancy. In re Welty, 217 B.R. 907, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 92 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1998).

Conveyance of homestead property not void as to excess. —

A deed by the owner, without the consent of his or her spouse, conveying property embracing a homestead, but of a value in excess of $4,000.00 (now ($10,000), is not void as to the excess. Stolldorf v. Stolldorf, 384 P.2d 969, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1963).

Applied in

In re Estate of Edelman, 68 Wyo. 30, 228 P.2d 408, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (1951).

Quoted in

Geist v. Converse County Bank, 79 B.R. 939, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10402 (D. Wyo. 1987); Kwiecinski v. Community First Nat'l Bank of Powell, 245 B.R. 672, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 221 (10th Cir. 2000).

Cited in

Altman v. District Court, 36 Wyo. 290, 254 P. 691, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (1927).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison With the Uniform Probate Code — Part I,” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 169 (1972).

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Homestead exemption as extending to rentals derived from homestead property, 40 ALR2d 897.

Estate or interest in real property to which a homestead claim may attach, 74 ALR2d 1355.

§ 1-20-105. Wearing apparel.

The necessary wearing apparel of every person not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) in value, determined in the manner provided in W.S. 1-20-106 is exempt from levy or sale upon execution, writ of attachment or any process issuing out of any court in this state. Necessary wearing apparel shall not include jewelry of any type other than wedding rings.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 439; R.S. 1887, § 2787; R.S. 1899, § 3907; C.S. 1910, § 4761; C.S. 1920, § 6034; R.S. 1931, § 89-2990; C.S. 1945, § 3-4507; W.S. 1957, § 1-504; Laws 1975, ch. 60, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-21-105; Laws 1983, ch. 41, § 1; 2012, ch. 69, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “two thousand dollars ($2,000.00)” for “one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).”

Bankruptcy exemptions. —

Wedding rings inherited by an unmarried debtor that did not signify the debtor's own marriage but were worn for sentimental or ornamental purposes, were not “necessary wearing apparel” and not exempt in bankruptcy under Wyoming law. Zubrod v. Winters, 2002 WY 29, 40 P.3d 1231, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

In re Arp v. Jacobs, 3 Wyo. 489, 27 P. 800, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (1925); In re Tidball, 40 F.2d 560, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2049 (D. Wyo. 1930).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison With the Uniform Probate Code — Part I,” 7 Land & Water L. Rev. 169 (1972).

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-20-106. Exemption of other personal property; personalty used in livelihood; appraisement.

  1. The following property, when owned by  any person, is exempt from levy or sale upon execution, writ of attachment  or any process issuing out of any court in this state and shall continue  to be exempt while the person or the family of the person is moving  from one (1) place of residence to another in this state:
    1. The family bible, pictures and school  books;
    2. A lot in any cemetery or burial ground;
    3. Furniture, bedding, provisions and other  household articles of any kind or character as the debtor may select,  not exceeding in all the value of four thousand dollars ($4,000.00).  When two (2) or more persons occupy the same residence, each shall  be entitled to a separate exemption;
    4. The value in a motor vehicle not exceeding  five thousand dollars ($5,000.00);
    5. Not more than three (3) firearms not exceeding in all the value of three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) and their associated ammunition not to exceed one thousand (1,000) rounds per firearm.
  2. The tools, team, implements or stock in  trade of any person, used and kept for the purpose of carrying on  his trade or business, not exceeding in value four thousand dollars  ($4,000.00), or the library, instruments and implements of any professional  person, not exceeding in value four thousand dollars ($4,000.00),  are exempt from levy or sale upon execution, writ of attachment or  any process out of any court in this state.
  3. The value of the property selected by  any debtor shall be ascertained by the appraisement of three (3) disinterested  appraisers, to be selected and summoned by the officer claiming to  levy upon, attach or sell the property. The appraisers shall be sworn  by the officer to make a true appraisement of the value of the property.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 440, 442; R.S. 1887, §§ 2788, 2790; R.S. 1899, §§ 3907, 3910; C.S. 1910, §§ 4762, 4764; Laws 1909, ch. 102, § 3; 1911, ch. 58, § 1; C.S. 1920, §§ 6035, 6037; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 105; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-2991, 89-2992; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-4508, 3-4510; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-505, 1-507; Laws 1975, ch. 60, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-21-106; Laws 1983, ch. 41, § 1; 1989, ch. 59, § 1; 1996, ch. 43, § 1; 2012, ch. 69, § 1; 2016, ch. 21, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to sale on execution and removal of improvements on real estate upon foreclosure of mechanics' lien, see § 29-3-107 .

As to exemption of seal and register of notary public, see §§ 32-1-105 and 32-1-106 .

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “four thousand dollars ($4,000.00)” for “two thousand dollars ($2,000.00)” in (a)(iii) and twice in (b); and in (a)(iv), inserted “The value in” and substituted “five thousand dollars ($5,000.00)” for “in value two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400.00).”

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, added (a)(v).

Construction. —

A debtor could claim an exemption for tools of his trade for property used in a secondary occupation as long as he did not exceed the $2,000 cap. Dunivent v. Bechtoldt, 210 B.R. 599, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1108 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1997).

Pursuant to this section, a person can claim up to $2,000 for tools of his trade or business or up to $2,000 for “the library, instruments and implements of any professional person”; the only limitation imposed by the section is the $2,000 cap, so that an individual cannot multiply exemptions by claiming multiple occupations. Dunivent v. Bechtoldt, 210 B.R. 599, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1108 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1997).

“Such other household articles,” as used in this section, refers to the same character of articles included in language immediately preceding it, and a bankrupt's typewriter and phonograph are not exempt. In re Tidball, 40 F.2d 560, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2049 (D. Wyo. 1930).

Exempted articles to belong to main pursuit. —

Under this section, where a person has two or more separate pursuits, the exempted articles must belong to his main or principal pursuit. In re Edelman's Estate, 68 Wyo. 30, 228 P.2d 408, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1951). But see Dunivent v. Bechtoldt (In re Bechtoldt), 210 B.R. 599, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1108 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Wyo. 1997), (stating that the language in Edelman regarding primary employment was dicta).

Framed works of art were not pictures.—

Term “pictures” did not extend to the debtor’s paintings because the term “pictures” in the statute applied to those of high utility or sentimental value to the debtor and the family, but of relatively low monetary value to creditors and the paintings were framed works of art. Crow v. 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, 2018 WY 139, 430 P.3d 1171, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2018).

Automobile used by taxi driver in his business is exempt under this section as an implement used in his business. Pellish Bros. v. Cooper, 47 Wyo. 480, 38 P.2d 607, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1934).

Findings of trial court as to right of exemption under this section and §§ 1-20-108 and 20-1-202 , when made on conflicting evidence relative to judgment debtor's being about to remove from state, is conclusive. Wakefield v. Lord, 38 Wyo. 301, 266 P. 1066, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1928).

Vehicle used to commute not exempt. —

When a motor vehicle is: (1) not used directly in the performance of a person's employment duties; and (2) required by a person to commute to his or her sole workplace, the person cannot claim the vehicle as an exemption. Johnston v. Barney, 842 F.2d 1221, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1988) (decided prior to 1989 amendment).

Finding concerning vehicle not clearly erroneous. —

Where debtors were entitled to exempt certain personal property from their bankruptcy estate, including motor vehicles used in a person's trade or business as of the date of filing, the bankruptcy court's conclusion that a vehicle belonging to the debtors was not property subject to the exemption statute was not clearly erroneous as one debtor was retired on the date of filing of the petition and the other was a homemaker not working outside of the home. Royal v. Pancratz (In re Pancratz), 175 B.R. 85, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17086 (D. Wyo. 1994).

Husband and wife could each claim as exempt $2,000 of tools of trade under subsection (b) (for a total of $4,000) where both were involved in the same occupation. Coones v. FDIC, 796 P.2d 803, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1990).

Firearms. —

Although debtor was entitled to exemption for pistol he was required to carry as an air force security officer, his practice pistol was not a “tool of the trade” for which he could claim an exemption. Gregory v. Zubrod (In re Gregory), 245 B.R. 171, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 148 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Wyo.), aff'd, 246 F.3d 681, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 38302 (10th Cir. 2000).

Lien enforced if property voluntarily disposed of. —

A consensual lien encumbering exempt property may still be enforced if the debtor sells, or otherwise attempts to voluntarily transfer, an interest in the property. In re VanGorp, 128 B.R. 579, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 881 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1991).

Untimely objection to exemption. —

Where Chapter 7 Trustee's objection to the debtors' claimed exemption in their vehicle pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-20-106(a)(iv) (2006) was untimely under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b), 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(g) could not “save” the Trustee from failing to timely object where the Trustee did not “avoid” the lien. Instead, Trustee's counsel convinced the creditor to release the lien, and by pursuing this course, the Trustee failed to preserve the lien for the estate. Kuhnel v. Russell (In re Kuhnel), 346 B.R. 528, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2007 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 495 F.3d 1177, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17672 (10th Cir. 2007).

Stated in

In re Anselmi, 52 B.R. 479, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 6011 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

Bachmann v. Hurtt, 26 Wyo. 332, 184 P. 709, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1919); Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1999).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison With the Uniform Probate Code — Part I,” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 169 (1972).

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Special bank deposits as subject of attachment or garnishment to satisfy depositor's general obligations, 8 ALR4th 998.

§ 1-20-107. Exemptions when head of family dies.

Whenever the head of a family dies, deserts, or ceases to reside with the family, the family is entitled to all the benefits and privileges conferred upon the head of a family residing with the same, and the family, or any member thereof, may select the property claimed as exempt. Where the exempt property is the sole and separate property of the wife, it is, to the same extent and for all purposes, exempt for the debts of the wife.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 441; R.S. 1887, § 2789; R.S. 1899, § 3909; C.S. 1910, § 4763; C.S. 1920, § 6036; R.S. 1931, § 89-2993; C.S. 1945, § 3-4509; W.S. 1957, § 1-506; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-21-107.

Applied in

In re Estate of Edelman, 68 Wyo. 30, 228 P.2d 408, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (1951).

Cited in

Ullman v. Abbott, 10 Wyo. 97, 67 P. 467, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (1902); Bachmann v. Hurtt, 26 Wyo. 332, 184 P. 709, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1919); In re Arp v. Jacobs, 3 Wyo. 489, 27 P. 800, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (1925).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Rights of surviving spouse and children in proceeds of sale of homestead in decedent's estate, 6 ALR2d 515.

§ 1-20-108. Exception; residency required.

  1. No property claimed as exempt under W.S. 1-20-101 through 1-20-106 is exempt from attachment or sale upon execution for  the purchase money of the property.
  2. Any person claiming these exemptions shall  be a bona fide resident of this state.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 442; R.S. 1887, § 2790; R.S. 1899, § 3910; C.S. 1910, § 4764; C.S. 1920, § 6037; R.S. 1931, § 89-2992; C.S. 1945, § 3-4510; W.S. 1957, § 1-507; Laws 1975, ch. 60, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-21-108.

Exemption presumed established on appeal. —

Evidence not being in the record, supreme court must assume that the facts requisite for a claim of exemption were duly established. Pellish Bros. v. Cooper, 47 Wyo. 480, 38 P.2d 607, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1934).

Nonavailability of provisions to bankrupts. —

See In re Tidball, 40 F.2d 560, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2049 (D. Wyo. 1930).

Quoted in

Geist v. Converse County Bank, 79 B.R. 939, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10402 (D. Wyo. 1987).

Cited in

Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 123 P. 925, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 41 , 40 L.R.A. (n.s.) 785 (1912); Wakefield v. Lord, 38 Wyo. 301, 266 P. 1066, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (1928); VanGorp v. Norwest Fin. Wyo., Inc., 128 B.R. 579, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 881 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1991); MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-20-109. Exemptions from estates in bankruptcy.

In accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), the exemptions from property of the estate in bankruptcy provided in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) are not authorized in cases where Wyoming law is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition and the debtor’s domicile has been located in Wyoming for the one hundred eighty (180) days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition or for a longer portion of the one hundred eighty (180) day period than in any other place.

History. Laws 1980, ch. 8, § 1; 2004, ch. 130, § 1.

The 2004 amendment deleted “section 522(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978” following “In accordance with.”

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Applicability of state law. —

To the extent that a Wyoming debtor meets the domicile requirement of 11 USCS § 522(b)(2)(A), he claims his homestead exemptions under Wyoming law. In re Johnson, 184 B.R. 141, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 973 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1995)(decided prior to 2004 amendment).

Applied in

Dunivent v. Bechtoldt, 210 B.R. 599, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1108 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1997); Evans v. Royal (In re Evans), — F. Supp. 2d —, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21893 (D. Wyo. Jan. 11, 2000).

Stated in

In re Anselmi, 52 B.R. 479, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 6011 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); Michaels v. Zubrod, 282 B.R. 234, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 896 (10th Cir. 2002).

Cited in

Johnston v. Barney, 842 F.2d 1221, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Welty, 217 B.R. 907, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 92 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1998); Gregory v. Zubrod, 245 B.R. 171, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 148 (10th Cir. 2000); Zubrod v. Winters, 2002 WY 29, 40 P.3d 1231, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2002); Royal v. Baker, 273 B.R. 892, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 130 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 2002); Duncan v. Zubrod (In re Duncan), 294 B.R. 339, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 594 (10th Cir. 2003).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Conditioning reinstatement of attorney upon reaffirmation of debt discharged in bankruptcy, 39 ALR4th 586.

Right of debtor to “de-acceleration” of residential mortgage indebtedness under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USC § 1322(b)), 67 ALR Fed 217.

Debts for alimony, maintenance, and support as exceptions to bankruptcy discharge, under § 523(a)(5) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USC § 523(a)(5)), 69 ALR Fed 403.

When does medical practitioner's treatment of patient constitute “willful and malicious injury,” so as to make practitioner's debt arising from such treatment nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) of Bankruptcy Act (11 USC § 523(a)(6)), 77 ALR Fed 918.

Individual retirement accounts as exempt property in bankruptcy, 133 ALR Fed 1.

Creditor's right to have bankruptcy discharge of individual debtor revoked, vacated, and set aside, 138 ALR Fed 253.

What constitutes “disposable income” under § 1325(b) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USC § 1325(b)), providing that all disposable income for specified period must be applied to plan for payment of creditors, 138 ALR Fed 547.

Debts arising from penalties as exceptions to bankruptcy discharge under §§ 523(a)(7), (13) and 1328(a) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(7), (13), and 1328(a)), 150 ALR Fed 159.

§ 1-20-110. Exemption for retirement funds and accounts.

  1. The following are exempt from execution, attachment, garnishment or any other legal process:
    1. The interest of an individual or beneficiary in a retirement plan;
      1. and (B) Repealed by Laws 2015, ch. 108, § 2.
    2. Money or other assets payable to an individual from a retirement plan;
    3. The interest of a beneficiary in a retirement plan if the beneficiary acquired the interest as the result of the death of an individual. The beneficiary’s interest is exempt to the same extent that the individual’s interest was exempt immediately before the death of the individual;
    4. All property in this state of the judgment debtor where the judgment is in favor of any state or any political subdivision of any state for failure to pay that state’s or political subdivision’s income tax on benefits received from a pension or other retirement plan. This paragraph shall apply only to judgments obtained after the judgment debtor has established residency in Wyoming and has been domiciled in Wyoming for at least one hundred eighty (180) days; and
    5. Money or other assets payable to a beneficiary from a retirement plan if the beneficiary acquired the money or other assets as the result of the death of an individual. The beneficiary’s interest is exempt to the same extent that the individual’s interest in the money or other assets was exempt immediately before the death of the individual.
  2. The exemptions in subsection (a) of this section do not apply to a contribution made by an individual to a retirement plan within ninety (90) days before the individual files for bankruptcy.
  3. Any fund, plan or account specified in subsection (a) of this section is not exempt from the claim of an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order. However, the interest of an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order is exempt from all claims of any creditor of the alternate payee.
  4. As used in this section:
    1. “Alternate payee” means any spouse, former spouse, child or other dependent of an individual who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a retirement plan with respect to such individual;
    2. “Beneficiary” includes a person, trust or trustee who has, before or after the death of an individual, a direct or indirect beneficial interest in a retirement plan;
    3. “Beneficial interest” includes an interest that is acquired:
      1. As a designated beneficiary, survivor, co-annuitant, heir or legatee; or
      2. If excludable from gross income under the Internal Revenue Code as:
        1. A rollover under 26 U.S.C. section 408 or 408A;
        2. A distribution from one (1) retirement plan to another retirement plan;
        3. A distribution under 26 U.S.C section 402 if the distributed amount is contributed to another retirement plan within sixty (60) days of the distribution; or
        4. A distribution that is legally similar to a distribution under subdivision (I), (II) or (III) of this subparagraph.
    4. “Individual” means a participant in, owner of or alternative payee of a retirement plan;
    5. “Qualified domestic relations order” means as that term is defined by 26 U.S.C. section 414(p);
    6. “Retirement plan” means a plan, account or annuity that is qualified under 26 U.S.C. section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 409, 414 or 457 as amended.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 190, § 1; 1990, ch. 27, § 1; 1993, ch. 62, § 1; 1996, ch. 43, § 1; 1998, ch. 42, § 1; 2012, ch. 69, § 1; 2015, ch. 108, §§ 1, 2.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (a)(iii), inserted “including individual retirement accounts (IRAs) Roth individual retirement accounts (Roth IRAs) and simplified employee pension individual retirement accounts (SEP IRAs).”

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in the introductory language of (a), substituted “legal process” for “process: issued by any court”; rewrote the introductory language of (a)(i); repealed (a)(i)(A) and (a)(i)(B); rewrote (a)(ii) and (a)(iii); added (a)(v), and (b) through (d); and made related changes.

IRA funded by individual is not entitled to exemption under this section, nor is the classification created by this section violative of art. I, § 34, Wyo. Const. (uniform operation of general law). Kingston v. Honeycutt, 908 P.2d 976, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1995).

Bankruptcy cases. —

Unpublished decision: Although unemployment compensation and benefits paid from an employer's retirement plan were exempt under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-3-319 and 1-20-110 , the taxes withheld from this income and refunded to the Chapter 7 debtor were not exempt. The taxes were withheld under 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 3402(p)(2) and 3405(c), and under § 3402(a)(1) were deemed to be a “tax.” 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1631.

Cited in

Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect of anti-alienation provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 USCS § 1056(d)) (ERISA) on rights of judgment creditors, 131 ALR Fed 427.

§ 1-20-111. Exemption for contributions to a medical savings account.

Contributions by an individual to a qualified medical savings account are exempt from execution, attachment, garnishment or any other process issued by any court, except for judgments against an individual or other dependents for medical expenses, to the extent the contributions are allowable as a deduction under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 186, § 1.

Chapter 21 Procedure and Actions

Cross references. —

For provision that establishment of circuit court supplants and replaces county courts, see the editor's notes at article 1, chapter 9, title 5.

Article 1. In General

§ 1-21-101. Docket to be kept; contents.

  1. Every judge shall keep a docket in which  he shall enter:
    1. The title of all causes commenced before  him;
    2. The time when process was issued against  the defendant, its particular nature and to what officer delivered;
    3. The time when the parties appeared before  him, either without or upon the return of process;
    4. A brief statement of the nature of the  plaintiff’s demand and the amount claimed, and if any setoff was pleaded,  a similar statement of the setoff and the amount claimed;
    5. Every adjournment stating at whose request  and for what time;
    6. The time when the trial was had, stating  whether the trial was by the jury or by the justice;
    7. The verdict of the jury, when rendered  and the judgment thereon;
    8. The judgment of the court;
    9. The time of issuing execution and the  name of the officer to whom delivered;
    10. The fact of an appeal taken and allowed,  and when taken and allowed;
    11. Satisfaction of judgment and when made;
    12. Any other entries material to the cause,  showing the proceedings before the justice.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 7; R.S. 1887, § 3421; R.S. 1899, § 4330; C.S. 1910, § 5192; C.S. 1920, § 6468; R.S. 1931, § 62-301; C.S. 1945, § 14-201; W.S. 1957, § 1-508; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-101 ; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment deleted “Justices of the Peace” from the chapter title; and in (a) substituted “judge” for “justice of the peace.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Substantial compliance. —

An entry in docket of a justice of the peace, referring to the written petition of plaintiff on file in the cause, is sufficient compliance with the provisions of this section. Pointer v. Jones, 15 Wyo. 1, 85 P. 1050, 1906 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1906).

Cited in

Cheeseman v. Fenton, 13 Wyo. 436, 80 P. 823, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1905).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Necessity of notice of intention to correct error in judgment entry, 14 ALR2d 224.

§ 1-21-102. Proceedings when title or boundaries to land in question.

If it appears from the pleadings or the evidence of either party at the trial of any case in circuit court that the title or boundaries to lands are in question, the judge shall immediately make an entry thereof in the docket, cease all further proceedings, and certify to the district court of the county a transcript of all entries made in the docket relating to the case in the same manner and within the same time as upon appeal. The case shall then be conducted in the district court as though appealed to the district court for trial de novo, except that no bond as on appeal or payment of costs in the circuit court is required for the transfer to the district court.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 21; R.S. 1887, § 3435; Laws 1895, ch. 16, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4346; C.S. 1910, § 5208; C.S. 1920, § 6484; R.S. 1931, § 62-407; C.S. 1945, § 14-406; W.S. 1957, § 1-534; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-102 ; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice court” twice, and “judge shall” for “justice shall.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Jurisdiction of district court. —

Where action brought before a justice should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction and was, on motion of defendants, certified to district court, apparently on supposition that it was governed by this section, whereupon defendants appeared in district court, and successfully resisted plaintiff's motion to remand, court obtained jurisdiction of their persons, which could not be affected by the fact that, before going to trial, they moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, and district court had jurisdiction of the action, the subject matter thereof being within its original jurisdiction. Jenkins v. Jeffrey, 3 Wyo. 669, 29 P. 186, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1892).

Small claims action filed in a circuit court by a homeowners' association to collect allegedly overdue association dues should have been certified to the district court because the case encompassed questions concerning the validity of restrictive covenants that would affect homeowners' title. Granite Springs Retreat Ass'n v. Manning, 2006 WY 60, 133 P.3d 1005, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 2006).

Action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer was within jurisdiction of justice's court, where issue of title was immaterial because landlord and tenant relationship between parties was shown, tenant therefore being estopped to deny landlord's title. Hitshew v. Rosson, 41 Wyo. 509, 287 P. 316, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1930).

Cited in

Steffens v. Smith, 477 P.2d 119, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1970).

§ 1-21-103. Payment of costs for witness not examined.

If any witness is subpoenaed, attends and is not examined by either party, the costs of the witness shall be paid by the party ordering the subpoena, unless the adverse party confesses the matter or otherwise renders unnecessary the examination of the witness.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 30; R.S. 1887, § 3452; R.S. 1899, § 4363; C.S. 1910, § 5225; C.S. 1920, § 6501; R.S. 1931, § 62-604; C.S. 1945, § 14-504; W.S. 1957, § 1-543; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-103 .

Cross references. —

As to fees of witnesses, see § 1-14-102 .

Article 2. Procedure for Small Claims

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Small claims: jurisdictional limits as binding on appellate court, 67 ALR4th 1117.

Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from, small claims court proceeding, 70 ALR4th 1119.

§ 1-21-201. Procedure generally; jurisdiction extended.

In the trial of civil cases before any circuit court in which the amount claimed, exclusive of costs, does not exceed six thousand dollars ($6,000.00), the procedure is as defined in W.S. 1-21-201 through 1-21-205 . The department of revenue may consolidate claims for collection of taxes against a single taxpayer into a single case under the procedures in W.S. 1-21-201 through 1-21-205 subject to specified dollar limitations.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 30, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 14-1101; W.S. 1957, § 1-562; Laws 1971, ch. 214, § 29; 1973, ch. 216, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-201 ; Laws 1980, ch. 39, § 1; 1989, ch. 19, § 1; ch. 257, § 1; 1990, ch. 7, § 1; 1991, ch. 174, § 2; 1997, ch. 43, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2005, ch. 189, § 1; 2011, ch. 196, § 1; 2017, ch. 2, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice of the peace.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42,§ 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “five thousand dollars ($5,000.00)” for “three thousand dollars ($3,000.00).”

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, substituted “six thousand dollars ($6,000.00)” for “five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).”

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted “the procedure is” for “the procedure and costs are” in the first sentence.

Appellate jurisdiction assigned to district court. —

Actions for small claims are no different, other than the informal procedure, from any other civil actions triable in county courts or justice of the peace courts, and it follows that appellate jurisdiction is assigned to the district court within the same county. Johnson v. Statewide Collections, 778 P.2d 93, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 1989).

Applied in

Board of County Comm'rs v. Justice Court No. Two, 529 P.2d 977, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 253 (Wyo. 1974).

§ 1-21-202. Commencement of actions; remedy cumulative; continuance to obtain attorney; docketing.

  1. Actions may be commenced, heard and determined under W.S. 1-21-201 through 1-21-205 if the state, any governmental entity, any natural person, corporation, partnership, association or other organization appears before any circuit court and executes an affidavit reciting the full address of the defendant, the nature of the claim, the amount due and stating that demand has been made and payment refused. The remedy provided by this article is cumulative and not exclusive.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter  5 of Title 33 of the Wyoming Statutes, in small claims court, the  state, governmental entities, natural persons, corporations, partnerships,  associations or other organizations may litigate actions on behalf  of themselves in person or through authorized employees, with or without  an attorney, provided that if an attorney appears, the opposing party  is entitled to a continuance for the purpose of obtaining an attorney  of its own.
  3. The circuit judge shall docket the case  as provided by law.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 30, § 2; C.S. 1945, § 14-1102; W.S. 1957, § 1-563; Laws 1971, ch. 214, § 30; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-202 ; Laws 1983, ch. 75, § 1; 1991, ch. 46, § 1; 2000, ch. 24, § 4; 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2017, ch. 2, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (a), deleted “justice of the peace or” preceding “circuit judge”; and in (c) deleted “justice or” preceding “circuit judge.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a), deleted the second sentence, which read: “The plaintiff shall deposit an appearance fee of four dollars ($4.00) which shall be retained by the court as costs and taxed to the party against whom judgment is rendered.”

Construction. —

The statute only requires that a demand for payment of a small claim have been made and refused. Van Riper v. Odekoven, 2001 WY 58, 26 P.3d 325, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2001), reh'g denied, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. July 17, 2001).

Cited in

Near v. Casto, 613 P.2d 577, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1980).

§ 1-21-203. Affidavit of claim; service of summons; venue jurisdiction.

  1. The claimant shall prepare the affidavit as set forth. When the affidavit is executed by the claimant the court shall file the same and have summons served on the defendant in the manner provided by law or, if the defendant resides in the state, service may be made by the court by certified mail addressed to the defendant at his address within the state with return receipt requested. Upon receipt by the circuit judge of the return receipt signed by the defendant or his agent, service is complete.
  2. Venue provisions in W.S. 1-5-104(b) and 1-5-105 through 1-5-109 apply to actions commenced under this article.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 30, § 3; C.S. 1945, § 14-1103; W.S. 1957, § 1-564; Laws 1971, ch. 214, § 31; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-203 ; Laws 1991, ch. 46, § 1; 2000, ch. 24, § 4; 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2008, ch. 27, § 1; 2021, ch. 67, § 1.

The 2004 amendment deleted “justice or” preceding “circuit judge” twice in (a).

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2008 amendment, deleted “or at his request the circuit judge shall draft it for him” at the end of the first sentence of (a).

Laws 2008, ch. 27, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 4, 2008.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, in the second sentence of (a), deleted "at any location in the county" preceding "in the manner," substituted "state" for "county" twice; and added "1-5-104(b) and" in (b).

§ 1-21-204. Time for appearance.

The date of appearance of the defendant as provided in the summons shall be not more than twenty (20) days nor less than twelve (12) days from the date of service of the summons. When the circuit judge has fixed the date for the appearance of the defendant he shall inform the plaintiff of the date and at the same time order the plaintiff to appear with such books, papers and witnesses as necessary to prove his claim.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 30, § 4; C.S. 1945, § 14-1104; W.S. 1957, § 1-565; Laws 1971, ch. 214, § 32; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-204; Laws 2000, ch. 24, § 4; 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2021, ch. 67, § 1.

The 2004 amendment deleted “justice or” preceding “circuit judge.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, in the first sentence, substituted "twenty (20)" for "twelve (12)" following "more than" and "twelve (12)" for "three (3)" following "less than."

§ 1-21-205. Pleading and hearing; execution.

At any hearing the plaintiff and defendant and their witnesses may offer evidence. No formal pleading other than the claim and notice is necessary. The hearing and disposition of the hearing shall be informal. No prejudgment attachment or garnishment shall issue, but execution, including post judgment garnishment in aid of execution, may issue as prescribed by law for circuit court.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 30, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 14-1106; W.S. 1957, § 1-567; Laws 1971, ch. 214, § 34; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-205; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 2; 2000, ch. 24, § 4; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment deleted “justice or” preceding “circuit court.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Article 3. Attachment and Garnishment

§§ 1-21-301 through 1-21-333. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 4.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, §§ 125 through 157, related to attachment and garnishment. For present similar provisions, see §§ 1-15-201 through 1-15-212 and 1-15-401 through 1-15-425 .

Article 4. Judgments

Cross references. —

As to judgments generally, see chapter 16 of this title.

§ 1-21-401. Endorsement of payments and satisfaction and release; requirements.

Every person recovering a judgment in circuit court shall endorse on the original judgment docket all payments made on the judgment, and when the judgment is satisfied by settlement or other payment, endorse the satisfaction and release on the judgment docket in the circuit court in which the judgment was entered. Endorsement of partial payment or satisfaction of the whole shall be made by the party recovering the judgment or his attorney in the case within fifteen (15) days after the payment has been made, and after each payment when more than one (1) payment is made on any judgment. Each endorsement shall be dated and signed by the person executing the same.

History. Laws 1939, ch. 72, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 14-714; W.S. 1957, § 1-618; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-401; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice of the peace court” twice.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-402. Endorsement of payments and satisfaction and release; penalty.

Every person who collects or is paid any money or other thing of value upon any judgment rendered in any circuit court who fails to comply with the provisions of W.S. 1-21-401 is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine for each offense of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200.00).

History. Laws 1939, ch. 72, § 2; C.S. 1945, § 14-715; W.S. 1957, § 1-619; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-402; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice of the peace court.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-403. Appeal of forcible entry and detainer actions.

In any forcible entry and detainer action appealed to the district court which is thereby determined against the defendant in possession, the court shall hear evidence concerning and render judgment for the rental value of the premises in controversy for the whole period of the unlawful detainer.

History. Laws 1890, ch. 36, § 9; 1895, ch. 57, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4405; C.S. 1910, § 5268; C.S. 1920, § 6540; R.S. 1931, § 62-1210; C.S. 1945, § 14-810; W.S. 1957, § 1-630; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-403.

Cross references. —

As to action for forcible entry and detainer in justice of the peace courts, see §§ 1-21-1001 to 1-21-1016 .

Article 5. Execution and Stay Thereof

Cross references. —

As to stay of execution generally, see §§ 1-17-201 to 1-17-210 .

§ 1-21-501. Issuance of execution.

Execution for the enforcement of a judgment except during the time it may be stayed, may be issued by the judge who renders the judgment, or by his successor in office, on the application of the party entitled thereto, any time within five (5) years of entry of the judgment, or the date of the last execution issued thereon.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 83; R.S. 1887, § 3504; R.S. 1899, § 4416; C.S. 1910, § 5279; C.S. 1920, § 6551; R.S. 1931, § 62-1301; C.S. 1945, § 14-901; W.S. 1957, § 1-641; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-501; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-502. Form and contents of execution.

  1. The execution shall be directed to the  sheriff of the county, subscribed by the judge by whom the judgment  was rendered, or by his successor in office, and dated the day of  delivery to the officer for execution. The execution shall refer to  the judgment by stating the names of the parties, the name of the  judge, the county where and the time when the judgment was rendered  and the true amount of the unsatisfied judgment. The execution shall  direct the sheriff to:
    1. Collect the amount of the judgment out  of the personal property of the judgment debtor and pay it to the  judgment creditor; and
    2. Make return on the execution within thirty  (30) days after receipt showing the manner of execution.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 84; R.S. 1887, § 3505; Laws 1890, ch. 78, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4417; C.S. 1910, § 5280; C.S. 1920, § 6552; R.S. 1931, § 62-1302; C.S. 1945, § 14-902; W.S. 1957, § 1-642; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-502; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice” twice in the introductory language in (a).

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-21-503. Endorsement on execution.

Before any execution is delivered, the judge shall state in his docket and on the back of his execution the amount of the debt or damages and costs, and the officer receiving the execution shall endorse on it the time of receiving the execution.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 85; R.S. 1887, § 3506; R.S. 1899, § 4418; C.S. 1910, § 5281; C.S. 1920, § 6553; R.S. 1931, § 62-1303; C.S. 1945, § 14-903; W.S. 1957, § 1-643; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-503; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-504. Renewal of execution.

If any execution is not satisfied, it may be renewed at the request of the plaintiff by the judge or his successor, by an endorsement thereon and dated when made. If any part of the execution has been satisfied, the endorsement of renewal shall state the sum due and every such endorsement shall continue the execution in full force for no longer than thirty (30) days. An entry of renewal shall be made in the docket.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 86; R.S. 1887, § 3507; R.S. 1899, § 4419; C.S. 1910, § 5282; C.S. 1920, § 6554; R.S. 1931, § 62-1304; C.S. 1945, § 14-904; W.S. 1957, § 1-644; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-504; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

§ 1-21-505. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 4.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 87, related to summoning garnishees to answer interrogatories. For present similar provisions, see § 1-15-407 .

§ 1-21-506. Receipt of money.

The officer holding an execution shall receive all money tendered to him in payment thereof and shall endorse the same on the execution. He shall give the payor a receipt stating the amount paid and the account for which it is received.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 88; R.S. 1887, § 3509; R.S. 1899, § 4421; C.S. 1910, § 5284; C.S. 1920, § 6556; R.S. 1931, § 62-1306; C.S. 1945, § 14-906; W.S. 1957, § 1-646; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-506.

§ 1-21-507. Rights of surety.

When any judgment is obtained against any surety the original judgment remains valid for the use of the surety, who thereafter may obtain execution on the judgment against the goods and chattels of the defendant. The surety is entitled to a transcript of the judgment for his own use, which has the same force and effect as transcripts in other cases.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 89; R.S. 1887, § 3510; R.S. 1899, § 4422; C.S. 1910, § 5285; C.S. 1920, § 6557; R.S. 1931, § 62-1307; C.S. 1945, § 14-907; W.S. 1957, § 1-647; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-507.

Cross references. —

For rights and remedies of surety upon paying judgment, see § 38-1-104 .

§ 1-21-508. Execution against joint debtors.

An execution on a judgment against joint debtors, one (1) or more of whom was not served with summons, shall contain a direction to collect the judgment from the joint property of all the defendants, or the separate property of the debtors served with summons, specified by name.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 90; R.S. 1887, § 3511; R.S. 1899, § 4423; C.S. 1910, § 5286; C.S. 1920, § 6558; R.S. 1931, § 62-1308; C.S. 1945, § 14-908; W.S. 1957, § 1-648; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-508.

§ 1-21-509. Right to sue surety.

In all cases of surety, the plaintiff may sue the surety upon his bond if the conditions of the bond are not performed.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 91; R.S. 1887, § 3512; R.S. 1899, § 4424; C.S. 1910, § 5287; C.S. 1920, § 6559; R.S. 1931, § 62-1309; C.S. 1945, § 14-909; W.S. 1957, § 1-649; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-509; Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 2.

§ 1-21-510. Execution for costs.

A judge may issue execution to enforce a judgment for costs in the same manner as in other cases.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 187; R.S. 1887, § 3603; R.S. 1899, § 4513; C.S. 1910, § 5377; C.S. 1920, § 6650; R.S. 1931, § 62-2001; C.S. 1945, § 14-910; W.S. 1957, § 1-650; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-510; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-511. Right to stay of execution.

Except as otherwise provided, any person against whom judgment is rendered may have stay of execution by entering into a bond with the adverse party within ten (10) days after rendition of the judgment, with good and sufficient surety, resident property holders of the county, approved by the judge, conditioned on the payment of the amount of the judgment, interest and costs that may accrue. The bond shall be entered on the docket and signed by the surety.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 92; R.S. 1887, § 3513; R.S. 1899, § 4425; C.S. 1910, § 5288; C.S. 1920, § 6560; R.S. 1931, § 62-1401; C.S. 1945, § 14-912; W.S. 1957, § 1-652; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-511; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

In general. —

Undertaking to stay execution is required to be conditioned for the payment of the amount of the judgment, interests and costs that may accrue. Evans v. Cheyenne Cement Stone & Brick Co., 20 Wyo. 188, 122 P. 588, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1912).

§ 1-21-512. Time for which stay granted.

  1. Stay of execution shall be granted as  follows:
    1. For thirty (30) days on any judgment not  exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00), excluding costs;
    2. For four (4) months on any judgment over  fifty dollars ($50.00) and not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100.00),  excluding costs;
    3. For six (6) months on any judgment in  excess of one hundred dollars ($100.00), excluding costs.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 93; R.S. 1887, § 3514; Laws 1895, ch. 5, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4426; C.S. 1910, § 5289; C.S. 1920, § 6561; R.S. 1931, § 62-1402; C.S. 1945, § 14-913; W.S. 1957, § 1-653; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-512.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-21-513. Cases in which stay not allowed.

  1. No stay of execution is allowed in the  following cases:
    1. On a judgment rendered against a circuit  court judge for refusing to pay over money collected or received in  his official capacity;
    2. On a judgment rendered against a sheriff  for failing to make return, making a false return or refusing to pay  over money collected in his official capacity;
    3. On a judgment against a surety for the  stay of execution;
    4. Where judgment is rendered in favor of  a surety who has been ordered by judgment to pay over money on account  of the principal;
    5. On a judgment obtained by a sheriff on  a bond executed to him for the delivery of property.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 94; R.S. 1887, § 3515; R.S. 1899, § 4427; C.S. 1910, § 5290; C.S. 1920, § 6562; R.S. 1931, § 62-1403; C.S. 1945, § 14-914; W.S. 1957, § 1-654; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-513; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (a)(i), substituted “circuit court judge” for “justice of the peace.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-21-514. Recall of execution.

If the execution issued before the bond for stay or for appeal is given, and such bond is given afterward and within the time allowed, the judge shall recall the execution.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 95; R.S. 1887, § 3516; R.S. 1899, § 4428; C.S. 1910, § 5291; C.S. 1920, § 6563; R.S. 1931, § 62-1404; C.S. 1945, § 14-915; W.S. 1957, § 1-655; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-514; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-515. Conditions under which execution issued notwithstanding stay.

When any person who is surety for stay of execution moves from the county before expiration of the stay, the judge shall issue execution on demand against the goods and chattels of the party against whom the original judgment was rendered. When any surety for the stay of execution becomes apprehensive that by delaying the execution until expiration of the stay he may be compelled to pay the judgment, the surety may file an affidavit of the facts with the judge who rendered judgment whereupon the judge shall issue execution against the judgment debtor. The surety is not thereby discharged from liability, but may be proceeded against after expiration of the stay.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 96; R.S. 1887, § 3517; R.S. 1899, § 4429; C.S. 1910, § 5292; C.S. 1920, § 6564; R.S. 1931, § 62-1405; C.S. 1945, § 14-916; W.S. 1957, § 1-656; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-515; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice” three times.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-516. Giving of further bond.

If within ten (10) days after levying the execution the judgment debtor enters into a further bond for stay of execution during the unexpired term of the first stay, and pays costs of the execution issued against him, the judge shall accept the further bond and recall the execution. The latest bond shall first be proceeded against until it appears by the return of the sheriff that there are no goods on which to levy, then proceedings shall be instituted on the first bond given.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 97; R.S. 1887, § 3518; R.S. 1899, § 4430; C.S. 1910, § 5293; C.S. 1920, § 6565; R.S. 1931, § 62-1406; C.S. 1945, § 14-917; W.S. 1957, § 1-657; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-516; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Cited in

Cheeseman v. Fenton, 13 Wyo. 436, 80 P. 823, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1905).

§ 1-21-517. Discovery in aid of execution.

  1. At any time after entry of judgment, the  judgment creditor may obtain discovery by interrogatories, depositions  or otherwise, from any person, including the judgment debtor, in accordance  with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. A person served with notice of discovery  under this section shall hold for the benefit of the judgment creditor  from the time of service all property, money and credits in his hands  belonging to the judgment debtor or due to him.

History. Laws 1988, ch. 37, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment deleted “for Justice Courts” at the end of (a).

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Article 6. Sales on Execution

Cross references. —

As to sale of goods and chattels on execution generally, see §§ 1-17-312 to 1-17-314 .

§ 1-21-601. Notice of sale.

The officer having levied upon goods and chattels by virtue of an execution shall without delay give public notice by advertisement in a newspaper published or widely circulated in the county where the property is to be sold. The notice shall state the time and place of sale, describe the goods and chattels, and shall be published at least ten (10) days before the day of sale.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 103; R.S. 1887, § 3519; R.S. 1899, § 4431; C.S. 1910, § 5294; C.S. 1920, § 6566; R.S. 1931, § 62-1501; C.S. 1945, § 14-1001; W.S. 1957, § 1-658; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-601.

§ 1-21-602. Manner of conducting sale; return.

At the time appointed, the officer shall expose the goods and chattels to public sale and sell them to the highest bidder. If there are no bidders or only a single bid is given, the sale shall be adjourned from time to time until a fair sale is had. The officer shall return the execution together with the money to the judge at the time of making the return.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 104; R.S. 1887, § 3520; R.S. 1899, § 4432; C.S. 1910, § 5295; C.S. 1920, § 6567; R.S. 1931, § 62-1502; C.S. 1945, § 14-1002; W.S. 1957, § 1-659; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-602; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-603. Officer not to purchase.

No officer shall directly or indirectly purchase any goods and chattels at any sale made by him upon execution. Every such sale shall be absolutely void.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 105; R.S. 1887, § 3521; R.S. 1899, § 4433; C.S. 1910, § 5296; C.S. 1920, § 6568; R.S. 1931, § 62-1503; C.S. 1945, § 14-1003; W.S. 1957, § 1-660; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-603.

Article 7. Trial of Property Rights in Property Seized on Execution or Attachment

Law reviews. —

For comment, “How to Enforce a Money Judgment in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 645 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments §§ 136 to 146.

§ 1-21-701. Notice and time of trial.

When an officer levies on property claimed by any person other than the party against whom the execution issued, the claimant shall give three (3) days notice of objection in writing to the plaintiff or his agent. If the plaintiff or his agent cannot be found within the county, the notice shall be served by leaving a copy at his usual place of abode in the county, or if no place of abode exists then by leaving notice at the court, stating the time and place of trial to determine the right to the property. The trial shall be held before a circuit court in the county at least one (1) day prior to the time appointed for sale of the property.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 122; R.S. 1887, § 3538; R.S. 1899, § 4449; C.S. 1910, § 5312; C.S. 1920, § 6584; R.S. 1931, § 62-1901; C.S. 1945, § 14-1301; W.S. 1957, § 1-661; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-701; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 2; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court in” for “justice of.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Intervener's question. —

Claimant to attached automobile having intervened and introduced evidence in action without objection, court was authorized to decide question raised by intervener's motion. Steffy v. Teton Truck Line Co., 44 Wyo. 345, 11 P.2d 1082, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1932).

§ 1-21-702. Judgment for claimant; restoration of property.

If on trial the court or jury is satisfied that the property or any part belongs to the claimant the court shall render judgment against the party in whose favor the execution issued, including costs. The court shall give a written order to the officer who levied on or is charged with selling the property, directing him to restore the property found to belong to the claimant.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 123; R.S. 1887, § 3539; R.S. 1899, § 4450; C.S. 1910, § 5313; C.S. 1920, § 6585; R.S. 1931, § 62-1902; C.S. 1945, § 14-1302; W.S. 1957, § 1-662; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-702; Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 2.

Intervener's question. —

Claimant to attached automobile having intervened and introduced evidence in action without objection, court was authorized to decide question raised by intervener's motion. Steffy v. Teton Truck Line Co., 44 Wyo. 345, 11 P.2d 1082, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1932).

§ 1-21-703. Judgment against claimant.

If the claimant fails to establish his right to the property or any part thereof, the judge shall render judgment against the claimant for costs accrued on account of the trial and issue execution therefor. The officer is not liable to the claimant for the property so taken.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 124; R.S. 1887, § 3540; R.S. 1899, § 4451; C.S. 1910, § 5314; C.S. 1920, § 6586; R.S. 1931, § 62-1903; C.S. 1945, § 14-1303; W.S. 1957, § 1-663; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-703; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Intervener's question. —

Claimant to attached automobile having intervened and introduced evidence in action without objection, court was authorized to decide question raised by intervener's motion. Steffy v. Teton Truck Line Co., 44 Wyo. 345, 11 P.2d 1082, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1932).

Article 8. Arbitration

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators — insurance appraisals or arbitrations, 63 ALR5th 675.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators—torts, 64 ALR5th 475.

5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration and Award §§ 148 to 256.

§ 1-21-801. Procedure generally.

Any civil cause pending before a judge may be submitted to the arbitration of three (3) men by agreement of the parties. Each party shall select one (1) arbitrator and the two (2) so selected shall choose the third. They shall be sworn by the judge and proceed in a summary manner to hear the cause. Any of the arbitrators may administer oaths, issue subpoenas for witnesses and compel their attendance, and punish for contempt. They shall make their awards in writing, any two (2) concurring being the award of all. The award shall be reported to the judge who shall enter judgment accordingly. The judgment is final unless it is made to appear to the judge within ten (10) days after the entry of judgment that the award was obtained by fraud, corruption or any undue means, in which case the judge shall set aside the award and the case shall stand for trial as though no award had been made.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 183; R.S. 1887, § 3599; R.S. 1899, § 4509; C.S. 1910, § 5373; C.S. 1920, § 6646; R.S. 1931, § 62-2101; C.S. 1945, § 14-1701; W.S. 1957, § 1-664; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-801; Laws, 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice” throughout.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and construction of agreement between attorney and client to arbitrate disputes arising between them, 26 ALR5th 107.

Participation in arbitration proceedings as waiver of objections to arbitrability under state law, 56 ALR5th 757.

§ 1-21-802. Appeal of setting aside award; grounds.

An aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the judge to set aside the award upon grounds of fraud, corruption or undue means as in other cases.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 184; R.S. 1887, § 3600; R.S. 1899, § 4510; C.S. 1910, § 5374; C.S. 1920, § 6647; R.S. 1931, § 62-2102; C.S. 1945, § 14-1702; W.S. 1957, § 1-665; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-802; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-803. Appeal of setting aside award; proceedings in district court.

If on appeal of any such award, the district court is satisfied the award was obtained by fraud, corruption or other undue means, the court shall set aside the award and proceed to hear and determine the cause on the merits.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 185; R.S. 1887, § 3601; R.S. 1899, § 4511; C.S. 1910, § 5375; C.S. 1920, § 6648; R.S. 1931, § 62-2103; C.S. 1945, § 14-1703; W.S. 1957, § 1-666; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-803.

§ 1-21-804. Appeal of setting aside award; affirmance.

If the court determines the award was not obtained by fraud, corruption or other undue means, it shall render judgment thereon for costs of the suit and award execution as in other cases.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 186; R.S. 1887, § 3602; R.S. 1899, § 4512; C.S. 1910, § 5376; C.S. 1920, § 6649; R.S. 1931, § 62-2104; C.S. 1945, § 14-1704; W.S. 1957, § 1-667; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-804.

Article 9. Contempt

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Lack of notice to contemnor at time of contemptuous conduct of possible criminal contempt sanctions as affecting prosecution for contempt in federal court, 76 ALR Fed 797.

§ 1-21-901. Grounds.

  1. A circuit court judge may punish for contempt  in the following cases and no others:
    1. Persons guilty of disorderly, contemptuous  and insolent behavior toward a judge engaged in any judicial proceeding,  which tends to interrupt such proceedings or impair the respect due  the judge’s authority;
    2. Persons guilty of resistance or disobedience  to any lawful order or process made or issued by the judge.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 174; R.S. 1887, § 3590; R.S. 1899, § 4500; C.S. 1910, § 5364; C.S. 1920, § 6637; R.S. 1931, § 62-2201; C.S. 1945, § 14-1601; W.S. 1957, § 1-668; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-901; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, throughout (a), substituted “circuit court judge” for “justice of the peace” and “judge” or a variant for “justice” or a variant.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Order not lawful.—

Trial court erred in ruling that the public defender had to accept all appointments to serve as counsel for indigent defendants unless and until the appointing court ruled otherwise, and therefore its order holding the state public defender in contempt for declining two appointments based on the unavailability of counsel was reversed, because this section afforded the public defender discretion to decline an appointment or appointments. The court further held that in exercising that discretion, there was no requirement, statutory or otherwise, that the public defender show an individualized injury in fact or meet the Strickland post-conviction showing of prejudice. Lozano v. Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Dist., 2020 WY 44, 460 P.3d 721, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2020).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Contempt for violation of compromise and settlement the terms of which were approved by court but not incorporated in court order, decree or judgment, 84 ALR3d 1047.

State court's power to order indefinite coercive fine or imprisonment to exact promise of future compliance with court's order — anticipatory contempt, 81 ALR4th 1008.

Profane or obscene language by party, witness or observer during trial proceedings as basis for contempt citation, 29 ALR5th 702.

§ 1-21-902. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 90, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 175, related to punishment for contempt.

Laws 2005, ch. 90, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 24, 2005.

§ 1-21-903. Hearing required; warrant of attachment.

No person shall be punished for contempt before a circuit court judge until after an opportunity to be heard and for that purpose the judge may issue his warrant of attachment to bring the offender before him.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 176; R.S. 1887, § 3592; R.S. 1899, § 4502; C.S. 1910, § 5366; C.S. 1920, § 6639; R.S. 1931, § 62-2203; C.S. 1945, § 14-1603; W.S. 1957, § 1-670; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-903; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court judge” for “justice,” and “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-904. Summary proceedings if offender present.

If the offender is present he may be summarily arraigned by the circuit court judge and proceeded against as if a warrant had been previously issued and the offender arrested thereon.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 177; R.S. 1887, § 3593; R.S. 1899, § 4503; C.S. 1910, § 5367; C.S. 1920, § 6640; R.S. 1931, § 62-2204; C.S. 1945, § 14-1604; W.S. 1957, § 1-671; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-904; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-905. Warrant of commitment.

The warrant of commitment for contempt must set forth the particular circumstances of the offense or it is void.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 178; R.S. 1887, § 3594; R.S. 1899, § 4504; C.S. 1910, § 5368; C.S. 1920, § 6641; R.S. 1931, § 62-2205; C.S. 1945, § 14-1605; W.S. 1957, § 1-672; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-905.

Applied in

Badley v. City of Sheridan, 440 P.2d 516, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1968).

§ 1-21-906. Commitment of witness; generally.

Any witness attending before a circuit court who refuses to be sworn in some form prescribed by law or to answer any pertinent or proper question, may by order be committed to the jail of the county.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 179; R.S. 1887, § 3595; R.S. 1899, § 4505; C.S. 1910, § 5369; C.S. 1920, § 6642; R.S. 1931, § 62-2206; C.S. 1945, § 14-1606; W.S. 1957, § 1-673; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-906; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to form of oath, see § 1-2-101 .

As to affirmation in lieu of oath, see § 1-2-103 .

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice of the peace.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42,§ 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-907. Commitment of witness; order.

The order shall specify the cause for which the order was issued. If it is for refusing to answer any question, the question shall be specified. The witness shall be closely confined pursuant to the order until he is sworn or answers.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 180; R.S. 1887, § 3596; R.S. 1899, § 4506; C.S. 1910, § 5370; C.S. 1920, § 6643; R.S. 1931, § 62-2207; C.S. 1945, § 14-1607; W.S. 1957, § 1-674; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-907.

§ 1-21-908. Commitment of witness; adjournment.

The circuit court shall adjourn the case at the request of either party for a reasonable time or until the witness testifies in the case.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 181; R.S. 1887, § 3597; R.S. 1899, § 4507; C.S. 1910, § 5371; C.S. 1920, § 6644; R.S. 1931, § 62-2208; C.S. 1945, § 14-1608; W.S. 1957, § 1-675; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-908; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-909. Failure of witness to attend.

If any person subpoenaed as a witness fails to attend, he is guilty of contempt and shall be fined all the costs for his apprehension unless he shows reasonable cause for his failure to attend, in which case the party requiring the appearance shall pay the costs.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 182; R.S. 1887, § 3598; R.S. 1899, § 4508; C.S. 1910, § 5372; C.S. 1920, § 6645; R.S. 1931, § 62-2209; C.S. 1945, § 14-1609; W.S. 1957, § 1-676; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-909.

Article 10. Forcible Entry and Detainer

Cross references. —

As to judgment on appeal to district court, see § 1-21-403 .

Provisions permissive, not exclusive. —

This article, providing for summary actions in forcible entry and detainer before justices, is not exclusive, but is permissive, and the landlord may resort thereto or, in proper cases, he may bring ejectment. Allen v. Houn, 29 Wyo. 413, 213 P. 757, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Remedy of re-entry not barred. —

An action brought under this article did not bar an exercise of the remedy of re-entry and the two are not inconsistent. Vissenberg v. Bresnahen, 65 Wyo. 367, 202 P.2d 663, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1949).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

35A Am. Jur. 2d Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 38, 40 to 41, 43 to 50, 52 to 63, 66 to 69.

Landlord and tenant: respective rights in excess rent when landlord relets at higher rent during lessee's term, 50 ALR4th 403.

Commercial leases: application of rule that lease may be canceled only for “material” breach, 54 ALR4th 595.

36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 3 to 109.

§ 1-21-1001. Jurisdiction of circuit courts.

Any circuit court within the judicial district may inquire against those who make unlawful and forcible entry into lands and tenements and detain the same, or against those who, having a lawful and peaceable entry into lands or tenements, unlawfully or by force hold the same. If it is found that an unlawful and forcible entry was made and the lands or tenements are held by force, or that after a lawful entry the lands are held unlawfully, the judge shall require restitution to the complaining party.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 158; R.S. 1887, § 3574; R.S. 1899, § 4485; C.S. 1910, § 5349; C.S. 1920, § 6621; R.S. 1931, § 62-1701; C.S. 1945, § 14-1501; W.S. 1957, § 1-677; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1001; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice,” “the judicial district” for “his county,” and “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

District court does not have original jurisdiction in forcible entry and detainer actions. Allen v. Houn, 29 Wyo. 413, 213 P. 757, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Purpose of section. —

This section is primarily intended to give summary restitution of properties unlawfully withheld. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

The principal object of the statutory proceeding is to furnish a speedy remedy for recovery of possession against tenants holding over their term and to save landlords from the need to resort to a cumbersome, dilatory, and expensive suit in ejectment. Knight v. Boner, 459 P.2d 205, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1969).

Specific relation between this section and § 1-21-1002 is not altogether clear insofar as cases of unlawful detainer are concerned. The last sentence of § 1-21-1002 has been construed as referring to the provisions of this section, so it may be that, unless reference is made only to forcible entry and detainer, this section might embrace cases of unlawful detainer not mentioned in § 1-21-1002.Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950).

Provisions must be complied with. —

A civil proceeding for forcible entry and detainer or unlawful detainer being statutory and summary in nature, statute conferring jurisdiction must be at least substantially complied with in the method of procedure prescribed by it or the jurisdiction will fail to attach and the proceeding will be coram non judice and void. White v. Veitch, 27 Wyo. 401, 197 P. 983, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1921).

Complaint essential to jurisdiction. —

In forcible entry and detainer cases, the filing of a complaint describing the property is essential to jurisdiction. White v. Veitch, 27 Wyo. 401, 197 P. 983, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1921).

Where justice court was without jurisdiction in an action of forcible entry and detainer because of lack of essential allegations in the complaint, objection of lack of jurisdiction was not waived by failing to raise it in the justice court, nor could an amended complaint filed in the district court cure such jurisdictional defect. White v. Veitch, 27 Wyo. 401, 197 P. 983, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1921).

Contents of complaint. —

Under this section, providing for action of unlawful detainer where lawful and peaceable entry has been made, but premises are subsequently unlawfully or forcibly held, the complaint, under § 1-21-1005 , must state the facts showing a lawful and peaceable entry and also the subsequent unlawful or forcible detainer. White v. Veitch, 27 Wyo. 401, 197 P. 983, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1921).

Complaint following language of statute sufficient. —

In an action of unlawful detainer, it is sufficient for the complaint to follow the language of the statute. Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950).

And it need not allege that lands were entered upon lawfully. —

Where petition stated that defendant unlawfully withheld possession of the premises from plaintiffs, it was held not to be necessary to allege, under this section, that the lands were entered upon lawfully, since the manner of entry upon the land would be wholly immaterial in such a case. Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950).

Action misdesignated. —

Where an action designated as forcible detainer which was in reality ejectment, which should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, was, on defendant's motion, certified to district court, where defendant appeared and successfully resisted plaintiff's motion to remand, court obtained jurisdiction of the persons by reason of such appearance, as the district court had original jurisdiction. Jenkins v. Jeffrey, 3 Wyo. 669, 29 P. 186, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1892).

Cause of action stated. —

Petition setting out lease and assignment and alleging that defendant was holding over stated a cause of action in forcible entry and detainer. Church v. Blakesley, 39 Wyo. 434, 273 P. 541, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 1929).

Prior possession by complainant is not necessary in unlawful detainer. Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950).

Only determination to be made in the proceeding is “the right or fact of possession.” Knight v. Boner, 459 P.2d 205, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1969).

Tenant is estopped to deny title of landlord, and any investigation of title to the premises is precluded. Knight v. Boner, 459 P.2d 205, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1969).

Forcible entry and detainer action does not involve title. Allen v. Houn, 29 Wyo. 413, 213 P. 757, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Hence, § 1-21-102 not applicable. —

The provisions of § 1-21-102 , requiring a justice of the peace to certify a case to the district court when it appears that title to lands or boundaries came in question before him, do not apply to cases relating to forcible entry and detainer under this section and § 1-21-1002 , since title is not therein involved. Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950). See Durante v. Consumers Filling Station Co., 71 Wyo. 271, 257 P.2d 347, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1953).

No jurisdiction to restore premises to mortgage foreclosure purchaser. —

Justice court held without jurisdiction in forcible entry and detainer action to restore to purchaser at mortgage foreclosure sale premises occupied by debtor after the latter filed petition under section in Bankruptcy Act regarding agricultural compositions and extensions, since it is a proceeding for recovering possession of land. In re Dickinson, 9 F. Supp. 227, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1197 (D. Wyo. 1934).

Equitable defenses are not available in cases of unlawful detainer under this section and § 1-21-1002 .Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950).

Neither the court of the justice of the peace nor the action of unlawful detainer is designed to try equitable defenses. Knight v. Boner, 459 P.2d 205, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1969).

The possessory action of forcible entry and detainer is not to be converted into an action of ejectment where the question of legal and equitable titles can be tried or to an action seeking equitable relief. That is not to say, of course, that a determination in the possessory action precludes an action in the proper forum to enforce equitable rights. Knight v. Boner, 459 P.2d 205, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1969).

A setoff or counterclaim in a detainer action is not permissible. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

The efficacy of this section as a summary remedy giving restitution for nonpayment of rent is lessened if not destroyed if a setoff or counterclaim is permitted to be interposed. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

The reason for not allowing setoffs or counterclaims in a detainer action is that since the action is a summary proceeding designed especially for the purpose of a speedy means of recovering possession of real property, tenants withholding the premises in violation of the covenants of their lease cannot through means of a cross-complaint or counterclaim frustrate the extraordinary remedy provided by this section. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Judgment for rent not authorized. —

There is no provision in this section authorizing the justice of the peace to render judgment for rent. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

But no splitting of action occurs when plaintiff sues in another action for rent due during the period of detainment. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Applied in

Hill v. Salmon, 69 Wyo. 1, 236 P.2d 518, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (1951).

§ 1-21-1002. When proceedings allowed.

  1. Proceedings for forcible entry and detainer  may be had in any of the following cases:
    1. Against tenants holding over their terms  or after a failure to pay rent for three (3) days after it is due;
    2. In sales of real estate on execution,  orders or other judicial process, including proceedings for the foreclosure  of a mortgage by court action, when the judgment debtor was in possession  at the time of rendition of the judgment or decree by virtue of which  the sale was made;
    3. When real estate has been sold under a  power of sale contained in any mortgage or trust deed and the purchaser  or his assignee has demanded possession;
    4. Any sale by executors, administrators,  guardians or on partition where any of the parties to the petition  were in possession at the commencement of the suit, after the sale  has been examined by the proper court and adjudged legal;
    5. In cases where the defendant is a settler  or occupier of lands or tenements, without color of title, to which  the complainant has the right of possession;
    6. Against renters in violation of any terms  imposed under W.S. 1-21-1204 or 1-21-1205 .
  2. This section shall not be construed as  limiting the provisions of W.S. 1-21-1201 through 1-21-1210 .

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 159; R.S. 1887, § 3575; R.S. 1899, § 4486; C.S. 1910, § 5350; Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 1; C.S. 1920, § 6622; R.S. 1931, § 62-1702; C.S. 1945, § 14-1502; W.S. 1957, § 1-678; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1002; Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 2; 2005, ch. 90, § 1.

The 2005 amendment deleted “1-21-1101 or” before “1-21-1201 through 1-21-1210 .”

Laws 2005, ch. 90, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 24, 2005.

Nature of remedy. —

Forcible entry and detainer is a purely statutory remedy, summary in character and in derogation of the common law. Steffens v. Smith, 477 P.2d 119, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1970).

Proceedings under forcible entry and detainer may be had only in cases enumerated in this section, and if a case is not one of those enumerated, the jurisdiction will fail to attach and the proceeding will be coram non judice and void. Steffens v. Smith, 477 P.2d 119, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1970).

Hence, where a seller sought to recover realty from a buyer to whom he had sold the realty under a contract for deed and whom he had put in possession and buyer had defaulted in the terms of the contract, the case was not one of those specific examples set forth in this section, and the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to bring an action under this section. Steffens v. Smith, 477 P.2d 119, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1970).

No question of title. —

In none of the enumerated cases in this section can the title be disturbed or called into question. Jenkins v. Jeffrey, 3 Wyo. 669, 29 P. 186, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1892).

Forfeiture of lease for nonpayment of rent not provided for. —

Subsection (a)(i) of this section merely says that failure to pay rent gives a right of summary action for possession; it does not amount to statutory provision for forfeiture of a lease for nonpayment of rent. Durante v. Consumers Filling Station Co., 71 Wyo. 271, 257 P.2d 347, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1953).

And action barred by tender of rent made before action brought. —

In an action of forcible entry and detainer brought under this section for failure to pay rent for three days, a tender of the rent made before commencement of the action bars the action. Durante v. Consumers Filling Station Co., 71 Wyo. 271, 257 P.2d 347, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1953).

Petition in language of subsection (a)(iii) sufficient. —

A petition in an action of forcible entry and detainer is sufficient where it discloses in the language of subsection (a)(iii) of this section that the real estate involved in the case has been sold under a power of sale contained in a mortgage and further that possession of the premises has been duly demanded. Ferguson v. Haygood, 67 Wyo. 422, 225 P.2d 336, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1950); Hill v. Salmon, 69 Wyo. 1, 236 P.2d 518, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1951).

Insufficient complaint. —

An allegation that plaintiff is lessee and entitled to possession of the premises, which are withheld from his possession by defendants without right was insufficient as a complaint. White v. Veitch, 27 Wyo. 401, 197 P. 983, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1921).

No jurisdiction to restore premises to mortgage foreclosure purchaser. —

Justice court held without jurisdiction in forcible entry and detainer action to restore to purchaser at mortgage foreclosure sale premises occupied by debtor after latter filed petition under section in Bankruptcy Act regarding agricultural compositions and extensions, since it is a proceeding for recovering possession of land. In re Dickinson, 9 F. Supp. 227, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1197 (D. Wyo. 1934).

Applied in

Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Cited in

Allen v. Houn, 29 Wyo. 413, 213 P. 757, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1923); Church v. Blakesley, 39 Wyo. 434, 273 P. 541, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (1929).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Forcible entry and detainer as a remedy of tenant against stranger wrongfully interfering with his possession, 12 ALR2d 1192.

Right of landowner who has conveyed property to third person to maintain forcible detainer or similar summary possessory action, 47 ALR2d 1170.

Right of landlord legally entitled to possession to dispossess tenant without legal process, 6 ALR3d 177.

§ 1-21-1003. Notice to quit premises required.

The party desiring to commence an action for forcible entry or detainer must notify the adverse party to leave the premises involved. The notice shall be served at least three (3) days before commencing the action, by leaving a written copy with the defendant or at his usual place of abode or business if he cannot be found.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 160; R.S. 1887, § 3576; R.S. 1899, § 4487; C.S. 1910, § 5351; C.S. 1920, § 6623; R.S. 1931, § 62-1703; C.S. 1945, § 14-1503; W.S. 1957, § 1-679; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1003.

Rights under oral lease. —

While landlord was entitled to take possession of premises occupied by defaulting tenant from day to day under oral lease without giving notice, he was without right to take possession of tenant's personal property in the building, and petition alleging these facts stated cause of action for conversion. Day v. Smith, 46 Wyo. 515, 30 P.2d 786, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1934).

Cited in

Hirsch v. McNeill, 870 P.2d 1057, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Waiver of statutory demand-for-rent due or of notice-to-quit prerequisite of summary eviction of lessee for nonpayment of rent — modern cases, 31 ALR4th 1254.

§ 1-21-1004. Summons; service and return.

The summons shall state the cause of the complaint against the defendant, the time and place of trial and shall be served and returned as in other cases. Such service shall be not less than three (3) nor more than twelve (12) days before the day of trial set by the judge. The defendant shall not be required to file a written answer to the complaint as a condition of being allowed to participate fully in the trial.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 161; R.S. 1887, § 3577; R.S. 1899, § 4488; C.S. 1910, § 5352; C.S. 1920, § 6624; R.S. 1931, § 62-1704; C.S. 1945, § 14-1504; W.S. 1957, § 1-680; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1004; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2015, ch. 111, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to service and return of summons generally, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

The 2004 amendment substituted “judge” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, added the last sentence.

§ 1-21-1005. Proceedings when defendant fails to appear.

If the defendant does not appear in accordance with a properly served summons the circuit court shall try the action as though he were present. Before proceeding, the plaintiff shall file a complaint in which he relies in order to recover the premises. The complaint must be sustained by proof or the action dismissed.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 162; R.S. 1887, § 3578; R.S. 1899, § 4489; C.S. 1910, § 5353; C.S. 1920, § 6625; R.S. 1931, § 62-1705; C.S. 1945, § 14-1505; W.S. 1957, § 1-681; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1005; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Necessity of complaint. —

In forcible entry and detainer cases, filing of complaint describing property and facts upon which plaintiff relies in order to recover, as required by this section, is basis of the action, without which the justice is powerless to act. White v. Veitch, 27 Wyo. 401, 197 P. 983, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1921).

Petition liberally construed. —

Petition in action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer must be liberally construed. Hitshew v. Rosson, 41 Wyo. 509, 287 P. 316, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1930).

Sufficient complaint. —

Petition setting up facts, but containing no allegation of wrongful and unlawful withholding of possession, was sufficient. Hitshew v. Rosson, 41 Wyo. 509, 287 P. 316, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1930).

Insufficient complaint. —

A complaint alleging that plaintiff is lessee and entitled to possession of premises in controversy which are withheld from his possession by defendants without right, held insufficient as complaint for forcible entry and detainer. White v. Veitch, 27 Wyo. 401, 197 P. 983, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1921).

Cited in

Jenkins v. Jeffrey, 3 Wyo. 669, 29 P. 186, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (1892); Allen v. Houn, 29 Wyo. 413, 213 P. 757, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1923); Church v. Blakesley, 39 Wyo. 434, 273 P. 541, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (1929).

§ 1-21-1006. Proceedings when defendant appears.

The defendant may, but is not required to, file a written answer to the plaintiff’s complaint. Each party may be allowed to amend any complaint or answer the party files.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 163; R.S. 1887, § 3579; R.S. 1899, § 4490; C.S. 1910, § 5354; C.S. 1920, § 6626; R.S. 1931, § 62-1706; C.S. 1945, § 14-1506; W.S. 1957, § 1-682; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1006; 2015, ch. 111, § 1.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, rewrote the section, which formerly read: “If the defendant appears, a like complaint shall be admitted or denied in the answer of the defendant. Both parties may be allowed to amend. If no answer is made by the defendant, he may not offer evidence upon his part, but shall only be allowed to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses.”

Cited in

Jenkins v. Jeffrey, 3 Wyo. 669, 29 P. 186, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (1892).

§ 1-21-1007. Bond on granting continuance.

No continuance shall be granted the defendant for longer than two (2) days unless he gives a bond to the adverse party, with good and sufficient surety approved by the circuit court, conditioned for the payment of the rent that may accrue and costs if judgment is rendered against him.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 164; R.S. 1887, § 3580; R.S. 1899, § 4491; C.S. 1910, § 5355; Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 2; C.S. 1920, § 6627; R.S. 1931, § 62-1707; C.S. 1945, § 14-1507; W.S. 1957, § 1-683; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1007; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-1008. Trial by judge or jury; judgment and costs.

  1. If the action is not continued, the place  of trial changed or if neither party demands a jury, upon the return  day of the summons the circuit court shall try the action. If the  circuit court concludes that the complaint is not true, the court  shall enter judgment against the plaintiff for costs. If the court  finds the complaint true, it shall render a general judgment in favor  of the plaintiff for restitution of the premises and costs. If the  court finds the complaint true in part, it shall render judgment for  restitution of that part only and the costs shall be taxed as deemed  equitable.
  2. If the case is one based on failure to  pay rent, the court shall further find the amount of rent due and  payable at the time of the hearing, together with the terms and conditions  of the agreement between the parties in relation to the amount and  time of payment of rent. If the trial is by jury the verdict shall  contain a finding of these facts and the court shall recite such findings  in the docket entry of proceedings. The court, upon these findings,  in addition to entering judgment for the plaintiff to have restitution,  shall render judgment in accordance with the findings for the amount  of rent found due, together with costs and attorney’s fees as provided  by the lease, and shall issue execution separate from the writ of  restitution for the rent found due and costs as in other actions.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 165; R.S. 1887, § 3581; R.S. 1899, § 4492; C.S. 1910, § 5356; Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 3; C.S. 1920, § 6628; R.S. 1931, § 62-1708; C.S. 1945, § 14-1508; W.S. 1957, § 1-684; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1008; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2008, ch. 67, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” and “court” for “justice” throughout; and made related and stylistic changes.

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, in (b), substituted “the hearing” for “commencement of the action” in the first sentence, and inserted “and attorney's fees as provided by the lease” in the last sentence.

Provision for judgment for rent only applies if amount is within justice's jurisdictional limit. —

The provision which requires rendering a judgment for the amount of rent found due only applies when the amount of rent due is within the jurisdictional limitation of the justice of the peace to render judgment therefor. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Although finding may be made as to amount over limitation. —

If the direction to render a judgment for the amount of rent due is to be construed as mandatory in every case, even when that amount is in excess of the court's constitutional jurisdiction, then the statutory requirement for such a judgment would clearly be unconstitutional and void, but a mere finding of the amount of rent due, even though that amount be in excess of the jurisdictional judgment limitation, would not be constitutionally violative. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Should the amount of rent found due exceed the jurisdictional limitation of the justice of the peace, no judgment for rent would be rendered, but the finding of amount of rent due and the terms of the parties' agreement would be retained, since this insures that a successful plaintiff will receive full monetary protection during pendency of an appeal. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Jurisdictional limit in forcible entry and detainer actions. —

The $ 7,000.00 monetary jurisdictional limit that is set forth with respect to county courts applies only in those subparagraphs of § 5-5-131 (now see 5-9-128 ) articulating jurisdiction in which the legislature specifically reiterated the amount; thus, the county court had jurisdiction in a forcible entry and detainer action in which the amount of rent due exceeded $ 7,000. Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 1-21-1009. Trial by jury; verdict.

If a jury is demanded by either party, the proceedings shall be the same as in other cases until the empaneling thereof. If the jury finds the complaint true they shall render a general verdict against the defendant, and if untrue, a general verdict in favor of the defendant. If true in part, the verdict shall set forth the facts they find true.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 166; R.S. 1887, § 3582; R.S. 1899, § 4493; C.S. 1910, § 5357; C.S. 1920, § 6629; R.S. 1931, § 62-1709; C.S. 1945, § 14-1509; W.S. 1957, § 1-685; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1009.

Cross references. —

As to qualifications, selection and impaneling of jury, see § 1-11-101 et seq.

§ 1-21-1010. Judgment upon verdict.

The circuit court shall enter the verdict upon the docket and render judgment thereon.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 167; R.S. 1887, § 3583; R.S. 1899, § 4494; C.S. 1910, § 5358; C.S. 1920, § 6630; R.S. 1931, § 62-1710; C.S. 1945, § 14-1510; W.S. 1957, § 1-686; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1010; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice,” and “the docket” for “his docket.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-1011. Exceptions.

Exceptions to the opinion of the circuit court on questions of law or evidence may be taken by either party, whether tried by a jury or the court.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 168; R.S. 1887, § 3584; R.S. 1899, § 4495; C.S. 1910, § 5359; C.S. 1920, § 6631; R.S. 1931, § 62-1711; C.S. 1945, § 14-1511; W.S. 1957, § 1-687; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1011; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

§ 1-21-1012. Writ of restitution; issuance.

When a judgment of restitution is entered by a circuit court, the court shall, at the request of the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, issue a writ of restitution thereon.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 169; R.S. 1887, § 3585; R.S. 1899, § 4496; C.S. 1910, § 5360; C.S. 1920, § 6632; R.S. 1931, § 62-1712; C.S. 1945, § 14-1512; W.S. 1957, § 1-688; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1012; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “justice,” and “the court” for “he.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Cited in

Steffens v. Smith, 477 P.2d 119, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1970).

§ 1-21-1013. Writ of restitution; execution and return.

Unless the defendant takes an appeal, the officer shall execute the writ of restitution within two (2) days after receiving it, Sundays excepted, by restoring the plaintiff to possession of the premises. He shall levy and collect the execution for rent and costs and make return as upon other executions.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 170; R.S. 1887, § 3586; R.S. 1899, § 4497; C.S. 1910, § 5361; Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 4; C.S. 1920, § 6633; R.S. 1931, § 62-1713; C.S. 1945, § 14-1513; W.S. 1957, § 1-689; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1013.

§ 1-21-1014. Proceedings upon stay on appeal; bond required.

  1. If the officer receives notice from the  circuit court that the proceedings have been stayed on appeal, he  shall immediately delay all further proceedings upon execution and  writ of restitution. If the premises have been restored to the plaintiff  he shall immediately place the defendant in possession thereof and  return the writ and execution with his proceedings and costs taxed  thereon.
  2. An appeal by a defendant shall not stay  the proceedings on judgment unless within forty-eight (48) hours after  judgment, Sundays excepted, the appellant executes and files with  the court his bond to plaintiff, with two (2) or more sufficient sureties  approved by the court, conditioned that the appellant will pay all  costs which have accrued or may thereafter accrue and all damages  which plaintiff may have sustained or may thereafter sustain in consequence  of the wrongful detention of the premises during the pendency of the  appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the bond, all further proceedings  in the case shall be stayed and the appellate court shall thereafter  issue all writs and processes to carry out the judgment of the appellate  court. The court in which the appeal is pending may require a new  bond in a larger amount, with sureties approved by the appellate court,  if deemed necessary to secure the rights of the parties.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 171; R.S. 1887, § 3587; R.S. 1899, § 4498; C.S. 1910, § 5362; Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 5; C.S. 1920, § 6634; R.S. 1931, § 62-1714; C.S. 1945, § 14-1514; W.S. 1957, § 1-690; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1014; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (a), substituted “circuit court” for “justice”; and in (b) twice substituted “court” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Stated in

Kost v. Thatch, 782 P.2d 230, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 222 (Wyo. 1989).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Circumstances in which indefinite stay of proceedings in federal civil case constitutes abuse of discretion or is otherwise unlawful, 150 ALR Fed 577.

§ 1-21-1015. Rents to be deposited on appeal.

  1. In appeals from the judgment of a circuit  court for rents due and payable, in addition to the bond required  by W.S. 1-21-1014 , the appellant shall deposit with the court the amount  of rent specified in the judgment. Unless the deposit is made, the  appeal is not perfected and proceedings upon the judgment shall be  had accordingly. If the appeal is perfected, the court shall transmit  the deposit to the clerk of the appellate court with the papers in  the case.
  2. Thereafter, when the rents become due,  the appellant shall deposit them with the clerk of the appellate court.  If at any time during the pendency of the appeal and before final  judgment the appellant fails to make any deposit of rent at the time  specified in the judgment appealed, the court in which such appeal  is pending shall, upon such fact being made to appear, and upon motion  and proof of such fact by the appellee, the appellate court shall  affirm the judgment appealed from with costs. Proceedings shall thereupon  be had as in like cases determined upon the merits and the rent money  deposited paid to the plaintiff or his assignee upon order of the  court.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 71, § 173; R.S. 1887, § 3589; R.S. 1899, § 4497; C.S. 1910, § 5363; Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 6; C.S. 1920, § 6635; R.S. 1931, § 62-1715; C.S. 1945, § 14-1515; W.S. 1957, § 1-691; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1015; Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (a), substituted “circuit court” for “justice,” and twice substituted “court” for “justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Full rental value for entire period assured if successful on appeal. —

Even though by appeal the party decreed restitution may be deprived of possession until final judgment, if ultimately successful, such a party is assured of receiving the full rental value found for the entire period during which possession will have been unlawfully withheld. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Cited in

Steffens v. Smith, 477 P.2d 119, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1970).

§ 1-21-1016. Ejectment not barred.

The pendency of an action for forcible entry or detainer does not bar an action of ejectment.

History. Laws 1913, ch. 112, § 6; C.S. 1920, § 6636; R.S. 1931, § 62-1716; C.S. 1945, § 14-1516; W.S. 1957, § 1-692; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-22-1016.

Cross references. —

As to actions of ejectment, see §§ 1-32-201 to 1-32-216 .

Cited in

Jenkins v. Jeffrey, 3 Wyo. 669, 29 P. 186, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (1892); Allen v. Houn, 29 Wyo. 413, 213 P. 757, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1923).

1-21-1017. Corporate and business representation in proceedings.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to subsection (c) of this section, a business entity may represent itself without an attorney in any proceedings under this article that the business entity commences or is required to respond to or participate in, provided that:
    1. The business entity is represented by an owner, shareholder, member or partner;
    2. The business entity owns a majority interest in the lands or tenements subject to the alleged unlawful and forcible entry;
    3. The person representing the business entity may litigate actions on behalf of the business entity without an attorney, provided that if an attorney appears on behalf of the business entity, the opposing party is entitled to a continuance for the purpose of obtaining an attorney of its own; and
    4. The business entity provides notice in writing to the court and all parties to the proceedings that it is being represented by an owner, shareholder, member or partner. The notice shall be signed by every owner, shareholder, member or partner of the business entity.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule, any person who represents a business entity in an action or proceeding under this article in accordance with the provisions of this section shall not be deemed to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, provided that the person complies with the provisions of W.S. 33-5-117 .
  3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any business entity that is seeking a judgment exceeding the amount specified in W.S. 1-21-201 in any action under this article.

History. Laws 2021, ch. 143, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 143, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2021.

Article 11. Replevin

§ 1-21-1101. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 90, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from C.L. 1876, ch. 71, Part I, § 106, provided that generally circuit courts have jurisdiction of actions for the recovery of specific personal property.

Laws 2005, ch. 90, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 24, 2005.

§§ 1-21-1102 through 1-21-1116. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 4.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from C.L. 1876, ch. 71, part I, §§ 107 through 109 and 111 through 121, and Laws 1973, ch. 173, § 1, related to replevin. For present similar provisions, see §§ 1-15-301 through 1-15-306 .

Article 12. Residential Rental Property

Law reviews. —

For article, “Wyoming's Residential Rental Property Act — A Critical Review,” see XXXV Land & Water L. Rev. 455 (2000).

§ 1-21-1201. Definitions.

  1. As used in this article:
    1. “Owner” means the owner, lessor or sublessor  of a residential rental unit and for purposes of notice and other  communication required or allowed under this article, “owner” includes  a managing agent, leasing agent or resident manager unless the agent  or manager specifies otherwise in writing in the rental agreement;
    2. “Rental agreement” means any agreement,  written or oral, which establishes or modifies the terms, conditions,  rules or any other provisions regarding the use and occupancy of a  residential rental unit;
    3. “Renter” means any renter, lessee, tenant  or other person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a residential  rental unit to the exclusion of others;
    4. “Residential rental unit” means a renter’s  principal place of residence and includes the appurtenances, grounds,  common areas and facilities held out for the occupancy of the residential  renter generally and any other area or facility provided to the renter  in the rental agreement, excluding a mobile home lot or recreational  property rented on an occasional basis;
    5. “Termination” means the lawful ending  or cessation of a rental agreement for any reason including expiration  of the rental period, voluntary termination by mutual agreement of  the parties, termination in accordance with W.S. 1-21-1203(d), abandonment of the leased premises by the renter prior  to expiration of the rental period or termination resulting from court  order.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Illustrative cases.—

There was no basis for granting renewed motions filed by an LLC that owned real property and an LLC that managed the property, seeking judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur of a jury verdict awarding a tenant who suffered carbon monoxide poisoning and was found to be 10% at fault for her injury $3 million in compensatory damages, $3 million in punitive damages against the LLC that owned the property, and $22.5 million against the LLC that managed the property; the court properly instructed the jury that the Wyoming Residential Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1201 et seq., established a new standard of reasonable conduct in cases involving personal injuries occurring on rental property. Lompe v. Sunridge Partners, LLC, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153371 (D. Wyo. 2014).

Cited in

Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (2004).

§ 1-21-1202. Duties of owners and renters; generally.

  1. Each owner and his agent renting or leasing  a residential rental unit shall maintain that unit in a safe and sanitary  condition fit for human habitation. Each residential rental unit shall  have operational electrical, heating and plumbing, with hot and cold  running water unless otherwise agreed upon in writing by both parties.  Provided, however, this section shall not prevent the rental of seasonal  rental units such as summer cabins which are not intended to have  such amenities.
  2. Each renter shall cooperate in maintaining  his residential rental unit in accordance with this article.
  3. This article does not apply to breakage,  malfunctions or other conditions which do not materially affect the  physical health or safety of the ordinary renter.
  4. Any duty or obligation in this article  may be assigned to a different party or modified by explicit written  agreement signed by the parties.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

Residential Rental Property Act changed the common law. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-21-1202 and 1-21-1203 are directly contrary to the common law rule that a landlord owed no duty to a tenant for dangerous or defective conditions of the premises. The Residential Rental Property Act clearly and unequivocally changed the common law by requiring landlords to provide rental premises that are reasonably safe, sanitary, and fit for human habitation. Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2004).

Duty on landlords establishes standard of reasonable care. —

Residential Rental Property Act establishes a new standard of conduct in cases involving personal injuries occurring on rental property — a standard of reasonable care under all of the circumstances. Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2004).

§ 1-21-1203. Owner's duties; notice by renter of noncompliance; duty to correct; exceptions; termination of rental agreement; liability limited.

  1. To protect the physical health and safety  of the renter, each owner shall:
    1. Not rent the residential rental unit unless  it is reasonably safe, sanitary and fit for human occupancy;
    2. Maintain common areas of the residential  rental unit in a sanitary and reasonably safe condition;
    3. Maintain electrical systems, plumbing,  heating and hot and cold water; and
    4. Maintain other appliances and facilities  as specifically contracted in the rental agreement.
  2. If the renter is current on all payments  required by the rental agreement and has reasonable cause supported  by evidence to believe the residential rental unit does not comply  with the standards for health and safety required under this article,  the renter shall advise the owner in writing of the condition and  specify the remedial action the renter requests be taken by the owner.  Within a reasonable time after receipt of this notice, the owner shall  either commence action to correct the condition of the residential  rental unit or notify the renter in writing that the owner disputes  the renter’s claim. The notices required by this subsection shall  be served by certified mail or in the manner specified by W.S. 1-21-1003 .
  3. The owner shall not be required to correct  or remedy any condition caused by the renter, the renter’s family  or the renter’s guests or invitees by inappropriate use or misuse  of the property during the rental term or any extension of it.
  4. The owner may refuse to correct the condition  of the residential rental unit and terminate the rental agreement  if the costs of repairs exceeds an amount which would be reasonable  in light of the rent charged, the nature of the rental property or  rental agreement. If the owner refuses to correct the condition and  intends to terminate the rental agreement, he shall notify the renter  in writing within a reasonable time after receipt of the notice of  noncompliance and shall provide the renter with sufficient time to  find substitute housing, which shall be no less than ten (10) days  nor more than twenty (20) days from the date of the notice. If the  rental agreement is terminated, the rent paid shall be prorated to  the date the renter vacates the unit and any balance shall be refunded  to the renter along with any deposit due in accordance with W.S. 1-21-1208 .
  5. The owner is not liable under this article  for claims for mental suffering or anguish.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

Residential Rental Property Act changed the common law. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-21-1202 and 1-21-1203 are directly contrary to the common law rule that a landlord owed no duty to a tenant for dangerous or defective conditions of the premises. The Residential Rental Property Act clearly and unequivocally changed the common law by requiring landlords to provide rental premises that are reasonably safe, sanitary, and fit for human habitation. Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2004).

Lack of written notice did not bar personal injury action. —

Tenant's failure to provide her landlord with written notice of a broken step, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1203(b), did not preclude a visitor's personal injury claim. The remedies provision of the Residential Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1206 , is exclusive to cases in which corrective action is sought and does not apply in personal injury actions. Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2004).

Limitations of remedies.—

Wyoming statute allowed costs, damages and affirmative relief, including judicial termination of rental agreement for failure to maintain heating, but Wyoming statute further provides that an owner is not liable for claims for mental suffering or anguish. Accordingly, Wyoming does not provide for civil penalties that would have put an apartment management company on notice that failure to maintain the furnaces could subject it to punitive damages of the magnitude awarded by the jury. Lompe v. Sunridge Partners, LLC, 818 F.3d 1041, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6053 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2016).

§ 1-21-1204. Renter's duties.

  1. Each renter shall:
    1. Maintain the residential rental unit occupied  in a clean and safe condition and not unreasonably burden any common  area;
    2. Dispose of all garbage and other waste  in a clean and safe manner;
    3. Maintain all plumbing fixtures in a condition  as sanitary as the fixtures permit;
    4. Use all electrical, plumbing, sanitary,  heating and other facilities and appliances in a reasonable manner;
    5. Occupy the residential rental unit in  the manner for which it was designed and shall not increase the number  of occupants above that specified in the rental agreement without  written permission of the owner;
    6. Be current on all payments required by  the rental agreement;
    7. Comply with all lawful requirements of  the rental agreement between the owner and the renter; and
    8. Remove all property and garbage either  owned or placed within the residential rental unit by the renter or  his guests prior to termination of the rental agreement and clean  the rental unit to the condition at the beginning of the rental agreement.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Cited in

Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (2004).

§ 1-21-1205. Prohibited acts by renter.

  1. No renter shall:
    1. Intentionally or negligently destroy,  deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the residential rental  unit or knowingly permit any person to do so;
    2. Interfere with another person’s peaceful  enjoyment of the residential property; or
    3. Unreasonably deny access to, refuse entry  to or withhold consent to enter the residential rental unit to the  owner, agent or manager for the purpose of making repairs to or inspecting  the unit, and showing the unit for rent or sale.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Cited in

Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (2004).

§ 1-21-1206. Renter's remedies; notice to owner or agent; judicial remedy; rights under termination of rental agreement.

  1. The remedies set forth in this section  are available to a renter in compliance with all provisions of W.S. 1-21-1204 and 1-21-1205 when the rental agreement has not been lawfully terminated  pursuant to W.S. 1-21-1203(d).
  2. If a reasonable time has elapsed after  the renter has served written notice on the owner under W.S. 1-21-1203 and the owner has failed to respond or to correct the  condition described in the notice, the renter may cause a “notice  to repair or correct condition” to be prepared and served on the owner  by certified mail or in the manner specified by W.S. 1-21-1003 . This notice shall:
    1. Recite the previous notice served under W.S. 1-21-1203 (b);
    2. State the number of days that have elapsed  since the notice was served and that under the circumstances the period  of time constitutes the reasonable time allowed under W.S. 1-21-1203(b);
    3. State the conditions included in the previous  notice which have not been corrected;
    4. Demand that the uncorrected conditions  be corrected; and
    5. State that if the owner fails to commence  reasonable corrective action within three (3) days he will seek redress  in the courts.
  3. If the owner has not corrected or used  due diligence to correct the conditions following notice under this  section, or if the owner has notified the renter that the claim is  disputed, the renter may commence a civil action in circuit court.  The court shall endorse on the summons the number of days within which  the owner is required to appear and defend the action, which shall  not be less than three (3) nor more than twenty (20) days from the  date of service. Upon a showing of an unreasonable refusal to correct  or the failure to use due diligence to correct a condition described  in this article, the renter may be awarded costs, damages and affirmative  relief as determined by the court. Damages awarded to the renter may  include rent improperly retained or collected. Affirmative relief  may include a declaration terminating the rental agreement, or an  order directing the owner to make reasonable repairs.
  4. If the court terminates the rental agreement  pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the renter is entitled  to receive a refund of the balance of the rent and the deposit on  the rental unit within thirty (30) days of the date the agreement  is ordered terminated. The renter shall be required to vacate the  rental unit no sooner than ten (10) days nor later than twenty (20)  days after termination of the rental agreement by a court.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (c), substituted “circuit court” for “county or justice of the peace court.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Limitations of remedies.—

Wyoming statute allowed costs, damages and affirmative relief, including judicial termination of rental agreement for failure to maintain heating, but Wyoming statute further provides that an owner is not liable for claims for mental suffering or anguish. Accordingly, Wyoming does not provide for civil penalties that would have put an apartment management company on notice that failure to maintain the furnaces could subject it to punitive damages of the magnitude awarded by the jury. Lompe v. Sunridge Partners, LLC, 818 F.3d 1041, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6053 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2016).

Lack of written notice did not bar personal injury action. —

Tenant's failure to provide her landlord with written notice of a broken step, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1203(b), did not preclude a visitor's personal injury claim. The remedies provision of the Residential Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1206 , is exclusive to cases in which corrective action is sought and does not apply in personal injury actions. Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2004).

§ 1-21-1207. Required notice of nonrefundable deposit.

Any rental agreement shall state whether any portion of a deposit is nonrefundable and written notice of this fact shall also be provided to the renter at the time the deposit is taken by the owner or his designated agent.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

Cited in

Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (2004).

§ 1-21-1208. Deductions from deposit; written itemization; time limits; failure to give notice; recovery by renter; utilities deposit; penalty.

  1. Upon termination of the rental agreement,  property or money held as a deposit may be applied by the owner or  his agent to the payment of accrued rent, damages to the residential  rental unit beyond reasonable wear and tear, the cost to clean the  unit to the condition at the beginning of the rental agreement and  to other costs provided by any contract. The balance of any deposit  and prepaid rent and a written itemization of any deductions from  the deposit together with reasons therefor, shall be delivered or  mailed without interest to the renter within thirty (30) days after  termination of the rental agreement or within fifteen (15) days after  receipt of the renter’s new mailing address, whichever is later. If  there is damage to the residential rental unit, this period shall  be extended by thirty (30) days. The renter shall within thirty (30)  days of termination of the rental agreement, notify the owner or designated  agent of the location where payment and notice may be made or mailed.
  2. After termination of the rental agreement,  property or money held and separately identified as a utilities deposit  shall be refunded by the owner to the renter within ten (10) days  of a satisfactory showing that all utility charges incurred by the  renter have been paid. Absent such showing within forty-five (45)  days of termination, the owner shall within fifteen (15) days thereafter,  apply the utilities deposit to the outstanding utility debt incurred  by the renter. Any refund due to the renter shall be paid within seven  (7) days after the utility deposit has been applied to the renter’s  utility debt, or within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the renter’s  new mailing address, whichever is later.
  3. If the owner of a residential rental unit  or his agent unreasonably fails to comply with subsection (a) or (b)  of this section, the renter may recover the full deposit and court  costs. In an action by a renter pursuant to this section, if the owner  is the prevailing party and the court finds the renter acted unreasonably  in bringing the action, the owner may be awarded court costs in addition  to any other relief available.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

§ 1-21-1209. Holder of owner's interest bound by provisions.

The holder of the interest of the owner or designated agent in the residential rental unit at the time of termination of the rental agreement shall be bound by the provisions of W.S. 1-21-1207 and 1-21-1208 .

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

§ 1-21-1210. Possession of premises and disposition of personal property abandoned by renter after termination of rental agreement.

  1. Upon regaining lawful possession of the  rental unit following termination of the rental agreement, the owner  may immediately dispose of any trash or property the owner reasonably  believes to be hazardous, perishable or valueless and abandoned. Any  property remaining within the rental unit after termination of the  rental agreement shall be presumed to be both valueless and abandoned.  Any valuable property may be removed from the residential rental unit  and shall thereafter be disposed of as follows:
    1. The owner shall provide written notice  to the renter in accordance with this paragraph, describing the property  claimed to be abandoned and stating that the property shall be disposed  of after seven (7) days from the date of service of the notice if  the renter or his agent does not, within the seven (7) day period,  take possession of the property or notify the owner in writing of  the renter’s intent to take possession of the property. The notice  provided by the owner under this paragraph shall be deemed served:
      1. On the date the notice is mailed by certified  mail to the renter at an address furnished to the owner by the renter  in writing specifically for this purpose;
      2. On the date notice is served on the renter  in accordance with Rule 4 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure  provided a copy of the written notice is delivered to the individual  renter personally; or
      3. On the date the notice is published in  a newspaper published in the county or widely circulated in the county  where the residential rental unit is located.
    2. If the owner does not receive a written  response from the renter within seven (7) days after service of notice  under paragraph (i) of this subsection, the property shall be conclusively  deemed abandoned and the owner may retain or dispose of the property;
    3. If the renter responds in writing to the  owner on or before seven (7) days after service of notice under paragraph  (i) of this subsection that he intends to take possession of the property,  the property shall be held for an additional period of seven (7) days  after the written response is received. If the renter fails to take  possession of the property within the additional fifteen (15) day  period, the property shall be conclusively deemed abandoned and the  owner may retain or dispose of the property.
  2. The owner is entitled to payment of storage  costs for the period the property remains in safekeeping plus the  cost of removal of the property to the place of storage. An owner  shall be allowed reasonable storage costs if he stores the property  himself or actual storage costs if the property is stored commercially.  Payment of storage costs shall be made before the renter removes the  property.
  3. The owner is not responsible for any loss  to the renter resulting from storage.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

Cited in

Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (2004).

§ 1-21-1211. Owner's remedies; eviction; judicial remedies; damages.

  1. If the renter does not vacate the premises  as required by a court order issued pursuant to W.S. 1-21-1001 et seq., the sheriff may remove the renter’s possessions  and prevent the renter from reentering the premises without further  action by the court.
  2. If the renter damages the rental property,  the owner may apply any property or money held as a deposit to the  payment of damages as provided in W.S. 1-21-1208(a) and the renter shall remain liable for any damages beyond  the damages paid by the deposit, plus interest at ten percent (10%)  per annum on any unpaid amounts. The owner may take any legal action  available to recover damages caused to the unit by the renter.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 198, § 1.

Cited in

Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (2004).

Article 13. Wyoming Safe Homes Act

Effective dates. —

Laws 2011, ch. 189, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

§ 1-21-1301. Short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the “Wyoming Safe Homes Act.”

History. Laws 2011, ch. 189, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “[t]his act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-21-1302(v).

§ 1-21-1302. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Domestic abuse” means as defined in W.S. 35-21-102(a)(iii);
    2. “Landlord” means the owner of a building  or the owner’s agent with regard to matters concerning the landlord’s  renting or leasing of a dwelling;
    3. “Sexual violence” means any act of sexual  assault, sexual abuse or stalking of an adult or minor, including  any nonconsensual sexual contact or intrusion as those terms are defined  in the Wyoming Criminal Code;
    4. “Tenant” means a person who has entered  into an oral or written lease with a landlord whereby the person is  the lessee under the lease;
    5. “This act” means W.S. 1-21-1301 through 1-21-1304 .

History. Laws 2011, ch. 189, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-21-1303. Breach of lease; recovery of rent; affirmative defense.

  1. In any action brought by a landlord against  a tenant to recover rent for breach of lease, the tenant shall have  an affirmative defense and not be liable for rent for the period after  which a tenant vacates the premises owned by the landlord and covered  by the lease, if by a preponderance of the evidence, the court finds  that:
    1. At the time the tenant vacated the premises,  the tenant or a member of the tenant’s household was under a credible  imminent threat of domestic abuse or sexual violence at the premises,  as demonstrated by medical, court or police evidence of domestic abuse  or sexual violence; and
    2. The tenant gave seven (7) days written  notice to the landlord prior to vacating the premises stating that  the reason for vacating the premises was because of a credible imminent  threat of domestic abuse or sexual violence against the tenant or  a member of the tenant’s household.
  2. In any action brought by a landlord against  a tenant to recover rent for breach of lease, the tenant shall have  an affirmative defense and not be liable for rent for the period after  which a tenant vacates the premises owned by the landlord and covered  by the lease, if by a preponderance of the evidence, the court finds  that:
    1. The tenant or a member of the tenant’s  household was a victim of domestic abuse or sexual violence on the  premises that are owned or controlled by the landlord and the tenant  has vacated the premises as a result of the sexual violence;
    2. The tenant gave seven (7) days written  notice to the landlord prior to vacating the premises stating that  the reason for vacating the premises was because of the domestic abuse  or sexual violence against the tenant or a member of the tenant’s  household, the date of the sexual violence, and that the tenant provided  medical, court or police evidence of domestic abuse or sexual violence  to the landlord supporting the claim of domestic abuse or sexual violence;  and
    3. The domestic abuse or sexual violence  occurred not more than sixty (60) days prior to the date of giving  the written notice to the landlord, or if circumstances are such that  the tenant could not reasonably give notice within that time period  because of reasons related to the domestic abuse or sexual violence,  including, but not limited to, hospitalization or seeking assistance  for shelter or counseling, then as soon thereafter as practicable.
  3. A landlord may not terminate a tenancy  based solely on the tenant’s or applicant’s or a household member’s  status as a victim of domestic abuse or sexual violence. This subsection  does not prohibit adverse housing decisions based upon other lawful  factors within the landlord’s knowledge.
  4. Nothing in this act shall be construed  to be a defense against:
    1. An action for recovery of rent for the  period of time before the tenant vacated the landlord’s premises and  gave notice to the landlord as required in this section; or
    2. Forcible entry and detainer for failure  to pay rent before the tenant gave notice to the landlord as required  in this section and vacated the premises.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 189, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “[t]his act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-21-1302(v).

§ 1-21-1304. Prohibition of waiver or modification.

The provisions of this act shall not be waived or modified in any lease or separate agreement between a landlord and tenant.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 189, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “[t]his act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-21-1302(v).

Chapter 22 Adoption

Cross references. —

For provisions prohibiting special laws for adoption of children, see art. 3, § 27, Wyo. Const.

For interstate compact on placement of children, see §§ 14-5-101 through 14-5-108 .

As to reports of adoption required to be filed with state registrar of vital records, see § 35-1-416 .

As to issuance of new birth certificate following adoption, see § 35-1-417 .

Editor's notes. —

Sections 1-23-101 to 1-23-124, which were enacted by § 1, ch. 188, Laws 1977, and which related to adoptions, have been deleted, and the provisions which were enacted as §§ 1-726.1 to 1-726.14, W.S. 1957, by § 1, ch. 187, Laws 1977, have been inserted in their place and renumbered as §§ 1-22-101 to 1-22-114 , respectively.

Termination of parental rights. —

In an adoption proceeding, the provisions regarding termination of parental rights found in this article control over the more general provisions for the termination of parental rights found in the paternity statutes. GWJ v. MH (In re BGH), 930 P.2d 371, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1996).

Law reviews. —

See “Adoption Without Parental Consent, to Better the Children's Welfare,” 7 Wyo. L.J. 41.

For a note, “Administrative Problems Relating to Adoption,” see 8 Wyo. L.J. 210.

See comment, “The Wyoming Juvenile Court Act of 1971,” VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 237 (1973).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption § 1 et seq.

79 Am. Jur. 2d Welfare Laws § 19, 20.

Annulment or vacation of adoption decree by adopting parent or natural parent consenting to adoption, 2 ALR2d 887.

Mental illness and the like of parents as grounds for adoption of their children, 45 ALR2d 1379.

Race as factor in adoption proceedings, 54 ALR2d 909.

Age of prospective adopting parents as factor in adoption proceedings, 56 ALR2d 823.

Conflict of laws as to contract to adopt, 81 ALR2d 1128.

Who, other than natural or adopting parents, or heirs of the latter, may collaterally attack adoption decree, 92 ALR2d 813.

Requirements as to residence or domicile of adoptee or adoptive parent for purposes of adoption, 33 ALR3d 176.

Religion as a factor in adoption proceedings, 48 ALR3d 383.

Validity and enforcement of agreement by foster parents that they will not attempt to adopt foster child, 78 ALR3d 770.

Restricting access to judicial records of concluded adoption proceedings, 83 ALR3d 800.

Restricting access to judicial records of pending adoption proceedings, 83 ALR3d 824.

Grandparents' visitation rights, 90 ALR3d 222.

Modern status of law as to equitable adoption or adoption by estoppel, 97 ALR3d 347.

Admissibility of social worker's expert testimony on child custody issues, 1 ALR4th 837.

Validity of agreement to pay expenses attendant on birth of child on condition that natural parents consent to adoption of child, 43 ALR4th 935.

Required parties in adoption proceedings, 48 ALR4th 860.

Action for wrongful adoption based on misrepresentation of child's mental or physical condition or parentage, 56 ALR4th 375.

Validity and construction of surrogate parenting agreement, 77 ALR4th 70.

Liability of public or private agency or its employees to prospective adoptive parents in contract or tort for failure to complete arrangement for adoption, 8 ALR5th 860.

Attorney malpractice in connection with services related to adoption of child, 18 ALR5th 892.

Adoption of child by same-sex partners, 27 ALR5th 54.

2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 1 et seq.

Article 1. In General

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Rights of unwed father to obstruct adoption of his child by withholding consent, 61 ALR5th 151.

2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons §§ 1 to 112.

§ 1-22-101. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Agency” means any person legally empowered  to place children for adoption or a certified private child welfare  agency or the department of family services;
    2. “Child” means the minor person to be adopted;
    3. “Parent” means the child’s father or mother  whose parental rights have not been judicially terminated;
    4. “Putative father” means the alleged or  reputed father of a child born out of wedlock, whether or not the  paternity rights and obligations of the father have been judicially  determined;
    5. “This act” means W.S. 1-22-101 through 1-22-114 .

History. Laws 1963, ch. 59, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-707.1, 1-726.1; Laws 1977, ch. 187, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

As to certified child care facilities, see §§ 14-3-206 to 14-3-209 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

“Parent” defined. —

The father is the parent intended under the provision of the former section, but where he has abandoned the child he relinquishes all claims and the mother becomes the parent within the meaning of the word “parent.” Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1893).

“Abandonment” defined. —

Abandonment imparts any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child and involves more than mere temporary absence or temporary neglect of parental duty. In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1948), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Official declaration of paternity not relevant to contested adoption cases. —

The putative father had standing to contest the adoption and had established a claim to paternity as required by § 1-22-108 (c)(i), although he failed to establish his paternity within three years of the child's birth, as required by § 14-2-105. The explicit standing requirement of § 1-22-108 must control in the adoption context. Moreover, when the legislature defined “putative father” to include an alleged father “whether or not the paternity rights and obligations of the father have been judicially determined” (subsection (a)(iv)), it clearly indicated that an official declaration of paternity was not relevant to contested adoption cases. In re Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 521 (Wyo. 1986).

Equitable adoption. —

The Supreme Court declined to apply the doctrine of equitable adoption to affect the distribution of a testate estate, as adoption and probate are both statutory procedures, with formalities designed to ensure certainty, and where neither the applicable statutes nor the last will and testament were ambiguous, neither legislative intent nor testamentary intent depended upon a resort to equity. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 2003 WY 119, 76 P.3d 1236, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2003).

Applied in

BDR v. BEB, 888 P.2d 216, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1995).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Admissibility of expert testimony regarding questions of domestic law, 66 ALR5th 135.

Grandparents' visitation rights where child's parents are deceased, or where status of parents is unspecified, 69 ALR5th 1.

Grandparents' visitation rights where child's parents are living, 71 ALR5th 99.

“Wrongful adoption” causes of action against adoption agencies where children have or develop mental or physical problems that are misrepresented or not disclosed to adoptive parents, 74 ALR5th 1.

§ 1-22-102. Persons subject to adoption.

  1. Any child may be adopted who is within  this state when the petition for adoption is filed.
  2. Any adult may be adopted, regardless of  his residence within or outside of this state at the time the petition  is filed, provided:
    1. The adopting parent was a stepparent,  grandparent or other blood relative, foster parent or legal guardian  who participated in the raising of the adult when the adult was a  child; and
    2. The adult files a consent to the adoption  with the court.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 59, § 2; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-707.2, 1-726.2; Laws 1977, ch. 187, § 1; 2009, ch. 65, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, designated the existing paragraph as (a) and added (b), and substituted “child” for “person” preceding “may be adopted” in (a).

Child's domicile when petition filed as relevant element. —

This state is the proper forum for an adoption proceeding where the adoptive parents reside in the state and the child is domiciled within the state at the time the petition for adoption is filed, even though the natural mother is domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction which is also the birthplace of the child. In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Marital or sexual relationship between parties as affecting right to adopt, 42 ALR4th 776.

§ 1-22-103. Adopting parties.

Any adult person who has resided in this state during the sixty (60) days immediately preceding the filing of the petition for adoption and who is determined by the court to be fit and competent to be a parent may adopt in accordance with this act.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 59, § 3; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-703.3, 1-726.3; Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 187, § 1; 1986, ch. 118, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-22-101(a)(v).

Quoted in

In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Age of prospective adoptive parent as factor in adoption proceedings, 84 ALR3d 665.

Library References.

Family Law and Practice § 64.07 (Matthew Bender).

§ 1-22-104. Petition for adoption of minor; by whom filed; requisites, confidential nature; inspection; separate journal to be kept.

  1. Adoption proceedings shall be commenced  by a petition filed in district court. The district court may transfer  jurisdiction of a petition to adopt a child to the juvenile court  if the child proposed for adoption in the petition is under the prior  and continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
  2. A petition may be filed by any single  adult or jointly by a husband and wife who maintain their home together,  or by either the husband or wife if the other spouse is a parent of  the child.
  3. The following documents shall be filed  with every petition to adopt a child:
    1. The appropriate consent to adoption pursuant  to W.S. 1-22-109 ;
    2. Any relinquishments as provided by W.S. 1-22-109 necessary to show the court that the person or agency  legally authorized to have custody and control of the child prior  to the adoption, has duly relinquished the child to the petitioners  for adoption;
    3. A report of the medical examination of  the child made by a licensed Wyoming physician within thirty (30)  days immediately preceding the filing of the petition to adopt. The  report shall be made on forms provided by the department of family  services. A medical report shall not be required when a parent of  the child joins in the petition to adopt or when the child resided  with the adoptive parents for more than six (6) months prior to filing  the petition;
    4. An affidavit from each petitioner setting  forth:
      1. Any previous or current diagnosed psychiatric  disorders of the petitioner;
      2. All felony convictions of the petitioner  within the preceding ten (10) years;
      3. All misdemeanor convictions of the petitioner  within the preceding five (5) years;
      4. The current parole or probation status  of the petitioner, if any.
    5. An affidavit stating the name or names of persons awarded visitation rights to the child under W.S. 20-7-101 or 20-7-102 or an affidavit stating that no visitation rights under W.S. 20-7-101 or 20-7-102 have been awarded in regard to the child;
    6. A form prescribed and furnished by the state registrar of vital records. The form shall be completed to the extent possible with the information required under W.S. 35-1-416 (a) including:
      1. The name of the child prior to adoption;
      2. Sex;
      3. Date of birth;
      4. Place of birth;
      5. Birth certificate number;
      6. Natural mother’s full maiden name; and
      7. Natural father’s full name.
  4. The petition and documents filed pursuant to this section, and the interlocutory decree, if entered, and the final decree of adoption shall constitute a confidential file and shall be available for inspection only to the judge, or, by order of court, to the parties to the proceedings or their attorneys, except as provided in W.S. 35-1-416 . Upon the entry of the final decree of adoption, all records in the proceedings shall be sealed and may be available for inspection only by order of court for good cause shown. The court may order inspection of all or part of the confidential file in adoption proceedings only if it appears to the court that the welfare and best interests of the child will be served by the inspection.
  5. The court may order inspection of all  or any part of the confidential file upon a proper motion made pursuant  to W.S. 1-22-203 (b). Any order permitting inspection under this subsection  shall preserve the anonymity of the natural parents, the adoptive  parents and the child and shall provide that the inspection is subject  to the provisions of W.S. 1-22-203 . Documents filed pursuant to W.S. 1-22-203(b) or this subsection shall become part of the confidential  file.
  6. For purposes of this section, “convicted”  includes pleas of guilty, nolo contendere, verdicts of guilty upon  which a judgment of conviction may be rendered and dispositions pursuant  to W.S. 7-13-301 and 35-7-1037 .

History. Laws 1955, ch. 184, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-708, 1-726.4; Laws 1959, ch. 45, § 1; 1963, ch. 59, § 4; 1965, ch. 39, § 1; 1973, ch. 91, § 1; ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 187, § 1; 1983, ch. 14, § 1; 1987, ch. 178, § 1; 1991, ch. 125, § 2; ch. 161, § 3; 1999, ch. 111, § 1; 2007, ch. 127, § 1; 2009, ch. 196, § 1; 2018, ch. 22, § 1; 2019, ch. 24, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added (c)(v).

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added the second sentence in (a).

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added (c)(vi); and in (d), added “except as provided in W.S. 35-1-416 ” at the end of the first sentence.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in (d), deleted the third sentence, which read: “The clerk of court shall maintain a separate journal for adoption proceedings to be confidential and available for inspection only by order of the court for good cause shown.”

Common law. —

At the common law adoption was unknown. In re Cadwell's Estate, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1920).

Adoption is statutory and statute must be conformed to. —

Adoption is entirely statutory, and the proceedings must be conducted in substantial conformity with the provisions of the statute. In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1948), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Stepfather held “related to the child to be adopted.” —

A stepfather whose wife had died before his petition for adoption of minor stepdaughter was filed was considered related by marriage to the stepdaughter at the time of his petition within the exception of this section which states that a medical report shall not be required in an adoption proceeding where one or both of the adopting parents is related to the child by either blood or marriage. Adoption of Petersen, 486 P.2d 887, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 228 (Wyo. 1971).

Counterclaim for care of children. —

In adoption proceedings parties seeking to adopt were not permitted to litigate money claims for the care of children by way of a counterclaim against the children's father, who had filed an application to be heard in opposition to the petition. In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1948), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Informal records. —

In the absence of any statute prescribing the manner in which a judge's record should be kept, or of evidence showing that he kept them in any other way than by writing them out on sheets of paper, record on detached piece of paper retained among the papers of his office, showing his consent and approval of adoption of a child, was sufficient. Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1893).

Applied in

In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1982); In re Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 475 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

In re Adoption of R.S.C., 837 P.2d 1089, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 1992); Shippey v. Rogers (In re Estate of Kirkpatrick), 2003 WY 125, 77 P.3d 404, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2003); Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, 107 P.3d 158, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (2005); DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017); DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Family Law — Contested Consent to Adoption: No Longer a Decision in the Child's Best Interest. In re Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 475 (Wyo. 1986),” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 203 (1987).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Necessity and sufficiency of consent to adoption by spouse of adopting parent, 38 ALR4th 768.

Restricting access to judicial records of concluded adoption proceedings, 103 ALR5th 255.

§ 1-22-105. Hearings to be closed; attendance of parties.

  1. Unless the court orders a hearing in open  court, all hearings in adoption proceedings shall be confidential  and held in closed court or court chambers. No person shall be admitted  except court officials, parties to the proceeding, counsel, nonconsenting  parents, the nonconsenting putative father of the child and witnesses.
  2. The petitioners and the child shall appear  at the hearing unless excused by the court.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 59, § 5; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-708.1, 1-726.5; Laws 1977, ch. 187, § 1.

Standing. —

District court correctly determined that, because natural father consented to adoption in sworn affidavit filed with court, he did not have standing to request or attend a hearing on merits of the adoption.

Stated in

MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, 107 P.3d 158, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (2005).

§ 1-22-106. When petition to be filed; order for hearing.

A petition to adopt a child shall be filed upon the entry of the child in the adoptive home or as soon thereafter as is reasonably convenient. When a petition is filed and presented to the judge, he shall set the petition for hearing. Any person whose consent to adoption is required by W.S. 1-22-109 and whose consent has not been filed shall be ordered to appear on the day set and show cause why the petition to adopt should not be granted and a decree of adoption entered.

History. Laws 1929, ch. 121, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 20-202; C.S. 1945, § 58-206; Laws 1955, ch. 187, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-709, 1-726.6; Laws 1963, ch. 59, § 6; 1965, ch. 5, § 1; 1977, ch. 187, § 1.

Quoted in

Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212 P.2d 78, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1949).

Stated in

MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1948).

§ 1-22-107. Service of petition and order; when service by publication permitted; exception.

  1. Prior to the hearing a copy of the petition  to adopt a child and all orders to show cause shall be served on any  persons whose consent to adoption is required by W.S. 1-22-109 and whose consent has not been filed with the petition  to adopt. Service shall be made in the same manner as provided for  by rule 4 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and shall be accomplished  so that a default judgment could be rendered at the hearing against  the person served. Service by publication is specifically allowed  where the defendant resides out of state, or his residence cannot,  with reasonable diligence, be ascertained.
  2. The petition and orders to show cause  need not be served upon parents or other persons whose rights to the  child have been terminated in a prior judicial proceeding.
  3. Prior to the hearing a copy of the petition  to adopt a child and an order to show cause shall be served on any  persons awarded visitation rights to the child under W.S. 20-7-101 or 20-7-102 . The consent of persons awarded visitation rights to  the adoption is not required. However, the court may exercise its  discretion to allow those persons an opportunity to be heard if the  court finds it to be in the best interest and welfare of the child.

History. Laws 1929, ch. 121, § 2; R.S. 1931, § 20-203; C.S. 1945, § 58-207; Laws 1945, ch. 186, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-710, 1-726.7; Laws 1977, ch. 187, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 16, § 1; 2007, ch. 127, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to judicial termination of parental rights, see § 14-2-308 et seq.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added (c).

Failure to exercise due diligence. —

An adoptive father failed to exercise the requisite due diligence in attempting to locate the natural father prior to serving by publication, where he merely questioned his wife as to the natural father's location and examined the telephone directory of a city which he had reasonable cause to suspect was not the natural father's location. In re Adoption of CAM, 861 P.2d 1102, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1993).

Effect of failure to give notice to parent. —

Even though adoption proceedings were without effect as to the father of the child, by reason of failure to give him notice as required by this section, the father was not entitled to obtain custody of the child on habeas corpus, where the evidence showed that the best interest and welfare of the child would be served by leaving it in the custody of the purported adoptive parents. Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212 P.2d 78, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1949).

Cited in

Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1948); In re JLB, 914 P.2d 828, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1996); Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, 107 P.3d 158, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (2005).

§ 1-22-108. Hearing on petition and objections; findings by court; effect of default.

  1. When the persons required to be served  as provided in W.S. 1-22-107 have been served personally or by publication and do  not appear at the hearing, a default shall be entered against them  and they shall be bound by the findings and judgment of the court.
  2. When any person whose consent is required  objects to the petition to adopt, he shall at least five (5) days  before the hearing file his objections and serve them on all parties  to the proceedings, including any person whose consent has been filed.
  3. If the putative father files and serves  his objections to the petition to adopt as provided in subsection  (b) of this section, and appears at the hearing to acknowledge his  paternity of the child, the court shall hear the evidence in support  of the petition to adopt and in support of the objection to the petition  and shall then determine whether:
    1. The putative father’s claim to paternity  of the child is established;
    2. The putative father having knowledge of  the birth or pending birth of the child has evidenced an interest  in and responsibility for the child within thirty (30) days after  receiving notice of the pending birth or birth of the child;
    3. The putative father’s objections to the  petition to adopt are valid; and
    4. The best interests and welfare of the  child will be served by granting the putative father’s claim to paternity  or by allowing the petition to adopt.
  4. The putative father has no right to assert  paternity in adoption, dependency or termination of parental rights  proceedings unless he is known and identified by the mother or agency,  or unless he has lived with or married the mother after the birth  of the child and prior to the filing of the petition to adopt, and  unless prior to the interlocutory hearing of the adoption proceedings,  he has acknowledged the child as his own by affirmatively asserting  paternity as provided in this section or registered as a putative  father under W.S. 1-22-117 .
  5. Based upon its determination and findings  after a hearing, the court may enter its order or decree in accordance  with W.S. 1-22-111 .

History. Laws 1977, ch. 187, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-726.8; Laws 1995, ch. 170, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to default judgment, see Rule 55, W.R.C.P.

Constitutionality. —

This section does not facially violate the constitution or encompass a discriminatory motive; it does not favor mothers over fathers, women over men, or adoptive parents over birth parents. GWJ v. MH (In re BGH), 930 P.2d 371, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1996).

Strict construction. —

Adoption statutes are strictly construed when the proceeding is against a nonconsenting parent, and every reasonable intendment is made in favor of that parent's claims; such strict construction is mandated by the fact that parental rights are fundamental rights. GWJ v. MH (In re BGH), 930 P.2d 371, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1996).

District court properly treated subsection (c) as a complete and independent adoption statute, regardless of whether § 1-22-110 might also apply. Section 1-22-110 provides a set of circumstances, such as the nonconsenting party's abuse, abandonment or failure to support the child, under which an adoption is justified no matter who the nonconsenting party is. But the more liberal adoption test of this section applies to only those adoptions contested by putative fathers who have already shown their lack of concern for their children by failing to establish legal paternity. In re Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 521 (Wyo. 1986).

Putative father had standing to contest the adoption and had established a claim to paternity as required by subsection (c)(i), although he failed to establish his paternity within three years of the child's birth, as required by former § 14-2-105. The explicit standing requirement of this section must control in the adoption context. Moreover, when the legislature defined “putative father” to include an alleged father “whether or not the paternity rights and obligations of the father have been judicially determined” (§ 1-22-101(a)(iv)), it clearly indicated that an official declaration of paternity was not relevant to contested adoption cases. In re Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 521 (Wyo. 1986).

Putative father's “interest in and responsibility for” child. —

Where evidence is uncontradicted that when father first learned that mother was pregnant with his child, he agreed she should not get an abortion, and he provided financial support and prenatal care while she lived with him, putative father showed “interest in and responsibility for” child pursuant to subsection (c)(ii). In a contested adoption case, the test is not what the father could or should have done, but what he did do within 30 days after he received notice of the pending birth of his child. In re Adoption of BBC, 831 P.2d 197, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. May 8, 1992).

Putative father's interest in child expressed by visits, offer of support, and gifts. —

The putative father expressed an interest in the child within the 30-day period by visiting the child immediately after birth, by offering his support immediately after the birth, and by bringing substantial gifts for the child, including clothing, at the initial visit. In re Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 521 (Wyo. 1986).

But absence of subsequent attempt to be father establishes abandonment. —

The court did not abuse its discretion when it found a good relationship between the child and the adopting stepfather and when it found that the putative father had willfully abandoned the child by not visiting for 20 months prior to the trial although he knew the location of the child at all times, by never trying to establish his paternity through legal process, and by never attempting to be a father to the child in any substantial way; therefore, the court correctly held that the putative father had no valid objections to the adoption. In re Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 521 (Wyo. 1986).

Termination of parental rights. —

In an adoption proceeding, the provisions regarding termination of parental rights found in this article control over the more general provisions for the termination of parental rights found in the paternity statutes. GWJ v. MH (In re BGH), 930 P.2d 371, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1996).

Quoted in

Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, 107 P.3d 158, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (2005).

Stated in

In re JLB, 914 P.2d 828, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

BDR v. BEB, 888 P.2d 216, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1995); MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Rights of unwed father to obstruct adoption of his child by withholding consent, 61 ALR5th 151.

§ 1-22-109. Consent to adoption.

  1. A written relinquishment of custody of  the child to be adopted and written consent to adoption shall be filed  with the petition to adopt and shall be signed by:
    1. Both parents, if living; or
    2. The surviving parent; or
    3. The mother and putative father of the  child if the name of the putative father is known; or
    4. The mother alone if she does not know  the name of the putative father, in which case she shall sign and  file an affidavit so stating and the court shall determine whether  the putative father has registered under W.S. 1-22-117 and if so, shall require notice to be given to the putative  father; or
    5. The legal guardian of the person of the  child if neither parent is living or if parental rights have been  judicially terminated; or
    6. The executive head of the agency to whom  the child has been relinquished for adoption; or
    7. The person having exclusive legal custody  of the child by court order; or
    8. The legally appointed guardian of any  parent or putative father who has been adjudged mentally incompetent.
  2. If the child to be adopted is over the  age of fourteen (14) years his written consent to adoption shall also  be filed with the petition to adopt.
  3. The consent to adoption shall be signed  any time after the birth of the child. The consent shall be acknowledged  or may be approved in the following manner:
    1. The consent shall be acknowledged by a:
      1. Person authorized to take acknowledgments;
      2. Representative of the department of family  services; or
      3. Representative of a certified agency to  whom the custody of the child is being relinquished for adoption.
    2. If not acknowledged as provided in paragraph  (i) of this subsection, the consent to adoption may be approved by  the court after:
      1. The person giving the consent has appeared  before the court in an informal hearing in court chambers; and
      2. The court finds that the consent is knowingly  and voluntarily given.
  4. Consent to adoption and the relinquishment  of a child for adoption are irrevocable unless obtained by fraud or  duress, except that if the court should deny the adoption on account  of a claim or objection of the putative father of the child, the court  may also allow the mother of the child to withdraw her consent and  relinquishment. The consent or relinquishment by a parent who is a  minor is valid and may not be revoked solely because of minority.
  5. The consent to adoption and the relinquishment  of custody of a child for adoption may be contained in a single instrument.

History. Laws 1929, ch. 121, § 3; R.S. 1931, § 20-204; Laws 1933, ch. 99, § 1; 1941, ch. 112, § 1; C.S. 1945, §§ 58-208, 58-211, 58-217; Laws 1953, ch. 122, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-710.1, 1-710.3, 1-710.4, 1-714, 1-717, 1-722, 1-726.9; Laws 1963, ch. 59, §§ 7, 9, 10; 1977, ch. 187, § 1; 1986, ch. 118, § 1; 1987, ch. 178, § 1; 1989, ch. 40, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1995, ch. 170, § 2; 1998, ch. 7, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

As to state children's home, see § 25-1-201 .

Practice and procedure. —

Natural parents' consent to adoption of child is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid and binding decree of adoption, and therefore court may determine validity of a natural parent's consent without regard to whether adoptive parents have been joined. JK v. MK, 5 P.3d 782, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Statutory requirements not followed. —

District court did not have jurisdiction to consider grandparents' petition to adopt a child where the statutory requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-109 were not followed; the mother specifically denied that the name of the putative father was unknown, and thus the district court could not proceed with the adoption without the written relinquishment and written consent to adoption signed by the putative father, at least without a determination as to whether the name of the putative father was, or was not, known. CLT v. SJT (In re JWT), 2005 WY 4, 104 P.3d 93, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 2005), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Effect of abandonment of child by parent. —

The “parents” whose consent to an adoption was required under former §§ 58-201 and 58-202, W.C.S. 1945, were held to be parents who had not by abandonment lost the right to the care, custody and control of their children. In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1948), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018) (construing former §§ 58-201, 58-202, W.C.S. 1945).

The mother of a child cannot bind its father by her relinquishment since for adoption to be permitted, the written consent of the father is required unless he has abandoned the child. Peters v. Campbell, 80 Wyo. 492, 345 P.2d 234, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1959).

Relinquishment in writing after birth required. —

The natural mother did not physically relinquish the child, and she did not relinquish the child in writing after her birth, as contemplated by statute. Therefore, the adoption was invalid. In re Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 475 (Wyo. 1986) (decided prior to 1986 amendment).

Fraudulent representations must relate to past or existing fact. —

When fraud is alleged in the context of an adoption consent, the representations must relate to a past or existing fact, and may not ordinarily be predicated upon a representation which relates to the future. It must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Adoption of P., 583 P.2d 706, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 224 (Wyo. 1978).

Duress deemed act performed without free will. —

Duress, referred to in subsection (d), has been said to exist whenever one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to perform some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will. In re Adoption of P., 583 P.2d 706, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 224 (Wyo. 1978); In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1982).

Fraud and duress not found. —

Minor father's consent to adoption of his child was not secured by either fraud or duress, and therefore district court did not err in finding father's consent irrevocable as a matter of law. JK v. MK, 5 P.3d 782, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Undue influence is not separate ground for revocation of consent for adoption. In re TR, 777 P.2d 1106, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1989).

Mistake. —

Father's consent to adoption was not vitiated by his mistaken belief that he had six months within which to revoke his consent, where his mistake was not known and could not have been known by private agency arranging placement of his child. JK v. MK, 5 P.3d 782, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Attempt to revoke untimely. —

Natural father's attempt to revoke his consent and vacate final adoption decree more than two years after entry of decree was untimely, and he was not entitled to relief from decree. LVW v. J (In re MSVW), 965 P.2d 1158, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1998).

Cited in

Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 9 , 20 L.R.A. 199 (1893); Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1948); State ex rel. TRL v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1989); In re Adoption of R.S.C., 837 P.2d 1089, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 1992).

Stated in

E.R.C.K. v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2013 WY 160, 314 P.3d 1170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Dec 24, 2013).

Law reviews. —

“Administrative Problems Relating to Adoption,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 210.

For case note, “Family Law — Contested Consent to Adoption: No Longer a Decision in the Child's Best Interest. In re Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 475 (Wyo. 1986),” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 203 (1987).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Consent of divorced parents as essential to adoption, 47 ALR2d 824.

Necessity of securing consent of parents of illegitimate child to its adoption, 51 ALR2d 497.

What constitutes “undue influence” in obtaining parent's consent to adoption of child, 50 ALR3d 918.

Right of natural parent to withdraw valid consent to adoption of child, 74 ALR3d 421.

Mistake or want of understanding as ground for revocation of consent to adoption or of agreement releasing infant to adoption placement agency, 74 ALR3d 489.

What constitutes “duress” in obtaining parent's consent to adoption of child or surrender of child to adoption agency, 74 ALR3d 527.

Adoption of child in absence of statutorily required consent of public or private agency or institution, 83 ALR3d 373.

Validity of birth parent's “blanket” consent to adoption which fails to identify adoptive parents, 15 ALR5th 1.

Natural parent's indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption — Factors other than employment status, 84 ALR5th 191.

§ 1-22-110. When adoption permitted without consent.

  1. In addition to the exceptions contained   in W.S. 1-22-108 , the adoption of a child may be ordered without the written   consent of a parent or the putative father if the court finds that   the nonconsenting parent or putative father is unknown and that the   putative father has not registered under W.S. 1-22-117 and the affidavit required by W.S. 1-22-109(a)(iv) has been filed with the petition to adopt or if the court   finds that the putative father or the nonconsenting parent or parents   have:
    1. Been given notice of the hearing as provided   in W.S. 1-22-107 and has failed to answer or appear at the hearing; or
    2. Been judicially deprived of parental rights   of the child for any reason; or
    3. Willfully abandoned or deserted the child;   or
    4. Willfully failed to contribute to the   support of the child for a period of one (1) year immediately prior   to the filing of the petition to adopt and has failed to bring the   support obligation current within sixty (60) days after service of   the petition to adopt; or
    5. Willfully permitted the child to be maintained   in or by a public or private institution or by the department of  family  services for a period of one (1) year immediately prior to  the filing  of the petition without substantially contributing to  the support  of the child; or
    6. Failed, within thirty (30) days after   receiving notice of the pending birth or birth of the child, to advise   or notify the agency which gave the putative father the notice of   pending birth or birth of his interest in or responsibility for the   child or his declaration of paternity; or
    7. Been adjudged by a court to be guilty   of cruelty, abuse, neglect or mistreatment of the child; or
    8. Caused the conception of the child born   out of wedlock as a result of sexual assault or incest for which  he  has been convicted; or
    9. Willfully failed to pay a total dollar   amount of at least seventy percent (70%) of the court ordered support   for a period of two (2) years or more and has failed to bring the   support obligation one hundred percent (100%) current within sixty   (60) days after service of the petition to adopt.
  2. Any petition filed pursuant to paragraphs   (a)(iv) or (ix) of this section shall contain a clear statement of   the consequences of the respondent’s failure to bring the support   obligation current.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 2, § 9; Laws 1879, ch. 1, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 2282; R.S. 1899, § 3023; C.S. 1910, § 3960; C.S. 1920, § 5026; R.S. 1931, § 20-212; C.S. 1945, § 58-213; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-710.2, 1-719, 1-726.10; Laws 1963, ch. 59, § 8; 1977, ch. 187, § 1; 1990, ch. 106, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1992, ch. 84, § 1; 1995, ch. 170, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to judicial termination of parental rights, see § 14-2-308 et seq. As to child protective services, see § 14-3-201 et seq.

Section is not unconstitutional because it allegedly has different standards for terminating parental rights than § 14-2-309 (grounds for termination of parental-child legal relationship). The two sections do not serve identical purposes. In re Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 516 (Wyo. 1985).

Section does not provide for termination of parental rights; rather, it provides for adoption without consent under the conditions set forth in the statute. In re Adoption of SLS, 808 P.2d 207, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1991).

District court properly treated § 1-22-108 (c) as a complete and independent adoption statute, regardless of whether this section might also apply. This section provides a set of circumstances, such as the nonconsenting party's abuse, abandonment or failure to support the child, under which an adoption is justified no matter who the nonconsenting party is. But the more liberal adoption test of § 1-22-108 applies to only those adoptions contested by putative fathers who have already shown their lack of concern for their children by failing to establish legal paternity. In re Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 521 (Wyo. 1986).

“Or” defined. —

See In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

Parental rights already terminated. —

Adoption court did not err in granting the foster parents’ petition for adoption because service by publication upon an unknown father was proper at the time that it was completed, and the court in the termination case obtained jurisdiction over the parties and terminated the father’s parental rights; nothing on the face of the termination order or the record indicated that the district court subsequently lost jurisdiction; the father’s collateral attack on the termination order could not be maintained in the adoption case; and the father did not have standing to object to or otherwise participate in the adoption proceeding as his parental rights had already been terminated, and he had no legally protectable interest at stake. RB v. State (In re SSO), 2017 WY 142, 406 P.3d 723, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 2017).

Strict construction. —

When a proceeding is against a nonconsenting parent in an adoption proceeding the statute must be strictly construed and every reasonable intendment is made in favor of the nonconsenting parent's claims. In re Adoption of Narragon, 530 P.2d 413, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1975); In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1975); In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976); In re Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1982); MVC v. MB (In re SMR), 982 P.2d 1246, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1999).

When an adoption proceeding is contested by a nonconsenting parent, this section must be strictly construed and every reasonable intendment made in favor of the nonconsenting parent's claims. MVC v. MB (In re SMR), 982 P.2d 1246, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1999).

As used in context of subsection (a)(iv), “willfully” means intentionally, knowingly, purposely, voluntarily, consciously, deliberately and without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from carelessly, inadvertently, accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly. In re Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1982).

Willful failure to contribute financially. —

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying a petition filed by a mother and stepfather to adopt a child because it carefully weighed conflicting evidence, determined credibility, and came to a reasonable conclusion; the district court specifically considered the willfulness of the father’s failure to financially support the child, and despite that evidence, it concluded other factors outweighed those concerns under the circumstances. JEG v. BCB (In re ZEM), 2020 WY 17, 458 P.3d 21, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2020).

Jury trial. —

Although Wyoming law guarantees a right to jury trial in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, there is no such guarantee in a proceeding involving adoption in the absence of parental consent; because adoption statutes are strictly construed, this means there is no right at all. MTM v. LD (In re KJD), 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002).

Evidence held sufficient.—

District court could reasonably rely on a mother’s expenditures on substance abuse evaluations, housing, and pursuing better and higher paying employment, both during and outside the two-year period at issue, in evaluating the mother’s intent and ability to pay child support. The evidence was sufficient to support the district court’s conclusion that the mother had not forgotten her statutory obligation to her children and that the father and stepmother failed to prove the mother’s willfulness by clear and convincing evidence. CML v. ADBL (In re CJML), 2020 WY 23, 458 P.3d 53, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 2020).

Abandonment by father. —

Where a father has relinquished all claims on his minor child by abandonment, his consent to adoption of such child is unnecessary, and notice need not be served on him of proceedings for such adoption on the application of the mother. Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1893).

Mother adjudged guilty of neglect. —

Regardless of the errors or mistakes the Wyoming Department of Family Services might have made in the juvenile proceeding, the reality was that the mother admitted the neglect allegations and the district court entered an order of final disposition, concluding that the child was a neglected child; the mother did not object to, or appeal from, that final disposition order finding her guilty of neglect. Furthermore, the mother could not challenge the validity of the neglect order in the adoption proceeding; thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the mother's consent to the child's adoption was not required under subsection (a)(vii) of this section because the mother had been adjudged guilty of neglecting the child. TF v. Dep't of Family Serv. (In re CF), 2005 WY 118, 120 P.3d 992, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 2005).

District court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the mother's consent to the child's adoption was not required under subsection (a)(iv) of this section because the district court simply made a misstatement when it referred to the preponderance of the evidence standard in its decision letter because there was clear and convincing evidence to support the finding that (1) the mother willfully failed to contribute to the child's support during the one year preceding the filing of the adoption petition; and (2) the substantial child support payments that the mother did make were untimely as they were made more than 60 days after service of the adoption petition. The TF v. Dep't of Family Serv. (In re CF), 2005 WY 118, 120 P.3d 992, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 2005).

Evidence and burden of proof of abandonment. —

When the matter in controversy is whether a parent has abandoned his child so as to have dispensed with the necessity of his consent, the burden of proof is on the party seeking to justify the adoption on that ground and the evidence to show abandonment must be clear and convincing. In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1948), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Evidence held insufficient to show abandonment. In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1948), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Sufficient record. —

With respect to a district court's finding that a biological father's consent to an adoption of his daughter was not required pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 , because the father, who conceded that he not paid at lease 70 percent of court--ordered child support for two years or more, failed to meet his burden of providing a sufficient record to allow proper evaluation of the district court's decision, the district court's findings were assumed to be adequately supported. MJH v. AV (In re JRH), 2006 WY 89, 138 P.3d 683, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 2006).

There was no showing of abandonment where all the proof submitted demonstrated some parental inattention and neglect, which may in some manner have been explained by the bad feeling between petitioners and the mother's husband and which did not contribute to the joy of any such reunion. In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1975).

There was no showing of abandonment by clear and convincing evidence, or otherwise, where the district court found that the father made monthly telephone calls and wrote occasional letters to his daughter while he was in prison; when considering abandonment, the trial court should consider whether an incarcerated nonconsenting parent, unable to fulfill the customary duties of an unrestrained parent, has nonetheless pursued the opportunities and options which may be available to carry out such duties to the best of his ability. TOC v. TND (In re TLC), 2002 WY 76, 46 P.3d 863, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2002).

Abandonment is more than temporary absence or neglect. In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1975).

Evidence of such abandonment must be clear and convincing. In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1975).

Intention to abandon. —

A mother's refusal of an earlier request to give a written consent to the adoption of her child by petitioners belied an intention to abandon the child. In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1975).

Willful failure to contribute financially. —

Guardians failed to present clear and convincing evidence that mother willfully failed to financially contribute to support of her child, and therefore trial court properly denied guardians' petition for adoption. MVC v. MB (In re SMR), 982 P.2d 1246, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1999).

Adoption without the mother's consent was proper because the evidence did not support her assertion that she lacked the ability to pay child support. She voluntarily quit her job after being ordered to pay child support and did not register for any employment services or complete any educational programs; and although she earned some money from babysitting while her parents were paying all of her living expenses, she paid none of it toward her child support obligation. EOS v. JLS (In re Adoption of RMS), 2011 WY 78, 253 P.3d 149, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 2011).

Adoption without the father's consent was proper because the father's willful failure to contribute to the support of his child was supported by evidence showing that the father was unemployed for an entire year but did not engage the assistance of a job service agency and did not seek to advance his employment prospects through college courses or job training, the father received military pay before he was served with the adoption petition and did not contribute any of it to his child support obligation, and the father gave shifting testimony as to the timing of his attempt to create a military allotment to pay child support. DLH v. JLA (In re AMP), 2012 WY 132, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (2012).

Need to prove willful failure to bring child support payments current. —

Proof of willfulness in the nonconsenting father's failure to bring his child support obligation current within 60 days after service of the adoption petition was unnecessary because in the second clause of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iv), as opposed to the first, “failed” was not modified by the word “willfully,” indicating that the obligation to bring child support payments current existed irrespective of the delinquent parent's state of mind; it was indisputed that the father did not pay his accumulated arrearages. DLH v. JLA (In re AMP), 2012 WY 132, 286 P.3d 746, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 2012).

There was no showing of willful nonpayment of support. —

The district court's finding, that the father's failure to pay child support was a consequence of incarceration which was of his own making and willful, was clearly erroneous in relying on incarceration as a grounds for dispensing with the need for the father's consent, and the district court's other findings, which included that while incarcerated the father made minimal support payments, and that since his release the father's support had been “reasonable and substantial,” precluded a finding that the statute has been satisfied. TOC v. TND (In re TLC), 2002 WY 76, 46 P.3d 863, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2002).

Two year period of willful nonpayment. —

The two year period of willful failure to pay court ordered support referred to in § 1-22-110(a)(ix) means the two years or more immediately prior to the filing of the petition to adopt. TOC v. TND (In re TLC), 2002 WY 76, 46 P.3d 863, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2002).

Intent to terminate parental ties. —

There must be, in order to constitute abandonment, an actual intent to terminate the parental ties and a purpose to relinquish parental claims. In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1975).

In Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1948), decided under a former statute, it was said that abandonment imports conduct by the parent “… which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It involves more than temporary absence or neglect of parental duty. There must be evidence that, at some time, parental interests, duties and obligations have been definitely dropped. Strauser recognizes that in some circumstances failure to furnish money is quite important; subsections (c) and (d) of this section retain that point of view. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

It is of little or no importance if the persons in temporary care of the children are volunteers, who expect no assistance from the parent. In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1975).

Where mother had infrequent but continuing contact with her child and initiated proceedings to terminate guardianship on one occasion, and later sought legal advice regarding restoration of her custody of child, there was no showing of an actual intent to terminate parental ties on mother's part. MVC v. MB (In re SMR), 982 P.2d 1246, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1999).

Withholding contributions deemed willful failure to contribute. —

The withholding of contributions to the support of the children was, under the circumstances, a willful failure to contribute to the support of the children, even though the father was denied his rights of visitation. In re Adoption of CHJ, 778 P.2d 124, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1989).

Where a husband acknowledged that his former wife was on welfare and had requested support money from him, that he had been steadily employed, earning $5.00 and $6.00 an hour, that his failure to furnish some support money was not due to inadvertence, carelessness or thoughtlessness and that he knew of the whereabouts of his wife and his children, and where he did not present any justifiable excuse for failure to contribute to the support of his children, the trial court did not err in finding such failure to be “willful.” In re Adoption of G.A.R., 810 P.2d 113, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1991).

Willfully Allowed Child To Remain in Custody of Institution Without Contributing to Child's Support —. —

District court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the mother's consent to the child's adoption was not required under subsection (a)(v) of this section because the mother willfully allowed the child to remain in the custody of the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) for the year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition without substantially contributing to his support, and physical placement of the child with his grandfather would not have removed the child from DFS's legal custody. The TF v. Dep't of Family Serv. (In re CF), 2005 WY 118, 120 P.3d 992, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 2005).

Only substantial or regular contributions by nonconsenting parent prevent adoption. —

Contributions which are necessary by the nonconsenting parent to prevent adoption without his consent pursuant to subsection (a)(iv) must be substantial or regular, or constitute a material factor in the child's support. In re Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1982).

Petition filed prematurely dismissed. —

Where the child's natural father first became delinquent on December 1, 1988 or a reasonably short time thereafter, a petition to adopt without consent filed on November 7, 1989, was at least three weeks premature, and therefore subject to dismissal. In re Adoption of SLS, 808 P.2d 207, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1991).

“Maintenance by” the Wyoming department of public welfare (now division of public assistance and social services) does not bring adoption case under this section, since language of section refers to “maintenance in.” In re Adoption of Narragon, 530 P.2d 413, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1975).

One seeking the adoption of another's child without his consent must, under the circumstances of this case, allege and prove not only his nonsupport, if able, for the prescribed period but also willful abandonment. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

Legislative intent. —

The legislature with good reason wished to preserve the abandonment concept as additional to the mere failure to support; they are not synonymous. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

The natural parent must not be excluded, if his or her role can be consistently continued. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

Not necessary to obtain consent of natural parent convicted of illicit sexual relations. —

Because of the natural father's conviction of taking indecent liberties, incest, and illicit sexual relations, he was adjudged guilty of cruelty, abuse and mistreatment of his daughter, and it was not necessary to obtain his consent in order that his daughter be adopted. In re Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 516 (Wyo. 1985).

And parent excludable from hearing on merits of petition to adopt. —

A determination by the district court that the natural father's consent to adopt was not required effectively terminated his parental rights to his daughter. After this determination, he was, in effect, a stranger to the adoption proceedings. The court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating the proceedings and excluding him from the hearing on the merits of the petition to adopt. In re Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 516 (Wyo. 1985).

Construction of former § 1-710.2. —

This section is poorly written and ungrammatical. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

This section is grammatically incorrect when subsection (c) is read with the opening phrase of the statute, thus: “An adoption may be decreed without the written consent of the parent or parents of the child sought to be adopted where said nonconsenting mother or father: (c) who [sic] has willfully abandoned such child.” In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

The series of alternatives was interrupted by the absence of the word “or” between subsections (c) and (d) and so joinder of (c) and (d) must have been intended. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

Since the word “or” is absent, subsections (c) and (d) are not separate and not alternatives. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

The supreme court could not say that there is clerical error in omission of “or” at the end of subsection (c). In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

The introductory language of this section and subsection (d) would make sense and avoid a seeming lack of connection if the words were rearranged as follows: place the words “has not contributed to the support of said child during a period of one (1) year immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption” at the beginning of the subsection, followed by “if it is proven to the satisfaction of the court that said father or mother, if able, or.” In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

If the word “who” was left out, and it does serve no useful purpose, subsection (c) would be able to stand alone. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

Subsections (a), (b) and (e) can be read separately with the opening of the section. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

Subsections (c) and (d) must be read and considered together since the conjunctive “or” does not appear following (c) as it does following each of the other conditions which must exist in the alternative before a parent loses his rights of parenthood. In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1976).

Applied in

GWJ v. MH, 930 P.2d 371, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1996).

Quoted in

Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1994).

Stated in

In re Parental Rights of SCN, 659 P.2d 568, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1983).

Cited in

In re Adoption of P., 583 P.2d 706, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 224 (Wyo. 1978); State ex rel. TRL v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1989); BDR v. BEB, 888 P.2d 216, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1995); EBH v. Hot Springs Dep't of Family Servs., 2001 WY 100, 33 P.3d 172, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For a note dealing with adoption of children without parental consent, see 7 Wyo. L.J. 41.

See “The Status of Legal Abandonment in Wyoming,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 205.

See “Administrative Problems Relating to Adoption,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 210.

See “Observations and Suggestions Concerning Wyoming Statutes Relating to Adoption Based on Abandonment,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 218.

For comment, “Wyoming's New Termination of Parental Rights Statute,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 621 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Necessity of consent of parent under statute providing for adoption of abandoned or deserted child, 35 ALR2d 662.

Parent's involuntary confinement, or failure to care for child as result thereof, as permitting adoption without parental consent, 78 ALR3d 712.

Comment note: Natural parent's indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption — general principles, 82 ALR5th 443.

Natural parent's indigence resulting from unemployment or underemployment as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption, 83 ALR5th 375.

Natural parent's indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption — Factors other than employment status, 84 ALR5th 191.

Library References.

Family Law and Practice §§ 64.11, 64.20 (Matthew Bender).

§ 1-22-111. Decree; investigation; denial of adoption.

  1. After the petition to adopt has been filed  and a hearing held the court acting in the best interest and welfare  of the child may make any of the following orders:
    1. Enter an interlocutory decree of adoption  giving the care and custody of the child to the petitioners pending  further order of the court;
    2. Defer entry of an interlocutory decree  of adoption and order the department of family services or a private  licensed agency to investigate and report to the court the background  of the child and of the petitioners, and the medical, social and psychological  background and status of the consenting parent and putative father.  After a written report of the investigation is filed, the court shall  determine if the adoption by petitioners is in the best interest and  welfare of the child and thereupon enter the appropriate order or  decree;
    3. Enter a final decree of adoption if the  child has resided in the home of the petitioner for six (6) months;  or
    4. Deny the adoption if the court finds that  the best interests and welfare of the child will be served by such  denial.
  2. If the court denies the adoption it shall  make an order for proper custody consistent with the best interest  and welfare of the child.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 2, § 3; Laws 1882, ch. 26, § 3; R.S. 1887, § 2276; R.S. 1899, § 3017; C.S. 1910, § 3954; C.S. 1920, § 5020; R.S. 1931, § 20-206; C.S. 1945, § 58-203; Laws 1955, ch. 185, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-711, 1-726.11; Laws 1963, ch. 59, § 11; 1977, ch. 187, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3.

Subject matter jurisdiction.—

Adoption statutes did not preclude the district court from ordering a Wyoming adoption decree recognizing or approving a Hague Convention adoption certificate. Reading the broad language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-111 , with the express statutory language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-1-417(e), the adoption statutes allowed district courts to approve adoptions of children born in a foreign country and to enter a report of a Wyoming adoption. As a result, the district court erred in dismissing petitioners’ petition for an order of adoption. In re Adoption of Majb, 2020 WY 157, 478 P.3d 196, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 2020).

Adoption petition denied.—

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying a petition filed by a mother and stepfather to adopt a child because it carefully weighed conflicting evidence, determined credibility, and came to a reasonable conclusion; the district court specifically considered the willfulness of the father’s failure to financially support the child, and despite that evidence, it concluded other factors outweighed those concerns under the circumstances. JEG v. BCB (In re ZEM), 2020 WY 17, 458 P.3d 21, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2020).

Statutory noncompliance asserted where decree interlocutory. —

An adoptive parent was not estopped from asserting noncompliance by the district court with the adoption statute, because the court's adoption decree was interlocutory, and not final, the children not having resided in the home of petitioner for six months as required for entry of a final decree of adoption. In re Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d 550, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1988), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

Informal record. —

Record of judge on detached piece of paper, found among papers of his office was sufficient. Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1893).

Applied in

Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1948).

Quoted in

In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1975); In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1982).

Stated in

In re Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 521 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 9 , 20 L.R.A. 199 (1893); Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 2003 WY 119, 76 P.3d 1236, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2003); Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, 107 P.3d 158, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (2005); E.R.C.K. v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2013 WY 160, 314 P.3d 1170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 166 , 2013 WL 6822656 (Dec 24, 2013); E.R.C.K. v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2013 WY 160, 314 P.3d 1170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 166 , 2013 WL 6822656 (Dec 24, 2013).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Family Law — Contested Consent to Adoption: No Longer a Decision in the Child's Best Interest. In re Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 475 (Wyo. 1986),” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 203 (1987).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Applicability of res judicata to decrees or judgment in adoption proceedings, 52 ALR2d 406.

Race as factor in adoption proceedings, 34 ALR4th 167.

§ 1-22-112. Application for final decree.

  1. If an interlocutory decree has been entered  petitioners may apply for a final decree of adoption after the child  has resided in the home of the petitioners for six (6) months and  a hearing on the petition may be required.
  2. If an interlocutory decree has not been  entered a hearing on the petition for a final decree of adoption shall  be set as provided in W.S. 1-22-106 , notice thereof shall be given as provided in W.S. 1-22-107 and a final hearing shall be had on the petition.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 51, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 58-209; W.S. 1957, § 1-711.2, 1-715, 1-726.12; Laws 1963, ch. 59, § 13; 1965, ch. 11, § 1; 1969, ch. 40, § 1; 1977, ch. 187, § 1.

Statutory noncompliance asserted where decree interlocutory. —

An adoptive parent was not estopped from asserting noncompliance by the district court with the adoption statute, because the court's adoption decree was interlocutory, and not final, the children not having resided in the home of petitioner for six months as required for entry of a final decree of adoption. In re Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d 550, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1988), overruled in part, T.C. v. State (In re Adoption of L-MHB), 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2018).

A substantial compliance with this section is sufficient and that does not require a child to be kept as a prisoner for the six months' residential period. In re Adoption of Hiatt, 69 Wyo. 373, 242 P.2d 214, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1952).

Evidence supporting finding of residence in home of petitioners. —

Where trial court found that adopting parents had absolute care, custody, support and control of minor child and had taken care of him the same as if he were their own natural born son, there was substantial evidence showing that trial court was warranted in finding that the minor child was a bona fide resident in the home of the adopting parents within the meaning of this section. In re Adoption of Hiatt, 69 Wyo. 373, 242 P.2d 214, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1952).

Stated in

In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1982).

Cited in

Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1948).

Law reviews. —

See “Administrative Problems Relating to Adoption,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 210.

§ 1-22-113. Petition for adoption of an adult; consent required.

When a petition to adopt an adult is filed a copy of the petition together with a summons issued as in other civil actions shall be served on the adult. If the adult objects to adoption by the petitioner the petition shall be dismissed. When the consent of the adult is given, the petition shall be granted and a final decree of adoption made and entered. The decree may change the name of the adopted person.

History. Laws 1947, ch. 83, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-726, 1-726.13; Laws 1977, ch. 187, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to change of name in adoption proceedings, see § 1-25-104 .

It is the adoptee that is required to consent to the adoption under this section, and not the parents. Pangarova v. Nichols, 419 P.2d 688, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Wyo. 1966).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Adoption of adult, 21 ALR3d 1012.

Marital or sexual relationship between parties as affecting right to adopt, 42 ALR4th 776.

§ 1-22-114. Effect of adoption.

  1. Upon the entry of a final decree of adoption  the former parent, guardian or putative father of the child shall  have no right to the control or custody of the child. The adopting  persons shall have all of the rights and obligations respecting the  child as if they were natural parents.
  2. Adopted persons may assume the surname  of the adoptive parent. They are entitled to the same rights of person  and property as children and heirs at law of the persons who adopted  them.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 2, §§ 4, 10; R.S. 1887, §§ 2277, 2286; R.S. 1899, §§ 3018, 3027; C.S. 1910, §§ 3955, 3964; C.S. 1920, §§ 5021, 5029; R.S. 1931, §§ 20-207, 20-215; C.S. 1945, §§ 58-204, 58-216; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-712, 1-721, 1-726.14; Laws 1977, ch. 187, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to change of name in adoption proceedings, see § 1-25-104 .

As to rights of heirs at law, see title 2.

Statutory provisions control. —

Adoption at common law was unknown and, therefore, the adoption of minor children as well as the rights and liabilities emanating therefrom are governed by statutory provisions concerning descent, distribution and adoption. In re Estate of Randall, 506 P.2d 432, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1973).

Natural grandparent not entitled to visit child. —

Any agreement, whether it was oral or in writing or whether or not it was included within the terms of an adoption decree, would not give a natural grandparent a right to visitation with the child. To the extent the existence of any such agreement permitting her to visit with the child could be proved, it would be void and unenforceable as violative of public policy. In re Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1990).

Because the legislature did not provide that paternal grandparent visitation rights survived the adoption of their grandchild by the child's maternal grandparents, such visitation rights were limited and terminable without notice, and therefore did not rise to the magnitude of constitutionally protected liberty interests. The adoption statutes extinguished all legal relationships between the adopted child and his biological family. Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, 107 P.3d 158, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2005).

Heirship. —

A son by adoption became the legal heir of the intestate brother of his adopted father, who died before the intestate brother. In re Cadwell's Estate, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1920).

Where two brothers were adopted by one family and several siblings were not, and where one of the brothers died intestate without any children, a district court erred in determining that the biological siblings were entitled to an inheritance; the other adopted brother's daughter was the only true heir of the decedent. Shippey v. Rogers (In re Estate of Kirkpatrick), 2003 WY 125, 77 P.3d 404, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2003).

Rights of inheritance prior to 1969 amendment. —

See In re Estate of Randall, 506 P.2d 432, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1973).

Rights of inheritance vest immediately on the death of intestate and devolutionary rights must be determined in relation to that date. In re Estate of Randall, 506 P.2d 432, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1973).

Applied in

Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1948).

Quoted in

In re TR, 777 P.2d 1106, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 9 , 20 L.R.A. 199 (1893); Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1948); E.R.C.K. v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2013 WY 160, 314 P.3d 1170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 166 , 2013 WL 6822656 (Dec 24, 2013); E.R.C.K. v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2013 WY 160, 314 P.3d 1170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 166 , 2013 WL 6822656 (Dec 24, 2013).

Law reviews. —

See “Administrative Problems Relating to Adoption,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 210.

See “Implied Revocation of Wills in Wyoming,” 10 Wyo. L.J. 112.

See article “Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code — Part I,” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 169 (1972).

For case notes, “Constitutional Law—Family Law—Grandparent Visitation Rights—Constitutional Considerations and the Need to Define the ‘Best Interest of the Child’ Standard. Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1993),” see XXIX Land & Water L. Rev. 593 (1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Adoption as affecting right of inheritance through or from natural parent or other natural kin, 37 ALR2d 333.

Right of adopted child to inherit from kindred of adoptive parent, 43 ALR2d 1183.

Change of child's name in adoption proceedings, 53 ALR2d 927.

Conflict of laws as to adoption as affecting descent and distribution of decedent's estate, 87 ALR2d 1240.

Right of children of adopted child to inherit from adopting parent, 94 ALR2d 1200.

Right of adopted child to inherit from intestate natural grandparent, 60 ALR3d 631.

Validity and application of statute authorizing change in record of birthplace of adopted child, 14 ALR4th 739.

Natural parent's parental rights as affected by consent to child's adoption by other natural parent, 37 ALR4th 724.

Adopted child as subject to protection of statute regarding rights of children pretermitted by will, or statute preventing disinheritance of child, 43 ALR4th 947.

Adoption as precluding testamentary gift under natural relative's will, 71 ALR4th 374.

Postadoption visitation by natural parent, 78 ALR4th 218.

Adopted child as within class named in testamentary gift, 36 ALR5th 395.

Adopted child as within class named in deed or inter vivos trust instrument, 37 ALR5th 237.

Grandparents' visitation rights where child's parents are deceased, or where status of parents is unspecified, 69 ALR5th 1.

Grandparents' visitation rights where child's parents are living, 71 ALR5th 99.

Denial of social security benefits to adopted children who are neither natural children nor stepchildren of eligible individual and who do not meet dependency requirements, under § 202(d)(8) of the Social Security Act, as amended (42 USC § 402(d)(8)), 57 ALR Fed 124.

§ 1-22-115. Subsidization of adoption; qualification for payments; authority to adopt rules and regulations.

  1. The department of family services may  grant subsidy payments to the adoptive parent of a child or to another  person on behalf of the child, if, at the time the child is placed  for adoption:
    1. The child is in the legal custody of the  department or a private child placement agency certified by the state  and is legally available for adoption;
    2. The department or a certified private  child placement agency is financially responsible for the child;
    3. Reasonable efforts to place the child  for adoption prior to consideration of a subsidy payment have been  unsuccessful;
    4. The child has special needs as determined  by the division; and
    5. The department or a certified private  child placement agency has determined the adoptive parent can provide  for the nonfinancial needs of the child.
  2. Subsidy payments under this section may  provide for the cost of health, maintenance, medical and surgical  treatment and costs incurred for the adoption, care, training and  education of the child.
  3. The determination of an adoptive parent’s  eligibility for subsidy payments shall be made before the completion  of the legal adoption of the child. All payments shall be reviewed  not less than annually by the department. Subsidy payments may continue,  subject to rules and regulations of the department, for any adoptive  parent terminating Wyoming residency with the child in custody.
  4. The department of family services shall  adopt a plan pursuant to P.L. 96-272 and rules and regulations necessary  for the administration of this section.
  5. Subsidy payments made under this section  shall:
    1. Not exceed the amount of payments for  comparable assistance under foster care;
    2. Be terminated or reduced if the need for  payments has altered or no longer exists as determined by the department  or if the child has reached the age of majority; and
    3. Be made from funds appropriated to the  department for foster care purposes.
  6. The department of family services may  accept on behalf of the state any available federal funds for purposes  consistent with this section. The department shall administer the  funds in conformance with this section and the terms and conditions  under which they are issued.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 144, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Editor's notes. —

Public Law 96-272, referred to in subsection (d), appears as various sections throughout 26 and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1-22-116. Medical history of natural parents and adoptive child.

To the extent available, the medical history of a child subject to adoption and his natural parents, with information identifying the natural parents eliminated, shall be provided by an authorized agency or may be provided by order of a court to the child’s adoptive parent any time after the adoption decree or to the child after he attains the age of majority. The history shall include but not be limited to all available information regarding conditions or diseases believed to be hereditary, any drugs or medication taken during pregnancy by the child’s natural mother and any other information which may be a factor influencing the child’s present or future health. The department of family services shall promulgate rules governing the release of medical histories under this section.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 144, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Meaning of “agency.” —

The term “agency,” as used in the first sentence, apparently means “agency” as defined in § 1-22-101(a)(i). See also § 1-22-101(a)(v).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

“Wrongful adoption” causes of action against adoption agencies where children have or develop mental or physical problems that are misrepresented or not disclosed to adoptive parents, 74 ALR5th 1.

§ 1-22-117. Putative father registry.

  1. The department of family services shall  establish a putative father registry which shall record the names  and addresses of:
    1. Any person adjudicated by a court of this  state to be the father of a child born out-of-wedlock;
    2. Any person who has filed with the registry  before or after the birth of a child out-of-wedlock, a notice of intent  to claim paternity of the child;
    3. Any person adjudicated by a court of another  state or territory of the United States to be the father of an out-of-wedlock  child, where a certified copy of the court order has been filed with  the registry by that person or any other person; and
    4. Any person who has filed with the registry  an instrument acknowledging paternity.
  2. A person filing a notice of intent to  claim paternity of a child or an acknowledgement of paternity shall  include therein his current address and shall notify the registry  of any change of address pursuant to procedures prescribed by regulations  of the department.
  3. A person who has filed a notice of intent  to claim paternity may at any time revoke a notice of intent to claim  paternity previously filed therewith and, upon receipt of the notification  by the registry, the revoked notice of intent to claim paternity shall  be deemed a nullity nunc pro tunc.
  4. An unrevoked notice of intent to claim  paternity of a child may be introduced in evidence by any party, other  than the person who filed such notice, in any proceeding in which  such fact may be relevant.
  5. The department of family services shall,  upon request, provide the names and addresses of persons listed with  the registry to any court or authorized agency, and such information  shall not be divulged to any other person, except upon order of a  court for good cause shown.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 170, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of putative father to visitation with child born out of wedlock, 58 ALR5th 669.

Article 2. Confidential Intermediaries

§ 1-22-201. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Adoptee” means a person who, as a minor,  was adopted pursuant to a final decree of adoption entered by a court;
    2. “Adoptive parent” means an adult who has  become a parent of a minor through the legal process of adoption;
    3. “Adult” means a person eighteen (18) years  of age or older;
    4. “Biological grandparent” means a parent,  by birth or adoption, of a biological parent;
    5. “Biological parent” means a parent, by  birth, of an adopted person;
    6. “Biological sibling” means a sibling,  by birth, of an adopted person;
    7. “Chief justice” means the chief justice  of the Wyoming supreme court;
    8. “Confidential intermediary” means a person  twenty-one (21) years of age or older who has completed a training  program for confidential intermediaries which meets the standards  set forth by the commission pursuant to W.S. 1-22-202(b) and who is authorized to inspect confidential relinquishment  and adoption records at the request of an adult adoptee, adoptive  parent, biological parent, biological sibling or biological grandparent;
    9. “Consent” means voluntary, informed, written  consent. Consent always shall be preceded by an explanation that the  consent permits the confidential intermediary to arrange a personal  contact among biological relatives;
    10. “Court” means any court of record with  jurisdiction over the matter at issue;
    11. “This act” means W.S. 1-22-201 through 1-22-203 .

History. Laws 1991, ch. 125, § 1; 1993, ch. 1, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

“Wrongful adoption” causes of action against adoption agencies where children have or develop mental or physical problems that are misrepresented or not disclosed to adoptive parents, 74 ALR5th 1.

§ 1-22-202. Commission created; powers; duties.

  1. There is hereby created within the department  of family services, an adoption intermediary commission of five (5)  members. Representation and appointment of the members shall be as  follows:
    1. One (1) member shall represent the judicial  branch and shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the  chief justice;
    2. One (1) member shall represent the department  of family services and shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure  of the director of the department;
    3. One (1) member shall represent private  adoption agencies and shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure  of the director of the department of family services;
    4. One (1) member shall represent programs  which provide confidential intermediary services and shall be appointed  by and serve at the pleasure of the director of the department of  family services;
    5. One (1) member shall be an adult adoptee,  adoptive parent or biological parent appointed by and serve at the  pleasure of the director of the department of family services.
  2. The commission shall have the responsibility  for:
    1. Drafting a manual of standards for training  confidential intermediaries;
    2. Monitoring confidential intermediary training  programs to ensure compliance with the standards set forth in the  manual with authority to approve or deny such programs based upon  compliance with such standards;
    3. Maintaining an up-to-date list of persons  who have completed training as confidential intermediaries and communicating  that list to the judicial branch.
  3. The commission shall adopt rules for its  own procedure. The commission shall select a chairman, a vice-chairman,  and such other officers as it deems necessary, and shall keep a record  of its proceedings. The commission shall meet as often as necessary  to carry out its duties, but in no instance shall it meet less than  semiannually. The commission may seek input from confidential intermediary  organizations in carrying out its duties.
  4. The commission shall be voluntary and  no state funds or personnel, except members of the commission appointed  pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, shall be used in its operation.  The commission may accept gifts and grants and expend funds received  to carry out its duties.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 125, § 1.

§ 1-22-203. Confidential intermediaries; confidential intermediary services.

  1. Any person who has completed a confidential  intermediary training program which meets the standards set forth  by the commission shall be responsible for notifying the commission  that his name should be included on the list of confidential intermediaries  to be maintained by the commission and made available to the judicial  branch. The commission’s rules shall specify when and under what conditions  the name of a confidential intermediary shall be removed from the  list available to the judicial branch. Once a person is included on  such list, he shall be:
    1. Authorized to inspect confidential relinquishment  and adoption records, as ordered by the court, upon motion to the  court by an adult adoptee, adoptive parent, biological parent, biological  sibling or biological grandparent;
    2. Available, subject to time constraints,  for appointment by the court to act as a confidential intermediary  for an adult adoptee, adoptive parent, biological parent, biological  sibling or biological grandparent.
  2. Any adult adoptee, adoptive parent, biological  parent, biological sibling or biological grandparent who is eighteen  (18) years of age or older may file a motion, with supporting affidavit,  in the court where the adoption took place or in the court in which  parental rights were terminated pursuant to W.S. 14-2-308 through 14-2-319 , to appoint one (1) or more confidential intermediaries  for the purpose of determining the whereabouts of the unknown biological  relative or relatives, except that no one shall seek to determine  the whereabouts of a relative who is a minor. The court may rule on  the motion and affidavit without hearing and may appoint a confidential  intermediary. Costs related to the proceeding and investigation shall  be the responsibility of the party filing the motion for appointment  and investigation.
  3. Any information obtained by the confidential  intermediary during the course of his investigation shall be kept  strictly confidential and shall be utilized only for the purpose of  arranging a contact between the individual who initiated the search  and the sought-after biological relative.
  4. When a sought-after biological relative  is located by a confidential intermediary on behalf of the individual  who initiated the search:
    1. Contact shall be made between the parties  involved in the investigation only when written consent for such contact  has been obtained from both parties and filed with the court;
    2. If consent for personal communication  is not obtained from both parties, all relinquishment and adoption  records and any information obtained by any confidential intermediary  during the course of his investigation shall be returned to the court  and shall remain confidential.
  5. Any person acting as a confidential intermediary  who knowingly fails to comply with the provisions of subsections (c)  and (d) of this section shall be subject to citation and punishment  for contempt as provided by Rule 42, Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 125, § 1; 1993, ch. 1, § 1; 2004, ch. 130, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (e), substituted “Rule 42” for “Rule 41.”

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Quoted in

Shippey v. Rogers (In re Estate of Kirkpatrick), 2003 WY 125, 77 P.3d 404, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2003).

Cited in

Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 2003 WY 119, 76 P.3d 1236, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2003).

Chapter 23 Miscellaneous Contracts and Actions; Statute of Frauds

Law reviews. —

For a note, “Heart Balm Legislation and the Constitution,” see 1 Wyo. L.J. 75.

For comments on the right of children to maintain action against one who enticed their parent, see 1 Wyo. L.J. 194, 7 Wyo. L.J. 209.

For a note, “Recovery of Engagement Gifts and the Heart Balm Acts,” see 3 Wyo. L.J. 147.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 1 et seq.

Rights in respect of engagement and courtship presents when marriage does not ensue, 44 ALR5th 1.

17B C.J.S. Contracts §§ 600 to 804; 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of, § 1 et seq.

§ 1-23-101. Right of actions abolished.

The rights of action to recover money as damage for the alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction or breach of contract to marry are abolished. No act done in this state shall give rise, either in or out of this state, to any of the rights of action abolished. No contract to marry made in this state shall give rise, either in or out of this state, to any right of action for the breach thereof.

History. Laws 1941, ch. 36, § 2; C.S. 1945, § 3-513; W.S. 1957, § 1-728; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-24-101 .

Application. —

In a divorce case, a trial court did not abuse it discretion by denying a wife's motion to amend her complaint to add a promissory estoppel claim because the husband's alleged promises relating to support could have been barred by the “Heart Balm Statute” and by the statute of frauds. Dane v. Dane, 2016 WY 38, 368 P.3d 914, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2016).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Injured party's release of tortfeasor as barring spouse's action for loss of consortium, 29 ALR4th 1200.

Rights in respect of engagement and courtship presents when marriage does not ensue, 44 ALR5th 1.

Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against paramours, 99 ALR5th 445.

§ 1-23-102. Contracts or instruments based on right of action declared void; execution of instruments, settling claims or bringing action prohibited.

All instruments executed within this state in payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise of any claim or cause of action abolished or barred by W.S. 1-23-101 , whether the claim or cause of action arose in or out of this state, are void. It is unlawful to cause any person to execute a contract or instrument or cause any person to give, pay, transfer or deliver any money or thing of value in payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise of any such claim or cause of action, or to receive, take or accept any money or thing of value as payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise of any such claim or cause of action. It is unlawful to commence or cause to be commenced, either as party, attorney or as agent of either in any court of this state, any proceeding or action seeking to enforce or recover upon any such contract or instrument, knowing it to be such, whether executed in or out of this state.

History. Laws 1941, ch. 36, § 3; C.S. 1945, § 3-514; W.S. 1957, § 1-729; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-24-102 .

§ 1-23-103. Filing pleading or service of process prohibited.

It is unlawful for a person either as a party, attorney or an agent of either, to file or serve or threaten to cause to be filed or served, any process or pleading in any court of the state, setting forth or seeking to recover money upon any cause of action abolished or barred by W.S. 1-23-101 , whether the cause of action arose in or out of the state.

History. Laws 1941, ch. 36, § 4; C.S. 1945, § 3-515; W.S. 1957, § 1-730; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-24-103 .

Cited in

Condict v. Lehman, 837 P.2d 81, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1992).

§ 1-23-104. Penalty for violation of provisions.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of W.S. 1-23-102 or 1-23-103 , is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or by imprisonment for a term of not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, or both.

History. Laws 1941, ch. 36, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 3-516; W.S. 1957, § 1-731; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-24-104 .

Chapter retroactive. —

Section 5, ch. 36, Laws 1941, reads: “In so far as not violative of constitutional guarantees, the provisions of this act shall have a retroactive application and shall bar all actions and causes of actions now existing and all suits pending in the state of Wyoming for alienation of affection, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry.”

Severability. —

Section 7, ch. 36, Laws 1941, reads: “If any of the provisions of this act or the application thereof to any persons or circumstances is held invalid such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to such end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

§ 1-23-105. Agreements void unless in writing.

  1. In the following cases every agreement  shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof  be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
    1. Every agreement that by its terms is not  to be performed within one (1) year from the making thereof;
    2. Every special promise to answer for the  debt, default or miscarriage of another person;
    3. Every agreement, promise or undertaking  made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promise to marry;
    4. Every special promise by an executor or  administrator, to answer any demand out of his own estate;
    5. Every agreement or contract for the sale  of real estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one (1) year;
    6. To charge any person upon, or by reason  of a representation or assurance concerning the character, conduct,  credit, ability, trade or dealings of another, to the intent or purpose  that such other may obtain thereby, credit, money or goods.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 57, §§ 1, 3; R.S. 1887, § 1249; R.S. 1899, § 2953; C.S. 1910, § 3751; C.S. 1920, § 4719; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 73; R.S. 1931, § 47-101; C.S. 1945, § 5-101; W.S. 1957, § 16-1; W.S. 1977, § 16-1-101 ; Laws 1982, ch. 62, § 1.

I.General Consideration.

Cross references. —

As to limitation of actions with reference to contracts in writing, see § 1-3-105 .

As to limitation of actions with reference to contracts not in writing, see § 1-3-105 .

As to effect of partial payment or new promise in writing on limitation of actions, see § 1-3-119 .

As to abolition of actions for breach of contract to marry, see §§ 1-23-101 through 1-23-104 .

For constitutional provisions that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be made, see art. 1, § 35, Wyo. Const.

As to necessity for express contract in writing, signed by parties thereto, with reference to leases, see § 34-2-129 .

For Comprehensive Curative Act, see §§ 34-8-101 through 34-8-105 .

For statute of frauds for contracts for sale of personal property not otherwise covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, see § 34.1-1-206.

For statute of frauds for contracts for sales of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code, see § 34.1-2-201.

As to formal requisites of security agreements and financing statements under the Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 34.1-9-203, 34.1-9-502.

Editor's notes. —

As originally enacted, C.L. 1876, ch. 57, consisted of 3 sections. Section 1 contained substantially the same provisions as the first five paragraphs of this section; § 2 related to contracts for sales of goods for more than $50.00 and was repealed by § 77, ch. 98, Laws 1917, which act adopted the former Uniform Sales Act; § 3 was substantially the same as paragraph (vi) of this section; and § 4 provided that the act was not applicable to transactions happening prior to its passage.

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Legislative purpose. —

The statute of frauds is an expression of fixed legislative policy of the state and is absolutely necessary to preserve the title to real property from the chances, the uncertainty, and the fraud attending the admission of parol testimony. Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1997).

Statute of frauds was enacted to prevent fraud, not to aid it, and should receive a reasonable interpretation with that end in view. Wallis v. Bosler, 70 Wyo. 129, 246 P.2d 771, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1952).

And should be liberally construed. —

This statute is to be liberally construed. Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., 32 Wyo. 313, 232 P. 511, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1925).

With some exceptions, equity as well as law is bound by the statute of frauds. Crosby v. Estate of Strahan, 78 Wyo. 302, 324 P.2d 492, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1958).

Equitable exceptions to the statute of frauds exist, but the supreme court restricts, rather than expands, those exceptions, even when a hardship will occur. Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1997).

It may be necessary for court to uphold oral agreements to accomplish the purpose of the statute of frauds. Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1978).

Certain matters immaterial if statute satisfied. —

Where there is a valid and enforceable contract entered into in compliance with the statute of frauds, part performance is immaterial, as is any subsequent ratification. Part performance only becomes a significant issue when a contract fails to satisfy the statute of frauds. Reed v. Wadsworth, 553 P.2d 1024, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 1976).

Effect of voidable contract in tort action. —

In the setting of tortious interference with a contract, it is not necessarily fatal to a cause of action that an underlying contract may be voidable by reason of this section. Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1979).

Applied in

Aimonetto v. Fire Ins. Exch., 417 F.2d 307, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10261 (10th Cir. 1969); Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1993); Barlage v. Key Bank, 892 P.2d 124, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1995); Giacchino v. Estate of Stalkup, 908 P.2d 983, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 236 (Wyo. 1995).

Quoted in

Wight v. Linden, 69 Wyo. 67, 237 P.2d 475, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (1951); North Am. Uranium, Inc. v. Johnston, 77 Wyo. 332, 316 P.2d 325, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (1957); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Miles, 711 P.2d 390, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 622 (Wyo. 1985); In re Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1990).

Stated in

Cates v. Daniels, 628 P.2d 862, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo. 1981).

Cited in

Holland v. Windsor, 461 P.2d 47, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1969); Adams v. KVWO, Inc., 570 P.2d 458, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1977); Lavoie v. Safecare Health Serv., Inc., 840 P.2d 239, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1992); Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Co., 1 P.3d 615, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2000); WERCS v. Capshaw, 2004 WY 86, 94 P.3d 421, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (2004); Shaw Constr., LLC v. Rocky Mt. Hardware, Inc., 2012 WY 60, 275 P.3d 1238, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Apr. 18, 2012).

Law reviews. —

See “A Possible Bar to Implied Covenants in Wyoming Oil and Gas Lease,” 11 Wyo. L.J. 57.

For case note, “Probate — The Enforcement of Unwritten Wills, In re Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 389 , 42 A.L.R.4th 167 (Wyo. 1983),” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 279 (1985).

For case note, “Real Estate Brokers and Salespersons — When is a Broker Not a Broker? Walter v. Moore, 700 P.2d 1219, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 485 (Wyo. 1985),” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 241 (1986).

For article, “Wyoming Employment Law,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 775 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Memorandum which will satisfy statute of frauds as predicable in whole or in part upon writings prior to the oral agreement, 1 ALR2d 841.

Restrictions upon use of real property, 5 ALR2d 1316.

Performance as taking contract, not to be performed within a year, out of statute of frauds, 6 ALR2d 1053.

Sale, or contract for sale, of standing timber as within provision of statute of frauds respecting sale or contract of sale of real property, 7 ALR2d 517.

Check as payment, 8 ALR2d 251.

Moral obligation connected with contract within statute of frauds as consideration for executory promise, 8 ALR2d 787.

Statutory necessity and sufficiency of written statement as to amount of compensation in broker's contract to procure purchase, sale or exchange of real estate, 9 ALR2d 747.

Delivery of memorandum as necessary to its effectiveness to satisfy statute of frauds, 12 ALR2d 508.

Statute of frauds as affecting enforceability as between the parties to agreement to purchase property at judicial or tax sale for their joint benefit, 14 ALR2d 1267.

Failure to object to parol evidence or voluntary introduction thereof, as waiver of defense of statute of frauds, 15 ALR2d 1330.

Sufficiency of memorandum of lease agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds, as regards terms and conditions of lease; term of demise; amount of rent or time and manner of payment, 16 ALR2d 621.

Agency to purchase personal property for another as within statute of frauds, 20 ALR2d 1140.

Sufficiency of description or designation of land in contract or memorandum of sale under statute of frauds, 23 ALR2d 6.

Necessity and sufficiency of statement of consideration in contract or memorandum of sale of land, under statute of frauds, 23 ALR2d 164.

Construction and effect of exception making statute of frauds' provision inapplicable where goods are manufactured by seller for buyer, 25 ALR2d 672.

Liability for inducing breach of contract in violation of statute of frauds, 26 ALR2d 1227.

Rights of parties under oral agreement to buy land or bid it in at judicial sale, 27 ALR2d 1285.

Oral contract for personal services as long as employee is able to continue in work, to do satisfactory work, or the like, as within statute of frauds relating to contracts not to be performed within year, 28 ALR2d 878.

Validity of oral promise or agreement not to revoke will, 29 ALR2d 1229.

Oral acceptance of written offer by party sought to be charged as satisfying statute of frauds, 30 ALR2d 972.

What constitutes part performance sufficient to take agreement in consideration of marriage out of statute of frauds; execution of will, 30 ALR2d 1419.

Effect of attempted cancellation or erasure in memorandum otherwise sufficient to satisfy statute of frauds, 31 ALR2d 1112.

Application of statute of frauds to promise not to make a will; effect of performance, 32 ALR2d 370.

Construction of statute requiring representations as to credit, etc., of another to be in writing; conspiracy; representation by credit agencies; fraudulent representations, 32 ALR2d 743.

Lien of vendee for purchase money paid under invalid parol contract, 33 ALR2d 1375, 82 ALR3d 1040.

Promise by stockholder, officer or director to pay debt of corporation, 35 ALR2d 906.

Statute of frauds as applicable to seller's oral warranty as to quality or condition of chattel, 40 ALR2d 760.

Real estate broker's right to recover in quantum meruit for services although contract is not in writing as required by statute; agreements between brokers, 41 ALR2d 905.

Agreement to drop or compromise will contest or withdraw objections to probate, as within statute of frauds, 42 A.L.R.2d 1319.

Statute of frauds as affecting option for repurchase by vendor, 44 ALR2d 342.

Agreement between brokers as within statute requiring agreements for commissions for the sale of real estate to be in writing, 44 ALR2d 741.

Statute of frauds as affecting question when real estate owned by partner before formation of partnership will be deemed to become asset of firm, 45 ALR2d 1009.

Sufficiency, under the statute of frauds, of description or designation of land in contract or memorandum of sale which gives right to select a tract to be conveyed, 46 ALR2d 894.

Joint adventure agreement for acquisition, development or sale of land as within provision of statute of frauds governing broker's agreement for commission on real estate sale, 48 ALR2d 1042.

Promissory estoppel in place of statute of frauds, 48 ALR2d 1069, 56 ALR3d 1037.

Vendee's liability for use and occupancy of premises, where vendor disaffirms land contract unenforceable under the statute of frauds, 49 ALR2d 1169.

Contract to support, maintain or educate a child as within provision of statute of frauds relating to contracts not to be performed within a year, 49 ALR2d 1293.

Performance or other factors as avoiding applicability of provision of statute of frauds relating to contract not to be performed within a year, to contract to support, maintain or educate a child, 49 ALR2d 1293.

Necessity of writing to create right by private grant or reservation to hunt or fish on another's land, 49 ALR2d 1395.

Novation through creditor's acceptance of obligation of third person as question of fact or law, 61 ALR2d 755.

Applicability of statute of frauds to promises to pay for medical, dental or hospital services furnished to another, 64 ALR2d 1071.

Provision of Negotiable Instrument Law requiring renunciation of rights to be in writing, 65 ALR2d 593.

Solid mineral royalty as real or personal property for purposes of statute of frauds, 68 ALR2d 732.

What constitutes promise made in or upon consideration of marriage within statute of frauds, 75 ALR2d 633.

Surrender of written lease by parol, 78 ALR2d 933.

Part performance doctrine with respect to renewal option in lease not complying with statute of frauds, 80 ALR2d 425.

Admissibility of parol evidence to connect signed and unsigned documents relied on as memorandum to satisfy statute of frauds, 81 ALR2d 991.

Applicability of statute of frauds to profit sharing or bonus plans, 81 ALR2d 1066.

Note of buyer as payment, 81 ALR2d 1355.

Enforceability, under statute of frauds provisions as to contracts not to be performed within a year, of oral employment contract for more than one year but specifically made terminable upon death of either party, 88 ALR2d 701.

Will or instrument in form of will as sufficient memorandum of contract to devise or bequeath, 94 ALR2d 921.

Validity of promise to provide for illegitimate child, as affected by statute of frauds, 20 ALR3d 500.

Oral contract to provide for illegitimate child as affected by part performance, 20 ALR3d 500.

Price fixed in contract violating statute of frauds as evidence of value in an action on quantum meruit, 21 ALR3d 9.

Parol exception of fixtures from conveyance or lease, 29 ALR3d 1441.

Oral agreement as to partition, 37 ALR3d 962.

Applicability of statute of frauds to agreement to rescind contract for sale of land, 42 ALR3d 242.

Validity of lease or sublease subscribed by one of the parties only, 46 ALR3d 619.

Comment note on statute of frauds and conflict of laws, 47 ALR3d 137.

Action by employee in reliance on employment contract which violates statute of frauds as rendering contract enforceable, 54 ALR3d 715.

Statute of frauds as affecting contract for permanent employment, 60 ALR3d 218.

Exceptions to rule that oral gifts of land are unenforceable under statute of frauds, 83 ALR3d 1294.

Check given in land transaction as sufficient writing to satisfy statute of frauds, 9 ALR4th 1009.

Promise by one other than principal to indemnify one agreeing to become surety or guarantor as within statute of frauds, 13 ALR4th 1153.

Enforceability, by landowner, of subdivision developer's oral promise to construct or improve roads, 41 ALR4th 573.

Modern status of views as to validity of premarital agreements contemplating divorce or separation, 53 ALR4th 22.

Enforceability of premarital agreements governing support or property rights upon divorce or separation as affected by circumstances surrounding executions — modern status, 53 ALR4th 85.

Enforceability of premarital agreements governing support or property rights upon divorce or separation as affected by fairness or adequacy of those terms — modern status, 53 ALR4th 161.

Sufficiency of showing, in establishing boundary by parol agreement, that boundary was uncertain or in dispute before agreement, 72 ALR4th 132.

Applicability of statute of frauds to promise to pay for legal services furnished to another, 84 ALR4th 994.

Promissory estoppel of lending institution based on promise to lend money, 18 ALR5th 307.

Rights in respect of engagement and courtship presents when marriage does not ensue, 44 ALR5th 1.

Liability for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations involving sale of business, stock, or real estate, 71 ALR5th 491.

Satisfaction of statute of frauds by e-mail, 110 ALR5th 277.

II.Agreements to Which Statute Applies.
A.Agreements Not to Be Performed Within One Year.

Oral contract must be capable of complete execution within year, with reference to at least one of the parties, to be without the statute. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

Performance by one party within year. —

If performance by one of the parties to a contract can be fully executed within a year, and is so executed, the contract is not within the statute. Hageman & Pond v. Clark, 69 Wyo. 154, 238 P.2d 919, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1951).

Statute invalidates only agreements that cannot be performed within one year. —

The statute invalidating agreements not to be performed within one year includes only agreements which cannot be performed within that period. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929); Zimmerman v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Asso., 848 F.2d 1047, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 7553 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1988).

So that agreement fixing three year maximum time limit was outside statute. —

Parol agreement not exceeding three years to pay monthly sum so long as competing dance hall was not operated held not within statute as to agreements not to be performed within one year, since it only fixed maximum time limit and did not require more than one year for performance. Stewart v. McKeon, 36 Wyo. 106, 252 P. 1024, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1927).

As was contract to be performed during life of given person. —

A contract which by its terms is not to be performed for a longer period than during the life of a given person is not within the clause of the statute of frauds invalidating oral agreements not to be performed within one year. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

Oral agreements to provide for widow and give her free pew in synagogue for her life held not within statute. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

Oral agreement to do particular act during, at or after one year is within statute. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

Where parties intend permanent arrangement, contract is within statute, although no time for performance is specified. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

Oral contract requiring maintenance of room in hospital and Bible in synagogue to perpetuate memory of plaintiff's husband held within statute. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

Agreement not to institute wrongful death action. —

Oral agreement of widow, not appointed as administratrix, to forego instituting death action as husband's representative, held within statute, where more than one year remained for bringing suit. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

Evidence of writing necessary for employment contract. —

The converse to the employment at will rule is that when a contract of employment states a definite duration, dismissal only for cause is presumed. However, this rule incorporates two restrictions: (1) performance under a contract of definite duration is within the statute of frauds, making evidence of a writing necessary if the terms are not performed within one year; and (2) employers and employees are free to enter into express contracts which state a duration but contain specific language preserving the right to terminate at will by either party. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1994).

Employment contract without definite term terminable at will. —

Where there was no specific provisions in an employment contract fixing a definite term of employment, but only a subjective “understanding,” the contract was terminable at will. Allen v. Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 479 (Wyo. 1985), overruled in part, Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 17, 105 P.3d 1079, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2005).

B.Promises to Answer for Debt, etc., of Another.

Statute inapplicable where main purpose of promisor is to serve his own interest. —

Where main purpose of promisor is to serve own interest and in consideration of his promise to answer for debt, default or miscarriage of another he obtains direct and substantial benefit, his promise is valid without writing. Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Stockgrowers' Bank, 173 F. 859, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5113 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1909).

A contract whereby one guaranteed to pay attorneys a fee for acting as counsel in a certain suit for a third party, in consideration that they would obtain an agreement in writing from the third party that he would pay a sum of money which he was then owing to a bank of which the party giving the guaranty was president and a large stockholder, is not within the statute of frauds. Ivenson v. Caldwell, 3 Wyo. 465, 27 P. 563, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1891).

And where promise to pay debt of another is not chief purpose of transaction in which it inheres, and a substantial and valuable consideration therefor inures directly to the benefit of the promisor, the promise does not fall within the statute, and no writing is necessary to support it. Northern Gas Co. v. El Rancho Verde, Inc., 79 Wyo. 93, 332 P.2d 59, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1958).

And where original undertaking. —

Promise to pay debt of promisor by paying his creditor's debt to another is an original undertaking of the promisor and no writing is needed to support it. Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Stockgrowers' Bank, 173 F. 859, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5113 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1909).

Evidence offered to establish defendant's agreement to hold plaintiff and others harmless if they would become bail for payment of judgment was not inadmissible as proving oral promise to answer for debt or default of another, where the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to raise an issue of fact which might have been resolved by holding that defendant assumed a primary, as distinguished from a secondary or collateral, liability. Kirch v. Nicholson, 42 Wyo. 489, 297 P. 398, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1931).

.Statute is applicable to agreement to transfer real estate.—

Although a purported oral agreement between a claimant, the claimant's parent, and the claimant's grandparent was simply for a transfer in ownership of the family ranch, and not specifically a sale of the real property, the statute of frauds applied nonetheless. Furthermore, the statute barred any oral agreement that attempted to convey or affect an interest in real property. Willey v. Willey, 2016 WY 116, 385 P.3d 290, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 2016).

Agreement by grantee to assume mortgage debt outside statute. —

An agreement by the grantee of land to assume a mortgage debt may be by oral promise and is not within the statute. Bolln v. La Prele Live Stock Co., 27 Wyo. 335, 196 P. 748, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1921).

Third parties' promise to pay real estate purchasers' promissory note installments unenforceable. —

An oral agreement between the purchasers of certain real estate and third parties, under which the third parties agreed to assume and pay the annual installments on the promissory note, which could not, according to its terms, be paid within a year, was void and unenforceable according to the provisions of subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii). B-T, Ltd. v. Blakeman, 705 P.2d 307, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 524 (Wyo. 1985).

C.Agreements for Sale, etc., of Real Estate.

Exceptions. —

Court erred in granting summary judgment finding that the statute of frauds barred children's claims to an interest in the contested property because they presented sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of fact concerning the existence of a clear and definite oral agreement, their performance under that agreement and their reliance on the agreement. Redland v. Redland, 2012 WY 148, 288 P.3d 1173, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 2012).

Statute necessary to protect property titles. —

The statute of frauds is an expression of fixed legislative policy of the state and is absolutely necessary to preserve the title to real property from the chances, the uncertainty, and the fraud attending the admission of parol testimony. Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1978).

Partial summary judgment granted because no agreement, reasonable reliance or misrepresentation. —

Partial summary judgment was properly granted to an owner in a quiet title action because there was no oral contract between the owner and two relatives regarding the management of a ranch since, at most, it was an “agreement to agree.” Promissory estoppel did not remove the requirements of this section because the reliance was not reasonable, and equitable estoppel did not apply either since there was no evidence of any misrepresentation. Parkhurst v. Boykin, 2004 WY 90, 94 P.3d 450, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 2004).

But estoppel may defeat statute. —

Equitable, particularly promissory, estoppel may be used to defeat the statute of frauds and result in the creation of a restrictive covenant, a negative covenant, or equitable servitude upon real estate. Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1978); Kincheloe v. Milatzo, 678 P.2d 855, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1984).

Written listing unnecessary where broker completes sale. —

The public policy of this state did not require a written listing for the sale of real estate by a licensed broker in order for the broker to recover a commission in an instance in which a sale of the property was completed through the efforts of the broker. The broker's performance, consisting of bringing an able and willing buyer, who purchased the property, to the closing removed the oral contract from the requirements of subsection (a)(v). Wyoming Realty Co. v. Cook, 872 P.2d 551, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1994).

“Contract for sale of real estate” defined. —

A “contract for the sale of real estate” is one for the transfer of property or real estate for a fixed price in money, or its equivalent. Mecum v. Metz, 30 Wyo. 495, 222 P. 574, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 32 Wyo. 79, 229 P. 1105, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1924); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 1976).

Irrigation easements within statute. —

A right-of-way for construction, maintenance and exclusive use of irrigation ditch is an interest in real estate within the statute of frauds. Linck v. Brown, 55 Wyo. 100, 96 P.2d 909, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1939).

Court properly concluded that a lease and its concomitant authorization for an easement holder to use the right-of-way was efficacious where the easement holder already had a second right-of-way through acquisitions of rights-of-way held by its predecessors in interest, and the easement holder's use of another entity's right-of-way did not create a significant additional burden to that right-of-way or the interest a landowner had in it. In addition, the landowner cited no pertinent authority nor did he make a cogent argument that the circumstances amounted to a violation of the statute of frauds that invalidated the lease agreement between a television station and the easement holder. Cundy v. Range Tel. Coop., Inc., 2005 WY 153, 123 P.3d 901, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2005).

Statute is applicable to agreement to devise real estate. Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1925); Sievers v. Barton, 775 P.2d 489, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1989).

And to agreement to perfect title. —

Oral agreement to perfect title in exchange for interest in mining claims held within statute and void. Mecum v. Metz, 30 Wyo. 495, 222 P. 574, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 32 Wyo. 79, 229 P. 1105, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1924).

“Grubstake” contracts are not within statute of frauds. Feusner v. Farley, 80 Wyo. 124, 338 P.2d 835, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1959).

Oral agreement to deal in real estate not within statute. —

In applying the statute of frauds, the courts generally draw a clear distinction between oral contracts for the sale, transfer or creation of an interest in real property and a partnership or joint adventure to acquire, sell and deal in real estate. The basis of the distinction is that an oral agreement between parties to acquire, sell or otherwise deal in real estate and to share in the speculative profits is an agreement concerning personal, not real, property; the real property acquired and dealt in is regarded as personal property among the partners to the speculative adventure and hence not within the statute of frauds. Dayvault v. Baruch Oil Corp., 211 F.2d 335, 1954 U.S. App. LEXIS 4225 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1954).

This section does not preclude a party to a parol contract for buying and reselling land and sharing profits from recovering his share of the profits after the land has been resold. Hoge v. George, 27 Wyo. 423, 200 P. 96, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1921).

Thus, accounting for rents and profits under such contract not barred. —

This section did not bar plaintiff from securing an accounting from defendants for the rents and profits earned under an oral contract entered into between plaintiff and defendants in New York to acquire, sell and deal in oil and gas leases located in Wyoming. Dayvault v. Baruch Oil Corp., 211 F.2d 335, 1954 U.S. App. LEXIS 4225 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1954).

But joint adventure concept limited. —

Defendant as owner and coowner had title, though inchoate and defeasible, to unpatented mining claims, and oral agreement to transfer an interest therein was invalid under statute and not valid as joint adventure, though interests of defendant's coowners were to be acquired by forfeiture. Mecum v. Metz, 32 Wyo. 79, 229 P. 1105, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1924).

Parties entitled to repudiate oral “understandings” prior to execution of written instrument. —

Inasmuch as the parties intended a written instrument be a condition precedent to making operational or effective any “understandings” reached by them as to the disputed title to disputed lands, no enforceable oral agreement was reached, there was no fraud, and either party had the right to reconsider or repudiate the terms of such “understandings” prior to the execution of a written instrument. Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, 696 P.2d 76, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 451 (Wyo. 1985).

Transaction resulting in creation of tenancy in common. —

Where parties agreed orally to construct and did construct temporary storage reservoir on public land for individual use, their interests proportionate to lands under irrigation, parties became tenants in common and statute of frauds cannot be invoked to defeat the relationship. Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 478, 102 P.2d 64, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 56 Wyo. 129, 105 P.2d 278, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1940).

Lending title. —

Subsection (a)(v) is inapplicable where there was no contract for the sale of lands, and the title was lent for a specific purpose. Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 1976).

Verbal agreement to assign lease of realty which will not expire until lapse of more than one year is void. Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1930).

Where owner of land executed agreement by which he sold and conveyed to second party, his heirs and assigns, all of the oil, gas, coal and other minerals under certain lands, together with the right of ingress and egress, for the purpose of drilling, mining and operating for minerals, agreement called for royalties for the several minerals in case second party should discover oil or minerals, and conveyance was to be in effect for 10 years from discovery, and as much longer as gas or other minerals could be produced in paying quantities, but if operations were not begun within six months, grant should be void, and provided that “lease is not intended as a mere franchise, but is intended as a conveyance of the property therein mentioned,” verbal assignment of this lease was void under the statute of frauds. Montana & W. Oil Co. v. Gibson, 19 Wyo. 1, 113 P. 784, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1911).

Oral modification of a lease with an option to purchase agreement. —

Record contained sufficient evidence that created genuine issues of material fact as to the application of the statute of frauds, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a seller in a suit brought by land purchasers for the enforcement of a lease with an option to purchase agreement where the purchasers claimed that the agreement had been orally modified by the seller; conduct of the purchasers supported their claim where, inter alia, they had continued to make all of their monthly payments under the agreement. Linton v. E. C. Cates Agency, Inc., 2005 WY 63, 113 P.3d 26, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 2005).

Surrender of lease. —

A lease for a term of years may be surrendered by operation of law, and an agreement in writing is not necessary in such a case. Barber v. Smythe, 59 Wyo. 468, 143 P.2d 565, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1943).

Where tenant vacated premises under oral agreement to surrender long-term lease, statute of frauds did not apply and tenant's subsequent assignment of lease to third party conveyed nothing, and third party became a trespasser. Barber v. Smythe, 59 Wyo. 468, 143 P.2d 565, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1943).

Ratification of lease for term of years. —

Since a lease for a term of years must be in writing, any ratification of it by the remainderman must also be in writing. Wood v. Trenchard, 550 P.2d 490, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1976).

Unsigned lease admissible in action for waste. —

In an action by a lessor against the lessee for damages for waste committed during the term, the lease was not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it was for a term exceeding one year, and was not signed by defendant. Marshall v. Rugg, 6 Wyo. 270, 44 P. 700, 1896 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1896).

Contract description inadequate. —

With respect to a breach of contract action where the buyers rescinded their offer to buy real estate, in the operative portion of the contract description the phrase “a parcel of land” identified neither the size nor the specific location of the land, there was nothing within the contract that guided the appellate court to specific extrinsic evidence of those facts, and therefore, the real-estate contract was void, and summary judgment for the plaintiff sellers, which awarded them the earnest money deposit, plus attorney's fees, was reversed. Pullar v. Huelle, 2003 WY 90, 73 P.3d 1038, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 2003).

Term sheet did not satisfy requirements for a contract. —

Property description in the term sheet did not satisfy the requirements for precision under the Wyoming Statute of Frauds; thus, the term sheet could not constitute a contract under the Wyoming Statute of Frauds. Therefore, the association could not prove a set of facts entitling it to relief on its breach of contract claim, and the trial court properly dismissed the association's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Platte Valley Wyo-Braska Beet Growers Ass'n v. Imperial Sugar Co., 100 Fed. Appx. 717, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2004).

Boundary by oral agreement limited. —

The doctrine of boundary by agreement, by which adjoining landowners may by an understanding not affected by deeds determine their boundary line in such a manner as to have it binding upon themselves and their successors, is limited, as oral agreements changing known boundary lines violate the statute of frauds. If the boundary line is not doubtful or in dispute, an oral agreement for its change is invalid, this involving an actual transfer of land within the statute. Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d 798, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 523 (Wyo. 1986), overruled in part, Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1991).

In an action for adverse possession, a remand was required for consideration of whether the parties reached an oral agreement to divide the land at issue and whether that oral agreement was unenforceable because of the statute of frauds. Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 2000).

III.The Memorandum.

Note or memorandum need not have been made contemporaneously with contract. Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., 32 Wyo. 313, 232 P. 511, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1925); Laramie Printing Trustees v. Krueger, 437 P.2d 856, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1968).

And may consist of several writings. —

The “memorandum” may consist of several related writings connected with each other and connected with the subject matter of the transaction. Laramie Printing Trustees v. Krueger, 437 P.2d 856, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1968).

Not referring to each other. —

Writings, when signed by defendant though not referring to each other, held sufficient. Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., 32 Wyo. 313, 232 P. 511, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1925).

But interrelationship and connection between separate writings must appear on their face in order for them to be considered together as evidence of an oral agreement, or else they cannot be used to satisfy the writing requirement of subsection (a). Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1982).

Addendum to oral agreement needs sufficient consideration. —

A veterinarian's addendum to an oral agreement, with its pay raise, represented sufficient separate consideration supporting the reaffirmation of the covenant not to compete. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, 861 P.2d 531, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1993).

Oral modification of at-will employment agreement. —

Court properly found that an employee was not entitled to relief in a termination case where an oral promise to him that he could return to the truck driving position if a management job did not “work out” did not provide him with any job security because he signed an application which included an express provision emphasizing that all employees were at-will employees and prohibiting oral modifications of an employee's at-will status. Finch v. Farmers Co-Op Oil Co., 2005 WY 41, 109 P.3d 537, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2005).

Writings addressed to contracting corporation's president. —

Memorandum of agreement with corporation held not insufficient, though some of writings composing it addressed corporation's president rather than corporation. Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., 32 Wyo. 313, 232 P. 511, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1925).

Letter stating intention to convey property. —

A letter to a mother, proposing to marry her daughter, and stating that the writer intends “to deed over to May, when we are married,” a certain house and lot, which letter is shown to the daughter, is a sufficient memorandum, within the statute of frauds. North Platte Milling & Elevator Co. v. Price, 4 Wyo. 293, 33 P. 664, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1893).

Letter expressing desire to pay designated amount of another's debt does not necessarily constitute promise to pay it, although under some circumstances word “desire” might be construed as “promise.” Robar Corp. v. Kingham, 51 Wyo. 409, 66 P.2d 1046, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1937).

Mutual wills held not sufficient memoranda to satisfy statute. Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1925).

Requirement of signing. —

The requirement of this section that the agreement be “subscribed by the party to be charged therewith” means exactly what it says. The requirement is satisfied if the party to be charged either signs the agreement or authorizes another in writing to sign in his behalf. However, parol authority or an oral ratification is not sufficient. Wallis v. Bosler, 70 Wyo. 129, 246 P.2d 771, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1952); Czapla v. Grieves, 549 P.2d 650, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1976).

Wyoming requires greater certainty in writing's description before extrinsic evidence may supplement; greater certainty requires the description of the land be sufficiently definite to locate it without recourse to oral testimony. In re Estate of Jackson, 892 P.2d 786, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1995).

Description of land. —

Where contract is for the conveyance of land, the description must be sufficient to fix and comprehend the property which is the subject of the transaction, so that, with the assistance of external evidence, the description, without being contradicted or added to, can be connected with and applied to the very property intended and to the exclusion of all other property. Noland v. Haywood, 46 Wyo. 101, 23 P.2d 845, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1933).

A memorandum providing for the exchange of “280 acres of land on Clear Creek in township 54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . range 79” in Sheridan county for “property located in Sheridan, Wyoming, at 9 N. Vale Ave., including all furniture,” was not sufficient to satisfy the provisions of this section in an action for specific performance. Noland v. Haywood, 46 Wyo. 101, 23 P.2d 845, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1933).

Contract void where location not described. —

When a writing only states the total acreage without any description of the location of the land involved, the statute of frauds' requirement that the subject matter be reasonably certain is not satisfied and the contract is void. In re Estate of Jackson, 892 P.2d 786, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1995).

Sufficiency of property report. —

A property report which reasonably identifies the parties, the subject matter, and their obligations to each other is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds with respect to a note or memorandum in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged. Richardson v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1990).

Loan application procedure. —

Neither an express or implied contract was created where defendant bank's loan officer advised plaintiff borrowers that they would be eligible for a loan and instructed plaintiffs to contact a building contractor, develop design plans, and keep him updated; the lender instructed plaintiffs not to sign disclosure documents, and there was nothing in the record that indicated the relationship ever extended beyond the loan application stage. Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, 75 P.3d 640, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2003).

Scope of memorandum. —

Evidence sustained finding that memorandum setting out representations in exchange of property did not cover representations in a printed folder and those made subsequent to memorandum. Baylies v. Vanden Boom, 40 Wyo. 411, 278 P. 551, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1929).

Vendor cannot willfully and unilaterally reject more formal instrument and then hide behind statute of frauds because it was not done, especially where a memorandum between the parties is adequate in its terms. Reed v. Wadsworth, 553 P.2d 1024, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 1976).

IV.When Statute Not Applied.

Tendency to restrict number of exceptions to statute. —

The tendency has been to restrict rather than enlarge and multiply the cases of exceptions to the statute of frauds, and the courts should not be tempted to turn aside from its plain provisions merely because of the hardship of a particular case. Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1978).

Parol evidence admissible to show circumstances making written contract. —

Parol evidence of the circumstances under which a written antenuptial contract was made is admissible, though the statute of frauds provides that an agreement in consideration of marriage, except the mutual promise to marry, shall be void unless in writing. North Platte Milling & Elevator Co. v. Price, 4 Wyo. 293, 33 P. 664, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1893).

Action by third party beneficiary not barred where principal parties signed contract. —

A plaintiff who acquired an option on mineral rights from one of the parties to a written contract concerned with the development of the same mineral rights could maintain an action as a third party beneficiary of the contract against the parties to the contract though the plaintiff did not sign the contract, since the parties sought to be charged on the contract both signed. Coleman v. Mountain Mesa Uranium Corp., 240 F.2d 12, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4257 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1956).

Contract partly within and partly without statute. —

Widow, agreeing orally to refrain from bringing suit as personal representative for wrongful death of husband, was not entitled to recover under defendant's agreement to provide for her and maintain pew in church for her use for remainder of her natural life, and to maintain hospital room and Bible in synagogue in memory of her husband, on ground that part of defendant's promises were not within the statute, where plaintiff's agreement was itself within statute, and therefore afforded no consideration for defendant's promises. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

This section is satisfied where contract is no longer executory and has been performed by one party. Engle v. First Nat'l Bank, 590 P.2d 826, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 362 (Wyo. 1979); Lambousis v. Johnston, 657 P.2d 358, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 274 (Wyo. 1983).

Where an oral contract creating interests in land has been carried into effect, and each party has gone into possession thereunder, the rights so acquired are not affected by the statute of frauds. Rohrbaugh v. Mokler, 26 Wyo. 514, 188 P. 448, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1920).

The statute of frauds applies only to executory contracts, and not to agreements which have been completely executed and performed on both sides. In such case, the rights, duties and obligations of the parties are entirely unaffected by the statute. Nussbacher v. Manderfeld, 64 Wyo. 55, 186 P.2d 548, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1947).

In an action under former § 34-6-101 (now § 2-9-101 ) by a surviving husband for a declaration terminating joint tenancy in lands conveyed to husband and wife as joint tenants and vesting title to said land in the husband as the surviving tenant, it could not be contended by heirs of the deceased wife that the surviving husband sought to charge the deceased wife and her estate with a purported agreement which was never subscribed and signed by her in violation of the provisions of statute of frauds, since the statute of frauds does not apply to completely executed agreements. Nussbacher v. Manderfeld, 64 Wyo. 55, 186 P.2d 548, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1947).

An executed agreement is not within the statute of frauds; when a contract has been executed, the transaction has passed beyond the stage of an agreement. Barber v. Smythe, 59 Wyo. 468, 143 P.2d 565, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1943).

An oral agreement to surrender a long-term lease is not effective unless fully performed, but if performed it is effective, and the surrender becomes effective by operation of law. Barber v. Smythe, 59 Wyo. 468, 143 P.2d 565, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1943).

If performance on one side of a contract is fully executed, the contract is not within the statute of frauds. Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 1976).

Even if full performance takes longer than a year, an action on an oral contract is not barred by this section when one of the parties has fully performed. Lambousis v. Johnston, 657 P.2d 358, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 274 (Wyo. 1983).

Sufficient part performance permits specific performance of oral contract. —

When one side of an oral agreement has been fully or substantially performed, the agreement is removed from the statute of frauds. Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1997).

Duration and part performance. —

The statute of frauds did not apply where there was an oral agreement over 30 years and part performance by a party. Metz Bev. Co. v. Wyo. Bevs. Inc., 2002 WY 21, 39 P.3d 1051, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2002).

An oral contract may be specifically enforced where there has been such partial performance as to take it out of the operation of the statute of frauds or to render application of the statute unfair and inequitable. Butler v. McGee, 373 P.2d 595, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1962).

What constitutes part performance. —

A part performance to take an oral agreement to convey real estate out of the statute of frauds must be substantial and of such a nature that the refusal to enforce the agreement would result not merely in the denial of the right which the agreement was intended to confer but an unjust and unconscionable injury. Crosby v. Estate of Strahan, 78 Wyo. 302, 324 P.2d 492, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1958); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 1976).

Where the value of plaintiff's services could have been estimated, his claim of substantial part performance by virtue of his services failed. Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1993).

Factors considered in partial performance. —

Since the common law exception to the statute of frauds of substantial performance is a version of equitable estoppel, the court will look to the relations of the parties to a parol agreement, the nature of the parol agreement, and the relative benefit and detriment derived by the parties in determining whether substantial performance removes the agreement from the statute of frauds. Empfield v. Kimbrough, 900 P.2d 1153, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1995).

Possession and payment of purchase price are sufficient. —

Where purchaser takes possession under an oral contract and pays all or a part of the agreed price, it is sufficient to take the transaction out of the provisions of this section. Johnson v. Maki, 45 Wyo. 113, 16 P.2d 46, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1932).

Sufficiency of possession. —

In order for possession to be sufficient as a part performance of an oral contract, the acts constituting performance must be referable solely to the contract sought to be enforced, and not such as might have been referable to some other or different contract. Butler v. McGee, 373 P.2d 595, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1962).

The possession by the vendee, relied upon as a part performance of a parol contract for the sale of land, must have been delivered by the vendor, or taken by the vendee with the knowledge and consent or acquiescence of the vendor. Butler v. McGee, 373 P.2d 595, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1962).

Possession must be taken at, or immediately after, the time the contract was made, and must be visible, notorious, exclusive, continuous and maintained. Butler v. McGee, 373 P.2d 595, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1962).

Admission into possession was insufficient to take oral agreement for interest in mining claims out of statute, where possession was not exclusive. Mecum v. Metz, 30 Wyo. 495, 222 P. 574, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 32 Wyo. 79, 229 P. 1105, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1924).

Section inapplicable where quiet title refused because adverse possessors failed to demonstrate equities. —

Refusal to quiet title in adverse possessors because they failed to demonstrate the equities which entitled them to such relief and restoration of possession to the title holder of record did not invoke prohibition of this section merely because of presence of oral agreement among neighboring owners to so return lands. Harsha v. Anastos, 693 P.2d 760, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 423 (Wyo. 1985).

Notice of lease renewal and partial rent payment sufficient. —

In a suit contesting the validity of the renewal of a grazing lease, the giving of the required notice for renewal by the plaintiffs as well as their payment of the first four months rent of the five year lease was sufficient partial performance to remove the contract out of the statute of frauds. McClellan v. Britain, 826 P.2d 245, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1992).

Performance by plaintiff of contract to execute mutual wills held insufficient to take case out of statute. Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1925).

Oral settlement agreement in probate enforced. —

Policy considerations favoring family settlements and the swift and certain adjudication in probate matters were, under the unique facts of this case, paramount when juxtaposed with the policy considerations underlying the statute of frauds. Maycock v. Maycock (In re Estate of Maycock), 2001 WY 103, 33 P.3d 1114, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2001).

Probate court did not err in ordering performance of an oral settlement agreement concerning the decedent's estate because there were sufficient notes and memoranda to avoid frontal offense to the statute of frauds. Maycock v. Maycock (In re Estate of Maycock), 2001 WY 103, 33 P.3d 1114, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2001).

Services alone do not constitute sufficient part performance. —

Services alone do not constitute part performance to take a case out of the statute of frauds except in exceptional cases where the services cannot be measured in money. Crosby v. Estate of Strahan, 78 Wyo. 302, 324 P.2d 492, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1958).

But may support recovery on quantum meruit. —

One who performs services is entitled to recover quantum meruit therefor, though this section applies. Nastrom v. Sederlin, 43 Wyo. 330, 3 P.2d 82, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1931).

Pleading and proof of oral contract held admissible as showing the rendition of services for a recovery for the quantum meruit. Nastrom v. Sederlin, 43 Wyo. 330, 3 P.2d 82, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1931).

Courts will not allow use of statute as instrument of fraud. —

Courts will not allow defense of statute of frauds when in doing so it becomes instrument of perpetrating fraud. Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1930).

But mere refusal or nonperformance of parol agreement is not such fraud as takes the case out of the statute. Crosby v. Estate of Strahan, 78 Wyo. 302, 324 P.2d 492, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1958).

For either party has right to refuse to execute parol contract. —

In order to justify the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, the fraud complained of must be something more than the mere refusal of a party to perform his agreement; either party has the right to refuse to execute a parol contract within the operation of the statute, and the exercise of that right is no more a fraud than a breach of any other contract. Crosby v. Estate of Strahan, 78 Wyo. 302, 324 P.2d 492, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1958).

Accordingly, promisee must show change of position, injury and loss. —

The promisee of an oral contract, in order to be able to rely on the doctrine of estoppel, must be able to show that he has changed his position substantially for the worse and that he has incurred unjust and unconscionable injury and loss. Crosby v. Estate of Strahan, 78 Wyo. 302, 324 P.2d 492, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1958).

Such as inducement to buy property. —

Where lessee by orally representing that he would assign sublease to purchaser induced purchaser to buy property, principle of equitable estoppel precluded lessee from relying on statute of frauds in action to determine entitlement to rent from sublessee. Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1930).

Examples of oral agreements upheld. —

Where owners of adjoining lots constructed their improvements in reliance upon an oral agreement for a private way between the lots, their acts were sufficient to take the agreement out of the statute of frauds. Forde v. Libby, 22 Wyo. 464, 143 P. 1190, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1914).

Performance for 16 months of oral agreement to pay monthly sum so long as competing dance hall was not operated held to remove agreement from statute. Stewart v. McKeon, 36 Wyo. 106, 252 P. 1024, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1927).

An oral agreement under which defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff $500.00 if the plaintiff waived his rights to cut defendant's timber under a prior written contract so as to enable defendant to sell all of his timber to a third party was not barred by the statute of frauds where the plaintiff refrained from cutting the timber and the defendant sold his timber to the third party. Gaido v. Tysdal, 68 Wyo. 490, 235 P.2d 741, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1951).

Alleged oral modifications to agreement concerning size of building were not barred by statute of frauds, where there were writings which evidenced the size increase, and larger foundation was actually poured and existed in the ground. Roussalis v. Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 2000).

Trial court properly declined to rule that a brother's claim that he was owed a bonus by his brother was unenforceable because the substantial performance of the brother making the claim- -he continued in the position of employment for the two years as he had promised- took the parties' oral agreement outside the statute of frauds. Schmid v. Schmid, 2007 WY 148, 166 P.3d 1285, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2007).

Reimbursement of loss. —

District court properly granted summary judgment to a successor trustee because the mother's amendments to her trust requiring a daughter to reimburse an investment loss to the trust was not a debt that implicated the statute of frauds and, although the mother consulted with her other daughters about the amendments on isolated occasions, there was no indication in the record that they unduly influenced her into amending the trust. Meyer v. Miller, 2014 WY 91, 330 P.3d 263, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 2014).

V.Pleading And Practice.

Defense of statute of frauds was available only to parties to transfer. Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 P. 570, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1924).

Where city vacated part of a street, in consideration of surrender by adjoining owner of his rights under an oral contract, which lot owner and the other party treated as valid, city could not thereafter attack validity of that contract. Rohrbaugh v. Mokler, 26 Wyo. 514, 188 P. 448, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1920).

Statute may be raised by complaint or answer. —

A party may rely on the statute of frauds under the general issue or a general denial (now complaint or answer, see Rules 7 and 8, W.R.C.P.). Williams-Hayward Shoe Co. v. Brooks, 9 Wyo. 424, 64 P. 342, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1901).

Statute of frauds may be raised under general denial (now defensive pleading, see Rules 7 and 8, W.R.C.P.). Davison v. Nicholson, 37 Wyo. 412, 263 P. 605, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1928).

Or invoked by defensive pleading. —

Defense of statute of frauds may be invoked by demurrer (now defensive pleading, see Rules 7 and 8, W.R.C.P.), where petition shows on its face that contract relied on by plaintiff was oral and within statute. Davison v. Nicholson, 37 Wyo. 412, 263 P. 605, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1928).

Law of the case. —

Landowners did not raise the statute of frauds in their brief, and either the trial court wrongly interpreted landowners' argument, or they abandoned it on appeal; either way, it was now the law of this case that the statute of frauds, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105(a)(v), provided no basis for denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. Davison v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, 2010 WY 121, 238 P.3d 556, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2010).

Defendant must manifest objection to proof. —

Defendant must, to avail himself of statute of frauds, manifest objection to proof so as to call it to court's attention. Davison v. Nicholson, 37 Wyo. 412, 263 P. 605, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1928); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1982).

Failure to object constitutes waiver. —

Failure to object to oral evidence during trial constitutes waiver of statute. Davison v. Nicholson, 37 Wyo. 412, 263 P. 605, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1928); Jim's Water Serv., Inc. v. Alinen, 608 P.2d 667, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1980); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1982).

Appeal of barred claim. —

Where general finding and judgment were had against plaintiff in action for board and lodging allegedly furnished defendant's employees, reviewing court would disregard alleged error in finding that plaintiff's alleged claim was barred by statute of frauds. Cook v. McDonald, 60 Wyo. 215, 148 P.2d 594, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1944).

Doctrine of partial performance.—

Contract for the sale of a lot in a real estate subdivision violated the statute of frauds because the contract and the addendum did not indicate with reasonable certainty the basis for identifying the land. However, the equities required enforcement of the contract under the doctrine of partial performance because the seller, in reliance on the buyer’s conduct and the contract, proceeded to perform its obligations under the contract and altered its position to its detriment. Davis v. Harmony Dev., LLC, 2020 WY 39, 460 P.3d 230, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2020).

§ 1-23-106. Gambling contracts void.

All contracts, promises, agreements, conveyances, securities, and notes, made, given, granted, executed, drawn or entered into, where the whole or any part of the consideration thereof shall be for any money, property or other valuable thing won by any gaming, or by playing cards or any gambling device or game of chance, or by betting on the side or hands of any person gaming or for the reimbursing or paying any money or property knowingly lent or advanced at the time and place of such play, to any person or persons so gaming or betting, shall be utterly void and of no effect. No assignment of any bill, bond, note or other evidence of indebtedness, where the whole or any part of the consideration for such assignment shall arise out of any gaming transaction, shall in any manner offset the defense of the person or persons making, entering into, executing or giving such instrument so assigned, or the remedies of any person interested therein.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 35, § 118; R.S. 1887, § 1001; R.S. 1899, § 2187; C.S. 1910, § 2860; C.S. 1920, § 3393; R.S. 1931, § 48-201; C.S. 1945, § 5-301; W.S. 1957, § 16-2; W.S. 1977, § 16-2-101 ; Laws 1982, ch. 62, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to gambling generally, see §§ 6-7-101 through 6-7-104 .

As to regulatory powers of cities and towns, see § 15-1-103(a)(xvi).

As to effect of illegality of transaction on rights of holder in due course, see § 34.1-3-305.

Basis for this section is that wagers are against human welfare, considered to be of a higher interest, and are not to be encouraged. Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., 572 P.2d 412, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 286 (Wyo. 1977).

Section declares gambling contracts void and of no effect. Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., 572 P.2d 412, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 286 (Wyo. 1977).

Even though gambling may be carried on without any criminal violation of the law or criminal responsibility, a gambling debt is unenforceable. Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., 572 P.2d 412, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 286 (Wyo. 1977).

Note void in whosesoever hands it comes. —

Under this section, providing that all notes made or entered into in whole or in part for a gambling consideration, or for money won at cards, “shall be utterly void, and of no effect,” the maker of such a note may defeat it in whosesoever hands it may come. Swinney v. Edwards, 8 Wyo. 54, 55 P. 306, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1898).

Transfer held not for consideration of money won at gambling. —

Certificates of deposit were cashed for holder who was engaged in gambling by the keeper of the gambling room, at time when holder was not indebted for past losses, and the full amount of the certificates was paid him, but most of it was thereafter lost in gambling. It was held that transfer of the certificates was not “for the consideration of money won” from the holder, so as to be void. Kinney v. Hynds, 7 Wyo. 22, 49 P. 403, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1897), reh'g denied, 7 Wyo. 22, 52 P. 1081, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1898).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Recovery of amount of debt deposited with stakeholder, 8 ALR2d 307.

Recovery of money or property entrusted to another for purpose of lottery tickets but not so used, 8 ALR2d 307.

Recovery of money or property entrusted to another for purpose of dealings in futures or on margin but not so used, 8 ALR2d 307.

Agreement between charitable home and applicant for admission respecting compensation to home and property right of applicant as wagering contract, 10 ALR2d 864.

Recovery of money or property lost through cheating or fraud in forbidden gambling or game, 39 ALR2d 1213.

Money lent by broker for dealings in futures or on margin, 53 ALR2d 345.

State lotteries: actions by ticketholders against state or contractor for state, 40 ALR4th 662.

Enforceability of contract to share winnings from legal lottery ticket, 90 ALR4th 784.

Right to recover money lent for gambling purposes, 74 ALR5th 369.

§ 1-23-107. Individual liability of members of governmental agencies.

  1. Notwithstanding W.S. 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 , the members of any governmental board, agency, council, commission or governing body are not individually liable for any actions, inactions or omissions by the governmental board, agency, council, commission or governing body.
  2. This section does not affect individual  liability for intentional torts or illegal acts.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 100, § 1; 1992, ch. 53, § 2; 2006, ch. 114, § 1; 2017, ch. 41, § 1.

The 2006 amendment substituted “1-39-121” for “1-39-120” in (a).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts for a bill to become law as provided by Art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

The 2017 amendment , effective July 1, 2017, at the beginning of (a), substituted “1-39-120” for “1-39-121.”

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Qualified immunity. —

Where a subdivision developer alleging an entitlement or right to obtain approval of his subdivision from a board of county commissioners failed to identify a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that had been violated, the members of the board were entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Marshall v. Board of County Comm'rs, 912 F. Supp. 1456, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 761 (D. Wyo. 1996).

Law reviews. —

For comments, “Wyoming Tort Reform and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: A Second Opinion,” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 593 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability for personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in church premises, 8 ALR5th 1.

Chapter 24 Amercement

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

70 Am. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police and Constables §§ 230, 234.

Disqualification of judge because of pecuniary interest in amercement, 72 ALR3d 375.

80 C.J.S. Sheriffs and Constables §§ 359 to 385.

§ 1-24-101. Causes for amercement.

  1. On motion in court and notice in writing  as provided in W.S. 1-24-102 , an officer shall be amerced in the amount of the judgment  including costs, and ten percent (10%) thereon for the plaintiff or  defendant when:
    1. An execution or order of sale is directed  and delivered to him to be executed, and he neglects or refuses to  execute it;
    2. He neglects or refuses to sell any property  which by any writ or order he is directed to sell;
    3. He fails to call an inquest, or to return  to the clerk’s office a copy of the certificate of inquisition made  by the inquest;
    4. He neglects to return to the proper court  on or before the return day an execution or order of sale directed  and delivered to him;
    5. He neglects to return a correct inventory  of personal property taken on execution, unless he returns that the  amount of the judgment, including costs, has been paid to him;
    6. He neglects, on demand, to pay to the  person entitled thereto, any money collected or received by him for  the use of such person, at any time after he collects or receives  the same; or
    7. He neglects or refuses to pay to the judgment  debtor on demand all money received by him on any sale made beyond  what is sufficient to satisfy the writ or order of sale, with interest  and costs.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 594; R.S. 1887, § 2942; R.S. 1899, § 4061; C.S. 1910, § 4921; C.S. 1920, § 6191; R.S. 1931, § 89-3701; C.S. 1945, § 3-5201; W.S. 1957, § 1-732; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-25-101 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Sheriff's actions in execution sale within scope of chapter. —

In an execution sale the actions of the sheriff are circumscribed by statutes and he is subject to amercement. Eggeman v. Western Nat'l Bank, 596 P.2d 318, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 417 (Wyo. 1979).

§ 1-24-102. Notice of motion for amercement.

If the officer resides in the county in which the motion is made, the notice shall be served upon him at least two (2) days before the motion is heard. If he is an officer of another county, the notice shall be served upon him or left at his office at least fifteen (15) days before the motion is heard, or sent to him by certified mail at least sixty (60) days before the motion is heard.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 595; R.S. 1887, § 2943; R.S. 1899, § 4062; C.S. 1910, § 4922; C.S. 1920, § 6192; R.S. 1931, § 89-3702; C.S. 1945, § 3-5202; W.S. 1957, § 1-733; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-25-102 .

§ 1-24-103. Amercement for failure to serve or return process.

If an officer fails to execute any summons or other process directed to him, or to return the same as required by law, unless he is prevented by unavoidable accident from doing so, he shall be amerced, upon motion and notice in writing as provided by law in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) and be liable to the action of any person aggrieved by the failure. He is not liable to an action or amercement for failure to execute any process directed to him from any county other than that in which he was elected unless his fees are deposited with the clerk who issued the process and an endorsement of that fact is made and subscribed by the clerk on the process at the time of its issue.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 596; R.S. 1887, § 2944; R.S. 1899, § 4063; C.S. 1910, § 4923; C.S. 1920, § 6193; R.S. 1931, § 89-3703; C.S. 1945, § 3-5203; W.S. 1957, § 1-734; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-25-103 .

§ 1-24-104. Amercement of clerks of court.

If a clerk of court neglects or refuses on demand to pay to the person entitled thereto any money received by him in his official capacity for the use of that person, he may be amerced, on motion and notice as provided by law.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 597; R.S. 1887, § 2945; R.S. 1899, § 4064; C.S. 1910, § 4924; C.S. 1920, § 6194; R.S. 1931, § 89-3704; C.S. 1945, § 3-5204; W.S. 1957, § 1-735; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-25-104 .

§ 1-24-105. Amount of amercement for not paying over money.

When the cause of amercement is the refusal to pay over money collected, the officer shall not be amerced in a greater sum than the amount withheld, with ten percent (10%) thereon.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 598; R.S. 1887, § 2946; R.S. 1899, § 4065; C.S. 1910, § 4925; C.S. 1920, § 6195; R.S. 1931, § 89-3705; C.S. 1945, § 3-5205; W.S. 1957, § 1-736; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-25-105.

§ 1-24-106. Surety of officer may be made party to judgment.

A surety of an officer may be made party to a judgment of amercement against the officer, but the goods, chattels, lands and tenements of the surety are not liable to execution when sufficient goods, chattels, lands and tenements of the officer against whom judgment is rendered can be found to satisfy the execution. Either party may proceed against the officer by attachment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 599; R.S. 1887, § 2947; R.S. 1899, § 4066; C.S. 1910, § 4926; C.S. 1920, § 6196; R.S. 1931, § 89-3706; C.S. 1945, § 3-5206; W.S. 1957, § 1-737; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-25-106.

Cross references. —

As to attachment following judgment generally, see §§ 1-17-301 to 1-17-345 .

As to rights and remedies of surety upon paying judgment, see § 38-1-104 .

§ 1-24-107. Officer may have execution on original judgment.

If an officer who is amerced has not collected the amount of the original judgment, he may sue out an execution and collect for his own use the amount of the judgment, in the name of the original plaintiff.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 600; R.S. 1887, § 2948; R.S. 1899, § 4067; C.S. 1910, § 4927; C.S. 1920, § 6197; R.S. 1931, § 89-3707; C.S. 1945, § 3-5207; W.S. 1957, § 1-738; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-25-107.

Chapter 25 Change of Name

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

57 Am. Jur. 2d Name §§ 9 to 15.

Rights and remedies of parents inter se with respect to the names of their children, 53 ALR2d 914.

Right of married woman to use maiden surname, 67 ALR3d 1266.

Circumstances justifying grant or denial of petition to change adult's name, 79 ALR3d 562.

65 C.J.S. Names §§ 21 to 28.

§ 1-25-101. Verified petition to be presented; information to be shown in petition; order of court making change; record to be made.

Every person desiring to change his name may petition the district court of the county of the petitioner’s residence for the desired change. The petition shall be verified by affidavit setting forth the petitioner’s full name, the name desired, a concise statement of the reason for the desired change, the place of his birth, his place of residence and the length of time he has been an actual bona fide resident of the county in which the petition is filed. If the court is satisfied that the desired change is proper and not detrimental to the interests of any other person, it shall order the change to be made, and record the proceedings in the records of the court. In the event a confidentiality order has been entered pursuant to W.S. 35-21-112 or any other court order allowing a party to maintain confidentiality of addresses, city or state of residence or other information identifying the residence, the address, city or state of residence or other information identifying the residence of the party shall remain confidential.

History. Laws 1890-91, ch. 44, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4191; C.S. 1910, § 5051; C.S. 1920, § 6313; R.S. 1931, § 89-4401; C.S. 1945, § 3-5701; W.S. 1957, § 1-739; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-26-101 ; 2013, ch. 98, § 2.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added the last sentence.

  1. Child's best interest.

    Mother did not show it was error to deny the mother's petition to change the mother's child's name due to a trial court's failure to consider whether the change was in the child's best interest because (1) such a finding was not statutorily required, and (2) the state of the record made it impossible to find if the trial court considered the child's best interest or if the mother raised the issue. Enh v. Hansley, 2016 WY 86, 378 P.3d 296, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 1-25-102. Residence requirement.

A person petitioning for a change of name shall have been a bona fide resident of the county in which the petition is filed for at least two (2) years immediately preceding filing the petition.

History. Laws 1890-91, ch. 44, § 2; R.S. 1899, § 4192; C.S. 1910, § 5052; C.S. 1920, § 6314; R.S. 1931, § 89-4402; C.S. 1945, § 3-5702; W.S. 1957, § 1-740; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-26-102.

§ 1-25-103. Notice to be given by publication.

Except in a proceeding in which the court has issued a confidentiality order pursuant to W.S. 35-21-112 or any other court order allowing a party to maintain confidentiality of addresses, city or state of residence or other information identifying the residence of the party, public notice of the petition for a change of name shall be given in the same manner as service by publication upon nonresidents in civil actions.

History. Laws 1890-91, ch. 44, § 3; R.S. 1899, § 4193; C.S. 1910, § 5053; C.S. 1920, § 6315; R.S. 1931, § 89-4403; C.S. 1945, § 3-5703; W.S. 1957, § 1-741; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-26-103; 2013, ch. 98, § 2.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added “Except in a proceeding in which the court has issued a confidentiality order pursuant to W.S. 35-21-112 or any other court order allowing a party to maintain confidentiality of addresses, city or state of residence or other information identifying the residence of the party.”

§ 1-25-104. Change of name in adoption proceedings.

In all cases of the adoption of children in the manner provided by law, the court before which such adoption proceeding is held, may change the name of any child so adopted and make an order to that effect, which shall be recorded in the records of the proceeding of adoption. Each child who has heretofore, in Wyoming, been adopted according to law, may have his or her name changed to that of the parents who have adopted him or her, upon the parents, who have adopted such child, on behalf of such child, filing a petition therefor.

History. Laws 1890-91, ch. 44, § 4; R.S. 1899, § 3028; C.S. 1910, § 3965; C.S. 1920, § 5030; R.S. 1931, § 20-216; C.S. 1945, § 3-5704; W.S. 1957, § 1-742; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-26-104.

Cross references. —

For provision that the decree of adoption of adult may include name change, see § 1-22-113 .

For similar provision concerning adoption of children, see § 1-22-114 .

As to issuance of new birth certificate following adoption, see § 35-1-417 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Name of child as changed by adoption, 53 ALR2d 927.

Chapter 26 Eminent Domain

Cross references. —

As to eminent domain generally, see art. 1, § 32, Wyo. Const.

For provision that no private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation, see art. 1, § 33, Wyo. Const.

For provision that the right of eminent domain shall never be so abridged or construed as to prevent the legislature from taking property and franchises of corporations, see art. 10, § 9, Wyo. Const.

Law reviews. —

See article, “Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power vs. Eminent Domain,” III Land & Water L. Rev. 33 (1968).

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

For case note, “REAL PROPERTY — Wyoming's Private Road Statutes: Approaching A Dead End? Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1995),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 443 (1996)

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Eminent domain: right to condemn property owned or used by private educational, charitable, or religious organization, 80 ALR3d 833.

Eminent domain: validity of appropriation of property for anticipated future use, 80 ALR3d 1085.

Good will as element of damages for condemnation of property on which private business is conducted, 81 ALR3d 198.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance protecting historical landmarks, 18 ALR4th 990.

Eminent domain: industrial park or similar development as public use justifying condemnation of private property, 62 ALR4th 1183.

Abutting owner's right to damages for limitation of access caused by traffic regulation, 15 ALR5th 821.

Measure of damages or compensation in eminent domain as affected by premises being restricted to particular educational, religious, charitable or noncommercial use, 29 ALR5th 36.

Construction and application of rule requiring public use for which property is condemned to be “more necessary” or “higher use” than public use to which property is already appropriated — state takings, 49 ALR5th 769.

29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 1 et seq.

Library References.

American Law of Mining, 2nd Edition § 112.05 (Matthew Bender).

Article 1. Public Building and School Sites; Public Utility Plants and Facilities

§§ 1-26-101 through 1-26-110. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 3.

Cross references. —

For present provisions as to eminent domain, see §§ 1-26-501 through 1-26-817 .

Editor's notes. —

This article derived from Laws 1882, ch. 13, § 10, Laws 1890, ch. 64, § 1, Laws 1901, ch. 70, § 1, and Laws 1933, ch. 78, §§ 1 through 7.

Article 2. Railroads

§§ 1-26-201 through 1-26-210. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 3.

Cross references. —

For present provisions as to eminent domain, see §§ 1-26-501 through 1-26-817 .

Editor's notes. —

This article derived from Laws 1888, ch. 56, §§ 1, 2, 22, 24 and 31 through 36.

Article 3. Roads, Ditches and Flumes; Pipe, Electric Transmission, Telephone and Telegraph Lines

§§ 1-26-301 through 1-26-303. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 3.

Cross references. —

For present provisions as to eminent domain, see §§ 1-26-501 through 1-26-817 .

Editor's notes. —

This article derived from C.L. 1876, ch. 34, part I, § 45 and Laws 1901, ch. 31, §§ 1 and 2.

Article 4. Ways of Necessity for Certain Purposes

§§ 1-26-401 through 1-26-405. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 3.

Cross references. —

For present provisions as to eminent domain, see §§ 1-26-501 through 1-26-817 .

Editor's notes. —

This article derived from Laws 1907, ch. 52, §§ 1, 9 and 12, Laws 1977, ch. 73, § 1 and Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1.

Article 5. Generally

I.General Consideration.

Editor's notes. —

All of the following pre-1990 annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

For article, “A Critical Look at Wyoming Water Law,” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 307 (1989).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §§ 1 to 16.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance protecting historical landmarks, 18 ALR4th 990.

Seizure of property as evidence in criminal prosecution or investigation as compensable taking, 44 ALR4th 366.

Construction and application of rule requiring public use for which property is condemned to be “more necessary” or “higher use” than public use to which property is already appropriated — state takings, 49 ALR5th 769.

Method of determining rate of interest allowed on award to owner of property taken by United States in eminent domain proceeding, 56 ALR Fed 477.

Dismissal, under Rule 71A(i)(3) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of defendant unnecessarily or improperly joined in condemnation action, 57 ALR Fed 490.

29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 1 to 89.

II.Public Buildings And Utilities.

Only provision applicable to cities and towns. —

This section held to be the only provision applicable to cities and towns. Newcastle v. Toomey, 78 Wyo. 432, 329 P.2d 264, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1958).

Mandatory provisions, applicability. —

Insofar as statutes governing condemnation by cities of first class were inapplicable to complaining parties, and insofar as failure to comply therewith could not prejudice them, statutes could not be consider mandatory as to them. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

Demand of jury trial. —

Entry of final order by court in condemnation by a city for a water system, before the time provided by former §§ 1-770, 1-774 and 1-777 does not prejudice right of landowners to demand a jury trial, within the time allowed by the statute therefor. City of Cheyenne v. Edwards, 22 Wyo. 401, 143 P. 356, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1914).

Power of eminent domain cannot be exercised by resolution or ordinance. —

There is no statutory provision which grants to any city or town any power to exercise the power of eminent domain by resolution or ordinance adopted by a town or city council. Newcastle v. Toomey, 78 Wyo. 432, 329 P.2d 264, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1958).

Ratification by council. —

Fact that city council did not adopt formal resolution authorizing city attorney to institute condemnation proceedings is not fatal where, after proceedings were instituted, council ratified what had been done. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

Abutting property, condemnation. —

Statutes authorizing condemnation by cities of first class apply both to property physically taken and to abutting property indirectly damaged even though some provisions relating to actual taking cannot be carried out. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

Applicability of act. —

The provisions of this section apply to City of Cheyenne to authorize it to condemn land to establish city waterworks. Edwards v. Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 P. 677, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1911), reh'g denied, 19 Wyo. 110, 122 P. 900, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1912).

Petition to change water permit. —

A petition to change water permits from a beneficial to a preferred use for municipal purposes, even if considered as a petition for condemnation, cannot be basis for taking from holders of such permits anything more than their claims and settling rights injuriously affected by the change of use. Town of Newcastle v. Smith, 28 Wyo. 371, 205 P. 302, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1922).

Limitation of act. —

This section does not empower city to purchase a gas plant by issuance of bonds. Lakota Oil & Gas Co. v. Casper, 57 Wyo. 329, 116 P.2d 861, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1941).

Light plants may be acquired by eminent domain, but bonds must be within debt limitation fixed by statute and authority for issuance must be voted by the people. Whipps v. Greybull, 56 Wyo. 355, 109 P.2d 805, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1941).

Construction. —

Chapter 78, Laws 1933 (former §§ 1-747 to 1-753), and Revised Statutes 1931, § 22-1601 et seq. (former § 15-530), dealing with same subject matter, should be construed together. Jensen v. Afton, 59 Wyo. 500, 143 P.2d 190, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1943).

Utility financing. —

Power to purchase public utility plant accorded cities and towns by ch. 78, Laws 1933 (former §§ 1-747 to 1-753), does not imply a power also to finance that purchase in a manner which legislature has persistently refused to recognize. Jensen v. Afton, 59 Wyo. 500, 143 P.2d 190, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1943).

Revenue bonds. —

Town did not have power to issue revenue bonds to purchase power company property, especially where such property had over half the assessed value of all taxable property and town already had bonded indebtedness of $53,000 and the school district, of $66,000. Jensen v. Town of Afton, 59 Wyo. 500, 143 P.2d 190, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (1943).

Fatal defects. —

Original petition showing proceedings for acquisition of gas plant were not started until summer of 1933 and acquisition was not authorized at special election discloses fatal defect under this act. Lakota Oil & Gas Co. v. Casper, 57 Wyo. 329, 116 P.2d 861, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1941).

Limitation of power. —

City could not give itself power to purchase gas plant by execution of bonds without authorization through special election, by reserving such right in franchise; such power must come from legislature. Lakota Oil & Gas Co. v. Casper, 57 Wyo. 329, 116 P.2d 861, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1941).

Petition. —

Petition in declaratory judgment action to determine validity of contract between plaintiff and city for acquisition of gas plant, disclosing acquisition was not authorized at special election, was fatally defective in view of statutory provision that no city shall start proceedings for acquisition of a utility unless acquisition was authorized as special election. Lakota Oil & Gas Co. v. Casper, 57 Wyo. 329, 116 P.2d 861, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1941).

III.Railroads.
A.In General.

Gates. —

This section gives a railroad the right to install a gate in the fence so as to give the owners a farm crossing. Hildebrand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 45 Wyo. 175, 17 P.2d 651, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1933).

Paramount right of grantees. —

United States not having invoked forfeiture of use of lands, defendant's right thereto as grantee's successor was paramount to plaintiff's through subsequent patent. Richardson v. Midwest Ref. Co., 39 Wyo. 58, 270 P. 154, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1928).

Right to assail title. —

Grant by United States to run pipeline across its lands held limited fee, making it impossible for anyone but grantor to assail title. Richardson v. Midwest Ref. Co., 39 Wyo. 58, 270 P. 154, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1928).

Strangers to title. —

Plaintiff, being stranger to land title granted by United States, was in no position to complain of irregularities therein. Richardson v. Midwest Ref. Co., 39 Wyo. 58, 270 P. 154, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1928).

Courts are without jurisdiction to interfere with the state highway commission's exercise of lawfully delegated authority to determine the necessity for and location of public highways. Woolley v. State Highway Comm'n, 387 P.2d 667, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1963).

The decision of highway commission must stand if it is within its authority, has some reasonable basis, and is not arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory. Woolley v. State Highway Comm'n, 387 P.2d 667, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1963).

But courts have inherent power to inquire into such matters as fraud, conduct tantamount to fraud or usurpation of power. Woolley v. State Highway Comm'n, 387 P.2d 667, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1963).

And landowner may obtain their aid to inquire into necessity for taking. —

A landowner, where issues are properly joined, may obtain the aid of a court to inquire into the use of and the necessity for the lands sought to be appropriated. Woolley v. State Highway Comm'n, 387 P.2d 667, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1963).

B.Procedure.

Synonymous terms. —

The term “damaged” used in constitution and term “injuriously affected” used in various sections of condemnation statute, are synonymous. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940); Barber v. State Highway Comm'n, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1959).

Terms “damaged” and “injuriously affected” synonymous. —

The term “damaged” used in the Wyo. Constitution [Art. 1, § 33] and the term “injuriously affected” used in this section are synonymous. Barber v. State Highway Comm'n, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1959).

Mandatory provisions, applicability. —

Insofar as statutes governing condemnation by cities of first class were inapplicable to complaining parties, and insofar as failure to comply therewith could not prejudice them, statutes could not be considered mandatory as to them. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

Abutting property, condemnation. —

Statutes authorizing condemnation by cities of first class apply both to property physically taken and to abutting property indirectly damaged even though some provisions relating to property actually taken cannot be carried out in the latter type of case. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

Certificate of assessment. —

Certificate of assessment filed by commissioners in condemnation proceedings will be confirmed unless exceptions or application for jury trial are filed within 15 days after certificate of assessment is filed. Hoover v. Biagini, 43 Wyo. 416, 5 P.2d 291, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1931).

A certificate of assessment is not a pleading in the ordinary sense. Routh v. State Highway Comm'n, 402 P.2d 706, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1965).

However, development of issues raised by a last pleading is brought about by such certificate in eminent domain proceedings. Routh v. State Highway Comm'n, 402 P.2d 706, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1965).

Where owners are alleged as minors. —

Allegation that owners of described realty were certain named minors and that certain individual was “duly appointed, qualified and acting guardian of said minors,” was sufficiently specific, where guardian thought she was and appeared as guardian of minors' estate. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

The authority as to notice by publication must be construed in connection with other sections of our statute which provide as to what must be done when notice by publication is permitted. Newcastle v. Toomey, 78 Wyo. 432, 329 P.2d 264, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1958).

Proposed use of land has no bearing on regularity of taking. —

Although a proposed use of the land for building purposes might have some relevancy on the issue of its most available use at the time of the taking in connection with the matter of compensation, such evidence has no bearing on the regularity of the taking. Woolley v. State Highway Comm'n, 387 P.2d 667, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1963).

Counter pleadings to a petition are not required. State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court, 399 P.2d 583, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1965).

And landowner is not in default if he files no pleadings. —

By the very nature of the condemnation proceedings, the parties whose property is taken may expect a proper award even though they made no appearance, and they cannot fairly be said to be in default because they file no pleadings. State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court, 399 P.2d 583, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1965).

But it is clear that counter pleadings are contemplated, at least on the questions of authority, public purpose, use and necessity for the primary reason that unless “controverted by counter pleadings” the allegations of the petition “shall be deemed to be true.” State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court, 399 P.2d 583, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1965).

Jury may assess the compensation in an action of condemnation by a city. City of Cheyenne v. Edwards, 22 Wyo. 401, 143 P. 356, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1914).

Jury questions. —

Where cattle were injured by entering railroad's property by private gate which was not protected by cattle guards and plaintiff makes out prima facie case independent of former § 37-210, question of negligence is for jury. Hildebrand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 45 Wyo. 175, 17 P.2d 651, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1933).

Where railroad has knowledge that gates along right of way are customarily left open and no steps are taken to correct the custom, question of railroad's negligence when cattle are injured is for the jury. Hildebrand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 45 Wyo. 175, 17 P.2d 651, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1933).

Demand for jury trial. —

Nothing can be done on the commissioners' award where landowner files demand for a jury trial. Laramie V. R.R. v. Gradert, 43 Wyo. 268, 3 P.2d 88, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 353, 4 P.2d 1096, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1931).

Demand for jury trial pending. —

While demand for a jury trial is pending it is improper to file exceptions to commissioners' award, motion for declaratory order and motion to strike portions of the award. Laramie V. R.R. v. Gradert, 43 Wyo. 268, 3 P.2d 88, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 353, 4 P.2d 1096, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1931).

C.Damages.

Synonymous terms. —

The term “damaged” used in constitution and term “injuriously affected” used in various sections of condemnation statute, are synonymous. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

The word “property” as contained in the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in § 33, Art. I, of the Wyoming Constitution, and in this section, for which an owner must receive “just compensation” when taken or damaged by a condemnor, is treated as a word of most general import and is liberally construed. It is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess, and there is nothing to indicate that the legislature, in providing the right of setoff for benefits, used the word “property” in any different sense. State Highway Comm'n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1970).

“Benefits, or advantages.” —

It is not clear whether the term “benefits, or advantages” was used by the legislature in this section in a restrictive sense as embracing only special benefits or in the broader sense of both general and special benefits. The statute was initially enacted in territorial days and has not since been amended. The prevailing rule today, however, whether by statute or otherwise, is to limit the setoff to special benefits. State Highway Comm'n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1970).

This section embraces special benefits. State Highway Comm'n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1970).

Special benefits have been variously defined but generally as “those which arise from the peculiar relation of the land in question to the public improvement.” State Highway Comm'n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1970).

Where a traffic interchange is constructed upon the land taken and quadrants are created out of an owner's land not taken but adjacent to, or in close proximity to, the “ramps” of the interchange, with the result that such property may be enhanced in value because its highest and best use is immediately favorably changed or its potential for favorable change in use appears by reasonable probability to the imminent, such land is “specially benefited.” State Highway Comm'n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1970).

If the land not taken is enhanced in value for the reason that the improvement makes it desirable and available for a higher and better use than for farming, for example, a special benefit may result. State Highway Comm'n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1970).

The existence and extent of a special benefit ordinarily are questions of fact for the jury. State Highway Comm'n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1970).

The burden is on the commission to prove the value of special benefits. State Highway Comm'n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1970).

Liberal view is taken of foundation for opinions as to value. —

The supreme court has long been committed to a liberal view in the matter of foundation for opinion evidence of values. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Where such evidence is limited to supporting expert or showing investigation. —

Just as there is a degree of tolerance from the somewhat exacting foundation for the admission of the price of comparable sales as independent, substantive evidence and the foundation necessary when such evidence is used in support of expert opinion, there is tolerance in the foundation for the opinion itself when the use of such information is limited to the general purpose of showing the investigation made by the expert to gain knowledge of the market value of property in the vicinity of the subject property. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Even a non-expert may testify to the value of property if his knowledge has been derived through the general avenues of information to which the ordinary businessman resorts to inform himself as to values for the conduct of his affairs. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Supporting facts are not necessary to make estimate of value admissible. —

It is not necessary for a witness to give supporting facts in order to make his estimate of values admissible. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

And lack of supporting facts only affects extent to which probative value of estimate will go. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Whether witness is qualified to testify as expert on value is question for judge. —

Whether or not the qualifications of a witness to testify as an expert on valuation are sufficiently established is a question for preliminary determination by the trial judge within the proper limits of his discretion. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

And there is no fixed standard by which this may be determined. —

See State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Much depends upon the special knowledge, training, and experience of the witness in the art of valuation. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

And on his preliminary investigation made in preparing to render opinion on damages to property in question. —

See State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Development of basis for knowledge of expert. —

If there is lack of completeness in the investigation or reliance upon irrelevant factors as the sole basis for knowledge, such as wholly incomparable sales, that will no doubt be developed by further voir dire of opposing counsel under leave of court and is a matter to be considered by the court in its preliminary determination. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Expert is usually qualified by showing familiarity with property and business experience. —

The usual expert is qualified by showing his familiarity with the property and with other property in the neighborhood, his experience in the business, his familiarity with the state of the market and of sales of similar property in the vicinity. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Objection of no proper foundation does not challenge experience of experts. —

The objection that no proper foundation has been laid is insufficient to challenge the education, training, and experience of witnesses to function as professional appraisers. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Evidence of sales of comparable properties may under proper circumstances be offered under three conditions: (a) As independent substantive evidence of the value of the property, (b) as giving an account of the factual basis upon which the opinion is founded, and (c) in cross-examination to affect the weight of the opinion. State Highway Comm'n v. McNiff, 395 P.2d 29, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1964).

If the trial court, upon preliminary inquiry and within the proper exercise of his discretion, is satisfied that sufficient comparability is shown, evidence of comparable sales may be received (a) as independent substantive evidence of the value of the property or (b) as giving an account of the factual basis upon which the witness relied. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

No general rule can be laid down governing degree of similarity which must exist between properties sold and that condemned to make evidence of sales admissible. State Highway Comm'n v. McNiff, 395 P.2d 29, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1964).

And the propriety of receiving such evidence must be determined by the trial judge within the proper limits of his discretion. State Highway Comm'n v. McNiff, 395 P.2d 29, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1964).

With burden upon offerer to satisfy court of similarity. —

Where comparable sales are used the burden is upon the offerer to satisfy the court of a reasonable degree of similarity. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Where there was no recent sale of property in the vicinity that was identical to that sought to be taken, there are available only two methods — or a combination of the two — by which the property could be evaluated, either by lay or expert witnesses: (a) The opinions of persons familiar generally with values of property in the entire area or (b) extrapolations by using, with proper adjustments, the prices of properties which were somewhat similar. State Highway Comm'n v. McNiff, 395 P.2d 29, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1964).

Requirements for compensation for damage to right appurtenant to land. —

In order to recover compensable damage for impairment of a right appurtenant to the land there must be shown some diminution in substance to the land or damage which rendered it intrinsically less valuable. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

No damage to remaining property where access was improved. —

Where the uncontroverted evidence shows not only a substantial improvement in defendants' means of access but also actual enhancement thereof by provision for additional access to the new interstate highway, no damage resulted to the remaining property. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Assumption that circuity of travel resulted in substantial damage held speculative. —

For defendant's experts to assume that the resulting circuity of travel of some 400 feet — added to the then existing circuity of travel to and from the “urban development” tract on a gravel road — resulted in a substantial diminution of the value of such tract, is to resort to speculation and surmise. State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1964).

Determination of damages. —

The commissioners in determining damages to land not taken should consider easements and privileges reserved to the land owner. Laramie V. R.R. v. Gradert, 43 Wyo. 268, 3 P.2d 88, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 353, 4 P.2d 1096, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1931).

D.Court Order.

Mandatory provisions, applicability. —

Insofar as statutes governing condemnation by cities of first class were inapplicable to complaining parties, and insofar as failure to comply therewith could not prejudice them, statutes could not be considered mandatory as to them. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

Abutting property, condemnation. —

Statutes authorizing condemnation by cities of first class apply both to property physically taken and to abutting property indirectly damaged even though some provisions relating to actually taking cannot be carried out. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

Order vesting title. —

After payment of award condemnor is entitled to an order vesting title in it, though it had obtained possession prior thereto by giving bond. Laramie V. R.R. v. Gradert, 43 Wyo. 268, 3 P.2d 88, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 353, 4 P.2d 1096, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1931).

Final order. —

Entry of final order by the court in condemnation by a city for a water system, before the time provided in former section 1-770, 1-774 and 1-777 does not prejudice rights of landowners to demand jury trial. City of Cheyenne v. Edwards, 22 Wyo. 401, 143 P. 356, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1914).

When final order is entered the condemnor is seized with fee title of the land taken. Laramie V. R.R. v. Gradert, 43 Wyo. 268, 3 P.2d 88, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 353, 4 P.2d 1096, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1931).

Personal judgment. —

Personal judgment is proper in condemnation proceeding where property has been taken by consent or otherwise, before compensation has been made. Laramie V. R.R. v. Gradert, 43 Wyo. 268, 3 P.2d 88, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 353, 4 P.2d 1096, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1931).

Court cannot substitute its judgment on question of damages for that of the commissioners. —

There is no specific authority in the statute which authorizes the court, in passing on exceptions, to substitute its judgment on the question of damages for that of the commissioners; and in the absence of specific authority, the court's power is limited to ordering a new appraisal by the appointed commissioners or a new appraisal by new commissioners or a new confirmation of the commissioners' report but the power of the court to review the award must be limited to plain errors of law, misconduct or grave error of fact indicating plain partiality or corruption. State Highway Comm'n v. System Inv. Corp., 361 P.2d 528, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 1961).

And does not have the right to increase or decrease the amount. —

In the absence of clearly stated statutory authority, the trial court does not have the right generally to increase or decrease the amount of an award granted by commissioners or a jury of viewers. State Highway Comm'n v. System Inv. Corp., 361 P.2d 528, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 1961).

For, to do so would give advantage to party excepting to the report. —

If the trial judge could increase or decrease the award, then the party excepting to the report would have an advantage over the party not excepting, in that he alone can determine as to whether or not a trial by jury shall be had. State Highway Comm'n v. System Inv. Corp., 361 P.2d 528, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 1961).

Certificate of assessment. —

Certificate of assessment filed by commissioners in condemnation proceedings will be confirmed unless exceptions or application for jury trial are filed within 15 days after certificate of assessment is filed. Hoover v. Biagini, 43 Wyo. 416, 5 P.2d 291, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1931).

Interest. —

Where both parties excepted to the commissioners' award in condemnation proceedings and land owner filed demand for jury, all being thereafter withdrawn by agreement of parties, interest should be allowed on award from date of land owners' withdrawal of demand for jury trial. Laramie V. R.R. v. Gradert, 43 Wyo. 268, 3 P.2d 88, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 353, 4 P.2d 1096, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1931).

Striking extraneous provision. —

Where certificate of award for a railway right of way contained provision for an irrigation ditch it was proper to strike such provision. Laramie V. R.R. v. Gradert, 43 Wyo. 268, 3 P.2d 88, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 353, 4 P.2d 1096, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1931).

Statute does not authorize trial judge to increase or decrease the award of the commissioners. —

Former § 1-771 does not, expressly or otherwise, provide that the trial judge may increase or decrease the award of the commissioners, it merely provides that the party taking exceptions to the report of the commissioners may have a trial by jury, but the right, the opportunity to have such trial is limited to the party who takes exceptions to the report. State Highway Comm'n v. System Inv. Corp., 361 P.2d 528, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 1961).

Rules cannot be applied to require demand to be made before commissioners act. —

Plaintiff's argument that the application of W.R.C.P. Rule 38 (b), to former § 1-771 would require that the demand for jury trial be made within ten days after the service of the last pleading directed to the issue, thus requiring such demand before even the court-appointed commissioners had made their appraisal and certificate of award, was technical, wholly unreasonable, and could not be approved. State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court, 399 P.2d 583, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1965).

IV.Roads and Pipelines.

Providing access to national forest. —

It was not improper for the court to permit a county, which condemned a privately owned road to provide access to a national forest, to proceed under this chapter instead of the provisions of the statutes which relate to the establishment of county roads, §§ 24-3-101 through 24-3-127 .L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1990).

In an action where a county, on behest of the U.S. forest service (USFS), condemned a private road to provide access to a national forest, the USFS was not an indispensable party. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1990).

Test for determining damages to remainder. —

A comprehensive statement of the over-all situation relating to the before and after value of the entire holdings of the landowner is the criterion universally accepted as being proper in eminent domain proceedings where it is claimed that damages accrued to remaining holdings by reason of the easement sought to be taken. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961).

Testimony as to the price paid by a condemnor for purchase of like lands is inadmissible whether or not the land is similar to that in controversy. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961).

Jury trial. —

Landowner is entitled to a jury trial to fix compensation. City of Cheyenne v. Edwards, 22 Wyo. 401, 143 P. 356, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1914).

There is no constitutional right to a trial by jury in condemnation cases, and in the absence of a special constitutional or statutory provision such a right does not exist. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961).

A trial by jury has not been provided for in condemnation proceedings under this section by a pipeline company. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961).

Special statutory provisions for a trial by jury have been made in most condemnation procedures adopted by the legislature in Wyoming, but the procedure adopted for pipeline companies and other companies referred to in this section remains an exception to the general rule. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961).

This section contains no provision for exceptions to the award. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961).

However, court has inherent power to review appraisers' report. —

Irrespective of statutory authority therefor it has been generally held that the court to which the report of the appraisers is submitted has power to review said report and to entertain exceptions thereto. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961).

The inherent and constitutional powers of the courts are such that they have a right of review of exceptions in all proceedings of this nature. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961).

Court limited to confirming, setting aside or remitting report on questions of law. —

In the absence of statutory authority the court's power is limited to the right to confirm, set aside or remit the report of appraisers. Only questions of law are open for consideration and determination by the district judge, i.e., whether the award was substantiated by the evidence and was fairly, impartially and regularly made. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961).

And same questions determine supreme court's review of judgment. —

In passing on the propriety of a condemnation judgment there are two considerations upon which the decision of the supreme court must depend, first, is there substantial, competent evidence upon which the judgment may be based, and second, was the award of the appraisers fair, impartial and regularly made. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1961). See, also, Meyer v. Colorado Cent. Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1928).

V.Ways Of Necessity.

Constitutionality. —

Statute permitting fee to be taken for way of necessity does not deny due process of law or take property without compensation. Meyer v. Colorado Cent. Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1928).

Purpose of act. —

The 1907 act was adopted to cure an adjudged defect in the former act concerning notice. Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 121 P. 522, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1912).

Appeal. —

Under this article, where defendant prevented a preliminary survey of a right of way for an irrigation ditch, court's confirmation of appraisers' report on conflicting evidence as to route appraised and described being different will not be disturbed on appeal. Hoover v. Biagini, 43 Wyo. 416, 5 P.2d 291, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1931).

Electric plant owner. —

While fact that electric plant owner has power of eminent domain is not determinative of its status as public utility, it is factor which may be considered. Rural Elec. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 57 Wyo. 451, 120 P.2d 741, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 57 Wyo. 451, 120 P.2d 741, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1942).

Irrevocable license. —

A parol license to construct and maintain a flume to carry water into land of plaintiff and across land of defendant, having been acted upon by plaintiff, and flume having been constructed as to time when statute gave plaintiff a right to condemn way for construction of the flume, is irrevocable. Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 121 P. 522, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1912).

Jury trial. —

Landowner is entitled to a jury trial for fixing amount of compensation. City of Cheyenne v. Edwards, 22 Wyo. 401, 143 P. 356, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1914).

Foreign corporation; benefit outside state. —

A foreign corporation duly authorized to do business in Wyoming is not authorized either by this section, or independent thereof, to condemn land in Wyoming for irrigation works to reclaim lands solely located in Colorado. Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P. 43, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1913).

Registering complaint. —

Owners not appealing from award for taking land for way of necessity and demanding jury trial cannot complain of its insufficiency. Meyer v. Colorado Cent. Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1928).

Way of necessity; surface. —

Way of necessity, for which another's land may be taken, is not limited to the surface. Meyer v. Colorado Cent. Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1928).

Prescriptive rights. —

The right to maintain a flume across the lands of another may be acquired by prescription, and damages may be recovered for its destruction. Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 121 P. 522, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1912).

Decision under prior law — Constitutionality. —

Statute which provided method for obtaining right of way for private irrigation ditch over lands of another by proceedings was unconstitutional and void for failure to provide for notice to property owner of time and place of meeting of appraisers appointed to determine amount of compensation. Sterritt v. Young, 14 Wyo. 146, 82 P. 946, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1905).

Affirmance of judgment. —

Where landowner did not file exceptions and demand for jury trial until after more than a month after filing certificate of assessment, judgment affirming the commissioners' award will be affirmed. Hoover v. Biagini, 43 Wyo. 416, 5 P.2d 291, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1931).

Election by owner. —

Owner, after electing to take an unconditional personal judgment against power company and a lien upon all its realty within the county and the right to enforce judgment by execution, could not assert a right of action for damages for flooding his land where agreement entitled company to immediate possession and right to flood the land. Big Horn Power Co. v. Martin, 24 Wyo. 400, 160 P. 334, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1916).

Damages to business. —

Owners are not entitled to compensation for damage to business, but may only recover injury to their lands, in condemnation proceedings. Morrison v. Cottonwood Dev. Co., 38 Wyo. 190, 266 P. 117, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1928).

Competency of evidence. —

Evidence of value of defendants' farming implements, horses, and cattle, and of their investment generally were not competent in condemnation suits to prove damage to defendants' business. Morrison v. Cottonwood Dev. Co., 38 Wyo. 190, 266 P. 117, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1928).

Affirmance of judgment. —

Where landowner did not file exceptions and demand for jury trial until after more than a month after filing certificate of assessment, judgment affirming the commissioners' award will be affirmed. Hoover v. Biagini, 43 Wyo. 416, 5 P.2d 291, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1931).

Estoppel. —

Where one consents to the occupation of his land by another possessing the power of eminent domain for the purpose of such occupation, without either requiring payment by agreement, or proceedings to condemn, and allows the party entering to go on and expend the necessary money and labor to complete the proposed work, he will be regarded as having acquiesced therein, and is therefore estopped from maintaining either trespass or ejectment, and is restricted to a suit for damages. Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 121 P. 522, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1912).

Decree not making final disposition of case not appealable. —

Parties in a condemnation proceeding were not entitled to appeal from a decree of the trial court which determined that the proceeding was duly and regularly filed, approved bond for payment of compensation, and appointed commissioners, since no final disposition of the case had been made by the trial court. Such final determination does not come until the jury renders a verdict and its award is confirmed by an order of the trial court. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 67 Wyo. 300, 224 P.2d 172, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1950).

§ 1-26-501. Short title.

  1. This act shall be cited as the “Wyoming  Eminent Domain Act”.
  2. Except as otherwise specifically provided  by statute, the power of eminent domain may be exercised only as provided  by this act and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent  the Rules of Civil Procedure do not conflict with this act.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to condemnation of property, see Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For meaning of “this act,” see § 1-26-502(a)(vi).

Partial taking. —

The Wyoming Eminent Domain Act and the cases interpreting those provisions require that the homeowners whose homes were condemned by the county receive fair market value as just compensation for any property taken by the county or, for a partial taking, the greater of the property rights taken or the amount by which the fair market value of the property is diminished. Miller v. Campbell County, 901 P.2d 1107, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 2002 WY 104, 49 P.3d 999, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2002); Bush Land Dev. Co. v. Crook Cnty. Weed & Pest Control Dist., 2017 WY 12, 388 P.3d 536, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The More Things Change, The More Things Stay The Same: A Practitioner’s Guide to Recent Changes in Wyoming’s Eminent Domain Act” see 8 Wyo. L. Rev. 1 (2008).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Jury trial under Rule 71A(h) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 71A(h), 28 U.S.C.) in condemnation proceedings by United States, 164 ALR Fed 341.

§ 1-26-502. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Condemn” means to take property under  the power of eminent domain;
    2. “Condemnee” means a person who has or  claims an interest in property that is the subject of a prospective  or pending condemnation action;
    3. “Condemnor” means a person empowered to  condemn;
    4. “Litigation expenses” means the reasonable  costs, disbursements and expenses, including attorney, appraisal and  engineering fees, associated with a condemnation proceeding;
    5. “Public entity” means the state of Wyoming  and its agencies, municipalities, counties, school districts, political  subdivisions and special districts;
    6. “This act” means W.S. 1-26-501 through 1-26-817 .

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Cited in

Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 2002 WY 104, 49 P.3d 999, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 1-26-503. Public use required; other acquisitions.

  1. Nothing in this act requires that the  power of eminent domain be exercised to acquire property. Whether  property necessary for public use is to be acquired by purchase, other  means or by eminent domain is a decision left to the discretion of  the person authorized to acquire the property.
  2. Subject to any other statute relating  to the acquisition of property, any person or public entity authorized  to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may also  acquire the property for the use by grant, purchase, lease, gift,  devise, contract or other means.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For meaning of “this act,” see § 1-26-502(a)(vi).

Municipality may acquire property by adverse possession. —

Although the legislature has expressly given municipalities the power to acquire property through eminent domain and statutory dedication, those two means are not exclusive. A municipality may, in appropriate circumstances, acquire real property by adverse possession or prescription. Koontz v. Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 558 (Wyo. 1987).

Cited in

Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 2002 WY 104, 49 P.3d 999, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2002); Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 2005 WY 108, 118 P.3d 996, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (2005).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right to condemn property in excess of needs for particular public purpose, 6 ALR3d 297.

§ 1-26-504. Requirements to exercise eminent domain.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by law, the  power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a  proposed use only if all of the following are established:
    1. The public interest and necessity require  the project or the use of eminent domain is authorized by the Wyoming  Constitution;
    2. The project is planned or located in the  manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good  and the least private injury; and
    3. The property sought to be acquired is  necessary for the project.
  2. Findings of the public service commission,  the interstate commerce commission and other federal and state agencies  with appropriate jurisdiction are prima facie valid relative to determinations  under subsection (a) of this section if the findings were made in  accordance with law with notice to condemnees who are parties to the  condemnation action and are final with no appeals from the determinations  pending.
  3. When a public entity determines that there  is a reasonable probability of locating a particular public project  on specifically identifiable private property and that the project  is expected to be completed within two (2) years of that determination,  the public entity shall provide written notice of the intention to  consider the location and construction of the project to the owner  as shown on the records of the county assessor. The notice shall include  a description of the public interest and necessity of the proposed  project. The public entity shall provide an opportunity for the private  property owners to consult and confer with representatives of the  public entity regarding the project.
  4. A condemnor shall prove each requirement  of subsection (a) of this section by a preponderance of the evidence.  Failure of the condemnor to prove any requirement of subsection (a)  of this section shall result in dismissal of the condemnation action  without prejudice.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 2007, ch. 139, § 2; 2013, ch. 201, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to taking of private property, see art. 1, § 32 and art. 10, § 9, Wyo. Const.

As to public service commission, see § 37-2-101 .

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added (c).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (d).

Town does not fall within definition of “state agency,” as defined in subsection (b), and, therefore, its condemnation action is subject to a more stringent review. Town of Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, 806 P.2d 281, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1991).

“Necessity.” —

The term “necessity,” when used in the context of an eminent domain proceeding, means “reasonably convenient or useful to the public”; a showing that the project will increase public safety is sufficient. Board of County Comm'rs v. Atter, 734 P.2d 549, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 411 (Wyo. 1987).

Burden of proof. —

Once a condemnor has established a prima facie case of public necessity, either by introducing its findings on the matter as provided in subsection (b) or by the production of evidence which factually supports its determination of public necessity, the burden then shifts to the condemnee who must then either concede the existence of a necessity or be prepared to show bad faith or abuse of discretion as an affirmative defense. Board of County Comm'rs v. Atter, 734 P.2d 549, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 411 (Wyo. 1987).

The language of subsection (a)(i) does not permit the district court to balance the competing interests. Once a town presents evidence that the project will increase safety, it has met its burden as to that particular determination. The burden then shifts to those opposing the condemnation to present evidence of bad faith or abuse of discretion. Town of Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, 806 P.2d 281, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1991).

Non-public power company demonstrated public interest and necessity. —

In a condemnation action by a non-public power company, the company demonstrated public interest and necessity as required by Wyo. Stat Ann. § 1-26-504(a)(i) where the evidence plainly demonstrated the need for additional electric power to the energy corporation's service territory and that additional power would inure to the benefit of the public in that locality, both in terms of the additional power itself and the reliability of service in the area. Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 2005 WY 108, 118 P.3d 996, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2005).

Evidence showed direct reasonable route and least private harm. —

In a condemnation action by a non-public power company, the company located the transmission line in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury as required by Wyo. Stat Ann. § 1-26-504(a)(ii) where the company devoted several years to examining several alternate routes, and the map demonstrated that the route chosen was, on its face, a direct and reasonable route. Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 2005 WY 108, 118 P.3d 996, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2005).

Evidence sufficient to show compliance. —

District court did not err in finding the condemnor board of county commissioners met all the requirements of the eminent domain statutes in seeking to condemn part of the condemnees' land in connection with a water system for a reservoir's recreational facilities where the board presented evidence that: 1) the project was in the public interest and necessary; 2) the water benefited many uses in an area accessed by members of the general public and private individuals; 3) although there might be ways to relocate the water system, at that time its use in place was compatible with the greatest public good; and 4) the condemnees failed to show bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the board. Conner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 148, 54 P.3d 1274, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2002).

Railroad offered sufficient evidence that a 50-foot tract of land was needed to provide slope support for a railroad track and to allow construction of a fire break and access road, so the public necessity requirement for condemnation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-504(a) was satisfied. The evidence showed that the soils around the property were unstable and prone to failure and that the property was needed to achieve the recommended minimum standard for railroad slopes. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. A 50-foot Wide Easement Consisting of 6.99 Acres More Or Less, 346 Fed. Appx. 297, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19997 (10th Cir. 2009).

Existence of a contractual right to property does not preclude action for eminent domain. —

A trial court erred when it dismissed a condemnation action brought against a landowner by a natural gas company because the gas company already had contractual access to the property which was the subject of an eminent domain proceeding; the existence of a lease agreement between property owners does not preclude an action for eminent domain if necessary to protect property interests or maintain facilities and improvement, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-504(a)(iii). Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 2002 WY 104, 49 P.3d 999, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2002).

Evidence sufficient to show “substantial private harm.” —

Evidence showing that a town's airport runway extension project would cause 520 acres of irrigated farm land to suffer “substantial private harm” was sufficient to support a ruling that the town failed to locate or plan the project “in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.” Town of Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, 806 P.2d 281, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1991).

Cited in

Platt v. Platt, 2014 WY 142, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Nov. 6, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The More Things Change, The More Things Stay The Same: A Practitioner’s Guide to Recent Changes in Wyoming’s Eminent Domain Act” see 8 Wyo. L. Rev. 1 (2008).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Eminent domain: possibility of overcoming specific obstacles to contemplated use as element in determining existence of necessary public use, 22 ALR4th 840.

Eminent domain: public taking of sports or entertainment franchise or organization as taking for public purpose, 30 ALR4th 1226.

Construction and application of rule requiring public use for which property is condemned to be “more necessary” or “higher use” than public use to which property is already appropriated — state takings, 49 ALR5th 769.

§ 1-26-505. Condemnation of property devoted to a public use.

  1. If a proposed use cannot be obtained under W.S. 1-26-813 , any condemnor may exercise the power of eminent domain  to acquire property appropriated to public use if the proposed use  will not unreasonably interfere with or impair the continuance of  the public use as it then exists or may reasonably be expected to  exist in the future. The burden of proving that a proposed use will  not unreasonably interfere with or impair the continuance of the existing  public use is on the prospective condemnor.
  2. Where property is taken under subsection  (a) of this section, the parties shall attempt to make an agreement  determining the conditions upon which the property is taken and the  manner and extent of its use by each of the parties. Except as otherwise  provided by law, if the parties are unable to agree, the court shall  fix the terms and conditions upon which the property is taken and  the manner and extent of its use by each of the parties.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Eminent domain: review of electric power company's location of transmission line for which condemnation is sought, 19 ALR4th 1026.

§ 1-26-506. Entry prior to condemnation action.

  1. A condemnor and its agents and employees  may enter upon real property and make surveys, examinations, photographs,  tests, soundings, borings and samplings, or engage in other activities  for the purpose of appraising the property or determining whether  it is suitable and within the power of the condemnor to condemn if  the entry is:
    1. Preceded by prior notice to the condemnee  specifying the particular activity to be undertaken and the proposed  use and potential recipient of the data thereby obtained and the condemnee  has been given fifteen (15) days to grant written authorization;
    2. Undertaken during reasonable hours, normally  during daylight;
    3. Accomplished peaceably and without inflicting  substantial injury to land, crops, improvements, livestock or current  business operations.
  2. The entry and activities authorized by  this section do not constitute a trespass.
  3. The condemnor is liable under W.S. 1-26-508 for damages resulting from activities authorized by this  section.
  4. Subject to applicable confidentiality  restrictions under federal or state law, the results of survey information  acquired from the property sought related to threatened and endangered  species, cultural resources and archeological resources shall be made  available to the condemnee upon request.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 2007, ch. 139, § 2.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a)(i) substituted “the condemnee specifying the particular activity to be undertaken and the proposed use and potential recipient of the data thereby obtained and the condemnee has been given fifteen (15) days to grant written authorization” for “and written authorization from the owner or his agent”; in (a)(iii) inserted “to land, crops, improvements, livestock or current business operations” at the end of the sentence; added (d).

Violation of notice requirement. —

Although the district court held the condemnor board of county commissioners in contempt of its order permitting the condemnor to enter the condemnees' property to operate and maintain its water system but requiring the condemnor to give the condemnees notice prior to going onto the property, the condemnees were not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to this section where the district court made no findings that the board had violated the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-508(b). Conner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 148, 54 P.3d 1274, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2002).

Library references. —

American Law of Mining, 2nd Edition § 100.04 (Matthew Bender).

§ 1-26-507. Entry prior to condemnation action; court orders.

  1. If reasonable efforts to accomplish a  lawful entry or to perform authorized activities upon real property  under W.S. 1-26-506 have been obstructed or denied the condemnor may apply  to the district court for an order permitting entry.
  2. Unless after notice and hearing good cause  to the contrary is shown, the court shall make its order permitting  and describing the purpose of the entry and setting forth the nature  and scope of activities the court determines are reasonably necessary  and authorized to be made upon the property. In addition to requiring  a deposit under subsection (c) of this section, the order shall include  terms and conditions with respect to the time, place and manner of  entry and authorized activities upon the property which will facilitate  the purpose of the entry and minimize damage, hardship and burden  to the parties.
  3. An order permitting entry under subsection  (b) of this section shall include a determination by the court of  the amount, if any, that will fairly compensate the owner or any other  person in lawful possession or physical occupancy of the property  for damages for physical injury to the property and for substantial  interference with its possession or use, found likely to be caused  by the entry and activities authorized by the order and shall require  the condemnor to deposit cash or other security with the court before  entry. The clerk of court shall invest any cash deposit in any legal  interest bearing investment and the interest earnings shall accrue  to the account of the condemnor. Unless sooner disbursed by court  order, the cash or other security shall be retained on deposit for  six (6) months following termination of the entry. The court for good  cause may extend the period of retention.
  4. After notice and hearing the court may  modify an order under subsection (c) of this section. If a deposit  is required or the amount required to be deposited is increased by  an order of modification, the court shall specify the time within  which the required amount must be deposited and may direct that any  further entry or specified activities or studies under the order modified  be stayed until the required deposit has been made.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Cited in

Conner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 148, 54 P.3d 1274, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Eminent domain: compensability of loss of visibility of owner's property, 7 ALR5th 113.

§ 1-26-508. Entry prior to condemnation action; damages.

  1. A condemnor is liable for physical injury  to, and for substantial interference with possession or use of, property  caused by his entry and activities upon the property. This liability  may be enforced in a civil action against the condemnor or by application  to the court as provided by subsection (c) of this section unless  voluntarily paid by the condemnor.
  2. In an action or other proceeding for recovery  of damages under this section, the prevailing party shall be allowed  his costs. In addition, the court shall award the condemnee his litigation  expenses incurred in any proceeding under W.S. 1-26-507 if it finds that the condemnor:
    1. Entered the property unlawfully;
    2. Entered upon the property lawfully but  thereafter engaged in activities upon the property which caused significant  damage to the property not reasonably necessary to the purposes of  the entry; or
    3. Failed substantially to comply with an  order made under W.S. 1-26-507 .
  3. If funds are on deposit under W.S. 1-26-507 , the owner or other person entitled to damages under  subsection (a) of this section may apply to the court for an award  of the amount he is entitled to recover. The court shall determine  the amount and award it to the person entitled thereto and direct  that its payment be made out of the money on deposit. If the amount  on deposit is insufficient to pay the full amount, the court shall  enter judgment against the condemnor for the unpaid portion.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Condemnees not entitled to attorney fees. —

Although the district court held the condemnor board of county commissioners in contempt of its order permitting the condemnor to enter the condemnees' property to operate and maintain its water system but requiring the condemnor to give the condemnees notice prior to going onto the property, the condemnees were not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to this section where the district court made no findings that the board had violated the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-508(b). Conner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 148, 54 P.3d 1274, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Eminent domain: compensability of loss of visibility of owner's property, 7 ALR5th 113.

Method of determining rate of interest allowed on award to owner of property taken by United States in eminent domain proceeding, 56 ALR Fed 477.

§ 1-26-509. Negotiations; scope of efforts to purchase.

  1. A condemnor shall make reasonable and  diligent efforts to acquire property by good faith negotiation.
  2. In attempting to acquire the property  by purchase under W.S. 1-26-510 , the condemnor, acting within the scope of its powers  and to the extent not otherwise forbidden by law, shall negotiate  in good faith and may contract with respect to:
    1. Any element of valuation or damages recognized  by law as relevant to the amount of just compensation payable for  the property;
    2. The extent, term or nature of the property  interest or other right to be acquired;
    3. The quantity, location or boundary of  the property;
    4. The acquisition, removal, relocation or  disposition of improvements upon the property and of personal property  not sought to be taken;
    5. The date of proposed entry and physical  dispossession;
    6. The time and method of payment of agreed  compensation or other amounts authorized by law; and
    7. Any other terms or conditions deemed appropriate  by either of the parties.
  3. Good faith negotiation shall include,  but not be limited to, written notice of the following:
    1. To the extent reasonably known at the  time, the proposed project, the land proposed to be condemned, plan  of work, operations and facilities in a manner sufficient to enable  the condemnee to evaluate the effect of the proposed project, plan  of work, operations and facilities on the condemnee’s use of the land;
    2. The name, address, telephone number and,  if available, facsimile number and electronic mail address of the  condemnor and his designee, if any;
    3. An initial written settlement offer that  shall include:
      1. A description of the general location  and extent of the property sought, with sufficient detail for reasonable  identification;
      2. An offer that, at the condemnee’s request,  a representative of the condemnor will tour the property sought with  the condemnee or the condemnee’s representative at a mutually agreeable  time prior to the deadline for the condemnee’s response to the initial  written offer to discuss issues related to the property sought and  the initial offer;
      3. An estimate of the fair market value of  the property sought and the general basis for such estimate;
      4. A discussion of the reclamation planned  by the condemnor for the property disturbed by the condemnor’s project;
      5. An offer to acquire the property sought,  allowing the condemnee up to sixty-five (65) days from the date the  initial written offer was sent via certified mail to respond or make  a counter-offer in writing; and
      6. A written notice that the condemnee is  under no obligation to accept the initial written offer but if the  condemnee fails to respond to the initial written offer the right  to object to the good faith of the condemnor may be waived under W.S. 1-26-510(a), that the condemnor and the condemnee are obligated to  negotiate in good faith for the purchase of the property sought, that  formal legal proceedings may be initiated if negotiations fail and  that the condemnee has a right to seek advice from an attorney, real  estate appraiser, or any other person of his choice during the negotiations  and any subsequent legal proceedings.
    4. A written response from the condemnor  to any counter-offer made in writing by the condemnee to the initial  written offer pursuant to subparagraph (iii)(E) of this subsection.
  4. The written notice required under subsection  (c) of this section shall be given to the condemnee of record as shown  on the records in the county assessor’s office at the time, no less  than ninety (90) days prior to commencement of a condemnation action.
  5. The condemnor shall send by certified  mail, return receipt requested, a notice of final offer at least fifteen  (15) days prior to commencing a condemnation action.
  6. A condemnee shall make reasonable and  diligent efforts to negotiate in good faith with the condemnor including  a timely written response to the written offer identified in subparagraph  (c)(iii)(E) of this section, specifying areas of disagreement.
  7. The condemnor shall reimburse the condemnee  for all reasonable litigation expenses if a court finds the condemnor  failed to negotiate in good faith as required under subsections (b)  through (e) of this section, or to comply with any requirements  of W.S. 1-26-504(a).
  8. At any time in the negotiation, at the  request of either party and upon mutual agreement, dispute resolution  processes including mediation or arbitration may be employed or the  informal procedures for resolving disputes established pursuant to W.S. 11-41-101 through 11-41-110 may be requested through the Wyoming agriculture and  natural resource mediation board.
  9. If a court or jury finds that the fair  market value of the property sought by the condemnor is more than  one hundred fifteen percent (115%) of the final offer required by  subsection (e) of this section, the condemnor shall reimburse the  condemnee for all reasonable litigation expenses incurred after the  condemnee’s receipt of the final offer.
  10. Attorney’s fees and other expenses  awarded under this section from a public entity to a condemnee shall  be reported by the public entity which paid the fees, to the Wyoming  attorney general within sixty (60) days of the award. The Wyoming  attorney general shall collect this data and report annually to the  governor on the amount of all taxpayer funded fee awards, beginning  July 31, 2014. The report shall identify the name of each party to  whom an award was made, the name of each counsel of record representing  each party to whom an award was made, the public agency which paid  each award and the total amount of each award.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 2007, ch. 139, § 2; 2013, ch. 201, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (b) substituted “may” for “shall” following “forbidden by law,” inserted “in good faith” following “negotiate” and inserted “may” preceding “contract with respect to”; in (b)(ii) inserted “, term” following “The extent” and inserted “or other right” preceding “to be acquired”; added (c) through (h).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in (g), substituted “any requirements of W.S. 1-26-504(a)” for “ W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii) and (iii)” and made a punctuation change, and added (j) and (k).

Good faith negotiation requirement not met.—

District court properly held that appellant failed to satisfy the good-faith negotiation requirement; while the 70 acres sought in the condemnation proceeding were contained within the roughly 2,100 acres addressed in appellant’s initial offer, appellee could not have known that it had the option to accept the offer only as to those 70 acres, and it was not at all clear that the discrete 70 acres were the subject of the negotiations. EOG Res., Inc. v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 2020 WY 95, 468 P.3d 667, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2020).

Requirements of initial offer.—

Type of property right sought to be acquired is one of several factors that could bear on whether an initial offer sufficiently described the property sought in a subsequent condemnation action; the property sought to be condemned is not required to be identical to the property described in the offer. Instead, there must be a sufficient resemblance between the two to allow a court to conclude that the subject of negotiation was clear to both parties and that the offer might have been accepted as it related to the property sought to be condemned. EOG Res., Inc. v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 2020 WY 95, 468 P.3d 667, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2020).

Attorney fees.—

As appellant failed to meet the standard for good faith negotiation, appellee was entitled to reimbursement and could submit a statement for attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. EOG Res., Inc. v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 2020 WY 95, 468 P.3d 667, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2020).

Evidence sufficient to show compliance. —

District court did not err in finding the condemnor board of county commissioners met all the requirements of the eminent domain statutes in seeking to condemn part of the condemnees' land in connection with a water system for a reservoir's recreational facilities where the board presented evidence that: 1) the project was in the public interest and necessary; 2) the water benefited many uses in an area accessed by members of the general public and private individuals; 3) although there might be ways to relocate the water system, at that time its use in place was compatible with the greatest public good; and 4) the condemnees failed to show bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the board. Conner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 148, 54 P.3d 1274, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2002).

In a condemnation action by a non-public power company, the company negotiated in good faith with landowners as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann §§ 1-26-509 , 1-26-510 where the company had great discretion with respect to the location of the transmission line and it attempted to accommodate owner concerns about location, especially early on in the negotiation process. Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 2005 WY 108, 118 P.3d 996, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2005).

Annual payments may be part of compensation

District court could consider evidence of comparable easements in determining just compensation for pipeline easements condemned by a carbon dioxide pipeline developer, but erroneously rejected some comparable easements on the basis that they were not the result of arms' length transactions or that they related to a natural gas pipeline. Further, annual payments were allowed as compensation. Barlow Ranch, L.P. v. Greencore Pipeline Co. LLC, 2013 WY 34, 301 P.3d 75, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2013).

Cited in

Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 2002 WY 104, 49 P.3d 999, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 1-26-510. Preliminary efforts to purchase.

  1. Except as provided in W.S. 1-26-511 , an action to condemn property may not be maintained  over timely objection by the condemnee unless the condemnor made a  good faith effort to acquire the property by purchase before commencing  the action. A condemnee may not object to the good faith of the condemnor  if the condemnee has failed to respond to an initial written offer  as provided in W.S. 1-26-509(c)(iii)(E) and the condemnor has met the requirements of W.S. 1-26-509(c).
  2. Negotiations conducted in substantial  compliance with W.S. 1-26-509(b) through (e) are prima facie evidence of “good faith”  by the condemnor under subsection (a) of this section.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 2007, ch. 139, § 2.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a) added last sentence; in (b) substituted “1-26-509(b) through (e)” for “1-26-509(b)(i) through (vi)” and inserted “by the condemnor” preceding “under subsection (a).”

Applied in

Conner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 148, 54 P.3d 1274, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2002).

Quoted in

Foianini v. Brinton, 855 P.2d 1238, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 2002 WY 104, 49 P.3d 999, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 1-26-511. Purchase efforts waived or excused.

  1. A condemnor’s failure or inability substantially  to comply with W.S. 1-26-509 and 1-26-510 does not bar the maintenance of a condemnation action,  notwithstanding timely objection, if:
    1. Compliance is waived by written agreement  between the property owner and the condemnor;
    2. One (1) or more of the owners of the property  is unknown, cannot with reasonable diligence be contacted, is incapable  of contracting and has no legal representative, or owns an interest  which cannot be acquired by contract; or
    3. Due to an emergency affecting public health  or safety, there is a compelling need to avoid the delay in commencing  the action which compliance would require.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 2007, ch. 139, § 2.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a)(iii) substituted “an emergency affecting public health or safety” for “conditions not caused by or under the control of the condemnor.”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-26-512. Contents of authorization.

  1. A public entity may not commence a condemnation  action until it has first adopted a written resolution in substantial  conformity with this section, authorizing commencement and prosecution  of the action. The authorization may be amended or rescinded at any  time before or after commencement of the condemnation action but if  rescinded the public entity shall pay the litigation expenses of the  condemnee.
  2. In addition to other requirements imposed  by law, the condemnation authorization required by subsection (a)  of this section shall include:
    1. A general statement of the proposed public  use for which the property is to be taken and a reference to the specific  statute that authorizes the taking of the property by the condemnor;
    2. A description of the general location  and extent of the property to be taken, with sufficient detail for  reasonable identification; and
    3. A declaration that a taking of the described  property is necessary and appropriate for the proposed public use.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Evidence sufficient to show compliance. —

District court did not err in finding the condemnor board of county commissioners met all the requirements of the eminent domain statutes in seeking to condemn part of the condemnees' land in connection with a water system for a reservoir's recreational facilities where the board presented evidence that: 1) the project was in the public interest and necessary; 2) the water benefited many uses in an area accessed by members of the general public and private individuals; 3) although there might be ways to relocate the water system, at that time its use in place was compatible with the greatest public good; and 4) the condemnees failed to show bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the board. Conner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 148, 54 P.3d 1274, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2002).

Expenses not paid where resolution “amended.” —

This section requires payment of litigation expenses in the event of a “rescission” but not an “amendment” of a resolution authorizing condemnation. Board of County Comm'rs v. Atter, 734 P.2d 549, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 411 (Wyo. 1987).

§ 1-26-513. Deposit at commencement of action.

  1. At the time of commencing an eminent domain  proceeding the condemnor shall deposit in court an amount equal to  the condemnor’s last offer of settlement prior to the action. Upon  motion of the condemnee and following a hearing if the amount originally  deposited is clearly inadequate, the court shall order the condemnor  to make an additional deposit. The clerk of court shall invest the  deposit in any legal interest bearing investment and interest earnings  shall accrue to the account of the condemnor.
  2. The court may waive the requirement of  a deposit for a public entity if the public entity is financially  or legally unable to post the deposit but the public entity may not  obtain possession of the property prior to judgment until the appropriate  deposit is made.
  3. The condemnee may withdraw any portion  of the deposit prior to final judgment which the court determines  is not subject to claims of mortgagees and other claimants. The amount  withdrawn constitutes a lien against the property of the condemnee  and the condemnee is liable to the condemnor for any amount withdrawn  which exceeds the final judgment in the action. If the condemnee withdraws  any portion of the deposit prior to judgment, he waives all defenses  to the action except the right to contest the amount to be awarded  and the condemnor is entitled to immediate possession of the property  subject to the court’s determination of a reasonable period during  which the condemnee can remove improvements and take other actions  authorized by the court.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-514. Interest taken; due compensation.

  1. In the case of public entities the court  may grant an easement or fee simple title to the public entity if  necessary for the purpose for which the land was condemned. In cases  not involving public entities, following determination of due compensation  the court shall enter an order granting an easement to the condemnor  which shall not include any claim, interest or property in or to the  underlying minerals or mineral estate except for subsurface support.
  2. The court in determining due compensation  may authorize a lump-sum payment or an annual installment or amortization  payment to continue throughout the term of the easement.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Running of interest on judgment where both parties appeal, 11 ALR4th 1099.

Eminent domain: compensability of loss of visibility of owner's property, 7 ALR5th 113.

§ 1-26-515. Abandonment, nonuse or new use.

Upon abandonment, nonuse for a period of ten (10) years, or transfer or attempted transfer to a use where the transferee could not have condemned for the new use, or where the new use is not identical to the original use and new damages to the landowner whose property was condemned for the original use will occur, any easement authorized under this act terminates.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For meaning of “this act,” see § 1-26-502(a)(vi).

Compensation for reclamation of pipeline easement

District court was not required to consider, as an element of just compensation for a pipeline developer's taking of easements for a pipeline, the developer's reclamation responsibility under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-714 at the time the easement terminated. Compensation for reclamation was separate from, and in addition to, the compensation for the taking. Barlow Ranch, L.P. v. Greencore Pipeline Co. LLC, 2013 WY 34, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. R-13).

Cited in

Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 2005 WY 108, 118 P.3d 996, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (2005).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and construction of provision of Cable Communications Policy Act (47 USC § 541(a)(2)) allowing cable companies access to utility easements on private property, 113 ALR Fed 523.

§ 1-26-516. Action for inverse condemnation.

When a person possessing the power of condemnation takes possession of or damages land in which he has no interest, or substantially diminishes the use or value of land, due to activities on adjoining land without the authorization of the owner of the land or before filing an action of condemnation, the owner of the land may file an action in district court seeking damages for the taking or damage and shall be granted litigation expenses if damages are awarded to the owner.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Action one for inverse condemnation.—

Trial court properly emphasized that in the absence of eminent domain proceedings the action was an inverse condemnation case because eminent domain proceedings were not used by a county for the expansion of a road; according to the county, it did not need to use eminent domain proceedings because it already had an easement for the project. Byrnes v. Johnson Cty. Comm'rs, 2020 WY 6, 455 P.3d 693, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2020).

Substantial diminishment of property's value.—

Trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law that a property owner failed to establish a taking and failed to provide proof of damages because the evidence presented did not prove a “substantial diminishment” of the property’s value; a witness’s testimony did not establish a value of the owner’s property as a whole, and the value of the property needed to be established in order to determine whether the impairment of the driveways substantially diminished that value. Byrnes v. Johnson Cty. Comm'rs, 2020 WY 6, 455 P.3d 693, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2020).

Value of property.—

Trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law on the ground that no jury would be able to determine the before and after value of property based on the evidence presented because the estimated costs for changes to the property did not equate to “fair market value"; the estimated costs did not reflect the value of an arms-length transaction for the sale of the property, did not establish the lack of a market for the property, and did not establish comparable sales. Byrnes v. Johnson Cty. Comm'rs, 2020 WY 6, 455 P.3d 693, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2020).

Trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law because the value of the property taken was not established; the only values presented were the value of the property after the road expansion, estimated costs of amending the driveway approaches, and an overall estimate of all costs, and under either of the two measures of damages in a partial takings case, the jury would not have been able to reach a conclusion based on the limited evidence presented. Byrnes v. Johnson Cty. Comm'rs, 2020 WY 6, 455 P.3d 693, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2020).

Permanent taking is not required in order to maintain an action for inverse condemnation under this section. The plain language of the section evinces a legislative intent to allow recompense to an owner of property not only for permanent takings, but also for damage or diminution in value, although it is applicable only to conduct on adjoining land. Waid v. State, 996 P.2d 18, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2000).

Emotional distress is not a proper element of damages in an inverse condemnation action. See Miller v. Campbell County, 854 P.2d 71, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1993).

Exclusive remedy in inverse condemnation. —

Owners' exclusive remedy for a city's installation of a storm drain on their property in the mistaken belief that it owned an easement was in inverse condemnation. Because this remedy was available, the owners' assertion that they were being deprived of access to the courts by not being allowed to pursue a Wyoming Governmental Claims Act claim lacked merit. Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 2012 WY 19, 270 P.3d 644, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2012).

Facts not applied to statute. —

Plaintiff failed to accurately apply the statute to the facts of the case to establish how the prescribed activities set out in the statute relate to his situation, although he attempted to do so by resorting to arguments already disposed of by the district court. Doenz v. Sheridan County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 949 P.2d 464, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1997).

Plaintiffs' claim for inverse condemnation were untimely. —

Where the plaintiffs discovered the “act, error or omission” which provided the basis of the claim of inverse condemnation no later than the date of the 1987 flood, the two year time for filing claims under the statute began to run in July 1987, and it had expired by the time plaintiffs filed their claims with the department of transportation in 1995. Waid v. State, 996 P.2d 18, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2000).

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies. —

District court properly dismissed a property owner's claim for inverse condemnation against a county Weed and Pest Control District, its board of directors, and four of its employees because there was no indication in the record that the owner specifically pursued the statutory remedy, nothing in the record suggested that following the available procedure would have been futile, that the District adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability which was contrary to the law, or that it was improbable that the owner could obtain appropriate relief through the administrative process. Bush Land Dev. Co. v. Crook Cnty. Weed & Pest Control Dist., 2017 WY 12, 388 P.3d 536, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2017).

Condemnees' counterclaim properly dismissed. —

Order granting condemnor's motion to dismiss condemnees' counterclaim for inverse condemnation was properly granted where the condemnees presented no evidence as to any damages they incurred due to the condemnor's alleged inverse condemnation of their property in maintaining a water system for a reservoir's recreational facilities outside the boundaries of an easement granted the condemnor by the condemnees' predecessor in interest. Conner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 148, 54 P.3d 1274, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2002).

Constitutional signature and certification requirements were not met. —

District court should not have acquired jurisdiction over property owners' inverse condemnation claim against a city under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-516 , because owners' complaint failed to include an allegation that the constitutional signature and certification requirements were met as required by Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7. Gose v. City of Douglas, 2008 WY 126, 193 P.3d 1159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2008), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Cited in

Miller v. Campbell County, 722 F. Supp. 687, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11685 (D. Wyo. 1989).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Zoning regulations limiting use of property near airport as taking of property, 18 ALR4th 542.

Local use zoning of wetlands or flood plain as taking without compensation, 19 ALR4th 756.

State statute of limitations applicable to inverse condemnation or similar proceedings by landowner to obtain compensation for direct appropriation of land without the institution or conclusion of formal proceeding against specific owner, 26 ALR4th 68.

Inverse condemnation state court class actions, 49 ALR4th 618.

Article 6. Informal Procedure for Disputes Involving Limited Amounts

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §§ 414 to 738.

29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 201 to 374.

§ 1-26-601. Informal claims procedure authorized.

This article applies whenever only the amount of compensation is in dispute and the total compensation demanded by any condemnee is less than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00), excluding interest and costs, or the difference between the latest offer of the condemnor and the latest demand by any condemnee is less than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00). The supreme court may adopt rules governing proceedings under this article.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-602. Request for informal procedure.

A party may file with the court a written request that the issue of the amount of compensation be determined under this article, identifying the property and setting forth the amount of the condemnor’s latest offer and the condemnee’s latest demand for compensation.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-603. Hearing.

  1. If the court determines that the request  should be granted, it shall hold a hearing upon reasonable notice  to the parties to determine compensation.
  2. The court shall proceed without a jury  and in an informal manner. The parties may present oral and documentary  proof and may argue in support of their respective positions but the  rules of evidence need not be followed. Neither party is required  to offer the opinion of an expert or to be represented by an attorney.  Unless demanded by a party and at his own expense, a record of testimony  received at the hearing need not be kept.
  3. Costs shall be claimed and taxed as in  other condemnation actions. Upon entry of judgment, the clerk shall  serve upon the parties a copy of the judgment with notice of its entry,  together with instructions as to the procedure for demanding a retrial.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-604. Demand for retrial.

  1. Either party, within thirty (30) days  after entry of the judgment, may reject the judgment and file a written  demand for trial. The action shall be restored to the docket of the  court as though proceedings under this article had not occurred.
  2. If the condemnor files a demand under  subsection (a) of this section and ultimately obtains a judgment no  more favorable to him, the court may require him to pay, in addition  to costs, the condemnee’s litigation expenses incurred after the demand  was filed.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Article 7. Compensation

Compensation does not include any factor for loss of business, including the rental value of the land taken. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1990).

Jury not to consider appraisers' recommendation. —

The involvement of appraisers pursuant to Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., in effect, constitutes a panel like a special master to advise the court, and the product of the appraisers' deliberations and consideration of just compensation should not be weighed in the balance of evidence at a jury trial, which clearly is a determination de novo and not a review of the appraisers' recommendation. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1990).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §§ 112 to 114.

Assemblage or plottage as factor affecting value in eminent domain proceedings, 8 ALR4th 1202.

Eminent domain: Compensability of loss of view from owner's property — state cases, 25 ALR4th 671.

Liability for damage to land or its occupants from dust, gases, odors, vibration, or the like, occasioned by defendant's continuous vehicular use of adjoining or nearby public highway, 25 ALR4th 1192.

29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 71 to 200.

§ 1-26-701. Compensation standards.

  1. An owner of property or an interest in  property taken by eminent domain is entitled to compensation determined  under the standards prescribed by W.S. 1-26-701 through 1-26-713 .
  2. Unless otherwise provided by law, the  right to compensation accrues upon the date of possession by the condemnor.
  3. Except as specifically provided by W.S. 1-26-701 through 1-26-713 , compensation, damages, or other relief to which a person  is otherwise entitled under this act or other law are not affected,  but duplication of payment is not permitted.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For meaning of “this act,” see § 1-26-502(a)(vi).

Quoted in

Miller v. Campbell County, 901 P.2d 1107, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 1-26-702. Compensation for taking.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of  this section, the measure of compensation for a taking of property  is its fair market value determined under W.S. 1-26-704 as of the date of valuation.
  2. If there is a partial taking of property,  the measure of compensation is the greater of the value of the property  rights taken or the amount by which the fair market value of the entire  property immediately before the taking exceeds the fair market value  of the remainder immediately after the taking.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Measure of compensation for partial taking.

Trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law on the ground that no jury would be able to determine the before and after value of property based on the evidence presented because the estimated costs for changes to the property did not equate to “fair market value"; the estimated costs did not reflect the value of an arms-length transaction for the sale of the property, did not establish the lack of a market for the property, and did not establish comparable sales. Byrnes v. Johnson Cty. Comm’rs, 2020 WY 6; 2020 Wyo. LEXIS (January 13, 2020).

Trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law because the value of the property taken was not established; the only values presented were the value of the property after the road expansion, estimated costs of amending the driveway approaches, and an overall estimate of all costs, and under either of the two measures of damages in a partial takings case, the jury would not have been able to reach a conclusion based on the limited evidence presented. Byrnes v. Johnson Cty. Comm’rs, 2020 WY 6; 2020 Wyo. LEXIS (January 13, 2020).

The landowner whose property is the subject of a partial taking is entitled to prove not only the difference between the fair market value of the property prior to the taking and the fair market value of the remainder after the taking, under the “before and after rule,” but he also is entitled to prove the value of the property rights taken. The measure of compensation is the greater of those alternative amounts. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1990).

The Wyoming Eminent Domain Act and the cases interpreting those provisions require that the homeowners whose homes were condemned by the county receive fair market value as just compensation for any property taken by the county or, for a partial taking, the greater of the property rights taken or the amount by which the fair market value of the property is diminished. Miller v. Campbell County, 901 P.2d 1107, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1995).

District court could consider evidence of comparable easements in determining just compensation for pipeline easements condemned by a carbon dioxide pipeline developer, but erroneously rejected some comparable easements on the basis that they were not the result of arms' length transactions or that they related to a natural gas pipeline. Further, annual payments were allowed as compensation. Barlow Ranch, L.P. v. Greencore Pipeline Co. LLC, 2013 WY 34, 301 P.3d 75, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2013).

Collateral source rule. —

The collateral source rule is not applicable in an inverse condemnation action, and the forgiveness of mortgages or payments from the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund must be credited against any compensation award for the fair market value of the land taken or for the diminution in value of land partially taken. Otherwise, the homeowners would receive a double recovery, a “windfall.” Miller v. Campbell County, 901 P.2d 1107, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1995).

Quoted in

Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 28 P.3d 838, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2001).

Cited in

Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 2002 WY 104, 49 P.3d 999, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Fear of powerline, gas or oil pipeline, or related structure as element of damages in easement condemnation proceeding, 23 ALR4th 631.

Eminent domain: compensability of loss of view from owner's property — state cases, 25 ALR4th 671.

Liability for damage to land or its occupants from dust, gases, odors, vibration, or the like, occasioned by defendant's continuous vehicular use of adjoining or nearby public highway, 25 ALR4th 1192.

Eminent domain: measure and elements of damages or compensation for condemnation of public transportation system, 35 ALR4th 1263.

Eminent domain: compensability of loss of visibility of owner's property, 7 ALR5th 113.

§ 1-26-703. Date of valuation.

The date of valuation is the date upon which the condemnation action was commenced.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

§ 1-26-704. Fair market value defined.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of  this section:
    1. The fair market value of property for  which there is a relevant market is the price which would be agreed  to by an informed seller who is willing but not obligated to sell,  and an informed buyer who is willing but not obligated to buy;
    2. The fair market value of property for  which there is no relevant market is its value as determined by any  method of valuation that is just and equitable;
    3. The determination of fair market value  shall use generally accepted appraisal techniques and may include:
      1. The value determined by appraisal of the  property performed by a certified appraiser;
      2. The price paid for other comparable easements  or leases of comparable type, size and location on the same or similar  property;
      3. Values paid for transactions of comparable  type, size and location by other public or private entities in arms length transactions for comparable transactions on the same  or similar property.
  2. The fair market value of property owned  by an entity organized and operated upon a nonprofit basis is deemed  to be not less than the reasonable cost of functional replacement  if the following conditions exist:
    1. The property is devoted to and is needed  by the owner in order to continue in good faith its actual use to  perform a public function, or to render nonprofit educational, religious,  charitable or eleemosynary services; and
    2. The facilities or services are available  to the general public.
  3. The cost of functional replacement under  subsection (b) of this section includes:
    1. The cost of a functionally equivalent  site;
    2. The cost of relocating and rehabilitating  improvements taken, or if relocation and rehabilitation is impracticable,  the cost of providing improvements of substantially comparable character  and of the same or equal utility; and
    3. The cost of betterments and enlargements  required by law or by current construction and utilization standards  for similar facilities.
  4. In determining fair market value under  this section, no terms or conditions of an agreement containing a  confidentiality provision shall be required to be disclosed unless  the release of such information is compelled by lawful discovery,  upon a finding that the information sought is relevant to a claim  or defense of any party in the eminent domain action. The court shall  ensure that any such information required to be disclosed remains  confidential. The provision of this subsection shall not apply if  the information is contained in a document recorded in the county  clerk’s office or has otherwise been made public.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 2007, ch. 139, § 2; 2013, ch. 201, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added (a)(iii); and added (d).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in (a)(iii)(C), substituted “public or private entities” for “companies.”

Value of property.—

Comparables for pipeline easement

Value of property.—

Trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law on the ground that no jury would be able to determine the before and after value of property based on the evidence presented because the estimated costs for changes to the property did not equate to “fair market value"; the estimated costs did not reflect the value of an arms-length transaction for the sale of the property, did not establish the lack of a market for the property, and did not establish comparable sales. Byrnes v. Johnson Cty. Comm'rs, 2020 WY 6, 455 P.3d 693, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2020).

Trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law because the value of the property taken was not established; the only values presented were the value of the property after the road expansion, estimated costs of amending the driveway approaches, and an overall estimate of all costs, and under either of the two measures of damages in a partial takings case, the jury would not have been able to reach a conclusion based on the limited evidence presented. Byrnes v. Johnson Cty. Comm'rs, 2020 WY 6, 455 P.3d 693, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2020).

Comparables for pipeline easement

District court could consider evidence of comparable easements in determining just compensation for pipeline easements condemned by a carbon dioxide pipeline developer, but erroneously rejected some comparable easements on the basis that they were not the result of arms' length transactions or that they related to a natural gas pipeline. Further, annual payments were allowed as compensation. Barlow Ranch, L.P. v. Greencore Pipeline Co. LLC, 2013 WY 34, 301 P.3d 75, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2013).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The More Things Change, The More Things Stay The Same: A Practitioner’s Guide to Recent Changes in Wyoming’s Eminent Domain Act” see 8 Wyo. L. Rev. 1 (2008).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Assemblage or plottage as factor affecting value in eminent domain proceedings, 8 ALR4th 1202.

Fear of powerline, gas or oil pipeline, or related structure as element of damages in easement condemnation proceeding, 23 ALR4th 631.

§ 1-26-705. Effect of condemnation action on value.

  1. The fair market value of the property  taken, or of the entire property if there is a partial taking, does  not include an increase or decrease in value before the date of valuation  that is caused by:
    1. The proposed improvement or project for  which the property is taken;
    2. The reasonable likelihood that the property  would be acquired for that improvement or project; or
    3. The condemnation action in which the property  is taken.
  2. If, before completion of the project as  originally adopted, the project is expanded or changed to require  the taking of additional property, the fair market value of the additional  property does not include a decrease in value before the date of valuation,  but does include an increase in value before the date on which it  became reasonably likely that the expansion or change in the scope  of the project would occur, if the decrease or increase is caused  by any of the factors described in subsection (a) of this section.
  3. Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b)  of this section, a decrease in value before the date of valuation  which is caused by physical deterioration of the property within the  reasonable control of the property owner, and by his unjustified neglect,  may be considered in determining fair market value.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Eminent domain: compensability of loss of visibility of owner's property, 7 ALR5th 113.

§ 1-26-706. Compensation to reflect project as planned.

  1. If there is a partial taking of property,  the fair market value of the remainder on the valuation date shall  reflect increases or decreases in value caused by the proposed project  including:
    1. Impairment of the use of his other property  caused by the condemnation; and
    2. The increase in damage to his property  by the general public which could reasonably be expected to occur  as a result of the proposed actions of the condemnor;
    3. Any work to be performed under an agreement  between the parties or pursuant to W.S. 1-26-714 .

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 2007, ch. 139, § 2.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a)(iii) inserted “or pursuant to W.S. 1-26-714 ” at the end of the sentence.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Applied in

Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 2002 WY 104, 49 P.3d 999, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Eminent domain: compensability of loss of visibility of owner's property, 7 ALR5th 113.

§ 1-26-707. Special assessment proceedings excluded.

If there is a partial taking of property and special assessments or charges are imposed upon the remainder to pay for all or part of the project, the increase in value of the remainder, if any, caused by the project shall be considered in determining its value after the partial taking only to the extent the increase exceeds the amount of the special assessments or charges.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-708. Use by defendant; risk of loss.

  1. Unless the court otherwise directs, the  condemnee may use the property sought to be taken for any lawful purpose  before the date on which the condemnor is authorized to take possession.
  2. Thereafter, the condemnee may use the  property only for any purpose or use which is not inconsistent with  the estate taken by the condemnor. The uses authorized by subsection  (a) of this section include any normal work on the property and the  planting, cultivation and removal of crops.
  3. The compensation awarded the condemnee  shall include an amount sufficient to compensate for loss caused by  any temporary restriction or limitation imposed by the court upon  his right to use the property under subsection (a) of this section.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

§ 1-26-709. Compensation for growing crops and improvements.

  1. The compensation for crops growing on  the property on the date of valuation is the higher of the current  fair market value of the crops in place, assuming the right to bring  them to maturity and to harvest them, or the amount by which the existence  of the crops enhances the fair market value of the property.
  2. The compensation for an interest in improvements  is the higher of the fair market value of the improvements, assuming  their immediate removal from the property, or the amount by which  the existence of the improvements enhances the fair market value of  the property.
  3. If improvements are destroyed, removed  or damaged by the condemnee after the date of valuation, the amount  of compensation shall be adjusted to reflect the extent to which the  fair market value of the property has thereby been reduced.
  4. Crops or improvements that are first placed  upon the property after the date of valuation shall be excluded from  consideration in determining the amount of the award, except that  the award shall be adjusted to include the reasonable and necessary  cost of providing improvements required by law and improvements necessary  to protect life or property as authorized by the court.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Evidence of road construction costs deemed relevant. —

The taking of a private road encompasses the immediate removal of the road, which is an “improvement” within the contemplation of subsection (b). Consequently, evidence of road construction costs may well be relevant as to its market value. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1990).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

§ 1-26-710. Compensation for divided interests.

The amount of compensation for the taking of property in which divided interests exist is based upon the fair market value of the property considered as a whole.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-711. Taking of leasehold interest.

  1. If all or part of the property taken includes  a leasehold interest, the effect of the condemnation action upon the  rights and obligations of the parties to the lease is governed by  the provisions of the lease, and in the absence of applicable provisions  in the lease, by this section.
  2. If there is a partial taking and the part  of the property taken includes a leasehold interest that extends to  the remainder, the court may determine that:
    1. The lease terminates as to the part of  the property taken but remains in force as to the remainder, in which  case the rent reserved in the lease is extinguished to the extent  it is affected by the taking; or
    2. The lease terminates as to both the part  taken and the remainder, if the part taken is essential to the purposes  of the lease or the remainder is no longer suitable for the purpose  of the lease.
  3. The termination or partial termination  of a lease under this section shall occur at the earlier of the date  on which, under an order of the court, the condemnor is permitted  to take possession of the property, or the date on which title to  the property is transferred to the condemnor.
  4. This section does not affect or impair  a lessee’s right to compensation if his leasehold interest is taken  in whole or in part.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Power of municipal corporation to lease or sublet property owned or leased by it, 47 ALR3d 19.

Goodwill or “going concern” value as element of lessee's compensation for taking leasehold in eminent domain, 58 ALR3d 566.

Measure and elements of lessee's compensation for condemnor's taking or damaging of leasehold, 17 ALR4th 337.

Validity, construction, and effect of statute or lease provision expressly governing rights and compensation of lessee upon condemnation of leased property, 22 ALR5th 327.

§ 1-26-712. Acquisition of property subject to lien.

Notwithstanding the provisions of an agreement, if any, relating to a lien encumbering the property neither the condemnor nor condemnee is liable to the lienholder for any penalty for prepayment of the debt secured by the lien, and the amount awarded by the judgment to the lienholder shall not include any penalty therefor.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-713. Loss of goodwill.

  1. In addition to fair market value determined  under W.S. 1-26-704 , the owner of a business conducted on the property taken,  or on the remainder if there is a partial taking, shall be compensated  for loss of goodwill only if the owner proves that the loss:
    1. Is caused by the taking of the property  or the injury to the remainder;
    2. Cannot reasonably be prevented by a relocation  of the business or by taking steps and adopting procedures that a  reasonably prudent person would take and adopt in preserving the goodwill;
    3. Will not be included in relocation payments  under W.S. 16-7-101 through 16-7-121 ; and
    4. Will not be duplicated in the compensation  awarded to the owner.
  2. Within the meaning of this section, “goodwill”  consists of the benefits that accrue to a business as a result of  its location, reputation for dependability, skill or quality and any  other circumstances resulting in probable retention of old or acquisition  of new patronage.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Goodwill or “going concern” value as element of lessee's compensation for taking leasehold in eminent domain, 58 ALR3d 566.

§ 1-26-714. Reclamation and restoration.

  1. A condemnor who acquires a property right  or interest of less than fee simple title in any land shall be responsible  for reclamation on such land and for restoration of the land and any  improvements thereon. The reclamation and restoration shall return  the property and improvements to the condition existing prior to the  condemnation to the extent that reasonably can be accomplished.
  2. Reclamation and restoration shall include  but not be limited to, grading to the natural contour, replacement  of topsoil, the planting and establishment of appropriate ground cover  and control of weeds resulting from condemnor’s disturbance, as follows:
    1. In the case of a growing crop for which  compensation has been paid, a ground cover shall be required only  if requested by the condemnee;
    2. In the case of grazing lands, native grasses  and forbs previously growing on the disturbed land shall be reseeded  and established unless the establishment of alternative beneficial  plants are agreed to by the parties.
  3. The responsibility of the condemnor under  this section shall include the following:
    1. Damages caused by the condemnor, its successors  or its agents during entry prior to condemnation as authorized by W.S. 1-26-506 and 1-26-507 ;
    2. Damages caused by the condemnor, its successors  or its agents during construction of the project under the condemnation;
    3. Damages caused by the condemnor, its successors  or its agents subsequent to the construction and during the use of  the property during the time of the condemnor’s possession;
    4. Damages caused by the condemnor, its successors  or its agents in the removal of any facilities or improvements on  the property at the termination of the authorized use;
    5. Restoration and reclamation shall begin  as soon as reasonably possible after completion of project construction,  unless otherwise agreed to by the condemnor and the condemnee.
  4. Nothing herein shall preclude the condemnor  and the condemnee from agreeing to compensation in lieu of the obligations  provided in this section.

History. Laws 2007, ch. 139, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2007, ch. 139, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2007.

Compensation for reclamation separate from compensation for taking

District court was not required to consider, as an element of just compensation for a pipeline developer's taking of easements for a pipeline, the developer's reclamation responsibility under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-714 at the time the easement terminated. Compensation for reclamation was separate from, and in addition to, the compensation for the taking. Barlow Ranch, L.P. v. Greencore Pipeline Co. LLC, 2013 WY 34, 301 P.3d 75, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2013).

Article 8. Power of Eminent Domain Granted

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §§ 17 to 53.

Zoning as a factor in determination of damages in eminent domain, 9 ALR3d 291.

Right to enter land for preliminary survey or examination, 29 ALR3d 1104.

Traffic noise and vibration from highway as element of damages in eminent domain, 51 ALR3d 860.

Validity and construction of statutes regulating strip mining, 86 ALR3d 27.

Unsightliness of powerline or other wire, or related structure, as element of damages in easement condemnation proceeding, 97 ALR3d 587.

29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 3 to 4, 62 to 70, 201 to 212.

§ 1-26-801. Authority of state, counties and municipal corporations to acquire by condemnation proceedings; uranium mill tailings; public purpose.

  1. The state or any county or municipal corporation  may purchase or acquire by condemnation any real estate including  streets, alleys or public highways, as sites for public buildings  or for any other necessary public purpose. Proceedings in condemnation  shall be conducted in the name of the state, county or municipal corporation  and by the attorney general when for the state, the county attorney  when for the county and the municipal attorney when for a municipal  corporation.
  2. In carrying out responsibilities under  P.L. 95-604, the state may purchase or acquire by condemnation any  real estate or radioactive materials if determined necessary to stabilize  and control uranium mill tailings in a safe and environmentally sound  manner. Proceedings in condemnation shall be as provided by this act.
  3. As used in  and for purposes of this section only, “public purpose”  means the possession, occupation and enjoyment of the land by a public  entity. “Public purpose” shall not include the taking  of private property by a public entity for the purpose of transferring  the property to another private individual or private entity except  in the case of condemnation for the purpose of protecting the public  health and safety, in which event the public entity may transfer the  condemned property for value to a private individual or entity. However,  nothing in this section shall restrict or impair the right or authority  of the Wyoming energy authority to transfer property condemned by the authority to another public  or private entity insofar as the transfer is consistent with the statutory  purposes or duties of the authority.
    1. and (ii) Repealed by Laws 2019, ch. 34, §  4.
  4. If a public entity acquires property in  fee simple title under this chapter but fails to make substantial  use of the property for a period of ten (10) years, there is a presumption  that the property is no longer needed for a public purpose and the  previous owner or his successor may apply to the court to request  that the property be returned to the previous owner or his successor  upon repayment of the amount originally received for the property  in the condemnation action. A public entity may rebut the presumption  created under this subsection by showing good cause for the delay  in using the property.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 1983, ch. 145, § 1; 2007, ch. 139, § 2; 2019, ch. 34, §§ 3, 4, §§ 3, 4.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added (c) through (d).

The 2019 amendments. —

The first 2019 amendment, by ch. 34, § 3, effective July 1, 2020, in (c), substituted “energy” for “pipeline” preceding “authority,” deleted “or the Wyoming infrastructure authority” preceding “to transfer property,” and substituted “the authority.” for “:” at the end.

The second 2019 amendment, by ch. 34, § 4, effective July 1, 2020, repealed former (c)(i) and (c)(ii), which read: “(i) The Wyoming pipeline authority acting pursuant to W.S. 37-5-102 , as to pipelines as defined in W.S. 37-5-202(a)(iv); or

“(ii) The Wyoming infrastructure authority acting pursuant to W.S. 37-5-303 , as to facilities as defined in W.S. 37-5-302(a)(iii).”

Editor's notes. —

P.L. 95-604, referred to in subsection (b), appears as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2021, 2022, 2111, 2113, 2114, 2201, 7901, 7911 through 7925, 7941 and 7942.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-26-502(a)(vi).

Cited in

Miller v. Campbell County, 722 F. Supp. 687, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11685 (D. Wyo. 1989); L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1990).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

For article, “The More Things Change, The More Things Stay The Same: A Practitioner’s Guide to Recent Changes in Wyoming’s Eminent Domain Act” see 8 Wyo. L. Rev. 1 (2008).

§ 1-26-802. Proceedings by water companies and incorporated cities or towns.

Any water company or incorporated city or town of this state may acquire by purchase, grant or condemnation any land, real estate, claim, easement or right-of-way required for or that may be affected by the construction, operation or maintenance of any waterworks.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

§ 1-26-803. Municipal streets and alleys; utility mains or pipes; tax levy.

Any incorporated city or town in Wyoming may use or authorize the use of its streets and alleys by others, and may obtain by purchase, grant or condemnation in the manner provided by law all necessary lands for the construction, laying and operating of mains or pipes for sewers, gas or water for the use of the cities and towns, and for that purpose to have the power to levy a tax within the constitutional limits upon all personal and real property within the corporate limits of the cities and towns.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-804. Acquisition of public utility plants by cities and towns.

Any incorporated city or town of this state may acquire by condemnation, purchase or gift the franchise and the plant, facilities, equipment and property of any person or entity owning or operating in the city or town a franchise and plant, facilities, equipment or other property used or intended for the purpose of supplying or furnishing to the public of the city or town any public utility service mentioned in W.S. 1-26-805 .

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-805. Acquisition of public utility plants by cities and towns; definition of facilities which may be acquired.

For the purposes of W.S. 1-26-804 through 1-26-809 “public utility service” means and includes communication or transmission of intelligence or messages by telephone service; electricity for light, heat, power and like purposes; natural or artificial gas for heat, light, power and like purposes; steam for heat, power and like purposes; or water for municipal, domestic, agricultural, irrigation, manufacturing and like purposes, including surface water drainage in accordance with W.S. 16-10-103 .

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 1995, ch. 118, § 2.

§ 1-26-806. Acquisition of public utility plants by cities and towns; purpose of acquisition; ownership or operation.

The purpose for which the franchise and plant, facilities, equipment or other property may be acquired is for municipal ownership or operation of the business by the city or town, which right is hereby given to any incorporated city or town.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-807. Acquisition of other property for public utility service.

Any incorporated city or town of this state has the further right to acquire by condemnation, purchase or gift any real estate or other property, public or private, whether within or outside the corporate limits of the city or town, for rights-of-way, sites, buildings or other purposes connected with or necessary to carry on the business of municipal ownership or operation of any public utility service, or to secure outside connections for any public utility service.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-808. Election in cities and towns on question of acquisition.

No city or town shall acquire the franchise or the plant, facilities, equipment or other property of any person or entity for the purpose of supplying or furnishing to the public of the city or town any public utility service unless authorized at an election. The election shall be held as provided by law for the submission of a bond issue under the Political Subdivision Bond Election Law, W.S. 22-21-101 through 22-21-112 .

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 1996, ch. 97, § 2.

§ 1-26-809. Determination of value of franchise to be acquired.

In determining the value of the franchise, consideration shall be given to the total amount paid for the franchise for the entire term of the franchise and deductions made proportioned on the unexpired term of the franchise.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-810. Powers of railroad companies relative to condemnation generally.

  1. Any railroad company organized under the  laws of this state, the laws of the United States or which has been  duly organized under the laws of any other state and has filed copies  of its articles of incorporation with the secretary of state in this  state as required by law is authorized to:
    1. Exercise the power of eminent domain to  acquire rights-of-way for railroad tracks and easements for offices,  depots and other appurtenant facilities related directly to the operation  of the railroad;
    2. Take, hold and appropriate a right-of-way  over adjacent lands sufficient to enable the corporation to construct  and repair its road upon the line of its location or relocation thereof;  and
    3. Acquire a right to conduct water by aqueducts  and to make appropriate drains.
  2. Any land taken, appropriated and held  otherwise than by the consent of the owner shall not exceed two hundred  (200) feet in width unless greater width is necessary for excavations,  embankments, depositing waste earth or for construction of other appurtenant  facilities necessary for the operation of the railroad.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Width limitation. —

Condemnation of a 50-foot tract of land, when combined with the width of land involved in a settlement agreement between a railroad and the property owners, did not violate the 200-foot limit on railroad condemnation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-810(b). The 50-foot tract was needed for slope support for a railroad track and was therefore necessary for the operation of the railroad. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. A 50-foot Wide Easement Consisting of 6.99 Acres More Or Less, 346 Fed. Appx. 297, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19997 (10th Cir. 2009).

Cited in

Bush Land Dev. Co. v. Crook Cnty. Weed & Pest Control Dist., 2017 WY 12, 388 P.3d 536, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

§ 1-26-811. Crossing public highways; privileges and duties.

  1. A railroad company may raise or lower  any county road or other public highway for the purpose of having  its railroad pass over or under the road or highway. Repair or reconstruction  of roads or highways shall be expeditiously completed.
  2. While engaged in raising or lowering any  county road or other public highway or in making any other alteration  which may obstruct the public way, a railroad company shall provide  and maintain suitable temporary ways to enable travelers to avoid  or pass obstructions.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-812. Constructing, maintaining, abandoning or closing crossings.

  1. When any person owns land on both sides  of any railroad, the company owning the railroad shall construct and  maintain reasonably adequate means of crossing the railroad.
  2. No railroad shall abandon, close or fail  to maintain any public highway crossing unless in accordance with  the provisions of W.S. 37-10-102 .
  3. No railroad shall abandon, close or fail  to maintain any other existing crossing which has been maintained  or recognized by the railroad for more than five (5) years prior to  the effective date of this act without:
    1. Providing written notice of its intended  action to every person owning lands adjacent to the crossing;
    2. Advertising its intended action in a newspaper  of general circulation in the county of the crossing; and
    3. No sooner than three (3) weeks after providing  the notice required, holding a meeting open to all persons at which  it shall explain and at which persons shall be permitted to express  their views on the intended action.
  4. Any railroad violating subsection (c)  of this section shall not be entitled to assert any of the powers  provided by W.S. 1-26-810 over any lands which are part of or are adjacent to the  crossing, until the railroad has reconstructed the crossing abandoned,  closed or not maintained in violation of subsection (c) of this section.
  5. In any action involving the abandonment,  closing or maintenance of a railroad crossing which has been maintained  or recognized by the railroad for more than five (5) years prior to  the effective date of this act, the railroad shall not be entitled  to assert any of the powers provided by W.S. 1-26-810 over any lands which are part of or are adjacent to the  crossing unless the railroad establishes by a preponderance of the  evidence:
    1. The closing or abandonment of the crossing  is justified by either financial or safety considerations;
    2. There exists reasonable alternative means  of access to all property served by the crossing; and
    3. That it has complied with the provisions  of this section and the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed  as limiting or prohibiting any person from maintaining any other action  at law for a railroad’s failure to maintain a crossing, or abandonment  or closing of a crossing.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 1991, ch. 118, § 1.

Right to jury trial. —

Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1(k) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-812(f) did not provide property owners with a right to a jury trial in a condemnation suit brought by a railroad. Section 1-26-812(f) merely confirmed that the statute did not affect other potential actions at law for a railroad's failure to maintain a crossing and did not itself provide a right to trial by jury. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. A 50-foot Wide Easement Consisting of 6.99 Acres More Or Less, 346 Fed. Appx. 297, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19997 (10th Cir. 2009).

Wyoming Eminent Domain Act. —

See §§ 1-26-501 and 1-26-502(a)(vi).

§ 1-26-813. Right-of-way along public ways granted; permission necessary for new lines.

  1. Persons authorized to do business in this state for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating a public utility or communications company may set their fixtures and facilities along, across or under any of the public roads, streets and waters of this state in such manner as not to inconvenience the public in their use. Any public utility or communications company desiring to install its facilities in any city shall first attempt to obtain consent from the city council in accordance with applicable law. A person shall first obtain permission from the state transportation commission or the board of county commissioners in the county where the construction is contemplated before entering upon any state highway or county road for the purpose of commencing the construction. An application for all construction permits, licenses and authorizations to construct broadband facilities on government property or public rights-of-way shall be submitted to the appropriate governing entity as the applicable governing entity may require. Upon receiving an application as required in this subsection, any necessary permits, licenses or authorizations shall receive a response, be approved or be denied by the city, department of transportation or the county. Unless a different period is stipulated to by the parties, the city, department of transportation or the county shall respond to the application, approve or deny all necessary permits, authorizations and licenses not later than sixty (60) calendar days after receipt of the application.
  2. As used in this section, “communications company” means a person, or any agent, contractor or subcontractor of the person, who in the course of business, provides services which are telecommunications services, as defined in W.S. 37-15-103(a)(xii), internet protocol enabled service or voice over internet protocol. For purposes of this section only, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a communications company includes a cable operator as defined in 47 U.S.C § 522(5), provided the cable operator provides any of the services listed in this subsection. As used in this section:
    1. “Internet protocol enabled service” means any service, capability, functionality or application, other than voice over internet protocol service, using existing internet protocol, or any successor internet protocol, that enables an end user to send or receive a communication in existing internet protocol format, or any successor internet protocol format, utilizing a broadband connection at the end user’s location, regardless of whether the communication is voice, data or video;
    2. “Voice over internet protocol service” means any service that:
      1. Enables real time, two-way voice communication originating from or terminating at the user’s location in internet protocol or a successor protocol;
      2. Utilizes a broadband connection at the user’s location; and
      3. Permits a user to receive a call that originates on the public switched telephone network and to terminate a call to the public switched telephone network.
  3. Nothing in this section shall:
    1. Authorize communications companies to set or install permanent towers along, across or under any of the public roads, streets and waters of this state or to set communication poles in a state managed right-of-way;
    2. Be construed to prohibit a city, town or county from requiring a franchise before issuing any permits, licenses or authorizations as provided by this section.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 1991, ch. 241, § 3; 2019, ch. 138, § 1; 2021, ch. 45, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, designated former undesignated paragraph as present (a), and added "or communications company" following "public utility" twice, and "in accordance with applicable law" following "city council"; and added (b).

The 2021 amendment, in (a), substituted "Persons" for "Corporations" at the beginning, added the third through sixth sentence; added the second sentence in (b); and added (c).

Laws 2021, ch. 45, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved April 1, 2021.

Judgment is proper when county acts within its rights. —

Judgment on the pleadings in favor of the county was proper because the county was within its rights to enter into a public road right-of-way use agreement with a private utility company, which would allow the utility to build a proposed sewer line, because the agreement was in public's interest, it fit within scope of the easement granted by servient estates and did not increase their burden. A public road easement could be used for an underground sewer line and such right was not defeated solely because the sewer line was to be constructed by a private entity. Box L Corp. v. Teton County, 2004 WY 75, 92 P.3d 811, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2004).

Facilities subject to common-law relocation requirements. —

Public utility facilities such as power poles are located in the public way only by authority of licenses issued pursuant to this section and its earlier codifications. Any facilities licensed under statute are subject to the relocation requirements of the common law, regardless of what the license may say, or not say, concerning this subject. Only the legislature may shift the burden of relocation expenses to the state. State Highway Comm'n v. Sheridan-Johnson Rural Electrification Ass'n, 784 P.2d 588, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 243 (Wyo. 1989).

Section does not grant board of county commissioners authority to regulate public utilities. — Vandehei Developers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 790 P.2d 1282, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1990).

Quoted in

Schott v. Miller, 943 P.2d 1174, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1997).

Cited in

State v. Homar, 798 P.2d 824, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1990).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Placement, maintenance or design of standing utility pole as affecting private utility's liability for personal injury resulting from vehicle's collision with pole within or beside highway, 51 ALR4th 602.

§ 1-26-814. Right of eminent domain granted; petroleum or other pipeline companies; purposes.

Whenever any utility or any petroleum or other pipeline company, authorized to do business in this state, has not acquired by gift or purchase any land, real estate or claim required for the construction, maintenance and operation of their facilities and appurtenances or which may be affected by any operation connected with the construction or maintenance of the same, the utility or company has the right of eminent domain and may condemn the easement required by the utility or company.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Comparable easements may be used to find fair market value of condemned easement

District court could consider evidence of comparable easements in determining just compensation for pipeline easements condemned by a carbon dioxide pipeline developer, but erroneously rejected some comparable easements on the basis that they were not the result of arms' length transactions or that they related to a natural gas pipeline. Further, annual payments were allowed as compensation. Barlow Ranch, L.P. v. Greencore Pipeline Co. LLC, 2013 WY 34, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. R-13).

Cited in

Bush Land Dev. Co. v. Crook Cnty. Weed & Pest Control Dist., 2017 WY 12, 388 P.3d 536, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

§ 1-26-815. Right of eminent domain granted; ways of necessity for authorized businesses; purposes; extent.

  1. Any person, association, company or corporation  authorized to do business in this state may appropriate by condemnation  a way of necessity over, across or on so much of the lands or real  property of others as necessary for the location, construction, maintenance  and use of reservoirs, drains, flumes, ditches including return flow  and wastewater ditches, underground water pipelines, pumping stations  and other necessary appurtenances, canals, electric power transmission  lines and distribution systems, railroad trackage, sidings, spur tracks,  tramways, roads or mine truck haul roads required in the course of  their business for agricultural, mining, exploration drilling and  production of oil and gas, milling, electric power transmission and  distribution, domestic, municipal or sanitary purposes, or for the  transportation of coal from any coal mine or railroad line or for  the transportation of oil and gas from any well.
  2. The right of condemnation may be exercised  for the purpose of:
    1. Acquiring, enlarging or relocating ways  of necessity; and
    2. Acquiring easements or rights-of-way over  adjacent lands sufficient to enable the owner of the way of necessity  to construct, repair, maintain and use the structures, roads or facilities  for which the way of necessity is acquired.
  3. A way of necessity acquired hereunder  shall not exceed one hundred (100) feet in width on each side of the  outer sides or marginal lines of the reservoir, drain, ditch, underground  water pipeline, canal, flume, power transmission line or distribution  system, railroad trackage, siding or tramway unless a greater width  is necessary for excavation, embankment or deposit of waste from excavation.  In no case may the area appropriated exceed that actually necessary  for the purpose of use for which a way of necessity is authorized.
  4. No person qualified to exercise the condemnation  authority granted by this section, except a public utility that has  been granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity pursuant  to W.S. 37-2-205 , shall exercise the authority for the erection, placement  or expansion of collector systems associated with commercial facilities  generating electricity from wind. The prohibition imposed by this  subsection shall be effective immediately and shall end June 30, 2015 or upon the effective date of legislation establishing additional  conditions for the use of condemnation authority for the erection,  placement or expansion of collector systems associated with commercial  facilities generating electricity from wind, whichever occurs earlier.  As used in this subsection, “collector systems associated with commercial  facilities generating electricity from wind” means the conductor infrastructure,  including conductors, towers, substations, switchgear and other components  necessary to deliver power from any commercial facility generating  electricity from wind up to but not including electric substations  or interconnections facilities associated with existing or proposed  transmission lines that serve load or that export energy from Wyoming.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1; 2003, ch. 161, § 1; 2010, ch. 48, § 1; 2011, ch. 86, § 1; 2013, ch. 34, § 1.

The 2010 amendment, added (d).

Laws 2010, ch. 48, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 5, 2010.

The 2011 amendment, in (d), substituted “2013” for “2011.”

Laws 2011, ch. 86 § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2011.

The 2013 amendment, in (d), substituted “2015” for “2013”.

Laws 2013, ch. 34, section 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, section 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 14, 2013.

Certificate of convenience and necessity not required from non-public utility company. —

In a condemnation case under Wyo. Const. art. I, § 32 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-815 , by a power company, a certificate of convenience and necessity under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-2-205 and 1-26-816 was not required because the company was not a ‘public utility’ as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann § 37-1-101(a)(vi) in that the company supplied wholesale power to an energy corporation that in turn sold it to its members. Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 2005 WY 108, 118 P.3d 996, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2005).

Owner of servient estate not surface owner for purposes of mining application. —

After condemnation of a way of necessity for a railroad spur track and a mine truck haul road, the owner of a servient estate is not a surface owner for purposes of the mining permit application statute and, therefore, his consent, or an order in lieu thereof, need not be included in the mining permit application. WYMO Fuels v. Edwards, 723 P.2d 1230, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 601 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

Bush Land Dev. Co. v. Crook Cnty. Weed & Pest Control Dist., 2017 WY 12, 388 P.3d 536, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

Library References.

American Law of Mining, 2nd Edition §§ 86.04, 100.04 (Matthew Bender).

§ 1-26-816. Condemnation and certificate of public necessity and convenience.

No person shall institute a condemnation proceeding relating to any facility for which a certificate of public necessity and convenience is required until the certificate has been issued.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

§ 1-26-817. Reservation of right to establish crossings.

Any condemnation order entered shall in all cases reserve to the owner or occupant of any real property through, over or across which any right-of-way is acquired the right to establish suitable crossings connecting his or their lands on either side of the right-of-way, at any point or points which may be selected by the owner or occupant. The ditch, canal, drain, flume or other irrigation works shall be protected at the crossings by the construction and maintenance of a suitable bridge or viaduct at the expense of the owner or occupant.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 174, § 1.

Cited in

Bush Land Dev. Co. v. Crook Cnty. Weed & Pest Control Dist., 2017 WY 12, 388 P.3d 536, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2017).

Chapter 27 Habeas Corpus

Cross references. —

As to writ generally, see art. 1, § 17, Wyo. Const.

As to original jurisdiction of supreme court, see art. 5, § 3, Wyo. Const.

As to power of district court and judges, see art. 5, § 10, Wyo. Const.

As to right of accused to apply for writ under Uniform Extradition Act, see § 7-3-210 .

For supplemental post conviction procedures, see §§ 7-14-101 to 7-14-108 .

As to application for writ, see Rule 3, Sup. Ct.

Consolidated petition for post-conviction relief and habeas corpus, filed in the district court of the county of trial and dismissed by the trial judge, was treated by the supreme court as a petition for post-conviction relief for the following reasons: (1) the court's judgment could not be impeached by a writ of habeas corpus; (2) the court in habeas corpus was not authorized to grant a new trial; (3) all issues which could have been raised in a habeas proceeding were raised in the petition for post-conviction relief; and (4) no appeal lay from the denial of the habeas petition. State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 187, 88 L. Ed. 2d 155, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 4988 (U.S. 1985).

Applied in

Hamill v. Ferguson, 937 F. Supp. 1517, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17115 (D. Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

Hamill v. Ferguson, 937 F. Supp. 1528, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17100 (D. Wyo. 1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus § 1 et seq.

Waiver or loss of accused's right to speedy trial as affecting right to habeas corpus, 57 ALR2d 239.

Right of prisoner held under extradition warrant to raise question of identity in habeas corpus proceeding, 93 ALR2d 912.

Attack, by petition for writ of habeas corpus, on personal service as having been obtained by fraud or trickery, 98 ALR2d 551.

Abuse of writ as basis for dismissal of state prisoner's second or successive petition for federal habeas corpus, 60 ALR Fed 481.

What constitutes “an opportunity for full and fair litigation” in state court precluding habeas corpus review under 28 USC § 2254 in federal court of state prisoner's fourth amendment claims, 75 ALR Fed 9.

39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 1 et seq.

§ 1-27-101. Petition to be under oath; contents.

  1. The petition for the writ of habeas corpus  shall be sworn to and shall state:
    1. The person for whom the writ is sought  is restrained of his liberty, by whom he is restrained and the place  where he is restrained, stating the names of the parties if known  and if unknown, describing them with as much particularity as practicable;
    2. The cause or reason for the restraint  according to the best information of the petitioner, and if it is  by virtue of any legal process, a copy thereof must be annexed or  a satisfactory reason presented for its absence;
    3. The restraint is illegal;
    4. The legality of the restraint has not  been adjudged in a prior proceeding, of the same character, to the  best knowledge and belief of the applicant, or if previously adjudged  the facts of the prior proceeding with a copy of all the papers connected  therewith or a satisfactory reason for the absence thereof; and
    5. Whether petition for the writ has been  made to and refused by any court or judge, and if a petition has been  made, a copy of the petition with the reason for the refusal appended  or satisfactory reasons given for the failure to do so.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 1264; R.S. 1899, § 5464; C.S. 1910, § 6326; C.S. 1920, § 7622; R.S. 1931, § 51-101; C.S. 1945, § 3-6501; W.S. 1957, § 1-810; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-101 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Statutory regulation. —

The issuance of the writ of habeas corpus may be regulated by statute, provided the statutory regulations do not infringe upon the constitutional right to the writ. Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1899).

Availability. —

Except where there has been a remand following an appeal in a criminal case, or where one of the statutes or rules, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-27-101 et seq., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 , Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35, otherwise expressly permits a district court to continue to assert jurisdiction over that criminal case, no authority exists for the district court to act in the case and its jurisdiction over the case should end. Barela v. State, 2002 WY 143, 55 P.3d 11, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2002).

The district court was without jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed over five years after the entry of his plea and over five years after his sentence was imposed; defendant's criminal case became final for purposes of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea at the expiration of the time for taking a direct appeal from the district court's judgment and sentence. Barela v. State, 2002 WY 143, 55 P.3d 11, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2002).

Requirements of petition. —

Petition for writ is required to state that the person on whose behalf it is presented, is illegally restrained of his liberty, or the writ may be granted without an application whenever the court or judge has evidence, from some proceedings before them, that any person within jurisdiction of the court or officer is illegally imprisoned or restrained of his liberty. State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1908).

Noncompliance held not fatal. —

While the petitioner did not file in the supreme court a copy of all the papers connected with a former proceeding, and such failure to comply with this section was specifically disapproved and might have constituted grounds for refusing the writ, since the supreme court had allowed the writ earlier, the omission was not fatal. In re Briggs, 404 P.2d 752, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1965).

Repeated applications. —

Subdivision 4 does not prevent repeated applications for the writ, when, upon showing of the prisoner, he is entitled to relief. Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1899).

Jurisdictional facts. —

Jurisdictional facts cognizable on habeas corpus are not alone those which relate to jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, but also those relating to jurisdiction to render the particular judgment. Hovey v. Sheffner, 16 Wyo. 254, 93 P. 305, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1908).

Jurisdictional matters. —

Province of habeas corpus proceedings is to inquire only into jurisdiction matters. Ex parte Madson, 25 Wyo. 338, 169 P. 336, 1917 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1917).

One of the provisos of habeas corpus proceedings is to inquire into jurisdictional matters. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Impeaching regularity of judgment. —

In habeas corpus proceedings regularity of the judgment under which petitioners were imprisoned cannot be impeached for errors or defects not affecting the jurisdiction of the court to render the judgment. Hollibaugh v. Hehn, 13 Wyo. 269, 79 P. 1044, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1905).

Collateral attack on judgment. —

Where attack on judgment by habeas corpus is collateral, judgment cannot be impeached for any error or irregularity not affecting power of the court to act in the case. Younger v. Hehn, 12 Wyo. 289, 75 P. 443, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1904).

Attack of decisions. —

Unless a court has exceeded its jurisdiction, its decisions are not subject to attack by means of a writ of habeas corpus, no matter how erroneous they may appear to be. Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1899).

Nature of inquiry. —

Inquiry will not be made, on habeas corpus whether a de facto state penitentiary, wherein petitioner is imprisoned, is such de jure. Kingen v. Kelley, 3 Wyo. 566, 28 P. 36, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1891).

Discharged insane patients. —

Where a patient, not violently or dangerously insane, was unconditionally discharged by competent authority of the hospital, he cannot be reincarcerated without another judicial inquiry. Byers v. Solier, 16 Wyo. 232, 93 P. 59, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1907).

Discharge when arrested on civil warrant. —

A party arrested on a civil warrant in another county from that in which action is pending is entitled to discharge on habeas corpus. Ahlrep v. Hughes, 18 Wyo. 51, 102 P. 659, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1909).

Arrest without warrant. —

An arrest without a warrant is not a jurisdictional defect, and is waived where the persons arrested appear in court and submit to arraignment without objection. Hollibaugh v. Hehn, 13 Wyo. 269, 79 P. 1044, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1905).

Extradition. —

Habeas corpus is a proper proceeding to determine whether accused is a fugitive from justice, and subject to return to another state in extradition proceedings. Ryan v. Rogers, 21 Wyo. 311, 132 P. 95, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1913).

Whether accused was present in the demanding state at commission of crime may be inquired into on habeas corpus, where release is sought from arrest for extradition. Zulch v. Roach, 23 Wyo. 335, 151 P. 1101, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1915).

Time of crime. —

The time of the commission of the crime charged in the complaint or indictment is conclusive in habeas corpus proceedings instituted to prevent extradition, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Zulch v. Roach, 23 Wyo. 335, 151 P. 1101, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1915).

Custody of children. —

In habeas corpus proceeding involving right to custody of an infant, evidence was found sufficient to warrant court in denying petitioner right to custody of child on the ground that it would be to the best interest of the child, and save a separation of those remaining of the family, though it involved practical annulment of an appointment of petitioner as guardian of child by probate court of another state. Jones v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 77 P. 439, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1904).

Welfare of children. —

Where a father without a home, the mother being dead, proposes to take a four-year-old daughter from the care of her mother's parents to place her with his own relatives, the welfare of the child is to be considered. Harris v. Muir, 24 Wyo. 213, 157 P. 26, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1916).

Best interests of children. —

Section 3-2-105 is merely directory, and, in habeas corpus by a father to obtain the custody of his children living with the mother, the question is to be determined with reference to the best interest of the children. Tytler v. Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 89 P. 1, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1907).

Law of the forum in child custody. —

Question as to custody of children is to be determined by the law of the forum, irrespective of the law of the domicile. Tytler v. Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 89 P. 1, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1907).

Permanent custody. —

The mother being dead, a father having no home of his own was not entitled to take his four-year-old daughter from good care by her mother's parents to place her with his relatives; such an order not settling the permanent custody of the child. Harris v. Muir, 24 Wyo. 213, 157 P. 26, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1916).

In habeas corpus by a father to obtain custody of his minor children from the mother, evidence considered, and held that a judgment awarding custody to the father was an abuse of discretion; but that he should be permitted to visit them at all reasonable times. Tytler v. Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 89 P. 1, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1907).

Commitment for contempt was at an end where prisoner was allowed to go free for almost two years without completing service. Posvar v. McPherson, 36 Wyo. 159, 253 P. 667, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1927).

Contempt record. —

The record in a contempt proceeding imports absolute verity, and cannot be questioned on habeas corpus to release the prisoner. Ex parte Bergman, 3 Wyo. 396, 26 P. 914, 1890 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1890).

Mere errors of law. —

Mere errors of law in imposing a sentence for contempt which do not affect jurisdiction of the trial court will not be reviewed on habeas corpus. Fisher v. McDaniel, 9 Wyo. 457, 64 P. 1056, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1901).

Plea withdrawals. —

Where defendant entered nolo contendere pleas to operating an unlawful clandestine laboratory operation and possession of a controlled substance, the state failed to uphold the provision in the plea agreement promising that defendant would not be charged with federal firearms crimes; because the sentence and judgment had already been imposed, the district court had no jurisdiction over defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and the proper avenue for presenting a challenge to defendant's conviction was by way of post-conviction relief under this section. Brown v. State, 2008 WY 9, 175 P.3d 1158, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 2008).

Decision not appealable. —

A decision in a habeas corpus proceeding is not appealable, as the petitioner may avail himself of successive writs before other courts. Ex parte Brugneaux, 51 Wyo. 103, 63 P.2d 800, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1937).

Order discharging petitioner is not appealable. —

An order entered in a proceeding under this section discharging petitioner is not appealable. And this rule applies although petitioner was arrested pursuant to extradition proceedings. Geyer v. Tuck, 68 Wyo. 52, 229 P.2d 924, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1951).

There is no appeal from the disallowance of a writ of habeas corpus by a district court. Foster v. Warden of Wyo. State Penitentiary, 489 P.2d 1166, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1971).

Normally, a person may petition for a writ of habeas corpus again and again to the same or other courts, each denial thereof being a nonappealable determination. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Appeal available in child-custody cases. —

An appeal is available from action taken in a habeas corpus proceeding in child-custody cases. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

The proper remedy is an application for a writ of habeas corpus to the supreme court. Foster v. Warden of Wyo. State Penitentiary, 489 P.2d 1166, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1971).

A writ of habeas corpus in all restraint cases, including child-custody cases, may be filed in the supreme court of Wyoming although the issuance of a similar writ may have been refused by a district court. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Appeal costs. —

Appeal costs were taxable against prevailing plaintiff in habeas corpus proceedings and district court costs against defendant sheriff. Posvar v. McPherson, 36 Wyo. 159, 253 P. 667, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1927).

Legislative intent regarding appeal. —

It is clear that legislature meant to keep common law in force when habeas corpus act was enacted and under common law no appeal lies from a judgment in habeas corpus proceedings, as prisoner has the right to go before other courts and other judges of state to secure his release. Ex parte Brugneaux, 51 Wyo. 103, 63 P.2d 800, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1937).

Applied in

Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1963); Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1972); Weldon v. Wyoming Dep't of Cors., 963 F. Supp. 1098, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6606 (D. Wyo. 1997).

Cited in

Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14834 (10th Cir. 1988).

Law reviews. —

For article, “A Preliminary Review of Wyoming Revised Civil Commitment Procedures,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 531 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

When is a person in custody of governmental authorities for purpose of exercise of state remedy of habeas corpus — modern cases, 26 ALR4th 455.

Validity of state statutes and administrative regulations regulating internet communications under commerce clause and First Amendment of federal constitution, 98 ALR5th 167.

Issuance by federal court, pursuant to 28 USC § 2241(c)(5), of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum requiring presence of prisoner to testify at civil or criminal trial, 65 ALR Fed 321.

§ 1-27-102. Petition to be verified; presentation.

The petition shall be sworn to by the person confined or by someone in his behalf, and presented to a court or officer authorized to allow the writ.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 1265; R.S. 1899, § 5465; C.S. 1910, § 6327; C.S. 1920, § 7623; R.S. 1931, § 51-102; C.S. 1945, § 3-6502; W.S. 1957, § 1-811; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-102 .

§ 1-27-103. Courts and judges allowing writ; service in any part of state.

The writ of habeas corpus may be allowed by the supreme or district court or by any judge of those courts. It may be served in any part of the state.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 3; R.S. 1887, § 1266; R.S. 1899, § 5466; C.S. 1910, § 6328; C.S. 1920, § 7624; R.S. 1931, § 51-103; C.S. 1945, § 3-6503; W.S. 1957, § 1-812; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-103 .

Statutory regulation. —

The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be regulated by statute, providing the statutory regulation does not infringe upon constitutional right of the writ. Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1899).

Jurisdiction. —

A writ of habeas corpus, issued out of supreme court, will not invoke appellate or revisory jurisdiction of the court, but merely brings up body of the prisoner and cause of his commitment, and not the record of the judicial proceeding, if any, in which the commitment has occurred. Hovey v. Sheffner, 16 Wyo. 254, 93 P. 305, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1908).

Jurisdiction of judge. —

Under constitution a district judge's jurisdiction in habeas corpus is an unqualified one, and it is as broad in its scope as that of a court in such proceeding. Tytler v. Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 89 P. 1, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1907).

Petition treated as original proceeding in supreme court. —

Where petitioner filed what he termed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and an appeal from the disallowance of a writ of habeas corpus by a district court, the petition was treated and considered as an original proceeding in the supreme court. Foster v. Warden of Wyo. State Penitentiary, 489 P.2d 1166, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1971).

Cited in

State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 16 , 22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 896 (1908).

§ 1-27-104. Petition to be made to nearest judge.

Petition for a writ shall be made to the court or judge most convenient in point of distance to the applicant. A more remote court or judge may refuse the writ unless a sufficient reason is stated in the petition for not applying to the more convenient supreme or district court or judge.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 5; R.S. 1887, § 1268; R.S. 1899, § 5467; C.S. 1910, § 6329; C.S. 1920, § 7625; R.S. 1931, § 51-104; C.S. 1945, § 3-6504; W.S. 1957, § 1-813; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-104 .

Applied in

State v. District Court, 715 P.2d 191, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 501 (Wyo. 1986).

Stated in

State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 16 , 22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 896 (1908).

§ 1-27-105. Writ to be allowed if grounds sufficient; contents of writ.

  1. The writ shall be allowed if the petition  shows a sufficient ground for relief and is in accordance with the  foregoing requirements.
  2. The writ shall be directed to the person  having custody of or who is alleged to be unlawfully restraining the  petitioner, and shall command such person to produce the petitioner  in person before the court or judge issuing the writ at the time and  place specified in the writ. It shall further command such person  to have with him the writ with his return thereon showing his doings  in response thereto.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 7; R.S. 1887, § 1270; R.S. 1899, § 5469; C.S. 1910, § 6331; C.S. 1920, § 7627; R.S. 1931, § 51-106; C.S. 1945, § 3-6506; W.S. 1957, § 1-815; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-105 .

Petitioner must make case. —

Under this section writ will not issue in the first instance as of course, but petitioner must make out a prima facie case for its issuance. Ex parte Bergman, 3 Wyo. 396, 26 P. 914, 1890 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1890).

Denial of writ. —

The Wyoming supreme court did not violate petitioner's due process and equal protection rights by denying his habeas corpus petition on its own motion where petitioner did not state sufficient grounds for issuance of a writ. Weldon v. Wyoming Dep't of Corrections State Penitentiary Warden, 963 F. Supp. 1098, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6606 (D. Wyo.), aff'd, 127 F.3d 1110, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35011 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1997).

Effect of statute. —

Statute providing a proceeding whereby one who has been adjudged of unsound mind and who has been restored to sanity may have his restoration to capacity adjudged, and his guardianship, if not a minor, terminated, does not divest courts of jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus in behalf of one illegally confined in an insane asylum, under their general constitutional power. Byers v. Solier, 16 Wyo. 232, 93 P. 59, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1907).

Stated in

Foster v. Warden of Wyo. State Penitentiary, 489 P.2d 1166, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1971).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and application of state statute providing compensation for wrongful conviction and incarceration, 34 ALR4th 648.

§ 1-27-106. Issuance of writ.

When the writ is allowed by a court, it is to be issued by the clerk, but when allowed by a judge he must issue the writ himself, subscribing his name thereto without any seal.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 8; R.S. 1887, § 1271; R.S. 1899, § 5470; C.S. 1910, § 6332; C.S. 1920, § 7628; R.S. 1931, § 51-107; C.S. 1945, § 3-6507; W.S. 1957, § 1-816; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-106 .

§ 1-27-107. Reasons to be assigned for disallowance.

If the writ is disallowed, the court or judge shall cause the reasons of the disallowance to be appended to the petition and returned to the person applying for the writ.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 9; R.S. 1887, § 1272; R.S. 1899, § 5471; C.S. 1910, § 6333; C.S. 1920, § 7629; R.S. 1931, § 51-108; C.S. 1945, § 3-6508; W.S. 1957, § 1-817; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-107 .

Petitioner must make case. —

Writ will not issue in the first instance as of course, as the petitioner must make out a prima facie case for the issuance of the writ. Ex parte Bergman, 3 Wyo. 396, 26 P. 914, 1890 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1890).

Quoted in

Goldsmith v. Cheney, 468 P.2d 813, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1970).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Abuse of writ as basis for dismissal of state prisoner's second or successive petition for federal habeas corpus, 60 ALR Fed 481.

§ 1-27-108. Penalty for wrongful disallowance.

Any judge, acting individually or as a member of a court, who wrongfully and willfully refuses the allowance of the writ when properly applied for, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 10; R.S. 1887, § 1273; R.S. 1899, § 5472; C.S. 1910, § 6334; C.S. 1920, § 7630; R.S. 1931, § 51-109; C.S. 1945, § 3-6509; W.S. 1957, § 1-818; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-108 .

§ 1-27-109. Duty of court to issue writ without application in certain instances.

Whenever any court or judge authorized to grant this writ has evidence from a judicial proceeding before it that any person within the jurisdiction of the court or judge is illegally imprisoned or restrained, the court or judge shall issue the writ or cause it to be issued though no application has been made.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 11; R.S. 1887, § 1274; R.S. 1899, § 5473; C.S. 1910, § 6335; C.S. 1920, § 7631; R.S. 1931, § 51-110; C.S. 1945, § 3-6510; W.S. 1957, § 1-819; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-109 .

Cited in

State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 16 , 22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 896 (1908).

§ 1-27-110. Service of writ.

The writ may be served by the sheriff or by any other person appointed by the issuing court or judge for that purpose. If served by any person other than the sheriff, he possesses the same power and is liable to the same penalty for a nonperformance of his duty as though he were the sheriff.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 12; R.S. 1887, § 1275; R.S. 1899, § 5474; C.S. 1910, § 6336; C.S. 1920, § 7632; R.S. 1931, § 51-111; C.S. 1945, § 3-6511; W.S. 1957, § 1-820; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-110 .

Cross references. —

As to penalty for nonperformance of duty, see § 1-24-104 .

§ 1-27-111. Manner of service.

Service shall be made by leaving the original writ with the person to whom it is directed as defendant and preserving a copy on which to make the return of service. If the defendant cannot be found, or if he does not have the plaintiff in custody, service may be made upon any person having the plaintiff in his custody in the same manner and with the same effect as though he had been named defendant therein.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, §§ 13, 14; R.S. 1887, §§ 1276, 1277; R.S. 1899, §§ 5475, 5476; C.S. 1910, §§ 6337, 6338; C.S. 1920, §§ 7633, 7634; R.S. 1931, §§ 51-112, 51-113; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-6512, 3-6513; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-821, 1-822; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-111 .

§ 1-27-112. Authorization to arrest defendant.

If the defendant conceals himself or refuses admittance to the person attempting to serve the writ, or if he attempts wrongfully to carry the plaintiff out of the county or state after service of the writ, the person attempting to serve the writ may arrest the defendant and bring him and the plaintiff promptly before the judge or court before whom the writ is made returnable.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 15; R.S. 1887, § 1278; R.S. 1899, § 5477; C.S. 1910, § 6339; C.S. 1920, § 7635; R.S. 1931, § 51-114; C.S. 1945, § 3-6514; W.S. 1957, § 1-823; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-112.

§ 1-27-113. Power of sheriff making arrest.

In order to make the arrest, the sheriff or other person having the writ possesses the same power as a sheriff for the arrest of a person charged with a felony.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 16; R.S. 1887, § 1279; R.S. 1899, § 5478; C.S. 1910, § 6340; C.S. 1920, § 7636; R.S. 1931, § 51-115; C.S. 1945, § 3-6515; W.S. 1957, § 1-824; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-113.

Cross references. —

As to power of sheriff to make arrests, see §§ 7-2-102 and 7-2-103 .

§ 1-27-114. Plaintiff may be taken in custody by officer; power of officer.

If the plaintiff is found and no one appears to have charge or custody of him, the person having the writ may take him into custody and make return accordingly. To get possession of the plaintiff’s person in such cases, he possesses the same power as given by W.S. 1-27-113 for the arrest of the defendant.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 17; R.S. 1887, § 1280; R.S. 1899, § 5479; C.S. 1910, § 6341; C.S. 1920, § 7637; R.S. 1931, § 51-116; C.S. 1945, § 3-6516; W.S. 1957, § 1-825; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-114.

§ 1-27-115. Order for summary production of plaintiff.

The court or judge to whom the petition for the writ is made may order the sheriff or any other person to bring the plaintiff promptly before the court or judge if convinced that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury before he can obtain relief by the proceedings authorized.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 18; R.S. 1887, § 1281; R.S. 1899, § 5480; C.S. 1910, § 6342; C.S. 1920, § 7638; R.S. 1931, § 51-117; C.S. 1945, § 3-6517; W.S. 1957, § 1-826; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-115.

§ 1-27-116. Order for defendant's arrest for criminal offense.

When the evidence is sufficient to justify the arrest of the defendant for a criminal offense committed in connection with the illegal restraint of the petitioner, the order shall also order the arrest of the defendant.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 19; R.S. 1887, § 1282; R.S. 1899, § 5481; C.S. 1910, § 6343; C.S. 1920, § 7639; R.S. 1931, § 51-118; C.S. 1945, § 3-6518; W.S. 1957, § 1-827; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-116.

§ 1-27-117. Order for defendant's arrest for criminal offense; service of order of arrest.

The officer or person to whom the order is directed must execute it by bringing the defendant, and the plaintiff if required, before the court or judge issuing it. The defendant shall make return to the writ of habeas corpus in the same manner as if the ordinary course had been pursued.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 20; R.S. 1887, § 1283; R.S. 1899, § 5482; C.S. 1910, § 6344; C.S. 1920, § 7640; R.S. 1931, § 51-119; C.S. 1945, § 3-6519; W.S. 1957, § 1-828; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-117.

§ 1-27-118. Examination, commitment or discharge of defendant.

The defendant may be examined, committed, bailed or discharged according to the nature of the case.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 21; R.S. 1887, § 1284; R.S. 1899, § 5483; C.S. 1910, § 6345; C.S. 1920, § 7641; R.S. 1931, § 51-120; C.S. 1945, § 3-6520; W.S. 1957, § 1-829; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-118.

§ 1-27-119. Errors in writ to be disregarded.

The writ of habeas corpus shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or misdescription of the plaintiff or defendant if enough is stated to show the meaning and intent of the writ.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 22; R.S. 1887, § 1285; R.S. 1899, § 5484; C.S. 1910, § 6346; C.S. 1920, § 7642; R.S. 1931, § 51-121; C.S. 1945, § 3-6521; W.S. 1957, § 1-830; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-119.

§ 1-27-120. Identity of defendant presumed.

Any person served with the writ is presumed to be the person to whom it is directed, although it may be directed to him by a wrong name or description.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 23; R.S. 1887, § 1286; R.S. 1899, § 5485; C.S. 1910, § 6347; C.S. 1920, § 7643; R.S. 1931, § 51-122; C.S. 1945, § 3-6522; W.S. 1957, § 1-831; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-120.

Evidence of identity. —

Where plaintiff was arrested on a foreign indictment and in habeas corpus proceedings denied that he was the person for whom warrant was intended, burden was on demanding state to introduce some evidence identifying plaintiff as the person indicted. Ryan v. Rogers, 21 Wyo. 311, 132 P. 95, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1913).

Identity as fugitive from justice. —

One arrested as a fugitive from justice is entitled as of right on habeas corpus to show that he is not a fugitive from the justice of demanding state, and overcome the presumption to the contrary arising from the face of the extradition warrant. Ryan v. Rogers, 21 Wyo. 311, 132 P. 95, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1913).

Evidence of alibi insufficient. —

In habeas corpus to obtain plaintiff's discharge from arrest under extradition warrant, evidence of an alibi was not so clear and satisfactory as to require a determination that plaintiff was not a fugitive from justice of the demanding state. Ryan v. Rogers, 21 Wyo. 311, 132 P. 95, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1913).

§ 1-27-121. Contents of defendant's answer.

The defendant in his answer shall state simply and unequivocally whether he then has or at any time has had the plaintiff under his control and restraint, and if so, the reason therefor. If he has transferred him to another person, he shall state the fact, to whom and the time thereof, and the reason and authority therefor. If he holds him by virtue of a legal process or written authority, a copy thereof shall be annexed.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, §§ 29-31; R.S. 1887, §§ 1292-1294; R.S. 1899, §§ 5491-5493; C.S. 1910, §§ 6353-6355; C.S. 1920, §§ 7649-7650; R.S. 1931, §§ 51-128 to 51-130; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-6528 to 3-6530; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-837 to 1-839; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-121.

§ 1-27-122. Petitioner may reply to answer; trial by court.

The petitioner may reply to the defendant’s answer, and all issues joined thereon shall be tried by the judge or court.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 32; R.S. 1887, § 1295; R.S. 1899, § 5494; C.S. 1910, § 6356; C.S. 1920, § 7652; R.S. 1931, § 51-131; C.S. 1945, § 3-6531; W.S. 1957, § 1-840; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-122.

§ 1-27-123. Evidence before magistrate may be reviewed.

The reply may deny the sufficiency of the testimony to justify the action of the committing magistrate, on the trial of which issue all written testimony before the magistrate may be given in evidence before the court or judge in connection with any other testimony which may then be produced.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 33; R.S. 1887, § 1296; R.S. 1899, § 5495; C.S. 1910, § 6357; C.S. 1920, § 7653; R.S. 1931, § 51-132; C.S. 1945, § 3-6532; W.S. 1957, § 1-841; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-123.

§ 1-27-124. Compelling attendance of witnesses; punishing for contempt.

The judge issuing the writ of habeas corpus or the judge before whom it is tried has the same power as a court to compel the attendance of witnesses or to punish contempt of his authority.

History. Laws 1884, ch. 47, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 1298; R.S. 1899, § 5497; C.S. 1910, § 6359; C.S. 1920, § 7655; R.S. 1931, § 51-134; C.S. 1945, § 3-6534; W.S. 1957, § 1-843; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-124.

§ 1-27-125. Certain proceedings not reviewable.

Habeas corpus is not permissible to question the correctness of the action of a grand jury in finding a bill of indictment, or a petit jury in the trial of a cause nor of a court or judge when acting within their jurisdiction and in a lawful manner.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 34; R.S. 1887, § 1299; R.S. 1899, § 5498; C.S. 1910, § 6360; C.S. 1920, § 7656; R.S. 1931, § 51-135; C.S. 1945, § 3-6535; W.S. 1957, § 1-844; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-125.

“Manner.” —

The word “manner” had reference to the method of acting, and not to the degree of perfection or correctness in the results arrived at, unless judgment pronounced was absolutely void. Hovey v. Sheffner, 16 Wyo. 254, 93 P. 305, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1908).

Appellate review. —

In absence of express statute, decision in a habeas corpus case is not reviewable by an appellate court. Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1899).

Revocation of parole. —

A prisoner seeking federal habeas review of parole revocation did not fairly represent his claims to the Wyoming supreme court by giving that court an opportunity to rule on the merits when he filed his state habeas corpus petition. Hamill v. Ferguson, 937 F. Supp. 1517, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17115 (D. Wyo. 1996).

Drawing jury. —

Under this section, a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus could not thereunder question regularity of method adopted by the court in drawing and summoning the jury by which he was convicted. Younger v. Hehn, 12 Wyo. 289, 75 P. 443, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1904).

Reviewing errors of law. —

A writ of habeas corpus is not available to review errors of law not affecting jurisdiction of the court to make order under which petitioner is held. Hovey v. Sheffner, 16 Wyo. 254, 93 P. 305, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1908).

Scope of inquiry. —

Under this section, charge that a plea of guilty was not voluntary, but was extorted from defendants through fear and misrepresentation, is not open for consideration on habeas corpus. Hollibaugh v. Hehn, 13 Wyo. 269, 79 P. 1044, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1905).

Validity of judgment. —

Validity of a judgment sentencing defendant to imprisonment until his fine is paid cannot be questioned on habeas corpus proceedings on the ground that no time is fixed for the imprisonment. In re MacDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 P. 18, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1893).

Applied in

State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo. 1985); Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987); Hopkinson v. State, 798 P.2d 1186, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1990); Hopkinson v. State, 798 P.2d 1193, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1990).

Quoted in

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14908 (10th Cir. 1999).

Cited in

Weldon v. Wyoming Dep't of Cors., 963 F. Supp. 1098, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6606 (D. Wyo. 1997); Parkhurst v. Shillinger, 128 F.3d 1366, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29095 (10th Cir. 1997); Saunders v. Hornecker, 2015 WY 34, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Mar. 5, 2015).

§ 1-27-126. When petitioner to be discharged.

If no sufficient legal cause of detention is shown, the petitioner must be discharged.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 35; R.S. 1887, § 1300; R.S. 1899, § 5499; C.S. 1910, § 6361; C.S. 1920, § 7657; R.S. 1931, § 51-136; C.S. 1945, § 3-6536; W.S. 1957, § 1-845; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-126.

Inquiry into contempt. —

Where one imprisoned for contempt sues out writ of habeas corpus, court before whom such writ is returnable may examine into the acts, constituting alleged contempt; and, if they do not in law constitute a contempt, prisoner should be discharged. Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1899).

Jurisdictional defect. —

Where petitioner, under information charging him with grand larceny, pleaded guilty of petit larceny, and such plea was accepted, a judgment of conviction of grand larceny, because he had previously been convicted of petit larceny and sentenced to penitentiary, was void, and he should be discharged on habeas corpus, the defect being jurisdictional. Bandy v. Hehn, 10 Wyo. 167, 67 P. 979, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1902), overruled, Munoz v. Maschner, 590 P.2d 1352, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 375 (Wyo. 1979).

Failure to show venue. —

In habeas corpus, where evidence certified by committing magistrate fails to show venue, the commitment is fatally defective; and where the application is to the supreme court, and the expense of supplying such evidence therein would be burdensome to parties, prisoner will be discharged. Ex parte Brenner, 3 Wyo. 412, 26 P. 993, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1891).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Availability of postconviction relief under 28 USC § 2255 based on alleged governmental violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (18 USC Appx), 58 ALR Fed 443.

§ 1-27-127. Errors in commitment to be disregarded.

Although the commitment of the petitioner was irregular, if the court or judge is satisfied from the evidence that he ought to be held to bail or committed either for the offense charged or any other, an order may be made accordingly.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 36; R.S. 1887, § 1301; R.S. 1899, § 5500; C.S. 1910, § 6362; C.S. 1920, § 7658; R.S. 1931, § 51-137; C.S. 1945, § 3-6537; W.S. 1957, § 1-846; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-127.

Cross references. —

As to bail, see Rule 3.1, W.R. Cr. P.

Discharge. —

Though evidence showed that defendants were not in demanding state at time laid as that of commission of the fraud, they were not entitled to discharge on habeas corpus, having admitted their presence in the demanding state and participation in the business in which frauds were alleged. Zulch v. Roach, 23 Wyo. 335, 151 P. 1101, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1915).

Regularity of judgment. —

In habeas corpus proceedings regularity of the judgment under which petitioners were imprisoned cannot be impeached for errors or defects not affecting jurisdiction of the court to render the judgment. Hollibaugh v. Hehn, 13 Wyo. 269, 79 P. 1044, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1905).

§ 1-27-128. Petitioner may be committed or admitted to bail.

The petitioner may be committed, let to bail or his bail be mitigated or increased as justice requires.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 37; R.S. 1887, § 1302; R.S. 1899, § 5501; C.S. 1910, § 6363; C.S. 1920, § 7659; R.S. 1931, § 51-138; C.S. 1945, § 3-6538; W.S. 1957, § 1-847; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-128.

Cross references. —

As to bail, see Rule 3.1, W.R. Cr. P.

§ 1-27-129. Custody of petitioner pendente lite.

Until the sufficiency of the cause of restraint is determined, the defendant may retain the petitioner in his custody.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 38; R.S. 1887, § 1303; R.S. 1899, § 5502; C.S. 1910, § 6364; C.S. 1920, § 7660; R.S. 1931, § 51-139; C.S. 1945, § 3-6539; W.S. 1957, § 1-848; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-129.

Cross references. —

As to order to bring plaintiff promptly before the court or judge, see § 1-27-115 .

§ 1-27-130. Presence of petitioner at trial; waiver.

The petitioner or his attorney may waive in writing his right to be present at the trial, in which case the proceedings may be had in his absence. The writ in such cases will be modified accordingly.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 39; R.S. 1887, § 1304; R.S. 1899, § 5503; C.S. 1910, § 6365; C.S. 1920, § 7661; R.S. 1931, § 51-140; C.S. 1945, § 3-6540; W.S. 1957, § 1-849; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-130.

§ 1-27-131. Refusal of officer to deliver copy of process.

Any officer refusing to deliver a copy of any legal process by which he detains the petitioner in custody to any person who demands a copy, shall forfeit five hundred dollars ($500.00) to the person detained.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 42; R.S. 1887, § 1307; R.S. 1899, § 5506; C.S. 1910, § 6368; C.S. 1920, § 7664; R.S. 1931, § 51-143; C.S. 1945, § 3-6543; W.S. 1957, § 1-852; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-131.

§ 1-27-132. Transfer, removal or concealment of person with intent to avoid service.

Whoever, having under his restraint any person for whose release a writ of habeas corpus has been issued or is being applied for, transfers that person to the custody or control of another or conceals the place of his confinement or restraint, or removes him from the jurisdiction of the court from which the writ is issued or sought, with the intent to avoid the service or effect of the writ, or whoever knowingly aids or abets in the commission of any such offense, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned not more than ninety (90) days, or both.

History. Laws 1890, ch. 73, § 119; R.S. 1899, § 5085; C.S. 1910, § 5936; C.S. 1920, § 7225; R.S. 1931, § 32-616; C.S. 1945, § 9-625; W.S. 1957, § 1-853; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-132.

§ 1-27-133. Papers to be filed; journal entry.

When the proceedings are before a judge and the writ is allowed, all papers in the case shall be filed with the clerk of the district court of the county wherein the final proceedings are had, and the final order shall be entered by the clerk upon the journal as a vacation order.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 43; Laws 1882, ch. 23, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 1308; R.S. 1899, § 5507; C.S. 1910, § 6369; C.S. 1920, § 7665; R.S. 1931, § 51-144; C.S. 1945, § 3-6544; W.S. 1957, § 1-854; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-133.

§ 1-27-134. Fees and costs not to be advanced.

No officer shall refuse to perform any of the duties required by law in habeas corpus proceedings because his fees are not paid in advance, but the judge or court to whom a petition is made may require the petitioner to give security for the payment of costs that may be taxed against him.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 61, § 44; R.S. 1887, § 1309; R.S. 1899, § 5508; C.S. 1910, § 6370; C.S. 1920, § 7666; R.S. 1931, § 51-145; C.S. 1945, § 3-6545; W.S. 1957, § 1-855; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-28-134.

Cross references. —

As to costs and security therefor, see chapter 14 of this title.

Chapter 28 Injunctions

Cross references. —

As to injunction pending appeal, see Rule 62(c), W.R.C.P.

As to injunctions generally, see Rule 65, W.R.C.P.

Equitable nature of relief. —

Although actions for injunctive relief are authorized by this chapter, they are, by nature, requests for equitable relief that are not granted as a matter of right, but are within the lower court's equitable discretion. Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1997), overruled in part, White v. Allen, 2003 WY 39, 65 P.3d 395, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2003).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 1 et seq.

Propriety of federal court injunction against suit in foreign country, 78 ALR Fed 831.

43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 1 et seq.

§ 1-28-101. “Injunction” defined.

An injunction is a command to refrain from a particular act. It may be the final judgment in an action or may be allowed as a provisional remedy, and when so allowed it is by order.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 571; R.S. 1887, § 2919; R.S. 1899, § 4038; C.S. 1910, § 4897; C.S. 1920, § 6167; R.S. 1931, § 89-3501; C.S. 1945, § 3-6601; W.S. 1957, § 1-856; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-101 .

Temporary injunction. —

Motion for new trial in district court is not necessary to obtain review of an order denying motion to dissolve temporary injunction allowed pendente lite. Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 196, 105 P. 571, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1909).

A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is in the nature of a provisional remedy and may be issued at any time during the pending litigation. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, 519 P.2d 972, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1974).

A suit for injunction is a civil suit and the rules of procedure are the same as in any other civil suit. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, 519 P.2d 972, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1974).

Injunction pendente lite. —

Where, in an action for recovery or possession of realty, defendant answers setting up as affirmative matter a contract for sale which plaintiff is unable to carry out, and prays for damages, or, in alternative, for specific performance, defendant is entitled to injunction pendente lite to protect her possession of the property; and fact that her answer is not styled cross-petition or counterclaim is immaterial. Weaver v. Richardson, 21 Wyo. 343, 132 P. 1148, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1913).

Specificity. —

An injunction enjoining land owners from interfering with an irrigation company's access to and repair of its facilities across the owners' land was proper and specific enough where there was absolutely no possibility of uncertainty or confusion and where the merits of the case had already been decided and the latest injunction merely told the owners for the third time that they were restrained from interfering with the company's access to its facilities. Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 2003 WY 126, 77 P.3d 412, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2003).

Nature of remedy. —

Injunction is equitable remedy. Norris v. United Mineral Prods. Co., 61 Wyo. 386, 158 P.2d 679, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1945).

Stated in

Olson v. Leith, 71 Wyo. 316, 257 P.2d 342, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1953).

Cited in

Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 15, 61 P.3d 1255, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2003); Tavern, LLC v. Town of Alpine, 2017 WY 56, 395 P.3d 167, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 1-28-102. Causes for injunction; granting temporary order.

When it appears by the petition that the plaintiff is entitled to relief consisting of restraining the commission or continuance of some act the commission or continuance of which during the litigation would produce great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff, or when during the litigation it appears that the defendant is doing, threatens to do, or is procuring to be done some act in violation of the plaintiff’s rights respecting the subject of the action and tending to render the judgment ineffectual, a temporary order may be granted restraining the act. The order may also be granted in any case where it is specially authorized by statute and by municipal ordinance adopted pursuant to W.S. 15-1-103(a)(xlvi).

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 572; R.S. 1887, § 2920; R.S. 1899, § 4039; C.S. 1910, § 4898; C.S. 1920, § 6168; R.S. 1931, § 89-3502; C.S. 1945, § 3-6602; W.S. 1957, § 1-857; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-102 ; Laws 1991, ch. 206, § 1.

Time of issuance. —

A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is in the nature of a provisional remedy and may be issued at any time during the pending litigation. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, 519 P.2d 972, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1974).

Where injunction wrongfully issued. —

If the plaintiff prevails in the final hearing on the injunction, the defendant cannot recover even if the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction was wrongfully issued. However, good sense and equity dictate an exception to this rule when the temporary restraining order is overly broad or too far-reaching in scope. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, 519 P.2d 972, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1974).

Preliminary Injunction Proper. —

In a matter arising out of non-compete agreements, a district court did not err in granting a preliminary injunction against employees because there was a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and a technology company would suffer immediate and irreparable harm if the employees and their business were allowed to compete. CBM Geosolutions, Inc. v. Gas Sensing Tech. Corp., 2009 WY 113, 215 P.3d 1054, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2009).

Complaint which fails to state why damage action insufficient properly dismissed. —

The court did not err in dismissing a claim for injunctive relief. The complaint lacked allegations of facts justifying its conclusions that the plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law, and that failure to grant the injunction would result in irreparable injury. In particular, the complaint failed to state why an action at law for recovery of monetary damages, which is all that was pleaded, would have been an insufficient remedy. Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 469 (Wyo. 1986).

Restraining use of letters. —

Under this section, writer and addressee of letters obtained by defendant and used in divorce suit was entitled to temporary injunction, restraining her from gaining access to the letters or publishing them. King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 P. 730, 1917 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1917).

Cited in

Weaver v. Richardson, 21 Wyo. 343, 132 P. 1148, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (1913).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Injunction to prevent insured from settling suit against wrongdoer to detriment of insurer, 51 ALR2d 697.

Injunction against attorney's representation of interest adverse to that of former client, 52 ALR2d 1243.

Rights of parents to injunction with respect to names of children, 53 ALR2d 914.

Dismissal of suit for injunction as conclusively establishing that temporary injunction had been improvidently granted, 54 ALR2d 473.

Injunction against suit in another state or country for divorce or separation, 54 ALR2d 1240.

Injunction against repeated or continuing trespasses involving waters and water rights, 60 ALR2d 310.

Injunction against repeated or continuing trespasses on real property, 60 ALR2d 310.

Name appropriation by employer or former employer, 52 ALR4th 156.

Enforceability of sale-of-business agreement not to compete against nonsigner or nonowning signer, 60 ALR4th 294.

§ 1-28-103. When and by whom granted.

The injunction may be granted at the time of commencing the action, or at any time before judgment, by the district court or a judge thereof, or in the absence from the county of the judge, by the court commissioner of the county, when it appears by affidavit of the plaintiff or his agent that the plaintiff is entitled thereto. When an injunction has been vacated during the pendency of the action in the district court, and an appeal is taken to the supreme court from the judgment or final order after trial in the district court, an injunction may be granted at any time before judgment or final order in the supreme court by a judge of the supreme court, when it appears to the court or judge by affidavit of the party or his agent that the party is entitled thereto. Upon like proof, an injunction may also be allowed by the supreme or district court or by a judge of either as a temporary remedy, during the pendency of a case on error or appeal.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 573; R.S. 1887, § 2921; R.S. 1899, § 4040; C.S. 1910, § 4899; C.S. 1920, § 6169; R.S. 1931, § 89-3503; C.S. 1945, § 3-6603; W.S. 1957, § 1-858; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-103 .

Cross references. —

As to jurisdiction of district court to issue injunction, see also art. 5, § 10, Wyo. Const.

In general. —

An injunction may be granted at time of commencing action. McBride v. Union Pac. R.R., 3 Wyo. 247, 21 P. 687, 1889 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1889).

This section is not superseded by the Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1974).

Verification of petition sufficient. —

This section, requiring affidavits on application for an injunction, is satisfied where petition containing the requisite averments is properly verified. Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 409, 108 P. 977, 1910 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1910).

Equity jurisdiction. —

The jurisdiction of a court of equity is, in absence of statute, limited to protection of property rights, and it has no jurisdiction to restrain prosecution of a criminal proceeding. Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 P. 864, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1905).

Inclusion of distant lands. —

In suit to enjoin defendants from driving cattle over plaintiff's lands, decree should not include an injunction as to lands, described in complaint, several miles distant from those trespassed upon, and as to which there was no showing that defendants had in any way trespassed or threatened so to do. Martin v. Platte Valley Sheep Co., 12 Wyo. 432, 76 P. 571, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 12 Wyo. 432, 76 P. 571, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1904).

Property rights. —

Where property rights are involved in a criminal prosecution, equity will intervene by injunction to protect such rights, if at all, not in restraint of the criminal proceedings, but rather in aid of the civil jurisdiction of the court, and will merely suspend criminal proceedings until property rights can be determined. Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 P. 864, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1905).

Remedy at law. —

In absence of defendant's insolvency, remedy at law is adequate to redress any injury suffered by plaintiff on account of any overt act of defendant in excluding plaintiff's cattle from open and unenclosed public lands. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co. v. McIlquam, 14 Wyo. 209, 83 P. 364, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1905).

Trespass. —

In an action for an injunction to restrain defendants from driving their sheep upon private lands of plaintiffs, where it appeared that defendants had threatened to drive their sheep upon the range in which such lands lay, but it also appeared that there was only a single trespass, without any threats of continuance, and without any showing of permanent injury, and that shortly afterwards the sheep left the range, there was no ground for the issuance of an injunction. Healy v. Smith, 14 Wyo. 263, 83 P. 583, 1906 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1906).

Void statutes. —

Conceding that equity will restrain a criminal prosecution under a void statute, it will not try validity of the statute, and will not interfere until such statute has been declared void by the proper legal tribunal. Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 P. 864, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1905).

Cited in

McCray v. Baker, 3 Wyo. 192, 18 P. 749, 1888 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (1888).

§ 1-28-104. Order of injunction and notice.

The order of injunction shall be addressed to the party enjoined and shall state the injunction. When the injunction is allowed at the commencement of the action, the clerk shall endorse upon the summons “injunction allowed”, and it is not necessary to issue the order of injunction; nor is it necessary to issue the order when notice of the application has been given to the party enjoined. Service of the summons so endorsed or the notice of the application for an injunction is notice of its allowance.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 577; R.S. 1887, § 2925; R.S. 1899, § 4044; C.S. 1910, § 4904; C.S. 1920, § 6174; R.S. 1931, § 89-3508; C.S. 1945, § 3-6607; W.S. 1957, § 1-862; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-104 .

Cross references. —

As to service of summons, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

Granting without notice. —

Statutes, by implication, permit granting of an injunction before answer and without notice. Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 409, 108 P. 977, 1910 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1910).

§ 1-28-105. Injunction operative from time of notice.

An injunction shall bind the party from the time he has notice and the bond required is executed.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 579; R.S. 1887, § 2927; R.S. 1899, § 4046; C.S. 1910, § 4906; C.S. 1920, § 6176; R.S. 1931, § 89-3510; C.S. 1945, § 3-6609; W.S. 1957, § 1-864; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-105 .

Undertaking. —

Where injunction was issued restraining county and prosecuting attorney from prosecuting a party for violating anti-gambling law, the undertaking properly ran to the attorney individually, as neither the state nor county was a party. Littleton v. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, 91 P. 832, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1907).

Suit on injunction bond. —

Under former § 1-861 and §§ 3-5301, 3-5303, 3-5310 and 3-5318, W.C.S. 1945, suit could not be maintained on an injunction bond pending petition in error from a judgment dissolving an injunction, though no supersedeas bond was filed. Tutty v. Ryan, 13 Wyo. 134, 78 P. 657, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1904), reh'g denied, 13 Wyo. 134, 79 P. 920, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1905).

§ 1-28-106. When second application for injunction denied.

No injunction shall be granted by a judge after a motion therefor has been overruled by his court on the merits of the application. When it has been refused by the court in which the action is brought, or a judge thereof, it shall not be granted to the same applicant by a court of inferior jurisdiction, or any judge thereof.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 580; R.S. 1887, § 2928; R.S. 1899, § 4047; C.S. 1910, § 4907; C.S. 1920, § 6177; R.S. 1931, § 89-3511; C.S. 1945, § 3-6610; W.S. 1957, § 1-865; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-106 .

Temporary injunction. —

Motion for new trial in district court is not necessary to obtain review of an order denying motion to dissolve temporary injunction allowed pendente lite. Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 196, 105 P. 571, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1909).

§ 1-28-107. Enforcement of injunction; penalties.

An injunction or restraining order granted by a judge may be enforced as the act of the court, and disobedience may be punished by the court as a contempt. An attachment may be issued against the disobedient party upon satisfactory showing by affidavit of the breach of the injunction or restraining order. The disobedient party may be required by the court or judge to pay a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200.00), to make immediate restitution to the party injured and to give further security to obey the injunction or restraining order. In default thereof, he may be committed to custody until he complies with the requirements or is otherwise legally discharged. Fines collected under this section shall be paid to the state treasurer and credited as provided in W.S. 8-1-109 .

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 581; R.S. 1887, § 2929; R.S. 1899, § 4048; C.S. 1910, § 4908; C.S. 1920, § 6178; R.S. 1931, § 89-3512; C.S. 1945, § 3-6611; W.S. 1957, § 1-866; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-107; 2009, ch. 168, § 203.

Cross references. —

As to attachment of the person generally, see §§ 1-15-201 to 1-15-212 .

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, deleted “for the use of the county,” following “($200.00)” in the third sentence, and added the last sentence.

Strict construction. —

This section, which expressly provides imprisonment for nonpayment of fine, imposed for disobedience of an injunction, but not for nonpayment of costs, is penal, and should be strictly construed as giving no authority to imprison for nonpayment of costs. Porter v. State, 16 Wyo. 131, 92 P. 385, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 1907).

Contempt. —

Judges are expressly authorized to punish for contempt for violation of injunctions under this section. Mau v. Stoner, 12 Wyo. 478, 76 P. 584, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1904), reh'g denied, 14 Wyo. 183, 83 P. 218 (Wyo. 1905).

During the dependency of a declaratory judgment action to establish rights under an easement, plaintiff used the road across defendants' property in violation of a court order; the district court acted within its jurisdiction in holding defendant in contempt of court and by imposing the punishment of forfeiture of the easement; the contempt proceeding was not rendered criminal even though the district court utilized criminal procedure. The course of the proceedings demonstrated that the contempt proceeding was civil pursuant to this section; the action was brought by a private party, rather than the state, to enforce compliance with the protections provided in the injunction. Stephens v. Lavitt, 2010 WY 129, 239 P.3d 634, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 2010).

Irregular judgment. —

Judgment of contempt for violating injunction prohibiting removal of improvements from mortgaged premises after foreclosure without issuing attachment and affidavit therefor before trial, was irregular. Federal Land Bank v. Sells, 40 Wyo. 498, 280 P. 98, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1929).

Review on appeal. —

A final order in contempt proceeding authorized by this section, where affecting a substantial right, and made in a special proceeding, and on a summary application in an action after final judgment, and in aid of such judgment, was reviewable on appeal, under former § 3-5301, W.C.S. 1945. Laramie Nat'l Bank v. Steinhoff, 7 Wyo. 464, 53 P. 299, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1898).

Reviewable on writ of error. —

Provisions of this section are not only punitive, but are in aid of plaintiff's remedy in main suit, and an order made in contempt proceeding authorized by it, which adjudges party guilty and imposes fine, is an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, is final, and reviewable on writ of error. Porter v. State, 16 Wyo. 131, 92 P. 385, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 1907).

Cited in

United Mine Workers, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1989).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Violation of automatic stay provisions of 1978 Bankruptcy Code (11 USC § 362) as contempt of court, 57 ALR Fed 927.

Federal government's liability for damages under 11 USC § 362(h) for willful violation of automatic stay in bankruptcy, 117 ALR Fed 1.

§ 1-28-108. Additional security may be required.

At any time before judgment, upon reasonable notice to the party who obtained the injunction, a party enjoined may move the court or judge for additional security. If it appears that the surety has removed from the state or is insufficient, the court may vacate the injunction unless in a reasonable time sufficient security is given.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 582; R.S. 1887, § 2930; R.S. 1899, § 4049; C.S. 1910, § 4909; C.S. 1920, § 6179; R.S. 1931, § 89-3513; C.S. 1945, § 3-6612; W.S. 1957, § 1-867; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-108.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Recovery of damages resulting from wrongful issuance of injunction as limited to amount of bond, 30 ALR4th 273.

§ 1-28-109. Affidavits used on hearing.

On the hearing of an application for an injunction, each party may read affidavits, and all affidavits shall be filed.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 583; R.S. 1887, § 2931; R.S. 1899, § 4050; C.S. 1910, § 4910; C.S. 1920, § 6180; R.S. 1931, § 89-3514; C.S. 1945, § 3-6613; W.S. 1957, § 1-868; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-109.

§ 1-28-110. Motion to vacate or modify injunction.

When an injunction has been granted a party may, before trial, apply to the court in which the action is pending, or a judge thereof, or to the supreme court or a judge thereof, to vacate or modify the same. The party applying for vacation or modification shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of the time and place for hearing the motion. The application may be made upon the petition and affidavits upon which the injunction was granted, or upon affidavits of the party enjoined, with or without answer.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 584; R.S. 1887, § 2932; R.S. 1899, § 4051; C.S. 1910, § 4911; C.S. 1920, § 6181; R.S. 1931, § 89-3515; C.S. 1945, § 3-6614; W.S. 1957, § 1-869; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-110.

Cross references. —

As to modification or vacation of judgment generally, see §§ 1-16-401 to 1-16-409 .

Matters set up in affidavit. —

Where motion is made to vacate an injunction before answer, pursuant to statute authorizing such motion upon affidavits, judge may give same effect to defensive matters set up in affidavits as to such matters set up in an answer. Huber v. Delong, 54 Wyo. 240, 91 P.2d 53, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1939).

Cited in

McBride v. Union Pac. R.R., 3 Wyo. 247, 21 P. 687, 1889 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (1889); Smith v. Healy, 12 Wyo. 218, 75 P. 430, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (1904).

§ 1-28-111. Evidence on hearing of motion.

When the application is made upon affidavits of the defendant but not otherwise, the plaintiff may oppose the same by affidavits or other evidence in addition to the evidence on which the injunction was granted.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 585; R.S. 1887, § 2933; R.S. 1899, § 4052; C.S. 1910, § 4912; C.S. 1920, § 6182; R.S. 1931, § 89-3516; C.S. 1945, § 3-6615; W.S. 1957, § 1-870; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-29-111.

Chapter 29 Libel and Slander

Cross references. —

As to limitation of action for libel and slander, see § 1-3-105 .

As to abatement of cause of action by death of either party, see § 1-4-102 .

For provision that truth is defense to civil or criminal action for libel, see art. 1, § 20, Wyo. Const.

Instruction on right of jury to refuse law held proper. —

Under constitutional provision that jury shall have right to determine the facts and the law in libel cases under direction of the court, instruction as to rights of jury in refusing the law as given in the instructions and in finding contrary thereto was proper. Nicholson v. State, 24 Wyo. 347, 157 P. 1013, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1916).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander §§ 313 to 341.

Privileged nature of statements or utterances by member of school board in course of official proceedings, 85 ALR3d 1137.

Privileged nature of communication between insurer and insured, 85 ALR3d 1161.

Defamation: Loss of employer's qualified privilege to publish employee's work record or qualification, 24 ALR4th 144.

State constitutional protection of allegedly defamatory statements regarding private individual, 33 ALR4th 212.

Criticism or disparagement of physician's or dentist's character, competence or conduct as defamation, 38 ALR4th 836.

Defamation of psychiatrist, psychologist or counselor, 38 ALR4th 874.

What constitutes “single publication” within meaning of single publication rule affecting action for libel and slander, violation of privacy or similar torts, 41 ALR4th 541.

Actionable nature of advertising impugning quality or worth of merchandise or products, 42 ALR4th 318.

Criticism or disparagement of attorney's character, competence or conduct as defamation, 46 ALR4th 326.

Defamation by gestures or acts, 46 ALR4th 403.

Defamation: publication by intracorporate communication of employee's evaluation, 47 ALR4th 674.

Defamation: privilege attaching to news report of criminal activities based on information supplied by public safety officers — modern status, 47 ALR4th 718.

Physician's tort liability for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information about patient, 48 ALR4th 668.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for defamation, 49 ALR4th 1158.

Liability of better business bureau or similar organization in tort, 50 ALR4th 745.

Defamation: who is “libel-proof,” 50 ALR4th 1257.

Name appropriation by employer or former employer, 52 ALR4th 156.

Libel and slander: defamation by cartoon, 52 ALR4th 424.

Libel and slander: defamation by photograph, 52 ALR4th 488.

Defamation of class or group as actionable by individual member, 52 ALR4th 618.

Liability of employer, supervisor or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress, 52 ALR4th 853.

Credit card issuer's liability, under state laws, for wrongful billing, cancellation, dishonor or disclosure, 53 ALR4th 231.

Libel and slander: defamation by question, 53 ALR4th 450.

Libel and slander: sufficiency of identification of allegedly defamed party, 54 ALR4th 746.

Defamation of professional athlete or sports figure, 54 ALR4th 869.

False light invasion of privacy — cognizability and elements, 57 ALR4th 22.

False light invasion of privacy — defenses and remedies, 57 ALR4th 244.

Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as defamation — post-New York Times cases, 57 ALR4th 404.

Libel or slander: defamation by statement made in jest, 57 ALR4th 520.

False light invasion of privacy — accusation or innuendo as to criminal acts, 58 ALR4th 902.

False light invasion of privacy — neutral or laudatory depiction of subject, 59 ALR4th 502.

False light invasion of privacy — disparaging but noncriminal depiction, 60 ALR4th 51.

Imputation of allegedly objectionable political or social beliefs or principles as defamation, 62 ALR4th 314.

Publication of allegedly defamatory matter by plaintiff (“self-publication”) as sufficient to support defamation action, 62 ALR4th 616.

Defamation: designation as “scab,” 65 ALR4th 1000.

Validity of criminal defamation statutes, 68 ALR4th 1014.

Intrusion by news-gathering entity as invasion of right of privacy, 69 ALR4th 1059.

In personam jurisdiction, in libel and slander action, over nonresident who mailed allegedly defamatory letter from outside state, 83 ALR4th 1006.

Who is “public figure” for purposes of defamation action, 19 ALR5th 1.

Who is “public official” for purposes of defamation action, 44 ALR5th 193.

Libel and slander: charging one with breach or nonperformance of contract, 45 ALR5th 739.

Defamation: publication of letter to editor in newspaper as actionable, 54 ALR5th 443.

Action under 42 USC § 1985(1) for conspiracy to defame or otherwise harm the reputation of federal official, 69 ALR Fed 913.

Free exercise of religion clause of first amendment as defense to tort liability, 93 ALR Fed 754.

53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander §§ 1 to 106, 187 to 197.

§ 1-29-101. Radio and television stations; liability generally.

The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound broadcasting station or network of stations, and the agents or employees of the owner, licensee or operator are not liable for damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered in a visual or sound broadcast by one other than the owner, licensee, or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless the complaining party proves that the owner, licensee, operator, agent or employee failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such statement in the broadcast.

History. Laws 1947, ch. 37, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-872; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-30-101 .

New York Times v. Sullivan not applicable. —

This section defines the standard of liability imposed upon visual or sound radio broadcasters where the standard of liability described in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710, 1964 U.S. LEXIS 1655, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964), relating to public officials, is not applicable. Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1976).

The states are free to adopt their own standards of liability in connection with the rights of those who are neither public officials nor public figures. Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1976).

Law reviews. —

See “Reading from Radio Script as Libel,” 2 Wyo. L.J. 127.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Libel or slander in television transmission, 15 ALR2d 785, 50 ALR3d 1311, 56 ALR3d 386.

False news reports as to births, betrothals, marriages, divorces or similar marital matters, 9 ALR3d 559.

Defamation by radio or television, 50 ALR3d 1311.

Libel and slander: necessity of expert testimony to establish negligence of media defendant in defamation action by private individual, 37 ALR4th 987.

Defamation: application of New York Times and related standards to nonmedia defendants, 38 ALR4th 1114.

Liability of internet service provider for internet or e-mail defamation, 84 ALR5th 169.

§ 1-29-102. Radio and television stations; liability for statements made by political candidates.

An owner, licensee or operator or the agents or employees of any owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound broadcasting station is not liable for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of the station by any candidate for public office.

History. Laws 1947, ch. 37, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 1-873; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-30-102 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Criticism or disparagement of character, competence or conduct of candidate for office as defamation, 37 ALR4th 1088.

§ 1-29-103. Limitation as to damages.

In an action for damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound broadcast, the complaining party shall be allowed only the actual damages he has alleged and proved.

History. Laws 1947, ch. 37, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 1-874; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-30-103 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Who is protected by statute restricting recovery unless retraction is demanded, 84 ALR3d 1249.

What constitutes special damages in action for slander of title, 4 ALR4th 532.

Proof of injury to reputation as prerequisite to recovery of damages in defamation action — post-Gertz cases, 36 ALR4th 807.

Defamation of church member by church or church official, 109 ALR5th 541.

§ 1-29-104. Publication of proceedings of governing bodies deemed privileged; exception.

The publication of a fair and impartial report of the proceedings before state or municipal legislative bodies, or before state or municipal executive bodies, boards or officers, or the whole or a fair synopsis of any document presented, filed or issued in any proceeding before a legislative or executive body, board or officer, is privileged unless it is proved that the publication was made maliciously.

History. Laws 1949, ch. 128, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-875; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-30-104 .

Cross references. —

As to privilege of members of the legislature, see art. 3, § 16, Wyo. Const.

Law reviews. —

See “Evidence of a Refusal to Retract in Actions of Libel,” 11 Wyo. L.J. 95.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Testimony of witness before legislative committee as basis for civil action for slander, 54 ALR2d 1298.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of statements or utterances by members of governing body of public institution of higher learning in course of official proceedings, 33 ALR4th 632.

Defamation: privilege accorded state or local governmental administrative records relating to private individual member of public, 40 ALR4th 318.

Who is “public official” for purposes of defamation action, 44 ALR5th 193.

Liability of newspaper for libel and slander - 21st century cases. 22 A.L.R.6th 553.

§ 1-29-105. Publication of criminal and civil proceedings deemed privileged; exceptions.

The publication of a fair and impartial report of any indictment, the issuing of any warrant, the arrest of any person accused of crime, or the filing of any pleading or other document in any criminal or civil cause in any court, or of the contents thereof, is privileged unless it is proved that the same was published maliciously or that the defendant has refused or neglected to publish in the same manner in which the publication complained of appeared a reasonable written explanation or contradiction thereof by the plaintiff, or that the publisher has refused upon plaintiff’s request to publish the subsequent determination of the suit or action.

History. Laws 1949, ch. 128, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 1-876; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-30-105 .

Requirements for privilege to apply. —

The ordinary and obvious meaning of fair does not require that the report be true or accurate; what is required for the privilege to apply is that the report have qualities of impartiality and honesty, and be free from prejudice, favoritism and self-interest. Casteel v. News-Record, 875 P.2d 21, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1994).

“With malice” means the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Casteel v. News-Record, 875 P.2d 21, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1994).

Finding of malice defeats privilege. —

A finding of malice will defeat the privilege. When applying a conditional privilege, absence of malice is presumed, and the plaintiff must prove malice on the part of the defendant. Casteel v. News-Record, 875 P.2d 21, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1994).

Cited in

Davis v. Big Horn Basin Newspapers, Inc., 884 P.2d 979, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Findings, reports or the like of judges as privileged, 42 ALR2d 825.

Privilege applicable to judicial proceedings as extending to administrative proceedings, 45 ALR2d 1296.

Proceedings, presentments, investigations and reports of grand jury, 48 ALR2d 716.

Statements in counsel's argument to jury as privileged, 61 ALR2d 1300.

Privilege in connection with proceedings to disbar attorney, 77 ALR2d 493.

Privilege of reporting judicial proceedings as extending to proceeding held in secret or as to which record is sealed by court, 43 ALR3d 634.

Propriety of publishing identity of sexual assault victim, 86 ALR3d 80.

Actionability of false newspaper report that plaintiff has been arrested, 93 ALR3d 625.

Libel and slander: reports of pleadings as within privilege for reports of judicial proceedings, 20 ALR4th 576.

Libel and slander: Attorneys' statements, to parties other than alleged defamed party or its agents, in course of extrajudicial investigation or preparation relating to pending or anticipated civil litigation as privileged, 23 ALR4th 932.

Who is “public official” for purposes of defamation action, 44 ALR5th 193.

Liability of newspaper for libel and slander - 21st century cases. 22 A.L.R.6th 553.

§ 1-29-106. Publication of indecent matter prohibited.

Nothing in W.S. 1-29-104 or 1-29-105 shall authorize the publication of blasphemous or indecent matter.

History. Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-30-106 .

Cross references. —

As to obscenity, see §§ 6-4-301 and 6-4-302 .

There is no right of private action based on §§ 1-29-106 , 6-4-301 and 6-4-302 . Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 727, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26567 (D. Wyo. 1986).

Am Jur 2d and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of newspaper for libel and slander - 21st century cases. 22 A.L.R.6th 553.

Chapter 30 Mandamus

Cross references. —

As to actions by or against the state generally, see chapter 35 of this title.

As to application for writ of mandamus, see Rule 3, Sup. Ct.

Cited in

State ex rel. Wyo. Ass'n of Consulting Eng'rs & Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1990).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus § 1 et seq.

Availability of mandamus to review order of reference to master or auditor, 76 ALR2d 1120.

Mandamus to compel ascertainment of compensation for property taken or injuries inflicted under power of eminent domain, 91 ALR2d 991.

Summary judgment in mandamus cases, 3 ALR3d 675.

Judgment granting or denying writ of mandamus as res judicata, 21 ALR3d 206.

Mandamus to compel disciplinary investigation or action against physician or attorney, 33 ALR3d 1429.

Mandamus, under 28 USC § 1361, to obtain change in prison condition or release of federal prisoner, 114 ALR Fed 225.

55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 1 et seq.

§ 1-30-101. “Mandamus” defined.

Mandamus is a writ issued in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board or person commanding the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 725; R.S. 1887, § 3073; R.S. 1899, § 4194; C.S. 1910, § 5054; C.S. 1920, § 6316; R.S. 1931, § 89-4501; C.S. 1945, § 3-6701; W.S. 1957, § 1-877; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-101 .

Subject matter jurisdiction.—

Subject matter jurisdiction existed because a movant's request that a court order a coroner to provide a more detailed verdict and case docket fell under the definition of mandamus. The fact that the movant did not caption the action as a mandamus was not fatal to the movant's claim. Williams v. Sundstrom, 2016 WY 122, 385 P.3d 789, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2016).

Supreme court jurisdiction. —

Under this section and art. 5, § 3, Wyo. Const., supreme court has jurisdiction to issue mandamus to compel governor to perform a ministerial duty. State ex rel. Irvine v. Brooks, 14 Wyo. 393, 84 P. 488, 1906 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1906).

Function of mandamus is to command performance of a ministerial duty which is plainly defined and required by law. Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1979), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998); State ex rel. Feeney v. District Court, 607 P.2d 1259, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 614 P.2d 710, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 259 (Wyo. 1980).

Thus, mandamus will not intervene to control minor court judge's discretion. State ex rel. Feeney v. District Court, 614 P.2d 710, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 259 (Wyo. 1980).

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies forecloses mandamus. —

Failure to pursue administrative relief and exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with a zoning ordinance forecloses the remedy of mandamus. State ex rel. Epp v. Mayor, 894 P.2d 590, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 1995).

Power to issue mandamus when writ of prohibition improperly requested. —

The supreme court has the power to grant proper relief, in the form of mandamus, when a party improperly requests a writ of prohibition without objection, providing the party has shown a clear entitlement to such relief. Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1979), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Necessary parties. —

Lessee is a necessary party in mandamus proceedings to compel board of land commissioners to cancel a lease of school lands. State ex rel. Marsh v. State Land Comm'rs, 7 Wyo. 478, 53 P. 292, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1898).

Receipt by treasurer. —

Under payment of taxes, mandamus will issue to compel treasurer to issue a receipt in full. Lobban v. State, 9 Wyo. 377, 64 P. 82, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1901).

County attorney. —

Because statutes with respect to the specific duties of a county attorney in emergency detention and involuntary hospitalization proceedings are ambiguous, the district court did not err in denying appellants' petition for a writ of mandamus directing the county attorney to commence court proceedings and to appear at initial emergency detention hearings as well as to appear and present the case in chief. State ex rel. W. Park Hosp. Dist. v. Skoric, 2014 WY 41, 321 P.3d 334, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2014).

Mandamus to deposit protested taxes. —

County treasurer did not have authority to unilaterally determine that escrowed funds paid by taxpayer under protest were in excess of amount under appeal, and treasurer was therefore ordered to deposit protested taxes in an interest-bearing escrow account. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 1999).

Mandamus to sign warrant. —

A petition for mandamus to compel the chairman of the board of county commissioners to sign a warrant, which states that the board allowed petitioner's claim and ordered it paid, and that clerk drew warrant therefor, is not demurrable for failure to state that there were funds in the treasury to pay the same, and that an itemized statement of the claim was filed, since former section, forbidding issue of demand warrants unless there are funds on hand to pay the same, and art. 16, § 7, Wyo. Const., prohibiting the audit, allowance or payment of claims unless a sworn itemized statement be filed, apply to the drawing of the warrants in the first instance, and on demurrer it will be presumed that officers did not violate the law. Appel v. State, 9 Wyo. 187, 61 P. 1015, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1900).

Mandamus of corporate officers. —

Where officers of a corporation have custody of books and records and deny stockholders access thereto, mandamus is proper remedy. Wyoming Coal Mining Co. v. State ex rel Kennedy, 15 Wyo. 97, 87 P. 337, 1906 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 15 Wyo. 97, 87 P. 984, 1906 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1906).

Livestock board secretary. —

Mandamus will not lie to compel secretary of state board of livestock commissioners (now Wyoming livestock board) to pay proceeds from a sale of estrays to a claimant unless secretary abuses his discretion, and refuses to consider proofs presented to him. State ex rel. Foote v. Board of Live-Stock Comm'rs, 4 Wyo. 126, 32 P. 114, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1893).

Auditor subject to mandamus. —

In proper cases state auditor is subject to the writ of mandamus under art. 5, § 3, Wyo. Const., this section and § 1-30-104 , where there is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Jeffrey v. Burdick, 3 Wyo. 588, 28 P. 146, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1891).

Mandamus to compel repair of highways. —

Mandamus is recognized as a proper remedy to compel public officers to take care of and keep in repair public highways only when the exercise is so apparent and obvious that the refusal to act is the result of a determination not to discharge a plain duty. Board of County Comm'rs v. State, 369 P.2d 537, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1962).

Risk manager's duty was not clear and certain. —

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue a writ of mandamus where the notice of the employee's claim sought payments denied under the State Employees' and Officials' Group Plan (Group Plan), the risk manager's duty was not clear and certain, and had the risk manager investigated the claim as required she likely would have denied it on the ground that the employee had not exhausted the Group Plan appeals process. State ex rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, 201 P.3d 1127, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2009).

Tax shortfall grants. —

Mandamus was not the proper remedy for determining whether tax shortfall grants authorized for school districts were required by statute to be included as local resources in the year in which they were paid; the districts were not entitled to the writ without a showing they had no plain and adequate remedy at law, and there was no such showing. State ex rel. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Ohman, 895 P.2d 49, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 1995).

Applied in

State ex rel. Wilkerson v. State Bd. of Equalization, 490 P.2d 1258, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1971).

Cited in

State ex rel. Wyoming Agric. College v. Irvine, 14 Wyo. 318, 84 P. 90, 1906 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (1906).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 159 (1985).

§ 1-30-102. By what courts issued; cannot control judicial discretion.

The writ can only be issued by the supreme court or the district court. It may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment or to proceed to discharge any of its functions but it cannot control judicial discretion.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 726; R.S. 1887, § 3074; R.S. 1899, § 4195; C.S. 1910, § 5055; C.S. 1920, § 6317; R.S. 1931, § 89-4502; C.S. 1945, § 3-6702; W.S. 1957, § 1-878; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-102 .

Cross references. —

For another provision giving jurisdiction to supreme court and district courts, see art. 5, § 3, Wyo. Const.

Who may issue writ. —

The writ can only be issued by the supreme court or a district court. State ex rel. Jeffrey v. Burdick, 3 Wyo. 588, 28 P. 146, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1891).

Discretion of district court. —

Under this section the supreme court cannot control exercise of judicial discretion by the district court and judge. State ex rel. Murphy v. District Court, 38 Wyo. 382, 267 P. 424, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1928).

Mandamus cannot be utilized to test abuse of discretion of lower court judicial officer. State ex rel. Feeney v. District Court, 614 P.2d 710, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 259 (Wyo. 1980).

Mandamus is not the proper method to challenge the action of a judicial officer in excluding the news media from a pretrial hearing, assuming that the decision to exclude the media was the result of the exercise of the judicial officer's discretion. State ex rel. Feeney v. District Court, 607 P.2d 1259, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 614 P.2d 710, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 259 (Wyo. 1980).

Letting state leases. —

Letting of leases on state lands by board of land commissioners involves exercise of judicial discretion and cannot be controlled by mandamus. State ex rel. Marsh v. State Land Comm'rs, 7 Wyo. 478, 53 P. 292, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1898).

Secretary of state. —

A writ of mandamus to compel secretary of state to affix state seal to and countersign a commission issued by the governor to one appointed by him to office, will not be denied because the commission would confer on person appointed no actual right, and therefore the writ would require the secretary to do a useless thing. State ex rel. Miller v. Barber, 4 Wyo. 409, 34 P. 1028, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1893).

Stated in

Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1979).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 159 (1985).

§ 1-30-103. Application for writ; notice to defendant.

The application for a writ must be by petition, in the name of the state, on the relation of the party applying and verified by affidavit. The court may require notice of the application to be given to the defendant, may grant an order to show cause why it should not be allowed, or may allow the writ without notice.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 727; R.S. 1887, § 3075; R.S. 1899, § 4196; C.S. 1910, § 5056; C.S. 1920, § 6318; R.S. 1931, § 89-4503; C.S. 1945, § 3-6703; W.S. 1957, § 1-879; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-103 .

Constitutionality of allowing writ without notice. —

Where statutory authority is given therefor, the peremptory writ of mandamus may be granted without notice or opportunity to defend and still not violate due process provisions of either state or federal constitutions, in cases where the writ is asked against public officers, as distinguished from cases where the writ is to require performance of private or personal duty affecting property rights. State ex rel. Blonder v. Goodbrod, 77 Wyo. 126, 307 P.2d 1073, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1957).

Section leaves to the discretion of the court the matter of dispensing with notice. Where that discretion has been exercised the supreme court will not ordinarily interfere unless there is patent abuse. But, if it be found that the court has misapprehended the applicable law which robs the court of authority to grant the particular relief afforded, then the supreme court will rectify the error. State ex rel. Blonder v. Goodbrod, 77 Wyo. 126, 307 P.2d 1073, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1957).

But court is not given carte blanche to dispense with notice at will and for slight reason. —

The supreme court will not assume that with the enactment of this section the legislature intended to give courts carte blanche to dispense with notice at will and for slight reason. It is more reasonable to ascribe to the lawmakers the limited purpose of making it possible to compel action in this summary fashion only in the clearest of cases where it is practically impossible to conceive of there being any valid excuse for non-performance of duty and where delay may result in defeat of right. State ex rel. Blonder v. Goodbrod, 77 Wyo. 126, 307 P.2d 1073, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1957).

Liability of off-duty police officer. —

Plaintiff in wrongful death action may prevail only if plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish that off-duty police officer was acting within his scope of duties at the time he responded to an emergency bulletin. Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1995).

Review of noncompliant pleading.—

Although a movant did not file a petition for writ of mandamus in the name of the State of Wyoming, on relation of the party applying, or verify it by affidavit, because the movant may have been allowed to amend the movant's claim to meet the requirements and the district court resolved the action on the merits, the appellate court, in the interests of finality and judicial economy, addressed whether the movant was entitled to the relief which the movant requested. Williams v. Sundstrom, 2016 WY 122, 385 P.3d 789, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2016).

Applied in

Williams v. Tharp, 2017 WY 8, 388 P.3d 513, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 1-30-104. Writ not to be issued if adequate remedy at law; party beneficially interested.

The writ must not be issued when there is an adequate remedy at law. It may issue on the information of the party beneficially interested.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 728; R.S. 1887, § 3076; R.S. 1899, § 4197; C.S. 1910, § 5057; C.S. 1920, § 6319; R.S. 1931, § 89-4504; C.S. 1945, § 3-6704; W.S. 1957, § 1-880; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-104 .

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies forecloses mandamus. —

Failure to pursue administrative relief and exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with a zoning ordinance forecloses the remedy of mandamus. State ex rel. Epp v. Mayor, 894 P.2d 590, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 1995).

Administrative remedy is not adequate remedy at law. —

The reference in this section to a plain and adequate remedy “in the ordinary course of the law” comprehends more than the “administrative remedy” provided under § 41-3-603 for reviewing decisions of water commissioners. Le Beau v. State, 377 P.2d 302, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1963).

But the right of appeal is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Le Beau v. State, 377 P.2d 302, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1963); Wyoming Bd. of Equalization v. State, 637 P.2d 248, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1981).

Thus, mandamus cannot substitute for appeal. —

In the absence of good reason therefor mandamus cannot be resorted to as a substitute for an appeal. Le Beau v. State, 377 P.2d 302, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1963).

Mandamus cannot be made to serve the purpose of an ordinary suit. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, 377 P.2d 299, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 1963); Le Beau v. State, 377 P.2d 302, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1963); State ex rel. Badley v. Sheridan, 513 P.2d 647, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1973).

Remedy by appeal. —

Where applicant for mineral lease had adequate remedy by appeal from contest proceeding, mandamus against board of land commissioners will not lie. State ex rel. Walls v. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 36 Wyo. 302, 254 P. 491, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1927).

Relator's right must be clear and certain. —

To warrant the issuance of mandamus not only must there be a legal right in the relator but owing to the extraordinary and drastic character of mandamus and the caution exercised by courts in awarding it, it is also important that the right sought to be enforced be clear and certain so as not to admit of any reasonable controversy. Le Beau v. State, 377 P.2d 302, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1963).

Writ of mandamus will issue only where the duty to perform is clear, certain and undisputable. State ex rel. Badley v. Sheridan, 513 P.2d 647, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1973).

The law must not only authorize the demanded action but require it for mandamus to issue. State ex rel. Badley v. Sheridan, 513 P.2d 647, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1973); Wyoming Bd. of Equalization v. State, 637 P.2d 248, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1981).

Mandamus does not lie to determine if water was illegally impounded. —

Mandamus is not the proper remedy for determining whether water has been illegally impounded by a water commissioner. The issues involved should not be disposed of in mandamus proceedings, but by appeal under former § 41-63, which provides for an appeal to the district court, or by an appropriate legal or equitable action. Le Beau v. State, 377 P.2d 302, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1963).

Action on certificate of indebtedness. —

Where county commissioners claim to have a defense against a claim based on certificates of indebtedness, mandamus against treasurer is not the remedy, as action against county based on certificate is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. State ex rel. Robertson Inv. Co. v. Patterson, 47 Wyo. 416, 38 P.2d 617, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1934).

Mandamus for tax receipt. —

Contention that mandamus would not lie to compel issuance of the receipt in that the taxpayers could bring an action to quiet title was without merit, since, even if they were in possession, quieting of title would not give them the receipt to which they were entitled, and hence the remedy was neither specific nor adequate. Lobban v. State, 9 Wyo. 377, 64 P. 82, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1901).

Under this section, where purchasers at mortgage sale liquidated taxes which were assessed against the mortgagor and a lien on the land, and county treasurer wrongfully refused to give receipt in full on ground that a personalty tax against mortgagor was a lien superior to the mortgage, contention that mandamus did not lie to compel giving of such receipt because the priority of liens could have been determined in the foreclosure suit was without merit, since statute not only permits foreclosure by advertisement, but taxpayers were not mortgagees. Lobban v. State, 9 Wyo. 377, 64 P. 82, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1901).

Tax shortfall grants. —

Mandamus was not the proper remedy for determining whether tax shortfall grants authorized for school districts were required by statute to be included as local resources in the year in which they were paid; the districts were not entitled to the writ without a showing they had no plain and adequate remedy at law, and there was no such showing. Britton v. Halliburton Servs., 895 P.2d 45, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 1995).

Right to office. —

Mandamus is not the proper remedy to try title to office between contending parties. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Grant, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1905).

Judgment annulling election in which unqualified candidate's name appeared on ballot appropriate remedy. —

The district court correctly ruled that a candidate, who had been convicted of a felony in another state and who had not had his rights restored in Wyoming, was unqualified to run for county commissioner. The fact that Wyoming might have treated the candidate's conviction as a misdemeanor had it occurred here, and that the candidate did not lose his civil rights in the state of conviction, did not alter this outcome. However, the court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus directing the holding of a special election, as a judgment annulling the election in which the unqualified candidate's name appeared on the ballot was the appropriate remedy. Mills v. Campbell County Canvassing Bd., 707 P.2d 747, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 588 (Wyo. 1985).

Right to salary. —

After the alleged unlawful removal of one from a public office and the appointment and qualification of his successor, the former claiming to still hold the office may have his right to the salary thereof determined on mandamus to compel the proper officer to issue a warrant to him for the salary alleged to be due, though as incidental to the determination of that matter it may be necessary to decide upon the legality of the removal of relator. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Grant, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1905).

Mandamus was a proper remedy to compel an irrigation district to supply water, where there had been a persistent and willful avoidance by the district of its contractual duty and an ordinary action at law followed by an appeal would have been an inadequate remedy. State ex rel. Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Wheatland Irrigation Dist., 728 P.2d 172, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 639 (Wyo. 1986).

Applied in

Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 1999).

Cited in

State ex rel. Jeffrey v. Burdick, 3 Wyo. 588, 28 P. 146, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1891); Wyoming Coal Mining Co. v. State ex rel. Kennedy, 15 Wyo. 97, 87 P. 337, 1906 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (1906).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Adequacy of remedy at law for refusal of corporation or its agent to register or effectuate transfer of stock, 22 ALR2d 12.

Remedy by appeal or writ of error as affecting mandamus to enforce right to jury trial, 41 ALR2d 780.

Mandamus to compel assertedly disqualified judge to recuse self or to certify his disqualification, 45 ALR2d 937, 56 ALR Fed 494.

Right of parents to mandamus against school officials with respect to names of children, 53 ALR2d 914.

Mandamus to compel admission to membership in professional associations, 89 ALR2d 964.

§ 1-30-105. Writ to be peremptory if right is clear; alternative writ to issue in other cases.

When the right to require the performance of the act is clear and it is apparent that no valid excuse can be given for not performing it, a court may allow a peremptory mandamus. In all other cases an alternative writ must first be issued on the allowance of the court, or a judge thereof.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 729; R.S. 1887, § 3077; R.S. 1899, § 4198; C.S. 1910, § 5058; C.S. 1920, § 6320; R.S. 1931, § 89-4505; C.S. 1945, § 3-6705; W.S. 1957, § 1-881; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-105 .

Cited in

Williams v. Sundstrom, 2016 WY 122, 385 P.3d 789, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2016).

Supreme court's jurisdiction. —

Under art. 5, § 3, Wyo. Const., and this section, statute, insofar as it authorizes a single judge of the supreme court in vacation to allow issuance of alternative writ of mandamus, is not repugnant to the constitution, since it merely provides a method of procedure to set in motion the original jurisdiction of such court in mandamus to state officers, and such allowance is not inhibited by the constitution. State ex rel. Bennett v. Barber, 4 Wyo. 56, 32 P. 14, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1892).

Writ of mandamus should only issue where duty to perform is clear, certain and undisputable. Wyoming Bd. of Equalization v. State, 637 P.2d 248, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1981).

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies forecloses mandamus. —

Failure to pursue administrative relief and exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with a zoning ordinance forecloses the remedy of mandamus. State ex rel. Epp v. Mayor, 894 P.2d 590, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 1-30-106. Docket entry of allowance of writ.

The allowance of a peremptory writ ordering the defendant to do the act required immediately upon service, or an alternative writ ordering that he do the act or show cause before the court at a specified time and place why he does not do the act, shall be entered upon the docket.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 730; R.S. 1887, § 3078; R.S. 1899, § 4199; C.S. 1910, § 5059; C.S. 1920, § 6321; R.S. 1931, § 89-4506; C.S. 1945, § 3-6706; W.S. 1957, § 1-882; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-106 .

Cited in

Williams v. Sundstrom, 2016 WY 122, 385 P.3d 789, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 1-30-107. Issuance and service of writ.

The writ shall be issued by the clerk of the court in which the application is made and shall contain a copy of the petition, verification and order of allowance. A copy shall be served upon the defendant personally, by the sheriff of the proper county or by a person specially authorized by the court or judge. The officer or person shall report his proceedings to the court, and if the service is made by a person not an officer, the return must be verified by his affidavit.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 731; R.S. 1887, § 3079; R.S. 1899, § 4200; C.S. 1910, § 5060; C.S. 1920, § 6322; R.S. 1931, § 89-4507; C.S. 1945, § 3-6707; W.S. 1957, § 1-883; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-107 .

Cited in

State ex rel. Feeney v. District Court, 607 P.2d 1259, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (1980).

§ 1-30-108. Defendant may answer.

On the return day of an alternative writ or such other day as the court may allow, the defendant may answer as in a civil action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 732; R.S. 1887, § 3080; R.S. 1899, § 4201; C.S. 1910, § 5061; C.S. 1920, § 6323; R.S. 1931, § 89-4508; C.S. 1945, § 3-6708; W.S. 1957, § 1-884; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-108 .

§ 1-30-109. Judgment on default.

If no answer is made, a peremptory mandamus shall be allowed against the defendant.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 734; R.S. 1887, § 3082; R.S. 1899, § 4203; C.S. 1910, § 5063; C.S. 1920, § 6325; R.S. 1931, § 89-4510; C.S. 1945, § 3-6710; W.S. 1957, § 1-886; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-109 .

§ 1-30-110. Effect and construction of pleadings.

The pleadings shall have the same effect and be construed and amended as in civil actions.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 735; R.S. 1887, § 3083; R.S. 1899, § 4204; C.S. 1910, § 5064; C.S. 1920, § 6326; R.S. 1931, § 89-4511; C.S. 1945, § 3-6711; W.S. 1957, § 1-887; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-110 .

Allegation of presumed facts. —

It is not necessary to allege and show affirmatively matters of fact which the law presumes from other facts which are alleged. State ex rel. Bennett v. Barber, 4 Wyo. 56, 32 P. 14, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1892).

Prima facie case. —

It is only necessary that petition make out a prima facie case entitling aggrieved party to the extraordinary aid of the court. Appel v. State, 9 Wyo. 187, 61 P. 1015, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1900).

§ 1-30-111. Issues of fact; trial.

Issues of fact made by the pleadings shall be tried and further proceedings had thereon the same as in civil actions.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 736; R.S. 1887, § 3084; R.S. 1899, § 4205; C.S. 1910, § 5065; C.S. 1920, § 6327; R.S. 1931, § 89-4512; C.S. 1945, § 3-6712; W.S. 1957, § 1-888; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-111 .

§ 1-30-112. Judgment for plaintiff; damages.

If judgment is for the relator, he may recover damages as ascertained by the court, a jury or by a referee or master as in a civil action, plus costs. A peremptory mandamus shall also be granted to him without delay.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 737; R.S. 1887, § 3085; R.S. 1899, § 4206; C.S. 1910, § 5066; C.S. 1920, § 6328; R.S. 1931, § 89-4513; C.S. 1945, § 3-6713; W.S. 1957, § 1-889; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-112 .

Cross references. —

As to costs generally, see chapter 14 of this title.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Allowance of damages to successful plaintiff or relator in mandamus, 73 ALR2d 903.

Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus proceedings, 34 ALR4th 457.

§ 1-30-113. Recovery a bar to other actions.

A recovery of damages against a defendant shall bar any other action upon that cause of action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 738; R.S. 1887, § 3086; R.S. 1899, § 4207; C.S. 1910, § 5067; C.S. 1920, § 6329; R.S. 1931, § 89-4514; C.S. 1945, § 3-6714; W.S. 1957, § 1-890; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-113 .

§ 1-30-114. Costs against relator.

If judgment is given for the defendant, all costs shall be adjudged against the relator.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 739; R.S. 1887, § 3087; R.S. 1899, § 4208; C.S. 1910, § 5068; C.S. 1920, § 6330; R.S. 1931, § 89-4515; C.S. 1945, § 3-6715; W.S. 1957, § 1-891; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-114 .

Cross references. —

As to costs generally, see chapter 14 of this title.

Mandatory section. —

This section is mandatory. State ex rel. Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170 P. 1, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1918).

§ 1-30-115. Penalty for failure to comply with mandamus.

When a peremptory mandamus is directed to a public officer, body or board commanding the performance of a public duty specially enjoined by law, and the court finds that the officer or any member of a body or board has, without just excuse, refused or neglected to perform the duty enjoined, the court may impose a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) on the officer or member. Payment of the fine shall bar an action for any penalty incurred by the officer or member by reason of his refusal or neglect.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 740; R.S. 1899, § 4209; C.S. 1910, § 5069; C.S. 1920, § 6331; R.S. 1931, § 89-4516; C.S. 1945, § 3-6716; W.S. 1957, § 1-892; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-115 .

§ 1-30-116. County treasurer to levy and assess tax upon mandamus.

When a peremptory mandamus is issued against the commissioners of a county, the trustees of a school district or the officers of a municipal corporation to levy and assess a tax to pay interest upon a debt or to create a sinking fund for the payment of a funded debt, and the officers have resigned, or refuse or neglect to levy and assess the tax, or their offices are vacant, upon motion of an interested person, the court may issue a special order to the county treasurer of the proper county commanding him to levy and assess the taxes required by law and to place the same upon the tax list for collection by the county treasurer.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 741; R.S. 1887, § 3089; R.S. 1899, § 4210; C.S. 1910, § 5070; C.S. 1920, § 6332; R.S. 1931, § 89-4517; C.S. 1945, § 3-6717; W.S. 1957, § 1-893; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-116 .

§ 1-30-117. County treasurer to levy and assess tax upon mandamus; duties and fees of treasurer.

When a special order is issued to the county treasurer he is responsible for its execution in the same manner as if he were an officer of the court. He shall receive such fees for his services in executing the order, if not otherwise fixed by the court, as are allowed by law for making tax duplicates. The fees and all other costs of the proceedings shall be added to the taxes levied in executing the order, and placed upon the duplicate for collection with the taxes.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 742; R.S. 1887, § 3090; R.S. 1899, § 4211; C.S. 1910, § 5071; C.S. 1920, § 6333; R.S. 1931, § 89-4518; C.S. 1945, § 3-6718; W.S. 1957, § 1-894; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-117 .

Cross references. —

As to costs generally, see chapter 14 of this title.

§ 1-30-118. County treasurer to levy and assess tax upon mandamus; powers of court.

The provisions of W.S. 1-30-116 and 1-30-117 shall not be construed to limit the power of the court to carry its order and judgment into execution or to punish any officer named therein for contempt or disobedience of its orders or writs.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 743; R.S. 1887, § 3091; R.S. 1899, § 4212; C.S. 1910, § 5072; C.S. 1920, § 6334; R.S. 1931, § 89-4519; C.S. 1945, § 3-6719; W.S. 1957, § 1-895; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-31-118 .

Chapter 31 Quo Warranto

Cross references. —

As to actions by and against the state generally, see chapter 35 of this title.

As to jurisdiction, see art. 5, § 3, Wyo. Const.

As to application for writ, see Rule 3, Sup. Ct.

When applicable. —

When a civil action is brought in this state against one usurping, unlawfully holding or exercising public office, the quo warranto statutes are applicable. Dickerson v. City Council of Buffalo, 582 P.2d 80, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1978).

Action brought in name of state. —

The statutes of this state provide that in those instances where the legal existence of a corporation and the right of public officers to hold office are at issue, the remedy is quo warranto, and the action must be brought under the pertinent statutes in the name of the state of Wyoming. Dickerson v. City Council, 582 P.2d 80, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1978).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

65 Am. Jur. 2d Quo Warranto § 1 et seq.

Statute of limitations or laches as applicable to quo warranto proceedings, 26 ALR2d 828.

Quo warranto as remedy for determination of rights of noncivil service or public employee, with respect to discharge, under state veterans' tenure statute, 58 ALR2d 960.

Remedy for determining right or title to office in unincorporated private association, 82 ALR2d 1169.

Default judgment against defendant without introduction of evidence in quo warranto proceedings, 92 ALR2d 1121.

74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 1 et seq.

§ 1-31-101. Actions against persons.

  1. A civil action may be brought in the name  of the state:
    1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes  into or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, civil or military,  or a franchise within this state or an office in a corporation created  by authority of this state;
    2. Against a public officer, civil or military,  who does or suffers an act which by law works a forfeiture of his  office;
    3. Against an association of persons who  act as a corporation within this state without being legally incorporated  or who fail to comply with the corporation laws of the state.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 744; R.S. 1887, § 3092; R.S. 1899, § 4213; C.S. 1910, § 5073; C.S. 1920, § 6335; R.S. 1931, § 89-4601; C.S. 1945, § 3-7101; W.S. 1957, § 1-896; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-101 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Section furnishes exclusive remedy in action to try title to public office, being both appropriate and adequate. State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, 401 P.2d 954, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1965).

Exclusive and adequate remedy. —

Where quo warranto is available to try title to public office, the remedy is appropriate, adequate and exclusive. Dickerson v. City Council of Buffalo, 582 P.2d 80, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1978).

Injunction not permissible where quo warranto is appropriate. —

It is elementary that in situations wherein a quo warranto proceeding is an appropriate and adequate remedy resort to an injunction is not permissible. Crawford v. City of Sheridan, 392 P.2d 519, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1964).

Cited in

In re Fourth Judicial Dist., 4 Wyo. 133, 32 P. 850, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (1893); Reals v. Smith, 8 Wyo. 159, 56 P. 690, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (1899).

§ 1-31-102. Actions against corporations.

  1. A like action may be brought against a  corporation:
    1. When it has violated the law governing  its creation or renewal;
    2. When it has forfeited its privileges and  franchises by nonuse;
    3. When it has committed or omitted an act  which amounts to a surrender of its corporate rights, privileges and  franchises;
    4. When it has misused a franchise or privilege  conferred upon it by law or exercised a franchise or privilege not  so conferred.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 745; R.S. 1887, § 3093; R.S. 1899, § 4214; C.S. 1910, § 5074; C.S. 1920, § 6336; R.S. 1931, § 89-4602; C.S. 1945, § 3-7102; W.S. 1957, § 1-897; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-102 .

Cross references. —

As to judgments in actions against corporations, see §§ 1-31-118 to 1-31-122 .

As to limitation upon time of bringing action against corporations or officers, see § 1-31-127 .

For general provisions concerning corporations, see §§ 17-16-101 to 17-16-1803.

As to quo warranto proceedings to forfeit the charter of corporations guilty of unfair discrimination, see § 40-4-102 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Quoted in

Dickerson v. City Council, 582 P.2d 80, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1978).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Personal Liability for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations in Wyoming,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 273 (1983).

§ 1-31-103. Commencement of action.

The attorney general or a county attorney shall commence an action when directed by the governor, supreme court or legislature, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that such an action can be established by proof.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 746; R.S. 1887, § 3094; R.S. 1899, § 4215; C.S. 1910, § 5075; C.S. 1920, § 6337; R.S. 1931, § 89-4603; C.S. 1945, § 3-7103; W.S. 1957, § 1-898; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-103 ; Laws 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1.

§ 1-31-104. Upon whose relation action brought; security for costs.

  1. The prosecuting officer may bring the  action upon his own relation or, by leave of court, he may bring the  action upon the relation of another person. If the action is brought  pursuant to W.S. 1-31-101(a)(i), the court may require security for costs as in other  cases.
  2. Upon application for leave to file a petition  upon the relation of another person, the court may direct notice thereof  to be given to the defendant previous to granting such leave and may  hear the defendant in opposition thereto; and if leave is granted  an entry thereof shall be made on the journal or the fact shall be  endorsed by the judge on the petition, which shall then be filed.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, §§ 747, 753; R.S. 1887, §§ 3095, 3101; R.S. 1899, §§ 4216, 4222; C.S. 1910, §§ 5076, 5082; C.S. 1920, §§ 6338, 6344; R.S. 1931, §§ 89-4604, 89-4610; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-7104, 3-7110; W.S. 1957, §§ 1-899, 1-905; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-104 .

Cross references. —

As to fees, costs and security therefor, see chapter 14 of this title.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Personal Liability for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations in Wyoming,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 273 (1983).

§ 1-31-105. Action by person claiming public office; security for costs.

A person claiming to be entitled to a public office unlawfully held and exercised by another may bring an action therefor upon giving security for costs.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 748; R.S. 1887, § 3096; R.S. 1899, § 4217; C.S. 1910, § 5077; C.S. 1920, § 6339; R.S. 1931, § 89-4605; C.S. 1945, § 3-7105; W.S. 1957, § 1-900; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-105 .

Cross references. —

As to fees, costs and security therefor, see chapter 14 of this title.

Quo warranto proper remedy. —

Quo warranto and not mandamus is the proper remedy to try title to office between contending parties. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Grant, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1905).

Ex rel. action. —

Under provisions of this section and former section, the action should be prosecuted in the name of the state on relation of the claimant. Reals v. Smith, 8 Wyo. 159, 56 P. 690, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1899).

Proof of right to office. —

In quo warranto to determine the right and title of the relator to office, his legal right to the office must affirmatively appear, but no presumption obtains in favor of respondent charged with obtaining possession of the office by force under an alleged appointment by the governor. People ex rel. Emerson v. Shawver, 30 Wyo. 366, 222 P. 11, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1924).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of private person not claiming office to maintain quo warranto proceeding to test title to, or existence of, public office, 51 ALR2d 1306.

§ 1-31-106. Appointment of attorney when county attorney disabled.

When the office of county attorney is vacant or when the county attorney is absent, interested in the action or disabled from any cause, the court may direct or permit any member of the bar to act in his place to bring and prosecute the action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 749; R.S. 1887, § 3097; R.S. 1899, § 4218; C.S. 1910, § 5078; C.S. 1920, § 6340; R.S. 1931, § 89-4606; C.S. 1945, § 3-7106; W.S. 1957, § 1-901; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-106 ; Laws 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1.

§ 1-31-107. Petition in action for usurpation of office.

When the action is against a person for usurping an office, the petition shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto with an averment of his right thereto.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 750; R.S. 1887, § 3098; R.S. 1899, § 4219; C.S. 1910, § 5079; C.S. 1920, § 6341; R.S. 1931, § 89-4607; C.S. 1945, § 3-7107; W.S. 1957, § 1-902; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-107 .

Election contest. —

Original application for leave to file petition in quo warranto to contest election of district judge was denied where petition charged irregular, illegal or fraudulent acts or omissions relating to conduct of election or canvassing of votes, and determination of fact issues would require taking large volume of evidence. State ex rel. Walton v. Christmas, 48 Wyo. 239, 44 P.2d 905, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1935).

§ 1-31-108. All claimants may be made defendants.

All persons who claim to be entitled to the same office or franchise may be made defendants in the same action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 751; R.S. 1887, § 3099; R.S. 1899, § 4220; C.S. 1910, § 5080; C.S. 1920, § 6342; R.S. 1931, § 89-4608; C.S. 1945, § 3-7108; W.S. 1957, § 1-903; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-108 .

§ 1-31-109. Place of bringing action.

An action under W.S. 1-31-101 through 1-31-130 can be brought in the supreme court, or in the district court of the county in which the defendant or one (1) of the defendants, resides or is found or, when the defendant is a corporation, in the county in which it is situated or has a place of business.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 752; R.S. 1887, § 3100; R.S. 1899, § 4221; C.S. 1910, § 5081; C.S. 1920, § 6343; R.S. 1931, § 89-4609; C.S. 1945, § 3-7109; W.S. 1957, § 1-904; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-109 .

Cross references. —

As to venue provisions generally, see chapter 5 of this title.

§ 1-31-110. Issuance and service of summons.

When the petition is filed a summons shall issue and be served as in other cases.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 754; R.S. 1887, § 3102; R.S. 1899, § 4223; C.S. 1910, § 5083; C.S. 1920, § 6345; R.S. 1931, § 89-4611; C.S. 1945, § 3-7111; W.S. 1957, § 1-906; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-110 .

Cross references. —

As to issuance and service of summons, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

§ 1-31-111. Service by publication.

When a summons is returned not served because the defendant or its officers or office cannot be found within the county, service by publication may be had as provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 755; R.S. 1887, § 3103; R.S. 1899, § 4224; C.S. 1910, § 5084; C.S. 1920, § 6346; R.S. 1931, § 89-4612; C.S. 1945, § 3-7112; W.S. 1957, § 1-907; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-111 .

Cross references. —

For provisions as to service by publication, see Rule 4(e), W.R.C.P.

§ 1-31-112. Judgment in case of usurpation.

When a defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, franchise or privilege, judgment shall be rendered ousting the defendant and allowing the relator to recover his costs.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 758; R.S. 1887, § 3106; R.S. 1899, § 4227; C.S. 1910, § 5087; C.S. 1920, § 6349; R.S. 1931, § 89-4615; C.S. 1945, § 3-7115; W.S. 1957, § 1-910; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-112 .

Acting adjutant general held usurper. —

The governor exceeded his powers in undertaking to remove plaintiff from the office of adjutant general of the Wyoming national guard under the general power conferred by the provisions of former section, and because of such fundamental error, the acting adjutant general was a usurper unlawfully holding and occupying such office. State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, 401 P.2d 954, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1965).

§ 1-31-113. Judgment ousting trustee or director of corporation.

When the action is against a trustee or director of a corporation and the court finds that at his election either illegal votes were received or legal votes were rejected sufficient to change the result, judgment may be rendered ousting the defendant and in favor of the person who is entitled to be declared elected at the election.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 759; R.S. 1887, § 3107; R.S. 1899, § 4228; C.S. 1910, § 5088; C.S. 1920, § 6350; R.S. 1931, § 89-4616; C.S. 1945, § 3-7116; W.S. 1957, § 1-911; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-113 .

§ 1-31-114. Judgment ousting trustee or director of corporation; order for new election of trustee; service.

In a case named in W.S. 1-31-113 the court may order a new election to be held at a time and place and by judges appointed by the court. Notice of the election, naming the judges, shall be given for the time and in the manner provided by law for notice of elections of directors or trustees of the corporation. The order of the court is obligatory upon the corporation and its officers when a duly certified copy thereof is served upon its secretary personally or left at its principal office with someone of suitable age, and the court may enforce its order by contempt or otherwise.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 760; R.S. 1887, § 3108; R.S. 1899, § 4229; C.S. 1910, § 5089; C.S. 1920, § 6351; R.S. 1931, § 89-4617; C.S. 1945, § 3-7117; W.S. 1957, § 1-912; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-114 .

§ 1-31-115. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to office; generally; to take oath and execute bond; taking over office; demanding books and papers.

If judgment is rendered in favor of the person claiming to be entitled to an office, he may, after taking the oath of office and executing any official bond required by law, assume the execution of the office. He shall immediately demand of the defendant all books and papers in his custody or within his power pertaining to the office from which he has been ousted.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 761; R.S. 1887, § 3109; R.S. 1899, § 4230; C.S. 1910, § 5090; C.S. 1920, § 6352; R.S. 1931, § 89-4618; C.S. 1945, § 3-7118; W.S. 1957, § 1-913; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-115 .

§ 1-31-116. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to office; action for damages against person ousted; limitation on time of action.

The successful claimant may at any time within one (1) year after the date of the judgment, bring an action against the party ousted and recover the damages he sustained by reason of the usurpation.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 762; R.S. 1887, § 3110; R.S. 1899, § 4231; C.S. 1910, § 5091; C.S. 1920, § 6353; R.S. 1931, § 89-4619; C.S. 1945, § 3-7119; W.S. 1957, § 1-914; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-116 .

§ 1-31-117. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to office; person refusing to deliver books or papers deemed guilty of contempt; penalty.

If the defendant refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to demand, he is guilty of contempt of court and shall be fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), and imprisoned in the county jail until he complies with the order of the court or is otherwise discharged by law.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 763; R.S. 1887, § 3111; R.S. 1899, § 4232; C.S. 1920, § 6354; R.S. 1931, § 89-4620; C.S. 1945, § 3-7120; W.S. 1957, § 1-915; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-117 .

§ 1-31-118. Judgment against corporations; corporation to be ousted and dissolved.

When it is found that a corporation has, by an act done or omitted, surrendered or forfeited its corporate rights, privileges and franchises or has not used the same for five (5) years, judgment shall be entered that it be ousted and excluded therefrom, and that it be dissolved. When it is found and adjudged that a corporation has offended in any matter or manner which does not work a surrender or forfeiture, or has misused a franchise or exercised a power not conferred by law, judgment shall be entered that it be ousted from the continuance of the offense or exercise of the power.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 764; R.S. 1887, § 3112; R.S. 1899, § 4233; C.S. 1910, § 5093; C.S. 1920, § 6355; R.S. 1931, § 89-4621; C.S. 1945, § 3-7121; W.S. 1957, § 1-916; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-118 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Corporation as necessary or proper party defendant in proceedings to determine validity of election or appointment of corporate director officer, 21 ALR2d 1048.

§ 1-31-119. Judgment against corporations; appointment of trustees when corporation dissolved; bond required; powers generally.

The court rendering a judgment dissolving a corporation shall appoint trustees of the creditors and stockholders of the corporation who, after giving a bond payable to the state of Wyoming in a sum and with sureties as the court may designate, conditioned that they will faithfully discharge their trust and properly pay and apply all money that may come into their hands, shall have power to settle the affairs of the corporation, collect and pay outstanding debts and divide among the stockholders the money and other property which remains after the payment of debts and necessary expenses.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 765; R.S. 1887, § 3113; R.S. 1899, § 4234; C.S. 1910, § 5094; C.S. 1920, § 6356; R.S. 1931, § 89-4622; C.S. 1945, § 3-7122; W.S. 1957, § 1-917; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-119 .

§ 1-31-120. Judgment against corporations; duties and powers of trustees.

The trustees shall promptly demand all money, property, books, deeds, notes, bills, obligations and papers of every description within the custody or control of the officers of the corporation, which belong to the corporation or are in any way necessary for the settlement of its affairs or for the discharge of its debts and liabilities. They may sue for and recover the demands and property of the corporation, and are jointly and severally liable to the creditors and stockholders to the extent of its property and effects which come into their hands.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 766; R.S. 1887, § 3114; R.S. 1899, § 4235; C.S. 1910, § 5095; C.S. 1920, § 6357; R.S. 1931, § 89-4623; C.S. 1945, § 3-7123; W.S. 1957, § 1-918; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-120 .

§ 1-31-121. Judgment against corporations; penalty for failure to deliver items to trustees; enforcement of delivery; liability to trustees.

An officer of a corporation who refuses or neglects to deliver any money or other thing pursuant to such demand is guilty of contempt of court and shall be fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) and imprisoned in the county jail until he complies with the order of the court or is otherwise discharged by law. He is liable to the trustees for the value of all money or other things refused or neglected to be surrendered, together with all damages that are sustained by the stockholders and creditors of the corporation in consequence of the neglect or refusal.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 767; R.S. 1887, § 3115; R.S. 1899, § 4236; C.S. 1910, § 5096; C.S. 1920, § 6358; R.S. 1931, § 89-4624; C.S. 1945, § 3-7124; W.S. 1957, § 1-919; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-121 .

§ 1-31-122. Judgment for costs.

If judgment is rendered against a corporation or against a person claiming to be a corporation, the court may render judgment for costs against the directors, trustees or other officers of the corporation, or against the person claiming to be a corporation.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 768; R.S. 1887, § 3116; R.S. 1899, § 4237; C.S. 1910, § 5097; C.S. 1920, § 6359; R.S. 1931, § 89-4625; C.S. 1945, § 3-7125; W.S. 1957, § 1-920; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-122 .

§ 1-31-123. Order directing transfer of books and papers; enforcement by fine or imprisonment.

In all actions under W.S. 1-31-101 through 1-31-130 , when the judgment is against the defendant, the court may make an order directing the defendant promptly to deliver the books, papers, property, money, deeds, notes, bills and obligations to the persons entitled thereto or the trustees appointed to receive them. If complaint is made upon affidavit to the district court of a neglect or refusal to comply with the order, the court shall direct an attachment returnable immediately to issue for the defendant, who may be required to answer under oath touching the premises. If it appears that the defendant neglects or refuses, the court shall render judgment of fine or imprisonment, or both, as the court making the order might have rendered.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 769; R.S. 1887, § 3117; R.S. 1899, § 4238; C.S. 1910, § 5098; C.S. 1920, § 6360; R.S. 1931, § 89-4626; C.S. 1945, § 3-7126; W.S. 1957, § 1-921; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-123.

Cross references. —

As to attachment of the person generally, see §§ 1-15-201 to 1-15-212 .

§ 1-31-124. Injunction in aid of proceedings against banking associations.

Any stockholder or stockholders, owning not less than one-fourth (1/4) of the paid in capital stock of any banking association, or entitled to the beneficial interest therein, may have an injunction pending proceedings in quo warranto, restraining the directors or trustees from making any disposition of the assets of the corporation prejudicial to the interests of the stockholders or inconsistent with their duties as directors or trustees.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 770; R.S. 1887, § 3118; R.S. 1899, § 4239; C.S. 1910, § 5099; C.S. 1920, § 6361; R.S. 1931, § 89-4627; C.S. 1945, § 3-7127; W.S. 1957, § 1-922; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-124.

Cross references. —

For provisions concerning injunctions, see chapter 28 of this title.

§ 1-31-125. Injunction in aid of proceedings against banking associations; security required of bank directors.

The court may, upon satisfactory proof that the directors or trustees of a corporation have violated or are about to violate any of the franchises thereof, require them to give security to the stockholders satisfactory to the court for the proper discharge of their duties, and for the proper management and security of the assets. The court may enjoin the directors or trustees from paying out or issuing the notes of circulation of the bank and from incurring any additional liabilities, except for the payment of the necessary services of the officers and employees of the banking association, the amount of which while the proceedings are pending shall be under the control of the court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 771; R.S. 1887, § 3119; R.S. 1899, § 4240; C.S. 1910, § 5100; C.S. 1920, § 6362; R.S. 1931, § 89-4628; C.S. 1945, § 3-7128; W.S. 1957, § 1-923; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-125.

§ 1-31-126. Injunction against aid of proceedings against banking associations; directors may be enjoined from borrowing money.

The court may enjoin the directors or trustees from borrowing or issuing, either directly or indirectly, any of the money or assets of the bank for their individual benefit while the proceedings are pending.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 772; R.S. 1887, § 3120; R.S. 1899, § 4241; C.S. 1910, § 5101; C.S. 1920, § 6363; R.S. 1931, § 89-4629; C.S. 1945, § 3-7129; W.S. 1957, § 1-924; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-126.

Cross references. —

For provisions concerning injunctions, see chapter 28 of this title.

§ 1-31-127. Limitation upon time of bringing action against corporations or officer.

Nothing in W.S. 1-31-101 through 1-31-130 shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter unless commenced within five (5) years after the act complained of was committed. An action may not be brought against a corporation for the exercise of a power or franchise under its charter which it has exercised for a term of twenty (20) years, nor may an action be brought against an officer to oust him from his office unless within three (3) years after the cause of the ouster or the right to hold the office arose.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 773; R.S. 1887, § 3121; R.S. 1899, § 4242; C.S. 1910, § 5102; C.S. 1920, § 6364; R.S. 1931, § 89-4630; C.S. 1945, § 3-7130; W.S. 1957, § 1-925; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-127.

§ 1-31-128. Actions against officers of ousted corporations; limitation upon time.

When judgment of forfeiture and ouster is rendered against a corporation because of misconduct of the officers, trustees or directors, a person injured thereby may within one (1) year, in an action against the officers or directors, recover damages sustained by reason of the misconduct.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 774; R.S. 1887, § 3122; R.S. 1899, § 4243; C.S. 1910, § 5103; C.S. 1920, § 6365; R.S. 1931, § 89-4631; C.S. 1945, § 3-7131; W.S. 1957, § 1-926; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-128.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Personal Liability for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations in Wyoming,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 273 (1983).

§ 1-31-129. Provisions to be cumulative.

Nothing in W.S. 1-31-101 through 1-31-130 is intended to restrain any court from enforcing the performance of trusts for charitable purposes at the relation of the county attorney of the proper county, or from enforcing trusts or restraining abuses in other corporations at the suit of a person injured.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 775; R.S. 1887, § 3123; R.S. 1899, § 4244; C.S. 1910, § 5104; C.S. 1920, § 6366; R.S. 1931, § 89-4632; C.S. 1945, § 3-7132; W.S. 1957, § 1-927; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-129; Laws 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Personal Liability for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations in Wyoming,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 273 (1983).

§ 1-31-130. Precedence of actions; speedy trial.

Actions for quo warranto shall have precedence in any court over any civil business pending therein. If the matter is of public concern, on the motion of the attorney general or prosecuting attorney, the court shall require as speedy a trial of the merits of the case as may be consistent with the rights of the parties.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 777; R.S. 1887, § 3125; R.S. 1899, § 4246; C.S. 1910, § 5106; C.S. 1920, § 6368; R.S. 1931, § 89-4634; C.S. 1945, § 3-7134; W.S. 1957, § 1-929; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-32-130.

Abandonment. —

Failure of incumbents to bring quo warranto until eight months after invalid appointments of new board members and after annual meeting did not show loss of offices by “abandonment” or by “acquiescence.” People ex rel. Warren v. Christian, 58 Wyo. 39, 123 P.2d 368, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1942).

Chapter 32 Real Property

Editor's notes. —

Since no art. 1 of this chapter is set out in § 1, ch. 188, Laws 1977, arts. 2 to 5 have been redesignated as arts. 1 to 4 herein and the section numbers changed accordingly.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and application of Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (12 USCS §§ 2601 et seq.), 142 ALR Fed 511.

73 C.J.S. Property §§ 16 to 20.

Article 1. Partition

Law reviews. —

For a note on the right of co-lessees under an oil and gas lease to compel partition in kind, see 3 Wyo. L.J. 144.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

59A Am. Jur. 2d Partition § 1 et seq.

Timber rights as subject to partition, 21 ALR2d 618.

Maintainability of partition action where United States or state owns an undivided interest in property, 59 ALR2d 937.

Grant of part of cotenancy land, taken from less than all cotenants, as subject of protection through partition, 77 ALR2d 1376.

Contractual provisions as affecting right to judicial partition, 37 ALR3d 962.

Right to partition of overriding royalty interest in oil and gas leasehold, 58 ALR3d 1052.

Judicial partition of land by lot or chance, 32 ALR4th 909.

Option to purchase real property as affected by optionor's receipt of offer for, or sale of, larger tract which includes the optioned parcel, 34 ALR4th 1217.

Contract of sale or granting of option to purchase, to third party, by both or all of joint tenants or tenants by entirety as severing or terminating tenancy, 39 ALR4th 1068.

Oil and gas royalty as real or personal property, 56 ALR4th 539.

68 C.J.S. Partition § 1 et seq.

§ 1-32-101. Who compelled to make partition.

Tenants in common and coparceners of any estate of lands, tenements or hereditaments within the state may be compelled to make a partition thereof as hereinafter prescribed.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 614; R.S. 1887, § 2962; R.S. 1899, § 4081; C.S. 1910, § 4941; C.S. 1920, § 6211; R.S. 1931, § 89-3801; C.S. 1945, § 3-6901; W.S. 1957, § 1-935; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-201.

Cross references. —

As to power of guardian to act for ward, see § 1-32-117 .

As to powers of foreign guardian, see § 1-32-118 .

Civil action. —

An action for partition under this article is a civil action under the provisions of § 3-301, W.C.S. 1945, which abolishes the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Court's jurisdiction. —

Where tenant in common brought suit for partition of described real estate and cotenant consented to the partition, though other lands held by the parties under leases were not included, court had jurisdiction to partition the land included in the petition. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

No person is compelled to remain a cotenant of another. That was the rule of the Roman law. That, with a few exceptions, is the rule of the common law. And that is the rule under this section. In re Dixon's Estate, 66 Wyo. 197, 207 P.2d 510, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1949).

Cotenant cannot establish homestead as against other cotenant. —

Tenants in common had equal right of possession and one cotenant could not establish a homestead right as against the interests of the other cotenants. The fact that the land in question was once the homestead of the father of the parties and that a patent was issued to him did not prevent partitioning among his heirs. Osborn v. Warner, 694 P.2d 730, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 442 (Wyo. 1985).

Action between siblings. —

Court properly granted first son summary judgment on second son's counterclaim to enforce divestiture of devised land and properly denied second son's motion to reopen the estate of the sons' father, since first son's petition to partition ranch did not request forced sale to third parties but allowed for equitable divisions and because “in terrorem” clause revoking bequests was not violated as first son withdrew challenge of second son's land lease. Sorenson v. Sorenson (In re Estate of Sorenson), 9 P.3d 259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2000).

Estates in reversion or remainder. —

In absence of statute authorizing it, partition cannot be awarded, either at law or in equity, of an estate in reversion or remainder, but may be had between tenants for life or years, and between the owner of the fee of an undivided interest and a tenant for life of another undivided interest. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Partition as affected by lease given by part only of cotenants, 49 ALR2d 797.

§ 1-32-102. Where proceedings to be had.

When the estate is situated in one (1) county the proceedings shall be had in that county, and when situated in two (2) or more counties the proceedings may be had in any county in which a part of the estate is situated.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 615; R.S. 1887, § 2963; R.S. 1899, § 4082; C.S. 1910, § 4942; C.S. 1920, § 6212; R.S. 1931, § 89-3802; C.S. 1945, § 3-6902; W.S. 1957, § 1-936; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-202.

Cross references. —

For other provisions concerning venue in actions involving real property, see §§ 1-5-101 and 1-5-102 .

Plaintiff Must Show His Title And Right to Possession.

Although defendant breached a supplemental agreement when it did not make a reassignment offer by a certain date, a state oil and gas lease never terminated. Because defendant retained the right to drill and produce the lands subject to the lease, plaintiffs could not show that they were entitled to possession of those lands or that defendant unlawfully kept them out of possession. Stone v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 2009 WY 114, 216 P.3d 489, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 2009), reh'g denied, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. Oct. 13, 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1068, 130 S. Ct. 2096, 176 L. Ed. 2d 724, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3367 (U.S. 2010).

Quoted in

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 9 P.3d 259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 1-32-103. Filing and contents of petition.

A person entitled to partition of an estate may file his petition in the district court setting forth the nature of his title, a description of the lands, tenements or hereditaments of which partition is demanded, and naming each tenant in common, coparcener or other interested person as defendant. If the petition seeks a division of property which division would otherwise be subject to the provisions of title 18, chapter 5, article 3 of the Wyoming statutes, the petition shall disclose that fact.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 616; R.S. 1887, § 2964; R.S. 1899, § 4083; C.S. 1910, § 4943; C.S. 1920, § 6213; R.S. 1931, § 89-3803; C.S. 1945, § 3-6903; W.S. 1957, § 1-937; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-203; 2013, ch. 128, § 1.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added the last sentence.

In general. —

Partition statute, requiring each tenant in common, coparcener, or “other interested person,” to be named defendants, does not prevent partition between parties in possession as tenants in common, though either or both hold less than a fee simple, where property is capable of partition. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Quoted in

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 9 P.3d 259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2000).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Spouse of living co-owner of interest in property as necessary or proper party to partition action, 57 ALR2d 1166.

§ 1-32-104. Finding of court; order for partition; appointment of commissioners; ordering writ of execution to issue.

If the court finds that the plaintiff has a legal right to any part of the estate, it shall order partition in favor of the plaintiff or all parties in interest, appoint three (3) disinterested persons of the vicinity to be commissioners to make the partition and order a writ of execution to issue. A partition under this article shall be subject to the provisions of title 18, chapter 5, article 3 of the Wyoming statutes including any exemptions provided therein and as authorized by the county pursuant to those provisions. The court shall order the partition only after compliance by the petitioner with those provisions, as applicable.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 617; R.S. 1887, § 2965; R.S. 1899, § 4084; C.S. 1910, § 4944; C.S. 1920, § 6214; R.S. 1931, § 89-3804; C.S. 1945, § 3-6904; W.S. 1957, § 1-938; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-204; 2013, ch. 128, § 1.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added the second and third sentences.

Order as determination of rights. —

The rights of parties in action for partition are determined by the order which finds them to be tenants in common, ascertains and adjudges their respective shares, and orders a partition thereof, whether the order is final or interlocutory. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Although a partition agreement differed from the statutory scheme of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-104 , the agreement was properly enforced under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 70 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-108 when a co-tenant failed to abide by agreement. The “deemed denied” rule of Wyo. R. Civ. P. 6(c)(2) did not divest district court of subject matter jurisdiction to enter partition order because no showing of error was made and the motion at issue was interlocutory so that the court retained jurisdiction to enter the order enforcing partition after the original motion was deemed denied. Bixler v. Oro Mgmt., 2006 WY 140, 145 P.3d 1260, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (2006).

Authority of court. —

After appointing commissioners to make a partition of property, a trial court did not err in vacating an easement that was created by the commissioners because both parties had requested modifications concerning the easement, and the commissioners had acknowledged that the decision to create the easement had probably created a lot of problems. Platt v. Platt, 2011 WY 155, 264 P.3d 804, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2011).

Quoted in

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 9 P.3d 259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 1-32-105. Writ of partition directed to sheriff; contents; administering oath to commissioners.

The writ of partition may be directed to the sheriff of any county in which any part of the estate lies, and shall command him to administer the oaths of the commissioners, and setoff and divide to the plaintiff or each party in interest such part and proportion of the estate as the court shall order.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 618; R.S. 1887, § 2966; R.S. 1899, § 4085; C.S. 1910, § 4945; C.S. 1920, § 6215; R.S. 1931, § 89-3805; C.S. 1945, § 3-6905; W.S. 1957, § 1-939; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-205.

Quoted in

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 9 P.3d 259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 1-32-106. View and examination of estate by commissioners; setting aside under oath.

In making the partition, the commissioners must examine the estate and set apart the same in such lots as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the different parts.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 619; R.S. 1887, § 2967; R.S. 1899, § 4086; C.S. 1910, § 4946; C.S. 1920, § 6216; R.S. 1931, § 89-3806; C.S. 1945, § 3-6906; W.S. 1957, § 1-940; Laws l977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-206.

Preparation of report. —

Where commissioners in partition proceedings announced their conclusions in presence of both parties, and then requested counsel for one of them to prepare their report, and counsel did so in accordance with their conclusions, the adverse party was not prejudiced, where a copy of the report was handed to his counsel and opportunity afforded him to suggest changes before it was signed by the commissioners. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Contents of report. —

Rejection of report of commissioners in partition proceedings is not justified on grounds of an omission in the report of the facts concerning character and situation of the premises, nor because of failure to specifically state therein that partition has been equitably and advantageously made; the statute being silent respecting the contents of the report. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Unequal allotments. —

Action of commissioners in partition proceedings will not be set aside on ground of unequal allotments, except where partition appears to have been made on wrong principles, or where it is shown by clear preponderance of evidence that partition is grossly unequal. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Specific case. —

In suit for partition, evidence examined was held to warrant decision that commissioners appointed in proceedings to partition the premises acted fairly, and that the partition made by them was equitable. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Quoted in

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 9 P.3d 259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 1-32-107. Partition of several tracts.

When partition of more than one (1) tract is demanded, the commissioners shall set off to each plaintiff or party in interest his proper proportion in each of the several tracts unless the several tracts are owned by the same proprietors in the same proportion in each tract, in which case the whole share of any proprietor in all the several tracts may be set off to the proprietor according to the best discretion of the commissioners.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 620; R.S. 1887, § 2968; R.S. 1899, § 4087; C.S. 1910, § 4947; C.S. 1920, § 6217; R.S. 1931, § 89-3807; C.S. 1945, § 3-6907; W.S. 1957, § 1-941; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-207.

§ 1-32-108. Amicable partition.

Before a writ of partition is issued, the person of whom partition is demanded may appear in court in person or by attorney and consent to a partition of the estate according to the facts and prayer set forth in the petition. This amicable partition, when made and recorded, is valid and binding between the parties thereto.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 621; R.S. 1887, § 2969; R.S. 1899, § 4088; C.S. 1910, § 4948; C.S. 1920, § 6218; R.S. 1931, § 89-3808; C.S. 1945, § 3-6908; W.S. 1957, § 1-942; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-208.

Partition by consent was enforced. —

Although a partition agreement differed from the statutory scheme of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-104 , the agreement was properly enforced under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 70 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-108 when a co-tenant failed to abide by agreement. The “deemed denied” rule of Wyo. R. Civ. P. 6(c)(2) did not divest district court of subject matter jurisdiction to enter partition order because no showing of error was made and the motion at issue was interlocutory so that the court retained jurisdiction to enter the order enforcing partition after the original motion was deemed denied. Bixler v. Oro Mgmt., 2006 WY 140, 145 P.3d 1260, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (2006).

Quoted in

Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (1907).

§ 1-32-109. Appraisement required where estate cannot be divided according to writ; return by commissioners; election to take at appraised value.

When the commissioners are of the opinion that the estate cannot be divided according to the demand of the writ without manifest injury to its value, they shall return that fact to the court with a just valuation of the estate. If the court approves the return and one (1) or more of the parties elects to take the estate at such appraised value, it shall be adjudged to him upon his paying to the other parties their proportion of the appraised value according to their respective rights, or securing the same as hereinafter provided.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 622; R.S. 1887, § 2970; R.S. 1899, § 4089; C.S. 1910, § 4949; C.S. 1920, § 6219; R.S. 1931, § 89-3809; C.S. 1945, § 3-6909; W.S. 1957, § 1-943; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-209.

Manifest injury to value of property.

District court's orders were not sufficiently complete to establish that a partition in kind could be made without manifest injury to the value of the property. The fact that a dedicated ditch was not located made any finding that partition in kind would not manifestly injure the value of the property clearly erroneous. Platt v. Platt, 2014 WY 142, 337 P.3d 431, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 2014).

Party not compelled to sell. —

Where lands of tenants in common are capable of partition, the law does not compel party moving for partition to sell his interest for the price offered by the other party, though the price exceeds valuation placed on it by the commissioners appointed in the proceedings or by the party himself, so that such offer made and refused is no ground for rejecting commissioners' report of actual partition. Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 16 Wyo. 1, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1907).

Quoted in

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 9 P.3d 259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2000).

Law reviews. —

See “Can Co-Lessee Under An Oil & Gas Lease Compel a Partition in Kind?” 3 Wyo. L.J. 144.

§ 1-32-110. Terms of payment upon election to take; execution of conveyance.

If one (1) or more of the parties elects to take the estate at the appraised value, unless the court for good cause directs the entire payment to be made in cash, or unless all the parties in interest agree to different terms, the terms of payment shall be one-third (1/3) cash, one-third (1/3) in one (1) year and one-third (1/3) in two (2) years, with interest, the deferred payments to be secured to the satisfaction of the court. On payment in full or in part with sufficient security for the remainder, the sheriff shall make and execute a conveyance to the party electing to take the same according to the order of the court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 623; R.S. 1887, § 2971; R.S. 1899, § 4090; C.S. 1910, § 4950; C.S. 1920, § 6220; R.S. 1931, § 89-3810; C.S. 1945, § 3-6910; W.S. 1957, § 1-944; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-210.

Cross references. —

For provision that the successor to sheriff making the sale may execute deed, see § 1-32-116 .

Quoted in

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 9 P.3d 259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 1-32-111. Order for sale of estate in absence of election to take.

If no election to take the estate at the appraised value is made, at the instance of a party the court may order the sale thereof at public auction by the sheriff who executed the writ of partition or his successor.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 624; R.S. 1887, § 2972; R.S. 1899, § 4091; C.S. 1910, § 4951; C.S. 1920, § 6221; R.S. 1931, § 89-3811; C.S. 1945, § 3-6911; W.S. 1957, § 1-945; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-211.

Quoted in

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 9 P.3d 259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 1-32-112. Conduct and terms of sale.

All such sales shall be made at the courthouse unless the court for good cause directs it to be made on the premises. The sale shall be conducted in all respects as a sale upon execution except that it is not necessary to appraise the estate. The estate shall not be sold for less than two-thirds (2/3) of its appraised value as returned by the commissioners. Unless the court directs for good cause the entire payment to be made in cash, the purchase money is payable one-third (1/3) on the day of sale, one-third (1/3) in one (1) year and one-third (1/3) in two (2) years, with interest.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 625; R.S. 1887, § 2973; R.S. 1899, § 4092; C.S. 1910, § 4952; C.S. 1920, § 6222; R.S. 1931, § 89-3812; C.S. 1945, § 3-6912; W.S. 1957, § 1-946; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-212.

Cross references. —

As to rate of interest on judgments, see § 1-16-102 .

As to sale and redemption of realty upon execution, see chapter 18 of this title.

As to rate of interest when not provided otherwise by agreement or by law, see § 40-14-106(e).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Trust arising from parol agreement to bid on property sold at partition sale for person having an interest therein, 27 ALR2d 1285.

Estoppel of or waiver by parties or participants regarding irregularities or defects in partition sale, 2 A.L.R.2d 6.

Rights and remedies of one purchasing at partition sale where there was misrepresentation or mistake as to acreage or location of boundaries of tract sold, 69 ALR2d 254.

§ 1-32-113. Return by sheriff of proceedings of sale; confirmation by court; execution of deed of conveyance.

On the return by the sheriff of his proceedings the court shall examine the same. If a sale has been made and the court approves the sale, on receiving payment of the consideration money or taking sufficient security therefor to the satisfaction of the court, the sheriff shall execute and deliver a deed to the purchaser.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 626; R.S. 1887, § 2974; R.S. 1899, § 4093; C.S. 1910, § 4953; C.S. 1920, § 6223; R.S. 1931, § 89-3813; C.S. 1945, § 3-6913; W.S. 1957, § 1-947; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-213.

Cross references. —

For provision that successor to sheriff making sale may execute deed, see § 1-32-116 .

§ 1-32-114. Distribution of proceeds of sale or election to take; liability of sheriff and his sureties.

The money or securities arising from a sale of or an election to take the estate shall be distributed and paid by order of the court to the parties entitled thereto, in lieu of their respective parts and proportions of the estate and according to their just rights therein. All receipts of money or securities by the sheriff shall be in his official capacity, and his sureties on his official bond are liable for any misapplication thereof.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 627; R.S. 1887, § 2975; R.S. 1899, § 4094; C.S. 1910, § 4954; C.S. 1920, § 6224; R.S. 1931, § 89-3814; C.S. 1945, § 3-6914; W.S. 1957, § 1-948; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-214.

Cross references. —

As to amercement of officers generally, see chapter 24 of this title.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Rights of surviving spouse and children in proceeds of partition sale of homestead in decedent's estate, 6 ALR2d 515.

Partition action involving joint tenants with rights of survivorship.—

District court in partitioning a vacant lot that the parties owned as joint tenants with rights of survivorship properly ruled that each party owned an undivided, one-half interest in the property as one of the cotenants failed to rebut the presumption of equal shares. While the court could reduce one cotenant’s share of the proceeds by any disproportionate amount of property taxes and maintenance costs paid by the other cotenant, the court’s finding that the other cotenant had paid a particular sum of money in property taxes was erroneous. Gallagher v. Townsend, 2019 WY 66, 443 P.3d 847, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2019).

§ 1-32-115. Alias writ for sale; reappraisement by disinterested persons; sale with or without revaluation.

When the estate has been once offered and not sold, an alias writ for the sale thereof may be issued as often as need be. The court may order a reappraisement by three (3) disinterested persons of the vicinity appointed by the court, and direct a sale of the estate at not less than two-thirds (2/3) of such appraised value, or if the court deem it for the interest of the parties, may order a sale without such reappraisement at not less than a sum it may fix.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 628; R.S. 1887, § 2976; R.S. 1899, § 4095; C.S. 1910, § 4955; C.S. 1920, § 6225; R.S. 1931, § 89-3815; C.S. 1945, § 3-6915; W.S. 1957, § 1-949; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-215.

§ 1-32-116. Succeeding officer may make deed.

When a conveyance is not made by the officer who made the sale, the court being satisfied that the sale or election was regularly made and the purchase money has been fully paid or secured, may order the sheriff of the county or officer performing his duties to execute and deliver to the purchaser or person electing to take the property a deed for the lands sold or taken.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 629; R.S. 1887, § 2977; R.S. 1899, § 4096; C.S. 1910, § 4956; C.S. 1920, § 6226; R.S. 1931, § 89-3816; C.S. 1945, § 3-6916; W.S. 1957, § 1-950; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-216.

§ 1-32-117. Guardian may act for ward.

The guardian of a minor or other person under legal disability may on behalf of his ward do and perform any act respecting the partition of an estate which the minor or other person under legal disability could do. He may elect, on behalf of the ward, to take the estate when the same cannot be divided without injury, and make payments therefor on behalf of the ward.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 630; R.S. 1887, § 2978; R.S. 1899, § 4097; C.S. 1910, § 4957; C.S. 1920, § 6227; R.S. 1931, § 89-3817; C.S. 1945, § 3-6917; W.S. 1957, § 1-951; Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-217.

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Guardian's position as joint tenant or successor to property in ward's estate as raising conflict of interest, 69 ALR3d 1198.

§ 1-32-118. Powers of foreign guardian.

A person appointed according to the laws of any other state or country to take charge of the estate of a person under legal disability not a resident of this state, upon being duly authorized in this state to take charge of the estate situate in this state, may act in the partition of the estate to the same extent that the guardian of a person under legal disability is authorized to act by W.S. 1-32-117 .

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 631; R.S. 1887, § 2979; R.S. 1899, § 4098; C.S. 1910, § 4958; C.S. 1920, § 6228; R.S. 1931, § 89-3818; C.S. 1945, § 3-6918; W.S. 1957, § 1-952; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-218.

§ 1-32-119. Actions by 1 tenant in common or coparcener against another.

One (1) tenant in common or coparcener may recover from another his share of rents and profits received by the tenant in common or coparcener from the estate. One (1) parcener may maintain an action of waste against another, but no parcener shall possess any privileges over another in any election, division, partition or matter to be made or done concerning lands which have descended.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 632; R.S. 1887, § 2980; R.S. 1899, § 4099; C.S. 1910, § 4959; C.S. 1920, § 6229; R.S. 1931, § 89-3819; C.S. 1945, § 3-6919; W.S. 1957, § 1-953; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-219.

Law reviews. —

See “Accountability of a Cotenant for Use and Occupation,” 12 Wyo. L.J. 156.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Relief against cotenant for rents and profits or use in occupation as an incident of or adjustment in partition, 51 ALR2d 388.

Compensation, in partition proceedings, for improvements made or placed on premises of another by mistake, 57 ALR2d 263.

§ 1-32-120. Partition of property of religious corporations.

When two (2) or more religious denominations or other societies or associations have united in a corporation and as a corporation acquire title to real estate in this state, and subsequently agree to separate and form two (2) or more separate corporations, either corporation after the separate organization may file its petition for partition of property so acquired and held.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 633; R.S. 1887, § 2981; R.S. 1899, § 4100; C.S. 1910, § 4960; C.S. 1920, § 6230; R.S. 1931, § 89-3820; C.S. 1945, § 3-6920; W.S. 1957, § 1-954; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-220.

§ 1-32-121. Partition of property of religious societies.

When two (2) or more religious societies or congregations have acquired in common land upon which to erect a house of public worship, buildings for church or school purposes, or for a cemetery, and either desires to abandon the joint use of the property, it may commence an action for the partition of the common property except the cemetery, which may continue to be used in common.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 634; R.S. 1887, § 2982; R.S. 1899, § 4101; C.S. 1910, § 4961; C.S. 1920, § 6231; R.S. 1931, § 89-3821; C.S. 1945, § 3-6921; W.S. 1957, § 1-955; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-221.

§ 1-32-122. Costs and expenses to be equitably taxed.

The court shall tax the costs and expenses which accrue in the action including reasonable attorney’s fees for plaintiff’s attorney or any other attorney rendering service in the case for the common benefit of all the parties.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 636; R.S. 1887, § 2984; R.S. 1899, § 4103; C.S. 1910, § 4963; C.S. 1920, § 6233; R.S. 1931, § 89-3823; C.S. 1945, § 3-6923; W.S. 1957, § 1-957; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-222.

Cross references. —

As to fees and costs generally, see chapter 14 of this title.

Attorney's fee. —

In view of statute, trial court did not abuse discretion by allowing reasonable attorney's fee to plaintiff's counsel in partition action wherein asserted adverse interests were defeated, presumably by help of plaintiff's attorney. Hackett v. Linch, 57 Wyo. 289, 116 P.2d 868, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1941).

Cited in

TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Grieve, 887 P.2d 511, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Allowance and apportionment of attorney's fees. 94 ALR2d 575.

Amount of attorney's compensation in matters involving real estate, 58 ALR3d 201.

Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees in matters involving real estate—modern cases, 10 ALR5th 448.

Article 2. Quieting Title, Ejectment, Rights of Occupying Claimants

Cross references. —

As to limitations of actions concerning real estate generally, see § 1-3-102 .

As to venue of actions concerning real estate, see §§ 1-5-101 and 1-5-102 .

As to lis pendens when real estate is located in other counties, see § 1-6-107 .

Law reviews. —

See “Mineral Severance in Wyoming,” 2 Wyo. L.J. 62.

For comment, “Procedural Considerations in the Judicial Determination of Water Disputes,” see VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 513 (1974).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

25 Am. Jur. 2d Ejectment § 1 et seq.; 41 Am. Jur. 2d Improvements §§ 5 to 29; 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title and Determination of Adverse Claims § 1 et seq.

28A C.J.S. Ejectment § 1 et seq.; 42 C.J.S. Improvements §§ 4 to 9.

§ 1-32-201. Action to quiet title.

An action may be brought by a person in possession of real property against any person who claims an estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining the adverse estate or interest. The person bringing the action may hold possession himself or by his tenant.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 637; R.S. 1887, § 2985; R.S. 1899, § 4104; C.S. 1910, § 4964; C.S. 1920, § 6234; R.S. 1931, § 89-3901; C.S. 1945, § 3-7001; W.S. 1957, § 1-958; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-301.

Cross references. —

As to statute of limitations for actions for recovery of real property, see § 1-3-103 .

Purpose for which action to quiet title is brought is to determine adverse claims to real property to secure repose and put at rest in one comprehensive action all adverse and conflicting claims, to fix the status of the land with respect to ownership, and to establish by decree a muniment of title to it. Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, 652 P.2d 395, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 390 (Wyo. 1982).

Nature of action. —

Proceeding to quiet title is an action equitable in its nature and governed by rules pertaining to suits in equity, except where statute directs otherwise. Norris v. United Mineral Prods. Co., 61 Wyo. 386, 158 P.2d 679, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1945).

“Possession” means possession of land when one is in occupation thereof, with the intention, actually realized, of excluding occupation by others, or when, although not in actual occupation, one claims the right of exclusive occupation, and no person is in occupation opposing that claim. Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1947).

The definition of possession found in § 34-2-131 (a)(iv) (tax deeds) pertains only to §§ 34-2-131 through 34-2-135 and cannot be applied to a determination of whether a party has complied with the possession requirement under this section. Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1995).

Ownership not essential to maintain suit. —

It was intention of legislature in enacting this section to emphasize prescriptive laws of universal recognition in the western states that ownership of title is not essential to maintenance of suit to quiet title action. Gillis v. Downey, 85 F. 483, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2183 (8th Cir. 1898).

But possession required. —

In an action to quiet title to land held under alleged void tax deed, where plaintiff was not in possession, ejectment, rather than a quiet title action, was held proper remedy. Huber v. Delong, 54 Wyo. 240, 91 P.2d 53, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1939).

In consolidated civil actions involving ownership disputes among neighboring landowners, the trial court's grant of appellees' quiet title claim was reversed because appellees did not prove that they were in possession of the disputed portion of their tract. In fact, they proved the opposite. Bellis v. Kersey, 2010 WY 138, 241 P.3d 818, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2010).

Basis for rule requiring possession by plaintiff. —

The rule requiring actual possession by plaintiff in an action to quiet title is based on the availability of full protection through an action in ejectment or its statutory substitute. Amick v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 269, 314 P.2d 944, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1957).

If land is not occupied by anyone, the plaintiff having title may sue to have his title quieted, either because the remedy exists independent of the statute or because his title gives him constructive possession. Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1947).

The plaintiff was entitled to maintain her quiet title action where, although she did not physically reside on the property, she claimed title to it by virtue of a tax deed, visited the property on a number of occasions, paid the property taxes, made efforts to obtain title insurance and financing so that she could develop the property, and discussed the development of the property with a builder/developer. Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1995).

Plaintiff without federal patent. —

In action by one in possession of land, claiming under certificate of purchase issued by United States land office, against another claimant under an entry, court had jurisdiction to determine the right to possession, but, no patent having been issued, it had no jurisdiction to determine title, and until patent issues the courts cannot control the disposal of the lands. Laramie Nat'l Bank v. Steinhoff, 11 Wyo. 290, 71 P. 992, 73 P. 209, 1903 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1903).

Suit by administrator. —

An administrator could sue to quiet title to irrigation ditch rights, particularly in view of former § 2-161 (now § 2-7-401 ), which so provided. Bamforth v. Ihmsen, 28 Wyo. 282, 204 P. 345, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 28 Wyo. 282, 205 P. 1004, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1922).

Suit by mortgagee. —

Mortgagee not in possession is entitled to sue to cancel quitclaim deed as cloud. Chesney v. Valley Live Stock Co., 34 Wyo. 378, 244 P. 216, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1926).

Possession analogous to that of tenant. —

A town could bring an action to quiet title to a tract of land against a defendant, who claimed a lien against the property, where the town held title to the property for the benefit of a federal agency, which agency had erected buildings thereon, since the federal agency, while not exactly a tenant, occupied a position analogous thereto. Amick v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 269, 314 P.2d 944, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1957).

Claim under void tax title dismissed. —

Where defendant was in possession and had made improvements on her tract, but she did not have legal title and claimed under a void tax title, her counterclaim to quiet her title was properly dismissed. Morad v. Brown, 549 P.2d 312, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1976).

Adverse claim need not be of any particular character. Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1947).

Party need not bring quiet title action after adverse title vests. —

A party holding title by adverse possession is not barred by § 1-3-103 because he does not bring a quiet title action within 10 years after his adverse title vests. Sanders v. Lidle, 674 P.2d 1291, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1984).

Once adverse title is vested, subsequent possession need not be adverse up to time quiet title action is filed, so long as title is not divested in the meantime. Sanders v. Lidle, 674 P.2d 1291, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1984).

Quiet title and ejectment actions distinguished. —

A quiet title action requires proof of possession, while an ejectment action requires proof that the complainant is illegally being kept from possession. Bragg v. Marion, 663 P.2d 505, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 320 (Wyo. 1983).

Petition. —

In an action brought under this section, a petition which not only alleges possession in plaintiff, but that he claims title in fee, is not demurrable because it does not more particularly describe such title. Durell v. Abbott, 6 Wyo. 265, 44 P. 647, 1896 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1896).

Partnership owned mineral interests in certain land because, inter alia, the partnership's predecessor acquired title by default judgment pursuant to a properly stated quiet title and adverse possession suit under which the predecessor was broadly granted the entire property when other potential interest owners did not respond. Clay v. Mt. Valley Mineral Ltd P'ship, 2015 WY 84, 351 P.3d 961, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2015).

Burden. —

The burden of showing a better right is met when the defendant produces evidence of record title. It is then incumbent upon the plaintiff in possession to overcome the defendants' prima facie showing. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966).

Admission. —

The admission of the defendants that plaintiff was in possession of the disputed tract constituted a prima facie showing of an interest in the land that was good against any claimant that could not show a better right. Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1966).

Property restored to record title holder where adverse claimants without “clean hands.” —

Since holders by adverse possession failed to demonstrate the equities (“clean hands”) which entitled them to prevail in quiet title action, the district court properly treated action as a claim for ejectment and restored the disputed property to the record title holder. Harsha v. Anastos, 693 P.2d 760, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 423 (Wyo. 1985).

Partial summary jugment granted because no agreement, reasonable reliance or misrepresention. —

Partial summary judgment was properly granted to an owner in a quiet title action because there was no oral contract between the owner and two relatives regarding the management of a ranch since, at most, it was an “agreement to agree.” Promissory estoppel did not remove the requirements of the statute of frauds because the reliance was not reasonable, and equitable estoppel did not apply either since there was no evidence of any misrepresentation. Parkhurst v. Boykin, 2004 WY 90, 94 P.3d 450, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 2004).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction.—

District court had subject matter jurisdiction because an airport had no duty to comply with the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 when it was seeking redress for the independent acts of a lessee, which was not a bank or a financial institution. Sky Harbor Air Serv. v. Cheyenne Reg'l Airport Bd., 2016 WY 17, 368 P.3d 264, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2016).

For case where plaintiffs failed to prove title or interest in property, and, therefore, could not bring action to quiet title, see Hirsch v. McNeill, 870 P.2d 1057, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1994).

Quoted in

Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, 226 P.3d 889, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Mar. 23, 2010).

Cited in

Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1916); Denny v. Stevens, 52 Wyo. 253, 73 P.2d 308, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 48 , 113 A.L.R. 1337 (1937); Yene v. Stassinos, 730 P.2d 791, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 650 (Wyo. 1986).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Remedy of tenant against third person wrongfully interfering with his possession, 12 ALR2d 1192.

Maintainability, by lessee, of action to quiet title to leasehold, 51 ALR2d 1227.

Real-property/quiet-title actions against United States under Quiet Title Act (28 USCS § 2409a), 60 ALR Fed 645.

§ 1-32-202. Petition in actions to recover realty; sufficiency.

In an action to recover real property it is sufficient if the plaintiff’s petition states that he has a legal estate in and is entitled to possession of the real property, describing the same with sufficient certainty as to enable an officer holding an execution to identify it, and that the defendant unlawfully keeps him out of possession. It is not necessary to state how the plaintiff’s estate or ownership is derived.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 639; R.S. 1887, § 2987; R.S. 1899, § 4106; C.S. 1910, § 4966; C.S. 1920, § 6236; R.S. 1931, § 89-3903; C.S. 1945, § 3-7003; W.S. 1957, § 1-959; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-302.

Assignment.—

Dissolved homeowners association (HOA) equitably assigned ownership of a lot to a second HOA. Since the second HOA had legal title to the lot and was entitled to possession, summary judgment in favor of the second HOA on its claim for ejectment was affirmed. Prancing Antelope I, LLC v. Saratoga Inn Overlook Homeowners Ass'n, 2021 WY 3, 478 P.3d 1171, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2021).

Action is less technical than common-law action. —

The action for recovery of real property under this section and § 1-32-203 , is the same in substance as common-law action in ejectment without the fictions and technicalities of pleading and practice with which it was encumbered. Allen v. Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Ejectment and quiet title actions distinguished. —

A quiet title action requires proof of possession, while an ejectment action requires proof that the complainant is illegally being kept from possession. Bragg v. Marion, 663 P.2d 505, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 320 (Wyo. 1983).

Proper allegations. —

A petition alleging ownership of real property, a present right to its possession, and that defendant unlawfully keeps plaintiff out of possession, together with allegations as to a lease between plaintiff and defendant and breach of covenants and conditions by defendant, properly stated an action in ejectment, of which the district court has jurisdiction, and not an action in forcible entry and detainer. Allen v. Houn, 29 Wyo. 413, 213 P. 757, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Quantum of estate. —

Under this section it is not necessary to allege the quantum of the estate. Jenkins v. Jeffrey, 3 Wyo. 669, 29 P. 186, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1892).

Joinder of actions. —

An action in ejectment may be joined with one to remove cloud from the title and cancellation of instruments. Johnson v. Sellers, 53 Wyo. 403, 84 P.2d 744, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1938).

Misjoinder. —

Where a misjoinder of separate causes of action is not apparent upon the face of the petition, the defect must be raised by answer or it will be waived. Johnson v. Sellers, 53 Wyo. 403, 84 P.2d 744, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1938).

Effect of affidavits. —

In an action to quiet title to land held under an alleged void tax deed, injunction was issued without notice and on verified petition, restraining defendants from interfering with plaintiff's possession, plaintiff not being in possession, ejectment was held proper remedy. Before answer was filed trial court vacated the injunction on affidavits on motion, and in passing thereon, the judge could give defensive matters set up in the affidavits the same effect as if set up in an answer. Huber v. Delong, 54 Wyo. 240, 91 P.2d 53, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1939).

General denial. —

Under § 1-32-203 , defendant's general denial of the allegations of the petition in an action to recover possession of land is simply a denial of plaintiff's title and an admission of defendant's possession; it will not support evidence to show an equitable defense. ANDERSON v. RASMUSSEN, 5 Wyo. 44, 36 P. 820, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1894).

Plaintiff must show his title and right to possession. —

A plaintiff in order to maintain the action of ejectment must show that he has title to and is entitled to possession of the land. Tibbals v. Mica Mountain Mines, Inc., 172 F.2d 449, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2729 (10th Cir. Wyo.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925, 69 S. Ct. 1169, 93 L. Ed. 1733, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 2326 (U.S. 1949), reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S. Ct. 34, 94 L. Ed. 513 (U.S. 1949).

Plaintiff must show right and title giving right to possession. Allen v. Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Plaintiffs who did not have either the legal or equitable title to mining claims could not maintain ejectment to recover possession of the mining claims. Tibbals v. Mica Mountain Mines, Inc., 172 F.2d 449, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2729 (10th Cir. Wyo.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925, 69 S. Ct. 1169, 93 L. Ed. 1733, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 2326 (U.S. 1949), reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S. Ct. 34, 94 L. Ed. 513 (U.S. 1949).

Defendant may defeat action by showing lease. —

The tenant may defeat the action by showing that he holds under a lease which has not expired. Allen v. Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Or equitable title. —

The defendant may show an equitable title defeating plaintiff's right to possession. Allen v. Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Violation of lease. —

District court had jurisdiction in landlord's action to recover possession of property on ground that tenant had violated a condition of lease, the action under the pleadings being one for the recovery of real property, under this section and § 1-32-203 , the statutory substitute for the common law action in ejectment, and not a forcible entry and detainer action. Allen v. Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Common source of title. —

Where in ejectment action both parties claim title from same source for all purposes of the case it is treated as if title resided in that source, each party being estopped from denying it, and so far as respects that source the inquiry is reduced to which party, if either, has title from that source. Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wyo. 385, 1881 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1881), writ of error dismissed, 105 U.S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 1018, 1881 U.S. LEXIS 2110 (U.S. 1882).

Where neither plaintiff nor defendant has possession. —

Where the evidence showed that neither plaintiff nor defendant was in actual possession of a mineral estate or the surface estate, it did not justify an action to recover possession under this section, the statutory substitute for common-law ejectment. Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1947).

Adverse possession. —

Possession to be “adverse,” must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, hostile, and under color of right. City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929).

The prime object in prescribing how adverse possession shall be manifested is to advise real owner that his ownership is in danger. City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929).

Encroachment. —

That adjoining owner's house encroached slightly on strip claimed by defendant, held not to affect exclusiveness of defendant's possession. City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929).

Acceptance of third mortgage. —

Acceptance by first mortgagee of a third mortgage including the amount due on the first mortgage did not, in absence of agreement to contrary, discharge the lien of the first mortgage, and the first mortgagee continued to hold first and third liens on the property. Bolln v. La Prele Live Stock Co., 27 Wyo. 335, 196 P. 748, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1921).

Burden of proof. —

Presumption is that one occupying land for prescriptive period under mistake as to boundary occupies adversely under claim of right, burden of proof being on one claiming contrary. City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929).

Evidence of ownership. —

Prior possession is prima facie evidence of ownership. Allen v. Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1923).

Question of fact. —

Doubt whether possession is adverse must be submitted to trier of facts; otherwise it may be law question on undisputed facts. City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1929).

In consolidated civil actions involving ownership disputes among neighboring landowners, the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous as they related to the denial of appellants' adverse possession claim, as they related to the grant of appellees' trespass and ejectment claims, or as they related to actual trespass damages awarded to appellees. Bellis v. Kersey, 2010 WY 138, 241 P.3d 818, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2010).

Foreclosure of lien. —

In vendor's suit to foreclose his lien, court may order a sale in satisfaction of the lien, as on foreclosure of a mortgage, if deeming it the more equitable manner of granting relief under the circumstances. Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1916).

Foreclosure on contract. —

In a vendor's action to foreclose as mortgage the contract of sale, judgment, quieting plaintiff's title and putting him in possession, appearing to have been formed upon theory of strict foreclosure of mortgage, but failing to allow defendants any time in which to pay the amount due, was improper. Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1916).

In a vendor's suit to foreclose as mortgage the contract of sale, judgment quieting title in him was to be construed as based upon equitable principles, foreclosing defendants' interest in the lands and awarding possession merely as an ancillary equitable remedy. Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1916).

Applied in

Harsha v. Anastos, 693 P.2d 760, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 423 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Iba v. Central Ass'n, 5 Wyo. 355, 40 P. 527, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (1895); Morad v. Brown, 549 P.2d 312, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1976); Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1995).

Law reviews. —

See “Mineral Severance in Wyoming,” 2 Wyo. L.J. 62.

For comment, “Procedural Considerations in the Judicial Determination of Water Disputes,” see VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 513 (1974).

§ 1-32-203. Petition in action to recover realty; answer.

It is sufficient if the defendant’s answer denies generally the title alleged in the petition or that he withholds the possession, but if he denies the title of the plaintiff, possession by the defendant shall be taken as admitted. When he does not defend for the whole premises, the answer shall describe the particular part for which defense is made.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 640; R.S. 1887, § 2988; R.S. 1899, § 4107; C.S. 1910, § 4967; C.S. 1920, § 6237; R.S. 1931, § 89-3904; C.S. 1945, § 3-7004; W.S. 1957, § 1-960; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-303.

Reply. —

No reply is required to an answer in ejectment, which denies the allegations of plaintiff's ownership and right to possession, and avers title and right in defendant. Iba v. Central Ass'n, 5 Wyo. 355, 40 P. 527, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 5 Wyo. 355, 42 P. 20, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1895).

Waiver of defect. —

Alleged defect resulting from failure to make defendant a party defendant in representative capacity is waived where point was raised neither by demurrer (now motion to dismiss) nor by answer in court below. Delfelder v. Teton Land & Inv. Co., 46 Wyo. 142, 24 P.2d 702, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 46 Wyo. 142, 26 P.2d 153, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1933).

Cited in

Anderson v. Rasmussen, 5 Wyo. 44, 36 P. 820, 1894 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1894); Allen v. Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (1923).

§ 1-32-204. Petition in action against cotenant.

If the action is by a tenant in common against a cotenant, the plaintiff must state that the defendant either denied the plaintiff’s right or did some act amounting to such denial.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 641; R.S. 1887, § 2989; R.S. 1899, § 4108; C.S. 1910, § 4968; C.S. 1920, § 6238; R.S. 1931, § 89-3905; C.S. 1945, § 3-7005; W.S. 1957, § 1-961; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-304.

Cited in

Burnham v. Coffinberry, 2003 WY 109, 76 P.3d 296, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2003).

§ 1-32-205. Recovery when right terminates during action.

In an action for the recovery of real property when the plaintiff shows a right to recover at the time the action was commenced but his right has terminated during the pendency of the action, the verdict and judgment must be according to the fact and the plaintiff may recover for withholding the property.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 642; R.S. 1887, § 2990; R.S. 1899, § 4109; C.S. 1910, § 4969; C.S. 1920, § 6239; R.S. 1931, § 89-3906; C.S. 1945, § 3-7006; W.S. 1957, § 1-962; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-305.

§ 1-32-206. Benefit of occupying claimant law.

Parties in an action for the recovery of real property may avail themselves of the statutes for the relief of occupying claimants of land.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 643; R.S. 1887, § 2991; R.S. 1899, § 4110; C.S. 1910, § 4970; C.S. 1920, § 6240; R.S. 1931, § 89-3907; C.S. 1945, § 3-7007; W.S. 1957, § 1-963; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-306.

Value of improvements. —

In ejectment, a proceeding to assess value of improvements of occupying claimant, was not a separate action. Brewer v. Folsom Bros. Co., 43 Wyo. 433, 5 P.2d 283, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1931), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 517, 7 P.2d 224, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1932).

Occupying claimant not applying in ejectment action for value of improvements cannot maintain a separate suit for the improvements. Brewer v. Folsom Bros. Co., 43 Wyo. 433, 5 P.2d 283, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1931), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 517, 7 P.2d 224, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1932).

Limitations. —

Special statute of limitations governing recovery of property sold for taxes does not start to run in favor of tax sale purchaser until he has deed and takes possession. Denny v. Stevens, 52 Wyo. 253, 73 P.2d 308, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1937), reh'g denied, 52 Wyo. 253, 73 P.2d 308, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1938).

Cited in

Morad v. Brown, 549 P.2d 312, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1976); Morad v. Whitaker, 565 P.2d 484, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 264 (Wyo. 1977).

Law reviews. —

See “The Tax Sale Purchaser's Lien,” 4 Wyo. L.J. 275.

§ 1-32-207. Conditions under which occupying claimant to be paid for improvements.

  1. A person in quiet possession of land or  tenement who claims to own the land and who has obtained title to  and is in possession of the land without fraud or collusion on his  part, shall not be evicted or turned out of possession by any person  who proves an adverse and better title until the occupying claimant  or his heirs are fully paid the value of all lasting and valuable  improvements made on the land by him or by the person under whom he  holds, previous to receiving actual notice by the commencement of  suit on the adverse claim under which eviction may be effected, unless  the occupying claimant refuses to pay to the person proving an adverse  and better title the value of the land, without improvements made  thereon, upon demand of the successful claimant or his heirs as hereinafter  provided:
    1. If the occupying claimant holds a plain  and connected title in law or equity, derived from the records of  a public office;
    2. If he holds the same by deed, devise,  descent, contract, bond or agreement from and under a person claiming  title as aforesaid, derived from the records of a public office, or  by deed duly authenticated and recorded;
    3. If he holds under sale on execution against  a person claiming title as aforesaid, derived from the records of  a public office, or by deed duly authenticated and recorded;
    4. If he holds under a sale for taxes authorized  by the laws of this state; or
    5. If he holds under a sale and conveyance  made by executors, administrators or guardians or by any other person  in pursuance of an order of court where lands are or have been directed  to be sold.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 644; R.S. 1887, § 2992; R.S. 1899, § 4111; C.S. 1910, § 4971; C.S. 1920, § 6241; R.S. 1931, § 89-3908; C.S. 1945, § 3-7008; W.S. 1957, § 1-964; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-307.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Declaratory judgment. —

Declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate city's sale of realty, to which persons entitled to reimbursement for improvements were not made parties, could not prejudice the latters' rights. Quackenbush v. Cheyenne, 52 Wyo. 146, 70 P.2d 577, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1937).

Necessary parties. —

In action to invalidate sale of real estate by city, persons who had subsequently acquired title to part thereof and made improvements, not having been made parties, reviewing court would not make any announcement which would prejudice their rights and send case back to district court with direction to dismiss. Quackenbush v. Cheyenne, 52 Wyo. 146, 70 P.2d 577, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1937).

Proceeding to assess value. —

In ejectment, a proceeding to assess value of improvements of occupying claimant, was not a separate action. Brewer v. Folsom Bros. Co., 43 Wyo. 433, 5 P.2d 283, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1931), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 517, 7 P.2d 224, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1932).

Who is entitled. —

One who took and held possession of land, but not by virtue of any contract or agreement from or under a person claiming title derived from the public records or otherwise, is not entitled to the benefits of the occupying claimants' act. Brown v. Grady, 16 Wyo. 151, 92 P. 622, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1907).

In a dispute between a tax sale purchaser and a mortgagee over the validity of the purchaser’s tax deed, the purchaser’s statutory reimbursement claims were not ripe because the mortgagee (1) had not sought to evict the purchaser, and (2) was not a “person redeeming real property.”Montierth v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 2018 WY 41, 415 P.3d 654, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 2018).

Good faith. —

Improvements on another's land must have been made in good faith to authorize recovery of compensation in equity. Casper Nat'l Bank v. Swanson, 42 Wyo. 113, 291 P. 812, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1930).

Subrogation. —

Mortgagee of property of insane ward acquired by mortgagor wrongfully from guardian of ward was not entitled to subrogation to mortgage and lien claims paid with mortgagee's funds. Casper Nat'l Bank v. Swanson, 42 Wyo. 113, 291 P. 812, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1930).

Value of improvements. —

Occupying claimant not applying in ejectment action for value of improvements cannot maintain a separate suit for the improvements. Brewer v. Folsom Bros. Co., 43 Wyo. 433, 5 P.2d 283, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1931), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 517, 7 P.2d 224, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1932).

Cited in

Van Patten v. Van Patten, 784 P.2d 218, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 241 (Wyo. 1989).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Compensation, upon eviction, for improvements made or placed on premises of another by mistake, 57 ALR2d 263.

Air-conditioning appliance, equipment or apparatus as fixture, 69 ALR4th 359.

§ 1-32-208. Conditions under which occupying claimant to be paid for improvements; tax title sufficient to protect occupant.

  1. The title by which the successful claimant  succeeds against the occupying claimant in all cases of lands sold  for taxes by virtue of any law of this state shall be considered an  adverse and better title, under the provisions of W.S. 1-32-207 , whether it is the title under which taxes were due and  for which the land was sold, or any other title or claim.
  2. The occupying claimant holding possession  of land sold for taxes, having the deed of a collector of taxes or  county treasurer therefor or a certificate of the sale from a collector  of taxes or a county treasurer, or claiming under the person who holds  the deed or certificate shall be considered as having sufficient title  to the land to demand the value of improvements as provided by law.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 645; R.S. 1887, § 2993; R.S. 1899, § 4112; C.S. 1910, § 4972; C.S. 1920, § 6242; R.S. 1931, § 89-3909; C.S. 1945, § 3-7009; W.S. 1957, § 1-965; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-308.

Cross references. —

As to tax deeds, see §§ 34-2-131 to 34-2-135 .

As to sale of real estate for taxes generally, see § 39-13-108 .

In general. —

Under occupying claimant's statute, person holding possession of land sold for taxes, having deed of a collector of taxes or county treasurer therefor, or certificate of such sale from a collector of taxes, or county treasurer or claiming under a person who holds such deed or certificate has sufficient title to demand value of improvements and taxes paid, together with interest. Walther v. Steward, 54 Wyo. 160, 88 P.2d 475, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1939).

Limitations. —

Special statute of limitations governing recovery of property sold for taxes does not start to run in favor of tax sale purchaser until he has deed and takes possession. Denny v. Stevens, 52 Wyo. 253, 73 P.2d 308, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1937), reh'g denied, 52 Wyo. 253, 73 P.2d 308, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1938).

Pleadings. —

In action involving validity of a tax title, plaintiff did not claim reimbursement for taxes paid, nor improvements, and was adjudged not entitled to the property but court order gave ten days to file supplemental petition setting up such claims; it was held that it was immaterial whether petition was entitled “supplemental” or amendment to his original petition, as issues were made up and tried and neither party was injured by the designation. Walther v. Steward, 54 Wyo. 160, 88 P.2d 475, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1939).

Law reviews. —

See “The Tax Sale Purchaser's Lien,” 4 Wyo. L.J. 275.

§ 1-32-209. Entry of claim against occupying claimant; subsequent procedure.

At the request of either party, the court rendering judgment against the occupying claimant shall cause a docket entry thereof to be made, and the cause shall then proceed as do other civil actions.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 646; R.S. 1887, § 2994; R.S. 1899, § 4113; C.S. 1910, § 4973; C.S. 1920, § 6243; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 107; R.S. 1931, § 89-3910; C.S. 1945, § 3-7010; W.S. 1957, § 1-966; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-309.

Proceeding to assess value. —

In ejectment, a proceeding to assess value of improvements of occupying claimant was not a separate action. Brewer v. Folsom Bros. Co., 43 Wyo. 433, 5 P.2d 283, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1931), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 517, 7 P.2d 224, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1932).

Suit for cancellation. —

Mortgagee not in possession and having merely lien was entitled to maintain suit for cancellation of quitclaim deed as cloud, there being no adequate remedy at law. Chesney v. Valley Live Stock Co., 34 Wyo. 378, 244 P. 216, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1926).

Suit for improvements. —

Occupying claimant not applying in ejectment action for value of improvements cannot maintain a separate suit for the improvements. Brewer v. Folsom Bros. Co., 43 Wyo. 433, 5 P.2d 283, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1931), reh'g denied, 43 Wyo. 517, 7 P.2d 224, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1932).

§ 1-32-210. Question of fact to be tried by jury upon request; view of premises; findings; trial by court without jury.

  1. An occupying claimant desiring a jury  trial shall have five (5) days and the opposite party ten (10) days  after the rendering of the judgment as provided in W.S. 1-32-209 to demand a jury and deposit a jury fee as in civil actions.  If no jury is demanded the case shall be tried by the court.
  2. For the trial of the question of fact  a jury, if demanded, shall view the premises in question. From the  view and the testimony, the jury shall find in their verdict:
    1. The reasonable value of the permanent  and valuable improvements made on the land previous to the occupying  claimant’s receipt of actual notice of the adverse claim of the plaintiff;
    2. The damages, if any, the land has sustained  by waste, including the value of the timber or other valuable material  removed or destroyed; and
    3. The net annual value of the rents and  profits of the land accruing after the occupying claimant received  notice of claim by service of summons.
  3. The jury shall find the value of the land  at the time judgment was rendered with the improvements thereon and  its value without the improvements or damages sustained by waste and  return their verdict in open court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 647; R.S. 1887, § 2995; R.S. 1899, § 4114; C.S. 1910, § 4974; C.S. 1920, § 6244; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 108; R.S. 1931, § 89-3911; C.S. 1945, § 3-7011; W.S. 1957, § 1-967; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-310.

Cross references. —

As to qualifications, selection and impanelling of jury, see § 1-11-101 et seq.

Good faith. —

In order that one may recover compensation for improvements made on another's land, even in a court of equity, the improvements must have been made upon the land in good faith. Casper Nat'l Bank v. Swanson, 42 Wyo. 113, 291 P. 812, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1930).

Where a loan company accepted a mortgage on real estate to secure funds used to discharge prior liens thereon for improvements placed on the lands by the mortgagor to whom the lands had been conveyed by a guardian of the real owner pursuant to void sale proceedings, of which said loan company was charged with notice, it will not be accorded relief in equity as a purchaser in good faith. Casper Nat'l Bank v. Swanson, 42 Wyo. 113, 291 P. 812, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1930).

§ 1-32-211. Setting aside verdict and judgment.

The verdict of the jury or judgment of the court are subject to the same rules for setting aside verdicts and judgments as provided in any other civil action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 649; R.S. 1887, § 2997; R.S. 1899, § 4116; C.S. 1910, § 4976; C.S. 1920, § 6246; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 109; R.S. 1931, § 89-3912; C.S. 1945, § 3-7012; W.S. 1957, § 1-968; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-311.

Cross references. —

As to modification or vacation of judgment generally, see §§ 1-16-401 to 1-16-409 .

As to new trials and amendment of judgments, see Rule 59, W.R.C.P.

As to relief from judgment or orders, see Rule 60, W.R.C.P.

§ 1-32-212. Judgment on report of jury in favor of plaintiff in ejectment.

If the jury reports a sum in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment on the assessment and valuation of the valuable improvements, the assessment of damages for waste and the net annual value of the rents and profits, the court shall render judgment therefor and issue execution thereon. If no such excess be reported the plaintiff in ejectment is barred from having or maintaining an action for mesne profits.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 650; R.S. 1887, § 2998; R.S. 1899, § 4117; C.S. 1910, § 4977; C.S. 1920, § 6247; R.S. 1931, § 89-3913; C.S. 1945, § 3-7013; W.S. 1957, § 1-969; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-312.

§ 1-32-213. Proceedings if report of jury is for occupying claimant.

If the jury reports a sum in favor of the occupying claimant on the assessment and valuation of the valuable improvements, deducting therefrom any damages sustained by waste and the net annual value of the rents and profits which the occupying claimant has received after the commencement of the action, the successful claimant or his heirs may either demand of the occupying claimant the value of the land without the improvements so assessed and tender a deed of the land to the occupying claimant, or may pay the occupying claimant the sum allowed by the jury in his favor, within such reasonable time as the court shall allow.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 651; R.S. 1887, § 2999; R.S. 1899, § 4118; C.S. 1910, § 4978; C.S. 1920, § 6248; R.S. 1931, § 89-3914; C.S. 1945, § 3-7014; W.S. 1957, § 1-970; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-313.

Declaratory judgment. —

Declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate city's sale of realty, to which persons entitled to reimbursement for improvements were not made parties, could not prejudice the latters' rights. Quackenbush v. Cheyenne, 52 Wyo. 146, 70 P.2d 577, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1937).

Cited in

Quackenbush v. City of Cheyenne, 52 Wyo. 146, 70 P.2d 577, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (1937).

§ 1-32-214. Writ of possession to issue on payment for improvements.

If the successful claimant, his heirs or their guardians elect to pay to the occupying claimant the sum reported in his favor by the jury, a writ of possession shall issue in favor of the successful claimant, his heirs or their guardians.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 652; R.S. 1887, § 3000; R.S. 1899, § 4119; C.S. 1910, § 4979; C.S. 1920, § 6249; R.S. 1931, § 89-3915; C.S. 1945, § 3-7015; W.S. 1957, § 1-971; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-314.

§ 1-32-215. Writ of possession to issue if deed tendered and payment refused.

If the successful claimant, his heirs or their guardians elect to receive the value of the land without improvements, assessed to be paid by the occupying claimant, and tender a general warranty deed conveying their adverse or better title within the time allowed by the court for the payment of money, and the occupying claimant refuses or neglects to pay the successful claimant, his heirs or their guardians within the time limited, a writ of possession shall issue in favor of the successful claimant, his heirs or their guardians.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 653; R.S. 1887, § 3001; R.S. 1899, § 4120; C.S. 1910, § 4980; C.S. 1920, § 6250; R.S. 1931, § 89-3916; C.S. 1945, § 3-7016; W.S. 1957, § 1-972; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-315.

§ 1-32-216. Occupying claimant and heirs not to be evicted except as provided in W.S. 1-32-214 and 1-32-215; right to bring action for title.

The occupying claimant or his heirs shall not be evicted from possession of the land except as provided in W.S. 1-32-214 and 1-32-215 where application is made for the value of improvements. When an election is made by the successful claimant, his heirs or their guardians to surrender lands under the provisions of W.S. 1-32-207 through 1-32-216 the occupying claimant or his heirs may, at any time after payment is made, bring an action in the court where judgment of eviction was obtained, and obtain judgment for the title of the land if it has not been previously conveyed to the occupant.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 654; R.S. 1887, § 3002; R.S. 1899, § 4121; C.S. 1910, § 4981; C.S. 1920, § 6251; R.S. 1931, § 89-3917; C.S. 1945, § 3-7017; W.S. 1957, § 1-973; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-316.

Article 3. Sale or Lease of Certain Interests

Cross references. —

As to deeds, mortgages and leases generally, see §§ 34-2-101 to 34-2-130 .

Law reviews. —

See “Survival of Certain Feudal Law Concepts in Wyoming,” 2 Wyo. L.J. 91.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts §§ 553 to 629.

90A C.J.S. Trusts §§ 404 to 481.

§ 1-32-301. Authorization to sell qualified fee.

In an action by the owner of any qualified or conditional fee or any other qualified, conditional or determinable interest, or by a person claiming under such owner, or by the trustees or beneficiaries of an estate held in trust, the district courts may authorize the sale of any estate, whether created by will, deed, contract or descent, when satisfied that a sale would be for the benefit of the person holding the first and present estate, interest or use and do no substantial injury to the heirs in tail or others in expectancy, succession, reversion or remainder.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 661; R.S. 1887, § 3009; R.S. 1899, § 4128; C.S. 1910, § 4988; C.S. 1920, § 6258; R.S. 1931, § 89-3922; C.S. 1945, § 3-6401; W.S. 1957, § 1-974; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-401.

Cross references. —

For provision prohibiting creation of estate in fee tail, see § 34-1-137 .

Expectancies or contingent interests are alienable property. Caldwell v. Armstrong, 342 F.2d 485, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 6212 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1965).

§ 1-32-302. Requisites of petition; parties.

The petition shall contain a description of the estate to be sold, a clear statement of the interest of the plaintiff, and a copy of the will, deed or other instrument of writing by which the estate is created. All persons in being who are interested in the estate or who may by the terms of the will, deed or other instrument creating the estate become interested as heir, reversioner or otherwise, shall be made parties to the petition. If the name or residence of any person who ought to be made a party is unknown to the plaintiff, the fact shall be verified by the affidavit of the plaintiff and the sale may be ordered notwithstanding such names and residences are unknown.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 662; R.S. 1887, § 3010; R.S. 1899, § 4129; C.S. 1910, § 4989; C.S. 1920, § 6259; R.S. 1931, § 89-3923; C.S. 1945, § 3-6402; W.S. 1957, § 1-975; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-402.

§ 1-32-303. Hearing of petition; order for and effect of sale.

Upon hearing the petition if it is shown a sale of the estate would be for the benefit of the tenant in tail or for life, and do no substantial injury to the heirs in tail or others in expectancy, succession, reversion or remainder, the court shall direct a sale of the estate to be made and the manner thereof, and shall appoint some suitable person to make the sale. The sale shall vest the estate sold in the purchaser, freed from the entailment, limitation or condition.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 663; R.S. 1887, § 3011; R.S. 1899, § 4130; C.S. 1910, § 4990; C.S. 1920, § 6260; R.S. 1931, § 89-3924; C.S. 1945, § 3-6403; W.S. 1957, § 1-976; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-403.

Cross references. —

For provision prohibiting creation of estate in fee tail, see § 34-1-137 .

In general. —

Where estate is granted or devised for life with remainder over, district courts have power to authorize life tenant to lease for term of years, or to sell and convey such estate. Murrell v. Stock Growers' Nat'l Bank, 74 F.2d 827, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4018 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1934).

§ 1-32-304. Sale by consent of parties; right of guardians to assent in place of wards.

All parties in interest may appear voluntarily and consent in writing to the sale. Testamentary guardians and guardians appointed by the court may consent in place of their wards.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 664; R.S. 1887, § 3012; R.S. 1899, § 4131; C.S. 1910, § 4991; C.S. 1920, § 6261; R.S. 1931, § 89-3925; C.S. 1945, § 3-6404; W.S. 1957, § 1-977; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-404.

§ 1-32-305. Report of sale to court; confirmation; conveyance of premises upon payment of purchase money.

All sales shall be reported to the court authorizing them. If on examination it appears that the sale was fairly conducted and the price obtained is the reasonable value of the estate sold, the court shall confirm the sale and direct a deed of conveyance be made to the purchaser on payment of the purchase money, or on securing the payment thereof in a manner approved by the court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 665; R.S. 1887, § 3013; R.S. 1899, § 4132; C.S. 1910, § 4992; C.S. 1920, § 6262; R.S. 1931, § 89-3926; C.S. 1945, § 3-6405; W.S. 1957, § 1-978; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-405.

§ 1-32-306. Proceeds to descend like estate sold.

For purposes of descent, succession, reversion or remainder, all monies arising from the sale have the same character and are governed by the same principles as the estate sold, and pass according to the terms of the deed, will or other instrument creating the estate.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 666; R.S. 1887, § 3014; R.S. 1899, § 4133; C.S. 1910, § 4993; C.S. 1920, § 6263; R.S. 1931, § 89-3927; C.S. 1945, § 3-6406; W.S. 1957, § 1-979; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-406.

Legislature may change estate. —

The legislature by special act may change an entailed estate to that of a fee simple estate, as by so doing it would not take any strict legal right from anyone. Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wyo. 224, 89 P.2d 1085, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1939).

Due process. —

Section 66-137, W. C. S. 1945, did not deprive defendants of vested property rights without due process of law, where there were no heirs, but only heirs apparent, to the living, persons with mere expectancies or possibilities of inheritance which may have been fulfilled or defeated, depending upon various contingencies and situations. Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wyo. 224, 89 P.2d 1085, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1939).

Heirs apparent. —

An heir apparent has no vested right in the estate of his ancestor prior to latter's death, and no vested property rights therein, and legislation dealing with estates of persons who die after its effective date does not deal with vested rights. Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wyo. 224, 89 P.2d 1085, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1939).

Remedial statutes. —

A remedial statute does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested rights. Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wyo. 224, 89 P.2d 1085, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1939).

§ 1-32-307. Investment of proceeds of sale; reinvestment in other real estate; descent; appointment of trustees to make investments; security required of trustees.

  1. Money arising from the sales shall be  invested, under the direction and supervision of the court, in the  certificates of the funded debt of this state or of the United States,  or in bonds secured by mortgage on unencumbered real estate situated  in the proper county of double the value of the money secured thereby,  exclusive of buildings and other improvements and of timber, mines  and minerals. The court may order the money to be reinvested in other  real estate within this state under such restrictions as it may prescribe,  which investments shall be reported to the court and subject to its  approval and confirmation.
  2. For purposes of descent, succession, reversion  or remainder the real estate in which the money is reinvested shall  have the same character and be governed by the same principles as  the estate sold, and shall pass according to the terms of the deed,  will or other instrument creating the estate sold.
  3. The court shall appoint competent trustees  to invest and manage the money who from time to time shall report  to the court their proceedings and the condition of the fund. The  court shall require of the trustees security for the faithful discharge  of their duty and may from time to time require additional security,  remove the trustees for cause or reasonable apprehension thereof and  may accept the resignation of a trustee and fill a vacancy by a new  appointment.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 667; R.S. 1887, § 3015; R.S. 1899, § 4134; C.S. 1910, § 4994; C.S. 1920, § 6264; R.S. 1931, § 89-3928; C.S. 1945, § 3-6407; W.S. 1957, § 1-980; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-407.

§ 1-32-308. Use of income; taxes and expenses.

The net income accruing from sales shall be paid to the person who would be entitled to the use or income of the estate, were the same unsold. All taxes and the expenses of investment and management of the fund shall be paid by the person entitled to the income thereof.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 668; R.S. 1887, § 3016; R.S. 1899, § 4135; C.S. 1910, § 4995; C.S. 1920, § 6265; R.S. 1931, § 89-3929; C.S. 1945, § 3-6408; W.S. 1957, § 1-981; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-408.

§ 1-32-309. Right to lease estate for term of years; rents and profits.

Upon like proceedings the court may direct that the estate be leased for a term of years, renewable or otherwise, as may appear most beneficial and equitable. The rents and profits shall be paid to the person who might otherwise be entitled to the use and occupancy of the estate or the income thereof.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 669; R.S. 1887, § 3017; R.S. 1899, § 4136; C.S. 1910, § 4996; C.S. 1920, § 6266; R.S. 1931, § 89-3930; C.S. 1945, § 3-6409; W.S. 1957, § 1-982; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-409.

In general. —

Where estate is granted or devised for life with remainder over, district courts have power to authorize life tenant to lease for term of years, or to sell and convey such estate. Murrell v. Stock Growers' Nat'l Bank, 74 F.2d 827, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4018 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1934).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Life tenant's death as affecting rights under lease given by him, 14 ALR4th 1054.

§ 1-32-310. Sale of property given or purchased for religious use; generally.

When any real estate except burial grounds of a cemetery has been donated, bequeathed or otherwise entrusted to or purchased by any person or trustee for any public religious use but not to or for use of any particular religious denomination, or when the same has been donated, bequeathed, entrusted to or purchased by a particular religious denomination and has been abandoned for such use, the district court of the county in which the real estate is located, upon good cause shown upon the petition of any citizen of the vicinity, may make an order for the sale of the property whether the same has been built upon or otherwise improved or not, and may make the order as to costs and disposition of the proceeds of the sale of the religious or other public use as shall be just, proper and equitable. The purchaser shall be invested with as full and complete a title thereto as the character of the original grant for the religious use will allow.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 670; R.S. 1887, § 3018; R.S. 1899, § 4137; C.S. 1910, § 4997; C.S. 1920, § 6267; R.S. 1931, § 89-3931; C.S. 1945, § 3-6410; W.S. 1957, § 1-983; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-410.

§ 1-32-311. Sale of property given or purchased for religious use; necessary parties to proceeding.

All persons who have a vested, contingent or reversionary interest in the real estate and the trustees or other officers of any religious society then using the same shall be made parties to the petition and be notified of the filing and pendency thereof as in a civil action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 671; R.S. 1887, § 3019; R.S. 1899, § 4138; C.S. 1910, § 4998; C.S. 1920, § 6268; R.S. 1931, § 89-3932; C.S. 1945, § 3-6411; W.S. 1957, § 1-984; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-411.

Article 4. Specific Performance; Actions for Purchase Money

Cross references. —

As to venue of action for specific performance of contract to sell realty, see § 1-5-103 .

As to specific performance and conveyance of real estate in connection with personal representatives, see § 2-7-601 et seq.

Law reviews. —

For a note, “Survivorship in the Proceeds of a Sale of Jointly Owned Property,” see 12 Wyo. L.J. 63.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 1 et seq.

Provision making purchaser's obligation under land contract conditional upon securing loan, 5 ALR2d 287.

Change of conditions after execution of contract or option for sale of real property as affecting right to specific performance, 11 ALR2d 390.

Mutuality of remedy as essential to granting of specific performance, 22 ALR2d 508.

Parties to action to specific performance of contract for conveyance of realty after death of party to the contract, 40 ALR2d 938.

Indefiniteness as precluding specific performance of contract for sale or exchange of real estate failing to specify time for giving of possession, 56 ALR2d 1272.

Venue of action for specific performance of contract pertaining to real property, 63 ALR2d 456.

Economic duress or business compulsion in execution of contract for sale of real property, 12 ALR4th 1262.

Option to purchase real property as affected by optionor's receipt of offer for, or sale of, larger tract which includes the optioned parcel, 34 ALR4th 1217.

Necessity of real-estate purchaser's election between remedy of rescission and remedy of damages for fraud, 40 ALR4th 627.

Provision in land contract for liquidated damages upon default of purchaser as affecting right of vendor to maintain action for damages for breach of contract, 39 ALR5th 33.

81A C.J.S. Specific Performance § 1 et seq.

§ 1-32-401. Completion of contract by survivors.

When two (2) or more persons who own an interest in land become bound in writing for its sale and conveyance and one (1) of them dies before the land is conveyed, the survivor may by petition against the purchaser and the heirs or devisees of the deceased party, be authorized to complete the contract.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 655; R.S. 1887, § 3003; R.S. 1899, § 4122; C.S. 1910, § 4982; C.S. 1920, § 6252; R.S. 1931, § 89-3918; C.S. 1945, § 3-7501; W.S. 1957, § 1-985; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-501.

§ 1-32-402. Requisites of petition; copy of contract to be annexed.

The petition must set forth the names of the contracting parties, describe the lands contracted for, state the time the contract was made, that the contract has been fully performed by the purchaser and have annexed a copy of the contract.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 656; R.S. 1887, § 3004; R.S. 1899, § 4123; C.S. 1910, § 4983; C.S. 1920, § 6253; R.S. 1931, § 89-3919; C.S. 1945, § 3-7502; W.S. 1957, § 1-986; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-502.

§ 1-32-403. Findings of court; order authorizing completion of contract; requirements and effect of deed.

If the court finds the allegations of the petition to be true, it may order the survivors to complete the contract by conveying the land. The deed shall recite the order and shall convey as complete and perfect a title and have the same effect as if executed by all the owners.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 657; R.S. 1887, § 3005; R.S. 1899, § 4124; C.S. 1910, § 4984; C.S. 1920, § 6254; R.S. 1931, § 89-3920; C.S. 1945, § 3-7503; W.S. 1957, § 1-987; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-503.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Award of damages to purchaser for delay in conveyance of land, 7 ALR2d 1204.

§ 1-32-404. Heirs and devisees may ask completion.

The heirs at law or devisees of a person who purchased an interest in land by written contract and died before conveyance thereof to him, may compel conveyance as the deceased might have done.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 660; R.S. 1887, § 3008; R.S. 1899, § 4127; C.S. 1910, § 4987; C.S. 1920, § 6257; R.S. 1931, § 89-3921; C.S. 1945, § 3-7504; W.S. 1957, § 1-988; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-504.

§ 1-32-405. Recoupment of vendee in action for purchase money.

  1. In actions for the recovery of purchase  money for real estate by vendor against vendee, the vendee may, notwithstanding  his continued possession, set up by way of counterclaim, any breach  of the covenants of title acquired by him from the vendor and make  any person claiming an adverse estate or interest therein party to  the action. Upon the hearing the vendee may recoup against the vendor’s  demand the present worth of any existing lien or encumbrance thereon.
  2. If the adverse estate or interest is an  estate in reversion or remainder or contingent upon a future event,  the court may:
    1. Order the vendee with his assent to surrender  possession to his vendor upon the repayment of so much of the purchase  money as has been paid, with interest; or
    2. Direct the payment of the purchase money  claimed in the action, upon the vendor giving bond in double the amount  thereof with two (2) or more sureties approved by the court, conditioned  for the repayment of the same with interest if the vendee or his privies  are subsequently evicted by reason of the defect.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 638; R.S. 1887, § 2986; R.S. 1899, § 4105; C.S. 1910, § 4965; C.S. 1920, § 6235; R.S. 1931, § 89-3902; C.S. 1945, § 3-7002; W.S. 1957, § 1-989; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-33-505.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Risk of loss by casualty pending contract for conveyance of real property — modern cases, 85 ALR4th 233.

Chapter 33 Receivers

Cross references. —

As to fiduciaries generally, see title 4.

As to receivers generally, see Rule 66, W.R.C.P.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

65 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers § 1 et seq.

75 C.J.S. Receivers § 1 et seq.

§ 1-33-101. Cases in which receiver appointed.

  1. A receiver may be appointed by the district  court in the following actions or cases:
    1. By a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase  of property;
    2. By a creditor to subject any property  or fund to his claim;
    3. By a partner or other person jointly owning  or interested in any property or fund, whose right to or interest  in the property or fund or the proceeds thereof is probable and where  it is shown that the property or fund is in danger of being lost,  removed or materially injured;
    4. By a mortgagee for the foreclosure of  his mortgage and sale of mortgaged property where it appears that  the mortgaged property is in danger of being lost, removed or materially  injured, or that a condition of the mortgage has not been performed  and the property is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage  debt;
    5. After judgment to carry the judgment into  effect;
    6. After judgment to dispose of the property  according to the judgment or preserve it during the pendency of an  appeal, or when an execution has been returned unsatisfied and the  judgment debtor refuses to apply the property in satisfaction of the  judgment;
    7. When a corporation has been dissolved  or is insolvent or in imminent danger of insolvency or has forfeited  its corporate rights; and
    8. In all other cases where receivers have  been appointed by courts of equity.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 587; R.S. 1887, § 2935; R.S. 1899, § 4054; C.S. 1910, § 4914; C.S. 1920, § 6184; R.S. 1931, § 89-3601; C.S. 1945, § 3-7301; W.S. 1957, § 1-990; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-101 .

Cross references. —

As to receivership in connection with property attached prior to judgment, see §§ 1-15-201 to 1-15-205 .

As to proceedings in aid of execution, see §§ 1-17-412 and 1-17-413 .

As to liquidation of banks, see §§ 13-4-301 and 13-4-302 .

As to liquidation of savings and loan associations, see § 13-6-405 .

As to liquidation of foreign building and loan associations, see § 13-8-202 .

As to appointment and qualification of receiver to liquidate corporations, see § 26-28-106 .

As to receivership in regard to University Securities Law, see § 21-17-430 .

As to receivership in regard to multilevel or pyramid distributorship, see §§ 40-3-118 and 40-3-119 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Notice. —

As general rule, receiver should not be appointed until after notice to defendant or other interested parties. O'Donnell v. First Nat'l Bank, 9 Wyo. 408, 64 P. 337, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1901).

Party affected by personal judgment entitled to opportunity to be heard. —

A party to be affected by a personal judgment must have his day in court or an opportunity to be heard. Barber v. Barber, 349 P.2d 198, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1960), citing, L. C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1951).

And determination of cause without hearing is fatal. —

Where the principles of natural justice demand that rights not be affected without an opportunity to be heard, then notwithstanding the silence of this section, courts will not proceed to an adjudication without notice and hearing, and determination of the cause without a hearing is fatal. Barber v. Barber, 349 P.2d 198, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1960), citing, Barrett v. Oakley, 40 Wyo. 449, 278 P. 538, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1929).

And hearing must be before confirmation of receivers' report. —

Where there is a serious question as to the adherence by the receivers to the authority granted them by the court's appointment, the hearing to be effective must be before confirmation and not afterward, since ordinarily the confirmation of a judicial sale by a court of competent jurisdiction cures all irregularities in the proceedings leading up to or in the conduct of the sale, and courts are reluctant to disturb sales which have been confirmed. Barber v. Barber, 349 P.2d 198, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1960).

Discretion of court. —

Appointment of receiver pendente lite rests to considerable extent in discretion of the court, and the probability that plaintiff will finally be entitled to a decree is a material circumstance to be considered, under this section. Barrett v. Green River & Rock Springs Live Stock Co., 28 Wyo. 379, 205 P. 742, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1922).

Other grounds. —

Receiver will be appointed where other grounds in addition to insolvency make preservation of property for creditors necessary. State ex rel. Avenius v. Tidball, 35 Wyo. 496, 252 P. 499, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1927).

Abandonment of corporate affairs. —

Petition alleging abandonment of corporate affairs by officers and probability of loss by depreciation of assets warranted appointment of receiver. Stockmen's Nat'l Bank v. Calloway Shops, 41 Wyo. 232, 285 P. 146, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1930).

Judgment creditor's right. —

Judgment creditor may have receiver appointed against debtor corporation, though resulting in its dissolution. State ex rel. Avenius v. Tidball, 35 Wyo. 496, 252 P. 499, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1927).

Judgment creditor may have receiver appointed to take over judgment debtor's property to enforce judgment. State ex rel. Avenius v. Tidball, 35 Wyo. 496, 252 P. 499, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1927).

Mortgage foreclosure. —

In mortgage foreclosure action receiver may be appointed of rents and profits of mortgaged property where it appears property is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, or condition of mortgage has not been performed and property is probably insufficient to discharge the debt. Anderson v. Matthews, 8 Wyo. 513, 58 P. 898, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1899).

Receiver may be appointed in mortgage foreclosure without showing person liable for indebtedness was insolvent. Grieve v. Huber, 38 Wyo. 223, 266 P. 128, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1928), reh'g denied, 41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1930).

Mortgagor's rights. —

Under this section and § 1-33-104 , appointment of receiver during period of redemption does not constitute an invasion of mortgagor's constitutional rights, since mortgagor's right of possession during such period is conditional. Grieve v. Huber, 38 Wyo. 223, 266 P. 128, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1928), reh'g denied, 41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1930).

Order of confirmation. —

Where order appointing a receiver in suit to foreclose second mortgage, and directing him to pay the rents and profits to the second mortgagee, and the acts of the receiver in pursuance thereof, are confirmed after first mortgagee has appeared and asked appointment of a receiver, the order of confirmation is conclusive on the first mortgagee and his privies, though the original appointment of the receiver was invalid, and thereafter the order is a complete defense to an action by first mortgagee or his privies to recover rents and profits collected by receiver prior to confirmation order. Anderson v. Riddle, 10 Wyo. 277, 68 P. 829, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1902).

Stated in

Kirby Royalties, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 458 P.2d 101, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1969).

Cited in

Johnson v. Smith, 455 P.2d 244, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1969).

Law reviews. —

See “Collecting Money Judgments in Wyoming,” 6 Wyo. L.J. 159.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Inspection of corporate books and records by a stockholder for purpose of determining advisability of receivership, 15 ALR2d 11.

Appointment or discharge of receiver for marital or community property necessitated by suit for divorce or separation, 15 ALR4th 224.

§ 1-33-102. Persons ineligible as receiver; exceptions.

No person interested in an action shall be appointed receiver or be a representative of the receiver except by consent of the parties.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 588; R.S. 1887, § 2936; R.S. 1899, § 4055; C.S. 1910, § 4915; Laws 1915, ch. 128, § 1; C.S. 1920, § 6185; R.S. 1931, § 89-3602; C.S. 1945, § 3-7302; W.S. 1957, § 1-991; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-102.

The fundamental thought underlying this section is that no one should act as attorney for the receiver who represents antagonistic interests unless by consent of the parties. State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Goppert, 66 Wyo. 117, 205 P.2d 124, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1949).

An attorney, who represented a receiver, was not guilty of unprofessional conduct in “coaxing” some of his friends to form a partnership and bid in the assets of the firm in receivership. State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Goppert, 66 Wyo. 117, 205 P.2d 124, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1949).

“No fund” check holder. —

Corporate employee retiring “no fund” check previously given her for salary before qualifying as receiver, was not “creditor” precluding appointment as receiver. Stockmen's Nat'l Bank v. Calloway Shops, 41 Wyo. 232, 285 P. 146, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1930).

Objections to appointment. —

Objection that receiver was wrongfully appointed by reason of this section, on ground that she was creditor, could not be made after receiver had qualified, managed property, and had made final settlement to court. Stockmen's Nat'l Bank v. Calloway Shops, 41 Wyo. 232, 285 P. 146, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1930).

Receiver's interest. —

Bank receiver could not be removed on ground of interest, where some of intervening depositors seeking removal consented to appointment; it not appearing which interveners withheld consent. State ex rel. Howell v. Bank of Glenrock, 36 Wyo. 125, 253 P. 665, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1927).

§ 1-33-103. Oath and bond of receiver.

Before he enters upon his duties the receiver must be sworn to perform faithfully and give surety approved by the court, or by the clerk upon order of the court, in such sum as the court shall direct not to exceed double the amount of any property involved, conditioned that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver and obey the orders of the court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 589; R.S. 1887, § 2937; Laws 1895, ch. 12, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 4056; C.S. 1910, § 4916; C.S. 1920, § 6186; R.S. 1931, § 89-3603; C.S. 1945, § 3-7303; W.S. 1957, § 1-992; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-103.

Appointment not effective until receiver qualifies and posts bond. —

Although an order appointing a receiver is entered, the appointment is not effective until he qualifies and posts bond as required by order of the court. Krist v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 349 (Wyo. 1983).

§ 1-33-104. Powers of receiver.

The receiver under control of the court, may bring and defend actions in his own name as receiver, take and keep possession of the property, receive rents, collect, compound for and compromise demands, make transfers and generally do acts respecting the property as the court may authorize.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 590; R.S. 1887, § 2938; R.S. 1899, § 4057; C.S. 1910, § 4917; C.S. 1920, § 6187; R.S. 1931, § 89-3604; C.S. 1945, § 3-7304; W.S. 1957, § 1-993; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-104.

Receiver is an officer and arm of the court and acts under the direction and supervision of the court. The receiver's duties require that he keep separate, accurate records of receipts and disbursements and all business of the receivership, that he take possession of and keep and preserve receivership property, and that he report to the court, account, and obey orders of the court. Krist v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 349 (Wyo. 1983).

Extension of receivership. —

Under this section, where a junior mortgagee has made proper showing, and secured receivership for his benefit, and a senior mortgagee, a party in the former's foreclosure suit, subsequently makes a similar showing, receivership will be extended to protect right of senior mortgagee to rents accruing after his application for receiver. Anderson v. Matthews, 8 Wyo. 513, 58 P. 898, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1899).

Burden on receiver to prove accounting, while burden on claimant to prove claim. —

Where the receiver files an account with the court, the burden of proof is upon the receiver to prove that accounting. One who asserts a charge or a counterclaim against the receiver or the receivership estate has the burden of proof as to that claim. Krist v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 349 (Wyo. 1983).

Where receiver steps outside his authority, he is subject to suit as individual. —

The general rule is that a receiver can neither sue nor be sued without order of the court. Where the receiver steps outside his authority granted to him by the court, he cannot claim the protection of the court and he can be sued as an individual. Krist v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 349 (Wyo. 1983).

Receiver's compensation addressed to sound discretion of trial court. —

The allowance of compensation to a receiver and his attorney is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. This is because the receiver acts under the authority of the court and is considered to be an officer of the court. The court supervises him, knows his circumstances, the services rendered by him, the amount of time he has expended and what is reasonable, and can judge the value of those services. Krist v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 349 (Wyo. 1983).

And receiver who is also creditor may recover fees and expenses. —

There is no general rule that a receiver who is also a creditor cannot recover reasonable fees and expenses for acting as a receiver. Krist v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 349 (Wyo. 1983).

Applied in

Barber v. Barber, 349 P.2d 198, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1960).

Cited in

Grieve v. Huber, 38 Wyo. 223, 266 P. 128, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (1928).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Federal receivers of property in different districts under 28 USCS § 754, 57 ALR Fed 621.

§ 1-33-105. Investment of funds by receiver.

Funds in the hands of a receiver may be invested upon interest by order of the court with the consent of all parties to the action.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 591; R.S. 1887, § 2939; R.S. 1899, § 4058; C.S. 1910, § 4918; C.S. 1920, § 6188; R.S. 1931, § 89-3605; C.S. 1945, § 3-7305; W.S. 1957, § 1-994; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-105.

§ 1-33-106. Disposition of trust property during litigation.

When a party admits he has in his possession or under his control any money or other thing capable of delivery which is the subject of the litigation, held by him as trustee for another party or which belongs or is due to another party, the court may order the same to be deposited in court or delivered to the other party with or without security, subject to further direction of the court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 592; R.S. 1887, § 2940; R.S. 1899, § 4059; C.S. 1910, § 4919; C.S. 1920, § 6189; R.S. 1931, § 89-3606; C.S. 1945, § 3-7306; W.S. 1957, § 1-995; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-106.

§ 1-33-107. Enforcement of orders of court.

When a court orders the deposit or delivery of money or other thing and the order is disobeyed, the court, besides punishing the disobedience as for contempt, may order the sheriff to take the money or thing and deposit or deliver it in conformity with the direction of the court.

History. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 593; R.S. 1887, § 2941; R.S. 1899, § 4060; C.S. 1910, § 4920; C.S. 1920, § 6190; R.S. 1931, § 89-3607; C.S. 1945, § 3-7307; W.S. 1957, § 1-996; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-107.

§ 1-33-108. Publication of notice of appointment of receiver; requiring claims to be presented.

Within thirty (30) days after a receiver is appointed and qualified if the court so orders, the receiver shall publish for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of the county in which he is appointed a notice that he is appointed receiver, stating the date of the appointment and requiring all persons having claims against the person, company, corporation or partnership for which the receiver is appointed to exhibit their claims to the receiver within the four (4) months from the date of the first publication of the notice, and if the claims are not exhibited within the four (4) months they are forever barred from participation in the assets of the receivership.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 17, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 89-3608; C.S. 1945, § 3-7308; W.S. 1957, § 1-997; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-108.

§ 1-33-109. Publication of notice of appointment of receiver; proof of publication; procedure when claimant out of state.

After the notice is given as required, a copy with an affidavit of publication must be filed in the office of the clerk of court and the court shall enter a decree that notice to creditors has been duly given and that all claims not exhibited as required by law are barred. When it appears by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court that a claimant had no notice by reason of being out of the state, the claim may upon order of the court be presented at any time before a decree of final settlement of the receivership is entered.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 17, § 2; R.S. 1931, § 89-3609; C.S. 1945, § 3-7309; W.S. 1957, § 1-998; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-109.

§ 1-33-110. Time for bringing suit against receiver.

When a properly filed claim is rejected by the receiver, or if allowed by the receiver is rejected by the court, the holder of the claim must bring suit against the receiver within four (4) months after the date upon which he is given notice of the rejection, otherwise the claim is forever barred.

History. Laws 1925, ch. 29, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 89-3610; C.S. 1945, § 3-7310; W.S. 1957, § 1-999; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-34-110.

Pending cases. —

Section 2, ch. 29, Laws 1925, reads: “This act shall apply to all cases of receivership now pending, excepting only that the holder of any claim rejected previous to the passage of this act, shall have four months from the date upon which this act goes into effect, within which to file suit upon such claims.”

Section 3, ch. 29, Laws 1925, makes the act effective from and after passage. Approved February 12, 1925.

Chapter 34 Replevin

§§ 1-34-101 through 1-34-118. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3.

Revision of chapter. —

Laws 1987, ch. 198, § 3, revised this chapter by repealing and recreating former §§ 1-15-101 through 1-15-407 and 1-34-101 through 1-34-118 as present §§ 1-15-101 through 1-15-425 .

No detailed explanation of the changes made by Laws 1987, ch. 198, has been attempted. For tables of revised and renumbered sections, see Volume 11 of the Wyoming Statutes Annotated.

Chapter 35 State, State Agencies and Political Subdivisions; Actions by or Against

Cross references. —

As to mandamus, see chapter 30 of this title.

As to quo warranto, see chapter 31 of this title.

As to claims against governmental entities, see chapter 39 of this title.

As to suits against state, see art. 1, § 8, Wyo. Const.

For provision that criminal prosecution shall be in name of state, see art. 5, § 15, Wyo. Const.

As to setoffs in suits by state, see § 9-1-405 .

As to duty of attorney general to prosecute and defend all suits by or against the state, see § 9-1-603 .

As to power of cities and towns to sue and be sued, see § 15-1-103 .

As to actions by city of first class to recover fines or penalties, see § 15-3-402 .

As to civil actions by bondholders upon nonpayment of local improvement bonds, see §§ 15-6-434 and 15-6-435 .

As to power of county to sue and be sued, see § 18-2-101 .

As to name in which county shall sue or be sued, see § 18-2-109 .

As to duty of county attorney, see § 18-3-302 .

As to powers of board of trustees of school district to sue and be sued, see § 21-3-111 .

As to right of citizen to sue in name of state to recover fines, penalties and forfeitures for benefit of school district, see § 21-13-206 .

As to power of state highway commission to sue and be sued, see § 24-2-101 .

As to maintenance of suits by Wyoming oil and gas conservation commission, see § 30-5-114 .

As to name in which suits brought in connection with Carey Act lands, see § 36-7-103 .

As to actions by board of land commissioners in connection with sale of state lands, see § 36-9-117 .

As to actions by state against railroad companies for failure to burn fireguards, see § 37-9-302 .

As to actions by county against railroads for failure to maintain depots within four miles of cities or towns, see § 37-9-403 .

As to actions against persons accepting rebates from public utilities, see § 37-12-209 .

As to actions for violation of orders of public service commission, see § 37-12-212 .

As to duty of attorney general to defend suits against the state or water users in the state with reference to interstate streams, see § 41-11-101 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties and Other Political Subdivisions §§ 680 to 845; 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories and Dependencies, §§ 85 to 88, 90, 91, 94 to 107, 110, 111, 113 to 121.

64A C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 1922 to 1974; 81 C.J.S. States §§ 267 to 328.

§ 1-35-101. Actions against state agencies deemed actions against state; jurisdiction.

Any action permitted by law which is brought against the state loan and investment board, board of land commissioners, public service commission of Wyoming, state board of equalization of Wyoming or the trustees of the University of Wyoming is an action against the state of Wyoming and no action shall be brought against any of such boards, commissions or trustees except in the courts of the state of Wyoming, and no action shall be maintained against any of such boards, commissions or trustees in any other jurisdiction.

History. Laws 1933, Sp. Sess., ch. 35, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-7601; W.S. 1957, § 1-1018; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-36-101 ; Laws 1992, ch. 25, § 3; 1998, ch. 13, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to state loan and investment board, see § 11-34-102 .

As to board of trustees of university of Wyoming, see § 21-17-201 .

As to board of land commissioners, see § 36-2-101 .

As to public service commission, see § 37-2-101 .

As to board of equalization, see § 39-11-102 .1.

Strict construction. —

It is generally held that statutes authorizing suit against the state are to be strictly construed, since they are in derogation of the state's sovereignty. Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1947).

Waiver provisions are strictly construed. Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10184 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1971).

Claim is condition precedent. —

A formal claim, in proper form, exhibited to the state auditor, is a condition precedent to the filing of an action against the state of Wyoming, either under this section or directly against the state and whether or not there is liability insurance. Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1975).

Section not applicable to state agency not enumerated therein. —

This section cannot be read as though it included a board or commission which has not been enumerated therein. Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1947).

There is no authority to sue the board of trustees of the university of Wyoming; it is not “permitted by law.” Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1975).

A suit against the university of Wyoming and its trustees for damages for injuries sustained when a child fell from a dormitory window should have named the state of Wyoming and not the university and its trustees, if it is possible to sue the state directly. Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1975).

Authority of the board of trustees of the university of Wyoming to sue or be sued cannot be inferred from this section, declaring any suit against the trustees of the university of Wyoming to be an action against the state of Wyoming, because of the introductory words appearing in the section, “Any action permitted by law, which shall be brought against … the trustees of the university of Wyoming is hereby declared to be an action against the State of Wyoming.” Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1975).

Immunity waived only as to actions in state courts. —

By law immunity of the trustees of the university of Wyoming from suit is waived only as to actions in the courts of the state of Wyoming, not as to the suits in the federal courts. Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10184 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1971).

Where there is no clear intent in a waiver of immunity statute to subject state agencies to actions in the federal courts, such suits may not be maintained. Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10184 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1971).

State agency not suable in federal court. —

A state agency, functioning as an arm, an alter ego of the state, cannot be sued in federal court because of the prohibition of such suits by the eleventh amendment of the federal constitution, unless the agency waives its eleventh amendment immunity or consents to suit. Atchison v. Nelson, 460 F. Supp. 1102, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14320 (D. Wyo. 1978).

Although injunctive and declaratory relief available. —

The immunity conferred on state agencies and individuals does not extend so far as to prevent injunctive or declaratory relief. Atchison v. Nelson, 460 F. Supp. 1102, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14320 (D. Wyo. 1978).

Immunity under Declaratory Judgments Act. —

The university of Wyoming and the board of trustees of that institution are immune from suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act. Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyo., 531 P.2d 884, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1975).

Where state officer required to use state property to afford relief demanded. —

A suit is against the state wherein a state officer or agency is, or will be, required to use state property or funds in order to afford the relief demanded, or which seeks to compel officers or agents to do acts which will impose contractual liability on the state. Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1975).

Applied in

Board of Trustees v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1983).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming,” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 229 (1972).

For case note, “Filing of Claims Against the State: Is ‘Almost’ Good Enough? Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Wyoming Hwy. Dep't, 582 P.2d 583, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 214 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 259 (1979).

For case note, “Sovereign Immunity of the State of Wyoming, Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 274 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1979).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Contributory negligence as defense to action by state, 1 ALR2d 827.

Tortious breach of contract as within consent by state to suit on contract, 1 ALR2d 864.

Immunity from suit of governmental liquor control agency, 9 ALR2d 1292.

Declaratory relief with respect to unemployment compensation as suit against state, 14 ALR2d 826.

Liability of state or governmental unit or agency for damages in tort in operating hospital as affected by capacity to be sued, 25 ALR2d 203.

Maintainability of partition action where state owned an undivided interest in property, 59 ALR2d 937.

Sovereign immunity doctrine as precluding suit against sister state for tort committed within forum state, 81 ALR3d 1239.

Tort liability of college, university, fraternity or sorority for injury or death of member or prospective member by hazing or initiation activity, 68 ALR4th 228.

§ 1-35-102. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to authority to carry liability insurance, see § 15-1-104 .

As to presentation and allowance of claims against cities, see § 15-1-125 .

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1975, ch. 197, § 1, related to waiver of governmental immunity to extent of liability insurance.

§ 1-35-103. Violation of state contracts to be reported to attorney general; investigation; action to recover damages; employment of special assistants.

  1. Any officer, board or commission of the  state of Wyoming, or their legal counsel, responsible for the enforcement  of any contract between the state of Wyoming and any person, having  reason to believe that there has been a violation of the terms of  the contract to the damage of the state of Wyoming, shall report the  matter to the attorney general of the state of Wyoming. The attorney  general shall make such investigation of the matter as is necessary.  Upon completion of the investigation and finding of probable damages  to the state of Wyoming, the attorney general may bring suit in any  court of competent jurisdiction to recover all damages that the state  of Wyoming may have incurred by reason of the breach of contract,  or for any money or other property that may be due on the contract.  Subject to the governor’s approval he may employ specially qualified  assistants or counsel to aid in any investigation of such action.
  2. A contract with the state of Wyoming includes  any contract, lease or instrument in writing entered into by any board,  officer or commission of the state of Wyoming for the benefit of the  state whether the contract is made in the name of the state of Wyoming  or in the name of the officer, board or commission.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 66, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-7602; W.S. 1957, § 1-1019; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-36-103 ; Laws 2004, ch. 132, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a), inserted “or their legal counsel” following “commission of the state of Wyoming.”

State officers are not given right to sue in their own names. —

The officers, boards and commissions mentioned in this section are not given the right to sue in their own names. They must sue in the name of the state. They are but instrumentalities or agencies, as there always must be, through which the state initiates its activities. Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1947).

And they are not rendered subject to suit by others. —

From the fact that officers, boards and commissions of the state may sue, as provided in this section, it does not follow that they are also subject to suit by others. Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1947).

Validity of specialist employment contracts. —

Contract for employment of specialists to receive as compensation to extent of 25% of amount recovered was held valid and properly authorized by the legislature. Bourne v. Cole, 53 Wyo. 31, 77 P.2d 617, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1938). See also MacDougall v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 48 Wyo. 493, 49 P.2d 663, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1935).

Law reviews. —

See article, “Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming — Part II,” VII Land & Water L. Rev. 617 (1972).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Recovery based on tortfeasor's profits in action for procuring breach of contract, 5 ALR4th 1276.

Recovery of punitive damages for breach of building or construction contract, 40 ALR4th 110.

§ 1-35-104. Actions under control of attorney general; settlement or compromise with approval of governor.

The attorney general shall control all investigations and actions instituted and conducted in behalf of the state as provided in W.S. 1-35-103 and has full discretionary powers to prosecute all investigations and litigation and, with the approval of the governor, to settle, compromise or dismiss the actions.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 66, § 2; C.S. 1945, § 3-7603; W.S. 1957, § 1-1020; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-36-104 .

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Attorney's authority to compromise suit for government, 30 ALR2d 944.

§ 1-35-105. Compensation of assistants and court costs to be paid from sums recovered; limitation on amount.

Any contract of employment providing for reimbursement of court costs incurred in connection with or fees to be paid for the specially qualified assistants and counsel whose services may be employed shall provide that such fees and costs shall only be paid from moneys recovered by the state as the result of any investigations, litigation or compromise in connection with which the services are rendered. The total obligation created by the employment for reimbursement of court costs and payment of fees for services rendered in each particular investigation or litigation shall not exceed one-half (1/2) of the amount recovered in the proceedings.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 66, § 4; C.S. 1945, § 3-7605; W.S. 1957, § 1-1022; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-36-105 .

§ 1-35-106. Disposition of sums recovered; appropriation for costs and fees.

All moneys collected by virtue of W.S. 1-35-103 through 1-35-106 shall be paid into the state treasury of the state of Wyoming, and there is hereby appropriated out of any monies so recovered a sum not exceeding one-half (1/2) of the amount recovered to pay the costs and fees for the special assistants, to be paid by the warrant drawn on the state treasury.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 66, § 5; C.S. 1945, § 3-7606; W.S. 1957, § 1-1023; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-36-106 .

§ 1-35-107. Actions by state or instrumentality, county, municipality or school district; judgment and enforcement.

The state of Wyoming or any department or instrumentality thereof, county, incorporated city or town and school district therein is authorized to bring an action in any court having jurisdiction to recover any money due it upon any contract or other liability or obligation. In any such action the court shall enter judgment for the amount found to be due the state of Wyoming or any of the above entities, and any such judgment may be enforced by levy upon execution or by any other process provided by law.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 36, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-7607; W.S. 1957, § 1-1024; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-36-107 .

Cross references. —

As to enforcement of judgments, see chapter 17 of this title.

Editor's notes. —

In connection with this section, see MacDougall v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 48 Wyo. 493, 49 P.2d 663 (1935); Bourne v. Cole, 53 Wyo. 31, 77 P.2d 617 (1938).

Cited in

Board of County Comm'rs v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d 946, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of bidder for state or municipal contract to rescind bid on ground that bid was based upon his own mistake or that of his employee, 2 ALR4th 991.

§ 1-35-108. Deposit of security by state, municipality or agency.

The state of Wyoming, a county, city or town, or any departments or agencies thereof or any party acting for or on behalf of any such department or agency in his official capacity shall not be required to deposit security for damages, fees or costs in any civil, criminal or special proceeding instituted or pending in any court or special tribunal in the state unless expressly required so to do by the rule, statute or ordinance generally providing for deposit of security for such purposes.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 9-18.6; W.S. 1977, § 9-1-127; Laws 1982, ch. 62, § 1.

1-35-109. Legislature and legislators as party to actions; properly naming party.

  1. In any action challenging any official act of the legislature as a whole and naming the legislature or any member thereof as a party, the proper party shall be “The Legislature of the State of Wyoming.” In any such action challenging an official act of either body of the legislature or a committee of the legislature the proper party shall be the appropriate body or committee of “the Legislature of the State of Wyoming”.
  2. In any action challenging any official act of a member of the state legislature, the legislator shall be designated only by the legislative office held unless the action seeks relief from actions of the legislator other than actions taken in his official capacity.
  3. Any individual named in an action in which the proper party is the legislature or a body of the legislature or who has otherwise been improperly named has the substantive right to petition the court to have his name removed from the action.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require naming the legislature as a party when the claim or cause of action arises from the enforcement or operation of any law.

History. Laws 2017, ch. 163, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2017, ch. 163, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 6, 2017.

Generally. —

Wyoming citizens lacked standing to challenge Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-35-109 where they failed to allege taxpayer standing, one citizen’s status as an elected representative provided no basis for standing, they failed to allege any personal interest distinguishable from any other citizen’s interest, and they sought prospect remedies only. Allred v. Bebout, 2018 WY 8, 409 P.3d 260, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2018).

Chapter 36 Arbitration

Cross references. —

As to arbitration in connection with justice of the peace courts, see §§ 1-21-801 to 1-21-804 .

For provision requiring legislature to provide for voluntary submission of differences to arbitrators, see art. 19, § 8, Wyo. Const.

As to arbitration of claims for value of diseased animals killed by order of state veterinarian, see §§ 11-19-106 to 11-19-108 .

As to arbitration of claims for damages done by game animals and birds, see § 23-1-901 .

As to arbitration in connection with collective bargaining for firefighters, see §§ 27-10-105 to 27-10-107 .

As to arbitration of controversies by public service commission, see § 37-2-113 .

Arbitration is method of voluntary settlement of disputes embedded in public policy of Wyoming and is favored by the supreme court of Wyoming. In re Town of Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1977).

Informal divorce proceeding. —

An informal divorce proceeding was not the type of “binding arbitration” that precluded an appeal where: (1) this article was never invoked by either the parties or the court; (2) the record made no reference to any arbitration agreement; and (3) the court acknowledged that the issues were appealable. Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1997), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Cited in

Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1992).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Arbitration — Jurisdiction from Participations. Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. v. Strube Constr. Co., 715 P.2d 540, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1986),” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 183 (1987).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

4 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute Resolution §§ 8 to 13, 70 to 217; 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration and Award § 1 et seq.

Constitutionality of arbitration statutes, 55 ALR2d 432.

Statute of limitations as bar to arbitration under agreement, 94 ALR3d 533.

Defendant's participation in action as waiver of right to arbitration of dispute involved therein, 98 ALR3d 767.

Claim of fraud in inducement of contract as subject to compulsory arbitration clause contained in contract, 11 ALR4th 774.

Liability of organization sponsoring or administering arbitration to parties involved in proceeding, 41 ALR4th 1013.

Which statute of limitations applies to efforts to compel arbitration of a dispute, 77 ALR4th 1071.

Validity and construction of provisions for arbitration of disputes as to alimony or support payments or child visitation or custody matters, 38 ALR5th 69.

Alternative dispute resolution: sanctions for failure to participate in good faith in, or comply with agreement made in, mediation, 43 ALR5th 545.

Awarding attorneys' fees in connection with arbitration, 60 ALR5th 669.

Re-exhaustion of arbitration procedure as appropriate course for resolving backpay issues arising as a result of resolution of grievance, 59 ALR Fed 501.

Employee's right to intervene in federal judicial proceeding concerning labor arbitration, 59 ALR Fed 733.

What statute of limitations applies to action to compel arbitration pursuant to § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act (29 USC § 185), 96 ALR Fed 378.

Consolidation by federal court of arbitration proceedings brought under Federal Arbitration Act (9 USC § 4), 104 ALR Fed 251.

Construction and application of § 10(a)(4) of Federal Arbitration Act (9 USCS § 10(a)(4)) providing for vacating of arbitration awards where arbitrators exceed or imperfectly execute powers, 136 ALR Fed 183.

Construction and application of § 10(a)(1)-(3) of Federal Arbitration Act (9 USCS § 10(a)(1)-(3)) providing for vacating of arbitration awards where award procured by fraud, corruption, or undue means, where arbitrators evidence partiality or corruption and where arbitrators engage in particular acts of misbehavior, 141 ALR Fed 1.

Vacating on public policy grounds arbitration awards reinstating discharged employees, 142 ALR Fed 387.

Refusal to enforce foreign arbitration awards on public policy grounds, 144 ALR Fed 481.

Enforceability of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements as regards claims under federal civil rights statutes 152 ALR Fed 75.

6 C.J.S. Arbitration and Award § 1 et seq.

§ 1-36-101. Short title.

W.S. 1-36-101 through 1-36-119 may be cited as the Uniform Arbitration Act.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 22; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.1; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-101 .

Challenge of arbitration award has always been available. —

Challenge of an arbitration award under the common law, or under statutes similar to this chapter, although limited in extent, has always been available. In re Appeal of Riverton Valley Elec. Ass'n, 391 P.2d 489, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1964).

Cited in

Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers Union v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 376 P.2d 640, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1962); Vogt v. MBNA Am. Bank, 2008 WY 26, 178 P.3d 405, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Mar. 6, 2008).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Conflict of laws as to validity and effect of arbitration provision in contract for purchase or sale of goods, products or services, 95 ALR3d 1145.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators — insurance appraisals or arbitrations, 63 ALR5th 675.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators—torts, 64 ALR5th 475.

Validity and effect under state law of arbitration agreement provision for alternative method of appointment of arbitrator where one party fails or refuses to follow appointment procedure specified in agreement, 75 ALR5th 595.

Validity and effect under Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) of arbitration agreement provision for alternative method of appointment of arbitrator where one party fails or refuses to follow appointment procedure specified in agreement, 159 ALR Fed 1.

§ 1-36-102. “Court” defined; jurisdiction.

“Court” means the district court having jurisdiction of the parties. An agreement providing for arbitration in this state may be enforced by the court in the county where the parties to the controversy reside or may be personally served.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 16; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.2; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-102 .

Quoted in

Vogt v. MBNA Am. Bank, 2008 WY 26, 178 P.3d 405, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Mar. 6, 2008).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and construction of agreement between attorney and client to arbitrate disputes arising between them, 26 ALR5th 107.

§ 1-36-103. Written agreement to submit controversy to arbitration valid.

A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of the contract. This includes arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their respective representatives unless otherwise provided in the agreement.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.3; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-103 .

Arbitration matter of contract. —

Although arbitration is favored, it is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to submit any dispute to arbitration which he has not agreed to submit. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 403 (Wyo. 1981).

The right to have a dispute submitted to arbitration is a contractual right. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 403 (Wyo. 1981).

District court erred in denying a nursing home's motion to compel arbitration in a wrongful death action alleging negligence where a general power of attorney unambiguously gave the decedent's older daughter actual authority to sign an arbitration agreement on the decedent's behalf, and the agreement was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 2017 WY 122, 403 P.3d 1014, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 2017).

And right to arbitration may be waived either expressly or implicitly. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 403 (Wyo. 1981).

Or estopped. —

Even where a dispute is subject to arbitration, there are certain instances where a party asserting arbitration is estopped by his own conduct to rely on unexhausted arbitration procedures. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 403 (Wyo. 1981).

Court to decide whether dispute subject to arbitration. —

The courts are to decide the question of whether a grievance or dispute arises under the terms of a bargaining agreement and should be arbitrated, unless the agreement clearly demonstrates that the question is reserved to the arbitrator. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 403 (Wyo. 1981).

Informal divorce proceedings. —

An informal divorce proceeding was not the type of “binding arbitration” that precluded an appeal where: (1) this article was never invoked by either the parties or the court; (2) the record made no reference to any arbitration agreement; and (3) the court acknowledged that the issues were appealable. Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1997), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Party, by participating in arbitration proceedings without objection, waived objection to arbitrability. —

Because an agreement to arbitrate need not be written and can arise as the result of the conduct of parties to an existing dispute regardless of whether or not they have previously contracted for arbitration, a party, by participating in arbitration proceedings, waived its objections to the arbitrability of the dispute. While the party moved to dismiss the arbitration for untimely filing at the commencement of the hearing, such a motion could not be reshaped into an objection to jurisdiction on the grounds there was no agreement to arbitrate. The opportunity to defend or be heard upon the merits of the case was not, as the party claimed, lost forever, as a party who proceeds with arbitration over his explicit objections as to arbitrability is not foreclosed from raising the issue on a motion to confirm or vacate the award in the district court. Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. v. Strube Constr. Co., 715 P.2d 540, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1986).

County as party to arbitration agreement. —

In action based on award by arbitrators for damages caused by location of public road, evidence was insufficient to show county board authorized arbitration agreement or ratified it, or that plaintiff's deed, pursuant to arbitration agreement, was delivered to or accepted by county. Kelly v. Board of Comm'rs, 24 Wyo. 386, 159 P. 1086, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1916).

Applied in

In re Town of Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1977); T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects & Planners, 661 P.2d 1040, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1983).

Quoted in

Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 1163, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14114 (10th Cir. 1999).

Cited in

American Nat'l Bank v. Cheyenne Hous. Auth., 562 P.2d 1017, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1977).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Enforcement of contractual arbitration clause as affected by expiration of contract prior to demand for arbitration, 5 ALR3d 1008.

Validity and enforceability of provision for binding arbitration and waiver thereof, 24 ALR3d 1325.

Breach or repudiation of collective labor contract as subject to or as affecting right to enforce arbitration provision in contract, 29 ALR3d 688.

Breach or repudiation of contract as affecting right to enforce arbitration clause therein, 32 ALR3d 377.

Conflict of laws as to a validity and effect of arbitration provision in contract for purchase or sale of goods, products or services, 95 ALR3d 1145.

Claim of fraud in inducement of contract as subject to compulsory arbitration clause contained in contract, 11 ALR4th 774.

Attorney's submission of dispute to arbitration, or amendment of arbitration agreement, without client's knowledge or consent, 48 ALR4th 127.

Enforcement of arbitration agreement contained in construction contract by or against nonsignatory, 100 ALR5th 481.

Disposition by bankruptcy court of request for arbitration pursuant to arbitration agreement to which debtor in bankruptcy is a party, 72 ALR Fed 890.

§ 1-36-104. Duty of court on application of party to arbitrate.

  1. On application of a party showing an arbitration  agreement and the opposing party’s refusal to arbitrate, the court  shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration. If the opposing  party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court  shall proceed summarily to determine the issue raised and shall order  or deny arbitration accordingly.
  2. If an issue referable to arbitration under  the alleged agreement is involved in an action or proceeding pending  in a court having jurisdiction to hear applications to compel arbitration,  the application shall be made therein. Otherwise the application shall  be made in the court of proper venue.
  3. Any action or proceeding involving an  issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for arbitration  or an application therefor has been made or, if the issue is severable,  the stay may be with respect thereto only. When the application is  made in such action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall  include such stay.
  4. An order for arbitration shall not be  refused on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or because  any fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not  been shown.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.4; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-104 .

Strong policy exists favoring arbitration of disputes where parties have bargained for this procedure in their contract. American Nat'l Bank v. Cheyenne Hous. Auth., 562 P.2d 1017, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1977).

In the face of an arbitration clause which is couched in broad terms, litigation instead of arbitration should not be available at the option of a party. American Nat'l Bank v. Cheyenne Hous. Auth., 562 P.2d 1017, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1977).

The role of the court, where one party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement and the other party contends that the agreement does not apply to the dispute, is to proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised. American Nat'l Bank v. Cheyenne Hous. Auth., 562 P.2d 1017, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1977).

District court must determine arbitrability in light of all contract terms. —

The district court is obligated to determine the question of arbitrability in the light of all the contract terms which form the agreement to arbitrate. Where the parties detailed that the agreement to arbitrate would not extend beyond any applicable statute of limitations, the district court was compelled to ascertain that issue as a part of its determination whether an agreement to arbitrate existed. Pioneer Water & Sewer Dist. v. Civil Eng'g Professionals, 905 P.2d 1245, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1995).

Burden of demonstrating arbitrability. —

Under the prescribed statutory procedure the burden of demonstrating arbitrability would be upon the party asserting it. American Nat'l Bank v. Cheyenne Hous. Auth., 562 P.2d 1017, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1977).

Fraudulent agreement to arbitrate. —

Investors' claim that an arbitration clause in an investment contract was the product of fraud was a “gateway issue” that was properly determined by a court and not an arbitrator, and the broad arbitration clause did not show a clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate. Thus, a district court did not err by finding that claims of fraud, breach of contract, and negligence were not subject to arbitration. Fox v. Tanner, 2004 WY 157, 101 P.3d 939, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 2004).

Party's refusal to arbitrate self evident. —

District court erred when it interpreted subsection (a) of this section to mean that a party applying to the court must show both an arbitration agreement and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate and found plaintiff's complaint deficient for its failure to include defendant's refusal to arbitrate; filing the complaint to compel arbitration is self evident of the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate. Jackson State Bank v. Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1992).

Contractor waived arbitration. —

Contractor waived his right to have the parties' disputes arbitrated by failing to request that the trial court order the parties to arbitrate their differences under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-104 . Scherer v. Schuler Custom Homes Constr., 2004 WY 109, 98 P.3d 159, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 2004), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. Oct. 19, 2004).

Party, by participating in arbitration proceedings without objection, waived objection to arbitrability. —

Because an agreement to arbitrate need not be written and can arise as the result of the conduct of parties to an existing dispute regardless of whether or not they have previously contracted for arbitration, a party, by participating in arbitration proceedings, waived its objections to the arbitrability of the dispute. While the party moved to dismiss the arbitration for untimely filing at the commencement of the hearing, such a motion could not be reshaped into an objection to jurisdiction on the grounds there was no agreement to arbitrate. The opportunity to defend or be heard upon the merits of the case was not, as the party claimed, lost forever, as a party who proceeds with arbitration over his explicit objections as to arbitrability is not foreclosed from raising the issue on a motion to confirm or vacate the award in the district court. Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. v. Strube Constr. Co., 715 P.2d 540, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

Garaman, Inc. v. Williams, 912 P.2d 1121, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Disposition by bankruptcy court of request for arbitration pursuant to arbitration agreement to which debtor in bankruptcy is a party, 72 ALR Fed 890.

§ 1-36-105. When court to appoint arbitrators.

If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of arbitrators this method shall be followed. In the absence thereof, or if the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator fails or is unable to act and his successor has not been appointed, the court on application of a party shall appoint one (1) or more arbitrators. An arbitrator so appointed has all the powers of one specifically named in the agreement.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.5; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-105 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and effect under state law of arbitration agreement provision for alternative method of appointment of arbitrator where one party fails or refuses to follow appointment procedure specified in agreement, 75 ALR5th 595.

Validity and effect under Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) of arbitration agreement provision for alternative method of appointment of arbitrator where one party fails or refuses to follow appointment procedure specified in agreement, 159 ALR Fed 1.

§ 1-36-106. Powers of arbitrators.

The powers of the arbitrators may be exercised by a majority unless otherwise provided by the agreement or by law.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.6; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-106 .

§ 1-36-107. Notice and hearing.

  1. The arbitrators shall appoint a time and  place for the hearing and serve the parties with notice either personally  or by registered mail not less than five (5) days before the hearing.  Appearance at the hearing waives the notice. The arbitrators may adjourn  the hearing from time to time as necessary, and on request of a party  or upon their own motion may postpone the hearing to a time not later  than the date fixed by the agreement for making the award, unless  the parties consent to a later date. The arbitrators may hear and  determine the controversy upon the evidence produced notwithstanding  the failure of a party duly notified to appear. The court on application  may direct the arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing and  determination of the controversy.
  2. The parties are entitled to be heard,  to present evidence material to the controversy and to cross-examine  witnesses appearing at the hearing.
  3. The hearing shall be conducted by all  the arbitrators but a majority may determine any question and render  a final award. If during the course of the hearing an arbitrator for  any reason ceases to act, the remaining arbitrator or arbitrators  may continue with the hearing and determination of the controversy.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.7; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-107 .

§ 1-36-108. Right to be represented by attorney; effect of waiver.

A party may be represented by an attorney at any arbitration proceeding or hearing. A waiver of representation prior to the proceeding is ineffective.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.8; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-108 .

§ 1-36-109. Authority of arbitrators to issue subpoenas and administer oaths; service of subpoenas; depositions; compelling person to testify; witness fees.

  1. The arbitrators may issue subpoenas for  the attendance of witnesses, for the production of books, records,  documents and other evidence and may administer oaths. Subpoenas issued  shall be served, and upon application to the court by a party or the  arbitrators, enforced in the manner provided by law for the service  and enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action.
  2. On application of a party and for use  as evidence, the arbitrators may permit a deposition to be taken of  a witness who cannot be subpoenaed or is unable to attend the hearing,  in the manner designated by the arbitrators.
  3. All provisions of law compelling a person  under subpoena to testify are applicable.
  4. The same fees for attendance as a witness  shall be paid as for a witness in the district court.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 7; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.9; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-109 .

Cross references. —

As to witnesses generally, see § 1-12-101 et seq.

As to witness fees, see § 1-14-102 .

As to subpoenas, see Rule 45, W.R.C.P.

§ 1-36-110. Award of arbitrators.

  1. The award shall be in writing and signed  by the arbitrators joining in the decision. A copy shall be delivered  to each party personally, or by registered mail or as provided in  the agreement.
  2. An award shall be made within the time  fixed by the agreement, or if not so fixed, within such time as the  court orders on application of a party. The parties may extend the  time in writing either before or after the expiration thereof. A party  waives the objection that an award was not made within the time required  unless he notifies the arbitrators of his objection prior to the delivery  of the award to him.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.10; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-110 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Modern status of rules respecting concurrence of all arbitrators as condition of binding award under private agreement not specifying unanimity, 83 ALR3d 996.

Arbitrator's power to award punitive damages, 83 ALR3d 1037.

Referee's failure to file report within time specified by statute, court order or stipulation as terminating reference, 71 ALR4th 889.

Re-exhaustion of arbitration procedure as appropriate course for resolving backpay issues arising as a result of resolution of grievance, 59 ALR Fed 501.

§ 1-36-111. Modification of award.

  1. On application of a party or an order  of the court, the arbitrators may modify the award:
    1. When there was an evident miscalculation  of figures or description of a person or property referred to in the  award;
    2. When the award is imperfect as to form  not affecting the merits of the controversy; or
    3. For the purpose of clarifying the award.
  2. The application shall be made within twenty  (20) days after delivery of the award to the applicant. Written notice  shall be given promptly to the opposing party, stating he must serve  his objections within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice. The  award as modified is subject to the provisions of W.S. 1-36-113 , 1-36-114 and 1-36-115 .

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.11; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-111 .

Quoted in

T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects & Planners, 661 P.2d 1040, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1983).

§ 1-36-112. Expenses and fees for arbitrators.

The arbitrators’ expenses, fees and other costs, not including counsel fees, incurred in the arbitration shall be paid as provided in the award, unless otherwise provided in the arbitration agreement.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 10; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.12; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-112 .

§ 1-36-113. Confirmation of award by court.

Upon application of a party the court shall confirm the award unless within the time limits allowed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying the award.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 11; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.13; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-113 .

Mootness. —

Where an arbitration award for costs had been satisfied and no controversy remained, the doctrine of mootness prohibited a trial court from entering judgment confirming the award. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Tilden, 2003 WY 31, 64 P.3d 739, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2003).

Ways of presenting reasons for vacating awards. —

There are two ways in which a party may present reasons for vacating an award: (1) by filing a petition with the trial court to vacate the award; or (2) by raising reasons supporting vacation in an answer, filed within the 90-day time limit of § 1-36-114(b), to the other party's petition to confirm. T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects & Planners, 661 P.2d 1040, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1983).

Arbitration award properly confirmed. —

District court did not have any basis to question an arbitration award and properly confirmed it in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-113 because there was nothing in the record to indicate that a debtor filed a motion to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award, or otherwise objected to the award under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-114 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-115 . Vogt v. MBNA Am. Bank, 2008 WY 26, 178 P.3d 405, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2008).

Cited in

Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha v. Dorr, Bentley & Pecha, 841 P.2d 811, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1992); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Tilden, 2005 WY 53, 110 P.3d 865, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (2005).

§ 1-36-114. When court to vacate award.

  1. Upon application of a party the court  shall vacate an award where:
    1. The award was procured by corruption,  fraud or other undue means;
    2. There was evident partiality by an arbitrator  appointed as a neutral, corruption of any of the arbitrators or misconduct  prejudicing the rights of any party;
    3. The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
    4. The arbitrators refused to postpone the  hearing upon sufficient cause being shown, refused to hear evidence  material to the controversy or otherwise conducted the hearing as  to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
    5. There was no arbitration agreement, the  issue was not adversely determined by a court as provided by law and  the applicant did not participate in the arbitration hearing without  raising the objection. The fact that the relief was such that it could  not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground  for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
  2. An application for vacating an award shall  be made within ninety (90) days after delivery of a copy of the award  to the applicant, or if predicated upon corruption, fraud or other  undue means it shall be made within ninety (90) days after the grounds  are known or should have been known.
  3. In vacating the award on grounds other  than stated in paragraph (a)(v) of this section the court may order  a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the agreement  or by the court in accordance with W.S. 1-36-105 . If the award is vacated on grounds set forth in paragraph  (a)(iii) or (iv) of this section the court may order a rehearing before  the arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in  accordance with W.S. 1-36-105 . The time within which the agreement requires the award  to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the date  of the order.
  4. If the application to vacate is denied  and no motion to modify or correct the award is pending, the court  shall confirm the award.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 12; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.14; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-114 ; 2009, ch. 169, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, substituted “in paragraph (a)(v) of this section the” for “in subsection (a)(v) the” in the first sentence of (c).

Court may vacate arbitration award on nonstatutory grounds. —

When an applicant pleads and proves one of the grounds set out in subsection (a) is not the only time an arbitration award can be vacated. This section does not prohibit the district court from vacating an award on other grounds. Texas W. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 629 (Wyo. 1986).

When arbitrator exceeds powers. —

An arbitrator exceeds his powers when he decides matters which were not submitted to him. T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects & Planners, 661 P.2d 1040, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1983).

The trial court properly vacated an award for consequential damages since no claim for such damages was properly made under the procedure plaintiff had agreed to in a submission agreement, leaving the arbitrator with no authority to award such damages. JBC of Wyoming Corp. v. Cheyenne, 843 P.2d 1190, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 198 (Wyo. 1992).

Acceptance in part. —

Acceptance by the parties of a divisible part of the award does not estop the objecting party from challenging validity and justness of the other part. Waisner v. Waisner, 15 Wyo. 420, 89 P. 580, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1907).

Mistake. —

A mistake, though honestly made, which would work a fraud on either party, is sufficient ground for impeaching a statutory award upon grounds of fraud, and therefore to vitiate it. Waisner v. Waisner, 15 Wyo. 420, 89 P. 580, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1907).

Ways of presenting reasons for vacating awards. —

There are two ways in which a party may present reasons for vacating an award: (1) by filing a petition with the trial court to vacate the award; or (2) by raising reasons supporting vacation in an answer, filed within the 90-day time limit of subsection (b), to the other party's petition to confirm. T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects & Planners, 661 P.2d 1040, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1983).

Filing of petition to confirm does not extend 90-day time period of subsection (b), within which a request for vacation of the award must be presented. T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects & Planners, 661 P.2d 1040, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1983).

Time limit not enlarged by procedural review. —

Request for procedural review, pursuant to professional association's “Code of Ethics and Arbitration Manual” did not enlarge time for filing application to vacate arbitration award. Simon v. Teton Bd. of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2000).

Courts which favor arbitration process are reluctant to disturb arbitrators' just solutions to controversies. In re Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1977).

Supreme court is not at liberty to choose arithmetic of contractor over computations of arbitrators with reference to what days should be assigned to the contractor for the assessment of liquidated damages for delays in delivery of pipe for a water line project. In re Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1977).

Basis for award where contract has broad arbitration provision. —

Arbitrators are free to base their award on facts or methods of computation other than those which the parties stipulated where contract provides for a broad submission of “all questions and controversies” to arbitration. In re Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1977).

Expense of fence not a claim for damages. —

Arbitrators exceeded their authority when they compensated a landowner for the construction of a stack yard fence the landowner had constructed as a measure to avoid further damage by wildlife; this expense was not a claim for damage within § 23-1-901 .State, Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Thornock, 851 P.2d 1300, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1993).

Award confirmation proper in absence of objection. —

District court did not have any basis to question an arbitration award and properly confirmed it in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-113 because there was nothing in the record to indicate that a debtor filed a motion to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award, or otherwise objected to the award under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-114 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-115 . Vogt v. MBNA Am. Bank, 2008 WY 26, 178 P.3d 405, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2008).

No error in refusing to vacate award. —

Pursuant to the reasons articulated in this section and the bases set forth in case law, the district court did not err in refusing to vacate an arbitration award. There was evidence to support plaintiff's claim that her former husband's parents had promised to repay loans made over period of 12 years when plaintiff and her former husband took over the family run general store business; furthermore, there was evidence that plaintiff relied upon that promise to her detriment by not insisting upon repayment of the loans in the ordinary course of business and making considerable efforts throughout the years to assist with the business. Welty v. Brady, 2005 WY 157, 123 P.3d 920, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 2005).

Quoted in

Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha v. Dorr, Bentley & Pecha, 841 P.2d 811, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1992).

Cited in

Fox v. Tanner, 2004 WY 157, 101 P.3d 939, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (2004).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Admissibility of affidavit or testimony of arbitrator to impeach or explain award, 80 ALR3d 155.

What constitutes corruption, fraud, or undue means in obtaining arbitration award justifying avoidance of award under state law, 22 ALR4th 366.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrator — labor disputes, 66 ALR5th 611.

Setting aside arbitration award on ground of interest or bias of arbitrators — commercial, business, or real estate transactions, 67 ALR5th 179.

§ 1-36-115. When court to modify or correct award.

  1. Upon application made within ninety (90)  days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, the court  shall modify or correct the award where:
    1. There was an evident miscalculation of  figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person or  property referred to in the award;
    2. The arbitrators awarded upon a matter  not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting  the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; or
    3. The award is imperfect in a matter of  form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.
  2. If the application is granted, the court  shall modify and correct the award as to intent and shall confirm  the award as so modified and corrected. Otherwise the court shall  confirm the award as made.
  3. An application to modify or correct an  award may be joined in the alternative with an application to vacate  the award.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.15; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-115 .

Courts which favor arbitration process are reluctant to disturb arbitrators' just solutions to controversies. In re Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1977).

Supreme court is not at liberty to choose arithmetic of contractor over computations of arbitrators with reference to what days should be assigned to the contractor for the assessment of liquidated damages for delays in delivery of pipe for a water line project. In re Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1977).

Basis for award where contract has broad arbitration provision. —

Arbitrators are free to base their award on facts or methods of computation other than those which the parties stipulated where contract provides for a broad submission of “all questions and controversies” to arbitration. In re Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1977).

Award confirmation proper in absence of objection. —

District court did not have any basis to question an arbitration award and properly confirmed it in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-113 because there was nothing in the record to indicate that a debtor filed a motion to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award, or otherwise objected to the award under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-114 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-115 . Vogt v. MBNA Am. Bank, 2008 WY 26, 178 P.3d 405, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2008).

Trial court properly modified arbitrator's award in the proper amount under subsection (a)(i), as the arbitrator's offset of $40,000 due under a lease-sale of trucks was improper, inasmuch as the figure used by the arbitrator for the balance remaining to be paid under the lease had already been reduced by $40,000 for the sale of the trucks. Althoff, Inc. v. IFG Leasing Co., 704 P.2d 1302, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 532 (Wyo. 1985).

Quoted in

Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha v. Dorr, Bentley & Pecha, 841 P.2d 811, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1992); Simon v. Teton Bd. of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 1-36-116. Judgment upon granting order confirming, modifying or correcting award; costs and disbursements.

Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, the judgment shall conform and be enforced as any other judgment. Costs of the application, proceedings and disbursements may be awarded by the court.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 14; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.16; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-116.

Cross references. —

As to judgments generally, see chapter 16 of this title.

As to enforcement of judgments, see chapter 17 of this title.

Applied in

Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. v. Strube Constr. Co., 715 P.2d 540, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

Smith, Keller & Assocs. v. Dorr & Assocs., 875 P.2d 1258, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1994).

§ 1-36-117. Application to court to be by motion; notice and hearing to be in manner provided by law.

An application to the court for relief shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner provided by law or rule of court. Notice of an initial application for an order shall be served in the manner provided by law for the service of a summons in an action unless otherwise specified by the parties.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 15; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.17; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-117.

Cross references. —

As to service of summons, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

§ 1-36-118. Venue upon initial and subsequent applications.

An initial application shall be made to the court of the county in which the agreement provides the arbitration hearing shall be held. Otherwise the application shall be made in the county where the adverse party resides or has a place of business or, if he has no residence or place of business in this state, to the court of the county where the adverse party can be served. All subsequent applications shall be made to the court hearing the initial application unless the court otherwise directs.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 17; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.18; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-118.

§ 1-36-119. Appeals.

  1. An appeal may be taken from:
    1. An order denying the application to compel  arbitration;
    2. An order granting an application to stay  arbitration;
    3. An order confirming or denying confirmation  of an award;
    4. An order modifying or correcting an award;
    5. An order vacating an award without directing  a rehearing; or
    6. A final judgment or decree entered by  the court.
  2. The appeal shall be taken in the manner  of a civil action.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 116, § 18; W.S. 1957, § 1-1048.19; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-37-119.

Cross references. —

As to appeals generally, see Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Severability. —

Section 21, ch. 116, Laws 1959, reads: “If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.”

Appeal of motion to compel arbitration. —

Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration was proper because it was a final order of a district court under this section. Fox v. Tanner, 2004 WY 157, 101 P.3d 939, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 2004).

Cited in

Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 2017 WY 122, 403 P.3d 1014, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 2017).

Applied in

American Nat'l Bank v. Cheyenne Hous. Auth., 562 P.2d 1017, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1977); Althoff, Inc. v. IFG Leasing Co., 704 P.2d 1302, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 532 (Wyo. 1985).

Law reviews. —

For article, Tyler J. Garrett, “Anatomy of a Wyoming AppealA Practitioner’s Guide for Civil Cases, see 16 Wyo. L. Rev. 139 (2016).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Appealability of state court's order or decree compelling or refusing to compel arbitration, 6 ALR4th 652.

Chapter 37 Declaratory Judgments

Cross references. —

As to judgments generally, see chapter 16 of this title.

As to enforcement of judgments generally, see chapter 17 of this title.

For another provision concerning declaratory judgments, see Rule 57, W.R.C.P.

Court will not render advisory opinion on matter not ripe for declaratory judgment. Langdon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 640 P.2d 1092, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 299 (Wyo. 1982).

As where official administrative action not taken on issue. —

The insurance commissioner cannot ask the court to advise him relative to which of two actions he should take in connection with the requirement of allocation of premiums on policies covering multi-state risks where he has not taken official administrative action on the issue one way or the other. Langdon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 640 P.2d 1092, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 299 (Wyo. 1982).

A justiciable controversy must exist before a court may grant declaratory relief, and court should not hear a case where there has been a change in circumstances occurring either before or after a case has been filed that eliminates the controversy. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1999).

Declaratory judgment action, filed beyond 30 days from driver license revocation, properly considered. —

Declaratory judgment and mandamus actions filed by drivers whose licenses had been revoked, challenging the interpretation by the department of motor vehicles of the statute upon which the department relied in refusing to restore the drivers' driving privileges, even though filed beyond 30 days from the rulings by independent hearing officers revoking the licenses, were properly considered by the district court. State v. Kraus, 706 P.2d 1130, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 573 (Wyo. 1985).

Requirements for jury trial in declaratory judgment action depend on nature of case. Where the nature of the case primarily was equitable, the district court was not required to grant a jury trial. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 739 P.2d 754, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 469 (Wyo. 1987).

Applied in

Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Department of Revenue & Taxation, 820 P.2d 977, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Wyo. 1991).

Cited in

Dickerson v. City Council, 582 P.2d 80, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1978); Tri-County Elec. Ass'n v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 1978); Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 551 (Wyo. 1987).

Law reviews. —

For a note, “Basic Misconceptions of the Declaratory Judgment Law,” see 12 Wyo. L.J. 66.

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Extent to which res judicata principles apply to actions for declaratory relief, 10 ALR2d 782.

Jury trial, 13 ALR2d 777.

Burden of proof, 23 ALR2d 1243.

Negligence cases, 28 ALR2d 957.

Partnership or joint venture matters, 32 ALR2d 970.

Title or right to office in unincorporated private association, 82 ALR2d 1169.

Validity or existence of common-law marriage, 92 ALR2d 1102.

26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 1 et seq.

§ 1-37-101. Short title.

“This act” means W.S. 1-37-101 through 1-37-115 and may be cited as the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.

History: Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 16; R.S. 1931, § 89-2416; C.S. 1945, § 3-5816; W.S. 1957, § 1-1049; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-101 ; § 1; Laws 2014, ch. 79, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

Section 1-37-114 , referred to in this section, was renumbered as § 1-37-115 in 1977. See editor's notes following § 1-37-106 .

The 2014 amendment, substituted “through 1-37-115 ” for “through 1-37-114 .”

Laws 2014, ch. 79, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 10, 2014.

Referendum disputes. —

When a voter contested a city clerk's rejection of signatures on a municipal referendum petition, a district court had jurisdiction to hear the voter's declaratory judgment suit under Wyo. R. App. P. 12.12 and the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (Act), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-101 et seq., because the “right” to be declared was within the Act's scope, and the voter was an “interested person.” City of Casper v. Holloway, 2015 WY 93, 354 P.3d 65, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 2015).

Justiciability. —

Whether a city had to negotiate with a firefighters' union in executive session, unless the union consented to public negotiations, was not justiciable because the city council had not yet had the opportunity to decide whether to conduct the negotiations in executive session. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local Union No. 279 v. City of Cheyenne, 2013 WY 157, 316 P.3d 1162, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2013).

Whether negotiations exchanged between a firefighters' union and a city were public records was not justiciable because the city had not yet been able to decide whether to conduct negotiations in executive session, so there was not yet a basis to determine if the exemption in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-405(b) applied. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local Union No. 279 v. City of Cheyenne, 2013 WY 157, 316 P.3d 1162, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2013).

Exchange of school lands. —

A controversy over the constitutionality of exchanges of state lands without a public auction involved precisely the type of circumstance contemplated by the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, for (1) this controversy impacted many stakeholders, including state-school-land lessees, the beneficiaries of the funds generated by state school lands, the legislature which had adopted statutes authorizing exchanges, those members of the executive branch of state government whose responsibility was to steward the state school lands, and the public at large; and (2) as inevitable growth and development increased the pressure on Wyoming state lands, the need for certainty and clarity regarding this aspect of the management of state lands grew.Dir. of the Office of State Lands & Invs. v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. July 10, 2003).

Applied in

Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1962); Cheyenne Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Sav. Bank, 391 P.2d 933, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1964); State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court, 426 P.2d 431, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1967); Karn v. Hayes, 530 P.2d 156, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1975); Wyoming Nat'l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 1994).

Cited in

Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1961); Merrill v. Bishop, 69 Wyo. 45, 237 P.2d 186, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (1951); MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F. Supp. 580, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13022 (D. Wyo. 1971); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1973); Jackson v. Wyoming State Treas. ex. rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't, 521 P.2d 571, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 196 (Wyo. 1974); Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974); State ex rel. Wyo. Farm Loan Bd. v. Herschler, 622 P.2d 1378, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 285 (Wyo. 1981); Union Pac. Resources Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 895 P.2d 464, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 1995); Thompson-Green v. Estate of Drobish, 2006 WY 126, 143 P.3d 897, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (2006); Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2015 WY 40, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Mar. 19, 2015); Best v. Best, 2015 WY 133, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Sept. 30, 2015); Inman v. Inman (In re Estate of Inman), 2016 WY 101, 382 P.3d 67, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 1-37-102. Scope and general consideration.

Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions may declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No proceeding is open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the effect of a final judgment.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 89-2401; C.S. 1945, § 3-5801; W.S. 1957, § 1-1051; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-102 .

Constitutionality. —

This chapter is constitutional, as against contention that it conferred nonjudicial power on courts. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Construction. —

To accomplish its purpose, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to be liberally construed and administered. Barber v. City of Douglas, 931 P.2d 948, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1997).

Nature of action. —

Right conferred hereby, although legal right under law, is equitable in nature, since actions hereunder are in nature of “bills of peace.” Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Standing. —

Trial court properly determined that appellees had standing to file a complaint pursuant to the Wyoming Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act for a declaration that appellants did not have authority to block their use of a public easement to access their property because appellees owned substantial property in the subdivision containing the public easement. Carnahan v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, 273 P.3d 1065, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2012).

Equitable nature. —

Action for declaratory relief is essentially equitable in character. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

Time limitations. —

Inasmuch as a declaratory judgment act is available to a party as an independent action, separate and apart from a petition for review, the time in which a petition for review must be filed is immaterial. Wyo. Cmty. College Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. College Dist., 2001 WY 86, 31 P.3d 1242, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2001).

“Proper parties.” —

Persons interested in action under the provisions of this chapter, are at least “proper parties.” Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Joinder. —

Equitable principle that, to avoid multiplicity of suits, joinder is permitted when community of interest in facts and law exists, applies to actions at law under provisions of this chapter. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Former use of general demurrer. —

Either statute of limitations or doctrine of laches may properly be raised by general demurrer (now motion) to petition for declaratory judgment. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

Good purpose served. —

There is no reason to bring an action for a declaratory judgment unless some good purpose will be served thereby. Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1935).

To justify an action under this chapter, some useful purpose must be accomplished thereby. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Anticipated disputes not adjudicated. —

This section gives the courts no power to determine future rights or anticipated disputes or controversies and must treat them as existing and genuine. White v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 76, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 415 (Wyo. 1979).

Advisory opinions. —

It is axiomatic that the Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be relied upon to secure an advisory opinion. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974); Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 706, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1977).

Modify decree or judgment. —

Action for declaratory judgment may not be invoked to modify a judicial decree or judgment. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

Existence of another adequate remedy will not, of itself, preclude declaratory judgment relief. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 345 (Wyo. 1982).

Other relief not precluded. —

That plaintiff sought declaration of rights under this chapter, did not preclude other relief appropriate to what purported to be action in equity. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Declaratory judgment should not be used to usurp or replace specific administrative relief, particularly when the initial decision is committed to an administrative body. City of Cheyenne v. Sims, 521 P.2d 1347, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1974).

There is restriction on availability of declaratory judgment action to administrative matters. Where the action would result in a prejudging of issues that should be decided in the first instance by an administrative body, it should not lie. This restriction on the scope of declaratory judgments is akin to the requirement that administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial relief is available. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 345 (Wyo. 1982).

Prescriptive public easement. —

Declaratory judgment action filed by the County of Washakie was not the appropriate means to establish a prescriptive public easement because, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-101 , the legislature established a specific statutory procedure that required such claims to be brought initially before the board of county commissioners. Ten Broek v. County of Washakie, 2003 WY 164, 82 P.3d 269, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Wyo. 2003).

Action entertained where relief concerns construction or interpretation of regulations or statute. —

Where the desired relief concerns the validity and construction of agency regulations, or where it concerns the constitutionality or interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be, based, the action should be entertained. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 345 (Wyo. 1982); State Bd. of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 737 P.2d 350, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 449 (Wyo. 1987).

Questions already adjudicated. —

Questions already adjudicated by court having jurisdiction of subject matter and parties, cannot thereafter be subject, between such parties and their privies, of a declaratory judgment action. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

Justiciable controversy necessary. —

In order that declaratory relief may be obtained, it is jurisdictional requisite that petition disclose justiciable controversy. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944); Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 706, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1977); White v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 76, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 415 (Wyo. 1979).

Before the district court may grant declaratory relief, a justiciable controversy must exist. West Tex. Utils. Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, 807 P.2d 932, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1991).

Trial court properly dismissed property owners' declaratory judgment action against the State Engineer and the Board of Control because the action was not justiciable; even if the case presented a matter of great public importance, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115 , did not extend the jurisdiction of the district court, and the property owners failed to show that any relief would have a practical effect on them. William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, 206 P.3d 722, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2009).

There was no justiciable controversy before the district court with respect to the association’s claims for declaratory relief because it never brought any claims with respect to the individual defendant’s removal of two signs; there was never any attempt by the association to install informational signage within the platted easements, nor any allegations that the ranch or its fence prevented the association from doing so; the association’s complaint contained no allegations concerning directional or other signage; and the association made no allegations concerning the need to install above ground utilities and communication facilities within the platted easements, or that the ranch’s fence or other actions prevented such installation. Johnson Cty. Ranch Improvement #1, LLC v. Goddard, 2020 WY 115, 471 P.3d 307, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 2020).

And must be based on facts. —

Claim that actual or justiciable controversy exists must be based upon facts pleaded or established. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

On face of pleading. —

If it appears on face of pleading that no justiciable controversy is presented, general demurrer (now motion) is proper. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

No justiciable controversy as contemplated by Declaratory Judgments Act exists where it appears on face of pleading that facts alleged disclose that either statute of limitations or doctrine of laches is applicable thereto. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

Where under deeds or contracts operating companies sought to collect from landowners “pro rata share of expense of defending suit,” but no facts were alleged indicating that controversy had arisen, court properly refused to determine matter by declaratory judgment. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

A clear statement of the necessary elements of a justiciable controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is: first, a justiciable controversy requires parties having existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or an argument evoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, wanting these qualities be of such great and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. Finally, the proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974); Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 706, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1977); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2692 (U.S. 1980).

But there is a well-recognized exception that the rule requiring the existence of justiciable controversies is not followed or is relaxed in matters of great public interest or importance. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2692 (U.S. 1980).

The right to seek public office for which one has proper qualifications is a fundamental right such as to be a question of great public importance and thus properly falls within the exception to the declaratory judgment rule requiring the existence of a justiciable controversy. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974).

A dispute may be a “friendly” one where parties may have agreed to submit a question to courts for determination, and this is in and of itself no valid objection to the rendition of a declaratory judgment if the basic elements necessary as the basis of a declaratory judgment action are present and if the same is sustainable of judicial determination and adjudication of a present right. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974).

Actual controversy not raised. —

Where there is an existing and unappealed order of the state land board granting to appellants an unexercised preference right to purchase state land and under which they claim, the first count of the board's complaint attacking its own ruling did not raise an actual controversy within the strictures of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to properly consider it. White v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 76, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 415 (Wyo. 1979).

No basis for declaratory relief. —

No case was made showing that plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief where the requested relief, a declaration that defendants violated a legal duty to abide by the law, enforce the law, or uphold the law, would have no effect upon the rights, status or legal relationship of plaintiff and defendants. Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1997).

A prayer that the court “make a declaration of rights of the respective parties” does not alone make the action necessarily one under this chapter. Goodson v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 243 P.2d 163, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1952).

No action for failure to provide credit to contractor erroneously collecting sales tax. —

A business erroneously collected sales tax from its customers and remitted the same to the state, and was assessed sales and use tax on materials consumed by it as a contractor. When the state failed to provide a credit under former § 39-6-409 (excessive and deficient payments; now see § 39-15-109 ) for the sales tax collected, a declaratory judgment action was brought. Such an action was improper, however, as the case did not concern the constitutionality or interpretation of former § 39-6-409, which was not concerned with the granting of credit against a person's liability through the application of moneys resulting from overpayment by third parties. M & B Drilling & Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 706 P.2d 243, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 560 (Wyo. 1985).

An action to quiet title is essentially an action for declaratory relief as contemplated by this section, and a judgment sustained under this section, after a trial of issues raised by pleadings showing a dispute over a title, would not be reversed. Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1947).

Construction of statute. —

In an action under this chapter it was held that a statute providing that only taxpayers could vote at bond election was unconstitutional. Simpkin v. Rock Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 237 P. 245, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1925).

Declaratory judgment action was permissible despite the absence of a timely petition for review of an administrative action where the school districts were challenging the department of education's interpretation of § 21-13-102 , the recapture statute. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2000).

Construction of contract. —

Landowners presented a justiciable controversy in filing their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to settle their rights to water use under their contracts with the town; the case was one of contract construction, not the construction of any right to use water under a permit and appropriation system. Barber v. City of Douglas, 931 P.2d 948, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1997).

Action was properly brought under this chapter by sugar manufacturer for construction of contract with beet growers, and for decree that growers, threatening to sue, had been paid amount due under contract. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Contract entered into between employer and trade union is primarily one, as far as it goes, for benefit of each individual member of the union accepted, unless, perhaps, he dissents, when such member enters into the employment. Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1935).

Terminable controversy. —

Declaration may be refused unless it appears that a decision, whichever way it may go, will terminate the uncertainty or controversy. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

A declaratory judgment action is not proper where it will not terminate the controversy. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 345 (Wyo. 1982).

Construction of wills. —

Under this chapter district courts have power, upon petition of any person interested, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under a will, to declare rights, status or other legal relations thereunder, and to determine any question arising in administration of an estate. Murrell v. Stock Growers' Nat'l Bank, 74 F.2d 827, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4018 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1934).

The University of Wyoming and the board of trustees of that institution are immune from suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act. Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyo., 531 P.2d 884, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1975).

State, its agencies and its officers may not raise defense of sovereign immunity to actions under Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (§§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115 ); provided that, if such actions also concern those contract and tort claims which are the subject of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, the procedural aspects of that act must be met. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 345 (Wyo. 1982).

A declaratory judgment is a binding adjudication of the rights and status of the litigants even though no consequential relief is awarded. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974).

Applied in

Ludwig v. Harston, 65 Wyo. 134, 197 P.2d 252, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (1948); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1988); Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1995); Best v. Best, 2015 WY 133, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Sept. 30, 2015).

Quoted in

Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1992).; ; Rock v. Lankford, 2013 WY 61, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (May 17, 2013); Inman v. Inman (In re Estate of Inman), 2016 WY 101, 382 P.3d 67, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2016).

Cited in

Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch Co., 54 Wyo. 367, 92 P.2d 568, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (1939); Snake River Brewing Co. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, 39 P.3d 397, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Administrative Law, Wyoming Style,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 223 (1983).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Federal question jurisdiction in declaratory judgment suit challenging state statute or regulation on grounds of federal preemption, 69 ALR Fed 753.

§ 1-37-103. Right of interested party to have determination made.

Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 2; R.S. 1931, § 89-2402; C.S. 1945, § 3-5802; W.S. 1957, § 1-1052; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-103 .

Construction. —

To accomplish its purpose, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to be liberally construed and administered. Barber v. City of Douglas, 931 P.2d 948, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1997).

The University of Wyoming and the board of trustees of that institution are immune from suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act. Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1975) (decided prior to enactment of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act).

State, its agencies and its officers may not raise defense of sovereign immunity to actions under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (§§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115 ); provided that, if such actions also concern those contract and tort claims which are the subject of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, the procedural aspects of that act must be met. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 345 (Wyo. 1982).

Determination of liabilities. —

This section permits not only construction, but determination of rights and liabilities under contract. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Section applicable to insurance contracts. —

Where the declaratory judgment statute applies to “any written contract or other writings constituting a contract,” insurance contracts come within the purview of the statute. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 706, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1977).

Controversy must be justiciable. —

The mandate of this section to the effect that a party who seeks a declaration of his or her “rights, status, or other legal relations” under a contract must first show his interest is but an expression of the basic declaratory judgment law requirement, which denies access to the services of the chapter unless the parties' controversy is real and not merely imagined — in other words, it must be justiciable. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 706, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1977).

The “interest” requirement is but an expression of the basic doctrine that the judiciary will not invoke its remedial powers unless presented with a justiciable controversy; numerous doctrines have evolved under the justiciability umbrella, including the doctrine of mootness, and the central question in a mootness case is whether decision of a once living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties. Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1992).

Trial court properly dismissed property owners' declaratory judgment action against the State Engineer and the Board of Control because the action was not justiciable; even if the case presented a matter of great public importance, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115 , did not extend the jurisdiction of the district court and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 specifically required that an interested person present an appropriate right for declaration before the district court could assume jurisdiction. William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, 206 P.3d 722, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2009).

Standing to challenge term limit law. —

Secretary of State's claim that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103 violated his right to be a candidate involved a matter of great public importance, and the usual requirements for showing a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act could be relaxed. Additionally, the proceedings were genuinely adverse in character because the Secretary was prohibited from seeking a third term; therefore, the Secretary had established a justiciable controversy. Maxfield v. State, 2013 WY 14, 294 P.3d 895, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2013).

Standing to challenge zoning regulation. —

Real estate development partnership had standing to challenge the validity of a county zoning regulation that required it to obtain approval of its plan to sell 40-acre parcels of the land that the partnership had contracted to buy because even though the partnership was not yet the record owner, it had a “tangible interest” pursuant to its purchase contract and because the county had indicated that it intended to enforce the zoning regulation. The partnership met the four-part test required to pursue a declaratory judgment action. Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2004 WY 84, 94 P.3d 412, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 2004).

Judgment available to construe lease provision requiring lessees to transfer liquor license. —

A declaratory judgment was available to construe the provision of a lease containing the requirement that the lessees transfer their liquor license to the lessor at the conclusion of the lease. Such a provision was valid and enforceable as between the parties, but was subject to the provisions of § 12-4-601(b), requiring a public hearing and approval by the licensing authority. Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Dev. Co., 708 P.2d 39, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 584 (Wyo. 1985).

No justiciable issue. —

A justiciable issue cannot be structured out of the mere request of a liability insurance company, which does not place its own policy in evidence, to have a defendant insurance company declared liable to a potential claimant under the terms of the defendant's policy. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 706, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1977).

Standing to challenge ordinances.—

District court erred in determining that the property owners lacked standing to bring their declaratory judgment actions against the town and a consultant where their claims as to their rights as affected by the sewage facility ordinances and connection and usage fees fell with the general scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the complaint sufficiently alleged a tangible interest that had been harmed and that a judicial decision would have remedied that harm. Tavern, LLC v. Town of Alpine, 2017 WY 56, 395 P.3d 167, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2017).

Dismissal proper where issues the same as in pending criminal action. —

Because a hunter's declaratory judgment action presented the same issues as the hunter's pending criminal action, the trial court did not err in dismissing the declaratory judgment action. Heilig v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, 2003 WY 27, 64 P.3d 734, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 2003).

Standing to challenge term limit law. —

State legislators and electors had standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging a term limit law; without immediate judicial attention, the legislators would have been unable to seek reelection and the electors would have been unable to cast a ballot for those legislators. Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2004).

Tax matters. —

Under review of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-109 , an owner of natural gas wells was properly granted declaratory judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act , finding that the Department of Revenue had no authority to change the valuation methodology for production taxes and royalties without complying with the notice provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-203(b). Exhaustion of remedies was not required, and the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not apply because only questions of law were presented. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007 WY 21, 150 P.3d 1216, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2007).

Construction of contracts. —

This section specifically provides for declaratory relief actions to be initiated for the purpose of construing contract provisions. Pribble v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 933 P.2d 1108, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 933 P.2d 1108, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1997).

Landowners presented a justiciable controversy in filing their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to settle their rights to water use under their contracts with the town; the case was one of contract construction, not the construction of any right to use water under a permit and appropriation system. Barber v. City of Douglas, 931 P.2d 948, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1997).

Appellees' action fell within the scope of the Wyoming Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act because they sought to have the court construe their rights as owners of property in a subdivision; language used in a plat was considered in accordance with contract interpretation principles. Carnahan v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, 273 P.3d 1065, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2012).

Construction of wills. —

Under this chapter district courts have power, upon petition of any person interested, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under a will, to declare rights, status or other legal relations thereunder, and to determine any question arising in administration of an estate. Murrell v. Stock Growers' Nat'l Bank, 74 F.2d 827, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4018 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1934).

Annexation of land. —

Under this section of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, landowners had standing to bring a declaratory judgment regarding a municipal ordinance because (1) a justiciable controversy existed, (2) they had an interest in the matter because the annexation brought their land within the city's control, (3) the annexation of the land in question facilitated the annexation of the landowners' property, and (4) a judgment of the court would resolve the controversy. Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, 79 P.3d 500, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 2003).

Exchange of school lands. —

A controversy over the constitutionality of exchanges of state lands without a public auction involved precisely the type of circumstance contemplated by the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, for (1) this controversy impacted many stakeholders, including state-school-land lessees, the beneficiaries of the funds generated by state school lands, the legislature which had adopted statutes authorizing exchanges, those members of the executive branch of state government whose responsibility was to steward the state school lands, and the public at large; and (2) as inevitable growth and development increased the pressure on Wyoming state lands, the need for certainty and clarity regarding this aspect of the management of state lands grew.Dir. of the Office of State Lands & Invs. v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. July 10, 2003).

Mining exploration permit. —

Dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) was proper where agricultural landowners had not made any effort to seek relief with the county board of commissioners, which was the administrative agency responsible for administering the county zoning resolution pertaining to mineral exploration permit requirements, and instead sought to enforce the zoning resolution through a declaratory judgment action against the mining companies under this section. Quinn Revocable Trust v. SRW, Inc., 2004 WY 65, 91 P.3d 146, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 2004).

Applied in

State ex rel. Christopulos v. Husky Oil Co., 575 P.2d 262, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 268 (Wyo. 1978); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 1980); Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1995).

Quoted in

Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1975); Bragg v. Marion, 663 P.2d 505, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 320 (Wyo. 1983); DeWitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 539 (Wyo. 1986); West Tex. Utils. Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1991); Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 924 P.2d 91, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1996); Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp. v. Alpenhof Lodge Assocs., 2005 WY 46, 109 P.3d 555, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (2005); City of Torrington v. Smith, 2016 WY 126, 386 P.3d 336, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2016).

Stated in

Simons v. Laramie County Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 1116, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1987); Rock v. Lankford, 2013 WY 61, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (May 17, 2013).

Cited in

Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1993); Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1996); Sheridan Retirement Partners v. City of Sheridan, 950 P.2d 554, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1997); Snake River Brewing Co. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, 39 P.3d 397, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2002); Pullar v. Huelle, 2003 WY 90, 73 P.3d 1038, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 2003); Lozier v. Blattland Invs., LLC, 2004 WY 132, 100 P.3d 380, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (2004); Laughter v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Sweetwater County, 2005 WY 54, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 60 , 110 P.3d 875 (2005).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Water Law—Indian Law—Cowboys, Indians and Reserved Water Rights: May a State Court Limit How Indian Tribes Use Their Water? In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, 835 P.2d 273, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 467 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Tax question as proper subject of action for declaratory judgment, 11 ALR2d 359.

Unemployment compensation, 14 ALR2d 826.

Declaratory judgment as to validity of lease, 60 ALR2d 400.

Declaratory judgment, during lifetime of spouses, as to construction of antenuptial agreement dealing with property rights of survivor, 80 ALR2d 941.

Breach of lessor's covenant against use of his other property in competition with lessee-covenantee, 97 ALR2d 4.

Validity, construction and application of criminal statutes or ordinances as proper subject for declaratory judgment, 10 ALR3d 727.

Availability and scope of declaratory judgment action in determining rights of parties or powers and exercise thereof by arbitrators under arbitration agreements, 12 ALR3d 854.

§ 1-37-104. Contract may be construed at any time.

A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 3; R.S. 1931, § 89-2403; C.S. 1945, § 3-5803; W.S. 1957, § 1-1053; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-104 .

Quoted in

West Tex. Utils. Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1991); State Ex Rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, 201 P.3d 1127, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Feb. 24, 2009).

Cited in

Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (1931).

§ 1-37-105. Fiduciary's rights to be construed.

  1. Any person interested as or through an  executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor,  devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or beneficiary of a trust, in  the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, a minor  or person under legal disability, may have a declaration of rights  or other legal relations in respect thereto:
    1. To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees,  legatees, heirs, next of kin or others;
    2. To direct the executors, administrators  or trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their  fiduciary capacity; or
    3. To determine any question arising in the  administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction  of wills and other writings.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 4; R.S. 1931, § 89-2404; C.S. 1945, § 3-5804; W.S. 1957, § 1-1054; Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-105 .

Cross references. —

As to minors as parties to actions, see § 1-1-102 .

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Declaratory judgment in probate case. —

Although it is more regular and desirable that an action for declaratory judgment be initiated in the district court under the usual civil procedures, there would seem to be no prohibition or valid objection to an action seeking a declaration of heirship being initiated by the district court in its probate arm. In re Estate of Lonquest, 526 P.2d 994, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 235 (Wyo. 1974).

Construction of wills. —

Under this chapter district courts have power, upon petition of any person interested, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under a will, to declare rights, status or other legal relations thereunder, and to determine any question arising in administration of an estate. Murrell v. Stock Growers' Nat'l Bank, 74 F.2d 827, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4018 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1934).

§ 1-37-106. Adjudication of water rights.

  1. The state of Wyoming upon the relation  of the attorney general may institute an action to have determined  in a general adjudication the nature, extent, and relative priority  of the water rights of all persons in any river system and all other  sources, provided:
    1. For the purposes of this section:
      1. The term “general adjudication” shall  mean the judicial determination or establishment of the extent and  priority of the rights to use water of all persons on any river system  and all other sources within the state of Wyoming. The court conducting  such a general adjudication shall:
        1. Certify to the state board of control  those legal and factual issues which the court deems appropriate for  the board to determine. Upon such certification, the board shall exercise  those powers and follow those procedures set forth in Rule 53 of the  Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure;
        2. Confirm those rights evidenced by previous  court decrees, or by certificates of appropriation, or by certificates  of construction heretofore issued by the Wyoming state board of control;
        3. Determine the status of all uncancelled  permits to acquire the right to the use of the water of the state  of Wyoming and adjudicate all perfected rights thereunder not theretofore  adjudicated under W.S. 41-4-511 ;
        4. Determine the extent and priority date  of and adjudicate any interest in or right to use the water of the  river system and all other sources not otherwise represented by the  aforedescribed decrees, certificates, or permits;
        5. Establish, in whatever form determined  to be most appropriate by the court, one or more tabulations or lists  of all water rights and their relative priorities on the river system  and all other sources.
      2. The word “person” shall be construed to  mean an individual, a partnership, a corporation, a municipality,  the state of Wyoming, the United States of America, or any other legal  entity, public or private.
    2. When the potential defendants number one  thousand (1,000) or more, personal service of a summons and complaint  shall not be required and (A) the court shall order that the clerk  obtain service on known potential defendants by mailing a court-approved  notice of the action by certified mail, return receipt requested,  and (B) the court shall order that the clerk obtain service on all  unknown parties by publication of said notice for four (4) consecutive  weeks in a newspaper published in each of the counties within which  interests in and rights to the use of water may be affected by the  adjudication. If there is no newspaper in one (1) or more of said  counties, then publication for such counties shall be in one (1) or  more newspapers published in the state, and of general circulation  within said counties. If publication is in a daily newspaper, one  (1) insertion a week shall be sufficient;
    3. The complaint for such a general adjudication  shall be captioned: “In re the General Adjudication of All Rights  to Use Water in the  . . . . .  River  System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming”;
    4. When the water rights to be determined  are located in more than one (1) county, the general adjudication  may be brought in any of the counties.

History. Laws 1977, ch. 2, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-1054.1.

Cross references. —

As to board of control, see § 41-4-201 .

Editor's notes. —

Section 1-1054.1, W.S. 1957, which was enacted by § 1, ch. 2, Laws 1977, has been inserted as § 1-37-106 and the subsequent sections, enacted by § 1, ch. 188, Laws 1977, have been redesignated accordingly. Also, because of chapter renumbering, the sections in the chapter appear as §§ 1-37-101 to 1-37-115 instead of §§ 1-38-101 to 1-38-114 as originally enacted.

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Waiver shown. —

Owner's predecessor-in-interest waived any right he had to water under a canal permit when, in order to obtain a ditch enlargement permit, the predecessor submitted an affidavit requesting a canal permit be cancelled; that decision was made final when a ditch enlargement certificate of appropriation was issued in 1922. Abandonment was not shown because there was no formal abandonment or forfeiture procedure, as contemplated by prior and current law. General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys. & All Other Sources v. State, 2015 WY 104, 355 P.3d 1222, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2015).

No bar against adjudicating Indian water rights. —

Article 21, § 26 of the Wyoming Constitution only bars state jurisdiction over Indian water rights when federal law also bars that jurisdiction. Congress' policy under the federal McCarran Amendment is to allow state courts to adjudicate Indian water rights as part of general stream adjudications. Because of the McCarran Amendment, there is no federal law which prevents the state from adjudicating the Indian water rights on the Big Horn River System. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S. Ct. 3265, 106 L. Ed. 2d 610, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3337 (U.S. 1989), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Adjudication of water rights under this section is final and binding. Claimants have several avenues available to them should unforeseen future problems develop, such as Rule 60, W.R.C.P., and § 1-37-110 (supplemental relief). The court does not need to retain jurisdiction as a “safety net.” In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S. Ct. 3265, 106 L. Ed. 2d 610, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3337 (U.S. 1989), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

And state engineer allowed to monitor rights. —

The provisions in a stream adjudication decree, authorizing the state engineer to monitor Indian reserved water rights, were proper, as they contemplated neither the application of state law nor the authority to deprive the Tribes of water without the assistance of the courts in a suit for the administration of the decree. The role of the state engineer was not to apply state law, but to enforce the reserved rights against state appropriators, as decreed under principles of federal law. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S. Ct. 3265, 106 L. Ed. 2d 610, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3337 (U.S. 1989), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Prior adjudication. —

Petition to intervene brought by irrigators to adjudicate water rights was properly dismissed by the district court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., as the matter was barred by res judicata and the petition was untimely. The disputed reservoir certificates were originally adjudicated in 1963. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to use Water in the Big Horn River System, 2004 WY 21, 85 P.3d 981, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2004).

Cited in

In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, 835 P.2d 273, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1992); In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, 899 P.2d 848, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1995); Wyoming v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 1030, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11526 (D. Wyo. 1996); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 2002 WY 89, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 93 , 48 P.3d 1040 (Wyo. 2002); Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2015 WY 40, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Mar. 19, 2015).

Law reviews. —

For discussion of the Wyoming general adjudication statute, see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 457 (1977).

For comment, “McCarran Amendment General Adjudications in Wyoming: Threshold Problems,” see XVI Land & Water L. Rev. 53 (1981).

For Comment, “Wyoming's Experience With Federal Non-Indian Reserved Rights: The Big Horn Adjudication,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 433 (1986).

For article, “A Critical Look at Wyoming Water Law,” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 307 (1989).

For case note, “Water Law — Quantification of Federal Reserve Indian Water Rights — ‘Practicably Irrigated Acreage’ Under Fire: The Search for a Better Legal Standard. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd, 492 U.S. 406, 106 L. Ed. 2d 342, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3173 (1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S. Ct. 3265, 106 L. Ed. 2d 610, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3337 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998),” see XXV Land & Water L. Rev. 417 (1990).

For case note, “WATER LAW — Drawing the Line on Indian Reserved Water Rights: No ‘Super-Walton’ Rights in Wyoming's Big Horn River System. In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, 899 P.2d 848, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1995),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 425 (1996)

§ 1-37-107. Enumeration not exclusive.

The enumeration in W.S. 1-37-103 through 1-37-106 does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in W.S. 1-37-102 in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 5; R.S. 1931, § 89-2405; C.S. 1945, § 3-5805; W.S. 1957, § 1-1055; Laws 1977, ch. 2, § 2; ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-106.

Actions not covered. —

A declaratory judgment will not be entered when action involves damages, and in which right to a removal to the federal court exists. Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1935).

Personal service contracts. —

Under general rule, except where employee's services are unique and extraordinary, specific performance, or the correlative right of injunction, will not be granted to enforce a contract for personal services and only remedy is for damages. Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1935).

Sovereign immunity does not apply in actions between governmental entities. —

This act does not invoke sovereign immunity principles for actions against governmental agencies or specify restrictions to determine the rights or the award of appropriate relief between segments of Wyoming government. Board of County Comm'rs v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d 946, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1994).

Applied in

Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 1980).

Cited in

Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (1931).

Stated in

Rock v. Lankford, 2013 WY 61, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (May 17, 2013).

Law reviews. —

For discussion of the Wyoming general adjudication statute, see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 457 (1977).

§ 1-37-108. Discretionary power retained by court.

The court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment where the judgment would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 6; R.S. 1931, § 89-2406; C.S. 1945, § 3-5806; W.S. 1957, § 1-1056; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-107.

Discretion. —

Under this section, the trial court has wide discretionary powers. This discretion is not an arbitrary one, but one which should be based upon sound legal principle. The court in the exercise of such discretion is not required to render a futile judgment that would not terminate any uncertainty or controversy or render advisory opinions. Wyoming Humane Soc'y v. Port, 404 P.2d 834, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1965).

District court has broad latitude to decide whether declaratory relief is appropriate. West Tex. Utils. Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, 807 P.2d 932, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1991).

Uncertainty. —

It was proper to refuse declaration where it would leave the parties uncertain as to their rights as to matters not before the court. Ziegler v. Pickett, 46 Wyo. 283, 25 P.2d 391, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1933).

Under this section a declaration may be refused unless it will terminate uncertainty. Ziegler v. Pickett, 46 Wyo. 283, 25 P.2d 391, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1933).

Terminable controversy. —

Declaration may be refused unless it appears that a decision, whichever way it may go, will terminate the uncertainty or controversy. Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1944).

Bringing in parties. —

Where mere personal judgment was asked, court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to have other parties brought in. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Actions not covered. —

A declaratory judgment will not be entered when action involves damages, and in which right to a removal to the federal court exists. Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1935).

Stated in

Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974); Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1997).

§ 1-37-109. Review.

Final orders and judgments entered in declaratory judgment proceedings may be reviewed as in other civil actions.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 7; R.S. 1931, § 89-2407; C.S. 1945, § 3-5807; W.S. 1957, § 1-1057; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-108.

Cross references. —

As to appeals, see Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Jurisdiction.—

Dismissal of an appeal was appropriate because a district court's order was not a final appealable order, as the court's order interpreted a trust provision and held that the Wyoming Probate Code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-101 , governed the transfer of property to the trust, but did not grant the final report and accounting and petition for final decree that was filed by the decedent's spouse and did not determine the share of the estate that the heirs were entitled to receive, nor did it discharge the personal representative and close the estate. Inman v. Inman (In re Estate of Inman), 2016 WY 101, 382 P.3d 67, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2016).

Review in declaratory judgment actions. —

Under review provided in this section, an owner of natural gas wells was properly granted declaratory judgment under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-103 , 1-37-114 , and 1-37-108 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, finding that the Department of Revenue had no authority to change the valuation methodology for production taxes and royalties without complying with the notice provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-203(b). Exhaustion of remedies was not required, and the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not apply because only questions of law were presented. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007 WY 21, 150 P.3d 1216, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2007).

Quoted in

Sherard v. Sherard, 2006 WY 105, 142 P.3d 673, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (2006); R.C.R., Inc. v. Deline, 2008 WY 96, 190 P.3d 140, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Aug. 15, 2008).

Stated in

Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 924 P.2d 91, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1996).

§ 1-37-110. Supplemental relief.

Further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted. Application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application is sufficient the court, on reasonable notice, shall require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment to show cause why further relief should not be granted.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 8; R.S. 1931, § 89-2408; C.S. 1945, § 3-5808; W.S. 1957, § 1-1058; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-109.

Jurisdiction.—

District court had jurisdiction over a motion to enforce a judgment and net profits contract pertaining to oil and gas leases under its inherent authority to interpret and enforce its own judgment and the further relief provision of the Wyoming Declaratory Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-101 et seq. While it would have been preferable for the statutory procedure to have been followed, the failure did not impact the working interest owners' procedural opportunities to contest the motion. Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2015 WY 40, 346 P.3d 880, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2015).

No sovereign immunity between government segments. —

A sovereign immunity restriction will not be applied to the determination of rights or the award of appropriate relief between segments of the Wyoming government. Simons v. Laramie County Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 1116, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1987).

Adjudication of water rights under § 1-37-106 is final and binding. Claimants have several avenues available to them should unforeseen future problems develop, such as Rule 60, W.R.C.P., and this section. The court does not need to retain jurisdiction as a “safety net.” In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S. Ct. 3265, 106 L. Ed. 2d 610, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3337 (U.S. 1989), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Declaratory action regarding whether covenant ran with the land. —

District court ruled that an area of mutual interest clause in a mineral lease contract, executed only by the lessor and lessee, did not run with the land and was not binding on successors in interest. Summary judgment granting the lessee's claim for declaratory relief that no royalties were due from any successor in interest was granted. Mt. W. Mines, Inc. v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 376 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14152 (D. Wyo. 2005).

Quoted in

Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 1976).

Cited in

In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, 835 P.2d 273, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1992).

§ 1-37-111. Determination of issues of fact.

When a declaratory judgment proceeding involves the determination of an issue of fact, the issue may be tried and determined as in other civil actions.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 9; R.S. 1931, § 89-2409; C.S. 1945, § 3-5809; W.S. 1957, § 1-1059; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-110.

Cross references. —

As to trial by jury, see chapter 11 of this title and Rules 38 and 39, W.R.C.P.

Jury trial is not a matter of right in all cases. —

What the supreme court said in Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Demand jury. —

Defendants having failed to demand jury, could not complain. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Determination of facts by jury. —

That court, without jury, must determine applicability of rule against multiplicity of suits in actions under provisions of this chapter, does not preclude determination of facts by jury. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Quoted in

R.C.R., Inc. v. Deline, 2008 WY 96, 190 P.3d 140, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Aug. 15, 2008).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right to jury trial in action for declaratory relief in state court, 33 ALR4th 146.

§ 1-37-112. Costs.

The court may award costs in any proceeding as seem equitable and just.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 10; R.S. 1931, § 89-2410; C.S. 1945, § 3-5810; W.S. 1957, § 1-1060; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-111.

Cross references. —

As to costs generally, see chapter 14 of this title.

§ 1-37-113. Parties generally; proceedings involving validity of ordinance or franchise.

When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the municipality shall be made a party and may be heard. If the statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and may be heard.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 11; R.S. 1931, § 89-2411; C.S. 1945, § 3-5811; W.S. 1957, § 1-1061; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-112.

Intent and purpose of section. —

See Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1975).

Requirements mandatory. —

The requirements of this section, directing that the attorney general shall be “served with a copy of the proceeding” and “be entitled to be heard,” are mandatory and go to the jurisdiction of the court, and failure to comply with the mandates renders any lower court order void. Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1975).

Attorney general's duty. —

The attorney general, being the chief legal officer of the state, has a duty to protect the interests and the welfare of the people in declaratory judgment actions where statutory constitutional questions are an issue. Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1975).

Joinder. —

Under this section joinder of parties is permissible when there is community of interest in questions of fact and law. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1931).

Omitted parties. —

Declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate city's sale of realty, to which persons entitled to reimbursement for improvements were not made parties, could not prejudice the latters' rights. Quackenbush v. Cheyenne, 52 Wyo. 146, 70 P.2d 577, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1937).

district court properly granted a city's motion for summary judgment in an owner's declaratory judgment action because the owner did not seek administrative review of the city's approval of the neighbors' new construction or allege any vagueness or uncertainty in the city ordinance at issue, the existing garage on the neighbors' property was a grandfathered structure, the ordinance allowed a new building to retain the replaced building's grandfathered status as long as it was within the grandfathered building's footprint and allowed work other than restoration, and the neighbors' rights would not be prejudiced by the owner's failure to name them as parties. Sikora v. City of Rawlins, 2017 WY 55, 394 P.3d 472, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2017).

Parties held indispensable. —

In an action by an oil refiner for declaration that its plan to impound and recycle effluent water, being the water, purchased from a city, which remained after use in its refinery process, was not subject to the jurisdiction and control of the state engineer and the Wyoming state board of control, and that the proposed use did not infringe on any rights of downstream water appropriators, the state board of control and the city were necessary and indispensable parties to the action, and the cause should not proceed without their joinder. State by Christopulos v. Husky Oil Co., 575 P.2d 262, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 268 (Wyo. 1978).

Appearance waives personal jurisdiction. —

The individual plaintiffs submitted to the court's jurisdiction by voluntarily appearing and bringing their original action in that court. They, therefore, waived any objection to personal jurisdiction and the court appropriately exercised specific personal jurisdiction over those officers and directors with respect to the counterclaim following the dismissal of the complaint under Rule 37, W.R.C.P. Global Shipping & Trading, Ltd. v. Verkhnesaldincky Metallurgic Co., 892 P.2d 143, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1995).

In suit over protective covenant, seller/developer's representations irrelevant. —

The court properly found that a protective covenant entitled lot owners to use a right-of-way unobstructed by a second lot owner's fence. Extrinsic evidence concerning allegedly false oral representations made to the second lot owner by the seller/developer were neither relevant nor informative to a determination of the parties' rights vis-a-vis the duly filed covenant which created the access interest as a title record document. Revelle v. Schultz, 759 P.2d 1255, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1988).

Adjoining landowners. —

In an action to determine the rights of landowners along a public access fishing easement, adjoining landowners who did not join the action as plaintiffs were properly joined as third-party defendants since the third party defendants' interests might have been impaired or impeded by a judgment rendered in their absence. Lamb v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 985 P.2d 433, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1999), reh'g denied, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. Aug. 31, 1999).

Applied in

Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 1980); Baessler v. Freier, 2011 WY 125, 258 P.3d 720, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Aug. 26, 2011).

Quoted in

In re Estate of Lonquest, 526 P.2d 994, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 235 (Wyo. 1974); Ririe v. Board of Trustees, 674 P.2d 214, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 391 (Wyo. 1983); Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 771 P.2d 1206, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1977).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 159 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction, application and effect of § 11 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act that all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties, 71 ALR2d 723.

§ 1-37-114. Construction of chapter.

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is remedial. Its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and administered.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 12; R.S. 1931, § 89-2412; C.S. 1945, § 3-5812; W.S. 1957, § 1-1062; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-113.

Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. —

See § 1-37-101 and notes thereto.

In general. —

The Wyoming courts do not interpret the Declaratory Judgment Act in a narrow or technical sense, and there remains the prerequisite that the party seeking declaratory relief present the court with an actual controversy. Wyo. Cmty. College Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. College Dist., 2001 WY 86, 31 P.3d 1242, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2001).

A declaratory judgment action cannot substitute for an appeal. Simon v. Teton Bd. of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2000).

Trial court properly dismissed property owners' declaratory judgment action against the State Engineer and the Board of Control because the action was not justiciable; even if the case presented a matter of great public importance, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115 , did not extend the jurisdiction of the district court, and the property owners failed to show that any relief would have a practical effect on them. William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, 206 P.3d 722, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2009).

Employee was entitled to a declaration of her rights under the State Employees' and Officials' Group Plan (Group Plan) where, pursuant to the medical management provisions, she did not have the right to bring a legal action to recover under the Group Plan until she completed the required to level appeals process. State ex rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, 201 P.3d 1127, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2009).

City had failed to assert a justiciable controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act regarding its use of revenues from the sale of electricity where an assertion that a citizens group had taken contrary positions regarding the statutes at issue was insufficient to allege a tangible interest that had been harmed. City of Torrington v. Smith, 2016 WY 126, 386 P.3d 336, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2016).

Purpose may be carried out in actions not expressly based on chapter. —

The purpose of this chapter, as set forth in this section, may be carried out in actions not expressly based on the Declaratory Judgments Act. Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1947); Poling v. North Am. Life & Casualty Co., 593 P.2d 568, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 398 (Wyo. 1979).

Actions of board of county commissioners. —

Review of board of county commissioners' parliamentary procedural decision that a tie vote constituted no action and that it could vote again involved the board's procedures and its authority to engage in the actions at issue, which presented questions of law subject to a declaratory judgment action. Hirschfield v. Board of County Comm'rs, 944 P.2d 1139, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1997).

Existence of another adequate remedy will not, of itself, preclude declaratory judgment relief. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 345 (Wyo. 1982).

Begrudging availability of the declaratory vehicle is inconsistent with the act's expressed remedial tenor directed to the elimination of uncertainty and insecurity and the settlement of controversy. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974).

Administrative decisions. —

Ordinarily, a declaratory judgment action is not a substitute for an appeal from administrative decisions. If, however, such desired relief concerns the validity and construction of agency regulations, or if it concerns the constitutionality or interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be, based, it should be entertained. Wyo. Cmty. College Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. College Dist., 2001 WY 86, 31 P.3d 1242, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2001).

Under review of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-109 , an owner of natural gas wells was properly granted declaratory judgment under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-103 , 1-37-108 , and this section of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, finding that the Department of Revenue had no authority to change the valuation methodology for production taxes and royalties without complying with the notice provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-203(b). Exhaustion of remedies was not required, and the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not apply because only questions of law were presented. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007 WY 21, 150 P.3d 1216, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2007).

Quiet title. —

An action to quiet title is essentially an action for declaratory relief. Morad v. Brown, 549 P.2d 312, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1976).

Where the court disposed of the two main issues in the case before it, namely, that defendant's tax-based title was void and plaintiffs' legal title was proven, this in effect quieted title, but fell short of giving plaintiffs possession or a decree to that effect. Morad v. Brown, 549 P.2d 312, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1976).

Construction of will. —

Under this act district courts have power, upon petition of any person interested, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under a will, to declare rights, status or other legal relations thereunder, and to determine any question arising in administration of an estate. Murrell v. Stock Growers' Nat'l Bank, 74 F.2d 827, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4018 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1934).

Where declaratory action on insurance policy variance properly brought. —

Where the plaintiff, in effect, assumed the facts necessary to permit her to seek a declaration that the variance between the certificate of insurance and the master insurance policy resulted in an ambiguity which entitled her to a construction that a suicide limitation was applicable for zero years, such an action appropriately could be brought under this chapter. Poling v. North Am. Life & Casualty Co., 593 P.2d 568, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 398 (Wyo. 1979).

In an LLC, where withdrawing member did not voluntarily forfeit his equity interest , where members did not contract for buyout and where statute did not require it, court did not require LLC or members to buy withdrawn LLC member's equity interest; remanded for trial court to define his retained LLC equity rights in the declaratory judgment action. Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 2004 WY 1, 82 P.3d 274, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 2004).

Exchange of school lands. —

A controversy over the constitutionality of exchanges of state lands without a public auction involved precisely the type of circumstance contemplated by the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, for (1) this controversy impacted many stakeholders, including state-school-land lessees, the beneficiaries of the funds generated by state school lands, the legislature which had adopted statutes authorizing exchanges, those members of the executive branch of state government whose responsibility was to steward the state school lands, and the public at large; and (2) as inevitable growth and development increased the pressure on Wyoming state lands, the need for certainty and clarity regarding this aspect of the management of state lands grew.Dir. of the Office of State Lands & Invs. v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. July 10, 2003).

Stated in

Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2015 WY 40, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Mar. 19, 2015).

Applied in

Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 1980); Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Dev. Co., 708 P.2d 39, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 584 (Wyo. 1985); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1988); Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, 79 P.3d 500, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 2003); Best v. Best, 2015 WY 133, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Sept. 30, 2015).

Quoted in

West Tex. Utils. Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1991); Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1992); Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 2000).

Cited in

Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (1931); Snake River Brewing Co. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, 39 P.3d 397, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2002); Quinn Revocable Trust v. SRW, Inc., 2004 WY 65, 91 P.3d 146, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (2004).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act: Statutory and Case Law Analysis,” see XVI Land & Water L. Rev. 243 (1981).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

§ 1-37-115. Provisions severable.

The provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act are independent and severable. The invalidity of one (1) provision shall not affect or render the remainder of the act invalid.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 50, § 14; R.S. 1931, § 89-2414; C.S. 1945, § 3-5814; W.S. 1957, § 1-1063; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 1-38-114.

Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. —

See § 1-37-101 and notes thereto.

Cited in

Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2015 WY 40, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Mar. 19, 2015); Inman v. Inman (In re Estate of Inman), 2016 WY 101, 382 P.3d 67, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2016).

Chapter 38 Wrongful Death

Cross references. —

As to cause of action for wrongful death, see art. 9, § 4, Wyo. Const.

As to right of action when death caused by work-related injuries, see §§ 27-14-104 and 27-14-105 .

As to claim for damages when death caused by violation of safety regulations for mines, see § 30-2-106 .

Editor's notes. —

Sections 2 through 8, ch. 54, Laws 1982, read:

Approved March 9, 1982.

Chapter is Wyoming's version of Lord Campbell's Act. Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1963), overruled in part, Johnson v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2010).

Purpose. —

The whole import of the Wrongful Death Act is to benefit those persons who have been injured because of the death of a relative. Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2825 (D. Wyo. 1961).

In this chapter, the legislature has expressed a social policy that favors compensation to ameliorate the certain damage to relational interests resulting from the death of a family member. Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1990).

Distinctions between survival and wrongful death statutes. —

The prime difference between survival and wrongful death statutes is that the survival statute merely continues a cause of action in existence and the injured party's claim after death is an asset of the estate, while the wrongful death statute creates a new cause of action for the benefit of designated persons who have suffered the loss of a loved one and provider. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

The survival statute protects the creditors of the estate; the Wrongful Death Act does not. De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

A survival claim is based on the decedent's claim for damages sustained during his lifetime, while a wrongful death action creates a new claim or cause of action for the loss sustained by statutory beneficiaries of the decedent (directly from his death). Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23413 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S. Ct. 85, 78 L. Ed. 2d 94, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1117 (U.S. 1983).

Essentials of wrongful death complaint are: (1) the plaintiff's capacity to sue as personal representative of the deceased; (2) that the plaintiffs are the persons entitled by statute to damages; (3) that the plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to show in what particular the defendant was negligent; (4) that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of death and (5) damages. Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 445 (Wyo. 1979).

Effect of Worker's Compensation Act. —

Wrongful death statute is valid and is not repealed by the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act, except where it conflicts with the provisions of that act. Druley v. Houdesheldt, 75 Wyo. 155, 294 P.2d 351, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (1956), rehearing denied, 75 Wyo. 166, 296 P.2d 251 (1956). See § 27-14-104 .

State courts have jurisdiction of action for wrongful death on military reservation. Danielson v. Donmopray, 57 F.2d 565, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1134 (D. Wyo. 1932).

Law reviews. —

For comment “Comparative Negligence in Wyoming,” see VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 597 (1973).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

22A Am. Jur. 2d Death § 1 et seq.

Venue of wrongful death action, 36 ALR2d 1146.

Minority of surviving children as tolling limitation period in state wrongful death action, 85 ALR3d 162.

Tortious maintenance or removal of life supports, 58 ALR4th 222.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for noneconomic loss caused by personal injury or death of parent, 61 ALR4th 251.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for noneconomic loss caused by personal injury or death of spouse, 61 ALR4th 309.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by activities of hospital “rescue team”, 64 ALR4th 1200.

Recovery in death action for failure to diagnose incurable disease which caused death, 64 ALR4th 1232.

Tort liability for window washer's injury or death, 69 ALR4th 207.

Statute of limitations in wrongful death action based on medical malpractice, 70 ALR4th 535.

When is death “instantaneous” for purposes of wrongful death or survival action, 75 ALR4th 151.

Recovery of damages for loss of consortium resulting from death of child—modern status, 77 ALR4th 411.

Admissibility of evidence, in action for personal injury or death, of injured party's use of intoxicants or illegal drugs on issue of life expectancy, 86 ALR4th 1135.

Wrongful death damages for loss of expectancy of inheritance from decedent, 42 ALR5th 465.

Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime nature of tort — modern cases, 80 ALR Fed 105.

Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory damages for personal injury to or death of seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USC Appx § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness—modern cases, 96 ALR Fed 541.

Excessiveness or adequacy of award of damages for personal injury or death in actions under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USC § 51 et seq.)—modern cases, 97 ALR Fed 189.

25A C.J.S. Death § 1 et seq.

§ 1-38-101. Actions for wrongful death which survive; proceedings against executor or administrator of person liable.

Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued is liable in an action for damages, even though the death was caused under circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or second degree or manslaughter. If the person liable dies, the action may be brought against the executor or administrator of his estate. If he left no estate within the state of Wyoming, the court may appoint an administrator upon application.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 39, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 2364a; R.S. 1899, § 3448; C.S. 1910, § 4291; C.S. 1920, § 5560; R.S. 1931, § 89-403; C.S. 1945, § 3-403; Laws 1947, ch. 95, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-1065; Laws 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-39-101 , 2-14-201 ; Laws 1979, ch. 142, § 3; 1980, ch. 54, § 1; 1982, ch. 54, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to abatement and survival of actions generally, see §§ 1-4-101 and 1-4-102 .

As to homicide generally, see §§ 6-2-101 through 6-2-108 .

Section not repealed by constitution. —

The provisions of this section were not repealed by the adoption of the constitution. Mestas v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 12 Wyo. 414, 76 P. 567, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1904).

Section applies to citizens of other states. —

This section was intended to provide a remedy not only for the citizens of this state but for the citizens of other states, while passing through or residing within the state. Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2825 (D. Wyo. 1961).

Compared to survival of personal injury action. —

Where a person is injured by another, if he dies from other causes, an action for personal injury survives; however, if death results from the same injuries, the action may not be maintained by the personal representative for the estate, but may be brought under the wrongful death act for the next of kin. Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 2000).

Loss of chance doctrine applicable. —

Recognition of a patient's loss of a chance “to live” as being actionable within the context of this section does not strain the bounds of reason, logic, or the law. A party is not required to establish the lost chance of recovery or survival in an exact percentage for the matter to be submitted to a jury. The jury is to consider evidence of percentages of the lost chance in the assessment and apportionment of damages, and the damages recoverable equals the total sum of the damages for the underlying injury or death multiplied by the percentage of the lost chance. McMackin v. Johnson County Healthcare Ctr., 2004 WY 44, 88 P.3d 491, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2004).

Derivative of underlying action. —

A wrongful death action brought pursuant to this section is derivative of the underlying cause of action which could have been brought by the deceased during his lifetime. Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 1998), reh'g denied, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. Aug. 26, 1998).

Concerted action theory. —

Wrongful death action pursuant to this section was properly dismissed on summary judgment, because a reasonable jury could not have found that a minor boy whose snowboarding friend collided with wife of plaintiff widower to cause her death had encouraged his friend to ski in a tortious manner or knew that he was going to do so; thus, widower's “concerted action” claim was without merit. Keith v. J.A., 295 Fed. Appx. 309, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21366 (10th Cir. 2008).

Recovery allowed where death instantaneous. —

This section not being a survival statute, recovery may be had thereunder even though the deceased died instantaneously. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1931).

And where decedent's death is due to wrongful injuries. Parsons v. Roussalis, 488 P.2d 1050, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1971).

When separate actions against successive joint tort-feasors permitted. —

In a wrongful death suit, successive joint tort-feasors may be sued in separate actions where the facts of the claim in the first case are clearly different from those of the second case, the cause or causes of death have never been judicially determined and total actual damages expressed in a money amount have not been fixed. Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 445 (Wyo. 1979).

Construction with malpractice limitation statute. —

This section and § 1-3-107 , establishing a two-year time limitation for bringing a malpractice action, must be construed together; thus, where a decedent had failed to bring his claim against a physician and hospital within two-years, he had no viable action at the time of his death and a wrongful death action on behalf of his survivors was barred. Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 1998), reh'g denied, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. Aug. 26, 1998).

When malpractice action not precluded by release of original tort-feasor. —

If the release of the original tort-feasor is not actually intended to release doctors and hospitals who have treated or may in the future treat the tort victim, and if the amount paid to the tort victim does not constitute full compensation for claims against the original tort-feasor and the doctor and the hospital as well, and was not accepted as such, the tort victim can fairly and equitably seek further recovery from the doctor and the hospital for malpractice. Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 445 (Wyo. 1979).

Presumed that decedent exercised due care. —

In the absence of eye witnesses to an accident or other evidence sufficient to dispel or rebut the presumption, it is presumed that the decedent, acting on the instinct of self-preservation, was exercising ordinary care. However, the presumption becomes important only when negligence is found on the part of the defendant. Absent such a finding, the question of the decedent's due care does not arise. De Julio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 494 (Wyo. 1986).

Instruction adequately informed jury that anyone using public highway must keep proper lookout, an entirely adequate statement of applicable Wyoming law. The instruction then defined “proper lookout” as that lookout which would be maintained by an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person in light of all present conditions and those reasonably to be anticipated. That instruction could not be said to have misled or confused the jury. De Julio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 494 (Wyo. 1986).

Personal Representative. —

Even though it is not controlling, one of the factors the district court should consider in appointing a personal representative in a wrongful death suit, particularly if the proposed appointment is contested, is the priority list contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-201(a); that statutory list reflects legislative policy as to the order of significant human relationships, and as such, it is a useful tool in considering suitability to act as personal representative. Because the filing of a wrongful death action presupposes that the personal representative intends to pursue a civil action against the alleged wrongdoer, the district court should also consider the petitioner's financial and physical ability to do so, his or her geographic location, his or her intentions in regard to legal representation, and his or her stake in the outcome; given the potential in a wrongful death action that a multitude of claimants may be coupled with a limited damages recovery, the issue of family harmony or disharmony may likewise be important in the selection of a personal representative. Johnson v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2010).

Probate court erred in appointing a decedent's father as his personal representative for the purpose of filing a wrongful death suit because the appointment of a personal representative to pursue a wrongful death claim under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-38-101 and 102 was to be made by the district court within that wrongful death action. Johnson v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2010).

Appointment of a personal representative for probate proceedings was separate and distinct from the appointment of a personal representative for purposes of pursuing a wrongful death action. While it was proper for the probate court to appoint a personal representative for handling matters associated with the decedent's estate, the appointment of a personal representative to pursue a wrongful death claim was to be made by the district court within that wrongful death action. Johnson v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2010).

Applied in

Merrill v. United Air Lines, 288 F.2d 218, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4969 (2d Cir. 1961); Gillaspie v. Duncan, 410 P.2d 577, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1966); State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court, 426 P.2d 431, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1967); Middaugh v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 977, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11870 (D. Wyo. 1968); Lopez v. Arroyo, 489 P.2d 626, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 256 (Wyo. 1971); Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23413 (10th Cir. 1982); Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

Quoted in

Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1998); Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, 50 P.3d 323, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 58 Wyo. 211, 131 P.2d 315, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (1942); Muir v. Haggerty, 77 Wyo. 280, 314 P.2d 948, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (1957); Druley v. Houdesheldt, 75 Wyo. 166, 296 P.2d 251 (1956); Grabowski v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 421, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8001 (D. Wyo. 1968); Newcom v. Keever, 513 P.2d 1021, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1973); Rutledge v. Vonfeldt, 564 P.2d 350, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 256 (Wyo. 1977); Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1338, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Wyo. 2000).

Law reviews. —

For note on wrongful death in Wyoming as to causes of action, see 16 Wyo. L.J. 171.

For article, “Wrongful Death and Rightful Damages,” see II Land & Water L. Rev. 405 (1967).

For case note, “Wrongful Death — Siblings as Beneficiaries Under Wyoming's Wrongful Death Statutes, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984),” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 299 (1985).

For comment, “Wyoming Fetal Rights—Why the Abortion ‘Albatross’ Is a Bird of a Different Color: The Case for Fetal-Federalism,” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 627 (1993).

For article, “Wyoming's New Comparative Fault Statute,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 509 (1996)

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Fact that tort-feasor is member of class of beneficiaries as affecting right to maintain action for wrongful death, 95 ALR2d 585.

Hospital's liability for personal injury or death of doctor, nurse, or attendant, 1 ALR3d 1036.

Official death certificate as evidence of cause of death in civil or criminal action, 21 ALR3d 418.

Owner's or keeper's liability for death inflicted by wild animal, 21 ALR3d 603.

Right to maintain direct action against fellow employee for death covered by workmen's compensation, 21 ALR3d 845.

Right of action for death of woman who consented to illegal abortion, 36 ALR3d 630.

Right to maintain action or to recover damages for death of unborn child, 84 ALR3d 411.

Action against parent by or on behalf of unemancipated minor child for wrongful death of other parent, 87 ALR3d 849.

Automobile occupant's failure to use seat belts as contributory negligence, 92 ALR3d 9.

Modern status of interspousal tort immunity in personal injury and wrongful death actions, 92 ALR3d 901.

Validity of release of prospective right to wrongful death action, 92 ALR3d 1232.

Judgment in death action as precluding subsequent personal injury action by potential beneficiary of death action, or vice versa, 94 ALR3d 676.

Drug manufacturer's promotion of product as affecting its liability for product-caused injury, 94 ALR3d 1080.

Liability for injury or death of participant in automobile or horse race at public track, 13 ALR4th 623.

Effect of death of beneficiary upon right of action under death statute, 13 ALR4th 1060.

Judgment in favor of, or adverse to, person injured as barring action for his death, 26 ALR4th 1264.

Liability of attorney for suicide of client based on attorney's professional act or omission, 41 ALR4th 351.

Primary liability of private chain franchisor for injury or death caused by franchise premises or equipment, 59 ALR4th 1142.

State and local government liability for injury or death of bicyclist due to defect or obstruction in public bicycle path, 68 ALR4th 204.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by spoilage, contamination, or other deleterious condition of food or food product, 2 ALR5th 1.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by food product containing object related to, but not intended to be present in, product, 2 ALR5th 189.

Liability of travel publication, travel agent, or similar party for personal injury or death of traveler, 2 ALR5th 396.

Right of workers' compensation insurer or employer paying to a workers' compensation fund, on the compensable death of an employee with no dependants, to indemnity or subrogation from proceeds of wrongful death action brought against third-party tortfeasor, 7 ALR5th 969.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive damages awarded in personal injury or death cases, 12 ALR5th 195.

Venue of wrongful death action, 58 ALR5th 535.

Liability of landlord for injury or death occasioned by swimming pool maintained for tenants, 62 ALR5th 475.

Liability of owner of private residential swimming pool for injury or death occasioned thereby, 64 ALR5th 1.

§ 1-38-102. Action to be brought by wrongful death representative; recovery exempt from debts; measure and element of damages; limitation of action.

  1. Every wrongful death action under W.S. 1-38-101 shall be brought by and in the name of the decedent’s  wrongful death representative for the exclusive benefit of beneficiaries  who have sustained damage.
  2. If the decedent left a husband, wife,  child, father or mother, no debt of the decedent may be satisfied  out of the proceeds of any judgment obtained in any action for wrongful  death or out of the proceeds of any settlement of a wrongful death  claim.
  3. The court or jury, as the case may be,  may award such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as shall be deemed  fair and just. Every person for whose benefit an action for wrongful  death is brought may prove his respective damages, and the court or  jury may award such person that amount of damages to which it considers  such person entitled, including damages for loss of probable future  companionship, society and comfort.
  4. [Effective until July 1, 2022] An action for wrongful death shall be  commenced within two (2) years after the death of the decedent. If  the decedent’s death involved medical malpractice this limitation  period shall be tolled as provided in W.S. 9-2-1518 upon receipt by the director of the medical review panel  of a malpractice claim.
  5. [Effective July 1, 2022] An action for wrongful death shall be commenced within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
  6. The court appointing the wrongful death  representative may approve a settlement of a wrongful death action  or a wrongful death claim and resolve disputes relating to the allocation  of settlement proceeds.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 39, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 2364; R.S. 1899, § 3449; Laws 1909, ch. 3, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 4292; C.S. 1920, § 5561; R.S. 1931, § 89-404; Laws 1939, ch. 104, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-404; Laws 1947, ch. 132, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-1066; Laws 1973, ch. 139, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-39-102 , 2-14-202; Laws 1979, ch. 142, §§ 1, 3; 1980, ch. 54, § 1; 1982, ch. 54, § 1; 2012, ch. 5, § 2; 2021, ch. 99, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (a), substituted “wrongful death” for “such,” inserted “under W.S. 1-38-101 ,” and substituted “decedent's wrongful death” for “personal” and “for the exclusive benefit of beneficiaries who have sustained damage” for “of the deceased person”; in (b), substituted “decedent” for “deceased” twice, and “for wrongful death or out of the proceeds of any settlement of a wrongful death claim” for “brought under the provisions of this section”; in (c), deleted “in every such action” after “case may be,” and substituted “an action for wrongful death” for “such action”; in (d), substituted “An action for wrongful death” for “Every such action” and “decedent” for “deceased person,” and added the second sentence; and added (e).

The 2021 amendment , effective July 1, 2022, deleted the second sentence in (d), which read, "If the decedent's death involved medical malpractice this limitation period shall be tolled as provided in W.S. 9-2-1518 upon receipt by the director of the medical review panel of a malpractice claim."

I.General Consideration.

Cross references. —

As to limitation of actions generally, see chapter 3 of this title.

As to trial by jury, see Rules 38 and 39, W.R.C.P.

Wrongful death actions are civil actions. — State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court, 426 P.2d 431, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1967).

Limitation period not a statute of limitation. —

Because the two-year limitation period found in subsection (d) is an integral part of the right created by the statute and does not contain a savings clause, the limitation period in subsection (d) is a condition precedent, rather than a statute of limitations. Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1998).

The limitation period found in the wrongful death statute is a condition precedent, not a statute of limitations, and the discovery rule does not apply to conditions precedent, nor does the plain language of the statute lend itself to the application of the discovery rule. Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1998).

Appointment of Personal Representative. —

Probate court erred in appointing a decedent's father as his personal representative for the purpose of filing a wrongful death suit because the appointment of a personal representative to pursue a wrongful death claim under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-38-101 and 102 was to be made by the district court within that wrongful death action. Johnson v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2010).

Applied in

Merrill v. United Air Lines, 288 F.2d 218, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4969 (2d Cir. 1961); Middaugh v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 977, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11870 (D. Wyo. 1968); Newcom v. Keever, 513 P.2d 1021, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1973); Rosa v. Cantrell, 508 F. Supp. 330, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10771 (D. Wyo. 1981); Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23413 (10th Cir. 1982); Stroth v. N. Lincoln County Hosp. Dist., 2014 WY 81, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Jun 23, 2014).

Quoted in

Grabowski v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 421, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8001 (D. Wyo. 1968).

Stated in

Templar v. Tongate, 71 Wyo. 148, 255 P.2d 223, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (1953); De Julio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 494 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

Tuttle v. Short, 42 Wyo. 1, 288 P. 524, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 31 , 70 A.L.R. 106 (1930); Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 58 Wyo. 211, 131 P.2d 315, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (1942); Rutledge v. Vonfeldt, 564 P.2d 350, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 256 (Wyo. 1977); Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11704 (10th Cir. 1978); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 549 (Wyo. 1986); Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1338, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Wyo. 2000).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Probate Jurisdiction in Wrongful Death Actions,” see 2 Wyo. L.J. 109.

For note, “Employee Life Insurance Furnished by the Employer as Mitigating Damages Against the Employer in an Action for Wrongful Death,” see 15 Wyo. L.J. 232.

For case note, “Wrongful Death — Siblings as Beneficiaries Under Wyoming's Wrongful Death Statutes, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984),” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 299 (1985).

For case note, “Should a Wrongful Death Action Expire Before the Decedent Does? A Wrong Turn for Wrongful Death,” see XXXV Land & Water L. Rev. 235 (2000).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Measure and elements of damages for personal injury resulting in death of infant, 14 ALR2d 485, 45 ALR4th 234.

Capacity of local or foreign personal representative to maintain action for death under foreign statute providing for action by personal representative, 52 ALR2d 1016.

Capacity of foreign domiciliary or of ancillary personal representative to maintain action for death, under statute of forum providing for action by personal representative, 52 ALR2d 1048.

Cost of annuity as factor for consideration in fixing damages in death action, 53 ALR2d 1454.

Recovery of nominal damages in wrongful death action, 69 ALR2d 628.

Pension, retirement income, social security payments and the like of deceased as affecting recovery in wrongful death action, 81 ALR2d 949.

Damages for wrongful death of husband or father as affected by receipt of social security benefits, 84 ALR2d 764.

Recovery of prejudgment interest on wrongful death damages, 96 ALR2d 1104.

Time from which statute of limitations begins to run against cause of action for wrongful death, 97 ALR2d 1151.

Brothers and sisters of deceased as beneficiaries within state wrongful death statute, 31 ALR3d 379.

Right of representative of parent to maintain action for wrongful death against minor child, 62 ALR3d 1299.

Action for death of stepparent by or for benefit of stepchild, 68 ALR3d 1220.

Right of spouse to maintain action for wrongful death as affected by fact that injury resulting in death occurred before marriage, 69 ALR3d 1046.

Right to amend pending personal injury action by including action for wrongful death after statute of limitations has run against independent death action, 71 ALR3d 933.

Recovery, in action for benefit of decedent's estate in jurisdiction which has both wrongful death and survival statutes, of value of earnings decedent would have made after death, 76 ALR3d 125.

Admissibility and sufficiency of proof of value of housewife's services, in wrongful death action, 77 ALR3d 1175.

Right of illegitimate child, after Levy v. Louisiana, to recover under wrongful death statute for death of putative father, 78 ALR3d 1230.

Admissibility of evidence of, or propriety of comment as to, plaintiff spouse's remarriage, or possibility thereof, in action for damages for death of other spouse, 88 ALR3d 926.

Effect of death of beneficiary upon right of action under death statute, 13 ALR4th 1060.

Effect of settlement with and acceptance of release from one wrongful death beneficiary upon liability of tortfeasor to other beneficiaries or decedent's personal representative, 21 ALR4th 275.

Claim for punitive damages in tort action as surviving death of tortfeasor or person wronged, 30 ALR4th 707.

Assignability of proceeds of claim for personal injury or death, 33 ALR4th 82.

Recovery of damages for grief or mental anguish resulting from death of child — modern cases, 45 ALR4th 234.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for personal injuries resulting in death of persons engaged in farming, ranching or agricultural labor, 46 ALR4th 220.

Recoverability from tort-feasor of cost of diagnostic examinations absent proof of actual bodily injury, 46 ALR4th 1151.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of damages awarded for personal injuries resulting in death of retired persons, 48 ALR4th 229.

Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49 ALR4th 972.

Excessiveness and adequacy of damages for personal injuries resulting in death of minor, 49 ALR4th 1076.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for personal injuries resulting in death of persons engaged in professional, white-collar and nonmanual occupations, 50 ALR4th 787.

Wrongful death: surviving parent's minority as tolling limitation period on suit for child's wrongful death, 54 ALR4th 362.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for parents' noneconomic loss caused by personal injury or death of child, 61 ALR4th 413.

Effect of death of beneficiary, following wrongful death, upon damages, 73 ALR4th 441.

Fraudulent concealment of cause of action for wrongful death as affecting period of limitations, 88 ALR4th 851.

Air carrier's liability for injury from condition of airport premises, 14 ALR5th 662.

Wrongful death damages for loss of expectancy of inheritance from decedent, 42 ALR5th 465.

Recovery under state law for negligent infliction of emotional distress under rule of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 (1968), or refinements thereof, 96 ALR5th 107.

Limitation of liability of air carrier for personal injury or death, 91 ALR Fed 547.

II.Personal Representative.

Action for wrongful death can be brought only by personal representative of deceased. Tuttle v. Short, 42 Wyo. 1, 288 P. 524, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1930); Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2825 (D. Wyo. 1961); Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1963), overruled in part, Johnson v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2010).

Identity of decedent and running of limitation period. —

Where the identity of the decedent was not known and a personal representative could not be appointed, the limitation period did not run until the decedent was identified. Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1998).

Who may be nonresident administrator. —

Nothing in this section indicates any intention on the part of the Wyoming legislature to exclude a nonresident administrator from acting as personal representative. Certainly he or she can resort to the federal court under diversity provisions of the United States Code. Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2825 (D. Wyo. 1961).

But administrator acting as personal representative must not be confused with administrator of estate whose duties and powers are set out in § 2-7-103 ; for the personal representative is required merely to collect the amount received as damages from the wrongful death and to distribute it in the manner provided by law. Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2825 (D. Wyo. 1961).

Administrator recovering for beneficiaries is trustee for them. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1931); Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1963), overruled in part, Johnson v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2010).

Hence, designation of administrator is no more than statutory device to provide a party to file a civil action to collect damages and to pay them over to the persons entitled. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1975), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984); De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

And representative's title unimportant. —

It would appear to make little difference what title the special representative might possess, whether it be administrator or executor, foreign or domestic, so long as the amount collected inures to the benefit of the persons designated by law. Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2825 (D. Wyo. 1961).

However, court must be sitting in probate to appoint. —

A district court does not have authority, unless sitting in probate, to appoint a father as the personal representative of a deceased son for the purposes of a wrongful death action. Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1963), overruled in part, Johnson v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2010).

It is not within province of federal district courts to qualify term “personal representative” by interpolating the words “who is a resident of this state,” or “who is appointed in this state,” or “who is amenable to the jurisdiction of this state.” Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2825 (D. Wyo. 1961).

Promise of nonrepresentative not to institute action of no effect. —

Promise of widow, prior to appointment of husband's representative, that she would not institute an action for death of her husband as his personal representative could not operate as release or bind other legatees or heirs. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

The promise made by a widow did not, and could not, operate as a present transfer or release of the alleged cause of action which existed only in favor of, and under control of, the personal representative of deceased, yet to be appointed, and subject to the direction of the probate court. Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1963), overruled in part, Johnson v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2010).

And deemed within statute of frauds. —

Oral agreement of widow, not appointed as administratrix, to forego instituting action for husband's death as husband's personal representative was within statute of frauds where there remained more than a year for bringing action. Massion v. Mt. Sinai Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1929).

Judicial precedent. —

Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Johnson did not apply retroactively to strip a decedent's widow of her status as a properly appointed personal representative in her wrongful death action. The holding in Johnson was a departure from long-established precedent, precedent on which the widow had a solid basis to rely in filing her wrongful death action. Nodine v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 2012 WY 72, 277 P.3d 112, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 2012).

III.No Liability for Decedent's Debts.

Subsection (b) does not require distribution under laws of intestacy. It states only that when a decedent leaves a husband, wife, child, father or mother, any wrongful death action recovery shall not be liable for any debts of the deceased. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1975), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

Amount recovered does not become part of decedent's estate and is not subject to estate administration. Tuttle v. Short, 42 Wyo. 1, 288 P. 524, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1930); De Herrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 263 (Wyo. 1977).

Future alimony payments as debt. —

Assuming that the obligation for payment of future alimony installments did not terminate upon death, the obligation would then be a debt which could not be satisfied out of the proceeds of a wrongful death judgment inasmuch as decedent left a wife surviving him. Saffels v. Bennett, 630 P.2d 505, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 352 (Wyo. 1981), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

Worker's compensation benefits recoverable from wrongful death proceeds. —

Where the state sought reimbursement of worker's compensation benefits, paid on account of a worker's death, from a settlement received by the worker's wife in a subsequent wrongful death action, the settlement proceeds were subject to the reimbursement and lien provisions of the worker's compensation laws and were not protected by the provision of this section which provides that debts of the decedent cannot be satisfied out of wrongful death proceeds where the deceased is survived by relatives. West v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 822 P.2d 1269, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1991) (decided under former worker's compensation provisions).

IV.Beneficiaries of Action.

“Every person” construed. —

The words “every person,” in subsection (c), cannot be interpreted to have the effect of creating a new class of persons and a cause of action that did not previously exist. “Every person” means all, each or every person within a class or group, the class or group being that class set out in subsection (b). Saffels v. Bennett, 630 P.2d 505, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 352 (Wyo. 1981). But see Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984), annotated below.

The persons for whose benefit a wrongful death action is brought are all of those persons identified in § 2-4-101 , which establishes the rules of intestate succession. Whether any such recoveries will be subject to the payment of debts will be controlled by the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, and the distribution of any proceeds will be controlled by subsection (c), not by § 2-4-101 .Butler v. Halstead, 770 P.2d 698, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1989).

Adoptive siblings.—

Adoptive half-brother was a qualified beneficiary under the wrongful death statutes, and thus had standing to maintain a wrongful death action, where, through the adoption, the decedent and half-brother had one parent in common, and the clear language of the intestacy statutes allowed for an adopted child to inherit from his adoptive parent and for relatives, including adoptive brothers, to inherit from the adoptive child. Craft v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Health, 2020 WY 70, 465 P.3d 395, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 2020).

Mother and siblings may join in action. —

The decedent's mother and siblings were included in the statutory phrase “every person for whose benefit such action is brought” in subsection (c), thus permitting them to join in an action for wrongful death, even though the decedent left a surviving child. Butler v. Halstead, 770 P.2d 698, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1989).

Sisters and brothers may receive damages for “probable future companionship, society and comfort.” This does not, however, make it necessary to direct an award of damages. The decision of the jury to not award damages is within the jury's discretion. Crane v. Mekelburg, 728 F.2d 439, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25233 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1984).

In a wrongful death action brought by the personal representative in his capacity as administrator of the decedent's estate, a brother and the sisters of the decedent could participate and establish their respective damages, as the persons “for whose benefit such action is brought,” found in subsection (c), are identified in § 2-4-101 and includes such surviving siblings where the decedent does not leave a wife or children surviving. Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984), limited, Butler v. Halstead, 770 P.2d 698, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1989).

This section allows recovery for benefit of other than parents, i.e., intestate heirs, and for loss of the parent itself. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1979).

Illegitimate child is “person” within the scope of this section. Moreover, Wyoming's wrongful death statute cannot constitutionally deny an illegitimate infant the right to claim and recover damages for the wrongful death of his or her parent — mother or father. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1975), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

Beneficiaries not limited to heirs. —

There is no mandate from the legislature that because an administrator is appointed it means only heirs may be beneficiaries to the proceeds derived as a result of the action. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1975), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

The legislature, by amendment deleting any reference to the laws of distribution of a decedent's estate, has eliminated any question of a relationship between heirship and entitlement to damages. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1975), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

But decedent's ex-wife not entitled to recover. —

Decedent's ex-wife is not entitled to maintain an action as his personal representative nor is she within the class entitled to recover under the traditional rule of beneficiary dependence. Saffels v. Bennett, 630 P.2d 505, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 352 (Wyo. 1981), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

V.Damages.

The 1973 amendment removed one of inequities of old version. Whereas the court or jury under the former practice returned a lump sum award, which was arbitrarily divided according to laws of intestacy without regard to the fact that one heir may have been entitled to more or less than the statutory share, the amended statute permits each person claiming a loss to demand and prove his or her individual damage and recover. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1975), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984). See also, Booth v. Hackney, 516 P.2d 180, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1973).

Measure of damages is loss to beneficiaries. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1931).

One of the elements of damages is not the amount that deceased might have earned, but the amount that the beneficiaries might have received out of such earnings. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1931).

Elements of damages. —

The jury in fixing the damages may consider the age of the deceased, his habits, expectancy of life and earning capacity in the future if he had lived. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1931).

In an action for wrongful death, the court had the power to assess an additional amount for the loss of society, care and advice of the deceased. Muir v. Haggerty, 77 Wyo. 280, 314 P.2d 948, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1957).

Measure of damages compensable under this section could include loss of care, attention and society, while no recovery could be had for mental suffering. Knowles v. Corkill, 2002 WY 119, 51 P.3d 859, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 2002).

District court erred in awarding 75% of insurance settlement proceeds to a decedent's estranged wife because the burden of proof was on her to show that she suffered a loss of probable future companionship, society, and comfort, the decedent's parents and sister did not assert an affirmative defense in response to the wife's damages claim, the court's findings and rulings were inconsistent, and its error in applying the burden of proof carried through to the distribution. Soran v. Soran (In re Soran), 2014 WY 28, 319 P.3d 109, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2014).

Consideration of future earnings is proper factor in arriving at damages. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1979).

Mental suffering of survivors is not element of damages under this section. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1931).

Expert testimony regarding decedent's children's feelings of abandonment, as proof of damages, was properly excluded because such evidence was relevant to mental anguish damages, for which no recovery could be had. Knowles v. Corkill, 2002 WY 119, 51 P.3d 859, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 2002).

Nor pain and suffering of decedent. —

Pain and suffering of the decedent have no part in establishing damages. Parsons v. Roussalis, 488 P.2d 1050, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1971).

Nor “investment” of money spent in birth and rearing of children. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1979).

Exemplary damages are proper only in cases where wanton and willful misconduct is alleged, where the award is a jury determination and where the award is not excessive. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1979).

Legislature cannot limit amount of recovery. —

The legislature, by virtue of art. 10, § 4, Wyo. Const., cannot limit the amount of recovery in a wrongful death action. Muir v. Haggerty, 77 Wyo. 280, 314 P.2d 948, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1957).

Nor may jury instruction. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1931).

When verdict will be set aside as excessive. —

Before a verdict of a jury will be set aside as excessive, it must appear to be so excessive as to denote passion, prejudice, bias or some erroneous basis. Booth v. Hackney, 516 P.2d 180, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1973).

A judgment in a wrongful death action for $60,000 was held not excessive where deceased, aged 44, had a life expectancy of 25 years and contributed $5,000 a year to the support of his wife, aged 42, and three daughters aged 13, eight and three. Muir v. Haggerty, 77 Wyo. 280, 314 P.2d 948, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1957).

Court grants remittur or additur where verdict shocks conscience. —

If the verdict is so large or small that it shocks the judicial conscience, the court has not only the right, but the duty, to grant remittur or additur accordingly. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 397 (Wyo. 1983).

Allegation of damages. —

In an action for wrongful death where petition included a general claim for damages and where no demand by defendant was made for a bill of particulars, nor was a motion made for a more specific statement in the amended petition, testimony relating to the loss sustained by reason of the future loss of the earnings of the decedent was properly admitted, and no amendment was necessary in the absence of a demand therefor. Muir v. Haggerty, 77 Wyo. 280, 314 P.2d 948, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1957).

VI.Limitation Of Actions.

Open courts provision of constitution is not violated by limitation. —

Given the strong presumption of constitutionality that a statute enjoys and a persuasive authority, the two-year condition precedent of the wrongful death statute, § 1-38-102(d), does not violate the open courts provision of art. 1, § 8, Wyo. Const.Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 2000).

Section must be construed with other provisions. —

This section must be read together with § 1-3-116 , relating to tolling limitation of actions for absence from the state, abscondence or concealment, and with § 1-6-301 , relating to service of process on nonresident motorists through the secretary of state. Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Where the alleged tortfeasor dies prior to a wrongful death claimant filing his or her lawsuit, and the two-year period provided for under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(d) will expire before the period for rejection of claims provided for under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-712(a) expires, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 allows the holder of the wrongful death claim to bring his or her civil action and serve the alleged tortfeasor's personal representative before the claim has been filed and rejected in the probate estate. Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, 50 P.3d 323, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 2002).

Construction of insurance policies. —

Decedent's survivors did not qualify as “insured persons” under decedent's uninsured motorist policy because none of them suffered bodily injuries, and therefore $100,000 per person policy limit applied, rather than $300,000 limit for each occurrence. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Dahlheimer, 3 P.3d 820, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2000).

Statute of limitations not tolled. —

The absence from the state of a defendant in a wrongful death action did not toll the statute of limitations by reason of the applicability of § 1-3-116 , where the defendant could have been served at any time through substituted service upon the secretary of state under § 1-6-301 .Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Statute of limitations tolled.

Since the petition to appoint a wrongful death representative (WDR) was filed within two years of the WDR’s husband’s death, the statute of limitations period was tolled, and the wrongful death action was not untimely. Porter v. Ford Motor Co., 917 F.3d 1246, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 7206 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2019).

Policy reasons why tolling statute should not be applicable to extend limitation of section, as long as secretary of state may be served. —

See Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1976).

Library references. —

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 110.02D (Matthew Bender).

§ 1-38-102. Action to be brought by wrongful death representative; recovery exempt from debts; measure and element of damages; limitation of action. [Effective July 1, 2022]

  1. Every wrongful death action under W.S. 1-38-101 shall be brought by and in the name of the decedent’s wrongful death representative for the exclusive benefit of beneficiaries who have sustained damage.
  2. If the decedent left a husband, wife, child, father or mother, no debt of the decedent may be satisfied out of the proceeds of any judgment obtained in any action for wrongful death or out of the proceeds of any settlement of a wrongful death claim.
  3. The court or jury, as the case may be, may award such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as shall be deemed fair and just. Every person for whose benefit an action for wrongful death is brought may prove his respective damages, and the court or jury may award such person that amount of damages to which it considers such person entitled, including damages for loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort.
  4. An action for wrongful death shall be commenced within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
  5. The court appointing the wrongful death representative may approve a settlement of a wrongful death action or a wrongful death claim and resolve disputes relating to the allocation of settlement proceeds.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 39, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 2364; R.S. 1899, § 3449; Laws 1909, ch. 3, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 4292; C.S. 1920, § 5561; R.S. 1931, § 89-404; Laws 1939, ch. 104, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 3-404; Laws 1947, ch. 132, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 1-1066; Laws 1973, ch. 139, § 1; 1977, ch. 188, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 1-39-102 , 2-14-202; Laws 1979, ch. 142, §§ 1, 3; 1980, ch. 54, § 1; 1982, ch. 54, § 1; 2012, ch. 5, § 2; 2021, ch. 99, § 1.

§ 1-38-103. Appointment of wrongful death representative.

  1. The wrongful death representative may  be appointed by the district court in the county in which:
    1. The decedent resided;
    2. The decedent died;
    3. The claim for relief or some part of the  claim for relief arose; or
    4. A defendant resides or may be summoned.
  2. The district court may appoint the wrongful  death representative at any time after the decedent’s death. The appointment  shall be made in a separate action brought solely for appointing the  wrongful death representative. In any action in which appointment  of the wrongful death representative is sought, any person claiming  to qualify under W.S. 1-38-104(a) may intervene as a matter of right. After an action to  appoint the wrongful death representative is filed:
    1. No subsequent action for appointment may  be maintained; and
    2. If an action to appoint the wrongful death  representative is properly filed, the limitation period under W.S. 1-38-102(d) and any other applicable  limitation periods shall be tolled from the time the  action is filed until thirty (30) days after an order appointing the  wrongful death representative is entered.
  3. The appointment of the wrongful death  representative is a procedural device intended to provide a representative  to investigate and bring an action under W.S. 1-38-101 . Irregularities in the manner or method of appointment  are not jurisdictional.

History. Laws 2012, ch. 5, § 1; 2013, ch. 177, § 1.

The 2013 amendment, in (b)(ii) inserted “and any other applicable limitation periods” preceding “shall be tolled.”

Laws 2013, ch. 177, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 13, 2013.

Effective date. —

Laws 2012, ch. 5, § 4, makes the act effective July 1, 2012.

Jurisdiction.—

The vacating of a district court’s order finding a nursing and long-term care facility in contempt after the facility failed to comply with an order compelling it to respond to a pre-suit subpoena served in an action for appointment of a wrongful death representative was appropriate because the court lacked jurisdiction to compel discovery in the appointment proceeding. Life Care Ctr. of Casper v. Barrett, 2020 WY 57, 462 P.3d 894, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 2020).

§ 1-38-104. Factors for determining wrongful death representative.

  1. In appointing the wrongful death representative,  the court shall determine the person who will best represent the interests  of the potential beneficiaries of the action as a whole.
  2. In determining whether the best interests  of potential beneficiaries as a whole will be served by appointment  of the wrongful death representative, the court shall consider:
    1. The familial or other relationship of  the person making application to the decedent;
    2. The interests of the person making application  in relation to the interests of other potential beneficiaries as a  whole;
    3. Actions taken to secure appointment as  the wrongful death representative and to protect the interests of  all potential beneficiaries;
    4. Such other factors as the court deems  relevant.
  3. No appeal shall be allowed from an order  appointing the wrongful death representative. The court, however,  may entertain a motion to reconsider an appointment of the wrongful  death representative.

History. Laws 2012, ch. 5, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2012, ch. 5, § 4, makes the act effective July 1, 2012.

§ 1-38-105. Notice.

  1. Within thirty (30) days of the filing  of an action to appoint the wrongful death representative, the plaintiff  shall cause to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive  weeks in a daily or weekly newspaper of general circulation in the  county in which the decedent resided at the time of death, a notice  that an action to appoint the wrongful death representative has been  instituted and that any person claiming to qualify under W.S. 1-38-104(a) may intervene as a matter of right.
  2. Within sixty (60) days after appointment,  the wrongful death representative shall file with the court a report  listing all reasonably ascertainable beneficiaries. The report shall  set forth all reasonable efforts made by the wrongful death representative  to notify such beneficiaries of the wrongful death representative’s  appointment.
  3. Irregularities in the manner or method  of giving notice under this section are not jurisdictional.

History. Laws 2012, ch. 5, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2012, ch. 5, § 4, makes the act effective July 1, 2012.

Chapter 39 Governmental Claims

Cross references. —

As to individual liability of members of nonprofit corporate boards or governmental agencies, see § 1-23-107 .

Claims against state require legislative consent. —

Article 1, § 8, Wyo. Const. is not self-executing; no suit can be maintained against the state until the legislature makes provision for such filing and, absent such consent, no suit or claim could be made against the state. Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 434 (Wyo. 1979).

County cannot sue state in absence of specific constitutional or statutory provision authorizing such an action. State v. Board of County Comm'rs, 642 P.2d 456, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1982).

School district may not sue state in tort. —

Regardless of immunity, a school district may not sue the state, its creator and of which it is a part, in tort. The Wyoming Governmental Claim Act has no relevancy to this matter. Carbon County Sch. Dist. v. Wyoming State Hosp., 680 P.2d 773, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 283 (Wyo. 1984).

Court without jurisdiction over action against governmental entity where no prior claim filed. —

A district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a tort action brought by a complainant against a governmental entity, where the complainant fails to allege that a claim has been filed pursuant to § 1-39-113 and where, in fact, no claim has been filed. Dee v. Laramie County, 666 P.2d 957, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1983), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Action between two governmental entities involving state educational funding. —

The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is not applicable to an action between two governmental entities when the relief sought is a declaration of rights and liabilities of the governmental entitles under statutes affecting state educational funding and for the recovery of monies that should have been distributed in the past. Board of County Comm'rs v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d 946, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1994).

State penitentiary training officer. —

A training officer acting within the scope of his employment at a state penitentiary enjoys immunity from suit under this act. Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1994).

Stated in

Simons v. Laramie County Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 1116, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1987).

Cited in

Rocky Mt. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 345 (Wyo. 1982); City of Kemmerer v. Wagner, 866 P.2d 1283, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1993); Harston v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 913 P.2d 870, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1996).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

For comments, “Wyoming Tort Reform and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: A Second Opinion,” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 593 (1993).

For article, “Wyoming's New Comparative Fault Statute,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 509 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 1 et seq.

Liability of state, in issuing automobile certificate of title, for failure to discover title defect, 28 ALR4th 184.

State or local governmental unit's liability for injury to private highway construction worker based on its own negligence, 29 ALR4th 1188.

Official immunity of state national guard members, 52 ALR4th 1095.

Right of insured, precluded from recovering against owner or operator of uninsured motor vehicle because of governmental immunity, to recover uninsured motorist benefits, 55 ALR4th 806.

Governmental liability for failure to post highway deer crossing warning signs, 59 ALR4th 1217.

Tort liability of college or university for injury suffered by student as a result of own or fellow student's intoxication, 62 ALR4th 81.

State and local government liability for injury or death of bicyclist due to defect or obstruction in public bicycle path, 68 ALR4th 204.

Tort liability of college, university, fraternity or sorority for injury or death of member or prospective member by hazing or initiation activity, 68 ALR4th 228.

Governmental liability for negligence in licensing, regulating or supervising private day-care home in which child is injured, 68 ALR4th 266.

Municipal liability for negligent fire inspection and subsequent enforcement, 69 ALR4th 739.

Governmental tort liability for detour accidents, 1 ALR5th 163.

Right of one governmental subdivision to sue another such subdivision for damages, 11 ALR5th 630.

Liability of school or school personnel in connection with suicide of student, 17 ALR5th 179.

Validity, construction and application of “hazing” statutes, 30 ALR5th 683.

Complaint as satisfying requirement of notice of claim upon states, municipalities, and other political subdivisions, 45 ALR5th 109.

Persons or entities upon whom notice of injury or claim against state or state agencies may or must be served, 45 ALR5th 173.

Reviewability before trial of order denying qualified immunity to defendant sued in state court under 42 USCS § 1983, 49 ALR5th 717.

State or local government's liability to subcontractors, laborers, or materialmen for failure to require general contractor to post bond, 54 ALR5th 649.

Liability of United States for failure to warn of danger or hazard resulting from governmental act or omission as affected by “discretionary function or duty” exception to federal Tort Claims Act (28 USC § 2680(a)), 65 ALR Fed 358.

Applicability of Jones Act (46 USC § 688) to foreign seamen, foreign ships, or other foreign circumstances, 68 ALR Fed 360.

Right of member of family of serviceman to maintain action under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USC §§ 1346(b) , 2671 -2680) against United States based upon injuries sustained by serviceman while on active duty, 69 ALR Fed 949.

Applicability of libel and slander exception to waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal Torts Claims Act (28 USC § 2680(h)), 79 ALR Fed 826.

Applicability of 28 USC §§ 2680(a) and 2680(h) to Federal Tort Claims Act liability arising out of government informant's conduct, 85 ALR Fed 848.

Calculation of attorneys' fees under Federal Tort Claims Act — 28 USC § 2678, 86 ALR Fed 866.

Construction and application of Federal Tort Claims Act provision excepting from coverage claims arising out of assault and battery (28 USC § 2680(h)), 88 ALR Fed 7.

Construction and application of Federal Tort Claims Act provision excepting from coverage claims arising out of interference with contract rights (28 USC § 2680(h)), 92 ALR Fed 186.

Liability of local government under § 107(a) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 USC § 9607(a)), 133 ALR Fed 293.

Validity, as against claim under 42 USC § 1983, of accused's release-dismissal agreement, under which release of civil claims, against public officials or entities, growing out of criminal charges, is given to obtain relief from those charges — Post-Newton Cases, 139 ALR Fed 1.

Application of statute of limitations (42 USC § 9613(g)(2)) in action under § 107 of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) for recovery of costs for removal and or remedial action, 142 ALR Fed 115.

Construction and application of statute of limitations (42 USC § 9613(g)(1)) for action under § 107 of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 USC § 9607) for natural resource damages, 144 ALR Fed 285.

What constitutes “facility” within meaning of § 101(9) of the Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)), 147 ALR Fed 469.

What constitutes “claim arising in a foreign country” under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k), excluding such claims from Federal Tort Claims Act, 158 ALR Fed 137.

63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 661 to 672; 81A C.J.S. States §§ 196 to 202, 267 to 296, 298 to 306.

§ 1-39-101. Short title.

This act shall be known and cited as the “Wyoming Governmental Claims Act”.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

No equal protection violation. —

Where a new prison policy prohibited prisoners from keeping certain personal property items in their cells, an inmate sued the Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC) and claimed he had been denied equal protection of the law because the legislature did not include the DOC and the Wyoming State Penitentiary within the waiver of the rule of immunity. The Supreme Court of Wyoming rejected his claim, because the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act does not differentiate between inmates and non-inmates; since the inmate sought tens of millions of dollars in compensation for more than a thousand separate pieces of property, excluding such losses from the beneficent purposes of the WGCA was rational and withstood the equal protection provisions of both the United States and the Wyoming constitutions. Cosco v. Lampert, 2010 WY 52, 229 P.3d 962, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 910, 131 S. Ct. 1798, 179 L. Ed. 2d 666, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2478 (U.S. 2011).

Qualified Immunity. —

Sheriff, the county, and the board of county commissioners were entitled to summary judgment in a case filed under this section by an inmate who was sexually assault by a detention officer. The sheriff's supervision of an employee was a discretionary act and he acted in good faith when he opted not to terminate the detention officer for a prior disciplinary incident in which he admitting to taking inmate drugs; the record contained nothing to alert the sheriff of the risk that the officer would sexually assault an inmate. Uinta County v. Pennington, 286 P.3d 138, 2012 WY 129, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Oct 1, 2012).

Chapter may be construed as further, but incomplete, waiver of sovereign immunity. Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1980).

State loan and investment board immune from suit. —

The Wyoming Farm Loan Board (now state loan and investment board) is a governmental entity for purposes of the immunity under § 1-39-104 .Haldeman v. Wyoming Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21130 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1994).

Constitutional signature and certification requirements are jurisdictional. —

Claim filed under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 et seq., must meet the requirements of art. 16, § 7, Wyo. Const., including the requirement that it be signed by the claimant and certified to under penalty of perjury. Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1990), overruled, Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2004).

Notice of claim. —

Wyoming law is clear that presentation of a notice of claim is required in order to bring an action against a governmental entity and the failure to comply with that condition precedent results in dismissal. There is no requirement under Wyoming law that presentation of the notice of claim has to be alleged in the complaint; likewise, district courts do not lack jurisdiction over an action against a governmental entity if presentation of a claim is not alleged. Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Applied in

Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 569 (Wyo. 1987); Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1988); Katona v. City of Cheyenne, 686 F. Supp. 287, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4215 (D. Wyo. 1988); Stalkup v. State Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 838 P.2d 705, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1992); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Catchpole, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 147 , 6 P.3d 1275 (Wyo. 2000); Board of County Comm'rs v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 2000); Eathorne v. Bd. of Trustees, 2001 WY 36, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 47 , 21 P.3d 745 (Wyo. 2001)City of Torrington v. Cottier, 2006 WY 145, 145 P.3d 1274, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (2006); Gose v. City of Douglas, 2008 WY 126, 193 P.3d 1159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Oct. 13, 2008); McCann v. City of Cody, 2009 WY 86, 210 P.3d 1078, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (July 6, 2009); Heimer v. Antelope Valley Improvement, 2010 WY 29, 226 P.3d 860, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Mar. 18, 2010); Campbell County Mem. Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, 317 P.3d 573, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 3 , 2014 WL 46689 (Jan 7, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of United States, under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) , 2671 et seq.) or Suits in Admiralty Act (46 App. U.S.C. § 741 et seq.), for injuries or damages arising from issuance, preparation, or distribution of charts, maps, or like navigational aids, 164 ALR Fed 541.

§ 1-39-102. Purpose.

  1. The Wyoming legislature recognizes the  inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict  application of the doctrine of governmental immunity and is cognizant  of the Wyoming Supreme Court decision of Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners 575 P.2d 1155 (1978). It is further recognized that the state and its political  subdivisions as trustees of public revenues are constituted to serve  the inhabitants of the state of Wyoming and furnish certain services  not available through private parties and, in the case of the state,  state revenues may only be expended upon legislative appropriation.  This act is adopted by the legislature to balance the respective equities  between persons injured by governmental actions and the taxpayers  of the state of Wyoming whose revenues are utilized by governmental  entities on behalf of those taxpayers. This act is intended to retain  any common law defenses which a defendant may have by virtue of decisions  from this or other jurisdictions.
  2. In the case of the state, this act abolishes  all judicially created categories such as “governmental” or “proprietary”  functions and “discretionary” or “ministerial” acts previously used  by the courts to determine immunity or liability. This act does not  impose nor allow the imposition of strict liability for acts of governmental  entities or public employees.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Inmate's equal protections rights were not violated. —

Where a new prison policy prohibited prisoners from keeping certain personal property items in their cells, an inmate sued the Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC) and claimed he had been denied equal protection of the law because the legislature did not include the DOC and the Wyoming State Penitentiary within the waiver of the rule of immunity; the Supreme Court of Wyoming rejected his claim, because the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA) does not differentiate between inmates and non-inmates. The inmate's claim was subject to rational scrutiny; since the inmate sought tens of millions of dollars in compensation for more than a thousand separate pieces of property, excluding such losses from the beneficent purposes of the WGCA was rational and withstood the equal protection provisions of both the United States and the Wyoming constitutions. Cosco v. Lampert, 2010 WY 52, 229 P.3d 962, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 910, 131 S. Ct. 1798, 179 L. Ed. 2d 666, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2478 (U.S. 2011).

Discussion of history of common-law governmental immunity. —

See State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1982).

Exceptions to immunity.—

Supreme court rejected parents’ request to recognize an exception to immunity for violation of school policy and/or criminal conduct because it was not the supreme court’s prerogative to expand the exceptions to immunity beyond that provided by the legislature in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Whitham v. Feller, 2018 WY 43, 415 P.3d 1264, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2018).

No governmental act. —

There was not a scintilla of evidence in the record indicating that a governmental entity or an employee of the state was in any way responsible for the oil spill caused by unknown third persons. Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1988).

Under the lost chance doctrine, a negligent act must be a substantial cause of the lost chance to survive, and the damages awarded must be fully apportioned; therefore, medical malpractice claims using the doctrine are within the protection afforded by this section. McMackin v. Johnson County Healthcare Ctr., 2004 WY 44, 88 P.3d 491, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2004).

Action between two governmental entities involving state educational funding. —

The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is not applicable to an action between two governmental entities when the relief sought is a declaration of rights and liabilities of the governmental entitles under statutes affecting state educational funding and for the recovery of monies that should have been distributed in the past. Board of County Comm'rs v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d 946, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1994).

No respondeat superior actions. —

A governmental entity cannot be held liable under 42 USCS § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Kimbley v. Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1983).

No liability for harboring vicious animal. —

The waiver of governmental immunity incorporated in § 1-39-104 does not permit a claim of common-law liability for harboring an animal known to be vicious to be asserted against a city or town. Such a claim sounds in strict liability and claims for strict liability are not included in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Abelseth v. City of Gillette, 752 P.2d 430, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1988).

Sheriff's liability. —

Neither the sheriff nor the county was liable for the tortious conduct of the deputy because that conduct did not occur within the deputy's scope of duties, and neither the sheriff nor the county was liable for the conduct of the sheriff, even though within the scope of his duties, because his conduct was not tortious. Boyer-Gladden v. Hill, 2010 WY 12, 224 P.3d 21, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 2010).

Quoted in

Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 697 P.2d 606, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo. 1985); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985); De Wald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 561 (Wyo. 1986); Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 25532 (10th Cir. 1986); Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1994); Natrona County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, 81 P.3d 948, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 2003); Campbell County Mem. Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, 317 P.3d 573, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 3 , 2014 WL 46689 (Jan 7, 2014).

Stated in

Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1992); Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1994).

Cited in

Keehn ex rel. Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 1992); Heimer v. Antelope Valley Improvement, 2010 WY 29, 226 P.3d 860, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Mar. 18, 2010); Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Jul 16, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For comment, “Landowner Liability Under the Wyoming Recreational Use Statute,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 649 (1980).

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Immunity of public officer from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual, 5 ALR4th 773.

Modern status of rule excusing governmental unit from tort liability on theory that only general, not particular, duty was owed under circumstances, 38 ALR4th 1194.

§ 1-39-103. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Governmental entity” means the state, University of Wyoming or any local government;
    2. “Local government” means cities and towns, counties, school districts, joint powers boards, airport boards, public corporations, community college districts, special districts and their governing bodies, all political subdivisions of the state, and their agencies, instrumentalities and institutions, and governmental entities of another state but only while physically present in the state of Wyoming and while in the course of operating a cooperative public transportation program as defined by W.S. 16-1-104(f);
    3. “Peace officer” means as defined by W.S. 7-2-101 , but does not include those officers defined by W.S. 7-2-101 (a)(iv)(K) or those officers defined by W.S. 7-2-101(a)(iv)(M) unless otherwise provided in the applicable mutual aid agreement;
    4. “Public employee”:
      1. Means any officer, employee or servant  of a governmental entity, including elected or appointed officials, peace officers and persons acting on behalf or in service of a governmental  entity in any official capacity, whether with or without compensation;
      2. Does not include an independent contractor,  except as provided in subparagraphs (C) and (F) of this paragraph,  or a judicial officer exercising the authority vested in him;
      3. Includes contract physicians, physician  assistants, nurses, optometrists and dentists in the course of providing  contract services for state institutions or county jails;
      4. Includes individuals engaged in search and rescue operations under the coordination of a county sheriff pursuant to W.S. 18-3-609(a)(iii);
      5. Includes any volunteer physician providing medical services under W.S. 9-2-103(a)(i)(C);
      6. Includes contract attorneys in the course of providing contract services for the office of guardian ad litem as provided in W.S. 14-12-104 ;
      7. Includes any health care provider, as defined by W.S. 35-31-101 (a)(iii), and any individual included in the definition of medical facility in W.S. 35-31-101 (a)(v), under a contract with the state to deliver volunteer health care services to low income persons under W.S. 35-31-101 through 35-31-103 while providing the contracted services. Nothing in this subparagraph alters the requirement that any action for damages shall be brought against the state of Wyoming as provided by W.S. 35-31-102(g).
    5. “Scope of duties” means performing any  duties which a governmental entity requests, requires or authorizes a public employee to perform regardless of the time and place of performance;
    6. “State” or “state agency” means the state of Wyoming or any of its branches, agencies, departments, boards, instrumentalities or institutions;
    7. Repealed by Laws 2017, ch. 41, §  2.
    8. “Governmental entity of another state” means any state and its political subdivisions, agencies, instrumentalities and institutions and any local government entity within another state;
    9. “This act” means W.S. 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 .

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1; 1981, ch. 15, § 1; 1986, ch. 74, § 2; ch. 89, § 2; 1989, ch. 240, § 1; 1993, ch. 65, § 1; 1997, ch. 159, § 1; 1999, ch. 157, § 2; 2000, ch. 61, § 1; 2003, ch. 53, § 2; 2006, ch. 114, § 1; 2007, ch. 212, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; 2012, ch. 76, § 3; 2017, ch. 41, §§ 1, 2; ch. 113, § 1; ch. 153, § 1; 2018, ch. 95, § 2; 2020, ch. 122, § 2.

The 2006 amendment made a stylistic change at the end of (a)(v).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

The 2007 amendments. —

The first 2007 amendment, by ch. 212, § 1, effective July 1, 2007, in (a)(iv)(C), inserted “physician assistants, nurses, optometrists and dentists,” and inserted “or county jails” at the end of the sentence.

The second 2007 amendment, by ch. 215, § 1, effective July 1, 2007, substituted “9-2-103(a)(i))(C)” for “9-2-103(a)(iii)” in (a)(iv)(E).

While neither amendment gave affect to the other, both have been set out above.

The 2012 amendment, in (a)(iv)(B), substituted “subparagraphs” for “subparagraph” and inserted “and (F)”; and added (a)(iv)(F).

Laws 2012, ch. 76 § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 13, 2012.

The 2017 amendments. —

The 2017 amendments. — The first 2017 amendment, by ch. 41 § 1, effective July 1, 2017, at the end of former (a)(viii), present (a)(ix), substituted “1-39-120” for “1-39-121.”

The second 2017 amendment, by ch. 41, § 2, effective July 1, 2017, deleted former (a)(vii), which read: ““Year 2000 date change” means the change from calendar year 1999 AD to 2000 AD and associated date computations including the proper recognition of the year 2000 as a leap year.”

The third 2017 amendment, by ch. 113, § 1, in (a)(iv)(D), deleted “and the provisions of W.S. 1-39-112 shall apply for purposes of damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by their negligence while acting within the scope of their duties”; and made a related change. Laws 2017, ch. 113, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Art. 4, § 8, Wy. Const. Approved Mar. 2, 2017.

The fourth 2017 amendment, by ch. 153, § 1, effective July 1, 2017, at the end of (a)(ii), inserted “, and governmental entities of another state but only while physically present in the state of Wyoming and while in the course of operating a cooperative public transportation program as defined by W.S. 16-1-104(f)”; added present (a)(viii), and redesignated former (a)(viii) as (a)(ix).

While none of the amendments gave effect to the others, all have been set out as reconciled by the legislative service office.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added (a)(iv)(G).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a)(iv)(F) substituted “office of guardian ad litem” for “state public defenders office” and “W.S. 14-12-104 ” for “W.S. 7-6-103(k) or 14-12-104 .”

Cross references. —

As to University of Wyoming, see § 21-17-201 .

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Laws 2007, ch. 215, § 4, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Applicability. —

Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 3, states: “This act shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

Applicability. —

Because parents and a student specifically alleged that school district employees acted within their scope of duties, the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act applied to the employees’ actions as alleged in the complaint; the complaint stated the acts were attributed to the school district, and generally alleged the employees were acting within the scope of their employment or agency; Whitham v. Feller, 2018 WY 43, 415 P.3d 1264, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2018).

Employee of independent contractor. —

District court improperly denied a government hospital's motion for partial summary judgment in a medical malpractice action arising from the actions of a nurse employed by a contracted anesthesia services provider because the nurse was not a “public employee” for purposes of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and the Act did not provide an express waiver of sovereign immunity for non-employees of a governmental hospital; the district court erred in reading a prior appellate decision as implicitly waiving sovereign immunity against governmental entities for acts of ostensible or apparent agents. Campbell County Mem. Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, 317 P.3d 573, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 2014).

“Governmental entity” and “political subdivision” not equivalent concepts. —

The terms “governmental entity” and “political subdivision” are not equivalent concepts; using the broad definition of a governmental entity, any political subdivision is a governmental entity but the inverse is not true and a governmental entity does not necessarily constitute a political subdivision. Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1992).

Board of cooperative educational services is “governmental entity” for the purposes of this chapter, and the board's employees are not school district employees whose liability could be imputed to the district. Sykes v. Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. 1 & 2, Sykes v. Lincoln County Sch. Dist., 763 P.2d 1263, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1988).

Board of county commissioners is “governmental entity” for purposes of this chapter, such that sovereign immunity barred recovery in former coroner's tortious action for conduct not specifically enumerated under this chapter, conduct which involved budgetary allocations and expense determinations within the scope of the commissioners' duties. Veile v. Board of County Comm'rs, 860 P.2d 1174, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1993).

Department is governmental unit. —

The Wyoming department of transportation is the same governmental unit as its sister agencies, the department of employment and workers' safety and compensation division, for the purposes of applying the Bankruptcy Code's claim-specific immunity waiver provision. Wyoming DOT v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12124 (10th Cir. Wyo.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982, 119 S. Ct. 446, 142 L. Ed. 2d 400, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 7131 (U.S. 1998).

Construction with other law. —

Because workers' compensation statute did not define “state employee,” court elected to use ordinary and obvious definition of “public employee” found in Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Sell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. (In re Sell), 7 P.3d 1, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2000).

County pest control board deemed “special district.” —

A county weed and pest control board is included in this section as a “special district [or its] governing body.” Cranston v. Weston County Weed & Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1992).

Residential treatment facility not a public employee. —

Nonprofit corporation certified by the state as a residential treatment facility was not a public employee for the purpose of establishing liability under the Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-101 et seq., for the deaths of two minors in its care. Cline v. Department of Family Servs., 927 P.2d 261, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1996).

Liability of off-duty police officer. —

In wrongful death action, if the trier of fact determined that off-duty police officer was not acting within the scope of his official duties, then the municipality and the police officer would be insulated from liability under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. If, however, the trier of fact determined that the officer was acting within the scope of his official duties and was authorized to act at the accident scene, and that he, therefore, owed a legal duty to the deceased, liability should be determined as it would be in any negligence case. Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1995).

Applied in

Milton v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 372, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1988).

Quoted in

Kimbley v. City of Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1983).

Stated in

Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 612 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1982); Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1994); Peterson v. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. One, 929 P.2d 525, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1996); Boyer-Gladden v. Hill, 2010 WY 12, 224 P.3d 21, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Feb. 9, 2010); Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 2011 WY 55, 250 P.3d 522, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Mar. 29, 2011).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

For article, “Who's Really Who? Apportioning Liability of Independent Contractors Who Work for Hospitals that Qualify for Sovereign Immunity in a Rural State”, see 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 211 (2015).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Immunity of public officer from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual, 5 ALR4th 773.

What claims of governmental units constitute taxes qualifying for priority under provisions of § 507(a)(8) of Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)), 148 ALR Fed 351.

When is federal agency employee independent contractor, creating exception to United States waiver of immunity under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2671), 166 ALR Fed 187.

§ 1-39-104. Granting immunity from tort liability; liability on contracts; exceptions.

  1. A governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 . Any immunity in actions based on a contract entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided by the contract if the contract was within the powers granted to the entity and was properly executed and except as provided in W.S. 1-39-120(b). The claims procedures of W.S. 1-39-113 apply to contractual claims against governmental entities.
  2. When liability is alleged against any  public employee, if the governmental entity determines he was acting  within the scope of his duty, whether or not alleged to have been  committed maliciously or fraudulently, the governmental entity shall  provide a defense at its expense.
  3. A governmental entity shall assume and  pay a judgment entered under this act against any of its public employees,  provided:
    1. The act or omission upon which the claim  is based has been determined by a court or jury to be within the public  employee’s scope of duties;
    2. The payment for the judgment shall not  exceed the limits provided by W.S. 1-39-118 ; and
    3. All appropriate appeals from the judgment  have been exhausted or the time has expired when appeals may be taken.
  4. A governmental entity shall assume and  pay settlements of claims under this act against its public employees  in accordance with W.S. 1-39-115 , 1-41-106 or 1-42-204 .

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1; 1980, ch. 46, § 1; 1986, ch. 19, § 1; 1988, ch. 45, § 1; 1999, ch. 157, § 2; 2007, ch. 212, § 1; 2016, ch. 1, § 1; 2017, ch. 41, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, substituted “1-42-204” for “1-42-107” in subsection (d).

The 2016 amendment , effective July 1, 2016, added “1-39-120(b) and” preceding “1-39-121” in (a).

The 2017 amendment , effective July 1, 2017, in (a), added “and limited by W.S. 1-39-121 ” at the end of the first sentence, and deleted “and 1-39-121 ” following “1-39-120(b).”

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2016, ch. 1, § 2 state as follows: “This act shall apply to seizures of property which occur on or after July 1, 2016 and to any forfeitures proceedings related to property seized on or after July 1, 2016.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Applicability. —

Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 3, states: “This act shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

Contract exception did not apply.—

Client’s legal malpractice suit against public defenders alleged a general breach of the duty owed by an attorney to a client, not that they violated a specific contract term unrelated to the attorney-client relationship; therefore, the client’s suit was in tort and his attempt to categorize it as a breach of contract subject to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims failed. Dockter v. Lozano, 2020 WY 119, 472 P.3d 362, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2020).

No respondeat superior actions. —

A governmental entity cannot be held liable under 42 USCS § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Kimbley v. Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1983).

Sovereign immunity bars claims. —

The Mississippi court erroneously concluded that plaintiff's complaint for the torts of bad faith and infliction of emotional distress was not barred under Wyoming's law of sovereign immunity. Routh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo., cert. denied, 525 U.S. 814, 119 S. Ct. 49, 142 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4815 (U.S. 1998), reh'g denied, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. Feb. 17, 1998).

Applicability of § 1-39-112 . —

Without a determination that the officers were not acting within the scope of their duties or that their conduct was not tortious, the governmental entity does not escape liability for the tortious acts of its peace officers. Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1996).

In suit by former student alleging he was wrongfully terminated from pharmacy program, claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress were barred by Wyoming Governmental Claims Act Jemaneh v. Univ. of Wyo., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29789 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 622 Fed. Appx. 765, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20507 (10th Cir. Colo. 2015).

Social workers granted immunity. —

Social case workers are not “health care providers” within the meaning of §§ 1-39-110 and 1-12-601 . They are, therefore, granted immunity by this chapter. May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1993).

City not negligent in requiring iron pipe. —

The court properly granted summary judgment for a city, where the plaintiff's claim asserted that the city council was negligent in adopting an ordinance which required the use of an iron pipe in a water system, which proved over time to be unsatisfactory or perhaps even ill-considered. The claim did not fit the niche provided by § 1-39-108(a), nor was it one which fell within the statutory exceptions to the general immunity provided for in this section. Sawyer v. Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1990).

County commissioners immune from suit. —

County commissioners were acting well within the scope of their duties at all relevant times in allocating the budget and determining compensation for the county coroner's office, and were accordingly immune from suit in a former county coroner's tortious action for interference with official duties and discrimination. Veile v. Board of County Comm'rs, 860 P.2d 1174, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1993).

State Loan and Investment Board immune from suit. —

The Wyoming Farm Loan Board (now state loan and investment board) is a governmental entity for purposes of the immunity under § 1-39-104 .Haldeman v. Wyoming Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21130 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1994).

County clerk and budget officer immune from tort suit. —

A county clerk and budget officer was acting well within the scope of her duties in preparing budgets during the time a former county coroner alleged she committed tortious conduct and was accordingly immune from suit. Veile v. Board of County Comm'rs, 860 P.2d 1174, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1993).

State transportation commission immune. —

The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act repealed by implication an earlier statute authorizing suit against the state transportation commission, and therefore the commission was authorized to insert a sovereign immunity provision in its contract with paving contractor. Emulsified Asphalt v. Transportation Comm'n, 970 P.2d 858, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 182 (Wyo. 1998).

Failure to treat bid fairly. —

Unsuccessful bidder's challenge of an award to sell dump truck chassis and tractors to an out-of-state bidder based on the theory's failure to treat its bid fairly and for loss of profit and costs of submitting its bid sounded in tort and was precluded by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Lariat Diesel Corp. v. Wyo. DOT, 2004 WY 25, 86 P.3d 266, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2004).

Highway patrolman allegedly negligent in not sanding icy road not immune from suit. —

A highway patrolman, who was allegedly negligent in not having an icy road sanded after being called to the scene of an accident, was not immune from suit under subsection (a) of this section, even though § 1-39-112 , which creates an exception to governmental immunity, refers only to a “governmental entity.” His immunity was purely dependent upon the immunity of the state. His protection was found not in immunity, but in the duty of the state under subsection (b) of this section to provide him a defense and to indemnify him. State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 578 (Wyo. 1985).

State penitentiary training officer. —

A training officer acting within the scope of his employment at a state penitentiary enjoys immunity from suit under this act. Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1994).

No liability for harboring vicious animal. —

The waiver of governmental immunity incorporated in § 1-39-104 does not permit a claim of common-law liability for harboring an animal known to be vicious to be asserted against a city or town. Such a claim sounds in strict liability and claims for strict liability are not included in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Abelseth v. City of Gillette, 752 P.2d 430, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1988).

Injured governmental employee covered by worker's compensation precluded from suing government in tort. —

It is only in those situations where an injured governmental employee-plaintiff is covered by worker's compensation that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the worker's compensation laws preclude a direct action in tort against the employer-governmental entity. The Worker's Compensation Act and the waiver-of-immunity provisions of the Governmental Claims Act do, however, permit the injured governmental employee to structure a claim against his or her co-employee, provided the claimant can prove culpable negligence. Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

Negligent state employee may sue for indemnification, even though receiving worker's compensation benefits. —

The worker's compensation exclusive-remedy constitutional and statutory provisions did not deny standing to a state employee, held liable for his culpably negligent acts while acting within the scope of his employment, to bring suit against the state under this section for indemnification, even though the employee was receiving benefits from the worker's compensation fund. Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 697 P.2d 606, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

But estate of coemployee, killed by negligence, not third-party beneficiary to indemnity agreement. —

Even though the sovereign immunity of the state and one of its employees had been waived by § 1-39-105 , the estate of a coemployee, killed in an automobile mishap in the scope of his employment by reason of the culpable negligence of the state employee, did not possess standing to sue the state as a third-party beneficiary to the indemnity agreement between the state and the negligent employee. Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 697 P.2d 606, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

Omitted affirmative defense raised by summary-judgment motion. —

The board of county commissioners could raise an omitted affirmative defense of governmental immunity for the first time by a motion for summary judgment, where no prejudice to the adverse party was alleged. Pickle v. Board of County Comm'rs, 764 P.2d 262, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1988).

The Wyoming Underground Facilities Notification Act, § 37-12-301 et seq., does not contain an express waiver of government immunity. Diamond Surface v. Cleveland, 963 P.2d 996, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1998).

Public duty rule. —

Public duty only rule, if it ever was recognized in Wyoming, is no longer viable. Natrona County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, 81 P.3d 948, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 2003).

Contract exception did not apply.—

District court properly granted a school district’s motion to dismiss a special needs student’s personal injury claim based on governmental immunity where the school was obligated by the IDEA to implement the student’s IEP at no cost to the grandparents, thus, the IEP was not a contract and did not create an exception to the schools governmental immunity. SH v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 2018 WY 11, 409 P.3d 1231, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 2018).

Applicability. —

Because parents and a student specifically alleged that school district employees acted within their scope of duties, the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act applied to the employees’ actions as alleged in the complaint; the complaint stated the acts were attributed to the school district, and generally alleged the employees were acting within the scope of their employment or agency; Whitham v. Feller, 2018 WY 43, 415 P.3d 1264, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2018).

Exceptions to immunity.—

Supreme court rejected parents’ request to recognize an exception to immunity for violation of school policy and/or criminal conduct because it was not the supreme court’s prerogative to expand the exceptions to immunity beyond that provided by the legislature in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Whitham v. Feller, 2018 WY 43, 415 P.3d 1264, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2018).

Sheriff's liability. —

Neither the sheriff nor the county was liable for the tortious conduct of the deputy because that conduct did not occur within the deputy's scope of duties, and neither the sheriff nor the county was liable for the conduct of the sheriff, even though within the scope of his duties, because his conduct was not tortious. Boyer-Gladden v. Hill, 2010 WY 12, 224 P.3d 21, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 2010).

Applied in

Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 468 (Wyo. 1985); Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 612 (Wyo. 1985); Matthews v. Wyoming Dep't of Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 554 (Wyo. 1986); State Ex Rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, 201 P.3d 1127, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Feb. 24, 2009).

Quoted in

De Wald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 561 (Wyo. 1986); Sykes v. Lincoln County Sch. Dist., 763 P.2d 1263, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1988); Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1994); Newberry v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 919 P.2d 141, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1996); Hall v. Park County, 2010 WY 124, 238 P.3d 580, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 3, 2010); Campbell County Mem. Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, 317 P.3d 573, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 3 , 2014 WL 46689 (Jan 7, 2014); Tavern, LLC v. Town of Alpine, 2017 WY 56, 395 P.3d 167, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2017).

Stated in

State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1982); Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 25531 (10th Cir. 1985); Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 569 (Wyo. 1987); Cline v. State, Dep't of Family Servs., 927 P.2d 261, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1996); Eathorne v. Bd. of Trustees, 2001 WY 36, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 47 , 21 P.3d 745 (Wyo. 2001).

Cited in

Board of Trustees v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1983); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County Sch. Dist., 763 P.2d 1255, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1988); Cranston v. Weston County Weed & Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1992); Keehn ex rel. Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 1992); Scott v. School Dist. No. 6, 815 F. Supp. 424, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2899 (D. Wyo. 1993); Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1996); Peterson v. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. One, 929 P.2d 525, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1996); Romero v. Schulze, 974 P.2d 959, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1999); Bachmeier v. Hoffman, 1 P.3d 1236, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 2000); Natrona County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, 81 P.3d 948, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 2003); McMackin v. Johnson County Healthcare Ctr., 2004 WY 44, 88 P.3d 491, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (2004).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

For article, “Who's Really Who? Apportioning Liability of Independent Contractors Who Work for Hospitals that Qualify for Sovereign Immunity in a Rural State”, see 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 211 (2015).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Governmental tort liability for social service agency's negligence in placement, or supervision after placement, of children, 90 ALR3d 1214.

Governmental liability from operation of zoo, 92 ALR3d 832.

Liability of governmental unit for injuries or damage resulting from tree or limb falling onto highway from abutting land, 95 ALR3d 778.

Immunity of public officer from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual, 5 ALR4th 773.

Governmental tort liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual, 6 ALR4th 1155.

Liability of governmental officer or entity for failure to warn or notify of release of potentially dangerous individual from custody, 12 ALR4th 722.

Liability of governmental unit for intentional assault by employee other than police officer, 17 ALR4th 881.

Liability of governmental unit for injuries caused by driver of third vehicle to person whose vehicle had been stopped by police car, 17 ALR4th 897.

State lotteries: actions by ticketholders against state or contractor for state, 40 ALR4th 662.

Amount of appropriation as limitation on damages for breach of contract recoverable by one contracting with government agency, 40 ALR4th 998.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance limiting the kinds or amount of actual damages recoverable in tort action against governmental unit, 43 ALR4th 19.

Liability of school authorities for hiring or retaining incompetent or otherwise unsuitable teacher, 60 ALR4th 260.

Tort liability of public authorities for failure to remove parentally abused or neglected children from parents' custody, 60 ALR4th 942.

Legal aspects of speed bumps, 60 ALR4th 1249.

Reviewability before trial of order denying qualified immunity to defendant sued in state court under 42 USCS § 1983, 49 ALR5th 717.

Liability of municipality or other governmental unit for failure to provide police protection from crime, 90 ALR5th 273.

Tort liability of United States under claims act for acts committed by aliens, 78 ALR Fed 683.

Construction and application of Westfall Act provision providing federal employee immunity from ordinary tort suits if attorney general certifies that employee was acting within scope of office or employment at time of incident out of which claim arose (28 USCS § 2679(d)), 120 ALR Fed 95.

Claims arising from governmental conduct causing damage to plaintiff's real property as within discretionary function exception of federal tort claims act (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)), 167 ALR Fed 1.

Liability of United States for failure to warn of danger or hazard not directly created by act or omission of federal government and not in national parks as affected by “discretionary function or duty” exception to Federal Tort Claims Act, 169 ALR Fed 421.

Liability of United States for failure to warn of danger or hazard resulting from governmental act or omission as affected by “discretionary function or duty” exception to Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)), 170 ALR Fed 365.

Liability of United States for failure to warn local police or individuals of discharge, release, or escape of person who is deemed dangerous to public as affected by “discretionary act or duty” exception to Federal Tort Claims Act, 171 ALR Fed 655.

Claims arising from conduct of governmental employer in administering or failing to administer medical care as within discretionary function exception of Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)), 172 ALR Fed 407.

Liability of United States, under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 , 2680), for damages caused by ingestion or administration of government-approved drugs, vaccines, and medications, 173 ALR Fed 431.

Construction and application of Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) exception in 28 U.S.C. § 3680(c), concerning claims arising in respect of assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or detention of goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer, 173 ALR Fed 465.

§ 1-39-105. Liability; operation of motor vehicles, aircraft and watercraft.

A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of any motor vehicle, aircraft or watercraft.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1.

Police officers are not immune from liability if they negligently drive patrol car. De Wald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 561 (Wyo. 1986).

There is no bar to liability for operation of a motor vehicle, even if the motor vehicle is engaged in plowing snow on a roadway. Romero v. Hoppal, 855 P.2d 366, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1993).

Claim otherwise barred by sovereign immunity may be raised as counterclaim. —

A claim which would otherwise be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity may be asserted as a counterclaim in a government-initiated lawsuit if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and is asserted to reduce or defeat the government's claim. Ruppenthal v. State, 849 P.2d 1316, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1993).

Liability of supervisor. —

Where employee was the person directing and controlling loader as a driver for the purpose of propelling it as a motor vehicle when he was injured, the “operation” of the loader could not be imputed to defendants as a part of their responsibilities as supervisor and mechanic; there is persuasive authority against imputing “operation” to a supervisor or others not in actual physical control of the motor vehicle. Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1994).

School district was immune from claims of negligent design of a bus route, negligent training and supervision of bus drivers, and negligent entrustment of vehicles to bus drivers, which allegedly contributed to the death of a student bus passenger, since the exception to immunity applicable to operation of a motor vehicle did not apply to district supervisors who did not physically operate the bus. Sperry v. Fremont County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13910 (D. Wyo. 2015).

Liability not found. —

State was not liable for deaths of two minors killed when an automobile being driven by an employee of a state-certified residential treatment facility collided with an oncoming vehicle; the facility was in control of its day-to-day operations and thus an independent contractor outside the scope of the Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-101 et seq. Cline v. Department of Family Servs., 927 P.2d 261, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1996).

Applied in

Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 697 P.2d 606, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo. 1985); Metz v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2007 WY 166, 173 P.3d 334, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Oct. 23, 2007).

Quoted in

Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Veile v. Board of County Comm'rs, 860 P.2d 1174, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1993); May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1993); Campbell County Mem. Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, 317 P.3d 573, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 3 , 2014 WL 46689 (Jan 7, 2014); Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (July 31, 2015); Tavern, LLC v. Town of Alpine, 2017 WY 56, 395 P.3d 167, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

“Motor vehicle” or the like within statute waiving governmental immunity as to operation of such vehicles, 77 ALR2d 945.

Liability of municipality as bailee for damage to airplane, 44 ALR3d 862.

Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent occupant of moving vehicle, or for damage to such vehicle, as result of police chase, 4 ALR4th 865.

Municipal or state liability for injuries resulting from police roadblocks or commandeering of private vehicles, 19 ALR4th 937.

State's liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver, 41 ALR4th 111.

Tort liability of public schools and institutions of higher learning for accident involving motor vehicle operated by student, 85 ALR5th 301.

§ 1-39-106. Liability; buildings, recreation areas and public parks.

A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, recreation area or public park.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1.

Immunity not waived. —

Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of a school district and a teacher in a student's action to recover for injuries he sustained during a science demonstration conducted in a school gymnasium because the student's claims did not fall within the waiver of governmental immunity for operation or maintenance of a building; the student presented no evidence of a physical defect in the gymnasium. Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 353 P.3d 732, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2015).

Trial court properly granted a school district and a teacher summary judgment in a student's action to recover for injuries he sustained during a science demonstration conducted in a school gymnasium because the student's claims did not fall within the waiver of governmental immunity for operation or maintenance of a recreation area; conducting and supervising a science demonstration did not constitute operation or maintenance of a recreation area simply because the activity took place there. Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 353 P.3d 732, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2015).

Plaintiff’s negligence claim against the county fairgrounds did not fall within the waiver of immunity for negligent operation or maintenance of a building or recreation area because there was no evidence that the doors of the building were locked due to a physical defect in the doors or their locking mechanism; the failure of the doors to have a built-in propping mechanism was not a defect; and there was no evidence of how the brick or block came to be placed in the doorway on the evening of plaintiff’s injury, no evidence identifying the person who placed the object there and or the reason for doing so, and no testimony from anyone associated with the event concerning their experience with the doors that evening. Varela v. Goshen Cty. Fairgrounds, 2020 WY 124, 472 P.3d 1047, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 2020).

Waiver of immunity limited. —

The waiver of immunity in this section is limited by § 1-39-120 .Newberry v. Board of County Comm'rs, 919 P.2d 141, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1996).

State was not immune from suit. —

Where plaintiff park patron alleged state employees were negligent in approving the design and construction of the fountain in steam room in a state park, defendant State of Wyoming was not immune from suit because its activities fell within the statutory waiver of immunity for operation and maintenance of a public park under this section. Weber v. State, 2011 WY 127, 261 P.3d 225, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2011).

Waiver of immunity. —

Waiver of immunity for parks includes the activities undertaken by the State within the park facilities. Weber v. State, 2011 WY 127, 261 P.3d 225, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2011).

Park defined. —

Plain meaning of “park”as used in this section is “a public area of land having facilities for recreation,” and “a piece of open land with public amenities.” The word “park” means more than the land itself; it includes whatever “amenities” and “facilities for recreation” the owner of the park chooses to incorporate. Weber v. State, 2011 WY 127, 261 P.3d 225, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2011).

State's operation of park. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 36-8-304 and this section clearly provide that overseeing building construction on leased property and delivery of hot mineral water to lessees are parts of the State's operation of Hot Springs State Park. Weber v. State, 2011 WY 127, 261 P.3d 225, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2011).

Building inspections not “maintenance.” —

Building inspections conducted by the department of fire prevention and electrical safety were not “maintenance,” as contemplated by this section. Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1991).

The deliberate destruction of a building conducted during a municipal fire-training exercise is not “maintenance” for purposes of this section. City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1993).

War memorial stadium at university of Wyoming is “recreation area,” as contemplated by this section. Sports facilities are recreation areas. DiVenere v. University of Wyoming, 811 P.2d 273, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1991).

Operation defined. —

Term “operation” is not defined in this section; thus, the court uses the ordinary and obvious meaning of the term. “Operation” is defined as the “state of being operative or functional;” it is also defined as “the process of operating or mode of action.” Weber v. State, 2011 WY 127, 261 P.3d 225, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2011).

Trestle is a “bridge.” —

A trestle on the railroad right-of-way is a bridge for purposes of the application of § 1-39-120 .Newberry v. Board of County Comm'rs, 919 P.2d 141, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1996).

Quoted in

State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1982); Shisler v. Town of Jackson, 890 P.2d 555, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1995); Natrona County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, 81 P.3d 948, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 2003).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Landowner Liability Under the Wyoming Recreational Use Statute,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 649 (1980).

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

For article, “Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act: An Update,” see XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. 249 (1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of municipality for injuries occasioned by falling of awning or the like, 34 ALR2d 486.

Municipal liability for injuries from freezing of water overflowing walk from adjoining building, 39 ALR2d 782.

Liability of municipality for injuries from fall or slipping on debris or litter on outdoor stairway, 47 ALR2d 1086.

Municipal operation of bathing beach or swimming pool as governmental or proprietary function, for purposes of tort liability, 55 ALR2d 1434.

Municipal liability for injury from slide or chute, 69 ALR2d 1067.

Liability of municipal corporation for injury or death on or near loop-o-plane, ferris wheel, miniature car or similar ride, 86 ALR2d 350.

Liability of municipality for injuries resulting from fall or slipping on defective outdoor stairway, 92 ALR2d 469.

Liability of governmental unit for injuries or damage resulting from tree or limb falling onto highway from abutting land, 95 ALR3d 778.

Liability of governmental entity to builder or developer for negligent issuance of building permit subsequently suspended or revoked, 41 ALR4th 99.

Baseball player's right to recover from baseball-related personal injuries from nonplayer, 55 ALR4th 664.

State's liability for personal injuries from criminal attack in state park, 59 ALR4th 1236.

Liability to one struck by golf club, 63 ALR4th 221.

Liability for injury incurred in operation of power golf cart, 66 ALR4th 622.

Liability of local government entity for injury resulting from use of outdoor playground equipment at municipally owned park or recreation area, 73 ALR4th 496.

Violation of governmental regulations as to conditions and facilities of swimming pools as affecting liability in negligence, 79 ALR4th 461.

Liability for injuries to, or death of, water-skiers, 34 ALR5th 77.

Liability of landlord for injury or death occasioned by swimming pool maintained for tenants, 62 ALR5th 475.

Products liability: swimming pools and accessories, 65 ALR5th 105.

Liability of owner, operator, or other parties, for personal injuries allegedly resulting from snow or ice on premises of parking lot, 74 ALR5th 49.

§ 1-39-107. Liability; airports.

  1. A governmental entity is liable for damages  resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused  by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope  of their duties in the operation of airports.
  2. The liability imposed pursuant to subsection  (a) of this section does not include liability for damages due to  the existence of any condition arising out of compliance with any  federal or state law or regulation governing the use and operation  of airports.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1.

Cited in

May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1993); Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (July 31, 2015).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

For article, “Who's Really Who? Apportioning Liability of Independent Contractors Who Work for Hospitals that Qualify for Sovereign Immunity in a Rural State”, see 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 211 (2015).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of municipality for torts in connection with airport, 66 ALR2d 634.

§ 1-39-108. Liability; public utilities.

  1. A governmental entity is liable for damages  resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused  by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope  of their duties in the operation of public utilities and services  including gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection  or disposal, heating and ground transportation.
  2. The liability imposed pursuant to subsection  (a) of this section does not include liability for damages resulting  from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by a  failure to provide an adequate supply of gas, water, electricity or  services as described in subsection (a) of this section.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1.

Housing inspection not within waiver of immunity. —

A housing inspection is not one of the enumerated public utility or ground transportation service exceptions to the waiver of immunity. Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1991).

Licensing authorities not included in waiver. —

This section does not, within its language, include the authorities that license the public employees or entities that provide gas, electric, transportation and other listed services. Thus, the enforcement of this state's financial responsibility laws by employees of the department of revenue and taxation, financial responsibility division, is not included in the waiver of immunity articulated by this section. Gibson v. State, 811 P.2d 726, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 1991).

Municipal fire-training exercise not included in waiver. —

Because a municipal fire-training exercise is not specifically listed as one of the public utility or service exceptions to the waiver of immunity, immunity is available as a defense in such situations. City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1993).

City not negligent in requiring iron pipe. —

The court properly granted summary judgment for a city, where the plaintiff's claim asserted that the city council was negligent in adopting an ordinance which required the use of an iron pipe in a water system, which proved over time to be unsatisfactory or perhaps even ill-considered. The claim did not fit the niche provided by subsection (a), nor was it one which fell within the statutory exceptions to the general immunity provided for in § 1-39-104 .Sawyer v. Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1990).

Operation of public utilities. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-108 waives immunity for the negligence of public employees in the operation of public utilities and services including, solid or liquid waste collection or disposal. In other words, the statute waives immunity for negligence in keeping a public utility operable or functional. City of Torrington v. Cottier, 2006 WY 145, 145 P.3d 1274, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 2006).

Because a city's negligence in failing to ascertain ownership of property before installing a storm drain was unrelated to the operation and function of the storm drain, it did not constitute negligence in the operation of a public utility. Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 2012 WY 19, 270 P.3d 644, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2012).

Exception to governmental immunity for negligence in the operation of a public utility did not apply to a school district since the district's provision of ground transportation by busses, which allegedly contributed to the death of a student passenger, was not operation of a public utility, even though it served a public interest. Sperry v. Fremont County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13910 (D. Wyo. 2015).

Waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply to a former state employee's defamation claim because the claim did not rest on any actions involved in keeping a landfill operable or functional, but instead arose from the termination of the employee's employment. Armstrong v. Wyo. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 674 Fed. Appx. 842, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 179 (10th Cir. Wyo.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 175, 199 L. Ed. 2d 103, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5892 (U.S. 2017).

Wyoming Department of Transportation’s performance of eye exams was not a public service for which governmental immunity had been waived by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-108 as performing eye exams was not the same as the listed services, and the fact that the discrete service of performing eye exams was also available through private parties did not defeat immunity. Archer v. State ex rel. Wyo. DOT, 2018 WY 28, 413 P.3d 142, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2018).

City did not provide a public service for which governmental immunity had been waived by § 1-39-108 when it provided a marked street crossing given the specific exclusion set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-30-120(a). Archer v. State ex rel. Wyo. DOT, 2018 WY 28, 413 P.3d 142, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2018).

Cited in

Boyd v. Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1996); Weber v. State, 2011 WY 127, 261 P.3d 225, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 12, 2011); Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (July 31, 2015); Tavern, LLC v. Town of Alpine, 2017 WY 56, 395 P.3d 167, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of municipal corporation for spread of fire purposely and lawfully kindled, 24 ALR2d 241.

Liability of municipalities for pollution of subterranean waters, 38 ALR2d 1265.

Municipal liability for maintenance of public dump as nuisance, 52 ALR2d 1134.

Allowance of damages to successful plaintiff or relator in mandamus, 73 ALR2d 903, 34 ALR4th 457.

Liability of governmental unit for injuries or damage resulting from tree or limb falling onto highway from abutting land, 95 ALR3d 778.

Recovery of exemplary or punitive damages from municipal corporation, 1 ALR4th 448.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury, death, or property damage resulting from defect or obstruction in shoulder of street or highway, 19 ALR4th 532.

Municipal liability for negligent performance of building inspector's duties, 24 ALR5th 200.

§ 1-39-109. Liability; medical facilities.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of any public hospital or in providing public outpatient health care.
  2. The state of Wyoming is solely liable for damages resulting from, and the sole responsible party for, bodily injury or wrongful death to a patient treated under the provisions of W.S. 35-31-101 through 35-31-103 caused by the negligence of a health care provider or a medical facility while performing health care services pursuant to a contract to deliver volunteer health services under W.S. 35-31-101 through 35-31-103 .

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1; 2018, ch. 95, § 2.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added designation (a) and inserted "Except as provided in subsecction (b) of this section, a; and added (b).

Employee of covered entity.—

Wrongful death, medical malpractice, and negligence claims against a psychologist and the state hospital were improperly dismissed where the complaint sufficiently alleged that the psychologist was acting within the scope of her duties when she improperly diagnosed, treated, and monitored the decedent while he was a patient at the hospital, thereby falling within the Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-109(a) exception to sovereign immunity. Craft v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Health, 2020 WY 70, 465 P.3d 395, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 2020).

Employee of independent contractor. —

District court improperly denied a government hospital's motion for partial summary judgment in a medical malpractice action arising from the actions of a nurse employed by a contracted anesthesia services provider because the nurse was not a “public employee” for purposes of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and the Act did not provide an express waiver of sovereign immunity for non-employees of a governmental hospital; the district court erred in reading a prior appellate decision as implicitly waiving sovereign immunity against governmental entities for acts of ostensible or apparent agents. Campbell County Mem. Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, 317 P.3d 573, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 2014).

Malpractice claim based on lost chance doctrine. —

Under the lost chance doctrine, a negligent act must be a substantial cause of the lost chance to survive, and the damages awarded must be fully apportioned; therefore, medical malpractice claims using the doctrine are within the protection afforded by this section. McMackin v. Johnson County Healthcare Ctr., 2004 WY 44, 88 P.3d 491, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2004).

Cited in

Weber v. State, 2011 WY 127, 261 P.3d 225, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 12, 2011); Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (July 31, 2015).

Beavis v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 2001 WY 32, 20 P.3d 508, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability for wrongful autopsy, 18 ALR4th 858.

Liability of mental care facility for suicide of patient or former patient, 19 ALR4th 7.

Hospital's liability for mentally deranged patient's self-inflicted injuries, 36 ALR4th 117.

Liability of hospital or clinic for sexual relationships with patients by staff physicians, psychologists and other healers, 45 ALR4th 289.

Recovery in death action for failure to diagnose incurable disease which caused death, 64 ALR4th 1232.

§ 1-39-110. Liability; health care providers.

  1. A governmental entity is liable for damages  resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused  by the negligence of health care providers who are employees of the  governmental entity, including contract physicians, physician assistants,  nurses, optometrists and dentists who are providing a service for  state institutions or county jails, while acting within the scope  of their duties.
  2. Notwithstanding W.S. 1-39-118(a), for claims under this section against a physician, physician assistant, nurse, optometrist or dentist who is employed by a governmental entity or who is deemed to be a public employee of the state by virtue of a contract pursuant to W.S. 35-31-101 through 35-31-103 , based upon an act, error or omission occurring on or after May 1, 1988, the liability of a governmental entity shall not exceed the sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) to any claimant for any number of claims arising out of a single transaction or occurrence nor exceed the sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) for all claims of all claimants arising out of a single transaction or occurrence.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1; 1988, ch. 45, § 1; 1989, ch. 21, § 1; ch. 240, § 1; 1990, ch. 2, § 1; 2007, ch. 212, § 1; 2018, ch. 95, § 2.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a) inserted “physician assistants, nurses, optometrists and dentists” following “including contract physicians” and inserted “or county jails” preceding “while acting within the”; in (b) inserted “physician assistant, nurse, optometrist or dentist” following “this section against a physician”, substituted “a governmental entity” for “the state of Wyoming” preceding “based upon an act”, substituted “a governmental entity” for “the state” following “May 1, 1988, the liability of.”

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in (b), inserted “who is” following “optometrist or dentist” and “or who is deemed to be a public employee of the state by virtue of a contract pursuant to W.S. 35-31-101 through 35-31-103 ” prior to “based upon act.”

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2007, Ch. 212, § 3 states as follows: “This act shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

Applicability. —

Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 3, states: “This act shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

Liability for negligence of corrections officials. —

State of Wyoming was improperly granted summary judgment on the inmate’s negligence claim because it could not be concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the State, through the acts or omissions of the corrections officials, was liable for negligence. Bird v. Lampert, 839 Fed. Appx. 218, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 39317 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2020).

Employee of independent contractor. —

District court improperly denied a government hospital's motion for partial summary judgment in a medical malpractice action arising from the actions of a nurse employed by a contracted anesthesia services provider because the nurse was not a “public employee” for purposes of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and the Act did not provide an express waiver of sovereign immunity for non-employees of a governmental hospital; the district court erred in reading a prior appellate decision as implicitly waiving sovereign immunity against governmental entities for acts of ostensible or apparent agents. Campbell County Mem. Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, 317 P.3d 573, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 2014).

Government employees who inspect elevator for disabled person not “health care provider.” —

Employees of the division of vocational rehabilitation, which procured and inspected an elevator on behalf of a multiple sclerosis victim, were not “health care providers.” This exception, therefore, does not apply and the claim of the victim, who suffered injuries when the elevator malfunctioned, against the division was barred. Troyer v. Department of Health & Social Servs., Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation, 722 P.2d 158, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 589 (Wyo. 1986).

Social case workers are not “health care providers” within the meaning of this section and § 1-12-601 . They are, therefore, granted immunity by this chapter. May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1993).

Malpractice claim based on lost chance doctrine. —

Under the lost chance doctrine, a negligent act must be a substantial cause of the lost chance to survive, and the damages awarded must be fully apportioned; therefore, medical malpractice claims using the doctrine are within the protection afforded by this section. McMackin v. Johnson County Healthcare Ctr., 2004 WY 44, 88 P.3d 491, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2004).

Cited in

Beavis v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 2001 WY 32, 20 P.3d 508, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 2001); Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (July 31, 2015).

Quoted in

Stroth v. N. Lincoln County Hosp. Dist., 2014 WY 81, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Jun 23, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Immunity of municipal corporation from liability for damages in tort in operating hospital, 25 ALR2d 203, 18 ALR4th 858.

Governmental tort liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual, 6 ALR4th 1155.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by activities of hospital “rescue team”, 64 ALR4th 1200.

§ 1-39-111. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1986, ch. 89, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1, related to liability arising from the operation of public facilities.

§ 1-39-112. Liability; peace officers.

A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of peace officers while acting within the scope of their duties.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1; 1986, ch. 74, § 2.

Cross references. —

General powers of governing bodies, see § 15-1-103 .

Cases should rarely be disposed of by Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. —

Considering the requirements for qualified immunity and their definitions, cases involving the defense of qualified immunity should rarely be disposed of by Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1996).

Unlike absolute immunity, a determination that qualified immunity is generally available to peace officers is not sufficient to sustain a motion to dismiss. The defense of qualified immunity presents mixed questions of fact and law. These questions are better suited for resolution at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings after the facts are sufficiently developed. Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1996).

Applicability of section. —

Without a determination that the officers were not acting within the scope of their duties or that their conduct was not tortious, the governmental entity does not escape liability for the tortious acts of its peace officers. Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1996).

Where a plaintiff appealed a district court's entry of a judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants, since his claim did not fall within one of the statutorily authorized exceptions to governmental immunity, his claim was barred that defendants committed an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Wyoming Constitution. Stone v. Simone, 610 Fed. Appx. 751, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7203 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2015).

No respondeat superior actions. —

A governmental entity cannot be held liable under 42 USCS § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Kimbley v. Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1983).

Police officers are not immune from liability if they negligently drive patrol car. De Wald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 561 (Wyo. 1986).

Police officer setting up roadblock. —

In an action arising from an automobile accident which occurred when a fleeing suspect crashed into the plaintiffs' vehicle just after it cleared a roadblock set up to stop the fleeing suspect, a defendant police officer was not entitled to immunity since none of the decisions made by the officer were of an executive, policy nature. Board of County Comm'rs v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 2000).

Sheriff could have owed a duty to have arrested intoxicated driver. —

Trial court erred in dismissing a wrongful death action brought by mother against sheriff and county, on behalf of her son who was killed by an intoxicated driver; after determining that the intoxicated driver immediately intended to drive to follow an ambulance to the hospital to be with an injured friend, the sheriff had a duty to do what an ordinarily prudent law enforcement officer would have done under like circumstances. Becker v. Mason, 2006 WY 143, 145 P.3d 1268, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 2006).

Highway patrolman allegedly negligent in not sanding icy road not immune from suit. —

A highway patrolman, who was allegedly negligent in not having an icy road sanded after being called to the scene of an accident, was not immune from suit under § 1-39-104(a), even though this section refers only to a “governmental entity.” His immunity was purely dependent upon the immunity of the state. His protection was found not in immunity, but in the duty of the state under § 1-39-104(b) to provide him a defense and to indemnify him. State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 578 (Wyo. 1985).

Liability of off-duty police officer responding to emergency bulletin. —

Plaintiff in wrongful death action may prevail only if plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish that off-duty police officer was acting within his scope of duties at the time he responded to an emergency bulletin. Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1995).

In wrongful death action, if the trier of fact determined that off-duty police officer was not acting within the scope of his official duties, then the municipality and the police officer would be insulated from liability under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. If, however, the trier of fact determined that the officer was acting within the scope of his official duties and was authorized to act at the accident scene, and that he, therefore, owed a legal duty to the deceased, liability should be determined as it would be in any negligence case. Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1995).

Officer not negligent in failing to conduct more extensive sobriety testing. —

An officer was not negligent in failing to conduct more extensive sobriety testing on an intoxicated driver who injured another where informal sobriety tests conducted on the driver did not indicate that the driver was legally intoxicated. That an intoxicated driver or other law violator causes injury to another does not, without more, necessarily mean that a governmental entity or public employee was negligent. Keehn ex rel. Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 1992).

Action against parole board and officers not maintainable. —

A cause of action against the parole board and its officers for permitting a parolee to leave the state, after which he committed various murders, could not be maintained, as the defendants were not “law enforcement officers” and, hence, were not subject to claim or liability because of governmental immunity. Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 468 (Wyo. 1985).

Even though the legislature has not given the phrase “law enforcement officers” a statutory definition, the unambiguous language of this section plainly does not waive tort immunity for parole officers or county attorneys, persons who are not “law enforcement officers” as defined in Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 468 (Wyo. 1985).

Action against parole officer for alleged perjury. —

The trial court properly refused a probation officer's dismissal motion of claims against him on the basis of qualified immunity because a reasonable probation officer would have known that the perjury of the sort he allegedly committed violated § 6-5-301(a). Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 1992), cert. denied, White v. Cooney, 510 U.S. 813, 114 S. Ct. 60, 126 L. Ed. 2d 30, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4946 (U.S. 1993).

State penitentiary training officer. —

A training officer acting within the scope of his employment at a state penitentiary enjoys immunity from suit under this act. Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1994).

Agriculture department employees not “law enforcement officers.” —

Wyoming department of agriculture employees charged with administering the Wyoming Wholesome Meat Act of 1969 were not “law enforcement officers,” where they were not charged with traditional peace-keeping duties and had no power to maintain public order, to carry a weapon, or to hold or arrest persons accused of violating the act. Matthews v. Wyoming Dep't of Agric., 719 P.2d 216, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 554 (Wyo. 1986).

Game and fish personnel serving as bear management officers were not performing the functions of a “peace officer” and thus the officers' alleged negligence in monitoring a grizzly bear who mauled a hunter did not give rise to liability under this section. Peterson v. Wyoming Game And Fish Comm'n, 989 P.2d 113, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1999).

Public duty rule. —

Public duty only rule, if it ever was recognized in Wyoming, is no longer viable. Natrona County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, 81 P.3d 948, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 2003).

Applied in

Lafferty v. Nickel, 663 P.2d 168, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1983); Metz v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2007 WY 166, 173 P.3d 334, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Oct. 23, 2007).

Quoted in

Hill v. Park County ex rel. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 856 P.2d 456, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1993); Boyer-Gladden v. Hill, 2010 WY 12, 224 P.3d 21, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Feb. 9, 2010).

Cited in

May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1993); Campbell County Mem. Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, 317 P.3d 573, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 3 , 2014 WL 46689 (Jan 7, 2014); Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (July 31, 2015); Tavern, LLC v. Town of Alpine, 2017 WY 56, 395 P.3d 167, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent occupant of moving vehicle, or for damage to such vehicle, as result of police chase, 4 ALR4th 865.

Immunity of public officer from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual, 5 ALR4th 773.

Governmental tort liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual, 6 ALR4th 1155.

Liability of governmental officer or entity for failure to warn or notify of release of potentially dangerous individual from custody, 12 ALR4th 722.

Municipal or state liability for injuries resulting from police roadblocks or commandeering of private vehicles, 19 ALR4th 937.

Liability for failure of police response to emergency call, 39 ALR4th 691.

Liability for false arrest or imprisonment under warrant as affected by mistake as to identity of person arrested, 39 ALR4th 705.

Liability of police or peace officers for false arrest, imprisonment or malicious prosecution as affected by claim of suppression, failure to disclose or failure to investigate exculpatory evidence, 81 ALR4th 1031.

Performance of public duty by off-duty police officer acting as private security guard, 65 ALR5th 623.

Liability of municipality or other governmental unit for failure to provide police protection from crime, 90 ALR5th 273.

Admissibility of showing, in action in federal court under 42 USCS § 1983 based on conduct of police officers, that criminal charges brought against plaintiff in connection with incident giving rise to action were dismissed or that plaintiff was acquitted on some or all charges. 143 ALR Fed 621.

Construction and application of Federal Tort Claims Act provision (28 USC § 2680(h)) excepting from coverage claims arising out of false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, or abuse of process 152 ALR Fed 605.

§ 1-39-113. Claims procedure.

  1. No action shall be brought under this  act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which the  action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement  in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error  or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more  than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission,  if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, error or omission  was:
    1. Not reasonably discoverable within a two  (2) year period; or
    2. The claimant failed to discover the alleged  act, error or omission within the two (2) year period despite the  exercise of due diligence.
  2. The claim shall state:
    1. The time, place and circumstances of the  alleged loss or injury including the name of the public employee involved,  if known;
    2. The name, address and residence of the  claimant and his representative or attorney, if any; and
    3. The amount of compensation or other relief  demanded.
  3. All claims against the state shall be  presented to the general services division of the department of administration  and information. Claims against any other governmental entity shall  be filed at the business office of that entity. In the case of claims  against local governments the claim submitted need not be acted upon  by the entity prior to suit. For purposes of this section, “business  office” means:
    1. The county clerk of a county, including  its agencies, instrumentalities and institutions;
    2. The city or town clerk of a city or town,  including its agencies, instrumentalities and institutions;
    3. The secretary of a joint powers board,  airport board, public corporation, community college district board  of trustees or special district;
    4. The superintendent of a school district;
    5. The president of the University of Wyoming.
  4. In any action under this act, the complaint  shall state:
    1. That the claim required under subsection  (c) of this section was filed in accordance with this section;
    2. The date the claim under subsection (c)  of this section was filed;
    3. That the claim was in compliance with  the signature and certification requirements of article 16, section 7 of the Wyoming Constitution.
  5. In any claim filed with a governmental  entity under this act, the claim shall be signed by the claimant under  oath in substantially the following format:

    I,, have read and understand the provisions of the false swearing statute. I hereby certify under penalty of false swearing that the foregoing claim, including all of its attachments, if any, is true and accurate. Signature of Claimant Date Printed Name of Claimant STATE OF WYOMING COUNTY OF ss Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notarial Officer, this day of , Notarial Officer My Commission Expires: (Seal).

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History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1; 1981, ch. 142, § 1; 1985, ch. 49, § 1; 1989, ch. 110, § 1; 1991, ch. 29, § 3; 1992, ch. 41, § 1; 1997, ch. 178, § 1; 2010, ch. 27, § 1.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, inserted “For purposes of this section, ‘business office’ means” in the introductory language of (c); added (c)(i) through (c)(v); and added (d) through (e).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Construction. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) is a true nonclaim statute, and therefore the right to file a complaint against the State ceases to exist upon expiration of the limitation period for the presentment of a governmental claim if no valid governmental claim has been presented. Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, 101 P.3d 465, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 2004), overruled in part, Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 331 P.3d 1174, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2014).

Section applicable only to claims accruing after June 30, 1979. —

The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, including the two-year claim filing period found in subsection (a), only governs claims that accrue after June 30, 1979, the effective date of the act. Davis v. Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 612 (Wyo. 1985).

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act's (WGCA) omission of a reference to the tolling provision contained in the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act of 2005 evidences the legislature's intent that the tolling provision does not apply in the context of the notice-of-claim requirement under the WGCA; accordingly, the tolling provision in the Medical Review Panel Act does not operate to toll the two-year period for submitting a notice of claim to a governmental entity under the WGCA. Stroth v. N. Lincoln County Hosp. Dist., 2014 WY 81, 327 P.3d 121, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2014).

Plain language of the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act of 2005 unambiguously indicates the tolling period applies to the filing of a “complaint” in any court against a health care provider, but a notice of claim is not a “complaint” that must be filed in a “court”; it must be submitted to the governmental entity alleged to have been responsible for causing harm to the claimant, and if the condition is satisfied, the claimant is subject to a one-year statute of limitations for filing an action. Stroth v. N. Lincoln County Hosp. Dist., 2014 WY 81, 327 P.3d 121, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2014).

Eleventh amendment immunity not waived. —

State's waiver of its sovereign immunity for claims brought under this section does not amount to a waiver of its immunity under U.S. Const., Amend. 11. Ware v. Wyoming Bd. of Law Examiners, 973 F. Supp. 1339, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12155 (D. Wyo. 1997), aff'd, 161 F.3d 19, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 33398 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1998).

Applicable to joint powers board. —

A joint powers board is not a “political subdivision” such that it would be required to comply with the requirements of article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution; a joint powers board is a “governmental entity” and therefore the requirements for this section for bringing a claim apply to a joint powers board. Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1992).

Applicability to inverse condemnation action. —

Limitation period found in Wyoming Governmental Claims Act applied to an inverse condemnation cause of action and to the homeowners' tort claims against a city, and where the undisputed material facts showed that complaints had been filed well beyond one-year period set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 , the actions were time-barred. The district court was correct in applying its statute of limitation analysis to all of the state law claims and in dismissing the action on summary judgment. Lankford v. City of Laramie, 2004 WY 143, 100 P.3d 1238, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 2004).

Statute of limitations in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 did not apply to an inverse condemnation action because the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 et seq., did not apply to such claims, and all prior decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court to the contrary were reversed. 2013 WY 3, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 2 .

When claim accrues. —

A claim against a governmental entity does not accrue until all contractual terms creating a condition precedent have been exhausted; therefore, where a contract between a construction company and a joint powers board provided for arbitration, the construction company's claim accrued upon completion of the arbitration proceedings and not upon completion of the construction project. Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1992).

The expiration of the school year was not a condition precedent to plaintiff teachers' seeking redress with the court on their breach of contract claims; their claims accrued on the date the school board denied their applications for early retirement benefits. Peterson v. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. One, 929 P.2d 525, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1996).

Two-year notice of claim period commenced on date when patient discovered that doctor was actually an employee of county hospital. Romero v. Schulze, 974 P.2d 959, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1999).

A claim against a city board of public utilities for its negligence in failing to properly maintain a fire hydrant and the resulting damage to the plaintiff's home was time-barred since the two year limitations period began to run on the date that the plaintiff discovered water seepage into her basement, rather than on the later date that she discovered that the water came from the city water supply. Rawlinson v. Cheyenne Bd. of Pub. Utils, 2001 WY 6, 17 P.3d 13, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2001).

Although an improvement and service district argued that homeowners failed to file their governmental claim within the two-year statute of limitations, there were issues of material fact as to when the homeowners discovered or should have discovered the district's act, error or omission with respect to a continuous water leak in the district's water main. Moreover, there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding the commencement of the limitation period on the homeowners' claim for damages associated with a break in the district's water main. Heimer v. Antelope Valley Improvement, 2010 WY 29, 226 P.3d 860, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2010).

When claim accrues. —

Patient's medical malpractice claim was timely under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) because he presented his claim to the Wyoming Medical Review Panel just under two years from the date of his discharge; he presented evidence that the hospital treated him for the pain and dysfunction in his shoulder and arm until he was discharged. Nobles v. Mem'l Hosp. of Laramie County, 2013 WY 66, 301 P.3d 517, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2013).

Date must be included in claim. —

In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, an allegation under this section must encompass a statement of the date the claim was filed to demonstrate the filing of the claim within two years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission or, alternatively, the statutory ground for the late discovery of the alleged act, error or omission. Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. May 19, 1993), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 , with respect to the statute of limitations, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 , the date of the act, error, or omission had to be determined before it could be concluded that the patient timely filed a governmental claim against the doctor within the two-year period; date of discovery of employment relationship was crucial. Jost v. Goss, 2010 WY 104, 236 P.3d 994, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2010).

Where plaintiff did not even allege the filing of a claim in his Mississippi complaint, under applicable Wyoming law that would serve to justify dismissal of the complaint for the tort claims. Routh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo., cert. denied, 525 U.S. 814, 119 S. Ct. 49, 142 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4815 (U.S. 1998), reh'g denied, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. Feb. 17, 1998).

Complaint alleging property right in prison work assignment failed to state a claim under state law, in absence of any allegation that a timely claim was filed as required by this chapter. Garnett v. Hettgar, 2 P.3d 558, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Subject matter jurisdiction. —

Although the Wyoming legislature abolished the distinction between “governmental” and “proprietary functions” with respect to the assertion of claims against the state or its subdivisions in enacting the Governmental Claims Act of 1979, these terms continue to have vitality in determining the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in a particular controversy. Mountain View/Evergreen Improvement & Serv. Dist. v. Brooks Water & Sewer Dist., 896 P.2d 1355, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1995).

District court did not acquire subject matter jurisdiction over a driver's negligence claim against a city because the driver did not include in her complaint an averment that she had complied with the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 and this section. McCann v. City of Cody, 2009 WY 86, 210 P.3d 1078, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 2009), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

When plaintiff injured motorist filed suit against defendant city after his vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by a police officer, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether plaintiff complied with the requirements of this section for filing suit against a governmental entity. Upon presentation of proof that plaintiff had complied with those provisions by providing a notice of claim to the city, the district court also had subject matter jurisdiction to allow him to amend his complaint to so allege. Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

District court had subject matter jurisdiction to allow amendment of a wrongful death complaint to allege presentation of a notice of claim complying with this section and Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, which had been timely presented. The amendment related back to the original filing date in accordance with Wyo. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Hoffman v. Darnell, 2011 WY 65, 252 P.3d 936, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 2011).

Claim brought by homeowners with leaky basement accrued when water discovered in basement. —

Tort claims brought by homeowners — who discovered, after they purchased their homes, that their basements leaked — against the various government entities who inspected and approved the homes, accrued on the dates when the homeowners discovered the water in their basements and suffered damage, and not on the dates when the government entities committed their allegedly negligent acts. Davis v. Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 612 (Wyo. 1985).

In negligence action against surveyors for conducting erroneous land surveys and against the board of the county commissioners for filing the surveys, the plaintiffs did not “discover” the tortious act for purposes of the accrual of their cause of action until they received a corrected land surveyor's report. The statute of limitations did not begin to run on an earlier date when the title insurance agent advised them that he would not continue to issue title insurance policies because of survey discrepancies. Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach & Assocs., 824 P.2d 560, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1992).

Time for filing claim on behalf of minor begins to run at the time of the appointment of a guardian ad litem by the court pursuant to Rule 17(c), W.R.C.P. This disability for failing to file a claim disappears upon the minor reaching the age of majority. Dye v. Fremont County Sch. Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1991).

Failure to timely file claim bars suit. —

The failure to file a claim with the governmental entity within the two-year period provided in subsection (a) is an absolute bar to suit. Duran v. Board of County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 971, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1990).

Claim time-barred. —

Motorist did not establish facts necessary for estoppel to bar a statute of limitations defense where, although the motorist may have been induced by the city attorney to delay filing, she was in no way misled, nor did the city attorney conceal facts to the motorist's detriment. Archuleta v. City of Rawlins, 942 P.2d 404, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1997).

Where the plaintiffs discovered the “act, error or omission” which provided the basis of the claim of inverse condemnation no later than the date of the 1987 flood, the two year time for filing claims under the statute began to run in July 1987, and it had expired by the time plaintiffs filed their claims with the department of transportation in 1995. Waid v. State, 996 P.2d 18, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2000).

Landowners' monetary claims against a county challenging the conditional use permit application process required under the county's growth management plan should have been dismissed because the landowners failed to comply with the presentment requirements of this section or Wyo. Const., art. 16, § 7; along with other violations, the actions were not filed within the applicable two-year period. Laughter v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2005 WY 54, 110 P.3d 875, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 2005).

Order dismissing plaintiffs' negligence action against a town was proper because plaintiffs presented to the town a notice of claim that did not meet the requirements of Wyo. Const., art. 16, § 7, being neither signed nor certified to under penalty of perjury. The court appropriately dismissed the action with prejudice, inasmuch as it was then impossible for plaintiffs to comply with the mandatory filing deadline of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 . Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, 111 P.3d 290, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2005), overruled in part, Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 331 P.3d 1174, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2014).

While the detainee's filing occurred within the one-year limitation period of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 , the deputy was not served with the copy of the complaint until much later; pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 3(b), the suit was not “commenced” until that date, which was outside the one-year statutory period, and as a result, the detainee's state law tort claims against the deputy under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act were time-barred. Boyer-Gladden v. Hill, 2010 WY 12, 224 P.3d 21, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 2010).

District court did not err in dismissing a personal representative's complaint against a medical center because the representative failed to submit a timely notice of claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA); the tolling provision contained in the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act does not operate to toll the two-year period for submitting a notice of claim to a governmental entity under the WGCA. Stroth v. N. Lincoln County Hosp. Dist., 2014 WY 81, 327 P.3d 121, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2014).

Because a personal representative's notice of claim to the Medical Review Panel was filed over two years after the date of the alleged act, error, or omission, the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act of 2005 could not have operated to toll the time period for filing a notice of claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Stroth v. N. Lincoln County Hosp. Dist., 2014 WY 81, 327 P.3d 121, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2014).

Pest control board independent governmental entity. —

A weed and pest control district under title 11 is an independent governmental entity for purposes of this chapter. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' presentation of a notice of claim to the county board of commissioners within the two-year claim period in lieu of presenting a claim to the wood and pest control board deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the board. Cranston v. Weston County Weed & Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1992).

Defendant, absent misconduct, not estopped from asserting separate entity status. —

Although the defendant weed and pest control board had notice during the claims period that the plaintiffs believed they had a claim against the board, after the plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with the county board of commissioners, the board was not estopped from claiming that it was a separate governmental entity where no facts were alleged showing that the plaintiffs' delay in filing was induced by the board, or that the board misled them as to the need to file a claim. Cranston v. Weston County Weed & Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1992).

Notice requirement. —

A prerequisite in pursuing a claim against the state or its officers is compliance with the notice requirements of the claims act. Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1996), reh'g denied, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. Oct. 29, 1996), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Where an individual sued the city and a police officer for negligence, the individual's notice of claim, signed by the individual's attorney but not by the individual, did not meet the constitutional requirements for a valid claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 et seq., because it was not signed by the individual, and it was not certified to under penalty of perjury; thus, dismissal of the individual's complaint was proper despite any imprecision as to whether the district court dismissed the complaint under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) or W.R.C.P. 12(c). Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, 86 P.3d 872, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2004), overruled in part, Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 331 P.3d 1174, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2014).

In a contract case, a construction company fully complied with required notice requirements where a claim stated that a city caused delays by changing project specifications and failing to act to keep a project on schedule and where notice also clearly set forth damages that allegedly resulted from the city's conduct; therefore, supreme court and district court had subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with the matter presented. City of Gillette v. Hladky Constr., Inc., 2008 WY 134, 196 P.3d 184, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 2008).

Where a new prison policy imposed after the murder of a guard prohibited prisoners from keeping certain personal property in their cells, the inmate was notified in June of 2005 that his property would be destroyed; on September 11, 2007, the inmate submitted a claim form to the Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC) asking that he be repaid for the property's value. Because the inmate did not submit the notice of claim required by this section, the district court did not err by dismissing his civil suit against the DOC. Cosco v. Lampert, 2010 WY 52, 229 P.3d 962, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 910, 131 S. Ct. 1798, 179 L. Ed. 2d 666, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2478 (U.S. 2011).

Signature and certification required. —

Claim filed under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 et seq., must meet the requirements of art. 16, § 7, Wyo. Const., including the requirement that it be signed by the claimant and certified to under penalty of perjury. Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1990), overruled, Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2004).

Where persons injured in collisions with State employees presented putative notices of claim that were neither signed by them nor certified under penalty of perjury, those notices of claim were invalid because they did not meet the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, and the belated attempts to cure the deficiencies were ineffective because the limitation period of the nonclaim statute had passed, thereby extinguishing the statutory right to sue the State, and the plaintiffs did not show that the deficient notices of claim were, or could be, salvaged by the savings statute, by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or as a matter of public policy. Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, 101 P.3d 465, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 2004), overruled in part, Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 331 P.3d 1174, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2014).

A negligence case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because a driver did not present, within the mandatory two-year period of this section, a notice of claim personally signed under penalty of perjury, as required by Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.Wooster v. Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2005 WY 47, 109 P.3d 893, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. May 10, 2005), overruled in part, Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 331 P.3d 1174, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2014).

District court erred in granting summary judgment to the governmental entities and their employees based on lack of jurisdiction because, while a personal representative's negligence claim was neither signed under oath nor certified, the statutory and constitutional claim requirements were substantive, but not jurisdictional, and the entities and their employees waived their defense by failing to properly plead an affirmative defense that the claim was defective. Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 331 P.3d 1174, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2014).

Itemization in notice of claim. —

When a doctor filed a counterclaim against a government hospital for breach of contract, the notice of claim separated the damages into four categories of direct contractual damages, consequential damages, lost income and relocation. Because the itemization met the statutory and constitutional requirements for notices of governmental claims, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and erred by dismissing the counterclaim. Madsen v. Bd. of Trs. of Mem. Hosp., 2011 WY 36, 248 P.3d 1151, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 2011).

Notice of claim served on the town by a construction company met the itemization requirements of this section, because it identified the precise dollar amount of damages the construction company was seeking for breach of contract. Excel Constr., Inc. v. Town of Lovell, 2011 WY 166, 268 P.3d 238, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 2011).

Date of act, error, or omission. —

Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 , with respect to the statute of limitations, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 , the date of the act, error, or omission had to be determined before it could be concluded that the patient timely filed a governmental claim against the doctor within the two-year period; date of discovery of employment relationship was crucial. Jost v. Goss, 2010 WY 104, 236 P.3d 994, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2010).

Court without jurisdiction over action against governmental entity where no prior claim filed. —

A district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a tort action brought by a complainant against a governmental entity, where the complainant fails to allege that a claim has been filed pursuant to this section and where, in fact, no claim has been filed. Dee v. Laramie County, 666 P.2d 957, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1983), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

The court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff school teachers' breach of contract claims against the school board where the teachers failed to comply with this section's notice requirements. Peterson v. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. One, 929 P.2d 525, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1996).

Failure to meet the filing requirements of this act constituted an independent basis for barring claims. Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1994).

Lawsuit filed within year after untimely claim barred. —

A lawsuit filed within a year after an untimely claim under this section, but not within a year after a timely claim, was barred by the statute of limitations (§ 1-39-114 ). Davis v. Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 612 (Wyo. 1985).

Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against board of bar examiners was barred by plaintiff's failure to file a claim pursuant to this section. Ware v. Wyoming Bd. of Law Examiners, 973 F. Supp. 1339, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12155 (D. Wyo. 1997), aff'd, 161 F.3d 19, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 33398 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1998).

Barred claims cannot be revived. —

Assessment district did not file its action in time with respect to the areas covered in its first claim which was barred by the statute. The inclusion of barred claims with non-barred claims in the second notice of claim filed does not adjust this result; the plain language of the statute prevents a plaintiff from reviving a barred claim by including it in a claim for other damages that is not time barred. Mountain View/Evergreen Improvement & Serv. Dist. v. Brooks Water & Sewer Dist., 896 P.2d 1355, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1995).

Action between two governmental entities involving state educational funding. —

The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is not applicable to an action between two governmental entities when the relief sought is a declaration of rights and liabilities of the governmental entitles under statutes affecting state educational funding and for the recovery of monies that should have been distributed in the past. Board of County Comm'rs v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d 946, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1994).

Applied in

Board of Trustees v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1983); Lafferty v. Nickel, 663 P.2d 168, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1983); Boyd v. Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1996).

Quoted in

Milton v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 372, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1988); Shubert v. Dexter, 891 P.2d 55, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1995); Ahearn v. Town of Wheatland, 2002 WY 12, 39 P.3d 409, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 2002).

Stated in

Eathorne v. Bd. of Trustees, 2001 WY 36, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 47 , 21 P.3d 745 (Wyo. 2001).

Cited in

Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1988); Scott v. School Dist. No. 6, 815 F. Supp. 424, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2899 (D. Wyo. 1993); Veile v. Board of County Comm'rs, 860 P.2d 1174, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1993); Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2001 WY 33, 20 P.3d 521, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2001); Jauregui v. Memorial Hosp. of Sweetwater County, 2005 WY 59, 111 P.3d 914, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (2005); Lavatai v. State, 2005 WY 133, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 159 , 121 P.3d 121 (2005); Reed v. Cloninger, 2006 WY 37, 131 P.3d 359, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. Mar. 24, 2006); Gose v. City of Douglas, 2008 WY 126, 193 P.3d 1159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Oct. 13, 2008); Hall v. Park County, 2010 WY 124, 238 P.3d 580, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 3, 2010); Jackman Constr. v. Town of Baggs, 2012 WY 80, 278 P.3d 247, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (June 12, 2012).

Construction with other statutes.—

Although a claimant might have up to three years to file a complaint under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-113 and 1-39-114 (2017) of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, these provisions do not extend shorter statutes of limitations. The plain language of § 1-39-114 , prohibiting its use to extend shorter statutes of limitations, compels us to apply the statute of limitations at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 . Wyo. Guardianship Corp. v. Wyo. State Hosp., 2018 WY 114, 428 P.3d 424, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2018).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For case note, “Wrongful Death — Siblings as Beneficiaries Under Wyoming's Wrongful Death Statutes, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984),” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 299 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Power of city as to compromise of claim, 15 ALR2d 1359.

Infancy or incapacity as affecting, under equal protection requirements, notice required as condition of holding municipality or other political subdivision liable for personal injury, 34 ALR2d 725.

Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give required notice of claim of injury to municipality, county, or other governmental agency or body, 65 ALR2d 1278.

Attorney's mistake or neglect as excuse for failing to file timely notice of tort claim against state or local governmental unit, 55 ALR3d 930.

Modern status of the law as to validity of statutes or ordinances requiring notice of tort claim against local governmental entity, 59 ALR3d 93.

Local government tort liability: minority as affecting notice of claim requirement, 58 ALR4th 402.

Insufficiency of notice of claim against municipality as regards statement of place where accident occurred, 69 ALR4th 484.

Complaint as satisfying requirement of notice of claim upon states, municipalities, and other political subdivisions, 45 ALR5th 109.

Persons or entities upon whom notice of injury or claim against state or state agencies may or must be served, 45 ALR5th 173.

Sufficiency of notice of claim against local governmental unit as regards identity, name, address, and residence of claimant, 53 ALR5th 617.

When is claim properly presented to federal agency, under 28 USC § 2675(a), for purposes of satisfying prerequisite to subsequent suit under Federal Tort Claims Act, 73 ALR Fed 338.

Applicability and effect of 28 USC § 2675(b) pertaining to increase in federal tort claim over amount presented to agency, 80 ALR Fed 737.

§ 1-39-114. Statute of limitations.

Except as otherwise provided, actions against a governmental entity or a public employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after June 30, 1979 which are subject to this act shall be forever barred unless commenced within one (1) year after the date the claim is filed pursuant to W.S. 1-39-113 . In the case of a minor seven (7) years of age or younger, actions against a governmental entity or public employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after June 30, 1979 which are subject to this act are forever barred unless commenced within two (2) years after occurrence or until his eighth birthday, whichever period is greater. In no case shall the statute of limitations provided in this section be longer than any other applicable statute of limitations. In the absence of applicable insurance coverage, if the claim was properly filed, the statute shall be tolled forty-five (45) days after a decision by the entity, if the decision was not made and mailed to the claimant within the statutory time limitation otherwise provided herein.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in the first sentence, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Section inapplicable where defendant acting outside “scope of duties.” —

The plaintiff filed an action against the defendant, a school principal, seeking damages, in the alternative, for negligence in representing to the plaintiff that he had been employed as a teacher in the school system, or for breach of an implied contract of employment. An analysis of the school district rules, regulations and statements of policy demonstrated that the defendant could not have been requested, required or authorized to enter into a contract for employment for a teaching position with the plaintiff and, if he did so, he could not have been acting within the “scope of his duties” as a public employee. Therefore, the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, including the one-year period of limitations found in this section, did not apply. Milton v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 372, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. Oct. 24, 1988).

Plaintiff was not estopped from asserting that defendant acted outside “scope of duties” because of the allegation in his claim that he had been injured due to the defendant's actions, who “was acting within the scope and course of his employment.” Alternative pleading is authorized by Rule 8(e), W.R.C.P., and is not the same as the changing of statements of fact in separate proceedings. Milton v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 372, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. Oct. 24, 1988).

Limitations period not commenced where notice of claim insufficient. —

A notice of claim filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant city did not satisfy the requirements of the art. 16, § 7, Wyo. Const., and, therefore, did not begin the running of the statute of limitations where the notice of claim was neither signed nor verified by the plaintiff, who declared in an affidavit that he did not prepare it and that neither he nor any member of his family furnished it to the city. Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2001 WY 33, 20 P.3d 521, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2001), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Signature and certification requirement. —

Where persons injured in collisions with State employees presented putative notices of claim that were neither signed by them nor certified under penalty of perjury, those notices of claim were invalid because they did not meet the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, and the belated attempts to cure the deficiencies were ineffective because the limitation period of the nonclaim statute had passed, thereby extinguishing the statutory right to sue the State, and the plaintiffs did not show that the deficient notices of claim were, or could be, salvaged by the savings statute, by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or as a matter of public policy. Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, 101 P.3d 465, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 2004), overruled in part, Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 331 P.3d 1174, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2014).

Lawsuit filed within year after untimely claim barred. —

A lawsuit filed within a year after an untimely claim under § 1-39-113 , but not within a year after a timely claim, was barred by this section. Davis v. Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 612 (Wyo. 1985).

Applicability to inverse condemnation. —

Limitation period found in Wyoming Governmental Claims Act applied to an inverse condemnation cause of action and to the homeowners' tort claims against a city, and where the undisputed material facts showed that complaints had been filed well beyond one-year period set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 , the claims were time-barred. The district court was correct in applying its statute of limitation analysis to all of the state law claims and in dismissing the action on summary judgment. Lankford v. City of Laramie, 2004 WY 143, 100 P.3d 1238, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 2004).

Dismissal with prejudice was improper where property owners' inverse condemnation complaint against a city was filed within the one-year statute of limitations set forth in this section. Gose v. City of Douglas, 2008 WY 126, 193 P.3d 1159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2008), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Statute of limitations in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 did not apply to an inverse condemnation action because the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 et seq., did not apply to such claims, and all prior decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court to the contrary were reversed. 2013 WY 3, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 2 .

Barred claims cannot be revived. —

Assessment district did not file its action in time with respect to the areas covered in its first claim which was barred by the statute. The inclusion of barred claims with non-barred claims in the second notice of claim filed does not adjust this result; the plain language of the statute prevents a plaintiff from reviving a barred claim by including it in a claim for other damages that is not time barred. Mountain View/Evergreen Improvement & Serv. Dist. v. Brooks Water & Sewer Dist., 896 P.2d 1355, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1995).

Where plaintiff's minivan was struck by a county road grader on October 31, 2007, plaintiff's complaint filed against the county on February 20, 2009 was barred by the one-year period of limitations for bringing an action under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act; likewise, plaintiff's second complaint filed against the county on July 27, 2009 was time-barred. The district court never obtained jurisdiction over the action. Hall v. Park County, 2010 WY 124, 238 P.3d 580, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2010).

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA) does not provide for liability beyond its specific provisions, and there is no provision within the WGCA for application of the savings statute, which is not part of the Act, to causes of action thereunder. Therefore, the savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 , does not apply to actions filed under the WGCA. Hall v. Park County, 2010 WY 124, 238 P.3d 580, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2010).

Tolling period not applicable. —

The provision providing for a 45-day tolling period did not apply in an action against a county hospital for wrongful termination of employment as the undisputed evidence showed that the hospital had an insurance policy in effect, that the insurer sent a reservation letter to the hospital after it was advised of the plaintiff's claim, and that at no time did the insurer ever deny coverage and there was never any determination that there was no applicable coverage. Eathorne v. Bd. of Trustees, 2001 WY 36, 21 P.3d 745, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2001).

Plain language of the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act of 2005 unambiguously indicates the tolling period applies to the filing of a “complaint” in any court against a health care provider, but a notice of claim is not a “complaint” that must be filed in a “court”; it must be submitted to the governmental entity alleged to have been responsible for causing harm to the claimant, and if the condition is satisfied, the claimant is subject to a one-year statute of limitations for filing an action. Stroth v. N. Lincoln County Hosp. Dist., 2014 WY 81, 327 P.3d 121, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2014).

Estoppel not applicable. —

Motorist did not establish facts necessary for estoppel to bar a statute of limitations defense where, although the motorist may have been induced by the city attorney to delay filing, she was in no way misled, nor did the city attorney conceal facts to the motorist's detriment. Archuleta v. City of Rawlins, 942 P.2d 404, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1997).

Applied in

Shubert v. Dexter, 891 P.2d 55, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1995); Boyer-Gladden v. Hill, 2010 WY 12, 224 P.3d 21, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Feb. 9, 2010).

Quoted in

Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Lafferty v. Nickel, 663 P.2d 168, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1983); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1990); Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (2004); Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Jul 16, 2014).

Stated in

Nobles v. Mem'l Hosp. of Laramie County, 2013 WY 66, 301 P.3d 517, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (May 28, 2013).

Construction with other statutes.—

Although a claimant might have up to three years to file a complaint under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-113 and 1-39-114 (2017) of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, these provisions do not extend shorter statutes of limitations. The plain language of § 1-39-114 , prohibiting its use to extend shorter statutes of limitations, compels us to apply the statute of limitations at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 . Wyo. Guardianship Corp. v. Wyo. State Hosp., 2018 WY 114, 428 P.3d 424, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2018).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Death action against municipal corporation as subject to statute of limitations governing wrongful death actions or that governing actions against a municipality for injury to person or property, 53 ALR2d 1068.

Waiver of, or estoppel to rely upon, contractual limitation of time for bringing action against municipality or other political subdivision, 81 ALR2d 1039.

Local government tort liability: minority as affecting notice of claim requirement, 58 ALR4th 402.

§ 1-39-115. Settlement of claims.

  1. Upon receipt of a claim against the state  which is covered by insurance, the general services division of the  department of administration and information shall send the claim  to the insurance company insuring the risk involved for investigation,  adjustment, settlement and payment.
  2. A claim shall be settled only if the damage  claimed was caused by such negligence on the part of the state or  its public employees as might entitle the claimant to a judgment.
  3. Any person whose claim is rejected or  who is unsatisfied with the settlement offered may commence an action  in the appropriate court.
  4. Claims under this act which are not covered  by insurance may be settled as provided by W.S. 1-41-106 or 1-42-204 .

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1; 1981, ch. 142, § 1; 1986, ch. 74, § 2; 1988, ch. 45, § 1; 1991, ch. 29, § 3; 1997, ch. 178, § 1; 2007, ch. 212, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (d) substituted “1-42-204” for “1-42-107” at the end of the sentence.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 4, effective June 30, 1988, repealed subsections (a), (b) and (d).

Laws 1988, ch. 6, § 2, repealed Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 4.

Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 4, was also amended by Laws 1988, ch. 19, § 1, so as to repeal subsections (a), (b) and (d), effective June 30, 1990. This provision was not given effect due to the repeal of Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 4 by Laws 1988, ch. 6, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Applicability. —

Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 3, states: “This act shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

Notice requirement applies only to claims against state. —

The notice requirement in subsection (a) applies only to claims against the state, and not to local entities. Eathorne v. Bd. of Trustees, 2001 WY 36, 21 P.3d 745, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2001).

Claims identified as separate for insurance purposes treated as separate for settlement purposes. —

The settlement of a claim against a governmental employee was not a settlement of another claim against another employee involved in the same transaction or occurrence. These two claims had been identified as separate and different by the state under subsection (a). Consequently, the settlement of the first claim did not bar the assertion of the second claim pursuant to § 1-39-116(b). State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 578 (Wyo. 1985).

Writ of mandamus. —

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue a writ of mandamus where the notice of the employee's claim sought payments denied under the State Employees' and Officials' Group Plan (Group Plan), the risk manager's duty was not clear and certain, and had the risk manager investigated the claim as required she likely would have denied it on the ground that the employee had not exhausted the Group Plan appeals process. State ex rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, 201 P.3d 1127, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2009).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Estoppel as to claim against municipality, 1 ALR2d 338.

Contributory negligence as defense in action by municipality, 1 ALR2d 827.

Power of city as to compromise of claim, 15 ALR2d 1359.

Liability of state or municipality in tort for damages arising out of sale of intoxicating liquor by state or municipally operated liquor store or establishment, 95 ALR3d 1243.

Validity, as against claim under 42 USCS § 1983, of accused's release-dismissal agreement, under which release of civil claims, against public officials or entities, growing out of criminal charges, is given to obtain relief from those charges — Post-Newton Cases, 139 ALR Fed 1.

§ 1-39-116. Exclusiveness of remedy.

  1. The remedy against a governmental entity  as provided by this act is exclusive, and no other claim, civil action  or proceeding for damages, by reason of the same transaction or occurrence  which was the subject matter of the original claim, civil action or  proceeding may be brought against the governmental entity. No rights  of a governmental entity to contribution, indemnity or subrogation  shall be impaired by this section. Nothing in this section prohibits  any proceedings for mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, injunction  or quo warranto.
  2. The judgment in an action or a settlement  under this act constitutes a complete bar to any action by the claimant,  by reason of the same transaction or occurrence which was the subject  matter of the original suit or claim, against the governmental entity  or the public employee whose negligence gave rise to the claim.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Action against school district governed by chapter. —

While § 21-3-129 allows an action against a school district to the extent of its liability insurance, such an action must be brought pursuant to the procedures outlined in this chapter. Dye ex rel. Dye v. Fremont County Sch. Dist. No. 24, Dye v. Fremont County Sch. Dist., 820 P.2d 982, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1991).

Action between two governmental entities involving state educational funding. —

The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is not applicable to an action between two governmental entities when the relief sought is a declaration of rights and liabilities of the governmental entitles under statutes affecting state educational funding and for the recovery of monies that should have been distributed in the past. Board of County Comm'rs v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d 946, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1994).

Claims identified as separate for insurance purposes treated as separate for settlement purposes. —

The settlement of a claim against a governmental employee was not a settlement of another claim against another employee involved in the same transaction or occurrence. These two claims had been identified as separate and different by the state under § 1-39-115(a). Consequently, the settlement of the first claim did not bar the assertion of the second claim pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 578 (Wyo. 1985).

Quoted in

Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

Stated in

Dee v. Laramie County, 666 P.2d 957, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1983).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

§ 1-39-117. Jurisdiction; appeals; venue; trial by jury; liability insurance.

  1. Original and exclusive jurisdiction for  any claim filed in state court under this act shall be in the district  courts of Wyoming. Appeals may be taken as provided by law.
  2. Venue for any claim against the state  or its public employees pursuant to this act shall be in the county  in which the public employee resides or the cause of action arose  or in Laramie county. Venue for all other claims pursuant to this  act shall be in the county in which the defendant resides or in which  the principal office of the governmental entity is located.
  3. The right to a trial by jury is preserved.
  4. If a governmental entity has elected to  purchase liability insurance under this act, the court, in a trial  without a jury, may be advised of the insurance.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1; 1987, ch. 93, § 1; 2011, ch. 129, § 101.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in (a), inserted “filed in state court.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Section unconstitutional. —

This section, which purports to confine exclusive original jurisdiction for any claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act to the district courts of Wyoming is unconstitutional to the extent that it limits supplemental jurisdiction of a federal district court over tort claims against school districts, counties, and municipalities, and other lesser governmental entities. Scott v. School Dist. No. 6, 815 F. Supp. 424, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2899 (D. Wyo. 1993).

Court without jurisdiction to declare government's printing of money unconstitutional. —

The Governmental Claims Act did not confer jurisdiction upon a district court to declare that the United States government's printing of paper money was unconstitutional and that, therefore, a worker's compensation claimant was entitled to be paid in gold or silver. Further, such a claim was frivolous and there was no reasonable cause for the appeal from its dismissal, justifying an award, under Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P., of a fee of $100 as part of the costs. Skurdal v. State, 708 P.2d 1241, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 601 (Wyo. 1985).

Venue.—

Energy company’s bond forfeiture complaint under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act against the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission and the Wyoming Office of State Lands and Investments was properly dismissed because the complaint was filed in the wrong venue, as the cause of action did not arise in the county in which the complaint was filed.Black Diamond Energy of Del., Inc. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 2020 WY 45, 460 P.3d 740, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2020).

Subject matter jurisdiction. —

Litigant's failure to allege compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements does not and cannot affect a court's subject matter jurisdiction to act; pursuant to the constitution and this section, the district courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide actions brought against governmental entities, whether or not compliance is alleged, if a notice of claim complying with the constitutional and statutory requirements has been presented. District courts also have jurisdiction to allow the amendment of a complaint to allege presentation of a notice of claim complying with the statute and constitution when such a notice was in fact timely presented; to the extent that Board of Trustees of UW v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1983), and its progeny held otherwise, those decisions are overruled. .

When plaintiff injured motorist filed suit against defendant city after his vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by a police officer, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under this section to determine whether plaintiff complied with the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 and Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 for filing suit against a governmental entity. Upon presentation of proof that plaintiff had complied with those provisions by providing a notice of claim to the city, the district court also had subject matter jurisdiction to allow him to amend his complaint to so allege. Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Quoted in

Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985); Wooster v. Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2005 WY 47, 109 P.3d 893, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (2005).

Cited in

Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1995); Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Jul 16, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

§ 1-39-118. Maximum liability; insurance authorized.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of  this section, in any action under this act, the liability of the governmental  entity, including a public employee while acting within the scope  of his duties, shall not exceed:
    1. The sum of two hundred fifty thousand  dollars ($250,000.00) to any claimant for any number of claims arising  out of a single transaction or occurrence; or
    2. The sum of five hundred thousand dollars  ($500,000.00) for all claims of all claimants arising out of a single  transaction or occurrence.
  2. A governmental entity is authorized to  purchase liability insurance coverage covering any acts or risks including  all or any portion of the risks provided under this act. Purchase  of liability insurance coverage shall extend the governmental entity’s  liability as follows:
    1. If a governmental entity has insurance  coverage either exceeding the limits of liability as stated in this  section or covering liability which is not authorized by this act,  the governmental entity’s liability is extended to the coverage;
    2. Notwithstanding paragraph (i) of this  subsection, if a governmental entity acquires coverage in an amount  greater than the limits specified in this section for the purpose  of protecting itself against potential losses under a federal law  and if the purpose of the coverage is stated as a part of or by an  amendment to the insurance policy, the increased limits shall be applicable  only to claims brought under the federal law.
  3. In addition to the procurement of insurance  under subsection (b) of this section a local governmental entity may:
    1. Establish a self-insurance fund against  the liability of the governmental entity and its officers and employees;
    2. Join with other governmental entities,  by joint powers agreements under W.S. 16-1-102 through 16-1-108 , or otherwise, to pool funds and establish a self-insurance  fund or jointly purchase insurance coverage. Pooled funds may be deposited  with the state treasurer for disbursement as participating governmental  entities direct or may be deposited as provided by the terms of the  joint powers agreement;
    3. Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 142, § 2.
    4. Pay the judgment or settlement, with interest  thereon, in not to exceed ten (10) annual installments in cases of  undue hardship and levy not to exceed one (1) mill per year on the  assessed value of the governmental entity for such purpose;
    5. Enter into contracts with the general  services division of the department of administration and information  for the payment of assessments by the local government in such amounts  as determined by the division to be sufficient, on an actuarially  sound basis, to cover:
      1. The potential liability, or any portion  of potential liability, of the local government and its public employees  as provided by this act;
      2. Costs of administration;
      3. Payment by the division of claims against  the local government and its public employees acting within the scope  of their duties which have been settled or reduced to final judgment.
  4. No judgment against a governmental entity  shall include an award for exemplary or punitive damages, for interest  prior to judgments or for attorney’s fees.
  5. Except as hereafter provided, no judgment  authorized by this act may be enforced by execution or attachment  of property of a governmental entity but shall be paid only as authorized  by this section and W.S. 1-39-113 . A judgment authorized by this act may be enforced by  execution or attachment of the property of a governmental entity to  the extent coverage of the liability has not been obtained under subsection  (b) or (c) of this section or W.S. 1-39-115 unless the judgment is otherwise satisfied by the governmental  entity.
  6. The liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 may include liability for property damage in an amount  less than five hundred dollars ($500.00) in cases in which no personal  injury or death resulted, but only under the following conditions:
    1. A property damage claim may be paid at  the discretion of the governmental entity:
      1. In the case of the state, the director  of the department of administration and information or an employee  designated in writing by the director shall decide whether the claim  will be paid;
      2. In the case of a local governmental entity,  the local governmental entity shall appoint an official who shall  decide whether the claim will be paid.
    2. The decision of whether the property damage  claim will be paid shall be based on finding that:
      1. The act was performed by an employee of  the state or the local governmental entity;
      2. The act occurred while the employee was  acting within the scope of his employment duties;
      3. The employee acted negligently by breaching  a duty or by failing to act like a reasonable person; and
      4. The negligent act proximately caused the  property damage at issue.
    3. Property damage claims against the state  shall be paid from the self-insurance account created by W.S. 1-41-103 except that claims against the department of transportation  may be paid from nonrestricted highway funds. Property damage claims  against a local governmental entity shall be paid only to the extent  the local governing body has appropriated monies for that purpose.  There is no obligation on the state legislature or the local governing  body to make any appropriation for payment of property damage claims;
    4. If the director of the department of administration  and information or the local government official determines there  may be insufficient monies to pay all of the claims made during the  year, then the director or official may delay paying the claims until  close of the year at which time available monies shall be prorated  among those entitled to payment at an amount less than one hundred  percent (100%);
    5. The decisions of the director of the department  of administration and information or of the local government official  are final and are not subject to administrative or judicial review.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1; 1981, ch. 142, §§ 1, 2; 1986, ch. 81, § 2; ch. 89, § 2; 1988, ch. 45, § 1; 1989, ch. 110, § 1; 1991, ch. 29, § 3; ch. 241, § 3; 1997, ch. 178, § 1.

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the local government self-insurance program, see § 1-42-201 et seq.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Sufficient pleading for motion to dismiss purposes.—

Client specifically alleged that the insurance coverage exception applied and the public defenders claimed information beyond the face of the amended complaint established the absence of liability insurance; however, such information could not be considered by the district court on a motion to dismiss, where the only question was whether the client pleaded the insurance coverage exception, which he did here. Dockter v. Lozano, 2020 WY 119, 472 P.3d 362, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2020).

Scope of state immunity. —

This state retains immunity from tort actions for the state in any amount not covered by insurance unless the state's permission to sue has been granted. Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1980).

General immunity afforded by this chapter does not apply when a governmental agency has purchased insurance coverage for the liability which is the subject of suit. Helm v. Board of County Comm'rs, 989 P.2d 1273, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1999).

Because an insurance policy did not cover claims for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the purchase of such did not waive a school district's immunity in a case arising from an employment dispute. Metz v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2007 WY 166, 173 P.3d 334, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 2007).

District court erred in denying a hospital’s summary judgment motion because waived its immunity to ostensible agency claims under the insurance exception inasmuch as the coverage in the insurance policy at issue did no more than provide coverage for the hospital’s liability under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and, therefore, did not extend the hospital’s liability to include liability for its apparent agents. Mem'l Hosp. of Sweetwater Cty. v. Menapace, 2017 WY 131, 404 P.3d 1179, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2017).

Immunity not waived. —

Participation by local governments in a pool fund pursuant to subsection (c)(ii) is not the purchase of liability insurance coverage and, therefore, no waiver of governmental immunity results. City of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1991).

Exception to governmental immunity based on insurance coverage was applicable to claims arising from the death of a student passenger on a district bus since design of the bus route and stop locations and negligent instructions to student-pedestrians exiting the bus constituted use of the covered bus. Sperry v. Fremont County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13910 (D. Wyo. 2015).

Trial court properly granted a school district and a teacher summary judgment in a student's action to recover for injuries he sustained during a science demonstration conducted in a school gymnasium because the student's claims did not fall within the waiver of governmental immunity for operation or maintenance of a building or recreation are; the school district did not obtain insurance coverage that would extend its liability beyond the provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 353 P.3d 732, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2015).

Prejudgment interest on arbitration awards against governmental entities is not available. Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. v. Strube Constr. Co., 715 P.2d 540, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1986).

Applied in

Cranston v. Weston County Weed & Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1992); Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1992).

Quoted in

Pickle v. Board of County Comm'rs, 764 P.2d 262, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1988).

Stated in

Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 697 P.2d 606, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Daley v. Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, 30 P.3d 547, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Interest on claim against a governmental unit in absence of provision in contract or express statutory provision, 24 ALR2d 928.

Liability or indemnity insurance carried by governmental unit as affecting immunity from tort liability, 68 ALR2d 1437.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance limiting the kinds or amount of actual damages recoverable in tort action against governmental unit, 43 ALR4th 19.

Payment of attorneys' services in defending action brought against officials individually as within power or obligation of public body, 47 ALR5th 553.

§ 1-39-119. Application of provisions.

The provisions of this act shall not affect any provision of law, regulation or agreement governing employer-employee relationships.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 157, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Severability. —

Section 4, ch. 157, Laws 1979, reads: “If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.”

Tort claims arising out of employment relationship not excepted. —

This section does not serve to except claims which have their genesis in tort even though they arise out of an employment relationship. Board of Trustees v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1983), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Nor are contract claims. —

A claim for damages against the state for breach of the employment relationship based either in contract or tort must proceed, if at all, in accordance with the Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-101 et seq. Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1996), reh'g denied, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. Oct. 29, 1996), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Because an insurance policy did not cover claims for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the purchase of such did not waive a school district's immunity in a case arising from an employment dispute. Metz v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2007 WY 166, 173 P.3d 334, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 2007).

Applied in

Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Eathorne v. Bd. of Trustees, 2001 WY 36, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 47 , 21 P.3d 745 (Wyo. 2001).

§ 1-39-120. Exclusions from waiver of immunity.

  1. The liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-106 through 1-39-112 does not include liability for damages caused by:
    1. A defect in the plan or design of any  bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking  area;
    2. The failure to construct or reconstruct  any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or  parking area; or
    3. The maintenance, including maintenance  to compensate for weather conditions, of any bridge, culvert, highway,  roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
  2. Notwithstanding the waiver of immunity  for tort liability provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 or the waiver of  immunity in actions based on contract provided by W.S. 1-39-104 , a governmental  entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties  are immune from a civil action in tort, contract or otherwise alleging,  in whole or in part, the improper seizure of property pursuant to W.S. 35-7-1049 .

History. Laws 1986, ch. 89, § 1; 1991, ch. 34, § 1; 2016, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2016 amendment , effective July 1, 2016, added (b).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Laws 2016, ch. 1, § 2 state as follows: “This act shall apply to seizures of property which occur on or after July 1, 2016 and to any forfeitures proceedings related to property seized on or after July 1, 2016.”

Section constitutional. —

This section bears a reasonable relation to the legitimate legislative objectives of conserving public funds and preserving a fair and viable system of compensating persons injured by governmental actions. There is no constitutional infirmity. White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1989).

Where a new prison policy prohibited prisoners from keeping certain personal property items in their cells, an inmate sued the Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC) and claimed he had been denied equal protection of the law because the legislature did not include the DOC and the Wyoming State Penitentiary within the waiver of the rule of immunity; the Supreme Court of Wyoming rejected his claim, because the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act does not differentiate between inmates and non-inmates. The inmate's claim was subject to rational scrutiny; since the inmate sought tens of millions of dollars in compensation for more than a thousand separate pieces of property, excluding such losses from the beneficent purposes of the WGCA was rational and withstood the equal protection provisions of both the United States and the Wyoming constitutions. Cosco v. Lampert, 2010 WY 52, 229 P.3d 962, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 910, 131 S. Ct. 1798, 179 L. Ed. 2d 666, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2478 (U.S. 2011).

Waiver of immunity limited. —

The waiver of immunity in § 1-39-106 is limited by this section. Newberry v. Board of County Comm'rs, 919 P.2d 141, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1996).

Trestle is a “bridge.” —

A trestle on the railroad right-of-way is a bridge for purposes of the application of this section. Newberry v. Board of County Comm'rs, 919 P.2d 141, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1996).

There is no bar to liability for operation of a motor vehicle, even if the motor vehicle is engaged in plowing snow on a roadway. Romero v. Hoppal, 855 P.2d 366, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1993).

State liable for negligent operation of motor vehicles. —

The legislature's subsequent amendment in 1991 of subsection (a)(iii) demonstrates it always intended the state not have immunity for accidents resulting from the negligent operation of motor vehicles, including snowplows. The word “maintenance” in subsection (a)(iii) is a noun and not a verb; it means that the maintenance is not the act of maintaining, but rather the result of any said act. Romero v. Hoppal, 855 P.2d 366, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1993).

No immunity for maintenance. —

Subsection (a)(iii), as it was in effect at the time of an accident, did not bar suit when the collision occurred while snowplow was in the process of maintaining a roadway to compensate for weather conditions. The word “maintenance” in subsection (a)(iii) is a noun and not a verb; it means that the maintenance is not the act of maintaining, but rather the result of any said act. Romero v. Hoppal, 855 P.2d 366, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1993).

Improper drainage system, causing damage, authorizes claim. —

Where a plaintiff's property suffered damage in 1985, prior to the repeal of § 1-39-111 , as a result of the state's failure to properly construct or maintain a drainage system under a state highway, his claim was authorized by that section, and the court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1990), overruled, Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2004).

Operation of public utilities. —

City did not provide a public service for which governmental immunity had been waived by § 1-39-108 when it provided a marked street crossing given the specific exclusion set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-120(a). Archer v. State ex rel. Wyo. DOT, 2018 WY 28, 413 P.3d 142, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2018).

Ramps or concourses at war memorial stadium are not “sidewalks.” Rather, they are an integral part of the recreation area itself. DiVenere v. University of Wyoming, 811 P.2d 273, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1991).

Cited in

Shisler v. Town of Jackson, 890 P.2d 555, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1995); Fugle v. Sublette Cnty. Sch. Dist. #9, 2015 WY 98, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (July 31, 2015).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Governmental tort liability as to highway median barriers, 58 ALR4th 559.

Governmental tort liability for injury to roller skater allegedly caused by sidewalk or street defects, 58 ALR4th 1197.

Reviewability before trial of order denying qualified immunity to defendant sued in state court under 42 USCS § 1983, 49 ALR5th 717.

Appealability, under collateral order doctrine, of order denying qualified immunity in 42 USC § 1983 or Bivens action for damages where claim for equitable relief is also pending — post-Harlow cases, 105 ALR Fed 851.

§ 1-39-121. Granting immunity for year 2000 computer date failures. [Repealed]

History. Laws 1999, ch. 157, § 1; 2010, ch. 27, § 2; Repealed by Laws 2017, ch. 41, § 2.

Chapter 40 Crime Victims Compensation

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Victim Compensation and Restitution: Legislative Alternatives,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 681 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile's offense, 66 ALR4th 985.

81A C.J.S. States § 195.

Article 1. In General

Cross references. —

As to victim bill of rights, see § 14-6-502 .

§ 1-40-101. Short title.

This act [§§ 1-40-101 through 1-40-119 ] is known and may be cited as the “Crime Victims Compensation Act”.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1.

Cited in

Jones v. State, 2002 WY 35, 41 P.3d 1247, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 1-40-102. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act [§§ 1-40-101 through 1-40-119 ]:
    1. “Account” means the crime victims’ compensation  account established by W.S. 1-40-114 ;
    2. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 81, § 3.
    3. “Criminal act” means an act committed  or attempted in this state, including an act of domestic violence,  which constitutes a crime as defined by the laws of this state or  an act of terrorism, as defined by 18 U.S.C. 2331 committed outside the United States, and which results  in actual bodily injury, or actual mental harm, or death to the victim.  No act involving the operation of a motor vehicle, boat or aircraft  which results in injury or death constitutes a crime for the purpose  of this act unless the injury or death was recklessly or intentionally  inflicted through the use of the vehicle, boat or aircraft, or unless  the act constitutes a violation of W.S. 31-5-233 ;
    4. “Dependent” means any relative of the  victim who was wholly or partially dependent upon the victim’s income  at the time of his injury or death and includes the child of the victim  born after his death;
    5. “Economic loss” means and includes medical  and hospital expenses, loss of earnings, loss of future earnings resulting  from the injury, funeral and burial expenses and loss of support to  the dependents of the victim to include home maintenance and child  care;
    6. “Medical expense” includes the cost of  all medical and dental services, mental health counseling and care,  dental and prosthetic devices, eyeglasses or other corrective lenses,  and services rendered in accordance with any method of healing recognized  by the law of this state;
    7. “Personal injury” means actual bodily  injury or actual mental harm;
    8. “Relative of the victim” means his spouse,  parent, grandparent, stepparent, child including natural born child,  stepchild or adopted child, grandchild, brother or sister;
    9. “Victim” means:
      1. A person who suffers personal injury or  is killed in this state as a direct result of:
        1. A criminal act of another person;
        2. The person’s good faith and reasonable  effort in attempting to prevent the commission of a criminal act,  or to apprehend a person engaging in a criminal act or assisting a  law enforcement officer to do so;
        3. Assisting or attempting to assist a person  against whom a crime is being perpetrated or attempted;
        4. A federal crime occurring in Wyoming.
      2. A resident who is a victim of a crime  occurring outside this state if:
        1. The crime would be compensable had it  occurred inside this state; and
        2. The crime occurred in a state which does  not have a crime victim compensation program, for which the victim  is eligible as eligibility is set forth in W.S. 1-40-101 through 1-40-119 .
      3. A resident of this state who is injured  or killed by an act of terrorism, as defined by 18 U.S.C. 2331, committed outside the United States;
      4. Family members who are Wyoming residents  and who have suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of a terrorist  attack in the United States, regardless of the actual victim’s residency;
      5. A resident of this state who is a victim  of a crime involving terrorism occurring outside this state if:
        1. The crime would be compensable had it  occurred within this state; and
        2. The resident of this state suffered a  pecuniary loss as a direct result of the act of terrorism committed  in another state of the United States.
    10. “Division” means the victim services division  within the office of the attorney general, created by W.S. 9-1-636 ;
    11. “Catastrophic injury” means any permanent  disability of limbs or functions as a result of being a victim of  a crime;
    12. “Clandestine laboratory operation remediation”  means a remediation of a clandestine laboratory operation carried  out by a law enforcement agency acting as an emergency responder pursuant  to W.S. 35-9-152(a)(i).

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1987, ch. 119, § 1; 1989, ch. 233, § 1; 1997, ch. 122, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, §§ 2, 3; 1999, ch. 135, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 71, § 1; 2008, ch. 78, § 1.

The 2008 amendment, inserted (a)(xii).

Laws 2008, ch. 78, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 12, 2008.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-40-103. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 81, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1, related to the Wyoming Crime Victims' Compensation Commission.

§ 1-40-104. Division powers and duties.

  1. The division shall:
    1. Hear and determine all matters relating  to claims for compensation;
    2. Publish annually a report showing its  fiscal transactions for the preceding year, the amount of its accumulated  cash and securities and a balance sheet showing its financial condition  by means of an actuarial evaluation of commission assets and liabilities;
    3. Keep a true and accurate record of all  its proceedings, which record is open to public inspection at all  reasonable hours;
    4. Promulgate reasonable rules and regulations  necessary to carry out the purpose of this act pursuant to the Wyoming  Administrative Procedure Act;
    5. Perform any other functions necessary  to carry out the purpose of this act;
    6. Hearings and final decisions on victim’s  compensations awards conducted by the division shall be exempt from  the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, including the provisions  for judicial review under W.S. 16-3-114 and 16-3-115 .
  2. In addition to any other powers specified  by law, the division is empowered to:
    1. Request access to any reports of investigations,  medical records or other data necessary to assist the division in  making a determination of eligibility for compensation under this  act. Upon authorization of the attorney general, law enforcement officials,  state agencies and local government units shall provide assistance  or information requested by the division;
    2. Publicize the availability of compensation  and information regarding the filing of claims;
    3. Investigate claims;
    4. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 81, § 3.
    5. Subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance,  require the production of records and other evidence, administer oaths  or affirmations, conduct hearings and receive relevant evidence;
    6. Apply for and accept and administer monies  from the federal government, its agencies and all other sources, public  and private, for carrying out any of its functions;
    7. Collect, develop, analyze and maintain  statistical information, records and reports as the division determines  relevant or necessary to carry out its powers and duties pursuant  to this act;
    8. After exhausting all alternatives available  in paragraphs (i), (iii), (v) and (vi) of this subsection, direct  and pay for medical examinations of victims as the division determines  necessary to verify claims of economic loss due to injury;
    9. Collect all monies authorized by this  act to be collected by the division; and
    10. Pay all compensation or other benefits  that are determined to be due under this act and under division rules  and regulations.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 81, § 3.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1987, ch. 119, § 1; 1993, ch. 43, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, §§ 2, 3.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

§ 1-40-105. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 81, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1, related to the Victims' Compensation Commission receiving legal advice from the attorney general.

§ 1-40-106. Eligibility for compensation.

  1. The victim or his dependent is entitled  to compensation under this act [§§ 1-40-101 through 1-40-119 ] if:
    1. The victim suffered personal injury as  a result of a criminal act;
    2. Repealed by Laws 1989, ch. 233, § 2.
    3. The injury to or death of the victim was  not attributable to his own wrongful act;
    4. The appropriate law enforcement authorities  were notified of the criminal act allegedly causing the injury to  or death of the victim as soon as practical under the circumstance  after perpetration of the offense and the claimant cooperates with  appropriate law enforcement authorities with respect to the crime  for which compensation is sought;
    5. The application for compensation is filed  with the division within one (1) year after the date of the injury  to or death of the victim, or within any extension of time the division  allows for good cause shown; and
    6. The owner of real estate has paid all  claims for reimbursement pursuant to W.S. 35-9-158(a)(ii).
  2. No victim or dependent shall be denied  compensation solely because:
    1. He is a relative of the offender or was  living with the offender as a family or household member at the time  of the injury or death. However, the division may award compensation  to a victim or dependent who is a relative, family or household member  of the offender only if the division can reasonably determine the  offender will receive no economic benefit or unjust enrichment from  the compensation;
    2. He is not a resident of the state.
  3. Any person who perpetrates any criminal  act on the person of another or who is convicted of a felony after  applying to the division for compensation is not eligible or entitled  to receive compensation under this act.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1989, ch. 233, §§ 1, 2; 1998, ch. 81, § 2; 2008, ch. 78, § 1.

The 2008 amendment, inserted (a)(vi) and made related stylistic changes.

Laws 2008, ch. 78, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 12, 2008.

Applicability. —

In a drunk driving case, the sentencing court did not err when it ordered that restitution be paid to an injured passenger in addition to the amount paid to the crime victims compensation fund. Jones v. State, 2002 WY 35, 41 P.3d 1247, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 1-40-107. Application for compensation; required information.

  1. The application for compensation shall  be on a form furnished by the division, setting forth:
    1. The victim’s name and address;
    2. If the victim is deceased, the claimant’s  name and address and his relationship to the victim, the names and  addresses of the victim’s dependents and the extent to which each  is dependent;
    3. The date and nature of the criminal act  on which claim for compensation is based;
    4. The date and place where and the law enforcement  officials to whom notification of the criminal act was given;
    5. The nature and extent of the injuries  the victim sustained and the names and addresses of those giving medical  and hospitalization treatment to the victim;
    6. The economic loss to the applicant and  to all other persons as specified under paragraph (a)(ii) of this  section resulting from the injury or death;
    7. The amount and source of benefits, payments  or awards, if any, payable to the applicant and dependents;
    8. Releases authorizing the surrender to  the division of all reports, medical records and other information  relating to the claim and crime; and
    9. Any other information the division reasonably  requires.
  2. The division may require that materials  substantiating the facts stated in the application be submitted with  the application. If the division finds that an application does not  contain the required information or that the facts stated therein  have not been substantiated, it shall notify the applicant in writing  of the specific additional items or information or materials required  and that the applicant has thirty (30) days from the date of the notice  in which to furnish those items to the division. The division shall  reject the application of an applicant who although notified fails  to file the requested information or substantiating materials within  the time specified unless he requests, and the division grants, an  extension of time in which to furnish that information.
  3. An applicant may file an amended application  or additional substantiating materials to correct inadvertent errors  or omissions at any time before the division disposes of the original  application. In either case, the filing of additional information  or of an amended application shall be considered to have been filed  at the same time as the original application.
  4. Information contained in the claim files  and records of victims, which are subject to any privilege of confidentiality  under Wyoming law, shall remain confidential and shall not be open  to public inspection. The information shall be immune from legal process  and shall not, without the consent of the person furnishing the information,  be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any action, suit  or other judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2; 1999, ch. 135, § 1.

§ 1-40-108. Hearing; findings; order.

  1. Hearings shall be held on the application  and are open to the public unless the division determines that a closed  hearing is necessary because:
    1. The alleged assailant or offender has  not been brought to trial and a public hearing would adversely affect  either his apprehension or his trial;
    2. The victim or alleged assailant is a minor;
    3. An open hearing would cause trauma for  the victim;
    4. A public hearing would frustrate rather  than further the interest of justice.
  2. A record shall be kept of the proceedings  of hearings held before the division and shall include the division’s  findings of fact and conclusions of the amount of compensation, if  any, to which the applicant and persons dependent on a deceased victim  are entitled. No part of the record of any hearing before the division  may be used for any purpose in a criminal proceeding except in the  prosecution of a person alleged to have perjured himself in his testimony  before the division.
  3. At the conclusion of the hearing, the  division shall enter an order stating:
    1. Its findings of fact;
    2. Its decision as to whether or not compensation  is due under this act [§§ 1-40-101 through 1-40-119 ] and the amount of compensation due, if any;
    3. Whether disbursement of the compensation  awarded is to be made in a lump sum or in periodic payments; and
    4. The person or persons to whom the compensation  should be paid.
  4. If the division finds, in the case of  an application made by a person dependent for his support on a deceased  victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent  on that victim for their support, it shall also:
    1. Name those persons in its order;
    2. State the percentage share of the total  compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled;  and
    3. Order that those amounts be paid to those  persons directly or, in the case of a minor or incompetent, to his  guardian or conservator, as the case may be.
  5. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this  section, the division may promulgate rules providing for an expedited  claims process for applications in which eligibility is clear and  all information has been verified.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1989, ch. 233, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Restitutional sentencing under Victim and Witness Protection Act § 5 (18 USC §§ 3579 , 3580 [now see 18 USC §§ 3663 , 3664]), 79 ALR Fed 724.

§ 1-40-109. Standards for compensation.

  1. For the purpose of determining the amount  of compensation payable pursuant to this act, the division, insofar  as practicable, shall formulate standards for uniform application  of this act and shall take into consideration rates and amounts of  compensation payable for injuries and death under other laws of this  state and of the United States and the availability of funds under  this act.
  2. Loss of earnings and loss of future earnings  shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings  for the six (6) months immediately preceding the date of the injury,  or the current federal minimum wage, whichever is less.
  3. Loss of support shall be determined on  the basis of the victim’s or defendant’s average monthly earnings  for the six (6) months immediately preceding the date of the injury,  or the current federal minimum wage, whichever is less.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, the maximum individual award of compensation paid to any victim or dependent shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00). Compensation shall only be awarded for economic losses occurring within a twenty-four (24) month period from the date of the injury or discovery of the crime. However, the division may extend the twenty-four (24) month period to allow compensation for mental health counseling and care occurring within an additional twelve (12) month period for a total of thirty-six (36) months.
  5. In addition to the maximum award authorized in subsection (d) of this section, in the case of catastrophic injury the division may award an additional amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) to the victim to cover future lost wages, special medical needs and any other special assistance needed as a result of the injury. The additional award may be made only for economic losses occurring within twenty-four (24) months after the date of the injury or discovery of the crime.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2; 1999, ch. 135, § 1; 2019, ch. 11, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in (d) added “Compensation shall only be awarded for economic losses occurring within a twenty-four (24) month period from the date of the injury or discovery of the crime. However, the division may extend the twenty-four (24) month period to allow compensation for mental health counseling and care occurring within an additional twelve (12) month period for a total of thirty-six (36) months”; and in (e), substituted “economic losses” for “losses and expenses” and added “or discovery of the crime” to the last sentence.

§ 1-40-110. Compensation award.

  1. If a person is injured or killed by a  criminal act, the division may order the payment of compensation in  accordance with this act for:
    1. Expenses actually and reasonably incurred  as a result of the personal injury or death of the victim, by the  victim, his dependent, or any person responsible for the victim’s  maintenance;
    2. Loss of earning power as a result of the  victim’s total or partial incapacity;
    3. Economic loss to the deceased victim’s  dependents; and
    4. Any other loss resulting from the personal  injury or death of the victim which the division determines to be  reasonable.
  2. In determining whether to award compensation  under this act, the division shall consider:
    1. All circumstances surrounding the victim’s  conduct determined to be relevant which directly contributed to the  victim’s injury or death;
    2. Need for financial aid; and
    3. Any other relevant matters.
  3. The division shall not consider whether  the alleged assailant has been apprehended, prosecuted or convicted,  nor the result of any criminal proceedings against him.
  4. The crime victims compensation account  is not a state health program and is not intended to be used as a  primary payor to other health care assistance programs, but is a public,  quasi-charitable fund whose fundamental purpose is to assist victims  of violent crimes through a period of financial hardship as a payor  of last resort. Payment made in accordance with this section shall  be considered payment of last resort that follows all other sources  and is provided subsequent to all other benefits. Accordingly, in  determining the amount of compensation to be allowed by order, the  division shall consider amounts received or receivable from any other  source or sources by the victim or his dependents as a result of the  incident or offense giving rise to the application. The division shall  not deny compensation solely because the applicant is entitled to  income from a collateral source.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2; 1999, ch. 135, § 1.

§ 1-40-111. Emergency awards; limitation.

  1. The division may grant an emergency award  prior to the holding of a hearing, if upon application of a person  eligible for compensation, the division determines undue hardship  will result to the applicant if immediate payment is not made.
  2. The amount of the emergency award shall  be dependent on the applicant’s immediate and verifiable needs as  a result of loss of income or support, for emergency medical treatment,  or for funeral and burial expenses. The amount of an emergency award  to an applicant shall not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
  3. Any emergency award granted under this  section shall be deducted from the final compensation award made to  the applicant. The excess of the amount of any emergency award over  the amount of the final award, or the full amount of the emergency  award if no final award is made shall be repaid to the division by  the applicant.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2.

§ 1-40-112. Recovery from offender; restitution.

  1. If an order for the payment of compensation  for personal injury or death is made under this act [§§ 1-40-101 through 1-40-119 ], the state, upon payment of the amount of the order,  shall be subrogated to any right of action the victim or dependent  of the victim has against the person or persons responsible for the  injury or death, and the state may bring an action against the responsible  person for the amount of the damages the applicant sustained.
  2. The applicant or other recipient shall  give written notice to the division of the making of a claim or demand  or the filing of a suit for the damages specified in subsection (a)  of this section.
  3. Restitution by an offender under W.S. 7-9-101 through 7-9-115 shall:
    1. To the extent compensation is paid under  this act, be paid to the division, deposited in the account and be  set off against a judgment in favor of the state in a civil action  arising out of the same facts or event;
    2. Reduce by like amount any compensation  subsequently paid under this act arising out of the same facts or  event.
  4. through (f) Repealed  by Laws 1997, ch. 152, § 2.
  5. Any payment of benefits to, or on behalf  of, a victim or other claimant under this act creates a debt due and  owing to the state by any person found, in a criminal court proceeding  in which he is a party, to have committed the criminal act. Payment  of the debt shall be a condition of probation or parole:
    1. In making payment of the debt a condition  of probation or parole, the court or state board of parole shall set  the schedule or amounts of payments, subject to modification based  on change of circumstances;
    2. If the court or board does not order payment  of the debt, or orders only partial payment, it shall state on the  record the reasons therefor.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1987, ch. 119, § 1; ch. 157, § 2; 1997, ch. 152, § 2; 1998, ch. 81, § 2; 2013, ch. 32, § 1.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, substituted “7-9-115” for “7-9-112” in (c).

Cross references. —

As to probation and parole generally, see § 7-13-401 et seq.

As to disposition of earnings paid to prisoners, see §§ 7-16-205 and 7-16-308 .

As to record and disbursement of wages, see § 7-18-114 .

Quoted in

Jones v. State, 2002 WY 35, 41 P.3d 1247, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity, construction, and application of “Son of Sam” laws regulating or prohibiting distribution of crime-related book, film or comparable revenues to criminals, 60 ALR4th 1210.

§ 1-40-113. Waivers and releases void; exemption from creditors' claims.

Any agreement by an individual to waive, release or commute his rights under this act [§§ 1-40-101 through 1-40-119 ] is void. Compensation due under this act may not be assigned, pledged, encumbered, released or commuted. Compensation under this act is exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution and attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt, except that compensation for an allowable expense is not exempt from a claim of a creditor to the extent that creditor provided products, services or accommodations, the costs of which are included in the compensation award.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1.

§ 1-40-114. Crime victims' compensation account.

  1. There is established an account to be  known as the crime victims’ compensation account. The account is under  the administration and control of the division for purposes of providing  compensation or other benefits to crime victims and for purposes of  implementing this act. The account shall consist of all monies the  division receives or collects from any source and all monies shall  be paid to the state treasurer for deposit in the account. The division  may accept, and shall deposit to the account, any gifts, contributions,  donations, grants or federal funds specifically given to the division  for the benefit of victims of crime.
  2. The monies within the account may be withdrawn  therefrom by vouchers signed by the director of the division or his  designee. The division shall keep detailed permanent records of all  monies credited to the account and all expenditures and disbursements  from the account.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1987, ch. 119, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2; 2005, ch. 231, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, deleted the phrase “within the earmarked revenue fund” in the first sentence in (a).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

Cross references. —

For provisions relating to disbursal of unclaimed funds, see § 1-40-308 .

Cited in

Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1990).

§ 1-40-115. Informing victims of program and application procedure.

Each law enforcement and prosecuting agency, and any victim witness program or family violence advocate funded in whole or in part with state or federal funds, shall exercise reasonable care to insure that victims of crimes are informed of the existence of the state program of compensation for death or injuries sustained by victims of crime and the procedure for applying for compensation under this act.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1999, ch. 135, § 1.

§ 1-40-116. Fees not chargeable.

No fee shall be charged to the applicant in any proceeding under this act except as provided by this act. If the applicant is represented by counsel in making application under this act or in any further proceedings provided for in this chapter, the counsel shall not receive payment for his services except an amount as the division determines to be reasonable.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2.

§ 1-40-117. Falsifying, destroying or concealment of division records; furnishing false information or failing to disclose; other violations.

  1. Any agent or employee of the division  who knowingly makes a false entry or falsely alters any division record,  or who intentionally destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes or otherwise  impairs the verity or availability of any division record with the  knowledge of a lack of authority to do so, or who possesses a division  record and refuses to deliver up that record upon proper request of  a person lawfully entitled to receive it is guilty of a misdemeanor.
  2. Any violation of this chapter for which  a penalty is not otherwise provided is a misdemeanor.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to penalties for misdemeanors, see § 6-10-103 .

§ 1-40-118. Distribution of monies to crime victim service and victim assistance providers.

  1. In addition to any other powers specified  in this act the division shall oversee the distribution of federal  and state funds under its control, to eligible crime victim service  providers, including funds received under the federal Victims of Crime  Act of 1984.
  2. For purposes of this section “crime victim  service provider” means any program operated by a public agency or  nonprofit organization or any combination thereof which provides comprehensive  services to victims of crime, including but not limited to:
    1. Crisis intervention services;
    2. Informing victims and witnesses of the  case status and progress;
    3. Assistance in participating in criminal  justice proceedings;
    4. Performing advocate duties for crime victims;
    5. Assisting victims in recovering property  damaged or stolen and in obtaining restitution or compensation for  medical and other expenses incurred as a result of crime;
    6. Developing community resources to assist  victims of crime;
    7. Assisting victims of crime in the preparation  and presentation of claims under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.
  3. In establishing priorities the division  shall follow requirements regarding prioritization that are established  by the funding authority.
  4. The division shall by rule establish a  method for distributing monies to crime victim service providers.  The division’s rules and regulations shall reflect the following factors  in determining the distribution formula: population, needs assessment,  regional cost differences and any requirements promulgated by the  granting source.
    1. through (iii) Repealed  by Laws 1998, ch. 81, § 3.
  5. In determining whether a victim service  provider is eligible to receive grants under subsection (d) of this  section, the primary consideration shall be whether the eligibility  requirements of the granting source are met, including the provider’s  agreement to submit an annual unduplicated count of the number of  victims it served in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated  by the division.
    1. and (ii) Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 81, § 3.
  6. Funds distributed under this section shall  supplement, not supplant, existing victim or witness programs throughout  the state.
  7. To the extent the legislature provides  funding for victim assistance providers that serve victims of all  crimes, the division of victim services shall:
    1. Distribute the state funding provided  for victim assistance providers as follows:
      1. No less than two percent (2%) of the total  amount of state funding shall be distributed to each county and the  Wind River Indian Reservation for victim assistance providers within  the county or within the Wind River Indian Reservation that meet the  requirements established by the division of victim services;
      2. Of the remaining state funding under this  subsection, amounts shall be distributed to the victim assistance  providers within the counties and the Wind River Indian Reservation  on a proportional basis according to each county’s and the reservation’s  population. For purposes of the distribution under this subparagraph,  the population residing on the Wind River Indian Reservation shall  be determined separate from the balance of the population of Fremont  county;
      3. If funds have been returned to the division  pursuant to unfulfilled contracts under this subsection at the end  of the fiscal year, prior to reversion pursuant to W.S. 9-2-1008 , 9-2-1012(e) and 9-4-207(a), a law enforcement agency that has carried out a clandestine  laboratory operation remediation may apply for compensation under  this subsection for any remediation expenses not otherwise collected  pursuant to W.S. 35-9-158(a). The maximum amount payable pursuant to this subsection  to a law enforcement agency that has carried out a clandestine laboratory  operation remediation shall be the amount set forth in the court approved  expense report as provided under W.S. 35-9-158(a) minus amounts collected from other sources pursuant to W.S. 35-9-158(a).
    2. Require victim assistance providers to:
      1. Provide the services specified under subsection  (a) of this section;
      2. Advocate to ensure victims are allowed  to exercise their rights under the victims bill of rights established  in W.S. 1-40-203 ;
      3. Submit their long-term strategic plans  to the division of victim services for approval.
    3. Establish minimum program standards and  uniform reporting procedures for victim assistance providers that  receive state funding under this subsection through rules and regulations  adopted in accordance with W.S. 9-1-638(a)(vii).

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1989, ch. 233, § 1; 1991, ch. 159, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, §§ 2, 3; 2005, ch. 203, § 1; 2008, ch. 78, § 1; 2009, ch. 170, § 1; ch. 194, § 1; 2012, ch. 31, § 1.

The 2005 amendment added (g).

Laws 2005, ch. 203, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2005, except for paragraph (g)(iii), which becomes effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2005.

The 2008 amendment, inserted (g)(i)(C).

Laws 2008, ch. 78, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 12, 2008.

The 2009 amendments. — The first 2009 amendment by ch. 170, § 1, effective July 1, 2009, deleted “as established in the most recent federal decennial census” following “reservation's population” in the first sentence of (g)(i)(B).

The second 2009 amendment, by ch. 194, § 1, added “including the provider's agreement to submit an annual unduplicated count of the number of victims served in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the division” in (e).

Laws 2009, ch. 194, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 12, 2009.

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

The 2012 amendment, added “it” after “number of victims” in (e).

Laws 2012, ch. 31, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 8, 2012.

Victims of Crime Act of 1984. —

The federal Victims of Crime Act of 1984, referred to in subsection (a), appears as 42 U.S.C. § 10601 et seq.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2009, ch 170, § 3 provides: “(a) No authority to issue any license based upon population shall be diminished by application of this act until the 2010 federal decennial census has been conducted and officially released by the bureau of census.

“(b) No distribution of funding shall be diminished or increased based upon application of this act until the 2010 federal decennial census has been conducted and officially released by the bureau of census. To the extent any entity's share of funding would be reduced or increased by application of this act before that time, the distribution of funds shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of law prior to the amendment or repeal of such law by this act.”

Appropriations. —

Laws 2005, ch. 203, § 2, appropriates $500,000 from the general fund to the victim services division within the office of the attorney general for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2005, to implement the purposes of the act. Of this general fund appropriation, funds are not to be distributed to crime victim service providers in the district attorneys' offices in the first and seventh judicial districts although nothing in the act is meant to prohibit the district attorneys for those judicial districts from seeking funding for crime victim services through the state budget process or other appropriate means.

§ 1-40-119. Surcharge to be assessed in certain criminal cases; paid to account.

  1. In addition to any fine or other penalty  prescribed by law, a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere  to, or is convicted of, the following criminal offenses shall be assessed  a surcharge of not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more  than three hundred dollars ($300.00) for the offenses specified in  paragraph (v) of this subsection, not less than one hundred fifty  dollars ($150.00) nor more than three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00)  for the first plea to or conviction of offenses specified in paragraphs  (i) through (iv) of this subsection, and not less than two hundred  dollars ($200.00) nor more than four hundred dollars ($400.00) for  each subsequent plea to or conviction of offenses specified in paragraphs  (i) through (iv) of this subsection:
    1. Any violation of W.S. 6-1-101 through 6-2-313 and 6-2-319 through 6-10-203 ;
    2. Any violation of W.S. 31-5-225 , 31-5-229 , 31-5-233 or 41-13-220(a);
    3. Any violation of W.S. 35-7-1001 through 35-7-1057 ;
    4. Any violation of W.S. 6-2-314 through 6-2-318 ;
    5. Any violation of a municipal ordinance  which has substantially similar elements to the criminal offenses  specified in paragraphs (ii) through (iv) of this subsection or any  other violation of a municipal ordinance which causes actual damage  to persons or property.
  2. The surcharge enumerated in subsection  (a) of this section shall be imposed upon any defendant for whom prosecution,  trial or sentence is deferred under W.S. 7-13-301 and 7-13-302 or who participates in any other diversion agreement.
  3. Under no circumstances shall a court fail  to impose the surcharge required by subsections (a) and (b) of this  section if the court determines the defendant has an ability to pay  or that a reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have  an ability to pay.
  4. The surcharge shall be paid within ten  (10) days of imposition unless the court determines that it shall  be paid in installments over a reasonable period of time. Failure  to comply with the provisions for payment of the surcharge is punishable  as contempt of court. Contempt proceedings or other proceedings to  collect the surcharge may be initiated by the prosecuting attorney,  by the court on its own motion or by the division.
  5. Monies paid to the court by a defendant  shall be applied to the surcharge before being applied to any fine,  penalty, cost or assessment imposed upon the defendant. The proceeds  from the surcharge imposed by this section shall be remitted promptly  by the clerk of the court to the division for deposit in the account.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1987, ch. 154, § 1; 1991, ch. 155, § 1; ch. 159, § 1; ch. 167, § 2; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2; 1999, ch. 136, § 1; 2007, ch. 135, § 1; ch. 159, § 2; 2008, ch. 49, § 1; 2020, ch. 87, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to disposition of earnings paid to prisoners, see §§ 7-16-205 and 7-16-308 .

As to record and disbursement of wages, see § 7-18-114 .

The 2007 amendments. —

The first 2007 amendment, by ch. 135, § 1, effective July 1, 2007, inserted “or 41-13-220(a)” in (a)(ii), and made related changes.

The second 2007 amendment, by ch. 159, § 2, effective July 1, 2007, substituted “6-2-314 through 6-2-319 ” for “14-3-104 or 14-3-105 ” in (a)(iv).

While neither amendment gave affect to the other, both have been set out above.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, in introductory language of (a), substituted “one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than three hundred dollars ($300.00)” for “fifty dollars ($50.00),” substituted “one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) nor more than three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00)” for “one hundred dollars ($100.00),” added “, and not less than two hundred dollars ($200.00) nor more than four hundred dollars ($400.00) for each subsequent plea to or conviction of offenses specified in paragraphs (i) through (iv) of this subsection,” and made stylistic changes; in (d), added “or by the division” at the end, and made a related change.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a)(i) substituted “violation of W.S. 6-1-101 through 6-2-313 and 6-2-319 through 6-10-203 ” for “crime enumerated in W.S. 6-1-101 through 6-10-203 .”

Duty of court. —

This section imposes a mandatory duty on trial court to order payment of surcharge. Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2000).

When assessed. —

A criminal defendant's sentence was not illegal merely because he was not present when the crime victim's surcharge was assessed against him pursuant to this section. Brown v. State, 929 P.2d 522, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1996).

No maximum amount. —

While paragraph (a)(i) of this section requires a court to impose a minimum crime victim's surcharge, this section places no limit on the maximum surcharge that the court can require. Bird v. State, 939 P.2d 735, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1997).

A surcharge of $150 upon defendant's convictions for kidnapping and rape was not illegal as being in excess of the amount prescribed by this section. Bird v. State, 939 P.2d 735, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1997).

Unlawful to extend payment beyond 10 days. —

Where the district court determined that the defendant could not pay more than $50 within the 10-day period, and required the balance of the surcharge ($1,450) to be thereafter paid according to an executive agency plan, this constituted an unlawful imposition and statutorily unauthorized surplusage. Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1991) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).

The portion of a sentence extending the time for payment of the surcharge beyond the 10-day period specified in subsection (d) after entry of judgment is an unlawful imposition and a statutorily unauthorized surplusage. Hamburg v. State, 820 P.2d 523, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. Dec. 4, 1991) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).

Ability to pay. —

A trial court must make a finding with regard to the criminal defendant's ability to pay before ordering him to pay a victim's compensation surcharge. Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1997).

Surcharge not forgiven for failure to pay. —

The plain language of this section directs that a surcharge will not be forgiven or vacated simply because a defendant did not pay it within the 10-day period. Johnson v. State, 914 P.2d 810, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1996).

Restitution. —

A trial court's order that convicted arsonists pay an additional $1,500 victims' compensation surcharge was simply an alternative way of ordering the arsonists to pay restitution for the victims' loss of enjoyment of life. Such awards are improper. Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1997).

Applied in

Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1993).

Quoted in

Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1992).

For article, “A Comprehensive Treatise on Contempt of Court in Wyoming,” see 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 1 (2015).

Article 2. Victim and Witness Bill of Rights

§ 1-40-201. Short title.

This act may be cited as the “victims bill of rights”.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “[t]his act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-40-202(a)(v).

Cited in

Gabriel v. State, 925 P.2d 234, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1996); Thompson v. State, 2014 WY 89, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 97 , 2014 WL 3400960 (Jul 14, 2014).

§ 1-40-202. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Criminal act” means conduct which would  constitute a crime as defined by the laws of this state;
    2. “Victim” means an individual who has suffered  direct or threatened physical, emotional or financial harm as the  result of the commission of a criminal act or a family member of a  victim who is a minor or an incompetent or a surviving family member  of a homicide victim;
    3. “Witness” means a person who is likely  to testify in a criminal proceeding;
    4. “Key witness” means any witness identified  in writing by the prosecution as being entitled to the rights provided  by this act;
    5. “This act” means W.S. 1-40-201 through 1-40-210 .

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-40-203. Victim and witness bill of rights.

  1. All victims and witnesses of crime shall  be treated with compassion, respect and sensitivity.
  2. Crime victims, key witnesses and, upon  request, other witnesses shall have the following rights:
    1. To be provided notification and information  about events affecting the status of the case. These events shall  include, but are not limited to, the following as specified in W.S. 1-40-204 :
      1. The general status of the case, provided  the release of information does not compromise the investigation or  endanger witnesses;
      2. The scheduled hearings and dispositions  of the case;
      3. The sentencing phase of the case;
      4. The imprisonment or release of the accused  or convicted defendant.
    2. To be provided information about the right  to receive judicially ordered restitution as provided in W.S. 7-9-102 ;
    3. To be provided information about their  rights, privileges and interests under this act as provided in W.S. 1-40-204 ;
    4. To be provided information about compensation  available under the Crime Victims Compensation Act as provided in W.S. 1-40-101 through 1-40-119 ;
    5. To be provided information about services  and assistance available to victims and witnesses as provided in W.S. 1-40-204;
    6. To be provided information about available  legal recourse and other measures if subjected to threats or intimidation  as provided in W.S. 1-40-205 ;
    7. To be provided, at the discretion of the  prosecuting attorney or criminal justice personnel, reasonable protection  and safety immediately before, during and after criminal justice proceedings;
    8. To be provided with the names, official  telephone numbers and official addresses of the primary law enforcement  officer and prosecutor assigned to investigate the case;
    9. To attend and participate in criminal  justice system proceedings as provided in W.S. 1-40-206 ;
    10. To have the accused brought to trial as  provided in W.S. 1-40-207 . Nothing in this paragraph shall inhibit the ability  of counsel for the state and the defendant from entering into any  negotiated disposition of any charge or charges which have been levied  against the accused;
    11. To prompt return of property seized as  evidence as provided in W.S. 1-40-208 ;
    12. To be protected from discharge or discipline  by an employer due to involvement with the criminal justice process  as provided in W.S. 1-40-209 ;
    13. To be notified about the defendant’s conviction  as provided in W.S. 7-21-102(a);
    14. To be notified about the victim’s opportunity  to make a victim impact statement for use in the preparation of a  presentence investigation report concerning the defendant as provided  in W.S. 7-21-102(a)(iii);
    15. To be provided with the address and telephone  number of each probation office which is to prepare the presentence  investigation as provided in W.S. 7-21-102(a)(iv);
    16. To be notified that the presentence investigation  report and any statement of the victim in the report will be made  available to the defendant as provided in W.S. 7-21-102(a)(v);
    17. To be notified about the opportunity to  make an impact statement at sentencing as provided in W.S. 7-21-102(a); and
    18. To be notified of the time and place of  the sentencing proceeding and any changes thereof as provided in W.S. 7-21-102(a)(vii).
  3. Courts shall enforce crime victim and  witness rights under this act to the extent the recognition of those  rights do not conflict with constitutional and statutory rights of  the defendant.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2; 2004, ch. 130, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (b)(ii), substituted “W.S. 7-9-102 ” for “W.S. 7-9-107 ”; in (b)(xiii) substituted “W.S. 7-21-102(a)” for “W.S. 7-21-102(a)(ii)”; and in (b)(xvii) substituted “W.S. 7-21-102(a)” for “W.S. 7-21-102(a)(vii).”

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-40-202(a)(v).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Due Process. —

Abuse of Discretion. —

Due Process. —

There was no due process violation when a district court recessed sentencing proceedings for less than 24 hours to attend to a dental emergency because the district court relied upon accurate information presented by the people who made statements and defendant had an opportunity to respond to all information presented. Thompson v. State, 2014 WY 89, 330 P.3d 804, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2014).

Abuse of Discretion. —

District court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing defendant, a high school teacher who was convicted of having had improper sexual relations with three students, because the fact that two of defendant's victims testified on defendant's behalf did not qualify their testimony as more credible, or warrant special status more so than the victim that did not testify. Thompson v. State, 2014 WY 89, 330 P.3d 804, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2014).

§ 1-40-204. Rights of victims and witnesses to be informed during the criminal justice process.

  1. Victims of a criminal act shall be informed  without undue delay by law enforcement about:
    1. The rights enumerated in this act;
    2. The right to be informed of the status  of the case from the initial police investigation to the final appellate  review;
    3. The fact that financial assistance or  other social service options may be available to the victim;
    4. The existence of the Crime Victims Compensation  Act and that compensation may be available to the victim;
    5. The right to have an interpreter or translator  to inform the victim of these rights;
    6. The name and official telephone number  of the primary law enforcement officer assigned to investigate the  case together with the official address and telephone number of the  criminal justice agency investigating the case;
    7. The right to seek legal counsel and to  employ an attorney.
  2. Victims and key witnesses of a criminal  act shall be informed in writing by the prosecuting attorney about:
    1. Subject to order of the court, the right  to attend all hearings and proceedings involving the case, including  the right to be notified, upon request, of the date, time and place  of those hearings;
    2. The right to be notified in advance, if  reasonable, when a court proceeding has been rescheduled or canceled;
    3. The right to be advised of the potential  for plea negotiations and, prior to sentencing, the right to be informed  of the existence of a negotiated plea, the essentials of the agreement,  and the reasons for the disposition;
    4. The right to know the accused has obtained  a pretrial or presentence release;
    5. The right to discuss the case with the  prosecutor, and the official address and official telephone number  of the prosecutor;
    6. The availability of other remedies, including  the right to proceed in civil litigation generally and the right to  any profits attributable to the offender as a result of publication  or media coverage resulting from the crime;
    7. The fact that the attorneys involved and  their investigators are advocates either for the state or for the  defendant;
    8. The right to refuse to talk to attorneys,  private investigators, law enforcement, or anyone else unless on the  witness stand or under subpoena;
    9. If known to the prosecutor, the schedule  of any post sentence hearings affecting the probation of the offender;
    10. The right to provide an affidavit asserting  acts or threats of physical violence by the accused or at the accused’s  direction against the victim or a relative of the victim, the survivor  or designated key witness;
    11. The right to request notification that  the offender has filed a petition for expungement of the records of  conviction and advance notice of any hearing or proceeding thereon.
  3. Victims, key witnesses, offices of prosecutors,  victim witness coordinators and advocates who have participated in  the criminal prosecution shall be offered the opportunity to be informed  in writing by the department of corrections about:
    1. The commencement of the offender’s imprisonment  to serve the sentence imposed and the name, official address and security  classification of the place of confinement;
    2. The earliest date upon which the offender  could be released and the date released;
    3. Any transfer of the offender to another  facility including the security classification of that facility;
    4. Any placement of the offender in a community correctional program;
    5. Any change in location of the offender’s  parole supervision;
    6. The escape, recapture or death of an offender;
    7. Any reduction or extension of the offender’s  sentence.
  4. Victims, key witnesses, offices of prosecutors,  victim witness coordinators and advocates who have participated in  the criminal prosecution shall be offered the opportunity to be informed  in writing by the board of parole about:
    1. Any decision to grant or modify parole  and any conditions imposed;
    2. Any pending revocation of parole, any  associated return to custody, the revocation hearing date and disposition  of revocation proceedings;
    3. Any absconscion from supervision and subsequent  apprehension;
    4. Any rescission of parole;
    5. Discharge from parole.
  5. The governor’s office shall ensure that  the appropriate government agency shall notify in writing, or in person,  victims, key witnesses, prosecutors, victim witness coordinators and  advocates who have participated in the criminal prosecution of an  application for a pardon or the pending commutation of the offender.
  6. Victims, key witnesses, prosecutors, victim  witness coordinators and advocates who have participated in the criminal  prosecution who wish to receive notification and information shall  provide the appropriate criminal justice agencies with their current  address and telephone number. This address will only be used for notification  purposes.
  7. Nothing in subsections (c) through (e)  of this section shall mean the victim, key witnesses, prosecutors,  victim witness coordinators or advocates who have participated in  the criminal prosecution shall be given information that could jeopardize  the safety or security of any person.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1; 1992, ch. 25, § 3; 1998, ch. 81, § 2; 2005, ch. 24, § 1; 2011, ch. 69, § 2; 2014, ch. 117, § 1.

The 2005 amendment in (c)(ii), added “and the date released”; in (c)(v), substituted “change in location of the offender's parole supervision” for “decision to grant or modify parole and any conditions imposed”; added present (d), which expands on the provisions in former (c)(v), and redesignated former (d) through (f) as present (e) through (g), and updated an internal reference.

Laws 2005, ch. 24, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 17, 2005.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, added (b)(xi).

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, in (c)(iv), substituted “placement of the offender in a community correctional program” for “work release of the offender and the assigned work release site.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-40-202(a)(v).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of accused to have evidence or court proceedings interpreted, because accused or other participant in proceedings is not proficient in the language used, 32 ALR5th 149.

§ 1-40-205. Victims and witnesses of crime; free from intimidation.

  1. A victim or witness has the right to be  free from any form of harassment, intimidation or retribution.
  2. When waiting to testify in any proceeding  regarding a criminal act, a victim or key witness has the right to  be provided, upon request, with a waiting area separate from other  witnesses.
  3. When the threat of harassment, intimidation  or retribution cannot be avoided, the court shall take appropriate  measures to protect the victim or key witness.
  4. Law enforcement officers and prosecuting  attorneys shall provide information regarding law enforcement measures  available to protect victims and key witnesses.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1.

§ 1-40-206. Victims of crime; present in court.

Unless the court for good cause shown shall find to the contrary, the victim, the victim’s designee or both shall have the right to be present at all trial proceedings which may be attended by the defendant.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1.

Illustrative cases. —

The trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to sequester a victim of attempted murder while another attempted victim testified because: (1) the latter was to be the state's first witness, and (2) the former had made a lengthy pretrial statement, which had been supplied to the defense. Gabriel v. State, 925 P.2d 234, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1996).

§ 1-40-207. Victims; timing of trial of accused.

  1. The court shall consider the victim’s  interest and circumstances when setting any date for trial or in granting  or denying continuances.
  2. Nothing in this section shall infringe  upon any rights of the accused in a criminal case or inhibit the ability  of the prosecution and defense from entering into any agreement as  to trial setting or negotiated disposition of any charge or charges  pending against the defendant.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1.

§ 1-40-208. Prompt return of property; photographs in lieu of property.

  1. Victims and witnesses have the right to  have any personal property, which is not contraband, promptly returned  and any real estate, subject to declaration as uninhabitable under W.S. 35-9-156(d), released to the control of the real estate owner, provided  it does not interfere with prosecution, trial or appellate review  of the case.
  2. Criminal justice agencies shall work together to expedite the return of property, which is not contraband, when it is no longer needed. Prosecuting attorneys shall promptly notify law enforcement agencies when evidence is no longer needed. The prosecuting attorney shall notify the attorneys for the defendants of the intention to return the property twenty (20) days prior to its return to enable the defendants to seek relief from the court. No notice is required in the absence of a known suspect or defendant unless otherwise ordered by the court. No later than sixty (60) days after the property is taken as evidence, the prosecuting attorney shall make an initial determination whether to expedite the return of property to the victim or witness. The prosecuting attorney in exercising discretion to expedite the return of property shall consider whether:
    1. Photographs of the property would be admissible as evidence in lieu of the property;
    2. Submitting the photographs into evidence in lieu of the property will substantially prejudice any criminal proceeding;
    3. The property is required for evidentiary analysis; and
    4. Ownership of the property is disputed.
  3. The trial court exercising jurisdiction over a criminal proceeding shall, if requested, enter appropriate orders to preserve the property for evidentiary analysis or use, or return the property to the victim or witness as appropriate.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1; 2008, ch. 78, § 1; 2017, ch. 101, § 1.

The 2008 amendment, inserted “and any real estate, subject to declaration as uninhabitable under W.S. 35-9-156(d), released to the control of the real estate owner” in (a).

Laws 2008, ch. 78, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 12, 2008.

The 2017 amendment , effective July 1, 2017, rewrote (b), which formerly read: “Criminal justice agencies shall work together to expedite the return of property when it is no longer needed. Prosecuting attorneys shall promptly notify law enforcement agencies when evidence is no longer needed”; and in (c), substituted “orders to preserve the property for evidentiary analysis or use, or return the property to the victim or witness as appropriate” for “orders to implement the provisions of this section.”

§ 1-40-209. Victims and witnesses have a right to preservation of employment.

  1. A victim or witness who responds to a  subpoena from either the prosecution or defense in a criminal case  during working hours shall not suffer any change in terms of employment  solely because of the act of responding to a subpoena.
  2. A victim or witness, upon request, shall  be assisted by law enforcement agencies, the prosecuting attorney  or defense attorney in informing an employer that the need for victim  or witness cooperation may necessitate the absence of the victim or  witness from work.
  3. A victim or witness, who as a direct result  of a criminal act or of cooperation with law enforcement agencies,  prosecuting attorney or defense attorney, experiences financial hardship,  shall be assisted by those agencies, the prosecuting attorney or defense  attorney in explaining to employers and creditors the reasons for  that financial hardship.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1.

§ 1-40-210. No civil liability created; testimony inadmissible; no relief by appeal.

  1. Nothing in this act shall be construed  to create any civil cause of action for monetary damages against any  person nor shall it constitute grounds for any claim or motion raised  by either the state or defendant in any proceedings.
  2. Testimony or argument regarding the compliance  or noncompliance with this act is inadmissible in any criminal trial.
  3. The failure of a victim, designee or any  criminal justice agency personnel to exercise or enforce any right  granted by the provisions of this act shall not be grounds for relief  during proceedings or for any appeal of a conviction by a defendant  or grounds for any court to set aside, reverse or remand a criminal  conviction.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 166, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-40-202(a)(v).

Article 3. Compensation from Benefits of Crime

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §§ 1321 to 1330.

24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1759 et seq.

§ 1-40-301. Compensation from benefits of crime.

The legislature finds that the state has a compelling interest in preventing any person who is convicted of a criminal act from profiting from the criminal act and in recompensing victims of the criminal act. It is therefore the intent of the legislature to provide a mechanism whereby any profits from a criminal act that are received by the person convicted of the criminal act are available as restitution to the victims of the criminal act.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 152, § 1.

§ 1-40-302. Definitions.

  1. As used in this article:
    1. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 81, § 3.
    2. “Criminal act” means a conviction of an  offense as defined by W.S. 1-40-202(a)(i);
    3. “Escrow account” means an account created  under W.S. 1-40-303(a);
    4. “Profits from the crime” means:
      1. Any property obtained through or income  generated from the commission of the criminal act of which the defendant  was convicted;
      2. Any property obtained by or income generated  from the sale, conversion or exchange of proceeds of the criminal  act of which the defendant was convicted, including any gain realized  by the sale, conversion or exchange; and
      3. Any property that the defendant obtained  or income generated as a result of having committed the criminal act  of which the defendant was convicted, including any assets obtained  through the use of unique knowledge obtained during the commission  of, or in preparation for the commission of, the criminal act, as  well as any property obtained by or income generated from the sale,  conversion or exchange of such property and any gain realized by such  sale, conversion or exchange.
    5. “Victim” means as defined by W.S. 1-40-202(a)(ii);
    6. “Division” means the victim services division  within the office of the attorney general, created by W.S. 9-1-636 .

History. Laws 1997, ch. 152, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, §§ 2, 3.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 1-40-303. Distribution of profits from crime.

  1. Any person who contracts with a defendant  convicted of a criminal act in this state, or the defendant’s representative  or assignee, for payment of any profits from the criminal act of which  the defendant is convicted shall pay to the division any money that  would otherwise by terms of the contract be paid to the defendant  or the defendant’s representatives or assignees. The division shall  deposit the money in an escrow account for the benefit of any victim  of the criminal act of which the defendant was convicted.
  2. Notwithstanding any other applicable statute  of limitations, any person who is a victim of the criminal act from  which a defendant receives profits under subsection (a) of this section  may, within five (5) years of the establishment of the escrow account:
    1. Enforce any order of restitution entered  against the defendant against the monies on deposit in the escrow  account; or
    2. Bring a civil action in a court of competent  jurisdiction to recover a judgment against the defendant or the defendant’s  representatives or designees and enforce the judgment against monies  on deposit in the escrow account.
  3. Upon establishing an escrow account pursuant  to subsection (a) of this section, the division shall notify, at their  last known address, all known victims of the criminal act of the establishment  of the escrow account. The notice shall specify the existence of the  escrow account, the amount on deposit and the victim’s right to execute  an order of restitution or bring a civil action to recover against  the monies in the escrow account within five (5) years of the date  the escrow account is established.
  4. The attorney general is authorized to  bring any action necessary to enforce subsection (a) of this section.  If the attorney general prevails in an action under this subsection,  the court shall order the payment from the monies recovered to the  attorney general of reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 152, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2.

§ 1-40-304. Notification of division.

It shall be the responsibility of the victim, the victim’s attorney, or the victim’s representative to notify the division of the filing of any civil action under W.S. 1-40-303(b)(ii).

History. Laws 1997, ch. 152, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2.

§ 1-40-305. Disbursal of compensation; more than one claim.

  1. The division shall not disburse any compensation  from the escrow account until the later of:
    1. Five (5) years after the escrow account  is established; or
    2. The date all civil actions of which the  division has actual knowledge and that are filed within the five (5)  year period provided by W.S. 1-40-303(b)(ii) have been settled or reduced to judgment.
  2. If more than one (1) claim against the  monies in escrow is filed pursuant to W.S. 1-40-303(b)(i) or (ii), the division shall disburse payments from the  escrow account on a pro rata basis.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 152, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2.

§ 1-40-306. Actions null and void.

Any action taken by a defendant who is convicted of a criminal act or who enters a plea of guilty, whether by way of the execution of a power of attorney, the creation of corporate entities or any other action, to defeat the purpose of this article shall be null and void as against the public policy of this state.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 152, § 1.

§ 1-40-307. Interest on monies in escrow account.

Interest earned on the monies deposited in an escrow account shall accrue to the benefit of the payees of the account.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 152, § 1.

§ 1-40-308. Disbursal of unclaimed funds.

  1. Any unclaimed funds remaining in an escrow  account after the disbursal period provided by W.S. 1-40-305(a) shall be forfeited and paid over to the crime victims  compensation account created by W.S. 1-40-114 in accordance with this section.
  2. If any unclaimed funds remain in an escrow  account after the disbursal period provided by W.S. 1-40-305(a), the division shall seek an order in district court to  show cause why the funds should not be forfeited. Notice to the defendant  and proceedings on the order to show cause shall be according to the  Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, provided notice by publication shall  be once each week for two (2) consecutive weeks. The trial of the  issues shall be by the court.
  3. On final hearing the order to show cause  shall be taken as prima facie evidence that the funds constitute profits  from the crime and is sufficient for a judgment of forfeiture in the  absence of other proof.
  4. In disputed cases the burden shall be  upon the division to show that there is a reasonable basis for believing  that the funds constitute profits from the crime.
  5. The proceedings and judgment of forfeiture  shall be in rem and shall be primarily against the property itself.
  6. Upon the entry of a judgment of forfeiture  the court shall order the funds paid over to the crime victims compensation  account created by W.S. 1-40-114 .

History. Laws 1997, ch. 152, § 1; 1998, ch. 81, § 2.

Chapter 41 State Self-Insurance Program

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 4, effective June 30, 1988, repealed this chapter.

Laws 1988, ch. 6, § 2, repealed Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 4.

Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 4, was also amended by Laws 1988, ch. 19, § 1, so as to repeal this chapter effective June 30, 1990. This provision was not given effect due to the repeal of Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 4 by Laws 1988, ch. 6, § 2.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability § 1 et seq.

81A C.J.S. States § 299.

§ 1-41-101. Legislative findings and intent.

The legislature recognizes that certain liability insurance policies of the state of Wyoming have been cancelled, that no responsive bids have been received and that there exists a need to develop a method to handle claims brought under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act [§ 1-39-101 et seq.] and arising under federal law. The legislature declares that the appropriate remedy is to create an account for self-insurance of the state and to provide for a loss prevention program. It is the intent of the legislature that the self-insurance account shall be operated on an actuarially sound basis. The legislature further declares that its intent is that the availability of commercial liability insurance coverage shall be explored considering the possibility that the insurance industry can provide coverage in the future that is less expensive than the costs of providing a loss prevention program and paying for claims out of the self-insurance account.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1.

Applied in

State Ex Rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, 201 P.3d 1127, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Feb. 24, 2009).

Quoted in

W.A.R.M. v. Bonds, 866 P.2d 1291, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1994).

§ 1-41-102. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Division” means the general services  division of the department of administration and information;
    2. “Final money judgment” means any judgment  for monetary damages after all appropriate appeals from the judgment  have been exhausted or after the time has expired when appeals may  be taken;
    3. “Local government” means as defined by W.S. 1-39-103(a)(ii);
    4. “Peace officer” means as defined by W.S. 7-2-101 , but does not include those officers defined by W.S. 7-2-101 (a)(iv)(K) or those officers defined by W.S. 7-2-101(a)(iv)(M) unless otherwise provided in the applicable mutual aid  agreement;
    5. “Public employee” means any officer, employee  or servant of the state, provided the term:
      1. Includes elected or appointed officials,  peace officers, members of regional emergency response teams authorized  under W.S. 35-9-155 and persons acting on behalf or in service of the state  in any official capacity, whether with or without compensation, including  volunteer physicians providing medical services under W.S. 9-2-103(a)(i)(C);
      2. Does not include:
        1. An independent contractor except as provided  in subparagraphs (C) and (D) of this paragraph;
        2. A judicial officer exercising the authority  vested in him; or
        3. Any local government employees or officials  including county and prosecuting attorneys.
      3. Includes contract physicians, physician  assistants, nurses, optometrists or dentists in the course of providing  contract services for state institutions;
      4. Includes contract attorneys in the course of providing contract services for the office of guardian ad litem as provided in W.S. 14-12-104 ;
      5. Includes health care providers and medical facilities delivering volunteer health care services to low income individuals under a contract pursuant to W.S. 35-31-101 through 35-31-103 .
    6. “Risk manager” means the manager of the  risk management section of the general services division of the department  of administration and information;
    7. “Scope of duties” means performing any  duties which the state requests, requires or authorizes a public employee  to perform, or which the University of Wyoming or a local government  requests, requires or authorizes a peace officer to perform, regardless  of the time and place of performance;
    8. “State” or “state agency” means the state  of Wyoming or any of its branches, agencies, departments, boards,  instrumentalities or institutions but does not include the University  of Wyoming except as provided by W.S. 1-41-110(b);
    9. “Self-insurance account” or “account”  means the account created by W.S. 1-41-103 ;
    10. “This act” means W.S. 1-41-101 through 1-41-111 .

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1; 1988, ch. 50, § 1; 1989, ch. 240, § 1; 1991, ch. 29, § 3; 1997, ch. 159, § 1; ch. 178, § 1; 1999, ch. 100, § 1; 2000, ch. 61, § 1; 2003, ch. 53, § 2; 2004, ch. 98, § 2; 2007, ch. 212, § 1, ch. 215, § 1; 2012, ch. 76, § 3; 2018, ch. 95, § 2; 2020, ch. 122, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, in (a)(V)(A), inserted “members of regional emergency response teams authorized under W.S. 35-9-155 ” following “Includes elected or appointed officials, peace officers,” and made related changes.

Laws 2004, ch. 98, § 3 makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 10, 2004.

The 2007 amendments. —

The first 2007 amendment, by ch. 212, § 1, effective July 1, 2007, inserted “physician assistants, nurses, optometrists or dentists” in (a)(v)(C).

The second 2007 amendment, by ch. 215, § 1, substituted “9-2-103(a)(i))(C)” for “9-2-103(a)(iii)” in (a)(v)(A).

While neither amendment gave affect to the other, both have been set out above.

The 2012 amendment, in (a)(v)(B)(I), substituted “subparagraphs” for “subparagraph” and inserted “and (D)”; and added (a)(v)(D).

Laws 2012, ch. 76 § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 13, 2012.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added (a)(v)(E).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a)(v)(D) substituted “office of guardian ad litem” for “state public defenders office” and “W.S. 14-12-104 ” for “W.S. 7-6-103(k) or 14-12-104 .”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2007, ch. 215, § 4, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Cross references. —

As to University of Wyoming, see § 21-17-101 et seq.

Applicability. —

Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 3, states: “This act shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

Quoted in

W.A.R.M. v. Bonds, 866 P.2d 1291, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1994).

§ 1-41-103. Self-insurance account; creation; authorized payments.

  1. There is created the state self-insurance  account. The account shall be in such amount as the legislature determines  to be reasonably sufficient to meet anticipated claims. In addition  to any legislative appropriation, the account shall include all authorized  transfers of monies to the account, all income from investments of  monies in the account and payments by insurance or reinsurance companies.  The account may be divided into subaccounts for purposes of administrative  management. Appropriations to the account shall not lapse at the end  of any fiscal period.
  2. The self-insurance account shall maintain  sufficient reserves for incurred but unpaid claims as well as incurred  but unreported claims.
  3. Expenditures shall be made out of the  self-insurance account for the following claims which have been settled  or reduced to final judgment:
    1. Claims brought against the state or its  public employees under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, provided  any amount up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) paid  for or in defense of each claim involving an automobile, physical  damage, a settlement or adverse judgment shall be reimbursed to the  self-insurance account by the state agency, from its existing budget,  against which the claim is brought or which employs the public employee  against whom the claim is brought;
    2. Claims against the state or its public  employees, or a state judicial officer exercising the authority vested  in him, arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or other federal statutes, which the state has obligated  itself to pay under subsection (e) of this section, provided any amount  up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) paid for or in  defense of each claim resulting in settlement or adverse judgment  shall be reimbursed to the self-insurance account by the state agency,  from its existing budget, against which the claim is brought or which  employs the public employee against whom the claim is brought;
    3. Claims against  a peace officer employed, with or without  compensation, by the Wyoming state board of outfitters  and professional guides, the University of Wyoming or a local government  brought under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, provided:
      1. The act or omission upon which the claim  is based has been determined by a court or jury to be within the peace  officer’s scope of duties;
      2. The indemnification for the judgment shall  not exceed the limits provided by W.S. 1-39-118 ;
      3. Any amount  up to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) paid for or in defense  of each claim shall be paid on a dollar for dollar matching basis  from the account and from the University of Wyoming or the local government  employing the peace officers;
      4. Any amount  up to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) paid for or in defense  of each claim against a peace officer employed by the Wyoming state  board of outfitters and professional guides shall be paid by the board; and
      5. “Peace officer” as used in this paragraph  includes part time and reserve peace officers as defined in W.S. 9-1-701(a)(viii).
    4. Claims against  a peace officer employed, with or without compensation, by the Wyoming state board of outfitters  and professional guides, the University of Wyoming or a local government  arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or other federal statutes, provided:
      1. Any amount up to twenty thousand dollars  ($20,000.00) paid from the account for or in defense of each claim  shall be paid on a dollar for dollar matching basis from the account  and from the University of Wyoming or the local government employing  the peace officer;
      2. Any amount  up to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) paid for or in defense  of each claim against a peace officer employed by the Wyoming state  board of outfitters and professional guides shall be paid by the board;
      3. The conditions  and limitations of subsection (e) of this section apply to all claims  under this paragraph; and
      4. “Peace officer” as used in this paragraph  includes part time and reserve peace officers as defined in W.S. 9-1-701(a)(viii).
    5. Claims against contract physicians, physician  assistants, nurses, optometrists or dentists brought under the Wyoming  Governmental Claims Act or federal law, provided:
      1. The contract physician, physician assistant,  nurse, optometrist or dentist is unable to procure medical malpractice  insurance coverage up to the limits specified in W.S. 1-39-110(b) or 1-39-118 (a) as applicable;
      2. The liability of the state shall not exceed  limits specified in W.S. 1-39-118(a) except as the limitation may be increased by W.S. 1-39-110(b) both reduced by the amount of the contract physician’s,  physician assistant’s, nurse’s, optometrist’s or dentist’s malpractice  insurance coverage applicable to such claim; and
      3. The claim arises from services performed  by the contract physician, physician assistant, nurse, optometrist  or dentist for a state institution.
  4. Expenditures may also be made out of the  self-insurance account for any one (1) or more of the following:
    1. Expenses related to claims under subsection  (c) of this section;
    2. Costs of purchasing services, including  loss prevention, risk and claims control, and legal, actuarial, investigative,  support and adjustment services;
    3. Costs of insurance or reinsurance premiums  consistent with market availability;
    4. Administrative expenses incurred by the  division under this act including the cost of necessary personnel  within the office of the attorney general, as may be mutually agreed  upon by the risk manager and the attorney general, to handle claims  arising under this act.
  5. The state shall defend claims against  its public employees, or a state judicial officer exercising the authority  vested in him, arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or other federal statutes, subject to the following conditions:
    1. The state shall defend and, to the extent  provided by paragraph (v) of this subsection, indemnify any of its  public employees against any claim or demand, whether groundless or  otherwise, arising out of an alleged act or omission occurring in  the scope of duty;
    2. Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 50, § 2.
    3. If any civil action, suit or proceeding  is brought against any public employee of the state which on its face  falls within the provisions of paragraph (i) of this subsection, or  which the public employee asserts to be based in fact upon an alleged  act or omission in the scope of duty, the state shall appear and defend  the public employee under an automatic reservation of right by the  state to reject the claim unless the act or omission is determined  to be within the scope of duty;
    4. Any public employee of the state against  whom a claim within the scope of this subsection is made shall cooperate  fully with the state in the defense of the claim. If the state determines  that the public employee has not cooperated or has otherwise acted  to prejudice defense of the claim, the state may at any time reject  the defense of the claim;
    5. Unless the act or omission upon which  a claim is based is determined by the court or jury to be within the  public employee’s scope of duty, no public funds shall be expended  in payment of the final judgment against the public employee;
    6. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed  to:
      1. Increase the limits of liability under W.S. 1-39-118 for claims brought under the Wyoming Governmental Claims  Act;
      2. Affect the liability of the state itself  or of any of its public employees on any claim arising out of the  same accident or occurrence; or
      3. Waive the protection of the state or its  public employees from liability where immunity has not been specifically  waived.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1; 1988, ch. 6, § 1; ch. 50, §§ 1, 2; 1989, ch. 14, § 1; ch. 240, § 1; 1994, ch. 47, § 1; 1999, ch. 100, § 1; 2005, ch; 2007, ch. 212, § 1; 2010, ch. 82, § 1; 2011, ch. 176, § 1; 2019, ch. 115, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (a), deleted “within the earmarked revenue fund”; and in (c)(iii)(C) and (c)(iv)(A), substituted “account” for “fund.”

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, inserted variants of “physician assistants, nurses, optometrists or dentists” throughout (a).

The 2010 amendment, made stylistic change.

Laws 2010, ch. 82, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 9, 2010.

The 2011 amendment, in the introductory language of (d), added “any one (1) or more of the following”; and in (d)(ii), deleted “and” at the end.

Laws 2011, ch. 176 § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2011.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in the introductory language in (c)(iii) and in (c)(iv), added “with or without compensation” following “employed,” added (c)(iii)(E) and (c)(iv)(D), and made related changes.

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. —

See §§ 1-39-101 , 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-41-102(a)(x).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

Applicability. —

Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 3, states: “This act shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

Federal § 1983 actions against county sheriff. —

This chapter is intended to cover federal § 1983 actions brought against all peace officers in their individual capacity, as defined at § 7-2-101(a)(iv), including county sheriffs. W.A.R.M. v. Bonds, 866 P.2d 1291, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1994).

A federal § 1983 claim against a county sheriff in his or her official capacity is not covered by this chapter because a § 1983 official capacity action against a sheriff is really a § 1983 claim against the county and therefore is not a claim “against a peace officer employed by … a local government arising under 42 USCS 1983,” as is required by subsection (c)(iv). W.A.R.M. v. Bonds, 866 P.2d 1291, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1994).

§ 1-41-104. Investment of funds.

  1. Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 82, § 2.
  2. The state treasurer shall invest any portion  of the funds in the self-insurance account, including reserves, which  the risk manager determines is not needed for immediate use. Investments  shall be made as authorized by W.S. 9-4-715(a), (d) and (e).

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1; 1987, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 1; 1988, ch. 82, § 2; 1996, ch. 112, § 2; 2008, ch. 113, § 2.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, substituted “W.S. 9-4-715(a), (d) and (e)” for “W.S. 9-4-711 ” in (b).

§ 1-41-105. Powers and duties of risk manager.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection  (b) of this section, the risk manager shall:
    1. Administer the self-insurance account;
    2. Implement and administer a loss prevention  program for the purpose of reducing risks, accidents and losses;
    3. Administer, supervise and manage the investigation  and adjustment and settlement of claims covered by this act, including  subrogation and restitution claims filed on behalf of the state self-insurance  account;
    4. Provide legal services for the defense  of claims covered by this act through the attorney general or through  private attorneys approved by the attorney general;
    5. Approve and supervise persons who may  contract with the state to provide services;
    6. Procure insurance, including comprehensive  professional liability coverage for all peace officers, consistent  with market availability;
    7. Prepare a budget based upon economically  and actuarially sound principles, which will maintain a reasonable  and adequate surplus to meet estimated payments for contracts, services,  claims and expenses;
    8. Purchase loss prevention, actuarial and  other professional services as required; and
    9. Adopt rules governing the administration  of the state’s self-insurance account and loss prevention program  and to carry out the purposes of this act.
  2. If the risk manager determines it is economically  feasible he may contract with any private firm or firms to provide  any administrative or other services deemed necessary under this act.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1; 1999, ch. 100, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-41-102(a)(x).

Applied in

State Ex Rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, 201 P.3d 1127, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Feb. 24, 2009).

Quoted in

W.A.R.M. v. Bonds, 866 P.2d 1291, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1994).

§ 1-41-106. Compromise or settlement of claims; authority; primary insurance coverage.

  1. Any claim covered under this act may be  compromised or settled according to the requirements in subsection  (b) of this section. In settling a claim, the risk manager may require  the execution and presentation of those documents required by rule  and regulation including those documents which discharge or hold harmless  the state, local government or public employee of all liability under  the claim.
  2. The following parties are authorized to  make compromises or settlements of claims in the following amounts:
    1. Repealed by Laws 1999, ch. 100, § 2.
    2. The risk manager is authorized to settle  claims for an amount not to exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00);
    3. The risk manager, after consultation with  the attorney general, is authorized to settle claims for an amount  not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00); and
    4. The governor is authorized to settle claims  for any amount if the action arises under federal law. The governor  is authorized to settle claims brought under the Wyoming Governmental  Claims Act for any amount not to exceed the maximum liability limits  under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.
  3. The provisions of the Wyoming Administrative  Procedure Act are not applicable to the payment or settlement of claims.  Any person or party adversely affected in compromising or settling  a claim shall pursue his remedy in district court pursuant to the  Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.
  4. The risk manager and the state have no  liability, and no cause of action exists against either the risk manager  or the state, for failure to settle a claim.
  5. Except with respect to volunteer physicians  providing medical services under W.S. 9-2-103(a)(i)(C), an expenditure may be made out of the state self-insurance  account for settlement or payment of any claim which is covered by  liability insurance only to the extent any other liability insurance  is not sufficient to satisfy the claim. Except with respect to volunteer  physicians providing medical services under W.S. 9-2-103(a)(i)(C), any other liability insurance shall be considered as  the primary coverage. Nothing in this section shall be deemed an increase  in the limits of liability under W.S. 1-39-110 or 1-39-118(a).

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1; 1989, ch. 211, § 1; 1994, ch. 63, § 1; 1997, ch. 159, § 1; 1999, ch. 100, §§ 1, 2; 2007, ch. 215, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (e) substituted “9-2-103(a)(i))(C)” for “9-2-103(a)(iii)” twice.

Laws 2007, ch. 215, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved July 1, 2007.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-41-102(a)(x).

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. —

See §§ 1-39-101 , 1-39-103(a)(viii).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2007, ch. 215, § 4, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Writ of mandamus. —

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue a writ of mandamus where the notice of the employee's claim sought payments denied under the State Employees' and Officials' Group Plan (Group Plan), the risk manager's duty was not clear and certain, and had the risk manager investigated the claim as required she likely would have denied it on the ground that the employee had not exhausted the Group Plan appeals process. State ex rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, 201 P.3d 1127, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2009).

§ 1-41-107. Reports.

  1. The division shall make an annual report  to the governor and the legislature. The report shall include:
    1. The total number of claims filed against  the state and peace officers covered under this act;
    2. The number and amount of claims settled;
    3. The cost of legal fees and adjustors’  fees for the handling of claims;
    4. The number and amount of final judgments  paid;
    5. The number of claims pending and the reserves  set aside for each pending claim;
    6. The types and cost of insurance coverages  procured as authorized under this act.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-41-102(a)(x).

§ 1-41-108. Self-insurance program not subject to insurance laws.

Nothing in this act shall be construed as creating an insurance company nor in any way subjecting the self-insurance account to the laws of the state regulating insurance or insurance companies.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-41-102(a)(x).

§ 1-41-109. Confidential information.

The claim files maintained by the risk manager shall be considered privileged and confidential and shall be for the use of the risk manager and the insurance commissioner only.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to insurance commissioner, see § 26-2-102 .

Redaction of confidential information. —

Prison officials, in complying with an order to produce information concerning their remedial plan to address shortcomings in the prison's internal investigation process, could not redact from investigative reports the non-confidential information concerning the conditions of confinement but were allowed to redact and not publish to the public or inmates confidential materials relating to medical, personnel, and criminal history records, and information which, under a reasonable person standard, was necessary to protect the safety of inmates cooperating in the investigation process. Skinner v. Uphoff, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31945 (D. Wyo. Sept. 27, 2005), aff'd, 175 Fed. Appx. 255, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9237 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2006).

§ 1-41-110. Applicability.

  1. This act applies to claims based upon  acts, errors or omissions occurring on and after October 1, 1985.
  2. This act applies to claims against peace  officers employed by the University of Wyoming but does not apply  to other claims against the University of Wyoming unless the university  notifies the risk manager in writing on or before August 15 that it  elects to be covered by this act for the period beginning July 1 of  the succeeding fiscal year. If the University of Wyoming elects to  be covered by this act, it shall continue the coverage for not less  than three (3) years from the date the coverage begins.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1; 1988, ch. 19, § 2; 1990, ch. 4, § 1; 1999, ch. 100, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to throughout this section, see § 1-41-102(a)(x).

§ 1-41-111. No extension of liability.

Self-insurance provided under this act shall not be considered a purchase of insurance coverage and shall not be deemed an increase of the limits of liability under W.S. 1-39-118(b).

History. Laws 1986, ch. 74, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-41-102(a)(x).

Chapter 42 Local Government Insurance Program

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties and Other Political Subdivisions § 206; 57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability § 1 et seq.

Article 1. Local Government Self-Insurance Program

§ 1-42-101. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

§ 1-42-102. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to definitions.

§ 1-42-103. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to local government insurance account; creation; authorized payments.

§ 1-42-104. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to interfund transfer; repayment to account; investment of funds.

§ 1-42-105. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to creation of policy board; powers and duties of board; powers and duties of risk manager.

§ 1-42-106. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to initial assessments and assessments to repay interfund transfers.

§ 1-42-107. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to claims procedures; compromise or settlement of claims; authority.

§ 1-42-108. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to reports.

§ 1-42-109. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to local government insurance program not subject to insurance laws.

§ 1-42-110. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to confidential information.

§ 1-42-111. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to applicability.

§ 1-42-112. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 168, § 205.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 81, § 1, related to self-insurance not considered a purchase of insurance coverage.

Laws 2009, ch. 168, § 602, makes the act effective July 1, 2009.

§ 1-42-113. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 168, § 205.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1997, ch. 180, § 1, related to proposal to transfer administration of local government self-insurance account, transfer after approval, and effect.

Laws 2009, ch. 168, § 602, makes the act effective July 1, 2009.

Article 2. Local Government Self-Insurance Program — Local Administration

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

100 C.J.S Workmen's Compensation § 354.

§ 1-42-201. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Board” means the local government self-insurance  program joint powers board formed pursuant to this act;
    2. “Eligible senior citizen center” means  a private, nonprofit corporation which is providing the services to  senior citizens under W.S. 18-2-105 in a geographical area which is not otherwise served  by a senior citizen center which participates in the local government  self-insurance program;
    3. “Final judgment” means any judgment for  monetary damages after all appropriate appeals from the judgment have  been exhausted or after the time has expired when appeals may be taken;
    4. “Local government” means as defined by W.S. 1-39-103(a)(ii) and includes eligible senior citizen centers;
    5. “Local government self-insurance program”  or “program” means the program created by this act;
    6. “Public employee” means any officer, employee  or servant of a local government including elected or appointed officials  and persons acting on behalf or in service of the local government  in any official capacity, whether with or without compensation, including  individuals engaged in search and rescue operations under the coordination  of a county sheriff pursuant to W.S. 18-3-609(a)(iii). “Public employee”:
      1. Except as provided in subparagraph (B)  of this paragraph, does not include an independent contractor, peace  officer or a judicial officer exercising the authority vested in him;
      2. Includes contract physicians, physician  assistants, nurses, optometrists and dentists in the course of providing  contract services for county jails.
    7. “Scope of duties” means performing any  duties which a local government requests, requires or authorizes a  public employee to perform, regardless of the time and place of performance;
    8. “This act” means W.S. 1-42-201 through 1-42-206 .

History. Laws 1997, ch. 180, § 1; 2007, ch. 212, § 1; 2008, ch. 44, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a)(vi) substituted ““Public employee”” for “The term” at the end of the paragraph; added (a)(vi)(A) through (a)(vi)(B).

The 2008 amendment, substituted “1-42-206” for “1-42-207” in (a)(viii).

Laws 2008, ch. 44, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 5, 2008.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2008, ch. 44, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Applicability. —

Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 3, states: “This act shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

§ 1-42-202. Local government self-insurance program; creation; authorized payments.

  1. There is created the local government  self-insurance program to provide a mechanism for local governments  to pool resources to handle claims brought against local governments  under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and arising under federal  law. It is the intent of the legislature that the local government  self-insurance program shall be operated by a joint powers board formed  by local governments participating in the program and administered  in accordance with the provisions of this act. The program shall provide  for assessments by participating local governments, which together  with all income from investments of the program and payments by insurance  or reinsurance companies are actuarially sufficient to meet anticipated  claims against participating local governments and all associated  administrative expenses.
  2. Upon approval of the board, expenditures  shall be made by the program for the following claims which have been  settled or reduced to final judgment:
    1. Claims brought against participating local  governments, other than eligible senior citizen centers or their public  employees, other than peace officers, under the Wyoming Governmental  Claims Act;
    2. Claims against participating local governments  or their judicial officers or public employees, other than peace officers,  arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or other federal statutes subject to the provisions of  subsection (e) of this section;
    3. Claims brought against participating eligible  senior citizen centers, including its directors, officers, employees  and volunteers, arising from acts within the scope of their activities  in rendering any service that a senior citizen center may lawfully  render;
    4. Claims against contract physicians, physician  assistants, nurses, optometrists or dentists brought under the Wyoming  Governmental Claims Act or federal law, provided:
      1. The contract physician, physician assistant,  nurse, optometrist or dentist is unable to procure medical malpractice  insurance coverage up to the limits specified in W.S. 1-39-110(b) or 1-39-118(a) as applicable;
      2. The liability of the county shall not  exceed limits specified in W.S. 1-39-118(a) except as the limitation may be increased by W.S. 1-39-110(b) both reduced by the amount of the contract physician’s,  physician assistant’s, nurse’s, optometrist’s or dentist’s malpractice  insurance coverage applicable to such claim; and
      3. The claim arises from the services performed  by the physician, physician assistant, nurse, optometrist or dentist  for a county jail.
  3. Upon approval of the board, expenditures  may also be made from the program for expenses related to claims under  subsection (b) of this section, administrative expenses, insurance  and services procured in accordance with W.S. 1-42-203 .
  4. Claims against participating local governments  and their public employees, or a judicial officer exercising the authority  vested in him, arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or other federal statutes, shall be defended and indemnification  paid subject to the following conditions:
    1. Public employees of participating local  governments, other than peace officers, shall be defended and, to  the extent provided by paragraph (v) of this subsection, indemnified  against any claim or demand, whether groundless or otherwise, arising  out of an alleged act or omission occurring in the scope of duty;
    2. Any civil action, suit or proceeding which  is brought against any public employee which on its face falls within  the provisions of paragraph (i) of this subsection, or which the public  employee, other than peace officers, asserts is based on an alleged  act or omission in the scope of duty, shall be defended under the  program with an automatic reservation of right by the board to reject  the claim unless the act or omission is determined to be within the  scope of duty. Any public employee against whom a claim within the  scope of this subsection is made shall cooperate fully in the defense  of the claim. If the board determines that the public employee has  not cooperated or has otherwise acted to prejudice defense of the  claim, the defense of the claim may be rejected at any time;
    3. Unless the act or omission upon which  a claim is based is determined by the court or jury to be within the  public employee’s scope of duty, no funds shall be expended from the  program in payment of the final judgment against the public employee;
    4. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed  to:
      1. Increase the limits of liability under W.S. 1-39-118 for claims brought under the Wyoming Governmental Claims  Act;
      2. Affect the liability of a participating  local government or of any of its public employees on any claim arising  out of the same accident or occurrence; or
      3. Waive the protection of a local government  or its public employees from liability where immunity has not been  specifically waived.
  5. The program shall be limited in liability  to payment of no more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00)  for any one (1) occurrence plus loss adjustment expenses. Participating  local governments shall be responsible for the amount of any adjudicated  claims and expenses in excess of this amount.
  6. Notwithstanding any other provision of  this act, no expenditure shall be made from the program in any action  to pay any claim or final judgment for exemplary or punitive damages.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 180, § 1; 2007, ch. 212, § 1; 2009, ch. 168, § 204.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added (b)(iv).

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, deleted “Effective upon the transfer of the local government account as provided in W.S. 1-42-113 ,” preceding “there is created” in the first sentence of (a).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-42-201(a)(viii).

Applicability. —

Laws 2007, ch. 212, § 3, states: “This act shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

§ 1-42-203. Self-insurance program board; powers and duties.

  1. The board shall:
    1. Administer the program;
    2. Provide legal services for the defense  of claims covered by this act;
    3. Procure insurance, including reinsurance,  purchase loss prevention, actuarial and other professional services  as required by the board;
    4. Establish assessments as necessary to  operate the program on an actuarially sound basis. Assessments shall  be computed to provide for:
      1. Expenditures authorized under this act;  and
      2. Stabilization charges to develop adequate  reserves.
    5. Apportion and collect assessments from  each participating local government;
    6. Establish deductibles or retentions as  deemed necessary for the efficient operation of the program; and
    7. Adopt rules governing the administration  of the program.
  2. The board may deny a local government  participation in or may terminate a participant from the program for  a failure to pay the assessments required under this act.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 180, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-42-201(a)(viii).

§ 1-42-204. Claims procedures; compromise or settlement of claims; no extension of liability.

  1. Nothing in this act shall be deemed to  obviate the necessity of compliance with W.S. 1-39-113 by any claimant.
  2. Any claim covered under this act may be  compromised or settled according to the rules of the board. The provisions  of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act are not applicable to  the payment or settlement of claims. Any person or party adversely  affected in compromising or settling a claim shall pursue his remedy  in district court pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.  The board has no liability, and no cause of action exists against  the board for failure to settle a claim.
  3. Self insurance provided under this act  shall not be considered a purchase of insurance coverage and shall  not be deemed an increase of the limits of liability under W.S. 1-39-118(b).

History. Laws 1997, ch. 180, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-42-201(a)(viii).

§ 1-42-205. Local government insurance program not subject to insurance laws.

Nothing in this act shall be construed as subjecting the local government insurance account to the laws of the state regulating insurance or insurance companies.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 180, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 1-42-201(a)(viii).

§ 1-42-206. Confidential information.

The claim files maintained by the board shall be considered privileged and confidential and shall be for the use of the board only.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 180, § 1.

§ 1-42-207. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2008, ch. 44, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1997, ch. 180, § 1, related to reports made by the local government self-insurance program board to the governor and the legislature.

Chapter 43 Mediation

Law reviews. —

For article, “Mediation and Wyoming Domestic Relations Cases — Practical Considerations, Ethical Concerns and Proposed Standards of Practice,” see XXVII Land & Water L. Rev. 435 (1992).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Alternative dispute resolution: sanctions for failure to participate in good faith in, or comply with agreement made in, mediation, 43 ALR5th 545.

§ 1-43-101. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Communication” means any item of information  disclosed during the mediation process through files, reports, interviews,  discussions, memoranda, case summaries, notes, work products of the  mediator, or any other item of information disclosed during the mediation,  whether oral or written;
    2. “Mediation” means a process in which an  impartial third person facilitates communication between two (2) or  more parties in conflict to promote reconciliation, settlement, compromise  or understanding;
    3. “Mediator” means an impartial third person  not involved in the conflict, dispute or situation who engages in  mediation;
    4. “Party to the mediation” means a person  who is involved in the conflict, dispute or situation and is rendered  mediation services by a mediator or consults a mediator with a view  to obtaining mediation services;
    5. “Representative of the mediator” means  a person employed by the mediator to assist in the rendition of mediation  services;
    6. “Representative of the party” means a  person having authority to obtain mediation services on behalf of  the party to the mediation or to act on advice rendered by the mediator;
    7. “This act” means W.S. 1-43-101 through 1-43-104 .

History. Laws 1991, ch. 217, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Quoted in

Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, 92 P.3d 298, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (2004).

§ 1-43-102. General rule of confidentiality.

Any communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the mediation process or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 217, § 1.

Quoted in

Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, 92 P.3d 298, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (2004).

§ 1-43-103. General rule of privilege; claiming privilege; exception.

  1. A party to the mediation has a privilege  to refuse to disclose and to prevent all mediation participants from  disclosing confidential communications.
  2. The privilege under this section may be  claimed by a representative of the party or by a party, his guardian  or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased party, or  the successor, trustee or similar representative of a corporation,  association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The  person who was the mediator may claim the privilege but only on behalf  of the party. The mediator’s authority to do so is presumed in the  absence of evidence to the contrary.
  3. There is no privilege under this section  if any one (1) of the following conditions is met:
    1. All the parties involved provide written  consent to disclose;
    2. The communication involves the contemplation  of a future crime or harmful act;
    3. The communication indicates that a minor  child has been or is the suspected victim of child abuse as defined  by local statute;
    4. The communication was otherwise discoverable  prior to the mediation;
    5. One of the parties seeks judicial enforcement  of the mediated agreement.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 217, § 1.

Quoted in

Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, 92 P.3d 298, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (2004).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Testimonial privilege for confidential communications between relatives other than husband and wife — state cases, 62 ALR5th 629.

§ 1-43-104. Immunity.

Mediators are immune from civil liability for any good faith act or omission within the scope of the performance of their power and duties.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 217, § 1.