§ 20-1-101. Marriage a civil contract.

Marriage is a civil contract between a male and a female person to which the consent of the parties capable of contracting is essential.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 81, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 1541; R.S. 1899, § 2955; C.S. 1910, § 3891; C.S. 1920, § 4955; R.S. 1931, § 68-101; C.S. 1945, § 50-101; W.S. 1957, § 20-1; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-101 .

Various provisions of marriage statute constitute complete code on form and requisites of marriage, and hence there is no room for the contention that statutory provisions in contravention of common law must be strictly construed. In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1943).

Common-law marriages invalid. —

Common-law marriages entered into in Wyoming are not valid. In re Reeves' Estate, 58 Wyo. 432, 133 P.2d 503, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1943).

Neither marriage statutes nor public policy would justify supreme court in holding that common-law marriages are valid and such “marriage” does not give to an alleged common-law widow share in the deceased's estate. In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1943).

Jurisdiction over same-sex divorce action. —

District court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Wyo. Const. art. 5, §§ 1, 10 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-104 over a divorce action involving a same-sex couple legally married in Canada. Recognizing the marriage under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-111 for this limited purpose was not inconsistent with the definition of marriage in this section. Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, 253 P.3d 153, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2011).

Cited in

Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017).

Stated in

Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Mental capacity to marry, 82 ALR2d 1040.

Recognition by forum state of marriage which, although invalid where contracted, would have been valid if contracted within forum state, 82 ALR3d 1240.

Marriage between persons of same sex—United States and Canadian cases, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

§ 20-1-102. Minimum marriageable age; exception; parental consent.

1. At the time of marriage the parties shall be at least sixteen (16) years of age except as otherwise provided.
2. All marriages involving a person under sixteen (16) years of age are prohibited and voidable, unless before contracting the marriage a judge of a court of record in Wyoming approves the marriage and authorizes the county clerk to issue a license therefor.
3. When either party is a minor, no license shall be granted without the verbal consent, if present, and written consent, if absent, of the father, mother, guardian or person having the care and control of the minor. Written consent shall be proved by the testimony of at least one (1) competent witness.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 81, §§ 2, 5; R.S. 1887, §§ 1542, 1545; R.S. 1899, §§ 2956, 2959; C.S. 1910, §§ 3892, 3895; C.S. 1920, §§ 4956, 4959; R.S. 1931, §§ 68-102, 68-105; C.S. 1945, §§ 50-102, 50-105; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-2, 20-3; Laws 1975, ch. 4, § 1; ch. 61, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2.1; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-102 .

Cross references. —

As to marriage being voidable when either party is under age of consent, see § 20-2-101 .

Stated in

Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1998).

§ 20-1-103. License; required.

1. Before solemnization of any marriage in this state, a marriage license shall be obtained from a Wyoming county clerk.
2. Application for a marriage license shall be made by one (1) of the parties to the marriage before the license is issued. Upon receipt of an application, the county clerk shall ascertain by the testimony of a competent witness and the applicant, the names, the social security numbers of the parties who have valid social security numbers, residences and ages of the parties and whether there is any legal impediment to the parties entering into the marriage contract according to the laws of the state of their residence. The clerk shall enter the facts ascertained in a book kept by him for that purpose, except for the social security numbers which shall be provided to the state office of vital records and not made a part of the county public record. He may issue a license to marry and shall date the license on the date of issuance except as otherwise provided.
3. Unless there is an order to waive the requirements of this section by a judge of a court of record in the county pursuant to W.S. 20-1-105 , the clerk shall refuse to issue a license if:
   1. Either of the parties is legally incompetent to enter into a marriage contract according to the law of this state; or
   2. There is any legal impediment; or
   3. Either party is a minor and the consent of a parent or guardian has not been given.
4. A marriage license obtained from a Wyoming county clerk shall expire one (1) year from the date the license was issued if the parties have not solemnized the marriage. The expiration date shall be shown on the marriage license. Upon expiration of a marriage license, the parties shall apply for and obtain a new marriage license before solemnization of their marriage in this state.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 81, §§ 4, 6, 7; R.S. 1887, §§ 1544, 1546, 1547; R.S. 1899, §§ 2958, 2960, 2961; Laws 1907, ch. 97, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1910, §§ 3894, 3896, 3897; C.S. 1920, §§ 4958, 4960, 4961; Laws 1931, ch. 99, § 1; R.S. 1931, §§ 68-104, 68-106, 68-107; Laws 1935, ch. 3, § 1; 1945, ch. 144, § 1; C.S. 1945, §§ 50-104, 50-106, 50-107; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-4 to 20-6; Laws 1975, ch. 61, § 2; 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-103 ; Laws 1997, ch. 193, § 2; 1998, ch. 90, § 1; 2009, ch. 40, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added (d).

Repealing clauses. —

Section 2, ch. 144, Laws 1945, repealed § 68-111, R.S. 1931 (§ 11, ch. 81, C.L. 1876), relating to return of performance of ceremony, as being in conflict with § 24, ch. 115, Laws 1941 (§ 35-71).

Provision mandatory. —

This section requires that previous to the solemnization of a marriage a license for that purpose “must” be obtained. The mandatory requirement of a license is a legislative declaration of “public policy” which should be enforced by the courts and precludes the formation of the marriage tie in Wyoming by a common-law marriage. In re Trent's Claim, 68 Wyo. 146, 231 P.2d 180, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1951), overruled, Bowers v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 593 P.2d 182, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 394 (Wyo. 1979).

Common-law marriages invalid. —

Neither marriage statutes nor public policy would justify supreme court in holding that common-law marriages are valid. In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1943).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of solemnized marriage as affected by defective license or license wrongfully issued or obtained, 61 ALR2d 847.

§ 20-1-104. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 22, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1921, ch. 160, §§ 15 and 16, related to serological tests required prior to obtaining a license.

§ 20-1-105. Judge may order license issued.

1. If any county clerk refuses to issue a license to marry, or in case of circumstances arising which would necessitate the waiver of any one (1) or more of the requirements of W.S. 20-1-102 and 20-1-103(b) and (c), either applicant for the license may apply to the district court of the county for the issuance of a license without compliance with one (1) or more of those requirements. If the judge finds that a license should be issued, or such circumstances exist that it is proper that any one (1) or more of the requirements should be waived, the judge may order in writing the issuance of the license. Upon the order of the judge being filed with the county clerk, the county clerk shall issue the license at the time specified in the order. No fee or court costs shall be charged or taxed for the order.
2. If either party is under sixteen (16) years of age, the parents or guardians may apply to any judge of a court of record in the county of residence of the minor for an order authorizing the marriage and directing the issuance of a marriage license. If the judge believes it advisable, he shall enter an order authorizing the marriage and directing the county clerk to issue a license. Upon filing of a certified copy of the order with the county clerk, the county clerk shall issue a license and endorse thereon the fact of the issuance of the order. No person authorized to perform marriage ceremonies in Wyoming shall perform any marriage ceremony if either party is under the age specified by this subsection unless the license contains the endorsement.
3. Before issuing the order provided by this section the judge may require affidavits or other proof of the competency of the parties or of any other facts necessitating or making the order advisable. The order may be in substantially the following form:

   I . . . . . , the undersigned . . . . . , a judge of the . . . . . court, a court of record in and for . . . . . county, Wyoming, hereby order that a marriage license may issue to . . . . . of . . . . . (address) and . . . . . of . . . . . (address) on the . . . . . day of . . . . . (year) . . . . . Date: . . . . .

History. Laws 1975, ch. 61, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-8.1, 20-8.2; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-105 ; Laws 1999, ch. 150, § 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 45, § 1.

§ 20-1-106. Who may solemnize marriage; form of ceremony.

1. Every district or circuit court judge, district court commissioner, supreme court justice, magistrate and every licensed or ordained minister of the gospel, bishop, priest or rabbi, or other qualified person acting in accordance with the traditions or rites for the solemnization of marriage of any religion, denomination or religious society, may perform the ceremony of marriage in this state.
2. In the solemnization of marriage no particular form is required, except that the parties shall solemnly declare in the presence of the person performing the ceremony and at least two (2) attending witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 81, §§ 8, 9; R.S. 1887, §§ 1548, 1549; R.S. 1899, §§ 2962, 2963; Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 1; C.S. 1910, §§ 3898, 3899; C.S. 1920, §§ 4962, 4963; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 76; R.S. 1931, §§ 68-108, 68-109; C.S. 1945, §§ 50-110, 50-111; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-10, 20-11; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-106 ; Laws 1999, ch. 79, § 1; 2000, ch. 24, § 4; 2004, ch. 42, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to filing of record of marriage with state registrar of vital records, see § 35-1-422 .

The 2004 amendment, in (a), deleted “justice of the peace” following “supreme court justice.”

Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2004.

Statute mandatory. —

The former provision that “in any case there shall be at least two witnesses besides the minister or magistrate present at the ceremony” leaves little room for construction, is mandatory, and establishes a legislative public policy which courts will enforce. In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1943).

Cited in

Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017); Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 20-1-107. Certificate of marriage.

1. When a marriage is solemnized, the person performing the ceremony shall give one (1) of the parties a certificate under his hand and signed by the witnesses to the marriage, specifying the names, ages and place of residence of the parties married, the names and residences of at least two (2) witnesses who were present at the marriage, and the time and place thereof.
2. The county clerk of each county in the state shall record all returns of marriages in a book kept for that purpose within one (1) month after receipt.
3. The original certificate and record of marriage made by the person performing the ceremony and the record thereof or a certified copy of the certificate or record is admissible in all courts and places as presumptive evidence of the fact of the marriage.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 81, §§ 10, 12, 16; R.S. 1887, §§ 1550, 1552, 1556; R.S. 1899, §§ 2964, 2966, 2970; C.S. 1910, §§ 3900, 3902, 3906; C.S. 1920, §§ 4964, 4966, 4970; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 77; R.S. 1931, §§ 68-110, 68-112, 68-116; C.S. 1945, §§ 50-112, 50-113, 50-117; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-12 to 20-14; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-107 .

Failure to record did not invalidate marriage. —

A marriage, regularly solemnized, was held valid where license was issued but not recorded. Connors v. Connors, 5 Wyo. 433, 40 P. 966, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1895).

§ 20-1-108. Offenses relating to marriage generally.

If the county clerk neglects to record a marriage certificate, or if any person performs a marriage ceremony knowing that he is not legally authorized to do so or knowing of any legal impediment to the proposed marriage, he is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) or imprisonment for not exceeding one (1) year.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 81, § 13; R.S. 1887, § 1553; R.S. 1899, § 2967; C.S. 1910, § 3903; C.S. 1920, § 4967; R.S. 1931, § 68-113; C.S. 1945, § 50-114; W.S. 1957, § 20-15; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-108 .

§ 20-1-109. When marriage solemnized by unauthorized person valid.

No marriage solemnized in any manner authorized by W.S. 20-1-106 , shall be deemed or adjudged to be void, nor is the validity of the marriage in any way affected because of a lack of jurisdiction or authority of the person performing the ceremony of marriage if the marriage is consummated with a full belief on the part of the persons so married, or either of them, that the person performing the ceremony was lawfully authorized to do so.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 81, § 14; R.S. 1887, § 1554; R.S. 1899, § 2968; C.S. 1910, § 3904; C.S. 1920, § 4968; R.S. 1931, § 68-114; C.S. 1945, § 50-115; W.S. 1957, § 20-16; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-109 ; Laws 1999, ch. 79, § 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of marriage as affected by lack of legal authority of person solemnizing it, 13 ALR4th 1323.

§ 20-1-110. Marriage ceremony according to rites and customs of religious societies or assemblies.

Any religious society or religious assembly may perform the ceremony of marriage in this state according to the rites and customs of the society or assembly. The clerk or keeper of the minutes, proceedings or other book of the society or assembly wherein the marriage occurs, or if none then the moderator or person presiding in the society or assembly, shall make out and transmit to the county clerk of the county a certificate of the marriage.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 81, § 15; R.S. 1887, § 1555; R.S. 1899, § 2969; C.S. 1910, § 3905; C.S. 1920, § 4969; R.S. 1931, § 68-115; C.S. 1945, § 50-116; W.S. 1957, § 20-20; Laws 1967, ch. 108, § 1; 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-110 .

§ 20-1-111. Foreign marriages.

All marriage contracts which are valid by the laws of the country in which contracted are valid in this state.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 81, § 17; R.S. 1887, § 1557; R.S. 1899, § 2971; C.S. 1910, § 3907; C.S. 1920, § 4971; R.S. 1931, § 68-117; C.S. 1945, § 50-118; W.S. 1957, § 20-21; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-111 .

This section merely declares the common-law rule. Bowers v. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Div., 593 P.2d 182, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 394 (Wyo. 1979).

Limited recognition of common-law marriages. —

A common-law marriage, valid in the state in which it is contracted, is valid in Wyoming for purposes of receipt of benefits under our worker's compensation laws. Jim's Water Serv. v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 376 (Wyo. 1979), limited, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

Common-law marriage recognized. —

See Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20337 (D. Wyo. 1985).

Remarriage after divorce. —

Remarriage by a woman within one year after securing a divorce within the state, contracted outside the state and with a resident of the state, who had gone out of the state to evade the prohibition of former C.S. 1910, § 3951, against such remarriage, was valid, since the latter section did not make such marriage invalid, but merely imposed a punishment on the parties contracting it. Hoagland v. Hoagland, 27 Wyo. 178, 193 P. 843, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1920).

Jurisdiction over same-sex divorce action. —

District court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Wyo. Const. art. 5, §§ 1, 10 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-104 over a divorce action involving a same-sex couple legally married in Canada. Recognizing the marriage under this section for this limited purpose was not inconsistent with the definition of marriage in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 . Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, 253 P.3d 153, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2011).

Discretion of court. —

District court ruled that each party to the divorce should pay his or her own attorney fees; this decision was not challenged on appeal, and there was no reason to deviate from the district court's formula and award the mother attorney fees. Opitz v. Opitz, 2007 WY 207, 173 P.3d 405, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 2007).

§ 20-1-112. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1995, ch. 117, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1985, ch. 22, § 1, related to the physician's certificate and rubella and Rh test required prior to issuing a marriage license.

§ 20-1-113. Legitimacy of children presumed.

The legitimacy of all children conceived or born during the marriage is rebuttably presumed pursuant to W.S. 14-2-504 .

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 22; R.S. 1887, § 1588; R.S. 1899, § 3005; C.S. 1910, § 3941; C.S. 1920, § 5007; R.S. 1931, § 35-125; C.S. 1945, § 3-5923; W.S. 1957, § 20-67; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-117 ; W.S. 1977, § 20-2-117 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 4; 2003, ch. 93, § 2.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Presumption of legitimacy of child born after annulment, divorce or separation, 46 ALR3d 158.

Legitimation by marriage to natural father of child born during mother's marriage to another, 80 ALR3d 219.

§ 20-1-201. Separate estate of real and personal property; not subject to control of spouse; exceptions.

All property belonging to a married person as his separate property which he owns at the time of his marriage or which during marriage he acquires in good faith from any person by descent or otherwise, together with all rents, issues, increase and profits thereof, is during marriage his sole and separate property under his sole control and may be held, owned, possessed and enjoyed by him the same as though he were single. Such property is not subject to the disposal, control or interference of his spouse and is exempt from execution or attachment for the debts of his spouse if the property was not conveyed to him by his spouse in fraud of his creditors. The necessary expenses of the family and the education of the children are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, for which they may be sued jointly or separately.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 82, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 1558; R.S. 1899, § 2972; C.S. 1910, § 3908; Laws 1915, ch. 15, § 1; 1917, ch. 5, § 1; C.S. 1920, § 4974; R.S. 1931, § 69-101; C.S. 1945, § 50-201; W.S. 1957, § 20-22; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-201 .

Person's separate estate includes business, trade and earnings. Coyne v. State, 595 P.2d 970, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 424 (Wyo. 1979).

Disability insurance policy. —

Even assuming that the husband properly characterized the benefits from the disability insurance policy as separate property, they were subject to division by the trial court in the same manner as the parties' jointly owned property where that portion of the disability payments from the insurance policy received by the husband prior to the divorce substituted for income he would have otherwise earned and thus was the product of the marital union. Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, 61 P.3d 383, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2003).

Right of control and disposition of woman's estate, in her lifetime, by her is absolute, except in case of a homestead, and her right to dispose of her estate by will is also absolute, except that under § 2-4-101 the husband has option to take one-half of the estate, in spite of her will. In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1940).

Right to sue husband. —

Wife as invited guest in husband's automobile may not sue husband for injuries resulting from alleged gross negligence, at least not in absence of liability insurance taken out by husband for his protection. McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1943).

Separately owned property. —

A married person's separately owned property is subject to distribution by the court, as well as jointly owned property. Mann v. Mann, 979 P.2d 497, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1999).

While a former husband claimed that gifts from his father were his separate property under this section, such a claim did not affect the district court's discretion to make a 50/50 disposition of the parties' property under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 in a divorce action. McMurry v. McMurry, 2010 WY 163, 245 P.3d 316, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 2010).

In granting divorce, court may dispose of wife's separate property. Lovejoy v. Lovejoy, 36 Wyo. 379, 256 P. 76, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1927), reh'g denied, 38 Wyo. 358, 267 P. 91, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1928).

Liability for necessary expenses of family. —

Account stated for necessary expenses of family as between husband and creditor is not binding on wife, or at least is not conclusive against her, and she is liable only for actual value of necessary expenses incurred. Miracle v. Barker, 59 Wyo. 92, 136 P.2d 678, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1943).

Well-drilling unnecessary expense. —

Drilling of well to irrigate front yard did not constitute a necessary expense of family under the provisions of this section. Rodolph v. Rodolph, 415 P.2d 71, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1966).

Wife's entirety interest in property. —

A wife has an interest in property held by her and her husband by the entirety, consistent with the spirit and letter of art. 6, § 1, Wyo. Const., this section and § 20-1-202 .Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 75 Wyo. 444, 297 P.2d 213, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1956).

Indivisibility, inalienability of entirety estate. —

In the absence of an agreement to the contrary the income, rents and profits of an estate by the entirety are an integral, indivisible part thereof and frequently are the most important part. The estate itself, title and fee thereof, is indivisible between husband and wife and cannot be alienated or in any way disposed of unless they agree to the contrary. That indivisibility must logically extend to every part of the estate including the rents, income and profits thereof and hence neither spouse would alone be able to divest the other thereof voluntarily or involuntarily against the wishes of the other during the life of both. Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 75 Wyo. 444, 297 P.2d 213, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1956).

Ranching operation. —

Court did not err in ordering a piece of a ranching estate to the wife, even though it was given to the parties by the father's grandmother and the husband used it for his ranching operations, where the evidence clearly showed the grandmother gifted the property to the parties and the wife said that she intended to pass the property on to the parties' sons. Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, 69 P.3d 917, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2003).

Exclusive right of husband to rents, profits, usufruct, swept away. —

The exclusive right to rents, profits and usufruct of an estate by the entirety on the part of the husband alone has been swept away by former §§ 50-201 through 50-205, W.C.S. 1945 (this section and § 20-1-202 ). Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 75 Wyo. 444, 297 P.2d 213, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1956).

And rents and profits cannot be mortgaged by 1 spouse. —

The rents, income and profits of property held by husband and wife by the entirety cannot be subjected to note and mortgage where wife by virtue of her minority disaffirms the note and mortgage. Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 75 Wyo. 444, 297 P.2d 213, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1956).

Applied in

Kane v. Kane, 706 P.2d 676, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 629 (Wyo. 1985).

Quoted in

West v. Wyoming State Treas., 822 P.2d 1269, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1991).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Conflict of Interest — Legal Interests vs. Relational Interests. Coyne v. State ex rel. Thomas, 595 P.2d 970, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 424 (Wyo. 1979),” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 349 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right and incidence where real property purchased with wife's funds is placed in spouses' joint names, 43 ALR2d 917.

Marriage as extinguishing contractual indebtedness between parties, 45 ALR2d 722.

Spouse's acceptance or retention of benefits of other spouse's fraudulent act as ratification of transaction, 82 ALR3d 625.

Modern status of rule that husband is primarily or solely liable for necessaries furnished wife, 20 ALR4th 196.

Liability of community property for antenuptial debts and obligations, 68 ALR4th 877.

Failure to disclose extent or value of property owned as ground for avoiding premarital contract, 3 ALR5th 394.

§ 20-1-202. Rights and limitations of married persons incident to the marriage relationship.

1. Any married person may transfer his separate property in the same manner and to the same extent as if he were unmarried and he may make contracts and incur obligations and liabilities, all of which may be enforced against him to the same extent and in the same manner as if he were unmarried.
2. Any person may, while married, sue and be sued in all matters having relation to his property, person or reputation, in the same manner as if he were single.
3. When a married person sues or is sued alone, proceedings shall be had and judgment rendered and enforced as if he were unmarried. His separate property and estate is liable for any judgment against him but he is entitled to the benefit of all exemptions for heads of families.
4. When any person against whom liabilities exist marries and has or acquires lands, judgment on the liability may be rendered against her, to be levied on the lands only.
5. A person is not liable for the debts and liabilities of his spouse contracted before marriage without an assumption thereof in writing.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 82, §§ 3, 6, 7; Laws 1882, ch. 68, § 3; 1886, ch. 60, § 326; R.S. 1887, §§ 59, 1560, 1563, 1564, 2666; R.S. 1899, §§ 2973, 2974, 2977, 2978, 3760; C.S. 1910, §§ 3909, 3910, 3913, 3914, 4615; C.S. 1920, §§ 4975, 4976, 4979, 4980, 5886; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 78; R.S. 1931, §§ 69-102, 69-103, 69-105, 69-107, 89-2212; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-3510, 50-202, 50-203, 50-206, 50-207; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-23 to 20-25, 20-27, 20-29; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-1-202 .

Cross references. —

As to abolition of actions for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of promise to marry, and for provision that any contract or instrument based on any such right of action shall be void, see §§ 1-23-101 through 1-23-105 .

As to release or conveyance of wife's interest in husband's real estate generally, see § 34-1-109 .

As to husband or wife appointing the other attorney in fact to dispose of any interest in real estate, see § 34-1-129 .

As to disposal or encumbrance of homestead being absolutely void unless wife voluntarily joins in conveyance or encumbrance, see § 34-2-121 .

As to rule of civil procedure as to capacity of married woman to sue and be sued, see Rule 17, W.R.C.P.

Person's separate estate includes business, trade and earnings. See Coyne v. State, 595 P.2d 970, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 424 (Wyo. 1979).

Contract between husband and wife to settle marital property rights. —

Husband and wife may, in contemplation of separation or divorce, by valid agreement between themselves, settle and adjust all property rights growing out of the marital relation. Rhinehart v. Rhinehart, 52 Wyo. 363, 75 P.2d 390, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (1938).

Right of wife to sue husband. —

Wife as guest in husband's automobile may not sue husband for injury resulting from alleged gross negligence, at least not in absence of liability insurance taken out by husband for his protection. McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1943).

Liability of husband when property owned by wife. —

Husband was not liable for automobile tort committed by wife in use of her separate estate and property where no question of agency, ratification, participation or consent of husband was involved. Christensen v. McCann, 41 Wyo. 101, 282 P. 1061, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1929).

Tort damages for impairment of capacity to perform duties. —

A married woman is entitled to recover damages against a tort-feasor for any impairment of her capacity to perform ordinary duties of the home or for loss of ability to perform the duties she customarily performs upon the farm or in the interest of her husband's farming business. Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1956).

Married woman entitled to homestead exemption. —

A married woman, against whom personal judgment was rendered, though judgment was also against her husband, was entitled to homestead exemption in her separate property, on which she lived with her husband, though she was not head of family. Bachmann v. Hurtt, 26 Wyo. 332, 184 P. 709, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1919).

Finding of trial court as to right of exemption conclusive. —

Finding of trial court as to right of exemption, when made on conflicting evidence relative to judgment debtor's being about to remove from state, is conclusive. Wakefield v. Lord, 38 Wyo. 301, 266 P. 1066, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1928).

Applied in

Kane v. Kane, 706 P.2d 676, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 629 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Mann v. Mann, 979 P.2d 497, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1999).

Law reviews. —

See note, “Interspousal Disability Doctrine,” 17 Wyo. L.J. 267 (1963).

For case note, “Conflict of Interest — Legal Interests vs. Relational Interests. Coyne v. State ex rel. Thomas, 595 P.2d 970, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 424 (Wyo. 1979),” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 349 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Separation agreement as affecting right to curtesy, 34 ALR2d 1020, 34 ALR2d 1039.

Right of wife to recover in individual capacity for medical expenses of husband injured by third person's negligence, 42 ALR2d 843.

Authority of wife to borrow money on husband's credit, 55 ALR2d 1215.

Wife as head of family within homestead or other property exemption provision, 67 ALR2d 779.

Husband's liability for funeral expenses of wife, 82 ALR2d 873.

Conflict of laws as to right of action between husband and wife or parent and child, 96 ALR2d 973.

What law governs the right of a tortiously injured married woman to sue in her own name and the ownership of the cause of action, 97 ALR2d 725.

Spouse's or parent's right to recover punitive damages in connection with recovery of damages for medical expenses or loss of services or consortium arising from personal injury to other spouse or to child, 25 ALR3d 1416.

Conflict of laws as to right of action for loss of consortium, 46 ALR3d 880.

Right of married woman to use maiden surname, 67 ALR3d 1266.

Modern status of interspousal tort immunity in personal injury and wrongful death actions, 92 ALR3d 901.

Recovery for loss of consortium for injury occurring prior to marriage, 5 ALR4th 300.

Necessity of physical injury to support cause of action for loss of consortium, 16 ALR4th 537.

Modern status of rule that husband is primarily or solely liable for necessaries furnished wife, 20 ALR4th 196.

Spouse's liability, after divorce, for community debt contracted by other spouse during marriage, 20 ALR4th 211.

Spouse's dissipation of marital assets prior to divorce as factor in divorce court's determination of property division, 41 ALR4th 416.

§ 20-2-101. Void and voidable marriages defined; annulments.

1. Marriages contracted in Wyoming are void without any decree of divorce:
   1. When either party has a husband or wife living at the time of contracting the marriage;
   2. When either party is mentally incompetent at the time of contracting the marriage;
   3. When the parties stand in the relation to each other of parent and child, grandparent and grandchild, brother and sister of half or whole blood, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew, or first cousins, whether either party is illegitimate. This paragraph does not apply to persons not related by consanguinity.
2. A marriage is voidable if solemnized when either party was under the age of legal consent unless a judge gave consent, if they separated during nonage and did not cohabit together afterwards, or if the consent of one (1) of the parties was obtained by force or fraud and there was no subsequent voluntary cohabitation of the parties.
3. Either party may file a petition in the district court of the county where the parties or one (1) of them reside, to annul a marriage for reasons stated in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and proceedings shall be held as in the case of a petition for divorce except as otherwise provided. Upon due proof the marriage shall be declared void by a decree of nullity.
4. An action to annul a marriage on the ground that one of the parties was under the age of legal consent provided by W.S. 20-1-102(a) may be filed by the parent or guardian entitled to the custody of the minor. The marriage may not be annulled on the application of a party who was of the age of legal consent at the time of the marriage nor when it appears that the parties, after they had attained the age of consent, had freely cohabited as man and wife.
5. An action to annul a marriage on the grounds of mental incompetency may be commenced on behalf of a mentally incompetent person by his guardian or next friend. A mentally incompetent person restored to competency may maintain an action of annulment, but no decree may be granted if the parties freely cohabited as husband and wife after restoration of competency.
6. An action to annul a marriage on the grounds of physical incapacity may only be maintained by the injured party against the party whose incapacity is alleged and may only be commenced within two (2) years from the solemnization of the marriage.
7. All decrees of annulment may include provisions for the custody and support of children pursuant to this article, W.S. 20-2-201 through 20-2-204 and 20-2-301 through 20-2-315 and for the division of property pursuant to W.S. 20-2-114 .

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, §§ 1 to 3, 26; R.S. 1887, §§ 1567 to 1569, 1592; R.S. 1899, §§ 2981 to 2984; C.S. 1910, §§ 3917 to 3920; C.S. 1920, §§ 4983 to 4986; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 79; R.S. 1931, §§ 35-101 to 35-104; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5901 to 3-5903, 3-5927; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-32 to 20-35; Laws 1975, ch. 61, § 2; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-101 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 3; 2006, ch. 114, § 1.

The 2006 amendment, substituted “20-2-114” for “20-2-131” in (g).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

Editor's notes. —

The bracketed section reference has been inserted in subsection (g) as the apparent intended reference.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Bigamous marriage not validated by cohabitation after death of first spouse. —

Where the first husband died after the wife had married for a second time, subsequent continued cohabitation between her and the “second husband” did not validate their illegal marriage. In re Reeves' Estate, 58 Wyo. 432, 133 P.2d 503, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1943).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect of annulment of marriage on rights arising out of act of or transactions between parties prior thereto, 2 ALR2d 637.

Avoidance of procreation of children as grounds for annulment, 4 ALR2d 227.

Validity of marriage as affected by intention of the party that it should be only a matter of form or jest, 14 ALR2d 624.

Antenuptial knowledge relating to alleged grounds as barring right to annulment; physical or mental incapacity; immoral conduct before marriage; prior marriage; marriage barred by terms of divorce decree or statute, 15 ALR2d 706.

What constitutes duress sufficient to warrant annulment of marriage, 16 ALR2d 1430.

Refusal of sexual intercourse as ground for annulment, 28 ALR2d 499.

Applicability, to annulment actions, of residence requirements of divorce statutes, 32 ALR2d 734.

Right to attack validity of marriage after death of parties thereto, 47 ALR2d 1393.

Limitation of actions for annulment of marriage, 52 ALR2d 1163.

Right to allowance of permanent alimony in connection with decree of annulment, 54 ALR2d 1410.

What constitutes intoxication sufficient to warrant annulment of marriage, 57 ALR2d 1250.

Concealed premarital unchastity or parenthood as ground of divorce or annulment, 64 ALR2d 742.

Mental incompetency of defendant at time of action as precluding annulment of marriage, 97 ALR2d 483.

Concealment or misrepresentation as to previous marriage or divorce as ground for annulment of marriage, 15 ALR3d 759.

What constitutes mistake in the identity of one of the parties to warrant annulment of marriage, 50 ALR3d 1295.

Incapacity for sexual intercourse as ground for annulment, 52 ALR3d 589.

Right to allowance of permanent alimony in connection with decree of annulment, 81 ALR3d 281.

Recovery for services rendered by persons living in apparent relation of husband and wife without express agreement for compensation, 94 ALR3d 552.

Enforceability of agreement requiring spouse's cooperation in obtaining religious bill of divorce, 29 ALR4th 746.

Prior institution of annulment proceedings or other attack on validity of one's marriage as barring or estopping one from entitlement to property rights as surviving spouse, 31 ALR4th 1190.

Court's authority to award temporary alimony or suit money in action for divorce, separate maintenance, or alimony where the existence of a valid marriage is contested, 34 ALR4th 814.

Homosexuality, transvestism and similar sexual practices as grounds for annulment of marriage, 68 ALR4th 1069.

Failure to disclose extent or value of property owned as ground for avoiding premarital contract, 3 ALR5th 394.

Power of incompetent spouse's guardian or representative to sue for granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of marriage, or to make compromise or settlement in such suit, 32 ALR5th 673.

Homosexuality as ground for divorce, 96 ALR5th 83.

Library References.

Family Law and Practice § 5.02 (Matthew Bender).

§ 20-2-102. Petition by spouse for support.

When the husband and wife are living separately, or when they are living together but one (1) spouse does not support the other spouse or children within his means, and no proceeding for divorce is pending, the other spouse or the department of family services may institute a proceeding for support. No less than five (5) days after notice is personally served upon the nonsupporting spouse, the court may hear the petition and grant such order concerning the support of the spouse or children as it might grant were it based on a proceeding for divorce. If the nonsupporting spouse cannot be personally served within this state but has property within the jurisdiction of the court, or debts owing to him, the court may order such constructive service as appears sufficient and proper and may cause an attachment of the property. Upon completion of constructive service the court may grant relief as if personal service was had.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 18; R.S. 1887, § 1584; R.S. 1899, § 3001; C.S. 1910, § 3937; C.S. 1920, § 5003; R.S. 1931, § 35-121; C.S. 1945, § 3-5919; Laws 1951, ch. 34, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-36; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-102 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, see chapter 4 of this title.

Maintenance pending hearing. —

On writ of error to a decree allowing separate maintenance, the question of the wife's right to maintenance pending hearing on the writ will be postponed until the final hearing, where no application for such maintenance was made in the trial court, and the wife is earning sufficient for her support. Brown v. Brown, 22 Wyo. 92, 135 P. 801, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1913).

Jurisdiction. —

In an action seeking a divorce and the custody and support for child, divorce was denied, but the court retained jurisdiction of the remainder of the action and legally entered a decree awarding plaintiff custody of the child and judgment for support money therefor. Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1937).

In proceedings under this section, neither the court, the judge nor the court commissioner had jurisdiction to make a permanent and final adjudication of the property rights between the parties. Brown v. Brown, 23 Wyo. 1, 146 P. 231, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1915).

Contract, whereby the husband agrees to pay the wife one-half of proceeds from a sale of homestead, cannot be enforced by proceedings under this section. Brown v. Brown, 23 Wyo. 1, 146 P. 231, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1915).

Powers of court. —

The grant of power to provide for custody and care of children in connection with a divorce decree, does not abrogate equitable powers of the court existing independent thereof, nor does it limit exercise of the power granted in another statute under somewhat different circumstances. Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1937).

Power to adjudicate property rights limited. —

In the absence of such a statute as § 20-2-106(c), a court in a separate maintenance action similar to this section does not have the power to adjudicate property rights of the parties or to divide their property. Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 280 (Wyo. 1977).

Notice. —

Notice of a longer time than provided for by statute does not make the proceeding invalid, nor can the defendant complain, as he had a better opportunity to be heard than in a summary proceeding, and was not prejudiced. Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1937).

Duty of defendant to raise defenses. —

In separate maintenance action it was duty of defendant to interpose defense that his wife deserted him willfully and his failure to do so negated any such misbehavior up to date of decree. Davis v. Davis, 56 Wyo. 524, 111 P.2d 124, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1941).

In gross award unauthorized. —

This section does not authorize the award of a sum in gross for the wife's maintenance. Brown v. Brown, 23 Wyo. 1, 146 P. 231, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1915).

Effect of court finding for wife in separate maintenance action. —

In a proceeding filed by wife for separate maintenance wherein the husband files a cross petition for a divorce, a decree of the trial court finding generally in favor of the wife and for an allowance for support of wife is not a final order, but is an order for alimony pendente lite. Such decree does not determine the merits of the divorce especially when the trial court sustains a motion by the wife to strike the cross petition. Holmes v. Holmes, 66 Wyo. 317, 211 P.2d 946, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1949).

Husband to pay wife's attorney fees. —

Wife living apart from husband pursuant to separate maintenance decree held entitled to payment of attorney's fee on husband's appeal from judgment denying him a divorce on ground of willful desertion. Davis v. Davis, 56 Wyo. 524, 111 P.2d 124, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1941).

Supreme court may compel husband on his prosecuting a writ of error to a judgment for separate maintenance, rendered under this section, to pay his wife a reasonable sum for attorney's fees in the supreme court. Brown v. Brown, 22 Wyo. 92, 135 P. 801, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1913).

Husband is not liable for contempt for failure to pay arrears due under order for temporary alimony entered in a proceeding for separate maintenance where proceeding has been finally and definitely determined by a decree rendered on the merits. Holmes v. Holmes, 66 Wyo. 317, 211 P.2d 946, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1949).

Law reviews. —

See “Enforcement of Civil Liability for Nonsupport in the State of Wyoming,” 8 Wyo. L.J. 227 (1954).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Defenses available to husband in civil suit by wife for support, 10 ALR2d 466, 36 ALR4th 502.

Nonresident wife's right to maintain action for separate maintenance or alimony alone against resident husband, 36 ALR2d 1369.

Allowance of alimony in lump sum in action for separate maintenance without divorce, 61 ALR2d 946.

Property rights of spouses in action for separate maintenance or support without divorce, 74 ALR2d 316.

Husband's death as affecting periodic payment provision of separation agreement, 5 ALR4th 1153.

Necessity, in action against husband for necessaries furnished wife, or proving husband's failure to provide necessities, 19 ALR4th 432.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as separate maintenance, alimony, or support for spouse without absolute divorce, 26 ALR4th 1190.

Order awarding temporary support or living expenses upon separation of unmarried partners pending contract action based on services relating to personal relationship, 35 ALR4th 409.

Reconciliation as affecting decree for limited divorce, separation, alimony, separate maintenance or spousal support, 36 ALR4th 502.

Divorce and separation: attributing undisclosed income to parent or spouse for purposes of making child or spousal support award, 70 ALR4th 173.

§ 20-2-103. Petition to affirm marriage.

When the validity of any marriage is denied by either party, the other party may file a petition to affirm the marriage. Upon due proof of the validity thereof, it shall be declared valid by a decree of the court which is conclusive upon all persons concerned.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 4; R.S. 1887, § 1570; R.S. 1899, § 2987; C.S. 1910, § 3923; C.S. 1920, § 4989; R.S. 1931, § 35-107; C.S. 1945, § 3-5904; W.S. 1957, § 20-37; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-103 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 3.

§ 20-2-104. Causes for divorce generally; venue generally.

A divorce may be decreed by the district court of the county in which either party resides on the complaint of the aggrieved party on the grounds of irreconcilable differences in the marital relationship.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 5; R.S. 1887, § 1571; R.S. 1899, § 2988; C.S. 1910, § 3924; C.S. 1920, § 4990; R.S. 1931, § 35-108; C.S. 1945, § 3-5905; W.S. 1957, § 20-38; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-104 .

Venue.—

To the extent that a district court dismissed a divorce action on the basis of improper statutory venue, the court erred because the husband filed the divorce complaint in the court in accordance with the applicable venue statute, as the husband lived in the county where the court was located and the wife did not live in Wyoming. Saunders v. Saunders, 2019 WY 82, 445 P.3d 991, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2019).

Postnuptial agreement's provision stipulating for divorce by simple termination of “contract” was void as against public policy, since dissolution of a marriage requires a decree of divorce by a court with appropriate jurisdiction. Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1993).

The statutory grounds of divorce are exclusive, the courts having authority in this field to do only that which is prescribed by the legislature. Logan v. Logan, 396 P.2d 198, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1964).

Grounds for child custody support, alimony, and property division not modified. —

The enactment of this section, which does no more than provide no-fault grounds for divorce, does not modify the traditional existing grounds for determining child custody support, alimony, attorney fees and division of property under § 20-2-114 .Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1984).

Trial court has discretion in determining sufficiency of grounds. —

Some latitude for the exercise of discretion is permitted to the trial court in determining the sufficiency of grounds for divorce. Gill v. Gill, 363 P.2d 86, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1961).

Court did not err in unequivocally granting a wife a divorce from the husband where neither party requested special findings, thus, the court was not required to state its findings concerning which party was aggrieved and why, the court signed and dated the divorce decree two days before both the default and the divorce decree were entered, and no authority required the court to postpone the divorce proceedings pending the clerk’s entry of default on the husband’s counterclaim. Commonwealth ex rel. Tinder v. Werner, 280 S.W.2d 214, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 152 (Ky. 1955).

And its finding will stand in the absence of abuse of discretion. Gill v. Gill, 363 P.2d 86, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1961); Brydon v. Brydon, 365 P.2d 55, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1961).

“Spouse abuse.” —

Reference to “spouse abuse” in former § 20-2-113(a) was applicable to non-marital domestic relationships. Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2000), reh'g denied, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. May 23, 2000).

Jurisdiction over same-sex divorce action. —

District court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Wyo. Const. art. 5, §§ 1, 10 and this section over a divorce action involving a same-sex couple legally married in Canada. Recognizing the marriage under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-111 for this limited purpose was not inconsistent with the definition of marriage in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 . Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, 253 P.3d 153, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2011).

Lack of findings on irreconcilable differences did not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction. —

District court's failure to make findings on irreconcilable differences or equitable property distribution did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the applicable statutes did not so provide, and (2) nothing showed the court usurped power the court did not have or extended jurisdiction beyond the court's authority. Linch v. Linch, 2015 WY 141, 361 P.3d 308, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 2015).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Divorce Mediation: An Innovative Approach to Family Dispute Resolution,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 693 (1983).

For article, “The Fault Factor in No-Fault Divorce and Equitable Distribution: Some Suggestions for Change in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 133 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Reconciliation as affecting separation agreement or decree, 35 ALR2d 707, 36 ALR4th 502.

What amounts to incompatibility or inability of parties to live together within statutes relating to substantive grounds for divorce, 58 ALR2d 1218.

Power of court to grant absolute divorce to both spouses upon showing of mutual fault, 13 ALR3d 1364.

Retrospective effect of statute prescribing grounds of divorce, 23 ALR3d 626.

Validity, construction and effect of “no-fault” divorce statutes providing for dissolution of marriage upon finding that relationship is no longer viable, 55 ALR3d 581, 86 ALR3d 1116.

Refusal of sexual intercourse as justifying divorce or separation, 82 ALR3d 660.

Transvestism or transsexualism of spouse as justifying divorce, 82 ALR3d 725.

Insanity as defense to divorce or separation suit — post-1950 cases, 67 ALR4th 277.

Doctrine of forum non conveniens: Assumption or denial of jurisdiction of action involving matrimonial dispute, 55 ALR5th 647.

Homosexuality as ground for divorce, 96 ALR5th 83.

Library References.

Family Law and Practice §§ 4.01, 4.02, 4.03, 20.03 (Matthew Bender).

§ 20-2-105. Divorce action for insanity; when permitted; conditions to bringing action; liability for support.

1. A divorce may be granted when either party has become incurably insane and the insane person has been confined in a mental hospital of this state or of another state or territory for at least two (2) years immediately preceding the commencement of the action for divorce.
2. Upon the filing of a verified complaint showing that a cause of action exists under this section, the district court shall appoint some person to act as guardian of the insane person in the action. The summons and complaint in the action shall be served upon the defendant by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the guardian and to the county attorney of the county in which the action is brought.
3. The county attorney upon whom the summons and complaint is served shall appear for and defend the defendant in the action. No divorce shall be granted under this section except in the presence of the county attorney.
4. In any action brought under this section, the district courts possess all the powers relative to the payment of alimony, the distribution of property and the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the parties as in other actions for divorce.
5. Costs in the action, as well as the actual expenses of the county attorney and the expenses and fees of the guardian, shall be paid by the plaintiff. The expenses of the county attorney and expenses and fees of the guardian shall be fixed and allowed by the court, and the court may make such order as to the payment of fees and expenses as may seem proper.

History. Laws 1921, ch. 16, §§ 1 to 5; R.S. 1931, §§ 35-134 to 35-138; Laws 1943, ch. 56, § 1; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5935 to 3-5939; Laws 1949, ch. 28, § 1; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-39 to 20-43; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-105 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 3.

Repealing clauses. —

Laws 1921, ch. 16, § 6, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Insanity as affecting right to divorce or separation on other grounds, 19 ALR2d 144.

Insanity as substantive ground of divorce or separation, 24 ALR2d 873.

Insanity as defense to divorce or separation suit — post-1950 cases, 67 ALR4th 277.

Power of incompetent spouse's guardian or representative to sue for granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of marriage, or to make compromise or settlement in such suit, 32 ALR5th 673.

Library References.

Family Law and Practice § 20.03 (Matthew Bender).

§ 20-2-106. Judicial separation; procedure; powers of court; defenses.

1. When circumstances are such that grounds for a divorce exist, the aggrieved party may institute a proceeding by complaint in the same manner as if petitioner were seeking a decree of divorce, but praying instead to be allowed to live separate and apart from the offending party.
2. No separation by decree entered hereunder shall be grounds for a divorce on the grounds of desertion or two (2) year separation unless those grounds existed at the time of petitioning for judicial separation. A decree of divorce may be granted after the decree of judicial separation is entered upon proper grounds arising thereafter.
3. The court may make such orders as appear just, including custody of the children, provision for support, disposition of the properties of the parties, alimony, restraint of one (1) or both spouses during litigation and restraint of disposition of property. The court may impose a time limitation on the order or render a perpetual separation. The parties may at any time move the court to be discharged from the order.
4. All defenses available in an action for divorce are available under this section.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 122, §§ 1 to 4; 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-106 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

In the 1977 revision of title 20, provisions for divorce on the grounds of desertion or two year separation, referred to in subsection (b), were omitted. The revision also omitted defenses available in an action for divorce, referred to in subsection (d).

Differences between action for judicial separation and absolute divorce. —

In an action for judicial separation, the grounds which base a limited decree are preserved for a later action of absolute divorce and the parties have the right to have the decree discharged. Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 280 (Wyo. 1977).

Effect of subsection (c) in separate maintenance action. —

In the absence of subsection (c) of this section, a court in a separate maintenance action similar to § 20-2-102 does not have the power to adjudicate property rights of the parties or to divide their property. Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 280 (Wyo. 1977).

Section does not specifically provide authority to award attorney's fees. Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 280 (Wyo. 1977).

Implied discretion to allow attorney's fees. —

With the broad authority given the court in the judicial separation law, the same discretion to allow attorney's fees allowed under § 20-2-111 would be implied. Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 280 (Wyo. 1977).

Provision of decree held not award of attorney fees. —

Provision of decree ordering husband to pay $8,000 indebtedness to wife's father, which amount included the $5,000 attorney fees paid by the wife, was part of the equitable division of property, not an award of attorney fees. Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 280 (Wyo. 1977).

Cited in

State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980); Ellison v. Walter ex rel. Walter, 834 P.2d 680, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1992).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Fault Factor in No-Fault Divorce and Equitable Distribution: Some Suggestions for Change in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 133 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Husband's death as affecting periodic payment provision of separation agreement, 5 ALR4th 1153.

Divorce and separation: method of valuation of life insurance policies in connection with trial court's division of property, 54 ALR4th 1203.

Insanity as defense to divorce or separation suit — post-1950 cases, 67 ALR4th 277.

Divorce and separation: effect of court order prohibiting sale or transfer of property on party's right to change beneficiary of insurance policy, 68 ALR4th 929.

§ 20-2-107. Residential requirements generally for plaintiffs.

1. No divorce shall be granted unless one of the parties has resided in this state for sixty (60) days immediately preceding the time of filing the complaint, or the marriage was solemnized in this state and one of the parties has resided in this state from the time of the marriage until the filing of the complaint.
2. A married person who at the time of filing a complaint for divorce resides in this state is a resident although his spouse may reside elsewhere.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, §§ 6, 33; R.S. 1887, §§ 1572, 1599; R.S. 1899, §§ 2989, 3013; Laws 1901, ch. 2, § 1; C.S. 1910, §§ 3925, 3949; C.S. 1920, §§ 4991, 5015; R.S. 1931, §§ 35-109, 35-133; Laws 1935, ch. 29, § 1; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5907, 3-5934; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-48, 20-49; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-107 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 3; 2017, ch. 130, § 1.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a), substituted “one of the parties” for “the plaintiff” twice.

Jurisdiction based on domicile. —

The doctrine of matrimonial domicile as the basis of jurisdiction to grant a divorce has been replaced by the view that “unitary domicile” or the domicile of either spouse is the basis of jurisdiction in such actions. Clauss v. Clauss, 459 P.2d 369, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1969).

Domicile question of law and fact. —

Whether a person has a domicile or residence in a particular place within the meaning of this section is a question of law and of fact determined from the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Millar v. Millar, 369 P.2d 207, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1962).

Indefinite stay and home in state. —

In order that the court may have jurisdiction to grant a divorce to the plaintiff his residence in this state must have been for the purpose of remaining here indefinitely and his residence must be with the bona fide intention of making Wyoming his home. Millar v. Millar, 369 P.2d 207, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1962).

Domicile not relinquished until new one established. —

Once a domicile is established, it is not relinquished until a new domicile is in fact established. Clauss v. Clauss, 459 P.2d 369, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1969).

Jurisdiction is determined by plaintiff's residence at the time of filing the petition, and it is immaterial where one afterwards establishes one's residence. Duxstad v. Duxstad, 17 Wyo. 411, 100 P. 112, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1909).

Woman plaintiff suing for divorce who had residence in Wyoming but who when she needed care went to her parents' home in Nebraska temporarily, though not intending to return to live with her husband, had not lost her residence in Wyoming at time of filing her petition less than two months later, and the district court had jurisdiction of her divorce action. Duxstad v. Duxstad, 17 Wyo. 411, 100 P. 112, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1909).

Failure to allege residential basis for jurisdiction. —

Failure to allege a residential basis for a district court's jurisdiction in a divorce did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction because it was undisputed that a former husband satisfied those requirements. Linch v. Linch, 2015 WY 141, 361 P.3d 308, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 2015).

Acquisition of new domicile. —

In order to acquire a new domicile, a person must voluntarily disassociate himself from his present domicile, take up a permanent residence elsewhere, and intend to live and reside in the new residence for an indefinite period of time. Clauss v. Clauss, 459 P.2d 369, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1969).

Estoppel from challenging decree. —

Former husband was estopped from challenging the validity of a divorce decree based on his claim that the wife was not a resident of Wyoming when she filed the action because the decree carried a prima facie presumption of jurisdictional regularity, the wife made a prima facie showing of residence, and both parties had remarried and had children in reliance upon the validity of the decree. McDougall v. McDougall, 961 P.2d 382, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1998).

Husband was estopped from denying validity of divorce decree on grounds of wife's residence, where he accepted benefits from separation agreement, which was incorporated in decree, for nearly three years. Black v. De Black, 1 P.3d 1244, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 2000).

Applied in

Hensley v. Hensley, 896 P.2d 115, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

Ellison v. Walter ex rel. Walter, 834 P.2d 680, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1992).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Duty to recognize and give effect to decrees of divorce rendered in other states, or in foreign country, as affected by lack of domicile at divorce forum, 1 ALR2d 1385, 27 ALR2d 1303.

Length or duration of domicil, as distinguished from fact of domicil, as a jurisdictional matter, 2 ALR2d 291.

Validity of statute permitting granting of divorces to nonresidents, 3 ALR2d 666.

Jurisdiction as affected by change of residence pendente lite, 7 ALR2d 1414.

Residence or domicil, for purposes of divorce action, of one in armed forces, 21 ALR2d 1163.

Nature and location of one's business or calling as element in determining domicil in divorce cases, 36 ALR2d 756.

What constitutes residence or domicil within state by citizen of another country for purpose of jurisdiction in divorce, 51 ALR3d 223.

Validity of statute imposing durational residency requirements for divorce applicants, 57 ALR3d 221.

§ 20-2-108. Action conducted as civil action.

Actions to annul or affirm a marriage, for a divorce or to establish any order regarding the maintenance or custody of children shall be conducted in the same manner as civil actions, and the court may decree costs and enforce its decree as in other cases, except a divorce decree shall not be entered less than twenty (20) days from the date the complaint is filed.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 10; R.S. 1887, § 1576; R.S. 1899, § 2993; C.S. 1910, § 3929; C.S. 1920, § 4995; R.S. 1931, § 35-113; C.S. 1945, § 3-5911; W.S. 1957, § 20-50; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-108 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 3.

Divorce deemed civil action. —

Proceedings for divorce are not listed in Wyoming statutes as “special proceedings” but as an action to which general rules of equity are ordinarily applied, though in some respects limited by statute. Book v. Book, 59 Wyo. 423, 141 P.2d 546, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1943).

Suit by minor. —

While commencement of a suit by a minor in his own name is an irregularity, it may be cured by amendment of petition. Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1937).

§ 20-2-109. Restraining orders concerning property or pecuniary interests during litigation.

If after filing a complaint for divorce it appears probable to the court that either party is about to do any act that would defeat or render less effective any order which the court might ultimately make concerning property or pecuniary interests, an order shall be made for the prevention thereof and such process issued as the court deems necessary or proper.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 16; R.S. 1887, § 1582; R.S. 1899, § 2999; C.S. 1910, § 3935; C.S. 1920, § 5001; R.S. 1931, § 35-119; C.S. 1945, § 3-5917; W.S. 1957, § 20-56; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-109 .

Coverage of bond. —

Bond given in action of divorce, to secure dissolution of order restraining alienation of property and also conditioned upon payment of temporary alimony, does not cover payment of permanent alimony as well. Snow v. Duxstad, 23 Wyo. 82, 147 P. 174, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1915).

Bond, given to secure dissolution of order restraining disposition of property and to secure payment of alimony pending suit, covers alimony accruing during the period between dismissal of plaintiff's action and disposition of her appeal. Snow v. Duxstad, 23 Wyo. 82, 147 P. 174, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1915).

Release of surety. —

Dismissal of action for divorce by trial court did not release surety from his liability on a bond executed to procure the release of defendant in such action from a temporary restraining order. Snow v. Duxstad, 23 Wyo. 82, 147 P. 174, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1915).

Return by surety on bond of money deposited with him by his principal to secure his liability does not release him from liability on reversal of judgment of dismissal of action in which bond was given. Snow v. Duxstad, 23 Wyo. 82, 147 P. 174, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1915).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Spouse's dissipation of marital assets prior to divorce as factor in divorce court's determination of property division, 41 ALR4th 416.

Divorce and separation: effect of court order prohibiting sale or transfer of property on party's right to change beneficiary of insurance policy, 68 ALR4th 929.

§ 20-2-110. Restraint during litigation.

After the filing of a complaint for divorce or to annul a marriage, on the petition of either party the court may prohibit the other party from imposing any restraint upon the petitioner’s personal liberty during the pendency of the action.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 11; R.S. 1887, § 1577; R.S. 1899, § 2994; C.S. 1910, § 3930; C.S. 1920, § 4996; R.S. 1931, § 35-114; C.S. 1945, § 3-5912; W.S. 1957, § 20-57; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-110 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 3.

§ 20-2-111. Alimony during pendency of action; allowances for prosecution or defense of action; costs.

In every action brought for divorce, the court may require either party to pay any sum necessary to enable the other to carry on or defend the action and for support and the support of the children of the parties during its pendency. The court may decree costs against either party and award execution for the costs, or it may direct costs to be paid out of any property sequestered, in the power of the court, or in the hands of a receiver. The court may also direct payment to either party for such purpose of any sum due and owing from any person.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 12; R.S. 1887, § 1578; R.S. 1899, § 2995; C.S. 1910, § 2931; C.S. 1920, § 4997; R.S. 1931, § 35-115; C.S. 1945, § 3-5913; W.S. 1957, § 20-58; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-111 .

Discretion not abused by award for attorney fees. —

District court acted well within its authority in ordering a father to pay a mother’s attorney fees and, therefore, there was no abuse of discretion; in enforcement actions, a court has discretion to award attorney fees and costs. Van Fleet v. Guyette, 2020 WY 78, 466 P.3d 812, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 2020).

Mother was not entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees based on a father’s lack of cogent argument and citation to pertinent legal authority because the trial court’s judgment was reversed in part, but the mother was statutorily entitled to reimbursement of certain costs and fees necessarily incurred in having to defend against the father’s largely baseless challenges to the trial court’s visitation and property division awards. Johnson v. Johnson, 2020 WY 18, 458 P.3d 27, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2020).

Section inapplicable to action for breach of settlement agreement. —

Where an action by a divorced wife on a property settlement agreement was a proceeding for breach of contract and to recover damages therefor, it is not within the purview of this section, nor is it within the extended authority given this section by interpretations placed upon it which have held proper allowance of attorney's fees for prosecuting appeals in divorce actions or in proceedings for modification of divorce decrees or for enforcement of such decrees. Ulrich v. Ulrich, 366 P.2d 999, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1961).

Parties and court bound by contract settlements. —

Contract between husband and wife fixing amount of alimony is binding upon both of them and upon court in trial of an action for divorce, contract in such and similar cases being presumed fair, and burden is on wife to establish the contrary. Rhinehart v. Rhinehart, 52 Wyo. 363, 75 P.2d 390, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (1938).

Discretion of court. —

Even though grave abuse of trial court's discretion is asserted, supreme court cannot fairly charge trial court therewith when it is not supplied with oral testimony given at hearings on motions before trial court. Book v. Book, 59 Wyo. 423, 141 P.2d 546, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1943).

Extremely broad discretion in handling and disposing of matters allowing litigation expense and support money to wife in divorce action should not be interfered with by supreme court except upon clear proof that such discretion was gravely abused. Book v. Book, 59 Wyo. 423, 141 P.2d 546, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1943); Haltom v. Haltom, 755 P.2d 876, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1988).

Interpretation of “necessary”. —

Although the husband asserted that the award of attorney's fees was not necessary under this section as the wife had the funds, the meaning of “necessary” in the statute was that the expenditure was required to defend the divorce case, which the husband had filed. McMurry v. McMurry, 2010 WY 163, 245 P.3d 316, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 2010).

Attorney's fees awardable. —

Court has broad discretion as to whether to award attorney's fees pursuant to this section. Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1991).

Husband's argument that attorney fee award was not authorized by this section was without merit because the appeal arose from wife's efforts to enforce the February 2006 judgment after husband's failure to comply. Burnett v. Steeley, 2008 WY 94, 190 P.3d 132, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 2008).

Mother was entitled to attorney's fees on appeal where had incurred thousands of dollars in attorney's fees in post-divorce litigation and additional fees were incurred in subsequent litigation and in the instant appeal, her monthly net income for child support purposes was $3,378.15, and the post-divorce litigation generated in the case was excessive and much of the responsibility for that litigation rested with the father. Jensen v. Milatzo-Jensen, 2014 WY 165, 340 P.3d 276, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 2014).

Award of attorney fees. —

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney fees where the only evidence was an itemized list of plaintiff's attorney fees presented by plaintiff with no objection from defendant. Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1997).

District court properly granted the wife attorney's fees and costs in a divorce case, where it was apparent from the record, including the accounting and itemized legal bills the wife submitted to the district court, as well as the wife's testimony, that the wife incurred the attorney's fees and costs at issue while attempting to enforce a district court's judgment against the husband; the statute authorized the district court to award the wife attorney's fees and costs for that purpose. Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2006 WY 48, 132 P.3d 189, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2006).

Award of attorney fees to the mother under this section was affirmed, even though the contempt findings against the father were reversed, because the mother was forced to file her motion to enforce the divorce decree. Bullock v. Bullock, 2014 WY 131, 336 P.3d 136, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 2014).

Authority to fix and approve attorney's fees. —

While the statutes in divorce actions do not specifically provide authority to award attorney's fees, this section gives the trial court authority to require the husband to pay necessary sums for the wife to carry on or defend an action for divorce. The court has considered that authority to fix and approve attorney's fees. Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 280 (Wyo. 1977).

Attorney's fees not penalty. —

The allowance of attorney's fees is pursuant to the court's authority in divorce matters to assist the party in continuing the litigation of the action, and not as a penalty under Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 223 (Wyo. 1978).

Evidentiary standard for fees, costs not satisfied. —

An informal exchange between the district court and wife's counsel regarding counsel's fees did not satisfy the evidentiary standard as to either attorney fees or costs. Delgado v. Delgado, 773 P.2d 446, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1989).

It was an abuse of discretion to order a father to pay a mother's attorney's fees incurred in resisting the father's denied motions for protective orders because the mother did not meet the mother's burden to show the fees were reasonable. Jensen v. Milatzo-Jensen, 2013 WY 27, 297 P.3d 768, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2013).

Discretion not abused by award for attorney fees. —

Under this section, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court when it required the husband to pay $7,000 towards the wife's attorney fees. Karns v. Karns, 511 P.2d 955, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1973).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the former wife's request for attorney's fees was reasonable based on an itemized list of fees she submitted. Rocha v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1996).

Although husband and wife were both independently wealthy, this section does not require that wife establish financial necessity for an award of attorney's fees and costs, and her itemized list of expenses was sufficient to establish reasonableness of fees in light of expenditures made by husband. Black v. De Black, 1 P.3d 1244, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 2000).

In post-divorce proceedings, the mother was the prevailing party on the father's motion to modify child custody; notwithstanding the parties' divorce settlement agreement, the district court's decision to award the mother $ 135,000 in attorneys' fees and costs under this section was not unreasonable. The mother proved the reasonableness of the fees under the lodestar test, because her motion contained minute detail as to all that was involved in incurring the fees and costs; during the motion hearing, counsel also argued as to the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees. Weiss v. Weiss, 2009 WY 124, 217 P.3d 408, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2009).

Allowance of attorney's fees not needed. —

The wife did not need the allowance of attorney's fees to enable her to carry on an action to enforce the decree or to defend an action to modify the decree: she had a master's degree in special education and was employed as an educational diagnostician for a school district. Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1985).

Modification of award. —

Application to modify award of alimony to wife, because of her remarriage, was properly denied, where alimony was in settlement of wife's claims against husband. Moore v. Moore, 33 Wyo. 230, 237 P. 235, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1925).

Testimony on original trial was properly admitted on application to modify decree of alimony. Moore v. Moore, 33 Wyo. 230, 237 P. 235, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1925).

Motion to reconsider. —

Where motion to reconsider was filed only six days after court's order denying wife's motion for temporary alimony, support and expense money and attorney's fees, motion was addressed to sound discretion of trial court. Book v. Book, 59 Wyo. 423, 141 P.2d 546, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1943).

Dismissal of appeal as remedy. —

Where a husband brought error to review a judgment against him in divorce, and was required to pay his wife's attorney fees, which he failed to do, her remedy was by motion to dismiss, and not to punish him for contempt. Brown v. Brown, 22 Wyo. 316, 140 P. 829, 1914 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1914).

Trial court may consider motion for support during appeal. —

After commencement of proceedings in error district court has jurisdiction to grant an order for a reasonable amount for support of the wife and a reasonable amount for attorney's fees. Snow v. Duxstad, 23 Wyo. 82, 147 P. 174, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1915).

Or supreme court may consider motion. —

Where, on refusal to grant divorce, action was brought to supreme court on error, that court, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may consider motion for an allowance for support of plaintiff and her child pending proceedings, and for reasonable allowance for expenses. Duxstad v. Duxstad, 16 Wyo. 396, 94 P. 463, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1908).

Preservation for review of attorney fee award. —

Where wife appealed from the $15,000 awarded to her for her attorney fees pursuant to her Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 motion, the appellate court could not review the factual basis for the district court's discretionary ruling where there was no transcript of the hearing on the wife's motion for attorneys' fees in the record. Seherr-Thoss v. Seherr-Thoss, 2006 WY 111, 141 P.3d 705, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2006).

Quoted in

DeWitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 539 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

Cotton v. McCulloh, 2005 WY 159, 125 P.3d 252, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (2005).

Law reviews. —

See “Alimony in an Ex Parte Proceeding,” 12 Wyo. L.J. 72 (1957).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Misconduct or fault of wife as affecting right to temporary alimony, 2 ALR2d 307.

Jurisdiction as to alimony or maintenance pending appeal of matrimonial action, 19 ALR2d 703.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 54 ALR2d 1422.

Amount of attorney's compensation for services in divorce matters, 56 ALR2d 13.

Husband's right to alimony, maintenance, suit money or attorney's fees, 66 ALR2d 880.

Necessity and sufficiency of notice and hearing as to allowance of suit money or counsel fees in divorce or other marital action, 10 ALR3d 280.

Wife's possession of independent means as affecting her right to temporary alimony, 60 A.L.R.3d 719.

Husband's death as affecting periodic payment provision of separation agreement, 5 ALR4th 1153.

Authority of divorce court to award prospective or anticipated attorneys' fees to enable parties to maintain or defend divorce suit, 22 ALR4th 407.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as separate maintenance, alimony, or support for spouse without absolute divorce, 26 ALR4th 1190.

Excessiveness or adequacy of money awarded as temporary alimony, 26 ALR4th 1218.

Court's authority to award temporary alimony or suit money in action for divorce, separate maintenance, or alimony where the existence of a valid marriage is contested, 34 ALR4th 814.

Order awarding temporary support or living expenses upon separation of unmarried partners pending contract action based on services relating to personal relationship, 35 ALR4th 409.

Reconciliation as affecting decree for limited divorce, separation, alimony, separate maintenance or spousal support, 36 ALR4th 502.

Divorced or separated spouse's living with member of opposite sex as affecting other spouse's obligation of alimony or support under separation agreement, 47 ALR4th 38.

Power to modify spousal support award for a limited term, issued in conjunction with divorce, so as to extend the term or make the award permanent, 62 ALR4th 180.

Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees in domestic relations cases, 17 ALR5th 366.

Validity, construction, and application of provision in separation agreement affecting distribution or payment of attorneys' fees, 47 ALR5th 207.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of lump-sum alimony award, 49 ALR5th 441.

Alimony or child-support awards as subject to attorneys' liens, 49 ALR5th 595.

Effect of same-sex relationship on right to spousal support, 73 ALR5th 599.

§ 20-2-112. Examination concerning property interests; enforcement of court orders; temporary custody of children.

1. In a proceeding for divorce, the court may cause the attendance of either party and compel an answer under oath concerning his property, rights or interests, or money that he may have or money due or to become due to him from others, and make such order thereon as is just and equitable. To enforce its orders concerning alimony, temporary or permanent, or property or pecuniary interests, the court may require security for obedience thereto, or may enforce the orders by attachment, commitment, injunction or by other means.
2. On the application of either party, the court may make such order concerning the care and custody of the minor children of the parties and their suitable maintenance during the pendency of the action as is proper and necessary and may enforce its order and decree in the manner provided in subsection (a) of this section. The party applying for the order shall notify the court of any known protection or custody orders issued on behalf of the parties from any other court. The court shall consider evidence of spouse abuse or child abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the children. If the court finds that family violence has occurred, the court shall make arrangements for visitation during temporary custody that best protect the children and the abused spouse from further harm.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, §§ 13, 17; R.S. 1887, §§ 1579, 1583; R.S. 1899, §§ 2996, 3000; C.S. 1910, §§ 3932, 3936; C.S. 1920, §§ 4998, 5002; R.S. 1931, §§ 35-116, 35-120; C.S. 1945, §§ 3-5914, 3-5918; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-59, 20-60; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-112 ; Laws 1989, ch. 227, § 1; Laws 1999, ch. 93, § 1; 2000, ch. 34, § 3.

Cross references. —

For the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, see chapter 5 of this title.

Welfare of child paramount consideration. —

In awarding custody of children in divorce proceedings, leading question is welfare and benefit of children, and parental wishes, rights, and affections must in all cases give way to this paramount issue, both in law and equity. Ex parte Madson, 25 Wyo. 338, 169 P. 336, 1917 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1917).

In determining question of its custody, the welfare of a child of divorced parents is a matter of paramount consideration. Linch v. Harden, 26 Wyo. 47, 176 P. 156, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1918).

Controlling question in awarding custody of children is their welfare, but rights of parents must be considered if not conflicting with such welfare. Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1926).

And custody may be given to third person. —

Under this section and former § 20-2-113 , relating to custody of children in divorce proceedings, court could order children into custody of third person during pendency of action. Ex parte Madson, 25 Wyo. 338, 169 P. 336, 1917 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1917).

Jurisdiction to permit out-of-state visit. —

District court has jurisdiction to grant divorced wife permission to take children, who were in custody of husband, out of state for visit. Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1926).

Parent has duty to support incapacitated child even though the child has reached the age of majority. Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1982).

Discretion of court. —

Order allowing wife to remove children, who were in custody of husband, from his home for visit on receiving court's permission was not abuse of discretion. Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1926).

Effect of child's earnings on parental liability for nonsupport. —

Husband who owed $1,670 for support of son attending university was liable for contempt though son earned $300 a month during the summer vacation, since earnings of child during the time a support order is in effect has no bearing on guilt or innocence of contempt. Weppner v. Weppner, 78 Wyo. 106, 319 P.2d 127, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 1957).

Failure to appear, pay support, justifies arrest. —

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a bench warrant for the husband's arrest and setting bail, where the husband had failed to attend at least three hearings and to pay temporary support, temporary alimony and attorney's fees. Honan v. Honan, 809 P.2d 783, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1991).

Court abused its discretion in issuing temporary order modifying custody. —

District court abused its discretion in issuing a temporary order modifying child custody because it was not appropriate to use a temporary order as a sort of probationary custody arrangement for over seven months before entering a final order; the temporary order sacrificed the children’s vital interest in stability; and, although the district court likely acted with the belief that the temporary order might enhance stability for the children, by keeping the shared custody arrangement in place and motivating the mother to stop drinking and cease her alienating conduct, the supreme court had rejected the courts’ attempts to make better parents out of the parties by imposing certain custody arrangements. Womack v. Swan, 2018 WY 27, 413 P.3d 127, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2018).

Cited in

Tracy v. Tracy, 2017 WY 17, 388 P.3d 1257, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2017).

Stated in

Forney v. Minard, 849 P.2d 724, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey alimony decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous, 12 ALR2d 1059.

Decree for alimony rendered in another state or country (or domestic decree based thereon) as subject to proceedings, by equitable remedies or by contempt proceedings, 18 ALR2d 862.

Right to interest on unpaid alimony, 33 ALR2d 1455.

Pleading and burden of proof, in contempt proceedings, as to ability to comply with order for payment of alimony or child support, 53 ALR2d 591.

Proceeding for enforcement of order as affected by Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended, 54 ALR2d 390.

Decree for periodical payments for support or alimony as a lien or the subject of a declaration of lien, 59 ALR2d 656.

Who may institute civil contempt proceeding arising out of matrimonial action, 61 ALR2d 1083.

Laches, statute of limitations or acquiescence as defense to action or proceeding for alimony or support of child allowed by court order or decree, 70 ALR2d 1250, 5 ALR4th 1015.

Necessity of notice of application for temporary custody of child, 31 ALR3d 1393.

Withholding visitation rights for failure to make alimony or support payments, 51 ALR3d 520.

Effect, in subsequent proceedings, of paternity findings or implications in divorce or annulment decree or in support or custody order made incidental thereto, 78 ALR3d 846.

Admissibility of social worker's expert testimony on child custody issues, 1 ALR4th 837.

Parent's physical disability or handicap as factor in custody award or proceedings, 3 ALR4th 1044.

Spouse's professional degree or license as marital property for purposes of alimony, support, or property settlement, 4 ALR4th 1294.

Laches or acquiescence as defense, so as to bar recovery of arrearages of permanent alimony or child support, 5 ALR4th 1015.

Appointment or discharge of receiver for marital or community property necessitated by suit for divorce or separation, 15 ALR4th 224.

Necessity of requiring presence in court of both parties in proceedings relating to custody or visitation of children, 15 ALR4th 864.

Propriety of awarding custody of child to parent residing or intending to reside in foreign country, 20 ALR4th 677.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as separate maintenance, alimony, or support for spouse without absolute divorce, 26 ALR4th 1190.

Court-authorized permanent or temporary removal of child by parent to foreign country, 30 ALR4th 548.

Property settlement agreement as affecting divorced spouse's right to recover as named beneficiary under former spouse's life insurance policy, 31 ALR4th 59.

Spouse's right to discovery of closely held corporation records during divorce proceeding, 38 ALR4th 145.

Necessity that divorce court value property before distributing it, 51 ALR4th 11.

Divorce: propriety of using contempt proceeding to enforce property settlement award or order, 72 ALR4th 298.

Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments, 11 ALR5th 259.

Rights and remedies of parents inter se with respect to the names of their children, 40 ALR5th 697.

Divorce and separation: attorney's contingent fee contracts as marital property subject to distribution, 44 ALR5th 671.

Construction and effect of statutes mandating consideration of, or creating presumptions regarding, domestic violence in awarding custody of children, 51 ALR5th 241.

Admissibility of expert testimony regarding questions of domestic law, 66 ALR5th 135.

Division of lottery proceeds in divorce proceedings, 124 ALR 5th 537.

§ 20-2-113. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 6.

Cross references. —

For present provisions as to custody and visitation, see § 20-2-201 et seq. For present provisions as to child support, see § 20-2-301 et seq.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1882, ch. 40, §§ 14, 29, related the the court's authority to make disposition of any children after granting a divorce or annulment decree.

§ 20-2-114. Disposition of property to be equitable; factors; alimony generally.

1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, in granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to either party reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other’s ability to pay and may order so much of the other’s real estate or the rents and profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either party.
2. In making a disposition of property pursuant to this section, a court shall not do any of the following:
   1. Consider any federal disability benefits awarded to a veteran for service-connected disabilities pursuant to title 38, chapter 11 of the United States Code;
   2. Indemnify a veteran’s spouse or former spouse for any waiver or reduction in military retirement or retainer pay related to receipt of veteran disability benefits pursuant to title 38, chapter 11 of the United States Code;
   3. Award any other income or property of the veteran to the veteran’s spouse or former spouse as compensation for any waiver or reduction in military retirement or retainer pay related to receipt of veteran disability benefits pursuant to title 38, chapter 11 of the United States Code.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 15; R.S. 1887, § 1581; R.S. 1899, § 2998; C.S. 1910, § 3934; C.S. 1920, § 5000; R.S. 1931, § 35-118; C.S. 1945, § 3-5916; W.S. 1957, § 20-63; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-114 ; Laws 1982, ch. 20, § 1; 2000, ch. 34, § 3; 2013, ch. 196, § 1.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, designated the existing provision as (a), added “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section” at the beginning of (a), and added (b).

• I. General Consideration.
• II. Disposition of Property.
• III. Review and Enforcement.

§ 20-2-115. [Amended and Renumbered.]

Amended and renumbered as § 20-2-314 by Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 2.

§ 20-2-116. Revision of alimony and other allowances.

After a decree for alimony or other allowance for a party or children and after a decree for the appointment of trustees to receive and hold any property for the use of a party or children pursuant to W.S. 20-2-314 , the court may from time to time, on the petition of either of the parties, revise and alter the decree respecting the amount of the alimony or allowance or the payment thereof and respecting the appropriation and payment of the principal and income of the property so held in trust and may make any decree respecting any of the matters which the court might have made in the original action.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 21; R.S. 1887, § 1587; R.S. 1899, § 3004; C.S. 1910, § 3940; C.S. 1920, § 5006; R.S. 1931, § 35-124; C.S. 1945, § 3-5922; W.S. 1957, § 20-66; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-116 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 3.

Implied-in-fact modification.—

District court, which required a father to pay 75% of his daughter's residential treatment costs, did not clearly err in rejecting the father's claim of an implied-in-fact modification of the parties' divorce agreement. The views reflected in the parties' testimony, coupled with the lack of any discussion between the parties as to cost sharing, made it objectively unreasonable to find an implied-in-fact agreement to modify the divorce agreement. Samiec v. Hopkins, 2015 WY 131, 358 P.3d 506, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 2015).

Property settlement contracts favored. —

A husband and wife may not only enter a property settlement contract but it is favored in the law and should be enforced if legally possible. Pavlica v. Pavlica, 587 P.2d 639, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 249 (Wyo. 1978).

Court cannot modify money judgment. —

This section, authorizing the court to alter a decree for alimony or allowance for children, cannot be interpreted as permitting it to interfere with or modify what has become a money judgment. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976); Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 364 (Wyo. 1981).

Or decree containing agreed property settlement. —

A trial court does not have power to modify a decree insofar as it contains an agreed property settlement or if it is in the nature of a property settlement. Pavlica v. Pavlica, 587 P.2d 639, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 249 (Wyo. 1978); Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 364 (Wyo. 1981).

A provision in a divorce decree calling for payment of a sum certain — $800 a month for 10 years — and fixing the obligation as a lien upon real property in order to secure the payment even after the death of the parties was in fact a part of the property settlement and the trial court was without justification to change the payments. McMillan v. McMillan, 702 P.2d 1279, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 503 (Wyo. 1985).

As no continuing jurisdiction over spouses. —

To say that the court has a continuing jurisdiction and a responsibility to revise its provisions for the custody of children, according to their best interest and welfare, is not to say the court retains the same kind of continuing jurisdiction with respect to the civil rights of the parents, as between each other. Pavlica v. Pavlica, 587 P.2d 639, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 249 (Wyo. 1978).

Foreign judgment subject to section. —

If a foreign judgment for divorce with provisions for alimony and support is to be entered in a district court of this state with the same force and effect as a judgment of this state, it must be subject to the provisions of this section. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976).

Modification denied. —

District court did not abuse its discretion in finding the father was voluntarily underemployed and in refusing to modify alimony as the district court was not bound to modify alimony because it modified the child support; the alimony served a different purpose and was not awarded solely on the basis of income but was, to a degree, in lieu of property available for division; and the court was justified in considering employment expectancy reasonably created by the father’s experience, capability and physical ability when it refused to modify the original award, notwithstanding the imputed income it used to modify child support. Linden v. Linden, 2020 WY 9, 455 P.3d 1254, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2020).

Equitable powers of court not abrogated. —

The grant of statutory power to provide for the custody and care of children in connection with a divorce decree does not abrogate the equitable powers of the court existing independent thereof. It follows from this that the equitable powers of the court likewise exist in an action having to do with unpaid child support installments. Wardle v. Wardle, 464 P.2d 854, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1970).

Agreement by parties has no effect on power of court to modify. —

Under this section giving the court a general power to modify a decree for alimony or support, the exercise of that power is not affected by the fact that the decree is based on an agreement entered into by the parties to the action. Buchler v. Buchler, 65 Wyo. 452, 202 P.2d 670, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1949).

Courts have power to refuse judicial approval of agreement between husband and wife as to payments for support of herself and children, with a provision that it would bind the parties, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns. Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1933).

Proceeding to modify divorce decree is filed under same docket assigned in original proceeding. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1965).

But separate and distinct case. —

A modification proceeding involves new issues framed by facts differing from those existing when the original decree was entered. A new adjudication of the rights of the parties must be made. For all intents and purposes it is a separate and distinct case from the original proceeding. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1965).

Changed circumstances basis for modification. —

The whole theory which admits of a modification is that a condition which affected the interest and welfare of the child and parties either no longer exists or has so materially changed that there is a new situation presented which requires a new adjudication. Rubeling v. Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1965).

No modification of the decree can be made except for change in circumstances. Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1933).

Provisions in a decree of divorce for payments for support of wife and children meant alimony, so that court may reduce allowance when changed circumstances demand. Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1933).

A change of circumstances must exist in order to warrant revision of an allowance of alimony to a wife under this section. Buchler v. Buchler, 65 Wyo. 452, 202 P.2d 670, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1949).

Proof of change of circumstances is required in a support modification proceeding, even though it is proved that the support requirements are, for practical purposes, impossible of attainment by the father. Rubeling v. Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1965).

As long as the circumstances and conditions continue unchanged, there is no lawful power or authority in the supreme court to supplant the prior judgment of the trial court by any type of modification. Rubeling v. Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1965).

Any modification of the judgment nisi by a court of this state must be consistent with previous decisions of the supreme court declaring that a modification hearing is not a time to reconsider the evidence and premises upon which the original judgment was entered, but only to consider whether there has been such change of circumstances as to warrant a different decree. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976).

Trial court did not abuse discretion in determining no substantial change in circumstances warranting modification or termination of husband's alimony obligation to his wife because husband failed to provide appellate court with an adequate record, including properly authenticated trial transcript or statement of the evidence pursuant to Wyo. R. App. P. 3.03, to permit rational review of trial court's decision, and appellate court presumed reliability of trial court's decision and competency of evidence upon which that decision was based. Schluck v. Schluck, 2008 WY 92, 189 P.3d 877, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2008).

There is a strong presumption that original alimony decree was reasonable. Heyl v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1974).

Courts should proceed with caution in modifying any alimony decree. Heyl v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1974).

And burden upon party seeking revision. —

The burden of clearly proving there has been substantial change in the circumstances of the party or parties to alimony decree making such modification just and equitable is upon the party seeking the revision. Heyl v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1974).

Petitioning husband failed to show that the trial court did not exercise sound judgment or otherwise abused its discretion by providing continuing support to the wife through an award of alimony; even though the husband's income had decreased since the divorce, only two years had elapsed since the date of the original decree, and the husband expected more income after completing an electrical apprenticeship. Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, 76 P.3d 836, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2003).

Admission of testimony. —

On application to modify alimony decree, under this section, testimony as to original circumstances and evidence introduced on original trial, such as, that husband admitted that advances were made to him by wife, were properly admitted. Moore v. Moore, 33 Wyo. 230, 237 P. 235, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1925).

Proper evidence. —

Where husband could not continue to make payments provided for in decree without assistance from his father, it was proper to show that owing to father's change in circumstances the assistance could not be made by the father. Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1933).

Test for decision in alimony revision, like child support, is in the exercised discretion of the district court, and that decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse. Dorr v. Newman, 785 P.2d 1172, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1990).

Trial court has broad discretion in revision of alimony. Heyl v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1974).

The propriety of child support and maintenance and the determination relative to the amount thereof is within the discretion of the trial court and may be modified by the court as the circumstances require. Booker v. Booker, 626 P.2d 561, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 319 (Wyo. 1981).

Change of circumstances. —

Where change of husband's circumstances are such that he cannot make payments it is incumbent on the court to alter the decree. Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1933).

Obligation not automatically cancelled by remarriage. —

Remarriage can be considered a sufficient change of circumstances to terminate alimony, but it does not automatically terminate alimony payments without amendatory court action. Maher v. Maher, 2004 WY 62, 90 P.3d 739, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 2004).

Failure to achieve same earning level constitutes change in financial condition, and when the supporting spouse's financial condition has become so impaired he is unable to meet the obligation imposed by the original decree, it is incumbent upon the court to modify that support provision. Jones v. Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1993).

Court found no merit in a former husband's argument that his unrealized belief that he would receive sufficient earnings to cover both his living expenses and alimony payments upon moving to another state constituted a failed expectation supporting his claim that a substantial change in circumstances occurred. Maher v. Maher, 2004 WY 62, 90 P.3d 739, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 2004).

Court cannot modify award of alimony after payment completed. —

A district court may not modify, under this section, a durational award of alimony after full payment is completed unless the divorce decree specifies otherwise. Harshfield v. Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1992).

Award vacated absent evidence of ability, need. —

An award of alimony to the husband in the amount of $120,000, to be paid in monthly installments of $1,000 over a period of 10 years, was vacated, where there was scant evidence of either the wife's ability to pay alimony or the husband's need for support. Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 1989).

Obligation not automatically canceled by remarriage. —

Where the separation agreement and the decree into which it was incorporated made no provision for automatic termination of alimony upon remarriage, the remedy available to the alimony obligor was reserved to a petition to modify the decree. Remarriage could be a change of circumstance, but it did not automatically cancel the obligation provided in the decree without amendatory court action. Swetich v. Smith, 802 P.2d 869, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1990).

Alimony extended after remarriage. —

Alimony may be extended after termination of the original term of payment has expired, including such a circumstance as remarriage. Richardson v. Richardson, 868 P.2d 259, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1994).

Application for modification because of remarriage may be refused where allowance of alimony in the nature of settlement for advances. —

A husband's application for modification of a decree awarding alimony to his wife, because of her remarriage, may be refused on the ground that the wife has made advances of money to her husband and the allowance of alimony is in the nature of a settlement thereof. Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 1961).

Death of payor. —

This section changed the common law and allows, under the continuing jurisdiction of the court to modify the divorce decree, alimony payments to continue after the death of the payor spouse, if the decree intends to require such continued payments by using language such as “alimony will continue for her the spouse's lifetime”. Oedekoven v. Oedekoven, 920 P.2d 649, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1996).

Voluntary assumption of costs insufficient grounds for modification. —

The voluntary assumption of the costs of a new home and family after a divorce decree and property settlement agreement are not the changes in circumstances which normally require a modification of the decree. Booker v. Booker, 626 P.2d 561, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 319 (Wyo. 1981).

Bankruptcy proceedings justify modification. —

The court may treat the results of a bankruptcy proceeding as a change of circumstances justifying modification of the original decree. Richardson v. Richardson, 868 P.2d 259, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1994).

Acquisition of large mortgage or airplane insufficient to terminate alimony. —

Accepted Wyoming law does not accommodate the purchase of a house for over $200,000 with a large mortgage or the acquisition of an airplane for tax loss writeoff purposes as a required “change of circumstance” sufficient to terminate alimony. Johnson v. Johnson, 717 P.2d 335, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 529 (Wyo. 1986).

Judge may delete language sounding in property settlement upon determining payments alimony. —

Considering the substantially equal division of the marriage property and the stated purpose of the payments provided for in the divorce decree — to support the wife due to her “lack of a college education, lack of employable skills, and medical condition” —, the trial judge did not err in his determination that these payments were indeed alimony, and in his deletion of language sounding in property settlement, i.e., “That should plaintiff die prior to said alimony being paid in full, plaintiff's estate, assignees and devisees shall be liable for the balance.” Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 499 (Wyo. 1985).

Violation of custody provisions in a divorce decree constitutes a change in circumstances sufficient to justify the cancelling of arrearages and suspending of future payments. Wardle v. Wardle, 464 P.2d 854, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1970).

Removal of children from state, without the father's consent, may be a sufficient change of circumstances to justify suspending or reducing support payments until the children have been returned. Wardle v. Wardle, 464 P.2d 854, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1970).

When matter of wife's need becomes material. —

Where a husband seeks to terminate his alimony payments, the matter of his wife's need does not become material and should not be considered unless and until a sufficient factual showing of material change of circumstances or conditions has been made to justify any modification of the decree. Heyl v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1974).

When final judgment is entered, discretionary powers of courts are exhausted. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976); Pavlica v. Pavlica, 587 P.2d 639, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 249 (Wyo. 1978); Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 364 (Wyo. 1981).

Just because the final judgment for a fixed sum of money grows out of a divorce action, this does not continue the power of the court granting the divorce or a subsequent court having jurisdiction of the matter to extend the time for payment thereof or otherwise modify the same. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976).

There is no provision in this section which permits the court, having entered a final and complete judgment, to allow the judgment to be paid over a period of time or to be subject to qualifications that do not pertain to other judgments. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1976).

Court's judgment will not be disturbed upon appeal in the absence of a clearly demonstrated abuse of discretion. Heyl v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1974).

Record held to show change in circumstances to justify the reduction in payments provided for in original decree. — See Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1933).

Attorney's fee in connection with modification hearing. —

Where the district court ordered an attorney's fee of $100 to be paid by the husband to the wife for the modification proceedings heard in the district court, and this fee was intended to cover services rendered on behalf of the wife in the district court, for services rendered or to be rendered in the supreme court it would be better for the supreme court to say whether a further payment should be made, and if so how much. Rubeling v. Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1965).

Applied in

Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1992).

Quoted in

Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 223 (Wyo. 1978); Cubin v. Cubin, 685 P.2d 680, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1984); Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1985).

Cited in

Parry v. Parry, 766 P.2d 1168, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1989); Underkofler v. Underkofler, 834 P.2d 1140, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1992).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Alimony in an Ex Parte Proceeding,” see 12 Wyo. L.J. 72 (1957).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Husband's default, contempt or other misconduct as affecting modification of decree for support, 6 ALR2d 835.

Power of court to modify provisions of divorce decree as to alimony, as respects past due installments, 6 ALR2d 1277, 52 ALR3d 156.

Changing financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for modification of decree for alimony or maintenance, 18 ALR2d 10.

Necessity of personal service within state upon nonresident spouse as prerequisite of court's power to modify its decree as to alimony or child support in matrimonial action, 62 ALR2d 544.

Income tax as a factor in readjusting alimony, 51 ALR3d 461.

Retrospective increase in allowance for alimony, separate maintenance or support, 52 ALR3d 156.

Power of court to modify decree for support, alimony or the like, based on agreement of parties, 61 ALR3d 520.

Father's liability for support of child furnished after divorce decree which awarded custody to mother but made no provision for support, 91 ALR3d 530.

Divorced woman's subsequent sexual relations or misconduct as warranting, alone or with other circumstances, modification of alimony decree, 98 ALR3d 453.

Removal of child from jurisdiction as justifying termination, suspension, or reduction of child support payments, 8 ALR4th 1231.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as permanent alimony following divorce, 28 ALR4th 786.

Reconciliation as affecting decree for limited divorce, separation, alimony, separate maintenance or spousal support, 36 ALR4th 502.

Divorced or separated spouse's living with member of opposite sex as affecting other spouse's obligation of alimony or support under separation agreement, 47 ALR4th 38.

Court's authority to reinstitute parent's support obligation after terms of prior decree have been fulfilled, 48 ALR4th 952.

Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after absolute divorce, for modification of child custody or support order, 57 ALR4th 710.

Power to modify spousal support award for a limited term, issued in conjunction with divorce, so as to extend the term or make the award permanent, 62 ALR4th 180.

Divorce: voluntary contributions to child's education expenses as factor justifying modification of spousal support award, 63 ALR4th 436.

Divorce: court's authority to institute or increase spousal support award after discharge of prior property award in bankruptcy, 87 ALR4th 353.

Alimony as affected by recipient spouse's remarriage in absence of controlling specific statute, 47 ALR5th 129.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of lump-sum alimony award, 49 ALR5th 441.

Alimony or child-support awards as subject to attorneys' liens, 49 ALR5th 595.

Construction and effect of statutes mandating consideration of, or creating presumptions regarding, domestic violence in awarding custody of children, 51 ALR5th 241.

Consideration of obligor's personal injury recovery or settlement in fixing alimony or child support, 59 ALR5th 489.

Retirement of husband as change of circumstances warranting modification of divorce decree — Prospective retirement, 110 ALR5th 237.

§ 20-2-117. [Amended and Renumbered.]

Amended and renumbered as § 20-1-113 by Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 4.

§ 20-2-118. [Amended and Renumbered.]

Amended and renumbered as § 20-2-315 by Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 2.

§ 20-2-201. Disposition and maintenance of children in decree or order; access to records.

1. In granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a marriage or upon the establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-401 through 14-2-907 , the court may make by decree or order any disposition of the children that appears most expedient and in the best interests of the children. In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following factors:
   1. The quality of the relationship each child has with each parent;
   2. The ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging for each child’s care by others as needed;
   3. The relative competency and fitness of each parent;
   4. Each parent’s willingness to accept all responsibilities of parenting, including a willingness to accept care for each child at specified times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified times;
   5. How the parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with each other;
   6. How the parents and each child interact and communicate with each other and how such interaction and communication may be improved;
   7. The ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care without intrusion, respect the other parent’s rights and responsibilities, including the right to privacy;
   8. Geographic distance between the parents’ residences;
   9. The current physical and mental ability of each parent to care for each child;
   10. Any other factors the court deems necessary and relevant.
2. In any proceeding in which the custody of a child is at issue the court shall not prefer one (1) parent as a custodian solely because of gender.
3. The court shall consider evidence of spousal abuse or child abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the children. If the court finds that family violence has occurred, the court shall make arrangements for visitation that best protects the children and the abused spouse from further harm.
4. The court shall order custody in well defined terms to promote understanding and compliance by the parties. In determining custody a court shall not favor or disfavor any form of custody. Custody shall be crafted to promote the best interests of the children, and may include any combination of joint, shared or sole custody.
5. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the noncustodial parent shall have the same right of access as the parent awarded custody to any records relating to the child of the parties, including school records, activities, teachers and teachers’ conferences as well as medical and dental treatment providers and mental health records.
6. At any time the court may require parents to attend appropriate parenting classes, including but not limited to, parenting classes to lessen the effects of divorce on children.
7. At anytime a court is considering the custody or visitation rights of a service member, as defined by W.S. 20-2-205 , the court shall comply with W.S. 20-2-205 .
8. A court finding of physical placement of a child in a child support order shall not be considered a disposition of custody under this section.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1; 2003, ch. 93, § 2; 2011, ch. 36, § 2; 2015, ch. 113, § 1; 2018, ch. 7, § 1.

Cross references. —

For present provisions as to child support, see § 20-2-301 et seq.

For the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, see chapter 5 of this title.

As to process, and service and filing of pleadings and other papers, see Rules 4 and 5, W.R.C.P.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, added (g).

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, added (h).

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in (d), added the second sentence.

Order did not include well defined terms.—

District court’s failure to determine how custody and visitation would work when the child started school undermined the stability of his environment and disregarded the requirement that it order custody in well defined terms to promote understanding and compliance by the parties. Martin v. Hart, 2018 WY 123, 429 P.3d 56, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 2018).

Change in circumstances warranted change in custody.—

Record supported the district court’s determination that it was in the child’s best interests to award primary custody to the mother; the father’s continuous interference with the mother’s relationship with the child and his refusal to follow the court’s orders despite being held in contempt of court weighed against the father retaining custody, plus the mother’s life had stabilized and she was more willing and capable of fostering a relationship between the child and the father. Bishop v. Bishop, 2017 WY 130, 404 P.3d 1170, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2017).

Best Interests and Father's Behavior.—

District court's decision to give little weight to the father's behavior was not an abuse of discretion, as the evidence supported the finding that he was capable of caring for the child despite some poor decisions made during the parties' marriage, and he was a fit and competent parent. Williams v. Williams, 2016 WY 21, 368 P.3d 539, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2016).

Conditions on visitation. —

District court properly ordered a mother to refrain from using any alcohol during visitation with the children and to subject herself to chemical testing during the visitation periods because the appropriate use of controlled substances and alcohol were problematic in the mother’s life, and the court properly considered evidence presented at prior hearings regarding the mother’s behavior while using alcohol, which was certainly relevant to the best interests of the children. Kidd v. Jacobson, 2020 WY 64, 463 P.3d 795, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 2020).

Spousal Abuse.—

Trial court did consider the evidence of spousal abuse, and it did not abuse its discretion when it declined to base its custody decision on the evidence of abuse. Williams v. Williams, 2016 WY 21, 368 P.3d 539, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2016).

Primary Caregiver Factor.—

District court abused its discretion by failing to give appropriate weight to the fact that the mother acted as the child’s primary caregiver throughout her life, and finding contrary to the evidence that the father shared in the role of primary caregiver. Williams v. Williams, 2016 WY 21, 368 P.3d 539, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the father primary physical and residential custody of the child after she entered kindergarten; contrary to the mother’s claim, the trial court did not ignore her primary caregiver status and noted that the father had a large support system in Wyoming, whereas the mother did not have a large support system in Idaho, plus the mother had given the father two weeks’ notice before moving, which move made his visitation schedule impossible. Walsh v. Smith, 2020 WY 25, 458 P.3d 58, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2020).

Change in residence.—

District court appropriately evaluated and weighed the factors and declined to change custody from the mother to the father after the mother moved from Wyoming to Arizona where she found work; the mother had been the children's primary caregiver, she had made good efforts to facilitate a relationship with the father, the district court was reluctant to force her to return to Wyoming, where she could not support herself, and the trial court ordered the father as much visitation as possible under the circumstances, such that there was no abuse of discretion. Greer v. Greer, 2017 WY 35, 391 P.3d 1127, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2017).

District court abused its discretion in granting a custody modification petition prompted by a custodial mother’s relocation because the court did not consider (1) the impact of sibling separation, (2) the child’s separation from a primary caregiver, and (3) the mother’s motive or the possibility of reasonable visitation. Ianelli v. Camino, 2019 WY 67, 444 P.3d 61, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the father primary physical and residential custody of the child after she entered kindergarten; no serious question was ever raised regarding the relocation factors, the court made clear that its most pressing concern was the support network available to the child in each location and each parent’s willingness to put her needs above their own, and the court reasonably gave greater weight to factors other than the relocation factors. Walsh v. Smith, 2020 WY 25, 458 P.3d 58, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2020).

Findings for unconventional arrangements must appear on the record. —

Child custody decisions must be based upon the best interests of the children, with consideration given to the statutory factors of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-20(a). When the exercise of its discretion in custody matters involves splitting custody of children between parents or other unconventional custody approaches, the trial court must provide an explanation of its reasoning and place its findings on the record. Noonan v. Noonan, 2005 WY 145, 122 P.3d 964, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 2005).

Court, not parties, may revise decree. —

While agreements and stipulations between the divorced parties are presumed fair and favored by the courts, such agreements must be promptly submitted to the district court having jurisdiction to revise the original decree. The parties may not independently revise the decree; only the district court can do that, when warranted. McKenzie v. Shepard, 814 P.2d 701, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1991).

Statutory powers not exclusive. —

The grant of power to provide for custody and care of children in connection with a decree granting a divorce does not abrogate the equitable powers of court existing independent thereof, nor does it limit exercise of the power granted in another statute under somewhat different circumstances. Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1937).

Settlement agreement presumed to merge into decree. —

When, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the parties enter into a settlement agreement in contemplation of divorce and the district court's divorce decree incorporates or adopts by reference that agreement, the agreement is presumed to merge into the decree and will no longer be given effect. Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1992).

Two step analysis. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) sets forth factors to be considered in determining the best interests of a child in an initial custody proceeding, however, it is only during the second step of a modification inquiry that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) requires consideration of the best interests of the child pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a). A best interest analysis is not required, nor even necessarily appropriate, to the threshold determination as to whether a material change in circumstances has occurred. CLH v. MMJ (In re TLJ), 2006 WY 28, 129 P.3d 874, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2006).

Parentage Act does not apply. —

The rules under the Wyoming Parentage Act (§ 14-2-101 et seq.) do not apply where paternity of a child presumed to be a child of the marriage is determined by consent of the parties in a proceeding to modify a divorce decree to include a child conceived during the marriage but born afterward. CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1992).

Parental rights yield to rights of child. —

Recognition that parental rights are fundamental does not alter the cardinal rule that when the rights of a parent and the rights of a child collide, it is the rights of the parent which must yield. Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1995).

Limitation on child's using term “daddy” unenforceable. —

An order prohibiting the wife from encouraging or allowing the child to refer to anyone except the husband as “daddy” or any other such term was unenforceable, potentially abusive and overly broad. Gaines v. Doby, 773 P.2d 442, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1989).

Divorce decree is res judicata on all issues therein decided, as a general rule. Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 408 (Wyo. 1981).

Custody decrees not res judicata. —

Judgments awarding custody of child of divorced parents, necessarily provisional in character, ordinarily are not res judicata either in same court or that of another state, despite full faith and credit clause of federal constitution (article 4, § 1), except as to specific facts before court at time of any judgment in question. Linch v. Harden, 26 Wyo. 47, 176 P. 156, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1918).

Where Oregon court, which had divorced father, granted him custody of minor daughter on ground mother was not suitable custodian, Wyoming court thereafter, on showing mother was in situation and condition properly to care for child, properly awarded custody to her. Oregon order was conclusive only as to facts on which it was made. Linch v. Harden, 26 Wyo. 47, 176 P. 156, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1918).

Order amending order relative to custody of children of divorced parents, though appealable as final order, does not preclude further hearing on question of custody. Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1926).

Default judgments as to custody or visitation. —

When the parties do not intentionally ignore the process involving the future of their child, default is not favored when the issue of child custody or visitation is before the court. Esquibel v. Esquibel, 917 P.2d 1150, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1996).

Postnuptial agreement restricting court's power invalid. —

A postnuptial agreement's provision attempting to restrict the court's proper custody determination by requiring that any child of the marriage be placed in the custody of the same sex parent was invalid, i.e., void as against public policy, in direct conflict with subsection (a). Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1993).

Welfare of child paramount consideration. —

The goal to be achieved in dealing with the custody of children, is a reasonable balance of the rights and affections of each of the parents, with paramount consideration being given to the welfare and needs of the children. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1965).

In child custody and support proceedings, the paramount concern of the court is the child's welfare. Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1982).

In a custody dispute, a father's claim that the father should have been granted custody or visitation in France, based on a claim that the children were or could become French citizens, failed because (1) the claim was properly considered in the context of the statutory best interest factors, (2) the father did not comply with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-12-301 through 1-12-306 so as to allow the court to take judicial notice of French law, and (3) the father filed no transcript of the trial court's proceedings. Harignordoquy v. Barlow, 2013 WY 149, 313 P.3d 1265, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 817, 135 S. Ct. 66, 190 L. Ed. 2d 33, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 5136 (U.S. 2014).

District court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary custody of a child to the father because its detailed analysis demonstrated that it carefully considered the best interests of the child and determined that they would be served by awarding primary custody to the father. JCLK v. ZHB, 2015 WY 95, 353 P.3d 720, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2015).

Court erred in modifying visitation schedule. —

Although the district court properly found a material change in circumstances that had negatively affected the children’s best interests based on the visitation location at the parties’ former marital residence, and properly modified the location for the father’s visitation, the district court erred in modifying the father’s visitation schedule to provide that the children would spend extended periods of time with him beyond what either party requested because it made no finding that would explain why such visitation was in the children’s best interests; and the record did not contain evidence that such a schedule was in the children’s best interests. Booth v. Booth, 2019 WY 5, 432 P.3d 902, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2019).

Gender as a factor in custody award. —

Consideration of gender is not prohibited in a custody determination; this section simply prohibits gender from being the sole basis of a custody award. Every case requires careful weighing of relevant factors, looking to the unique and individual family relationships, in order to reach a resolution that is in the best interests of the children. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, 92 P.3d 298, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2004) sub. nom.Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, 125 P.3d 1022, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2006).

Gender as consideration in award of custody. —

Consideration of gender is not prevented in a custody award; the statute simply prohibits gender from being the sole basis of a custody award. Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, 22 P.3d 861, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2001).

Ordinarily, the care and custody of young children should be awarded to the mother. Butcher v. Butcher, 363 P.2d 923, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1961).

Change from father to mother urgent as daughter became a teenager. —

Trial court did not err in changing child custody from the father to the mother when the daughter's preference to live with the mother had become more urgent as the daughter became a teenager, and the mother had changed her lifestyle. Basden v. Cole, 2005 WY 151, 123 P.3d 566, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. Dec. 20, 2005).

But maternal preference mistake of law. —

The trial court specifically stated that it was utilizing a maternal preference for a custody decision. This is a mistake of law, and not a matter of discretion. Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 526 (Wyo. 1986).

And custody may be awarded father in interests of children. —

Custody of children will be awarded to the father when it appears that the best interests of the children will be promoted, and while young children of tender age are ordinarily awarded to the mother, that rule is not inflexible. Butcher v. Butcher, 363 P.2d 923, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1961).

Domestic violence in home that mother shared with boyfriend amounted to a material change in circumstances that warranted awarding primary custody to father. Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2000), reh'g denied, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. May 23, 2000).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody decree and granting physical custody of the parties' children to the father. The district court found there was no real change in the mother's circumstances, citing she continued to live with her parents, they continued to provide for her and her children, she had been through numerous jobs, and she continued to prowl the bars at least two nights each week while her parents looked after the children. In contrast, the court found significant changes in the father's circumstances, including: regular employment for over 18 months, financial responsibility for himself and his children, and lifestyle changes which enhanced his ability to parent his children including the providing of health insurance for the children, his stoppage of smoking, drinking and chewing, and his remarriage. Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, 96 P.3d 21, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 2004).

Sufficient evidence for change of custody. —

Sufficient evidence supported the court's change of custody in favor of the father, even though there was favorable testimony in favor of the mother, where the father was better able to provide an environment which could meet the child's emotional, developmental, and educational needs and the father and his wife could provide the child with a more stable home. Gray v. Pavey, 2007 WY 84, 158 P.3d 667, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2007).

Thus, he may be awarded custody where he cannot support them in mother's home. —

The custody of children may be awarded to the father when it appears that he will be able to provide a suitable home for them but will not be able to support himself and furnish an allowance to the mother which will enable her to properly take care of the children. Butcher v. Butcher, 363 P.2d 923, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1961).

Change in circumstances warranted change in custody. —

Court did not err in modifying child custody where in addition to considering the mother's multiple relocations, it found that the mother had not maintained stable employment and had not provided adequate supervision of the children, she repeatedly interfered with the father's parental and visitation rights and failed to provide adequate treatment to the youngest daughter for her emotional problems until compelled to provide therapy by court order, and there was evidence that the mother had attempted to emotionally manipulate the children against their father. Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, 117 P.3d 1244, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2005).

Change in circumstances occurred and it was in the best interests of the children to grant primary physical custody to the father where his efforts to improve his life personally and professionally, juxtaposed with the mother's instability and reliance on her parents for support of her and the two children, was determinative. Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, 96 P.3d 21, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 2004).

In a child custody modification case where there was a split custody arrangement, the trial court erred in not finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred. The mother's relocation to another state could be viewed as such, so too that the mother's fiance and her brother were accused of sexually assaulting the parties' youngest daughter, and that the father's wife's abusive acts against her step-children could warrant a change. Thus the case was remanded for further proceedings. JRS v. GMS, 2004 WY 60, 90 P.3d 718, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2004).

Court balances parents' rights and affection. —

The objective for the trial court is to find a reasonable balance of the rights and affection of each of the parents, in light of the child's needs. Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1982).

Where the trial court allowed the father to offset his past-due child support obligation by the amount of damages sustained as a result of the mother's violation of the parties' property agreement, though the father's property, wrongfully retained by the mother, was not used for the exclusive benefit of the child, and the debts which the father paid were not those of the child, the setoff between judgments impaired the child's right to support and was improper. Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1985).

Preference of child. —

A child's unequivocal preference to live with a particular parent is a factor that, although not conclusive, must be considered. Wilcox-Elliott v. Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

District court did not abuse its discretion in considering the child's stated preference of living with the mother where it was not persuaded that the 10-year old child was mature enough to decide what was in his best interest, and the child showed no hostility toward either parent and stated that he was okay living with either parent. Demers v. Nicks, 2016 WY 13, 366 P.3d 977, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 2016).

Beyond the district court noting that the mother believed the children preferred to live with her, the children did not testify and were not interviewed as to their preference, and the mother waived this argument by failing to put on any direct evidence on her own behalf. JR v. TLW, 2016 WY 45, 371 P.3d 570, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 2016).

Judge may honor child's long-standing preference and award primary custody to father. —

There was no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination that the father should have primary custody of his 15-year-old daughter, who had stated a preference to live with her father as far back as the original divorce proceeding, some five years prior to the filing of the petition to modify visitation, and had not changed that preference. Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 499 (Wyo. 1985).

Separation of siblings permissible.—

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the father primary physical and residential custody of the child after she entered kindergarten; the trial court did not err by failing to expressly address the effect of separating the child from her younger half-brother, and as the parties did not request formal findings on the issue, the mother could not complain about the lack of them. The mother also did not raise the sibling separation issue while the father did and the record showed that the court considered the issue. Walsh v. Smith, 2020 WY 25, 458 P.3d 58, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2020).

The court did not abuse its discretion by awarding primary custody of the younger son to the father and granting primary custody of the other two children to the mother, where evidence existed showing that: the father was a fit, capable parent; the younger son preferred to live with his father; the younger son's performance and behavior improved while with the father; and the parents lived about 100 yards apart. Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1993).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in a divorce action in awarding primary residential custody of the parties' two children to the father because reasonable minds could have reached different conclusions about which parent's custody would have been in the best interests of the children under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a); the trial court's oral findings were sufficiently detailed so as to provide an adequate basis for its determination awarding the father custody of the children, effectively separating them from their half-brothers for much of the time. Blakely v. Blakely, 2009 WY 127, 218 P.3d 253, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 2009).

Although the district court should have analyzed the effects of separating a child from his half-siblings and should have explained its reasons for doing so on the record, it did not commit reversible error because the record provided sufficient evidence to support the award of primary custody of the child to the father. JCLK v. ZHB, 2015 WY 95, 353 P.3d 720, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2015).

Supervised visitation.—

It was not an abuse of discretion to order supervision of a father’s visitation because (1) the father’s statutory right to associate with the children did not apply, (2) the evidence supported findings that the father abused the children, and (3) the evidence supported findings conditioning the father’s unsupervised visitation on the father’s and the children’s therapy. Johnson v. Johnson, 2020 WY 18, 458 P.3d 27, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2020).

Financial condition of parties is important factor in making award. —

One of the main factors to be considered in awarding custody of children is the financial and economic condition of the respective parties because of the fact that the children must be fed and clothed. Butcher v. Butcher, 363 P.2d 923, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1961).

When the question involves support payments, the matter should be decided with consideration of the paying parent's ability to pay, the recipient's spending habits and all other surrounding circumstances. Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 408 (Wyo. 1981).

The “best-interest of the child” requirement is attendant with educational opportunity and a stable environment for which economic resources are not insignificant. Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 526 (Wyo. 1986).

No error in awarding primary custody to father. —

See Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 321 (Wyo. 1984).

District court properly granted custody to father where there was evidence that the mother did not demonstrate a willingness to relinquish care of the child to the father at specified times; for example, mother took the child away from the father on the third day of a five-day camping trip. Additionally, father knew and followed the child's bedroom routine but mother would get the child up to brush his teeth and wash his hands, and while mother would enforce a 7:00 curfew when the child was with the father, she did not always enforce it when the child was with her. Pahl v. Pahl, 2004 WY 40, 87 P.3d 1250, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2004).

In a decree of divorce, the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the father primary child custody. While the evidence favored both parties, the court considered the fact that alcohol negatively impacted the mother's relationship with her children and she chose to move in with a man a mere eight weeks after meeting him. Lopez v. Lopez, 2005 WY 88, 116 P.3d 1098, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2005).

District court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of the mother's evidence of spousal abuse because the record showed that district court considered the evidence and it could have reasonably determined from the totality of evidence that mother should have primary legal custody subject to liberal visitation by the father. Buttle v. Buttle, 2008 WY 135, 196 P.3d 174, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 2008), overruled in part, Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, 417 P.3d 157, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding a mother liberal visitation after finding that it was not in a child's best interest for the mother to have the child during night time hours; there was no de facto shared custody with a father because the mother's visitation was limited to three weekends a month and two weekdays per week. Moreover, no abuse of discretion resulted from the fact that the child and a sibling might not have been together during the entirety of the mother's visitation. Davidson v. Carrillo, 2014 WY 65, 325 P.3d 444, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2014).

District court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father primary custody where it had considered the parties' existing arrangement and explained why it no longer worked in light of the mother's imminent relocation to another state. Demers v. Nicks, 2016 WY 13, 366 P.3d 977, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 2016).

District court found that the mother's role as the primary caregiver was not in the children's best interests, given her claim to values superior than those of the father, her reluctance to foster a positive relationship between the father and the children by openly disparaging him, and her inability to respect the father's rights as a parent without intrusion; no abuse of discretion was found. JR v. TLW, 2016 WY 45, 371 P.3d 570, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 2016).

District court’s shift from shared custody to primary physical custody with the father and visitation with the mother when the child entered school was appropriate where the only thing the district court had assumed was that the child’s age would change. Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, 417 P.3d 157, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2018).

District court’s award of primary custody to the father was affirmed where it considered the quality of relationship with each parent, the ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child, how the parents and child maintained and strengthened their relationship with each other, how the parents and child interacted and communicated, how such communications could be improved, and other relevant factors. Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, 417 P.3d 157, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2018).

District court reasonably decided that due to the importance of the parties’ child, who suffered from autism spectrum disorder, having a known and set schedule rather than imposing a new and different schedule that likely would have caused disruption and instability to the child, it was in the child’s best interest to continue with the arrangement of the child living with the father that had by then been in place for months pursuant to the parties’ agreement after the mother left town and then returned. Ransom v. Ransom, 2017 WY 132, 404 P.3d 1187, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 2017).

No error in award of primary custody to mother. —

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the mother primary care, custody, and control of the child where (1) although both parents were fit parents who loved their child, the evidence showed that the parties had a hard time getting along and that there was often little to no communication between them and thus shared custody would be inappropriate; (2) although the mother was from Columbia, she clearly testified that she had no intention of moving to Columbia; and (3) daycare, which child would attend if placed with the mother, was appropriate for the child rather than placing the child with the father, who did not work because of a disability, because it provided a good opportunity for social engagement for the child. Groenstein v. Groenstein, 2005 WY 6, 104 P.3d 765, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2005).

District court did not abuse its discretion by awarding custody of a child to a mother; although the district court did not address the parties' respective work schedules, this did not mean that it necessarily ignored this factor; moreover, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find for the mother, even though there were inconsistencies in her testimony. Bingham v. Bingham, 2007 WY 145, 167 P.3d 14, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2007).

Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was in the best interests of the children for the mother to have primary custody because the court clearly considered the effect that the mother's arrest, which resulted in a deferral, had on the children, and the 16-year-old son's testimony clearly demonstrated that he preferred the living arrangement he had with mother. Dahlke v. Dahlke, 2015 WY 76, 351 P.3d 937, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2015).

There was sufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that it was in the child's best interests to give the mother primary physical custody and allow the father to develop a healthy relationship with the child through visitation; the district court examined each factor in the statute, took into account the complex reality of the situation, and noted in part that the father’s employment and avocation interfered with his efforts, and the mother had put her education on hold and attended to the child nearly continuously since he was born. IC v. DW, 2015 WY 135, 360 P.3d 999, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 2015).

Gender as a factor in custody award.—

Custody decision was not based solely on gender; the district court adhered to its statement that in deciding to award physical custody to the mother, the district court had not preferred the mother solely because of gender, and the district court properly based its decision upon objective criteria and related evidence without gender bias. IC v. DW, 2015 WY 135, 360 P.3d 999, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 2015).

Plans to move abroad proper consideration. —

District court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary custody of a child to the father; although the mother was the primary caregiver, that factor was not necessarily determinative, and the mother's plan to move to Germany with the child was properly considered because the move would have limited the father's ability to exercise regular visitation. Pahl v. Pahl, 2004 WY 40, 87 P.3d 1250, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2004).

Plan to abscond with children relevant consideration. —

Evidence that a parent planned to abscond with children who were the subject of a pending custody battle, and thereby deny the other parent visitation, was relevant to an initial custody determination. Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. Dec. 1, 1988).

Absence of formal findings where no request made. —

Where a father did not request that the district court make findings of fact pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a), he could not complain of the absence of formal findings with respect to each factor listed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 . Stonham v. Widiastuti, 2003 WY 157, 79 P.3d 1188, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 2003).

Ample evidence supported custody with mother in Indonesia. —

Although the district court did not make specific findings with respect to each factor listed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 , there was ample evidence in the record and in the district court's findings to support its determination that awarding the mother, a citizen of Indonesia, physical custody was in the children's best interest. The mother had been the children's primary caretaker; she was emotionally better equipped to care for the children; and she had the support of a stable, supportive, and loving family in Indonesia. Stonham v. Widiastuti, 2003 WY 157, 79 P.3d 1188, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 2003).

Visitation schedule reasonable. —

Where a father was granted two weeks of visitation in the spring, two weeks in the fall, four weeks in the summer, and any other visitation that he was able to exercise, it was reasonable under the circumstances as primary physical custody was awarded to the mother, a native and citizen of Indonesia. Stonham v. Widiastuti, 2003 WY 157, 79 P.3d 1188, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 2003).

Bond requirement for visitation. —

The court did not err in imposing a $50,000 bond requirement as a condition of exercising visitiation in light of the contentious nature of the case and reported statements by the father that he planned to kidnap the children; there was no evidence that the bond was penal in nature, and it bore a reasonable relationship to the expenses the mother would have incurred if she were compelled to enforce the custody order from her home in Indonesia. Stonham v. Widiastuti, 2003 WY 157, 79 P.3d 1188, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 2003).

Appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion. —

Court did not err in awarding custody of two children to mother during the school/work week (Sunday afternoon through Thursday) and to the father Thursday evening through Sunday. Evidence showed that the mother was a “stay at home mom” who maintained the home, helped with children with basic educational skills, and provided transportation, but father was a very engaged parent who worked a 40-plus hour work week but helped the mother with most of the child-rearing tasks. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, 92 P.3d 298, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2004) sub. nom.Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, 125 P.3d 1022, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2006).

Decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless discretion abused. —

The district court's decision in regard to custody of children will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of abuse of discretion or the violation of some legal principle. Gill v. Gill, 363 P.2d 86, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1961).

District court's decision amending order relative to custody of children will not be disturbed on appeal, in absence of abuse of discretion or violation of some legal principle. Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1926).

An appellate court will not interfere with the trial court's decision regarding modification of custody absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion. Semler v. Semler, 924 P.2d 422, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 1996).

No abuse of discretion where court awarded custody of parties' two minor children to father. — See Trudeau v. Trudeau, 822 P.2d 873, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 1991).

Court did not abuse discretion by refusing to award custody of parties' daughter to father. See Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1995).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding physical custody of the children to the mother with visitation for the father because the parents' failure to cooperate and communicate precluded a shared custody arrangement. Stevens v. Stevens, 2014 WY 23, 318 P.3d 802, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 2014).

Guardian ad litem recommendation.—

District court explained in detail its reasoning in rejecting the recommendation of the guardian ad litem because of the parties' lack of cooperation, and there was no abuse of discretion. JR v. TLW, 2016 WY 45, 371 P.3d 570, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 2016).

Shared custody issues. —

The court's determination that the children were “comfortable” in both homes did not sufficiently address the disruption which unavoidably results from moving the children's primary residence four times during the school year. Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1998), overruled in part, Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, 417 P.3d 157, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2018).

District court erred by failing to ensure that the children's best interests were protected when it ordered shared custody pursuant to a settlement agreement in a divorce proceeding without having all of the facts necessary to evaluate the impact that shared custody might have on the children. Eickbush v. Eickbush, 2007 WY 179, 171 P.3d 509, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 2007), overruled in part, Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, 417 P.3d 157, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2018).

District court erred by ordering shared custody where it did not serve the best interest of the child, as the arrangement would require the child to spend at least three hours every fourth day traveling on highways, sometimes in extreme winter weather conditions, would require him to attend two different day cares during the course of every week, and would separate him from his primary caregiver; district court's finding that both parties were “good parents” was insufficient to support the shared custody arrangement, as the parents did not live in close proximity, and they had no history of effective communication or cooperative decision making. Buttle v. Buttle, 2008 WY 135, 196 P.3d 174, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 2008), overruled in part, Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, 417 P.3d 157, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2018).

District court disregarded or failed to consider the factors in ordering shared custody, and the stated reasons were not a sufficient basis to order shared custody; the parties had significantly different philosophies regarding the developmental services the child would receive and shared custody did not provide the framework that best served the child. Williams v. Williams, 2016 WY 21, 368 P.3d 539, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2016).

In Wyoming, the fundamental consideration in determining child custody should be the best interests of the children. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) (2017). The Supreme Court of Wyoming holds there is no presumption that shared custody is contrary to the best interests of the children and shared custody should be considered on an equal footing with other forms of custody. Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, 417 P.3d 157, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2018).

District court’s determination that shared custody was in the child’s best interests was affirmed where the district court considered the child’s developmental needs, and the record was replete with instances of the parties’ cooperating and sharing time with the child. Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, 417 P.3d 157, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2018).

No material change in circumstances. —

Since Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) required a 2 step approach to a child custody modification: (1) a material change in circumstances; and then (2) a best interest of the child analysis, district court properly denied a father's motion for modification without further consideration once it had found there had been no material change in circumstances. CLH v. MMJ (In re TLJ), 2006 WY 28, 129 P.3d 874, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2006).

No finding on domestic violence allegation. —

It was necessary to remand a child custody case for further proceedings because as to the mother's allegation that the father physically abused her in one incident of domestic violence, the trial court did not make any note as to whether it considered the evidence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(c), let alone the weight it carried in the final decision. In re Paternity, JWH v. DAH, 2011 WY 66, 252 P.3d 942, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Apr. 14, 2011).

Applied in

Fergusson v. Fergusson, 2002 WY 66, 45 P.3d 641, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 2002).

Quoted in

GGV v. JLR, 2002 WY 19, 39 P.3d 1066, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2002); Beeman v. Beeman, 2005 WY 45, 109 P.3d 548, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (2005); Hayzlett v. Hayzlett, 2007 WY 147, 167 P.3d 639, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Sept. 18, 2007).

Cited in

RS v. Dept. of Family Servs. (In re KLS), 2004 WY 87, 94 P.3d 1025, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (2004); Parris v. Parris, 2009 WY 44, 204 P.3d 298, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Mar. 30, 2009); ELA v. AAB, 2016 WY 98, 382 P.3d 45, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 2016).

Law reviews. —

See “The Problem of Parental Kidnapping,” 10 Wyo. L.J. 225.

For comment, “Child Custody Arrangements: Say What You Mean, Mean What You Say,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 591 (1996).

For comment, “Protecting Our Children in Custody Cases: The Wyoming Legislature Should Create an Attorney/Guardian Ad Litem Who Represents the Best Interests of the Child and Can Give the Child the Benefit of Limited Confidentiality,” see XXXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 427 (1999).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Jurisdiction to award custody of child having legal domicil in another state, 4 ALR2d 7.

Jurisdiction of court to award custody of child domiciled in state but physically outside of it, 9 ALR2d 434.

Nonresidence as affecting one's right to custody of child, 15 ALR2d 432.

Consideration of investigation by welfare agency or the like in making award as between parents of custody of children, 35 ALR2d 629.

Consent of natural parents as essential to adoption where parents are divorced, 47 ALR2d 824.

Marriage of minor child as terminating provisions in divorce or similar decree, 58 ALR2d 355.

Court's power as to support and maintenance of children in marriage annulment proceedings, 63 ALR2d 1029.

Mental health of contesting parent as factor in award of child custody, 74 ALR2d 1073.

“Split,” “divided,” or “alternate” custody of children, 92 ALR2d 695.

Propriety of separating children by awarding custody to different parents, 98 ALR2d 926.

Propriety of court conducting private interview with child in determining custody, 99 ALR2d 954.

Child's wishes as factor in awarding custody, 4 ALR3d 1396.

Power of court which denies divorce or legal separation to award custody or make provision for support of child, 7 ALR3d 1096.

Award of custody of child to parent against whom divorce is decreed, 23 ALR3d 6.

Extraterritorial effect of valid award of custody of child of divorced parents, in absence of substantial change in circumstances, 35 ALR3d 520.

Right, in child custody proceedings, to cross-examine investigating officer whose report is used by court in its decision, 59 ALR3d 1337.

Modern status of maternal preference rule or presumption in child custody cases, 70 ALR3d 262.

Effect, in subsequent proceedings, of paternity findings or implications in divorce or annulment decree or in support or custody order made incidental thereto, 78 ALR3d 846.

Right to require psychiatric or mental examination for party seeking to obtain or retain custody of child, 99 ALR3d 268.

Admissibility of social worker's expert testimony on child custody issues, 1 ALR4th 837.

Parent's physical disability or handicap as factor in custody award or proceedings, 3 ALR4th 1044.

Necessity of requiring presence in court of both parties in proceedings relating to custody or visitation of children, 15 ALR4th 864.

Propriety of awarding custody of child to parent residing or intending to reside in foreign country, 20 ALR4th 677.

Effect of remarriage of spouses to each other on child custody and support provisions of prior divorce decree, 26 ALR4th 325.

Court-authorized permanent or temporary removal of child by parent to foreign country, 30 ALR4th 548.

Right of parent to regain custody of child after temporary conditional relinquishment of custody, 35 ALR4th 61.

Propriety of provision of custody or visitation order designed to insulate child from parent's extramarital sexual relationships, 40 ALR4th 812.

Primary caretaker role of respective parents as factor in awarding custody of child, 41 ALR4th 1129.

Parent's transsexuality as factor in award of custody of children, visitation rights or termination of parental rights, 59 ALR4th 1170.

Mother's status as “working mother” as factor in awarding child custody, 62 ALR4th 259.

Child custody: separating children by custody awards to different parents — post-1975 cases, 67 ALR4th 354.

Child custody and visitation rights of person infected with AIDS, 86 ALR4th 211.

Denial or restriction of visitation rights to parent charged with sexually abusing child, 1 ALR5th 776.

Continuity of residence as factor in contest between parent and nonparent for custody of child who has been residing with nonparent—modern status, 15 ALR5th 692.

Parent's use of drugs as factor in award of custody of children, visitation rights, or termination of parental rights, 20 ALR5th 534.

Smoking as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 36 ALR5th 377.

Rights and remedies of parents inter se with respect to the names of their children, 40 ALR5th 697.

Construction and effect of statutes mandating consideration of, or creating presumptions regarding, domestic violence in awarding custody of children, 51 ALR5th 241.

Mental health of contesting parent as factor in award of child custody, 53 ALR5th 375.

Initial award or denial of child custody to homosexual or lesbian parent, 62 ALR5th 591.

Custodial parent's homosexual or lesbian relationship with third person as justifying modification of child custody order, 65 ALR5th 591.

Admissibility of expert testimony regarding questions of domestic law, 66 ALR5th 135.

Child custody and visitation rights arising from same-sex relationship, 80 ALR5th 1.

Religion as factor in child custody cases, 124 ALR 5th 203.

Parents' work schedules and associated dependent care issues as factors in child custody determinations. 26 A.L.R.6th 331.

Effect of parent's military service upon child custody. 21 A.L.R.6th 577.

§ 20-2-202. Visitation.

1. The court may order visitation it deems in the best interests of each child and the court shall:
   1. Order visitation in enough detail to promote understanding and compliance;
   2. Provide for the allocation of the costs of transporting each child for purposes of visitation;
   3. Require either parent who plans to change their home city or state of residence, to give written notice thirty (30) days prior to the move, both to the other parent and to the clerk of district court stating the date and destination of the move. In the event a confidentiality order has been entered pursuant to W.S. 35-21-112 or any other court order allowing a party to maintain confidentiality of addresses or other information identifying the residence of the victim of domestic abuse, the address, city or state of residence or other information identifying the residence of the victim of domestic abuse shall remain confidential.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1; 2013, ch. 98, § 2.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added the last sentence in (a)(iii).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Many of the following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Visitation order not sufficiently definite. —

Visitation schedule was deficient because it did not designate which weekends a father would exercise his visitation, or otherwise address that deficiency by requiring the father to provide the mother timely notice of when he proposed to exercise visitation; the district court had to revise its order to specify when the father would exercise weekend visitation because that detail was necessary to promote each party’s understanding of their obligations and to permit it to enforce compliance. Edwards v. Edwards, 2020 WY 35, 459 P.3d 448, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 3 6 (Wyo. 2020); 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (March 9, 2020).

Allocation of travel costs for visits.—

It was reasonable for the court to require the parents to pay for their own travel expenses under the circumstances of this case, where the record established that the mother voluntarily relocated for better employment, thus creating the need for travel. Walsh v. Smith, 2020 WY 25, 458 P.3d 58, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2020).

Welfare, needs, of children given paramount consideration. —

The definition of “rights of visitation” is an aspect of the determination of custody and, in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the children are to be given paramount consideration. The decision of the trial court with respect to such matters will not be disturbed by the supreme court unless it can identify a clear abuse of discretion. Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1990); KC v. KM (In re IC), 941 P.2d 46, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 1997).

Evidence of child's best interest. —

The court abused its discretion in ruling on visitation and support where there was no evidence regarding the best interest and welfare of the child. KC v. KM (In re IC), 941 P.2d 46, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 1997).

Child's need for support and parent's ability to pay not related to visitation questions. —

In an action to modify a divorce decree, the denial of visitation rights by either the custodial parent or the child does not constitute a change in circumstances justifying the reduction or termination of the noncustodial parent's support obligation. A child's need for support and a parent's ability to pay are not related to questions concerning visitation. Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1985).

Visitation schedule modified to serve educational development. —

Where the court's modification of a visitation schedule was designed to serve the best interests of the parties' daughter by ensuring her educational development, the court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the father's visitation rights. Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1995).

Grandparents' visitation rights premised upon statute only. —

Under subsection (c), a grandparent has no standing to petition for visitation rights where his or her request for visitation rights is not premised upon “the death or remarriage of one (1) or both parents or after a divorce or judicial separation.” If grandparents are to have visitation rights in Wyoming, it is only after the occurrence of one of these precipitating events. In re Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1990) (decided prior to 1991 amendment).

And agreement permitting visits void and unenforceable. —

Any agreement, whether it was oral or in writing or whether or not it was included within the terms of an adoption decree, would not give a grandparent a right to visitation with the child. To the extent the existence of any such agreement permitting visitation with the child could be proved, it would be void and unenforceable as violative of public policy. In re Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1990).

Hearing and finding as to visitation rights required. —

The requirement of prior similar provision that “if the court finds, after a hearing, that the visitation would be in the best interest of the child,” was mandatory, and required both a hearing and a written finding of best interest. Nation v. Nation, 715 P.2d 198, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 504 (Wyo. 1986).

Error to enforce visitation provisions without hearing. —

In a proceeding for the post-decree enforcement of a divorce decree, the court erred in entering an order on the father's motion to enforce provisions of the judgment and decree with respect to visitation without providing him a hearing. Bloom v. Bloom, 798 P.2d 1193, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1990).

Court abused discretion by modifying visitation rights without hearing. —

The district court abused its discretion in modifying the visitation provisions of the divorce decree without affording father an opportunity to be heard or otherwise providing for the development of an evidentiary record. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899 P.2d 46, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1995).

Error to allow counsel to withdraw but deny request for continuance. —

In a child visitation case, a court erred by allowing the father's counsel to withdraw one day before the trial and by denying his request for a continuance to obtain substitute counsel where the father was not extended notice concerning his counsel's motion to withdraw, there was no withdrawal hearing, and he was not notified of the withdrawal order. Moreover, the hearing concerning visitation was so abbreviated that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded that evidence had been presented of such a change warranting modification of visitation or that modification was in the best interest of the child; therefore, the father was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. Sims v. Day, 2004 WY 124, 99 P.3d 964, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2004).

Grandparents' visitation claims litigable by independent proceedings or intervention. —

Grandparents' visitation claims may be litigated by independent proceedings; or, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(b), W.R.C.P., by intervening in a divorce proceeding post-decree, in the exercise of discretion of the court, when the requisite facts under the rule exist. Nation v. Nation, 715 P.2d 198, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 504 (Wyo. 1986).

Court may clarify modification order. —

Where the language employed by the court in modifying the visitation provisions of a divorce decree was subject to misconstruction, the court could properly clarify its earlier modification order in light of the circumstances of the parents and for the benefit of the children. Bachand v. Walters, 809 P.2d 284, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1991).

Visitation in correctional facility. —

While there is no absolute right to visitation in a correctional facility, denial of visitation, or modification of visitation, must be based upon evidence conspicuous in the record. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899 P.2d 46, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1995).

Allocation of travel costs for visits. —

In a divorce action, a district court did not err in requiring a custodial parent to pay the travel expenses associated with two visits per year to the non-custodial parent's location because the travel costs were substantial and the custodial parent helped to create the situation by moving the parties' children to another state. Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, 74 P.3d 1230, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2003).

District court did not abuse its discretion in requiring a father to pay his children's mother a per diem when she visited the children at their new out-of-state home because there was no immutable standard for the allocation of travel expenses for the purpose of visitation and the determination of the reasonableness of such an award was to be made on a case-by-case basis. Inman v. Williams, 2009 WY 51, 205 P.3d 185, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2009).

Liberal visitation supported by evidence. —

Trial court properly ordered the parties to have alternate weeks with their minor child once he reached five years of age because the trial court properly provided a comprehensive evaluation of all the relevant factors before ordering such liberal visitation as amounted to equally splitting the child's time, the opportunities to disagree were reduced because the father had been given primary decision-making authority regarding the child's health and well-being, and the child had a half-brother on the mother's side. JS v. MB, 2010 WY 114, 237 P.3d 974, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2010).

Visitation order not sufficiently definite. —

Trial court's visitation order was not sufficiently definite to promote understanding and compliance as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-202(a)(i) because the order did not address holiday and summer visitation. Roemmich v. Roemmich, 2010 WY 115, 238 P.3d 89, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2010).

Provision regarding visitation contained in the stipulated decree did not meet the requirements of this statute because the provision simply stated that the father should have reasonable visitation rights with the minor children at the mother’s discretion, which was insufficient for the parents to each understand their obligations, and so the decree could be enforced by contempt sanctions should that regrettably become necessary; a proper visitation provision should specify which weekends, holidays, and other days the father was allowed visitation; details concerning overnight visits and issues relating to transportation between the parents; and specify how the visitation schedule would change as the children got older. Long v. Long, 2018 WY 26, 413 P.3d 117, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2018).

District court's visitation plan was not sufficiently definite to promote understanding and compliance as required the statute, and remand was required. IC v. DW, 2015 WY 135, 360 P.3d 999, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 2015).

Quoted in

GGV v. JLR, 2002 WY 19, 39 P.3d 1066, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Interference by custodian of child with noncustodial parent's visitation rights as ground for change of custody, 28 ALR4th 9.

Visitation rights of homosexual or lesbian parent, 36 ALR4th 997.

Parent's or relative's rights of visitation of adult against latter's wishes, 40 ALR4th 846.

Religion as factor in visitation cases, 95 ALR5th 533.

Restrictions on parent's child visitation rights based on parent's sexual conduct, 99 ALR5th 475.

§ 20-2-203. Jurisdiction for enforcement and modification.

1. A court in this state which enters a custody order under W.S. 20-2-201 has continuing subject matter jurisdiction to enforce or modify the decree concerning the care, custody and visitation of the children as the circumstances of the parents and needs of the child require, subject to the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. A service member’s temporary duty, deployment or mobilization, as defined in W.S. 20-2-205 , shall not alter any court’s continuing jurisdiction under this section. A court which has jurisdiction to enforce or modify an order under this section may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it finds it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances of the case and that the court which entered the original order is a more appropriate forum and has jurisdiction as set forth in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
2. A court in any county in Wyoming in which the child has lived with his parents, a parent or a person acting as a parent for six (6) consecutive months immediately prior to commencement of the custody proceeding may assert subject matter jurisdiction and adjudicate any proceedings involving the child. Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons shall be included as part of the six (6) month period.
3. Any party seeking to enforce or modify a custody order pursuant to this section shall attach a certified copy of the custody order to the petition to be enforced or modified. A certified copy of an order entered by a Wyoming court providing for the care, custody or visitation of children may be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of any county in this state in which either parent resides if neither parent resides in the county of original jurisdiction. The district court for the county in which the order is filed has jurisdiction to enforce the order, provided:
   1. Upon request of the district court for the county in which a certified copy of the order has been filed, the court which originally entered the order shall forward certified copies of the transcript of the court record and pleadings, orders, decrees, records of hearings, social studies and other pertinent documents relating to the original proceeding; and
   2. The district court for the county in which a certified copy of the order has been filed shall give due consideration to the transcript of the record and all other documents submitted to it in accordance with paragraph (i) of this subsection.
4. In any proceeding to enforce or modify an order concerning the care, custody and visitation of children, any required notice or pleading shall be served as provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1; 2005, ch. 11, § 2; 2011, ch. 36, § 2.

Cross references. —

For Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, see §§ 20-5-201 to 20-5-502 .

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a), twice inserted “and Enforcement” preceding “Act.”

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, inserted the present second sentence in (a).

Editor's notes. —

Many of the following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Continuing jurisdiction of divorce court. —

Father's failure to attach a copy of the referenced order did not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over his petition to modify child custody and support because the father identified the decree he was seeking to modify by title and date in his petition, which was filed in the same court and under the same docket number as the original decree; the mother was aware of the original decree and the grounds for the father's petition for modification. Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161, 315 P.3d 648, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2013).

District court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce and modify custody provisions of a decree because a father's modification petition was filed in the same district court that granted the original divorce decree in which the mother was awarded primary physical custody of the child Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161, 315 P.3d 648, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2013).

In proceedings for modification of a divorce decree, an opportunity to be heard is required. Tanner v. Tanner, 482 P.2d 443, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 205 (Wyo. 1971).

Proceeding to modify divorce decree is filed under same docket assigned in original proceeding. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1965).

Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in original court. —

A district court lacked jurisdiction to modify child custody, support and visitation provisions of a divorce decree entered by the district court of another county; continuing jurisdiction in the court which issued the decree was exclusive. Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1988).

District court did not err when it ordered the potential re-opening of a mother's petition to modify custody in the event that the children's father continued to flaunt the district court's visitation orders after the father relocated because the district court had continuing jurisdiction in custody and visitation matters. Although the father viewed the order as a threat that exceeded the district court's jurisdiction, the reviewing court viewed it as a warning that the father's continued recalcitrance could undermine the district court's initial determination that the father's intent to relocate was properly motivated and sincere. Inman v. Williams, 2009 WY 51, 205 P.3d 185, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2009).

Jurisdiction to modify decree issued by district court in another county. —

If a party wishes to file a petition for modification of custody or maintenance in a district court other than that which issued the original decree, the party must file a certified copy of the decree and show that both parties no longer reside in the county of original jurisdiction, and in addition one parent must reside in the county in which the decree is filed. Vineyard v. Jenkins, 983 P.2d 1234, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1999).

Jurisdiction not transferable to other district court. —

The district court in Natrona County, in which an original divorce decree was entered, had no authority to transfer jurisdiction to the district court in Platte County without notice of the parties, and that court had no authority to accept such a transfer of jurisdiction. However, the Natrona County district court could have transferred the case to Platte County to hear the case and exercise jurisdiction of the Natrona County district court, provided that any order entered pursuant to such an arrangement was filed in Natrona County. Glandt v. Taylor, 920 P.2d 647, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1996).

Continuing jurisdiction of divorce court. —

The trial court has, as part of its continuing jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree, authority to declare valid a presumed parent-child relationship arising out of the marriage and to make orders of custody and support for the child conceived during the marriage, even after the divorce is final. CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1992).

Oral motion for modification improper way to assert claim. —

The oral motion of the plaintiff for modification of a divorce decree, made on the date of hearing of the formal and properly filed petition for modification of the decree of divorce by the defendant, was an improper way to assert his claim. The proper procedure was for the plaintiff to file an answer and counterclaim for modification to the petition for modification, in accordance with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, and thereafter the case would have been handled in the same fashion as any other civil case. Since the time for answer and counterclaim had passed, it was suggested that the plaintiff file a petition for modification and that, on the rehearing of the case which the appellate court required, it be consolidated with the defendant's petition for modification for trial. Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 484 (Wyo. 1986).

Provision for retention of jurisdiction to make custody determination. —

Retention of jurisdiction provision, providing “the state of Wyoming shall retain jurisdiction over the custody of the minor child,” would not provide a Wyoming court with jurisdiction to make a custody determination unless the child or one of his parents continued to reside in the state and/or maintain the necessary significant connections to sustain subject matter and in personam jurisdiction. Crites v. Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1992).

Provision in divorce decree stating “the district courts of the state of Wyoming shall retain jurisdiction over the custody of the minor child” did not impose upon the father an affirmative obligation or duty to attempt custody modification only in a Wyoming court, nor did the provision impose an affirmative obligation or duty not to attempt to modify child custody in a state other than Wyoming; therefore the father could not be held in contempt for violating the order when he sought to have the custody decree modified in a Texas court. Crites v. Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1992).

Limitations on jurisdiction. —

Even though the state had continuing jurisdiction to modify a custody decree which granted the father visitation, it did not have jurisdiction to issue an order that another state, to which the custodial parent had moved, notify the court of the custodial parent's address. Lacey v. Lacey, 925 P.2d 237, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1996).

In post-divorce proceedings, the district court erred by modifying child custody the absence of a petition from either party/parent seeking such modification. It was without jurisdiction to do so under this section. Weiss v. Weiss, 2009 WY 124, 217 P.3d 408, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2009).

Continuing jurisdiction as to children does not extend to rights of parents between themselves. —

To say that the court has a continuing jurisdiction and a responsibility to revise its provisions for the custody of children, according to their best interest and welfare, is not to say the court retains the same kind of continuing jurisdiction with respect to the civil rights of the parents, as between each other. Strahan v. Strahan, 400 P.2d 542, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1965); Pavlica v. Pavlica, 587 P.2d 639, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 249 (Wyo. 1978).

Quoted in

GGV v. JLR, 2002 WY 19, 39 P.3d 1066, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2002).

Stated in

Willis v. Davis, 2010 WY 149, 243 P.3d 568, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Nov. 18, 2010); Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2015 WY 40, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Mar. 19, 2015).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Jurisdiction of court to award custody of child domiciled in state but physically outside of it, 9 ALR2d 434.

Necessity of personal service within state upon nonresident spouse as prerequisite of court's power to modify its decree as to child support in matrimonial action, 62 ALR2d 544.

Opening or modification of divorce decree as to custody or support of child not provided for in the decree, 71 ALR2d 1370.

Court's power to modify child custody order as affected by agreement which was incorporated in divorce decree, 73 ALR2d 1444.

§ 20-2-204. Enforcement and modification.

1. Either parent may petition to enforce or modify any court order regarding custody and visitation.
2. A court having jurisdiction under W.S. 20-2-203 may, upon appropriate motion of a party, require a parent to appear before the court and show just cause why the parent should not be held in contempt, upon a showing that the parent has willfully violated an order concerning the care, custody and visitation of the children. In order to enforce and require future compliance with an order the court may find that the parent is in contempt of court, award attorney’s fees, costs and any other relief as the court may deem necessary under the circumstances to the party aggrieved by the violation of an order.
3. A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a). In any proceeding in which a parent seeks to modify an order concerning child custody or visitation, proof of repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to allow visitation to the other parent in violation of an order may be considered as evidence of a material change of circumstances. Any modification under this subsection shall be subject to the limitations and requirements of W.S. 20-2-205 .

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1; 2011, ch. 36, § 2.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, added the last sentence in (c).

Editor's notes. —

Many of the following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Procedural requirements. —

While the general rule is that a court has continuing jurisdiction to modify the custody and support aspects of its own decree, such jurisdiction is bestowed upon the court only through proper petition by one of the parents in the underlying action pursuant to former Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-2-113(a). Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, 30 P.3d 542, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2001).

Supreme Court of Wyoming's precedent clearly answers that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2015) limits the modification of a final order, not the modification of a temporary order. Demers v. Nicks, 2016 WY 13, 366 P.3d 977, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 2016).

Whether or not to modify a decree is in the sound discretion of the court. — Beard v. Beard, 368 P.2d 953, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 1962).

The district court exercises broad discretion in making decisions that pertain to child custody. Wilcox-Elliott v. Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

Court had jurisdiction. —

District court plainly had jurisdiction over a father’s petition to modify custody, and it had authority to use a guardian ad litem (GAL) to assist in deciding the petition, because when the father invoked the district court’s jurisdiction by filing a petition to modify custody and alleging a material change in circumstances the district court had before it a child custody matter and authority to appoint a GAL. Van Fleet v. Guyette, 2020 WY 78, 466 P.3d 812, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 2020).

Two step analysis. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) sets forth factors to be considered in determining the best interests of a child in an initial custody proceeding, however, it is only during the second step of a modification inquiry that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) requires consideration of the best interests of the child pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a). A best interest analysis is not required, nor even necessarily appropriate, to the threshold determination as to whether a material change in circumstances has occurred. CLH v. MMJ (In re TLJ), 2006 WY 28, 129 P.3d 874, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2006).

Due process.—

District court did not abuse its discretion by holding an hour and a half telephonic hearing on the father's modification motions; the manner in which the district conducted the hearing was not unreasonable under the circumstances, and it did not deny the father his right to due process. ELA v. AAB, 2016 WY 98, 382 P.3d 45, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 2016).

Parental stipulation. —

Under former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113(a), the legal prerequisite on a party filing a petition for modification of a child support provision in a divorce decree cannot be extinguished by parental stipulation to reduced payments. The law precludes parties from bargaining away the funds intended for the exclusive benefit of their children. Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, 30 P.3d 542, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2001).

Contempt orders cannot be converted. —

Under former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113(a), neither a contempt order or stipulation temporarily modifying a party's child support obligation reflected a petition to modify a divorce decree respecting child support where the contempt orders made no findings as to a change in circumstances warranting modification and where the parties did not expressly or impliedly consent to consideration of modification by the court. Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, 30 P.3d 542, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2001).

Under former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113(a), without a petition for modification of child support, evidence of consent to modification, and appropriate findings of changed circumstances, contempt orders cannot be converted by application of W.R.C.P. 15(b) to orders modifying the original support order. Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, 30 P.3d 542, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2001).

No jurisdiction to modify child custody. —

In post-divorce proceedings, the district court erred by modifying child custody the absence of a petition from either party/parent seeking such modification. It was without jurisdiction to do so under this section. Weiss v. Weiss, 2009 WY 124, 217 P.3d 408, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2009).

Court had jurisdiction. —

Full evidentiary hearing was not required before the trial court temporary changed custody, as the temporary order was only to last until the parties could conduct some discovery and engage in enough preparation for a custody trial that was set. Tracy v. Tracy, 2017 WY 17, 388 P.3d 1257, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2017).

Burden of proof for modification of custody. —

There is a serious danger that courts will be so ready to modify custody orders that the child will be disturbed and upset by repeated changes — the only cure being continued careful scrutiny of each case at the trial court level, coupled with the imposition of a heavy burden of persuasion upon the party asking for modification. Tanner v. Tanner, 482 P.2d 443, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 205 (Wyo. 1971).

Where parties to divorce suit made written agreement as to custody of children, burden is on applicant to show cause for its modification. Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1926).

Where it is contended that due to changed conditions a previous decree providing for custody of a child should be modified in the interest of the child so as to better provide for its welfare, the burden is upon the party alleging it, to prove that such change has in fact occurred, and that it warrants a modification. Laughton v. Laughton, 71 Wyo. 506, 259 P.2d 1093, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1953).

In determining whether or not there should be a modification of a divorce decree as to custody, it is the movant's burden to show there has been a change of circumstance and that, the welfare of the child being of first import, the change warrants a modification. Tanner v. Tanner, 482 P.2d 443, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 205 (Wyo. 1971).

The party moving to modify the child custody provisions of a divorce decree has the burden of showing that the modification will be in the best interests of the children. Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo. 1983).

The party seeking a modification of the custody provisions of a divorce decree bears the burden of showing that: (1) a substantial or material change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare has occurred subsequent to the entry of the initial decree; and (2) a modification of the decree will be in the child's best interests. Wilcox-Elliott v. Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

Custody decree will not be modified unless there is a substantial change of circumstances occurring subsequent to the decree. It is not to be done except for the most cogent reasons. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1965).

In order to justify a substantial modification of decree awarding custody of a child, there must be a change of circumstances or the discovery of material facts unknown to the court at the time of the original decree. The paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. Laughton v. Laughton, 71 Wyo. 506, 259 P.2d 1093, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1953).

While modification of a decree as concerns child custody rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, a change will be made only for the most cogent reasons. Tanner v. Tanner, 482 P.2d 443, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 205 (Wyo. 1971).

In order for a modification of a decree to be warranted, it must be established that there has been a material or substantial change in circumstances which outweighs society's interest in applying the doctrine of res judicata. Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 408 (Wyo. 1981).

Because of the res judicata effect generally afforded divorce decrees, the party seeking to modify the child custody provisions of a divorce decree must show that there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the original decree warranting a modification of the child custody provisions. Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo. 1983).

The district court's determination that a child's desire to live with her mother did not constitute a material change in circumstances justifying modification of custody did not amount to an abuse of discretion or disclose any procedural error. Mulkey-Yelverton v. Blevins, 884 P.2d 41, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1994).

Where parties' 2002 stipulation altered only visitation, not custody, the initial custody order, entered in 1998, was still in effect; therefore, the 1998 order was ‘the order in question’ under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c), for purposes of a later petition to modify custody. TW v. BM, 2006 WY 68, 134 P.3d 1262, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 2006).

It was error to make a mother show a material change in circumstances to modify a visitation order because (1) the original, California, order allowed modification in the child's best interests without showing a change, (2) that order preempted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c), under U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, given the full faith and credit clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, and (3) 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A required enforcing the California order according to the order's terms. Gjertsen v. Haar, 2015 WY 56, 347 P.3d 1117, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2015).

Evidence warranted modification of divorce decree provisions relating to the father's visitation with his minor daughter and the mother's medical insurance coverage for herself and the child, where the parties willingly presented and tried the modification issues, and the court reasonably concluded from the evidence that the parties wanted it to exercise its revisory powers. Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. Aug. 14, 1990).

Contempt order improper.—

District court abused its discretion in holding the mother in contempt for violations related to the children’s brokerage accounts that had been remedied before the case was filed. Breen v. Black, 2020 WY 94, 467 P.3d 1023, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2020).

When the district court found the mother in civil contempt for failure to pay her share of the children’s medical bills, the district court improperly transferred the father’s burden to prove nonpayment to the mother to prove payment; if the father had established by clear evidence that the mother owed an amount certain on the medical bills, the burden would have shifted, but until he did so, the burden rested squarely on the father. As there was no clear violation of the order, the contempt finding was reversed. Breen v. Black, 2020 WY 94, 467 P.3d 1023, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2020).

Improper contempt order made attorney fee award also improper.—

Because the district court erred in holding the mother in contempt, the award of attorney’s fees to the father was also reversed. Breen v. Black, 2020 WY 94, 467 P.3d 1023, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2020).

Change of circumstances not found.—

District court did not abuse its discretion when it found no material change of circumstances in a child custody matter because the evidence supported the decision as the child was doing well; the mother had a full-time job with benefits; there was no evidence of any disruption to the child’s schooling, medical care, or family relationships; the mother and father regularly communicated and cooperated about all aspects of the child’s life; the mother’s emotional condition was stable; and the mother had no issues with alcohol or drugs. Smith v. Kelly, 2019 WY 60, 442 P.3d 297, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 2019).

District court did not err in finding no substantial change of circumstances had occurred when children did not spend one-half of each year with their mother as provided in custody decree where it found parties had foreseen that provision in the decree would not be strictly adhered to because children would have to commute to school. Sorensen v. May, 944 P.2d 429, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1997).

District court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the changes of circumstances that occurred after the parties' divorce were not material and did not justify a change of custody because: (1) while the mother did, at times, fail to communicate with the father as required by the decree, significant evidence showed that she informed of many events affecting their sons, including illnesses and injuries, and discussed issues with the father, such as the older son's need for counseling and the younger son's behavioral problems; (2) the record did not establish that the mother repeatedly violated the visitation provisions of the decree, as the father testified that she had only interfered with his visitation rights one time in 2004; (3) at the time of trial, the younger son's behavioral problems had resolved and the older son's anxiety problems had also improved; (4) even though the mother moved frequently after the divorce, there was no evidence that she moved in order to undermine the relationship between the father and the children; and (5) the evidence established that, despite having experienced a great deal of instability in their lives since the divorce, at the time of trial the sons were healthy, well-behaved children who were generally doing well in school and living in a stable home with their mother, her fiance, and their new baby. Morris v. Morris, 2007 WY 174, 170 P.3d 86, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 2007).

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying the father's motion to modify the mother's visitation; the district court found that the mother's practice of dressing her son as a girl was being addressed in counseling, and implicitly the district court found that the child's welfare was being preserved, and while other judges might have found a material change of circumstances, the court could not retry the case on appeal, and no abuse of discretion was found. ELA v. AAB, 2016 WY 98, 382 P.3d 45, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 2016).

In a child custody dispute, there was no material change in circumstances to warrant a change in custody because a detective who investigated a report of abuse by a step-brother found that there was no evidence to support the allegation, and the step-brother no longer had any physical contact with the children. Thus, the evidence demonstrated that it was unlikely that the children were being abused by the step-brother and those allegations did not constitute a material change in circumstances. Willis v. Davis, 2013 WY 44, 299 P.3d 88, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 2013).

District court abused its discretion by determining that the changes in the mother's life created a material change in circumstances warranting the reopening of the existing custody order because the relatives abilities of the parties to parent their daughter had not materially changed. The evidence showed that the mother's move to Denver did not change the existing parenting agreement, the father presented no evidence that the mother was unable to provide for her daughter after she lost her job, he presented no evidence that the mother's theft conviction affected their daughter, the mother's dating following the divorce and her remarriage did not result in a material change in circumstances. Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, 341 P.3d 377, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2015), reh'g denied, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. Feb. 3, 2015).

Mother did not show a material change of circumstances justifying a change in custody because (1) the evidence did not show a father caused parental alienation to the point of a material change, (2) the parties' improper behavior toward one another was not new, (3) the mother was still a flight risk, and (4) incidents of violence and improper discipline in the father's home, while wrong, were isolated. Gjertsen v. Haar, 2015 WY 56, 347 P.3d 1117, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2015).

Reversal not warranted. —

The error in admitting the testimony of the attorney/guardian ad litem did not result in manifest injustice, and did not warrant reversal of the district court's determination that Mother failed to show a change in circumstances to justify modification of custody. Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

Inappropriate behavior was warning sign of substantial change in circumstances, sufficient to invoke the authority of the court to modify custody and visitation provisions. Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 228 (Wyo. 1995).

Remarriage alone insufficient grounds for modification. —

A divorce decree in favor of husband awarding major custody of child to the husband cannot be modified by wife on a petition filed six months after date of decree on the ground that the wife has remarried and is able now to provide a home for the child, since remarriage in and of itself is not sufficient ground for modification of custody. Laughton v. Laughton, 71 Wyo. 506, 259 P.2d 1093, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1953).

Remarriage by one of the divorced parents, standing alone, does not constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a change of custody. Kreuter v. Kreuter, 728 P.2d 1129, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 644 (Wyo. 1986).

Relocation by custodial parent. —

An intrastate relocation by a custodial parent, taking children along, cannot by itself be considered a change in circumstances sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the question of custody. Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1999), overruled in part, Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, 293 P.3d 440, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 2012).

District court did not err by determining that a mother's relocation, nearly 1,400 miles from a father, created a material change in circumstances warranting the reopening of the original custody order; the considerable increase in the geographical distance created a material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Cook v. Moore, 2015 WY 125, 357 P.3d 749, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 2015).

It was not an abuse of discretion to modify a child's custody from the child's relocating mother to the child's father because (1) the move was a material change of circumstance, (2) the court thoroughly reviewed relevant factors, so the court's decision was deferred to, and (3) a sibling separation was adequately explained. Paden v. Paden, 2017 WY 118, 403 P.3d 135, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2017).

Relocation warranted modification of visitation. —

Modification of a father's visitation schedule was warranted when the father moved 40 miles because, when the father moved, the daily life the parties contemplated for the parties' child ceased to exist, requiring an inquiry into whether modification of visitation was in the best interest of the child. Jensen v. Milatzo-Jensen, 2013 WY 27, 297 P.3d 768, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2013).

Reopening joint custody order. —

When the reopening of a joint custody order is before the court, the stability-of-placement consideration that is central to the strict reopening standards in the primary custodial context appears to be of minimal importance because the joint custody order has not fixed one parent as the primary nurturer. Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1995).

A second distinctive feature suggests a joint custody order should be more readily opened. The premise of the joint custody order is the parents' ability to resolve between themselves the custodial details; when the parents are unable to make this cooperative arrangement work, a change of circumstances justifying judicial reexamination of the original joint custody order is demonstrated. Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1995).

When joint custodians inform the district court the joint custody ordered by that court has failed, they present a sufficient change in circumstances justifying the reopening of the custody order and awarding of primary custody to one parent. Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1995).

Res judicata and collateral estoppel not a bar to relitigation of custody issues. —

Res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the modification of a child custody decree where the matters decided in the prior adjudications did not expressly address custody of the children as presented by the father in the last proceeding. Moreover, while the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel can bar reopening a divorce decree, a district court retains jurisdiction to modify a decree of divorce under certain circumstances, most especially where a party is able to show a material change in circumstances surrounding the care, custody, and visitation of a child. Aragon v. Aragon, 2005 WY 5, 104 P.3d 756, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2005).

Res judicata barred second motion to modify custody. —

When the district court denied the mother's motion to modify child custody because the facts before it did not support a material change of circumstances warranting a change in custody under this section, the district court denied her second motion to modify filed nine days later based on the doctrine of res judicata. Because the record on appeal did not include a transcript or statement of the evidence presented at the hearing, the Supreme Court of Wyoming accepted the district court's finding that the issues the mother presented in her second motion were identical to those decided by the first order. Willis v. Davis, 2010 WY 149, 243 P.3d 568, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2010).

Material change in circumstances. —

In a child custody modification case where there was a split custody arrangement, the trial court erred in not finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred. The mother's relocation to another state could be viewed as such, so too that the mother's fiance and her brother were accused of sexually assaulting the parties' youngest daughter, and also the father's wife's abusive acts against her step-children could warrant a change. Thus the case was remanded for further proceedings. JRS v. GMS, 2004 WY 60, 90 P.3d 718, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2004).

Court did not err in modifying child custody where in addition to considering the mother's multiple relocations, it found that the mother had not maintained stable employment and had not provided adequate supervision of the children, she repeatedly interfered with the father's parental and visitation rights and failed to provide adequate treatment to the youngest daughter for her emotional problems until compelled to provide therapy by court order, and there was evidence that the mother had attempted to emotionally manipulate the children against their father. Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, 117 P.3d 1244, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2005).

When a mother and father presented a material change in circumstances by their agreement that shared physical custody was not working, the trial court was required under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) to determine what arrangement was in the child's best interest; the trial court was not limited to maintaining the status quo or in awarding primary custody to the mother on her petition. Roemmich v. Roemmich, 2010 WY 115, 238 P.3d 89, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2010).

There was material change in circumstances warranting the court's reopening of the existing custody order because both parties invited the district court to revise the joint custody arrangement. Dahlke v. Dahlke, 2015 WY 76, 351 P.3d 937, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2015).

District court correctly concluded that the father established a material change in circumstances to reopen the visitation and that he was entitled to extended summer visitation and specific holiday visitation, but it abused its discretion by granting the father visitation for nearly the entire summer rather than the six weeks requested, as his proposed visitation schedule addressed problems that had arisen by requiring fewer exchanges and providing him with extended periods with the children. Meehan-Greer v. Greer, 2018 WY 39, 415 P.3d 274, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2018).

Modification of custody and award of custody of the parents' minor child to the father under this section was affirmed because the father's ability to act as responsible parent had surged ahead of that of the mother. He had secured stable employment, continued to advance in his career, and had become financially responsible for himself and his family for a number of years. BB v. RSR, 2007 WY 4, 149 P.3d 727, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2007).

Since Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) required a 2 step approach to a child custody modification: (1) a material change in circumstances; and then (2) a best interest of the child analysis, district court properly denied a father's motion for modification without further consideration once it had found there had been no material change in circumstances. CLH v. MMJ (In re TLJ), 2006 WY 28, 129 P.3d 874, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2006).

Change from father to mother urgent as daughter became a teenager. —

Trial court did not err in changing child custody from the father to the mother when the daughter's preference to live with the mother had become more urgent as the daughter became a teenager, and the mother had changed her lifestyle. Basden v. Cole, 2005 WY 151, 123 P.3d 566, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. Dec. 20, 2005).

Sufficient evidence for change of custody. —

Sufficient evidence supported the court's change of custody in favor of the father even though there was favorable testimony in favor of the mother, where the father was better able to provide an environment which could meet the child's emotional, developmental, and educational needs and the father and his wife could provide the child with a more stable home. Gray v. Pavey, 2007 WY 84, 158 P.3d 667, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2007).

Court properly modified Texas custody order. The court issued a decision letter containing specific findings of fact that a substantial change of circumstances had taken place based on assaults by the husband, who had custody under the Texas order, on the wife and the children. Rosics v. Heath, 746 P.2d 1284, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 561 (Wyo. 1987), overruled, Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1992).

Contempt judgment proper. —

Trial court properly entered a judgment for amounts it found were owed to a mother based on a father's contempt under this section as trial courts had inherent and statutory authority to enforce their orders in domestic cases through contempt sanctions; there was no record to support the father's claim that payments he had made against the amounts he owed were not credited. Walker v. Walker, 2013 WY 132, 311 P.3d 170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2013).

Court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody award. —

Court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody award to place the children with the mother, where the court found that the mother had surged far ahead in her personal development and ability to serve as a parent and that neither the mother nor the father was especially fit to be a parent at the time the initial custody determination was made. Thompson v. Thompson, 824 P.2d 557, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1992).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded custody to the father after the mother was repeatedly found in contempt of the court's orders and the district court found that a change in custody was in the best interests of the children. Ready v. Ready, 906 P.2d 382, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 1995).

It was reasonable for the court to conclude that limiting the mother's visitation with the children would limit the damage done by mutual parental insistence upon use of the children as weapons in an acrimonious contest between lifestyles. Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 228 (Wyo. 1995).

A court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the child custody provisions of a divorce decree where there had been an extreme decrease of stability in the mother's life compared to a significant increase of stability in the father's life. Wilcox-Elliott v. Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1998).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in transferring custody to the mother where the children ran away from home to be with their mother, indicated a strong preference for living with her, and were involved in the juvenile justice system and ultimately placed in the mother's home by the juvenile court. Rocha v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1996).

Court properly granted custody of children to their father where the mother failed to respect the father's rights and responsibilities, the father could provide a more stable environment for the children, and he had demonstrated a willingness to create and foster a relationship between the children and the mother. Aragon v. Aragon, 2005 WY 5, 104 P.3d 756, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2005).

Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was in the best interests of the children for the mother to have primary custody because the court clearly considered the effect that the mother's arrest, which resulted in a deferral, had on the children, and the 16-year-old son's testimony clearly demonstrated that he preferred the living arrangement he had with mother. Dahlke v. Dahlke, 2015 WY 76, 351 P.3d 937, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2015).

Mother's contention that the district court erred in permitting pre-order evidence as a benchmark to determine whether there had been a material change in circumstances was not considered where she failed to identify any specific evidence that she considered improper; even if the claim was considered, there was no indication that the district court improperly relied on pre-order evidence as it had appropriately based its decision on the change in circumstances occurring after the entry of the original custody order. BB v. RSR, 2007 WY 4, 149 P.3d 727, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2007).

Order modifying child custody, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-204(c), was affirmed where the evidence supported findings of a change in circumstances and that it was in the best interests of the children to live with their father, especially given the preference toward preservation of sibling relationships where the two older children were already living with the father which caused the younger two children to be separated from the older two. Hayzlett v. Hayzlett, 2007 WY 147, 167 P.3d 639, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 2007).

No conflict between statutory law and procedural rules as to issue of modification. —

Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P., merely augments and supplements statutory law by stating that certain issues shall be treated “in all respects” as if they had been raised in the pleadings. In other words, the issue of modification may, under certain circumstances, be treated as if it had been requested or petitioned for by a parent. Strahan v. Strahan, 400 P.2d 542, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1965).

Contempt proceedings permissible. —

Contempt proceedings to enforce provisions of decree are part of court's continuing jurisdiction to modify or enforce provisions of a divorce decree regarding support, custody and visitation. Gaines v. Doby, 773 P.2d 442, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1989).

Custody decree will not be modified unless there is a substantial change of circumstances. —

Father's unchanged circumstances, including having substandard housing and a probationary driver's license which limited his ability to pick up the children for visitation, outweighed the mother's relocation, which improved her employment prospects and increased stability for the children around her family, and supported the denial of the father's motion to modify custody. Olsen v. Olsen, 2013 WY 115, 310 P.3d 888, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2013).

Mother properly found in contempt for visitation violations. —

Mother was properly held in civil contempt for violating a father's visitation rights because (1) court orders required certain conduct of the mother regarding that visitation, (2) the mother was aware of the orders, and (3) the mother disobeyed the orders without seeking modification. Shindell v. Shindell, 2014 WY 51, 322 P.3d 1270, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2014).

Mother was properly found in contempt of the divorce decree's provisions as the visitation and cooperation provisions were sufficiently clear and specific because, before the mother unilaterally discontinued the father's visits, she had allowed visitation supervised by parties other than the one listed in the decree, which was evidence that she understood the visitation terms; the mother was not allowed to unilaterally discontinue the father's visitation; and, although the decree did not specifically require telephone access, when the mother refused to allow the father telephonic or in-person visitation, she willfully interfered with the children's access to their father. Kleinpeter v. Kleinpeter, 2017 WY 76, 397 P.3d 189, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 2017).

Motion not made pursuant to statute and appellate court's jurisdiction.—

Motion from which the mother appealed could be interpreted only as seeking temporary custody modification, given that it was not made pursuant to the statute, but plainly requested only an ex parte order granting emergency relief, and she did not serve the motion on the father or his counsel; because the order resolved only the issue of temporary custody, it was not appealable, and because the court lacked jurisdiction, the mother’s appeal was dismissed. Wood v. Wood, 2018 WY 93, 424 P.3d 247, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 2018).

Due process rights violated. —

In a custody case, because the district court found the mother to be in indirect contempt of court, without issuing a show cause order on the father’s motion, and that transgression of this statute was a serious procedural error that denied the mother her right to due process, the district court abused its discretion and its contempt holding against the mother was reversed. Womack v. Swan, 2018 WY 27, 413 P.3d 127, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2018).

Due process rights not violated. —

District court did not deny the mother due process by forcing her into a second trial on the merits, without providing her notice that custody of the children was subject to modification, because the mother did not assert that the temporary order should have had conclusive effect under the principles of res judicata and she could not rely on the assertion now to impose retroactively the requirement that the father show a material change of circumstances to modify custody; although the request for setting failed to state with particularity the grounds for the motion, the mother had approximately eight months to file a motion for clarification; and the mother had a meaningful opportunity to prepare and to be heard. Womack v. Swan, 2018 WY 27, 413 P.3d 127, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2018).

Material change in circumstances.—

District court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there had been a material change in circumstances supporting the change of custody from the father to the mother; the father withheld visitation for seven months based upon his own determination that the mother’s boyfriend posed a threat to the child, despite the fact that the district court had found otherwise, and the father did not show that the district court erred in considering the child’s emotional state and/or need for counseling. Bishop v. Bishop, 2017 WY 130, 404 P.3d 1170, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2017).

It was an abuse of discretion to decline to reopen a custody and visitation order on a father’s motion because (1) the court’s apparent belief that the subject children had to show objective evidence of harm before the order could be reopened was error, and (2) the mother’s continued instability, poor decision-making regarding partners and the children’s care, and unwillingness to address issues affecting the children through counseling, which had been ordered, and the parties’ inability to make current custody and visitation arrangements work, demonstrated a material change in circumstances. Jacobson v. Kidd, 2018 WY 108, 426 P.3d 813, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2018).

Wyoming Supreme Court has never said a district court must wait until children exhibit negative consequences before reconsidering custody and/or visitation, but the Court has said that, in order to be considered material, a change in circumstances must affect the children’s welfare, which means that the change holds some relevance in the children’s life, and a circumstance may have relevance in a child’s life before there are outward signs of harm, and a district court may take into account the obvious or natural effects of a situation in finding a material change in circumstance. Jacobson v. Kidd, 2018 WY 108, 426 P.3d 813, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 2018).

Proper way to enforce decree but judgment for non-parties improper.—

Wife filed a motion in the divorce case to hold the husband in contempt of court for failing to pay his share of their daughters' college expenses, and that was an appropriate way to enforce the decree; however, the district court could not enter judgment in favor of the daughters because they were not parties to the divorce proceeding. Waterbury v. Waterbury, 2017 WY 11, 388 P.3d 532, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 2017).

Mother properly ordered to pay father's attorney fees. —

When a mother was held in civil contempt for violating a father's visitation rights, the mother was properly ordered to pay the father's attorney fees because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(b) and Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42.1 allowed such a remedy. Shindell v. Shindell, 2014 WY 51, 322 P.3d 1270, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2014).

Relocation by custodial parent. —

District court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to change primary custody of the children because it considered the mother’s relocation and clearly had her motives for moving in mind when it made its decision; the district court discussed how the children fared under the original custody order, both before and after the mother’s relocation, and the children’s behavioral, social, and academic issues. Kimzey v. Kimzey, 2020 WY 52, 461 P.3d 1229, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 2020).

Relocation warranted modification of visitation. —

District court erred in declining to modify visitation because the record contained significant evidence showing how the visitation schedule was not working for the best interests of the children; once the district court determined there was a material change of circumstances regarding custody and visitation and the children were being harmed by the current visitation schedule, it had the responsibility to fashion an order in the children’s best interests. Kimzey v. Kimzey, 2020 WY 52, 461 P.3d 1229, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 2020).

Cited in

Tafoya v. Tafoya, 2013 WY 121, 309 P.3d 1236, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Oct 2, 2013); Greer v. Greer, 2017 WY 35, 391 P.3d 1127, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2017).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Power of court to modify provisions of divorce decree for support of children, as respects past due installments, 6 ALR2d 1277.

Material facts existing at the time of rendition of decree of divorce, but not presented to court, as ground for modification of provision as to custody of child, 9 ALR2d 623.

Alienation of child's affections as ground for modification of custody award, 32 ALR2d 1005.

Right to custody of child as affected by death of custodian appointed by divorce decree; jurisdiction to amend custody provisions, 39 ALR2d 258.

Remarriage of parent as ground for modification of divorce decree as to custody of child, 43 ALR2d 363.

Violation of provision of agreement for decree as to custody of child as affecting provision as to payment for support of child, and vice versa, 95 ALR2d 118.

Child custody provisions of divorce or separation decree as subject to modification on habeas corpus, 4 ALR3d 1277.

Custodial parent's sexual relations with third person as justifying modification of child custody order, 100 ALR3d 625.

§ 20-2-205. Temporary military duty; definitions; modification of orders; visitation assignment; electronic evidence.

1. When a service member who has custody or visitation of a child receives temporary duty, deployment or mobilization orders from the military which require the service member to move a substantial distance from the service member’s residence or otherwise have a temporary but material effect on the service member’s ability to exercise custody or visitation responsibilities:
   1. Any order establishing the terms of custody or visitation in place at the time the service member receives the temporary duty, deployment or mobilization orders may only be temporarily modified so as to provide for the child’s best interests;
   2. Any order modifying an existing custody or visitation order that is determined necessary due to the temporary duty, deployment or mobilization of a service member shall specify that the service member’s military service is the basis for the order and shall further state that it is entered by the court solely as a temporary order;
   3. In issuing any temporary custody or visitation order under this section, the court shall consider whether the temporary order should automatically terminate;
   4. For purposes of determining custody and visitation after the return of a service member and upon motion under W.S. 20-2-204 , the temporary duty, mobilization or deployment of the service member, and the resulting temporary disruption to a child’s schedule, shall be neutral factors in determining a material change in circumstances and shall not, alone, constitute a material change in circumstances warranting a permanent modification of custody or visitation rights.
2. If a service member with visitation rights receives temporary duty, deployment or mobilization orders that require the service member to move a substantial distance from the service member’s residence or otherwise have a material effect on the service member’s ability to exercise visitation rights, the court may, upon motion of the service member, order that the service member’s visitation rights, or a portion thereof, may be exercised by a family member with a close and substantial relationship to the minor child for the duration of the service member’s absence, if the alternate visitation is in the child’s best interest.
3. Upon motion of a service member who has received temporary duty, deployment or mobilization orders, the court shall, for good cause shown, expedite any pending hearing in custody and visitation matters when the military duties of the service member have a material effect on the service member’s ability, or anticipated ability, to appear in person at a regularly scheduled hearing.
4. Upon motion of a service member who has received temporary duty, deployment or mobilization orders together with reasonable advanced notice and proof that the service member’s military duties have a material effect on his ability to appear in person, the court may allow the service member to present testimony and evidence by electronic means in pending custody and visitation matters. The phrase “electronic means” includes communication by telephone, video teleconference or the Internet.
5. Nothing in this section shall alter the duty of the court to consider the best interest of the child in deciding custody or visitation matters.
6. As used in this section:
   1. “Deployment” means federal service of the United States under title 10, United States Code, in compliance with military orders received by a service member to report for combat operations, contingency operations, peacekeeping operations, a temporary duty assignment or other federal service for which the service member is required to report and to be unaccompanied by family members. “Deployment” also shall encompass any federal service that includes a period during which a service member is listed by the United States department of defense as missing in action, a prisoner of war or remains subject to his deployment orders on account of security sequestration, sickness, wounds, leave or other lawful cause. The term shall not apply to any service member who is absent without leave or considered a deserter from the armed forces;
   2. “Mobilization” means the recall to active duty of a retired service member or the call-up of a national guard or reserve component service member to extended active duty status pursuant to title 10 United States Code, sections 12301, 12302, 12303 and 12304. “Mobilization” does not include national guard or reserve annual or weekend training;
   3. “Return” means official release or termination of temporary duty, deployment or mobilization orders or the resumption of a service member’s physical presence within the state of Wyoming or state of permanent residence if other than Wyoming. “Return” does not include presence during temporary leave periods;
   4. “Service member” means a uniformed member of the United States army, navy, air force, marine corps, coast guard, United States public health service commissioned corps, national oceanic and atmospheric administration commissioned corp, national guard or any reserve or auxiliary component thereof;
   5. “Temporary duty” means the temporary transfer of a service member from one (1) military installation to a different location for a period of more than forty-five (45) days but less than one hundred eighty (180) days in order to accomplish training, assist in the performance of any military mission or for medical treatment.

History. Laws 2011, ch. 36, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2011, ch. 36, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2011.

§ 20-2-301. Purpose.

Where necessary and appropriate, the court shall enter orders, whether temporary or permanent, pursuant to and in compliance with this article for the maintenance of children in actions for divorce, annulment, paternity, support, out-of-home placement and any other action for the maintenance or support of children.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

Many of the following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Meaning of “this article.” —

For definition of “this article,” referred to in this section, see § 20-2-303(a)(iv).

Temporary and permanent support orders proper.—

District court acted well within its statutory authority and discretion when it ordered temporary child support appropriate to circumstances during the proceedings, and then issued a permanent child support order, effective as of the last day of the trial; the retroactive child support order seemed particularly reasonable in this case where the final decree was necessarily delayed by father’s ill-fated, post-trial attempt to undermine mother’s fitness. Bruce v. Bruce, 2021 WY 38, 482 P.3d 328, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2021).

Custody and support inseparable. —

Upon a hearing for change of custody, the trial court is obliged to consider all its aspects and make provision for adequate support. Custody implies a consideration of the obligation of support. The two — custody and provision for support — are inseparable. Rose v. Rose, 576 P.2d 458, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 276 (Wyo. 1978).

Decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless discretion abused. —

Decisions regarding child support rest largely within the discretion of the district court, and its decision in that regard will not be disturbed on appeal except for grave abuse of that discretion or violation of some legal principle. Harrington v. Harrington, 660 P.2d 356, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1983). See also Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo. 1983); Roberts v. Vilos, 776 P.2d 216, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1989); CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1992).

Modification of child support within discretion of court. —

The propriety of child support and maintenance and the determination relative to the amount thereof is within the discretion of the trial court and may be modified by the court as the circumstances require. Booker v. Booker, 626 P.2d 561, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 319 (Wyo. 1981).

But is separate and distinct case. —

A modification proceeding involves new issues framed by facts differing from those existing when the original decree was entered. A new adjudication of the rights of the parties must be made. For all intents and purposes it is a separate and distinct case from the original proceeding. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1965).

And judge disqualified in original proceeding vested with jurisdiction to try new issues. —

A presiding judge, though disqualified in original divorce proceeding pursuant to Rule 40.1(b), W.R.C.P., is vested with jurisdiction to try new issues and enter decree modifying custody provisions of original decree in the absence of his being disqualified anew. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1965).

Court may not, of its own initiative, modify its own order with respect to, among other things, a child support obligation absent a proper petition by one of the parents requesting such modification. Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1989).

Retrospective ratification of oral modification of support agreement is improper where agreement is not timely submitted to district court for ratification and the State, which became a party to the agreement upon assignment of rights to support payments by custodial parent, did not agree to retrospective ratification of the modification agreement. Department of Family Servs. v. Peterson, 957 P.2d 1307, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1998).

Later petition to establish support allowed. —

When the original divorce decree and subsequent modifications do not contain any references to child support, a later petition to establish support is not a “motion to modify,” although it may be improvidently so labeled. It is merely ancillary or supplemental to the main cause, and it is not necessary that a determination on the motion be based on a change in circumstance. The standard for establishing, rather than modifying, child support should apply. Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 566 (Wyo. 1987).

Since provisions in original divorce decree pertaining to child support were void, subsequent proceedings were for purpose of establishment rather than modification of child support, and were thus not precluded by subdivision (a) of this section. Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1999).

Court granted jurisdiction to provide for children's support when necessary. —

Subsection (a) grants the district court jurisdiction to provide for the support of the children of divorced parents when the need for support is necessary. Such power is conferred upon the court notwithstanding the age of the child. Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1982).

Continuing jurisdiction as to child support. —

An application to enforce the provisions of a decree in an action for a divorce concerning the support of a child is a supplementary proceeding incidental to the original suit. The court has a continuing jurisdiction in this respect. Erb v. Erb, 573 P.2d 849, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 260 (Wyo. 1978).

The obligation of support bestowed by subsection (a) impliedly becomes a part of every divorce decree involving the welfare of the children of a marriage and the trial court has a continuing jurisdiction to modify. Rose v. Rose, 576 P.2d 458, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 276 (Wyo. 1978).

District court had no authority to retrospectively modify decree of divorce with respect to child support; although prior to the 1987 amendment, this section did not specifically prohibit retrospective modifications, the 1987 amendment merely codified the common law as it existed in Wyoming. Parry v. Parry, 766 P.2d 1168, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1989).

Child support order reflects what parent can reasonably be expected to pay. —

A child support order may not accurately reflect what the children actually require but only what the parent can reasonably be expected to pay. Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1974).

Insurance coverage as part of divorce decree. —

District court correctly determined that the reason father no longer had dental insurance on child was not relevant where father claimed he had removed child at mother's request, and court correctly found father's failure to maintain coverage was a violation of divorce decree requiring he maintain coverage. Harris v. Harris, 948 P.2d 405, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1997).

Obligation of support is a continuing one under this section. Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1974); Rose v. Rose, 576 P.2d 458, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 276 (Wyo. 1978).

Which is subject to change contingent on change in circumstances. —

The obligation of support is at all times subject to change upon proper request to the court for modification or clarification contingent upon a change in circumstances of the parties. Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1974).

Decree creates sequential judgments. —

In the absence of a statute, a decree for periodic payments of child support creates sequential judgments enforceable under the statutory procedures for enforcement of judgments. Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1997).

Where a mother did not execute on periodic child support payments within five years of their becoming due, the judgments became dormant, subject to revival within 21 years. Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1997).

Change in circumstances need not be unforeseeable. —

A substantial change in circumstances is required to modify a divorce decree, but the change need not be an unforeseeable one. Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 408 (Wyo. 1981).

Denial of visitation rights not change in circumstances. —

The denial of visitation rights by either the custodial parent or the child does not constitute a change in circumstances justifying the reduction or termination of the noncustodial parent's support obligation. A child's need for support and a parent's ability to pay are not related to questions concerning visitation. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

Lack of visitation and negative feelings not to be considered. —

Lack of visitation and negative feelings between a noncustodial parent and child are not proper factors that a court may consider in determining whether to deviate from the presumptive support guidelines; such consideration is, therefore, an abuse of discretion. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

Offset not permitted. —

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a father's child support payments could not be offset against the parties' original property settlement. Rocha v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1996).

Operating under monthly deficit not enough to free party from support obligation. The noncustodial parent's desired standard of living cannot determine his ability to pay. However, capacity to contribute must be recognized as a physical fact and a legal requirement. Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 527 (Wyo. 1986).

When inflation important factor. —

In a proceeding to modify a support decree, inflation could be a proper factor for consideration under circumstances in which it had a substantial and disproportionate effect on the relative financial position of the parties' contribution to support. Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 408 (Wyo. 1981).

Voluntary assumption of costs insufficient grounds for modification. —

The voluntary assumption of the costs of a new home and a family after a divorce decree and property settlement agreement are not the changes in circumstances which normally require a modification of the decree. Booker v. Booker, 626 P.2d 561, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 319 (Wyo. 1981).

Modification with changing needs of children. —

Proof of increased income is not, of itself, sufficient to show substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of a divorce decree as related to child support. The needs of the children, and not the standard of living desired by the custodial parent, is the issue. Harrington v. Harrington, 660 P.2d 356, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1983).

Discovery permitted. —

When one petitions for modification of child support, normally discovery should be allowed with respect to the assets of the other party and information relating to the needs of the children. Failure to permit such discovery has been held to be reversible error. Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1991).

In refusing to allow the father, in connection with a petition for modification of child support, to discover relevant evidence relating to any changes in the financial circumstances of his ex-wife since the entry of the divorce decree, the district court abused its discretion. Cubin v. Cubin, 685 P.2d 680, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1984).

Father's disability payments considered by court. —

Social security disability payments awarded, post divorce, for the benefit of a father's disability, as a matter of law, do not constitute satisfaction of child support payments required by the divorce decree. The receipt of such benefits by the children is one factor to be considered by the court in making its determination as to whether a significant, material change of circumstances has occurred that is sufficient to justify modification of a noncustodial parent's obligation for support. The party obligated to make those payments has an affirmative duty to seek modification of the support order. Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1991).

As are children's social security benefits. —

The fact that children become entitled to receive social security benefits is not the exclusive factor for the court to consider in ruling upon a petition for modification. A determination of the amounts of child support that are appropriate in an instance in which modification is sought due to a change in circumstances requires a consideration of the needs of the children, the ability of the father to contribute to those needs and his responsibility to do so, and the ability of the mother to contribute to those needs and her responsibility to do so. Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1991).

But benefits not applied to prior obligation. —

The application of a lump sum payment of social security benefits, that the obligor's children received after the determination was made of his entitlement to benefits, to a prior support obligation would have amounted to a retrospective modification of the support obligation, and was forbidden by statute. Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1991).

Undivided child support order should not be regarded as equally divisible. —

To regard an undivided child support order as equally divisible among the children is to ignore the fact that the requirements of the individual children may vary widely, depending on the circumstances. Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1974).

Making an allowance for four children without specifying the amount considered necessary for each child does not mean that the decree must be construed as constituting a severable decree. Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1974).

Where court terminated support toward one child. —

Fact that court found that father was not liable for support of child who had reached 18 years of age and reduced his monthly payments accordingly did not establish that his child support obligations towards his other three children under an undivided child support order ended upon each child becoming 18. Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1974).

Substantial change in circumstances justified modification. —

The court did not abuse its discretion when it found that a substantial change in wife's monthly financial circumstances, two months after the original decree was entered, justified a modification of the decree. Lewis v. Lewis, 716 P.2d 347, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 519 (Wyo. 1986).

No “substantial change” where stipulated amount. —

The district court could reasonably conclude that there was not a “material and substantial change” in the husband's average income where he stipulated to the amount for child support as contained in the decree — and had agreed to an even greater amount in the original stipulation. Esponda v. Esponda, 796 P.2d 799, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1990).

Construction of conditions in modification decree. —

Conditions in a modification decree, if possible, are to be construed not to operate as a forfeiture of the rights of parties. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1965).

Condition met by substantial performance. —

The condition of a modification decree requiring husband to be “current” in his support payments was met by substantial performance in good faith. Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 1965).

Parent has duty to support incapacitated child even though the child has reached the age of majority. Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1982).

Contempt. —

District court did not err in finding former husband in contempt and accepting court commissioner's determinations that husband had not paid former wife's moving costs or maintained dental insurance for child as ordered by divorce decree and that husband was in arrears for child support and alimony. Harris v. Harris, 948 P.2d 405, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1997).

Statutory attorney liens may not be asserted against child support. —

As a matter of public policy, statutory attorney liens may not be asserted against monies which represent payments for child support because the custodial parent does not own the child support payments received from the clerk of court, but rather such support payments belong to the minor children, and because the custodial parent, rather than the children, owes a debt to the attorney. Sue Davidson, P.C. v. Naranjo, 904 P.2d 354, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

Knezovich v. Knezovich, 2015 WY 6, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Jan. 8, 2015).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Support provisions of judicial decree or order as limit of father's liability for expenses of child, 7 ALR2d 491.

Father's liability for support of child furnished after entry of decree of divorce not providing for support, 69 ALR2d 203, 91 ALR3d 530.

Allocation or apportionment of previous combined award of alimony and child support, 78 ALR2d 1110.

Change in financial condition or needs of parents or children as ground for modification of decree for child support payments, 89 ALR2d 7.

Remarriage as basis for modification of amount of child support provision of divorce decree, 89 ALR2d 106.

Propriety and effect of undivided award for support of more than one person, 2 ALR3d 596.

What voluntary acts of child, other than marriage or entry into military service, terminate parent's obligation to support, 32 ALR3d 1055.

Income of child from other source as excusing parent's compliance with support provisions of divorce decree, 39 ALR3d 1292.

Wife's possession of independent means as affecting her right to allowance for support of her children, 60 ALR3d 719.

Power of court to modify decree for support of children based on agreement of the parties, 61 ALR3d 511.

Father's liability for support of child furnished after divorce decree which awarded custody to mother but made no provision for support, 91 ALR3d 530.

Propriety of decree in proceeding between divorced parents to determine mother's duty to pay support for children in custody of father, 98 ALR3d 1146.

Responsibility of noncustodial divorced parent to pay for, or contribute to, costs of child's college education, 99 ALR3d 322.

Validity and effect, as between former spouses, of agreement releasing parent from payment of child support provided for in an earlier divorce decree, 100 ALR3d 1129.

Validity and enforceability of escalation clause in divorce decree relating to alimony and child support, 19 ALR4th 830.

Excessiveness or adequacy of money awarded as child support, 27 ALR4th 864.

What constitutes “extraordinary” or similar medical or dental expenses for purposes of divorce decree requiring one parent to pay such expenses for child in custody of other parent, 39 ALR4th 502.

Stepparent's postdivorce duty to support stepchild, 44 ALR4th 520.

Court's authority to reinstitute parent's support obligation after terms of prior decree have been fulfilled, 48 ALR4th 952.

Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after absolute divorce, for modification of child custody or support order, 57 ALR4th 710.

Withholding visitation rights for failure to make alimony or support payments, 65 ALR4th 1155.

Divorce and separation: attributing undisclosed income to parent or spouse for purposes of making child- or spousal-support award, 70 ALR4th 173.

State court's authority, in marital or child custody proceeding, to allocate federal income tax dependency exemption for child to noncustodial parent under § 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 USC § 152(e)), 77 ALR4th 786.

What constitutes order made pursuant to state domestic relations law for purposes of qualified domestic relations order exception to antialienation provision of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 USC § 1056(d)), 79 ALR4th 1081.

Parent's child support liability as affected by other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation regarding sterility or use of birth control, or refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 ALR5th 337.

Loss of income due to incarceration as affecting child support obligation, 27 ALR5th 540.

Treatment of depreciation expenses claimed for tax or accounting purposes in determining ability to pay child or spousal support, 28 ALR5th 46.

Right to credit on child support payments for social security or other government dependency payments made for benefit of child, 34 ALR5th 447.

Support provisions of judicial decree or order as limit of parent's liability for expenses of child, 35 ALR5th 757.

Alimony or child-support awards as subject to attorneys' liens, 49 ALR5th 595.

Right to credit on child support arrearages for time parties resided together after separation or divorce, 104 ALR5th 605.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time child spent in custody of noncustodial parent, other than for visitation or under court order, without custodial parent's approval, 108 ALR5th 359.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time children spent in custody of noncustodial parent pursuant to visitation or court order, 118 ALR 5th 385.

Right to credit on child-support arrearages for money given directly to child, 119 ALR 5th 445.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time child lived with noncustodial parent, other than for visitation or by court order, with approval of custodial parent, 120 ALR 5th 229.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to housing costs, utility bills, and other alleged household necessities made for child's benefit while child is not living with obligor parent, 123 ALR 5th 565.

Right to credit on child support arrearages for gifts to child, 124 ALR 5th 441.

§ 20-2-302. Applicability.

This article applies to all orders for the support or maintenance of children.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1.

Meaning of “this article.” —

For definition of “this article,” referred to in this section, see § 20-2-303(a)(iv).

§ 20-2-303. Definitions.

1. As used in this article:
   1. “Age of majority” means as defined in W.S. 14-1-101(a) or 14-2-204(a), whichever is applicable;
   2. “Income” means any form of payment or return in money or in kind to an individual, regardless of source. Income includes, but is not limited to wages, earnings, salary, commission, compensation as an independent contractor, temporary total disability, permanent partial disability and permanent total disability worker’s compensation payments, unemployment compensation, disability, annuity and retirement benefits, and any other payments made by any payor, but shall not include any earnings derived from overtime work unless the court, after considering all overtime earnings derived in the preceding twenty-four (24) month period, determines the overtime earnings can reasonably be expected to continue on a consistent basis. In determining income, all reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expenses shall be deducted. Means tested sources of income such as Pell grants, aid under the personal opportunities with employment responsibilities (POWER) program, supplemental nutrition assistance program and supplemental security income (SSI) shall not be considered as income. Gross income also means potential income of parents who are voluntarily unemployed or underemployed;
   3. “Net income” means income as defined in paragraph (ii) of this subsection less personal income taxes, social security deductions, cost of dependent health care coverage for all dependent children, actual payments being made under preexisting support orders for current support of other children, other court-ordered support obligations currently being paid and mandatory pension deductions. Payments towards child support arrearage shall not be deducted to arrive at net income;
   4. Repealed by Laws 2019, ch. 186, §  2.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 225, § 1; Laws 1990, ch. 60, § 2; Laws 1993, ch. 184, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 196, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 20-6-301 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 2; 2013, ch. 193, § 1; 2019, ch. 186, § 2.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, substituted “supplemental nutrition assistance program” for “food stamps” in the last sentence in (a)(ii).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, repealed (a)(iv), which read: "`This article' means W.S. 20-2-301 through 20-2-315 ."

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Means tested income.—

District court properly excluded Massachusetts “CASH” benefits from mother’s income calculations because it qualified as means tested income; the phrase “such as” - akin to the term “includes” - is enlarging, not exclusive, and mother explained her income had to be below a certain amount to qualify for state benefits. Bruce v. Bruce, 2021 WY 38, 482 P.3d 328, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2021).

Calculation of husband’s net income.—

District court did not abuse its discretion when it included depreciation in a father’s income because the court’s calculations were supported by the record and did not exceed the bounds of reason. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by adding certain distributions from a limited liability company established by the father and the father’s then wife to the father’s income. Marquis v. Marquis, 2020 WY 141, 476 P.3d 212, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 2020).

Imputed income. —

Child support award erred because the court found a father was voluntarily underemployed based on overtime income the father had earned more than 24 months prior to trial without finding the overtime income would continue. Johnson v. Johnson, 2020 WY 18, 458 P.3d 27, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2020).

Mother's motion to modify child support was properly denied because she was voluntarily unemployed from January to November 2013; she was able to earn the income imputed to her during this time period because she had active medical licenses in multiple states. She did not claim that her employment away from Wyoming prevented her from exercising visitation with the children, and her personality conflicts with colleagues that resulted in her leaving employment positions were not relevant as to whether she was able to find employment. Levene v. Levene, 2014 WY 161, 340 P.3d 270, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 2014).

Calculation of husband’s net income. —

In the parties' divorce, the trial court erred in determining the husband's net income because it was required to use the statutory definitions of “income” and “net income” rather than the arbitrary number associated with the amount he tithed to his church. Bagley v. Bagley, 2013 WY 126, 311 P.3d 141, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2013).

Parties' income was properly calculated for purposes of child support modification because (1) it was not an abuse of discretion to deduct the mother's home office expenses, and (2) the court did not have to average the father's fluctuating income. Zupan v. Zupan, 2016 WY 78, 377 P.3d 770, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 2016).

District court, which used the father's federal tax information to ascertain his income and added depreciation back to the adjusted gross income figure on the father's return, acted within its discretion in calculating the father's net income as it did for child support purposes; the district court correctly calculated the presumptive level of support by considering the parties' most recent income information as representative of their current earning ability, consistent with case law. Ackerman v. Ott, 2014 WY 93, 330 P.3d 271, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2014).

Relation to other statutes. —

District court cannot simply sign off on a stipulated decree deviating from the guidelines when Title XIX Medicaid coverage benefits are being paid for the benefit of children; however, a court is not precluded from ordering a deviation downward from the presumed child support amount after making appropriate findings if a party has any of the means-tested sources of income referred to. District court may use its discretion and consider whether a deviation is appropriate, even when means tested sources of income are being paid on behalf of any of the children; this interpretation is consistent with other child support statutes. Dellit v. Tracy, 2015 WY 153, 362 P.3d 353, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 2015).

Income includes “contribution.” —

Monthly “contribution,” for use of first floor of father's house as a residence for the poor, was income for purposes of calculating father's child support obligation. Fountain v. Mitros, 968 P.2d 934, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1998), reh'g denied, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 5, 1999).

Imputed income. —

Where mother voluntarily left her teaching position and was a second-year law student with zero income, district court could reasonably find she was voluntarily unemployed, and could impute her income from prior years. KC v. KJM (In re IC), 971 P.2d 603, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1999).

Uncertain historical gifts excluded from “income.” —

The court is afforded discretion to include or not include historical gifts as a source of income and may rule that gifts to a spouse were so uncertain as to preclude their inclusion in a calculation of monthly income. Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Trial court's award of child support was proper because it took into consideration the statutory factors, including decisions to impute income, how the fact that the children were still living in the mother's home impacted her ability to work, and that the father did not show that deviation was appropriate. Stevens v. Stevens, 2014 WY 23, 318 P.3d 802, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 2014).

Deferred compensation is not “income.” —

The amount withheld from the father's pay for deferred compensation was not income under the child support guidelines, because deferred compensation is not a “payment or return in money or in kind” to the father when it is paid into a fund for his later benefit. Ahearn v. Ahearn, 993 P.2d 942, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1999).

Deduction of business expenses. —

District court did not err in refusing to deduct defendant's purported business expenses in calculating child support; defendant relied almost exclusively on deductions appearing in his federal income tax return, which did not excuse him from responsibility of showing that deductions were reasonable and appropriate. Roseman v. Sackett, 979 P.2d 940, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 1999).

The principal portion of a business mortgage payment may be deductible if, in its discretion, the district court determines that the payment reasonably and legitimately reduces net income for child support purposes. Fleenor v. Fleenor, 992 P.2d 1065, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1999).

Appellate court held if in computing child support, a trial court automatically rejected a business expense that had been afforded 26 USCS § 179 treatment, that court had not fulfilled its obligation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-303(a)(ii) to determine whether the amount should be deducted as a reasonable and legitimate business expense. Watson v. Watson, 2002 WY 180, 60 P.3d 124, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 218 (Wyo. 2002).

Social security dependency benefits properly considered. —

Because dependency benefits represent an amount earned through a parent's contributions to the social security program, it is proper to include those amounts in the disabled parent's income. Groenstein v. Groenstein, 2005 WY 6, 104 P.3d 765, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2005).

Federal tax return not inappropriate for determining child support. —

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court, under this section, to use the most recent tax returns for determining income; defendant father's tax refund could be considered as affecting cash flow. Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, 76 P.3d 836, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2003).

Federal income tax computations differ significantly. —

Because federal income tax computations differ in significant respects from the computations required by this section, the district court erred in substituting the federal income tax concepts to arrive at the presumptive child support amounts under former § 20-6-304 (now see § 20-2-304 ). Houston v. Smith, 882 P.2d 240, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1994).

Applied in

Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, 74 P.3d 1230, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2003).

Quoted in

Pasenelli v. Pasenelli, 2002 WY 159, 57 P.3d 324, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

Underkofler v. Underkofler, 834 P.2d 1140, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1992).

Focus in determining income. —

It is clear from case law that the focus for determining income should be upon the reasonable and legitimate nature of the expense and its impact on the party's actual cash flow in the year in question rather than the treatment of the expense by federal law in the context of income taxes. Ackerman v. Ott, 2014 WY 93, 330 P.3d 271, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2014).

§ 20-2-304. Presumptive child support.

1. Child support shall be expressed in a specific dollar amount. The following child support tables shall be used to determine the total child support obligation considering the combined income of both parents. The appropriate table is based upon the number of children for whom the parents share joint legal responsibility and for whom support is being sought. After the combined net income of both parents is determined it shall be used in the first column of the tables to find the appropriate line from which the total child support obligation of both parents can be computed from the third column. The child support obligation computed from the third column of the tables shall be divided between the parents in proportion to the net income of each. The noncustodial parent’s share of the joint child support obligation shall be paid to the custodial parent through the clerk as defined by W.S. 20-6-102(a)(x):
   1. One (1) child:

      Net Monthly Income of Both Parents Percentage of Income Allocated For One Child Base Support Plus Marginal Percentage $846.00 22.0 $186.00 + 21.3% over $846.00 $2,961.00 21.5 $637.00 + 14.3% over $2,961.00 $4,652.00 18.9 $879.00 + 11.8% over $4,652.00 $5,498.00 17.8 $979.00 + 10.2% over $5,498.00 $7,613.00 15.7 $1,195.00 + 9.3% over $7,613.00 $10,151.00 14.1 $1,431.00 + 7.5% over $10,151.00 $12,900.00 12.7 $1,638.00 + 5.9% of anything over $12,900.00

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   2. Two (2) children:

      Net Monthly Income of Both Parents Percentage of Income Allocated For Two Children Base Support Plus Marginal Percentage $ 846.00 32.9 $278.00 + 32.8% over $846.00 $2,961.00 32.8 $971.00 + 20.7% over $2,961.00 $4,652.00 28.4 $1,321.00 + 17.4% over $4,652.00 $5,498.00 26.7 $1,468.00 + 15.2% over $5,498.00 $7,613.00 23.5 $1,789.00 + 14.3% over $7,613.00 $10,151.00 21.2 $2,152.00 + 10.4% over $10,151.00 $12,900.00 18.9 $2,438.00 + 9.5% of anything over $12,900.00

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   3. Three (3) children:

      Net Monthly Income of Both Parents Percentage of Income Allocated For Three Children Base Support Plus Marginal Percentage $846.00 40.2 $340.00 + 39.4% over $846.00 $2,961.00 39.6 $1,173.00 + 23.9% over $2,961.00 $4,652.00 33.9 $1,577.00 + 20.9% over $4,652.00 $5,498.00 31.9 $1,754.00 + 17.9% over $5,498.00 $7,613.00 28.0 $2,132.00 + 16.8% over $7,613.00 $10,151.00 25.2 $2,558.00 + 11.6% over $10,151.00 $12,900.00 22.3 $2,877.00 + 11.6% of anything over $12,900.00

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   4. Four (4) children:

      Net Monthly Income of Both Parents Percentage of Income Allocated For Four Children Base Support Plus Marginal Percentage $846.00 44.9 $380.00 + 43.9% over $846.00 $2,961.00 44.2 $1,309.00 + 26.8% over $2,961.00 $4,652.00 37.9 $1,763.00 + 22.9% over $4,652.00 $5,498.00 35.6 $1,957.00 + 20.1% over $5,498.00 $7,613.00 31.3 $2,383.00 + 18.5% over $7,613.00 $10,151.00 28.1 $2,852.00 + 13.1% over $10,151.00 $12,900.00 24.9 $3,212.00 + 13.0 % of anything over $12,900.00

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   5. Five (5) or more children:

      Net Monthly Income of Both Parents Percentage of Income Allocated For Five or More Children Base Support Plus Marginal Percentage $846.00 49.4 $418.00 + 48.3% over $846.00 $2,961.00 48.6 $1,439.00 + 29.6% over $2,961.00 $4,652.00 41.7 $1,940.00 + 24.8% over $4,652.00 $5,498.00 39.1 $2,150.00 + 22.2% over $5,498.00 $7,613.00 34.4 $2,619.00 + 20.4% over $7,613.00 $10,151.00 30.9 $3,137.00 + 14.5% over $10,151.00 $12,900.00 27.4 $3,535.00 + 14.3% of anything over $12,900.00

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2. Repealed by Laws 2018, ch. 42, §  2.
3. When each parent keeps the children overnight for more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the year and both parents contribute substantially to the expenses of the children in addition to the payment of child support, a shared responsibility child support obligation shall be determined by multiplying the parents’ total child support obligation as derived from subsection (a) of this section by one hundred fifty percent (150%). After the shared responsibility child support obligation is determined, that amount shall be divided between the parents in proportion to the net income of each. The proportionate share of the total obligation of each parent shall then be multiplied by the percentage of time the children spend with the other parent to determine the theoretical support obligation owed to the other parent. The parent owing the greater amount of child support shall pay the difference between the two (2) amounts as the net child support obligation.
4. When each parent has physical custody of at least one (1) of the children, a shared responsibility child support obligation for all of the children shall be determined by use of the tables. The shared responsibility child support amount shall be divided by the number of children to determine the presumptive support obligation for each child, which amount shall then be allocated to each parent based upon the number of those children in the physical custody of that parent. That sum shall be multiplied by the percentage that the other parent’s net income bears to the total net income of both parents. The obligations so determined shall then be offset, with the parent owing the larger amount paying the difference between the two (2) amounts to the other parent as a net child support obligation.
5. If a proportion of a support obligor’s social security or veteran’s benefit is paid directly to the custodian of the obligor’s dependents who are the subject of the child support order, the total amount of the social security or veteran’s benefit, including the amounts paid to the obligor and custodian under the child support order, shall be counted as gross income to the obligor. However, in determining the support amount, the amount of the social security or veteran’s benefit sent directly to the custodian shall be subtracted from the obligor’s share of presumptive support. If the subtraction of the social security or veteran’s benefit sent directly to the custodian results in a negative dollar amount, the support amount shall be set at zero. The child support obligation shall be offset by the amount of the social security or veteran’s benefit sent directly to the custodian, beginning from the time the custodian began receiving the social security or veteran’s benefit. The obligor or the department of family services may apply to the court to receive a credit against arrears for any social security or veteran’s benefits that are paid retroactively to the custodian. For purposes of this subsection, “custodian” means the custodian of dependent children under a child support order and the physical custodian of dependent children who are the subject of a child support order.
6. If the difference between the obligor’s net income and the self-support reserve is less than the support obligation as calculated from the tables in subsection (a) of this section, the support obligation shall be set using the difference between the obligor’s net income and the self-support reserve. As used in this subsection “self-support reserve” means the current poverty line for one (1) person as specified by the poverty guidelines updated periodically in the Federal Register by the United States department of health and human services under the authority of 42 U.S.C. 9902(2).

History. Laws 1989, ch. 225, § 1; Laws 1990, ch. 60, § 2; Laws 1993, ch. 184, § 1; Laws 1994, ch. 89, § 1; Laws 1995, ch. 174, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 20-6-304 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 2; 2005, ch. 12, § 1; 2013, ch. 7, § 1; ch. 19, § 1; 2018, ch. 42, §§ 1, 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, increased the net monthly income amounts, the percentage of income allocated, and the base support in the tables in (a); in (b), substituted “eight hundred thirty-three dollars ($833.00)” for “seven hundred thirty-two dollars ($732.00)”; and added (e).

The 2013 amendments. —

The first 2013 amendment, by ch. 7, § 1, effective July 1, 2013, substituted “as defined by W.S. 20-6-102(a)(x)” for “of court” in (a).

The second 2013 amendment, by ch. 19, § 1, effective July 1, 2013, changed the values in all the tables in (a); and in (b), substituted “eight hundred forty-six dollars ($846.00)” for “eight hundred thirty-three dollars ($833.00),” and added “twenty-two percent (22%) of net income for one (1) child and” and “for two (2) or more children.”

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

The 2018 amendments. — The first 2018 amendment, by ch. 42, § 1, effective July 1, 2018, substituted “shared responsibility child” for “joint presumptive” or similar language throughout (c) and (d); in (c), substituted “more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the year” for “more than forty percent (40%) of the year,” “determined by multiplying the parents' total child support obligation as derived from subsection (a) of this section by one hundred fifty percent (150%). After” for “determined by use of the tables. After,” and “obligation is determined, that amount” for “obligation is derived from column three of the tables, that amount”; and added (f).

The second 2018 amendment, by ch. 42, § 2, effective July 1, 2018, repealed former (b), which read: “Where the combined income of the custodial parent and the noncustodial parent is less than eight hundred forty-six dollars ($846.00), the support obligation of the noncustodial parent shall be twenty-two percent (22%) of net income for one (1) child and twenty-five percent (25%) of net income for two (2) or more children, but in no case shall the support obligation be less than fifty dollars ($50.00) per month for each family unit in which there are children to whom the noncustodial parent owes a duty of support.”

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

No relief based on claim of unconstitutionality.—

Father was not entitled to relief based on his claim that this section was unconstitutional because he advocated for the $50 child support order in his proposed divorce decree and the cases he relied on from New York and Washington, wherein the courts declared their respective states’ mandatory minimum child support obligations unconstitutional because they were irrebuttable and therefore conflicted with federal law, were decided before the divorce decree was entered and the father provided no justification for not raising that argument prior to the divorce decree. Webb v. Wyo. ex rel. Dep't of Family Servs., Child Support Enf't Div., 2020 WY 111, 471 P.3d 289, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 2020).

Proper calculation. —

District court did not exceed the bounds of reason when it found a father was not voluntarily underemployed on the basis that he earned less money at his new job than he made while operating a lawn care business because the father closed a business for various reasons, testifying that his new job allowed him to fully exercise visitation with his children; the business was failing, and the father could not independently revive a failing business and parent his four children as a single father. Edwards v. Edwards, 2020 WY 35, 459 P.3d 448, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2020).

Reliance on confidential financial affidavit.—

Mother’s testimony was consistent with her confidential financial affidavit (CFA), which had sufficient required supporting documentation, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the CFA to calculate her monthly income; mother’s updated CFA listed her hourly rate at $ 13.50 and her weekly hours at approximately 27 hours, which was consistent with her testimony, and father’s bald assertion that her testimony reflected a much higher income was not supported by the record. Bruce v. Bruce, 2021 WY 38, 482 P.3d 328, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2021).

Support to be calculated under the guidelines. —

In the parties' divorce, the trial court erred in calculating the child support for the parties' adult disabled daughter because it failed to follow the statutory procedure, which required that such support be calculated under the guidelines. Bagley v. Bagley, 2013 WY 126, 311 P.3d 141, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2013).

Calculation should be presumptive amount. —

Calculation of a father's child support obligation under this section was clearly incorrect as the net income figures specified represented a substantial decrease in the father's income and a substantial increase in the mother's income, yet the trial court increased the father's child support obligation; the trial court was ordered to arrive at a support calculation that complied with the statutory tables. Walker v. Walker, 2013 WY 132, 311 P.3d 170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2013).

Proper calculation. —

District court, which used the father's federal tax information to ascertain his income and added depreciation back to the adjusted gross income figure on the father's return, acted within its discretion in calculating the father's net income as it did for child support purposes; the district court correctly calculated the presumptive level of support by considering the parties' most recent income information as representative of their current earning ability, consistent with case law. Ackerman v. Ott, 2014 WY 93, 330 P.3d 271, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2014).

It was not an abuse of discretion to order a father to pay child support when the father had not filed a required financial affidavit because (1) the court had sufficient other evidence of the parties' finances, and (2) the father could not complain on appeal of the father's disregard of statutory requirements. Peak v. Peak, 2016 WY 109, 383 P.3d 1084, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2016).

Federal tax return inappropriate for determining child support. —

Because federal income tax computations differ in significant respects from the computations required by former § 20-6-301 (now 20-2-303 ), the district court erred in substituting the federal income tax concepts to arrive at the presumptive child support amounts under this section. Houston v. Smith, 882 P.2d 240, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1994).

But there is no per se prohibition in using federal tax return to determine child support. —

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court, under this section, to use the most recent tax returns for determining income; defendant father's tax refund could be considered as affecting cash flow. Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, 76 P.3d 836, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2003).

Deviation from presumptive support.—

District court did not abuse its discretion when it did not allow a downward deviation from a father’s presumptive child support because the father failed to establish that the father contributed substantially to the expenses of the children of the father and the mother. Marquis v. Marquis, 2020 WY 141, 476 P.3d 212, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 2020).

Factors prior to enactment of section to be considered. —

The enactment of this section has not obviated the court's need to consider those factors it previously considered when determining whether child support was warranted; i.e., the child's welfare, the paying parent's ability to pay, the recipient's spending habits, and all other surrounding circumstances. Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1992).

Social security dependency benefits properly considered. —

Because dependency benefits represent an amount earned through a parent's contributions to the social security program, it is proper to include those amounts in the disabled parent's income. Groenstein v. Groenstein, 2005 WY 6, 104 P.3d 765, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2005).

Alimony not included in income determination. —

Monthly alimony payments should not be included in a spouse's income for purposes of determining his/her share of a joint child support obligation. The policy behind an award of alimony is to provide the dependent spouse with a standard of living comparable to what that spouse enjoyed during the term of the marriage, not to support the children. Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Previously divided assets. —

Contemplation of previously divided assets a second time, as income for purposes of post-decree child support adjustment is inequitable and violative of the rule announced in Klatt v. Klatt, 654 P.2d 733, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 413 (Wyo. 1982).Bollig v. Bollig, 919 P.2d 136, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1996).

District court incorrectly considered the father's receipt of previously divided marital property as income. Bollig v. Bollig, 919 P.2d 136, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1996).

Overnight visitation. —

In a child support case, a district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a father to pay less than the statutory presumptive amount because he had necessary child day care costs, the father had the children for a substantial period of time, and he paid his share of uncovered medical expenses. However, the father did not have the children overnight for 40 percent of the time. Dellit v. Tracy, 2015 WY 153, 362 P.3d 353, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 2015).

Rebuttable presumption.—

District court properly denied a father’s motion for relief from an income withholding order because his motion requested that his child support obligation be vacated, he presented no argument that the order, itself, was improper, that Wyoming’s statutory approach to setting child support included an irrebuttable presumption, and did not present a record that would enable review of his claim, the court’s findings—which considered the needs of the children and the timing of the father’s release from prison—did not support an argument that the court applied an irrebuttable presumption, and it was arguable that the statute at issue created a rebuttable presumption of $50 per month minimum child support when read in conjunction with another section. MSC, II v. MCG, 2019 WY 59, 442 P.3d 662, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 2019).

Lack of visitation and negative feelings not to be considered. —

Lack of visitation and negative feelings between a noncustodial parent and child are not proper factors that a court may consider in determining whether to deviate from the presumptive support guidelines; such consideration is, therefore, an abuse of discretion. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

In a mother's action to modify child support under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311 , a district court abused its discretion when it determined that the magnitude of the negative feelings and the extent of the alienation that had occurred between a father and his adult son warranted a downward deviation of half the presumptive child support under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-2-304 and 20-2-307(a). Steele v. Neeman, 2009 WY 58, 206 P.3d 384, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 2009).

Pre-statutory child support agreements not necessarily changed. —

Child support agreements made prior to the enactment of the statutory child support guidelines do not necessarily have to be changed simply because of the enactment of the statutory guidelines. Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1991).

But original agreement weighed against statutory factors. —

In making its determination as to whether to deviate from the child support guidelines, the court may consider the list of factors under former § 20-6-302 (now 20-2-307 ) and the parties' original agreement and weigh their relevance. Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1991).

No joint obligation absent joint “substantial contribution.” —

A parent who keeps the children overnight the required percentage of the year and pays a child support obligation has not satisfied the three requirements of subsection (d). Evidence must also support a finding that both parents substantially contributed to the expenses of the children. The legislative intent to encourage both parents' involvement in the financial maintenance of their children requires this degree of participation. Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1994).

Order directing a father to pay a mother $680 per month in child support was proper because the joint custody child support provision in the statute did not apply as the father's contribution was not substantial and he was, instead, entitled to a downward deviation from the presumptive child support amount for his additional contribution. Lee v. Lee, 2013 WY 76, 303 P.3d 1128, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2013).

Children from later marriage relevant to support determination. —

In a child support modification suit brought on behalf of a child from the noncustodial parent's first marriage, the court was correct when it held that the children born to the petitioner's later marriage should not be factored into the child support guidelines matrix set forth in this section. However, the court erred when it concluded that it had to strictly apply the guidelines set forth in this section and could not take into consideration the parent's later-born minor children for purposes of determining the modification award, as the court may consider responsibility for later born children pursuant to former § 20-6-302(b)(iv) (now 20-2-307 ). Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1992).

District court properly modified child support because it did not abuse its discretion in deviating from the presumptive child support amount; once the district determined that deviation was appropriate based on the father’s obligation to a later-born child from his subsequent marriage, nothing prevented it from calculating the appropriate support obligation by considering the presumptive amount for all of the father’s children. TSR v. State ex rel. Dep't of Family Servs., 2017 WY 144, 406 P.3d 729, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2017).

Upper scale for upwardly varying future income. —

The court properly set an upper scale of $2,000 per month for child support, based on a theory that the parent's income might vary upwardly in the future. Madison v. Madison, 859 P.2d 1276, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1993).

Rebuttable presumption that modification is warranted created. —

Rather than requiring courts to modify existing support awards, former § 20-6-306(a) (now see 20-2-311 ), in conjunction with subsection (a) of this section and former § 20-6-302 (now 20-3-307), created a rebuttable presumption that modification would be warranted when application of the guidelines would result in a 20% change in the monthly support award; this rebuttable presumption applies not only when child support is initially awarded, but also when a support award is modified. Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1992); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

Slight deviation from guidelines permissible. —

A court's deviation of $25.81 less than that provided in an award pursuant to this section was permissible, despite the lack of written or specific findings on the record to account for the deviation, as required by former § 20-6-302(b) (now 20-2-307 ). Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1993).

Deviation allowed where parties agree to amount. —

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not following the child support guidelines in this section in an instance in which the parties had agreed upon the amount of child support; the court found good cause to deviate from the presumptive amounts established by the statutory formula, and it did not modify the amount of child support in response to the father's petition. Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1995).

Deviation from presumptive support. —

Trial court did not err in ordering child support to end when the child became 18 and in having deviated from the presumptive support level; although the parties were not aware of their son's learning disability at the time that the divorce decree, that decree stated support would end once each child reached the age of 18, and the mother had forgiven the child support arrearages owed to her by the father. Shelhamer v. Shelhamer, 2006 WY 83, 138 P.3d 665, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2006).

District court’s order sufficiently indicated the reason for its departure from the presumptive child support amount because the order clearly provided that the downward deviation from presumptive child support was based on the father’s responsibility for the support of a later-born child from a subsequent marriage; The district court’s decision clearly indicates that applying the presumptive child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. TSR v. State ex rel. Dep't of Family Servs., 2017 WY 144, 406 P.3d 729, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2017).

Failure to comply with statutory requirements. —

Child support order was erroneous because the order contained no findings with regard to the parties' incomes, which was necessary for calculating presumptive child support in accordance with the statute; hence, it was necessary to remand the case to the district court. JKS v. AHF (In re ARF), 2013 WY 97, 307 P.3d 852, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2013).

Although the district court was privy to information regarding the husband’s finances that would allow it to reach a decision about child support, and the husband’s failure to file a financial affidavit did not render the stipulated decree problematic with respect to child support, the fact that the district court did not acknowledge the presumptive child support amount did; further, the order originally establishing the amount of child support could not be relied upon as that order also failed to state the presumptive amount, and it did not give any indication as to how the court reached the $2,500 per month calculation. Long v. Long, 2018 WY 26, 413 P.3d 117, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2018).

Material circumstantial change warrants modification of agreement. —

When the amount of child support is set by agreement, the party seeking modification must demonstrate a material change in circumstances other than a 20 percent departure from the statutory guidelines. Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1995).

Change from shared to primary custody created rebuttable presumption that modification warranted. —

In a child support action, a district court erred by failing to modify child support in a proceeding commenced after a change from shared custody to primary custody with the mother. Pursuant to the presumptive child support guidelines, the father should have been required to pay 20 percent more than he had been required to pay under the previous order. McCulloh v. Drake, 2005 WY 18, 105 P.3d 1091, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2005).

Father failed to establish that he “contributed substantially” to expenses of children where he provided evidence of only nominal contributions, including child care costs and magazine subscriptions. He offered no evidence that he had increased expenses for a larger apartment or home to provide the children with living space while they were in his custody; no evidence of increased food, heating or utility expenses while the children were in his custody; and no evidence of providing for the needs of the children with clothing, toys or other necessities at any time. Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1994) (decided prior to 1994 amendment).

District court did not err in declining to apply shared custody provision where father failed to show a substantial contribution to his daughter's expenses. Fountain v. Mitros, 968 P.2d 934, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1998), reh'g denied, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 5, 1999).

Child support to be paid where reasonably possible. —

Since child support obligations are specifically designated in § 7-16-205 , it is clear that the legislature intended they be paid where reasonably possible, and where prisoner made no credible showing that payment of his minimal child support would deprive him of necessities during his prison incarceration, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the prisoner to pay child support. Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1993).

Shared custody arrangements. —

Where the court directed that the husband and wife will alternate the child's physical care every four months, each parent was entitled to receive presumptive support for the periods that he or she had the child overnight for more than forty percent of the year, to be determined by use of the tables. Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1998).

It was error, based on a prior visitation schedule, to deny a father's request to reduce the father's child support obligation by calculating the obligation pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304(c) because the father showed (1) each party had custody of the parties' child over 40 percent of a year, (2) the calculation reduced the father's child support obligation over 20 percent, and (3) the father contributed substantially to the child's expenses, but child support was not reduced since the father did not meet the 40 or 20 percent requirements under a new visitation schedule that was approved. Jensen v. Milatzo-Jensen, 2013 WY 27, 297 P.3d 768, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2013).

Order granting a mother physical custody but granting a father liberal visitation was not a mistake due to granting the father de facto shared custody, because (1) each parent's time with the children was not approximately 50% in a given year, and (2) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304(c) did not apply. Loran v. Loran, 2015 WY 24, 343 P.3d 400, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2015).

Ordering joint presumptive child support was an abuse of discretion because no required finding that each parent contributed substantially to the children's expenses in addition to paying child support was made. Loran v. Loran, 2015 WY 24, 343 P.3d 400, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2015).

District court did not err in failing to apply joint presumptive child support because a parent did not have the parties' child overnight for forty percent of the year. Wright v. Wright, 2015 WY 37, 344 P.3d 267, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 2015), reh'g denied, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. Apr. 7, 2015).

Incarcerated parent's assets or income applied toward child support. —

If an incarcerated parent does have assets or income while in prison, that income can properly be applied against that parent's outstanding support obligation. Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1993).

Denial of visitation rights not change in circumstances. —

The denial of visitation rights by either the custodial parent or the child does not constitute a change in circumstances justifying the reduction or termination of the noncustodial parent's support obligation. A child's need for support and a parent's ability to pay are not related to questions concerning visitation. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

Insufficient financial information. —

Motion to set aside the default divorce decree should have been granted under W.R.C.P. 60(b) because the trial court failed to base its findings of fact in accordance with W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) regarding property distribution, child custody, visitation, and support on some evidence in the record, and the trial court did not comply with the dictates of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308(a) by obtaining sufficient financial evidence of both parties' income to make factual determinations, to comply with the presumptive child support guidelines found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304 , or to determine whether to deviate from those guidelines under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307 . Noonan v. Noonan, 2005 WY 145, 122 P.3d 964, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 2005).

Applied in

Smith v. Smith, 863 P.2d 624, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1993); Goody v. Goody, 939 P.2d 731, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1997); Fleenor v. Fleenor, 992 P.2d 1065, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1999); Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, 74 P.3d 1230, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2003).

Quoted in

Esponda v. Esponda, 796 P.2d 799, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1990); Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, 92 P.3d 298, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (2004); Carbaugh v. Nichols, 2014 WY 2, 315 P.3d 1175, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 2 , 2014 WL 31325 (Jan 6, 2014).

Cited in

Kidd v. Kidd, 832 P.2d 566, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1992); Underkofler v. Underkofler, 834 P.2d 1140, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1992); Wright v. Wright, 5 P.3d 61, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 2000); Davidson v. Carrillo, 2014 WY 65, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (May 22, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Child Support and Social Security Dependent Benefits: a Comprehensive Analysis and Proposal for Wyoming,” see 2 Wyo. L. Rev. 39 (2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Loss of income due to incarceration as affecting child support obligation, 27 ALR5th 540.

§ 20-2-305. Abatements. [Repealed]

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1; 2003, ch. 25, § 1; 2005, ch. 204, § 1; 2014, ch. 35, § 1; Repealed by Laws 2018, ch. 42, § 2.

§ 20-2-306. Revision of presumptive child support.

On or before December 1, 1996, and at least once every four (4) years thereafter, the department of family services shall review the presumptive child support established under this article to ensure that application results in the determination of appropriate child support award amounts.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 225, § 1; Laws 1990, ch. 60, § 2; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; Laws 1993, ch. 184, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 20-6-305 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 2; 2008, ch. 44, § 1.

The 2008 amendment, deleted “and shall submit a report to the joint labor, health and social services interim committee and shall recommend any proposed changes” at the end.

Laws 2008, ch. 44, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 5, 2008.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2008, ch. 44, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 20-2-307. Presumptive child support to be followed; deviations by court.

1. The presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-2-304 shall be rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount of child support to be awarded in any proceeding to establish or modify temporary or permanent child support amounts. Every order or decree providing for the support of a child shall set forth the presumptive child support amount and shall state whether the order or decree departs from that amount.
2. A court may deviate from the presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-2-304 upon a specific finding that the application of the presumptive child support would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case. In any case where the court has deviated from the presumptive child support, the reasons therefor shall be specifically set forth fully in the order or decree. In determining whether to deviate from the presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-2-304 , the court shall consider the following factors:
   1. The age of the child;
   2. The cost of necessary child day care;
   3. Any special health care and educational needs of the child;
   4. The responsibility of either parent for the support of other children, whether court ordered or otherwise;
   5. The value of services contributed by either parent;
   6. Any expenses reasonably related to the mother’s pregnancy and confinement for that child, if the parents were never married or if the parents were divorced prior to the birth of the child;
   7. The cost of transportation of the child to and from visitation;
   8. The ability of either or both parents to furnish health, dental and vision insurance through employment benefits;
   9. The amount of time the child spends with each parent;
   10. Any other necessary expenses for the benefit of the child;
   11. Whether either parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. In such case the child support shall be computed based upon the potential earning capacity (imputed income) of the unemployed or underemployed parent. In making that determination the court shall consider:
       1. Prior employment experience and history;
       2. Educational level and whether additional education would make the parent more self-sufficient or significantly increase the parent’s income;
       3. The presence of children of the marriage in the parent’s home and its impact on the earnings of that parent;
       4. Availability of employment for which the parent is qualified;
       5. Prevailing wage rates in the local area;
       6. Special skills or training; and
       7. Whether the parent is realistically able to earn imputed income.
   12. Whether or not either parent has violated any provision of the divorce decree, including visitation provisions, if deemed relevant by the court; and
   13. Other factors deemed relevant by the court.
3. If the parties fail to agree that the presumptive child support amount under W.S. 20-2-304 is appropriate, the court may order the party seeking to deviate from the presumptive child support amount to pay reasonable attorney fees and court costs to the other party unless, after hearing the evidence and considering the factors contained in subsection (b) of this section, the court deviates from the presumptive support amount.
4. Agreements regarding child support may be submitted to the court. All such agreements shall be accompanied by a financial affidavit as required by W.S. 20-2-308 . The court shall use the presumed child support amounts to review the adequacy of child support agreements negotiated by the parties. If the agreed amount departs from the presumed child support, the parties shall furnish statements of explanation which shall be included with the forms and shall be filed with the court. The court shall review the agreement and inform the parties whether or not additional or corrected information is needed, or that the agreement is approved or disapproved. No agreement which is less than the presumed child support amount shall be approved if means tested sources of income such as aid under the personal opportunities with employment responsibilities (POWER) program, health care benefits under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, supplemental nutrition assistance program, supplemental security income (SSI) or other similar benefits are being paid on behalf of any of the children.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 225, § 1; Laws 1990, ch. 60, § 2; Laws 1993, ch. 184, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 196, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 20-6-302 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 2; 2013, ch. 193, § 1.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, substituted “supplemental nutrition assistance program” for “food stamps” near the end of (d).

Deviation from the guidelines.—

District court did not abuse its discretion when it did not allow a downward deviation from a father’s presumptive child support because the father failed to establish that the father contributed substantially to the expenses of the children of the father and the mother. Marquis v. Marquis, 2020 WY 141, 476 P.3d 212, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 2020).

Factors supported deviation. —

District court did not exceed the bounds of reason when it found a father was not voluntarily underemployed on the basis that he earned less money at his new job than he made while operating a lawn care business because the father closed a business for various reasons, testifying that his new job allowed him to fully exercise visitation with his children; the business was failing, and the father could not independently revive a failing business and parent his four children as a single father. Edwards v. Edwards, 2020 WY 35, 459 P.3d 448, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2020).

Deviation from the guidelines. —

It was not an abuse of discretion not to order retroactive child support because the district court (1) identified presumptive support, (2) recognized the court could order a downward deviation for another child’s support and retroactive support, and (3) reasonably compromised by ordering neither. Shipley v. Smith, 2020 WY 26, 458 P.3d 852, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 2 6 (Wyo. 2020); 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (February 25, 2020).

Imputation of income not supported by record. —

It was not an abuse of discretion not to impute a father’s prior income because (1) the court heard relevant evidence, and (2) the father explained why the father took a lower-paying job. Shipley v. Smith, 2020 WY 26, 458 P.3d 852, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 2 6 (Wyo. 2020); 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (February 25, 2020).

Consideration of factors for deviation required.—

Remand on the issue of deviation from child support was necessary because the record included no evidence of the cost of insurance, and the district court did not consider the mother’s financial obligations to her other child, the cost of transporting the child to and from visitation, even though its order required extensive travel. Martin v. Hart, 2018 WY 123, 429 P.3d 56, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 2018).

Support to be calculated under the guidelines. —

In the parties' divorce, the trial court erred in calculating the child support for the parties' adult disabled daughter because it failed to follow the statutory procedure, which required that such support be calculated under the guidelines. Bagley v. Bagley, 2013 WY 126, 311 P.3d 141, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2013).

Presumptive amount properly ordered. —

District court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a mother to pay the presumptive child support amount as calculated with the guidelines because the district court specifically stated that it was ordering the mother to pay the presumptive child support amount as calculated with the guidelines. Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161, 315 P.3d 648, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2013).

District court properly denied a father’s motion for relief from an income withholding order because his motion requested that his child support obligation be vacated, he presented no argument that the order, itself, was improper or that Wyoming’s statutory approach to setting child support included an irrebuttable presumption, and did not present a record that would enable review of his claim, the court’s findings—which considered the needs of the children and the timing of the father’s release from prison—did not support an argument that the court applied an irrebuttable presumption, and it was arguable that the statute at issue created a rebuttable presumption of $50 per month minimum child support when read in conjunction with another section. MSC, II v. MCG, 2019 WY 59, 442 P.3d 662, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 2019).

A deviation from the guidelines.—

District court’s order sufficiently indicated the reason for its departure from the presumptive child support amount because the order clearly provided that the downward deviation from presumptive child support was based on the father’s responsibility for the support of a later-born child from a subsequent marriage; The district court’s decision clearly indicates that applying the presumptive child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. TSR v. State ex rel. Dep't of Family Servs., 2017 WY 144, 406 P.3d 729, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2017).

Pre-statutory child support agreements not necessarily changed. —

Child support agreements made prior to the enactment of the statutory child support guidelines do not necessarily have to be changed simply because of the enactment of the statutory guidelines. Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1991).

But original agreement weighed against statutory factors. —

In making its determination as to whether to deviate from the child support guidelines, the court may consider the list of factors under this section and the parties' original agreement and weigh their relevance. Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1991).

Marriage document impermissibly attempted to limit court's authority to set support payments to 10% of the non-custodial parent's annual income; while Wyoming permits the parties to submit child support agreements to the court, the legislature requires court approval or rejection of any plan. Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1993).

Children from later marriage relevant to support determination. —

In a child support modification suit brought on behalf of a child from the noncustodial parent's first marriage, the court was correct when it held that the children born to the petitioner's later marriage should not be factored into the child support guidelines matrix set forth in former § 20-6-304(a) (now see 20-2-304 ). However, the court erred when it concluded that it had to strictly apply the guidelines and could not take into consideration the parent's later-born minor children for purposes of determining the modification award, as the court may consider responsibility for later born children pursuant to subsection (b)(iv) of this section. Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1992).

District court properly modified child support because it did not abuse its discretion in deviating from the presumptive child support amount; once the district determined that deviation was appropriate based on the father’s obligation to a later-born child from his subsequent marriage, nothing prevented it from calculating the appropriate support obligation by considering the presumptive amount for all of the father’s children. TSR v. State ex rel. Dep't of Family Servs., 2017 WY 144, 406 P.3d 729, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2017).

Rebuttable presumption that modification is warranted created. —

Rather than requiring courts to modify existing support awards, former § 20-6-306(a) (now see 20-2-311 ), in conjunction with former §§ 20-6-304(a) (now 20-2-304 ) and this section, created a rebuttable presumption that modification would be warranted when application of the guidelines would result in a 20% change in the monthly support award; this rebuttable presumption applies not only when child support is initially awarded, but also when a support award is modified. Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1992); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

Change from shared to primary custody created rebuttable presumption that modification warranted. —

In a child support action, a district court erred by failing to modify child support in a proceeding commenced after a change from shared custody to primary custody with the mother. Pursuant to the presumptive child support guidelines, the father should have been required to pay 20 percent more than he had been required to pay under the previous order. McCulloh v. Drake, 2005 WY 18, 105 P.3d 1091, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2005).

Denial of visitation rights not change in circumstances. —

The denial of visitation rights by either the custodial parent or the child does not constitute a change in circumstances justifying the reduction or termination of the noncustodial parent's support obligation. A child's need for support and a parent's ability to pay are not related to questions concerning visitation. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

Lack of visitation and negative feelings not to be considered. —

Lack of visitation and negative feelings between a noncustodial parent and child are not proper factors that a court may consider in determining whether to deviate from the presumptive support guidelines; such consideration is, therefore, an abuse of discretion. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

District court abused its discretion when it determined that the magnitude of the negative feelings and the extent of the alienation that had occurred between a father and his adult son warranted a downward deviation of half the presumptive child support under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-2-304 and 20-2-307(a). Steele v. Neeman, 2009 WY 58, 206 P.3d 384, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 2009).

A deviation from the guidelines is permitted only when the trial court makes a finding that it would be unjust or inappropriate to follow them in a particular case and it specifically sets forth in full the reasons therefor in the divorce decree. Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1998).

Deviation from presumptive child support obligation is allowed when district court finds that it would be unjust or inappropriate to apply the presumptive support obligation. Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 1998).

Slight deviation from guidelines permissible. —

A court's deviation of $25.81 less than that provided by the support guidelines of former § 20-6-304 (now 20-2-304 ) was permissible, despite the lack of written or specific findings on the record to account for the deviation, as required by subsection (b). Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1993).

Deviation if consideration of social security dependency benefits results in unjust amount. —

Treating social security benefits paid to dependent children as earnings of the contributing parent allows for a just calculation of child support and thus social security benefits should be considered when making a presumptive child support determination. However, a district court may deviate from the presumptive child support amount should the calculations result in an unjust or inappropriate amount of support under the circumstances. Groenstein v. Groenstein, 2005 WY 6, 104 P.3d 765, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2005).

Factors supported deviation. —

Defendant father's choice to reside in an economically depressed area where work in his former profession, at which he earned up to $50,000 a year, was not available, his decision not to exercise his right to overnight visitation with his daughter and therefore his not incurring meal and other additional expenses he would incur if she were staying at his home, one son's hearing disability, which required additional expenses for hearing aids and batteries, and the mother's provision of cash assistance to the oldest son in college, fell within the factors listed in this section which justified deviation from the presumptive child support level. Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, 76 P.3d 836, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2003).

In a child support case, a district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a father to pay less than the statutory presumptive amount because he had necessary child day care costs, the father had the children for a substantial period of time, and he paid his share of uncovered medical expenses. However, the father did not have the children overnight for 40 percent of the time. Dellit v. Tracy, 2015 WY 153, 362 P.3d 353, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 2015).

Order directing a father to pay a mother $680 per month in child support was proper because the joint custody child support provision did not apply as the father's contribution was not substantial and he was, instead, entitled to a downward deviation under the statute from the presumptive child support amount for his additional contribution. Lee v. Lee, 2013 WY 76, 303 P.3d 1128, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2013).

Because it was within the trial court's discretion to deviate from its presumptive child support determinations, it did so on the basis of one of the statutorily defined factors in this section, the mother's support of another child in addition to three at issue, and it made a specific finding relevant to that factor in its decision letter, there was no abuse of discretion. Windham v. Windham, 2015 WY 61, 348 P.3d 836, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2015).

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b)(xi), the evidence supported a finding that the father was realistically able to earn the higher income and that he was voluntarily underemployed, which justified deviation from the child support guidelines; the district court adequately indicated that the reason for the decision was that the father was voluntarily underemployed, one of the reasons specifically listed in the statute. Opitz v. Opitz, 2007 WY 207, 173 P.3d 405, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 2007).

Insurance and travel costs. —

Downward deviation of $25.00 per month in father's child support obligation was appropriate in consideration of father's insurance and travel costs. KC v. KJM (In re IC), 971 P.2d 603, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1999).

Deviation allowed for substantial cost of transportation and visitation. —

In a divorce action, a district court was not required to examine all of the factors in this section before deviating from the presumptive child support amount to account for the non-custodial parent's cost of transportation to and from visitation. Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, 74 P.3d 1230, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2003).

Factors supported deviation. —

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b)(xi), the evidence supported a finding that the father was realistically able to earn the higher income and that he was voluntarily underemployed, which justified deviation from the child support guidelines; the district court adequately indicated that the reason for the decision was that the father was voluntarily underemployed, one of the reasons specifically listed in the statute. Opitz v. Opitz, 2007 WY 207, 173 P.3d 405, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 2007).

Downward deviation for travel costs. —

In a divorce action, a district court was not required to examine all of the factors in this section before deviating from the presumptive child support amount to account for a non-custodial parent's cost of transportation to and from visitation. Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, 74 P.3d 1230, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2003).

Alimony as child support. —

There was no evidence in the record that in stipulation in a divorce decree the parents intended for alimony payments to be transformed into child support. Pasenelli v. Pasenelli, 2002 WY 159, 57 P.3d 324, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 2002).

Material circumstantial change warrants modification of agreement. —

When the amount of child support is set by agreement, the party seeking modification must demonstrate a material change in circumstances other than a 20 percent departure from the statutory guidelines. Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1995).

No modification of support justified. —

District court did not abuse its discretion in finding no material change of circumstances justifying modification of child support where parent refused to pay support from severance pay or assets after termination of employment and had not attempted to find a job conforming to her physical restrictions, and the medical condition that she claimed was a change in circumstances existed at the time of the divorce. Murphy v. Holman, 945 P.2d 1193, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1997).

Previously divided assets. —

Contemplation of previously divided assets a second time, as income for purposes of post-decree child support adjustment is inequitable and violative of the rule announced in Klatt v. Klatt, 654 P.2d 733, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 413 (Wyo. 1982).Bollig v. Bollig, 919 P.2d 136, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1996).

District court incorrectly considered the father's receipt of previously divided marital property as income. Bollig v. Bollig, 919 P.2d 136, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1996).

Title XIX benefits. —

District court cannot simply sign off on a stipulated decree deviating from the guidelines when Title XIX Medicaid benefits are being paid for the benefit of children; however, a court is not precluded from ordering a deviation downward from the presumed child support amount after making appropriate findings if a party has any of the means-tested sources of income referred to. District court may use its discretion and consider whether a deviation is appropriate, even when means tested sources of income are being paid on behalf of any of the children; this interpretation is consistent with other child support statutes. Dellit v. Tracy, 2015 WY 153, 362 P.3d 353, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 2015).

Terms of divorce decree. —

Trial court did not err in ordering child support to end when the child became 18 and in having deviated from the presumptive support level; although the parties were not aware of their son's learning disability at the time that the divorce decree, that decree stated support would end once each child reached the age of 18, and the mother had forgiven the child support arrearage owed to her by the father. Shelhamer v. Shelhamer, 2006 WY 83, 138 P.3d 665, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2006).

Child support order could not stand because there was no evidence in the record supporting the $ 1,160 income imputed to the mother; rather than calculating child support under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(d) using the $ 1,025 net monthly income imputed to the mother in the parties' divorce decree, the trial court imputed a net monthly income of $ 1,160 to the mother. Roemmich v. Roemmich, 2010 WY 115, 238 P.3d 89, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2010).

District court could properly consider incarcerated father's retirement assets in determining whether or not a deviation from presumptive child support was justified, although large deviation on basis of this factor alone was not warranted. Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 1998).

Uncertain historical gifts excluded from “income.” —

The court is afforded discretion to include or not include historical gifts as a source of income and may rule that gifts to a spouse were so uncertain as to preclude their inclusion in a calculation of monthly income. Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Committing a crime not voluntarily underemployed. —

Father was not voluntarily underemployed because he voluntarily committed a crime which limited his employment options; legislature did not contemplate voluntarily committing a crime when it enacted this section, and evidence revealed that father made a good faith effort to find the highest paying job possible given his situation. Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 1998).

Imputation of income supported by record. —

In determining the mother's income for child support purposes, the trial court did not err in failing to impute more than $ 1,400 per month to the mother based on her voluntary underemployment. The only job out of the three part-time jobs she held where the mother could increase her hours of work paid $ 10 per hour, and although the mother had significant educational training in both finance and fashion design, there was no testimony that those jobs were available in Jackson. Groenstein v. Groenstein, 2005 WY 6, 104 P.3d 765, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2005).

Imputation of income not supported by record. —

The record did not support the district court's decision to impute an annual $ 35,000 income to a mother for the purpose of computing child support, where the record (1) included evidence of the mother's employment history and income level, but (2) did not include any evidence regarding the availability of employment or the local wage rates in the pertinent area. Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, 74 P.3d 1230, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2003).

Trial court's award of child support was proper because it took into consideration the statutory factors, how the fact that the children were still living in the mother's home impacted her ability to work, and that the father did not show that deviation was appropriate. Stevens v. Stevens, 2014 WY 23, 318 P.3d 802, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 2014).

Failure to comply with statutory requirements. —

Child support order was erroneous because the order did not set forth the presumptive child support amount, as required by the statute; hence, it was necessary to remand the case to the district court. JKS v. AHF (In re ARF), 2013 WY 97, 307 P.3d 852, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2013).

Although the district court was privy to information regarding the husband’s finances that would allow it to reach a decision about child support, and the husband’s failure to file a financial affidavit did not render the stipulated decree problematic with respect to child support, the fact that the district court did not acknowledge the presumptive child support amount did; further, the order originally establishing the amount of child support could not be relied upon as that order also failed to state the presumptive amount, and it did not give any indication as to how the court reached the $2,500 per month calculation. Long v. Long, 2018 WY 26, 413 P.3d 117, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2018).

Applied in

Morehead v. Morehead, 811 P.2d 721, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1991).

Quoted in

Smith v. Smith, 863 P.2d 624, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1993); Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1994); Barrett-Oliver v. Quast, 2013 WY 71, 302 P.3d 909, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Jun 6, 2013).

Cited in

Underkofler v. Underkofler, 834 P.2d 1140, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1992); Madison v. Madison, 859 P.2d 1276, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1993); Fountain v. Mitros, 968 P.2d 934, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1998); Noonan v. Noonan, 2005 WY 145, 122 P.3d 964, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (2005); Davidson v. Carrillo, 2014 WY 65, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (May 22, 2014); Jensen v. Milatzo-Jensen, 2014 WY 165, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Dec. 17, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Child Support and Social Security Dependent Benefits: a Comprehensive Analysis and Proposal for Wyoming,” see 2 Wyo. L. Rev. 39 (2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Application of child support guidelines to cases of joint, split, or similar shared custody arrangements, 57 ALR5th 389.

Basis for imputing income for purpose of determining child support where obligor spouse is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, 76 ALR5th 191.

§ 20-2-308. Financial affidavits required; financial reporting.

1. No order establishing or modifying a child support obligation shall be entered unless financial affidavits on a form approved by the Wyoming supreme court which fully discloses the financial status of the parties have been filed, or the court has held a hearing and testimony has been received.
2. Financial affidavits of the parties shall be supported with documentation of both current and past earnings. Suitable documentation of current earnings includes but is not limited to pay stubs, employer statements, or receipts and expenses if self-employed. Documentation of current earnings shall be supplemented with copies of the most recent tax return to provide verification of earnings over a longer period.
3. The court may require, or the parents may agree, to exchange financial and other appropriate information once a year or less often, by regular mail, for the purpose of analyzing the propriety of modification of court ordered child support.
4. All financial affidavits and records required by law to be attached to the affidavit shall constitute a confidential file and are subject to inspection by persons other than the parties, their attorneys or the department of family services to the extent necessary to enforce the Child Support Enforcement Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act only by court order.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1; 2003, ch. 155, § 1.

Cross references. —

For the Child Support Enforcement Act, see chapter 6 of this title. For the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, see chapter 4 of this title.

Financial affidavit.—

Mother’s testimony was consistent with her confidential financial affidavit (CFA), which had sufficient required supporting documentation, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the CFA to calculate her monthly income; mother’s updated CFA listed her hourly rate at $ 13.50 and her weekly hours at approximately 27 hours, which was consistent with her testimony, and father’s bald assertion that her testimony reflected a much higher income was not supported by the record. Bruce v. Bruce, 2021 WY 38, 482 P.3d 328, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2021).

Mother did attach multiple current pay stubs, her 2017 W-2, and her 2017 and 2018 tax returns to her confidential financial affidavit in satisfaction of the statute, and there was no offer of proof whereby the father could show that the mother’s 2018 W-2 would have changed the court’s calculations; there was no statutory violation or abuse of discretion that would require the district court’s calculation to be overturned. Bruce v. Bruce, 2021 WY 38, 482 P.3d 328, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2021).

Evidentiary hearing.—

District court had sufficient evidence to arrive at a clear understanding of a father’s income without a hearing and did not abuse its discretion when it relied on the parties’ submissions to calculate the father’s income and child support. The district court had sufficient information to calculate the father’s income, and both the mother and the father presented memoranda and arguments regarding child support and attached financial affidavits, income tax returns, and other supporting documentation. Marquis v. Marquis, 2020 WY 141, 476 P.3d 212, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 2020).

Insufficient financial evidence.—

Remand to a district court for additional proceedings to determine a father’s income was necessary because the district court abused its discretion under in ordering child support as the district court did not have sufficient information about the father’s finances to calculate child support, potentially misinterpreted the evidence before it, and ignored its statutory obligation to obtain that information before entering a child support order. Lemus v. Martinez, 2019 WY 52, 441 P.3d 831, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2019).

Timing.

This section contains no timing requirements relating to the filing of a financial affidavit; therefore, a father did not prevail in his argument relating to a mother's financial affidavit because the mother filed a signed and notarized affidavit before a trial court entered its support order, and the father was not prejudiced in any manner by the delayed filing. Davidson v. Carrillo, 2014 WY 65, 325 P.3d 444, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2014).

Financial affidavit. —

District court did not abuse its discretion by using a mother's affidavit of indigency, which showed her gross income, because the mother disregarded its express order to provide a financial affidavit; the mother appeared at the default hearing, and the district court ordered her to submit a financial affidavit, which she did not do. Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161, 315 P.3d 648, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2013).

It was not an abuse of discretion to order a father to pay child support when the father had not filed a required financial affidavit because (1) the court had sufficient other evidence of the parties' finances, and (2) the father could not complain on appeal of the father's disregard of statutory requirements. Peak v. Peak, 2016 WY 109, 383 P.3d 1084, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2016).

Although the district court was privy to information regarding the husband’s finances that would allow it to reach a decision about child support, and the husband’s failure to file a financial affidavit did not render the stipulated decree problematic with respect to child support, the fact that the district court did not acknowledge the presumptive child support amount did; further, the order originally establishing the amount of child support could not be relied upon as that order also failed to state the presumptive amount, and it did not give any indication as to how the court reached the $2,500 per month calculation. Long v. Long, 2018 WY 26, 413 P.3d 117, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2018).

Tax returns. —

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court, under this section, to use the most recent tax returns for determining income since defendant father's tax refund could be considered as affecting cash flow. Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, 76 P.3d 836, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2003).

Transcripts. —

District court had to ensure that proceedings to establish paternity were reported, so that a transcript of those proceedings would be available in the event of an appeal; there must be a record suitable for the purpose of meaningful review on appeal. JAG v. State, 2002 WY 158, 56 P.3d 1016, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 2002).

Insufficient financial evidence. —

Motion to set aside the default divorce decree should have been granted under W.R.C.P. 60(b) because the trial court failed to base its findings of fact in accordance with W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) regarding property distribution, child custody, visitation, and support on some evidence in the record, and the trial court did not comply with the dictates of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308(a) by obtaining sufficient financial evidence of both parties' income to make factual determinations, to comply with the presumptive child support guidelines found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304 , or to determine whether to deviate from those guidelines under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307 . Noonan v. Noonan, 2005 WY 145, 122 P.3d 964, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 2005).

Child support order could not stand under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308(a) because there was no evidence in the record supporting the $ 1,160 income imputed to the mother, nor was there any explanation for the order requiring her to pay $ 279 per month, as opposed to an earlier calculation of $ 239 per month; the mother did not file a financial affidavit nor did she testify concerning her income. Roemmich v. Roemmich, 2010 WY 115, 238 P.3d 89, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2010).

Cited in

Dellit v. Tracy, 2015 WY 153, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Dec. 4, 2015).

§ 20-2-309. Contents of orders; change of address or employment; income withholding entered; payment.

1. All orders shall include the:
   1. Names of the parties;
   2. Repealed by Laws 2011, ch. 121, § 2.
   3. Repealed by Laws 2004, ch. 72, § 2.
   4. Right of either party or, when appropriate, the department of family services to petition to enforce an order pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201 through 20-2-204 , 20-2-310 and 20-2-311(d).
2. All child support orders shall be accompanied by a confidential statement that contains the names, addresses, dates of birth, places of birth and social security numbers of each party and each child to whom the order relates and the names and addresses of each party’s employer. Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, the confidential statement may be inspected by:
   1. The parties and their attorneys;
   2. The department of family services to the extent necessary to enforce the Child Support Enforcement Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; and
   3. Other persons or entities, if permitted by court order.
3. The court shall order each party to notify the clerk of court in writing within fifteen (15) days of any change in address or employment.
4. In any subsequent enforcement action brought under this chapter in which the parties were previously ordered to provide the clerk of the court with their current residential, mailing and employer’s address, the court, upon sufficient showing to the satisfaction of the court that a diligent effort has been made to ascertain the location of a party, shall deem state due process requirements for notice and service of process to be met upon delivery of written notice to the most recent residential or employer address of that party filed with the clerk of the district court and the state case registry pursuant to the requirements of this section provided:
   1. An affidavit attesting to the diligent effort to locate the party is filed with the court at the time of filing the subsequent enforcement action; and
   2. Delivery of the written notice to the most recent residential or employer address of the party is made by personal service or by certified mail.
5. Upon entry of any order for the support of a child under this section the court shall also enter an income withholding order as provided by W.S. 20-6-204 .
6. All child support payments shall be paid to the clerk as defined by W.S. 20-6-102(a)(x).
7. For purposes of this section, “party” does not include the department of family services.
8. The confidential statement required pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall not be inspected or further released except as provided in this subsection if the court has issued a confidentiality order pursuant to W.S. 35-21-112 or any other court order allowing a party to maintain confidentiality of addresses, city or state of residence or other information identifying the residence of the victim of domestic abuse. The court may release the confidential statement required under subsection (b) of this section to the department of family services to the extent necessary to enforce the Child Support Enforcement Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, provided:
   1. The department releases information protected by a confidentiality order only to governmental agencies or courts of competent jurisdiction and does not release information protected by the confidentiality order to the opposing party or attorneys representing or employed by the opposing party;
   2. The department shall exclude or redact information protected by a confidentiality order from information provided under this subsection to the greatest extent possible in conformance with the Child Support Enforcement Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act;
   3. The department shall provide written notice to parties receiving information protected by a confidentiality order from the department stating that the information is protected by a confidentiality order and shall only be disseminated by the receiving party to the extent necessary to comply with the Child Support Enforcement Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 72, § 1; 2003, ch. 155, § 1; 2004, ch. 72, §§ 1, 2; 2011, ch. 121, §§ 1, 2; 2013, ch. 7, § 1; ch. 98, § 2.

The 2004 amendment rewrote the section, moving provisions from the introductory language in (a) and from repealed (a)(iii) to (a)(i), (a)(iv) and new (b), redesignating subsections because of the addition of (b), and adding (g).

Laws 2004, ch. 72, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 5, 2004.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in (a)(i), deleted “addresses, dates of birth and places of birth” following “Name” and “and all children to whom the order relates” at the end; repealed former (a)(ii), which read: “Names and addresses of each party's employer; and”; and in the introductory language of (b), inserted “names, addresses, dates of birth, places of birth and” and “to whom the order relates and the names and addresses of each party's employer.”

The 2013 amendments. —

The first 2013 amendment, by ch. 7, § 1, effective July 1, 2013, substituted “as defined by W.S. 20-6-102(a)(x)” for “of the district court” in (f).

The second 2013 amendment, by ch. 98, § 2, effective July 1, 2013, added “Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section” in (b); added (h).

§ 20-2-310. Enforcement of child support.

1. In any proceeding to enforce the decree concerning the maintenance of children, any required notice or pleading shall be served as provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. A court may, upon appropriate motion, require a parent to appear before the court and show just cause why the parent should not be held in contempt and, upon a showing that the parent has willfully violated a child support order, make such order or orders as the court deems necessary and appropriate.
3. In any case in which child support has been ordered to be paid to the clerk, any periodic payment or installment under the provisions of an order concerning maintenance is, on the date it is due, a judgment by operation of law.
4. If an able-bodied obligor is unemployed and otherwise unable to fulfill his court-ordered child support obligation, the court may order the obligor to participate in the personal opportunities with employment responsibilities (POWER) work program administered by the department of workforce services, excluding the benefit portion of that program, without regard to the program eligibility requirements under title 42 or the department rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
5. The court in order to enforce and require future compliance with an order, may find that the parent is in contempt of court, award attorney fees, costs and any other relief as the court may deem necessary under the circumstances.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 3; 2013, ch. 7, § 1.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, deleted “of the court” preceding “any periodic payment” in (c).

Not applicable when action not to enforce child support.—

Judgment on arrearages by operation of law.—

Right to counsel in contempt proceeding. —

Not applicable when action not to enforce child support.—

Trial court erred in ordering 10% post-judgment interest under this section, because the judgment was not an order to enforce child support. Lew v. Lew, 2019 WY 99, 449 P.3d 683, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2019).

Judgment on arrearages by operation of law.—

District court erred by failing to recognize that a mother had a judgment against the father on child support arrears on the dates when they were due by operation of law with the full force, effect, and attributes of a judgment of the State of Wyoming, including the ability to be enforced. Furthermore, the district court did not have authority to impede the mother's right to enforce the judgment. Rambo v. Rambo, 2017 WY 32, 391 P.3d 1108, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2017).

Right to counsel in contempt proceeding. —

Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process did not require the State of Wyoming to provide an indigent party with counsel in a civil contempt proceeding for nonpayment of child support, because Wyoming had sufficient substitute procedural safeguards to protect indigent obligors against the possibility of wrongful incarceration. Respondent was informed of the burden on the State to show a failure to pay court ordered child support was willful; all respondents were provided forms upon which they could set forth current income, asset and liability information and were given opportunity to explain any reasons they may have for failure to pay; and the district court was also required make an express finding as to the obligor's ability to pay in order to determine whether the failure was willful or not under this section. Dep't of Family Servs. v. Currier, 2013 WY 16, 295 P.3d 837, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2013).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time children spent in custody of noncustodial parent pursuant to visitation or court order, 118 ALR 5th 385.

Right to credit on child-support arrearages for money given directly to child, 119 ALR 5th 445.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time child lived with noncustodial parent, other than for visitation or by court order, with approval of custodial parent, 120 ALR 5th 229.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to housing costs, utility bills, and other alleged household necessities made for child's benefit while child is not living with obligor parent, 123 ALR 5th 565.

Right to credit on child support arrearages for gifts to child, 124 ALR 5th 441.

§ 20-2-311. Adjustment of child support orders.

1. Any party, or the department of family services in the case of child support orders being enforced by the department, may petition for a review and adjustment of any child support order that was entered more than six (6) months prior to the petition or which has not been adjusted within six (6) months from the date of filing of the petition for review and adjustment. The petition shall allege that, in applying the presumptive child support established by this article, the support amount will change by twenty percent (20%) or more per month from the amount of the existing order. The court shall require the parents to complete a verified financial statement on forms approved by the Wyoming supreme court, and shall apply the presumptive child support set out in this article in conducting the review and adjustment. If, upon applying the presumptive child support to the circumstances of the parents or child at the time of the review, the court finds that the support amount would change by twenty percent (20%) or more per month from the amount of the existing order, the court shall consider there to be a change of circumstances sufficient to justify the modification of the support order. The provisions of this section do not preclude a party or assignee from bringing an action for modification of a support order, based upon a substantial change of circumstances, at any time. Every three (3) years, upon the request of either parent or, if there is a current assignment of support rights in effect, upon the request of the department, the court, with respect to a support order being enforced under this article and taking into account the best interests of the child involved, shall review and, if appropriate, adjust the order in accordance with the guidelines established pursuant to this article. Any adjustment under the three (3) year cycle shall be made without a requirement for a showing of a change in circumstances. The commencement of aid under the personal opportunities with employment responsibilities (POWER) program, medical benefits under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, supplemental nutrition assistance program and supplemental security income (SSI) shall be considered a substantial change of circumstances requiring modification of child support.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the parties fail to agree that the presumptive child support amount under W.S. 20-2-304 is appropriate, the court may order the party seeking to deviate from the presumptive child support amount to pay a reasonable attorney fee and court costs to the other party unless, after hearing the evidence and considering the factors contained in W.S. 20-2-307(b), the court deviates from the presumptive support amount.
3. In addition to the petition authorized under subsection (a) of this section, the court on its own motion, or the department without petitioning the court, may increase monthly child support payments to include amounts for arrearages or may decrease the monthly child support payment in cases of emergencies or if the arrearages are paid. Any action by the department to increase monthly child support payments under this subsection shall allow the obligor a reasonable opportunity to contest the action in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and rules and regulations adopted by the department.
4. An order for child support is not subject to retroactive modification except:
   1. Upon agreement of the parties; or
   2. The order may be modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was served upon the obligee as provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, if the obligor or the department is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee or the department is the petitioner.

History. Laws 1990, ch. 60, § 1; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; Laws 1993, ch. 184, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 193, § 2; ch. 196, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 20-6-306 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 2; 2013, ch. 193, § 1.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, substituted “supplemental nutrition assistance program” for “food stamps” near the end of (a).

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For definition of “this article,” referred to in this section, see § 20-2-303(a)(iv).

Change in circumstances.

—

District court abused its discretion by reopening the stipulated child support order because it did not require the mother to show a change in circumstances regarding child support other than a 20 percent change in the presumptive support amount; because the mother made no request to set aside the parties’ child support stipulation to correct a mistake or for any other reason, no basis existed for the district court to disregard the stipulated amounts. Kimzey v. Kimzey, 2020 WY 52, 461 P.3d 1229, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 2020).

Petition requirement. —

The clear language of former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113(a) instructs that the court may not, of its own initiative, modify its own order with respect to, among other things, a child support obligation absent a proper petition by one of the parents requesting such modification. Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, 30 P.3d 542, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2001).

Burden of proof. —

Under former Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-2-113(a), the party who seeks to have a child support order modified has the burden of showing that a substantial or material change in circumstances has occurred since the initial decree was entered. Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, 30 P.3d 542, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2001).

The party seeking modification of a child support order must establish that there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances subsequent to the decree that outweighs the interests of society in applying the doctrine of res judicata. Goody v. Goody, 939 P.2d 731, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1997).

Remedy for indigent obligors. —

Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process does not require the State of Wyoming to provide an indigent party with counsel in a civil contempt proceeding for nonpayment of child support, because Wyoming has sufficient substitute procedural safeguards to protect indigent obligors against the possibility of wrongful incarceration. Specifically, there are procedures available under this section for parents to obtain modification of their child support obligations when they are unable to comply. Dep't of Family Servs. v. Currier, 2013 WY 16, 295 P.3d 837, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2013).

Use of financial affidavits and testimony. —

Where a mother filed a financial affidavit as was contemplated by subsection (a), even though the court ruled that the affidavit was incomplete and, instead of using it, used the father's financial affidavit and the mother's testimony to compute the parties' net income and to determine whether the father's child support obligation should be increased, the court had adequate evidence before it to make its calculations and did not abuse its discretion. Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1995).

Rebuttable presumption that modification is warranted created. —

Rather than requiring courts to modify existing support awards, subsection (a) of this section, in conjunction with former §§ 20-6-304(a) and 20-6-302 (now see 20-2-304 and 20-2-307 ), created a rebuttable presumption that modification would be warranted when application of the guidelines would result in a 20% change in the monthly support award; this rebuttable presumption applies not only when child support is initially awarded, but also when a support award is modified. Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1992).

Shared custody arrangements.

It was error, based on a prior visitation schedule, to deny a father's request to reduce the father's child support obligation by calculating the obligation pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304(c) because the father showed (1) each party had custody of the parties' child over 40 percent of a year, (2) the calculation reduced the father's child support obligation over 20 percent, and (3) the father contributed substantially to the child's expenses, but child support was not reduced since the father did not meet the 40 or 20 percent requirements under a new visitation schedule that was approved. Jensen v. Milatzo-Jensen, 2013 WY 27, 297 P.3d 768, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2013).

Retroactivity.

Father was not entitled to a retroactive modification of child support, based on a new visitation schedule approved on appeal, because (1) the father did not request retroactive modification in the trial court, and (2) retroactive modification was not available since child support was not modified. Jensen v. Milatzo-Jensen, 2013 WY 27, 297 P.3d 768, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2013).

Change from shared to primary custody created rebuttable presumption that modification warranted. —

In a child support action, a district court erred by failing to modify child support in a proceeding commenced after a change from shared custody to primary custody with the mother. Pursuant to the presumptive child support guidelines, the father should have been required to pay 20 percent more than he had been required to pay under the previous order. McCulloh v. Drake, 2005 WY 18, 105 P.3d 1091, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2005).

Existence of child support agreement. —

District court erred in denying adjustment of father's child support obligation on grounds that parties had reached a child support agreement, since agreement specifically invoked statutory child support guidelines. Wright v. Wright, 5 P.3d 61, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 2000).

Although the parties stipulated that support would be modified after 48 months when the mother completed a four year degree program, their agreement did not prohibit her from seeking modification in the interim where there was a 20 percent change in the presumptive child support level. Pasenelli v. Pasenelli, 2002 WY 159, 57 P.3d 324, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 2002).

Support increased despite desire for new home. —

The court properly found that, under the circumstances, a father's desire to have a new home in which to provide a nicer environment for his children was not a sufficient basis for substantially reducing his child support obligation. In fact, the court properly considered the father's needs, as well as those of the children, in arriving at a modificatory increase. Smith v. Smith, 863 P.2d 624, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1993).

Lack of visitation and negative feelings not to be considered. —

Lack of visitation and negative feelings between a noncustodial parent and child are not proper factors that a court may consider in determining whether to deviate from the presumptive support guidelines; such consideration is, therefore, an abuse of discretion. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

Evidence upon which original judgment based not to be reconsidered. —

A father was precluded from arguing in a child support modification proceeding that he was never capable of paying the ordered support amount; any objection on that basis was waived by the father's failure to appeal the original decree. Goody v. Goody, 939 P.2d 731, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1997).

A modification hearing is not a time to reconsider the evidence and premises upon which the original judgment was entered, but only to consider whether there has been such a change of circumstances as to warrant a different decree. Goody v. Goody, 939 P.2d 731, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1997).

Change in circumstances. —

Modification of child support was not justified where the record failed to support the father's contention that the mother's unemployment and the fact that the father paid all the children's medical and recreational expenses represented a change in circumstances that had occurred since the original support decree. Goody v. Goody, 939 P.2d 731, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1997).

Debts acquired subsequent to a divorce decree do not necessarily constitute a change in circumstances sufficient to alter a support order, especially where the debts are largely a result of voluntary choices. Goody v. Goody, 939 P.2d 731, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1997).

Father’s child support obligation was properly modified because, (1) while the mother alleged no material change in circumstances and the trial court did not so find, a material change occurred, as a custody change the mother alleged was more than enough to establish a change in circumstances, and (2) the court found a 20% increase in the presumptive support amount. Zupan v. Zupan, 2016 WY 78, 377 P.3d 770, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 2016).

Calculation of a father’s child support obligation under this section was clearly incorrect as the net income figures specified represented a substantial decrease in the father’s income and a substantial increase in the mother’s income, yet the trial court increased the father’s child support obligation; the trial court was ordered to arrive at a support calculation that complied with the statutory tables. Walker v. Walker, 2013 WY 132, 311 P.3d 170, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2013).

Modification of support in some areas not supported by evidence.—

District court properly reopened the child support provision and ordered the father to pay the presumptive child support amount, only because the mother consented to that specific action, but the evidence did not establish any independent basis for the district court to modify child support or medical payments. Meehan-Greer v. Greer, 2018 WY 39, 415 P.3d 274, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2018).

Later born children.—

District court properly modified child support because it did not abuse its discretion in deviating from the presumptive child support amount; once the district determined that deviation was appropriate based on the father’s obligation to a later-born child from his subsequent marriage, nothing prevented it from calculating the appropriate support obligation by considering the presumptive amount for all of the father’s children. TSR v. State ex rel. Dep't of Family Servs., 2017 WY 144, 406 P.3d 729, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2017).

Denial of visitation rights not change in circumstances. —

The denial of visitation rights by either the custodial parent or the child does not constitute a change in circumstances justifying the reduction or termination of the noncustodial parent's support obligation. A child's need for support and a parent's ability to pay are not related to questions concerning visitation. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1995).

Change in custody. —

In child custody modification action where child had been taken from mother's custody because of abuse and placed with father, the father did not owe retroactive child support for the time period during which the mother did not have custody. GGV v. JLR, 2002 WY 19, 39 P.3d 1066, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2002).

Public assistance recipients. —

Section 20-6-106(m)(i) (paragraph repealed) authorized the Department of Family Services to bring an action to enforce a child support order pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, without regard to the obligee's status as a recipient or nonrecipient of public assistance. Department of Family Servs. v. Peterson, 960 P.2d 1022, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1998).

No change in circumstances found. —

District court did not abuse its discretion in finding no material change of circumstances justifying modification of child support where parent refused to pay support from severance pay or assets after termination of employment and had not attempted to find a job conforming to her physical restrictions, and the medical condition that she claimed was a change in circumstances existed at the time of the divorce. Murphy v. Holman, 945 P.2d 1193, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1997).

Credit for overpayment of child support obligation. —

District court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a father credit for an overpayment of his child support obligation, since statutes and case law indicated a clear aversion to the unilateral modification of child support orders, and the circumstances did not warrant application of the exception to the general rule because (1) the father overpaid the obligation intentionally and voluntarily, (2) the mother never asked the father for the extra payments, nor did his daughter, (3) the father unilaterally modified that obligation without court approval, and (4) it was the father's obligation to pay the specified amounts according to the decree, and orders modifying it thereafter. Starkey v. Starkey, 2007 WY 106, 161 P.3d 515, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 2007).

Allocation of dependent tax credit. —

Determinations concerning the allocation of the dependent tax credit of I.R.C. § 152(e) are subject to modification under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311(a). Leseberg v. Taylor, 2003 WY 131, 78 P.3d 201, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2003).

Wyoming courts do not steadfastly apply in all modification proceedings under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311(a) the Utah standard, requiring the noncustodial parent to demonstrate he or she has a higher income and provides the majority of support for the child and a finding by the district court that allocating the dependent tax credit of I.R.C. § 152 to the noncustodial parent is in the child's best interest; however, Wyoming's trial courts can and do consider both the child's best interest and the parties' relative financial positions when determining the respective support obligations under Wyoming's statutory scheme. Leseberg v. Taylor, 2003 WY 131, 78 P.3d 201, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2003).

District court did not abuse its discretion in finding that no substantial change of circumstances occurred justifying reallocation of the dependent tax credit portion of the parties' divorce decree; even if the mother properly computed the amount of support she provided for the child, the income of the father, the noncustodial parent, remained higher than the mother's. Leseberg v. Taylor, 2003 WY 131, 78 P.3d 201, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2003).

Standard of review. —

A trial court's decision to modify a divorce decree is reviewed for abuse of discretion; an abuse of discretion occurs when a court's decision exceeds the bounds of reason or constitutes an error of law. Goody v. Goody, 939 P.2d 731, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1997).

Retroactivity. —

There was no abuse of discretion in denying retroactive effect to a child support modification where the trial court's decision coincided with the oldest child's 18th birthday, when defendant father was no longer obligated to pay support for that son. Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, 76 P.3d 836, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2003).

Given the parties were sharing custody of the children, the father had been providing insurance for the children and paying half of their uncovered medical expenses and some of the mother’s expenses, and the court did not have sufficient financial information from the parties for the period of retroactivity, the district court’s decision not to award the mother retroactive child support was reasonable. Sears v. Sears, 2021 WY 20, 479 P.3d 767, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2021).

Applied in

Fleenor v. Fleenor, 992 P.2d 1065, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1999).

Quoted in

Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1992);Smith v. Smith, 2003 WY 87, 72 P.3d 1158, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2003).

Stated in

Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1994); Ahearn v. Ahearn, 993 P.2d 942, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1999).

Cited in

Kidd v. Kidd, 832 P.2d 566, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1992).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Consideration of obligor's personal injury recovery or settlement in fixing alimony or child support, 59 ALR5th 489.

Right to credit against child support arrearages for time child lived in custody of noncustodial parent, other than for visitation, where custodial parent's approval was not in issue or was disputed by parties, 112 ALR5th 185.

Right to credit on child support for health insurance, medical, dental, and orthodontic expenses paid for child's benefit while child is not living with obligor parent, 1 A.L.R.6th 493.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to educational expenses of child while child is not living with obligor parent, 2 A.L.R.6th 439.

Right to credit on child support for contributions to travel expenses of child while child is not living with obligor parent, 3 A.L.R.6th 641.

Right to credit on child support for continued payments to custodial parent for child who has reached majority or otherwise become emancipated, 4 A.L.R.6th 531.

§ 20-2-312. Redirection of child support.

Upon affidavit by the current custodian or the department filed with the clerk of the district court, or by operation of law when public funds have been expended on behalf of a minor child, that the care and control of the child resides in a party other than the obligee under a child support order, the child support shall, by operation of law, be redirected to the person or agency who has the care and control of the child and shall be subject to assignment by the person having the care and control of the child pursuant to W.S. 20-6-106 . The department, upon proof by affidavit filed with the clerk of district court or upon verified information it has received pursuant to W.S. 20-6-106 that the child support is subject to an assignment, may redirect the child support to the person or agency in whose favor the assignment is made.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1.

§ 20-2-313. Cessation of child support.

1. An on-going child support obligation terminates when the:
   1. Parents marry or remarry each other;
   2. Child dies;
   3. Child is legally emancipated; or
   4. Child attains the age of majority.
2. After the remarriage of the parents to each other, the court may eliminate all child support arrearage existing between the parents except those assigned to the state of Wyoming.

History. Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 1.

Age of majority. —

Trial court properly granted a father's request to reduce his child support obligation when his eldest son turned 18-years-old and properly denied the mother's request to apply Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-101 as it existed when the parties were divorced in 1992, under which the age of majority was 19, and to extend the father's obligation until the children were 19-years-old where the original divorce decree and settlement agreement did not specify a child support obligation for either parent. Jordan v. Brackin, 2003 WY 151, 79 P.3d 536, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 2003).

Trial court did not err in ordering child support to end when the child became 18 and in having deviated from the presumptive support level; although the parties were not aware of their son's learning disability at the time that the divorce decree, that decree stated support would end once each child reached the age of 18, and the mother had forgiven the child support arrearages owed to her by the father. Shelhamer v. Shelhamer, 2006 WY 83, 138 P.3d 665, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2006).

§ 20-2-314. Court may appoint trustees to manage amount set aside for children.

Upon application by any party, the court may order any amount set apart for the children to be paid to a trustee or trustees appointed by the court, upon trust to invest the same and to apply the income thereof to the support of the children in such manner as the court directs. This section does not apply to periodic payments designated as child support by a court order.

History. Laws 1882, ch. 40, § 20; R.S. 1887, § 1586; R.S. 1899, § 3003; C.S. 1910, § 3939; C.S. 1920, § 5005; R.S. 1931, § 35-123; C.S. 1945, § 3-5921; W.S. 1957, § 20-65; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-2-115 ; W.S. 1977, § 20-2-115 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 2.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Court's establishment of trust to secure alimony or child support in divorce proceedings, 3 ALR3d 1170.

§ 20-2-315. Court may require security for child support payments.

1. Upon the issuance of any order or entering of a decree under this chapter which provides for child support payments, or any time thereafter following notice and opportunity for hearing, the court may, for good cause shown, require the obligor to provide security of nonexempt property that the court deems satisfactory to secure payment of child support.
2. The court, upon petition and following notice and hearing, shall no longer require the order for security if the court determines:
   1. Good cause no longer exists to require security to assure payment upon the obligation to pay child support; and
   2. There is no overdue support outstanding.
3. Once the child support obligation has terminated and arrearages satisfied, the security shall be released.

History. Laws 1985, ch. 77, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 20-2-118 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 2.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Alimony or child-support awards as subject to attorneys' liens, 49 ALR5th 595.

§ 20-2-316. Adjustment of child support for a disabled adult child.

1. A noncustodial parent may petition for an adjustment of child support for a child who has reached the age of majority but qualifies under W.S. 14-2-204(a)(i) to continue to receive support from the noncustodial parent. The court shall allow the adjustment in cases where the noncustodial parent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that an adjustment of the child support order is in the best interest of the child who has reached the age of majority.
2. A noncustodial parent petitioning the court for an adjustment under this section shall adhere to the requirements of W.S. 20-2-311 .

History. Laws 2012, ch. 24, § 1.

Effective date. —

Laws 2012, ch. 24, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2012.

§ 20-2-401. Medical support to be included as part of child support order.

1. In any action to establish or modify a child support obligation, the court shall order either or both of the parents to provide medical support, which may include dental, optical or other health care needs for their dependent children. The court shall:
   1. Require in the support order:
      1. That one (1) or both parents shall provide insurance coverage for the children if insurance can be obtained at a reasonable cost and the benefits under the insurance policy are accessible to the children; and
      2. That both parents be liable to pay any medical expenses not covered by insurance and any deductible amount on the required insurance coverage as cash medical support; or
   2. Specify in the court order the proportion for which each parent will be liable for any medical expenses as cash medical support, which may include dental, optical or other health care expenses incurred by any person or agency on behalf of a child if the expenses are not covered by insurance.
2. When the insurance coverage is ordered pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the court shall order the obligated parent to submit to the court and to the other parent, or to the other parent’s representative, written proof that the insurance has been obtained or that application for insurability has been made within sixty (60) days after the entry of the order requiring insurance coverage. Proof of insurance coverage shall contain, at a minimum:
   1. The name of the insurer;
   2. The policy number;
   3. The address to which all claims should be mailed;
   4. A description of any restrictions on usage, such as preapproval for hospital admission, and the manner in which to obtain preapproval;
   5. A description of all deductibles; and
   6. Two (2) copies of claim forms.
3. The court shall order the obligated parent to notify the court and the other parent if insurance coverage for any child is denied, revoked, or altered in any way that would affect the other parent including any change relating to information required in subsection (b) of this section.
4. The court may hold an obligated parent in contempt for refusing to provide the ordered insurance, or for failing or refusing to provide the information required in subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
5. In addition to enforcement by contempt, as provided for in subsection (d) of this section, the obligated parent is liable to the other parent, any person or agency for:
   1. Part or all of the cost of medical care and medical insurance premiums paid or provided to a child for any period in which the obligated parent failed to provide required coverage;
   2. Any direct insurance benefits received by the obligated parent and not used for the medical care of the child; and
   3. Any reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in collection that the court may determine appropriate.
6. In any action to establish or modify a child support obligation and upon a sufficient showing by the department of family services that birth costs were paid by medical assistance within the preceding five (5) years, the court shall also order that the father pay birth costs to the department in the manner set forth in W.S. 14-2-1001 through 14-2-1008 . Failure of the department to make a sufficient showing under this subsection shall not preclude the department from subsequently seeking recovery in any other manner authorized by law.
7. If the department of family services has previously attempted to recover birth costs pursuant to W.S. 14-2-1001 through 14-2-1008 , the court is not required to issue the order described in subsection (f) of this section.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 51, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 20-6-301 ; Laws 1990, ch. 15, § 2; Laws 1995, ch. 144, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1977, § 20-6-401 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 5; 2010, ch. 12, § 1; 2018, ch. 131, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to an uninsured child health insurance program for low income families, see § 35-25-101 et seq.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, substituted “at a reasonable cost and the benefits under the insurance policy are accessible to the children” for “through an employer or other group carrier, or if it is otherwise reasonably available” in (a)(i)(A); deleted “one (1) or” preceding “both parents” in (a)(i)(B), and inserted “as cash medical support” in (a)(i)(B) and (a)(ii).

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added (f) and (g).

Attorney's fees.—

District court properly awarded the father attorney’s fees and costs incurred in responding to the mother’s Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion where the mother continued to assert in her Rule 60(b) motion that the judgment was satisfied and that she was entitled to a credit for amounts that the father owed her, and there was nothing unreasonable in the conclusion that the father would have felt compelled to respond to the allegations as part of his effort to collect on the judgment. Olson v. Schriner, 2020 WY 36, 459 P.3d 453, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2020).

Trial court did not err in requiring that father obtain health insurance for minor children. However, if insurance could not be acquired within the reasonable allocation of resources that he had, he was entitled to defend any contempt proceeding on the basis of reasonable efforts to obtain and to maintain insurance. Morehead v. Morehead, 811 P.2d 721, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1991).

Trial court did not err in requiring that father obtain health insurance for minor children. —

District court properly declined to determine what amount, if any, the father owed the mother for medical expenses, and thus, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to enter an order for a specific amount, because the amount, reasonableness, and necessity of the medical expenses for the child's care were not issues raised by the pleadings in the modification proceedings, and the district judge did no more than point out that expenses not covered by insurance were to be divided evenly under the existing decree. Carbaugh v. Nichols, 2014 WY 2, 315 P.3d 1175, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2014).

Cited in

Scaling v. Scaling, 805 P.2d 866, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1991).

§ 20-2-402. Employer's obligations.

1. Where a parent is required by a court or administrative order to provide health coverage for a child, at the time of the order, which is offered by and available through an employer doing business in this state to the parent, the employer is required to comply with the following:
   1. To permit the parent who has already met eligibility requirements, to enroll, under the family coverage, any child who is otherwise eligible for the coverage without regard to any enrollment season restrictions;
   2. If the parent is enrolled but fails to make application to obtain coverage for the child, to permit enrollment of the child under family coverage upon application by the child’s other parent, the department of health in administering the Wyoming Medical Assistance and Services Act or the department of family services in administering the child support enforcement program;
   3. To transfer the national medical support notice to the appropriate group health plan providing the health care coverage for which the child is eligible within twenty (20) business days after the date of the national medical support notice;
   4. To withhold from the employee’s compensation the employee’s share, if any, of premiums for health coverage and to pay this amount to the insurer;
   5. Not to disenroll, or eliminate coverage of, the child unless the employee is no longer insured by that employer’s plan or the employer is provided satisfactory written evidence that:
      1. The court or administrative order is no longer in effect;
      2. The child is or will be enrolled in comparable health coverage which will take effect not later than the effective date of disenrollment;
      3. The employer has eliminated family health coverage for all of its employees; or
      4. The employee is no longer working for the employer.
   6. To notify the department within thirty (30) business days whenever the obligor’s employment is terminated. The notice shall include the following information:
      1. When the obligor left the employment;
      2. The last known address of the obligor;
      3. The last known telephone number for the obligor; and
      4. The name, address and telephone number of the obligor’s new employer, if known.
2. No employer shall use the existence of the medical child support order authorized by this act:
   1. As grounds for discharge or discipline;
   2. To otherwise penalize an obligor; or
   3. As grounds to refuse to employ a person.
3. Any employer who violates subsection (a) or (b) of this section is subject to a civil penalty of not more than one hundred dollars ($100.00). Any penalty collected under this section shall be distributed to the county public school fund in the county where the penalty was collected.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 18, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 20-6-402 ; Laws 2000, ch. 34, § 5; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 70, § 2; 2004, ch. 17, § 1; 2006, ch. 114, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a)(iii), substituted “the date” for “receipt”; and added (a)(v)(D).

The 2006 amendment, in (a), added “or” at the end of (v)(C); and made a related change in (B).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

Wyoming Medical Assistance and Services Act. —

See § 42-4-101 et seq.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-2-406(a)(xi).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 20-2-403. Department of family services; duties of department and custodial parent; rules and regulations.

1. In IV-D cases where the noncustodial parent is required to provide health care coverage pursuant to a child support order, and for whom the employer is known, the department shall enforce the provision of court ordered health care coverage for dependent children, where appropriate, through the use of the national medical support notice as provided by federal or state law, unless alternate coverage is allowed by any order of the court or tribunal, including:
   1. Cash contributions for health insurance coverage premiums through the custodial parent’s employment;
   2. Private coverage, unrelated to the noncustodial parent’s employment.
2. The department shall transfer the national medical support notice to the employer within two (2) business days after an employee who is an obligor in a IV-D case is entered in the state directory of new hires.
3. The department shall promptly notify the employer when there is no longer a current order for medical support in effect for which the department is responsible.
4. The custodial parent, in consultation with the department, shall promptly select from available insurance plan options when the insurance plan administrator reports that there is more than one (1) option available under the plan, and shall take into consideration the income withholding of, and costs to, the obligor.
5. The department shall, through rules and regulations, develop procedures to determine when it is appropriate to utilize the national medical support notice.

History. Laws 2002, Sp. Sess., ch. 70, § 1.

§ 20-2-404. Rights of obligor.

1. The obligor shall have twenty (20) days from the date of receipt of the national medical support notice within which to request a hearing. If the obligor does not request a hearing within twenty (20) days, the opportunity for a hearing may be deemed waived.
2. The request for hearing shall be made in writing to the court or tribunal having appropriate jurisdiction, with notice provided to the department, and shall state the basis upon which the hearing is requested.
3. The obligor may contest the withholding based on mistake of fact, according to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. Notwithstanding any contest by the obligor under this subsection, the employer shall initiate withholding until the employer receives notice from the department that withholding is no longer required. Any funds that are found to be inappropriately withheld shall be refunded to the obligor, if no arrearages exist, in accordance with rules and regulations of the department.

History. Laws 2002, Sp. Sess., ch. 70, § 1; 2004, ch. 17, § 1.

§ 20-2-405. Priorities of payment.

1. In IV-D cases in which an obligor is subject to income withholding for court ordered child support payments, health care coverage and any arrearages, and the amount of withholding allowed by law does not satisfy all withholding orders against the obligor, payment of current child support obligations shall be given priority in accordance with W.S. 20-6-215 .
2. After the requirements of W.S. 20-6-215 are met, health insurance premiums shall be prioritized by the court or tribunal on a case-by-case basis.

History. Laws 2002, Sp. Sess., ch. 70, § 1.

§ 20-2-406. Definitions.

1. As used in this act:
   1. “Department” means the department of family services;
   2. “Employer” means any person who owes income to an obligor, including but not limited to, the United States government, a state government, any unit of local government and any school district;
   3. “IV-D agency” means the department of family services or any other state’s IV-D agency as defined by that state;
   4. “IV-D case” means a case with respect to a child in which support enforcement services are provided in accordance with Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act by the child support enforcement unit of the department to a custodian of a child who is a recipient of services under title 42, chapters 1, 2 or 4, of the Wyoming statutes [§§ 42-1-101 et seq, 42-2-101 et seq., and 42-4-101 et seq.], or is a recipient of Title IV-E foster care. The term also includes any case in which a parent or custodian of a child applies to the child support enforcement unit of the department for support enforcement services and pays a fee for such services;
   5. “Medical child support order” means an order, judgment or decree, including the approval of a settlement agreement, issued by a court or tribunal, requiring a parent to provide health care coverage for a child and which may require a payor to enroll the child in a health care benefit plan;
   6. “Mistake of fact” means an error in the amount of current support or arrearages, in the identity of the obligor or that the order of support does not exist or has been vacated;
   7. “National medical support notice” means the federally approved national medical support notice used to enforce the provision of health care coverage in IV-D cases for children of noncustodial parents who are required to provide health care coverage through an employment-related group health plan in accordance with a child support order;
   8. “Obligor” means a person who owes a duty of support for a child;
   9. “Payor” means any employer or other person who pays income to an obligor and who has or provides health care coverage to employees;
   10. “Title IV-D” means Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act which established the federal child support enforcement program;
   11. “Accessible” means the health care insurance plan is available and provides coverage for the child residing within the geographic area covered by the insurance plan;
   12. “Cash medical support” means any child support order calculated pursuant to article 3 of this chapter, or an amount ordered to be paid toward the cost of health care coverage provided by another parent through the parent’s employer or otherwise, or for other medical costs not covered by insurance;
   13. “Reasonable cost” means the cost to provide health care coverage or to provide cash medical support for children at no more than five percent (5%) of the providing party’s income, as defined in W.S. 20-2-303(a)(ii);
   14. “This act” means W.S. 20-2-401 through 20-2-406 .

History. Laws 2002, Sp. Sess., ch. 70, § 1; 2010, ch. 12, § 1.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, added (a)(xi) through (a)(xiii) and renumbered (a)(xi) as (a)(xiv).

Social Security Act. —

Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act, is compiled as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. Title IV-E is compiled as 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-3-101. Desertion generally; penalty; public welfare funds; prisoner's earnings; temporary order for support.

1. Any spouse who, without just cause or lawful excuse, deserts the other spouse or fails or refuses to provide adequately for the support and maintenance of the other spouse and who at the time of leaving, failure or refusal is or thereafter becomes in necessitous circumstances is guilty of a crime, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.
2. Any person who without just cause or legal excuse intentionally fails, refuses or neglects to provide adequate support which the person knows or reasonably should know the person is legally obligated to provide to a child under eighteen (18) years of age is guilty of:
   1. A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both;
   2. A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not less than seven (7) days nor more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if:
      1. The defendant has previously been convicted under this subsection; or
      2. The support has been ordered by any court and the defendant has failed to pay the support obligation within sixty (60) days after the date payment was due.
3. It is an affirmative defense to a charge under subsection (a) or (b) of this section that the person was unable to provide adequate support but did provide such support as was within that person’s ability and means. A person may not demonstrate inability to provide support if the person is employable but, without reasonable excuse, fails diligently to seek employment, terminates employment or reduces earnings or assets. A person who raises an affirmative defense has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
4. Support of spouse or child by public welfare funds or from any source other than from the other spouse or parent as the case may be, is not just cause or lawful excuse for the spouse or parent to fail to provide support under this section.
5. Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 117, §  2.
6. Proceedings under this section may be instituted upon verified complaint against any person guilty of the offenses.
7. At any time before trial, upon petition of the complainant and notice to the defendant, the court may enter a temporary order providing for the support of the deserted spouse or children or both, pendente lite, and may punish for violation of the order as for contempt.
8. This state has jurisdiction over an offense under this section if conduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of that conduct occurs within this state.

History. Laws 1915, ch. 72, §§ 1 to 3; C.S. 1920, §§ 5031 to 5033; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 80; R.S. 1931, §§ 32-803 to 32-805; C.S. 1945, §§ 9-803 to 9-805; Laws 1957, ch. 77, § 1; 1961, ch. 24; W.S. 1957, §§ 20-71 to 20-73; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-3-101 ; Laws 1987, ch. 157, § 2; 1993, ch. 202, § 1; 2000, ch. 48, § 2; 2014, ch. 117, § 2.

The 2014 Amendment, effective July 1, 2014, repealed former (e), which read: “If a person is imprisoned under this section, the court may divert any earnings of the person to the use and benefit of the spouse and any minor child as provided by W.S. 7-16-308 .”

Repeal of provisions relating to abandonment of minor children. —

Sections 9-801 and 9-802, W.C.S. 1945, providing a penalty for the abandonment of minor children by their parents or persons having lawful charge of such children, were repealed by Laws 1957, ch. 77, § 2.

Material for this chapter was taken from the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act, §§ 1 to 6 (now withdrawn), with very slight changes in terminology. Section 1 of the uniform act, however, omitted any designation of place or places of imprisonment and § 4 thereof included the word “curator” following the word “guardian”; otherwise the language of the first 6 sections of the uniform act, with the exceptions above noted, and that of this chapter was practically identical. State v. Haworth, 66 Wyo. 238, 208 P.2d 279, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1949).

Duty of mother as custodian. —

Under this section, where a child is placed in the custody of the mother pursuant to a divorce decree, the mother is required to do as much as she can do to take care of the child. State v. Haworth, 66 Wyo. 238, 208 P.2d 279, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1949).

Burden of proof. —

The state failed to prove that the defendant “without lawful excuse” by personal services, labor and earnings failed to support his child where the defendant did all he could for his child considering his ability to earn money, his physical handicaps and his meager schooling. State v. Haworth, 66 Wyo. 238, 208 P.2d 279, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1949).

Quoted in

Heather v. Delta Drilling Co., 533 P.2d 1211, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1975).

Cited in

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Changing Structure of Criminal Sentencing,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 591 (1983).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Death of obligor parent as affecting decree for support of child, 14 ALR5th 557.

§ 20-3-102. Ordering of payments for support in lieu of penalty; when authorized; term; release of defendant on probation; entering of recognizance; conditions of recognizance; providing for security.

1. Before trial with the consent of the defendant, or on entry of a plea of guilty or after conviction, instead of the penalty provided by W.S. 20-3-101(b) or in addition thereto, the court having regard to the circumstances and the financial ability or earning capacity of the defendant, may enter an order directing the defendant to pay a certain sum for not exceeding two (2) years, to the parent, the guardian or custodian of the minor child or children or to an organization or individual approved by the court as trustee. The court may release the defendant on probation for the period so fixed, upon a recognizance with or without surety in an amount as the court may order, conditioned that if the defendant appears in court whenever ordered and complies with the terms of the order of support or any modification thereof, the recognizance shall be void.
2. The court may require the defendant to provide any security of nonexempt property that the court deems satisfactory to secure the obligation to pay child support.
3. The court, upon petition and following notice and hearing, shall no longer require the order for security if the court determines:
   1. Good cause no longer exists to require security to assure payment upon the obligation to pay child support; and
   2. There is no overdue support outstanding.
4. Once the obligor has satisfied the obligation to make child support payments as ordered by the court, the security shall be released.

History. Laws 1915, ch. 72, § 4; C.S. 1920, § 5034; R.S. 1931, § 32-806; C.S. 1945, § 9-806; W.S. 1957, § 20-74; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-3-102 ; Laws 1985, ch. 77, § 2; 1993, ch. 202, § 1.

§ 20-3-103. Ordering of payments for support in lieu of penalty; violation of order; trial; sentence; forfeiture of recognizance; disposition of sum recovered.

If the court finds at any time during the period of probation the defendant has violated the terms of the order, it may forthwith proceed with the trial of the defendant under the original charge, or sentence him or her or enforce a suspended sentence under the original plea or conviction. In case of the forfeiture of recognizance, or enforcement thereof by execution, the sum recovered may be paid in whole or in part to the wife or to the guardian, custodian or trustee of the minor child or children.

History. Laws 1915, ch. 72, § 5; C.S. 1920, § 5035; R.S. 1931, § 32-807; C.S. 1945, § 9-807; W.S. 1957, § 20-75; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-3-103 .

§ 20-3-104. Proving marriage, parenthood; spouses as witnesses; disclosure of confidential communications; desertion, neglect or refusal to support.

No other or greater evidence is required to prove the marriage of a husband and wife or that the defendant is the father or mother of a child or children than is required to prove such facts in a civil action. In a prosecution under this act [§§ 20-3-101 through 20-3-104 ] no statute or rule of law prohibiting the disclosure of confidential communications between husband and wife shall apply. Both husband and wife are competent witnesses to testify against each other to any relevant matters including the fact of marriage and the parentage of the child or children but neither shall be compelled to give evidence incriminating himself or herself. Proof of the desertion of the wife, child or children in destitute or necessitous circumstances, or of the neglect or refusal to provide for the support and maintenance of the wife, child or children is prima facie evidence that the desertion, neglect or refusal is willful.

History. Laws 1915, ch. 72, § 6; C.S. 1920, § 5036; R.S. 1931, § 32-808; C.S. 1945, § 9-808; W.S. 1957, § 20-76; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-3-104 .

Cross references. —

As to husband and wife as witnesses in civil and criminal cases generally, see §§ 1-12-101 through 1-12-104 .

Repealing clauses. —

Laws 1915, ch. 72, § 7, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith.

Law reviews. —

For note, “Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases,” see 19 Wyo. L.J. 35 (1964).

For discussion of husband-wife testimonial privilege and the Federal Rules of Evidence, see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 601 (1977).

§ 20-3-105. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to enforcement of child support orders, see § 20-6-201 et seq.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1981, ch 168, § 1, related to the enforcement of child support orders.

§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 3.

Cross references. —

For similar provisions, see the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, §§ 20-4-139 through 20-4-194 .

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1, related to the reciprocal enforcement of support.

Quoted in

§ 20-4-139. Short title.

This act may be cited as the “Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.”

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

Law reviews. —

For note, “Family Law — Does the Court Really Look Out for the Best Interest of the Child? Jurisdiction and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1998),” see 2 Wyo. L. Rev. 589 (2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and application of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 90 ALR5th 1.

§ 20-4-140. Definitions.

1. As used in this act:
   1. “Child” means an individual, whether over or under the age of majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of support by the individual’s parent who is or is alleged to be the beneficiary of a support order directed to the parent;
   2. “Child support order” means a support order for a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing state or foreign country;
   3. “Duty of support” means an obligation imposed or imposable by law to provide support for a child, spouse or former spouse, including an unsatisfied obligation to provide support;
   4. “Home state” means the state or foreign country in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a petition or comparable pleading for support and, if a child less than six (6) months old, the state or foreign country in which the child lived from birth with any of them. A period of temporary absence of any of them is counted as part of the six (6) month or other period;
   5. “Income” includes earnings or other periodic entitlements to money from any source and any other property subject to withholding for support under the law of this state;
   6. “Income withholding order” means an order or other legal process directed to an obligor’s employer or other payor, as defined by the Income Withholding Act, W.S. 20-6-201 through 20-6-222 , to withhold support from the income of the obligor;
   7. Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 75, § 3.
   8. “Initiating tribunal” means the tribunal of a state or foreign country from which a petition or comparable pleading is forwarded or in which a petition or comparable pleading is filed for forwarding to another state or foreign country;
   9. “Issuing state” means the state in which a tribunal issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child;
   10. “Issuing tribunal” means the tribunal of a state or foreign country that issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child;
   11. “Obligee” means:
       1. An individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged to be owed or in whose favor a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child has been issued;
       2. A foreign country, state or political subdivision of a state to which the rights under a duty of support or support order have been assigned or which has independent claims based on financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support;
       3. An individual seeking a judgment determining parentage of the individual’s child; or
       4. A person that is a creditor in a proceeding under article 2 of this act.
   12. “Obligor” means an individual, or the estate of a decedent that:
       1. Owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support;
       2. Is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a parent of a child;
       3. Is liable under a support order; or
       4. Is a debtor in a proceeding under article 2 of this act.
   13. “Register” means to record or file in a tribunal of this state a support order or judgment determining parentage of a child issued in another state or a foreign country;
   14. “Registering tribunal” means a tribunal in which a support order or judgment determining parentage of a child is registered;
   15. “Responding state” means a state in which a petition or comparable pleading for support or to determine parentage of a child is filed or to which a petition or comparable pleading is forwarded for filing from another state or a foreign country;
   16. “Responding tribunal” means the authorized tribunal in a responding state or foreign country;
   17. “Spousal support order” means a support order for a spouse or former spouse of the obligor;
   18. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession under the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian nation or tribe;
       1. and (B) Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 75, § 3.
   19. “Support enforcement agency” means a public official, governmental entity or private agency authorized to:
       1. Seek enforcement of support orders or laws relating to the duty of support;
       2. Seek establishment or modification of child support;
       3. Request determination of parentage of a child;
       4. Attempt to locate obligors or their assets; or
       5. Request determination of the controlling child support order.
   20. “Support order” means a judgment, decree, order, decision, or directive, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued in a state or foreign country for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, retroactive support, or reimbursement for financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support. The term may include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, automatic adjustment, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other relief;
   21. “Tribunal” means a court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child. For purposes of establishing, enforcing or modifying support orders or determining parentage in Wyoming, tribunal means only the district court;
   22. “This act” means W.S. 20-4-139 through 20-4-213 ;
   23. “IV-D agency” means the department of family services;
   24. “Law” includes decisional and statutory law and rules and regulations having the force of law;
   25. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government, or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality or any other legal or commercial entity;
   26. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in a perceivable form;
   27. “Convention” means the convention on the international recovery of child support and other forms of family maintenance, concluded at the Hague on November 23, 2007;
   28. “Foreign country” means a country, including a political subdivision thereof, other than the United States, that authorizes the issuance of support orders and:
       1. Which has been declared under the law of the United States to be a foreign reciprocating country;
       2. Which has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this state as provided in W.S. 20-4-158 ;
       3. Which has enacted a law or established procedures for the issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under this act; or
       4. In which the convention is in force with respect to the United States.
   29. “Foreign support order” means a support order of a foreign tribunal;
   30. “Foreign tribunal” means a court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial entity of a foreign country which is authorized to establish, enforce or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child. The term includes a competent authority under the convention;
   31. “Issuing foreign country” means the foreign country in which a tribunal issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child;
   32. “Outside this state” means a location in another state or a country other than the United States, whether or not the country is a foreign country.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 193, § 2; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2004, ch. 130, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, §§ 2, 3.

The 2004 amendment, in (a)(xxii), substituted “20-4-194” for “20-4-192.”

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, deleted “the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act” from the end of (a)(vii) and (a)(xv); rewrote (a)(xviii)(B); added (a)(xix)(E); in (a)(xx) inserted “or directive” and “issued by a tribunal”; in (a)(xxii) substituted “20-4-197” for “20-4-194”; and added (a)(xxv) and (a)(xxvi).

The 2015 amendment, rewrote (a).

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 20-4-141. Remedies cumulative; application of act to resident of foreign country and foreign support proceeding.

1. Remedies provided by this act are cumulative and do not affect the availability of remedies under other law or the recognition of a foreign support order on the basis of comity.
2. This act does not:
   1. Provide the exclusive method of establishing or enforcing a support order under the law of this state; or
   2. Grant a tribunal of this state jurisdiction to render judgment or issue an order relating to child custody or visitation in a proceeding under this act.
3. A tribunal of this state shall apply article 1 of this act and, as applicable, article 2 of this act, to a support proceeding involving:
   1. A foreign support order;
   2. A foreign tribunal; or
   3. An obligee, obligor or child residing in a foreign country.
4. A tribunal of this state that is requested to recognize and enforce a support order on the basis of comity may apply the procedural and substantive provisions of article 1 of this act.
5. Article 2 of this act applies only to a support proceeding under the convention. In such a proceeding, if a provision of article 2 of this act is inconsistent with article 1 of this act, article 2 of this act controls.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added (b), designating the existing provision as (a); and in (a), added the language beginning “including the recognition.”

The 2015 amendment, in (a), substituted “this act” for “the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act” and “or the recognition of a foreign support order” for “including the recognition of a support order of a foreign country or political subdivision”; in (b)(ii), inserted “in a proceeding”; and added (c) through (e).

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-142. Basis for jurisdiction over nonresident.

1. In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or the individual’s guardian or conservator if:
   1. The individual is personally served with notice within the state;
   2. The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent in a record, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;
   3. The individual resided with the child in this state;
   4. The individual resided in this state and provided prenatal expenses or support for the child;
   5. The child resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of the individual;
   6. The individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;
   7. The individual asserted parentage of a child in this state pursuant to the putative father registry created by W.S. 1-22-117 and maintained in this state by the department of family services; or
   8. There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
2. The bases of personal jurisdiction set forth in subsection (a) of this section or in any other law of this state may not be used to acquire personal jurisdiction for a tribunal of this state to modify a child support order of another state unless the requirements of W.S. 20-4-183 are met, or, in the case of a foreign support order, unless the requirements of W.S. 20-4-197 are met.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2003, ch. 93, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a), deleted “or modify” following “enforce” and made a related change; and added (b).

The 2015 amendment, in the introductory language of (a), inserted “of a child”; in (a)(ii), inserted “in a record”; rewrote (a)(vii); in (b), substituted “are met, or, in the case of a foreign support order, unless the requirements of W.S. 20-4-197 are met” for “or 20-4-197 are met”; and made related and stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Jurisdiction acquired. —

District court acquired personal jurisdiction over nonresident mother by virtue of her demand for affirmative relief pursuant to Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, and court's jurisdiction extended to ordering visitation for father, changing child's name on birth certificate, and granting father the federal income tax dependency deduction. Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1998).

Jurisdiction in Wyoming was proper in a paternity and child support action where the father, residing in Ohio, was served with process in Ohio, and he filed a written response denying paternity; the father was given notice of the hearing and he appeared, albeit by telephone. JAG v. State, 2002 WY 158, 56 P.3d 1016, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 20-4-143. Procedure when exercising jurisdiction over nonresident.

Personal jurisdiction acquired by a tribunal of this state in a proceeding under this act or other law of this state relating to a support order continues as long as a tribunal of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order or continuing jurisdiction to enforce its order as provided by W.S. 20-4-146 , 20-4-147 and 20-4-196 .

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section to conform with changes proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-144. Initiating and responding tribunal of this state.

Under this act, a tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to forward proceedings to a tribunal of another state and as a responding tribunal for proceedings initiated in another state or a foreign country.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, substituted “this act” for “the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,” inserted “a tribunal of” and added “or a foreign country.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-145. Simultaneous proceedings.

1. A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a pleading is filed in another state or a foreign country only if:
   1. The petition or comparable pleading in this state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in the other state or the foreign country for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state or the foreign country;
   2. The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in the other state or the foreign country; and
   3. If relevant, this state is the home state of the child.
2. A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state or a foreign country if:
   1. The petition or comparable pleading in the other state or foreign country is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in this state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by this state;
   2. The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in this state;
   3. If relevant, the other state or foreign country is the home state of the child.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, inserted “or a foreign country” throughout the section.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-146. Continuing exclusive jurisdiction.

1. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state has, and shall exercise, continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order if the order is the controlling order and:
   1. At the time of filing of a request for modification, this state is the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or
   2. Even if this state is not the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, the parties consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this state may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order.
2. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state may not exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order if:
   1. All the parties who are individuals file consent in a record with the tribunal of this state that a tribunal of another state that has jurisdiction over at least one (1) of the parties, who is an individual or that is located in the state of residence of the child, may modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; or
   2. Its order is not the controlling order.
3. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 3.
4. If a tribunal of another state has issued a child support order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act or a law substantially similar to that act which modifies a child support order of a tribunal of this state, tribunals of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal of the other state.
5. A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a jurisdictional conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal.
6. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 3.
7. A tribunal of this state that lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child support order may serve as an initiating tribunal of another state to modify a support order issued in that state.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, §§ 2, 3.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section to conform with changes proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, including adding (b)(i) and (ii); repealing former (c), which provided limitations where a tribunal of another state has modified a child support order; repealing former (f), which pertained to continuing exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support orders; and adding (g).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

Continuing exclusive jurisdiction found. —

Wyoming trial court retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction to enforce a child support order where there was no evidence that Colorado courts ever assumed jurisdiction over the support order in issuing a restraining order and in terminating the father's parental rights. Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 20-4-147. Continuing jurisdiction to enforce a child support order.

1. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to enforce:
   1. The order if the order is the controlling order and has not been modified by a tribunal of another state that assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; or
   2. A money judgment for arrearages of support and interest on the order accrued before a determination that an order of a tribunal of another state is the controlling order.
2. A tribunal of this state having continuing jurisdiction over a support order may act as a responding tribunal to enforce the order.
3. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 3.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, §§ 2, 3; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section, deleting provisions pertaining to modification in (a) and (b), and repealing former (c), pertaining to modifying a spousal support order.

The 2015 amendment, in (a)(ii), inserted “or a foreign country.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-148. Determination of controlling child support orders.

1. If a proceeding is brought under this act and only one (1) tribunal has issued a child support order, the order of that tribunal controls and shall be recognized.
   1. through (iv) Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 3.
2. If a proceeding is brought under this act, and two (2) or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of this state, another state or a foreign country with regard to the same obligor and same child, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and individual obligee shall apply the following rules and by order shall determine which order controls and shall be recognized:
   1. If only one (1) of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this act, the order of that tribunal controls;
   2. If more than one (1) of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this act:
      1. An order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child controls; or
      2. If an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the order most recently issued controls.
   3. If none of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this act, the tribunal of this state shall issue a child support order, which controls.
3. If two (2) or more child support orders have been issued for the same obligor and same child, upon request of a party who is an individual or that is a support enforcement agency, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and the obligee who is an individual shall determine which order controls under subsection (b) of this section. This request may be filed with a registration for enforcement or registration for modification pursuant to W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-184 , 20-4-193 , 20-4-194 and 20-4-197 , or may be filed as a separate proceeding.
4. The tribunal that issued the controlling order under subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section has continuing jurisdiction to the extent provided in W.S. 20-4-146 or 20-4-147 .
5. A tribunal of this state that determines by order which is the controlling order under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) or subsection (c) of this section or that issues a new controlling order under paragraph (b)(iii) of this section shall state in that order:
   1. The basis upon which the tribunal made its determination;
   2. The amount of prospective support, if any; and
   3. The total amount of consolidated arrearages and accrued interest, if any, under all of the orders after all payments made are credited as provided by W.S. 20-4-150 .
6. Within thirty (30) days after issuance of an order determining which is the controlling order, the party obtaining the order shall file a certified copy of the order in each tribunal that issued or registered an earlier order of child support. A party or support enforcement agency obtaining the order that fails to file a certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the controlling order.
7. A request to determine which is the controlling order shall be accompanied by a copy of every child support order in effect and the applicable record of payments. The requesting party shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.
8. An order that has been determined to be the controlling order, or a judgment for consolidated arrearages of support and interest, if any, made pursuant to this section shall be recognized in proceedings under this act.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, §§ 2, 3; 2001, ch. 5, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section to focus on the determination of a controlling child support order rather than the recognition of such.

The 2015 amendment, in the introductory language of (a), inserted “or a foreign country”; and made stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-149. Child support orders for two or more obligees.

In responding to registrations or petitions for enforcement of two (2) or more child support orders in effect at the same time with regard to the same obligor and different individual obligees, at least one (1) of which was issued by a tribunal of another state or a foreign country, a tribunal of this state shall enforce those orders in the same manner as if the multiple orders had been issued by a tribunal of this state.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, deleted “multiple” preceding “registrations” near the beginning of the section.

The 2015 amendment, inserted “or a foreign country.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-150. Credit for payments.

A tribunal of this state shall credit amounts collected for a particular period pursuant to any child support order against the amounts owed for the same period under any other child support order for support of the same child issued by a tribunal of this state, another state or a foreign country.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section to conform with changes proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

The 2015 amendment, added “or a foreign country,” and made related and stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-151. Proceedings under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.

1. Except as otherwise provided in this act, W.S. 20-4-151 through 20-4-169 apply to all proceedings under this act.
2. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 3.
3. An individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency may initiate a proceeding authorized under the act by filing a petition in an initiating tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a petition or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state or a foreign country which has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, §§ 2, 3; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, repealed former (b), which delineated to the proceedings provided by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; and substituted “initiate” for “commence” in (c).

The 2015 amendment, in (a), substituted “this act” for “the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act”; and in (c), inserted “or a foreign country.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-152. Proceeding by minor parent.

A minor parent, or a guardian or other legal representative of a minor parent, may maintain a proceeding on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the minor’s child.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1.

§ 20-4-153. Application of law of this state.

1. Except as otherwise provided in this act, a responding tribunal of this state shall:
   1. Apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available in those proceedings; and
   2. Determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the presumptive child support established under W.S. 20-2-304 .

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 2004, ch. 130, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2.

The 2004 amendment, in (a)(ii), substituted “W.S. 20-2-304 ” for “W.S 20-6-304 .”

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, deleted “including the rules on choice of law” in (a)(i) following “substantive law”; and made stylistic changes.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 20-4-154. Duties of initiating tribunal.

1. Upon the filing of a petition authorized by this act, an initiating tribunal of this state shall forward the petition and its accompanying documents:
   1. To the responding tribunal or appropriate support enforcement agency in the responding state; or
   2. If the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, to the state information agency of the responding state with a request that they be forwarded to the appropriate tribunal and that receipt be acknowledged.
2. If requested by the responding tribunal, a tribunal of this state shall issue a certificate or other document and make findings required by the law of the responding state. If the responding tribunal is in a foreign country, upon request the tribunal of this state shall specify the amount of support sought, convert that amount into the equivalent amount in the foreign currency under applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported and provide any other documents necessary to satisfy the requirements of the responding foreign tribunal.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, deleted “three (3) copies of” following “forward” in the introductory paragraph of (a); rewrote (b) to prescribe duties for issuing a certificate where requested, including the requirement that the amount owed be converted to an equivalent amount in the foreign currency under applicable official or market exchange rate in the case of a foreign country or political subdivision; and made stylistic changes.

The 2015 amendment, in (b), substituted “tribunal is in a foreign country” for “state is a foreign country, or political subdivision,” “tribunal of this state” for “tribunal,” “foreign tribunal” for “state”, and made related changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-155. Duties and power of responding tribunal.

1. When a responding tribunal of this state receives a petition or comparable pleading from initiating tribunal or directly pursuant to W.S. 20-4-151(c), it shall cause the petition or pleading to be filed and notify the petitioner where and when it was filed.
2. A responding tribunal of this state, to the extent not prohibited by other law, may do one (1) or more of the following:
   1. Establish or enforce a support order, modify a child support order, determine the controlling child support order or determine parentage of a child;
   2. Order an obligor to comply with a support order, specifying the amount and manner of compliance;
   3. Order income withholding;
   4. Determine the amount of any arrearages, and specify a method of payment;
   5. Enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both;
   6. Set aside property for satisfaction of the support order;
   7. Place liens and order execution on the obligor’s property;
   8. Order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the obligor’s current residential address, electronic mail address, telephone number, employer, address of employment and telephone number at the place of employment;
   9. Issue a bench warrant for an obligor who has failed after proper notice to appear at a hearing ordered by the tribunal and enter the warrant in any local and state computer system for criminal warrants;
   10. Order the obligor to seek appropriate employment by specified methods;
   11. Award reasonable attorney’s fees and other fees and court costs;
   12. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 3.
   13. Grant any other available remedy.
3. A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a support order issued under this act, or in the documents accompanying the order, the calculations on which the support order is based.
4. A responding tribunal of this state may not condition the payment of a support order issued under this act upon compliance by a party with provisions for visitation.
5. If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order under this act, the tribunal shall send a copy of the order to the petitioner and the respondent and to the initiating tribunal, if any.
6. If requested to enforce a support order, arrearages or judgment, or modify a support order stated in a foreign currency, a responding tribunal of this state shall convert the amount stated in the foreign currency to the equivalent amount in dollars under the applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, §§ 2, 3; 2001, ch. 5, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to an uninsured child health insurance program for low income families, see § 35-25-101 et seq.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “not prohibited by other law” for “otherwise authorized by law” in the introductory language of (b); substituted “determine the controlling child support order or” for “render a judgment to” in (b)(i); added (f); and made a related change.

The 2015 amendment, in (b)(i), substituted “Establish” for “Issue,” and added “of a child”; in (b)(viii), inserted “electronic mail address”; in (b)(x), substituted “costs” for “court”; in (c), “this act” for “the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act”; in (f), substituted “responding tribunal” for “tribunal”; and made related changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-156. Inappropriate tribunal.

If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an inappropriate tribunal of this state, the tribunal shall forward the pleading and accompanying documents to an appropriate tribunal of this state or another state and notify the petitioner where and when the pleading was sent.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “the tribunal” for “it.”

The 2015 amendment, substituted “documents” for “document” and made additional stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-157. Duties of support enforcement agency.

1. A support enforcement agency of this state, upon request, shall provide services to a petitioner in a proceeding under this act.
2. A support enforcement agency of this state that is providing services to the petitioner shall:
   1. Take all steps necessary to enable an appropriate tribunal of this state, another state or a foreign country to obtain jurisdiction over the respondent;
   2. Request an appropriate tribunal to set a date, time and place for a hearing;
   3. Make a reasonable effort to obtain all relevant information, including information as to income and property of the parties;
   4. Within two (2) days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, after receipt of notice in a record from an initiating, responding or registering tribunal, send a copy of the notice to the petitioner;
   5. Within two (2) days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, after receipt of communication in a record from the respondent or the respondent’s attorney, send a copy of the communication to the petitioner; and
   6. Notify the petitioner if jurisdiction over the respondent cannot be obtained.
3. This act does not create or negate a relationship of attorney and client or other fiduciary relationship between a support enforcement agency or the attorney for the agency and the individual being assisted by the agency.
4. A support enforcement agency of this state that requests registration of a child support order in this state for enforcement or for modification shall make reasonable efforts:
   1. To ensure that the order to be registered is the controlling order; or
   2. If two (2) or more child support orders exist and the identity of the controlling order has not been determined, to ensure that a request for a determination is made in a tribunal having jurisdiction to do so.
5. A support enforcement agency of this state that requests registration and enforcement of a support order, arrearages or judgment stated in a foreign currency shall convert the amounts stated in the foreign currency into the equivalent amounts in dollars under the applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported.
6. A support enforcement agency of this state shall request a tribunal of this state to issue a child support order and an income withholding order that redirect payment of current support, arrearages and interest if requested to do so by a support enforcement agency of another state pursuant to W.S. 20-4-169 .

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted “of this state” and deleted “as appropriate” following “petitioner” in the introductory language in (b); inserted “in a record” in (b)(iv) and (v); and added (d), (e) and (f).

The 2015 amendment, in (b)(i), inserted “or a foreign country”; substituted “two (2) days” for “five (5) days” and deleted “a written” preceding “notice” in (b)(iv) and (b)(v); and made related and stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

Construction with Child Support Enforcement Act. —

Duty of state to provide child support services to any individual upon request was not limited by provision of Child Support Enforcement Act, chapter 6 of this title, limiting services to Wyoming residents. Flores v. Flores, 979 P.2d 944, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 20-4-158. Duty of attorney general.

1. If the state attorney general determines that the support enforcement agency is neglecting or refusing to provide services to an individual, the attorney general may order the agency to perform its duties under this act or may provide those services directly to the individual.
2. The attorney general may determine that a foreign country has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this state and take appropriate action for notification of the determination.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added (b), designating the existing provision as (a).

The 2015 amendment, in (b), deleted “or political subdivision” following “foreign country”.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-159. Private counsel.

An individual may employ private counsel to represent the individual in proceedings authorized by this act.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-160. Duties of state information agency.

1. The department of family services child support enforcement section is the state information agency under this act.
2. The state information agency shall:
   1. Compile and maintain a current list, including addresses, of the tribunals in this state which have jurisdiction under this act and any support enforcement agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the state information agency of every other state;
   2. Maintain a register of names and addresses of tribunals and support enforcement agencies received from other states;
   3. Forward to the appropriate tribunal in the county in this state in which the obligee who is an individual or the obligor resides, or in which the obligor’s property is believed to be located, all documents concerning a proceeding under this act received from another state or a foreign country; and
   4. Obtain information concerning the location of the obligor and the obligor’s property within this state not exempt from execution, by such means as postal verification and federal or state locator services, examination of telephone directories, requests for the obligor’s address from the obligor’s employer or employers, and examination of governmental records, including, to the extent not prohibited by other law, those relating to real property, vital statistics, law enforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, driver’s licenses and social security.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted “names and addresses of” in (b)(ii); substituted “county” for “place” in (b)(iii); and made a stylistic change.

The 2015 amendment, in (b)(iii), substituted “another state or a foreign country” for “an initiating tribunal or the state information agency of the initiating state”; in (b)(iv), substituted “from the obligor's employer or employers” for “from employer.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 52 ALR5th 221.

§ 20-4-161. Pleadings and accompanying documents.

1. In a proceeding under this act, a petitioner seeking to establish a support order, to determine parentage of a child or to register and modify a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country shall file a petition. Unless otherwise ordered under W.S. 20-4-162 , the petition or accompanying documents shall provide, so far as known, the name, residential address and social security numbers of the obligor and the obligee or the parent and alleged parent, and the name, sex, residential address, social security number and date of birth of each child for whose benefit support is sought or whose parentage is to be determined. Unless filed at the time of registration, the petition shall be accompanied by a copy of any support order known to have been issued by another tribunal. The petition or accompanying documents may include any other information that may assist in locating or identifying the respondent.
2. The petition shall specify the relief sought. The petition and accompanying documents shall conform substantially with the requirements imposed by the forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support enforcement agency.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote (a) to conform with changes proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

The 2015 amendment, in (a), inserted “of a child,” “a tribunal,” and “or a foreign country” in the first sentence, and made a stylistic change.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-162. Nondisclosure of information in exceptional circumstances.

If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of specific identifying information, that information shall be sealed and may not be disclosed to the other party or the public. After a hearing in which a tribunal takes into consideration the health, safety or liberty of the party or child, the tribunal may order disclosure of information that the tribunal determines to be in the interest of justice.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the first sentence, which formerly read: “Upon a finding, which may be made ex parte, that the health, safety or liberty of a party or child would be unreasonably put at risk by the disclosure of identifying information, or if an existing order so provides, a tribunal shall order that the address of the child or party or other identifying information not be disclosed in a pleading or other document filed in a proceeding under this act”; and added the last sentence.

§ 20-4-163. Costs and fees.

1. The petitioner may not be required to pay a filing fee or other costs.
2. If an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal of this state may assess against an obligor filing fees, reasonable attorney’s fees, other costs and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred by the obligee and the obligee’s witnesses. The tribunal may not assess fees, costs or expenses against the obligee or the support enforcement agency of either the initiating or the responding state or foreign country, except as provided by other law. Attorney’s fees may be taxed as costs, and may be ordered paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in the attorney’s own name. Payment of support owed to the obligee has priority over fees, costs and expenses.
3. The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees if it determines that a hearing was requested primarily for delay. In a proceeding under W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-184 , 20-4-193 , 20-4-194 and 20-4-197 , a hearing is presumed to have been requested primarily for delay if a registered support order is confirmed or enforced without change.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, in (b), inserted “of this state” in the first sentence, and inserted “or a foreign country” in the second sentence; in (c), inserted “20-4-193, 20-4-194 and 20-4-197 ”; and made related and stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-164. Limited immunity of petitioner.

1. Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding under this act before a responding tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney, or through services provided by the support enforcement agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the petitioner in another proceeding.
2. A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process while physically present in this state to participate in a proceeding under this act.
3. The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under this act committed by a party while physically present in this state to participate in the proceeding.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted “under this act” in (a).

The 2015 amendment, in (c), inserted “physically.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-165. Nonparentage as defense.

A party whose parentage of a child has been previously determined by or pursuant to law may not plead nonparentage as a defense to a proceeding under this act.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-166. Special rules of evidence and procedure.

1. The physical presence of a nonresident party who is an individual in a tribunal of this state is not required for the establishment, enforcement or modification of a support order or the rendition of a judgment determining parentage of a child.
2. An affidavit, a document substantially complying with federally mandated forms or a document incorporated by reference in any of them, which would not be excluded under the hearsay rule if given in person, is admissible in evidence if given under penalty of perjury or false swearing by a party or witness residing outside this state.
3. A copy of the record of child support payments certified as a true copy of the original by the custodian of the record may be forwarded to a responding tribunal. The copy is evidence of facts asserted in it, and is admissible to show whether payments were made.
4. Copies of bills for testing for parentage of a child, and for prenatal and postnatal health care of the mother and child, furnished to the adverse party at least ten (10) days before trial, are admissible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges billed and that the charges were reasonable, necessary and customary.
5. Documentary evidence transmitted from outside this state to a tribunal of this state by telephone, telecopier, or other electronic means that do not provide an original record may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.
6. In a proceeding under this act, a tribunal of this state shall permit a party or witness residing outside this state to be deposed or to testify under penalty of perjury or false swearing by telephone, audiovisual means or other electronic means at a designated tribunal or other location. A tribunal of this state shall cooperate with other tribunals in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
7. If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to answer on the ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from the refusal.
8. A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses does not apply in a proceeding under this act.
9. The defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child does not apply in a proceeding under this act.
10. A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, certified as a true copy, is admissible to establish parentage of the child.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2001, ch. 5, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a) substituted “a nonresident party who is an individual” for “the petitioner” and deleted “responding” preceding “tribunal”; in (b), deleted “A verified petition” at the beginning, and substituted “penalty of perjury or false swearing” for “oath”; substituted “record” for “writing” in (e); added (k); and made stylistic and related changes.

The 2015 amendment, in (e), inserted “electronic”; in (f), inserted “under penalty of perjury or false swearing” in the first sentence; and made stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-167. Communications between tribunals.

A tribunal of this state may communicate with a tribunal outside this state in a record, or by telephone, electronic mail or other means, to obtain information concerning the laws, the legal effect of a judgment, decree or order of that tribunal, and the status of a proceeding. A tribunal of this state may furnish similar information by similar means to a tribunal outside this state.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted “or foreign country or political subdivision” in three places; substituted “a record” for “writing”; and made a stylistic change.

The 2015 amendment, deleted “or foreign country or political subdivision” following “state” three times; inserted “electronic mail”; and made stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-168. Assistance with discovery.

1. A tribunal of this state may:
   1. Request a tribunal outside this state to assist in obtaining discovery; and
   2. Upon request, compel a person over which it has jurisdiction to respond to a discovery order issued by a tribunal outside this state.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, substituted “outside this state” for “of another state” in (a)(i) and (a)(ii); and made additional stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-4-169. Receipt and disbursement of payments.

1. A support enforcement agency or tribunal of this state shall disburse promptly any amounts received pursuant to a support order, as directed by the order. The agency or tribunal shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of another state or foreign country a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the amounts and dates of all payments received.
2. If neither the obligor, nor the obligee who is an individual, nor the child resides in this state, upon request from the support enforcement agency of this state or another state, a tribunal of this state shall:
   1. Direct that the support payment be made to the support enforcement agency in the state in which the obligee is receiving services; and
   2. Issue and send to the obligor’s employer a conforming income withholding order or an administrative notice of change of payee, reflecting the redirected payments.
3. The support enforcement agency of this state receiving redirected payments from another state pursuant to a law similar to subsection (b) of this section shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of the other state a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the amount and dates of all payments received.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added (b) and (c).

The 2015 amendment, in the introductory language of (a), inserted “with personal jurisdiction over the parties”; and substituted “outside this state” for “in another state” in (a)(i) and (a)(ii).

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-170. Establishment of support order.

1. If a support order entitled to recognition under this act has not been issued, a responding tribunal of this state with personal jurisdiction over the parties may issue a support order if:
   1. The individual seeking the order resides outside this state; or
   2. The support enforcement agency seeking the order is located outside this state.
2. The tribunal may issue a temporary child support order if the tribunal determines that the order is appropriate and the individual ordered to pay is:
   1. A presumed father of the child;
   2. Petitioning to have his paternity adjudicated;
   3. Identified as the father of the child through genetic testing;
   4. An alleged father who has declined to submit to genetic testing;
   5. Shown by clear and convincing evidence to be the father of the child;
   6. An acknowledged father as provided by W.S. 14-2-601 et seq.;
   7. The mother of the child; or
   8. An individual who has been ordered to pay child support in a previous proceeding and the order has not been reversed or vacated.
3. Upon finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard, that an obligor owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue a support order directed to the obligor and may issue other orders pursuant to W.S. 20-4-155 .

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote (b) to conform with changes proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

The 2015 amendment, in (a), added “with personal jurisdiction over the parties” in the introductory language and substituted “outside this” for “in another” in (a)(i) and (a)(ii).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-171. Employer's receipt of income withholding order of another state; employer's compliance with income withholding order of another state; compliance with multiple income withholding orders.

1. An income withholding order issued in another state may be sent by or on behalf of the obligee, or by the support enforcement agency to the person defined as the obligor’s employer under W.S. 20-6-201 through 20-6-222 without first filing a petition or comparable pleading or registering the order with a tribunal of this state.
   1. through (iii) Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 3.
2. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 3.
3. Upon receipt of an income withholding order, the obligor’s employer shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the obligor.
4. The employer shall treat an income withholding order issued in another state which appears regular on its face as if it had been issued by a tribunal of this state.
5. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (f) and (g) of this section, the employer shall withhold and distribute the funds as directed in the withholding order by complying with terms of the order which specify:
   1. The duration and amount of periodic payments of current child support, stated as a sum certain;
   2. The person designated to receive payments and the address to which the payments are to be forwarded;
   3. Medical support, whether in the form of periodic cash payment, stated as a sum certain, or ordering the obligor to provide health insurance coverage for the child under a policy available through the obligor’s employment;
   4. The amount of periodic payments of fees and costs for a support enforcement agency, the issuing tribunal, and the obligee’s attorney, stated as sums certain; and
   5. The amount of periodic payments of arrearages and interest on arrearages, stated as sums certain.
6. An employer shall comply with the law of the state of the obligor’s principal place of employment for withholding from income with respect to:
   1. The employer’s fee for processing an income withholding order;
   2. The maximum amount permitted to be withheld from the obligor’s income; and
   3. The times within which the employer shall implement the withholding order and forward the child support payment.
7. If an obligor’s employer receives two (2) or more income withholding orders with respect to the earnings of the same obligor, the employer satisfies the terms of the orders if the employer complies with the law of the state of the obligor’s principal place of employment to establish the priorities for withholding and allocating income withheld for two (2) or more child support obligees.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, §§ 2, 3; 2005, ch. 103, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted “by or on behalf of the obligee, or by the support enforcement agency” and deleted “or entity” following “person” in (a); deleted “or agency” following “person” in (e)(ii); in (g), substituted “two (2) or more” for “multiple” in two places, and deleted “multiple” following “the terms of the”; and made a stylistic change.

§ 20-4-172. Administrative enforcement of orders.

1. A party or support enforcement agency seeking to enforce a support order or an income withholding order, or both, issued in another state or a foreign support order may send the documents required for registering the order to a support enforcement agency of this state.
2. Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement agency, without initially seeking to register the order, shall consider and, if appropriate, use any administrative procedure authorized by the law of this state to enforce a support order or an income withholding order, or both. If the obligor does not contest administrative enforcement, the order need not be registered. If the obligor contests the validity or administrative enforcement of the order, the support enforcement agency shall register the order pursuant to this act.
3. The department of family services shall adopt rules and regulations consistent with federal requirements to implement this section.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 193, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted “or support enforcement agency” in (a).

The 2015 amendment, in (a), substituted “issued in another state or a foreign support order” “ for “issued by a tribunal of another state”; and in the last sentence in (b), substituted “this act” for “the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-173. Registration of order for enforcement.

A support order or income withholding order issued in another state or a foreign support order may be registered in this state for enforcement.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, made a stylistic change.

The 2015 amendment, substituted “issued in another state or a foreign support order” “issued by a tribunal of another state.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-174. Procedure to register order for enforcement.

1. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 20-4-206 , a support order or an income withholding order of another state or a foreign support order may be registered in this state by sending the following records to the appropriate tribunal in this state:
   1. A letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting registration and enforcement;
   2. Two (2) copies, including one (1) certified copy, of the order to be registered, including any modification of the order;
   3. A sworn statement by the person requesting registration or a certified statement by the custodian of the records showing the amount of any arrearage;
   4. The name of the obligor and, if known:
      1. The obligor’s address and social security number;
      2. The name and address of the obligor’s employer or other payor and any other source of income of the obligor; and
      3. A description and the location of property of the obligor in this state not exempt from execution.
      4. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 3.
   5. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 20-4-162 , the name and address of the obligee and, if applicable, the person to whom support payments are to be remitted.
2. On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as an order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign support order, together with one (1) copy of the documents and information, regardless of their form.
3. A petition or comparable pleading seeking a remedy that shall be affirmatively sought under other law of this state may be filed at the same time as the request for registration, or later. The pleading shall specify the grounds for the remedy sought.
4. If two (2) or more orders are in effect, the person requesting registration shall:
   1. Furnish to the tribunal a copy of every support order asserted to be in effect in addition to the documents specified in this section;
   2. Specify the order alleged to be the controlling order, if any; and
   3. Specify the amount of consolidated arrearages, if any.
5. A request for a determination of which is the controlling order may be filed separately or with a request for registration and enforcement or for registration and modification. The person requesting registration shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, §§ 2, 3; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2008, ch. 116, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “records” for “documents” in (a); in (a)(v) added the exception and deleted “agency or” preceding “person”; added (d) and (e) and made stylistic changes.

The 2008 amendment, made a stylistic change.

Laws 2008, ch. 116, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 13, 2008.

The 2015 amendment, in (a), added the exception, inserted “or a foreign support order,” and substituted “records to” for “records and information to”; in (b), substituted “an order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign support order” for “a foreign judgment”; and made related changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-175. Effect of registration for enforcement.

1. A support order or income withholding order issued in another state or a foreign support order is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state.
2. A registered support order issued in another state or a foreign country is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state.
3. Except as otherwise provided in this act, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce, but shall not modify, a registered support order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, inserted “support” in (b) and (c); in (a), inserted “or a foreign support order”; in (b),” inserted “or a foreign country”; in (c), substituted “this act” for “ W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-184 ”; and made a related change.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

A foreign order becomes a “registered” order upon filing with a Wyoming district court. Washington ex rel. Mahoney v. St. John, 964 P.2d 1242, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1998).

UIFSA consistent with full faith and credit clause. —

Rule of affording full recognition of foreign judgments, in reliance on full faith and credit clause of U.S. Constitution, is consistent with Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, which requires Wyoming district courts to recognize and enforce a registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction. Washington ex rel. Mahoney v. St. John, 964 P.2d 1242, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1998).

Enforcement of Washington support order. —

Where father admitted to residing in state of Washington with his wife and child while employed there, and wife and child continued to live in Washington after father deserted marriage and returned to Wyoming, Washington court which issued original child support order had personal jurisdiction over father served in Wyoming pursuant to Washington statute, and Wyoming district court was required to enforce the Washington support order pursuant to Wyoming's interpretation of the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution. State ex rel. Mahoney v. St. John, 964 P.2d 1242, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1998).

Am Jur 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity, Construction, and Application of Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA), 28 USCS § 1738B - State Cases. 18 A.L.R.6th 97.

§ 20-4-176. Choice of law.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, the law of the issuing state or foreign country governs:
   1. The nature, extent, amount and duration of current payments under a registered support order;
   2. The computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of interest on the arrearages under the support order; and
   3. The existence and satisfaction of other obligations under the support order.
2. In a proceeding for arrearages under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of this state or of the issuing state or foreign country, whichever is longer, applies.
3. A responding tribunal of this state shall apply the procedures and remedies of this state to enforce current support and collect arrearages and interest due on a support order of another state or foreign country registered in this state.
4. After a tribunal of this or another state determines which is the controlling order and issues an order consolidating arrearages, if any, a tribunal of this state shall prospectively apply the law of the state or foreign country issuing the controlling order, including its law on interest on arrearages, on current and future support, and on consolidated arrearages.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a), added the exception in the introductory language, substituted “under a registered support order” for “and other obligations of support and” in (a)(i), inserted “computation and,” “and accrual of interest on the arrearages,” and “support” in (a)(ii); added (a)(iii); in (b), inserted “under a registered support order” and deleted “under the laws” following “limitation”; added (c) and (d); and made stylistic and related changes.

The 2015 amendment, inserted ”or foreign country” and “of this section” throughout the section, and made related changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-177. Notice of registration of order.

1. When a support order or income withholding order issued in another state or a foreign support order is registered, the registering tribunal of this state shall notify the nonregistering party. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the registered order and the documents and relevant information accompanying the order.
2. A notice shall inform the nonregistering party:
   1. That a registered order is enforceable as of the date of registration in the same manner as an order issued by a tribunal of this state;
   2. That a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order shall be requested within twenty (20) days after notice unless the registered order is under W.S. 20-4-207 ;
   3. That failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner will result in confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages and precludes further contest of that order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted; and
   4. Of the amount of any alleged arrearages.
3. If the registering party asserts that two (2) or more orders are in effect, a notice shall also:
   1. Identify the two (2) or more orders and the order alleged by the registering party to be the controlling order and the consolidated arrearages, if any;
   2. Notify the nonregistering party of the right to a determination of which is the controlling order;
   3. State that the procedures provided in subsection (b) of this section apply to the determination of which is the controlling order; and
   4. State that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the order alleged to be the controlling order in a timely manner may result in confirmation that the order is the controlling order.
4. Upon registration of an income withholding order for enforcement, the support enforcement agency or the registering tribunal shall notify the obligor’s employer pursuant to W.S. 20-6-201 through 20-6-222 .

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted (c); redesignated former (c) as (d); and made a stylistic change.

The 2015 amendment, in the first sentence in (a), inserted “or a foreign support order”; rewrote (b)(ii); in (d), inserted “support enforcement agency”; and made a stylistic change.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-178. Procedure to contest validity or enforcement of registered order.

1. A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of a registered support order in this state shall request a hearing within the time required by W.S. 20-4-177 . The nonregistering party may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to W.S. 20-4-179 .
2. If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered support order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of law.
3. If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered support order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the matter for hearing and give notice to the parties of the date, time and place of the hearing.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2001, ch. 5, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, inserted “support” in (b) and (c); and rewrote the first sentence in (a).

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-179. Contest of registration or enforcement.

1. A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered support order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one (1) or more of the following defenses:
   1. The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party;
   2. The order was obtained by fraud;
   3. The order has been vacated, suspended or modified by a later order;
   4. The issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal;
   5. There is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought;
   6. Full or partial payment has been made;
   7. The statute of limitations under W.S. 20-4-176 precludes enforcement of some or all of the alleged arrearages; or
   8. The alleged controlling order is not the controlling order.
2. If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense under subsection (a) of this section, a tribunal may stay enforcement of a registered support order, continue the proceeding to permit production of additional relevant evidence and issue other appropriate orders. An uncontested portion of the registered support order may be enforced by all remedies available under the laws of this state.
3. If the contesting party does not establish a defense under subsection (a) of this section to the validity or enforcement of a registered support order, the registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming the order.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added (a)(viii) and made related changes.

The 2015 amendment, inserted “support” in the introductory language of (a) and (b); in (a)(vii), inserted “alleged”; in (c), inserted “to the validity or enforcement of a registered support order”; and made related and stylistic changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Lack of personal jurisdiction. —

Husband could not contest the validity of a Utah child support order being registered in Wyoming where the record contained no evidence that he ever challenged the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him by the Utah court, but instead the Utah court's findings of fact indicated that he actively and voluntarily participated in the proceedings before that court by filing pleadings, stipulating to the transfer of subject matter jurisdiction over support issues, and participating in the proceedings on the merits. Walton v. State ex rel. Utah ex rel. Wood, 2002 WY 108, 50 P.3d 693, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 20-4-180. Confirmed order.

Confirmation of a registered support order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, inserted “support.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-181. Procedure to register child support order of another state or foreign country for modification.

1. A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a child support order issued in another state shall register that order in this state in the same manner provided in W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-180 if the order has not been registered. A petition for modification may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or later. The petition shall specify the grounds for modification.
2. A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a foreign child support order not under the convention may register that order under W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-180 if the order has not been registered. A petition for modification may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or at another time. The petition shall specify the grounds for modification.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, in (a), substituted “W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-180 ” for “W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-176 ” in the first sentence, and substituted “petition” for “pleading” in the last sentence; and added (b).

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-182. Effect of registration for modification.

A tribunal of this state may enforce a child support order of another state registered for purposes of modification, in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this state, but the registered order may be modified only if the requirements of W.S. 20-4-183 or 20-4-193 have been met.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted “20-4-193 or 20-4-197 ” and made a stylistic change.

The 2015 amendment, substituted “W.S. 20-4-183 or 20-4-193 ” for “W.S. 20-4-183 , 20-4-193 or 20-4-197 .”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-183. Modification of child support order of another state.

1. If W.S. 20-4-193 does not apply, upon petition a tribunal of this state may modify a child support order issued in another state which is registered in this state if, after notice and hearing, the tribunal finds that:
   1. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 3.
   2. The following requirements are met:
      1. Neither the child, the obligee who is an individual nor the obligor resides in the issuing state;
      2. A petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification; and
      3. The respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state; or
   3. This state is the state of residence of the child, or a party who is an individual is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state and all of the parties who are individuals have filed consents in a record in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
2. Modification of a registered child support order is subject to the same requirements, procedures and defenses that apply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of this state and the order may be enforced and satisfied in the same manner.
3. A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state, including the duration of the obligation for support. If two (2) or more tribunals have issued child support orders for the same obligor and same child, the order that controls and shall be so recognized under W.S. 20-4-148 establishes the aspects of the support order which are nonmodifiable.
4. In a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support. The obligor’s fulfillment of the duty of support established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support by a tribunal of this state.
5. On issuance of an order by a tribunal of this state modifying a child support order issued in another state, the tribunal of this state becomes the tribunal having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
6. Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (e) of this section and W.S. 20-4-142(b), a tribunal of this state retains jurisdiction to modify an order issued by a tribunal of this state if:
   1. One (1) party resides in another state; and
   2. The other party resides outside the United States.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, §§ 2, 3; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote (a) by inserting the exception language at the beginning, repealing former (a)(i) which pertained to consent, and adding (a)(iii); in (c) added the exception language at the beginning, and inserted “same”; inserted (d), redesignating former (d) as (e); in present (e), inserted “by a tribunal of this state”; and made a stylistic change.

The 2015 amendment, deleted “except as otherwise provided in W.S. 20-4-197 ” in the introductory language of (a) and (b); in (c), inserted “including the duration of the obligation for support”; added (f); and made related changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-184. Recognition of order modified in another state.

1. If a child support order issued by a tribunal of this state is modified by a tribunal of another state which assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, a tribunal of this state:
   1. May enforce its order that was modified only as to arrearages and interest accruing before the modification;
   2. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 3.
   3. May provide appropriate relief for violations of its order which occurred before the effective date of the modification; and
   4. Shall recognize the modifying order of the other state, upon registration, for the purpose of enforcement.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, §§ 2, 3.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a), added “If a child support order issued by a,” substituted “is modified” for “shall recognize a modification of its earlier child support order,” deleted “this act or a law substantially similar to,” substituted “a tribunal of this state” for “and, upon request, except as otherwise provided in this act, shall”; substituted “arrearages and interest” for “amounts” in (a)(i); repealed former (a)(ii) which read, “Enforce only nonmodifiable aspects of that order”; and made stylistic changes.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-4-185. Proceeding to determine parentage.

1. A tribunal of this state authorized to determine parentage of a child may serve as a responding tribunal in a proceeding to determine parentage of a child brought under this act or a law or procedure substantially similar to this act.
2. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 3.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2003, ch. 93, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, §§ 2, 3; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section to conform with changes proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, including repealing former (b), which had provided for application of §§ 14-2-401 through 14-2-907 to determine parentage.

The 2015 amendment, in (a), substituted “A tribunal” for “A court,” inserted “of a child,” and substituted “this act” for “the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-186. Grounds for rendition.

1. For purposes of W.S. 20-4-186 and 20-4-187 , “governor” includes an individual performing the functions of the governor or the executive authority of a state covered by this act.
2. The governor of this state may:
   1. Demand that the governor of another state surrender an individual found in the other state who is charged criminally in this state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee; or
   2. On the demand of the governor of another state surrender an individual found in this state who is charged criminally in the other state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee.
3. A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsistent with this act applies to the demand even if the individual whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state when the crime was allegedly committed and has not fled therefrom.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, made a stylistic change in (b)(ii).

The 2015 amendment, in (a), substituted “this act” for “the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-187. Conditions of rendition.

1. Before making demand that the governor of another state surrender an individual charged criminally in this state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee, the governor of this state may require a prosecutor of this state to demonstrate that at least sixty (60) days previously the obligee had initiated proceedings for support pursuant to this act or that the proceeding would be of no avail.
2. If, under this act or a law substantially similar to this act, the governor of another state makes a demand that the governor of this state surrender an individual charged criminally in that state with having failed to provide for the support of a child or other individual to whom a duty of support is owed, the governor may require a prosecutor to investigate the demand and report whether a proceeding for support has been initiated or would be effective. If it appears that a proceeding would be effective but has not been initiated, the governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable time to permit the initiation of a` proceeding.
3. If a proceeding for support has been initiated and the individual whose rendition is demanded prevails, the governor may decline to honor the demand. If the petitioner prevails and the individual whose rendition is demanded is subject to a support order, the governor may decline to honor the demand if the individual is complying with the support order.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, deleted “the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act” following “similar to this act” in the first sentence in (b).

The 2015 amendment, in (a), substituted “this act” for “the Interstate Family Support Act”; and in (b), substituted “this act” for “the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-188. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration shall be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, revised the language of this section.

The 2015 amendment, inserted “uniform.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-4-189. Pending action or proceeding under Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act; law applicable.

Any action or proceeding under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act pending on July 1, 1995, shall continue under the provisions of such act until the court rules on any pending action or proceeding.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 1.

§ 20-4-190. Immunity from civil liability.

An employer that complies with an income withholding order issued in another state in accordance with this article is not subject to civil liability to an individual or agency with regard to the employer’s withholding of child support from the obligor’s income.

History. Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, substituted “that complies” for “who complies.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-191. Penalties for noncompliance.

An employer that willfully fails to comply with an income withholding order issued in another state and received for enforcement is subject to the same penalties that may be imposed for noncompliance with an order issued by a tribunal of this state.

History. Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, substituted “that willfully” for “who willfully” and “in another state” for “by another state.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-192. Contest by obligor.

1. An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an income withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer in this state by registering the order in a tribunal of this state and filing a contest to that order as provided in W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-184 , 20-4-193 , 20-4-194 and 20-4-197 , or otherwise contesting the order in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this state.
2. The obligor shall give notice of the contest to:
   1. A support enforcement agency providing services to the obligee;
   2. Each employer that has directly received an income withholding order relating to the obligor; and
   3. The person designated to receive payments in the income withholding order or if no person is designated, to the obligee.

History. Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 1; 2005, ch. 103, § 2; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a) inserted “by registering the order in a tribunal of this state and filing a contest to that order as provided in W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-197 , or otherwise contesting the order” and deleted “W.S. 20-4-176 applies to the contest” at the end; in (b)(iii) twice deleted “or agency” after “person”; and made stylistic changes.

The 2015 amendment, substituted “20-4-184, 20-4-193 , 20-4-194 and 20-4-197 ” for “20-4-197.”

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-193. Jurisdiction to modify child support order of another state when individual parties reside in this state.

1. If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state’s child support order in a proceeding to register that order.
2. A tribunal of this state exercising jurisdiction under this section shall apply the provisions of W.S. 20-4-139 through 20-4-150 , 20-4-173 through 20-4-184 , 20-4-193 through 20-4-198 and the procedural and substantive law of this state to the proceeding for enforcement or modification. W.S. 20-4-151 through 20-4-172 , 20-4-185 through 20-4-187 , 20-4-190 through 20-4-192 , 20-4-198 and 20-4-201 through 20-4-213 do not apply.

History. Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, in (b), substituted “20-4-150, 20-4-173 through 20-4-184 , 20-4-193 through 20-4-198 ” for “20-4-143, 20-4-173 through 20-4-184 , 20-4-193 , 20-4-194 ” and “20-4-190 through 20-4-192 , 20-4-198 and 20-4-201 through 20-4-213 ” for “and 20-4-190 through 20-4-192 ”; and made related changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-194. Notice to issuing tribunal of modification.

Within thirty (30) days after issuance of a modified child support order, the party obtaining the modification shall file a certified copy of the order with the issuing tribunal that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier order, and in each tribunal in which the party knows the earlier order has been registered. A party who obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the modified order of the new tribunal having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

History. Laws 1998, ch. 97, § 1.

§ 20-4-195. Application of act to nonresident subject to personal jurisdiction.

A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a proceeding under this act, under other law of this state relating to a support order, or recognizing a foreign support order may receive evidence from outside this state pursuant to W.S. 20-4-166 , communicate with a tribunal of outside this state pursuant to W.S. 20-4-167 , and obtain discovery through a tribunal outside this state pursuant to W.S. 20-4-168 . In all other respects, W.S. 20-4-151 through 20-4-185 , 20-4-190 , 20-4-194 and 20-4-197 do not apply and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this state.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, in (b), substituted “foreign support order” for “support order of a foreign country or political subdivision on the basis of comity,” “outside this state” for “another state” three times, and “W.S. 20-4-151 through 20-4-185 , 20-4-190 , 20-4-194 and 20-4-197 ” for “W.S. 20-4-151 through 20-4-185 ”; and made related changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 4, makes the act effective July 1, 2005.

§ 20-4-196. Continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify spousal support order.

1. A tribunal of this state issuing a spousal support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order throughout the existence of the support obligation.
2. A tribunal of this state may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state or a foreign country having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state or foreign country.
3. A tribunal of this state that has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order may serve as:
   1. An initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to enforce the spousal support order issued in this state; or
   2. A responding tribunal to enforce or modify its own spousal support order.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, in (b), inserted “or a foreign country” or similar language twice.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 4, makes the act effective July 1, 2005.

§ 20-4-197. Jurisdiction to modify child support order of foreign country.

1. Except as provided in W.S. 20-4-211 , if a foreign country lacks or refuses to exercise jurisdiction to modify its child support order pursuant to its laws, a tribunal of this state may assume jurisdiction to modify the child support order and bind all individuals subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal whether the consent to modification of a child support order otherwise required of the individual pursuant to W.S. 20-4-183 has been given or whether the individual seeking modification is a resident of this state or of the foreign country.
2. An order issued by a tribunal of this state modifying a foreign child support order pursuant to this section is the controlling order.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 103, § 1; 2015, ch. 75, § 2.

The 2015 amendment, in (a), added the exception, substituted “lacks or refuses to exercise jurisdiction to modify its child support order” for “or political subdivision that is a state will not or may not modify its order,” and deleted “or political subdivision” at the end; in (b), inserted “by a tribunal of this state modifying a foreign child support order”; and made related changes.

Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-198. State tribunal and support enforcement agency.

1. The district courts enumerated in W.S. 5-3-101 are the tribunals of this state.
2. The Wyoming department of family services is the support enforcement agency of this state.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

Effective date. — Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 2, 2015.

§ 20-4-201. Definitions.

1. As used in this article:
   1. “Application” means a request under the convention by an obligee or obligor, or on behalf of a child, made through a central authority for assistance from another central authority;
   2. “Central authority” means the entity designated by the United States or a foreign country described in W.S. 20-4-140(a)(xxviii) to perform the functions specified in the convention, as defined in W.S. 20-4-140(a)(xxvii);
   3. “Convention support order” means a support order of a tribunal of a foreign country described in W.S. 20-4-140(a)(xxviii);
   4. “Direct request” means a petition filed by an individual in a tribunal of this state in a proceeding involving an obligee, obligor or child residing outside the United States;
   5. “Foreign central authority” means the entity designated by a foreign country described in W.S. 20-4-140(a)(xxviii) to perform the functions specified in the convention;
   6. “Foreign support agreement”:
      1. Means an agreement for support in a record that:
         1. Is enforceable as a support order in the country of origin;
         2. Has been:
            1. Formally drawn up or registered as an authentic instrument by a foreign tribunal; or
            2. Authenticated by, or concluded, registered or filed with a foreign tribunal; and
         3. May be reviewed and modified by a foreign tribunal; and
      2. Includes a maintenance arrangement or authentic instrument under the convention.
   7. “United States central authority” means the secretary of the United States department of health and human services.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-202. Applicability.

This article applies only to a support proceeding under the convention. In the proceeding, if a provision of this article is inconsistent with article 1 of this act, this article controls.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-203. Relationship of the Wyoming support enforcement agency to the United States central authority.

The support enforcement agency of this state is recognized as the agency designated by the United States central authority to perform specific functions under the convention.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-204. Initiation by the Wyoming support enforcement agency proceeding under the convention.

1. In a support proceeding under this article, the support enforcement agency of this state shall:
   1. Transmit and receive applications; and
   2. Initiate or facilitate the institution of a proceeding regarding an application in a tribunal of this state.
2. The following support proceedings are available to an obligee under the convention:
   1. Recognition or recognition and enforcement of a foreign support order;
   2. Enforcement of a support order issued or recognized in this state;
   3. Establishment of a support order if there is no existing order, including, if necessary, determination of parentage of a child;
   4. Establishment of a support order if recognition of a foreign support order is refused under W.S. 20-4-208(b)(ii), (iv) or (ix);
   5. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of this state; and
   6. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.
3. The following support proceedings are available under the convention to an obligor against which there is an existing order:
   1. Recognition of an order suspending or limiting enforcement of an existing support order of a tribunal of this state;
   2. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of this state; and
   3. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.
4. A tribunal of this state may not require security, bond or deposit, however described, to guarantee the payment of costs and expenses in proceedings under the convention.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-205. Direct request.

1. A petitioner may file a direct request seeking establishment or modification of a support order or determination of parentage of a child. In the proceeding, the law of this state applies.
2. A petitioner may file a direct request seeking recognition and enforcement of a support order or support agreement. In the proceeding, W.S. 20-4-206 through 20-4-213 apply.
3. In a direct request for recognition and enforcement of a convention support order or foreign support agreement:
   1. A security, bond or deposit is not required to guarantee the payment of costs and expenses; and
   2. An obligee or obligor that in the issuing country has benefited from free legal assistance is entitled to benefit, at least to the same extent, from any free legal assistance provided for by the law of this state under the same circumstances.
4. A petitioner filing a direct request is not entitled to assistance from the support enforcement agency of this state.
5. This article does not prevent the application of laws of this state that provide simplified, more expeditious rules regarding a direct request for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support order or foreign support agreement.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-206. Registration of a convention support order.

1. Except as provided in this article, a party who is an individual or a support enforcement agency seeking recognition of a convention support order shall register the order in this state as provided in W.S. 20-4-173 through 20-4-184 , 20-4-193 , 20-4-194 and 20-4-197 .
2. Notwithstanding W.S. 20-4-161 and 20-4-174(a), a request for registration of a convention support order shall be accompanied by:
   1. A complete text of the support order, or an abstract or extract of the support order drawn up by the issuing foreign tribunal, which may be in the form recommended by the Hague Conference on Private International Law;
   2. A record stating that the support order is enforceable in the issuing country;
   3. If the respondent did not appear and was not represented in the proceedings in the issuing country, a record attesting, as appropriate, either that the respondent had proper notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard or that the respondent had proper notice of the support order and an opportunity to be heard in a challenge or appeal on fact or law before a tribunal;
   4. A record showing the amount of arrearages, if any, and the date the amount was calculated;
   5. A record showing a requirement for automatic adjustment of the amount of support, if any, and the information necessary to make the appropriate calculations; and
   6. If necessary, a record showing the extent to which the applicant received free legal assistance in the issuing country.
3. A request for registration of a convention support order may seek recognition and partial enforcement of the order.
4. A tribunal of this state may vacate the registration of a convention support order without the filing of a contest under W.S. 20-4-207 only if, acting on its own motion, the tribunal finds that recognition and enforcement of the order would be manifestly incompatible with public policy.
5. The tribunal shall promptly notify the parties of the registration or the order vacating the registration of a convention support order.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-207. Contest of a registered convention support order.

1. Except as otherwise provided in this article, W.S. 20-4-177 through 20-4-180 apply to a contest of a registered convention support order.
2. A party contesting a registered convention support order shall file a contest not later than thirty (30) days after notice of the registration, but if the contesting party does not reside in the United States, the contest shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days after notice of the registration.
3. If the nonregistering party fails to contest the registered convention support order by the time specified in subsection (b) of this section, the order is enforceable.
4. A contest of a registered convention support order may be based only on grounds set forth in W.S. 20-4-208 . The contesting party bears the burden of proof.
5. In a contest of a registered convention support order, a tribunal of this state:
   1. Is bound by the findings of fact on which the foreign tribunal based its jurisdiction; and
   2. May not review the merits of the order.
6. A tribunal of this state deciding a contest of a registered convention support order shall promptly notify the parties of its decision.
7. A challenge or appeal, if any, does not stay the enforcement of a convention support order unless there are exceptional circumstances.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-208. Recognition and enforcement of a registered convention support order.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce a registered convention support order.
2. The following grounds are the only grounds on which a tribunal of this state may refuse recognition and enforcement of a registered convention support order:
   1. Recognition and enforcement of the order is manifestly incompatible with public policy, including the failure of the issuing tribunal to observe minimum standards of due process, which include notice and opportunity to be heard;
   2. The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction consistent with W.S. 20-4-142 ;
   3. The order is not enforceable in the issuing country;
   4. The order was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure;
   5. A record transmitted in accordance with W.S. 20-4-206 lacks authenticity or integrity;
   6. A proceeding between the same parties and having the same purpose is pending before a tribunal of this state and that proceeding was the first to be filed;
   7. The order is incompatible with a more recent support order involving the same parties and having the same purpose if the more recent support order is entitled to recognition and enforcement under this act in this state;
   8. Payment, to the extent alleged arrearages have been paid in whole or in part;
   9. In a case in which the respondent neither appeared nor was represented in the proceeding in the issuing foreign country:
      1. If the law of that country provides for prior notice of proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard; or
      2. If the law of that country does not provide for prior notice of the proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the order and an opportunity to be heard in a challenge or appeal on fact or law before a tribunal; or
   10. The order was made in violation of W.S. 20-4-211 .
3. If a tribunal of this state does not recognize a convention support order under paragraph (b)(ii), (iv) or (ix) of this section:
   1. The tribunal may not dismiss the proceeding without allowing a reasonable time for a party to request the establishment of a new convention support order; and
   2. The support enforcement agency shall take all appropriate measures to request a child support order for the obligee if the application for recognition and enforcement was received under W.S. 20-4-204 .

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-209. Partial enforcement.

If a tribunal of this state does not recognize and enforce a convention support order in its entirety, it shall enforce any severable part of the order. An application or direct request may seek recognition and partial enforcement of a convention support order.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-210. Foreign support agreement.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce a foreign support agreement registered in this state.
2. An application or direct request for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support agreement shall be accompanied by:
   1. A complete text of the foreign support agreement; and
   2. A record stating that the foreign support agreement is enforceable as an order of support in the issuing country.
3. A tribunal of this state may vacate the registration of a foreign support agreement only if, acting on its own motion, the tribunal finds that recognition and enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with public policy.
4. In a contest of a foreign support agreement, a tribunal of this state may refuse recognition and enforcement of the agreement if it finds:
   1. Recognition and enforcement of the agreement is manifestly incompatible with public policy;
   2. The agreement was obtained by fraud or falsification;
   3. The agreement is incompatible with a support order involving the same parties and having the same purpose in this state, another state or a foreign country if the support order is entitled to recognition and enforcement under this act in this state; or
   4. The record submitted under subsection (b) of this section lacks authenticity or integrity.
5. A proceeding for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support agreement shall be suspended during the pendency of a challenge to or appeal of the agreement before a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-211. Modification of a convention child support order.

1. A tribunal of this state may not modify a convention child support order if the obligee remains a resident of the foreign country where the support order was issued unless:
   1. The obligee submits to the jurisdiction of a tribunal of this state, either expressly or by defending on the merits of the case without objecting to the jurisdiction at the first available opportunity; or
   2. The foreign tribunal lacks or refuses to exercise jurisdiction to modify its support order or issue a new support order.
2. If a tribunal of this state does not modify a convention child support order because the order is not recognized in this state, W.S. 20-4-208(c) applies.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-212. Personal information; limit on use.

Personal information gathered or transmitted under this article may be used only for the purposes for which it was gathered or transmitted.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§ 20-4-213. Record in original language; English.

A record filed with a tribunal of this state under this article shall be in the original language and, if not English, shall be accompanied by an English translation.

History. Laws 2015, ch. 75, § 1.

§§ 20-5-101 through 20-5-125. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 3.

Cross references. —

For present similar provisions, see § 20-5-201 et seq., the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1973, ch. 240, § 1, compiled the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.

§ 20-5-201. Short title.

This act may be cited as the “Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.”

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

Cited in

NC v. State, 2013 WY 2, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Jan 9, 2013).

§ 20-5-202. Definitions.

1. As used in this act:
   1. “Abandoned” means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision;
   2. “Child” means an individual who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age;
   3. “Child custody determination” means a judgment, decree or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child, including a permanent, temporary, initial or modification order. “Child custody determination” shall not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual;
   4. “Child custody proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child is an issue, including a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights or protection from domestic violence in which the issue may appear. “Child custody proceeding” shall not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation or enforcement under article 4 of this act;
   5. “Commencement” means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding;
   6. “Court” means an entity authorized under the law of a state to establish, enforce or modify a child custody determination;
   7. “Home state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding or, in the case of a child less than six (6) months of age, the state in which the child lived from birth with a parent or a person acting as a parent. A period of temporary absence of any of the persons mentioned is part of the period;
   8. “Initial determination” means the first child custody determination concerning a particular child;
   9. “Issuing court” means the court that makes a child custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this act;
   10. “Issuing state” means the state in which a child custody determination is made;
   11. “Modification” means a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination;
   12. “Person” means as defined by W.S. 8-1-102(a)(vi);
   13. “Person acting as a parent” means a person, other than a parent, who:
       1. Has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six (6) consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within one (1) year immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding; and
       2. Has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of this state.
   14. “Physical custody” means the physical care and supervision of a child;
   15. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
   16. “Tribe” means an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state;
   17. “Warrant” means an order issued by a court authorizing law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child;
   18. “This act” means W.S. 20-5-201 through 20-5-502 .

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

"Home state."

Wyoming courts properly exercised jurisdiction in a child custody matter because Wyoming was the subject children's “home state,” as (1) there were no proceedings in another jurisdiction requiring a determination between competing alternatives, and (2) the parties returned to Wyoming slightly more than six months before the children's mother filed for divorce. Harignordoquy v. Barlow, 2013 WY 149, 313 P.3d 1265, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 817, 135 S. Ct. 66, 190 L. Ed. 2d 33, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 5136 (U.S. 2014).

Wyoming court improperly assumed jurisdiction under the significant connection provisions in former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-104(a)(ii) where Texas was the minor child's “home state” under former Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-5-103(a)(v) and 20-5-104(a)(i) (repealed; now see § 20-5-301(a)(i)). and Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.201(a)(1). A foreign state which is neither a decree state nor a home state may not assume jurisdiction in contravention to the preference in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(ii), for home state jurisdiction. NMC v. JLW ex rel. NAW, 2004 WY 56, 90 P.3d 93, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2004).

Child custody proceeding. —

Proceeding in Wyoming brought by children's maternal grandmother after the children had been abused in Texas by their mother's boyfriend was an interstate child custody proceeding under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-202(a)(iv) and the Wyoming trial court's jurisdiction was governed by the UCCJEA. SC v. State (In re NC), 2013 WY 2, 294 P.3d 866, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 2013).

§ 20-5-203. Proceedings governed by other law.

This act shall not govern an adoption proceeding or a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical care for a child.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-204. Application to tribes.

1. A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., shall not be subject to this act to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.
2. A court of this state shall treat a tribe as if the tribe were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying articles 2 and 3 of this act.
3. A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this act shall be recognized and enforced under article 4 of this act.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-205. International application.

1. A court of this state shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying articles 2 and 3 of this act.
2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a child custody determination made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this act shall be recognized and enforced under article 4 of this act.
3. A court of this state may not apply this act if the child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-206. Effect of child custody determination.

A child custody determination made by a court of this state that had jurisdiction under this act shall bind all persons who have been served in accordance with the laws of this state or notified in accordance with W.S. 20-5-208 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to those persons, the determination shall be conclusive as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Custody determination to be made in forum with best access to relevant evidence. —

The provisions of former § 20-5-102(a)(iii) were an explicit recognition that the paramount consideration of the best interest of the child mandates that custody determinations be made in the forum having the best access to the relevant evidence. Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 398 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 1436, 75 L. Ed. 2d 794, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4204 (U.S. 1983).

Factors considered in determining jurisdiction of second state in custody question. —

When child custody is awarded in a divorce decree in one state and the child-custody question is later presented to a court of another state, a number of considerations affect the determination as to whether the second state may exercise jurisdiction, including: domicile, presence in the state, lack of jurisdiction in the first state to render the original decree, forum shopping, child stealing, best interests of the child, full faith and credit, comity, child abuse, abandonment, etc. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Purpose would be thwarted. —

Although it would be judicially efficient to approve the district court's actions in assuming jurisdiction over the father's motion to set aside and vacate portions of a divorce decree relating to child custody and support since the children had been in Wyoming longer than six months, such an action by the supreme court would undermine the legislative function, the purposes behind the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act jurisdictional requirements, and the basic doctrine of subject matter jurisdiction. Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1998).

§ 20-5-207. Priority.

If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this act is raised in a child custody proceeding, the question, upon request of a party, shall be given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-208. Notice to persons outside of state.

1. Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction when a person is outside this state may be given in a manner prescribed by the law of this state for service of process or by the law of the state in which the service is made. Notice shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice but may be by publication if other means are not effective.
2. Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this state or by the law of the state in which the service is made.
3. Notice shall not be required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

§ 20-5-209. Appearance and limited immunity.

1. A party to a child custody proceeding, including a modification proceeding, or a petitioner or respondent in a proceeding to enforce or register a child custody determination, shall not be subject to personal jurisdiction in this state for another proceeding or purpose solely by reason of having participated, or of having been physically present for the purpose of participating, in the proceeding.
2. A person who is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis other than physical presence shall not be immune from service of process in this state. A party present in this state who is subject to the jurisdiction of another state shall not be immune from service of process allowable under the laws of that state.
3. The immunity granted by subsection (a) of this section shall not extend to civil litigation based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this act committed by an individual while present in this state.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-210. Communication between courts.

1. A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under this act.
2. The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction may be made.
3. Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be made of the communication made pursuant to this subsection.
4. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a record shall be made of a communication under this section. The parties shall be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to the record.
5. For the purposes of this section, “record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-211. Taking testimony in another state.

1. In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in the other state. The court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon which the testimony shall be taken.
2. A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means or other electronic means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
3. Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

§ 20-5-212. Cooperation between courts; preservation of record.

1. A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to:
   1. Hold an evidentiary hearing;
   2. Order a person to produce or give evidence pursuant to procedures of that state;
   3. Order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a child involved in a pending proceeding;
   4. Forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented and any evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and
   5. Order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without the child.
2. Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may hold a hearing or enter an order described in subsection (a) of this section.
3. Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under subsections (a) and (b) of this section may be assessed against the parties according to the law of this state.
4. A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records of hearings, evaluations and other pertinent records with respect to a child custody proceeding until the child attains eighteen (18) years of age. Upon appropriate request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall forward a certified copy of those records.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-301. Initial child custody jurisdiction.

1. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 20-5-304 , a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
   1. This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six (6) months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
   2. A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with paragraph (i) of this subsection, or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-307 or 20-5-308 , and:
      1. The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one (1) parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
      2. Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships.
   3. All courts of another state having jurisdiction under provisions of law from that state in substantial conformity with paragraph (i) or (ii) of this subsection have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-307 or 20-5-308 ; or
   4. No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (i), (ii) or (iii) of this subsection.
2. Subsection (a) of this section shall be the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.
3. Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child shall not be necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Jurisdiction conferred in section pertains to custody determination only. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 339 (Wyo. 1981).

As section does not confer jurisdiction to award child support. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 339 (Wyo. 1981).

Suit for collection of child support was properly within jurisdiction of district court, even though the amount claimed was less than $7,000, where plaintiff requested the court to grant her specific performance of all the terms in a separation agreement and her complaint raised issues of child custody under this section. Daulton v. Daulton, 774 P.2d 635, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1989).

Wyoming district court retains in personam jurisdiction over the mother to enforce the visitation provisions of the original divorce decree through a contempt action even though she left the jurisdiction. Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. Aug. 18, 1992).

The Wyoming district court where the original decree was granted had continuing subject matter and in personam jurisdiction to enforce its original visitation order by issuing an order to show cause why the mother should not be held in contempt for denying the father court-ordered visitation. Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. Aug. 18, 1992).

Foreign state cannot assume jurisdiction. —

A foreign state which is neither a decree state nor a home state may not assume jurisdiction in contravention to Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act preference for “home state” jurisdiction. State ex rel. Griffin v. District Court, 831 P.2d 233, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1992).

Judicial discretion. —

Even in cases where Wyoming is the original decree state, when issue of concurrent jurisdiction is raised, court has duty to make a determination whether to exercise its discretion and retain jurisdiction over the matter or defer to courts of other state; court abuses its discretion if it retains jurisdiction solely on grounds that it issued original decree, since existence of jurisdiction is not determinative of whether that jurisdiction should be exercised under circumstances of a particular case. Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2000).

Evidence sufficient to support Wyoming court's claimed jurisdiction in multi-state custodial entanglement. —

See Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 398 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 1436, 75 L. Ed. 2d 794, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4204 (U.S. 1983).

Court had emergency custody jurisdiction to modify Texas custody order. — The court heard unchallenged evidence that the children in question were currently present in Wyoming and that the husband, who had custody under the Texas order, had assaulted the wife and the children. Rosics v. Heath, 746 P.2d 1284, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 561 (Wyo. 1987), overruled, Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1992).

Order compelling visitation proper exercise of discretion. —

District court's order compelling the mother to deliver the children to Wyoming for visitation was a proper exercise of discretion under the district court's continuing jurisdiction as the decree court; the district court's order was appropriate to enforce visitation and, consequently, not some character of child custody decree modification. Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. Aug. 18, 1992).

Jurisdictional requirements not met. —

Wyoming court improperly assumed jurisdiction under the significant connection provisions in former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-104(a)(ii) where Texas was the minor child's “home state” under former Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-5-103(a)(v) and 20-5-104(a)(i) and Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.201(a)(1). A foreign state which is neither a decree state nor a home state may not assume jurisdiction in contravention to the preference in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(ii), for home state jurisdiction. NMC v. JLW ex rel. NAW, 2004 WY 56, 90 P.3d 93, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2004).

Where the children were not present in the state for six months before the divorce proceedings were commenced and where the court was not able to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction existed under one of the other jurisdictional options under this section, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody and support issues. Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1998).

Jurisdiction properly declined. —

The district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction to hear Wyoming mother's motion to change custody where the children had lived with their father in Georgia for over two years and it was clear that Georgia was the location of significant evidence concerning the children's care, protection, training and personal relationships. Ritter v. Ritter, 989 P.2d 109, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1999).

Emergency jurisdiction. —

Although children had not lived in Wyoming for six months before the commencement of a custody proceeding, as required under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-301(a)(i), because the evidence showed that they were abused in Texas by their mother's boyfriend, a Wyoming trial court could exercise emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. SC v. State (In re NC), 2013 WY 2, 294 P.3d 866, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 2013).

Cited in

Prickett v. Prickett, 2007 WY 153, 167 P.3d 661, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Sept. 25, 2007).

§ 20-5-302. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.

1. Except as provided in W.S. 20-5-304 , a court of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent with W.S. 20-5-301 or 20-5-303 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
   1. A court of this state determines that the child, the child’s parents and any person acting as a parent do not have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships; or
   2. A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child’s parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.
2. A court of this state which has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under W.S. 20-5-301 .

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Jurisdiction established. —

Use of the conjunctive “and” requires both conditions in this section to be met; therefore, Wyoming district court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to resolve custody and visitation issues arising from the entry of a divorce decree in Wyoming because a father still had substantial connections to Wyoming since he resided there. The mother had relocated to Nebraska with the children. Prickett v. Prickett, 2007 WY 153, 167 P.3d 661, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 2007).

Cited in

Waldron v. Waldron, 2015 WY 64, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (May 1, 2015).

NC v. State, 2013 WY 2, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Jan 9, 2013).

§ 20-5-303. Jurisdiction to modify determination.

1. Except as provided in W.S. 20-5-304 , a court of this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless the court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under W.S. 20-5-301(a)(i) or (ii) and:
   1. The court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-302 or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-307 ; or
   2. A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child’s parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Factors considered in determining jurisdiction of second state in custody question. —

When child custody is awarded in a divorce decree in one state and the child-custody question is later presented to a court of another state, a number of considerations affect the determination as to whether the second state may exercise jurisdiction, including: domicile, presence in the state, lack of jurisdiction in the first state to render the original decree, forum shopping, child stealing, best interests of the child, full faith and credit, comity, child abuse, abandonment, etc. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Jurisdiction properly declined. —

The district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction to hear Wyoming mother's motion to change custody where the children had lived with their father in Georgia for over two years and it was clear that Georgia was the location of significant evidence concerning the children's care, protection, training and personal relationships. Ritter v. Ritter, 989 P.2d 109, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1999).

Challenge of order barred by bad faith. —

Where the mother stipulated and agreed that the child could leave the state of Wisconsin only as ordered by the court, that the child could not be removed from the state for the purposes of changing residency and that the period of visitation to the mother each summer be for only a five-week period, and these agreements were incorporated into a Wisconsin court order, the mother's violation of these orders constituted bad faith and unclean hands such as to bar the mother from challenging in Wyoming a Wisconsin order awarding the child to the husband. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Timing of requisite findings for modification of foreign custody decree. —

Before modifying a custody decree of foreign jurisdiction, a Wyoming court must find that the court which originally rendered the decree no longer has proper jurisdiction or has declined to assume jurisdiction; and the court must make this determination, not at the commencement of the Wyoming action, but at the time of the hearing on the decree. Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 398 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 1436, 75 L. Ed. 2d 794, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4204 (U.S. 1983).

Factors considered in determining jurisdiction of second state in custody question. —

When child custody is awarded in a divorce decree in one state and the child-custody question is later presented to a court of another state, a number of considerations affect the determination as to whether the second state may exercise jurisdiction, including: domicile, presence in the state, lack of jurisdiction in first state to render the original decree, forum shopping, child stealing, best interests of the child, full faith and credit, comity, child abuse, abandonment, etc. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Cited in

Prickett v. Prickett, 2007 WY 153, 167 P.3d 661, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Sept. 25, 2007).

§ 20-5-304. Temporary emergency jurisdiction.

1. A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, the child’s sibling or a parent of the child is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
2. If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this act and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303 , a child custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under a provision of law in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303 . If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303, a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child.
3. If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this act, or a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303 , any order issued by a court of this state under this section shall specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303 . The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires.
4. A court of this state which has been asked to make a child custody determination under this section, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of another state having jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303 , shall immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this state which is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303 , upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of another state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

Sufficient evidence of abuse. —

Because sufficient evidence showed that children had been abused in Texas by their mother's boyfriend, a Wyoming trial court had before it sufficient evidence to warrant emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-304(a). SC v. State (In re NC), 2013 WY 2, 294 P.3d 866, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 2013).

Cited in

Prickett v. Prickett, 2007 WY 153, 167 P.3d 661, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Sept. 25, 2007).

§ 20-5-305. Notice; opportunity to be heard; joinder.

1. Before a child custody determination is made under this act, notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the standards of W.S. 20-5-208 shall be given to all persons entitled to notice under the law of this state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any person having physical custody of the child.
2. This act shall not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
3. The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a child custody proceeding under this act are governed by the law of this state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Notice of hearing is not normally given to parties in default. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 339 (Wyo. 1981).

§ 20-5-306. Simultaneous proceedings.

1. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 20-5-304 , a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this article if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-307 .
2. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 20-5-304 , a court of this state, before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to W.S. 20-5-309 . If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this act, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction under the laws of that state in substantial conformity with this act does not determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding.
3. In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced in another state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody determination has been commenced in another state, the court may:
   1. Stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement;
   2. Enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or
   3. Proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Concurrent jurisdiction. —

Even in cases where Wyoming is the original decree state, when issue of concurrent jurisdiction is raised, court has duty to make a determination whether to exercise its discretion and retain jurisdiction over the matter or defer to courts of other state; court abuses its discretion if it retains jurisdiction solely on grounds that it issued original decree, since existence of jurisdiction is not determinative of whether that jurisdiction should be exercised under circumstances of a particular case. Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 2000).

Order compelling visitation proper exercise of discretion. —

District court's order compelling the mother to deliver the children to Wyoming for visitation was a proper exercise of discretion under the district court's continuing jurisdiction as the decree court; the district court's order was appropriate to enforce visitation and, consequently, not some character of child custody decree modification. Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. Aug. 18, 1992).

Jurisdiction properly declined. —

The district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction to hear Wyoming mother's motion to change custody where the children had lived with their father in Georgia for over two years and it was clear that Georgia was the location of significant evidence concerning the children's care, protection, training and personal relationships. Ritter v. Ritter, 989 P.2d 109, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1999).

Foreign state cannot assume jurisdiction. —

A foreign state which is neither a decree state nor a home state may not assume jurisdiction in contravention to Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act preference for “home state” jurisdiction. State ex rel. Griffin v. District Court, 831 P.2d 233, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1992).

§ 20-5-307. Inconvenient forum.

1. A court of this state which has jurisdiction under this act to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon motion of a party, the court’s own motion, or request of another court.
2. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
   1. Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
   2. The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
   3. The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
   4. The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
   5. Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
   6. The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;
   7. The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
   8. The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.
3. If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition the court considers just and proper.
4. A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

Factors. —

Decision to decline jurisdiction under this section is not based on fault. Rather, it is a determination of which forum is more appropriate. Symington v. Symington, 2007 WY 154, 167 P.3d 658, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 2007).

District court must consider “all relevant factors,” not just those articulated in this section, when deciding whether or not to decline jurisdiction. Symington v. Symington, 2007 WY 154, 167 P.3d 658, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 2007).

Not an inconvenient forum. —

There was no abuse of discretion in a district court's determination that Wyoming remained an appropriate jurisdictional forum under this section where a father resided in Wyoming, children visited there, they had not been out of Wyoming long, and the parties were not separated by a very long distance. The father's consent to registering the judgment in Nebraska was not the same as consenting to Nebraska's jurisdiction, and there was nothing to show that the jurisdictional requirements under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1240 were satisfied. Prickett v. Prickett, 2007 WY 153, 167 P.3d 661, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 2007).

Jurisdiction declined. —

Motion to decline jurisdiction in a child custody case under this section was granted because the children had lived and attended school in Idaho for nearly two years, a new guardian ad litem was needed due to a withdrawal, and the district court in question was no longer convenient for a father due to his relocation. Symington v. Symington, 2007 WY 154, 167 P.3d 658, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 2007).

Wyoming district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to exercise jurisdiction to resolve child custody and visitation issues arising from the parties’ original Wyoming divorce decree because the court weighed the statutory factors and found that it was an inconvenient forum under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-201 et seq., as the parties lived in different, foreign countries. Pokrovskaya v. Van Genderen, 2021 WY 68, 487 P.3d 228, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 2021).

Father's appeal of an order denying his objection to the district court's decision declining to exercise jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act was dismissed because the father's failure to timely perfect an appeal from the order declining jurisdiction prevented him from invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court; the objection was nothing more than a motion for reconsideration and did not toll the time for filing an appeal. Waldron v. Waldron, 2015 WY 64, 349 P.3d 974, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 2015).

§ 20-5-308. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct.

1. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 20-5-304 or by other law of this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this act because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:
   1. The parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction;
   2. A court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303 determines that this state is a more appropriate forum under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-307 ; or
   3. No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303 .
2. If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, it may provide an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a repetition of the unjustifiable conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303 .
3. If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, it shall assess against the party seeking to invoke its jurisdiction necessary and reasonable expenses including costs, communication expenses, attorney fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the assessment would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs or expenses against this state unless authorized by law other than this act.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Factors considered in determining jurisdiction of second state in custody question. —

When child custody is awarded in a divorce decree in one state and the child-custody question is later presented to a court of another state, a number of considerations affect the determination as to whether the second state may exercise jurisdiction, including: domicile, presence in the state, lack of jurisdiction in first state to render the original decree, forum shopping, child stealing, best interest of the child, full faith and credit, comity, child abuse, abandonment, etc. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Challenge of order barred by bad faith. —

Where the mother stipulated and agreed that the child could leave the state of Wisconsin only as ordered by the court, that the child could not be removed from the state for the purposes of changing residency and that the period of visitation to the mother each summer be for only a five-week period, and these agreements were incorporated into a Wisconsin court order, the mother's violation of these orders constituted bad faith and unclean hands such as to bar the mother from challenging in Wyoming a Wisconsin order awarding the child to the husband. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

§ 20-5-309. Information to be submitted to the court.

1. Subject to a confidentiality order entered pursuant to W.S. 35-21-112 or any other court order allowing a party to maintain confidentiality of addresses or other identifying information or other law providing for the confidentiality of procedures, addresses and other identifying information, in a child custody proceeding each party in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath as to the child’s present address or whereabouts, the places where the child has lived during the last five (5) years and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit shall state whether the party:
   1. Has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other proceeding concerning the custody of or visitation with the child, and if so, the pleading or affidavit shall identify the court, the case number and the date of the child custody determination, if any;
   2. Knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights and adoptions, and if so, the pleading or affidavit shall identify the court, the case number and the nature of the proceeding; and
   3. Knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or visitation with, the child, and if so, the pleading or affidavit shall list the names and addresses of those persons.
2. If the information required by subsection (a) of this section is not furnished, the court, upon motion of a party or its own motion, may stay the proceeding until the information is furnished.
3. If the declaration as to any of the items described in paragraphs (a)(i) through (iii) of this section is in the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional information under oath as required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and other matters pertinent to the court’s jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
4. Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding.
5. If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of identifying information, the information shall be sealed and may not be disclosed to the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the interest of justice.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1; 2013, ch. 98, § 2.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added “confidentiality order entered pursuant to W.S. 35-21-112 or any other” in (a).

Subject matter jurisdiction. —

District court had subject matter jurisdiction over a father's petition to modify child custody and support; although the requirement to provide the information in his or her initial pleading is mandatory, the statute does not indicate it is jurisdictional but states that the court may stay the proceeding until the information is furnished, but it is not required to do so, and the statute does not say that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the matter if the requisite statement is omitted. Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161, 315 P.3d 648, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2013).

Trial court did not improperly award child custody when a mother's complaint did not provide statutorily required custody information because the court continued to have jurisdiction, so failing to provide this information did not render the court's decree void. Peak v. Peak, 2016 WY 109, 383 P.3d 1084, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 20-5-310. Appearance of parties and child.

1. In a child custody proceeding in this state, the court may order a party to the proceeding who is in this state to appear before the court in person with or without the child. The court may order any person who is in this state and who has physical custody or control of the child to appear in person with the child.
2. If a party to a child custody proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is outside this state, the court may order that a notice given pursuant to W.S. 20-5-208 include a statement directing the party to appear in person with or without the child and informing the party that failure to appear may result in a decision adverse to the party.
3. The court may enter any orders necessary to ensure the safety of the child and of any person ordered to appear under this section.
4. If a party to a child custody proceeding who is outside this state is directed to appear under subsection (b) of this section or desires to appear personally before the court with or without the child, the court may require another party to pay reasonable and necessary travel and other expenses of the party so appearing and of the child.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

No personal jurisdiction absent proper service. —

Where the father failed to effect proper service of his petition to modify the custody provisions of the divorce decree upon the mother, the district court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the mother and could not enter a valid default judgment against her because of her failure to appear. Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

Prickett v. Prickett, 2007 WY 153, 167 P.3d 661, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Sept. 25, 2007).

§ 20-5-401. Definitions.

1. As used in this article:
   1. “Petitioner” means a person who seeks enforcement of an order for return of a child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or enforcement of a child custody determination;
   2. “Respondent” means a person against whom a proceeding has been commenced for enforcement of an order for return of a child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or enforcement of a child custody determination.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-5-402. Enforcement under the Hague Convention.

Under this article, a court of this state may enforce an order for the return of the child made under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as if it were a child custody determination.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

§ 20-5-403. Duty to enforce.

1. A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child custody determination of a court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with this act or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this act and the determination has not been modified in accordance with this act.
2. A court of this state may utilize any remedy available under other law of this state to enforce a child custody determination made by a court of another state. The remedies provided in this article are cumulative and do not affect the availability of other remedies to enforce a child custody determination.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-404. Temporary visitation.

1. A court of this state which does not have jurisdiction to modify a child custody determination may issue a temporary order enforcing:
   1. A visitation schedule made by a court of another state; or
   2. The visitation provisions of a child custody determination of another state that does not provide for a specific visitation schedule.
2. If a court of this state makes an order under paragraph (a)(ii) of this section, it shall specify in the order a period that it considers adequate to allow the petitioner to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction under the criteria specified in article 3 of this act. The order remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other court or the period expires.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Order compelling visitation proper exercise of discretion. —

District court's order compelling the mother to deliver the children to Wyoming for visitation was a proper exercise of discretion under the district court's continuing jurisdiction as the decree court; the district court's order was appropriate to enforce visitation and, consequently, not some character of child custody decree modification. Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. Aug. 18, 1992).

§ 20-5-405. Registration of child custody determination.

1. A child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this state, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the appropriate court in this state:
   1. A letter or other document requesting registration;
   2. Two (2) copies, including one (1) certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and
   3. Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 20-5-309 , the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be registered.
2. On receipt of the documents required by subsection (a) of this section, the registering court shall:
   1. Cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one (1) copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form; and
   2. Serve notice upon the persons named pursuant to paragraph (a)(iii) of this section and provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance with this section.
3. The notice required by paragraph (b)(ii) of this section shall state that:
   1. A registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of this state;
   2. A hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination must be requested within twenty (20) days after service of notice; and
   3. Failure to contest the registration will result in confirmation of the child custody determination and preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have been asserted.
4. A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order shall request a hearing within twenty (20) days after service of the notice. At that hearing, the court shall confirm the registered order unless the person contesting registration establishes that:
   1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with article 3 of this act;
   2. The child custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with article 3 of this act; or
   3. The person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with standards under a provision of law from that state in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-208 , in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which registration is sought.
5. If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and the person requesting registration and all persons served shall be notified of the confirmation.
6. Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-406. Enforcement of registered determination.

1. A court of this state may grant any relief normally available under the law of this state to enforce a registered child custody determination made by a court of another state.
2. A court of this state shall recognize and enforce, but shall not modify except in accordance with article 3 of this act, a registered child custody determination of a court of another state.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-407. Simultaneous proceedings.

If a proceeding for enforcement under this article is commenced in a court of this state and the court determines that a proceeding to modify the determination is pending in a court of another state having jurisdiction to modify the determination under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with article 3 of this act, the enforcing court shall immediately communicate with the modifying court. The proceeding for enforcement shall continue unless the enforcing court, after consultation with the modifying court, stays or dismisses the proceeding.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-408. Expedited enforcement of child custody determination.

1. A petition under this article in which the petitioner is seeking expedited enforcement shall be verified. Certified copies of all orders sought to be enforced and of any order confirming registration shall be attached to the petition. A copy of a certified copy of an order may be attached instead of the original.
2. A petition for enforcement of a child custody determination shall state:
   1. Whether the court that issued the determination identified the jurisdictional basis it relied upon in exercising jurisdiction and, if so, what the basis was;
   2. Whether the determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court whose decision is enforceable under this act and, if so, the identity of the court, the case number and the nature of the proceeding;
   3. Whether any proceeding has been commenced that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights and adoptions and, if so, the identity of the court, the case number and the nature of the proceeding;
   4. The present physical address of the child and the respondent, if known;
   5. Whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of the child and attorney fees is sought, including a request for assistance from law enforcement officials and, if so, the relief sought; and
   6. If the child custody determination has been registered and confirmed under W.S. 20-5-405 , the date and place of registration.
3. Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing the respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing and may enter any order necessary to ensure the safety of the parties and the child. The hearing shall be held on the next judicial day after service of the order unless that date is impossible. In the event that the next judicial day after service of the order is impossible, the court shall hold the hearing on the first judicial day possible. The court may extend the date of hearing at the request of the petitioner.
4. An order issued under subsection (c) of this section shall state the time and place of the hearing and advise the respondent that at the hearing the court will order that the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child and the payment of fees, costs and expenses under W.S. 20-5-412 , and may schedule a hearing to determine whether further relief is appropriate, unless the respondent appears and establishes either that:
   1. The child custody determination has not been registered and confirmed under W.S. 20-5-405 and that:
      1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with article 3 of this act;
      2. The child custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with article 3 of this act; or
      3. The respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with the standards under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-208 , in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought.
   2. The child custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-404 , but has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with article 3 of this act.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-409. Service of petition and order.

Except as provided in W.S. 20-5-411 , the petition and order shall be served by any method authorized by the law of this state upon the respondent and any person who has physical custody of the child.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

§ 20-5-410. Hearing and order.

1. Unless the court issues a temporary emergency order pursuant to W.S. 20-5-304 , upon a finding that a petitioner is entitled to immediate physical custody of the child, the court shall order that the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child unless the respondent establishes either that:
   1. The child custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed under W.S. 20-5-405 but has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under article 3 of this act; or
   2. The child custody determination has not been registered and confirmed under W.S. 20-5-405 and that:
      1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with article 3 of this act;
      2. The child custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with article 3 of this act; or
      3. The respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with the standards under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-208 , in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought.
2. The court shall award the fees, costs and expenses authorized under W.S. 20-5-412 and may grant additional relief, including a request for the assistance of law enforcement officials, and set a further hearing to determine whether additional relief is appropriate.
3. If a party called to testify refuses to answer on the ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the court may draw an adverse inference from the refusal.
4. A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses and a defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child may not be invoked in a proceeding under this article.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-411. Warrant to take physical custody of a child.

1. Upon the filing of a petition seeking enforcement of a child custody determination, the petitioner may file a verified application for the issuance of a warrant to take physical custody of the child if the child is immediately likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed from this state.
2. If the court, upon the testimony of the petitioner or other witness, finds that the child is imminently likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed from this state, it may issue a warrant to take physical custody of the child. The petition shall be heard on the next judicial day after the warrant is executed unless that date is impossible. In the event that the next judicial day after service of the order is impossible, the court shall hold the hearing on the first judicial day possible. The application for the warrant shall include the statements required by W.S. 20-5-408(b).
3. A warrant to take physical custody of a child shall:
   1. Recite the facts upon which a conclusion of imminent serious physical harm or removal from the jurisdiction is based;
   2. Direct law enforcement officers to take physical custody of the child immediately; and
   3. Provide for the placement of the child pending final relief.
4. The respondent shall be served with the petition, warrant and order immediately after the child is taken into physical custody.
5. A warrant to take physical custody of a child is enforceable throughout this state. If the court finds on the basis of the testimony of the petitioner or other witness that a less intrusive remedy is not effective, it may authorize law enforcement officers to enter private property to take physical custody of the child. If required by exigent circumstances of the case, the court may authorize law enforcement officers to make a forcible entry at any hour.
6. The court may impose conditions upon placement of a child to ensure the appearance of the child and the child’s custodian.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

§ 20-5-412. Costs, fees and expenses.

1. The court shall award the prevailing party, including a state, necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs, communication expenses, attorney fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees or expenses are sought establishes that the award would be clearly inappropriate.
2. The court may not assess fees, costs or expenses against a state unless authorized by law other than this act.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-413. Recognition and enforcement.

A court of this state shall accord full faith and credit to an order issued by another state and consistent with this act which enforces a child custody determination by a court of another state unless the order has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under a provision of law from that state that is in substantial conformity with article 3 of this act.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-414. Appeals.

An appeal may be taken from a final order in a proceeding under this article in accordance with expedited appellate procedures in other civil cases. Unless the court enters a temporary emergency order under W.S. 20-5-304 , the enforcing court may not stay an order enforcing a child custody determination pending appeal.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

§ 20-5-415. Role of prosecutor or other appropriate public official.

1. In a case arising under this act or involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the prosecutor or other appropriate public official may take any lawful action, including resort to a proceeding under this article or any other available civil proceeding, to locate a child, obtain the return of a child or enforce a child custody determination if there is:
   1. An existing child custody determination;
   2. A request to do so from a court in a pending child custody proceeding;
   3. A reasonable belief that a criminal statute has been violated; or
   4. A reasonable belief that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained in violation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
2. A prosecutor or other appropriate public official acting under this section acts on behalf of the court and may not represent any party.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-5-416. Role of law enforcement.

At the request of a prosecutor or other appropriate public official acting under W.S. 20-5-415 , a law enforcement officer may take any lawful action reasonably necessary to locate a child or a party and assist a prosecutor or other appropriate public official with responsibilities under W.S. 20-5-415 .

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

§ 20-5-417. Costs and expenses.

If the respondent is not the prevailing party, the court may assess against the respondent all direct expenses and costs incurred by the prosecutor or other appropriate public official and law enforcement officers under W.S. 20-5-415 or 20-5-416 .

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

§ 20-5-501. Application and construction.

In applying and construing this act, consideration shall be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

Editor's notes. —

The following annotations are taken from cases decided under prior law.

Applicability. —

Father's failure to include a child's residences in a petition to modify a custody order did not amount to an error because the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act did not apply to intrastate matters. MBB v. ERW, 2004 WY 134, 100 P.3d 415, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 2004).

§ 20-5-502. Transitional provision.

A motion or other request for relief made in a child custody proceeding or to enforce a child custody determination which was commenced before the effective date of this act is governed by the law in effect at the time the motion or other request was made.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 11, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

The effective date of this act is the effective date of Laws 2005, ch. 11, which is July 1, 2005.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-5-202(a)(xviii).

§ 20-6-101. Short title.

This act may be cited as the “Child Support Enforcement Act”.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-6-102(a)(vii).

Cited in

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990); Department of Family Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs. v. DDM, 877 P.2d 259, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 1994).

§ 20-6-102. Definitions.

1. As used in this act:
   1. “Noncustodial parent” means the parent who was not awarded primary physical custody of the child by the court;
   2. “Department” means the department of family services;
   3. “Division” means the designated body to administer Title IV-D child support services within the department of family services;
   4. “Obligee” means a person to whom the duty of support is owed;
   5. “Obligor” means any person owing a duty of support;
   6. “Title IV-D” means Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act as amended [42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.];
   7. “This act” means W.S. 20-6-101 through 20-6-112 ;
   8. “Support order” means any order entered by a court or a tribal court, which provides for payment for the support of a child and may include medical support, spousal support, arrearages related costs and fees, interest and penalties, income withholding, and other relief;
   9. “IV-D agency” means the department of family services;
   10. “Clerk” means, for the purpose of receipts, distribution and disbursement of child support, the clerk of district court in this state where the obligor is ordered to make payments, or where mandated by law, the state disbursement unit;
   11. “Licensing agency” means the state or any of its political subdivisions, any board, commission or other entity that issues licenses, certificates or permits necessary for an obligor to operate a motor vehicle, hunt, fish or practice a profession or occupation;
   12. “Program” means child support services provided in cooperation with the federal government pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, as amended.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 1; Laws 1985, ch. 109, § 2; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; Laws 1997, ch. 193, § 2; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2000, ch. 53, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-6-103. Child support enforcement program; administration by child support enforcement section.

1. The department shall establish a program of child support enforcement services in cooperation with the federal government pursuant to Title IV-D and other applicable federal regulations, to aid in administering the requirements of the program.
2. The department shall designate a division within the department to administer the program in accordance with this act.
3. Repealed by Laws 2017, ch. 179, §  2.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 1; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 2000, ch. 53, § 1; 2017, ch. 179, § 2.

The 2017 amendment, deleted (c).

Laws 2017, ch. 179, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved Feb. 17, 2017.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-6-102(a)(vii).

Evidence of actual income. —

In establishing the amount of back child support owed, a state must determine the actual income of both parents for the time period at issue, or the state must have a factual basis to support that any imputation of income was reasonable over the time periods at issue. Whitt v. State ex rel. Wright, 2001 WY 128, 36 P.3d 617, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2001).

Cited in

Dep't of Family Servs. v. Peterson, 960 P.2d 1022, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1998).

§ 20-6-104. Child support enforcement services generally.

1. The services in intrastate and interstate situations provided under the child support enforcement program subject to or by appropriate orders of the court shall include:
   1. The establishment, enforcement and modification of an obligor’s obligation to support dependent children;
   2. The establishment, enforcement and modification of an obligor’s obligation to provide medical support in all cases and medical insurance coverage for dependent children when available at a reasonable cost;
   3. The location of an obligor or putative parent, obligee or child for purposes of establishing, enforcing or modifying the child support and medical support obligations and enforcing the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act;
   4. The monitoring and processing of an obligor’s child support payments;
   5. Providing applications, information and intake services to all eligible persons pursuant to law or upon request;
   6. The location of persons, upon request of the noncustodial parent, in cases of denial or interference with court ordered visitation or in cases in which the custodial parent has removed the child from the state and failed to give notice of change of address in violation of a court order;
   7. When an obligor is required to provide medical insurance coverage through the employer’s health plan pursuant to a court order, the notification to an employer unless the obligor contests the notification and establishes good cause why the notice should not be provided;
   8. The establishment of paternity for out of wedlock children pursuant to W.S. 14-2-401 et seq.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 1; Laws 1988, ch. 10, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 193, § 2; 2000, ch. 53, § 1; 2003, ch. 93, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Cited in

Dep't of Family Servs. v. Peterson, 960 P.2d 1022, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1998).

“Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.” —

The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, referred to in subsection (a)(iii), appears as 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 653 and 663.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What voluntary acts of child, other than marriage or entry into military service, terminate parent's obligation to support, 55 ALR5th 557.

Construction and application of International Child Abduction Remedies Act (42 USC § 11601 et seq.), 125 ALR Fed 217.

§ 20-6-105. Eligibility for services; fees for services.

1. Child support enforcement services shall be provided to:
   1. Those recipients of aid under the personal opportunities with employment responsibilities (POWER) program who, as a condition of eligibility under federal law, are required to assign their rights to support to, and cooperate with, the department in the establishment of parentage and the establishment, enforcement and modification of support obligations; and
   2. Any eligible obligee or obligor without regard to income or the receipt of public assistance benefits. Eligibility shall be subject to reasonable standards established by the department. These standards shall take into account Title IV-D and other applicable federal regulations and the earnings, income and other resources already available to support the person.
2. The department may charge the obligee or obligor, a reasonable application fee under paragraph (a)(ii) of this section and W.S. 20-6-108(a) and may recover the fee and all necessary and reasonable expenses of providing services from the obligor or obligee. The department may waive or defer any fee upon a showing of:
   1. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.
   2. Necessity.
3. The department shall, to comply with federal law, collect an annual fee from the obligee for child support enforcement services provided under paragraph (a)(ii) of this section. The department shall recover the fee from the obligee. The court may assess the fee to the obligor in any child support order.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 196, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 1999, ch. 117, § 1; 2000, ch. 53, §§ 1, 2; 2007, ch. 189, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added (c).

Appropriations. —

Laws 2007, ch. 189, § 2, provides:

“There is appropriated three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00), or as much thereof as necessary, from the general fund to the department of family services for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2007 and ending June 30, 2008, to implement the purposes of this act. No part of this appropriation shall be expended without the prior approval of the chief information officer for any computer and software services and by the governor for all remaining expenditures.”

Construction with UIFSA. —

Subdivision (a)(ii) of this section was not intended to limit services available under Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, and therefore state was authorized to bring child support enforcement action in its own name without regard to residency of obligee. Flores v. Flores, 979 P.2d 944, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 20-6-106. Powers and duties of department regarding collection of support.

1. By signing an application for, or being a recipient of, aid under the personal opportunities with employment responsibilities (POWER) program, a support obligee assigns to the department, by operation of law, all rights that person and all other members of the household have to child and spousal support, whether accrued, present or future, and their right to medical support.
2. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.
3. The department has the power of attorney to act in the name of any recipient of public assistance in endorsing and cashing all drafts, checks, money orders or other negotiable instruments received by the department representing support payments for children on whose behalf public assistance has been previously paid.
4. For purposes of prosecuting any civil action under this act or other applicable state statutes relating to the enforcement of child support obligations, the department is the assignee of support rights to the extent of any public assistance provided to an obligee. No act of the obligee shall prejudice the rights of the department or the dependent child in any action or proceeding related to enforcement of child support services hereunder.
5. No agreement between any obligee and any obligor purporting to relieve the obligor of any duty of support or to settle past, present or future support or obligations either as settlement or prepayment will reduce or terminate any rights of the department to recover from the obligor for support provided by the department unless the department has consented to the agreement in writing or unless it has been approved by the court with notice to the department.
6. The department, in its own name, or on behalf of an obligee, obligor or a child may petition a court for modification of any court order establishing a support obligation.
7. If a court orders support to be paid by an obligor, the department shall be subrogated to the debt created by the order. This subrogation interest shall apply to all orders of support including child support orders, medical support orders, temporary spouse support orders, family maintenance and alimony orders. The subrogation shall extend to the amounts paid by the department in public assistance to or for the benefit of a dependent child and the amount of medical support provided by or through another division of the department of family services or the department of health.
8. The department may enforce, or, subject to the approval of the court, may compromise or settle any claim or judgment for a support obligation owed to or assigned to the department as may be in the best interest of the dependent child and the public.
9. The department may offer each county a cooperative agreement relating to the services to be provided by clerks of district court or child support authorities in child support enforcement cases. The department shall enter into a cooperative agreement with the department of workforce services to recover sums owed under a support order from unemployment benefits awarded to an obligor.
10. The department may contract with private vendors for services necessary to carry out its responsibilities under Title IV-D, applicable federal regulations, this act and its rules and regulations as they relate to child support enforcement.
11. The department may:
    1. and (ii) Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.
    2. Seek collection of child, medical and spousal support arrears, through the federal offset program under Title IV-D and all applicable federal regulations;
    3. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 193, § 3.
    4. Request a consumer report from a consumer reporting agency pursuant to section 604 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681b, provided the individual named in consumer report is associated with a IV-D support case, the report received by the department is kept confidential except to the extent needed to accomplish the purposes of this paragraph and the report is needed to:
       1. Locate the individual’s whereabouts;
       2. Establish the individual’s capacity to pay child support; or
       3. Establish, enforce or modify the appropriate level of child support payments.
    5. In appropriate circumstances, petition the court to order the child, mother or alleged father to submit to genetic tests to establish paternity, or, in the alternative, to require the testing on its own order;
    6. Issue subpoenas for information requested under paragraph (v) of this subsection and impose administrative penalties not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for any person failing to respond;
    7. Require all persons, including government, private for-profit employers and not-for-profit employers and public utility companies to respond to a request by the department for information on social security number, address, employment, compensation and benefits of any individual for any individual who owes or is owed support, or against or with respect to whom a support obligation is sought, and who is employed by the person as an employee or contractor, in accordance with rules adopted by the department. Any person who fails to respond to any request for information may be sanctioned by the department by imposing administrative penalties not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25.00). The department shall enter the employer information into the state directory of new hires within five (5) business days after receipt of the employer information. The department may issue administrative subpoenas for financial or other information needed to establish, modify or enforce a support order and impose administrative penalties not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for any person failing to respond. The department may administratively subpoena the customer records of public utility companies for the names and addresses of individuals who owe or are owed support, or against or with respect to whom a support obligation is sought. The department shall notify the supervisor of any employee of a governmental agency if the employee fails to respond to a request under this paragraph. Any person who, acting in good faith, provides information to the department under this paragraph shall not be liable for civil damages as a result of the information provided. The department shall deposit any penalties collected under this paragraph in the public school fund of the respective counties;
    8. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.
    9. Issue an income withholding order, if an income withholding order has not previously been issued. The department shall file the order with the clerk of court who shall mail copies of the order as provided by W.S. 20-6-204(c);
    10. Seize assets when an arrearage exists by:
        1. Intercepting or seizing periodic or lump sum payments from a state or local government agency, including unemployment compensation, workers’ compensation and other benefits or judgments, settlements and lottery winnings;
        2. Attaching and, pursuant to a court order, seizing assets owned solely by the obligor that are held in financial institutions or national chartered credit unions;
        3. Attaching public and private retirement funds pursuant to state law; and
        4. Imposing liens and, in appropriate cases, petitioning a court to force the sale of property and distribution of the proceeds.
    11. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.
    12. In any case where there exists child support arrearages and for which payments are allowed or required, petition the district court for an increase or decrease in the required payments due on the arrearages;
    13. Petition a court to void fraudulent transfers, or obtain a settlement in the best interests of a child support creditor when a prima facie case is established that the obligor has transferred income or property to avoid payment to the child support creditor;
    14. Appear in any judicial proceeding on behalf of the state when any obligee or obligor makes application for IV-D services, in order to establish, enforce or modify a child support order, medical support order or a spousal support order, if the spousal support issue is considered in conjunction with the child support or medical support issues, provided the department shall not be required to participate in visitation, custody, property settlement or other issues between the parties. The department shall certify that the obligee, obligor or child has applied for or is receiving Title IV-D services. Initial pleadings filed by the department or its contractors shall state that the action is being taken pursuant to this act or Title IV-D;
    15. If an obligee receives child support which has been assigned to the department, recover the child support payments out of current or future child support payments due to the obligee which are unassigned until the assigned sums have been fully paid;
    16. Allocate and distribute child, medical and spousal support whether accrued, present or future pursuant to regulations.
12. The department shall adopt reasonable rules and regulations to carry out the provision of this act, including rules and regulations governing:
    1. The provision of services pursuant to the program;
    2. The distribution of child support collected by the department;
    3. Due process safeguards;
    4. The administration of child support income;
    5. Requirements for adequate record keeping;
    6. Tracking and monitoring of program statistics and support payments.
13. If a court, on its own motion or pursuant to a request from the department, orders an able-bodied obligor who is unemployed and otherwise unable to fulfill his court-ordered child support obligation to participate in the personal opportunities with employment responsibilities program administered by the department, the department shall permit the obligor to participate pursuant to the court order without regard to the program eligibility requirements under title 42 or the department rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
14. through (r) Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.
15. The department shall not enforce any administrative procedures contained in this act until it has implemented rules providing due process safeguards, including requirements for notice, opportunity to contest the action and an opportunity to appeal to the district court. Any obligor may recover costs and reasonable attorney fees from the department or its child support collection contractor for costs incurred in any administrative hearing or subsequent court appeal if:
    1. It is found that the obligor did not owe an arrearage and had paid all required support to the clerk.
    2. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.
16. The department of health and the department of family services shall through rules and regulations develop procedures to allow the sharing of birth and paternity records for purposes of establishing paternity and child support obligations.
17. The department shall, to the extent required by federal law, have access to any information used by the state to locate an individual for purposes relating to motor vehicle laws or law enforcement and enter into agreements with financial institutions, national chartered credit unions, benefit associations, insurance companies, safe deposit companies, money market mutual funds or similar entities authorized to do business in the state as provided in W.S. 13-1-205 to develop and operate an automated data match system to obtain identifying information for each obligor who maintains an account at the institution and who owes past due child support in an amount equal to at least triple the current monthly child support obligation and to allow assets to be encumbered as provided by law.
18. The department shall report to any consumer reporting agency as defined in section 603(f) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681a(f) information regarding the amount of overdue support owed by an obligor.
19. The department shall, to the extent an obligor is resident in the state or owns real or personal property in the state, have a lien by operation of law against that real or personal property. After an obligor is in arrears at least triple the current monthly child support obligation, the department shall perfect and enforce a lien authorized by this section in the same manner as liens are perfected for the specific type of real or personal property upon which the lien is claimed. In the event there are competing liens or encumbrances on any property upon which a lien is attached pursuant to this section, the priority of the competing liens or encumbrances shall date from the date of filing or perfection. The state of Wyoming shall accord full faith and credit to a lien arising in another state as a result of child support arrearages when the other state or an agency thereof seeks to enforce such lien, provided the lien was properly filed and recorded under the laws of the state in which the lien was created.
20. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 1; Laws 1985, ch. 109, § 2; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; ch. 221, § 2; Laws 1993, ch. 112, § 1; Laws 1995, ch. 148, § 2; Laws 1997, ch. 128, § 2; ch. 193, §§ 2, 3; ch. 196, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 1999, ch. 117, § 1; 2000, ch. 53, §§ 1, 2; 2008, ch. 116, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

Cross references. —

For meaning of “Title IV-D,” see § 20-6-102(a)(vi).

The 2008 amendment, added “15 U.S.C. 1681a(f)” in (w).

Laws 2008, ch. 116, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 13, 2008.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (j).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i), (l), (v), or (x) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-6-102(a)(vii).

Modification proper.—

District court properly modified child support because it did not abuse its discretion in deviating from the presumptive child support amount; once the district determined that deviation was appropriate based on the father’s obligation to a later-born child from his subsequent marriage, nothing prevented it from calculating the appropriate support obligation by considering the presumptive amount for all of the father’s children. TSR v. State ex rel. Dep't of Family Servs., 2017 WY 144, 406 P.3d 729, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2017).

Parties in interest in support award. —

If the obligee of a child or spousal support award is not receiving public assistance, the support award is not assigned to the Department of Family Services, and the Department is not a party of interest in the matter. Department of Family Servs. v. Peterson, 960 P.2d 1022, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1998).

Assignment of support rights. —

This article requires that in exchange for receiving public assistance a custodial parent assigns all rights to support payments, whether past, current, or future; and that Department's right to subrogation from supporting parent begins when support obligation, and not public assistance, begins. Dept. of Family Servs. v. Peterson, 957 P.2d 1307, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1998) decided under prior law.

Public assistance recipients. —

This section authorized the Department of Family Services to bring an action to enforce a child support order pursuant to former § 20-6-306(a) (now see § 20-2-112 ), without regard to the obligee's status as a recipient or nonrecipient of public assistance. Department of Family Servs. v. Peterson, 960 P.2d 1022, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1998).

Stated in

Department of Family Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs. v. DDM, 877 P.2d 259, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 1994).

Cited in

Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 942 P.2d 1104, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1997); Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 20-6-107. Payment of support money collected to department.

1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section the obligor shall make all support payments to the department upon receipt of written notice that the children for whom the support obligation exists are receiving public assistance.
2. If an obligor is ordered by the court to make payments to the clerk of court, the clerk shall forward all payments received from the obligor to the department.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 1; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 2000, ch. 53, § 1.

§ 20-6-108. State parent locator service.

1. The department shall act as a state parent locator service to assist in:
   1. The location of parents who have abandoned their children or failed to provide for their support;
   2. The location of persons, upon the request of law enforcement agencies, in cases of parental kidnapping or child custody violations under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act [§§ 20-5-201 through 20-5-502 ]; and
   3. The location of persons, upon request of the noncustodial parent, in cases of denial or interference with court ordered visitation or in cases in which the custodial parent has removed the child from the state and failed to give notice of change of address in violation of a court order.
2. The department may request from state, county and local agencies all information and assistance necessary to carry out the purposes of this section. All state, county and city agencies, officers and employees shall cooperate in the location of parents who have violated custody or visitation orders or abandoned, deserted or failed to support their children and shall supply the department with all information available relative to the location, income and property of the parents.
3. Any records provided, created or established under this section are available only for purposes of this act.
4. The department shall comply with 42 U.S.C. § 653 with respect to the establishment, purpose and implementation of the federal parent locator service.
5. The state shall establish and maintain in the federal and state parent locator service, an automated case registry, which shall contain abstracts of support orders and other information as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 653.
6. The state case registry shall contain the names and social security numbers of the children. The state case registry of child support orders shall include abstracts of support orders, names, social security numbers or other uniform identification numbers and state identification numbers of individuals who owe support, in addition to the names and social security numbers of children of such persons.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 1; Laws 1988, ch. 10, § 1; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2000, ch. 53, § 1; 2005, ch. 11, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a)(ii), inserted “and Enforcement.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-6-102(a)(vii).

§ 20-6-109. Cooperation with other states.

1. When required to qualify for federal funds under Title IV-D, the department shall assist other states in locating parents under the terms and conditions of this act.
2. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 1; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2000, ch. 53, §§ 1, 2.

Cross references. —

For meaning of “Title IV-D,” see § 20-6-102(a)(vi).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-4-140(a)(xxii).

§ 20-6-110. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 109, § 3; 1986, ch. 18, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1985, ch. 109, § 1, related to the state commission on child support.

§ 20-6-111. Driver's license suspension; nonpayment of child support; administrative hearings.

1. When an obligor is in arrears in a court ordered child support obligation, the department or court may:
   1. Determine whether the obligor has a driver’s license, as defined in W.S. 31-7-102(a)(xxv), that is subject to withholding, suspension or restriction; and
   2. Obtain a court ordered withholding, suspension or restriction of the license unless the obligor pays the entire arrearage or enters into a payment plan approved by the department.
2. The court, on motion of the department or on its own motion, may direct the department of transportation to withhold, suspend or restrict the license and the department or the court shall send certified copies of the court order to the obligor, at the obligor’s last known address, and to the department of transportation instructing that the department of transportation notify the obligor of the license withholding, suspension or restriction in accordance with the licensing procedures, and that the withholding, suspension or restriction shall remain in effect until the department of transportation is notified by the department or the court that the obligor is in compliance with the court order or has entered into a payment plan approved by the department.
3. If at any time an obligor has complied with the terms of the court order, or has entered into a payment plan approved by the department, the court or the department, whichever has caused notice to be initially provided, shall immediately notify the department of transportation that the withholding, suspension or restriction may be lifted and the license may be reinstated if the obligor is otherwise eligible for reinstatement.
4. Nothing in this section shall prohibit subsequent orders and notices for subsequent arrearages if the obligor is again subject to the provisions of this section.
5. The department shall adopt rules and regulations to ensure notice is provided in an immediate and timely manner to the department of transportation that an obligor is in satisfactory compliance with the court order under this section. Upon receipt of the notice, the department of transportation shall immediately reinstate the license unless the license was suspended or revoked for other reasons. The department of transportation shall adopt reasonable rules and regulations to ensure the license is immediately reinstated upon receipt of the notice.
6. The department may determine that a driver’s license suspension may be better achieved through an administrative suspension if the obligor owes more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) in unpaid child support and the obligor has not made a full monthly child support payment either voluntarily or through income withholding for a period of at least ninety (90) consecutive days prior to the determination. The department shall notify the obligor by first class mail or by personal service if notification by first class mail was unsuccessful, that the obligor is in arrears in a child support obligation and that the obligor’s driver’s license as defined in W.S. 31-7-102(a)(xxv) shall be suspended by the department of transportation sixty (60) days after the date the obligor receives the notice unless the obligor:
   1. Pays the entire arrearage owed;
   2. Enters into a payment plan approved by the department; or
   3. Is in full compliance with a court ordered payment plan.
7. Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 155, § 2.
8. Any suspension arising under subsection (f) of this section may be appealed to the district court. The person whose license or driving privilege is affected may file a request for a hearing in the district court in the county where the child support order was issued. The person shall have sixty (60) days from the date of service of the notice of intent to suspend in which to file the request for hearing. A timely request for hearing shall stay imposition of any suspension under subsection (f) of this section. The district court shall immediately set the matter for determination.
9. Before the license or driving privilege of any person is to be withheld, suspended or restricted under this article, the department shall advise the licensee in the notice required under subsection (f) of this section of his right to appeal to district court for any dispute involving:
   1. through (iii) Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 155, § 2.
   2. The amount of current child support owed or arrearage;
   3. The identity of the alleged obligor named in the notice of suspension;
   4. The willfulness of any action or inaction of the obligor that contributed to the nonpayment of child support. As used in this paragraph, “willfulness” means without justifiable excuse.
10. and (m) Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 155, § 2.
11. The discretion to modify any order of suspension under this section to allow driving privileges is limited as follows:
    1. A person whose driving privileges have been suspended for nonpayment of child support may be granted limited driving privileges by the district court or the department of transportation for a period not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) days;
    2. A person granted limited driving privileges under this subsection by the district court or the department of transportation shall not be granted an extension of such privileges for twelve (12) months after the limited driving privileges expire unless the person has subsequently made full payment on his child support obligation in arrears, or is in full compliance with a payment plan approved by the department or ordered by a court.
    3. Repealed by Laws 2009, ch. 155, § 2.
12. After the obligor has paid his child support arrearages in full or has entered into a payment plan with the department, the department shall notify the department of transportation immediately and request the department of transportation to return the driver’s license of that obligor pursuant to this section.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 128, § 1; 2000, ch. 53, § 1; 2009, ch. 155, §§ 1, 2; 2014, ch. 35, § 1; 2015, ch. 113, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, substituted “court ordered child support” for “court order child support” in (a); substituted “a court ordered withholding” for “an administrative or court ordered withdrawing” in (a)(ii); deleted the former last two sentences, which read: “The department of transportation shall if requested by the obligor, conduct a record review and advise the court if a probationary or conditional license is appropriate. No hearing or appeal shall be permitted under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act for a license withheld, suspended or restricted pursuant to a court order” in (b); in (f), in the first sentence substituted “The department may determine” for “If the department determines” and added the provisions beginning with “if the obligor owes”, in the second sentence substituted “shall notify the obligor” for “may notify the department of transportation by electronic data transfer and any obligor”, substituted “if notification by certified mail was unsuccessful” for “or by certified mail, restricted delivery”, and substituted “sixty (60) days after the date the obligor receives the notice” for “ninety (90) days after the date of the notice”; substituted “owed” for “stated in the notice” in (f)(i); added (f)(iii); repealed (g), which dealt with the purview of hearing examiners; in (h), in the first sentence substituted “Any suspension arising under subsection (f)” for “Any order arising out of a hearing under subsection (g)”, in the second sentence substituted “request for a hearing” for “petition for a review of the record” and deleted “person resides or in the case of a nonresident in Laramie county or the county where the” preceding “child support order”, in the third sentence substituted “sixty (60) days from the date of service of the notice of intent to suspend” for “thirty (30) days from the date of the written order” and substituted “request for review” for “petition for review”, added the fourth sentence, and in the last sentence deleted “upon thirty (30) days written notice to the department” from the end; added “of his right to appeal to district court for any dispute involving” to the end of (j); repealed (j)(i) through (j)(iii), which enumerated items of which persons whose driver’s licenses are suspended or restricted should be informed; added (j)(iv) through (j)(vi); repealed (k), which dealt with time limits and procedures for hearings pursuant to notices of license suspensions or restrictions; repealed (m), which read: “Upon receipt of a timely request, the department shall conduct a review of its records and issue an order affirming, modifying or rescinding its notice to suspend the license of the obligor”; inserted “by the district court or the department of transportation” following “driving privileges” in (n)(i); in (n)(ii), inserted “by the district court or the department of transportation” preceding “shall not be granted” and added “or ordered by a court” at the end; repealed (n)(iii), which read: “The department shall notify the department of transportation by electronic data transfer that the person may be granted limited driving privileges as provided in this paragraph”; and added (o).

The 2014 amendment, in (f)(intro), inserted “full monthly” preceding “child support” in the first sentence.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in (f), substituted “two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00)” for “five thousand dollars ($5,000.00” in the first sentence, and substituted “first class mail or by personal service if notification by first class mail” for “certified mail, with return receipt requested, or by personal service if notification by certified mail” in the second sentence.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

§ 20-6-112. Professional, occupational or recreational license suspension; nonpayment of child support; notice and hearing.

1. The department may petition a court for an order to withhold, suspend or restrict any professional, occupational or hunting or fishing license, certificate or permit issued to an obligor who is in arrears in a child support obligation. The court may:
   1. Determine whether the obligor has a professional, occupational or recreational license, certificate or permit that is subject to withholding, suspension or restriction; and
   2. Issue a withholding, suspension or restriction of the license, certificate or permit unless the obligor pays the entire arrearage or enters into a payment plan approved by the department.
2. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 53, § 2.
3. The court, on motion of the department or on its own motion, may direct a licensing, certifying or permitting agency to withhold, suspend or restrict any license, certificate or permit and the department or the court shall send certified copies of the court order to the obligor, at the obligor’s last known address, and to the appropriate licensing, certifying or permitting agencies identified in the court order instructing that the licensing, certifying or permitting agency notify the obligor of the license, certificate or permit withholding, suspension or restriction in accordance with the licensing, certifying or permitting procedures, and that the withholding, suspension or restriction shall remain in effect until that agency is notified by the department or the court that the obligor is in compliance with the court order or has entered into a payment plan approved by the department. No hearing or appeal shall be permitted under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act for a license, certificate or permit withheld, suspended or restricted pursuant to a court order.
4. If at any time an obligor has complied with the terms of the court order, or has entered into a payment plan approved by the department, the court or the department, whichever has caused notice to be initially provided, shall immediately notify the licensing, certifying or permitting agency initially notified that the withholding, suspension or restriction may be lifted and the license, certificate or permit may be reinstated if the obligor is otherwise eligible for reinstatement.
5. Nothing in this section shall prohibit subsequent orders and notices for subsequent arrearages if the obligor is again subject to the provisions of this section.
6. The department shall adopt rules and regulations to ensure notice is provided in an immediate and timely manner to any licensing, certifying or permitting agency that was sent a copy of the court order that an obligor is in satisfactory compliance with the court order under this section. Upon receipt of the notice, the licensing, certifying or permitting agency shall immediately reinstate the license, certificate or permit unless the license, certificate or permit was suspended or revoked for other reasons. The licensing, certifying or permitting agencies shall adopt reasonable rules and regulations to ensure such licenses, certificates or permits are immediately reinstated upon receipt of the notice.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 128, § 1; 2000, ch. 53, §§ 1, 2.

§ 20-6-201. Short title.

This act may be cited as the “Income Withholding Act”.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” as used to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

Cited in

Jessen v. Jessen, 810 P.2d 987, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 1991).

§ 20-6-202. Definitions.

1. As used in this act:
   1. “Arrearage” means past due child support, past due medical support, past due spousal support, attorneys fees, guardian ad litem fees, costs, interest and penalties but does not include property settlements;
   2. “Child” means any person with respect to whom a support order, other than an order for spousal support, exists;
   3. “Clerk” means, for the purpose of receipt, distribution and disbursement of child support, the clerk of the district court in this state where the income withholding order is entered, or where mandated by law, the state disbursement unit;
   4. “Court” means any district court in this state;
   5. “Delinquency” means arrearage;
   6. “Disposable income” means income as defined under paragraph (a)(ix) of this section less personal income taxes, social security and Medicare deductions, cost of dependent health care coverage for all dependent children and mandatory pension deductions;
   7. “Department” means the department of family services;
   8. “Employer” means any person who owes income to an obligor, including but not limited to the United States government, the state of Wyoming, any unit of local government and any school district;
   9. “Income” means any form of payment or return in money or in kind to an individual, regardless of source. Income includes, but is not limited to wages, earnings, salary, commission, compensation as an independent contractor, temporary total disability, permanent partial disability and permanent total disability worker’s compensation payments, unemployment compensation, disability, annuity and retirement benefits and any other payments made by any payor;
   10. “Income withholding order” means a court’s or an administrative order requiring a payor to withhold income due an obligor for payment to the obligee in accordance with this act;
   11. “Notice to payor” means the notice provided to the employer pursuant to the income withholding order;
   12. “Obligee” means any person entitled to receive support under an order of support and includes the agency of this or another jurisdiction to which a person has assigned his right to support;
   13. “Obligor” means a person owing a duty of support;
   14. “Payor” means any employer or other person owing income to an obligor;
   15. “Support order” means any order entered by a court or tribunal of this or another state, or of a tribal court, which provides for payment for the support of a child and includes medical support and spousal support, but excludes property settlements;
   16. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 2, § 2.
   17. “Uniform income withholding order and notice to payor” means the federally approved uniform income withholding order and notice to payor;
   18. “State disbursement unit” means the clerks of district court collectively or the single address location established pursuant to W.S. 20-6-210(d). The state disbursement unit is the entity for receiving, distributing and disbursing child support payments;
   19. “This act” means W.S. 20-6-201 through 20-6-222 .

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1989, ch. 87, § 1; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; Laws 1993, ch. 199, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 150, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, §§ 1, 2; ch. 53, § 1; 2007, ch. 169, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, substituted “to the employer pursuant to the income withholding order” for “by W.S. 20-6-210 ” in (a)(xi).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-6-203. Notices; method of service.

All notices required by this act shall be served by certified mail return receipt requested or first class mail to the last known address of the addressee or shall be personally served as provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. If mailed, notice shall be deemed given when deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid. Proof of mailing shall be sufficient proof of notice.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; 2006, ch. 18, § 1; 2007, ch. 169, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to service of process, see Rules 4 and 5, W.R.C.P.

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, deleted the last sentence, which read: “The cost of mailing the notice is the responsibility of the obligee.”

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, inserted “or first class mail.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-204. Entry of income withholding order.

1. Upon entry or modification of any support order, the court shall also enter an income withholding order which shall take effect immediately, unless the parties agree otherwise, or unless one (1) of the parties demonstrates, and the court finds, that there is good cause not to require immediate income withholding. When the parties agree to an alternative arrangement, the arrangement shall be in writing, signed by the parties and reviewed and entered in the record by the court. The court shall include in the record its findings of good cause, including a statement explaining why implementation of immediate income withholding would not be in the best interests of the child and, in cases involving modification of child support, proof of timely payments.
2. If a support order was entered by a Wyoming court before the effective date of this act and an income withholding order has not previously been entered, the court which entered the support order shall enter the income withholding order on its own motion at the time the support order is subsequently modified or at any other time upon application of the obligee, the obligor or the department. An income withholding order under this subsection shall be entered without a hearing if an arrearage occurs. An income withholding order under this subsection may also be entered by the district court of any other county in this state in which the obligor, obligee or payor resides, provided:
   1. The petitioner files in the office of the clerk of that district court a certified copy of the support order and a sworn statement of the arrearages; and
   2. No other court in this state has entered an income withholding order based upon the same support order.
3. At the time an income withholding order is entered, the clerk shall mail a copy of the income withholding order and the support order to the last known address of the obligor and the obligee.
4. If a support order was entered by a Wyoming court and an income withholding order has not previously been entered, the department may issue an administrative income withholding order, subject to the applicable requirements of W.S. 20-6-101 through 20-6-112 .

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1989, ch. 87, § 1; Laws 1994, ch. 26, § 1; Laws 1995, ch. 144, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 193, § 2; 2000, ch. 2, § 1; ch. 48, § 2; 2003, ch. 58, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

“[T]he effective date of this act,” as referred to in subsection (b), is the effective date of Laws 1986, ch. 67 § 1. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 4, makes the act effective on June 1, 1986.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-205. When income withholding order becomes effective.

1. Except as otherwise provided by W.S. 20-6-204(a), an income withholding order which did not become effective immediately upon entry, becomes effective upon the earliest of the following:
   1. Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 2, § 2.
   2. The date the obligor requests withholding commence; or
   3. The date the obligor becomes delinquent in payment of an amount equal to one (1) month’s support obligation under the support order.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1989, ch. 87, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, §§ 1, 2.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-6-206. Contents of income withholding order.

1. The income withholding order shall:
   1. Direct the payor to withhold and remit to the clerk income due from the payor to the obligor, as specified in the notice to payor required by W.S. 20-6-210 , for the payment of current support obligations and for the liquidation of arrearages, if any;
   2. Order the payor to comply with all the terms of the notice to payor and all subsequent notices served upon the payor;
   3. State that the income withholding order is immediately effective or that the order will become effective as provided in W.S. 20-6-205(a)(ii) or (iii); and
   4. State the addresses, if known, and social security numbers of the obligor and the obligee.
2. If there is more than one (1) income withholding order in effect, and if the various orders require payment to two (2) or more payees, then the notice to payor shall provide that income withheld shall be disbursed according to the following:
   1. Each child shall receive an amount in the proportion which the child’s current support bears relative to the total of all amounts for current support under court orders; and
   2. Any remaining withheld income shall be distributed to each child in an amount proportional to which the arrearage for that child’s support bears relative to the total of all amounts ordered to be paid on arrearage.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1989, ch. 87, § 1; Laws 1993, ch. 199, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 193, § 2; 2000, ch. 2, § 1; 2007, ch. 169, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, deleted “from the clerk” following “all subsequent notices” in (a)(ii).

§ 20-6-207. Voluntary assignment by obligor.

1. An obligor may at any time voluntarily apply to the court to enter an income withholding order pursuant to W.S. 20-6-204(b) or file a verified written application with the clerk requesting that withholding commence pursuant to W.S. 20-6-205(a)(ii).
2. An income withholding order which becomes effective at the voluntary request of the obligor shall remain in effect until such time as:
   1. The obligor petitions the court to suspend withholding of income upon a showing of good cause, including a showing that income withholding has not been terminated previously and subsequently reinitiated and that the parties have agreed to an alternative arrangement as specified in W.S. 20-6-204 ; or
   2. There is no longer a current order for support and all arrearages as defined in W.S. 20-6-202 have been paid.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1993, ch. 199, § 1; Laws 1994, ch. 26, § 1.

§ 20-6-208. Notice to obligor.

1. Except where an income withholding order becomes effective immediately, the clerk shall send notice to the obligor no later than fifteen (15) days after the date when:
   1. The obligor becomes delinquent as specified in subsection (b) of this section; or
   2. An application by the obligee for income withholding has been granted by the court.
2. When an obligor becomes delinquent in payment in an amount equal to one (1) month’s obligation under the support order, the obligee or the department, to initiate income withholding, shall file with the clerk a verified notice of delinquency, a certified copy of which shall be served upon the obligor together with the form by which the obligor may petition to stay service as provided by W.S. 20-6-209 .
3. The notice of delinquency shall state:
   1. The terms of the support order;
   2. A computation of the period and total amount of arrearage as of the date of the notice;
   3. That the amount of income that will be withheld shall be the full amount due for current support and an additional sum toward arrearages, the total of which shall not exceed the amount authorized by W.S. 20-6-210(b)(iii);
   4. The effective date of the income withholding order as provided by W.S. 20-6-205 ;
   5. The income withholding order will be sent to any known current and subsequent payor of the obligor unless the obligor files a petition to stay service in accordance with W.S. 20-6-209 ;
   6. That the income withholding order applies to any current or subsequent payor or period of employment;
   7. The procedures available for contesting the income withholding including the grounds for contest and the period within which the petition to stay service shall be filed as provided by W.S. 20-6-209 ; and
   8. That failure to contest the income withholding within the period specified in W.S. 20-6-209(a) will result in the payor being notified to begin withholding.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1993, ch. 199, § 1; Laws 1994, ch. 26, § 1; 1999, ch. 98, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, § 1; ch. 48, § 1.

§ 20-6-209. Procedures to stay income withholding.

1. Within twenty (20) days from the date of service of the notice of delinquency the obligor may file with the clerk a petition to stay service of the income withholding order. The petition to stay shall include the obligor’s name, social security number, address, employer and employer’s address. The obligor shall mail a copy of the petition to the obligee, or to the obligee’s representative if the notice of delinquency was filed by someone other than the obligee, and to the department in all cases being enforced by the department. The obligor shall move for a hearing on the petition within five (5) days of filing the petition or the petition shall be denied. The income withholding order shall not be served on the payor until either a hearing has been deemed denied or until after a hearing has been held on the petition and the court has determined that the income withholding will become effective.
2. The grounds for the petition to stay service shall be limited to disputes concerning:
   1. The amount of current support or arrearage; or
   2. The identity of the alleged obligor named in the income withholding order.
3. If a petition to stay service states the grounds required by subsection (b) of this section, and has been filed as provided by subsection (a) of this section, and the obligor has moved for a hearing, the court shall set the matter for hearing and notify the obligor, the obligee or the obligee’s representative if the notice of delinquency was filed by someone other than the obligee of the time and place of the hearing. In all cases being enforced by the department, the department shall be given notice. The court shall hear and decide the dispute and notify the obligor of its determination within forty-five (45) days from the date the notice of delinquency was served on all parties entitled to notice.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1989, ch. 87, § 1; Laws 1993, ch. 199, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, § 1.

§ 20-6-210. Notice to payor.

1. The notice to payor shall be prepared and the original notice filed with the clerk. A copy of the notice shall be mailed or served pursuant to W.S. 20-6-203 to the payor and to the obligor. Notice to the payor also may be served by delivering a copy by electronic means if consented to by the payor. Notice to the payor and obligor shall be mailed or served by:
   1. The court if the income withholding order became effective immediately upon entry;
   2. The obligor if the income withholding order becomes effective under W.S. 20-6-205(a)(ii); or
   3. The department, acting pursuant to W.S. 20-6-105(a)(ii), or the obligee in all other cases.
2. The notice to payor shall state:
   1. An ascertainable amount to be withheld from the obligor’s income to be remitted to the clerk for current support and for arrearages;
   2. That the payor may withhold the fee provided by W.S. 20-6-212 (c);
   3. That the amount actually withheld for support combined with the fee authorized by W.S. 20-6-212 (c) shall not exceed the maximum amount authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1673;
      1. and (B) Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 169, § 2.
   4. The payor’s rights and duties under W.S. 20-6-212;
   5. That the withholding under this act has priority over any other legal process under state law against the same income;
   6. That the notice to payor is binding upon the payor until further notice is received as provided in accordance with W.S. 20-6-210(a);
   7. That the payor is subject to the sanctions of W.S. 20-6-218 .
3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the uniform income withholding order and notice to payor is deemed to meet the requirements of this act.
4. Withholding payments may be forwarded to a single address provided by the Wyoming department of family services, in accordance with the federal Social Security Act.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1989, ch. 87, § 1; Laws 1993, ch. 199, § 1; 1998, ch. 97, § 2; 2000, ch. 2, §§ 1, 2; 2007, ch. 169, §§ 1, 2; 2014, ch. 35, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, rewrote the introductory language in (a); inserted “department, acting pursuant to W.S. 20-6-105(a)(ii), or the” in (a)(iii); in (b), inserted “shall not exceed the maximum amount authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1673” in (iii), in (iv), in substituted “notice to payor” for “income withholding order” and substituted “is received as provided in accordance with W.S. 20-6-210(a)”; in (c) substituted “act” for “section” at the end of the sentence; repealed former (b)(iii)(A), which read: “Shall be the total amount of current child support ordered to be paid by this obligor and all arrearages owed by this obligor; and”; and repealed former (b)(iii)(B), which read: “Shall not exceed the maximum amount authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1673.”

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, in (a), split the former first sentence, which read “The notice to payor shall be prepared and the original notice filed with the clerk and a copy of the notice shall be mailed or served pursuant to W.S. 20-6-203 to the payor and to the obligor” into the present first two sentences and added the last sentence.

Social Security Act. —

The federal Social Security Act, referred to in subsection (a)(vi), appears as 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

Support garnishments have priority. —

Under Wyoming law an order withholding income for child support has priority over any other garnishment; moreover, creditor judgment garnishments may be imposed only to the extent support garnishments do not exceed the general 25 percent limit, and accordingly, support garnishments are not to be treated as an exemption to be deducted from gross earnings in calculating disposable earnings. Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, 57 P.3d 1203, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2002).

§ 20-6-211. Service of income withholding order; amended notice to payor; notice to labor organizations; penalty.

1. The department, acting pursuant to W.S. 20-6-105(a)(ii), or the obligee shall prepare, file with the clerk and mail to any known current or subsequent payor and the obligor a copy of the income withholding order and the notice to payor, upon or after the occurrence of one (1) of the following:
   1. No later than fifteen (15) days after the entry of the income withholding order if the court orders it to be effective immediately;
   2. If the obligor has not filed a petition to stay income withholding under W.S. 20-6-209(b), then no later than fifteen (15) days after the expiration of the time allowed for filing the petition;
   3. Entry of the court’s order determining that the income withholding order will become effective following hearing pursuant to W.S. 20-6-209(c); or
   4. Voluntary assignment by the obligor pursuant to W.S. 20-6-207 .
2. If the payor’s address is not known on the dates specified in subsection (a) of this section, the notice to payor shall be sent in accordance with W.S. 20-6-210(a) no later than fifteen (15) days after determining the payor’s address. At any time following service to the payor of the income withholding order and notice to payor under subsection (a) of this section, and if no support has been assigned, the department, acting pursuant to W.S. 20-6-105(a)(ii), or the obligee may prepare, file with the clerk of the court and mail to the payor and the obligor an amended notice to payor decreasing the amount to be withheld from the obligor’s income. The amended notice is binding upon the payor from the date of receipt.
3. In addition to subsection (a) of this section and in those cases in which it is known that the obligor may be placed in employment with a payor by a labor or other private or public employment referral organization referring individuals to employment and operating within this state, the obligee or the department may prepare, file with the clerk of court and mail to the referring organization certified copies of the income withholding order and the notice to payor or an amended notice to payor pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. The obligee or the department shall send the notice to payor under this subsection within the dates specified under subsection (a) of this section. The referring organization shall at the time of placement, forward the notice to payor to each payor with which the organization places the obligor. Upon forwarding the notice to payor, a labor or other nongovernmental organization shall notify the district court that the income withholding order has been forwarded to the payor. The district court shall, at the time it sends the withholding order and the notice to payor to the referring organization, include a self-addressed, stamped return envelope for the referring organization’s use for notification to the district court. Additional envelopes shall be available to the referring organization upon request. Any labor or other nongovernmental organization failing to provide notification to any payor at the time of placement as required by this subsection is liable for an amount of up to fifty dollars ($50.00) that the payor should have withheld from the obligor’s income. The department of workforce services may be reimbursed by the department of family services for its costs incurred under this act.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1989, ch. 87, § 1; Laws 1994, ch. 26, § 1; Laws 1997, ch. 198, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, § 1; 2007, ch. 169, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a), substituted “department, acting pursuant to W.S. 20-6-105(a)(ii), or the obligee shall prepare, file with the clerk” for “clerk shall prepare”, and substituted “a copy” for “certified copies”; rewrote (b), in part by inserting “shall be sent in accordance with W.S. 20-6-210(a),”, “department, acting pursuant to W.S. 20-6-105(a)(ii), or the” and deleting the next-to-last sentence relating to the mailing of certified copy of amended notice by the clerk; in (c), substituted “obligee or the department may prepare, file with the clerk of court” for “clerk may prepare” in the first sentence, and made a similar change in the second sentence.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in the last sentence of (c).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-212. Duties of the payor; administrative fee.

1. Upon receipt of certified copies of the notice to payor and the income withholding order, the payor shall deduct and pay over income as specified in the notice.
2. The payor shall begin the withholding no later than the first pay period that occurs following service on the payor of the notice and income withholding order. The payor shall deduct the maximum amount required by the notice, unless otherwise ordered by the court, for each pay period. The payor is not required to vary his normal pay and disbursement cycles in order to comply with this subsection. The payor shall remit the amount withheld to the state disbursement unit within seven (7) days after the date the obligor is paid, and the remittance shall include the name and social security number of the obligor and the date the income was withheld.
3. In addition to the amount withheld from the obligor’s income, the payor may, subject to limitations under W.S. 20-6-210(b)(iii) and 27-3-319(c), deduct and retain from the obligor’s remaining income five dollars ($5.00) for each payment made pursuant to the income withholding order.
4. If the payor has received more than one (1) notice to payor, all withheld amounts may be combined into a single payment in which case the payor shall separately identify the amount which is to be credited to each obligor. Upon request, the clerk of court or the department may provide assistance to a payor in determining the amount to be credited to each obligor.
5. Within thirty (30) days after the obligor’s employment terminates or the obligor ceases to receive income from the payor the payor shall give written notice thereof to the clerk. The notice shall include the following information:
   1. When the obligor ceased to receive income from the payor or when the obligor left his employment;
   2. The last known address of the obligor;
   3. The name and address of the obligor’s new payor if known.
6. For a period of one (1) year from the date the obligor’s employment terminates with the payor, the payor shall, upon request, disclose to the clerk or the department the following information:
   1. Any new address for the obligor of which the payor may become aware; and
   2. The name and address of the obligor’s new payor, if known to the payor.
7. In the case of worker’s compensation or unemployment compensation benefits, nothing in W.S. 20-6-202(a)(i) or (xv) shall require a payor to withhold an amount for any type of support or arrearage not authorized to be withheld from those benefits by federal law or regulation.
8. If insurance coverage of the obligor’s children is provided by or through the payor, the payor shall notify the clerk within thirty (30) days of any lapse or material change in that coverage.
9. The payor shall not be liable to the obligor for any payment or disclosure made as authorized by this act.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1987, ch. 130, § 1; Laws 1993, ch. 4, § 1; ch. 199, § 1; Laws 1994, ch. 26, § 1; Laws 1995, ch. 144, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, § 1; ch. 53, § 1; 2007, ch. 169, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (d) substituted “notice to payor” for “income withholding order from the clerk” and inserted “or the department.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 20-6-213. Notice to clerk of changes.

1. After an income withholding order has become effective under this act and within fifteen (15) days of any change:
   1. The obligee and obligor shall notify the clerk in writing of any change of address; and
   2. The obligor shall notify the clerk in writing of the name and address of any new payor.
2. The department, acting pursuant to W.S. 20-6-105(a)(ii), or the obligee shall give written notice to the clerk of the receipt of any other support payments including but not limited to, any federal offset or partial payment of any arrearage.
3. Within thirty (30) days after termination of the department’s authorization to receive payments for the obligee, the department shall give notice in writing or by electronic data transfer to the clerk to send future payments directly to the obligee.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, § 1; 2007, ch. 169, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added “department, acting pursuant to W.S. 20-6-105(a)(ii), or the” in (b).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-214. Duties of clerk of court.

1. The clerk shall:
   1. Maintain records showing receipt and disbursement of all funds received pursuant to this act;
   2. Promptly distribute all funds received to the appropriate person or agency;
   3. Promptly refund to the obligor any amounts shown to have been improperly withheld which are in the possession and control of the clerk;
   4. Promptly notify the obligee upon receipt of information provided to the clerk pursuant to W.S. 20-6-212(e);
   5. Promptly notify the payor of suspension or termination of the income withholding order when:
      1. The court has ordered a suspension or termination as provided by W.S. 20-6-216 ;
      2. The clerk receives a verified written notice from the obligor or the agency of this or another jurisdiction to which an obligee has assigned his right to support that there is no longer a support obligation and all arrearages have been paid; or
      3. The location of the obligee is unknown and the clerk has been unable to deliver payments remitted under the income withholding order for a period of ninety (90) days.
   6. Use forms specified by the department.
2. Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 26, § 2.
3. When there exists more than one (1) current order for support, the clerk shall distribute payments received pursuant to W.S. 20-6-206(b).

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1988, ch. 26, § 2; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; 2000, ch. 2, § 1; 2007, ch. 169, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, substituted “shall” for “may” in (c).

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-215. Minimum and maximum amount of withholding; allocation.

1. Subject to the limitation under W.S. 20-6-210(b)(iii) the aggregate amount of income withheld under an income withholding order served upon one (1) or more payors of an obligor shall:
   1. Satisfy the current support obligation under the support order;
   2. Include an additional amount to be applied toward the liquidation of any arrearage; and
   3. Include the amount actually withheld for support combined with the fee authorized by W.S. 20-6-212(c).
2. If the department is enforcing separate support obligations under this act against a single obligor, it shall allocate amounts withheld giving priority to current support up to the limits imposed under W.S. 20-6-210(b)(iii) using the allocation method provided in W.S. 20-6-206(b).

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; Laws 1993, ch. 199, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, § 1; 2006, ch. 114, § 1.

The 2006 amendment, added “and” in (a)(ii) and made a related change.

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 20-6-216. Petitions to modify, suspend or terminate income withholding order.

1. At any time after an income withholding order has been served upon a payor pursuant to W.S. 20-6-211 , the obligor, the obligee or the department may petition the court to:
   1. Modify, suspend or terminate the income withholding order due to modification, suspension or termination of the support order;
   2. Modify the amount of income to be withheld to reflect payment in full of the arrearage by income withholding or otherwise;
   3. Reduce the amount of income being withheld by a payor to conform to the maximum limitations under W.S. 20-6-210(b)(iii) and to order the repayment by the obligee to the obligor of any amounts withheld in violation of W.S. 20-6-210(b)(iii);
   4. Suspend the income withholding order because of inability to deliver the withheld income to the obligee due to the obligee’s failure to provide the clerk with a mailing address or other means of delivery for a period of ninety (90) days;
   5. Repealed by Laws 1993, ch. 199, § 2.
   6. Suspend the income withholding order when the suspension is consented to by:
      1. The obligor or the department if the support rights of the obligee have been assigned to the department; or
      2. The obligor and the person to whom the duty of support is owed. When the parties under this subparagraph agree to an alternative arrangement, the arrangement shall be in writing, signed by the parties and reviewed and entered in the record by the court.
2. An obligor may petition the court at any time to suspend or terminate an income withholding order upon grounds that:
   1. The obligor did not receive a copy of a required delinquency notice as provided by W.S. 20-6-209(a); and
   2. Grounds exist as specified by W.S. 20-6-209(b) to contest the withholding.
3. An obligor may petition the court at any time to suspend the withholding of income when there is no longer a current order for support and all arrearages have been paid.
4. An income withholding order suspended under this section shall again become effective upon the subsequent occurrence of one (1) of the events specified by W.S. 20-6-205(a)(ii) or (iii). The income withholding order may thereafter be served upon a payor of the obligor subject to the notice and hearing requirements of this act.
5. The clerk shall mail to any affected payor a certified copy of any order entered under this section which affects the duties of the payor.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1989, ch. 87, § 1; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; Laws 1993, ch. 199, §§ 1, 2; Laws 1994, ch. 26, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-217. Award of attorney fees.

Any time a hearing is held pursuant to this act, reasonable attorney’s fees may be awarded to the prevailing party.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-218. Penalties.

1. A payor who fails to withhold income in the amount specified in the notice to payor is liable for any amount up to the accumulated amount the payor should have withheld from the obligor’s income.
2. Payors shall pay in compliance with the instructions specified in the notice to payor and in accordance with the duties specified in W.S. 20-6-212 . No payor shall use the existence of an income withholding order authorized by this act as grounds to discharge, discipline or otherwise penalize an obligor or as grounds to refuse to employ a person. The penalties imposed under this section shall be collected from the violator, paid to the state treasurer and credited as provided in W.S. 8-1-109 . Before the court imposes a civil penalty, the payor accused of a violation shall be notified, in writing, of the specific nature of the alleged violation and the time and place, at least ten (10) days from the date of the notice, when a hearing of the matter shall be held. After hearing or upon failure of the accused to appear at the hearing, the court shall determine the amount of the civil penalty to be imposed in accordance with the limitation in this section.
3. Any payor who violates this section is subject to a civil penalty in an amount of not more than two hundred dollars ($200.00).
4. Penalties under this section shall not be imposed unless service of the notice to payor was completed by sending by certified mail return receipt requested to, or by personal service upon, the employer.
5. Except for a violation of subsection (b) of this section, an employer who complies in good faith with an income withholding order shall not be subject to civil liabilities.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; 1999, ch. 98, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 72, § 1; 2005, ch. 157, § 2; 2007, ch. 169, § 1.

The 2005 amendment in (b), substituted “paid to the state treasurer and credited as provided in W.S. 8-1-109 ” for “and distributed by the court to the county public school fund” in the fourth sentence.

Laws 2005, ch. 157, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 26, 2005.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (b), deleted the third sentence which pertained to civil penalty of violations, substituted “penalties imposed under this section” for “penalty,” and substituted “section” for “subsection” at the end of the last sentence; added (c) and (d) and redesignated the existing subsection accordingly.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-219. Priority of income withholding order.

An income withholding order under this act has priority over any other legal process under state law against the same income.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-220. Designation of federal administering agency.

The IV-D agency designated as the state agency to administer income withholding under this act for purposes of section 466(b)(5) and part D, title IV, section 454 of the federal Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 666(b)(5) and 654, respectively] is the child support enforcement unit of the department and, except where limited by federal law or regulation, the clerk of district court in each county.

History. Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1; Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3; Laws 1993, ch. 199, § 1; 2000, ch. 2, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act” as referred to in this section, see § 20-6-202(a)(xix).

§ 20-6-221. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 2, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, ch. 67, § 1, related to income withholding based upon support orders issued by courts in states other than Wyoming.