§ 14-1-101. Age of majority; rights on emancipation.

1. Upon becoming eighteen (18) years of age, an individual reaches the age of majority and as an adult acquires all rights and responsibilities granted or imposed by statute or common law, except as otherwise provided by law.
2. A minor may consent to health care treatment to the same extent as if he were an adult when any one (1) or more of the following circumstances apply:
   1. The minor is or was legally married;
   2. The minor is in the active military service of the United States;
   3. The parents or guardian of the minor cannot with reasonable diligence be located and the minor’s need for health care treatment is sufficiently urgent to require immediate attention;
   4. The minor is living apart from his parents or guardian and is managing his own affairs regardless of his source of income;
   5. The minor is emancipated under W.S. 14-1-201 through 14-1-206 ;
   6. The minor is twelve (12) years of age or older, is a smoker or user of tobacco products and the health care to which the minor consents is a tobacco cessation program approved by the department of health pursuant to W.S. 9-4-1204 .
3. The consent given pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is not subject to disaffirmance because of minority.
4. Any competent adult may enter into a binding contract and shall be legally responsible therefor.
5. A person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age may consent to donate and may donate blood.

History. Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 14-1.1, 16-3; W.S. 1977, §§ 14-1-101 , 16-3-101 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, ch. 26, § 1; 1982, ch. 62, § 1; 1986, ch. 20, § 1; 1989, ch. 207, § 2; 1993, ch. 1, § 1; 2006, ch. 114, § 1; 2009, ch. 198, § 1.

Cross references. —

For constitutional prohibition against local or special laws declaring any person of age, see art. 3, § 27, Wyo. Const.

As to minority being legal disability staying statute of limitations, see § 1-3-114 .

As to ineligibility of person under the age of majority to serve as administrator, see § 2-4-203 .

As to preference for appointment of guardian of minor, see § 3-2-107 .

For definition of “adult,” see § 8-1-102 .

As to minimum marriageable age, see § 20-1-102 .

As to minimum age to register to vote, see § 22-3-102 .

As to exclusion of minors under 18 years of age from definition of “employee” for purposes of minimum wage law, see § 27-4-201 .

As to service of subpoena not being made by any person under the age of 18 years, see Rule 45(b), W.R.C.P.

The 2006 amendment, deleted “or” at the end of (b)(iii).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added “any one (1) or more of the following circumstances apply” at the end of the introductory language of (b); added (b)(vi); and made a minor stylistic change.

Prospective operation. —

Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 4, provides: “This act shall operate prospectively only and shall not apply to existing court decrees, trusts, wills or other written documents.”

Severability. —

Laws 1973, ch. 213, § 5, provides: “If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3 provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Amendment applies prospectively. —

The legislature intended for the change in the age of majority made in 1993 to apply prospectively and not to apply to an existing court decree such as a child support order in a divorce decree; the district court erred in modifying the child support orders to reflect the new age of majority. Thomas v. Thomas, 913 P.2d 854, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1996).

Trial court properly granted a father's request to reduce his child support obligation when his eldest son turned 18-years-old and properly denied the mother's request to apply Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-101 as it existed when the parties were divorced, which would have extended the father's obligation until the children were 19-years-old, as the original divorce decree and settlement agreement did not specify a child support obligation for either parent. Jordan v. Brackin, 2003 WY 151, 79 P.3d 536, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 2003).

Juvenile tried and sentenced as adult. —

Although son answered to criminal charges in district court, he remained a minor until he reached eighteen, the age of majority, and son's incarceration, standing alone, did not effect an emancipation; father was therefore not entitled to suspension or termination of his child support obligation. Garver v. Garver, 981 P.2d 471, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1999).

District court properly denied defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because he did not met his burden of proving that the statute under which he was sentence was cruel or unusual where he was 18 at the time he committed a double homicide, his sentence to two consecutive life sentences for first-degree murder was effectively a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, and the defining the age of majority as 19 did not do so for purposes of determining criminal culpability. Nicodemus v. State, 2017 WY 34, 392 P.3d 408, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 2017).

Parent has duty to support incapacitated child even though the child has reached the age of majority. Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1982).

Quoted in

McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 481 (Wyo. 1985); Daniel v. State, 923 P.2d 728, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1996); Bagley v. Bagley, 2013 WY 126, 311 P.3d 141, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 131 , 2013 WL 5593300 (Oct 11, 2013).

Cited in

Jennings v. Jennings, 783 P.2d 178, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1989); KT v. State, 902 P.2d 1288, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1995).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code — Part IV,” see X Land & Water L. Rev. 155 (1975).

For comment, “The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Imprisonment of Juvenile Offenders,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1982).

For article, “The Ungrateful Living: An Estate Planner's Nightmare — The Trial Attorney's Dream,” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 401 (1989).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Inclusion or exclusion of day of birth in determining attainment of majority, 5 ALR2d 1143.

Enlistment, or consent to enlistment, of minor in military service as emancipating him, 36 ALR2d 1018.

Right of parent to maintain tort action against child, 60 ALR2d 1284, 62 ALR3d 1299.

Federal or state law as controlling question of representation of infant, 68 ALR2d 752.

Allowance from incompetent's estate to children, 99 ALR2d 946, 24 ALR3d 863.

Power to lease, or to authorize lease of, infant's lands beyond minority of guardianship, 6 ALR3d 570.

Liability for prenatal injuries, 40 ALR3d 1222.

Right of minor to have abortion performed without parental consent, 42 ALR3d 1397.

Right of child or parent to recover for alienation of the other's affections, 60 ALR3d 931.

Death action by or in favor of parent against unemancipated child, 62 ALR3d 1299.

Power of parent to have mentally defective child sterilized, 74 ALR3d 1224.

Statutory change of age of majority as affecting preexisting status or rights, 75 ALR3d 228.

Modern trends as to contributory negligence of children, 32 ALR4th 56.

Parent's or relative's rights of visitation of adult against latter's wishes, 40 ALR4th 846.

Post-secondary education as within nondivorced parent's child-support obligation, 42 ALR4th 819.

Infant's liability for medical, dental or hospital services, 53 ALR4th 1249.

Statute protecting minors in a specified age range from rape or other sexual activity as applicable to defendant minor within protected age group, 18 ALR5th 856.

§ 14-1-102. Right to contract.

1. An unemancipated minor may obtain a birth certificate from the department of health and may enter into a legally binding contract for housing, employment, purchase of a motor vehicle, receipt of a student loan, admission to postsecondary school, establishing a bank account, admission to a domestic violence or homeless shelter and receipt of services as a homeless youth or victim of domestic violence or sexual abuse, provided that the minor:
   1. Meets all of the following:
      1. At least sixteen (16) years of age;
      2. Willingly living separate and apart from his parents who consent to or acquiesce in the separate living arrangement;
      3. Homeless;
      4. Managing his own financial affairs.
   2. Submits a notarized affidavit in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
2. A notarized affidavit required under this section shall be:
   1. Signed and sworn to by the minor which includes all of the following:
      1. The minor’s full name;
      2. The minor’s birth date;
      3. A statement by the minor verifying the conditions listed in paragraph (a)(i) of this section;
      4. A statement by the minor declaring that the information provided is true and correct under penalty of perjury.
   2. Witnessed by two (2) or more adults. The acknowledgment by each adult witnessing the affidavit shall include a declaration that he is an attorney, health care provider, rabbi, priest, minister, clergy or other religious counselor or a college or school administrator or counselor and that to the best of his knowledge the minor signed the affidavit willingly and understands the nature and legal implications of the contract, if applicable. The affidavit shall require a rabbi, priest, minister, clergy or other religious counselor who witnesses an affidavit to verify under penalty of false swearing under W.S. 6-5-303 that the witness has not been convicted of a felony in this state or another jurisdiction. An adult witnessing an affidavit pursuant to this paragraph shall not assume any legal responsibility or liability under a contract entered into pursuant to this section.
3. A person that in good faith accepts an affidavit purportedly signed and sworn to in accordance with this section and who is without actual knowledge that the affidavit is fraudulent or otherwise invalid may rely upon the affidavit as if it were genuine and may enter into a contract that is legally binding upon the minor as provided under subsection (a) of this section.
4. For purposes of this section, “homeless” means as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. section 11434a(2).

History. Laws 2017, ch. 180, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2017, ch. 180, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2017.

§ 14-1-201. Definitions.

1. As used in this article:
   1. “Emancipation” means conferral of certain rights of majority upon a minor as provided under this article and includes a minor who:
      1. Is or was married;
      2. Is in the military service of the United States; or
      3. Has received a declaration of emancipation pursuant to W.S. 14-1-203 .
   2. “Minor” means an individual under the age of majority defined by W.S. 14-1-101(a);
   3. “Parent” means the legal guardian or custodian of the minor, his natural parent or if the minor has been legally adopted, the adoptive parent;
   4. “This act” means W.S. 14-1-201 through 14-1-206 .

History. Laws 1989, ch. 207, § 1; 1990, ch. 7, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-1-202. Application for emancipation decree; effect of decree.

1. Upon written application of a minor under jurisdiction of the court and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a district court may enter a decree of emancipation in accordance with this act. In addition to W.S. 14-1-101(b), the decree shall only:
   1. Recognize the minor as an adult for purposes of:
      1. Entering into a binding contract;
      2. Suing and being sued;
      3. Buying or selling real property;
      4. Establishing a residence;
      5. The criminal laws of this state.
   2. Terminate parental support and control of the child and their rights to his income;
   3. Terminate parental tort liability for the minor.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 207, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-1-201(a)(iv).

Cited in

Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Sept. 10, 2014).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Minor's entry into home of parent as sufficient to sustain burglary charge, 17 ALR5th 111.

§ 14-1-203. Application for emancipation decree; hearing; notice; rights and liabilities of emancipated minor; conditions for issuance of decree; filing of decree; copy to applicant.

1. Upon written application of a minor subject to personal jurisdiction of the court, a district court may enter a decree of emancipation in accordance with this act. The application shall be verified and shall set forth with specificity all of the following facts:
   1. That he is at least seventeen (17) years of age;
   2. That he willingly lives separate and apart from his parents;
   3. That his parents consent to or acquiesce in the separate living arrangement;
   4. That he is managing his own financial affairs; and
   5. That the source of his income is not derived from means declared unlawful under state or federal law or from assistance received under W.S. 42-2-104 .
2. The district court shall conduct a hearing on the minor’s application for emancipation within sixty (60) days after the date of filing. Notice of the hearing shall be given to the minor and his parents by certified mail at least ten (10) days before the date set for hearing.
3. At the hearing, the court shall advise the minor of the effect of emancipation pursuant to W.S. 14-1-202 . These rights and liabilities shall be stated in the emancipation decree.
4. The court may enter a decree of emancipation if the minor is at least seventeen (17) years of age and the court finds emancipation is in the best interests of the minor. In making a determination, the court shall consider if the:
   1. Minor’s parents consent to the proposed emancipation;
   2. Minor is living or is willing to live apart from his parents and is substantially able to provide self-maintenance and support without parental guidance and supervision;
   3. Minor demonstrates he is sufficiently mature and knowledgeable to manage his personal affairs without parental assistance; and
   4. Source of the minor’s income is not derived from means declared unlawful under state or federal law.
5. Upon entry of a decree of emancipation, the court shall file the decree with the county clerk of the county in which the child resides. A copy of the decree shall be issued to the minor.
6. A declaration of emancipation shall be conclusive evidence that the minor is emancipated, but emancipation may also be proved by other evidence like any other fact.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 207, § 1; 1996, ch. 111, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-1-201(a)(iv).

Child not emancipated. —

A child was not emancipated and, therefore, a noncustodial father was not relieved of his support obligation either by the mother's interference with visitation or by the entry of a temporary restraining order, which restrained the father from further contact with his daughter. Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2000).

Child not emancipated for purposes of determining if support is due. —

Judgment for unpaid child support in post-decree action was affirmed because nothing under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-203(f) was shown to indicate the child was emancipated and, absent a sufficient record, the appellate court assumes that sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court's implicit finding that the child is not emancipated. McElwain v. McElwain, 2005 WY 147, 123 P.3d 558, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 2005).

Juvenile tried and sentenced as adult. —

Although son answered to criminal charges in district court, he remained a minor until he reached eighteen, the age of majority, and son's incarceration, standing alone, did not effect an emancipation; father was therefore not entitled to suspension or termination of his child support obligation. Garver v. Garver, 981 P.2d 471, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1999).

Cited in

Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Sept. 10, 2014).

§ 14-1-204. Third party application; procedure.

1. Any interested third party having dealings with an apparently emancipated minor may apply to the district court where that minor is domiciled or may be found for a declaration of emancipation.
2. The application under this section shall be made in conformity with W.S. 14-1-203(a).
3. Proceedings under this section shall be conducted in conformity with the requirements of W.S. 14-1-203 .

History. Laws 1989, ch. 207, § 1.

§ 14-1-205. Application to department of transportation for emancipated status on driver's license; fee.

1. Upon application of an emancipated minor, the department of transportation shall indicate the minor’s emancipated status on his Wyoming driver’s license or if without a driver’s license, on the minor’s Wyoming identification card issued under W.S. 31-8-101 .
2. An applicant under this section shall pay two dollars ($2.00) to the division. The department of transportation shall deposit the fees in the manner prescribed by law for driver’s license and identification card fees and submit receipt and acknowledgement to the state treasurer.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 207, § 1; 1991, ch. 241, § 3; 1993, ch. 1, § 1; 2015, ch. 12, § 1.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in the second sentence in (b), substituted “department of transportation” for “state treasurer” and added “and submit receipt and acknowledgement to the state treasurer.”

§ 14-1-206. Emancipated minor subject to adult criminal jurisdiction.

An emancipated minor is subject to jurisdiction of adult courts for all criminal offenses.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 207, § 1.

§§ 14-2-101 through 14-2-120. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1957, §§ 14-59.2 to 14-59.23, related to parentage and paternity actions. For present law, see Title 14, chapter 2, articles 4 through 9.

§ 14-2-201. Maintenance and education of minor out of income from own property.

Any minor having a living parent and owning property with income sufficient for his maintenance and education in a manner more expensive than his parent can reasonably afford, regard given to the situation of the parent’s family and to all circumstances of the case, the expenses of the minor’s education and maintenance may be defrayed out of the income of the minor’s own property in whole or in part, as judged reasonable and as directed by the court. The charges for maintenance and education may be allowed accordingly in the settlements of the accounts of the minor’s guardian.

History. Laws 1890-91, ch. 70, art. 21, § 11; R.S. 1899, § 4876; C.S. 1910, § 5745; C.S. 1920, § 7021; R.S. 1931, § 50-112; C.S. 1945, § 7-111; W.S. 1957, § 14-4; W.S. 1977, § 14-1-102 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

Quoted in

Bagley v. Bagley, 2013 WY 126, 311 P.3d 141, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Oct 11, 2013).

§ 14-2-202. Payment or delivery to parent of minor's estate not exceeding $3,000; duty of parent.

1. Money or other property not exceeding three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) in value belonging to a minor having no guardian of his estate may be paid or delivered to a parent entitled to the custody of the minor to hold for the minor, upon written assurance verified by the oath of the parent that the total estate of the minor does not exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) in value. The written receipt of the parent shall be an acquittance of the person making the payment or delivery of money or other property.
2. It is the duty of the parent to apply the funds received to the use and benefit of the minor.

History. Laws 1953, ch. 28, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-5; Laws 1965, ch. 40, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 14-1-103; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-2-203. Parental tort liability for property damage of certain minors; exception; action cumulative.

1. Any property owner is entitled to recover damages from the parents of any minor under the age of seventeen (17) years and over the age of ten (10) years who maliciously and willfully damages or destroys his property. The recovery is limited to the actual damages in an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) in addition to taxable court costs. This section does not apply to parents whose parental custody and control of the child had been terminated by court order prior to the destructive act.
2. The action authorized in subsection (a) of this section is in addition to all other actions which the owner is entitled to maintain and nothing in this section precludes recovery in a greater amount from the minor, parents or any person for damages for which the minor or other person would otherwise be liable. The purpose of this section is to authorize recovery from parents in situations where they would not otherwise be liable.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 73, §§ 1-3; W.S. 1957, §§ 14-5.1 to 14-5.3; W.S. 1977, §§ 14-1-104 to 14-1-106; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1991, ch. 65, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to sanctions for juvenile offenders, see § 14-6-247 .

Section is constitutional. Mahaney v. Hunter Enters., 426 P.2d 442, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1967).

Section compatible with supreme court policy. —

Because Wyoming has rejected the “family purpose” doctrine, this section does not fly in the face of the policy set by the supreme court. Mahaney v. Hunter Enters., 426 P.2d 442, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1967).

Father not liable. —

Father not liable for negligence where son took vehicle without knowledge or consent of father and not on mission for father. See Kimble v. Muller, 417 P.2d 178, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1966).

Quoted in

Campbell v. State, 709 P.2d 425, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 608 (Wyo. 1985); WJH v. State, 2001 WY 54, 24 P.3d 1147, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For legislative comment, “Parental Tort Liability,” see I Land & Water L. Rev. 299 (1966).

For comments, “Wyoming Tort Reform and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: A Second Opinion,” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 593 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and construction of statutes making parents liable for torts committed by their minor children, 8 ALR3d 612.

Parental liability for injury or damage intentionally inflicted by minor child, 54 ALR3d 974.

Criminal responsibility of parent for act of child, 12 ALR4th 673.

Modern trends as to tort liability of child of tender years, 27 ALR4th 15.

Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian or other person signing minor's application for vehicle operator's license liable for licensee's negligence or willful misconduct, 45 ALR4th 87.

Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile's offense, 66 ALR4th 985.

§ 14-2-204. Liability for support; right of action; venue; service; measure of recovery; remedies cumulative; execution; continuing jurisdiction; notice.

1. Any person legally responsible for the support of a child who abandons, deserts, neglects or unjustifiably fails to support the child is liable for support of the child. It is no defense that the child was not or is not in destitute circumstances. For purposes of this section, a parent’s legal obligation for the support of his or her children, whether natural or adopted, continues past the age of majority in cases where the children are:
   1. Mentally or physically disabled and thereby incapable of self support; or
   2. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 1, § 2.
   3. Between the age of majority and twenty (20) years and attending high school or an equivalent program as full-time participants.
2. Either of the parents of the child, the department of family services or any other person, agency or institution furnishing the physical care or support of the child may commence civil action for past and future child and medical support.
3. The petition or complaint shall be filed in the district court of the county where the defendant resides, is found or has assets subject to attachment or execution. Service of process shall be as provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. The measure of recovery from the defendant is the reasonable value of the care or support, including medical support furnished to the child by the petitioner and the child support ordered pursuant to W.S. 20-2-303 , 20-2-304 , 20-2-307 and 20-2-311 . In addition, the court may make other suitable order for future care or support of the child. These remedies are cumulative and in addition to other remedies provided by law. Payments of future support shall be paid to the clerk of the district court.
5. and (f) Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 1, § 2.

History. Laws 1879, ch. 1, § 4; R.S. 1887, § 2285; R.S. 1899, § 3026; C.S. 1910, § 3963; C.S. 1920, § 5028; R.S. 1931, § 20-214; C.S. 1945, § 58-215; Laws 1953, ch. 134, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-18; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-104; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1989, ch. 182, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1993, ch. 197, § 1; 2000, ch. 1, §§ 1, 2; 2018, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in (d), substituted “W.S. 20-2-303 , 20-2-304 , 20-2-307 ” for “W.S. 20-2-303 through 20-2-305 , 20-2-307 .”

Cross references. —

As to enforcement of judgments, see chapter 17 of title 1.

As to service of process, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

Amendment applies prospectively. —

The legislature intended for the change in the age of majority made in 1993 to apply prospectively and not to apply to an existing court decree such as a child support order in a divorce decree; the district court erred in modifying the child support orders to reflect the new age of majority. Thomas v. Thomas, 913 P.2d 854, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1996).

Parent has duty to support incapacitated child even though the child has reached the age of majority. Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1982).

Support retroactive to birth. —

District court had statutory authority to award child support retroactively to date of child's birth. Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1999).

Father owed his children reasonable support from the date of their birth because the statute intended and recognized that child support would be collected retroactively in cases where a parent had abandoned a child and refused to participate in the support of the child. JAG v. State, 2002 WY 158, 56 P.3d 1016, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 2002).

Support to end at age of majority. —

Trial court did not err in ordering child support to end when the child became 18 and in having deviated from the presumptive support level; although the parties were not aware of their son's learning disability at the time that the divorce decree, stated support would end once each child reached the age of 18, and the mother had forgiven the child support arrearages owed to her by the father. Shelhamer v. Shelhamer, 2006 WY 83, 138 P.3d 665, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2006).

Full-time participation in school. —

The trial court did not err in denying father's petition to terminate child support once his daughter reached the age of majority based on his contention that she was not a full-time participant in a high school or its equivalent, where the daughter's absences from school were due to medical conditions and where she took immediate steps to enroll in an alternative school once she was forced to leave high school. Cossette v. Cossette, 2003 WY 107, 76 P.3d 795, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2003).

Statutes permit award to state of child support and other expenses. —

Sections 14-2-101 through 14-2-204 are broad enough to permit an award, on the petition of the state, for child support owing the child's mother and other expenses. Holtz v. State, 847 P.2d 972, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1993).

Disabled and in high school 19-year-old entitled to support. —

As the divorcing parties' 19-year-old daughter was disabled and still attending high school, she was entitled to child support. Bagley v. Bagley, 2013 WY 126, 311 P.3d 141, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2013).

Interest, but not a penalty incurred on child support arrearages.—

Because child support arrears did not become a judgment by operation of law under the relevant statute, as the matter was not an action separate from the parties' divorce proceedings, but was initiated by a mother's motion to show cause that was filed in the original divorce action, the mother was not entitled to a 10 percent penalty. However, the delinquent amounts did bear interest by the relevant statute at a rate of 10 percent per year from the date of rendition. Rambo v. Rambo, 2017 WY 32, 391 P.3d 1108, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2017).

Quoted in

Campbell v. State, 709 P.2d 425, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 608 (Wyo. 1985); Garver v. Garver, 981 P.2d 471, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1999).

Stated in

Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1974); Glandt v. Taylor, 920 P.2d 647, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1948); Heather v. Delta Drilling Co., 533 P.2d 1211, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1975); State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990); In re Adoption of G.A.R., 810 P.2d 113, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1991); Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2000); Jordan v. Brackin, 2003 WY 151, 79 P.3d 536, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 2003).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Status of Legal Abandonment in Wyoming,” see 8 Wyo. L.J. 205.

For article, “Observations and Suggestions Concerning Wyoming Statutes Relating to Adoption Based on Abandonment,” see 8 Wyo. L.J. 218.

For note, “Enforcement of Civil Liability for Nonsupport in the State of Wyoming,” see 8 Wyo. L.J. 227 (1954).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Maintenance of suit by child, independently of statute, against parent for support, 13 ALR2d 1142.

Presumption that child's clothes were furnished by parent, 61 ALR2d 1270.

Trust income or assets as subject to claim against beneficiary for child support, 91 ALR2d 262.

What voluntary acts, other than marriage or entry in military service, terminate parent's obligation to support, 32 ALR3d 1055.

Automobile or motorcycle as necessary for child, 56 ALR3d 1335.

Liability of parent for support of child institutionalized by juvenile court, 59 ALR3d 636.

Parent's obligation to support unmarried minor child who refuses to live with parent, 98 ALR3d 334.

Child's right of action for loss of support, training, parental attention or the like, against a third person negligently injuring parent, 11 ALR4th 549.

Post-secondary education as within nondivorced parent's child-support obligation, 42 ALR4th 819.

Stepparent's postdivorce duty to support stepchild, 44 ALR4th 520.

Postmajority disability as reviving parental duty to support child, 48 ALR4th 919.

Rights and obligations resulting from human artificial insemination, 83 ALR4th 295.

Parent's child support liability as affected by other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation regarding sterility or use of birth control, or refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 ALR5th 337.

Death of obligor parent as affecting decree for support of child, 14 ALR5th 557.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 52 ALR5th 221.

Validity, construction, and application of Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (18 U.S.C. § 228), 147 ALR Fed 1.

§ 14-2-205. Presence of parent, custodian or guardian at hearings; failure to appear; issuance of bench warrant.

1. It is the responsibility of one (1) or both parents, and the guardian or custodian of an unemancipated minor, if applicable, to appear with the minor before any court of this state in any proceeding in which the minor is required to appear and is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or to have violated a municipal ordinance. It shall be the responsibility of the court to afford any parent, guardian or custodian appearing with a minor pursuant to this subsection a reasonable opportunity to address the court.
2. In any proceeding in juvenile court, attendance of one or both parents, and the guardian or custodian of the minor, if applicable, shall be compelled as provided by W.S. 14-6-215 .
3. In a proceeding in a court other than the juvenile court, the presiding judge may require the presence of one or both parents, and the guardian or custodian of the minor, if applicable, at any hearing by causing an order to appear to be served in the manner provided by W.S. 14-6-214 .
4. Any person served with an order to appear under subsection (c) of this section who without reasonable cause fails to appear, is liable for contempt of court and the court may issue a bench warrant to cause the person to be brought before the court.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 185, § 1.

§ 14-2-206. Protection of parental rights.

1. The liberty of a parent to the care, custody and control of their child is a fundamental right that resides first in the parent.
2. The state, or any agency or political subdivision of the state, shall not infringe the parental right as provided under this section without demonstrating that the interest of the government as applied to the parent or child is a compelling state interest addressed by the least restrictive means.

History. Laws 2017, ch. 188, § 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2017, ch. 188, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2017.

Due process.—

Applicability.—

Due process.—

Supreme court considered a father’s argument that he was deprived of due process in the juvenile proceedings even though it was not raised below because given the close connection between procedures required in the early stages of a child protection action and the cessation of reunification efforts, the issue was of a fundamental nature; however, because the father did not address the issue to the juvenile court, the supreme court’s review was limited to a search for plain error. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Applicability.—

It was not an abuse of discretion to order supervision of a father’s visitation because (1) the father’s statutory right to associate with the children did not apply, (2) the evidence supported findings that the father abused the children, and (3) the evidence supported findings conditioning the father’s unsupervised visitation on the father’s and the children’s therapy. Johnson v. Johnson, 2020 WY 18, 458 P.3d 27, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2020).

§§ 14-2-301 through 14-2-307. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1955, ch. 169, §§ 1 through 6, related to termination of parental rights. For present similar provisions, see §§ 14-2-308 through 14-2-319 .

§ 14-2-308. Definitions.

1. As used in this act:
   1. “Abuse” means as defined by W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii);
   2. “Authorized agency” means:
      1. A public social service agency authorized to care for and place children; or
      2. A private child welfare agency certified by the state for such purposes pursuant to W.S. 14-6-201 through 14-6-243 , 14-4-101 through 14-4-116 , 1-22-101 through 1-22-114 ;
   3. “Child” or “minor” means an individual who is under the age of majority;
   4. “Court” means the district court in the district where the child resides or is found or the district court which has previously retained jurisdiction of the child because of a previous order entered by that court;
   5. “Mental health professional” means a person with an advanced degree in one of the behavioral sciences including a psychologist, social worker or clinical counselor;
   6. “Neglect” means as defined by W.S. 14-3-202(a)(vii);
   7. “Parent” means a natural parent or a parent by adoption;
   8. “Indigent party” means a person whose financial resources and income are insufficient to enable him to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of an attorney licensed to practice in this state;
   9. “This act” means W.S. 14-2-308 through 14-2-319 .

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1; 1985, ch. 86, § 2; 2000, ch. 48, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Clear and convincing evidence. —

Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure do apply to proceedings for termination of parental rights, and an entry of default can be entered by the clerk against the delinquent parent; however, a default judgment that terminates the rights of the parent cannot be entered by the district court without (1) holding the required hearing; and (2) Wyoming's Department of Family Services presenting clear and convincing evidence of the grounds to terminate the parental rights, all in accordance with the termination of parental rights statutes. If the court finds that a statutory basis for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence, it can then terminate the parent-child legal relationship. In re HLL, 2016 WY 43, 372 P.3d 185, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2016).

DFS is “authorized agency”. —

Department of Family Services (DFS), a public social service agency, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-2101(a), with authority to oversee the custody and care of children in cases of abuse and neglect under the Child Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-401 through 14-3-441 , was an “authorized agency” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-308 and 14-2-310 with authority to file a petition to terminate a mother's parental rights, even though DFS did not have custody of the children. State v. DH (In the Interest of LB), 2014 WY 10, 316 P.3d 1184, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 2014).

Applied in

LM v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs., 2007 WY 189, 171 P.3d 1077, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Dec. 5, 2007).

Stated in

Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982); SLJ v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re SJJ), 2005 WY 3, 104 P.3d 74, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (2005); DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017); DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 14-2-309. Grounds for termination of parent-child relationship; clear and convincing evidence.

1. The parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:
   1. The child has been left in the care of another person without provision for the child’s support and without communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) year. In making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional contributions, or incidental contacts and communications. For purposes of this paragraph, a court order of custody shall not preclude a finding that a child has been left in the care of another person;
   2. The child has been abandoned with no means of identification for at least three (3) months and efforts to locate the parent have been unsuccessful;
   3. The child has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child’s health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent;
   4. The parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent is unfit to have the custody and control of the child;
   5. The child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state of Wyoming for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the parent is unfit to have custody and control of the child;
   6. The child is abandoned at less than one (1) year of age and has been abandoned for at least six (6) months;
   7. The child was relinquished to a safe haven provider in accordance with W.S. 14-11-101 through 14-11-109 , and neither parent has affirmatively sought the return of the child within three (3) months from the date of relinquishment;
   8. The parent is convicted of murder or homicide of the other parent of the child under W.S. 6-2-101 through 6-2-104 ;
   9. The parent committed sexual assault and the child was conceived as a result of the sexual assault. For the purposes of this paragraph, the following shall apply:
      1. A person committed sexual assault if the person was convicted of an offense under W.S. 6-2-302 , 6-2-303 , 6-2-314 through 6-2-316 or other similar law of another jurisdiction;
      2. Reasonable effort to reunify the family is not required to terminate parental rights;
      3. This paragraph shall not apply if the parent seeking termination was married to or cohabiting with the parent committing the sexual assault resulting in the birth of the child for not less than two (2) years immediately after the birth of the child. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed as limiting a parent from seeking termination under another provision of this section or from seeking sole custody under title 20, chapter 5 of the Wyoming statutes.
2. Proof by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has been convicted of any of the following crimes may constitute grounds that the parent is unfit to have custody or control of any child and may be grounds for terminating the parent-child relationship as to any child with no requirement that reasonable efforts be made to reunify the family:
   1. Murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent or aiding and abetting, attempting, conspiring to commit or soliciting such a crime; or
   2. Commission of a felony assault which results in serious bodily injury to a child of the parent. As used in this paragraph “serious bodily injury” means as defined by W.S. 6-1-104 .
3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, evidence that reasonable efforts have been made to preserve and reunify the family is not required in any case in which the court determines any one (1) or more of the following by clear and convincing evidence:
   1. The parental rights of the parent to any other child have been terminated involuntarily;
   2. The parent abandoned, chronically abused, tortured or sexually abused the child;
   3. The parent has been convicted of committing one (1) or more of the following crimes against the child or another child of that parent:
      1. Sexual assault under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 ;
      2. Sexual battery under W.S. 6-2-313 ;
      3. Sexual abuse of a minor under W.S. 6-2-314 through 6-2-317 .
   4. The parent is required to register as a sex offender pursuant to W.S. 7-19-302 if the offense involved the child or another child of that parent. This shall not apply if the parent is only required to register for conviction under W.S. 6-2-201 ;
   5. Other aggravating circumstances exist indicating that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1; 1998, ch. 111, § 1; 1999, ch. 156, § 1; 2003, ch. 167, § 2; 2010, ch. 55, § 1; 2011, ch. 131, § 1; 2013, ch. 145, § 1; 2019, ch. 180, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to making reasonable efforts to preserve the family, see § 14-3-440 .

For disposition of children by court in granting divorce, see § 20-2-201 et seq.

As to desertion of children, see chapter 3 of title 20.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, added (a)(viii).

The 2011 amendment, in (a)(i), added the present last sentence.

Laws 2011, ch. 131, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2011.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in (c), in the introductory language, added “any one (1) or more of the following,” added (iii) and (iv), and made related and stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, added (a)(ix).

Aggravating circumstances.—

Juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that aggravating circumstances existed that would make reunification between a father and a child unlikely because the facts did not establish severe misconduct toward child; the father was never charged with abuse or neglect of child, and he was taking drug tests and following the case plan so he could have visitation with the child. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

“Other circumstances” in subsection (v) must be different from those listed in the other provisions of subsection (c) and serious enough to warrant the degree of culpability or liability imposed; interpreting subsection (v) in harmony with the other provisions of subsection (c), the legislature logically meant for “other aggravating circumstances” to meet the same level of severity as set out in the preceding provisions. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Failure to provide father with opportunity to be heard.

—

Supreme court considered a father’s argument that he was deprived of due process in the juvenile proceedings even though it was not raised below because, the issue was of a fundamental nature; the provision the State relied upon when requesting the juvenile court relieve the Department of Family Services of the duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify the father with the child was included within the statute setting out the procedure for termination of parental rights. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

In a termination of parental rights action, the trial court violated the father’s due process rights when it determined the best interests of the child without providing the father an opportunity to be heard. The hearing on summary judgment was limited to whether grounds for termination existed and there was no indication in the record that the related, and essential, issue of whether termination was in the best interests of the child was raised or considered. In re NRAE v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2020 WY 121, 472 P.3d 374, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2020).

Evidence sufficient to sustain termination of parental rights under paragraphs (a)(v).

—

District court properly terminated a father’s parental rights to his children as an unfit parent because the Department of Family Services had custody of the children for 15 of the most recent 22 months preceding trial, the father’s history and pattern of behavior were plainly relevant to his current parental fitness, the jury could infer that the father participated in or knew about the mother’s drug use, and the father failed to complete almost every requirement of the case plan, failed to take any steps to assist with therapy and recovery of the children’s significant mental health needs, made no attempts to maintain a relationship with them when he left town, and used methamphetamine as recently as two months before the trial began. Clark v. State (In re GGMC), 2020 WY 50, 460 P.3d 1138, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2020).

Evidence sufficient to sustain termination of parental rights under paragraphs (a)(v).—

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground that the mother was unfit to have custody and control of the mother's children, despite repeated exposure to substance abuse treatment and parenting classes, because the mother's behavior put the children at risk as the mother lived with roommates who had serious and lengthy criminal histories, participated with the roommates in distributing drugs, allowed drugs and pornography in the home, and drove while intoxicated with children in the car. LeBlanc v. State (In re ARLeB), 2017 WY 107, 401 P.3d 932, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2017).

Mother was unfit to have custody or control of the mother’s children because the mother admitted that the children were in foster care under the State of Wyoming’s responsibility for well over 15 of the most recent 22 months. Furthermore, the State presented clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of trial, the mother was not able to meet the children’s physical, mental, or emotional needs, as the mother lost contact with the children and could not provide a positive, nurturing, or safe environment for them. 2019 WY 15, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 15 .

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the children were in foster care for more than the 15 of the last 22 months when the termination petition was filed, the children exhibited significant mental health problems and educational issues, the mother lacked contact with the children while they were in foster care, the mother could not meet the children’s needs, the mother never completed parenting and diagnosis-specific trainings, and the mother did not address the mother’s own mental and physical health concerns. Harmon v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re DKS), 2020 WY 12, 456 P.3d 918, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2020).

Section 1-22-110 (adoption without consent) is not unconstitutional because it allegedly has different standards for terminating parental rights than this section. The two sections do not serve identical purposes. In re Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 516 (Wyo. 1985).

Due process. —

Due to the fundamental nature of the rights affected by a termination action, the procedures involved must satisfy due process and the evidence supporting a termination must be clear and convincing. MB v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs. ex rel. LB, 933 P.2d 1126, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1997).

Department of family services failed to comply with affidavit requirements of W.R.C.P. 56(e) to such an extent that clear and convincing evidence standard, required for termination of mother's parental rights, was not met, and district court's failure to hold hearing before terminating mother's parental rights on summary judgment deprived her of due process. CAC v. Natrona County Dep't of Family Servs., 983 P.2d 1205, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1999).

Guardian ad litem did not violate her duties or a mother's due process rights because she presented the child's preference to the jury and did not improperly argue that the jury had to decide the case based upon the child's best interests; the jury needed to know what was required to keep the child healthy and safe in order to determine if his health and safety would be seriously jeopardized if he were returned to the mother. Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

Guardian ad litem entitled to fully participate in termination case.—

Termination of parental rights cannot be based solely upon the best interests of the child, however, that does not mean that the guardian ad litem cannot participate in the evidentiary portion of the trial; the statutory provisions setting forth the requirements for termination of parental rights include factors directly related to the child's well-being. Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

State authorized to terminate parental rights under limited circumstances. —

The state has a compelling interest in the welfare of minor children and has the authority to terminate parental rights under certain limited circumstances, so long as it makes that determination in the best interest of the child and after a hearing. Blair v. Supreme Court of Wyoming, 671 F.2d 389, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 21745 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1982).

So long as there is reason to believe that a positive, nurturing parent-child relationship exists, the state's interest coincides with the parents' interest in preserving, not severing, family bonds. Once a parent has been proven unfit, however, the state's interest in terminating that parent's rights arises. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Parental rights terminated due to domestic violence and other issues. —

Court properly terminated a father's parental rights where the child was subjected to domestic violence, and where the father failed to follow the case plan, failed to obtain consistent and adequate housing, and failed to visit the child as often as allowed. RS v. Dept. of Family Servs. (In re KLS), 2004 WY 87, 94 P.3d 1025, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2004).

Strict scrutiny required in considering evidence to terminate parental rights. —

It is a fundamental right for one to have custody of his minor child, and the court must, therefore, consider the evidence to terminate parental rights with strict scrutiny. In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

Justification for a decision to terminate parental rights by summary judgment encounters rules, including the strict scrutiny standard, because the fundamental liberty of familial association is first presented. Consequently, clear and convincing evidence is required. In re Eb, 795 P.2d 1212, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1990).

Strict scrutiny standard requires that a case for termination of parental rights be established by clear and convincing evidence. LDC v. Department of Family Servs. (In re ZKP), 979 P.2d 953, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1999).

Necessary to show that less intrusive means of protection attempted or impractical. —

It must be shown that less intrusive means of protecting the child (e.g., counseling the parents) have been attempted or are impractical, before parental rights are terminated. In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

Failure to follow departmental rules. —

Even though the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of facts sufficient to terminate parental rights, the failure of the department of family services to follow its own rules adversely affected the parent's fundamental rights and mandated reversal of the trial court's order of termination. MB v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs. ex rel. LB, 933 P.2d 1126, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1997).

Termination of a mother's parental rights under this section was not invalidated due to a decision not to place children with their maternal grandmother because the placement decision did not affect the mother's ability to visit the children or strengthen a relationship with them; moreover, that placement was unsuitable due to the grandmother's failure to cooperate and the fact that she lived with a convicted sex offender. In addition, the Wyoming Department of Family Services was not required to wait for a second home evaluation for the grandmother after she moved to a different state before commencing termination proceedings against the mother. K.H. v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re D.H.), 2007 WY 196, 173 P.3d 365, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 2007).

District court did not err when it denied a father’s motion for judgment as a matter of law because the failure of the Department of Family Services to comply with its rules and regulations was harmless; the late completion of the father’s case plan made no difference in the outcome because the father failed to meet the requirements of the case plan, and an earlier explanation of the conditions for visitation or of the case plan requirements would have changed the results. Anastos v. State (In re Asa), 2018 WY 5, 408 P.3d 791, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2018).

Incarceration. —

Termination of the father's parental rights to his children under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv) was proper because, while the record was clear that a police report was admitted into evidence, the supreme court did not need to determine whether a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated because the father failed to prove that, if there was error, it was prejudicial. While the officer's report and testimony certainly informed the district court of the factual background regarding the allegations against father in the criminal case, his report and testimony were not necessary to establish that father was incarcerated due to a felony conviction; the father's own testimony established that to be the case, including that the crime was aggravated sexual assault of a minor. Msh v. Alh, 2012 WY 29, 271 P.3d 983, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Feb. 29, 2012).

Court committed no error in relying upon evidence of rehabilitative efforts in Oklahoma to sustain the requirement of unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate the family (i.e., termination of parental rights is the least intrusive means to satisfy the state's interest), by concluding that the evidence of efforts in Oklahoma was clear and convincing on this issue. In In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 509 (Wyo. 1987).

Subsection (a)(i) requires findings of both lack of support and lack of communication. In re Adoption of SLS, 808 P.2d 207, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1991).

Showing that child's well-being jeopardized required. —

Termination of parental rights cannot be ordered on the grounds of abuse or neglect unless the showing is clear and unequivocal that the child's health, mental or physical, and/or his social or educational well-being has actually been placed in jeopardy through the neglect or abuse by the parent. DS v. Department of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1980) (decided under prior law).

Consideration of “best interests” of child. —

In considering a termination of the parent-child relationship under subsection (a)(i), the court may consider the best interests of the child only as those interests relate to support and communication. In re Parental Rights of SCN, 659 P.2d 568, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1983).

Burden of proving neglect or abuse is upon him who seeks to take the child from the parent. DS v. Department of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1980) (decided under prior law).

Clear and convincing evidence. —

The case for termination of parental rights must be made by clear and convincing evidence. DKM v. RJS (In re SYM), 924 P.2d 985, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1996).

A father's parental rights were properly terminated where social services made appropriate efforts to reunify him with his child, they gave him notice of a change of goal for the case management, and they offered to pay transportation costs to visit the child and yet the father had no contact with the child for two years and never voluntarily paid child support despite court orders compelling him to do so. EBH v. Hot Springs Dep't of Family Servs., 2001 WY 100, 33 P.3d 172, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2001).

There was clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interests of a minor child to terminate the parents' rights to the child, since the parents failed to maintain a clean and healthy home for the child; the parents refused to properly feed and care for the child, resulting in health and developmental problems for the child; and the parents lacked stability to care for the child. SD v. Carbon County Dep't of Family Servs. (In re SED), 2002 WY 168, 57 P.3d 1235, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 2002).

Jury could reasonably conclude that placing an eight-month-old baby in a fleece bag and tying it shut placed the child in imminent risk of physical injury under Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-3-202(a)(ii) and (vii), 14-2-309 . In re Cs v. Johnson County Dep't of Family Servs., 2006 WY 130, 143 P.3d 918, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (2006).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the district court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) because it was undisputed that the children were in foster care for the 15 months preceding the termination hearing and the evidence tending to show that the mother was unfit was substantial. The evidence showed that: (1) the mother displayed an inability to monitor, to make healthy decisions regarding nutrition, or to provide a safe environment for her children; (2) she had a long-established history of surrounding herself and her children with unsafe individuals; (3) she experienced auditory hallucinations and paranoia; (4) she attempted to commit suicide in front of her children; (5) the children were upset with and resistant to visitation with their mother; and (6) the mother failed to complete various parts of her case plan and often refused to cooperate with service providers. M.L. v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs. (In the Interest of L.L.), 2007 WY 92, 159 P.3d 499, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2007).

District court's decision terminating a mother's parental rights pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) (2007) was affirmed where the findings that the mother had not maintained a stable residence, been sporadically employed, continued substance abuse, and had made little progress in the treatment of her psychological problems were fully supported by evidence in the record. MDW v. Hot Springs County Dep't of Family Servs. (In re SRJ), 2009 WY 94, 212 P.3d 611, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2009).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a father's parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) for unfitness, because he had a child abuse conviction, was incarcerated, and had weapons violations; the father also failed to comply with a case plan requiring him to obtain employment, attending counseling, and participate in regular visitation. The Wyoming Department of Family Services was not required to prove that less intrusive alternatives to termination of his parental rights were impractical. AJJ v. State (In re KMJ), 2010 WY 142, 242 P.3d 968, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 2010).

There was sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a father’s parental rights because he was unable to meet any of the child’s ongoing needs; the father was in prison at the time of the trial and did not anticipate being released on parole for more than a year, he admitted that he was found guilty of assault and battery on a son he had with another mother, and he had a history of substance abuse. Anastos v. State (In re Asa), 2018 WY 5, 408 P.3d 791, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2018).

District court correctly found clear and convincing evidence supported termination of a mother’s parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) (2019) where testimony from various Department of Family Services case workers, counselors, and the mother herself demonstrated a clear pattern of the inability to recognize and provide for the ongoing physical, mental and emotional needs of the children. Dunlap v. State (In re BAD), 2019 WY 83, 446 P.3d 222, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv) (2013) given the father's incarceration, alcohol consumption, and lack of responsibility for the child's schooling and medical needs. DRW v. DLP (In re ARW), 2015 WY 25, 343 P.3d 407, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 2015).

State not required to show reasonable efforts to reunify where abuse and neglect not at issue. —

State was not required to show reasonable efforts to reunify the family in a parental rights termination proceeding where the State did not file termination proceedings on the basis of abuse or neglect by a parent nor did the district court enter its order on that basis. Rather, the State filed termination proceedings, and the district court granted the petition, on the basis that the children were left in the care of another for at least a year and had been in foster care with the state for over fifteen of the last twenty-months, and the parents were unfit. SLJ v. Dep't of Family Servs.(In re SJJ), 2005 WY 3, 104 P.3d 74, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2005).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, appellant mother failed to prove the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) did not provide reasonable efforts under this section to rehabilitate her; DFS was not required to renew her drug testing contract because the mother appeared for testing infrequently and could have made her own arrangements for drug testing. Appellant had the opportunity but failed to attend team meetings; and DFS pursued less intrusive means of protecting the children such as a guardianship with relatives. TMC v. Dep't of Family Serv. (In re ARC), 2011 WY 119, 258 P.3d 704, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2011).

Consent to county's custody of children did not constitute “provision for child's support” under subsection (a)(i). In re SKJ, 673 P.2d 640, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 399 (Wyo. 1983).

“Neglect” defined. —

“Neglect” is word of common usage and understanding and can certainly be defined as a failure to do what is needed or required in connection with a factual situation. In re M., 556 P.2d 514, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1976) (decided under prior law).

Finding of “unintentional neglect” does not add ground for termination. —

A finding of “unintentional” neglect, although the word “unintentional” is not used in the statute, is not an addition of a ground for termination of rights constituting an amendment to this article by judicial legislation. In re M., 556 P.2d 514, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1976).

Adoption proceedings. —

In an adoption proceeding, the provisions regarding termination of parental rights found in the adoption statutes (§ 1-22-101 et seq.) control over the more general provisions for the termination of parental rights found in this article. GWJ v. MH (In re BGH), 930 P.2d 371, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1996).

Mental incapacity. —

In finding the parents unable, because of mental incapacity, to give the child proper care now or in the future and that such inability constituted “neglect,” the courts are considering the best interests and welfare of a child rather than the penalizing of parents. In re M., 556 P.2d 514, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1976).

Family doctor may give opinion on parent's mental age. —

In a case of unintentional neglect by mentally retarded parents, the family doctor with some mental health training and his own personal knowledge is as competent to reach an opinion as to mental age of a parent as is the expert witness whose examination will ordinarily cover a period of time not exceeding one week. In re M., 556 P.2d 514, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1976).

Evidence of abuse by stepfather admissible to show evidence of neglect by mother. —

In a proceeding to terminate parental rights on the grounds of neglect, admitting the evidence of a bruise, spanking and abuse by the stepfather was not an abuse of discretion, for if a stepfather or another abuses a child, it is evidence of neglect if the mother does not take some action to stop the abuse or remove the child from the abusive environment. MS v. Kuchera, 682 P.2d 982, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1984).

Summary judgment improper. —

Summary judgment order terminating parental rights was not appropriately granted where the affidavit of the mother denying abandonment raised a clear factual conflict, especially in light of the strict scrutiny and clear and convincing evidence required for parental rights termination. In In Interest of SVG, 826 P.2d 237, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1992).

Evidence sufficient to terminate parental rights under subsection (a)(iii). —

See In re SKJ, 673 P.2d 640, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 399 (Wyo. 1983).

Father's parental rights to his daughter were properly terminated under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv) where given the length of the father's term of incarceration, it was extremely improbable that the father would ever be able to appropriately care for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of his daughter during her minority or indeed well into her adulthood; most importantly, though, the father was convicted on several counts of sexually abusing his daughter. There could be nothing that made him more intrinsically unfit than abusing his child. CDB v. DJE, 2005 WY 102, 118 P.3d 439, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2005).

Termination of parental rights was justified by evidence of children's inadequate care, maintenance and supervision, as well as inappropriate physical punishment, and where agencies' extensive rehabilitative efforts had been unsuccessful, and children's health and safety would be jeopardized if they were returned to parents. RS v. Johnson County Dept. of Family Servs. (In re JL), 989 P.2d 1268, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1999).

Where the record disclosed long-term general neglect and the detailed instances were adequate to show by clear and convincing evidence that a mother had neglected, if not abused, her child and was unable to provide the child with basic health and safety within the prescribed statutory guidelines and where the State had met its responsibility to provide the services necessary to accomplish the specific goals and tasks called for before reunification could occur and yet the mother had made minimal progress toward meeting those goals, the court correctly terminated the mother's parental rights.MN v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In the Interest of MN), 2003 WY 135, 78 P.3d 232, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2003).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of appellant mother's parental rights under this section, because drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in the home within the reach of the children when they were taken into custody, the Wyoming Department of Family Services provided reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her by focusing on the drug issues, and appellant failed to comply with the service plan by missing drug tests and continuing to test positive for illegal drugs. Appellant failed to recognize her drug addiction, and the children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by returning them to her care; in fact, the children's health had improved in foster care. TMC v. Dep't of Family Serv. (In re ARC), 2011 WY 119, 258 P.3d 704, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2011).

Court properly terminated a mother's parental rights on the basis of unfitness because testimony revealed that the mother's substance abuse issues caused significant concern and created a barrier to the mother's reunification with her children; the mother failed to make progress under the service plan due to her inability to stay sober. The mother was also on probation in a criminal matter at the time of the hearing, and she continued to fail court-ordered urinalysis tests. ZMETS v. State, 2012 WY 68, 276 P.3d 392, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 2012).

Evidence insufficient to sustain termination of parental rights under paragraph (a)(i). —

Where the father was incarcerated for the commission of a felony and had additional charges pending against him, the mother sought termination of parental rights pursuant to subsection (a)(i). In its decision letter the district court found termination under this section inappropriate, because the mother did not establish that the father had left the child in the care of another; in fact, he had never met the child. JLW v. CAB (In re WDW), 2010 WY 9, 224 P.3d 14, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2010).

Evidence fell short of meeting the mother's burden to prove grounds for termination under(a)(1) of this section, as the father consistently sent letter and cards to his children while he was incarcerated, in spite of the fact that no communication came back, and he attempted to initiate communication through visitation once he was placed on supervised release. RAA v. AW, 2016 WY 117, 384 P.3d 1156, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2016).

Evidence sufficient to establish neglect. —

See In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998); TR v. Washakie County Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 736 P.2d 712, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 431 (Wyo. 1987).

Evidence of filthy and unsafe conditions in home, and of failure of six years of rehabilitative efforts, was sufficient to justify termination of mother's parental rights. LDC v. Department of Family Servs. (In re ZKP), 979 P.2d 953, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1999).

Evidence of unclean premises insufficient for termination. —

Evidence of isolated instances of unclean premises, dirty dishes and related matters is not sufficient grounds for termination. In re M., 556 P.2d 514, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1976).

Divorced parent's joblessness alone is insufficient basis for severing parent-child relationship. In re Parental Rights of SCN, 659 P.2d 568, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1983).

Evidence insufficient to establish abuse or neglect. —

See DS v. Department of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1980).

Evidence insufficient to terminate parental rights under subsection (a)(iii). —

Where the father's five children were living in an extremely dirty home, the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) did not provide evidence to connect his marijuana use with his unfitness as a parent; testimony indicated that he was a good father figure, and never used marijuana in the presence of the children. In the termination of parental rights action brought under this section, DFS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that returning the children to the father would be a risk to their health or safety. State v. TWE (In re ATE), 2009 WY 155, 222 P.3d 142, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 2009).

Conviction of child abuse justifies termination. —

Even if father had been successful in arguing the insufficiency of the evidence to terminate his parental rights for abuse, the judgment of termination would have to stand because of his conviction of the felony of child abuse, coupled with the clear and convincing evidence that he was an unfit parent by any standard. In In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 509 (Wyo. 1987).

Rights terminated for rape, resistance to rehabilitation. —

Evidence warranted the termination of the father's parental rights, where the record showed that he had repeatedly committed forcible rapes, beginning when he was 17 years old, culminating in the rape and death of an elderly woman, for which he was presently incarcerated under an extended prison sentence, and that he had resisted a rehabilitative program for sexual offenders available to him. In re Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 1989).

Appeal.—

District court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights to his children because the father's pro se “Brief Letter” presented no cogent legal argument; the letter presented no legal argument at all. NRL v. State (In re NRL), 2015 WY 27, 344 P.3d 759, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2015).

Incarceration. —

“Incarceration,” as used in subdivision (a)(iv), is an unambiguous term entitled to its plain and ordinary meaning. DKM v. RJS (In re SYM), 924 P.2d 985, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1996).

Where the father was incarcerated for the commission of a felony and had additional charges pending against him, he had struggled with drug and alcohol abuse when not in prison; he never voluntarily paid child support, and had never met his child. The district court's decision to terminate the father's parental rights under subsection (a)(iv) was supported by clear and convincing evidence. JLW v. CAB (In re WDW), 2010 WY 9, 224 P.3d 14, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2010).

Incarceration, per se, justifies termination. —

Where the termination of parental rights is premised, under subsection (a)(iv), upon the parent's incarceration, the state has no burden to demonstrate the unavailability of means less intrusive than termination. RW v. State, 766 P.2d 555, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1989).

When termination of parental rights is sought pursuant to subsection (a)(iv), the petitioner must establish: (1) that the parent is incarcerated due to a felony conviction; and (2) that the parent is unfit to have custody and control of the child. DKM v. RJS (In re SYM), 924 P.2d 985, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1996).

And conviction not affected by pending writ. —

The pendency of an application for a discretionary writ of certiorari to the United States supreme court in the case of the natural parents' second-degree murder convictions did not affect the status of those convictions for purposes of subsection (a)(iv). RW v. State, 766 P.2d 555, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1989).

But where mother's felony conviction was on appeal as of right, it could not qualify as a “conviction” for purposes of subdivision (a)(iv) of this section, until it was finally resolved by court. CAC v. Natrona County Dep't of Family Servs., 983 P.2d 1205, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1999).

Evidence sufficient to sustain termination of parental rights under paragraphs (a)(i) and (a)(v). —

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated where the children lived with their grandmother for many years, the mother provided no monetary support, and the mother visited the children only a few times. SLJ v. Dep't of Family Servs.(In re SJJ), 2005 WY 3, 104 P.3d 74, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2005).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her children pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) because the children had been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, and she continuously put them in dangerous situations and placed the wants and desires of her ex-husband and boyfriends ahead of their welfare; she also participated in the sexual abuse of one child. NLT v. State (In re KAT), 2012 WY 150, 288 P.3d 1217, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2012).

Evidence sufficient to sustain termination of parental rights under paragraph (a)(i). —

District court properly terminated a father's parental rights because the child was left in the care of the mother for nearly all of his life, the father made no provision for the child's support for four years, none of his contacts were directed to the child, but rather were addressed specifically to the mother and revolved around an effort to form some sort of a relationship with her, and although one e-mail mentioned that the father loved the child, it was not a communication toward the child, and the statute did not require that the mother pursue lesser options before seeking termination. Johnson v. Calkins, 2017 WY 50, 393 P.3d 1316, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of a father's parental rights where the children's mother proved by clear and convincing evidence that the father was incarcerated due to a felony conviction and was manifestly unfit to have custody of any child. DKM v. RJS (In re SYM), 924 P.2d 985, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1996).

Proof that the mother and father were incarcerated on felony charges relating to the endangerment of the children, evidence of their past parenting failures, and indications that their parenting skills had not improved supported the district court's termination of their parental rights for unfitness pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv). JD v. State (In re AE), 2009 WY 78, 208 P.3d 1323, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (Wyo. 2009).

Evidence sufficient to sustain termination of parental rights under paragraphs (a)(v). —

District court properly found there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant mother's parental rights be terminated under this section for unfitness, because the mother had a history of drug use, the children had low weights for their age, and the youngest child had a serious medical condition that required close monitoring. The children's health improved in foster care. TMC v. Dep't of Family Serv. (In re ARC), 2011 WY 119, 258 P.3d 704, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2011).

District court's determination that appellant, who had been incarcerated for nearly 20 years of his life, was unfit to have custody and control of his child was supported by clear and convincing evidence; accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support termination of appellant's parental rights under subsection (a)(v) of this section. RGS v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In re KGS), 2017 WY 2, 386 P.3d 1144, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2017).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper because the children were in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 50 months at the time of trial; the record was replete with evidence that the mother was unable to meet the needs of the children at the time of trial even during short visits, whether supervised or unsupervised; she tacitly admitted that she was unfit to have custody by arguing that she would have gained fitness at some time in the future if the termination had not occurred; and the mother’s claim that she might improve in the future and become fit to have custody and control of the children was irrelevant to the elements of this section. Swenson v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In re: LCH), 2019 WY 13, 434 P.3d 100, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence established that parents were unfit to have custody and control of their child because of the parents’ mental health diagnoses, history of substance abuse, drug-related criminal activity, inconsistent visitation, inconsistent housing, and failure to apply for services and benefits. Termination was also in the child’s best interest because the child had been placed out of the home and the court had no clear indication of when, if ever, the parents would have been sufficiently rehabilitated. Hood v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In re JPL), 2021 WY 94, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2021).

Trial court's determination of the mother's unfitness was supported by evidence that the mother exhibited a clear pattern of neglect adversely affected, and even injuring, the children, that such reckless and dangerous behavior resulted from the mother's drug and/or alcohol abuse, and that the mother paced the mental emotional needs of the children at risk; SAS v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re AGS), 2014 WY 143, 337 P.3d 470, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 2014).

Applied in

WR v. Natrona County Dep't of Family Servs., 916 P.2d 991, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1996).

Stated in

Perkins v. State, 2014 WY 11, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Jan 24, 2014).

Quoted in

In re CH, 783 P.2d 155, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 234 (Wyo. 1989); Jet v. State (In re Drt), 2010 WY 137, 241 P.3d 489, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Oct. 21, 2010); E.R.C.K. v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2013 WY 160, 314 P.3d 1170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 166 , 2013 WL 6822656 (Dec 24, 2013); E.R.C.K. v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2013 WY 160, 314 P.3d 1170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 166 , 2013 WL 6822656 (Dec 24, 2013).

Cited in

State ex rel. TRL v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1989); DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re “H” Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Termination of Parental Rights: Establishing Standards for the Wyoming Law, In the Matter of Parental Rights to X, Y and Z, DS v. Department of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1980),” see XVI Land & Water L. Rev. 295 (1981).

For comment “Wyoming's New Termination of Parental Rights Statute,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 621 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Legal malpractice in defense of parents at proceedings to terminate parental rights over dependent or neglected children, 18 ALR5th 902.

Parent's use of drugs as factor in award of custody of children, visitation rights, or termination of parental rights, 20 ALR5th 534.

Smoking as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 36 ALR5th 377.

Sufficiency of evidence to establish parent's knowledge or allowance of child's sexual abuse by another under statute permitting termination of parental rights for “allowing” or “knowingly allowing” such abuse to occur, 53 ALR5th 499.

Rights of unwed father to obstruct adoption of his child by withholding consent, 61 ALR5th 151.

Natural parent's indigence resulting from unemployment or underemployment as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption, 83 ALR5th 375.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Constitutional issues, 110 ALR5th 579.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — General considerations, 113 ALR5th 349.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Effect on parenting ability and parental rights, 116 ALR5th 559.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Best interests analysis, 117 ALR5th 349.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Issues concerning guardian ad litem and counsel, 118 ALR 5th 561.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Applicability of Americans With Disabilities Act, 119 ALR 5th 351.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Evidentiary issues, 122 A.L.R.5th 385.

§ 14-2-310. Parties authorized to file petition.

1. The petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship shall be filed with the court by:
   1. Either parent, when termination of the parent-child legal relationship is sought with respect to the other parent; or
   2. The guardian or the legal custodian of the child; or
   3. An authorized agency.
2. The petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship may be filed with the court by a biological or adoptive grandparent acting in loco parentis to the child, where the child has resided with the grandparent for a period of not less than one (1) year and the placement is not under the direction of a juvenile court or the department of family services.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1; 2019, ch. 88, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, added (b).

Cross references. —

As to commencement of actions generally, see Rule 3, W.R.C.P.

DFS is “authorized agency”. —

Department of Family Services (DFS), a public social service agency, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-2101(a), with authority to oversee the custody and care of children in cases of abuse and neglect under the Child Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-401 through 14-3-441 , was an “authorized agency” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-308 and 14-2-310 with authority to file a petition to terminate a mother's parental rights, even though DFS did not have custody of the children. State v. DH (In the Interest of LB), 2014 WY 10, 316 P.3d 1184, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 2014).

Commencement of termination proceedings. — Termination of a mother's parental rights was not invalidated due to a decision not to place children with their maternal grandmother because the placement decision did not affect the mother's ability to visit the children or strengthen a relationship with them; moreover, that placement was unsuitable due to the grandmother's failure to cooperate and the fact that she lived with a convicted sex offender. In addition, the Wyoming Department of Family Services was not required to wait for a second home evaluation for the grandmother after she moved to a different state before commencing termination proceedings against the mother. K.H. v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re D.H.), 2007 WY 196, 173 P.3d 365, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 2007).

Assistance of counsel required. — The department of family services and its director are not permitted to file a petition for parental termination without the assistance of counsel. In In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992).

Applied in

In re HLL, 2016 WY 43, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Apr. 12, 2016).

Stated in

Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 14-2-311. Contents of petition.

1. The petition for the termination of the parent-child legal relationship shall state:
   1. The legal name, sex, date and place of birth of the child, if known, and the jurisdictional facts;
   2. The name and residence of the petitioner and his relationship to the child;
   3. The name, address and place and date of birth of the parent, if known, and of the name of the person having the legal custody or guardianship of the child;
   4. The grounds for termination of the parent-child legal relationship pursuant to W.S. 14-2-309 ;
   5. Name and address of the person or authorized agency requesting appointment as the guardian of the child.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Stated in

Johnson v. Calkins, 2017 WY 50, 393 P.3d 1316, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 14-2-312. Hearing; appointment of guardian ad litem.

After the petition has been filed, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child unless the court finds the interests of the child will be represented adequately by the petitioner or another party to the action and are not adverse to that party. If the court appoints a guardian ad litem it shall approve a fee for services. When a petition is filed and presented to the judge, the judge shall set the petition for hearing. The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, including the right of a parent, child or interested person to demand a jury trial, are applicable in actions brought under this act.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1; 1985, ch. 86, § 2; 1993, ch. 109, § 1.

Cross references. —

For jury trial of right, see Rule 38, W.R.C.P.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-308(a)(ix).

Authority to appoint guardian ad litem.—

District court plainly had jurisdiction over a father’s petition to modify custody, and it had authority to use a guardian ad litem (GAL) to assist in deciding the petition, because when the father invoked the district court’s jurisdiction by filing a petition to modify custody and alleging a material change in circumstances the district court had before it a child custody matter and authority to appoint a GAL. Van Fleet v. Guyette, 2020 WY 78, 466 P.3d 812, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 2020).

This section is unambiguous and mandatory. — Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 is an unambiguous mandatory statute that does not allow a district court discretion not to appoint a guardian ad litem or not to make the appropriate record findings that no guardian ad litem is required; furthermore, the requirement that mandatory statutes be obeyed is most compelling in cases where fundamental parent-child relationships are at risk of severance. LM v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs., 2007 WY 189, 171 P.3d 1077, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Dec. 5, 2007).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 leaves no room for an assumption that the Department of Family Services will adequately represent the interests of children in a termination action. LM v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs., 2007 WY 189, 171 P.3d 1077, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Dec. 5, 2007).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 is an unambiguous mandatory statute that requires a district court in a parental rights termination action either to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent involved children, or to make a finding that no guardian ad litem is necessary because the petitioner or another party to the action will adequately represent the interests of the children, and the interests of the children are not adverse to that party. LM v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs., 2007 WY 189, 171 P.3d 1077, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Dec. 5, 2007).

Judgment terminating a mother's parental rights to her children was reversed and remanded because no guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the children in the proceedings, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 is an unambiguous mandatory statute that does not allow a district court discretion not to appoint a guardian ad litem or not to make the appropriate record findings that no guardian ad litem was required. LM v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs., 2007 WY 189, 171 P.3d 1077, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Dec. 5, 2007).

Guardian ad litem entitled to fully participate in termination case.—

District court did not err by refusing to restrict the guardian ad litem's (GAL) participation in an action seeking to terminate a mother's parental rights because the GAL was entitled to fully participate in the action; regardless of whether the child was technically a party to the action, he had an interest and rights in the proceeding. Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

Termination of parental rights cannot be based solely upon the best interests of the child, however, that does not mean that the guardian ad litem cannot participate in the evidentiary portion of the trial; the statutory provisions setting forth the requirements for termination of parental rights include factors directly related to the child's well-being. Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

No order terminating parental rights may be entered in Wyoming without hearing. Blair v. Supreme Court of Wyoming, 671 F.2d 389, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 21745 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1982).

One has a statutory right to a jury trial in a parental-termination proceeding. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Court must appoint attorney for child's interests before adjudicating termination issues. —

It is improper for the district court to adjudicate the substantive issues of termination of parental rights without appointing an attorney to protect the welfare of the child. In re Child X, 617 P.2d 1078, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1980) (decided under prior law).

Assistance of counsel required. —

The department of family services and its director are not permitted to file a petition for parental termination without the assistance of counsel. In In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992).

Motion to set aside entry of default denied.—

District court exercised sound judgment to deny a mother’s motion to set aside the entry of default because it properly applied the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and reasonably considered the three factors; the Department of Family Services would be prejudiced by the delay to the permanent placement of the children, and the mother’s failure to respond to the petition to terminate her parental rights for approximately four months constituted culpable conduct that led to her default. Hurd v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In re EMM), 2018 WY 36, 414 P.3d 1157, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2018).

No reversal despite unjustified ex parte conference. —

An ex parte conference between the trial judge and the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the minor child of the parties could not be ethically justified, but did not require the reversal of an adjudication of child custody in a divorce action where no prejudicial error was manifested. Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 1991).

Sufficiency of the Evidence. —

Party in default who has appeared at a parental rights termination hearing may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights. ZMETS v. State, 2012 WY 68, 276 P.3d 392, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 2012).

Applied in

In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982); In re Parental Rights of SCN, 659 P.2d 568, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1983); In Interest of SVG, 826 P.2d 237, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1992).

Quoted in

In re Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 1989); WR v. Natrona County Dep't of Family Servs., 916 P.2d 991, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For comment “Wyoming's New Termination of Parental Rights Statute,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 621 (1982).

For article, “Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, but is it a Formula for Malpractice?,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1999).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Consideration and weight of religious affiliations in appointment of guardian for child, 22 ALR2d 696.

Right of child to select his own guardian, 85 ALR2d 921.

Right of putative father to guardianship of illegitimate child, 45 ALR3d 216.

Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights, 92 ALR5th 379.

§ 14-2-313. Service of petition.

1. The petition shall be served on the following persons:
   1. The parent of the child;
   2. The guardian ad litem;
   3. The guardian or next friend of the parent if the parent is a minor;
   4. The department of family services if the child is or has been supported by public assistance funds.
2. Service of the petition on the person required to be served by subsection (a) of this section shall be made as provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. If the person is a nonresident or his residence is unknown, service may be had by constructive service or by publication as provided in the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1; 1993, ch. 109, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to service of process, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

Service by publication. —

Adoption court did not err in granting the foster parents’ petition for adoption because service by publication upon an unknown father was proper at the time that it was completed, and the court in the termination case obtained jurisdiction over the parties and terminated the father’s parental rights; nothing on the face of the termination order or the record indicated that the district court subsequently lost jurisdiction; the father’s collateral attack on the termination order could not be maintained in the adoption case; and the father did not have standing to object to or otherwise participate in the adoption proceeding as his parental rights had already been terminated, and he had no legally protectable interest at stake. RB v. State (In re SSO), 2017 WY 142, 406 P.3d 723, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 2017).

“Constructive service” allowed if procedural requirements followed. —

“Constructive service,” as applied in subsection (b), includes service by publication under Rule 4(e), W.R.C.P., and service for out-of-state residents under Rule 4(l), W.R.C.P. A petitioner has the right to use Rule 4 service of process to satisfy the service requirements of this section only if the procedural requirements delineated in the rule are accurately followed. Therefore, a petitioner's failure to properly conform to Rule 4(l)(2), W.R.C.P., when serving an out-of-state mother by registered mail in a termination proceeding, constituted inadequate service of process. In In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992).

Answer not waiver of defense of defective service. —

In a parental termination proceeding, a parent did not waive her defense to an agency's defective service of process by filing an answer, where she had already appropriately attacked the inadequate service with a defensive motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), W.R.C.P. In In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992).

If there was defective service, guardian ad litem waived objection by filing report the morning of the trial. In re Parental Rights to ARW, 716 P.2d 353, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 518 (Wyo. 1986), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

Stated in

Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 14-2-314. Social study required; information to be shown; not excluded as hearsay.

Upon the filing of a petition by anyone other than an authorized agency as defined by W.S. 14-2-308(a)(ii)(A), the court shall direct that a social study be made by the appropriate county office of public assistance and social services or by any authorized agency to aid the court in making a final disposition of the petition. The social study shall state the factual information pertaining to the allegations in the petition, the social history and the present situation and environment of the child and parent. The social study shall not be excluded as evidence by reason of hearsay alone. The social study shall be made available to any party to the action upon request.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1; 1985, ch. 86, § 2.

Hearsay rules apply where agency is party. —

Under this section, when a social study is independently made and an authorized agency is not the petitioner, the study is not solely inadmissible because of its character as hearsay. Where, however, the authorized agency is a party, this section does not apply to the submitted report and Rules 801 through 806, W.R.E., can operate to preclude its introduction. In In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992).

Psychological studies of mentally retarded parents held ofno assistance. —

Psychological studies of selected mentally retarded married parents and their capabilities and success in the care of their children may be of interest to those engaged in that phase of psychology, but they offer no assistance in determining the cases brought under the provisions of this article. In re M., 556 P.2d 514, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1976) (decided under prior law).

Noncompliance with this section was not prejudicial error.—

When the district court entered its decision letter concluding that the father's parental rights should be terminated, it was filed prior to the receipt of the social study required by this section; however, the father was not prejudiced. The decision letter was not a judgment, and the district court had the opportunity to consider the social study before issuing the order terminating parental rights. JLW v. CAB (In re WDW), 2010 WY 9, 224 P.3d 14, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2010).

Section not violated. —

See In re Parental Rights to ARW, 716 P.2d 353, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 518 (Wyo. 1986), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

Applied in

In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982); In re Parental Rights of SCN, 659 P.2d 568, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1983); In re Adoption of BBC, 849 P.2d 769, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1993).

Stated in

Zmets v. State, 2012 WY 68, 276 P.3d 392, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (May 16, 2012).

Law reviews. —

For comment “Wyoming's New Termination of Parental Rights Statute,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 621 (1982).

§ 14-2-315. Order terminating the parent-child legal relationship; contents.

The order terminating the parent-child legal relationship shall be in writing and shall contain the findings of the court. If the court terminates the parent-child legal relationship of either one (1) or both parents, it shall fix the responsibility for the child’s support and appoint a guardian of the child’s person or estate or both.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1.

Quoted in

In Interest of SVG, 826 P.2d 237, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1992).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Nonresidence as affecting one's right to custody of child, 15 ALR2d 432.

Alienation of child's affections as affecting custody award, 32 ALR2d 1005.

§ 14-2-316. Dismissal of petition; continuation of hearing.

If the court does not terminate the parent-child legal relationship, it shall dismiss the petition or direct an authorized agency to continue to make efforts to rehabilitate the parent and continue the hearing for no longer than six (6) months. The authorized agency shall provide the court with any additional reports regarding its rehabilitative efforts and results. Pending final hearing, the court may continue the present placement of the child or place the child in the temporary custody of an authorized agency and fix responsibility for temporary child support.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1.

Once parent-child relationship terminated, section inapplicable.—

Where the trial court properly decided to terminate the parent-child relationship, there was no need to determine whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the hearing so that additional efforts to rehabilitate the father might occur, as this section was not applicable. In In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 509 (Wyo. 1987).

Applied in

In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982).

§ 14-2-317. Effect of order of termination.

1. An order terminating the parent-child legal relationship divests the parent of all legal rights and privileges and relieves the child of all duties to that parent except:
   1. The order does not divest that parent of duties and support obligations unless otherwise specifically ordered by the court or the child is adopted; and
   2. Except as provided in W.S. 2-4-107(a)(i), the right of the child to inherit from the parent shall not be affected by the order.
2. The parent whose parent-child legal relationship has been terminated is not thereafter entitled to the notice of proceedings for the adoption of the child, nor has he any right to object to the adoption or otherwise participate in the adoption proceedings.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1; 1993, ch. 109, § 1; 2015, ch. 51, § 1.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in (a)(ii), added “Except as provided in W.S. 2-4-107(a)(i).”

No violation to award grandmother temporary custody. —

In a neglect action, a mother's parental rights were not violated by a temporary custody award to the grandmother, where the mother had already given up custody through the divorce decree when this case came before the juvenile court, and her rights as a parent remained intact in residual character. In In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1990).

No standing to object to adoption. —

Adoption court did not err in granting the foster parents’ petition for adoption because service by publication upon an unknown father was proper at the time that it was completed, and the court in the termination case obtained jurisdiction over the parties and terminated the father’s parental rights; nothing on the face of the termination order or the record indicated that the district court subsequently lost jurisdiction; the father’s collateral attack on the termination order could not be maintained in the adoption case; and the father did not have standing to object to or otherwise participate in the adoption proceeding as his parental rights had already been terminated, and he had no legally protectable interest at stake. RB v. State (In re SSO), 2017 WY 142, 406 P.3d 723, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 2017).

Applied in

In re Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 1989).

Quoted in

In re TLB, 771 P.2d 811, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1989); In re CH, 783 P.2d 155, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 234 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2000); Shippey v. Rogers (In re Estate of Kirkpatrick), 2003 WY 125, 77 P.3d 404, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2003); DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

Residual parental rights.—

Mother's claim that a permanency order should have designated the her preferred adoptive parents as the court-ordered adoptive parents had not been waived, but failed on the merits where the permanency order had not terminated the mother's parental rights or changed legal custody, and nothing in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(k) (2017) required findings as to the merits of the prospective adoption applicants. DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

Mother’s claim that a permanency order should have designated the her preferred adoptive parents as the court-ordered adoptive parents had not been waived, but failed on the merits where the permanency order had not terminated the mother’s parental rights or changed legal custody, and nothing in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(k) (2017) required findings as to the merits of the prospective adoption applicants. DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 14-2-318. Costs of proceedings; appointment of counsel.

1. The court may appoint counsel for any party who is indigent. Indigency shall be established by written affidavit signed and sworn to by the party or sworn testimony made a part of the record of the proceedings. The affidavit or sworn testimony shall state that the party is without sufficient money, property, assets or credit to employ counsel in his own behalf. The court may require further verification of financial condition as it deems necessary.
2. Where petitioner is an authorized agency as defined by W.S. 14-2-308(a)(ii)(B), it shall pay for the costs of the action. Costs shall include:
   1. Fee for the guardian ad litem. If the agency had entered into an agreement with the guardian ad litem program pursuant to W.S. 14-12-101 through 14-12-104 and the program was appointed to provide the guardian ad litem, the program shall pay the fee for the guardian ad litem in accordance with that agreement;
   2. Attorney’s fee for an indigent party;
   3. Other professional fees incurred by an indigent party in defense of an action brought under this act.
3. Prior to incurring any cost under subsection (b) of this section application shall be made to the court and written approval by the court shall be obtained.
4. Where petitioner is an authorized agency as defined by W.S. 14-2-308(a)(ii)(A):
   1. The district attorney for the county in which the petition is filed shall represent the authorized agency in all proceedings under this act;
   2. The authorized agency shall pay the reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses for an indigent party incurred in the defense of an action brought under this act and approved by the court; and
   3. The authorized agency shall pay the guardian ad litem reasonable fees and expenses approved by the court unless the agency had entered into an agreement with the guardian ad litem program pursuant to W.S. 14-12-101 through 14-12-104 and the program was appointed to provide the guardian ad litem. If so, the program shall pay the fee for the guardian ad litem in accordance with that agreement.

History. Laws 1981, ch. 102, § 1; 1985, ch. 86, § 2; 2012, ch. 76, § 3.

The 2012 amendment, added the second sentence in (b)(i); and in (d)(iii), added “unless the agency had entered into an agreement with the guardian ad litem program pursuant to W.S. 14-12-101 through 14-12-104 and the program was appointed to provide the guardian ad litem” and the last sentence.

Laws 2012, ch. 76 § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 13, 2012.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-308(a)(ix).

Assistance of counsel required. —

The department of family services and its director are not permitted to file a petition for parental termination without the assistance of counsel. In In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992).

Reasonable fees. —

Trial court did not err in awarding an attorney 50 percent of the fees the attorney requested under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-318(a) and (b) for representing an indigent parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding because the attorney's billing entry of over four hours of legal research regarding a pretrial memorandum revealed that the attorney failed to exercise billing judgment. Tolin v. State (In re NRF), 2013 WY 9, 294 P.3d 879, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2013).

Stated in

Zmets v. State, 2012 WY 68, 276 P.3d 392, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (May 16, 2012).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, but is it a Formula for Malpractice?,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1999).

§ 14-2-319. Determination of indigency; recovery of payment.

1. In determining whether a person is an indigent party for purposes of W.S. 14-2-318 , the court shall consider in addition to any other relevant factors the person’s income, property owned, outstanding obligations and the number and ages of his dependents. In each case the person, subject to the penalties for perjury, shall certify in writing, or by other record, material facts relating to his ability to pay as the court prescribes.
2. To the extent that an indigent party is able to provide for an attorney or for other expenses incurred in defense of an action brought under this act, the court may order that he make payment within a specified period of time or in specified installments.
3. Within eight (8) years after the date the services were rendered, the attorney general may sue on behalf of the state to recover payment or reimbursement from each person who has received legal assistance or another benefit under this act:
   1. To which he was not entitled;
   2. With respect to which he was not an indigent person when he received it; or
   3. With respect to which he has failed to make the certification required by subsection (a) of this section.
4. Within three (3) years after the date the services were rendered, the attorney general may sue on behalf of the state to recover payment or reimbursement from each person other than a person covered by subsection (c) of this section who:
   1. Has received legal assistance or other benefit under this act; and
   2. On the date on which suit is brought is financially able to pay or reimburse the state for all or part of the legal assistance or other benefit according to the standards of ability to pay applicable under this act but refuses to do so.
5. Amounts recovered under this section shall be remitted to the general fund.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 86, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-308(a)(ix).

Cited in

SLJ v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re SJJ), 2005 WY 3, 104 P.3d 74, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (2005).

§ 14-2-401. Short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the Wyoming Parentage Act.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referenced in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

De facto parentage not recognized. —

De facto parentage was not recognized in Wyoming because the legislature (1) defined the mother-child and father-child relationships, when adopting the Wyoming Parentage Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-401 et seq., advisedly, (2) left no gap of sufficient size to permit judicial adoption of the doctrine, and (3) acted extensively to define the parent-child relationship and children's relationships with those not their legal parents. LP v. LF, 2014 WY 152, 338 P.3d 908, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 2014).

Parentage by estoppel not recognized. —

Parentage by estoppel was not recognized in Wyoming because the legislature (1) defined the mother-child and father-child relationships, when adopting the Wyoming Parentage Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-401 et seq., advisedly, (2) left no gap of sufficient size to permit judicial adoption of the doctrine, (3) acted extensively to define the parent-child relationship and children's relationships with those not their legal parents, and (4) created criteria for presumptive parentage, preempting the field. LP v. LF, 2014 WY 152, 338 P.3d 908, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 2014).

Cited in

In re Paternity, JWH v. DAH, 2011 WY 66, 252 P.3d 942, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Apr. 14, 2011); IC v. DW, 2015 WY 135, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Oct. 7, 2015).

§ 14-2-402. Definitions.

1. As used in this act:
   1. “Acknowledged father” means a man who has established a father-child relationship under article 6 of this act;
   2. “Adjudicated father” means a man who has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the father of a child;
   3. “Alleged father” means a man who alleges himself to be, or is alleged to be, the genetic father or a possible genetic father of a child, but whose paternity has not been determined. The term does not include:
      1. A presumed father;
      2. A man whose parental rights have been terminated or declared not to exist; or
      3. A male donor.
   4. “Assisted reproduction” means a method of causing pregnancy other than through sexual intercourse. The term includes:
      1. Intrauterine insemination;
      2. Donation of eggs;
      3. Donation of embryos;
      4. In-vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and
      5. Intracytoplasmic sperm injection.
   5. “Child” means an individual of any age whose parentage may be determined under this act;
   6. “Commence” means to file the initial pleading seeking an adjudication of parentage in a district court of this state;
   7. “Determination of parentage” means the establishment of the parent-child relationship by the signing of a valid acknowledgment of paternity under article 5 of this act or by adjudication by the court;
   8. “Donor” means an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted reproduction, whether or not for consideration. The term does not include:
      1. A husband who provides sperm, or a wife who provides eggs, to be used for assisted reproduction by the wife;
      2. A woman who gives birth to a child by means of assisted reproduction;
      3. A parent under article 9 of this chapter.
   9. “Ethnic or racial group” means, for purposes of genetic testing, a recognized group that an individual identifies as all or part of the individual’s ancestry or that is so identified by other information;
   10. “Genetic testing” means an analysis of genetic markers to exclude or identify a man as the father or a woman as the mother of a child. The term includes an analysis of one (1) or a combination of the following:
       1. Deoxyribonucleic acid; and
       2. Blood-group antigens, red-cell antigens, human-leukocyte antigens, serum enzymes, serum proteins or red-cell enzymes.
   11. “Man” means a male individual of any age;
   12. “Parent” means an individual who has established a parent-child relationship under W.S. 14-2-501 ;
   13. “Parent-child relationship” means the legal relationship between a child and a parent of the child. The term includes the mother-child relationship and the father-child relationship;
   14. “Paternity index” means the likelihood of paternity calculated by computing the ratio between:
       1. The likelihood that the tested man is the father, based on the genetic markers of the tested man, mother and child, conditioned on the hypothesis that the tested man is the father of the child; and
       2. The likelihood that the tested man is not the father, based on the genetic markers of the tested man, mother and child, conditioned on the hypothesis that the tested man is not the father of the child and that the father is of the same ethnic or racial group as the tested man.
   15. “Presumed father” means a man who, by operation of law under W.S. 14-2-504 , is recognized as the father of a child until that status is rebutted or confirmed in a judicial proceeding;
   16. “Probability of paternity” means the measure, for the ethnic or racial group to which the alleged father belongs, of the probability that the man in question is the father of the child, compared with a random, unrelated man of the same ethnic or racial group, expressed as a percentage incorporating the paternity index and a prior probability;
   17. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form;
   18. “Signatory” means an individual who authenticates a record and is bound by its terms;
   19. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
   20. “Title IV-D” means Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act;
   21. “This act” means W.S. 14-2-401 through 14-2-907 .

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-2-403. Scope of act; choice of law.

1. This act applies to every determination of parentage in this state.
2. The court shall apply the law of this state to adjudicate the parent-child relationship. The applicable law does not depend on:
   1. The place of birth of the child; or
   2. The past or present residence of the child.
3. This act does not create, enlarge or diminish parental rights or duties under other law of this state.
4. This act does not authorize or prohibit an agreement between a woman and a man and another woman in which the woman relinquishes all rights as a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction, and which provides that the man and the other woman become the parents of the child. If a birth results under such an agreement and the agreement is unenforceable under Wyoming law, the parent-child relationship is determined as provided in article 4 of this act.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-404. Court of this state.

The district court is authorized to adjudicate parentage under this act.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-405. Protection of participants.

Proceedings under this act are subject to other law of this state governing the health, safety, privacy and liberty of a child or other individual who could be jeopardized by disclosure of identifying information, including address, telephone number, place of employment, social security number and the child’s day-care facility and school.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-406. Determination of maternity.

Provisions of this act relating to determination of paternity apply to determinations of maternity.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-407. Severability clause.

If any provision of this act or its application to an individual or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-408. Free transcript for appeal.

If a party is financially unable to pay the cost of a transcript, the court shall furnish on request a transcript for purposes of appeal under this act.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-501. Establishment of parent-child relationship.

1. The mother-child relationship is established between a woman and a child by:
   1. The woman’s having given birth to the child;
   2. An adjudication of the woman’s maternity; or
   3. Adoption of the child by the woman.
2. The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child by:
   1. An unrebutted presumption of the man’s paternity of the child under W.S. 14-2-504 ;
   2. An effective acknowledgment of paternity by the man under article 6 of this act, unless the acknowledgment has been rescinded or successfully challenged;
   3. An adjudication of the man’s paternity;
   4. Adoption of the child by the man; or
   5. The man’s having consented to assisted reproduction by his wife under article 9 of this act which resulted in the birth of the child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1; 2017, ch. 172, § 1.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (b)(v) substituted “article 9 of this act” for “article 8 of this act.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Not giving biological father same procedure to establish paternity as mother not unconstitutional. —

The failure to give the biological father the same procedure to establish paternity or nonpaternity as is given to the mother does not unconstitutionally deprive the father of due process oflaw nor equal protection of the law by virtue of an impermissible gender-based classification. A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982); A v. X, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982).

Statutes permit award to state of child support and other expenses. —

Former provisions were broad enough to permit an award, on the petition of the state, for child support owing the child's mother and other expenses. Holtz v. State, 847 P.2d 972, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1993).

State bound to protect child's right to legitimacy. —

Even in this era of no-fault divorce, frequent premarital sex, cohabitation and new attitudes toward child rearing, a child has a right to legitimacy and that right is one the state is bound to protect during minority. A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982).

Intestacy. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-107 is unequivocally one-sided and does not establish mutuality for inheritance purposes because adoptive parents have all relevant rights after an adoption, and the terms “mother” and “father” mean the adoptive parents; therefore, a district court erred by entering judgment in favor of several biological siblings because a niece was the only true heir of a decedent, who, along with the niece’s father, had been adopted. Shippey v. Rogers (In re Estate of Kirkpatrick), 2003 WY 125, 77 P.3d 404, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2003).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Relationship between victim and plaintiff-witness as affecting right to recover damages in negligence for shock or mental anguish, 94 ALR3d 486.

Marital status of prospective adopting parents as factor in adoption proceedings, 2 ALR4th 555.

Initial award or denial of child custody to homosexual or lesbian parent, 62 ALR5th 591.

Stepparent's postdivorce duty to support stepchild, 44 ALR4th 520.

Parental rights of man who is not biological or adoptive father of child but was husband or cohabitant of mother when child was conceived or born, 84 ALR4th 655.

Custodial parent's homosexual or lesbian relationship with third person as justifying modification of child custody order, 65 ALR5th 591.

§ 14-2-502. No discrimination based on marital status.

A child born to parents who are not married to each other has the same rights under the law as a child born to parents who are married to each other.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-503. Consequences of establishment of parentage.

Unless parental rights are terminated, a parent-child relationship established under this act applies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically provided by other law of this state.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-504. Presumption of paternity in context of marriage.

1. A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:
   1. He and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage;
   2. He and the mother of the child were married to each other and the child is born within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, divorce or after the entry of a decree of separation;
   3. Before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in apparent compliance with law, even if the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born during the invalid marriage or within three hundred (300) days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, divorce or after the entry of a decree of separation;
   4. After the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in apparent compliance with law, whether or not the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and he voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child, and:
      1. The assertion is in a record filed with the state office of vital records;
      2. He agreed to be and is named as the child’s father on the child’s birth certificate; or
      3. He promised in a record to support the child as his own.
   5. For the first two (2) years of the child’s life, he resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.
2. A presumption of paternity established under this section may be rebutted only by an adjudication under article 8 of this act.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

Not giving biological father same procedure to establish paternity as mother not unconstitutional. —

The failure to give the biological father the same procedure to establish paternity or nonpaternity as is given to the mother does not unconstitutionally deprive the father of due process of law nor equal protection of the law by virtue of an impermissible gender-based classification. A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982).

Presumed father was barred from contesting parentage of children by his failure to bring his action within a “reasonable time” pursuant to former § 14-2-104(a)(ii) [repealed] and by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel. In re Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1991).

Where the record demonstrated that the defendant was the presumed father of a child under this section by virtue of the fact that he married the child's natural mother and became obligated to pay child support through a Utah divorce decree, the paternity action was barred by the United States constitution's full faith and credit clause, res judicata, Wyoming precedent and this section's limitations period. Livingston v. Vanderiet, 861 P.2d 549, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1993).

Best interests of the children is standard to resolve paternity dispute. —

Where the mother's husband asserted paternity under the marital presumption provided in former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102(a)(i), now § 14-2-504(a)(i), and the mother's boyfriend asserted paternity under the holding out presumption of former § 14-2-102(a)(iv), now § 14-2-504(a)(v), the trial court was required to consider the best interests of the children and look to the presumption based on the weightier considerations of policy and logic as provided in former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102(b), now § 14-2-504(b). The trial court's decision finding that the boyfriend was the father of the children was supported by the record and simply confirmed and gave legal effect to a relationship that existed throughout the children's lives and did not impermissibly interfere with any rights the husband might have had stemming from his marriage to the children's mother. GDK v. State, 2004 WY 78, 92 P.3d 834, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 2004).

Presumption rebutted. —

Putative father was not a child's presumptive parent, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-504(a)(v), because the putative father stipulated to the accuracy and admissibility of a paternity test conclusively proving the putative father could not be the biological father, rebutting any presumption beyond any doubt. LP v. LF, 2014 WY 152, 338 P.3d 908, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 2014).

Action to declare nonexistence of presumptive father/child relationship time barred. —

Biological mother's action to declare the nonexistence of a presumptive father and child relationship, where the issue was not contested until almost four years after all of the relevant facts were known, was time barred under the statute that requires the action to be brought within a reasonable time. In re Adoption of R.S.C., 837 P.2d 1089, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 1992).

Where no timely action has been instituted within five years of a child's birth to declare the nonexistence of a father and child relationship, the statutory presumption of paternity becomes absolute, and any action to establish another's paternity is foreclosed. JA v. CJH, 923 P.2d 758, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 1996).

Presumption arising from marriage controls. —

The presumption of paternity found in former § 14-2-102(a)(i) controlled over the presumption in former § 14-2-102(a)(iv). This state has made a policy choice in favor of legitimacy. That choice is based on social considerations of the family unit and the child, which go beyond the marriage itself. LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S. Ct. 195, 130 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 6327 (U.S. 1994).

The proper construction of former § 14-2-102(c), when read in accord with the related paternity statute, § 35-1-411 , is that the mother cannot file an affidavit of paternity if she was married either at the time of conception or the time of birth of the child. Department of Family Servs., Div. of Public Assistance & Social Servs. v. PAJ, 934 P.2d 1257, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1997).

Conflicting presumptions. —

Presumptive father failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to meet his burden of proving that results of genetic test favoring another man were inaccurate or somehow deficient. TL v. CS, 975 P.2d 1065, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1999).

Failure to adhere to procedural requirements. —

Although failure to adhere to the procedural requirements of the statutes governing establishment of paternity of a child receiving aid from the department of family services may cause a judgment rendered under those statutes to be void, where the defendant had notice of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and was accorded the process due under all the circumstances of his case, the district court did not err in entering default against the defendant, nor did it abuse its discretion in refusing the defendant relief from that default. A.P. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 849 P.2d 703, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1993).

Blood or DNA test not required. —

Nothing in former § 14-2-102(b)'s language dictates that a blood or DNA test is a prerequisite to determining which of two presumptions is “founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.” LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S. Ct. 195, 130 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 6327 (U.S. 1994).

Where evidence supports finding of paternity. —

Although the court did not make a specific finding that defendant was the father, it did find that the natural mother and presumptive father were separated during the conceptive period and without sexual access, that such access had existed between the mother and defendant, that there was no evidence of sexual access by a third party and that the testimony rebutted the presumption of parentage by the presumptive father. Accordingly, the trial court found the defendant to be the father. Vigil v. Tafoya, 600 P.2d 721, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 457 (Wyo. 1979).

Res judicata barred plaintiff's second action to establish his paternity and to rebut presumed paternity of mother's husband where involuntary dismissal of first suit for failure to appear was adjudication on the merits and facts, parties, claims and issues raised or that could have been raised were the same; fact that defendants were divorced after first suit did not alter identity of parties nor provide basis for a different claim. CLS v. CLJ, 693 P.2d 774, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 424 (Wyo. 1985).

Action by child not barred by prior action by mother. —

A child who has not been included as a party in any prior paternity case nor any prior divorce action cannot be foreclosed by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or judicial estoppel with respect to the child's subsequent effort to achieve determination of paternity. RKS v. SDM by TY (In re SDM), 882 P.2d 1217, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1994).

Summary judgment appropriate. —

The court was correct in finding that a father was entitled to the two statutory presumptions as a matter of law, and where the presumptions were unrebutted, he was entitled to summary judgment. KC v. KM (In re IC), 941 P.2d 46, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 1997).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Recognition of child within statutes affecting status or rights of illegitimates, 33 ALR2d 705.

Proof of husband's impotency or sterility as rebutting presumption of legitimacy, 84 ALR3d 495.

Who may dispute presumption of legitimacy of child conceived or born during wedlock, 90 ALR3d 1032.

§ 14-2-601. Acknowledgment of paternity.

1. The mother of a child and a man claiming to be the genetic father of the child may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with intent to establish the man’s paternity.
2. An acknowledgment of paternity of a child born in Wyoming may be filed with the state office of vital records.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-602. Execution of acknowledgment of paternity.

1. An acknowledgment of paternity shall:
   1. Be in a record;
   2. Be signed, or otherwise authenticated, under penalty for false swearing by the mother and by the man seeking to establish his paternity;
   3. State that the child whose paternity is being acknowledged:
      1. Does not have a presumed father, or has a presumed father whose full name is stated; and
      2. Does not have another acknowledged or adjudicated father.
   4. State whether there has been genetic testing and, if so, that the acknowledging man’s claim of paternity is consistent with the results of the testing; and
   5. State that the signatories understand that the acknowledgment is the equivalent of a judicial adjudication of paternity of the child and that a challenge to the acknowledgment is permitted only under limited circumstances and is barred after two (2) years.
2. An acknowledgment of paternity is void if it:
   1. States that another man is a presumed father, unless a denial of paternity signed or otherwise authenticated by the presumed father or a court order rebutting the presumption is filed with the state office of vital records;
   2. States that another man is an acknowledged or adjudicated father; or
   3. Falsely denies the existence of a presumed, acknowledged or adjudicated father of the child.
3. A presumed father may sign or otherwise authenticate an acknowledgment of paternity.
4. Before a mother and a man claiming to be the genetic father of a child can sign an acknowledgment of paternity affidavit, the mother and the alleged father shall be provided notice orally or through use of video or audio equipment and in writing of the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, and the rights and responsibilities that arise from, signing the acknowledgment of paternity affidavit. If either the mother or the alleged father is a minor, any rights that attach as a result of the status as a minor shall also be provided orally or through the use of video or audio equipment and in writing, in addition to any other requirements of this subsection.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1; 2004, ch. 10, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, added (d).

§ 14-2-603. Denial of paternity.

1. A presumed father may sign a denial of his paternity. The denial is valid only if:
   1. An acknowledgment of paternity signed, or otherwise authenticated, by another man is filed pursuant to W.S. 14-2-605 ;
   2. The denial is in a record, and is signed, or otherwise authenticated, under penalty of perjury; and
   3. The presumed father has not previously:
      1. Acknowledged his paternity, unless the previous acknowledgment has been rescinded pursuant to W.S. 14-2-607 or successfully challenged pursuant to W.S. 14-2-608 ; or
      2. Been adjudicated to be the father of the child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-2-604. Rules for acknowledgment and denial of paternity.

1. An acknowledgment of paternity and a denial of paternity may be contained in a single document or may be signed in counterparts, and may be filed separately or simultaneously. If the acknowledgement and denial are both necessary, neither is valid until both are filed.
2. An acknowledgment of paternity or a denial of paternity may be signed before the birth of the child.
3. Subject to subsection (a) of this section, an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity takes effect on the birth of the child or the filing of the document with the state office of vital records, whichever occurs later.
4. An acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity signed by a minor and a legal guardian of the minor is valid if it is otherwise in compliance with this act.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-605. Effect of acknowledgment or denial of paternity.

1. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 14-2-607 and 14-2-608 , a valid acknowledgment of paternity filed with the state office of vital records is equivalent to an adjudication of paternity of a child and confers upon the acknowledged father all of the rights and duties of a parent.
2. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 14-2-607 and 14-2-608 , a valid denial of paternity by a presumed father filed with the state office of vital records in conjunction with a valid acknowledgment of paternity is equivalent to an adjudication of the nonpaternity of the presumed father and discharges the presumed father from all rights and duties of a parent.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For note, “Enforcement of Civil Liability for Nonsupport in the State of Wyoming,” see VIII Wyo. L.J. 227 (1954).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and construction of putative father's promise to support or provide for illegitimate child, 20 A.L.R.3d 500 (2009).

§ 14-2-606. No filing fee.

The state office of vital records shall not charge for filing an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-607. Proceeding for rescission.

1. A signatory may rescind an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity by commencing a proceeding to rescind before the earlier of:
   1. Sixty (60) days after the effective date of the acknowledgment or denial, as provided in W.S. 14-2-604 ; or
   2. The date of the first hearing in a proceeding to which the signatory is a party before a court to adjudicate an issue relating to the child, including a proceeding that establishes support.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-2-608. Challenge after expiration of period for rescission.

1. After the period for rescission under W.S. 14-2-607 has expired, a signatory of an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity may commence a proceeding to challenge the acknowledgment or denial only:
   1. On the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact; and
   2. Within two (2) years after the acknowledgment or denial is filed with the state office of vital records.
2. A party challenging an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity has the burden of proof.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-609. Procedure for rescission or challenge.

1. Every signatory to an acknowledgment of paternity and any related denial of paternity shall be made a party to a proceeding to rescind or challenge the acknowledgment or denial.
2. For the purpose of rescission of, or challenge to, an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity, a signatory submits to personal jurisdiction of this state by signing the acknowledgment or denial, effective upon the filing of the document with the state office of vital records.
3. Except for good cause shown, during the pendency of a proceeding to rescind or challenge an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity, the court may not suspend the legal responsibilities of a signatory arising from the acknowledgment, including the duty to pay child support.
4. A proceeding to rescind or to challenge an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity shall be conducted in the same manner as a proceeding to adjudicate parentage under article 8 of this act.
5. At the conclusion of a proceeding to rescind or challenge an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity, the court shall order the state office of vital records to amend the birth record of the child, if appropriate.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-610. Ratification barred.

A court or administrative agency conducting a judicial or administrative proceeding is not required or permitted to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-611. Full faith and credit.

A court of this state shall give full faith and credit to an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity effective in another state if the acknowledgment or denial has been signed and is otherwise in compliance with the law of the other state.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-612. Forms for acknowledgment and denial of paternity.

1. To facilitate compliance with this article, the state office of vital records shall prescribe forms for the acknowledgment of paternity and the denial of paternity.
2. A valid acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity is not affected by a later modification of the prescribed form.
3. Every hospital or birthing center located in the state shall provide to any person who holds himself out to be the natural parent of a child born in the state an affidavit of paternity pursuant to this act. The facility providing the affidavit shall forward the completed affidavit to the state office of vital records. Upon request, the state office of vital records shall provide blank affidavits of paternity to any facility making the request under this subsection.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-613. Release of information.

The state office of vital records may release information relating to the acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity to a signatory of the acknowledgment or denial, to courts and to the Title IV-D agency of this or another state.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-614. Adoption of rules.

The state office of vital records may adopt rules to implement this article.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-701. Scope of article.

1. This article governs genetic testing of an individual to determine parentage, whether the individual:
   1. Voluntarily submits to testing; or
   2. Is tested pursuant to an order of the court or a child support enforcement agency.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-2-702. Order for testing.

1. Except as otherwise provided in this article and article 8 of this act, the court shall order the child and other designated individuals to submit to genetic testing if the request for testing is supported by the sworn statement of a party to the proceeding:
   1. Alleging paternity and stating facts establishing a reasonable probability of the requisite sexual contact between the individuals; or
   2. Denying paternity and stating facts establishing a possibility that sexual contact between the individuals, if any, did not result in the conception of the child.
2. A child support enforcement agency may order genetic testing only if there is no presumed, acknowledged or adjudicated father.
3. If a request for genetic testing of a child is made before birth, the court or child support enforcement agency may not order in-utero testing.
4. If two (2) or more men are subject to court-ordered genetic testing, the testing may be ordered concurrently or sequentially.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

Petition improperly denied.—

District court erred in denying the petition to establish paternity where although it had discretion to determine the timeliness of a paternity petition before ordering testing, the statutes did not afford it discretion on the timeliness of a petition after ordering genetic testing. Specifically, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-817 did not afford the court discretion to deny a petition to establish paternity after ordering genetic testing pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-702 , the results of which had met the threshold established by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-705(a). TE v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re AAAE), 2020 WY 117, 471 P.3d 990, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2020).

§ 14-2-703. Requirements for genetic testing.

1. Genetic testing shall be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of genetic testing and performed in a testing laboratory accredited by:
   1. The American Association of Blood Banks, or a successor to its functions;
   2. The American Society for Histocompatibility and Immunogenetics, or a successor to its functions; or
   3. An accrediting body designated by the United States secretary of health and human services.
2. A specimen used in genetic testing may consist of one (1) or more samples, or a combination of samples, of blood, buccal cells, bone, hair, or other body tissue or fluid. The specimen used in the testing is not required to be of the same kind for each individual undergoing genetic testing.
3. Based on the ethnic or racial group of an individual, the testing laboratory shall determine the databases from which to select frequencies for use in calculation of the probability of paternity. If there is disagreement as to the testing laboratory’s choice, the following rules apply:
   1. The individual objecting may require the testing laboratory, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the report of the test, to recalculate the probability of paternity using an ethnic or racial group different from that used by the laboratory.
   2. The individual objecting to the testing laboratory’s initial choice shall:
      1. If the frequencies are not available to the testing laboratory for the ethnic or racial group requested, provide the requested frequencies compiled in a manner recognized by accrediting bodies; or
      2. Engage another testing laboratory to perform the calculations.
   3. The testing laboratory may use its own statistical estimate if there is a question regarding which ethnic or racial group is appropriate. If available, the testing laboratory shall calculate the frequencies using statistics for any other ethnic or racial group requested.
4. If, after recalculation using a different ethnic or racial group, genetic testing does not rebuttably identify a man as the father of a child under W.S. 14-2-605 , an individual who has been tested may be required to submit to additional genetic testing.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

Most of the following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Construction. —

District court did not err by looking to the genetic testing provision in former § 14-2-109 and finding that the mother's husband at the time of the child's birth was the biological father of her child; the district court properly construed the statute in pari materia with other statutes. RWR v. EKB (State ex rel. NDB), 2001 WY 118, 35 P.3d 1224, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2001).

Genetic testing, upon parties' agreement, not necessary. —

While genetic testing may presumptively be necessary in a paternity action, the presumption can be effectively rebutted by the agreement of the parties. In re Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1991).

Conflicting presumptions. —

Presumptive father failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to meet his burden of proving that results of genetic test favoring another man were inaccurate or somehow deficient. TL v. CS, 975 P.2d 1065, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1999).

Cited in

GDK v. State, 2004 WY 78, 92 P.3d 834, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (2004).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Who may dispute presumption of legitimacy of child conceived or born during wedlock, 90 ALR3d 1032.

Admissibility and weight of blood-grouping tests in disputed paternity cases, 43 ALR4th 579.

Authentication of blood sample taken from human body for purposes other than determining blood alcohol content, 77 ALR5th 201.

§ 14-2-704. Report of genetic testing.

1. A report of genetic testing shall be in a record and signed under penalty of perjury by a designee of the testing laboratory. A report made under the requirements of this article is self-authenticating.
2. Documentation from the testing laboratory of the following information is sufficient to establish a reliable chain of custody that allows the results of genetic testing to be admissible without testimony:
   1. The names and photographs of the individuals whose specimens have been taken;
   2. The names of the individuals who collected the specimens;
   3. The places and dates the specimens were collected;
   4. The names of the individuals who received the specimens in the testing laboratory; and
   5. The dates the specimens were received.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-705. Genetic testing results; rebuttal.

1. Under this act, a man is rebuttably identified as the father of a child if the genetic testing complies with this article and the results disclose that:
   1. The man has at least a ninety-nine percent (99%) probability of paternity, using a prior probability of one-half (1/2), as calculated by using the combined paternity index obtained in the testing; and
   2. A combined paternity index of at least one hundred (100) to one (1).
2. A man identified under subsection (a) of this section as the father of the child may rebut the genetic testing results only by other genetic testing satisfying the requirements of this article which:
   1. Excludes the man as a genetic father of the child; or
   2. Identifies another man as the possible father of the child.
3. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 14-2-710 , if more than one (1) man is identified by genetic testing as the possible father of the child, the court shall order them to submit to further genetic testing to identify the genetic father.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

Petition improperly denied.—

District court erred in denying the petition to establish paternity where although it had discretion to determine the timeliness of a paternity petition before ordering testing, the statutes did not afford it discretion on the timeliness of a petition after ordering genetic testing. Specifically, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-817 did not afford the court discretion to deny a petition to establish paternity after ordering genetic testing pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-702 , the results of which had met the threshold established by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-705(a). TE v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re AAAE), 2020 WY 117, 471 P.3d 990, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2020).

Expert testimony. —

Even if the district court erred in applying the current version of this section rather than the version that was in effect in 1992 in excluding the testimony of the father's expert disputed two genetic tests determining that he was the child's father, the error was harmless because the father's proffered evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. The first genetic test that determined that the father was not the child's biological father was not simply a problem with the test itself, but rather that samples had been accidentally switched, and those test results were not those of the father, the child, and the child's mother, but rather were the results for three different people; therefore, any expert opinion based on the first test was irrelevant as to whether the father was the child's father. RK v. State ex rel. Natrona County Child Support Enforcement Dep't, 2008 WY 1, 174 P.3d 166, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 2008).

Trial court did not commit plain error by admitting the State's expert's testimony regarding Wyoming's statutory paternity presumption where it was admitted to support uncharged misconduct under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) and there was no indication that the State relied on the evidence to shift its burden of proof to defendant. The expert testified regarding the presumption only to give context to the laboratory process, she testified that DNA testing showed that defendant was the father of the child victim's baby, three other witnesses testified that defendant was the baby's father, and the victim testified that defendant sexually assaulted her on five different occasions. Snyder v. State, 2015 WY 91, 353 P.3d 693, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2015).

§ 14-2-706. Costs of genetic testing.

1. Subject to assessment of costs under article 7 of this act, the cost of initial genetic testing shall be advanced:
   1. By a child support enforcement agency in a proceeding in which the agency is providing services;
   2. By the individual who made the request;
   3. As agreed by the parties; or
   4. As ordered by the court.
2. In cases in which the cost is advanced by the child support enforcement agency, the agency may seek reimbursement from a man who is rebuttably identified as the father.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Awards found proper. —

Where mother admitted at hearing that she never really doubted father's paternity, but she had denied paternity from date of father's original petition, she was properly ordered to pay part of father's attorney's fees and genetic testing costs. KC v. KJM (In re IC), 971 P.2d 603, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1999).

An award of costs was proper where presumptive father improperly continued to contest paternity, and did not prevail on remand after summary judgment in his favor was reversed. TL v. CS, 975 P.2d 1065, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1999).

Government agencies may pay cost. —

The Wyoming Parentage Act contemplates department of family services (DFS) will be a party to some actions under this title. An agency cannot bring an action and then claim it is not a party; since DFS is a party, this section authorizes an award of attorney fees. Department of Family Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs. v. DDM, 877 P.2d 259, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 1994).

Incurred costs must be reasonable. —

The discretion afforded to the trial court with respect to the assessment of costs is not absolute. It must be exercised in accordance with the rule that costs which are awarded to a litigant are limited in amount to those which the evidence shows actually have been incurred and shows to be reasonable. In re SAJ, 781 P.2d 528, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 216 (Wyo. 1989), (decided under prior law).

No abuse of discretion in court's denial of attorney fees.—

See LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S. Ct. 195, 130 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 6327 (U.S. 1994).

§ 14-2-707. Additional genetic testing.

The court or the child support enforcement agency shall order additional genetic testing upon the request of a party who contests the result of the original testing. If the previous genetic testing identified a man as the father of the child under W.S. 14-2-705 , the court or agency may not order additional testing unless the party provides advance payment for the testing.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-708. Deceased individual.

For good cause shown, the court may order genetic testing of a deceased individual.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-709. Identical brothers.

1. The court may order genetic testing of a brother of a man identified as the father of a child if the man is commonly believed to have an identical brother and evidence suggests that the brother may be the genetic father of the child.
2. If each brother satisfies the requirements as the identified father of the child under W.S. 14-2-705 without consideration of another identical brother being identified as the father of the child, the court may rely on nongenetic evidence to adjudicate which brother is the father of the child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-710. Confidentiality of genetic testing.

1. In all cases where paternity testing is undertaken, all genetic information, including genetic material and test results, shall be maintained only as long as an accreditation body specified in W.S. 14-2-703 requires such materials to be maintained for accreditation purposes. Thereafter, all materials shall be destroyed or returned to the individual from whom the information was obtained.
2. No testing shall be conducted on any identifiable genetic material for purposes other than paternity determination without the written consent of the individual from whom the genetic material is obtained.
3. All information obtained from identifiable genetic material submitted or used for determination of paternity shall be confidential and used solely for the purposes of determining paternity, unless individual identifiers are removed from the data used for purposes other than establishing paternity.
4. For purposes of this section, “genetic information” means any information about genes, gene products or inherited characteristics that may derive from the individual or a family member, including, but not limited to, information:
   1. Regarding carrier status;
   2. Regarding an increased likelihood of future disease or increased sensitivity to any substance;
   3. Derived from laboratory tests that identify mutations in specific genes or chromosomes, physical medical examinations, family histories, requests for genetic services or counseling, tests of gene products and direct analysis of genes or chromosomes.
5. Release of any information obtained in paternity testing without the written consent of the individual from whom the genetic material is obtained to anyone not directly involved in the paternity determination shall be a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or both fine and imprisonment.
6. An individual who intentionally releases an identifiable specimen of another individual for any purpose other than that relevant to the proceeding regarding parentage without a court order or the written permission of the individual who furnished the specimen commits a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or both fine and imprisonment.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-801. Proceeding authorized.

A civil proceeding may be maintained to adjudicate the parentage of a child. The proceeding is governed by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Action for support civil in nature. —

Where the purpose of the proceeding is simply to compel the putative father to support his child, it is almost universally held to be a civil proceeding and governed by the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. X v. Y, 482 P.2d 688, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1971) (decided under prior law).

§ 14-2-802. Standing to maintain proceeding.

1. Subject to article 5 of this act and W.S. 14-2-807 and 14-2-809 , a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by:
   1. The child;
   2. The mother of the child;
   3. A man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated;
   4. The child support enforcement agency;
   5. An authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency; or
   6. A representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated or a minor.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

Editor's notes. —

Most of the following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Not giving biological father same procedure to establish paternity as mother not unconstitutional. —

The failure to give the biological father the same procedure to establish paternity or nonpaternity as is given to the mother does not unconstitutionally deprive the father of due process of law nor equal protection of the law by virtue of an impermissible gender-based classification. A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982).

No privity between mother and child. —

Since the child could have been made a party, and this section recognizes a separate action by the child, there was no privity between the mother and the child for purposes of the paternity issue in either a divorce action or a paternity action. RKS v. SDM by TY (In re SDM), 882 P.2d 1217, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1994).

A child who has not been included as a party in any prior paternity case nor any prior divorce action cannot be foreclosed by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or judicial estoppel with respect to the child's subsequent effort to achieve determination of paternity. RKS v. SDM by TY (In re SDM), 882 P.2d 1217, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1994).

At common law, biological father could not bring action for paternity. A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982).

Consideration of plaintiff. —

The child, the natural mother, or the presumed father can bring an action at any time to formally declare the existence of the presumed father and child relationship. JA v. CJH, 923 P.2d 758, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 1996).

Failure to adhere to procedural requirements. —

Although failure to adhere to the procedural requirements of the statutes governing establishment of paternity of a child receiving aid from the department of family services may cause a judgment rendered under those statutes to be void, where the defendant had notice of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and was accorded the process due under all the circumstances of his case, the district court did not err in entering default against the defendant, nor did it abuse its discretion in refusing the defendant relief from that default. A.P. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 849 P.2d 703, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1993).

Leave to amend. —

The trial court acted within its discretion in allowing a father to file a second amended petition asserting that he was the presumptive, not putative, father in order to avoid the statute of limitations; allowing such amendment did not prejudice the mother. KC v. KM (In re IC), 941 P.2d 46, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 1997).

Award of costs was proper where presumptive father improperly continued to contest paternity, and did not prevail on remand after summary judgment in his favor was reversed. TL v. CS, 975 P.2d 1065, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1999).

Government agencies may pay cost. —

The former Wyoming Parentage Act contemplated department of family services (DFS) would be a party to some actions under this title. An agency could not bring an action and then claim it was not a party; since DFS was a party, former § 14-2-114 (repealed) authorized an award of attorney fees. Department of Family Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs. v. DDM, 877 P.2d 259, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 1994).

No assumption of costs for retained counsel. —

The appointment of counsel is a condition precedent to the department's obligation to assume the cost of representation. State by Department of Family Servs. v. Jennings, 818 P.2d 1149, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1991) (decided prior law).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect of death of child prior to institution of bastardy proceedings by mother, 7 ALR2d 1397.

Maintainability of bastardy proceeding by infant prosecutrix in own name and right, 50 ALR2d 1029.

Maintainability of bastardy proceeding against infant defendant without appointment of guardian ad litem, 69 ALR2d 1379.

Right of mentally incompetent mother to institute bastardy proceedings, 71 ALR2d 1247.

Death of putative father as precluding action for determination of paternity or for child support, 58 ALR3d 188.

Who may dispute presumption of legitimacy of child conceived or born during wedlock, 90 ALR3d 1032.

Right of indigent defendant in paternity suit to have assistance of counsel at state expense, 4 ALR4th 363.

Right of illegitimate child to maintain action to determine paternity, 86 ALR5th 637.

§ 14-2-803. Parties to proceeding.

1. The following individuals shall be joined as parties in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage:
   1. The mother of the child; and
   2. A man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Most of the following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Department of family services as party. —

An agency cannot bring an action and then claim it is not a party. Department of family services (DFS) initiated the action, participated and exercised control over the proceedings, and was a real party in interest who stood to benefit from identifying the father; just because DFS was required by statute to bring this action is irrelevant to whether the agency is a party. Department of Family Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs. v. DDM, 877 P.2d 259, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 1994).

Decree of paternity was void where the child was not made a party to the action nor was a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the child's best interests in the proceeding or in negotiating the agreement which the court adopted in its decree, and where the agreement was not the product of the required informal hearing or the recommendation of the court. In re TLB, 771P.2d 811, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1989).

No privity between mother and child. —

Since the child could have been made a party, and former § 14-2-104 (repealed) recognized a separate action by the child, there was no privity between the mother and the child for purposes of the paternity issue in either a divorce action or a paternity action. RKS v. SDM by TY (In re SDM), 882 P.2d 1217, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1994).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, but is it a Formula for Malpractice?,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1999).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Marriage of woman to one other than defendant as affecting bastardy proceeding, 98 ALR2d 256.

Necessity or propriety of appointment of independent guardian for child who is subject of paternity proceedings, 70 ALR4th 1033.

§ 14-2-804. Personal jurisdiction.

1. An individual may not be adjudicated to be a parent unless the court has personal jurisdiction over the individual.
2. A court of this state having jurisdiction to adjudicate parentage may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, or the guardian or conservator of the individual, if the conditions prescribed in W.S. 20-4-142 are met.
3. Lack of jurisdiction over one (1) individual does not preclude the court from making an adjudication of parentage binding on another individual over whom the court has personal jurisdiction.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

No privity between mother and child. —

Since the child could have been made a party, and former § 14-2-104 (repealed) recognized a separate action by the child, there was no privity between the mother and the child for purposes of the paternity issue in either a divorce action or a paternity action. RKS v. SDM by TY (In re SDM), 882 P.2d 1217, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1994).

Failure to adhere to procedural requirements. —

Although failure to adhere to the procedural requirements of the statutes governing establishment of paternity of a child receiving aid from the department of family services may cause a judgment rendered under those statutes to be void, where the defendant had notice of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and was accorded the process due under all the circumstances of his case, the district court did not err in entering default against the defendant, nor did it abuse its discretion in refusing the defendant relief from that default. A.P. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 849 P.2d 703, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1993).

Failure to allege facts showing residence. —

See Myuskovich v. State, 59 Wyo. 406, 141 P.2d 540, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1943).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of nonresident mother to maintain bastardy proceeding, 57 ALR2d 689.

Long-arm statutes: obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident parent in filiation or support proceeding, 76 ALR3d 708.

Death of obligor parent as affecting decree for support of child, 14 ALR5th 557.

§ 14-2-805. Venue.

1. Venue for a proceeding to adjudicate parentage is in the county of this state in which:
   1. The child resides or is found;
   2. The respondent resides or is found if the child does not reside in this state; or
   3. A proceeding for probate or administration of the presumed or alleged father’s estate has been commenced.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-2-806. No limitation; child having no presumed, acknowledged or adjudicated father.

1. A proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having no presumed, acknowledged or adjudicated father may be commenced at any time, even after:
   1. The child becomes an adult but only if the child initiates the proceeding; or
   2. An earlier proceeding to adjudicate paternity has been dismissed based on the application of a statute of limitation then in effect.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it apears in the printed acts.

§ 14-2-807. Limitation; child having presumed father.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a proceeding brought by a presumed father, the mother, or another individual to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed father shall be commenced within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts, but in no event later than five (5) years after the child’s birth.
2. A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship between a child and the child’s presumed father may be maintained at any time if the court determines that:
   1. The presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception; and
   2. The presumed father never openly held out the child as his own.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Applicability.—

In a paternity action, while the child at issue had a presumed father, that being the mother’s husband, petitioner, who had relations with the mother as part of the parties open relationship, had standing under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-802 to bring a paternity action. This section was a statute of limitations and did not otherwise modify the standing granted in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-802 . BJ v. KM, 2021 WY 37, 481 P.3d 1138, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 2021).

§ 14-2-808. Authority to deny motion for genetic testing.

1. In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed father or to challenge the paternity of a child having an acknowledged father, the court may deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing of the mother, the child and the presumed or acknowledged father if the court determines that:
   1. The conduct of the mother or the presumed or acknowledged father estops that party from denying parentage; and
   2. It would be inequitable to disprove the father-child relationship between the child and the presumed or acknowledged father.
2. In determining whether to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing under this section, the court shall consider the best interest of the child, including the following factors:
   1. The length of time between the proceeding to adjudicate parentage and the time that the presumed or acknowledged father was placed on notice that he might not be the genetic father;
   2. The length of time during which the presumed or acknowledged father has assumed the role of father of the child;
   3. The facts surrounding the presumed or acknowledged father’s discovery of his possible nonpaternity;
   4. The nature of the relationship between the child and the presumed or acknowledged father;
   5. The age of the child;
   6. The harm that may result to the child if presumed or acknowledged paternity is successfully disproved;
   7. The nature of the relationship between the child and any alleged father;
   8. The extent to which the passage of time reduces the chances of establishing the paternity of another man and a child support obligation in favor of the child; and
   9. Other factors that may affect the equities arising from the disruption of the father-child relationship between the child and the presumed or acknowledged father or the chance of other harm to the child.
3. In a proceeding involving the application of this section, a minor or incapacitated child shall be represented by a guardian ad litem.
4. Denial of a motion seeking an order for genetic testing shall be based on clear and convincing evidence.
5. If the court denies a motion seeking an order for genetic testing, it shall issue an order adjudicating the presumed father to be the father of the child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Presumption that blood, genetic tests necessary rebuttable.—

While blood or genetic tests are presumptively necessary in a paternity action, that presumption may be rebutted. In re SAJ, 781 P.2d 528, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 216 (Wyo. 1989), (decided under prior law).

§ 14-2-809. Limitation; child having acknowledged or adjudicated father.

1. If a child has an acknowledged father, a signatory to the acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity may commence a proceeding seeking to rescind the acknowledgement or denial or challenge the paternity of the child only within the time allowed under W.S. 14-2-607 or 14-2-608 .
2. If a child has an acknowledged father or an adjudicated father, an individual, other than the child, who is neither a signatory to the acknowledgment of paternity nor a party to the adjudication and who seeks an adjudication of paternity of the child shall commence a proceeding not later than two (2) years after the effective date of the acknowledgment or adjudication.
3. A proceeding under this section is subject to the application of the principles of estoppel established under W.S. 14-2-808 .

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-810. Joinder of proceedings.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be joined with a proceeding for adoption, termination of parental rights, child custody or visitation, child support, divorce, annulment, legal separation or separate maintenance, probate or administration of an estate or other appropriate proceeding.
2. A respondent may not join a proceeding described in subsection (a) of this section with a proceeding to adjudicate parentage brought under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Cross references. —

For the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, see § 20-4-139 et seq.

Standing.—

Department of Family Services could not challenge the district court’s order adjudicating petitioner’s paternity where it was not a party to the paternity action, and the joinder of the proceedings did not change the Department’s status as a nonparty in the paternity action. TE v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re AAAE), 2020 WY 117, 471 P.3d 990, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2020).

§ 14-2-811. Proceeding before birth.

1. A proceeding to determine parentage may be commenced before the birth of the child, but may not be concluded until after the birth of the child. The following actions may be taken before the birth of the child:
   1. Service of process;
   2. Discovery; and
   3. Except as prohibited by W.S. 14-2-702 , collection of specimens for genetic testing.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it apears in the printed acts.

§ 14-2-812. Child as party; representation.

1. A minor child is a permissible party, but is not a necessary party to a proceeding under this article.
2. The court shall appoint an attorney to represent the best interest of a minor or incapacitated child if the child is a party or the court finds that the interests of the child are not adequately represented.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-813. Admissibility of results of genetic testing; expenses.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a record of a genetic testing expert is admissible as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted in the report unless a party objects to its admission within fourteen (14) days after its receipt by the objecting party and cites specific grounds for exclusion. The admissibility of the report is not affected by whether the testing was performed:
   1. Voluntarily or pursuant to an order of the court or a child support enforcement agency; or
   2. Before or after the commencement of the proceeding.
2. A party objecting to the results of genetic testing may call one (1) or more genetic testing experts to testify in person or by telephone, videoconference, deposition or another method approved by the court. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the party offering the testimony bears the expense for the expert testifying.
3. If a child has a presumed, acknowledged or adjudicated father, the results of genetic testing are inadmissible to adjudicate parentage unless performed:
   1. With the consent of both the mother and the presumed, acknowledged or adjudicated father; or
   2. Pursuant to an order of the court under W.S. 14-2-702 .
4. Copies of bills for genetic testing and for prenatal and postnatal health care for the mother and child which are furnished to the adverse party not less than ten (10) days before the date of a hearing are admissible to establish:
   1. The amount of the charges billed; and
   2. That the charges were reasonable, necessary and customary.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-814. Consequences of declining genetic testing.

1. A person who declines to comply with an order for genetic testing is guilty of contempt of court.
2. If an individual whose paternity is being determined declines to submit to genetic testing ordered by the court, the court for that reason may adjudicate parentage contrary to the position of that individual.
3. Genetic testing of the mother of a child is not a condition precedent to testing the child and a man whose paternity is being determined. If the mother is unavailable or declines to submit to genetic testing, the court may order the testing of the child and every man whose paternity is being adjudicated.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-815. Admission of paternity authorized.

1. A respondent in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may admit to the paternity of a child by filing a pleading to that effect or by admitting paternity under penalty of perjury when making an appearance or during a hearing.
2. If the court finds that the admission of paternity satisfies the requirements of this section and finds that there is no reason to question the admission, the court shall issue an order adjudicating the child to be the child of the man admitting paternity.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-816. Temporary order.

1. In a proceeding under this article, the court shall issue a temporary order for support of a child if the order is appropriate and the individual ordered to pay support is:
   1. A presumed father of the child;
   2. Petitioning to have his paternity adjudicated;
   3. Identified as the father through genetic testing under W.S. 14-2-705 ;
   4. An alleged father who has declined to submit to genetic testing;
   5. Shown by clear and convincing evidence to be the father of the child; or
   6. The mother of the child.
2. A temporary order may include provisions for custody and visitation as provided by other law of this state.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-817. Rules for adjudication of paternity.

1. The court shall apply the following rules to adjudicate the paternity of a child:
   1. The paternity of a child having a presumed, acknowledged or adjudicated father may be disproved only by admissible results of genetic testing excluding that man as the father of the child or identifying another man as the father of the child;
   2. Unless the results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of genetic testing, a man identified as the father of a child under W.S. 14-2-705 shall be adjudicated the father of the child;
   3. If the court finds that genetic testing under W.S. 14-2-705 neither identifies nor excludes a man as the father of a child, the court may not dismiss the proceeding. In that event, the results of genetic testing, and other evidence, are admissible to adjudicate the issue of paternity;
   4. Unless the results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of genetic testing, a man excluded as the father of a child by genetic testing shall be adjudicated not to be the father of the child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it apears in the printed acts.

Petition improperly denied.—

District court erred in denying the petition to establish paternity where although it had discretion to determine the timeliness of a paternity petition before ordering testing, the statutes did not afford it discretion on the timeliness of a petition after ordering genetic testing. Specifically, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-817 did not afford the court discretion to deny a petition to establish paternity after ordering genetic testing pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-702 , the results of which had met the threshold established by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-705(a). TE v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re AAAE), 2020 WY 117, 471 P.3d 990, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2020).

Paternity must be proved by preponderance of evidence. X v. Y, 482 P.2d 688, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1971) (decided under prior law).

§ 14-2-818. Jury prohibited.

The court, without a jury, shall adjudicate paternity of a child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-819. Hearings; inspection of records.

Notwithstanding any other law concerning public hearings and records, any hearing or trial held under this act shall be held in closed court without admittance of any person other than those necessary to the action or proceeding. All papers and records other than the final judgment pertaining to the action or proceeding, whether part of the permanent record of the court or of a file in the state office of vital records services or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only by court order.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

Transcripts. —

District court had to ensure that proceedings to establish paternity were reported, so that a transcript of those proceedings would be available in the event of an appeal; there must be a record suitable for the purpose of meaningful review on appeal. JAG v. State, 2002 WY 158, 56 P.3d 1016, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 2002).

Quoted in

LeBlanc v. State (In re ARLeB), 2017 WY 107, 401 P.3d 932, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 14-2-820. Order on default.

1. The court shall issue an order adjudicating the paternity of a man who:
   1. After service of process, is in default; and
   2. Is found by the court to be the father of a child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it apears in the printed acts.

Failure to adhere to procedural requirements. —

Although failure to adhere to the procedural requirements of the statutes governing establishment of paternity of a child receiving aid from the department of family services may cause a judgment rendered under those statutes to be void, where the defendant had notice of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and was accorded the process due under all the circumstances of his case, the district court did not err in entering default against the defendant, nor did it abuse its discretion in refusing the defendant relief from that default. A.P. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 849 P.2d 703, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1993) (decided under prior law).

§ 14-2-821. Dismissal for want of prosecution.

The court may issue an order dismissing a proceeding commenced under this act for want of prosecution only without prejudice. An order of dismissal for want of prosecution purportedly with prejudice is void and has only the effect of a dismissal without prejudice.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-822. Order adjudicating parentage.

1. The court shall issue an order adjudicating whether a man alleged or claiming to be the father is the parent of the child.
2. An order adjudicating parentage shall identify the child by name and date of birth.
3. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, the court may assess filing fees, reasonable attorney’s fees, fees for genetic testing, necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred in a proceeding under this article. The court may award attorney’s fees, which may be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in the attorney’s own name.
4. The court may not assess fees, costs or expenses against the child support enforcement agency of this state or another state, except as provided by other law.
5. On request of a party and for good cause shown, the court may order that the name of the child be changed.
6. If the order of the court is at variance with the child’s birth certificate, the court shall order the state office of vital records to issue an amended birth certificate.
7. Upon a sufficient showing by the department of family services that birth costs were paid by medical assistance within the preceding five (5) years, the court shall include a requirement in an order adjudicating parentage that the father pay birth costs to the department in the manner set forth in W.S. 14-2-1004 . Failure of the department to make a sufficient showing under this subsection shall not preclude the department from subsequently seeking recovery in any other manner authorized by law.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1; 2018, ch. 131, § 2.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added (g).

Cross references. —

As to birth registration generally, see § 35-1-410 .

As to unwed mothers' and fathers' names on birth certificates, see § 35-1-411 .

As to judicial procedure to establish facts of birth where delayed certificate of birth is rejected, see § 35-1-415 .

For new certificate of birth following adoption, legitimation, and parternity determination, see § 35-1-417 .

UIFSA action. —

District court acquired personal jurisdiction over nonresident mother by virtue of her demand for affirmative relief pursuant to Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, and court's jurisdiction extended to ordering visitation for father, changing child's name on birth certificate, and granting father the federal income tax dependency deduction. Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1998) (decided under prior law).

Amount of judgment not excessive. —

Order directing able-bodied man to pay unmarried woman $300 annually until child becomes 16, provided that if defendant is inducted into army, he should pay $200 annually, is not excessive in amount. Myuskovich v. State, 59 Wyo. 406, 141 P.2d 540, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1943) (decided under prior law).

§ 14-2-823. Binding effect of determination of parentage.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a determination of parentage is binding on:
   1. All signatories to an acknowledgement or denial of paternity as provided in article 5 of this act; and
   2. All parties to an adjudication by a court acting under circumstances that satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of W.S. 20-4-142 .
2. A child is not bound by a determination of parentage under this act unless:
   1. The determination was based on an unrescinded acknowledgment of paternity and the acknowledgement is consistent with the results of genetic testing;
   2. The adjudication of parentage was based on a finding consistent with the results of genetic testing and the consistency is declared in the determination or is otherwise shown; or
   3. The child was a party or was represented in the proceeding determining parentage by an attorney representing the child’s best interest.
3. In a proceeding to dissolve a marriage, the court is deemed to have made an adjudication of the parentage of a child if the court acts under circumstances that satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of W.S. 20-4-142 , and the final order:
   1. Expressly identifies a child as a “child of the marriage,” “issue of the marriage,” or similar words indicating that the husband is the father of the child; or
   2. Provides for support of the child by the husband unless paternity is specifically disclaimed in the order.
4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a determination of parentage may be a defense in a subsequent proceeding seeking to adjudicate parentage by an individual who was not a party to the earlier proceeding.
5. An adjudication of the paternity of a child issued by a court of this state or by the filing of an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-605 without the benefit of genetic testing, may be challenged by a party to the adjudication only if post-adjudication genetic testing proves that the adjudicated father is not the biological father of the child pursuant to W.S. 14-2-817 . This section does not apply to any of the following:
   1. A paternity determination made in or by a foreign jurisdiction or a paternity determination which has been made in or by a foreign jurisdiction and registered in this state in accordance with the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act;
   2. A paternity determination based upon a court or administrative order of this state if the order was entered based upon blood or genetic test results which demonstrate that the alleged father was not excluded and that the probability of the alleged father’s paternity was ninety-nine percent (99%) or higher.
6. A petition for disestablishment of paternity shall be filed:
   1. In the district court in which the paternity order is filed;
   2. In the case of an adjudication as a result of the filing of an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-605 , notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the petition shall be filed within the earlier of two (2) years after the petitioner knew or should have known that the paternity of the child was at issue or as provided in W.S. 14-2-809 (b);
   3. In the case of an adjudication issued by a court of this state, the petition shall be filed only by the mother of the child, the adjudicated father of the child, the child, if the child was a party to the adjudication, or the legal representative of any of these parties. A petition filed by an individual who is not a party to the adjudication shall be filed pursuant to W.S. 14-2-809 . The petition under this paragraph shall be filed no later than two (2) years after the petitioner knew or should have known that the paternity of the child was at issue.
7. The court shall appoint an attorney to represent the best interests of a child if the court finds that the best interests of the child is not adequately represented. In cases concerning an adjudication of paternity pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the best interests of the child. In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider the following factors:
   1. The length of time between the proceeding to adjudicate parentage and the time that the adjudicated father was placed on notice that he might not be the genetic father;
   2. The length of time during which the adjudicated father has assumed the role of the father of the child;
   3. The facts surrounding the adjudicated father’s discovery of his possible nonpaternity;
   4. The nature of the relationship between the child and the adjudicated father;
   5. The age of the child;
   6. The harm that may result to the child if adjudicated paternity is successfully disproved;
   7. The nature of the relationship between the child and any alleged father;
   8. The extent to which the passage of time reduces the chances of establishing the paternity of another man and a child support obligation in favor of the child; and
   9. Other factors that may affect the equities arising from the disruption of the father-child relationship between the child and the adjudicated father or the chance of other harm to the child.
8. The court may order genetic testing pursuant to article 7 of this chapter.
9. The court may grant relief on the petition filed in accordance with this section upon a finding by the court of all of the following:
   1. The relief sought is in the best interests of the child pursuant to the factors in this section;
   2. The genetic test upon which the relief is granted was properly conducted;
   3. The adjudicated father has not adopted the child;
   4. The child is not a child whose paternity is governed by article 9 of this chapter;
   5. The adjudicated father did not act to prevent the biological father of the child from asserting his paternal rights with respect to the child.
10. If the court determines that test results conducted in accordance with W.S. 14-2-703 and 14-2-704 exclude the adjudicated father as the biological father, the court may nonetheless dismiss the action to overcome paternity and affirm the paternity adjudication if:
    1. The adjudicated father requests that paternity be preserved and that the parent-child relationship be continued; or
    2. The court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to preserve paternity. In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all of the factors listed in this section.
11. If the court finds that the adjudication of paternity should be vacated, in accordance with all of the conditions prescribed, the court shall enter an order which provides all of the following:
    1. That the disestablishment of paternity is in the best interests of the child pursuant to the factors in this section;
    2. That the adjudicated father is not the biological father of the child;
    3. That the adjudicated father’s parental rights and responsibilities are terminated as of the date of the filing of the order;
    4. That the birth records agency shall amend the child’s birth certificate by removing the adjudicated father’s name, if it appears thereon, and issue a new birth certificate for the child;
    5. That the adjudicated father is relieved of any and all future support obligations owed on behalf of the child from the date that the order determining that the established father is not the biological father is filed;
    6. That any unpaid support due prior to the date the order determining that the adjudicated father is not the biological father is filed, is due and owing;
    7. That the adjudicated father has no right to reimbursement of past child support paid to the mother, the state of Wyoming or any other assignee of child support.
12. Participation of the Title IV-D agency in an action brought under this section shall be limited as follows:
    1. The Title IV-D agency shall only participate in actions if services are being provided by the Title IV-D agency pursuant to title 20 chapter 6 of the Wyoming Statutes;
    2. When services are being provided by the Title IV-D agency under title 20 chapter 6 of the Wyoming Statutes, the Title IV-D agency may assist in obtaining genetic tests pursuant to article 7 of this chapter;
    3. An attorney acting on behalf of the Title IV-D agency represents the state of Wyoming in any action under this section. The Title IV-D agency’s attorney is not the legal representative of the mother, the adjudicated father or the child in any action brought under this section.
13. The costs of genetic testing, the fee of any guardian ad litem and all court costs shall be paid by the person bringing the action to overcome paternity unless otherwise provided by law.
14. A man presumed to be the father of a child without adjudication of paternity may bring a proceeding to adjudicate paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-807 .

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1; 2005, ch. 118, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, see Title 20, Chapter 4.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote (e), which formerly read “A party to an adjudication of paternity may challenge the adjudication only under the laws of this state relating to appeal, vacation of judgments or other judicial review”; and added (f) through (p).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Title IV-D, referred to in subsection (n), is Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 651 et seq.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-2-402(a)(xxi).

§ 14-2-901. Scope of article.

This article does not apply to the birth of a child conceived by means of sexual intercourse or to the birth of a child under a gestational agreement as defined by W.S. 35-1-401(a)(xiv).

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1; 2021, ch. 87, § 1.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, added "or to the birth of a child under a gestational agreement as defined by W.S. 35-1-401(a)(xiv)."

§ 14-2-902. Parental status of donor.

A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-903. Paternity of child of assisted reproduction.

A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as provided in W.S. 14-2-904 , with the intent to be the parent of her child, is the parent of the resulting child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-904. Consent to assisted reproduction.

1. Consent by a woman and a man who intends to be the parent of a child born to the woman by assisted reproduction shall be in a record signed by the woman and the man. This requirement shall not apply to a donor.
2. Failure to sign a consent required by subsection (a) of this section, before or after birth of the child, does not preclude a finding of paternity if the woman and the man, during the first two (2) years of the child’s life resided together in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as their own.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-905. Limitation on husband's dispute of paternity.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, the husband of a wife who gives birth to a child by means of assisted reproduction may not challenge his paternity of the child unless:
   1. Within two (2) years after learning of the birth of the child he commences a proceeding to adjudicate his paternity; and
   2. The court finds that he did not consent to the assisted reproduction, before or after birth of the child.
2. A proceeding to adjudicate paternity may be maintained at any time if the court determines that:
   1. The husband did not provide sperm for, or before or after the birth of the child consent to, assisted reproduction by his wife;
   2. The husband and the mother of the child have not cohabited since the probable time of assisted reproduction; and
   3. The husband never openly held out the child as his own.
3. The limitation provided in this section applies to a marriage declared invalid after assisted reproduction.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-906. Effect of dissolution of marriage or withdrawal of consent.

1. If a marriage is dissolved before placement of eggs, sperm or embryos, the former spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the former spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after a divorce, the former spouse would be a parent of the child.
2. The consent of a woman or a man to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by that individual in a record at any time before placement of eggs, sperm or embryos. An individual who withdraws consent under this section is not a parent of the resulting child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

§ 14-2-907. Parental status of deceased individual.

If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased individual consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child.

History. Laws 2003, ch. 93, § 1.

Cited in

IC v. DW, 2015 WY 135, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Oct. 7, 2015).

§ 14-2-1001. Short title.

This article may be cited as the “Medicaid Fairness Act.”

History. Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 5(a), makes the act effective July 1, 2018.

Editor’s notes. — Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 4, provides: “This act applies to the costs of the birth of any child by paid medical assistance on or after July 1, 2018.”

§ 14-2-1002. Definitions.

1. As used in this article:
   1. “Birth cost” means all expenses relating to prenatal care, delivery of a child and any other costs which are directly connected to a pregnancy and paid by medical assistance;
   2. “Department” means the department of family services created pursuant to W.S. 9-2-2101 ;
   3. “Federal poverty level” means the federal poverty guideline updated annually in the federal register by the United States department of health and human services;
   4. “Medical assistance” means as defined in W.S. 42-4-102(a)(ii).

History. Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 5(a), makes the act effective July 1, 2018.

§ 14-2-1003. Birth cost recovery – medical assistance.

1. Not more than sixty (60) days after an unmarried recipient of medical assistance gives birth to a child, the department of health shall notify the department of family services of the actual amount of birth costs paid by medical assistance.
2. Upon receiving notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the department shall determine whether the paternity of the child has been established.
3. Consistent with W.S. 42-4-106(b), if paternity has been established based on an acknowledgment made pursuant to W.S. 14-2-601 , the department shall, in writing, request the father to pay the amount of birth costs established pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1004 .
4. Within ninety (90) days of a request made pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, if the father has not made full payment or has not made arrangements for full payment to the satisfaction of the department, the department shall commence a civil action in accordance with W.S. 14-2-204 to recover the amount of birth costs established pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1004 .
5. If paternity has not been established, the department, in cooperation with the mother of the child, shall use any means authorized by law to determine the paternity of the child, subject to W.S. 42-4-122(b)(ii).
6. Consistent with W.S. 42-4-106(b), if the father of the child is identified by the department pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, the department shall bring a civil action to adjudicate paternity and recover the amount of birth costs established pursuant to W.S. 42-4-1004 from the father, in the manner set forth in W.S. 14-2-822 .
7. The department shall not take any of the actions set forth in this section on or after the fifth birthday of the child.

History. Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 5(a), makes the act effective July 1, 2018.

§ 14-2-1004. Birth cost recovery calculation – medical assistance.

1. Before requiring the payment of any amount of birth costs under W.S. 14-2-1003 , the department shall require the father to provide satisfactory proof of income. If the father does not provide satisfactory proof of income, or if the department is unable to determine the father’s income using any means authorized by law, a rebuttable presumption shall exist that the father’s income is greater than four hundred percent (400%) of the federal poverty level.
2. After notification of birth costs pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1003(a), the department shall calculate the amount of birth costs that are recoverable from the father in the following manner, subject to subsection (d) of this section:
   1. For a father earning less than two hundred percent (200%) of the federal poverty level, zero percent (0%) of the birth costs;
   2. For a father earning two hundred percent (200%) or greater, but less than two hundred fifty percent (250%) of the federal poverty level, ten percent (10%) of the birth costs;
   3. For a father earning two hundred fifty percent (250%) or greater, but less than three hundred percent (300%) of the federal poverty level, twenty percent (20%) of the birth costs;
   4. For a father earning three hundred percent (300%) or greater, but less than three hundred fifty percent (350%) of the federal poverty level, thirty percent (30%) of the birth costs;
   5. For a father earning three hundred fifty percent (350%) or greater, but less than four hundred percent (400%) of the federal poverty level, forty percent (40%) of the birth costs;
   6. For a father earning four hundred percent (400%) of the federal poverty level or greater, fifty percent (50%) of the birth costs.
3. The department may assess a fee, in addition to any recoverable birth costs under subsection (b) of this section, which equals the average expenses incurred by the department on a per case basis for the administration of this article and W.S. 42-4-122 , plus any attorney’s fees, if applicable. No fee or attorney’s fees shall be assessed against a father who meets the criteria of paragraph (b)(i) of this section.
4. The total amount recoverable by the department under this section, including any fee or attorney’s fees assessed pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, shall not exceed the average birth cost paid by medical assistance in this state, as established by rule promulgated pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1008 .

History. Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 5(a), makes the act effective July 1, 2018.

§ 14-2-1005. Birth cost recovery allocation – medical assistance.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, any amount recovered by the department pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1003(c), (d) or (f) shall be remitted to the department of health.
2. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, any amount recovered by the department pursuant to W.S. 20-2-401(f) shall be:
   1. Recovered in the manner set forth in W.S. 20-6-101 through 20-6-222 ; and
   2. Remitted by the department to the department of health.
3. The department of health shall remit to the federal government any amount collected under this article and required to be reimbursed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1396k(b).
4. The department may, on a quarterly basis, remit:
   1. Forty percent (40%) of the total amount of birth costs recovered pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1003(c), (d) and (f) and 20-2-401(f), less any reimbursements made to the federal government pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, to the birth cost recovery incentive account created pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1006(a).
   2. Any fee or attorney’s fee assessed by the department pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1004(c) to the birth cost recovery administration account created pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1006(b).

History. Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 5(a), makes the act effective July 1, 2018.

§ 14-2-1006. Birth cost recovery accounts.

1. There is created the birth cost recovery incentive account. Funds remitted to the account pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1005(d)(i) shall be used by the department for any services or programs relating to infants or mothers. The account may be divided into subaccounts for purposes of administrative management. Funds in the account are continuously appropriated and shall not lapse at the end of any fiscal period.
2. There is created the birth cost recovery administration account. Funds remitted to the account pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1005(d)(ii) shall be used by the department to offset the costs of the administration of this article and W.S. 42-4-122 . The account may be divided into subaccounts for purposes of administrative management. Funds in the account are continuously appropriated and shall not lapse at the end of any fiscal period.

History. Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 5(a), makes the act effective July 1, 2018.

§ 14-2-1007. Best interests of a child.

The department shall not take any action authorized by this article and W.S. 42-4-122 if the department determines that the action would not be in the best interests of a child.

History. Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 5(a), makes the act effective July 1, 2018.

§ 14-2-1008. Adoption of rules.

The department of family services and the department of health, in consultation with each other, shall each promulgate rules to carry out the provisions of this article and W.S. 42-4-122 .

History. Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2018, ch. 131, § 5(a), makes the act effective July 1, 2018.

§§ 14-3-101 through 14-3-103. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1982, ch. 75, § 5; 1983, ch. 171, § 3.

Cross references. —

For present provisions as to abandonment of child by parent, guardian or custodian, penalty and subsequent convictions, see § 6-4-403 .

Editor's notes. —

These sections derived from Laws 1890-91, ch. 20, § 2, Laws 1895, ch. 46, § 5, and Laws 1957, ch. 220, § 2.

§ 14-3-104. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 159, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

§ 14-3-104 , which derived from Laws 1957, ch. 220, § 7, related to penalty for soliciting to engage in illicit sexual relations.

§ 14-3-105 , which derived from Laws 1957, ch. 220, § 8, related to penalty for immoral or indecent acts.

§ 14-3-106 , which derived from Laws 1983, ch. 155, § 1, related to penalties of violation of the restrictions on disclosure of names or publication of information.

§ 14-3-105. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 159, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to offenses against morals generally, see chapter 4 of title 6.

As to sexual battery, see § 6-2-313 .

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1957, ch. 220, § 8, related to penalty for immoral or indecent acts.

§ 14-3-106. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 159, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section which derived from Laws 1983, ch. 155, § 1, related to penalties of violation of the restrictions on disclosure of names or publication of information.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes or ordinances regulating sexual performance by child, 42 ALR5th 291.

§ 14-3-107. Performing body-art on persons who have not reached the age of majority; penalties; definition.

1. No person shall knowingly perform body-art upon or under the skin of a person who has not reached the age of majority, except with the consent of the person’s parent or legal guardian who is present at the time the body-art procedure is performed upon the person. The person performing the body-art procedure shall demand proof of age prior to administering the body-art procedure upon the person. A motor vehicle driver’s license, a registration card issued under the federal Selective Service Act, an identification card issued to a member of the armed forces, a valid United States passport, a tribal identification card issued by the governing body of the Eastern Shoshone tribe of Wyoming or the Northern Arapahoe tribe of Wyoming or an identification card issued by the department of transportation is prima facie evidence of the age and identity of the person. Proof that the person performing the body-art procedure demanded, was shown and acted in reasonable reliance upon the information contained in any one (1) of the above documents as identification and proof of age is a defense to any criminal prosecution under this section.
2. Any person violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.
3. As used in this section:
   1. “Body-art” means the practice of physical body adornment utilizing body piercing, branding, scarification, sculpting or tattooing. This definition does not include practices conducted under the supervision of a physician licensed to practice medicine under Wyoming law nor does this definition include piercing of the outer perimeter or lobe of the ear by means of sterilized stud-and-clasp ear piercing systems;
   2. “Body piercing” means any puncturing or penetration of the skin or mucosa of a person and the insertion of jewelry or other adornment in the opening;
   3. “Branding” means any invasive procedure in which a permanent mark is burned into or onto the skin using either temperature, mechanical or chemical means;
   4. “Scarification” means any invasive procedure in which the intended result is the production of scar tissue on the surface of the skin;
   5. “Sculpting” means any modification of the skin, mucosa, cartilage or tissue of the body for nonmedical purposes;
   6. “Tattoo” means any indelible design, letter, scroll, figure, symbol or any other mark placed upon or under the skin with ink or colors, by the aid of needles or other instruments.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 186, § 1; 2004, ch. 47, § 1; 2005, ch. 130, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, substituted references pertaining to body-art for references pertaining to tatooing throughout (a); and added (c)(i) through (c)(v), making related changes.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the reference to the tribal identification card in (a).

Cited in

Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Sept. 10, 2014).

§ 14-3-108. Use of ultraviolet tanning devices by persons who have not reached the age of majority; presence required; consent required; penalty.

1. No person other than the minor’s parent or legal guardian shall knowingly allow a minor who has not reached fifteen (15) years of age to use an ultraviolet tanning device, unless the minor’s parent or legal guardian consents in writing to the use and is present the entire time of use. No person shall knowingly allow a minor age fifteen (15) years to the age of majority to use an ultraviolet tanning device, except with written consent obtained from the minor’s parent or legal guardian. Any person other than the minor’s parent or legal guardian allowing the use of an ultraviolet tanning device by a minor shall demand proof of age prior to allowing the use of an ultraviolet tanning device. A motor vehicle driver’s license, a registration card issued under the federal Selective Service Act, an identification card issued to a member of the armed forces, a valid United States passport, a tribal identification card issued by the governing body of the Eastern Shoshone tribe of Wyoming or the Northern Arapahoe tribe of Wyoming or an identification card issued by the department of transportation is prima facie evidence of the age and identity under this section. Proof that the person allowing the use of the ultraviolet tanning device demanded, was shown and acted in reasonable reliance upon the information contained in any one (1) of the above documents as identification and proof of age is a defense to any criminal prosecution under this section.
2. Any person violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00).
3. As used in this section:
   1. “Consent” means that the parent or legal guardian appears at the first time the minor uses the ultraviolet tanning device and signs a written consent form in the presence of the owner or an employee of the facility. The minor’s parent or legal guardian may withdraw this consent at any time. Unless so withdrawn, this consent shall be valid for twelve (12) months from the date the written consent form is signed. The parent or legal guardian must repeat the written consent process annually until the minor reaches the age of majority;
   2. “Present” means being physically present at the facility at which the tanning device is being used, but does not require the presence in the tanning room or booth being used;
   3. “Ultraviolet tanning device” means equipment that emits electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths in the air between two hundred (200) and four hundred (400) nanometers used for tanning of the skin, including, but not limited to, a sunlamp, tanning booth or tanning bed, but does not include equipment that emits ultraviolet radiation used by a health care professional in the treatment of disease or used pursuant to a prescription.

History. Laws 2010, ch. 114, § 1.

Cited in

Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Sept. 10, 2014).

§ 14-3-201. Purpose.

The purpose of W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-216 is to delineate the responsibilities of the state agency, other governmental agencies or officials, professionals and citizens to intervene on behalf of a child suspected of being abused or neglected, to protect the best interest of the child, to further offer protective services when necessary in order to prevent any harm to the child or any other children living in the home, to protect children from abuse or neglect which jeopardize their health or welfare, to stabilize the home environment, to preserve family life whenever possible and to provide permanency for the child in appropriate circumstances. The child’s health, safety and welfare shall be of paramount concern in implementing and enforcing this article.

History. Laws 1957, ch. 220, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-21; Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-105; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1995, ch. 136, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section, which read: “The purpose of W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 is to protect the best interest of the child or a disabled adult, to further offer protective services when necessary in order to prevent any harm to the child or any other children living in the home or to a disabled adult, to protect children or disabled adults from abuse or neglect which jeopardize their health or welfare, to stabilize the home environment and to preserve family life whenever possible.”

Grandparents' motion denied.—

Juvenile court did not make an unreasonable decision in denying the grandparents' motion seeking to transfer placement of their grandchild from the foster parents to the grandparents; the child had been in the foster parents' care approximately two and a half years, testimony indicated that changing placement could be detrimental to her, the juvenile court correctly concluded that the best interests of the child were paramount, and the juvenile court's reasoning was in accord with the statute governing permanency hearings. PM v. State (In the Interest of SO), 2016 WY 99, 382 P.3d 51, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2016).

Quoted in

JM v. Department of Family Servs., 922 P.2d 219, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1996); Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1996).

Stated in

Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1991); RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Evidence — Child Abuse and the Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Exception to the Hearsay Rule. Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1983),” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 735 (1985).

§ 14-3-202. Definitions.

1. As used in W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-216 :
   1. “A person responsible for a child’s welfare” includes the child’s parent, noncustodial parent, guardian, custodian, stepparent, foster parent or other person, institution or agency having the physical custody or control of the child;
   2. “Abuse” means inflicting or causing physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or mental health or welfare of a child other than by accidental means, including abandonment, unless the abandonment is a relinquishment substantially in accordance with W.S. 14-11-101 through 14-11-109 , excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual offense against a child as defined by law:
      1. “Mental injury” means an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of a child as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in his ability to function within a normal range of performance and behavior with due regard to his culture;
      2. “Physical injury” means any harm to a child including but not limited to disfigurement, impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising if greater in magnitude than minor bruising associated with reasonable corporal punishment, bleeding, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma or substantial malnutrition;
      3. “Substantial risk” means a strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or insignificant possibility;
      4. “Imminent danger” includes threatened harm and means a statement, overt act, condition or status which represents an immediate and substantial risk of sexual abuse or physical or mental injury. “Imminent danger” includes violation of W.S. 31-5-233(m).
   3. “Child” means any person under the age of eighteen (18);
   4. “Child protective agency” means the field or regional offices of the department of family services;
   5. “Court proceedings” means child protective proceedings which have as their purpose the protection of a child through an adjudication of whether the child is abused or neglected, and the making of an appropriate order of disposition;
   6. “Institutional child abuse and neglect” means situations of child abuse or neglect where a foster home or other public or private residential home, institution or agency is responsible for the child’s welfare;
   7. “Neglect” means a failure or refusal by those responsible for the child’s welfare to provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical or any other care necessary for the child’s well being. Treatment given in good faith by spiritual means alone, through prayer, by a duly accredited practitioner in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination is not child neglect for that reason alone;
   8. “State agency” means the state department of family services;
   9. “Subject of the report” means any child reported under W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-216 or the child’s parent, guardian or other person responsible for the child’s welfare;
   10. “Unsubstantiated report” means any report made pursuant to W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-216 that, upon investigation, is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
   11. “Substantiated report” means any report of child abuse or neglect made pursuant to W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-216 that, upon investigation, is supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
   12. through (xiv) Repealed by Laws 2002, ch. 86, § 3.
   13. “Collaborative” means the interagency children’s collaborative created by W.S. 14-3-215 ;
   14. “Department” means the state department of family services and its local offices;
   15. “Transportation” means the provision of a means to convey the child from one place to another by the custodian or someone acting on his behalf in the performance of required duties, but does not require the state to provide incidental travel or to purchase a motor vehicle for the child’s own use to travel.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 181, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.7; Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-113; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1983, ch. 146, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1993, ch. 1, § 1; ch. 44, § 1; 1994, ch. 39, § 1; 1995, ch. 136, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 86, §§ 2, 3; ch. 89, § 1; 2003, ch. 167, § 2; 2005, ch. 23, § 1; ch. 236, § 2; 2006, ch. 114, § 1; 2007, ch. 72, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to sexual offenses against children, see chapter 4 of title 6.

The 2005 amendments. —

The first 2005 amendment, by ch. 23, § 1, effective July 1, 2005, in (a)(x) substituted “Unsubstantiated” for “Unfounded,” in (a)(x) and (a)(xi) inserted provisions requiring investigation and changed the standard of evidence from credible to a preponderance, and made stylistic changes.

The second 2005 amendment, by ch. 236, § 2, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “14-3-216” for “14-3-215” in (a), (a)(x) and (a)(xi); added (a)(xv), (a)(xvi), (a)(xvii); and made a stylistic change.

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

The 2006 amendment, in (a), substituted “14-3-216” for “14-3-215.”

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a)(ii)(D), added the last sentence referring to “Imminent danger.”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3 provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Sufficient evidence of abuse.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants’ convictions for physically abusing the victim because the victim testified that defendant would sometimes use the black belt as punishment if the victim did not complete his chores, the belt would leave bruises on his bottom, back, and legs, and his three siblings testified that both defendants used a backscratcher to beat the victim. Larkins v. State, 2018 WY 122, 429 P.3d 28, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of mentally abusing two victims because one victim was diagnosed with PTSD and a counselor and a physician attributed the victims’ mental illnesses, in part, to the abuse they suffered and witnessed by defendants. Larkins v. State, 2018 WY 122, 429 P.3d 28, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 2018).

In a felony child abuse case, a district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury in the elements instruction of the count relating to the victim that physical injury excluded “reasonable corporal punishment”; the error was plain because the instructions were confusing as to the burden of proof. However, the State was entitled to retry defendant because it presented sufficient evidence to support a verdict finding that the victim's physical injuries due to getting hit in the ribs and slapped in the face were not the result of reasonable corporal punishment. Andersen v. State, 2014 WY 88, 330 P.3d 256, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2014).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for felony child abuse; defendant used wood to spank the victim, which left abrasions, bruises, and lacerations. Defendant's argument that the injuries were not serious and that he acted reasonably was misplaced; because the State was entitled to all favorable inferences that could have been drawn from the evidence, the jury was free to reject defendant's proffered justifications for the abuse. Swan v. State, 2014 WY 38, 320 P.3d 235, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2014).

“Sexual contact,” as defined by sexual assault provisions, amounts to “abuse.” —

“Sexual contact,” as defined by § 6-2-301(a)(vi) (sexual assault — definitions), obviously poses a serious danger to the physical and mental well-being of a child and amounts to “abuse” within the meaning of subsection (a)(ii) of this section. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Whether injuries accidental or deliberate important factor in ascertaining child abuse. —

In ascertaining whether a child has been a victim of abuse, it is important to discover whether the injuries sustained by the child were accidental or deliberate. Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253, 104 S. Ct. 3539, 82 L. Ed. 2d 844, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 2707 (U.S. 1984).

Malnutrition. —

Severe and substantial malnutrition resulting from mother's conscious disregard was sufficient to support conviction for felony child abuse. DeWitt v. State, 917 P.2d 1144, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1996).

Neglect. —

In a termination of parental rights case, it was reasonable to conclude that the developmental deficiencies displayed by a child were the result of neglect by his parents; social workers never saw the parents interact with the child, the house was so cluttered and filthy that the child could not roll over if placed on the floor, the child was constantly observed in his stroller, and at the age of one, the child could not hold up his own head, could not crawl, could not talk, and did not know how to use his fingers. SD v. Carbon County Dep't of Family Servs. (In re SED), 2002 WY 168, 57 P.3d 1235, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 2002).

It was no error to adjudicate a noncustodial father neglectful because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(i) did not require a parent to have physical custody of a child to be defined as “a person responsible for a child's welfare,” as prior to the use of the first “or” in the statute, the legislature listed categories of individuals who, by fitting into one of those categories, inherently were responsible for a child's welfare whether the child was in their custody or not, as long as a noncustodial parent had knowledge and an opportunity to act and failed or refused to do so, and categories listed after the “or” were broad and had no inherent responsibility towards a child, so the legislature modified those falling into that category by requiring physical custody or control of the child. TW v. State (In re JB), 2017 WY 26, 390 P.3d 357, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2017).

In order for a noncustodial parent—whether he or she lives in a different town, state, or country voluntarily, due to military deployment, or any other reason—to be deemed neglectful of a child, the State must prove that he or she had the knowledge and opportunity to act and he or she failed or refused to do so. TW v. State (In re JB), 2017 WY 26, 390 P.3d 357, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of neglect based on the mother's unsanitary and unkempt home because it showed that: (1) the children's food was rotten, and that it came from the dumpsters of nearby grocery stores; (2) there were bloodied cloth rags strewn about the upstairs bathroom; (3) there was a foul smell throughout the house; (4) one child's room lacked an apparent heat source and was cold; (5) water leaked from the bathroom into the child's room; (6) dog and cat feces remained on the floors without being cleaned up; and (7) trash and dirty laundry was scattered around the house. DL v. State (In re MC), 2013 WY 43, 299 P.3d 75, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support the neglect finding based on the mother's use of and availability of marijuana because the trial court could have reasonably concluded that it was neglectful to expose a 12-year-old child to the use of marijuana to the extent that he was knowledgeable as to its effects and was able to find it in the home. DL v. State (In re MC), 2013 WY 43, 299 P.3d 75, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2013).

“Substantiated report.” —

Subsection (a)(xi) suggests that an abuse report has been substantiated when an investigation reveals that credible evidence exists to support the allegations. JM v. Department of Family Servs., 922 P.2d 219, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1996) (decided prior to 2005 amendment).

Sufficient evidence of abuse. —

Trial court had before it sufficient evidence to show that children had been abused under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B); the children's statements to a detective, as well as photographs, indicated that they were bitten by the mother's boyfriend. SC v. State (In re NC), 2013 WY 2, 294 P.3d 866, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 2013).

Imminent risk of physical injury. —

Jury could reasonably conclude that placing an eight-month-old baby in a fleece bag and tying it shut placed the child in imminent risk of physical injury under Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-3-202(a)(ii) and (vii), 14-2-309 . In re Cs v. Johnson County Dep't of Family Servs., 2006 WY 130, 143 P.3d 918, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (2006).

Parental rights terminated due to domestic violence and other issues. —

Court properly terminated a father's parental rights where the child was subjected to domestic violence, and where the father failed to follow the case plan, failed to obtain consistent and adequate housing, and failed to visit the child as often as allowed. RS v. Dept. of Family Servs. (In re KLS), 2004 WY 87, 94 P.3d 1025, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2004).

Substantial evidence existed to support the Department's finding, where it found that the available facts, when viewed in light of surrounding circumstances, would cause a reasonable person to believe that the child was abused or neglected. RM v. Department of Family Servs.(In re Fair Hearing Request), 953 P.2d 477, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1998).

In parental-rights-termination proceeding, instructions as to low socioeconomic standing and slovenliness properly refused. —

In a proceeding to terminate parental rights on the grounds of neglect, instructions proffered by the mother stating that parental rights cannot be terminated on the basis that the natural parents, because of low social or economic standing, cannot provide their children with all the advantages that more affluent, better educated foster parents could provide, and stating that parental rights may not be terminated solely on the grounds of slovenliness, were properly refused. MS v. Kuchera, 682 P.2d 982, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1984).

Mental injury.—

Defendants did not dispute at their trial for multiple counts of child abuse that their children suffered mental injury because each of their children was found to have significant deficits in their social and behavioral development and two of their children were diagnosed with attention deficit disorders. Gifford v. State, 2017 WY 93, 399 P.3d 1240, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 2017).

Opinion evidence concerning abuse. —

Witness could offer his opinions concerning the children's abuse as a lay witness under Wyo. R. Evid. 701 because he did not testify that visits with the mother were abuse under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii), but merely intended to convey his opinion that the intermittent nature of their visits with the mother was causing problems for the children in adjusting to their lives without their mother. M.L. v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs. (In the Interest of L.L.), 2007 WY 92, 159 P.3d 499, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2007).

Applied in

DS v. Department of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1980); In re Child X, 617 P.2d 1078, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1980); In re SKJ, 673 P.2d 640, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 399 (Wyo. 1983).

Quoted in

In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982); Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 553 (Wyo. 1985); Campbell v. State, 709 P.2d 425, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 608 (Wyo. 1985); TR v. Washakie County Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 736 P.2d 712, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 431 (Wyo. 1987); Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1996); Jo v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (in the Interest of Re), 2011 WY 170, 267 P.3d 1092, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Dec. 28, 2011).

Cited in

RS v. Johnson County Dept. of Family Servs. (In re JL), 989 P.2d 1268, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1999); MN v. Dept' of Family Servs. (In the Interest of MN), 2003 WY 135, 78 P.3d 232, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2003).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Child Protection: A Suggested Role for Members of the Wyoming State Bar,” see IX Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1974).

For article, “Goodbye 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982” (part two), see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 509 (1984).

For comment, “Fetal Equality?: The Equality State's Response to the Challenge of Protecting Unborn Children,” see XXXII Land & Water L. Rev. 193 (1997).

For article, “The Wyoming Criminal Code Revisited: Reflections after Fifteen Years,” see XXXIII Land and Water L. Rev. 523 (1998).

§ 14-3-203. Duties of state agency; on-call services.

1. The state agency shall:
   1. Administer W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 ;
   2. Be responsible for strengthening and improving state and community efforts toward the prevention, identification and treatment of child abuse and neglect in the state; and
   3. Refer any person or family seeking assistance in meeting child care responsibilities, whether or not the problem presented by the person or family is child abuse or neglect, to appropriate community resources, agencies, services or facilities.
   4. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 4.
2. The state agency may contract for assistance in providing on-call services. The assistance may include screening protection calls, making appropriate referrals to law enforcement and the agency, and maintaining a record of calls and referrals. Contractors shall have training in child protection services.
3. The state agency shall ensure that all child protective service workers are trained:
   1. In the principles of family centered practice that focus on providing services to the entire family to achieve the goals of safety and permanency for children, including balancing the best interests of children with the rights of parents;
   2. In the duty of the workers to inform the individual subject to a child abuse or neglect allegation, at the earliest opportunity during the initial contact, of the specific complaints or allegations made against the individual;
   3. Concerning constitutional and statutory rights of children and families from and after the initial time of contact and the worker’s legal duty not to violate the constitutional and statutory rights of children and families from and after the initial time of contact;
   4. To know the state’s legal definitions of physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, dependency and endangerment;
   5. To know the provisions of federal and state laws governing child welfare practice, including but not limited to the Adoption and Safe Families Act, Indian Child Welfare Act, Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, the Child Abuse Prevention Treatment Act and the Family First Prevention Services Act, as amended;
   6. To make reasonable efforts to determine if the person responsible for the welfare of a child in a suspected case of child abuse or neglect is a member of the armed forces or if the child is enrolled in the defense enrollment eligibility reporting system of the United States department of defense.

History. Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-114; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1989, ch. 125, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, §§ 2, 4; 2006, ch. 114, § 1; 2017, ch. 3, § 1; 2019, ch. 143, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, repealed former (a)(iv) relating to diagnosis and referral for treatment of osteogenesis imperfecta and hemophilia; and added (c).

The 2006 amendment, in (a), inserted “and” at the end of (ii); and made a related change in (iii).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

The 2017 amendment , effective July 1, 2017, added (c)(vi).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in (c)(v), added “and the Family First Prevention Services Act” and made related changes.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3 provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Stated in

RM v. Department of Family Servs., 953 P.2d 477, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1998).

Federal Law. —

The Adoption and Safe Families Act is PL 105-89 and is codified primarily in 42 U.S.C.S. § 629 et seq. The Indian Child Welfare Act is codified as 29 U.S.C.S. § 1901 et seq. The Multi-Ethnic Placement Act is PL 103-382, which was codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 5115a et seq. before being repealed. Similar provisions are at 42 U.S.C.S. § 1996b. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act is codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 5101 et seq.

§ 14-3-204. Duties of local child protective agency.

1. The local child protective agency shall:
   1. Repealed by Laws 2017, ch. 179, §  2.
   2. Receive, assess, investigate or arrange for investigation and coordinate investigation or assessment of all reports of known or suspected child abuse or neglect;
   3. Within twenty-four (24) hours after notification of a suspected case of child abuse or neglect, initiate an investigation or assessment to verify every report. The representative of the child protective agency shall, at the initial time of contact with the individual subject to a child abuse and neglect investigation or assessment, advise the individual of the specific complaints or allegations made against the individual. A thorough investigation or assessment and report of child abuse or neglect shall be made in the manner and time prescribed by the state agency pursuant to rules and regulations adopted in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. If the child protective agency is denied reasonable access to a child by a parent or other persons and the agency deems that the best interest of the child so requires, it shall seek an appropriate court order by ex parte proceedings or other appropriate proceedings to see the child. The child protective agency shall assign a report:
      1. For investigation when allegations contained in the report indicate:
         1. That criminal charges could be filed, the child appears to be in imminent danger and it is likely the child will need to be removed from the home; or
         2. A child fatality, major injury or sexual abuse has occurred.
      2. For assessment when the report does not meet the criteria of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.
   4. If the investigation or assessment discloses that abuse or neglect is present, initiate services with the family of the abused or neglected child to assist in resolving problems that lead to or caused the child abuse or neglect;
   5. If the child protective agency is able through investigation to substantiate a case of abuse or neglect, it shall notify the person suspected of causing the abuse or neglect by first class mail to his last known address of his right to request a hearing on the agency’s determination for a final determination before the office of administrative hearings pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act;
   6. Make reasonable efforts to contact the noncustodial parent of the child and inform the parent of substantiated abuse or neglect in high risk or moderate risk cases as determined pursuant to rules and regulations of the state agency and inform the parent of any proposed action to be taken;
   7. Cooperate, coordinate and assist with the prosecution and law enforcement agencies;
   8. When the best interest of the child requires court action, contact the county and prosecuting attorney to initiate legal proceedings and assist the county and prosecuting attorney during the proceedings. If the county attorney elects not to bring court action the local child protective agency may petition the court for appointment of a guardian ad litem who shall act in the best interest of the child and who may petition the court to direct the county attorney to show cause why an action should not be commenced under W.S. 14-3-401 through 14-3-439 ;
   9. Refer a child receiving department services who is under the age of six (6) years to the department of health, division of developmental disabilities preschool program for educational and developmental screening and assessment; and
   10. Make reasonable efforts to determine if the person  responsible for the welfare of a child in a suspected case of child  abuse or neglect is a member of the armed forces or if the child is  enrolled in the defense enrollment eligibility reporting system of  the United States department of defense.
2. The local child protective agency may appeal an adverse determination of the office of administrative hearings.

History. Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.7:2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-115; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1993, ch. 44, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 2; 2005, ch. 236, § 2; 2009, ch. 127, § 1; 2013, ch. 142, § 1; 2017, ch. 3, § 1; ch. 179, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted provisions for assessment throughout; rewrote (a)(iii), adding the second and last sentences including (a)(iii)(A) and (a)(iii)(B) and adding provisions that investigation and assessments or reports should be made in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act; added (a)(v), redesignating former (a)(v) through (a)(vii) as (a)(vi) through (a)(viii); and added (a)(ix).

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, inserted “by first class mail to his last known address” and “on the agency's determination for a final determination before the office of administrative hearings” in (a)(v); and added (b).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, substituted “assessment to verify every report” for “assessment and verification of every report” in the first sentence in (a)(iii).

The 2017 amendments. — The first 2017 amendment, by ch. 3, § 1, effective July 1, 2017, added (a)(x), and made related changes.

The second 2017 amendment, by ch. 179, § 2, deleted (a)(i). Laws 2017, ch. 179, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved Feb. 17, 2017.

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

State not required to show reasonable efforts to reunify where abuse and neglect not at issue. —

State was not required to show reasonable efforts to reunify the family in a parental rights termination proceeding where there was no requirement for reasonable efforts because the termination was sought on the basis that the children were left in the care of another for at least a year under and had been in foster care with the state for over fifteen of the last twenty-months. SLJ v. Dep't of Family Servs.(In re SJJ), 2005 WY 3, 104 P.3d 74, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2005).

Cited in

Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1990); City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1991); DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re “H” Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003).

Quoted in

RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, but is it a Formula for Malpractice?,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1999).

§ 14-3-205. Child abuse or neglect; persons required to report.

1. Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that a child has been abused or neglected or who observes any child being subjected to conditions or circumstances that would reasonably result in abuse or neglect, shall immediately report it to the child protective agency or local law enforcement agency or cause a report to be made. The fact a child, who is at least sixteen (16) years of age, is homeless as defined in W.S. 14-1-102(d) shall not, in and of itself, constitute a sufficient basis for reporting neglect. Female genital mutilation under W.S. 6-2-502(a)(v) when the victim is a minor shall be considered child abuse for mandatory reporting under this section.
2. If a person reporting child abuse or neglect is a member of the staff of a medical or other public or private institution, school, facility or agency, he shall notify the person in charge or his designated agent as soon as possible, who is thereupon also responsible to make the report or cause the report to be made. Nothing in this subsection is intended to relieve individuals of their obligation to report on their own behalf unless a report has already been made or will be made.
3. Any employer, public or private, who discharges, suspends, disciplines or penalizes an employee solely for making a report of neglect or abuse under W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 [W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-216 ] is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.
4. Any person who knowingly and intentionally makes a false report of child abuse or neglect, or who encourages or coerces another person to make a false report of child abuse or neglect, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 181, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.8; Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-116; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 2005, ch. 23, § 1; 2017, ch. 180, § 2; 2020, ch. 105, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added (c) and (d).

The 2017 amendment , effective July 1, 2017, added the last sentence of (a).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a) added the last sentence.

Admissibility of child's statements to physician attributing fault. —

Where a physician, given his duty and his professional responsibility to determine whether a child abuse syndrome or a condition that requires treatment is present, questions a child concerning how the child was injured in order to assist him with respect to a diagnosis of child abuse syndrome, statements elicited attributing fault are pertinent to his diagnosis and treatment, and admitting these statements into evidence pursuant to the exception contained in Rule 803(4), W.R.E., is consistent with the policy of the court in child abuse cases. Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253, 104 S. Ct. 3539, 82 L. Ed. 2d 844, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 2707 (U.S. 1984).

Immunity provided from liability resulting from reporting.—

Section 14-3-209 does not limit immunity suits based only on reporting. Rather, it provides immunity from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise result because of reporting. Immunity includes participation in legal proceedings, as well as the underlying determination of the abuse which then led to the reporting. May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1993).

Counselor was immune from civil or criminal liability for reporting the father's alleged abuse of his son under this section, and therefore her motion for summary judgment was properly granted, because she acted upon a reasonable suspicion and the father failed to rebut the presumption of good faith with his negligence allegations. The evidence showed that the son told the counselor that his father watched him shower and touched his genitals and buttocks while assisting him with his showers. Thomas v. Rosenberger, 2015 WY 7, 341 P.3d 390, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 2015).

Counselor was entitled to immunity under this section for her participation in the child abuse investigation because the father presented the court with no genuine issue of material fact that the counselor acted in bad faith as he admitted he had no factual basis for his contention that she made the digital penetration allegations to any law enforcement agents and he did not provide the records or testimony of the investigations. Thomas v. Rosenberger, 2015 WY 7, 341 P.3d 390, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 2015).

Privilege removed from all evidence regarding child. —

District court did not err by allowing a mother's mental health providers to testify to privileged communications because the mother was not entitled to reinstate the privilege for information that was previously disclosed pursuant to an “express waiver” of the privilege; even without the express waivers, the evidence was admissible at trial because there was reasonable cause to believe or suspect that the child was being subjected to conditions or circumstances that would result in neglect. Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

Applied in

In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982).

Quoted in

Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, 177 P.3d 807, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Feb. 28, 2008).

Stated in

Alicea v. State, 13 P.3d 693, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 223 (Wyo. 2000); RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014).

Cited in

Leonard v. Converse County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1990); Elmore v. Van Horn, 844 P.2d 1078, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1992).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Evidence — Child Abuse and the Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Exception to the Hearsay Rule. Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1983),” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 735 (1985).

For comment, “Fetal Equality?: The Equality State's Response to the Challenge of Protecting Unborn Children,” see XXXII Land & Water L. Rev. 193 (1997).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Civil liability of physician for failure to diagnose or report battered child syndrome, 97 ALR3d 338.

§ 14-3-206. Child abuse or neglect; written report; statewide reporting center; documentation and examination; costs and admissibility thereof.

1. Reports of child abuse or neglect or of suspected child abuse or neglect made to the local child protective agency or local law enforcement agency shall be:
   1. Conveyed immediately by the agency receiving the report to the appropriate local child protective agency or local law enforcement agency and, if the person responsible for the welfare of a child is a member of the armed forces or if the child is enrolled in the defense enrollment eligibility reporting system of the United States department of defense, to the state judge advocate for the Wyoming military department. The agencies shall continue cooperating and coordinating with each other during the assessment or investigation; and
   2. Followed by a written report by the receiving agency confirming or not confirming the facts reported. The report shall provide to law enforcement, the local child protective agency and the state judge advocate for the Wyoming military department when appropriate, the following, to the extent available:
      1. The name, age and address of the child;
      2. The name and address of any person responsible for the child’s care;
      3. The nature and extent of the child’s condition;
      4. The basis of the reporter’s knowledge;
      5. The names and conditions of any other children relevant to the report;
      6. Any evidence of previous injuries to the child;
      7. Photographs, videos and x-rays with the identification of the person who created the evidence and the date the evidence was created; and
      8. Any other relevant information.
2. The state agency may establish and maintain a statewide reporting center to receive reports of child abuse or neglect on a twenty-four (24) hour, seven (7) day week, toll free telephone number. Upon establishment of the service, all reports of child abuse or neglect may be made to the center which shall transfer the reports to the appropriate local child protective agency.
3. Any person investigating, examining or treating suspected child abuse or neglect may document evidence of child abuse or neglect to the extent allowed by law by having photographs taken or causing x-rays to be made of the areas of trauma visible on a child who is the subject of the report or who is subject to a report. The reasonable cost of the photographs or x-rays shall be reimbursed by the appropriate local child protective agency. All photographs, x-rays or copies thereof shall be sent to the local child protective agency, admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect, and shall state:
   1. The name of the subject;
   2. The name, address and telephone number of the person taking the photographs or x-rays; and
   3. The date and place they were taken.
4. Any physician, physician’s assistant or nurse practitioner examining a child and finding reasonable cause to believe the child is a victim of child abuse or neglect and having reasonable cause to believe that other children residing in the same home may also be a victim of child abuse or neglect shall report to law enforcement the results of the examination and facts supporting reasonable cause with respect to the other child or children. Law enforcement may then bring any other child residing in the same home to a physician, physician’s assistant or nurse practitioner for examination. The examination shall take place within twenty-four (24) hours. Any physician, physician’s assistant, nurse practitioner or law enforcement officer denied access to a child for the purposes of examination under this subsection may seek an appropriate court order by ex parte proceedings or other appropriate proceedings to provide for the examination. After receiving the timely results of the examination, the examining physician, physician’s assistant, nurse practitioner or law enforcement officer shall consider whether temporary protective custody is necessary under W.S. 14-3-405 .

History. Laws 1971, ch. 181, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.9; Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-117; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, § 2; 2013, ch. 142, § 1; 2017, ch. 3, § 1; 2019, ch. 77, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote (a), adding paragraph designations, inserting the provisions in (a)(i), and in (a)(ii) deleting the provision that a report may be dispensed with for good cause shown, and specifying the requirements of the report; and in (c), substituted “document evidence of child abuse or neglect to the extent allowed by law” for “document child abuse or neglect.”

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added “assessment or” in (a)(1).

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a)(i), added “and, if the person responsible for the welfare of a child is a member of the armed forces or if the child is enrolled in the defense enrollment eligibility reporting system of the United States department of defense, to the state judge advocate for the Wyoming military department” in the first sentence; and in (a)(ii), substituted “the local child protective agency and the state judge advocate for the Wyoming military department when appropriate” for “or the local child protective agency.”

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, added (d).

Applied in

Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1983).

§ 14-3-207. Abuse or neglect as suspected cause of death; coroner's investigation.

Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has died as a result of child abuse or neglect shall report to the appropriate coroner. The coroner shall investigate the report and submit his findings in writing to the law enforcement agency, the appropriate district attorney and the local child protective agency.

History. Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.9:1; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-118; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch 22, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to coroners' inquests generally, see § 7-4-201 et seq.

§ 14-3-208. Temporary protective custody; order; time limitation; remedial health care.

1. When a child is taken into temporary protective custody pursuant to W.S. 14-3-405(a) and (b), the person taking custody shall immediately notify the local department of family services office and place or transfer temporary protective custody to the local department of family services office as soon as practicable. The local department of family services office shall:
   1. Accept physical custody of the child;
   2. Make reasonable efforts to inform the parent, noncustodial parent or other person responsible for the child’s welfare that the child has been taken into temporary protective custody, unless otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
   3. Arrange for care and supervision of the child in the most appropriate and least restrictive setting necessary to meet the child’s needs, including foster homes or other child care facilities certified by the department or approved by the court. When it is in the best interest of the child, the department shall place the child with the child’s noncustodial birth parent or with the child’s extended family, including adult siblings, grandparents, great-grandparents, aunts or uncles. Prior to approving placement with the child’s noncustodial birth parent or extended family, the department shall determine whether anyone living in the home has been convicted of a crime involving serious harm to children or has a substantiated case listed on the central registry established pursuant to W.S. 14-3-213 . The department may leave the child in the care of a physician or hospital when necessary to ensure the child receives proper care. A neglected child shall not be placed in a jail or detention facility other than for a delinquent act;
   4. Initiate an investigation of the allegations; and
   5. Assess the child’s mental and physical needs, provide for the child’s ordinary and emergency medical care and seek emergency court authorization for any extraordinary medical care that is needed prior to the shelter care hearing.
2. The law enforcement or medical provider shall promptly notify the court and the district attorney of any child taken into temporary protective custody and placed in its care pursuant to W.S. 14-3-405 without a court order.
3. Temporary protective custody shall not exceed forty-eight (48) hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays.
4. When the court orders the child into the legal custody of the department pursuant to W.S. 14-3-409(d) or 14-3-429 , the department shall:
   1. Accept legal custody of the child;
   2. Continue or arrange for, care, transportation and supervision of the child as provided in paragraph (a)(iii) of this section;
   3. Assess the child’s mental and physical health needs and provide for the child’s ordinary and emergency medical care;
   4. Arrange for the provision of the education of the child, including participation in individualized education or developmental services;
   5. Participate in multidisciplinary team meetings to develop treatment recommendations for the child;
   6. Perform any other duties ordered by the court relating to the care or custody of the child.

History. Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.9:2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-119; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 2004, ch. 42, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, in (b), substituted “district or circuit court judge or district court commissioner” for “district court judge, district court commissioner or justice of the peace.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section in conformance with § 14-3-201 as amended by Laws 2005, ch. 236.

Kinship placement. —

District court erred in permanently placing a mother's children with their foster parents for adoption, rather than with their aunt and uncle. Compelling preference as to what was best for the children was placement with nuclear or extended family members. LW v. State (In the Interest of JW), 2010 WY 28, 226 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2010).

Applied in

Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1983).

Stated in

Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1995).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and application of statute allowing endangered child to be temporarily removed from parental custody, 38 ALR4th 756.

Power of court or other public agency to order medical treatment over parental religious objections for child whose life is not immediately endangered, 21 ALR5th 248.

§ 14-3-209. Immunity from liability.

Any person, official, institution or agency participating in good faith in any act required or permitted by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 is immune from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise result by reason of the action. For the purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding, the good faith of any person, official or institution participating in any act permitted or required by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 shall be presumed.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 181, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.11; Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-120; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

Immunity for negligent reporters. —

This section provides immunity for all reporters of child abuse not acting in bad faith. Where there is no evidence of deliberately false accusations but only negligence, good faith will still remain presumed. Elmore v. Van Horn, 844 P.2d 1078, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. Feb. 4, 1993).

Counselor was immune from civil or criminal liability for reporting the father's alleged abuse of his son under this section, and therefore her motion for summary judgment was properly granted, because she acted upon a reasonable suspicion and the father failed to rebut the presumption of good faith with his negligence allegations. The evidence showed that the son told the counselor that his father watched him shower and touched his genitals and buttocks while assisting him with his showers. Thomas v. Rosenberger, 2015 WY 7, 341 P.3d 390, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 2015).

Counselor was entitled to immunity under this section for her participation in the child abuse investigation because the father presented the court with no genuine issue of material fact that the counselor acted in bad faith as he admitted he had no factual basis for his contention that she made the digital penetration allegations to any law enforcement agents and he did not provide the records or testimony of the investigations. Thomas v. Rosenberger, 2015 WY 7, 341 P.3d 390, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 2015).

Immunity provided from liability resulting from reporting. —

This section does not limit immunity suits based only on reporting. Rather, it provides immunity from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise result because of reporting. Immunity includes participation in legal proceedings, as well as the underlying determination of the abuse which then led to the reporting. May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

Hall v. State, 851 P.2d 1262, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1993).

§ 14-3-210. Admissibility of evidence constituting privileged communications.

1. Evidence regarding a child in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 shall not be excluded on the ground it constitutes a privileged communication:
   1. Between husband and wife;
   2. Claimed under any provision of law other than W.S. 1-12-101(a)(i) and (ii); or
   3. Claimed pursuant to W.S. 1-12-116 .

History. Laws 1971, ch. 181, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.12; Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-121; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1985, ch. 127, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Physician-patient and psychologist-client privileges limited by this article. —

The privileges created between physician-patient and psychologist-client by §§ 1-12-101 and 33-27-103 (now 33-27-123 ) are limited by the subsequent enactment of this article, which sets forth a procedure for ascertaining and correcting child abuse and neglect. In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

There is no indication that the legislature intended to repeal Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-210 when it enacted Wyo. Stat Ann. § 33-38-113 , and the two statutes are complementary; section 33-38-113 (a)(i) provides an exception to the privilege where abuse or harmful neglect of children, the elderly or disabled or incompetent individuals is known or reasonably suspected, and this exception is entirely consistent with § 14-3-210 .Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

Privilege removed from all evidence regarding child. —

The language of this section is definite in removing the named privilege from all evidence “regarding a child”; such language does not restrict application to communications between the child patient or child client and the physician or psychologist, but includes communications between the mother and the physician and psychologist. In re Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

District court did not err by allowing a mother's mental health providers to testify to privileged communications because the mother was not entitled to reinstate the privilege for information that was previously disclosed pursuant to an “express waiver” of the privilege; even without the express waivers, the evidence was admissible at trial because there was reasonable cause to believe or suspect that the child was being subjected to conditions or circumstances that would result in neglect. Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

Because a mother's physical and mental state was at the heart of the claim that she neglected her child, information the mother disclosed to her counselors was clearly “evidence regarding a child.” Cave v. State (In re GAC), 2017 WY 65, 396 P.3d 411, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2017).

Stated in

Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1978).

Law reviews. —

For discussion of husband-wife testimonial privilege and the Federal Rules of Evidence, see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 601 (1977).

For case note, “Evidence — Recognition of a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3879 (1996),” see XXXII Land & Water L. Rev. 873 (1997).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Presence of child at communication between husband and wife as destroying confidentiality of otherwise privileged communication between them, 39 ALR4th 480.

Validity, construction and application of statute limiting physician-patient privilege in judicial proceedings relating to child abuse or neglect, 44 ALR4th 649.

§ 14-3-211. Appointment of counsel for child and other parties.

1. The court shall appoint counsel to represent any child in a court proceeding in which the child is alleged to be abused or neglected. Any attorney representing a child under this section shall also serve as the child’s guardian ad litem unless a guardian ad litem has been appointed by the court. The attorney or guardian ad litem shall be charged with representation of the child’s best interest.
2. The court may appoint counsel for any party when necessary in the interest of justice.

History. Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.12:1; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-122; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to appointment of guardians ad litem, see Rule 17(c), W.R.C.P.

Court must appoint attorney for child before adjudicating termination issues. —

It is improper for the district court to adjudicate the substantive issues of termination of parental rights without appointing an attorney to protect the welfare of the child. In re Child X, 617 P.2d 1078, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1980).

Attorney may be appointed as guardian ad litem. —

The trial court did not err in appointing an attorney for one or more of the children to act as guardian ad litem for the children; the person appointed to represent the children was specifically referred to as a guardian ad litem, and his participation in the trial was within the boundaries set forth in case law.DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 13, 2004).

Proceedings fatally defective where no guardian appointed in parental-rights termination litigation. —

Where no guardian ad litem for the children was appointed to represent the minors' best interest in parental-rights termination litigation, expressly contrary to subsection (a), the proceedings are fatally defective and the case will be remanded to the district court, where a guardian ad litem must be appointed and a new trial conducted. Curutchet v. Bordarrampe, 726 P.2d 500, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 621 (Wyo. 1986).

No reversal despite unjustified ex parte conference. —

An ex parte conference between the trial judge and the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the minor child of the parties could not be ethically justified, but did not require the reversal of an adjudication of child custody in a divorce action where no prejudicial error was manifested. Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 1991).

Stated in

Nation v. Nation, 715 P.2d 198, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 504 (Wyo. 1986).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, but is it a Formula for Malpractice?,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1999).

§ 14-3-212. Child protection teams; creation; composition; duties; records confidential.

1. The state agency and the local child protective agency shall encourage and assist in the creation of child protection teams within the communities in the state. The purposes of the child protection teams shall be to identify or develop community resources to serve abused and neglected children within the community, to advocate for improved services or procedures for such children and to provide information and assistance to the state agency, local child protection agency and multidisciplinary teams, if a multidisciplinary team has been appointed. The department may promulgate reasonable rules and regulations in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act to define the roles and procedures of child protection teams.
2. The local child protection team shall be composed of:
   1. A member of the district attorney’s office;
   2. A designated representative from the school district or districts within the area served by the team;
   3. A representative from the local field office of the department of family services;
   4. A representative from the county government;
   5. A representative from each city and town in the county;
   6. Representatives from other relevant professions; and
   7. Temporary members selected for the needs of a particular case as determined by the team.
3. The local child protection team may:
   1. Assist and coordinate with the state agency, the local child protective agency and all available agencies and organizations dealing with children;
   2. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 4.
   3. Coordinate the provision of appropriate services for abused and neglected children and their families;
   4. Identify or develop community resources to serve abused and neglected children and advocate for improved services and procedures for such children;
   5. Identify training needs, sponsor training and raise community awareness of child protection issues; and
   6. Assist and make recommendations of appropriate services in individual cases brought to it by the state agency or the local child protection agency.
4. The local child protection team shall not act as a multidisciplinary team, but members of the child protection team may serve on a multidisciplinary team if appointed pursuant to W.S. 14-3-427 .
5. All records and proceedings of the child protection teams are subject to W.S. 14-3-214 .

History. Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.12:2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-123; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1985, ch. 130, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, §§ 2, 4.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a), deleted “multi-disciplinary” before “child protection teams,” and added last two sentences; inserted present (b)(iii) through (b)(v), redesignating former (b)(iii) and (b)(iv) as (b)(vi) and (b)(vii); repealed former (c)(ii), pertaining to diagnosis and prognosis, rewrote (c)(iii), which read: “Provide an adequate treatment plan for the abused and neglected child and his family,” added (c)(iv) through (c)(vi); and added (d), redesignating former (d) as (e).

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

§ 14-3-213. Central registry of child protection cases; establishment; operation; amendment, expungement or removal of records; classification and expungement of reports; statement of person accused.

1. The state agency shall establish and maintain a record of all child protection reports and a central registry of “under investigation” or “substantiated” child protection reports in accordance with W.S. 42-2-111 .
2. Through the recording of reports, the state agency’s recordkeeping system shall be operated to enable the state agency to:
   1. Immediately identify and locate prior reports of cases of child abuse or neglect to assist in the diagnosis of suspicious circumstances and the assessment of the needs of the child and his family;
   2. Continuously monitor the current status of all pending child protection cases;
   3. Regularly evaluate the effectiveness of existing laws and programs through the development and analysis of statistical and other information; and
   4. Maintain a central registry of “under investigation” reports and “substantiated” reports of child abuse or neglect for provision of information to qualifying applicants pursuant to W.S. 14-3-214(f).
3. Upon good cause shown and upon notice to the subject of an “under investigation” or “substantiated” report, the state agency may list, amend, expunge or remove any record from the central registry in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the state agency.
4. All reports of child abuse or neglect contained within the central registry shall be classified in one (1) of the following categories:
   1. “Under investigation”; or
   2. “Substantiated”.
   3. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 23, § 2.
5. Within six (6) months all reports classified as “under investigation” shall be reclassified as “substantiated” or expunged from the central registry, unless the state agency is notified of an open criminal investigation or criminal prosecution. Unsubstantiated reports shall not be contained within the central registry.
6. Any person named as a perpetrator of child abuse or neglect in any report maintained in the central registry which is classified as a substantiated report as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(xi) shall have the right to have included in the report his statement concerning the incident giving rise to the report. Any person seeking to include a statement pursuant to this subsection shall provide the state agency with the statement. The state agency shall provide notice to any person identified as a perpetrator of his right to submit his statement in any report maintained in the central registry.
7. Conviction of a person under W.S. 6-2-502(a)(v) when the victim is a minor shall be included as a substantiated report of child abuse in the central registry under this section.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 181, § 7; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.13; Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 2; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-124; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1994, ch. 39, § 1; 1995, ch. 136, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 86, § 2; 2005, ch. 23, §§ 1, 2; 2020, ch. 105, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section, to require the state agency to maintain a central registry of “under investigation” and “substantiated” reports of child abuse and neglect, to remove provisions for a “closed” category of reports, to require that within six months all reports classified as “under investigation” be reclassified as “substantiated” or otherwise expunged except as specified, and to provide that unsubstantiated reports not be kept in the central registry, and to otherwise conform to Laws 2005, ch. 23.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, added (g).

Applicability. —

This section applies only to child protective proceedings where there has been an adjudication and finding of child abuse or neglect, not to convictions of sexual assault where no child protective proceedings have occurred. Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1996).

§ 14-3-214. Confidentiality of records; penalties; access to information; attendance of school officials at interviews; access to central registry records pertaining to child protection cases.

1. All records concerning reports and investigations of child abuse or neglect are confidential except as provided by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 . Any person who willfully violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or imprisoned in the county jail not more than six (6) months, or both.
2. Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, applications for access to records concerning child abuse or neglect contained in the state agency or local child protective agency shall be made in the manner and form prescribed by the state agency. Upon appropriate application, the state agency shall give access to any of the following persons or agencies for purposes directly related with the administration of W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-216 :
   1. A local child protective agency;
   2. A law enforcement agency, guardian ad litem, child protection team or the attorney representing the subject of the report;
   3. A physician or surgeon who is treating an abused or neglected child, the child’s family or a child he reasonably suspects may have been abused or neglected;
   4. A person legally authorized to place a child in protective temporary custody when information in the report or record is required to determine whether to place the child in temporary protective custody;
   5. A person responsible for the welfare of the child;
   6. A court or grand jury upon a showing that access to the records is necessary for the determination of an issue, in which case access shall be limited to in camera inspection unless the court finds public disclosure is necessary;
   7. Court personnel who are investigating reported incidents of child abuse or neglect;
   8. An education or mental health professional serving the child, if the state agency determines the information is necessary to provide appropriate educational or therapeutic interventions.
3. A physician or person in charge of an institution, school, facility or agency making the report shall receive, upon written application to the state agency, a summary of the records concerning the subject of the report.
4. Any person, agency or institution given access to information concerning the subject of the report shall not divulge or make public any information except as required for court proceedings.
5. Nothing in W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 prohibits the attendance of any one (1) of the following at an interview conducted on school property by law enforcement or child protective agency personnel of a child suspected to be abused or neglected provided the person is not a subject of the allegation:
   1. The principal of the child’s school or his designee; or
   2. A child’s teacher or, counselor, or specialist employed by the school or school district and assigned the duties of monitoring, reviewing or assisting in the child’s welfare in cases of suspected child abuse or neglect.
6. Upon appropriate application, the state agency shall provide to any employer or entity whose employees or volunteers may have unsupervised access to children in the course of their employment or volunteer service, for employee or volunteer screening purposes, a summary of central registry records maintained under state agency rules since December 31, 1986, for purposes of screening employees or volunteers. The state agency shall provide the results of the records check to the applicant by certified mail if the records check confirms the existence of a report “under investigation” or a “substantiated” finding of abuse or neglect. Otherwise, the state agency shall provide the results of the records check to the applicant in accordance with agency rules and by United States mail. The written results shall confirm that there is a report “under investigation”, a “substantiated” finding of abuse or neglect on the central registry naming the individual or confirm that no record exists. When the individual is identified on the registry as a “substantiated” perpetrator of abuse or neglect, the report to the applicant shall contain information with respect to the date of the finding, specific type of abuse or neglect, a copy of the perpetrator’s voluntary statement and whether an appeal is pending. The applicant, or an agent on behalf of the applicant, shall submit a fee in an amount determined by rule of the state agency and proof satisfactory to the state agency that the prospective or current employee or volunteer whose records are being checked consents to the release of the information to the applicant. The applicant shall use the information received only for purposes of screening prospective or current employees and volunteers who may, through their employment or volunteer services, have unsupervised access to minors. Applicants, their employees or other agents shall not otherwise divulge or make public any information received under this section. The state agency shall notify any applicant receiving information under this subsection of any subsequent reclassification of the information pursuant to W.S. 14-3-213(e). The state agency shall screen all prospective agency employees in conformity with the procedure provided under this subsection.
7. There is created a program administration account to be known as the “child and vulnerable adult abuse registry account”. All fees collected under subsection (f) of this section shall be credited to this account.
8. No information, including recorded interviews of the child, shall be disclosed to any person in any civil proceeding not related to an abuse or neglect case brought under this article except upon order of the court which shall determine if good cause exists to disclose the information. Any protective order granting disclosure shall include appropriate protections against further dissemination in any form. The court may conduct an in camera review of a recorded interview prior to issuing a protective order and may impose such conditions as may be appropriate under the circumstances of the proceeding to prevent further dissemination of the recorded interview.
9. Any person may request a central registry screen and summary report on themselves as provided by subsection (f) of this section upon payment of the fee required by subsection (f) of this section.

History. Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.14; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-125; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1985, ch. 130, § 1; 1991, ch. 113, § 2; 1994, ch. 39, § 1; 1995, ch. 136, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 86, § 2; 2005, ch. 23, § 1; ch. 231, § 1; ch. 236, § 2; 2006, ch. 114, § 1; 2015, ch. 191, § 1; 2017, ch. 108, § 1; 2021, ch. 122, § 1.

The 2005 amendments. —

The first 2005 amendment, by ch. 23, § 1, effective July 1, 2005, added (b)(viii); and rewrote (f), modifying notification procedures for employees and volunteers under investigation, and otherwise conforming the provisions in accordance with Laws 2005, ch. 23.

The second 2005 amendment, by ch. 231, § 1, effective July 1, 2005, in (g), deleted “within the earmarked revenue fund” following “program administration account.”

The third 2005 amendment, by ch. 236, § 2, effective July 1, 2005, in (b), substituted “14-3-216” for “14-3-215.”

See the conflicting legislation note. This section is set out incorporating the amendments by all three 2005 acts.

The 2006 amendment, deleted “and” at the end of (b)(vi).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in (b), inserted the introduction “Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section” and created a new subsection (h).

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (f), substituted “employer or entity whose employees or volunteers may have unsupervised access to children in the course of their employment or volunteer service” for “employer or entity whose employees or volunteers may have unsupervised access to children in the course of their employment or volunteer service” in the first sentence, added “in accordance with agency rules and” in the third sentence, “or an agent on behalf of the applicant” in the fifth sentence, and “or current” in the sixth sentence; and added (j).

The 2021 amendment , effective July 1, 2021, substituted "in an amount determined by rule of the state agency" for "of ten dollars ($10.00) " in the sixth sentence of (f).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3 provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Victim's records not released unless constitutionally material. —

Where a defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with a minor, the nondisclosure to defense counsel of school records concerning the child did not deny the defendant his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confront witnesses and to compulsory process, nor did the trial court err in conducting an in-camera review of the records and applying a standard of constitutional materiality in determining which records, if any, were to be released to defendant's counsel. Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 792 P.2d 570, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 1990).

Admission of juvenile court records in parental rights termination proceeding. —

Court did not err in allowing records in a juvenile court neglect proceeding to be used in a parental rights termination proceeding; use of such records is entirely proper and in accord with the Child Protection Services statutes' purpose of protecting the best interests of the child. SLJ v. Dep't of Family Servs.(In re SJJ), 2005 WY 3, 104 P.3d 74, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2005).

Applied in

LeBlanc v. State (In re ARLeB), 2017 WY 107, 401 P.3d 932, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2017).

Cited in

Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1996).

§ 14-3-215. Interagency children's collaborative.

1. There is created an interagency children’s collaborative. The collaborative shall be composed of:
   1. The director of the department of family services, or his designee;
   2. The director of the department of health, or his designee;
   3. The superintendent of public instruction, or his designee;
   4. The director of the department of workforce services, or his designee; and
   5. The governor’s appointee who shall represent families receiving services from the state agencies represented in paragraphs (i) through (iv) of this subsection.
2. The department of family services shall adopt rules by July 1, 2005, to establish guidelines for review of case files of children in state custody as a result of any action commenced under this title. The rules shall be adopted by the department of family services with the advice of the departments of education, health and workforce services. In addition to providing for the review of cases and the progress made towards returning children in state custody to their homes, communities or other permanent placements, the guidelines shall provide specific processes for:
   1. Local multidisciplinary teams to voluntarily present case files to the collaborative for review;
   2. The review of cases in which more than one (1) state agency provides services to the child and his family; and
   3. The review of statewide availability and utilization of resources for children in state custody.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

A former § 14-3-215 was renumbered as § 14-3-216 by Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 3.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 5(a), makes § 14-3-215(a) effective July 1, 2005. Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 5(b), makes § 14-3-215(b) effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 11, 2005.

Cited in

RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014).

§ 14-3-216. Other laws not superseded.

No laws of this state are superseded by the provisions of W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-216 .

History. Laws 1977, ch. 110, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-28.15; W.S. 1977, § 14-2-126; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; W.S. 1977, 14–3–215; Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 3.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, renumbered this section, which was formerly numbered as § 14-3-215 , and substituted “14-3-216” for “14-3-215.”

§ 14-3-301. Definitions.

1. As used in this article:
   1. “Tobacco products” means any substance containing tobacco leaf or any product made or derived from tobacco that contains nicotine including, but not limited to, cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, snuff, chewing tobacco or dipping tobacco;
   2. “Vending machine” means any mechanical, electric or electronic self-service device which, upon insertion of money, tokens, or any other form of payment, dispenses nicotine products;
   3. “Retailer” means a business of any kind at a specific location that sells nicotine products to a user or consumer;
   4. “Self service display” means any display of nicotine products that is located in an area where customers are permitted and where the nicotine products are readily accessible to a customer without the assistance of a salesperson;
   5. “Electronic cigarette” means any device that can be used to deliver aerosolized or vaporized nicotine or synthetic nicotine material to the person using the device and includes any component, part and accessory of the device and any vapor material intended to be aerosolized or vaporized during the use of the device. “Electronic cigarette” includes, without limitation, any electronic cigar, electronic cigarillo, electronic pipe, electronic hooka, vapor pen and any similar product or device. “Electronic cigarette” does not include a battery or battery charger if sold separately from the electronic cigarette and does not include any product regulated as a drug or device by the United States food and drug administration under subchapter V of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act;
   6. “Nicotine products” means tobacco products and electronic cigarettes;
   7. “Vapor material” means any liquid solution or other material containing nicotine or synthetic nicotine that is depleted as an electronic cigarette is used. “Vapor material” includes liquid solution or other material containing nicotine or synthetic nicotine that is sold with or inside an electronic cigarette.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 76, § 1; 2000, ch. 93, § 2; 2007, ch. 93, § 1; 2013, ch. 144, § 1; 2020, ch. 53, § 1; ch. 83, § 1; ch. 86, § 2.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added (a)(iv).

The 2013 amendment, in (a), added “or any product made or derived from tobacco that contains nicotine” and “electronic cigarettes,” in (a)(i) and added (a)(v).

Laws 2013, ch. 144, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 13, 2013.

The 2020 amendments. — The first 2020 amendment, by ch. 53, § 1, effective July 1, 2020, rewrote (a)(v), which read “‘Electronic cigarette’ means a product that employs any mechanical heating element, battery or electronic circuit, regardless of shape or size, that can be used to deliver doses of nicotine vapor by means of heating a liquid nicotine solution contained in a cartridge or other delivery system.”

The second 2020 amendment, by ch. 83, § 1, effective July 1, 2020, in (a)(i) deleted “electronic cigarettes” and made stylistic changes; in (a)(ii) through (a)(iv) substituted “nicotine products” for “tobacco products”; rewrote (a)(v), which read “‘Electronic cigarette’ means a product that employs any mechanical heating element, battery or electronic circuit, regardless of shape or size, that can be used to deliver doses of nicotine vapor by means of heating a liquid nicotine solution contained in a cartridge or other delivery system”; and added (a)(vi) and (a)(vii).

The third 2020 amendment, by ch. 86, § 2, effective July 1, 2020, in (a)(i) deleted “electronic cigarettes” and made stylistic changes; rewrote (a)(v), which read “‘Electronic cigarette’ means a product that employs any mechanical heating element, battery or electronic circuit, regardless of shape or size, that can be used to deliver doses of nicotine vapor by means of heating a liquid nicotine solution contained in a cartridge or other delivery system”; and added (a)(vi) and (a)(vii).

This section is set out as reconciled by the Wyoming legislative service office.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-3-302. Prohibited sales or delivery.

1. No individual shall sell, offer for sale, give away or deliver nicotine products to any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years.
2. Any individual violating W.S. 14-3-309 or subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than:
   1. Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) for a first violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period. The court may allow the defendant to perform community service or attend a tobacco or nicotine cessation program and be granted credit against his fine and court costs at the rate of ten dollars ($10.00) for each hour of work performed or each hour of tobacco or nicotine cessation program attended;
   2. Five hundred dollars ($500.00) for a second violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period, regardless of the locations where the violations occurred. The court may allow the defendant to perform community service or attend a tobacco or nicotine cessation program and be granted credit against his fine and court costs at the rate of ten dollars ($10.00) for each hour of work performed or each hour of tobacco or nicotine cessation program attended;
   3. Seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) for a third or subsequent violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period, regardless of the locations where the violations occurred. The court may allow the defendant to perform community service and be granted credit against his fine and court costs at the rate of five dollars ($5.00) for each hour of work performed.
3. No retailer shall sell, permit the sale, offer for sale, give away or deliver nicotine products to any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years.
4. Any person violating subsection (c) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than:
   1. Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) for a first violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period;
   2. Five hundred dollars ($500.00) for a second violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period;
   3. Seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) for a third or subsequent violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period.
5. In addition to the penalties under paragraph (d)(iii) of this section, any person violating subsection (c) of this section for a third or subsequent time within a two (2) year period may be subject to an injunction. The department of revenue or the district attorney of the county in which the offense occurred, may petition the district court for an injunction to prohibit the sale of nicotine products in the establishment where the violation occurred. If the court finds that the respondent in the action has violated the provisions of subsection (c) of this section for a third or subsequent time within a two (2) year period and may continue to violate such provisions, it may grant an injunction prohibiting the respondent from selling nicotine products in the establishment where the violation occurred for a period of not more than one hundred eighty (180) days. For the purposes of this subsection, multiple violations occurring before the petition for the injunction is filed shall be deemed part of the violation for which the injunction is sought. If the person against whom the injunction is sought operates multiple, geographically separate establishments, the injunction shall apply only to the establishment where the violation occurred. The injunction shall prohibit all sales of nicotine products in the establishment where the violation occurred, regardless of any change in ownership or management of the establishment that is not a bona fide, arms length transaction while the injunction is in effect.
6. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsections (a) and (c) of this section that, in the case of a sale, the person who sold the nicotine product was presented with, and reasonably relied upon, an identification card which identified the person buying or receiving the nicotine product as being over twenty-one (21) years of age.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, no fine for a violation of subsection (c) of this section shall be imposed for a first offense in a twenty-four (24) month period if the retailer can show it had:
   1. Adopted and enforced a written policy against selling nicotine products to persons under the age of twenty-one (21) years;
   2. Informed its employees of the applicable laws regarding the sale of nicotine products to persons under the age of twenty-one (21) years;
   3. Required employees to verify the age of nicotine product customers by way of photographic identification or by means of electronic transaction scan device; and
   4. Established and imposed disciplinary sanctions for noncompliance.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 76, § 1; 2000, ch. 93, § 2; 2020, ch. 83, § 1; ch. 86, § 2.

The 2020 amendments. —

The first 2020 amendment, by ch. 83, § 1, effective July 1, 2020, substituted “nicotine products” for “tobacco products” with variation throughout; in (a), (c), (f), (g)(i), and (g)(ii) substituted “twenty-one (21) years” for “eighteen (18) years”; in (b)(i) and (b)(ii) substituted “community service or attend a tobacco or nicotine cessation program” for “community service,” “ten dollars ($10.00)” for “five dollars ($5.00),” and “work performed or each hour of tobacco or nicotine cessation program attended” for “work performed”; in (b)(i) and (d)(i) substituted “Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00)” for “Fifty dollars ($50.00)”; in (b)(ii) and (d)(ii) substituted “Five hundred dollars ($500.00)” for “Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00).”

The second 2020 amendment, by ch. 86, § 2, effective July 1, 2020, in the introductory language of (b) substituted “violating W.S. 14-3-309 or subsection (a)” for “violating subsection (a).”

While neither amendment gave effect to the others, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

Cited in

Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Sept. 10, 2014).

§ 14-3-303. Posted notice required; location of vending machines.

1. Any person who sells nicotine products shall post signs informing the public of the age restrictions provided by this article at or near every display of nicotine products and on or upon every vending machine which offers nicotine products for sale. Each sign shall be plainly visible and shall contain a statement communicating that the sale of nicotine products to persons under twenty-one (21) years of age is prohibited by law. Any person who owns, operates or manages a business where nicotine products are offered for sale at retail and at which persons under the age of twenty-one (21) are allowed admission with or without an adult, shall maintain all nicotine products within the line of sight of a cashier or other employee or under the control of the cashier or other employee. For purposes of this subsection:
   1. “Within the line of sight” means visible to a cashier or other employee while at the sales counter; and
   2. “Under control” means protected by security, surveillance or detection methods.
2. No person shall sell or offer nicotine products:
   1. Through a vending machine unless the vending machine is located in:
      1. Businesses, factories, offices or other places not open to the general public;
      2. Places to which persons under the age of twenty-one (21) years of age are not permitted access; or
      3. Business premises where alcoholic or malt beverages are sold or dispensed and where entry by persons under twenty-one (21) years of age is prohibited.
   2. Through a self service display except in:
      1. A vending machine as permitted in paragraph (i) of this subsection; or
      2. A business where entry by persons under twenty-one (21) years of age is prohibited.
3. Any person violating subsection (a) or (b) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than:
   1. Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) for a first violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period;
   2. Five hundred dollars ($500.00) for a second violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period;
   3. Seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) for a third or subsequent violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period.
4. For purposes of subsection (c) of this section, each day of continued violation under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall be deemed a separate offense.
5. In addition to the penalties under paragraph (c)(iii) of this section, any person violating subsection (a) or (b) of this section for a third or subsequent time within a two (2) year period may be subject to an injunction. The department or the district attorney of the county in which the offense occurred, may petition the district court for an injunction to prohibit the sale of nicotine products from the vending machines or the establishment where the violation occurred. If the court finds that the respondent in the action has violated the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section for a third or subsequent time within a two (2) year period and may continue to violate such provisions, it may grant an injunction prohibiting the respondent from selling nicotine products from vending machines or from the establishment where the violation occurred for a period of not more than one hundred eighty (180) days. For the purposes of this subsection, multiple violations occurring before the petition for the injunction is filed shall be deemed part of the violation for which the injunction is sought. If the person against whom the injunction is sought operates multiple, geographically separate establishments or vending machines, the injunction shall apply only to the establishment where the violation occurred and to the vending machines resulting in the violation. The injunction shall prohibit all sales of nicotine products from the vending machines or the establishment involved in the violation, regardless of any change in ownership or management of the vending machines or the establishment that is not a bona fide, arms length transaction while the injunction is in effect.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 76, § 1; 2000, ch. 93, § 2; 2007, ch. 93, § 1; 2020, ch. 83, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added (b)(i) and redesignated the remaining paragraphs accordingly; and added present (b)(ii).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, substituted “nicotine products” for “tobacco products” and “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age” throughout; in the introductory language of (a) deleted “Effective January 1, 2001” at the beginning of the third sentence; in (c)(i) substituted “Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00)” for “Fifty dollars ($50.00)”; and in (c)(ii) substituted “Five hundred dollars ($500.00)” for “Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00).”

§ 14-3-304. Purchase by person under twenty-one years of age prohibited.

1. No person under the age of twenty-one (21) years shall purchase or attempt to purchase nicotine products, or misrepresent his identity or age, or use any false or altered identification for the purpose of purchasing or attempting to purchase nicotine products. A person shall not be arrested for an alleged violation of this subsection but shall be issued a citation as a charging document by a peace officer having probable cause to believe the person violated this subsection. An officer issuing a citation shall deposit one (1) copy of the citation with the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense. Bond may be posted and forfeited for an offense charged under this section in an amount equal to the fine imposed by subsection (b) of this section.
2. Any person violating subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of twenty-five dollars ($25.00).
   1. through (iii) Repealed by Laws 2020, ch. 83, § 2.
3. In lieu of the fine under subsection (b) of this section, the court may allow the defendant to perform community service or attend a tobacco or nicotine cessation program and be granted credit against his fine and court costs at the rate of ten dollars ($10.00) for each hour of work performed or each hour of tobacco or nicotine cessation program attended.
4. No conviction under this section, whether by guilty plea, adjudication of guilt or forfeiture of bond shall be reported by the court to any law enforcement agency. Upon payment of the fine imposed by subsection (b) of this section, a criminal conviction under this section shall be expunged by operation of law from all records of the court six (6) months after the entry of conviction. For any person whose record of conviction was expunged under this subsection, the conviction is deemed not to have occurred and the individual may reply accordingly upon any inquiry in the matter. No expungement under this subsection shall be considered for purposes of any other law providing for expungement.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 76, § 1; 2000, ch. 93, § 2; 2020, ch. 83, §§ 1, 2.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a) substituted “twenty-one (21) years” for “eighteen (18) years” and “nicotine products” for “tobacco products” twice and added the last two sentences; redesignated the introductory language of (b) as (b) and substituted “twenty-five dollars ($25.00)” for “not more than”; repealed (b)(i) through (b)(iii), which read “(i) Fifty dollars ($50.00) for a first violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period; (ii) Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) for a second violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period; (iii) Seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) for a third or subsequent violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period”; in (c) substituted “tobacco or nicotine cessation program” for “tobacco cessation program” twice and “ten dollars ($10.00)” for “five dollars ($5.00)”; and rewrote (d), which read “After twenty-four (24) months or upon reaching the age of majority, whichever occurs later, a criminal conviction under this section may be expunged in accordance with W.S. 14-6-241 .”

§ 14-3-305. Possession or use by person under twenty-one years of age prohibited.

1. It is unlawful for any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years to possess or use any nicotine products. A person shall not be arrested for an alleged violation of this subsection but shall be issued a citation as a charging document by a peace officer having probable cause to believe the person violated this subsection. An officer issuing a citation shall deposit one (1) copy of the citation with the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense. Bond may be posted and forfeited for an offense charged under this section in an amount equal to the fine imposed by subsection (b) of this section.
2. Any person violating subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of twenty-five dollars ($25.00).
   1. through (iii) Repealed by Laws 2020, ch. 83, § 2.
3. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 93, § 4.
4. In lieu of the fine under subsection (b) of this section, the court may allow the defendant to perform community service or attend a tobacco or nicotine cessation program and be granted credit against his fine and court costs at the rate of ten dollars ($10.00) for each hour of work performed or each hour of tobacco or nicotine cessation program attended.
5. No conviction under this section, whether by guilty plea, adjudication of guilt or forfeiture of bond shall be reported by the court to any law enforcement agency. Upon payment of the fine imposed by subsection (b) of this section, a criminal conviction under this section shall be expunged by operation of law from all records of the court six (6) months after the entry of conviction. For any person whose record of conviction was expunged under this subsection, the conviction is deemed not to have occurred and the individual may reply accordingly upon any inquiry in the matter. No expungement under this subsection shall be considered for purposes of any other law providing for expungement.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 76, § 1; 2000, ch. 93, §§ 2, 4; 2020, ch. 83, §§ 1, 2.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a) substituted “twenty-one (21) years” for “eighteen (18) years” and “nicotine products” for “tobacco products” and added the last two sentences; redesignated the introductory language of (b) as (b) and substituted “twenty-five dollars ($25.00)” for “not more than”; repealed (b)(i) through (b)(iii), which read “(i) Fifty dollars ($50.00) for a first violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period; (ii) Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) for a second violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period; (iii) Seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) for a third or subsequent violation committed within a twenty-four (24) month period”; in (d) substituted “tobacco or nicotine cessation program” for “tobacco cessation program” twice and “ten dollars ($10.00)” for “five dollars ($5.00)”; and rewrote (e), which read “After twenty-four (24) months or upon reaching the age of majority, whichever occurs later, a criminal conviction under this section may be expunged in accordance with W.S. 14-6-241 .”

Cited in

Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Sept. 10, 2014).

§ 14-3-306. Teen court jurisdiction.

The teen court program authorized under W.S. 7-13-1203 may have jurisdiction over any offense committed by a minor under this article.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 93, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

Former § 14-3-306 was renumbered as § 14-3-308 by Laws 2000, ch. 93, § 3.

§ 14-3-307. Compliance inspections.

1. The department of health, working with local law enforcement agencies and other local individuals and organizations at the discretion of the department, shall be the lead agency to ensure compliance with this article.
2. The department of health shall develop strategies to coordinate and support local law enforcement efforts to enforce all state statutes relating to the prohibition of the sale of nicotine products to persons under twenty-one (21) years of age.
3. The department shall have discretion to:
   1. Work with each local law enforcement agency; and
   2. Coordinate local enforcement efforts that appropriately reflect the needs of the community.
4. To coordinate the enforcement of state statutes relating to the prohibition of the sale of nicotine products to persons under twenty-one (21) years of age and to comply with applicable federal law, the department of health shall have authority to contract with or provide grants to local law enforcement agencies or other local individuals or entities having the appropriate level of enforcement authority on the local level to conduct random, unannounced inspections at retail locations where nicotine products are sold. The local law enforcement agencies or other local individuals or entities authorized to conduct inspections shall be permitted to use minors and persons under twenty-one (21) years of age subject to the following:
   1. Prior to the inspection, the local law enforcement agency or other authorized individual or entity shall obtain the written consent of the person being used in the inspection or if using a minor, the written consent of the minor’s parents or guardian shall be obtained prior to the minor participating in an inspection. The written consent required under this paragraph shall include a notification that testimony in a subsequent court proceeding may be required;
   2. Any person under twenty-one (21) years of age participating in an inspection shall, if questioned, state his true age and that he is less than twenty-one (21) years of age;
   3. The appearance of a person under twenty-one (21) years of age shall not be altered to make him appear to be twenty-one (21) years of age or older;
   4. Neither a minor nor his parents or guardians shall be coerced into participating in such inspections;
   5. The person conducting the inspection shall photograph the participant immediately before the inspection and any photographs taken of the participant shall be retained by the person conducting the inspection;
   6. Any participant in an inspection under this section shall be granted immunity from prosecution under W.S. 14-3-304 or 14-3-305 .
5. The person conducting an inspection under this section shall:
   1. Remain within sight or sound of the participant attempting to make the purchase;
   2. Immediately inform in writing a representative or agent of the business establishment that an inspection has been performed and the results of the inspection;
   3. Within two (2) days, prepare a report of the inspection containing:
      1. The name of the person who supervised the inspection;
      2. The age and date of birth of the participant who assisted in the inspection;
      3. The name and position of the person from whom the participant attempted to purchase nicotine products;
      4. The name and address of the establishment inspected;
      5. The date and time of the inspection; and
      6. The results of the inspection, including whether the inspection resulted in the sale or distribution of, or offering for sale, nicotine products to a person under twenty-one (21) years of age.
   4. Immediately upon completion of the report required under this subsection, provide a copy of the report to a representative or agent of the business establishment that was inspected;
   5. Request a law enforcement officer to issue a citation for any illegal acts relating to providing nicotine products to persons under twenty-one (21) years of age during the inspection.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 93, § 1; 2020, ch. 83, § 1.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, substituted “nicotine products” for “tobacco products,” “persons under twenty-one (21) years of age” for “minors” with variation, and “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age” throughout; in the introductory language of (d) substituted “The local law enforcement agencies or other local individuals or entities authorized to conduct inspections shall be permitted to use minors and persons under twenty-one (21) years of age subject to the following” for “The use of minors during inspections is authorized subject to the following”; in (d)(i) substituted “Prior to the inspection, the local law enforcement agency or other authorized individual or entity shall obtain the written consent of the person being used in the inspection or if using a minor, the written consent” for “The written consent shall include notification that testimony in a subsequent court proceeding may be required. The written consent” and added the last sentence; in (d)(ii) substituted “Any person under twenty-one (21) years of age participating” for “A minor participating”; and in (d)(iii) substituted “The appearance of a person under twenty-one (21) years of age” for “The minor's appearance.”

§ 14-3-308. Further regulation by local ordinance.

1. Except as specified under subsection (b) of this section, this article shall not be construed to prohibit the imposition by local law or ordinance of further regulation or prohibition upon the sale, use and possession of nicotine products to any person under twenty-one (21) years of age, but the governmental entity shall not permit or authorize the sale, use or possession of nicotine products to any person under twenty-one (21) years of age in violation of this article.
2. No governmental entity shall enact any law or ordinance which changes the standards provided by W.S. 14-3-302(a) and (c), 14-3-303(a), 14-3-304(a) and 14-3-305(a).
3. The governmental entity may require that sellers of nicotine products obtain a license to sell nicotine products and may deny or revoke the license in the case of reported violations of W.S. 14-3-302 or similar local ordinance.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 76, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-306 ; Laws 2000, ch. 93, § 3; 2004, ch. 130, § 1; 2020, ch. 83, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (b), deleted “and (c)” from the end; and made stylistic changes.

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a) and (c) substituted “nicotine products” for “tobacco products”; in (a) substituted “twenty-one (21) years of age” for “eighteen (18) years of age” twice.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 14-3-309. Regulation of mail order and internet purchases and sales; proof of age; penalties.

1. No person shall sell at retail or wholesale any nicotine product through the internet or any other remote sales method to any person in this state, other than a vendor licensed under W.S. 39-15-106 , unless the seller performs an age verification on the purchaser through an independent third party age verification service. The age verification service utilized shall compare information available from public records to the personal information entered by the purchaser during the ordering process to establish that the purchaser is twenty-one (21) years of age or older.
2. No person shall sell at retail or wholesale any nicotine product through the internet or any other remote sales method to any person in this state, other than a vendor licensed under W.S. 39-15-106 , unless the seller uses a method of mailing or shipping that, upon delivery, requires the signature of a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age before the nicotine product will be released for delivery.
3. The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall not apply if the seller employs one (1) of the following protections to ensure age verification:
   1. The purchaser is required to create an online profile or account with personal information verifying that the purchaser is at least twenty-one (21) years of age including, but not limited to, the purchaser’s name, address and a valid phone number, if that personal information is verified by the seller through publicly available records and delivery is made to the same name and address; or
   2. The purchaser is required to upload a copy of the purchaser’s government issued identification and a current photograph of the purchaser verifying that the purchaser is at least twenty-one (21) years of age and delivery is made to the same name on the identification provided.
4. Any person violating subsection (a) or (b) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable as provided in W.S. 14-3-302(b).

History. Laws 2020, ch. 86, § 1.

Effective date. — Laws 2020, ch. 86, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2020.

§ 14-3-401. Short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the “Child Protection Act.”

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Due process.—

Child Protection Act (CPA) clearly requires a noncustodial parent be given timely notice of the juvenile court proceedings and an opportunity to be heard regarding the placement of the child; the CPA expresses the clear and unequivocal rule of law that the juvenile court shall involve the noncustodial parent in the proceedings at the earliest possible time. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Authority of Department of Family Services. —

Department of Family Services (DFS), a public social service agency, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-2101(a), with authority to oversee the custody and care of children in cases of abuse and neglect under the Child Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-401 through 14-3-441 , was an “authorized agency” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-308 and 14-2-310 with authority to file a petition to terminate a mother's parental rights, even though DFS did not have custody of the children. State v. DH (In the Interest of LB), 2014 WY 10, 316 P.3d 1184, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 2014).

Cited in

E.F.W. v. Saint Stephen’s Mission Indian High Sch., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8693 (D. Wyo. 1999); RS v. Dept. of Family Servs. (In re KLS), 2004 WY 87, 94 P.3d 1025, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (2004); SLJ v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re SJJ), 2005 WY 3, 104 P.3d 74, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (2005); JA v. State, 2008 WY 15, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Feb. 8, 2008); Jet v. State (In re Drt), 2010 WY 137, 241 P.3d 489, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Oct. 21, 2010); NC v. State, 2013 WY 2, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Jan 9, 2013); RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014).

§ 14-3-402. Definitions.

1. As used in this act:
   1. “Adjudication” means a finding by the court or the jury, incorporated in a decree, as to the truth of the facts alleged in the petition;
   2. “Adult” means an individual who has attained the age of majority;
   3. “Child” means an individual who is under the age of majority;
   4. “Clerk” means the clerk of a district court acting as the clerk of a juvenile court;
   5. “Commissioner” means a district court commissioner;
   6. “Court” means the juvenile court established by W.S. 5-8-101 ;
   7. “Custodian” means a person, institution or agency responsible for the child’s welfare and having legal custody of a child by court order or having actual physical custody and control of a child and acting in loco parentis;
   8. “Deprivation of custody” means transfer of legal custody by the court from a parent or previous legal custodian to another person, agency, organization or institution;
   9. “Judge” means the judge of the juvenile court;
   10. “Legal custody” means a legal status created by court order which vests in a custodian the right to have physical custody of a minor, the right and duty to protect, train and discipline a minor, the duty to provide him with food, shelter, clothing, transportation, ordinary medical care, education and in an emergency, the right and duty to authorize surgery or other extraordinary medical care. The rights and duties of legal custody are subject to the rights and duties of the guardian of the person of the minor, and to residual parental rights and duties;
   11. “Minor” means an individual who is under the age of majority;
   12. “Neglected child” means a child:
       1. Who has been subjected to neglect as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(vii);
       2. Who has been subjected to abuse as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii).
          1. through (IV) Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 4.
   13. “Parent” means either a natural or adoptive parent of the child, a person adjudged the parent of the child in judicial proceedings or a man presumed to be the father under W.S. 14-2-504 ;
   14. “Parties” include the child, his parents, guardian or custodian, the state of Wyoming and any other person made a party by an order to appear, or named by the juvenile court;
   15. “Protective supervision” means a legal status created by court order following an adjudication of neglect, whereby the child is permitted to remain in his home subject to supervision by the department of family services, a county or state probation officer or other qualified agency or individual the court may designate;
   16. “Residual parental rights and duties” means those rights and duties remaining with the parents after legal custody, guardianship of the person or both have been vested in another person, agency or institution. Residual parental rights and duties include but are not limited to:
       1. The duty to support and provide necessities of life;
       2. The right to consent to adoption;
       3. The right to reasonable visitation unless restricted or prohibited by court order;
       4. The right to determine the minor’s religious affiliation; and
       5. The right to petition on behalf of the minor.
   17. “Shelter care” means the temporary care of a child in physically unrestricting facilities pending court disposition or execution of a court order for placement or commitment;
   18. “Ordinary medical care” means medical, dental and vision examinations, routine medical, dental and vision treatment and emergency surgical procedures, but does not include nonemergency surgical procedures;
   19. “Temporary protective custody” means a legal status created prior to a shelter care hearing when a court, law enforcement officer, physician, physician’s assistant or nurse practitioner takes a child into protective custody pursuant to W.S. 14-3-405 . Temporary protective custody vests in a custodian the duty to protect the child and arrange for the provision of food, shelter, clothing, transportation, ordinary medical care and education. Temporary protective custody shall be transferred from the law enforcement officer, physician, physician’s assistant or nurse practitioner to the local child protection agency as soon as practicable to facilitate such care. Temporary protective custody divests the parent or custodian of his right to the custody and control of the child;
   20. “Transportation” means as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(xvii);
   21. “Initial hearing” means a hearing held in accordance with W.S. 14-3-426 ;
   22. “Shelter care hearing” means a hearing held in accordance with W.S. 14-3-409 ;
   23. “Transfer hearing” means a hearing held in accordance with W.S. 14-6-237 ;
   24. “Another planned permanent living arrangement” means a permanency plan for youth sixteen (16) years of age or older other than reunification, adoption, legal guardianship or placement with a fit and willing relative;
   25. “Qualified individual” means a person who meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 675a(c)(1)(D);
   26. “Qualified residential treatment program” means a program that meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 672(k)(4);
   27. “This act” means W.S. 14-3-401 through 14-3-441 .

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2001, ch. 61, § 2; 2003, ch. 93, § 2; 2005, ch. 236, §§ 2, 4; 2011, ch. 79, § 1; 2016, ch. 95, § 2; 2020, ch. 2, § 1; ch. 87, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a)(x), inserted “transportation” before “ordinary medical care”; rewrote the definition of “neglected child” in (a)(xii); in (a)(xvi), inserted “legal” before “custody”; and inserted (a)(xviii) through (a)(xx), redesignating former (a)(xviii) as present (a)(xxi).

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, added (a)(xxi) through (a)(xxiii), and redesignated former (a)(xxi) as (a)(xxiv).

The 2016 amendment renumbered former (a)(xxiv) as (a)(xxv), and added (a)(xxiv).

Laws 2016, ch. 95, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8, Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 4, 2016.

The 2020 amendments. — The first 2020 amendment, by ch. 2, § 1, effective July 1, 2020, added (a)(xxv), (a)(xxvi); redesignated former (a)(xxv) as (a)(xxvii); and in (a)(xxvii), substituted “14-3-440” for “14-3-441.”

The second 2020 amendment, by ch. 87, § 1, effective July 1, 2020, in (a)(xxv) substituted “14-3-441” for “14-3-440.”

This section is set out as reconciled by the Wyoming legislative service office.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Residual parental rights.—

Mother’s claim that a permanency order should have designated her preferred adoptive parents as the court-ordered adoptive parents had not been waived, but failed on the merits where the permanency order had not terminated the mother’s parental rights or changed legal custody, and nothing in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(k) (2017) required findings as to the merits of the prospective adoption applicants. DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

Jurisdiction. —

In a termination of parental rights proceedings, the father was a party over whom the court had jurisdiction, and his failure to comply with the case plan constituted neglect. RS v. Dept. of Family Servs. (In re KLS), 2004 WY 87, 94 P.3d 1025, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2004).

Neglected children. —

Trial court did not err in finding neglect under this section where: (1) the mother's daughter was unable to find the mother at home, so the daughter called a bar where the mother was known to frequent, (2) the mother and her boyfriend went to the bar nearly every night and drank, (3) the mother was drunk at the time her daughter called her, (4) the mother's boyfriend threatened the mother's father and the children with physical violence, (5) the children had seen the mother and boyfriend doing drugs, (6) there had been many family arguments and fighting, and (7) the oldest daughter had attempted, or at least threatened, suicide; thus, the circumstances constituted the failure or refusal to provide the adequate care and supervision necessary for the children's well-being. DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re H Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003).

Father had standing because he was adjudicated as neglectful based on the Mother's alleged violations of the consent decree. MR v. State (In the Interest of CDR), 2015 WY 79, 351 P.3d 264, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2015).

Court erred by revoking a consent decree in the neglect case because, although the court did not lose jurisdiction when the court was empowered to conduct a hearing and rule on the accusations, the court erred in concluding that the Mother violated the terms of the consent decree by drinking alcohol when the consent decree agreement did not expressly prohibit Mother from drinking but only required her to undergo alcohol/substance abuse evaluation and follow the regimen of treatment recommended. MR v. State (In the Interest of CDR), 2015 WY 79, 351 P.3d 264, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2015).

Juvenile court properly found that a mother had neglected her child by failing to provide adequate education for his well being because the child had numerous unexplained absences, the compulsory attendance statutes did not apply, the child protective services statutes and the Child Protection Act were complied with,and the mother received notice and an opportunity to be heard before the juvenile court made its findings. RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 334 P.3d 568, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2014).

Contempt proceeding. —

Adjudication of neglect under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402 et seq., the Wyoming Child Protection Act, was entered against defendant for not providing adequate care necessary for the well-being of his minor children; the juvenile court ordered defendant to satisfy certain requirements within a specified period of time. Because the contempt proceeding against defendant was not conducted as an independent criminal action apart from the underlying juvenile case as required by Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(c), with its own caption and docket number, the juvenile court never acquired jurisdiction to proceed; its judgment and sentence of contempt was null and void. BD v. State, 2010 WY 18, 226 P.3d 272, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2010).

Cited in

LW v. State (In the Interest of JW), 2010 WY 28, 226 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Mar. 18, 2010); Jo v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (in the Interest of Re), 2011 WY 170, 267 P.3d 1092, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Dec. 28, 2011).

HP v. State, 2004 WY 82, 93 P.3d 982, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (2004).

Quoted in

DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

Stated in

DT v. State, 2017 WY 36, 391 P.3d 1136, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2017).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Rights of unwed father to obstruct adoption of his child by withholding consent, 61 ALR5th 151.

§ 14-3-403. Juvenile court authority over certain issues.

1. Coincident with proceedings concerning a minor alleged to be neglected, the court has jurisdiction to:
   1. Determine questions concerning the right to legal custody of the minor;
   2. Order any party to the proceedings to perform any acts, duties and responsibilities the court deems necessary; or
   3. Order any party to the proceedings to refrain from any act or conduct the court deems detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the minor or essential to the enforcement of any lawful order of disposition of the minor made by the court.
2. Nothing contained in this act is construed to deprive the district court of jurisdiction to determine questions of custody, parental rights, guardianship or any other questions involving minors, when the questions are the subject of or incidental to suits or actions commenced in or transferred to the district court as provided by law, except:
   1. If a petition involving the same child is pending in juvenile court or if continuing jurisdiction has been previously acquired by the juvenile court, the district court may certify the question of custody to the juvenile court; and
   2. The district court at any time may request the juvenile court to make recommendations pertaining to guardianship or legal custody.
3. A party to the proceeding may file a petition for adoption or an appointment of guardianship in the underlying juvenile action in lieu of filing a petition with the district court.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2009, ch. 196, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and substituted “, except:” for the former period at the end of the introductory paragraph of (b); and added (c).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Claim precluded.—

This section precluded the mother's claim that the district court's jurisdiction was deficient. SAS v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re AGS), 2014 WY 143, 337 P.3d 470, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 2014).

Cited in

In the Interest of MM v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2009 WY 28, 202 P.3d 409, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Mar. 3, 2009).

§ 14-3-404. Venue; change of venue or judge.

Proceedings under this act may be commenced in the county where the child is living or is present when the proceedings are commenced. Change of venue or change of judge may be had under the circumstances and upon the terms and conditions provided by law in a civil action in the district court.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-405. Taking of child into custody; when permitted.

1. A child, or any other child residing in the same household, may be taken into custody by a law enforcement officer without a warrant or court order and without the consent of the parents, guardians or others exercising temporary or permanent control over the child when:
   1. There are reasonable grounds to believe a child is abandoned, lost, suffering from illness or injury or seriously endangered by the child’s surroundings and immediate custody appears to be necessary for his protection;
   2. The child’s conduct or behavior seriously endangers himself and immediate custody appears necessary; or
   3. The child is as evidenced by an examination being abused or neglected by a parent, guardian or legal custodian, a member of the parent’s, guardian’s or legal custodian’s household or any other person known to the parent, guardian or legal custodian.
2. A child may be taken into temporary protective custody by a physician, physician’s assistant or nurse practitioner without a warrant or court order and without the consent of the parents, guardians or others exercising temporary or permanent control over the child when the physician, physician’s assistant or nurse practitioner treating the child, or a hospital in which the child is being treated, finds that there is reasonable cause to believe an imminent danger to the child’s life, health or safety exists unless the child is taken into protective custody, whether or not additional medical treatment is required, and there is not time to apply for a court order.
3. A district attorney may file an emergency petition, or the department of family services, a local law enforcement officer, an administrator of a hospital in which a child reasonably believed to have been abused or neglected is being treated, or any physician, physician’s assistant or nurse practitioner who treated the child may request the court for a protective order. After considering the emergency petition or request, the judge or commissioner, upon finding that there is reasonable cause to believe that a child has been abused or neglected and that the child, by continuing in his place of residence or in the care and custody of the person responsible for his health, safety and welfare, would be in imminent danger of his life, health or safety, may:
   1. Issue an ex parte order or search warrant. The order shall place the child in the temporary protective custody of the local child protection agency;
   2. Issue an emergency order or search warrant upon application and hearing, authorizing ordinary or emergency care of the child or authorizing a forensic examination to collect evidence.
4. Temporary protective custody shall not exceed forty-eight (48) hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays.
5. When necessary for the best interest or welfare of the child in temporary protective custody, a court may order medical or other necessary health care, including mental health and substance abuse care, notwithstanding the absence of a prior finding of child abuse or neglect.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, § 2; 2019, ch. 77, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted the language pertaining to consent in the introductory language in (a); and added (b) through (e).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in the introductory language in (a), substituted “A child, or any other child residing in the same household, may” for “A child may,” in (a)(i), substituted “the child's” for “his,” added (a)(iii), and made related changes.

Due process.—

Juvenile court violated a father’s right to due process because it failed to give him reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the child protection action; many of the requirements of the Child Protection Act were not followed because the father was not informed when the child was taken into protective custody or of the shelter care hearing; the father was materially prejudiced by the due process violations because his lack of involvement colored the juvenile court’s ruling. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Cited in

Lara v. State, 2001 WY 53, 25 P.3d 507, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 2001); RS v. Dept. of Family Servs. (In re KLS), 2004 WY 87, 94 P.3d 1025, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (2004).

Applicability. —

Because children already had been adjudicated neglected before they were removed from their mother's custody and placed with relatives, the juvenile court correctly applied Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-429(a)(iv) instead of this section in deciding its conclusions of law. RH v. State (In the Interest of DRS), 2011 WY 128, 261 P.3d 697, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2011).

§ 14-3-406. Child in custody; no shelter care placement without court order; exceptions; notice to parent or guardian; release.

1. A child taken into temporary protective custody shall not be placed in shelter care without a court order unless shelter care is required to:
   1. Protect the child’s person;
   2. Prevent the child from being removed from the jurisdiction of the court; or
   3. Provide the child having no parent, guardian, custodian or other responsible adult with supervision and care and return him to the court when required.
2. Any person taking a child into temporary protective custody under this act shall as soon as possible notify the child’s parent, guardian or custodian. Unless the child’s shelter care is authorized by court order or required for one (1) of the reasons in subsection (a) of this section, the child shall be released to the care of his parent, guardian, custodian or other responsible adult upon that person’s written promise to present the child before the court upon request.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “temporary protective custody” for “custody” in the introductory language in (a) and in (b), and made a related change.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Due process.—

Juvenile court violated a father’s right to due process because it failed to give him reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the child protection action; many of the requirements of the Child Protection Act were not followed because the father was not informed when the child was taken into protective custody or of the shelter care hearing; the father was materially prejudiced by the due process violations because his lack of involvement colored the juvenile court’s ruling. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Cited in

Lara v. State, 2001 WY 53, 25 P.3d 507, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 2001).

§ 14-3-407. Shelter care; delivery of child pending hearing; placing children; notice if no court order.

1. If shelter care of a child appears necessary to the person taking custody of the child, the child shall be delivered as soon as possible to the court or to the department of family services pending a hearing.
2. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 4.
3. The department of family services shall promptly notify the court and the district attorney of any child being cared for by the department without a court order and shall deliver the child to the court upon request.
4. The department of family services shall care for the child under this section pursuant to temporary protective custody provisions as specified in W.S. 14-3-208 .

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, §§ 2, 4.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section to provide that the department of family services rather than a shelter care facility is responsible where a child is in immediate need of placement prior to a hearing, repealing former (b), which pertained to shelter care placement, and adding (d).

§ 14-3-408. Notice of shelter care to be given district attorney; written statement required; duty of district attorney.

1. When a child is taken into temporary protective custody without a court order and is placed in shelter care pursuant to W.S. 14-3-405(a) or (b), the person taking temporary protective custody of the child shall notify the district attorney without delay. Also the person shall as soon as possible file a brief written statement with the district attorney setting forth the facts which led to taking the child into custody and the reason why the child was not released.
2. Upon receiving notice that a child is being held in shelter care, the district attorney shall immediately review the need for shelter care and may order the child released unless he determines shelter care is necessary under the provisions of W.S. 14-3-406(a) or unless ordered by the court.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a) substituted “temporary protective custody” for “custody” and inserted the internal reference.

Due process.—

Juvenile court violated a father’s right to due process because it failed to give him reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the child protection action; many of the requirements of the Child Protection Act were not followed because the father was not informed when the child was taken into protective custody or of the shelter care hearing; the father and his family were not considered by the State or the juvenile court as options for the child’s placement. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

§ 14-3-409. Taking of child into custody; shelter care hearing where no court order; conditional release; evidence; rehearing.

1. When a child is taken into temporary protective custody without a court order or under an ex parte emergency order, a petition as provided in W.S. 14-3-412 shall be promptly filed and presented to the court. A shelter care hearing shall be held as soon as reasonably possible not later than forty-eight (48) hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays, after the child is taken into temporary protective custody to determine if further shelter care is required pending further court action. Written notice stating the time, place and purpose of the hearing shall be given to the child and to his parents, guardian or custodian.
2. At the commencement of the hearing the judge shall advise the child and his parents, guardian or custodian of:
   1. The contents of the petition and the nature of the allegations contained therein;
   2. Their right to counsel as provided in W.S. 14-3-422 ;
   3. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to present witnesses and evidence in their own behalf and the right to issuance of process by the court to compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence;
   4. The right to a jury trial as provided in W.S. 14-3-423 ;
   5. The right to appeal as provided in W.S. 14-3-432 ; and
   6. The state’s obligation, pursuant to W.S. 14-3-431(d), to file a petition to terminate parental rights when a child has been placed in foster care under the responsibility of the state for fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months unless the court finds that one (1) of the exceptions listed in W.S. 14-3-431(m) applies.
3. An initial hearing may be held in conjunction with a shelter care hearing, provided the requirements of W.S. 14-3-413 , 14-3-414 and 14-3-426 have been met. The court shall set a time not to exceed sixty (60) days for an adjudicatory hearing, unless the court finds good cause to delay or postpone the hearing. In no case shall the court hold the adjudicatory hearing more than ninety (90) days after the date the petition is filed.
4. The court shall determine whether or not the child’s full-time shelter care is required to protect the child’s welfare pending further proceedings. If the court determines that returning the child to the home is contrary to the welfare of the child, the court shall enter the finding on the record and order the child placed in the legal custody of the department of family services. If the court finds that full-time shelter care is not required, the court shall order the child released and may impose one (1) or more of the following conditions:
   1. Place the child in the custody and supervision of his parents, guardian or custodian, under the supervision of the department of family services or under the protective supervision of any individual or organization approved by the court that agrees to supervise the child; or
   2. Impose any other terms and conditions of release deemed reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the child at subsequent proceedings or necessary to his protection from harm.
5. All relevant and material evidence helpful in determining the need for shelter care may be admitted by the court even though not competent in an adjudicatory hearing on the allegations of the petition.
6. If a child is not released after a shelter care hearing and it appears by sworn statement of the parents, guardian or custodian that they did not receive notice and did not waive notice and appearance at the hearing, the court shall rehear the matter without delay.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 1998, ch. 18, § 1; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2009, ch. 169, § 1; 2011, ch. 79, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, rewrote (a), decreasing the time within which a hearing must be held where a child is taken into temporary protective custody; in (b) added provisions pertaining to presenting witnesses and compelling the production of evidence and added (b)(vi); rewrote (c); in (d) inserted the second sentence; and made related changes throughout.

The 2009 amendment, in (b)(vi), substituted “14-3-431(m)” for “14-3-431(d).”

Laws 2009, ch. 169, § 5 (b) makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 11, 2009.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in (a), substituted “A shelter” for “An informal shelter”; in (c), deleted “The parents, guardian or custodian shall be given an opportunity to admit or deny the allegations in the petition. If the allegations are admitted, the court shall make the appropriate adjudication and may proceed immediately to a disposition of the case, provided the court has the predisposition report and multidisciplinary team recommendations, in accordance with the provisions of W.S. 14-3-429 , except that a commissioner acting in the absence or incapacity of the judge may take testimony to establish a factual basis and accept an admission and perform all other requirements of the initial hearing but shall not proceed to disposition. If denied” at the beginning, and inserted the first sentence; and in the introductory language of (d), deleted “Regardless of whether the allegations in the petition are admitted or denied” at the beginning; and made related changes.

Due process.—

Juvenile court violated a father’s right to due process because it failed to give him reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the child protection action; many of the requirements of the Child Protection Act were not followed because the father was not informed when the child was taken into protective custody or of the shelter care hearing; the father was materially prejudiced by the due process violations because his lack of involvement colored the juvenile court’s ruling. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Failure to advise of right to counsel.—

Even though the juvenile court transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law when it failed to advise the father of his right to counsel at his first appearance in the permanency hearing and thereafter failed to act on the father’s initial request for appointment of counsel, the father failed to establish that these errors materially prejudiced him, and therefore the court found no plain error. FH v. State (In the Interest of ECH), 2018 WY 83, 423 P.3d 295, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2018).

Jurisdiction. —

In the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, a juvenile court did not lose jurisdiction to consider a neglect action when it dismissed without prejudice an initial neglect petition because the adjudicatory hearing was not held within 90 days of the filing of the petition as required by this section and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426 and it allowed the petition to be refiled; the juvenile court's remedy of the situation gave due attention to the 90-day deadline, while still protecting the child, and mother was afforded due process protections and she was not unfairly prejudiced by the delay. JA v. State, 2008 WY 15, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Feb. 8, 2008).

Court complied with statutory requirements. —

Trial court did not err in denying a mother's motion to withdraw her admission of child neglect because the court complied with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-409(b) and 14-3-426(a) by carefully advising the mother of her rights in the placement proceedings, and of the consequences that could result from an admission or a finding of neglect; that was as far as the court was required to go. Jet v. State (In re DRT), 2010 WY 137, 241 P.3d 489, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2010).

Cited in

DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re “H” Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003); RH v. State (in the Interest of DRS), 2011 WY 128, 261 P.3d 697, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Sept. 14, 2011); Scott v. Bd. of Trs., 2015 WY 128, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Sept. 18, 2015).

§ 14-3-410. Shelter care hearing conducted by commissioner; authority and duty; review by court.

1. In the absence or incapacity of the judge, the shelter care hearing may be conducted by a district court commissioner of the county in which the child is being held in shelter care.
2. The commissioner may make any order concerning the child’s release or continued shelter care as authorized to the judge under W.S. 14-3-409 . If the child is not released after the hearing, the commissioner shall promptly file with the court a complete written resume of the evidence adduced at the hearing and his reasons for not releasing the child. The commissioner shall conduct the hearing pursuant to W.S. 14-3-409 . The hearing shall be conducted in the presence of counsel and guardian ad litem, if so appointed. The commissioner may also appoint counsel, appoint a guardian ad litem, order a predisposition report, appoint a multidisciplinary team, issue subpoenas or search warrants, order physical or medical examinations and authorize emergency medical, surgical or dental treatment all as provided in this act. The commissioner shall not make final orders of adjudication or disposition.
3. The court shall review the reports, orders and actions of the commissioner as soon as reasonably possible and confirm or modify the commissioner’s orders and actions as it deems appropriate.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2011, ch. 79, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (b), inserted the third and fourth sentences, inserted “appoint counsel, appoint a guardian ad litem, order a predisposition report, appoint a multidisciplinary team” preceding “issue subpoenas or search warrants,” and substituted “this act” for “W.S. 14-3-417 through 14-3-420 .”

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in (b), deleted “except that if the parent who had been advised of his rights wishes to admit the allegations, the court may take testimony to establish a factual basis and accept the admission and perform all other requirements of the initial hearing but shall not enter the adjudication or proceed to disposition” at the end of the third sentence.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-411. Complaints alleging neglect; investigation and determination by district attorney.

Complaints alleging a child is neglected shall be referred to the office of the district attorney. The district attorney shall determine whether the best interest of the child requires that judicial action be taken. The department of family services and the county sheriff shall provide the district attorney with any assistance he may require in making an investigation. The district attorney shall prepare and file a petition with the court if he believes action is necessary to protect the interest of the child.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Need for separate investigation not shown. —

Mother did not show need for separate family services department investigation and substantiation of neglect where there had been a police investigation, a petition filed by a district attorney, and an adjudicatory hearing in the trial court.DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 13, 2004).

Cited in

DB v. State (In re CRA), 2016 WY 24, 368 P.3d 294, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2016).

Quoted in

RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014).

§ 14-3-412. Commencement of proceedings; contents of petition.

1. Proceedings in juvenile court are commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the court. The petition and all subsequent pleadings, motions, orders and decrees shall be entitled “State of Wyoming, In the Interest of  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , minor.” A petition shall be signed by the district attorney on information and belief of the alleged facts. All petitions must be verified.
2. The petition shall set forth all jurisdictional facts, including but not limited to:
   1. The child’s name, date of birth and address;
   2. The names and addresses of the child’s parents, guardian or custodian and the child’s spouse, if any;
   3. Whether the child is being held in shelter care and if so, the name and address of the facility and the time shelter care commenced;
   4. A statement setting forth with particularity the facts which bring the child within the provisions of this act; and
   5. Whether the child is an Indian child as defined in the federal Indian Child Welfare Act and, if so, a statement setting forth with particularity the notice provided to the appropriate tribal court.
3. The petition shall state if any of the facts enumerated in subsection (b) of this section are unknown.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2005, ch. 230, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, added (b)(v).

The 2005 amendment, effective March 10, 2005, made stylistic changes to (b)(iii) and (b)(iv).

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2009, ch. 70, § 2, effective July 1, 2009, provides: “The provisions of W.S. 14-3-427(e) and (f), 14-3-429(d), 14-6-227(e) and (f) and 14-6-427(e) and (f) as amended by section 1 of this act, shall apply to child protection cases in which a petition was filed under W.S. 14-3-412 , 14-6-212 or 14-6-412 on or after July 1, 2009.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 230, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Due process.—

Juvenile court violated a father’s right to due process because it failed to give him reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the child protection action; many of the requirements of the Child Protection Act were not followed because the father was not informed when the child was taken into protective custody or of the shelter care hearing; the father was materially prejudiced by the due process violations because his lack of involvement colored the juvenile court’s ruling. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Cited in

K.H. v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs., 2007 WY 196, 173 P.3d 365, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Dec. 12, 2007).

§ 14-3-413. Order to appear; contents thereof; when child taken into immediate custody; waiver of service.

1. After a petition is filed, the court shall issue an order to appear. The order shall:
   1. State the name of the court, the title of the proceedings and the time and place for the initial hearing;
   2. Direct the persons named therein to appear personally at the hearing and direct the person having actual physical custody or control of the child to present the child before the court at the hearing;
   3. Be directed to the child’s parents, guardian, custodian and the child’s spouse, if any, and to any other person the court deems necessary; and
   4. Be directed to the child if fourteen (14) years of age or more.
2. If it appears to the court by affidavit by the district attorney based on actual knowledge or on information and belief that the conduct, condition or surroundings of the child seriously endanger the child’s health or welfare, that the child may be removed from the jurisdiction of the court or that the child will not be brought before the court notwithstanding service of the order, the court may direct in the order to appear that the person serving the order take the child into immediate custody and bring him before the court.
3. Service of the order may be waived either in writing or by voluntary appearance at the hearing, provided a child may waive service of the order only with the consent of his parents, guardian, custodian, guardian ad litem or counsel.
4. With respect to a child who is alleged to have been abused or neglected, a noncustodial parent or putative father who has not had parental rights to the child removed by a court, and who is not alleged in the petition to have abused or neglected the child, shall be served with notice of the child protective proceeding pursuant to W.S. 14-3-414 and 14-3-415 . The notice shall inform the noncustodial parent or putative father of the following:
   1. A petition has been filed;
   2. The noncustodial parent or putative father has been named as such in the petition;
   3. A response from the noncustodial parent or putative father is required within sixty (60) days of the date of service; and
   4. Failure to respond to the notice, appear at hearings or participate in the case may result in the termination of his parental rights;
   5. The noncustodial parent or putative father may be considered for possible placement of the child.
5. A noncustodial parent or putative father served with notice of the child protective proceeding shall:
   1. Respond and appear as required by this section and W.S. 14-3-414 and 14-3-415 ;
   2. Admit or deny that he is the noncustodial parent or putative father of the child;
   3. Submit to the jurisdiction of the court;
   4. Provide information and abide by any order as required by the court.
6. A parent or putative father who is served pursuant to W.S. 14-3-414 and 14-3-415 and fails to respond as required by this section may not thereafter assert parental rights in contravention of any permanency plan for the child required by W.S. 14-3-431(j) and (k) unless good cause can be shown for failure to respond.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2009, ch. 196, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added (d) through (f).

Due process.—

Juvenile court violated a father’s right to due process because it failed to give him reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the child protection action; many of the requirements of the Child Protection Act were not followed because the father was not informed when the child was taken into protective custody or of the shelter care hearing; the father was materially prejudiced by the due process violations because his lack of involvement colored the juvenile court’s ruling. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Cited in

RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014).

§ 14-3-414. Service of process; order of custody.

1. In proceedings under this act, service of order to appear or other process within the state shall be made by the sheriff of the county where service is made, by his undersheriff or deputy or by any law enforcement officer or responsible adult not a party to the proceeding and appointed by the clerk.
2. Within the state, service of order to appear is made by personally delivering a copy of the order together with a copy of the petition to the person ordered to appear, provided that parents of a child may both be served by personally delivering to either parent two (2) copies of the order and petition, one (1) copy for each parent. A child under the age of fourteen (14) years is served by delivering a copy of the order together with a copy of the petition to the child’s parents, guardian, custodian or other adult having the actual physical custody and control of the child or to a guardian ad litem or attorney appointed for the child.
3. If it appears to the court by affidavit that the parents, guardian or custodian of the child cannot be found within the state, the court may order personal service outside the state or service by certified mail with return receipt requested signed by addressee only. The state agency having custody of the child shall also file an affidavit with the court explaining the efforts made to locate the missing parent when the address of the child’s parents, guardian or custodian is unknown and cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained, and the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child and to receive service of process.
4. Service by certified mail is complete on the date the clerk receives the return receipt signed by addressee. Personal service either within or outside the state is complete on the date when copies of the order to appear and petition are delivered to the person to be served.
5. When personal service of order to appear is made within the state, service shall be completed not less than two (2) days before the hearing and when made outside the state, service shall be completed not less than five (5) days before the hearing. However, notwithstanding any provision within this act, the court may order that a child be taken into custody as provided in W.S. 14-3-413 or that a child be held in shelter care pending further proceedings as provided in W.S. 14-3-409 , even though service of order to appear on the parents, guardian or custodian of the child is not complete at the time of making the order.
6. If the person’s residence is unknown, service may be had by constructive service or by publication as provided in the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2001, ch. 61, § 2; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2009, ch. 196, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, twice in (e), substituted “shall be completed” for “must be completed.”

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added (f).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Due process.—

Juvenile court violated a father’s right to due process because it failed to give him reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the child protection action; subsection (e) did not absolve the State of its obligation to give the father notice of the proceedings or the juvenile court of its obligation to give the father the opportunity to be heard on the child’s shelter care and/or placement. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Cited in

RH v. State (in the Interest of DRS), 2011 WY 128, 261 P.3d 697, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Sept. 14, 2011); RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014).

§ 14-3-415. Presence of parent, custodian or guardian at hearing; failure to appear; avoidance of service; issuance of bench warrant.

1. The court shall insure the presence at any hearing of the parents, guardian or custodian of any child subject to the proceedings under this act.
2. Any person served with an order to appear as provided in W.S. 14-3-414 and without reasonable cause fails to appear, is liable for contempt of court and the court may issue a bench warrant to cause the person to be brought before the court.
3. If the child, his parents, guardian or custodian or any other person willfully avoids or refuses service of order to appear, or it appears to the court that service of the order will be ineffectual or that the welfare of the child requires that he be brought immediately into the custody of the court, a bench warrant may be issued by the court for the child or his parents, guardian, custodian or any person having the actual physical custody or control of the child.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Due process.—

Father’s due process rights were not violated when the juvenile court denied his request for transport from the Wyoming Honor Farm to appear in person at the permanency hearing because he was permitted to appear by telephone while his counsel was present in the courtroom. FH v. State (In the Interest of ECH), 2018 WY 83, 423 P.3d 295, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2018).

§ 14-3-416. Appointment of guardian ad litem.

The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a party to proceedings under this act if the child has no parent, guardian or custodian appearing in his behalf or if the interests of the parents, guardian or custodian are adverse to the best interest of the child. A party to the proceeding or employee or representative thereof shall not be appointed guardian ad litem for the child.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Guardian ad litem properly appointed. —

The trial court did not err in appointing an attorney for one or more of the children to act as guardian ad litem for the children; the person appointed to represent the children was specifically referred to as a guardian ad litem, and his participation in the trial was within the boundaries set forth in case law.DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 13, 2004).

Cited in

RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, but is it a Formula for Malpractice?,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1999).

§ 14-3-417. Subpoenas for witnesses and evidence.

Upon application of any party to the proceeding, the clerk shall issue and the court on its own motion may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of records, documents or other tangible evidence at any hearing.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

§ 14-3-418. Search warrant; when authorized; affidavit required; contents of affidavit and warrant; service and return.

1. The court or a commissioner may issue a search warrant within the court’s jurisdiction if it appears by application supported by affidavit of one (1) or more adults that a child is being neglected, unlawfully detained or physically abused and his health or welfare requires that he be taken immediately into custody, or it appears by application supported by affidavit of one (1) or more adults that evidence of child abuse exists.
2. The affidavit shall be in writing, signed and affirmed by the affiant. The affidavit shall set forth:
   1. The name and age of the child sought, provided that if the name or age of the child is unknown the affidavit shall set forth a description of the child sufficient to identify him with reasonable certainty and a statement that the affiant believes the child is of age to come within the provisions of this act;
   2. The affiant’s belief that the child sought is being neglected, unlawfully detained or physically abused and his health or welfare requires that he be taken immediately into custody, and a statement of the facts upon which the belief is based; and
   3. The affiant’s belief that evidence of child abuse or neglect exists and could be obtained through forensic means, and a statement of the facts upon which the belief is based.
3. The warrant may be directed to any law enforcement officer of the county or municipality in which the place or premises to be searched is located. The warrant shall:
   1. Name or describe the child sought;
   2. Name the address or location and describe the place or premises to be searched;
   3. State the grounds for issuance of the warrant;
   4. Name the person or persons whose affidavit has been taken in support of the warrant; and
   5. Authorize the officer to whom the warrant is directed to conduct the search and instruct him as to the disposition of the child if found, pending further proceedings by the court.
4. The officer making the search may enter the place or premises described in the warrant at any time with force if necessary, in order to remove the child or to obtain evidence that the child is neglected, unlawfully detained or physically abused. The officer conducting the search shall serve a copy of the warrant upon the person in possession of the place or premises searched and shall return the original warrant to the court showing his actions in the premises.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2006, ch. 114, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a), added “or it appears by application supported by affidavit of one (1) or more adults that evidence of child abuse exists” at the end; and in the introductory language in (b), twice substituted “shall” for “must,” and added (b)(iii).

The 2006 amendment, in (b), added “and” at the end of (ii) and made a related change in (i).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3 provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-419. Physical and mental examinations.

Any time after the filing of a petition, on motion of the district attorney or the child’s parents, guardian, custodian or attorney or on motion of the court, the court may order the child to be examined by a licensed and qualified physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, psychologist or licensed mental health professional designated by the court to aid in determining the physical and mental condition of the child. The examination shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, but the court may commit the child to a suitable medical facility or institution for examination if deemed necessary. Commitment for examination shall not exceed fifteen (15) days.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

§ 14-3-420. Emergency medical, surgical or dental examination or treatment.

The court may authorize and consent to emergency medical, surgical or dental examination or treatment of a child taken into custody under the provisions of this act either before or after the filing of a petition, if in the opinion of a licensed and qualified physician or surgeon the child is suffering from a serious physical condition or illness which requires prompt treatment or prompt examination is necessary to preserve evidence of neglect.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-421. Reports of medical or mental examinations; use of results; copies.

The results of any medical or mental examination authorized or ordered by the court shall be reported to the court in writing and signed by the person making the examination. The results may not be considered by the court prior to adjudication but may be considered only in making a disposition under this act. Copies of the examination reports shall be made available to the child’s parents, guardian, custodian or attorney upon request.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-422. Advising of right to counsel required; appointment of counsel; verification of financial condition.

1. At their first appearance before the court and at their initial hearing the child’s parents, guardian or custodian shall be advised by the court of their right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings including appeal, and to employ counsel of their own choice.
2. The court shall upon request appoint counsel to represent the child’s parents, guardian or custodian if the child’s parents, guardian or custodian are unable to obtain counsel. If appointment of counsel is requested, the court shall require the child’s parents, guardian or custodian to verify their financial condition under oath, either by written affidavit signed and sworn to by the parties or by sworn testimony made a part of the record of the proceedings. The affidavit or sworn testimony shall state they are without sufficient money, property, assets or credit to employ counsel in their own behalf. The court may require further verification of financial condition if it deems necessary.
3. The court may appoint counsel for any party when necessary in the interest of justice.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2011, ch. 79, § 1.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in (a), inserted “and at their initial hearing.”

Failure to advise of right to counsel.—

Even though the juvenile court transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law when it failed to advise the father of his right to counsel at his first appearance in the permanency hearing and thereafter failed to act on the father’s initial request for appointment of counsel, the father failed to establish that these errors materially prejudiced him, and therefore the court found no plain error. FH v. State (In the Interest of ECH), 2018 WY 83, 423 P.3d 295, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2018).

Failure to appoint counsel at juvenile proceeding. —

Mother did not show how the failure to appoint her counsel at an initial juvenile proceeding violated her due process rights regarding termination of parental rights proceedings; termination proceedings are entirely separate and distinct from neglect proceedings, deriving their respective genesis from separate statutes and requiring different burdens of proof. MN v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In the Interest of MN), 2003 WY 135, 78 P.3d 232, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2003).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, but is it a Formula for Malpractice?,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1999).

§ 14-3-423. Rights of parties generally; demand for and conduct of jury trial.

1. A party to any proceeding under this act is entitled to:
   1. A copy of all charges made against him;
   2. Confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
   3. Introduce evidence, present witnesses and otherwise be heard in his own behalf; and
   4. Issue of process by the court to compel the appearance of witnesses or the production of evidence.
2. A party against whom a petition has been filed or the district attorney may demand a trial by jury at an adjudicatory hearing. The jury shall be composed of jurors selected, qualified and compensated as provided by law for the trial of civil matters in the district court. The jury may also be selected from the prospective jurors on the base jury list residing within five (5) miles of the city or town where the trial is to be held if the court directs. Demand for a jury trial must be made to the court not later than ten (10) days after the party making the demand is advised of his right to a jury trial at the initial hearing. No deposit for jury fees is required. Failure of a party to demand a jury is a waiver of this right.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2011, ch. 79, § 1; 2014, ch. 53, § 1.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in (b), added “at the initial hearing” at the end of the fourth sentence.

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, in the third sentence of (b), substituted “may also be selected from the prospective jurors on the base jury list” for “may be drawn from the jury panel of the district court or a special jury panel may be drawn from “jury box number three (3),” and substituted “if the court” for “whichever the court.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Waiver of right to jury trial.—

Although a parent argued that the parent did not waive the parent's right to a jury trial, because the parent called the juvenile court and notified it that the parent wanted a jury trial, the parent waived the right to a jury trial when the parent failed to file a written jury demand within ten days of the parent's initial hearing. CP v. State (In the Interest of NP), 2017 WY 18, 389 P.3d 787, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 14-3-424. Conduct of hearings generally; exclusion of general public and child; exceptions; consolidations, continuances or deferrals permitted.

1. Unless a jury trial is demanded, hearings under this act shall be conducted by the court without a jury in an informal but orderly manner and separate from other proceedings not included under this act. The district attorney shall present evidence in support of the petition and otherwise represent the state. If the allegations in the petition are denied, adjudicatory and disposition hearings shall be recorded by the court reporter or by electronic, mechanical or other appropriate means.
2. Except in hearings to declare a person in contempt of court, the general public are excluded from hearings under this act. Only the parties, counsel for the parties, jurors, witnesses, and other persons the court finds having a proper interest in the proceedings or in the work of the court shall be admitted. If the court finds it necessary in the best interest of the child, the child may be temporarily excluded from any hearing.
3. Hearings on two (2) or more petitions may be consolidated for purposes of adjudication when the allegations in the petitions pertain to the same act constituting the alleged neglect. Separate hearings on the petitions may be held thereafter for purposes of disposition.
4. The court may, on the motion of any party or on its own motion, continue or defer any hearing as the work of the court or justice requires.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Quoted in

LeBlanc v. State (In re ARLeB), 2017 WY 107, 401 P.3d 932, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2017).

Cited in

HP v. State, 2004 WY 82, 93 P.3d 982, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (2004).

§ 14-3-425. Burden of proof required; verdict of jury; effect thereof.

1. Allegations of conduct showing a child to be neglected must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
2. If trial by jury is demanded, the jury shall decide issues of fact raised by the petition and return its verdict as to the truth of the allegations contained in the petition. A finding by the jury that the allegations are true is a determination that judicial intervention is necessary for the best interest and welfare of the child.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Sufficient basis to terminate parental rights. —

In mother's appeal of the juvenile court's orders directing the Department of Family Services to pursue termination of the mother's parental rights that were entered after a review hearing in a neglect proceeding pursuant to the Child Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann §§ 14-3-401 through 14-3-440 , there was sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find by a preponderance of the evidence, as required under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-425 , that the children were neglected. Reasonable efforts had been made to reunify the family, the mother persistently failed to comply with her case plan, and the children's health and safety would be jeopardized if they were returned to her. The court found that at the time the neglect petition was filed, the mother was in prison and unable to care for the children, the location of the father was unknown, the children were left with grandparents who could not care for them, and the mother had consented to the neglect disposition. The court also found that upon the mother's release from prison, she allowed the children to ride in a car with the father who was intoxicated and under the influence of drugs, and additionally exposed them to instability due to her lack of employment and housing. HP v. State, 2004 WY 82, 93 P.3d 982, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2004).

Cited in

Jet v. State (In re Drt), 2010 WY 137, 241 P.3d 489, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Oct. 21, 2010); RH v. State (in the Interest of DRS), 2011 WY 128, 261 P.3d 697, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Sept. 14, 2011).

DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re “H” Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003).

§ 14-3-426. Initial hearing; adjudicatory hearing; entry of decree and disposition; evidentiary matters; continuance of disposition hearing.

1. There shall be an initial hearing. The initial hearing may be held in conjunction with the shelter care hearing provided the requirements of W.S. 14-3-413 , 14-3-414 and 14-3-426 have been met. The initial hearing may also be held after a shelter care hearing or a transfer hearing. At the initial hearing, the child and his parents, guardian or custodian shall be advised by the court of their rights under law and as provided in this act. They shall also be advised of the specific allegations in the petition and given an opportunity to admit or deny them. They shall also be advised of the possible liability for costs of treatment or services pursuant to this act. It is not necessary at the initial hearing for the district attorney to establish probable cause to believe the allegations in the petition are true. If the allegations are admitted, the court shall make the appropriate adjudication and may proceed immediately to a disposition of the case, provided the court has the predisposition report and multidisciplinary team recommendations, in accordance with the provisions of W.S. 14-3-429 , except that a commissioner acting in the absence or incapacity of the judge may take testimony to establish a factual basis and accept an admission and perform all other requirements of the initial hearing but shall not proceed to disposition.
2. If the allegations of the petition are denied, the court may, with consent of the parties, proceed immediately to hear evidence on the petition or it may set a later time not to exceed sixty (60) days for an adjudicatory hearing, unless the court finds good cause to delay or postpone the hearing. In no case shall the court hold the adjudicatory hearing more than ninety (90) days after the date the petition is filed. Only competent, relevant and material evidence shall be admissible at an adjudicatory hearing to determine the truth of the allegations in the petition. If after an adjudicatory hearing the court finds that the allegations in the petition are not established as required by this act, it shall dismiss the petition and order the child released from any shelter care.
3. If after an adjudicatory hearing or a valid admission or confession the court or jury finds that a child is neglected, it shall enter a decree to that effect stating the jurisdictional facts upon which the decree is based. It may then proceed immediately or at a postponed hearing within sixty (60) days to make proper disposition of the child.
4. In shelter care hearings or disposition hearings, all material and relevant evidence helpful in determining questions may be received by the court and relied upon for probative value. The parties or their counsel may examine and controvert written reports received as evidence and cross-examine persons making the reports.
5. On motion of any party or on its own motion, the court may continue a disposition hearing for a reasonable time not to exceed sixty (60) days to receive reports and other evidence bearing on the disposition to be made. The court shall make an appropriate order for shelter care of the child or for his release from shelter care subject to any terms and conditions the court deems necessary during the period of continuance.
6. At any time prior to disposition under W.S. 14-3-429 , the court, on motion of any party or on its own motion, may reconsider its order regarding shelter care or conditions of release made under W.S. 14-3-409 or 14-3-414 .
7. In the absence or incapacity of the judge, the initial hearing may be conducted by a district court commissioner.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2011, ch. 79, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (b), inserted the proviso at the end of the first sentence and inserted the second sentence.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, rewrote (a), substituting the first three sentences for “At their initial hearing, which may be held after a shelter care hearing or a transfer hearing,” inserting “At the initial hearing” at the beginning of the fourth sentence, substituting “hearing” for “appearance” in the seventh sentence, deleting the former eighth sentence, which read: “When a shelter care hearing is held in accordance with W.S. 14-3-409 , a separate initial hearing is not required if the child and his parents, guardian or custodian were present at the shelter care hearing and advised by the court as provided in this subsection,” and adding the last sentence; and added (g).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Due process.—

Juvenile court violated a father’s right to due process because it failed to give him reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the child protection action; many of the requirements of the Child Protection Act were not followed because the father was not informed when the child was taken into protective custody or of the shelter care hearing; the father was materially prejudiced by the due process violations because his lack of involvement colored the juvenile court’s ruling. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Mother's claim of no notice meritless. —

Mother's procedural due process rights were not violated even though the mother was not given notice that a visitation issue was going to arise at an initial hearing; this section gives notice to any parent that issues involving the conditions of shelter care can arise at any time, and the mother was given meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard when she challenged the trial court's ruling on visitation after the hearing. DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 13, 2004).

Improper preservation of issue for review. —

Court declined to address the merits of whether the State, trial court, or family services department failed to comply with this section, other sections, and various department rules in connection with the alleged lack of formal written reports and written case plan or the delay in setting an adjudicatory hearing because the mother failed to support her grievances with citations to relevant precedent and failed to show how any alleged deficiencies in the trial court prejudiced her; but the court did not retreat from its conviction that the judicial system had to be diligent in protecting parental rights, nor did the court imply that the department or any administrative agency was free to ignore statutes, agency rules, or court orders.DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 13, 2004).

Finding of neglect and order of placement transfer appealableorders. —

Court treated findings of fact and conclusions of law, which found neglect and ordered transfer of physical placement, as appealable orders because they had the effect of an adjudicatory decree and a dispositional order under this and other sections and they affected the mother's substantial rights.DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 13, 2004).

Jurisdiction following dismissal for failure to meet adjudicatory deadline. —

In the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, a juvenile court did not lose jurisdiction to consider a neglect action when it dismissed without prejudice an initial neglect petition because the adjudicatory hearing was not held within 90 days of the filing of the petition as required by this section and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-409 and it allowed the petition to be refiled; the juvenile court's remedy of the situation gave due attention to the 90-day deadline, while still protecting the child, and mother was afforded due process protections and she was not unfairly prejudiced by the delay. JA v. State, 2008 WY 15, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Feb. 8, 2008).

Mother's motion to withdraw admission of neglect properly denied.—

Trial court did not err in denying a mother's motion to withdraw her admission of child neglect because the court complied with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-409(b) and 14-3-426(a) by carefully advising the mother of her rights in the placement proceedings, and of the consequences that could result from an admission or a finding of neglect; that was as far as the court was required to go. Jet v. State (In re DRT), 2010 WY 137, 241 P.3d 489, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2010).

Cited in

HP v. State, 2004 WY 82, 93 P.3d 982, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (2004); RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014); Scott v. Bd. of Trs., 2015 WY 128, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Sept. 18, 2015).

§ 14-3-427. Predisposition studies and reports.

1. After a petition is filed alleging a child is neglected, the court shall order the department of family services to make a predisposition study and report. The court shall establish a deadline for completion of the report. While preparing the study the department shall consult with the child’s school and school district to determine the child’s educational needs. The study and report shall also cover:
   1. The social history, environment and present condition of the child and his family;
   2. The performance of the child in school, including whether the child receives special education services and how his goals and objectives might be impacted by the court’s disposition, provided the school receives authorization to share the information;
   3. The presence of child abuse and neglect or domestic violence histories, past acts of violence, learning disabilities, cognitive disabilities or physical impairments and the necessary services to accommodate the disabilities and impairments;
   4. The presence of any mental health or substance abuse risk factors, including current participation in counseling, therapy or treatment; and
   5. Other matters relevant to treatment of the child, including any pertinent family information, or proper disposition of the case, including any information required by W.S. 21-13-315(d).
2. Within ten (10) days after a petition is filed alleging a child is neglected, the court shall appoint a multidisciplinary team. Upon motion by a party, the court may add or dismiss a member of the multidisciplinary team.
3. The multidisciplinary team shall include the following:
   1. The child’s parent, parents or guardian;
   2. A representative of the school district who has direct knowledge of the child and, if the child receives special education, is a member of the child’s individualized education plan team;
   3. A representative of the department of family services;
   4. The child’s psychiatrist, psychologist or mental health professional;
   5. The district attorney or his designee;
   6. The child’s attorney or guardian ad litem, if one is appointed by the court;
   7. The volunteer lay advocate, if one is appointed by the court; and
   8. The foster parent.
4. In addition to the persons listed in subsection (c) of this section, the court may appoint one (1) or more of the following persons to the multidisciplinary team:
   1. and (ii) Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 4.
   2. The child;
   3. A relative;
   4. If the predispositional study indicates a parent or child has special needs, an appropriate representative of the department of health’s substance abuse, mental health or developmental disabilities division who has knowledge of the services available in the state’s system of care that are pertinent to those identified needs;
   5. Other professionals or persons who have particular knowledge relating to the child or his family, or expertise in children’s services and the child’s or parent’s specific disability or special needs, including linguistic and cultural needs.
5. Before the first multidisciplinary team meeting, the department of family services shall provide each member of the multidisciplinary team with a brief summary of the case detailing the allegations in the petition that have been adjudicated, if any. The multidisciplinary team shall review the child’s personal and family history, school records, mental health records and department of family services records and any other pertinent information, for the purpose of making case planning recommendations. To the extent appropriate, the team shall involve the child in the development of the recommendations.
6. At the first multidisciplinary team meeting, the team shall formulate reasonable and attainable recommendations for the court outlining the goals or objectives the parents should be required to meet for the child to be returned to the home or for the case to be closed, or until ordered by the court in termination proceedings. At each subsequent meeting, the multidisciplinary team shall review the progress of the parents and the child, and shall reevaluate the plan ordered by the court. For cause, which shall be set forth with specificity, the multidisciplinary team may adjust its recommendations to the court with respect to the goals or objectives in the plan to effect the return of the child to the home or to close the case. In formulating recommendations, the multidisciplinary team shall give consideration to the best interest of the child, the best interest of the family, the most appropriate and least restrictive case planning options available as well as costs of care. After each multidisciplinary team meeting, the coordinator shall prepare for submission to each member of the team and to the court a summary of the multidisciplinary team meeting specifically describing the recommendations for the court and the goals and objectives which should be met to return the child to the home or to close the case. If the recommendations for the case plan have been changed, the summary shall include a detailed explanation of the change in the recommendations and the reasons for the change.
7. All records, reports and case planning recommendations of the multidisciplinary team are confidential except as provided by this section. Any person who willfully violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00).
8. The court shall not consider any report or recommendation under this section prior to adjudication of the allegations in the petition without the consent of the child and the child’s parents, guardian or custodian.
9. Any member of a multidisciplinary team who cannot attend team meetings in person or by telephone may submit written reports and recommendations to the other team members and to the court. Individuals who are not members of the multidisciplinary team but have knowledge pertinent to the team’s decisions may be asked to provide information to the multidisciplinary team. The individuals shall be bound by the confidentiality provisions of subsection (g) of this section.
10. The department shall develop a case plan for a child when there is a recommendation to place the child outside the home. If a parent chooses not to comply with or participate in the case plan developed by the department, that parent is prohibited from later objecting to or complaining about the services that were provided to the child and family.
11. If the child is placed outside the home, the multidisciplinary team shall meet quarterly to review the child’s and the family’s progress toward meeting the goals or expectations in the case plan and the multidisciplinary team shall provide a written report with recommendations to the court prior to each review hearing.
12. No later than five (5) business days prior to the dispositional hearing, the multidisciplinary team shall file with the court the multidisciplinary team report which shall include the multidisciplinary team’s recommendations and the department case plan in a standard format established by the department.
13. Five (5) business days prior to each review hearing, the multidisciplinary team shall file with the court a report updating the multidisciplinary team report, the multidisciplinary team’s recommendations and the department case plan.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2005, ch. 236, §§ 2, 4; 2009, ch. 70, § 1, ch 196, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section, in part modifying duties, changing membership of multidisciplinary teams, and adding procedural provisions.

The 2009 amendments. —

The first 2009 amendment, by Laws 2009, ch. 70, § 1, effective July 1, 2009, added the first sentence in (e); and, in (f), added the first three sentences and the last two sentences.

The second 2009 amendment, by Laws 2009, ch. 196, § 1, effective July 1, 2009, added the last sentence in (k).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Laws 2009, ch. 70, § 2, provides: “The provisions of W.S. 14-3-427(e) and (f), 14-3-429(d), 14-6-227(e) and (f) and 14-6-427(e) and (f) as amended by section 1 of this act, shall apply to child protection cases in which a petition was filed under W.S. 14-3-412 , 14-6-212 or 14-6-412 on or after July 1, 2009.”

Improper preservation of issue for review. —

Court declined to address the merits of whether the State, trial court, or family services department failed to comply with this section, other sections, and various department rules in connection with the alleged lack of formal written reports and written case plan or the delay in setting an adjudicatory hearing because the mother failed to support her grievances with citations to relevant precedent and failed to show how any alleged deficiencies in the trial court prejudiced her; but the court did not retreat from its conviction that the judicial system had to be diligent in protecting parental rights, nor did the court imply that the department or any administrative agency was free to ignore statutes, agency rules, or court orders.DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 13, 2004).

Cited in

DB v. State (In re CRA), 2016 WY 24, 368 P.3d 294, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 14-3-428. Abeyance of proceedings by consent decree; term of decree; reinstatement of proceedings; effect of discharge or completing term.

1. At any time after the filing of a petition alleging a child to be neglected and before adjudication, the court may issue a consent decree ordering further proceedings held in abeyance. The placement of the child is subject to the terms, conditions and stipulations agreed to by the parties affected in accordance with W.S. 14-3-429 . The consent decree shall not be entered without the consent of the district attorney, the child’s guardian ad litem and the parents. Modifications to an existing consent decree may be allowed.
2. The consent decree shall be in writing and copies given to all parties. The decree shall include the case plan for the family.
3. A consent decree, if the child remains within the home, shall be in force for the period agreed upon by the parties unless sooner terminated by the court.
4. If the child is placed outside the home, a consent decree shall be in force for the period agreed upon by the parties but not longer than six (6) months unless sooner terminated by the court. For good cause the court may grant one (1) extension of the consent decree for no longer than six (6) months.
5. If a consent decree is in effect and the child is in placement, the court shall hold review hearings as provided by W.S. 14-3-431 .
6. If prior to discharge by the court or expiration of the consent decree, the parents or guardian of a child alleged to be neglected fail to fulfill the terms and conditions of the decree or a new petition is filed alleging the child to be neglected, the original petition and proceeding may be reinstated upon order of the court after hearing, and the court may proceed as though the consent decree had never been entered. If, as part of the consent decree, the parents or guardian made an admission to any of the allegations contained in the original petition, that admission shall be entered only if the court orders that the original petition and proceeding be reinstated and the admissions, if any, be entered. If the admission is entered, the court may proceed to disposition pursuant to W.S. 14-3-426 .
7. Parties discharged by the court under a consent decree without reinstatement of the original petition and proceeding shall not thereafter be proceeded against in any court for the same misconduct alleged in the original petition except concurrent criminal allegations or charges against a person accused to have abused or neglected a child shall not be affected by a consent decree.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2004, ch. 127, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a), inserted “the child's guardian ad litem” following “the consent of the district attorney,” and “added the last sentence; added (b); redesignated the former first sentence of (b) as (c), and inserted “if the child remains within the home” and deleted “but not longer than one (1) year”; added (d) and (e); redesignated the former second sentence of (b) as (f), and added the second sentence; redesignated former (c) as (g), and substituted “Parties discharged by the court” for “If the parties to the consent decree complete the period of supervision”; and made related and stylistic changes.

Extension. —

District court erred in denying a mother's motion to dismiss a consent degree because, while the mother's children were returned to her after the appeal was filed and the underlying juvenile case had been closed, the motion was not moot where it was necessary to provide guidance to state agencies and lower courts, the court lacked authority to extend the consent decree after it had expired, and the State's failure to initiate action within the six-month period specified in the decree deprived the juvenile court of any opportunity to modify or extend the decree “for good cause.” CY v. State (In the Interest of DJS-Y), 2017 WY 54, 394 P.3d 467, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 2017).

Revocation of consent decree. — Court erred by revoking a consent decree in the neglect case because, although the court did not lose jurisdiction when the court was empowered to conduct a hearing and rule on the accusations, the court erred in concluding that the Mother violated the terms of the consent decree by drinking alcohol when the consent decree agreement did not expressly prohibit Mother from drinking but only required her to undergo alcohol/substance abuse evaluation and follow the regimen of treatment recommended. MR v. State (In the Interest of CDR), 2015 WY 79, 351 P.3d 264, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2015).

Generally. — Nothing in the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-428 requires the court to conduct a hearing or make findings before a consent decree can end either by expiration of its term, or by discharge by the court. DB v. State (In re CRA), 2016 WY 24, 368 P.3d 294, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2016).

Supreme Court of Wyoming declines to interpret Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-428 as requiring a hearing prior to the juvenile court's discharge of a parent because the plain language of the statute does not include such a requirement. Similarly, the statute does not require any court findings prior to discharge. DB v. State (In re CRA), 2016 WY 24, 368 P.3d 294, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2016).

Dismissal proper. — Juvenile court properly dismissed a neglect action against a mother without a hearing or findings about the mother's completion of a consent decree's requirements where nothing in the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-428 required a hearing or findings before a consent decree could expire by its own expiration terms or by discharge, and there was nothing for the juvenile court to find or decide given that the county attorney had decided that the mother had complied with the consent decree satisfactorily and decided not to pursue the neglect case. DB v. State (In re CRA), 2016 WY 24, 368 P.3d 294, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 14-3-429. Decree where child adjudged neglected; dispositions; terms and conditions; legal custody.

1. In determining the disposition to be made under this act in regard to any child:
   1. The court shall review the predisposition report, the recommendations, if any, of the multidisciplinary team, the case plan and other reports or evaluations ordered by the court and indicate on the record what materials were considered in reaching the disposition;
   2. If the court does not place the child in accordance with the recommendations of the predisposition report or multidisciplinary team, the court shall enter on the record specific findings of fact relied upon to support its decision to deviate from the recommended disposition;
   3. When a child is adjudged by the court to be neglected the court shall enter its decree to that effect and make a disposition as provided in this section that places the child in the least restrictive environment consistent with what is best suited to the public interest of preserving families and the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child;
   4. When a child is adjudged to be neglected the court shall ensure that reasonable efforts were made by the department of family services to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the child’s home or to make it possible for the child to return to the child’s home. Before placing a child outside of the home, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that to return the child to the child’s home would not be in the best interest of the child despite efforts that have been made;
   5. The court shall not order an out-of-state placement unless:
      1. Evidence has been presented to the court regarding the costs of the out-of-state placement being ordered together with evidence of the comparative costs of any suitable alternative in-state treatment program or facility, as determined by the department of family services pursuant to W.S. 21-13-315(d)(vii), whether or not placement in the in-state program or facility is currently available;
      2. The court makes an affirmative finding on the record that no placement can be made in a Wyoming institution or in a private residential treatment facility or group home located in Wyoming that can provide adequate treatment or services for the child; and
      3. The court states on the record why no in-state placement is available.
2. If the child is found to be neglected the court may:
   1. Permit the child to remain in the legal custody of his parents, guardian or custodian without protective supervision, subject to terms and conditions prescribed by the court;
   2. Place the child under protective supervision;
   3. Transfer temporary legal custody to a relative or other suitable adult the court finds qualified to receive and care for the child, with or without supervision, subject to terms and conditions prescribed by the court;
   4. Transfer temporary legal custody to the department of family services or a state or local public agency responsible for the care and placement of neglected children, provided the child shall not be committed to the Wyoming boys’ school, the Wyoming girls’ school or the Wyoming state hospital.
3. In cases where a child is ordered removed from the child’s home:
   1. If a child is committed or transferred to an agency or institution under this section, at least every three (3) months the agency or institution shall recommend to the court if the order should be continued;
   2. The court shall order the parents or other legally obligated person to pay a reasonable sum for the support and treatment of the child as required by W.S. 14-3-435 , or shall state on the record the reasons why an order for support was not entered;
   3. In cases where the child is placed in custody of the department, support shall be established by the department through a separate civil action;
   4. Any order regarding potential placement at a psychiatric residential treatment facility shall not specify a particular psychiatric residential treatment facility or level of care for the placement of the child;
   5. If the child is placed in a qualified residential treatment program:
      1. Within thirty (30) days of the placement a qualified individual shall conduct an assessment to determine whether the child’s needs can be met through placement with family members or in a foster family home, or if the placement in a qualified residential treatment program provides the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child in the least restrictive environment consistent with short-term and long-term goals of the child and the child’s permanency plan;
      2. Within sixty (60) days of the placement the court shall:
         1. Consider the assessment completed pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph;
         2. Determine whether the child’s needs can be met through placement in a foster family home or whether the placement in a qualified residential treatment program provides the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child in the least restrictive environment;
         3. Determine whether the placement is consistent with short-term and long-term goals of the child, as specified in the child’s permanency plan;
         4. Approve or disapprove the placement.
4. As a part of any order of disposition and the terms and conditions thereof, the court may:
   1. Impose any demands, requirements, limitations, restrictions or restraints on the child, and do all things with regard to the child that his parents might reasonably and lawfully do under similar circumstances;
   2. Order the child, or his parents, or both, to undergo evaluation and indicated treatment or another program designed to address problems which contributed to the adjudication. A parent who willfully violates or neglects or refuses to comply with any order of the court may be found in contempt and punished as provided by W.S. 14-3-438 ;
   3. Require the child’s parents or guardian to attend a parenting class or other appropriate education or treatment designed to address problems which contributed to the adjudication and to pay all or part of the cost of the class, education or treatment in accordance with the court’s determination of their ability to pay;
   4. Require the child’s parents or guardian and the child to participate in a court supervised treatment program qualified under W.S. 7-13-1601 through 7-13-1615 , provided the court supervised treatment program accepts the child’s parents or guardian and the child for participation in its program.
5. An institution, organization or agency vested with legal custody of a child by court order shall have the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live, provided that placement of the child does not remove him from the state of Wyoming without court authorization. An individual vested with legal custody of a child by court order shall personally exercise custodial rights and responsibilities unless otherwise authorized by the court.
6. Whenever the court vests legal custody of a child in an institution, organization or agency it shall transmit with the order copies of all clinical reports, social studies and other information pertinent to the care and treatment of the child. The institution, organization or agency receiving legal custody of a child shall provide the court with any information concerning the child that the court may request.
7. In placing a child in the custody of an individual or a private agency or institution, the court shall give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child. Where a choice of equivalent services exists, the court shall, whenever practicable, select a person or an agency or institution governed by persons of the same religion as that of the parents of the child. In case of a difference in the religious faith of the parents, then the court shall select the person, agency or institution governed by persons of the religious faith of the child, or if the religious faith of the child is not ascertainable, then of the faith of either parent.
8. Absent a specific provision in the placement order requiring prior court approval for any change in placement, a department of state government vested with temporary legal custody of a child by court order under this section has authority to place the child in a residential facility or other out-of-home placement of similar or less restrictive confinement provided:
   1. At least ten (10) days prior to the change in placement written notice of the proposed placement is served upon the child, the child’s parents, the child’s representative, the current placement provider and the office of the district attorney of original jurisdiction, personally or by certified mail to the recipient’s last known address; and
   2. None of the parties within ten (10) days after notice is filed with the juvenile court having jurisdiction, makes a written objection to the proposed change in placement.
9. If a placement order vesting a department of state government with temporary legal custody of a child under this section includes a provision that court approval shall be required prior to any change in placement, the department may proceed to place the child in a residential facility or other out-of-home placement of similar or less restrictive confinement, and the court shall be deemed to have approved such change in placement, if:
   1. The conditions of paragraphs (h)(i) and (ii) of this section are met; and
   2. The court on its own motion does not set the matter for hearing within fifteen (15) days after notice of the proposed change in placement is filed with the juvenile court.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2009, ch. 70, § 1; ch. 145, § 2; 2013, ch. 164, § 1; 2020, ch. 2, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a)(i), substituted “review” for “place on the record,” and inserted “the case plan and other reports or evaluations ordered by the court and indicate on the record what materials were considered in reaching the disposition” at the end, and in (a)(ii) deleted “and in accord with the actual facilities presently available when the decree is entered” at the end; in (b)(i) inserted “legal” preceding “custody of his parents,” and in (b)(iv) inserted “the department of family services or” following “Transfer temporary legal custody to”; in (c)(ii), deleted “on its own motion, or on the motion of the person, agency or institution vested with custody or to whom compensation is due” preceding “shall order the parents or other legally,”; and added (c)(iii); and made stylistic changes throughout.

The 2009 amendments. —

The first 2009 amendment, by ch. 70, § 1, effective July 1, 2009, inserted “designed to address problems which contributed to the adjudication” in (d)(iii).

The second 2009 amendment by ch. 145, § 2, effective July 1, 2009, added (d)(iv).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (c)(iv).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, added (c)(v).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Laws 2009, ch. 70, § 2, effective July 1, 2009, provides: “The provisions of W.S. 14-3-427(e) and (f), 14-3-429(d), 14-6-227(e) and (f) and 14-6-427(e) and (f) as amended by section 1 of this act, shall apply to child protection cases in which a petition was filed under W.S. 14-3-412 , 14-6-212 or 14-6-412 on or after July 1, 2009.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Appropriations. —

Laws 2005, ch. 245, § 3, appropriates $1,000,000 from the general fund to the department of health beginning July 1, 2005, to provide funding for the implementation of best practices prevention and intervention services including parenting skills, life skills and indicated therapeutic interventions for the children and families of those individuals receiving treatment or addiction to methamphetamine and other controlled substances.

Laws 2005, ch. 245, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 15, 2005.

Sufficiency of evidence. —

Clear and convincing evidence regarding safety concerns and other matters showed that the agency made reasonable efforts to prevent the initial removal and that the children's best interests would not be served by allowing them to remain in their mother's home. RH v. State (In the Interest of DRS), 2011 WY 128, 261 P.3d 697, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2011).

There was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, including evidence that the mother failed to obtain housing, to obtain employment, to follow the recommendations of the Addiction Severity Index evaluation to participate in an intensive outpatient treatment, and failed to continue court-ordered urine analysis tests. DT v. State, 2017 WY 36, 391 P.3d 1136, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2017).

Applicability. —

Because children already had been adjudicated neglected before they were removed from their mother's custody and placed with relatives, the juvenile court correctly applied this section instead of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-405 in deciding its conclusions of law. RH v. State (In the Interest of DRS), 2011 WY 128, 261 P.3d 697, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2011).

Quoted in

Jet v. State (In re Drt), 2010 WY 137, 241 P.3d 489, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Oct. 21, 2010); Jo v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (in the Interest of Re), 2011 WY 170, 267 P.3d 1092, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Dec. 28, 2011).

Cited in

DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re “H” Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003); HP v. State, 2004 WY 82, 93 P.3d 982, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (2004); LW v. State (In the Interest of JW), 2010 WY 28, 226 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Mar. 18, 2010).

§ 14-3-430. Orders of protection; requirements.

1. On application of any party to the proceedings or on its own motion the court may make an order of protection in support of the decree and order of disposition, restraining or otherwise controlling the conduct of the child’s parents, guardian or custodian or any party to the proceeding whom the court finds to be encouraging, causing or contributing to the acts or conditions which bring the child within the provisions of this act.
2. The order of protection may require the person against whom it is directed to do or to refrain from doing any acts required or forbidden by law and necessary for the welfare of the child and the enforcement of the order of disposition, including the following requirements to:
   1. Perform any legal obligation of support;
   2. Not make contact with the child or his place of abode;
   3. Permit a parent reasonable visitation privileges under specified conditions and terms; or
   4. Give proper attention to care of the home and to refrain from conduct detrimental to the child and the home environment.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-431. Duration of orders of disposition; termination of orders; permanency hearings; petition for termination of parental rights.

1. An order of disposition shall remain in force for an indefinite period until terminated by the court whenever it appears the purpose of the order has been achieved and it is in the child’s best interest that he be discharged from further court jurisdiction.
2. Unless sooner terminated by court order, all orders issued under this act shall terminate with respect to a child adjudicated neglected, when he reaches eighteen (18) years of age unless the court has ordered care or services to continue beyond that time. The court shall conduct a review hearing at least six (6) months before the child reaches eighteen (18) years of age to determine whether care or transitional services should continue and for what period of time prior to the individual reaching the age of twenty-one (21) years.
3. The court shall conduct a review hearing six (6) months from the date of the child’s removal from the home and every six (6) months thereafter. If the child is placed in a qualified residential treatment program, the department of family services shall present to the court at the six (6) month review hearing the information required under subparagraphs (j)(iii)(A) through (D) of this section. At the six (6) month review hearing the court shall review the case plan to determine:
   1. The health and safety of the child;
   2. The continuing necessity for the placement;
   3. The appropriateness of the current placement;
   4. The reasonableness of efforts made to reunify the family and the consistency of those efforts with the case plan;
   5. The appropriateness of the case plan and the extent of compliance with the case plan including the permanent placement of the child;
   6. If progress has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement outside the home and the extent of that progress; and
   7. The date the child is expected to be returned to the home or placed for adoption or legal guardianship.
4. The court shall conduct a permanency hearing no later than twelve (12) months from the date of the child’s removal from the home and not less than once every twelve (12) months thereafter if the child remains in out-of-home placement or more frequently as deemed necessary by the court.
5. If the court determines as provided in W.S. 14-2-309(a)(vi), (b) or (c) that reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family are not required, a permanency hearing shall be held for the child within thirty (30) days after the determination.
6. At the permanency hearing, the court shall make determinations of reasonable efforts as outlined in W.S. 14-3-440 .
7. A permanency hearing is not required if the case was dismissed, the child was not removed from the home or the child was returned to the child’s parent or guardian.
8. The permanency hearing may be combined with a hearing required by other sections of this chapter if the hearing is held within twelve (12) months from the date of the child’s removal from the home. If a permanency hearing is combined with another hearing, the requirements of the court related to the disposition of the other hearing shall be met in addition to the requirements of this section.
9. At the permanency hearing, the department of family services shall present to the court:
   1. Efforts made to:
      1. Effectuate the permanency plan for the child, address the options for the child’s permanent placement, examine the reasons for excluding other permanency options and set forth the proposed plan to carry out the placement decision, including specific times for achieving the permanency plan; and
      2. Ensure the child be provided, to the greatest extent possible, the opportunity to participate in age appropriate or developmentally appropriate activities and experiences as defined in W.S. 14-13-101 (a)(i) to promote healthy child and adolescent development consistent with W.S. 14-13-101 through 14-13-104 .
   2. If the permanency plan is classified as another planned permanent living arrangement:
      1. A compelling reason for establishing another planned permanent living arrangement; and
      2. Documentation of the ongoing and unsuccessful efforts to return the child home, place the child for adoption or with a legal guardian or a fit and willing relative for purposes of guardianship or adoption, including evidence of efforts to use social media or other search technology to find biological family members for the child.
   3. If the child is placed in a qualified residential treatment program:
      1. Information to show that ongoing assessment of the child’s strengths and needs continues to support the determination that placement in a qualified residential treatment program provides the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child in the least restrictive environment consistent with the short-term and long-term goals of the child and the child’s permanency plan;
      2. The specific treatment needs that will be met for the child in the placement;
      3. The length of time the child is expected to remain in the placement;
      4. The efforts made by the department of family services to prepare the child to return home or be placed for adoption or legal guardianship.
10. At the permanency hearing, the court shall:
    1. Determine whether the permanency plan is in the best interest of the child and whether the department of family services has made reasonable efforts to finalize the plan;
    2. Order the department of family services to take any additional steps necessary to effectuate the terms of the permanency plan;
    3. Ask the child about his desired permanency outcome if it is determined that the child should be present at the hearing;
    4. Ask the child’s guardian ad litem or other legal representative about the child’s desired permanency outcome if it is determined inappropriate for the child to be present at the hearing;
    5. If the permanency plan is classified as another planned permanent living arrangement:
       1. Make a judicial determination and explain why, as of the date of the hearing, another planned permanent living arrangement is the best permanency plan for the child; and
       2. Provide reasons why it continues not to be in the best interest of the child to return home or be placed for adoption or with a legal guardian or a fit and willing relative for purposes of guardianship or adoption.
    6. Require that the child be provided, to the greatest extent possible, the opportunity to participate in age appropriate or developmentally appropriate activities and experiences as defined in W.S. 14-13-101 (a)(i) to promote healthy child and adolescent development consistent with W.S. 14-13-101 through 14-13-104 .
11. When a child has been placed in foster care under the responsibility of the state for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months the state shall file a petition to terminate parental rights or seek to be joined as a party to the petition if a petition has been filed by another party, unless:
    1. The child is in the care of a relative;
    2. The state agency has documented in the case plan a compelling reason for determining that filing the petition is not in the best interest of the child; or
    3. The state agency has not provided services to the child’s family deemed to be necessary for the safe return of the child to the home, if reasonable efforts described in W.S. 14-3-440 are required to be made.
12. Concurrently with the filing of a petition under subsection (m) of this section, the state agency shall identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified family for adoption of the child.
13. A petition to terminate parental rights shall be filed within sixty (60) days of a judicial determination that reasonable efforts to reunify the child and parent are not required pursuant to W.S. 14-2-309(a)(vi), (b) or (c).
14. A termination of parental rights hearing shall be held within ninety (90) days of the filing of the termination petition unless continued by the court for good cause shown.
15. At each of the review hearings, the court shall enter findings on the record pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 1998, ch. 44, § 1; 1999, ch. 4, § 1; 2001, ch. 61, § 2; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2005, ch. 201, § 1; 2016, ch. 95, § 2; 2020, ch. 2, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (b), substituted “unless the court has ordered care or services to continue beyond that time. The court shall conduct a review hearing at least six (6) months before the child reaches eighteen (18) years of age to determine whether care or transitional services should continue and for what period of time prior to the individual reaching the age of twenty-one (21) years” for “or has graduated from high school”; and added (g).

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the introductory language in (c) to provide for a review hearing once every six months rather than once every 12 months; added (d) through (k), redesignating former (d) and (e) as (m) and (n); and added (o), redesignating former (f) and (g) as (p) and (q).

The 2016 amendment rewrote (j) and added (j)(i)(A), (j)(i)(B), (j)(ii)(A), and (j)(ii)(B), and rewrote (k) and added (k)(i) through (k)(iv), (k)(v)A) and (k)(v)(B), and (k)(vi).

Laws 2016, ch. 95, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8, Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 4, 2016.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (c), added the second sentence; and added (j)(iii).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Due process. —

After the juvenile court issued an order that authorized removal of neglected children from their mother's custody without a subsequent order, the mother's due process rights were not violated by removing the children without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. She had notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the review hearing. RH v. State (In the Interest of DRS), 2011 WY 128, 261 P.3d 697, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2011).

In Wyoming dependency/neglect proceedings, due process requires that if a change in a permanency plan includes adoption or permanent placement other than reunification, parents must have the right to request, and on request must be provided with, an evidentiary hearing, and a parent must request the hearing if he or she desires one, because there may be instances in which parents do not dispute a recommendation or are content with a non-evidentiary hearing, so the failure to request such a hearing waives that right. KC v. State (In the Interest of GC), 2015 WY 73, 351 P.3d 236, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2015).

Hearing on change in goal of a permanency plan from reunification to adoption did not violate a mother's due process rights because (1) the mother did not seek a hearing or directly claim the hearing held violated due process, and (2) lack of a full evidentiary hearing was not plain error, as such a right was not clear at the time of the hearing, since Wyo. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3) said the rules of evidence only applied to juvenile adjudicatory hearings. KC v. State (In the Interest of GC), 2015 WY 73, 351 P.3d 236, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2015).

Juvenile court properly changed the permanency plan for a mother's child from family reunification to termination and adoption because, while the delays in holding review hearings were unacceptable and contrary to the child's best interests, the mother waived her due process and other claims relating to the change in permanency from reunification to adoption when she advocated a permanency goal of adoption, the Child Protection Act did not require that the permanency order include findings regarding the merits of prospective adoption applicants or that the order give effect to the mother's adoption preference, and determination of the adoptive parent(s) was a matter for a separate proceeding. DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

Revocation of consent decree. —

Revocation of consent decree. — Court erred by revoking a consent decree in the neglect case because, although the court did not lose jurisdiction when the court was empowered to conduct a hearing and rule on the accusations, the court erred in concluding that the Mother violated the terms of the consent decree by drinking alcohol when the consent decree agreement did not expressly prohibit Mother from drinking but only required her to undergo alcohol/substance abuse evaluation and follow the regimen of treatment recommended. MR v. State (In the Interest of CDR), 2015 WY 79, 351 P.3d 264, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2015).

Commencement of termination proceedings. — Termination of a mother's parental rights was not invalidated due to a decision not to place children with their maternal grandmother because the placement decision did not affect the mother's ability to visit the children or strengthen a relationship with them; moreover, that placement was unsuitable due to the grandmother's failure to cooperate and the fact that she lived with a convicted sex offender. In addition, the Wyoming Department of Family Services was not required to wait for a second home evaluation for the grandmother after she moved to a different state before commencing termination proceedings against the mother. K.H. v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re D.H.), 2007 WY 196, 173 P.3d 365, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 2007).

Authorized agency. — Department of Family Services (DFS), a public social service agency, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-2101(a), with authority to oversee the custody and care of children in cases of abuse and neglect under the Child Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-401 through 14-3-441 , was an “authorized agency” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-308 and 14-2-310 with authority to file a petition to terminate a mother's parental rights, even though DFS did not have custody of the children. State v. DH (In the Interest of LB), 2014 WY 10, 316 P.3d 1184, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 2014).

Presence of children.—

While this section clearly required the juvenile court to determine whether the children should be present at the permanency hearing, the juvenile court made the required determination at the end of the hearing and the statute did not expressly require that the decision be made prior to the hearing DT v. State, 2017 WY 36, 391 P.3d 1136, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2017).

Residual parental rights.—

Mother’s claim that a permanency order should have designated her preferred adoptive parents as the court-ordered adoptive parents had not been waived, but failed on the merits where the permanency order had not terminated the mother’s parental rights or changed legal custody, and nothing in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(k) (2017) required findings as to the merits of the prospective adoption applicants. DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

Mother’s claim that a permanency order should have designated the her preferred adoptive parents as the court-ordered adoptive parents had not been waived, but failed on the merits where the permanency order had not terminated the mother’s parental rights or changed legal custody, and nothing in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(k) (2017) required findings as to the merits of the prospective adoption applicants. DM v. State (In re L-MHB), 2017 WY 110, 401 P.3d 949, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2017).

Sufficiency of evidence. —

Sufficient evidence supported a trial court's decisions to change the goal of a permanency plan from reunification to adoption because a child's mother did not comply with the mother's case plan. KC v. State (In the Interest of GC), 2015 WY 73, 351 P.3d 236, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2015).

It was not an abuse of discretion to alter a father’s sons’ permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption because sufficient evidence showed the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) made reasonable reunification efforts, but those efforts were unsuccessful when the father (1) refused to cooperate with DFS or utilize rehabilitation programs available to the father while incarcerated, (2) engaged in misconduct limiting the father’s ability to have contact with the sons, and (3) then communicated with the sons only sporadically. TW v. State (In re JW), 2018 WY 22, 411 P.3d 422, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2018).

Termination of parental rights was proper. —

There was sufficient evidence to support the finding that termination of a mother's parental rights, rather than reunification, was in the best interest of her children under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(k) because she failed to improve her parenting skills despite 14 months of sustained assistance; she had irregular attendance and lack of engagement at visitations. JO v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In the Interest of RE), 2011 WY 170, 267 P.3d 1092, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Wyo. 2011).

Quoted in

Jet v. State (In re Drt), 2010 WY 137, 241 P.3d 489, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Oct. 21, 2010).

Cited in

LW v. State (In the Interest of JW), 2010 WY 28, 226 P.3d 873, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Mar. 18, 2010); SAS v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re AGS), 2014 WY 143, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Nov. 7, 2014).

HP v. State, 2004 WY 82, 93 P.3d 982, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (2004).

Jurisdiction.—

Juvenile court’s jurisdiction lapsed on a child’s 18th birthday because the juvenile court made the required findings over three months after the child turned 18; necause the juvenile court’s failure to address the procedural requirement deprived it of jurisdiction over the child, its belated order that its jurisdiction would continue until either an adult guardianship was in place or the child turned 21 was without effect. RH v. State (In the Interest of BG), 2019 WY 116, 451 P.3d 1161, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2019).

Grandparents' motion denied.—

Juvenile court did not make an unreasonable decision in denying the grandparents' motion seeking to transfer placement of their grandchild from the foster parents to the grandparents; the child had been in the foster parents' care approximately two and a half years, testimony indicated that changing placement could be detrimental to her, the juvenile court correctly concluded that the best interests of the child were paramount, and the juvenile court's reasoning was in accord with the statute governing permanency hearings. PM v. State (In the Interest of SO), 2016 WY 99, 382 P.3d 51, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2016).

Stated in

E.R.C.K. v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2013 WY 160, 314 P.3d 1170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Dec 24, 2013).

§ 14-3-432. Appeal; right generally; transcript provided; cost thereof.

1. Any party including the state may appeal any final order, judgment or decree of the juvenile court to the supreme court within the time and in the manner provided by the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.
2. Upon motion of the child’s parents, guardian or custodian, supported by affidavit stating they are financially unable to purchase a transcript of the proceeding, a transcript or so much thereof necessary to support the appeal shall be provided at no cost or at a cost the court determines they are able to pay. Any cost of the transcript not charged to the appellant shall be certified by the court to the county treasurer and paid from the funds of the county in which the proceedings were held.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Order in Child Neglect Proceeding Constituted Final Appealable Order. —

Juvenile court’s order in the prior neglect proceedings was a final, appealable order under the Child Protection Act and the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, and constituted a judgment, the collateral attack of which generally was disallowed; thus, the mother could not collaterally attack the order in the prior neglect proceedings on appeal under the guise of appealing the district court’s order terminating her parental rights. Reed v. State (In re Parental Rights To AM-LR), 2018 WY 76, 421 P.3d 551, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 2018).

§ 14-3-433. Stay of orders pending appeal; securing of payment; staying transfer of legal custody.

1. If an appeal is taken, an order to pay a fine, costs, support for a child, restitution or any order for the payment of money may be stayed by the juvenile court or by the supreme court pending appeal. The court may require the appellant to deposit with the clerk of court the whole or any part of the payment ordered, to give bond for the payment thereof or any other terms and conditions to secure payment upon final determination of the appeal as the court deems proper. The court may also issue any appropriate order to restrain the appellant from dissipating his assets pending appeal.
2. Either the juvenile court or the supreme court may stay an order transferring legal custody of a child to a person, agency, organization or institution other than his parents, guardian or former custodian, provided that suitable provision is made for the shelter care of the child pending the appeal.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

§ 14-3-434. Fees, costs and expenses.

1. There is no fee for filing a petition under this act nor shall any state, county or local law enforcement officer charge a fee for service of process under this act. Witness fees, juror fees and travel expenses in the amounts allowable by law may be paid to persons other than the parties who are subpoenaed or required to appear at any hearing pursuant to this act.
2. The following costs and expenses, when approved and certified by the court to the county treasurer, shall be a charge upon the funds of the county where the proceedings are held and shall be paid by the board of county commissioners of that county:
   1. Witness fees and travel expense;
   2. Jury fees, costs and travel expense;
   3. Costs of service of process or notice by certified mail;
   4. Costs of any physical or mental examinations or treatment ordered by the court;
   5. Reasonable compensation for services and costs of counsel appointed by the court;
   6. Reasonable compensation for services and costs of a guardian ad litem appointed by the court, unless the county participates in the guardian ad litem program pursuant to W.S. 14-12-101 through 14-12-104 and the program was appointed to provide the guardian ad litem; and
   7. Any other costs of the proceedings which would be assessable as costs in the district court.
3. In every case in which a guardian ad litem has been appointed to represent the child under this act or in which counsel has been appointed under this act to represent the child’s parents, guardian or custodian, the court shall determine whether the child’s parents, guardian, custodian or other person responsible for the child’s support is able to pay part or all of the costs of representation and shall enter specific findings on the record. If the court determines that any of the parties is able to pay any amount as reimbursement for costs of representation, the court shall order reimbursement or shall state on the record the reasons why reimbursement was not ordered. The court may also in any case order that all or any part of the costs and expenses enumerated in paragraphs (b)(i), (iii), (iv) and (vii) of this section, be reimbursed to the county by the child’s parents or any person legally obligated for his support, or any of them jointly and severally, upon terms the court may direct. An order for reimbursement of costs made pursuant to this subsection may be enforced as provided in W.S. 14-3-435 . Any reimbursement ordered for guardian ad litem services provided pursuant to W.S. 14-12-101 through 14-12-104 shall be apportioned between the county and the guardian ad litem program in accordance with payments made for those services.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2012, ch. 76, § 3.

The 2012 amendment, in (b)(vi), inserted “unless the county participates in the guardian ad litem program pursuant to W.S. 14-12-101 through 14-12-104 and the program was appointed to provide the guardian ad litem”; and in (c), added the last sentence.

Laws 2012, ch. 76 § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 13, 2012.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-435. Ordering payment for support and treatment of child; how paid; enforcement.

1. When legal custody of a child, other than temporary guardianship, is vested by court order in an individual, agency, institution or organization other than the child’s parents, the court shall in the same or any subsequent proceeding inquire into the financial condition of the child’s parents or any other person who may be legally obligated to support the child. After due notice and hearing the court shall order the parents or any other legally obligated person to pay a reasonable sum for the support and treatment of the child during the time that a dispositional order is in force. The requirements of W.S. 20-2-101 through 20-2-406 apply to this section. The amount of support shall be determined in accordance with the presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-2-304 . In any case where the court has deviated from the presumptive child support, the reasons therefor shall be specifically set forth in the order. The amount ordered to be paid shall be paid to the clerk of the juvenile court for transmission to the person, institution or agency having legal custody of the child or to whom compensation is due. The clerk of court is authorized to receive periodic payments payable in the name or for the benefit of the child, including but not limited to social security, veteran’s administration benefits or insurance annuities, and apply the payments as the court directs. An order for support under this subsection shall include a statement of the addresses and social security numbers if known, of each obligor, the names and addresses of each obligor’s employer and the names and birth dates of each child to whom the order relates. The court shall order each obligor to notify the clerk of court in writing within fifteen (15) days of any change in address or employment. If any person who is legally obligated to support the child does not have full time employment, the court may require that person to seek full time employment and may require community service work in lieu of payment until full time employment is obtained.
2. An order for the payment of money entered against a parent or other person legally obligated to support a child under the provisions of W.S. 14-3-434 , 20-2-101 through 20-2-406 or this section shall be entered separately from the decree of disposition under W.S. 14-3-429 and shall not be treated as a part of the confidential court record under W.S. 14-3-437 . The order may be filed in the district court of any county in the state. From the time of filing, the order shall have the same effect as a judgment or decree of the district court in a civil action and may be enforced by the district attorney, or the department of family services in the same manner and with the same powers as in other child support cases under W.S. 20-2-303 , 20-2-304 , 20-2-307 , 20-2-311 , 20-2-401 through 20-2-406 and 20-6-101 through 20-6-222 , or in any manner provided by law for enforcement of a civil judgment for money.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2000, ch. 1, § 1; ch. 34, § 3; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 70, § 2; 2018, ch. 42, § 1.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in (b), substituted “ W.S. 20-2-303 , 20-2-304 , 20-2-307 ” for “ W.S. 20-2-303 through 20-2-305 , 20-2-307 .”

§ 14-3-436. Proceedings deemed in equity.

All proceedings under this act shall be regarded as proceedings in equity and the court shall have and exercise equitable jurisdiction.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-437. Records and reports confidential; inspection.

1. Throughout proceedings pursuant to this act the court shall safeguard the records from disclosure. Upon completion of the proceedings, whether or not there is an adjudication, the court shall order the entire file, except for child support orders, and record of the proceeding sealed and the court shall not release these records except to the extent necessary to meet the following inquiries:
   1. From another court of law;
   2. From an agency preparing a presentence report for another court;
   3. From a party to the proceeding;
   4. From the department of family services for purposes of establishing, modifying or enforcing a support obligation.
2. Upon receipt of inquiries as set out in this section, the court may release a copy of the presentence investigation report together with a cover letter stating the disposition of the proceeding.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1; 2000, ch. 1, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-438. Liability for contempt; penalties.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court upon its own motion or upon the motion of the district or county attorney, or guardian ad litem, may find that the child’s parent, parents, or guardian or any other person who willfully violates, or neglects or refuses to obey or perform any order or provision of this act is liable for contempt of court and may be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or incarcerated not more than ninety (90) days, or both.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

Due process requirements not met. —

Adjudication of neglect under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402 et seq., the Wyoming Child Protection Act, was entered against defendant for not providing adequate care necessary for the well-being of his minor children; the juvenile court ordered defendant to satisfy certain requirements within a specified period of time. Because the contempt proceeding under pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-438 against defendant was not conducted as an independent criminal action apart from the underlying juvenile case as required by Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(c), with its own caption and docket number, the juvenile court never acquired jurisdiction to proceed; its judgment and sentence of contempt was null and void. BD v. State, 2010 WY 18, 226 P.3d 272, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2010).

Defendant's due process right to notice of criminal contempt charges was violated because (1) an order to show cause gave no adequate notice of the terms of the order defendant allegedly violated or defendant's alleged conduct constituting some violations, and (2) the error was compounded by a refusal to give defendant's counsel access to the juvenile court file containing the underlying order. Brown v. State, 2017 WY 45, 393 P.3d 1265, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2017).

Concurrent criminal contempt jurisdiction.—

Juvenile court criminal contempt jurisdiction was concurrent with district courts because (1) the legislative grant of jurisdiction to juvenile courts did not use the terms “exclusive” or “concurrent,” (2) Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 10 granted district courts general criminal jurisdiction, and (3) juvenile court jurisdiction was to be strictly construed. Brown v. State, 2017 WY 45, 393 P.3d 1265, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2017).

Cited in

DB v. State (In re CRA), 2016 WY 24, 368 P.3d 294, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 14-3-439. Separate docket for juvenile cases; availability of records for statistics.

The clerk of the court shall maintain a separate docket for cases under this act and record therein the case number, the allegations of the petition, the age of the child involved and the disposition made. The records shall be made available for statistical purposes provided the names of the parties are not revealed.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 14-3-402(a)(xxiv).

§ 14-3-440. Reasonable efforts for family reunification; exceptions.

1. Except as provided in W.S. 14-2-309(b) or (c), reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify the family:
   1. Prior to placement of the child outside the home, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the child’s home; and
   2. To make it possible for the child to safely return to the child’s home.
2. In determining what reasonable efforts shall be made with respect to a child and in making those reasonable efforts, the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.
3. Reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a legal guardian may be made concurrently with the reasonable efforts described in subsection (a) of this section.
4. If continuation of reasonable efforts described in subsection (a) of this section is determined to be inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child, reasonable efforts shall be made for placement of the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete the steps necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.
5. Reasonable efforts determinations shall include whether or not services to the family have been accessible, available and appropriate.
6. The court shall make the reasonable efforts determinations required under this section at every court hearing. The reasonable efforts determinations shall be documented in the court’s orders.
7. If the court determines as provided in W.S. 14-2-309(a)(vi), (b) or (c) that reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family are not required:
   1. A permanency hearing as provided in W.S. 14-3-431(e) shall be held for the child within thirty (30) days after the determination; and
   2. Reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.
8. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 201, § 2.

History. Laws 2001, ch. 61, § 1; 2005, ch. 201, §§ 1, 2; 2009, ch. 196, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, deleted former (g)(i), providing for a permanency hearing if a court determined that reasonable effort to reunify a family were not required, redesignating former (g)(ii) as present (g); and repealed former (h), requiring a petition to terminate parental rights to be filed within 60 days of a judicial determination that reasonable efforts to reunify a family were not required.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, redesignated former (g) as (g)(ii); and added the present introductory language in (g) and (g)(i).

Aggravating circumstances not shown.—

Juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that aggravating circumstances existed that would make reunification between a father and a child unlikely because the facts did not establish severe misconduct toward child; the father was never charged with abuse or neglect of child, and he was taking drug tests and following the case plan so he could have visitation with the child. AA v. State, 2021 WY 18, 479 P.3d 1252, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2021).

Construction.—

Reunification efforts are aimed at preventing removal of the child from the home or making it possible to return the child to his home, and this statutory language references a preexisting home and family. GS v. State (In the Interest of VS), 2018 WY 119, 429 P.3d 14, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2018).

Proper efforts made.—

Department of Family Services made reasonable efforts to reunify the family for 20 months, without success; the department’s primary legal obligation was to reunify the existent family, which was with the mother, but she failed to comply with her case plan, and despite the father being in prison with a release date of 2022, the department tried to find a placement for the child within his family. The father had no relationship with the child, and it was in the child’s best interest to change the permanency plan to adoption. GS v. State (In the Interest of VS), 2018 WY 119, 429 P.3d 14, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2018).

Applicability. —

State was not required to show reasonable efforts to reunify the family in a parental rights termination proceeding where there was no requirement for reasonable efforts because the termination was sought on the basis that the children were left in the care of another for at least a year under and had been in foster care with the state for over fifteen of the last twenty-months. SLJ v. Dep't of Family Servs.(In re SJJ), 2005 WY 3, 104 P.3d 74, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2005).

It was not an abuse of discretion to alter a father’s sons’ permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption because sufficient evidence showed the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) made reasonable reunification efforts, but those efforts were unsuccessful when the father (1) refused to cooperate with DFS or utilize rehabilitation programs available to the father while incarcerated, (2) engaged in misconduct limiting the father’s ability to have contact with the sons, and (3) then communicated with the sons only sporadically. TW v. State (In re JW), 2018 WY 22, 411 P.3d 422, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2018).

§ 14-3-441. Confidentiality in court proceedings.

In the event a confidentiality order has been entered pursuant to W.S. 35-21-112 or any other court order allowing a party to maintain confidentiality of addresses or other information identifying the residence of the victim of domestic abuse, the address and city or state of residence and other information identifying the residence of the victim of domestic abuse and any child residing with the victim of domestic abuse shall remain confidential in any court proceedings under this title.

History. Laws 2013, ch. 98, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2013, ch. 98, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2013.

Cited in

RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014); DB v. State (In re CRA), 2016 WY 24, 368 P.3d 294, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 14-4-101. Definitions.

1. As used in W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-115 :
   1. “Applicant” means any person making formal application to the certifying authority for certification to operate a child caring agency in the state of Wyoming;
   2. “Board” means the certification board;
   3. “Board of review” means the “certification board” sitting as a board of review;
   4. “Certified agency” means any person certified to do business under the provisions of W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 ;
   5. “Certifying authority” means the department of family services operating as the agency which issues certificates, makes inspections, enforces standards and handles all administrative details relating to enforcement of W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 ;
   6. “Child caring facility” means any person who operates a business to keep or care for any minor at the request of the parents, legal guardians or an agency which is responsible for the child and includes any of the following privately operated facilities:
      1. Children’s institutions;
      2. Child placing agencies whether for permanent or temporary placement;
      3. Foster homes not supervised by the state, any local government, school district or agency or political subdivision thereof;
      4. Group day care agencies;
      5. Detention homes;
      6. Public or private receiving homes;
      7. Correctional schools;
      8. Repealed by Laws 2013, ch. 193 § 2.
      9. Ranches for children whether for summer operation only or otherwise;
      10. Day or hourly nurseries, nursery schools, kindergartens or any other preschool establishment not accredited by the state board of education;
      11. Boarding homes not supervised by the state, any local government, school district or agency or political subdivision thereof;
      12. Boards of cooperative educational services established under W.S. 21-20-104 and providing services to children with disabilities of any school district; and
      13. Except as provided under subparagraph (a)(vi)(N) of this section, any other person not legally related to a minor, having legal or physical care, custody or control of the child, receiving payment therefor and not supervised by the state, any local government, school district or agency or political subdivision thereof.
   7. “Person” shall mean any individual, partnership, association or corporation.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, §§ 1, 2; W.S. 1957, §§ 14-46.1, 14-46.2; Laws 1963, ch. 153, §§ 1-3; 1965, ch. 93, § 1; 1971, ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; W.S. 1977, §§ 14-3-206 , 14-3-207 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1994, ch. 34, § 1; 1997, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 501; 2012, ch. 84, § 103; 2013, ch. 193, § 2.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted present (a)(vi)(H) for former (a)(vi)(H), which read: “Homes for defective children.”

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, repealed former (a)(vi)(H), which read: “Homes for children with developmental disabilities.”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subparagraph (a)(vi)(I) or (a)(vi)(L) or subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-4-102. Certification required; exceptions.

1. All child caring facilities except those excluded in subsection (b) of this section, are required to be certified by the certifying authority before exercising care, custody or control of any minor.
2. W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 do not apply to:
   1. A legal parent’s or legal relative’s care of a minor;
   2. Occasional care of a neighbor’s or friend’s child if the caretaking person does not regularly engage in this activity;
   3. Parents exchanging child care on a mutually cooperative basis;
   4. Child care by a person employed to come to the home of the child’s parent or guardian;
   5. Day-care agencies providing care for less than three (3) minors;
   6. Foster homes supervised by the state, any local government, school district or agency or political subdivision thereof;
   7. Ranches or farms not offering services to children who are homeless, delinquent or have an intellectual disability; and
   8. Summer camps operated by nonprofit organizations;
   9. Day-care facilities providing care to the children of only one (1) immediate family unit.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, §§ 2, 3; W.S. 1957, §§ 14-46.2, 14-46.3; Laws 1963, ch. 153, §§ 3, 4; 1965, ch. 93, §§ 1, 2; W.S. 1977, §§ 14-3-207 , 14-3-208 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1995, ch. 179, § 1; 2008, ch. 70, § 1.

The 2008 amendment, substituted “children who are homeless, delinquent or have an intellectual disability” for “homeless, delinquent or retarded children” in (b)(vii).

Laws 2008, ch. 70, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 7, 2008.

Applicability.

There was sufficient evidence for the district court to conclude that a cattle ranch offered services to children who were delinquent, and therefore it was a facility which was required to obtain certification pursuant to this section. Triangle Cross Ranch, Inc. v. State, 2015 WY 47, 345 P.3d 890, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2015).

§ 14-4-103. Certification board; establishment; composition; appointment of lay members; duties.

1. A certification board of not more than fifteen (15) members reflecting statewide representation is established and shall be composed of:
   1. One (1) representative from the department of family services;
   2. One (1) representative from the state department of education;
   3. Repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 4.
   4. The state fire marshal or his designee;
   5. Six (6) lay members who are residents of the state and operators of child caring facilities or parents;
   6. Not more than four (4) additional lay members with an interest in child care;
   7. One (1) representative from the state department of agriculture or other state or local agency which may be responsible for sanitation inspections of child care facilities; and
   8. One (1) representative from the state department of health.
2. The lay members shall be appointed by the governor for terms of two (2) years and may be removed by the governor as provided in W.S. 9-1-202 . Any vacancies among the lay members shall be filled by gubernatorial appointment.
3. The board shall:
   1. Designate investigators to investigate any child caring facility within the provisions of W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 ;
   2. Act as the board of review; and
   3. Act as an advisor to the state in all matters pertaining to child care programs and child care facility licensing.
4. When the board is acting as a board of review pursuant to paragraph (c)(ii) of this section, the chairman of the board may designate, on a case by case basis, a committee of the board made up of at least three (3) disinterested members of the board to hear the case and recommend a decision on behalf of the board.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 14-46.4; Laws 1963, ch. 153, § 5; 1969, ch. 110, § 1; 1971, ch. 141, §§ 3, 4; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-209 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1987, ch. 175, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, §§ 3, 4; 1995, ch. 179, § 1; 1999, ch. 118, § 1.

§ 14-4-104. Certification; application; standards; notification to certify or refuse; term.

1. Application for certification of a child caring facility within W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 shall be made to the certifying authority.
2. A certificate shall be issued upon compliance with the following standards:
   1. Good moral character of the applicant, his employees and any other person having direct contact with a child under the care, custody or control of the applicant;
   2. Practical experience, education or training of the applicant in child care and treatment;
   3. Uncrowded, safe, sanitary and well repaired facilities; and
   4. Wholesome food prepared in a clean and healthy environment.
3. The certifying authority shall notify the applicant of its decision to certify or refuse certification of the applicant within thirty (30) days after the application has been filed.
4. All full certificates are nontransferable. Duration of the certificate shall be determined pursuant to rules and regulations of the department, subject to an annual continuation fee.
5. The department is authorized to establish pursuant to rules and regulations full and provisional certificate fees and fees for continuation of a full certificate. Fees for continuation of a full certificate shall be due on the anniversary date of the original certificate. Fees collected by the department under this section shall be deposited in the general fund to offset the cost of administration of the board.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, §§ 4, 5; W.S. 1957, §§ 14-46.4, 14-46.5; Laws 1963, ch. 153, §§ 5, 6; 1965, ch. 93, § 3; 1969, ch. 110, § 1; 1971, ch. 141, §§ 3-6; W.S. 1977, §§ 14-3-209 , 14-3-210 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1995, ch. 179, § 1; 1999, ch. 118, § 1; 2010, ch. 69, § 203.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in (e), deleted the former last sentence, which read: “For the balance of the biennium that began July 1, 1998, the governor may add the fees collected under this section to the department's budget through the B-11 process.”

§ 14-4-105. Provisional certificate.

The certifying authority may issue a provisional certificate if a substandard child caring agency is attempting to meet the standards or to comply with the rules and regulations pursuant to W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 . A provisional certificate is effective for a period of not more than six (6) months and is nonrenewable.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 14-46.6; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-211 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-4-106. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1995, ch. 179, § 2.

Cross references. —

For present provisions relating to child care certificate renewal, see § 14-4-104(d) and (e).

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1961, ch. 135, § 7, related to child care certificate renewal, time, and expiration.

§ 14-4-107. Inspection by certifying board; right of entrance.

1. The certifying board shall periodically and at reasonable times inspect, investigate and examine all certified agencies and applicants for certification.
2. Any certified agency or applicant for certification shall give right of entrance and inspection of the facility to inspectors authorized by the certifying board. Any certified agency or applicant who denies admission to any authorized inspector shall have the certificate revoked or application denied.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 14-46.8; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-213 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-4-108. Suspension, revocation or nonrenewal of certificate; grounds; approval.

1. Any certificate made or issued pursuant to W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 may be suspended, nonrenewed or revoked by the certifying authority upon proof of violation of any provision within W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 .
2. Thirty (30) days prior to initiating suspension, revocation or nonrenewal of any certificate made or issued pursuant to W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 , the certifying authority shall give written notice to the certified agency of the alleged facts warranting the intended action and provide the certified agency an opportunity to request a hearing with the board of review within ten (10) days of the receipt of notice. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.
3. Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, if the certifying authority finds the life, health or safety of a child is in imminent danger, the certifying authority may immediately temporarily suspend certification of the agency pending hearing.
4. The certified agency may appeal to the district court for review of any adverse decision of the board of review as provided by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 14-46.9; Laws 1963, ch. 153, § 7; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-214 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1991, ch. 213, § 1.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See §§ 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

§ 14-4-109. Denial of certification; notice and hearing; appeal.

1. Upon receiving a notice of denial of certification, any applicant may request a hearing with the board of review by serving proper notice to the certifying authority. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.
2. Any applicant may appeal to the district court for review of the decision of the board of review as provided by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, §§ 10, 11; W.S. 1957, §§ 14-46.10, 14-46.11; Laws 1963, ch. 153, § 8; W.S. 1977, §§ 14-3-215 , 14-3-216 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1991, ch. 213, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to judicial review of administrative action, see Rule 12, W.R.A.P.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

§ 14-4-110. Enjoining operations in violation.

Any person may be enjoined from operating a child caring facility for violating any provision within W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 .

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, § 12; W.S. 1957, § 14-46.12; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-217; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

Cross references. —

For procedure relating to injunctions, see Rule 65, W.R.C.P.

§ 14-4-111. Penalty for uncertified operation.

Any child caring facility operating without certification under W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200.00) for each offense. Each day of operation without certification is a separate offense.

History. Laws 1961, ch. 135, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 14-46.13; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-218; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-4-112. Contracts by department of family services.

The department of family services is authorized to contract with any lawful authority of any child caring facility for the care and custody of Wyoming children which have been placed therein by court order under the Juvenile Justice Act or otherwise. The department shall select those child caring facilities requiring the least expense to the state for the care and custody of children.

History. Laws 1884, ch. 53, § 5; R.S. 1887, § 2336; R.S. 1899, § 4934; C.S. 1910, § 3131; C.S. 1920, § 3898; R.S. 1931, § 20-705; C.S. 1945, § 58-605; W.S. 1957, § 14-39; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-203 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 2019, ch. 186, § 1.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted “Juvenile Justice Act” for “Juvenile Court Act.”

§ 14-4-113. Commitment of uncontrollable child; refusal to receive.

1. If a child is committed to a child caring facility by a court under the Juvenile Justice Act or otherwise and the child caring facility cannot exercise proper control over the child, the child caring facility may report the facts to the court with jurisdiction for a reconsideration or rehearing on the order. If the facts warrant, the child shall then be committed to the Wyoming boys’ school, the Wyoming girls’ school, or such other privately or publicly operated facility as the court deems appropriate.
2. If a child caring facility refuses to receive a child under court order, then the court of competent jurisdiction shall provide for placement under other provisions of law.

History. Laws 1907, ch. 60, § 3; C.S. 1910, § 3125; C.S. 1920, § 3892; R.S. 1931, § 20-604; C.S. 1945, § 58-615; W.S. 1957, § 14-49; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-220; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 2004, ch. 130, § 1; 2019, ch. 186, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to establishment of Wyoming boys' school and Wyoming girls' school, see § 25-1-201 .

The 2004 amendment, in (a), substituted “Wyoming boys' school” for “industrial institute.”

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in (a), substituted “Juvenile Justice Act” for “Juvenile Court Act.”

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 14-4-114. [Repealed.]

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1907, ch. 60, § 4, related to state payments to a child care facility receiving a child under court order.

§ 14-4-115. Authority of counties and municipalities to have detention homes.

The board of county commissioners of any county or the governing body of any municipal corporation may acquire and maintain a detention home for care of delinquent minors, provided the detention home is not used for any other purpose.

History. Laws 1945, ch. 90, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 58-618; W.S. 1957, § 14-52; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-223; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-4-116. Mandatory immunizations for children attending child caring facilities.

1. As used in this section “child caring facility” means a facility required to be certified under W.S. 14-4-102 .
2. All persons over eighteen (18) months old attending or transferring into a child caring facility are required to be completely immunized in a similar manner to W.S. 21-4-309 .
3. The operator of the child caring facility shall be responsible for an audit of the immunization status of any child attending the child caring facility in a similar manner to W.S. 21-4-309 .

History. Laws 1979, ch. 23, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 14-3-224.

Editor's notes. —

This section was enacted as § 14-3-224 but has been renumbered in accordance with the 1978 revision of this title.

§ 14-4-117. Juvenile detention facilities standards; definitions; report.

1. Sheriffs, in consultation with other operators of juvenile detention facilities, shall develop and implement uniform standards after consideration of nationally recognized criteria for the operation of all hardware secure and staff secure juvenile detention facilities.
2. No minor shall be detained in a hardware secure or staff secure juvenile detention facility unless the facility has adopted the standards specified under subsection (a) of this section.
3. The sheriffs shall report to the joint judiciary interim committee by November 15, 2012 with respect to their progress in developing and implementing the standards specified under subsection (a) of this section.
4. As used in this section:
   1. “Hardware secure juvenile detention facility” means a facility used for the detention of minors that is characterized by locks on the doors and other restrictive hardware designed to restrict the movement of the minors and protect public safety;
   2. “Staff secure juvenile detention facility” means a facility used for the detention of minors that is characterized by a trained staff to supervise the movement and activities of detained minors at the facility, without the additional use of hardware secure equipment.
5. Nothing in this section shall apply to the Wyoming boys’ school or the Wyoming girls’ school.

History. Laws 2010, ch. 21, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2010, ch. 21, § 2, effective July 1, 2010, provides: “(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this act, this act is effective March 31, 2013.

“(b) W.S. 14-4-117(a), created by section 1 of this act, is effective July 1, 2010.”

Laws 2010, ch. 82, § 4, amends Laws 2010, ch. 21, § 2, to read: “(b) W.S. 14-4-117(a) and (c), created by section 1 of this act, is effective July 1, 2010.”

Laws 2010, ch. 82, § 6(b), makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 9, 2010.

§ 14-4-201. Quality child care system established.

1. A quality child care system is created for the purpose of assisting the working families of the state by encouraging the availability of high quality care for children in licensed child caring facilities. The system may consist of:
   1. A quality rating system;
   2. Incentive payments for higher levels of quality care;
   3. Grants for professional educational development;
   4. Technical assistance, business management services and family strengthening programs.
2. The quality child care system shall also provide for a parental education and public awareness program.
3. The department of workforce services is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the purpose of implementing all or any portion of this article. All rules and regulations shall be promulgated in consultation with the department of education, the department of family services, the department of health, University of Wyoming and early childhood specialists from the private sector.
4. The state’s responsibility for payments under this article shall be limited to the amount of funding provided for the quality child care system by the legislature. The department may receive donations from foundations or other private sources. Any such funds received shall be deposited into a separate account and are continuously appropriated to the department, which may distribute those funds in accordance with the provisions of this article. Services eligible to be paid for by another public program shall not be reimbursed under this article.
5. Infants and preschool children served under this article who qualify for disability services shall receive those services through a regional developmental preschool that is supported by state funding for this purpose, provided the parents or caretakers agree to those services. The cost of these services shall not be reimbursed by payments made to providers under this article.
6. In the delivery of services, facilities that receive funds under this article shall not discriminate against any individual on the basis of sex, color, race, religion, national origin, disability or age other than the age of the qualifying child. Notwithstanding this subsection, facilities shall retain the ability to refer children with developmental disabilities to appropriate services.
7. Upon approval of the application for funds as provided in this article, the facility shall enter into a contract with the state, wherein the facility shall agree:
   1. To provide child care services in this state for a minimum of one (1) year;
   2. To serve children from families eligible for support for child care under programs, other than the program created by this article, managed by the department of family services;
   3. To submit the reports required by W.S. 14-4-203(d) and to submit information as required in the department’s rules and regulations; and
   4. To immediately repay all funds provided to the facility pursuant to this article, attorney fees and costs incurred in collection, if the facility breaches the contract during the one (1) year period.
8. The department of workforce services shall structure its contracts with facilities to ensure necessary data is reported uniformly. The contracts shall specify what services will be provided under the contract and the outcome measures to be achieved to allow the department to determine compliance with contract provisions, the services provided, the outcomes achieved and to determine the extent of statewide needs based on the reports received.
9. Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 3.
10. The department, in rating facilities for quality and making payments to facilities pursuant to this article, shall not discriminate against any facility due to religious orientation, affiliation or instruction or the lack thereof. No state funds shall be used for materials for religious instruction, salaries and benefits for staff primarily engaged in religious instruction, or for any other incremental cost of religious instruction or observances. Any facility receiving state funds shall be prepared to demonstrate, if audited, that sufficient nongovernmental funds were available to cover all expenses of religious instruction or observance.
11. For purposes of this article:
    1. “Department” means the department of workforce services;
    2. “Facility” means child caring facility as defined in W.S. 14-4-101(a)(vi)(D) and (K);
    3. Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 3.

History. Laws 2006, ch. 64, § 1; 2007, ch. 156, §§ 2, 3.

Cross References. —

As to Child Care Facilities Act, see § 14-4-101 et seq. As to Child Protection Act, see § 14-3-401 et seq.

The 2007 amendment, in (a), substituted “assisting the working families of the state by encouraging the availability of high quality care for children” for “supplementing high quality care to children,” and substituted “The system may consist” for “consisting” in the last sentence of the introductory language, substituted “Grants for professional-educational” for “Scholarships for professional-educational” in (iii), substituted “business management services and family strengthening programs” for “and quality support” in (iv); inserted “all or any portion of” in (c); substituted “children with developmental disabilities to appropriate services” for “developmentally disabled children to regional developmental preschools supported by state funding” in (f); inserted “of family services” in (g)(ii); repealed former (m)(iii), which read: “Task force” means a joint task force of employees of the department of workforce services and department of family services appointed by the governor”; repealed former (j), which read: “The task force created pursuant to paragraph (m)(iii) of this section shall develop an outcomes measurement and data infrastructure system for purposes of performance measurement and quality improvement of services provided by facilities under contract with the department to address statewide planning for quality improvement and increased availability of child care facilities”; and made related changes.

Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 1, 2007.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Appropriations. —

Laws 2007, ch.157, §§ 1 and 2 state as follows:

“Section 1.

(a) For the fiscal biennium ending June 30, 2008, one million five hundred fifty-three thousand dollars ($1,553,000.00) of funds remaining from the appropriation made in 2006 Wyoming Session Laws, Chapter 64, Section 4 for the purpose of funding a quality child care program pursuant to W.S. 14-4-201 et seq., is hereby reappropriated to the department of workforce services for the following purposes:

1. Educational grants pursuant to W.S. 14-4-204(a) – three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00);
2. Continuing education training grants pursuant to W.S. 14-4-204(c) – three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00);
3. Business management services pursuant to W.S. 14-4-205(b) – one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00);
4. Parent education and public awareness programs pursuant to W.S. 14-4-206 – five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00);
5. Technical assistance pursuant to W.S. 14-4-205(b) – one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00);
6. Family strengthening programs pursuant to W.S. 14-4-205(c) – one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00); and
7. Administrative costs – one hundred fifty-three thousand dollars ($153,000.00). Section 2. For the fiscal biennium ending June 30, 2008, four million five hundred thirty-four thousand three hundred eight dollars ($4,534,308.00) of funds remaining from the appropriation made in 2006 Wyoming Session Laws, Chapter 64, Section 4 for the purpose of funding a quality child care program pursuant to W.S. 14-4-201 et seq., is hereby reappropriated to the department of family services to increase the reimbursement for child care under the Child Care Development Fund 45 C.F.R. 98 to the seventy-fifth percentile of the statewide average market rate and to provide an additional one dollar and forty cents ($1.40) per hour of reimbursement for the care of children less than one (1) year of age and an additional one dollar ($1.00) per hour of reimbursement for care of children one (1) year of age but less than two (2) years of age. All increases apply for qualifying families beginning July 1, 2007.” Effective dates. — Laws 2006, ch. 64, § 5, makes subsections (a), (b), and (c) effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become a law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Approved March 21, 2006.

§§ 14-4-202 and 14-4-203. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 2006, ch. 64, § 1, related to quality rating system.

§ 14-4-204. Educational development scholarships and continuing education grants.

1. The department by rule and regulation shall provide educational development scholarships to assist the owners or staff of child caring facilities to attain certificates or degrees in early childhood development or a related field. Payments under this subsection shall be conditioned upon the recipient of the educational development scholarship entering into a contract to work for a child caring facility in this state for a period as provided in subsection (d) of this section after receiving the certificate or degree.
   1. and (ii) Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 3.
2. A recipient of an educational development scholarship pursuant to this section who breaches the contract required by subsection (a) of this section shall repay that portion of funds provided to the recipient pursuant to this article that is for educational developmental expenses accruing during or after the semester in which the recipient breached the contract, together with attorney fees and costs incurred in collection.
3. The department by rule and regulation shall provide continuing education grants to child caring facilities to assist the owners or staff of those facilities to obtain continuing education training in early childhood development or related topics. Payments under this subsection shall be conditioned on the following:
   1. The recipient of the continuing education training provided through the grant entering into a contract to work for a child caring facility in this state for a period as provided in subsection (d) of this section after receiving the training; and
   2. An in-cash cost sharing contribution of at least ten percent (10%) from the facility employing the staff member at the time of continuing education training.
4. The department shall set a formula for duration of contractual commitments under this section through rule and regulation. Commitment duration shall be based on the value of the educational opportunity and shall be commensurate with the magnitude of the grant.
5. A recipient of a continuing education grant pursuant to this section shall repay all funds provided to the recipient pursuant to the grant, together with attorney fees and costs incurred in collection, if the recipient breaches the contract required by subsection (c) of this section.

History. Laws 2006, ch. 64, § 1; 2007, ch. 156, §§ 2, 3; 2008, ch. 82, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, added (c) and (d); rewrote (a) and (b), regarding the purpose and conditions of educational development grants; repealed former (a)(i) through (a)(ii), regarding the staff member wages and benefits; and made stylistic changes.

Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 1, 2007.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, in (a), twice substituted references to grants with references to development scholarships; in (a) and (c)(i) substituted “contract” for “written agreement”; rewrote (b); in (c), substituted “continuing education” for “staff development”; and added (e).

§ 14-4-205. Technical assistance and business management assistance; quality support; family strengthening program.

1. Quality support payments may be made available to facilities through a competitive process to provide quality care for infants or other children whose care may otherwise be difficult to obtain in the community. Grants shall be awarded as follows:
   1. Repayment shall be required if the facility closes the business within one (1) year after receiving the grant or if the facility fails to comply with any provision of the grant;
   2. Grant requests for increasing capacity shall only be awarded to existing licensed facilities that are at a quality level of three (3) or higher in the quality rating system;
   3. Quality support grants shall not be used for capital construction or purchase of land or buildings;
   4. Grants to any one (1) facility shall not exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) per child.
2. The department shall provide technical assistance to facilities on best practices for quality operational improvements and business management services of child caring facilities.
3. The department of health shall contract for delivery of voluntary family strengthening educational programs to promote family involvement in children’s development.

History. Laws 2006, ch. 64, § 1; 2007, ch. 156, § 2.

The 2007 amendment, in (b), deleted “department of family services and” preceding “department”, deleted “of workforce services” preceding “shall provide technical” and substituted “quality operational improvements and business management services” for “management”; and added (c).

Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 1, 2007.

§ 14-4-206. Parental education and public awareness.

1. The department shall develop and distribute materials to:
   1. Promote knowledge of the quality child care system;
   2. Promote an understanding of the benefits that accrue to children, families and communities from quality child care programs, as based upon the latest findings in research reports and studies;
   3. Promote the advantages of parents personally providing care for their own children whenever possible;
   4. Promote parent involvement in their child’s development and provide information and activities to parents or caretakers to promote early childhood learning and development at home;
   5. Emphasize the importance of parental responsibility and the involvement of the family in quality early childhood development; and
   6. Inform parents about choices available in childcare programs and how to choose an appropriate child caring facility.

History. Laws 2006, ch. 64, § 1; 2007, ch. 156, § 2.

The 2007 amendment added (a)(vi).

Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 1, 2007.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-4-207. Reporting requirements.

1. The department of workforce services shall report annually to the joint education interim committee and the joint labor, health and social services interim committee by October 1. The report shall include:
   1. The department’s progress in establishing the system under this article;
   2. The participating child caring facilities;
   3. Information that demonstrates the impacts of the services provided by the system on children, families and communities and how the department plans to measure these impacts;
   4. Public awareness activities;
   5. The collaborative efforts of the departments of education, family services, health, workforce services and others to provide comprehensive early childhood development experiences for children while meeting the needs of Wyoming’s workforce and economic development;
   6. System expenditures of public and private funds; and
   7. Recommendations for changes in the system’s operation.

History. Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 1; 2014, ch. 7, § 2.

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, in the introductory paragraph of (a), inserted “and” preceding “the joint labor” and deleted “and the joint appropriations interim committee” preceding “by October 1.”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2007, ch. 156, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 1, 2007.

§ 14-5-101. Compact provisions generally.

The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in form substantially as follows:

History. Laws 1963, ch. 179, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 14-52.1; W.S. 1977, § 14-4-101 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-5-102. Financial responsibility.

Financial responsibility for any child placed pursuant to the provisions within W.S. 14-5-101 shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of article IV thereof.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 179, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 14-52.2; W.S. 1977, § 14-4-102 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-5-103. Duties of department of family services.

1. “Appropriate public authorities” as used in article II of W.S. 14-5-101 and “appropriate authority in the receiving state” as used in article IV(a) of W.S. 14-5-101 mean the Wyoming department of family services. The department shall:
   1. Receive and act with reference to notices required by article II of W.S. 14-5-101; and
   2. Act as compact administrator in accordance with article VI of W.S. 14-5-101.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 179, §§ 3, 4; W.S. 1957, §§ 14-52.3, 14-52.4; W.S. 1977, §§ 14-4-103 , 14-4-104 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 14-5-104. Agreements with other party states authorized; when approval required.

Officers and agencies of the state of Wyoming and its subdivisions having authority to place children may enter into agreements with appropriate officers or agencies of other party states pursuant to article IV(b) of W.S. 14-5-101 . Any agreement which contains a financial commitment or imposes a financial obligation on the state of Wyoming, a subdivision or agency thereof is not binding unless it has the written approval of the director of the state budget department or the county treasurer in the case of a county.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 179, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 14-52.5; W.S. 1977, § 14-4-105 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1991, ch. 29, § 3; 2021, ch. 56, § 3.

The 2021 amendment, in the last sentence, substituted "director" for "administrator," added "state" preceding "budget," deleted "division of the Wyoming" preceding "department" and "of administration and information" preceding "or the county treasurer."

Laws 2021, ch. 56, § 7, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved April 1, 2021.

§ 14-5-105. Inspection and supervision of children and facilities in other states.

Any requirements for inspection or supervision of children, homes, institutions or other agencies in another party state which apply under W.S. 14-4-101 through 14-4-111 are deemed met if performed pursuant to an agreement entered into by appropriate officers or agencies of this state or a subdivision thereof as specified in article IV (b) of W.S. 14-5-101 and performed by agents of an administrative or governmental agency of another state.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 179, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 14-52.6; W.S. 1977, § 14-4-106 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-5-106. Placement of child in out-of-state institution.

Any district or juvenile court in any district in Wyoming which finds a child to be delinquent or guilty of committing a felony may place the child in an institution in another state pursuant to article V of W.S. 14-5-101 and shall retain jurisdiction as provided in article IV thereof.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 179, § 7; W.S. 1957, § 14-52.7; W.S. 1977, § 14-4-107 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-5-107. Prerequisites for placement of children from other states.

Any person, firm, partnership, corporation, state or political subdivision or agency thereof shall not send, bring or cause to be sent or brought to the state of Wyoming any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending person, firm, corporation, state, political subdivision or agency thereof complies with the prerequisites required in article II of W.S. 14-5-101 .

History. Laws 1963, ch. 179, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 14-52.8; W.S. 1977, § 14-4-108 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

§ 14-5-108. Penalties for violations.

Any person, firm or corporation which places a child in the state of Wyoming or receives a child in this state without meeting the requirements of W.S. 14-5-101 through 14-5-107 is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100.00) or imprisoned in the county jail for a maximum of thirty (30) days, or both. Each day of violation is a separate offense.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 179, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 14-52.9; W.S. 1977, § 14-4-109 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

Library references. —

Family Law and Practice § 64.21 (Matthew Bender).

§ 14-6-101. [Repealed.]

Repealed pursuant to Laws 2004, ch. 91, § 2; see § 14-6-102 .

Contingent repeal. —

Laws 2004, ch. 91, § 2, provides that W.S. 14-6-101 is repealed, effective upon certification by the governor of the state of Wyoming to the Wyoming secretary of state that at least thirty-four (34) other states have enacted the Interstate Compact for Juveniles. See The Council on State Governments website, updated June 29, 2009, which indicates the Compact has now been adopted by thirty-nine (39) states. http://csg-web.csg.org/programs/ncic/InterstateCompactforJuveniles.aspx

§ 14-6-102. Interstate Compact for Juveniles; compact provisions generally.

History. Laws 2004, ch. 91, § 1; 2017, ch. 172, § 1.

§ 14-6-201. Definitions; short title; statement of purpose and interpretation.

1. As used in this act:
   1. “Adjudication” means a finding by the court or the jury, incorporated in a decree, as to the truth of the facts alleged in the petition;
   2. “Adult” means an individual who has attained the age of majority;
   3. “Child” means an individual who is under the age of majority;
   4. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
   5. “Clerk” means the clerk of a district court acting as the clerk of a juvenile court;
   6. “Commissioner” means a district court commissioner;
   7. “Court” means the juvenile court established by W.S. 5-8-101 ;
   8. “Custodian” means a person, institution or agency responsible for the child’s welfare and having legal custody of a child by court order or having actual physical custody and control of a child and acting in loco parentis;
   9. “Delinquent act” means an act punishable as a criminal offense by the laws of this state or any political subdivision thereof, or contempt of court under W.S. 14-6-242 , or an act violating the terms and conditions of any court order which resulted from the criminal conviction of any child but does not include a status offense;
   10. “Delinquent child” means a child who has committed a delinquent act;
   11. “Deprivation of custody” means transfer of legal custody by the court from a parent or previous legal custodian to another person, agency, organization or institution;
   12. “Detention” means the temporary care of a child in physically restricting facilities pending court disposition or the execution of a court order to place or commit a child to a juvenile detention facility;
   13. “Judge” means the judge of the juvenile court;
   14. “Legal custody” means as defined in W.S. 14-3-402(a)(x);
   15. “Minor” means an individual who is under the age of majority;
   16. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
   17. “Parent” means either a natural or adoptive parent of the child, a person adjudged the parent of the child in judicial proceedings or a man presumed to be the father under W.S. 14-2-504 ;
   18. “Parties” include the child, his parents, guardian or custodian, the state of Wyoming and any other person made a party by an order to appear, or named by the juvenile court;
   19. “Probation” means a legal status created by court order following an adjudication of delinquency or of a status offense where a child is permitted to remain in his home subject to supervision by a city or county probation officer, the department or other qualified private organization the court may designate. A child is subject to return to the court for violation of the terms or conditions of probation provided for in the court order;
   20. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
   21. “Residual parental rights and duties” means those rights and duties remaining with the parents after custody, guardianship of the person or both have been vested in another person, agency or institution. Residual parental rights and duties include but are not limited to:
       1. The duty to support and provide necessities of life;
       2. The right to consent to adoption;
       3. The right to reasonable visitation unless restricted or prohibited by court order;
       4. The right to determine the minor’s religious affiliation; and
       5. The right to petition on behalf of the minor.
   22. “Shelter care” means the temporary care of a child in physically unrestricting facilities pending court disposition or execution of a court order for placement or commitment;
   23. “Status offense” means an offense which, if committed by an adult, would not constitute an act punishable as a criminal offense by the laws of this state or a violation of a municipal ordinance, but does not include a violation of W.S. 12-6-101(b) or (c) or any similar municipal ordinance;
   24. “Juvenile detention facility” means any facility which may legally and physically restrict and house a child, other than the Wyoming boys’ school, the Wyoming girls’ school, the Wyoming state hospital or other private or public psychiatric facility within the state of Wyoming. “Juvenile detention facility” does not include any residential treatment facility which is operated for the primary purpose of providing treatment to a child. A juvenile detention facility may be housed within an adult jail or correction facility if the facility otherwise meets the requirements of state law;
   25. “Department” means the Wyoming department of family services;
   26. “Another planned permanent living arrangement” means a permanency plan for youth sixteen (16) years of age or older other than reunification, adoption, legal guardianship or placement with a fit and willing relative;
   27. “Qualified individual” means a person who meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 675a(c)(1)(D);
   28. “Qualified residential treatment program” means a program that meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 672(k)(4);
   29. “This act” means W.S. 14-6-201 through 14-6-252 .
2. This act shall be known and may be cited as the “Juvenile Justice Act”.
3. This act shall be construed to effectuate the following public purposes:
   1. To provide for the best interests of the child and the protection of the public and public safety;
   2. Consistent with the best interests of the child and the protection of the public and public safety:
      1. To promote the concept of punishment for criminal acts while recognizing and distinguishing the behavior of children who have been victimized or have disabilities, such as serious mental illness that requires treatment or children with a cognitive impairment that requires services;
      2. To remove, where appropriate, the taint of criminality from children committing certain unlawful acts; and
      3. To provide treatment, training and rehabilitation that emphasizes the accountability and responsibility of both the parent and the child for the child’s conduct, reduces recidivism and helps children to become functioning and contributing adults.
   3. To provide for the care, the protection and the wholesome moral, mental and physical development of children within the community whenever possible using the least restrictive and most appropriate interventions;
   4. To be flexible and innovative and encourage coordination at the community level to reduce the commission of unlawful acts by children;
   5. To achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interest of public safety and when a child is removed from the child’s family, to ensure that individual needs will control placement and provide the child the care that should be provided by parents; and
   6. To provide a simple judicial procedure through which the provisions of this act are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair and timely hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.2; Laws 1976, ch. 3, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-102 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, §§ 1, 2; 1987, ch. 221, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1993, ch. 161, § 1; ch. 210, § 2; 1995, ch. 122, § 2; ch. 154, § 1; ch. 202, § 2; 1996, ch. 49, § 1; ch. 106, § 1; 1997, ch. 119, § 2; ch. 149, § 1; ch. 199, §§ 2, 3; 1998, ch. 7, § 1; 2003, ch. 93, § 2; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2008, ch. 18, § 1; 2016, ch. 56, § 1; ch. 95, § 2; 2020, ch. 2, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to age of majority, see § 14-1-101 .

For the Juvenile Justice Information System Act, see § 7-19-501 et seq.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a)(xii), substituted “to place or commit a child to a juvenile detention facility” for “for placement or commitment,” and in (a)(xiv) substituted “as defined in W.S. 14-3-402(a)(x)” for provisions pertaining to a legal status created by court order vesting in a custodian rights and duties over a minor; in (c)(i) and (ii), inserted “best interests of the child and the” preceding “protection of the public and public safety,” in (c)(ii)(A), added the language beginning “while recognizing and distinguishing the behavior” at the end, in (c)(ii)(C) added the language beginning “reduces recidivism” at the end, in (c)(iv) substituted “be flexible and innovative and encourage coordination at” for “protect the welfare of,” and “level to reduce the commission” for “and to control the commission,” in (c)(v) substituted “ensure that individual needs will control placement and provide” for “give,” and in (c)(vi) inserted “and timely” following “parties are assured a fair”; and made stylistic changes throughout.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, in (a)(xix), inserted “or of a status offense” in the first sentence, inserted “provided for in the court order” in the second sentence.

The 2016 amendments. — The first 2016 amendment, by ch. 95, § 1, effective July 1, 2016, added the second sentence in (a)(xxiv).

The second 2016 amendment, by ch. 95, § 2, effective July 1, 2016, redesignated former (a)(xxvi) as (a)(xxvii), and added (a)(xxvi).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, added (a)(xxvii), (a)(xxviii), and redesignated former (a)(xxvii) as (a)(xxix).

Effective dates. —

Laws 2016, ch. 95, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8, Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 4, 2016.

Purpose. —

Proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-201 et seq., are not criminal, but are special proceedings, the proceedings are equitable and not punitive to accomplish the purpose of providing treatment, training and rehabilitation for children, and to provide for the care, the protection and the wholesome moral, mental and physical development of children coming within its provisions; as such they are entitled to a liberal effect and a practical construction in favor of the child's welfare. TPJ v. State, 2003 WY 49, 66 P.3d 710, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2003).

Interested relative of neglected child may become “party” in neglect action through a motion to grant present custody. In In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1990).

Evidence supported finding of “neglect” where the mother left her children with another family which fed and clothed the children without reimbursement and paid for medication used to treat an ear infection developed by one of the children. In In Interest of N.M., 794 P.2d 564, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 1990).

State met its burden of proving child neglect, where record was clear that three days after infant's discharge from hospital for pneumonia, mother still had not provided infant with prescribed medication; expert medical testimony was not required for juvenile court's understanding of evidence before it, and record controverted mother's argument that poverty prevented her from providing the prescribed medication. MP v. State ex rel. CP, 965 P.2d 1155, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1998).

No conflict with Wyoming Sexual Offender Registration Act.—

Registration and limited notification requirements for certain adjudicated delinquents under the Wyoming Sexual Offender Registration Act (WSORA) did not conflict with the purposes of the Wyoming Juvenile Justice Act (WJJA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-201 et seq., as the language of the WJJA showed that it was to be administered to assure public safety as well as promote the interest of the child and was drafter with knowledge of the WSORA. Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

Standards for juvenile proceedings.

Finding that petitioner, a juvenile, was competent to proceeding to adjudication in a delinquency proceeding was improper because, although the juvenile court ordered a competency evaluation and ruled that petitioner was competent to proceed, it did not evaluate him under the correct standards set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-302 and 7-11-303 . The psychologist offered the opinion that he appeared to be less familiar with general legal terms and concepts than the average adult defendant, but because he was 12 at the time, the juvenile should not have been compared to the average adult defendant, but to an average child of the same age. SWM v. State, 2013 WY 49, 299 P.3d 673, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2013).

Applied in

KT v. State, 902 P.2d 1288, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1995); K.C. v. State, 2011 WY 108, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Jul 12, 2011).

Stated in

Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1995); Ct v. State, 2006 WY 101, 140 P.3d 643, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (2006).

Quoted in

Campbell v. State, 709 P.2d 425, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 608 (Wyo. 1985); CB v. State, 749 P.2d 267, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1988); In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1989); In Interest of C. N., 816 P.2d 1282, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1991); Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

Cited in

DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re “H” Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003); RM v. State (In re JM), 2014 WY 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Sept. 16, 2014); Triangle Cross Ranch, Inc. v. State, 2015 WY 47, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Mar. 26, 2015); Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile, 5 ALR4th 1211.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 ALR4th 1135.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's spouse (resident or nonresident) — state cases, 65 ALR5th 407.

§ 14-6-202. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 3, established and provided judges for juvenile courts.

§ 14-6-203. Jurisdiction; confidentiality of records.

1. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
2. Coincident with proceedings concerning a minor alleged to be delinquent, the court has jurisdiction to:
   1. Determine questions concerning the right to legal custody of the minor;
   2. Order any party to the proceedings to perform any acts, duties and responsibilities the court deems necessary; or
   3. Order any party to the proceedings to refrain from any act or conduct the court deems detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the minor or essential to the enforcement of any lawful order of disposition of the minor made by the court.
3. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction in all cases, other than status offenses, in which a minor is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or to have violated a municipal ordinance.
4. The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases, other than status offenses, in which a minor who has not attained the age of thirteen (13) years is alleged to have committed a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than six (6) months.
5. Except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, all cases over which the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction shall be originally commenced in the juvenile court but may thereafter be transferred to another court having jurisdiction pursuant to W.S. 14-6-237 .
6. The district attorney shall establish objective criteria, screening and assessment procedures for determining the court for appropriate disposition in cooperation and coordination with each municipality in the jurisdiction of the district court. The district attorney shall serve as the single point of entry for all minors alleged to have committed a crime. Except as otherwise provided in this section, copies of all charging documents, reports or citations for cases provided in this subsection shall be forwarded to the district attorney prior to the filing of the charge, report or citation in municipal or city court. The following cases, excluding status offenses, may be originally commenced either in the juvenile court or in the district court or inferior court having jurisdiction:
   1. Violations of municipal ordinances, except that if a juvenile is sentenced in a municipal court to a sentence exceeding ten (10) days of jail or detention, the municipal court shall provide to the district attorney in the juvenile’s county of residency and the department of education a copy of the judgment and sentence;
   2. All misdemeanors except:
      1. Those cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court; and
      2. If a juvenile is sentenced in a municipal or circuit court to a sentence exceeding ten (10) days of jail or detention, the municipal or circuit court shall provide to the district attorney in the juvenile’s county of residency and the department of education a copy of the judgment and sentence.
   3. Felony cases in which the minor has attained the age of seventeen (17) years. The prosecuting attorney shall consider those determinative factors set forth in W.S. 14-6-237(b)(i) through (vii) prior to commencing an action in the district court under this paragraph;
   4. Cases in which the minor has attained the age of fourteen (14) years and is charged with a violent felony as defined by W.S. 6-1-104(a)(xii);
   5. Cases in which a minor who has attained the age of fourteen (14) years is charged with a felony and has previously been adjudicated as a delinquent under two (2) separately filed juvenile petitions for acts which if committed by an adult constitute felonies.
7. Except as provided by subsection (j) of this section, all information, reports or records made, received or kept by any municipal, county or state officer or employee evidencing any legal or administrative process or disposition resulting from a minor’s misconduct are confidential and subject to the provisions of this act. The existence of the information, reports or records or contents thereof shall not be disclosed by any person unless:
   1. Disclosure results from an action brought or authorized by the district attorney in a court of public record;
   2. The person the records concern is under eighteen (18) years of age and, in conjunction with one (1) of his parents or with the ratification of the court, authorizes the disclosure;
   3. The person the records concern is eighteen (18) years of age or older and authorizes the disclosure;
   4. The disclosure results from the information being shared with or between designated employees of any court, any law enforcement agency, any prosecutor’s office, any employee of the victim services division within the office of the attorney general, any probation office or any employee of the department of family services or the minor’s past or present school district who has been designated to share the information by the department of family services or by the school district or anyone else designated by the district attorney in determining the appropriate court pursuant to a single point of entry assessment under this section;
   5. The disclosure is made to a victim of a delinquent act constituting a felony, in accordance with W.S. 14-6-501 through 14-6-509 ;
   6. The disclosure is authorized by W.S. 7-19-504 ; or
   7. The disclosure  is made to an administrative employee or member of the board of trustees  of the minor’s school district, authorized by the court to  receive the information, for purposes of the suspension or expulsion  of the minor pursuant to W.S. 21-4-305(c)(ii), provided:
      1. The court finds that the court action involves matters which are relevant to the suspension or expulsion of the minor pursuant to W.S. 21-4-305(e). Only materials and evidence relevant to the minor’s potential suspension or expulsion shall be disclosed to an administrative employee or member of the board of trustees of the minor’s school district; and
      2. The school district administrative employees or board of trustee members authorized to receive the minor’s confidential information shall only disclose the information:
         1. To other members  of the board of trustees or the superintendent for purposes of W.S. 21-4-305(c)(ii); and
         2. To the minor and his parents, legal guardians, attorneys or guardian ad litem.
8. Nothing contained in this act is construed to deprive the district court of jurisdiction to determine questions of custody, parental rights, guardianship or any other questions involving minors, when the questions are the subject of or incidental to suits or actions commenced in or transferred to the district court as provided by law.
9. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to require confidentiality of any matter, legal record, identity or disposition pertaining to a minor charged or processed through any municipal or circuit court.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.4; Laws 1973, ch. 225, § 1; 1976, ch. 3, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-104 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, § 1; 1985, ch. 37, § 1; 1989, ch. 117, § 1; ch. 247, § 2; 1994, ch. 84, § 1; 1995, ch. 63, § 1; ch. 154, § 1; 1997, ch. 27, § 2; ch. 28, § 1; ch. 199, §§ 2, 3; 1998, ch. 65, § 1; ch. 81, § 2; 2000, ch. 24, § 4; 2001, ch. 118, § 2; 2004, ch. 42, § 1; ch. 127, § 2; 2006, ch. 114, § 1; 2009, ch. 146, § 1; 2013, ch. 168, § 1; 2019, ch. 164, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to age of majority and rights upon emancipation, see § 14-1-101 .

The 2004 amendments. —

The first 2004 amendment, by ch. 42, § 1, in (j), deleted “justice of the peace” following “through any municipal.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

The second 2004 amendment, by ch. 127, § 2, effective July 1, 2004, in (f)(i) added the exception, and added (f)(ii)(B), making related changes; and in (g)(vi), deleted “or 14-6-240(g)” at the end.

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

The 2006 amendment, in (g), added (or) at the end of (v); and made a related change in (iv).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become a law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (f), added the first three sentences; and in (g)(iv), added “or anyone else designated by the district attorney in determining the appropriate court pursuant to a single point of entry assessment under this section” at the end.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (g)(vii), making related changes.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, in the introductory language in (g)(vii) and in (g)(vii)(B)(I), substituted “W.S. 21-4-305(c)(ii)” for “W.S. 21-4-305(d)."

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Former prosecutorial discretion constitutional. —

Former provisions vesting authority in the prosecuting attorney to decide in the first instance whether charges against a juvenile should be presented to the district court treating the person as an adult or in the juvenile court were constitutional. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984).

Section constitutional. —

Transfer process determinants of confidentiality and burden of proof, as well as the court of jurisdiction, have been uniformly held to constitutionally rest within legislative discretion. The Wyoming legislature has clearly and validly established the courts and transfer processes for the trial of criminal offenses committed by persons under the age of majority. Menapace v. State, 768 P.2d 8, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1989).

The statutory scheme is constitutional; there is no demonstrable prejudice arising out of the failure to assign the burden of proof prior to any hearing; and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to transfer case to juvenile court or on the part of the trial judge in transferring another case to the county court from juvenile court for a preliminary examination with the view that the case would be prosecuted in the district court. Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1995).

No inherent right to be prosecuted as juvenile. —

Since one does not have an inherent right to be prosecuted as a juvenile but that is a privilege granted by the legislature, the legislature can restrict or qualify the privilege as it sees fit, so long as there is not involved any arbitrary or discriminatory classification. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984).

Interstate Compact on Juveniles does not restrain application of criminal transfer provisions of this section. Menapace v. State, 768 P.2d 8, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1989).

Concurrent criminal contempt jurisdiction.—

Juvenile court criminal contempt jurisdiction was concurrent with district courts because (1) the legislative grant of jurisdiction to juvenile courts did not use the terms “exclusive” or “concurrent,” (2) Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 10 granted district courts general criminal jurisdiction, and (3) juvenile court jurisdiction was to be strictly construed. Brown v. State, 2017 WY 45, 393 P.3d 1265, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2017).

Jurisdiction exists despite erroneous placement of child. —

The trial court's erroneous application of the law relating to the placing of a child adjudged to be neglected did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, nor cause its decree to be void. In In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1989), reh'g denied, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 198 (Wyo. Aug. 25, 1989).

Juvenile court action suspends district court jurisdiction. —

Where a mother filed a petition to change custody as an adjunct to a prior divorce proceeding while a juvenile court action for neglect was in progress, civil and juvenile jurisdiction was combined from the two parallel actions for the hearing. A juvenile court action does not deprive the district court of its jurisdiction; the action in the juvenile court suspends, at least temporarily, the jurisdiction over the question of custody from the district court. In In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1990).

No counseling for parents absent their consent. —

When a child is adjudged by the court to be delinquent and is permitted to live in the parents' home, the consent of the parents is required before the court has authority to order the parents to go to counseling or evaluation. In Interest of C. N., 816 P.2d 1282, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1991).

Expert testimony on ability of 15-year-old to form specific intent to commit crime properly excluded.

Excluding defendant's expert testimony on the ability of a 15-year-old to form the specific intent to commit a crime did not violate defendant's right to present a defense because the testimony was not relevant, as (1) the expert would not have testified that 15-year-olds had no ability to form such an intent, as the testimony merely suggested that 15-year-olds were more impulsive than adults and had a reduced ability to evaluate consequences, (2) to the extent the testimony could be viewed as evidence of diminished capacity, it was not appropriate to expand defense of mental incapacity beyond the scope of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302 , and, (3) the defense of infancy was supplanted by the legislature's allocation of jurisdiction between juvenile and criminal courts. Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, 301 P.3d 106, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2013).

Denial of transfer motion. —

District court did not err in denying a juvenile defendant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court because the district court's analysis demonstrated that it exercised the appropriate judicial discretion in denying a transfer to juvenile court; the court thoroughly considered the evidence and argument presented and gave suitable weight to defendant's lack of maturity but ultimately concluded that defendant's diminished problem-solving and critical thinking skills paled in light of the maturity and sophistication exhibited in carrying out the planned burglaries. The district court likewise considered defendant's juvenile history and contact with law enforcement and his failure to complete probation and concluded that, while greater rehabilitative services would be available to defendant through the juvenile court, defendant was an unlikely candidate for rehabilitation. Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, 275 P.3d 377, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 2012), reh'g denied, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. Mar. 6, 2012).

Applied in

KT v. State, 902 P.2d 1288, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1995); McAdams v. State, 907 P.2d 1302, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 220 (Wyo. 1995); Hatch v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 930 P.2d 382, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1996).

Quoted in

State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1981).

Stated in

In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

ELR v. State, 902 P.2d 696, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1995); Garton v. State, 910 P.2d 1348, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1996).

Law reviews. —

For article “Admissibility of Violations of Law by Child as Evidence in Prosecution of Parents for Criminal Neglect,” see VII Wyo. L.J. 133 (1953).

For article “Administrative Problems Relating to Adoption,” see VIII Wyo. L.J. 210 (1954).

For article “Observations and Suggestions Concerning Wyoming Statutes Relating to Adoption Based on Abandonment,” see VIII Wyo. L.J. 218 (1954).

For comment, “The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Imprisonment of Juvenile Offenders,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1982).

For comment, “Prosecution as a Juvenile or an Adult? Is the Discretion Vested in the District Attorney by Section 14-6-203(c) of the Wyoming Statutes Unconstitutional and Violative of the Proper Role of a Prosecutor?” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1984).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of juvenile court over delinquents or dependents, 14 ALR2d 336.

Homicide by juvenile as within jurisdiction of juvenile court, 48 ALR2d 663.

Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time legal proceedings are commenced, as criterion of jurisdiction of juvenile court, 89 ALR2d 506.

Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile's offense, 66 ALR4th 985.

§ 14-6-204. Venue; change of venue or judge.

Proceedings under this act may be commenced in the county where the child is living or is present when the proceedings are commenced or in the county where the alleged delinquent act occurred. Change of venue or change of judge may be had under the circumstances and upon the terms and conditions provided by law in a civil action in the district court.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.5; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-105 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to transfer of trial and change of judge, see Rule 40.1, W.R.C.P.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Constitution's venue provision does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. —

The venue provision in Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 10 does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings which are, instead, controlled by this section. NJC v. State, 913 P.2d 435, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1996).

Venue provision in Juvenile Court Act constitutional. —

The venue provision in the Juvenile Court Act which allows a juvenile delinquency proceeding to be brought where the alleged delinquent act occurs or where the juvenile resides is not in conflict with the venue provision of Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 10. The venue provision in the constitution is inapplicable to juvenile delinquency matters because these proceedings are not deemed criminal. NJC v. State, 913 P.2d 435, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1996).

§ 14-6-205. Taking of child into custody; when permitted.

1. A child may be taken into custody by a law enforcement officer without a warrant or court order when:
   1. The circumstances would permit an arrest without a warrant under W.S. 7-2-102 ;
   2. There are reasonable grounds to believe the child has violated the terms of an order of the juvenile court issued pursuant to this act; or
   3. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
   4. The child’s conduct or behavior seriously endangers himself or the person or property of others and immediate custody appears necessary.
   5. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.6; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-108 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, §§ 2, 3; 2006, ch. 114, § 1; 2008, ch. 18, § 1.

The 2006 amendment, in (a), added “or” at the end of (ii); and made a related changes in (iv).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become a law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, inserted “issued pursuant to this act” in (a)(ii).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Quoted in

City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1991).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Child Protection: A Suggested Role for Members of the Wyoming State Bar,” see IX Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1974).

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Authority of court to order juvenile delinquent incarcerated in adult penal institution, 95 ALR3d 568.

When, under terms of Federal Youth Corrections Act (18 USC § 5005 et seq. [repealed]), must prisoner serving youth corrections sentence be segregated from adult prison population, 59 ALR Fed 746.

§ 14-6-206. Child in custody; no detention without court order; exceptions; notice to parent or guardian; release.

1. In accordance with procedures specified in W.S. 7-1-108(c) and (d), a child taken into custody shall not be held in detention or placed in shelter care without a court order unless detention or shelter care is required to:
   1. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
   2. Protect the person or property of others;
   3. Prevent the child from absconding or being removed from the jurisdiction of the court; or
   4. Provide the child having no parent, guardian, custodian or other responsible adult with supervision and care and return him to the court when required.
2. Any person taking a child into custody shall as soon as possible notify the child’s parent, guardian or custodian. Unless the child’s detention or shelter care is authorized by a court order issued pursuant to this act or required for one (1) of the reasons in subsection (a) of this section, the child shall be released to the care of his parent, guardian, custodian or other responsible adult upon that person’s written promise to present the child before the court upon request.
3. After issuing any citation to a child for a violation of a state or federal law or a municipal ordinance for which incarceration or a fine may be imposed, the law enforcement agency issuing the citation or its designee shall take reasonable actions to notify the child’s parent, guardian or custodian.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 7; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.7; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-107 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 3; 2008, ch. 18, § 1; 2010, ch. 22, § 1; 2013, ch. 119, § 1.

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, substituted “a court order issued pursuant to this act” for “court order” in (b).

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, inserted “In accordance with procedures specified in W.S. 7-1-108(c) and (d)” in the introductory language of (a).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (c).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Timely notification by another officer negated defendant's argument against admissibility of statement. —

Defendant's argument that failure to furnish notification required by subsection (b) would make her statement to police inadmissible was not addressed by court where timely notification was given to mother by another officer of the law enforcement agency which took defendant into custody. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984).

Cited in

M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1992).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Authority of court to order juvenile delinquent incarcerated in adult penal institution, 95 ALR3d 568.

Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile, 5 ALR4th 1211.

When, under terms of Federal Youth Corrections Act (18 USC § 5005 et seq. [repealed]), must prisoner serving youth corrections sentence be segregated from adult prison population, 59 ALR Fed 746.

§ 14-6-207. Detention or shelter care; delivery of child pending hearing; placing children; separate detention; notice if no court order.

1. If detention or shelter care of a child appears necessary to the person taking custody of the child, the child shall be delivered as soon as possible to the court or to the detention or shelter care facility designated by the court pending a hearing.
2. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
3. A child alleged to be delinquent shall if necessary, be detained in a separate detention home or facility for delinquent children.
   1. and (ii) Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
4. The person in charge of any detention or shelter care facility shall promptly notify the court and the district attorney of any child being detained or cared for at the facility without a court order and shall deliver the child to the court upon request.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.8; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-108 ; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1990, ch. 99, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1993, ch. 210, § 2; 1997, ch. 199, §§ 2, 3.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Authority of court to order juvenile delinquent incarcerated in adult penal institution, 95 ALR3d 568.

Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile, 5 ALR4th 1211.

When, under terms of Federal Youth Corrections Act (18 USC § 5005 et seq. [repealed]), must prisoner serving youth corrections sentence be segregated from adult prison population, 59 ALR Fed 746.

§ 14-6-208. Notice of detention to be given district attorney; written statement required; duty of district attorney.

1. When a child is taken into custody without a court order and is placed in detention or shelter care, the person taking custody of the child shall notify the district attorney without delay. Also the person shall as soon as possible file a brief written statement with the district attorney setting forth the facts which led to taking the child into custody and the reason why the child was not released.
2. Upon receiving notice that a child is being held in detention or shelter care, the district attorney shall immediately review the need for detention or shelter care and may order the child released unless he determines detention or shelter care is necessary under the provisions of W.S. 14-6-206(a) or unless ordered by the court.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.9; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-109; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1.

Cited in

NJC v. State, 913 P.2d 435, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1996).

§ 14-6-209. Taking of child into custody; informal hearing where no court order; conditional release; evidence; rehearing.

1. When a child is placed in detention or shelter care without a court order, a petition as provided in W.S. 14-6-212 shall be promptly filed and presented to the court. An informal detention or shelter care hearing shall be held as soon as reasonably possible not later than forty-eight (48) hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays, after the child is taken into custody to determine if further detention or shelter care is required pending further court action. The child shall be interviewed by the department or its designee prior to the detention or shelter care hearing, but in no event later than twenty-four (24) hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays, after the child is taken into custody. The department or its designee shall submit a written report of the interview to the court, including an assessment of the immediate needs of the child and a recommendation for the most appropriate placement for the child pending disposition of the violation. Written notice stating the time, place and purpose of the hearing shall be given to the child and to his parents, guardian or custodian.
2. At the commencement of the hearing the judge shall advise the child and his parents, guardian or custodian of:
   1. The contents of the petition and the nature of the charges or allegations contained therein;
   2. Their right to counsel as provided in W.S. 14-6-222 ;
   3. The child’s right to remain silent with respect to any allegations of a delinquent act;
   4. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to present witnesses and evidence in their own behalf and the right to issuance of process by the court to compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence;
   5. The right to a jury trial as provided in W.S. 14-6-223 ;
   6. The right to appeal as provided in W.S. 14-6-233 ; and
   7. All other rights afforded a criminal defendant.
3. The child shall be given an opportunity to admit or deny the allegations in the petition. If the allegations are admitted, the court shall make the appropriate adjudication and may proceed immediately to a disposition of the case, provided the court has the predisposition report and multidisciplinary team recommendations, in accordance with the provisions of W.S. 14-6-229 , except that a commissioner acting in the absence or incapacity of the judge may take testimony to establish a factual basis and accept an admission and perform all other requirements of the initial hearing but shall not proceed to disposition. If denied, the court shall set a time not to exceed sixty (60) days for an adjudicatory hearing or a transfer hearing, unless the court finds good cause to delay or postpone the hearing. In no case shall the court hold the adjudicatory hearing more than ninety (90) days after the date the petition is filed.
4. Regardless of whether the allegations in the petition are admitted or denied, the court shall determine whether or not the child’s full-time detention or shelter care is required pending further proceedings. If the court finds that returning the child to the home is contrary to the welfare of the child, the court shall enter the finding on the record and order the child placed in the legal custody of the department. The court shall explain the terms of the court order to the child, his parents or legal guardian and any other person the court deems necessary. If the court finds that full-time detention or shelter care is not required, the court shall order the child released and may impose one (1) or more of the following conditions:
   1. Place the child in the custody and supervision of his parents, guardian or custodian, under the protective supervision of the department or a county or state probation officer or under the supervision of any individual or organization approved by the court that agrees to supervise the child;
   2. Place restrictions on the child’s travel, associates, activities or place of abode during the period of his release, including a requirement that the child return to the physical custody of his parents, guardian or custodian at specified hours; or
   3. Impose any other terms and conditions of release deemed reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the child at subsequent proceedings.
5. All relevant and material evidence helpful in determining the need for detention or shelter care may be admitted by the court even though not competent in an adjudicatory hearing on the allegations of the petition.
6. If a child is not released after a detention or shelter care hearing and it appears by sworn statement of the parents, guardian or custodian that they did not receive notice and did not waive notice and appearance at the hearing, the court shall rehear the matter without delay.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 10; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.10; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-110; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1997, ch. 199, § 2; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2008, ch. 18, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a), substituted “forty-eight (48) hours” for “seventy-two (72) hours,” and inserted “excluding weekends and legal holidays” preceding “after the child is taken into custody”; in (b)(iv), inserted “and evidence” following “witnesses or to present witnesses,” and “and the right to issuance of process by the court to compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence” at the end; rewrote (c), adding the proviso and exception in the second sentence, the limitation in the third sentence, and adding the fourth sentence; in (d) inserted the second sentence, and in (d)(i) inserted “protective” preceding “supervision of the department.”

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, inserted the present third and fourth sentences in (a); inserted the present third sentence in the introductory language in (d).

Jurisdiction retained beyond 60 days. —

The court was not in error for refusing to grant a parent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction even though the petition for juvenile abuse/neglect was not adjudicated within 60 days. This section and § 14-6-226 only require that the court shall set a time for a hearing within 60 days. In In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Remedy for failure to set hearing. —

The proper remedy for a failure to set an adjudicatory hearing within the time constraints of this section and § 14-6-226 is a motion to the juvenile court for a prompt hearing brought by the minor through the guardian ad litem, or brought by the parents, guardians or custodian named in the petition as parties to the proceeding; if such a motion is not acted upon in a timely fashion, then a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be filed in the supreme court seeking release of the minor. In In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Court need not accept admission at hearing. —

Subsection (c) of this section and § 14-6-226 (a) through (c) do not require the juvenile court to accept an admission at the initial hearing or the detention hearing. Nor do they prohibit the juvenile court from continuing those hearings while it conducts a transfer hearing. McAdams v. State, 907 P.2d 1302, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 220 (Wyo. 1995) (decided prior to 1995 amendments of § 14-6-226 ).

Findings of court. —

Without a request for findings under Rule 52, W.R.C.P., the supreme court considers that the general findings by the juvenile court carries with it every finding of fact which is supported by the record. In In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Commissioner's order not entitled to res judicata. —

An order by a district court commissioner, made following a shelter care hearing conducted after the filing of a petition in juvenile court alleging neglect of a child, was not a final disposition of the issues and entitled to recognition under the doctrine of res judicata. In In Interest of AB, 839 P.2d 386, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1992).

Applied in

State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1981).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Applicability of rules of evidence to juvenile transfer, waiver, or certification hearings, 37 ALR5th 703.

§ 14-6-210. Hearing conducted by commissioner; authority and duty; review by court.

1. In the absence or incapacity of the judge, the detention or shelter care hearing may be conducted by a district court commissioner of the county in which the child is being detained or held in shelter care.
2. The commissioner may make any order concerning the child’s release, continued detention or shelter care as authorized to the judge under W.S. 14-6-209 . If the child is not released after the hearing, the commissioner shall promptly file with the court a complete written resume of the evidence adduced at the hearing and his reasons for not releasing the child. The commissioner shall conduct the hearing pursuant to W.S. 14-6-209 except that, if a child who has been advised of his rights wishes to admit the allegations, the commissioner may take testimony to establish a factual basis and accept the admission and perform all other requirements of the initial hearing but shall not proceed to disposition. The hearing shall be conducted in the presence of counsel and guardian ad litem, if so appointed. The commissioner may also appoint counsel, appoint a guardian ad litem, order a predisposition report, appoint a multidisciplinary team, issue subpoenas or search warrants, order physical or medical examinations and authorize emergency medical, surgical or dental treatment all as provided in this act. The commissioner shall not make final orders of adjudication or disposition.
3. The court shall review the reports, orders and actions of the commissioner as soon as reasonably possible and confirm or modify the commissioner’s orders and actions as it deems appropriate.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 11; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.11; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-111; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1993, ch. 210, § 2; 2004, ch. 127, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (b), inserted the third and fourth sentences, inserted “appoint counsel, appoint a guardian ad litem, order a predisposition report, appoint a multidisciplinary team” in the fourth sentence, and substituted “this act” for “W.S. 14-6-217 through 14-6-220 .”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Commissioner's order not entitled to res judicata. —

An order by a district court commissioner, made following a shelter care hearing conducted after the filing of a petition in juvenile court alleging neglect of a child, was not a final disposition of the issues and entitled to recognition under the doctrine of res judicata. In In Interest of AB, 839 P.2d 386, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1992).

§ 14-6-211. Complaints alleging delinquency; investigation and determination by district attorney.

1. Complaints alleging a child is delinquent shall be referred to the office of the district attorney. The district attorney shall determine whether the best interest of the child or of the public require that judicial action be taken. The department, the county sheriff and the county probation departments shall provide the district attorney with any assistance he may require in making an investigation. The district attorney shall prepare and file a petition with the court if he believes action is necessary to protect the interest of the public or child.
2. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 12; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.12; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-112; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1995, ch. 177, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, §§ 2, 3.

Cross references. —

As to duties of county attorney generally, see § 18-3-302 .

Quoted in

State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1981).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile, 5 ALR4th 1211.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 ALR4th 1135.

§ 14-6-212. Commencement of proceedings; contents of petition.

1. Proceedings in juvenile court are commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the court. The petition and all subsequent pleadings, motions, orders and decrees shall be entitled “State of Wyoming, In the Interest of  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , minor.” A petition shall be signed by the district attorney on information and belief of the alleged facts. All petitions must be verified.
2. The petition shall set forth all jurisdictional facts, including but not limited to:
   1. The child’s name, date of birth and address;
   2. The names and addresses of the child’s parents, guardian or custodian and spouse, if any;
   3. Whether the child is being held in detention or shelter care and if so, the name and address of the facility and the time detention or shelter care commenced; and
   4. A statement setting forth with particularity the facts which bring the child within the provisions of W.S. 14-6-203 . If the basis of the petition is an alleged delinquent act based upon a violation of the laws of the state or a political subdivision, the petition shall cite the alleged law violated.
3. The petition shall state if any of the facts enumerated in subsection (b) of this section are unknown.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.13; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-113; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1987, ch. 221, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2009, ch. 70, § 2, effective July 1, 2009, provides that: “The provisions of W.S. 14-3-427(e) and (f), 14-3-429(d), 14-6-227(e) and (f) and 14-6-427(e) and (f) as amended by section 1 of this act, shall apply to child protection cases in which a petition was filed under W.S. 14-3-412 , 14-6-212 or 14-6-412 on or after July 1, 2009.”

Minor's due process rights violated. —

Trial court violated minor's due process rights when it found her in contempt of court and placed her in a school for girls without notifying her that she could be declared to be a delinquent child and placed in the girls' school if she violated the juvenile court's order and the court failed to file a petition in the juvenile court stating the jurisdictional facts as required by § 14-6-212 .TLL v. State (In the Interest of TLL), 899 P.2d 44, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1995).

Quoted in

State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1981).

Cited in

In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993); Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1995).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Imprisonment of Juvenile Offenders,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1982).

§ 14-6-213. Order to appear; contents thereof; when child taken into immediate custody; waiver of service.

1. After a petition is filed, the court shall issue an order to appear. The order shall:
   1. State the name of the court, the title of the proceedings and the time and place for the initial hearing;
   2. Direct the persons named therein to appear personally at the hearing and direct the person having actual physical custody or control of the child to present the child before the court at the hearing;
   3. Be directed to the child’s parents, guardian, custodian and spouse, if any, and to any other person the court deems necessary; and
   4. Be directed to the child alleged to be delinquent.
2. If it appears to the court by affidavit by the district attorney based on actual knowledge or on information and belief that the conduct, condition or surroundings of the child seriously endanger the child’s health or welfare or the health, welfare or property of others, that the child may abscond or be removed from the jurisdiction of the court or that the child will not be brought before the court notwithstanding service of the order, the court may direct in the order to appear that the person serving the order take the child into immediate custody and bring him before the court.
3. Service of the order may be waived either in writing or by voluntary appearance at the hearing, provided a child may waive service of the order only with the consent of his parents, guardian, custodian, guardian ad litem or counsel.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 14; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.14; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-114; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 2.

Cited in

KT v. State, 902 P.2d 1288, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 14-6-214. Service of process; order of custody or detention.

1. In proceedings under this act, service of order to appear or other process within the state shall be made by the sheriff of the county where service is made, by his undersheriff or deputy or by any law enforcement officer or responsible adult not a party to the proceeding and appointed by the clerk.
2. Within the state, service of order to appear is made by personally delivering a copy of the order together with a copy of the petition to the person ordered to appear, provided that parents of a child may both be served by personally delivering to either parent two (2) copies of the order and petition, one (1) copy for each parent. A child under the age of fourteen (14) years is served by delivering a copy of the order together with a copy of the petition to the child’s parents, guardian, custodian or other adult having the actual physical custody and control of the child or to a guardian ad litem or attorney appointed for the child.
3. If it appears to the court by affidavit that the parents, guardian or custodian of the child cannot be found within the state, the court may order personal service outside the state or service by certified mail with return receipt requested signed by addressee only. If the address of the child’s parents, guardian or custodian is unknown and cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child and to receive service of process.
4. Service by certified mail is complete on the date the clerk receives the return receipt signed by addressee. Personal service either within or outside the state is complete on the date when copies of the order to appear and petition are delivered to the person to be served.
5. When personal service of order to appear is made within the state, service shall be completed not less than two (2) days before the hearing and when made outside the state, service shall be completed not less than five (5) days before the hearing. However, notwithstanding any provision within this act, the court may order that a child be taken into custody as provided in W.S. 14-6-213 or that a child be held in detention or shelter care pending further proceedings as provided in W.S. 14-6-209 , even though service of order to appear on the parents, guardian or custodian of the child is not complete at the time of making the order.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 15; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.15; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-115; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 2004, ch. 127, § 2.

Cross references. —

For service of process, see Rule 4, W.R.C.P.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, twice in (e), substituted “shall be completed” for “must be completed.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Law reviews. —

For article “Observations and Suggestions Concerning Wyoming Statutes Relating to Adoption Based on Abandonment,” see VIII Wyo. L.J. 218 (1954).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Service of process in juvenile court proceedings, 90 ALR2d 293.

§ 14-6-215. Presence of parent, custodian or guardian at hearing; failure to appear; avoidance of service; issuance of bench warrant.

1. The court shall insure the presence at any hearing of the parents, guardian or custodian of any child subject to the proceedings under this act.
2. Any person served with an order to appear as provided in W.S. 14-6-214 and without reasonable cause fails to appear, is liable for contempt of court and the court may issue a bench warrant to cause the person to be brought before the court.
3. If the child, his parents, guardian or custodian or any other person willfully avoids or refuses service of order to appear, or it appears to the court that service of the order will be ineffectual or that the welfare of the child requires that he be brought immediately into the custody of the court, a bench warrant may be issued by the court for the child or his parents, guardian, custodian or any person having the actual physical custody or control of the child.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 16; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.16; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-116; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to presence of a parent, custodian, or guardian at a proceeding in juvenile court, see § 14-2-205 .

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

§ 14-6-216. Appointment of guardian ad litem.

The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a party to proceedings under this act if the child has no parent, guardian or custodian appearing in his behalf or if the interests of the parents, guardian or custodian are adverse to the best interest of the child. A party to the proceeding or employee or representative thereof shall not be appointed guardian ad litem for the child.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 17; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.17; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-117; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to appointment of guardian ad litem, see Rule 17(c), W.R.C.P.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

County responsible for payment of guardian ad litem fees. —

A guardian ad litem, appointed pursuant to this section because the interests of the juvenile party's mother were adverse to the interests of the juvenile party, should have been paid by the county for service as a guardian ad litem, and not by the public defender; public defender is responsible for payment of guardian ad litem fees only when one is appointed to provide additional representation on the delinquency allegation pursuant to § 7-6-109 .Munker v. Juvenile Court, Seventh Judicial Dist., 837 P.2d 676, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1992).

Remedy for failure to set hearing. —

The proper remedy for a failure to set an adjudicatory hearing within the time constraints of §§ 14-6-209 and 14-6-226 is a motion to the juvenile court for a prompt hearing brought by the minor through the guardian ad litem, or brought by the parents, guardians or custodian named in the petition as parties to the proceeding; if such a motion is not acted upon in a timely fashion, then a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be filed in the supreme court seeking release of the minor. In In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Stated in

Ct v. State, 2006 WY 101, 140 P.3d 643, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (2006).

§ 14-6-217. Subpoenas for witnesses and evidence.

Upon application of any party to the proceeding, the clerk shall issue and the court on its own motion may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of records, documents or other tangible evidence at any hearing.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 18; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.18; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-118; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to subpoenas generally, see Rule 17, W.R. Cr. P.

§ 14-6-218. Search warrant; when authorized; affidavit required; contents of affidavit and warrant; service and return.

1. The court or a commissioner may issue a search warrant within the court’s jurisdiction if it appears by application supported by affidavit of one (1) or more adults that there is probable cause to believe a child has committed a delinquent act and the child is in hiding to avoid service of process or being taken into custody, or it appears by application supported by affidavit of one (1) or more adults that there is probable cause to believe a child has committed a delinquent act.
2. The affidavit shall be in writing, signed and affirmed by the affiant. The affidavit shall set forth:
   1. The name and age of the child sought, provided that if the name or age of the child is unknown the affidavit shall set forth a description of the child sufficient to identify him with reasonable certainty and a statement that the affiant believes the child is of age to come within the provisions of this act; and
   2. The affiant’s belief that the child sought has committed a delinquent act and is in hiding to avoid service of process or being taken into custody, and a statement of the facts upon which the belief is based.
   3. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
3. The warrant may be directed to any law enforcement officer of the county or municipality in which the place or premises to be searched is located. The warrant shall:
   1. Name or describe the child sought;
   2. Name the address or location and describe the place or premises to be searched;
   3. State the grounds for issuance of the warrant;
   4. Name the person or persons whose affidavit has been taken in support of the warrant; and
   5. Authorize the officer to whom the warrant is directed to conduct the search and instruct him as to the disposition of the child if found, pending further proceedings by the court.
4. The officer making the search may enter the place or premises described in the warrant at any time with force if necessary, in order to remove the child or to obtain evidence that a delinquent act has been committed. The officer conducting the search shall serve a copy of the warrant upon the person in possession of the place or premises searched and shall return the original warrant to the court showing his actions in the premises.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 19; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.19; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-119; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, §§ 2, 3; 2004, ch. 127, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to search and seizure generally, see Rule 41, W.R. Cr. P.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a), inserted “or it appears by application supported by affidavit of one (1) or more adults that there is probable cause to believe a child has committed a delinquent act”; and in (b), twice substituted “affidavit shall” for “affidavit must.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

§ 14-6-219. Physical and mental examinations; involuntary commitment of incompetents; subsequent proceedings.

1. Any time after the filing of a petition, on motion of the district attorney or the child’s parents, guardian, custodian or attorney or on motion of the court, the court may order the child to be examined by a licensed and qualified physician, surgeon, psychiatrist or psychologist designated by the court to aid in determining the physical and mental condition of the child. The examination shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, but the court may commit the child to a suitable medical facility or institution for examination if deemed necessary. Commitment for examination shall not exceed fifteen (15) days. Any time after the filing of a petition, the court on its own motion or motion of the district attorney or the child’s parents, guardian, custodian or attorney, may order the child’s parents, guardians or other custodial members of the child’s family to undergo a substance abuse assessment at the expense of the child’s parents, guardians or other custodial members of the child’s family and to fully comply with all findings and recommendations set forth in the assessment. Failure to comply may result in contempt proceedings as set forth in W.S. 14-6-242 .
2. If a child has been committed to a medical facility or institution for mental examination prior to adjudication of the petition and if it appears to the court from the mental examination that the child is competent to participate in further proceedings and is not suffering from mental illness or intellectual disability to a degree rendering the child subject to involuntary commitment to the Wyoming state hospital or the Wyoming life resource center, the court shall order the child returned to the court without delay.
3. If it appears to the court by mental examination conducted before adjudication of the petition that a child alleged to be delinquent is incompetent to participate in further proceedings by reason of mental illness or intellectual disability to a degree rendering the child subject to involuntary commitment to the Wyoming state hospital or the Wyoming life resource center, the court shall hold further proceedings under this act in abeyance. The district attorney shall then commence proceedings in the district court for commitment of the child to the appropriate institution as provided by law.
4. The juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction of the child on the petition pending final determination of the commitment proceedings in the district court. If proceedings in the district court commit the child to the Wyoming state hospital, the Wyoming life resource center or any other facility or institution for treatment and care of people with a mental illness or an intellectual disability, the petition shall be dismissed and further proceedings under this act terminate. If proceedings in the district court determine the child does not have a mental illness or an intellectual disability to a degree rendering him subject to involuntary commitment, the court shall proceed to a final adjudication of the petition and disposition of the child under the provisions of this act.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 20; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.20; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-120; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1990, ch. 24, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 81, § 2; 2008, ch. 70, § 1; ch. 85, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to Wyoming state hospital and Wyoming state training school, see §§ 25-1-201 and 25-5-103 , respectively.

As to hospitalization of mentally ill persons generally, see chapter 10 of title 25.

The 2008 amendments.—

The first 2008 amendment, by ch. 70, § 1, substituted “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” in (b) and (c); and in (d), substituted “people with a mental illness or an intellectual disability” for “the mentally ill or the mentally retarded” in the second sentence, and substituted “does not have a mental illness or intellectual disability” for “is not mentally ill or mentally retarded” in the third sentence.

Laws 2008, ch. 70, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 7, 2008.

The second 2008 amendment, by ch. 85, § 1, effective July 1, 2008, substituted references to intellectual disability for references to mental retardation and made other related changes in (d); and substituted “life resource center” for “state training school” in (b), (c) and (d).

This section is set out as reconciled by the Wyoming legislative service office.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Standards for juvenile proceedings.

Finding that petitioner, a juvenile, was competent to proceeding to adjudication in a delinquency proceeding was improper because, although the juvenile court ordered a competency evaluation and ruled that petitioner was competent to proceed, it did not evaluate him under the correct standards set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-302 and 7-11-303 . The psychologist offered the opinion that he appeared to be less familiar with general legal terms and concepts than the average adult defendant, but because he was 12 at the time, the juvenile should not have been compared to the average adult defendant, but to an average child of the same age. SWM v. State, 2013 WY 49, 299 P.3d 673, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2013).

Quoted in

In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993); AMB v. State, 892 P.2d 799, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 14-6-220. Emergency medical, surgical or dental examination or treatment.

The court may authorize and consent to emergency medical, surgical or dental examination or treatment of a child taken into custody under the provisions of this act either before or after the filing of a petition, if in the opinion of a licensed and qualified physician or surgeon the child is suffering from a serious physical condition or illness which requires prompt treatment or prompt examination is necessary to preserve evidence of a criminal offense.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 21; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.21; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-121; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

§ 14-6-221. Reports of medical or mental examinations; use of results; copies.

The results of any medical or mental examination authorized or ordered by the court shall be reported to the court in writing and signed by the person making the examination. The results may not be considered by the court prior to adjudication but may be considered only in making a disposition under this act or W.S. 14-6-219 . Copies of the examination reports shall be made available to the child’s parents, guardian, custodian or attorney upon request.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 22; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.22; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-122; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

§ 14-6-222. Advising of right to counsel required; appointment of counsel; verification of financial condition.

1. At their first appearance before the court the child and his parents, guardian or custodian shall be advised by the court of their right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings including appeal, and to employ counsel of their own choice.
2. The court shall upon request appoint counsel who may be the guardian ad litem to represent the child if the child, his parents, guardian, custodian or other person responsible for the child’s support are unable to obtain counsel. If appointment of counsel is requested, the court shall require the child and his parents, guardian, custodian or other person legally responsible for the child’s support to verify their financial condition under oath, either by written affidavit signed and sworn to by the parties or by sworn testimony made a part of the record of the proceedings. The affidavit or sworn testimony shall state they are without sufficient money, property, assets or credit to employ counsel in their own behalf. The court may require further verification of financial condition if it deems necessary. If the child requests counsel and his parents, guardian, custodian or other person responsible for the child’s support is able but unwilling to obtain counsel for the child, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the child and may direct reimbursement of counsel fees under W.S. 14-6-235(c).
3. The court may appoint counsel for any party when necessary in the interest of justice.
4. Counsel representing a child alleged to be delinquent under this act shall consider among other things what is in the best interest of the child.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 23; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.23; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-123; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, § 1; 1995, ch. 154, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to right to assigned counsel and assignment procedure generally, see Rule 44, W.R. Cr. P.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Counsel must be effective. —

The fact that counsel was assigned does not satisfy the constitutional requirement; effective assistance must be provided by counsel in the preparation of the case for trial. The standard for review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel demands that the juvenile demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the juvenile was prejudiced as a result of that deficient performance. LDO v. State, 858 P.2d 553, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

KT v. State, 902 P.2d 1288, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1995); Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1995); SWM v. State, 2013 WY 49, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Apr 25, 2013); Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, 401 P.3d 834, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Child Protection: A Suggested Role for Members of the Wyoming State Bar,” see IX Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1974).

For article, “Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, but is it a Formula for Malpractice?,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1999).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Duty to advise of right to assistance of counsel, 3 ALR2d 1003.

Right to and appointment of counsel in juvenile court proceedings, 60 ALR2d 691, 25 ALR4th 1072.

§ 14-6-223. Privilege against self-incrimination; rights of parties generally; demand for and conduct of jury trial.

1. A child alleged to be delinquent may remain silent and need not be a witness against or otherwise incriminate himself, whether before the court voluntarily, by subpoena or otherwise.
2. A party to any proceeding under this act is entitled to:
   1. A copy of all charges made against him;
   2. Confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
   3. Introduce evidence, present witnesses and otherwise be heard in his own behalf; and
   4. Issue of process by the court to compel the appearance of witnesses or the production of evidence.
3. A party against whom a petition has been filed or the district attorney may demand a trial by jury at an adjudicatory hearing. The jury shall be composed of jurors selected, qualified and compensated as provided by law for the trial of civil matters in the district court. The jury may also be selected from the prospective jurors on the base jury list residing within five (5) miles of the city or town where the trial is to be held, whichever the court directs. Demand for a jury trial must be made to the court not later than ten (10) days after the party making the demand is advised of his right to a jury trial. No deposit for jury fees is required. Failure of a party to demand a jury is a waiver of this right.

History: Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 24; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.24; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-124; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch 22, § 1; 2014, ch. 53, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to trial by jury generally, see chapter 11 of title 1.

As to examination of jurors, and alternate jurors, see Rule 47, W.R.C.P.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

The 2014 amendment, in (c), substituted “may also be selected from the prospective jurors on the base jury list” for “may be drawn from the jury panel of the district court or a special jury panel may be drawn from ‘jury box number three (3)’ containing the names of persons” in the third sentence.

Cited in

Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017); Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, 401 P.3d 834, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2017).

Applied in

KAA v. State, 2001 WY 24, 18 P.3d 1159, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Imprisonment of Juvenile Offenders,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Admissions or confessions; self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 43 ALR2d 1128.

Cross-examination of witnesses in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 43 ALR2d 1128.

Privileged communications in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 43 ALR2d 1128.

Right to jury trial in juvenile court delinquency proceedings, 100 ALR2d 1241.

Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 ALR4th 234.

§ 14-6-224. Conduct of hearings generally; exclusion of general public and child; exceptions; consolidations permitted.

1. Unless a jury trial is demanded, hearings under this act shall be conducted by the court without a jury in an informal but orderly manner and separate from other proceedings not included in W.S. 14-6-203 . The district attorney shall present evidence in support of the petition and otherwise represent the state. If the allegations in the petition are denied, adjudicatory and disposition hearings shall be recorded by the court reporter or by electronic, mechanical or other appropriate means.
2. Except in hearings to declare a person in contempt of court, the general public are excluded from hearings under this act. Only the parties, counsel for the parties, jurors, witnesses, victims and members of their immediate families and other persons the court finds having a proper interest in the proceedings or in the work of the court shall be admitted. If the court finds it necessary in the best interest of the child, the child may be temporarily excluded from any hearing except while evidence is being received at an adjudicatory hearing in support of the allegations of his delinquency.
3. Hearings on two (2) or more petitions may be consolidated for purposes of adjudication when the allegations in the petitions pertain to the same act or offense constituting the alleged delinquency. Separate hearings on the petitions may be held thereafter for purposes of disposition.
4. Repealed by Laws 2004, ch. 127, § 3.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 25; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.25; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-125; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1995, ch. 154, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 2; 2004, ch. 127, § 3.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, repealed former (d), pertaining to continuances and deferrals.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Statutes preserve court's discretion to delay hearing. —

Under subsection (a) of this section and § 14-6-226(b), a juvenile court may either proceed immediately or hold a hearing within 60 days, but the statutes also preserve the discretion of the court to do neither if the best interests of the child are served, at least until objection to the delayed hearing is asserted by a litigant. In In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1990).

Applied in

McAdams v. State, 907 P.2d 1302, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 220 (Wyo. 1995).

Quoted in

In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1995); LeBlanc v. State (In re ARLeB), 2017 WY 107, 401 P.3d 932, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Imprisonment of Juvenile Offenders,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1982).

For comment, “Prosecution as a Juvenile or an Adult? Is the Discretion Vested in the District Attorney by Section 14-6-203(c) of the Wyoming Statutes Unconstitutional and Violative of the Proper Role of a Prosecutor?” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1984).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 ALR4th 234.

§ 14-6-225. Burden of proof required; verdict of jury; effect thereof.

1. Allegations that a child has committed a delinquent act must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. If trial by jury is demanded, the jury shall decide issues of fact raised by the petition and return its verdict as to the truth of the allegations contained in the petition. A finding by the jury that the allegations are true is not deemed a conviction of guilt, but is a determination that judicial intervention is necessary for the best interest and welfare of the child and the public.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 26; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.26; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-126; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 2.

State's burden of proof in adjudication of child neglect is by preponderance of the evidence. MP v. State ex rel. CP, 965 P.2d 1155, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1998).

Evidence supported finding of neglect, where the mother left her children with another family which fed and clothed the children without reimbursement and paid for medication used to treat an ear infection developed by one of the children. In In Interest of N.M., 794 P.2d 564, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 1990).

Applied in

CH v. Campbell County D-PASS, 699 P.2d 830, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 484 (Wyo. 1985).

Stated in

In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1981); In Interest of AB, 839 P.2d 386, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1992); SWM v. State, 2013 WY 49, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Apr 25, 2013); Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

Applied in

K.C. v. State, 2011 WY 108, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Jul 12, 2011).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Degree of proof in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 43 ALR2d 1128.

Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile, 5 ALR4th 1211.

§ 14-6-226. Initial appearance; adjudicatory or transfer hearing; entry of decree and disposition; evidentiary matters; continuance of disposition hearing.

1. At their initial hearing, which may be held after a detention or shelter care hearing or a transfer hearing, the child and his parents, guardian or custodian shall be advised by the court of their rights under law and as provided in this act. They shall also be advised of the specific allegations in the petition and given an opportunity to admit or deny them, unless motion is made to the court to transfer the allegations of delinquency against the minor to another court. They shall also be advised of the possible liability for costs of treatment or services pursuant to this act or W.S. 25-11-101 through 25-11-108 . It is not necessary at the initial appearance for the district attorney to establish probable cause to believe the allegations in the petition are true. When a detention or shelter care hearing is held in accordance with W.S. 14-6-209 , a separate initial hearing is not required if the child and his parents, guardian or custodian were present at the detention or shelter care hearing and advised by the court as provided in this subsection.
2. If the allegations of the petition are denied, the court may, with consent of the parties, proceed immediately to hear evidence on the petition or it may set a later time not to exceed sixty (60) days for an adjudicatory or a transfer hearing, unless the court finds good cause to delay or postpone the hearing. In no case shall the court hold the adjudicatory hearing more than ninety (90) days after the date the petition is filed. Only competent, relevant and material evidence shall be admissible at an adjudicatory hearing to determine the truth of the allegations in the petition. If after an adjudicatory hearing the court finds that the allegations in the petition are not established as required by this act, it shall dismiss the petition and order the child released from any detention or shelter care.
3. If after an adjudicatory hearing or a valid admission or confession the court or jury finds that a child committed the acts alleging him delinquent, it shall enter a decree to that effect stating the jurisdictional facts upon which the decree is based. It may then proceed immediately or at a postponed hearing within sixty (60) days to make proper disposition of the child, unless the court finds good cause to delay or postpone the hearing.
4. In detention or shelter care hearings, disposition hearings or transfer hearings, all material and relevant evidence helpful in determining questions may be received by the court and relied upon for probative value. The parties or their counsel may examine and controvert written reports received as evidence and cross-examine persons making the reports.
5. On motion of any party or on its own motion, the court may continue a disposition hearing for a reasonable time not to exceed sixty (60) days to receive reports and other evidence bearing on the disposition to be made. The court shall make an appropriate order for detention or shelter care of the child or for his release from detention or shelter care subject to any terms and conditions the court deems necessary during the period of continuance.
6. At any time prior to disposition under W.S. 14-6-229 , the court, on motion of any party or on its own motion, may reconsider its order regarding detention, shelter care or conditions of release made under W.S. 14-6-209(d) or 14-6-214(e).
7. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 27; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.27; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-127; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, § 1; 1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1995, ch. 154, § 1; ch. 177, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, §§ 2, 3; 2004, ch. 127, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (b) and (c), added “unless the court finds good cause to delay or postpone the hearing” at the end of the first and second sentences, respectively, and also in (b) added the second sentence.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Statutes preserve court's discretion to delay hearing. —

Under subsection (b) of this section and § 14-6-224(a), a juvenile court may either proceed immediately or hold a hearing within 60 days, but the statutes also preserve the discretion of the court to do neither if the best interests of the child are served, at least until objection to the delayed hearing is asserted by a litigant. In In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1990).

Jurisdiction retained beyond 60 days. —

The court was not in error for refusing to grant a parent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction even though the petition for juvenile abuse/neglect was not adjudicated within 60 days. This section and § 14-6-209 only require that the court shall set a time for a hearing within 60 days. In In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Post-custody evidence admissible. —

The court was not in error in allowing into evidence at an adjudicatory hearing, under this section, evidence that occurred after the state's taking of the child. In In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

When express finding of neglect unnecessary. —

A trial court need not make an express finding of neglect under subsection (c) where, under the circumstances, its findings are tantamount to a finding of neglect. State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1981).

No counseling for parents absent their consent. —

When a child is adjudged by the court to be delinquent and is permitted to live in the parents' home, the consent of the parents is required before the court has authority to order the parents to go to counseling or evaluation. In Interest of C. N., 816 P.2d 1282, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1991).

Remedy for failure to set hearing. —

The proper remedy for a failure to set an adjudicatory hearing within the time constraints of § 14-6-209 and this section is a motion to the juvenile court for a prompt hearing brought by the minor through the guardian ad litem, or brought by the parents, guardians or custodian named in the petition as parties to the proceeding; if such a motion is not acted upon in a timely fashion, then a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be filed in the supreme court seeking release of the minor. In In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Court need to accept admission at hearing. —

Subsections (a) through (c) of this section and § 14-6-209(c) do not require the juvenile court to accept an admission at the initial hearing or the detention hearing. Nor do they prohibit the juvenile court from continuing those hearings while it conducts a transfer hearing. McAdams v. State, 907 P.2d 1302, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 220 (Wyo. 1995) (decided prior to 1995 amendments).

Findings of court. —

Without a request for findings under Rule 52, W.R.C.P., the supreme court considers that the general findings by the juvenile court carries with it every finding of fact which is supported by the record. In In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Quoted in

In Interest of N.M., 794 P.2d 564, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 1990).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Imprisonment of Juvenile Offenders,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Applicability of rules of evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 43 ALR2d 1128.

Hearsay evidence in juvenile delinquency proceeding, 43 ALR2d 1128.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 ALR4th 1135.

§ 14-6-227. Predisposition studies and reports.

1. After a petition is filed alleging the child is delinquent, the court shall order the department to make a predisposition study and report. The court shall establish a deadline for completion of the report. While preparing the study the department shall consult with the child’s school and school district to determine the child’s educational needs. The study and report shall also cover:
   1. The social history, environment and present condition of the child and his family;
   2. The performance of the child in school, including whether the child receives special education services and how his goals and objectives might be impacted by the court’s disposition, provided the school receives authorization to share the information;
   3. The presence of child abuse and neglect or domestic violence histories, past acts of violence, learning disabilities, cognitive disabilities or physical impairments and the necessary services to accommodate the disabilities and impairments;
   4. The presence of any mental health or substance abuse risk factors, including current participation in counseling, therapy or treatment; and
   5. Other matters relevant to the child’s present status as a delinquent, including any pertinent family information, treatment of the child or proper disposition of the case, including any information required by W.S. 21-13-315(d).
2. Within ten (10) days after a petition is filed alleging a child is delinquent, the court shall appoint a multidisciplinary team. Upon motion by a party, the court may add or dismiss a member of the multidisciplinary team.
   1. through (vii) Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
3. The multidisciplinary team shall include the following:
   1. The child’s parent, parents or guardian;
   2. A representative of the school district who has direct knowledge of the child and, if the child receives special education, is a member of the child’s individualized education plan team;
   3. A representative of the department;
   4. The child’s psychiatrist, psychologist or mental health professional;
   5. The district attorney or his designee;
   6. The child’s attorney or guardian ad litem, if one is appointed by the court;
   7. The volunteer lay advocate, if one is appointed by the court; and
   8. The foster parent.
4. In addition to the persons listed in subsection (c) of this section, the court may appoint one (1) or more of the following persons to the multidisciplinary team:
   1. and (ii) Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 236, § 4.
   2. The child;
   3. A relative;
   4. If the predispositional study indicates a parent or child has special needs, an appropriate representative of the department of health’s substance abuse, mental health or developmental disabilities division who has knowledge of the services available in the state’s system of care that are pertinent to those identified needs;
   5. Other professionals or persons who have particular knowledge relating to the child or his family, or expertise in children’s services and the child’s or parent’s specific disability or special needs, including linguistic and cultural needs.
5. Before the first multidisciplinary team meeting, the department of family services shall provide each member of the multidisciplinary team with a brief summary of the case detailing the allegations in the petition that have been adjudicated, if any. The multidisciplinary team shall, as quickly as reasonably possible, review the child’s personal and family history, school, mental health and department of family services records and any other pertinent information, for the purpose of making sanction recommendations. The team shall involve the child in the development of recommendations to the extent appropriate.
6. At the first multidisciplinary team meeting, the team shall formulate reasonable and attainable recommendations for the court outlining the goals or objectives the parents should be required to meet for the child to be returned to the home or for the case to be closed, or until ordered by the court in termination proceedings. At each subsequent meeting, the multidisciplinary team shall review the progress of the parents and the child, and shall reevaluate the plan ordered by the court. For cause, which shall be set forth with specificity, the multidisciplinary team may adjust its recommendations to the court with respect to the goals or objectives in the plan to effect the return of the child to the home or to close the case, or until ordered by the court in termination proceedings. The multidisciplinary team shall formulate written recommendations consistent with the purposes of this act. After each multidisciplinary team meeting, the coordinator shall prepare for submission to each member of the team and to the court a summary of the multidisciplinary team meeting specifically describing the recommendations for the court and the goals and objectives which should be met to return the child to the home or to close the case, or until ordered by the court in termination proceedings. If the recommendations for the case plan have been changed, the summary shall include a detailed explanation of the change in the recommendations and the reasons for the change.
7. All records, reports and sanction recommendations of the multidisciplinary team are confidential except as provided by this section. Any person who willfully violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00).
8. Except for consideration at a hearing on a motion to transfer the case to another court as provided in W.S. 14-6-237 , the court shall not consider any report or recommendation under this section prior to adjudication of the allegations in the petition without the consent of the child and the child’s parents, guardian or custodian.
9. Any member of a multidisciplinary team who cannot attend team meetings in person or by telephone may submit written reports and recommendations to the other team members and to the court. Individuals who are not members of the multidisciplinary team but have knowledge pertinent to the team’s decisions may be asked to provide information to the multidisciplinary team. The individuals shall be bound by the confidentiality provisions of subsection (g) of this section.
10. The department shall develop a case plan for a juvenile when there is a recommendation to place the child outside the home.
11. If the child is placed outside the home, the multidisciplinary team shall meet quarterly to review the child’s and the family’s progress toward meeting the goals or expectations in the case plan and the multidisciplinary team shall provide a written report with recommendations to the court prior to each review hearing.
12. No later than five (5) business days prior to the dispositional hearing, the multidisciplinary team shall file with the court the multidisciplinary team report which shall include the multidisciplinary team’s recommendations and the department case plan in a standard format established by the department.
13. Five (5) business days prior to each review hearing, the multidisciplinary team shall file with the court a report updating the multidisciplinary team report, the multidisciplinary team’s recommendations and the department case plan.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 28; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.28; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-128; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, § 1; 1987, ch. 221, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1993, ch. 161, § 1; 1996, ch. 106, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, §§ 2, 3; 2005, ch. 236, §§ 2, 4; 2009, ch. 70, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section, modifying duties, changing membership of the multidisciplinary team, and adding procedural provisions.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (e), added the first sentence, and in (f), added the first through third, and fifth and sixth sentences.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Laws 2009, ch. 70, § 2, effective July 1, 2009, provides: “The provisions of W.S. 14-3-427(e) and (f), 14-3-429(d), 14-6-227(e) and (f) and 14-6-427(e) and (f) as amended by section 1 of this act, shall apply to child protection cases in which a petition was filed under W.S. 14-3-412 , 14-6-212 or 14-6-412 on or after July 1, 2009.”

Failure to follow procedure warranted reversal. —

Dispositional order entered in a juvenile case relating to felony property was reversed and remanded because a predisposition report was not completed or reviewed, as required by this section. Moreover, the trial court failed to follow the particular sanction levels, and no reasons were given in writing for the failure to do so. CT v. State (In re CT), 2006 WY 101, 140 P.3d 643, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 2006).

Cited in

BW v. State, 12 P.3d 675, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 14-6-228. Abeyance of proceedings by consent decree; term of decree; reinstatement of proceedings; effect of discharge or completing term.

1. At any time after the filing of a petition alleging a child delinquent and before adjudication, the court may issue a consent decree ordering further proceedings held in abeyance and place a delinquent child under the supervision of a probation officer. The placement of the child is subject to the terms, conditions and stipulations agreed to by the parties affected. The consent decree shall not be entered without the consent of the district attorney, the child’s attorney, where applicable, and the child and the notification of the parents. Modifications to an existing consent decree may be allowed.
2. The consent decree shall be in writing and copies given to each of the parties. The decree shall include the case plan for the child.
3. A consent decree shall be in force for the period agreed upon by the parties but not longer than one (1) year unless the child is sooner discharged by the court.
4. If prior to discharge by the court or expiration of the consent decree, a child alleged to be delinquent fails to fulfill the terms and conditions of the decree or a new petition is filed alleging the child delinquent because of misconduct occurring during the term of the consent decree, the original petition and proceedings may be reinstated upon order of the court after hearing and the matter may proceed as though the consent decree had never been entered. If, as part of the consent decree, the child made an admission to any of the allegations contained in the original petition, that admission shall be entered only if the court orders that the original petition and proceeding be reinstated and the admissions, if any, be entered. If the admission is entered, the court may proceed to disposition pursuant to W.S. 14-6-226 .
5. If a consent decree is in effect and the child is in placement, the court shall hold a six (6) month and twelve (12) month review under W.S. 14-6-229 .
6. A child discharged by the court under a consent decree without reinstatement of the original petition and proceeding shall not thereafter be proceeded against in any court for the same offense or misconduct alleged in the original petition.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 29; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.29; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-129; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, § 1; 1987, ch. 221, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1995, ch. 154, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, § 2; 2004, ch. 127, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a), inserted “the child's attorney, where applicable” and added the last sentence; added (b); redesignated the former first sentence of (b) as (c); redesignated and rewrote the former second sentence of (b) as (d); added (e); and redesignated former (c) as (f) and inserted “and proceeding.”

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 ALR4th 234.

Quoted in

Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 14-6-229. Decree where child adjudged delinquent; dispositions; terms and conditions; legal custody.

1. In determining the disposition to be made under this act in regard to any child:
   1. The court shall review the predisposition report, the recommendations, if any, of the multidisciplinary team, the case plan and other reports or evaluations ordered by the court and indicate on the record what materials were considered in reaching the disposition;
   2. If the court does not place the child in accordance with the recommendations of the predisposition report or multidisciplinary team, the court shall enter on the record specific findings of fact relied upon to support its decision to deviate from the recommended disposition;
   3. When a child is adjudged by the court to be delinquent, the court shall enter its decree to that effect and make a disposition consistent with the purposes of this act;
   4. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
   5. The court shall not order an out-of-state placement unless:
      1. Evidence has been presented to the court regarding the costs of the out-of-state placement being ordered together with evidence of the comparative costs of any suitable alternative in-state treatment program or facility, as determined by the department pursuant to W.S. 21-13-315(d)(vii), whether or not placement in the in-state program or facility is currently available;
      2. The court makes an affirmative finding on the record that no placement can be made in a Wyoming institution or in a private residential treatment facility or group home located in Wyoming that can provide adequate treatment or services for the child; and
      3. The court states on the record why no in-state placement is available.
2. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
3. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3; 1993, ch. 210, § 3; 1984, ch. 67, §§ 2, 3; 1987, ch. 217, § 2, ch. 221, § 3.
4. If the child is found to be delinquent the court may impose any sanction authorized by W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 .
   1. through (vi) Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 119, § 3.
5. In cases where a child is ordered removed from the child’s home:
   1. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
   2. If a child is committed or transferred to an agency or institution under this section:
      1. At least every three (3) months the agency or institution shall recommend to the court if the order should be continued;
      2. Not less than once every six (6) months, the court of jurisdiction shall conduct a formal review to assess and determine the appropriateness of the current placement, the reasonable efforts made to reunify the family, the safety of the child and the permanency plan for the child. During this review:
         1. The department of family services shall present to the court:
            1. If the permanency plan is classified as another planned permanent living arrangement, documentation of the ongoing and unsuccessful efforts to return the child home or place the child for adoption or with a legal guardian or a fit and willing relative for purposes of guardianship or adoption, including evidence of efforts to use social media or other search technology to find biological family members for the child;
            2. Efforts made to ensure that the child is provided, to the greatest extent possible, the opportunity to participate in age appropriate or developmentally appropriate activities and experiences as defined in W.S. 14-13-101 (a)(i) to promote healthy child and adolescent development consistent with W.S. 14-13-101 through 14-13-104 ; and
            3. If the child is placed in a qualified residential treatment program: a. Information to show that ongoing assessment of the child’s strengths and needs continues to support the determination that placement in a qualified residential treatment program provides the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child in the least restrictive environment consistent with the short-term and long-term goals of the child and the child’s permanency plan; b. The specific treatment needs that will be met for the child in the placement; c. The length of time the child is expected to remain in the placement; d. The efforts made by the department of family services to prepare the child to return home or be placed for adoption or legal guardianship.
            4. If the permanency plan is classified as another planned permanent living arrangement: a. Make a judicial determination and explain why, as of the date of the review, another planned permanent living arrangement is the best permanency plan for the child; and b. Provide reasons why it continues not to be in the best interest of the child to return home or be placed for adoption or with a legal guardian, or be placed with a fit and willing relative for purposes of guardianship or adoption.
            5. Make findings whether the child has been provided, to the greatest extent possible, the opportunity to participate in age appropriate or developmentally appropriate activities and experiences as defined in W.S. 14-13-101(a)(i) to promote healthy child and adolescent development consistent with W.S. 14-13-101 through 14-13-104 .
         2. The court shall: (1) Determine whether the permanency plan is in the best interest of the child and whether the department of family services has made reasonable efforts to finalize the plan; (2) Order the department of family services to take any additional steps necessary to effectuate the terms of the permanency plan; (3) Ask the child or, if the child is not present at the review, the child’s guardian ad litem or other legal representative about the child’s desired permanency outcome;
   3. The court shall order the parents or other legally obligated person to pay a reasonable sum for the support and treatment of the child as required by W.S. 14-6-236 , or shall state on the record the reasons why an order for support was not entered;
   4. In cases where the child is placed in custody of the department, support shall be established by the department through a separate civil action;
   5. Any order regarding potential placement at a psychiatric residential treatment facility shall not specify a particular psychiatric residential treatment facility or level of care for the placement of the child.
   6. If the child is placed in a qualified residential treatment program:
      1. Within thirty (30) days of the placement a qualified individual shall conduct an assessment to determine whether the child’s needs can be met through placement with family members or in a foster family home, or if the placement in a qualified residential treatment program provides the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child in the least restrictive environment consistent with the short-term and long-term goals of the child and the child’s permanency plan;
      2. Within sixty (60) days of the placement the court shall:
         1. Consider the assessment completed pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph;
         2. Determine whether the needs of the child can be met through placement in a foster family home or whether the placement in a qualified residential treatment program provides the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child in the least restrictive environment;
         3. Determine whether the placement is consistent with the short-term and long-term goals for the child as specified in the child’s permanency plan;
         4. Approve or disapprove the placement.
6. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 119, § 3.
7. An institution, organization or agency vested with legal custody of a child by court order shall have the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live, provided that placement of the child does not remove him from the state of Wyoming without court authorization. An individual vested with legal custody of a child by court order shall personally exercise custodial rights and responsibilities unless otherwise authorized by the court.
8. Whenever the court vests legal custody of a child in an institution, organization or agency it shall transmit with the order copies of all clinical reports, social studies and other information pertinent to the care and treatment of the child. The institution, organization or agency receiving legal custody of a child shall provide the court with any information concerning the child that the court may request.
9. In placing a child in the custody of an individual or a private agency or institution, the court shall give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child. Where a choice of equivalent services exists, the court shall, whenever practicable, select a person or an agency or institution governed by persons of the same religion as that of the parents of the child. In case of a difference in the religious faith of the parents, then the court shall select the person, agency or institution governed by persons of the religious faith of the child, or if the religious faith of the child is not ascertainable, then of the faith of either parent.
10. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
11. The clerk of the court granting probation to a youth adjudicated delinquent shall send a certified copy of the order to the department of family services if the department has been requested to provide supervision of the probationer.
12. At the time of granting probation or at any later time, the court may request the department of family services to provide supervision of the probationer. The supervising probation officer shall not be required to supervise or report on a youth granted probation unless requested to do so by the court granting probation.
13. Absent a specific provision in the placement order requiring prior court approval for any change in placement, a department of state government vested with temporary legal custody of a child by court order under this section has authority to place the child in a residential facility or other out-of-home placement of similar or less restrictive confinement provided:
    1. At least ten (10) days prior to the change in placement written notice of the proposed placement is served upon the child, the child’s parents, the child’s representative, the current placement provider and the office of the district attorney of original jurisdiction, personally or by certified mail to the recipient’s last known address; and
    2. None of the parties within ten (10) days after notice is filed with the juvenile court having jurisdiction, makes a written objection to the proposed change in placement.
14. If a placement order vesting a department of state government with temporary legal custody of a child under this section includes a provision that court approval shall be required prior to any change in placement, the department may proceed to place the child in a residential facility or other out-of-home placement of similar or less restrictive confinement, and the court shall be deemed to have approved such change in placement, if:
    1. The conditions of paragraphs (o)(i) and (ii) of this section are met; and
    2. The court on its own motion does not set the matter for hearing within fifteen (15) days after notice of the proposed change in placement is filed with the juvenile court.
15. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 119, § 3.
16. An agency of state government vested with temporary legal custody of a child under this section shall have the right to transport the child as necessary.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 30; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.30; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-130; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, §§ 1 to 3; 1987, ch 217, §§ 1, 2; ch. 221, §§ 1 to 3; 1989, ch. 40, § 1; 1990, ch. 24, § 1; ch. 99, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; ch. 196, § 1; 1993, ch. 142, § 2; ch. 161, § 1; ch. 210, § 3; 1995, ch. 154, § 1; ch. 177, § 1; ch. 202, § 2; 1996, ch. 58, § 2; ch. 106, § 1; 1997, ch. 119, §§ 2, 3; ch. 199, §§ 2, 3; 1999, ch. 8, § 1; 2004, ch. 127, § 2; 2013, ch. 164, § 1; 2016, ch. 95, § 2; 2020, ch. 2, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to establishment of youth treatment center, see § 25-1-201 .

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a)(i), substituted “review” for “place on the record,” and inserted “the case plan and other reports or evaluations ordered by the court and indicate on the record what materials were considered in reaching the disposition” at the end, and in (a)(iii) deleted “and in accord with the actual facilities presently available when the decree is entered” at the end; in (e)(ii)(B) substituted “six (6) months” for “twelve (12) months,” and deleted the final sentence pertaining to placement in a state institution, in (e)(iii) deleted “on its own motion, or on the motion of the person, agency or institution vested with custody or to whom compensation is due,” and added (e)(iv); and added (r).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (e)(v).

The 2016 amendment, in (e)(ii)(B), added “During this review” at the end of the present introductory language, and added (e)(ii)(B)(I) and (e)(ii)(B)(II).

Laws 2016, ch. 95, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8, Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 4, 2016.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, added (e)(ii)(B)(I)(3) and (e)(vi); and made related changes.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Interested relative of neglected child may become party in neglect action through a motion to grant present custody. In In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1990).

Jurisdiction exists despite erroneous placement of child. —

The trial court's erroneous application of the law relating to the placing of a child adjudged to be neglected did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, nor cause its decree to be void. In In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1989), reh'g denied, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 198 (Wyo. Aug. 25, 1989).

“Evaluation and treatment” denotes a single course of action. —

The plain language of the statute reveals that the legislature gave the district courts authority to require that a parent or a child undergo an evaluation and indicated treatment or undergo another program which was designed to rectify the problems which contributed to the adjudication. The phrase “evaluation and indicated treatment” denotes a single course of action. While an evaluation may be imperative in some cases, in other instances an evaluation may not be necessary in order for the district court to determine that a certain program may be beneficial in solving the problems which resulted in the minor's delinquent behavior. ELR v. State, 902 P.2d 696, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1995).

No counseling for parents absent their consent. —

When a child is adjudged by the court to be delinquent and is permitted to live in the parents' home, the consent of the parents is required before the court has authority to order the parents to go to counseling or evaluation. In Interest of C. N., 816 P.2d 1282, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1991).

Specific finding not required. —

Although the district court failed to specifically find that ordered parenting classes constituted a “program designed to rectify problems which contributed to the adjudication,” the statute does not require the district court to make that specific finding and therefore the district court properly ordered the defendant to attend the classes. ELR v. State, 902 P.2d 696, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1995).

Out-of-state placement. —

Juvenile court did not exceed its statutory authority when it ordered the State to pay for private out-of-state placement for juvenile adjudged delinquent because statutory requirements were substantially adhered to. In re DCP, 2001 WY 77, 30 P.3d 29, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2001).

Probation condition requiring juvenile to submit to random chemical testing for the presence of alcohol was encompassed by subsections (f)(vi) and (f)(vii) where condition was designed to avoid any future problems involving alcohol. In re Interests of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (Wyo. 1992).

Failure to follow procedure warranted reversal. —

Dispositional order entered in a juvenile case relating to felony property was reversed and remanded because a predisposition report was not completed or reviewed, as required by this section. Moreover, the trial court failed to follow the particular sanction levels, and no reasons were given in writing for the failure to do so. CT v. State (In re CT), 2006 WY 101, 140 P.3d 643, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 2006).

Revoking driving privileges. —

Court's order was within statute's authority where court used the word “revoke” as opposed to using the words “restrict or restrain”; there was no discernible difference between “revoking” and “restraining or restricting” the child's driving privileges. In re Interests of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (Wyo. 1992).

Applied in

State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1981); CH v. Campbell County D-PASS, 699 P.2d 830, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 484 (Wyo. 1985).

Quoted in

WJH v. State, 2001 WY 54, 24 P.3d 1147, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 2001).

Stated in

In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980); In re AJ, 736 P.2d 721, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 435 (Wyo. 1987).

Law reviews. —

For article “Admissibility of Violations of Law by Child as Evidence in Prosecution of Parents for Criminal Neglect,” see VII Wyo. L.J. 133 (1953).

For comment, “The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Imprisonment of Juvenile Offenders,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile, 5 ALR4th 1211.

Foster parent's right to immunity from foster child's negligence claims, 55 ALR4th 778.

Application of rule of Dorszynski v. United States requiring that sentencing court make express finding of “no benefit” from treatment under Youth Corrections Act (18 USC § 5005 et seq. [repealed]), 54 ALR Fed 382.

§ 14-6-230. Orders of protection; requirements.

1. On application of any party to the proceedings or on its own motion the court may make an order of protection in support of the decree and order of disposition, restraining or otherwise controlling the conduct of the child’s parents, guardian or custodian or any party to the proceeding whom the court finds to be encouraging, causing or contributing to the acts or conditions which bring the child within the provisions of this act.
2. The order of protection may require the person against whom it is directed to do or to refrain from doing any acts required or forbidden by law and necessary for the welfare of the child and the enforcement of the order of disposition, including the following requirements to:
   1. Perform any legal obligation of support;
   2. Not make contact with the child or his place of abode;
   3. Refrain from conduct which in any way interferes with or disrupts the control and supervision of the child by his legal custodian;
   4. Permit a parent reasonable visitation privileges under specified conditions and terms;
   5. Give proper attention to care of the home and to refrain from conduct detrimental to the child and the home environment; or
   6. Enforce the child’s compliance with the terms and conditions imposed upon him by the order of disposition.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 31; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.31; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-131; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Quoted in

KT v. State, 902 P.2d 1288, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 14-6-231. Release of child from institution; duration of orders of disposition; termination of orders.

1. A child committed to the Wyoming boys’ school, the Wyoming girls’ school or the Wyoming state hospital may be released from that institution by the agency having the direct authority and control of the institution. This release shall not affect any other terms or conditions of the court’s order. The agency shall notify the court of any planned release and shall recommend further disposition of the child. The court shall discharge the child from further court jurisdiction or shall enter any other order of disposition specified under W.S. 14-6-229 for a child found to be delinquent.
2. An order of disposition shall remain in force for an indefinite period until terminated by the court whenever it appears the purpose of the order has been achieved and it is in the child’s best interest that he be discharged from further court jurisdiction.
3. Unless sooner terminated by court order, all orders issued under this act shall terminate with respect to a child adjudicated:
   1. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.
   2. Delinquent, when he reaches twenty-one (21) years of age;
   3. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 199, § 3.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 255, § 32; W.S. 1957, § 14-115.32; W.S. 1977, § 14-8-132; Laws 1978, ch. 25, § 1; 1984, ch. 67, § 1; 1987, ch. 217, § 1; 1989, ch. 40, § 1; 1990, ch. 24, § 1; 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1996, ch. 49, § 1; 1997, ch. 199, §§ 2, 3.

Cross references. —

As to establishment of youth treatment center, see § 25-1-201 .

As to Wyoming girls' school, see chapter 4 of title 25.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 14-6-201(a)(xxvi).

Quoted in

In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1989).

Stated in

In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1990).

Cited in

McAdams v. State, 907 P.2d 1302, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 220 (Wyo. 1995).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Institutional Transfer Statute: Three Challenges to the Imprisonment of Juvenile Offenders,” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 643 (1982).